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Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief
Unavailable
Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief
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Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief
Audiobook9 hours

Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief

Written by James M. McPherson

Narrated by George Guidall

Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

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About this audiobook

The Pulitzer Prize?winning author reveals how Lincoln won the Civil War and invented the role of commander in chief as we know it

As we celebrate the bicentennial of Lincoln?s birth, this study by preeminent, bestselling Civil War historian James M. McPherson provides a rare, fresh take on one of the most enigmatic figures in American history. Tried by War offers a revelatory (and timely) portrait of leadership during the greatest crisis our nation has ever endured. Suspenseful and inspiring, this is the story of how Lincoln, with almost no previous military experience before entering the White House, assumed the powers associated with the role of commander in chief, and through his strategic insight and will to fight changed the course of the war and saved the Union.


From the Trade Paperback edition.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateOct 7, 2008
ISBN9781440613043
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Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief
Author

James M. McPherson

James M. McPherson taught U.S. history at Princeton University for forty-two years and is author of more than a dozen books on the era of the Civil War. His books have won a Pulitzer Prize and two Lincoln Prizes.

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Rating: 3.9142814285714285 out of 5 stars
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  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    This book is about Lincoln and his relationship with the Generals who ran the civil war for him. It also contains some politics and some necessary detail on the battles. I was surprised at his tactical involvement in military operations, to the point of participating on the battlefield. The theme, I thought, was about the balky McClellan, who just wouldn't fight--to the point of insubordination. National, strategic thought is evident, also as Lincoln mulls through the conditions for surrender. There was little in the book about Lincoln's close advisors--maybe he did not have any? And, while the author spent much time on McClellan, little was spent on relationships with Grant, Sherman and the other do-nothings who occupied posts between "little Mac" and Grant.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    If your own life does not offer frustrations to irritate you beyond reason, you can read this account of what Lincoln had to endure with his generals during the Civil War, most notably George McClellan.McClellan didn’t seem too interested in engaging the army of which he had command, but he was so popular with his troops that Lincoln feared mutiny if he dismissed McClellan. McClellan also had overwhelming and enthusiastic support among Democrats. Therefore, Lincoln decided he had better put up with McClellan at least until after the elections in November of 1862.But there is much more in this book than contemplating how many lives might have not been lost if McClellan (and subsequent balky generals) had just followed Lincoln’s orders.McPherson organizes the book around five functions performed or overseen by Lincoln in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief: the formulation of policy, national strategy, military strategy, operations, and tactics. In all of these areas, McPherson shows how Lincoln based his decisions on one core concept, i.e., to preserve the nation by winning the war. Lincoln averred that “the right of a State to secede is not an open or debatable question” and that the President “cannot entertain any proposition for dissolution or dismemberment.” [It should be noted that there is nothing in the Constitution about whether or not a state may leave the Union. The South argued that the Constitution was simply a compact among sovereign states and states could opt out if they no longer found conditions for this compact favorable to them. Lincoln, however, argued that the nation predated the Constitution, having been declared by the people, not the states, in the Declaration of Independence. Therefore no state can dissolve the Union. This is the idea upon which he elaborated in The Gettysburg Address.]Later in his presidency, Lincoln added two other conditions for peace in addition to the insistence that the Union be restored. One was “abandonment of slavery.” Lincoln made a promise of freedom to black soldiers who fought for the Union, and, he maintained, he could not betray that promise. Nor would he agree to any ceasefire for the purpose of negotiations - he stipulated that there would be “no cessation of hostilities sort of an end of the war, and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the government.”Much of McPherson’s analysis is made by reporting the content of the telegrams Lincoln sent his generals, and explaining the many excuses the generals made by way of reply for not obeying Lincoln’s directions. Lincoln's suggestions for military operations were remarkably astute, but they mostly were ignored. Lincoln was incredibly frustrated over his generals’ inaction, excuses, and even insubordination, but he faced three main difficulties: (1) in the beginning, Lincoln was unsure of his own ability as a “commander in chief” and thought the West Point “professionals” perforce must know better than he, so he was apt to defer to their judgment; (2) many of the non-professionals were political appointments Lincoln had made to appease some faction or other, and while these men were very much out of their depth, Lincoln couldn’t take the political risk of cashiering them; (3) until near the end of the war, Lincoln just had no one else qualified to whom he could turn. By 1864, however, Lincoln finally had a competent team in place, consisting of Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and Thomas, inter alia - men who not only were eager and willing to fight an offensive war, rather than strictly taking a defensive stance, but who understood that the goal of the war was to destroy Lee’s army, not just to capture Richmond (whether the Confederate army was still intact or not!)McPherson tips his hat to Lincoln’s lucid and convincing explanations to the American people of the actions he took. As McPherson writes, Lincoln was “a master of metaphors” who utilized stories and homilies to make abstruse concepts seem totally clear and logical. He also defends the measures Lincoln took to extend the wartime powers of the Executive, such as Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus and his authorization of military tribunals to try civilians. As McPherson argues, at no time in American history was the survival of the country in greater danger than in the Civil War. Yet, he reminds us:"…compared with the draconian enforcement of espionage and sedition laws in World War I, the internment of more than one hundred thousand Japanese Americans in the 1940s, McCarthyism in the 1950s, or the National Security State of our own time, the infringement of civil liberties from 1861 to 1865 seems mild indeed.”Evaluation: This examination of how Lincoln fulfilled his role as a wartime Commander-in-Chief provides an excellent perspective on Lincoln, the military, and the many challenges facing a wartime president. In addition, you also get a brief history of the Civil War itself: one that summarizes, in a highly interesting format, most of its history.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    McPherson is one an expert on the causes and actions of the Civil War. The author's focus on Lincoln gives invaluable insight into Lincoln, both for his strength of character as well as his many mistakes. Being Commander was an ordeal when considering his generals.

    1 person found this helpful

  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    In “Tried By War” preeminent Civil War historian James McPherson brings his considerable talents to the subject of Abraham Lincoln’s actions as Commander-in-Chief during the Civil War. Utilizing a narrative that largely follows the rotating collection of Lincoln’s generals and how each came into and fell out of favor with the President. Throughout the war, Lincoln’s primary focus was the destruction of the rebel army, which he viewed as the key to defeating the Confederacy while his generals were too preoccupied with minimizing losses and capturing Richmond to sustain an effective assault on the Rebel forces.McPherson makes clear that Lincoln developed his military strategy based on his political strategy. Above all, Lincoln’s greatest desire was to maintain the Union. In order to gain support early on, he accomplished this by taking a defensive strategy, goading the rebels into attacking Fort Sumter and first setting foot in neutral Kentucky. These two actions solidified support for the war in the North and ensured that the border states would not actively support the Confederacy. With that support in place, Lincoln began his search for a general who would carry out his plan for an all-out attack on the rebel army.Brigadier General Irvin McDowell was placed in command of the Army of Northeastern Virginia but was quickly relieved following an embarrassing loss at Bull Run. The army’s failure was due to many factors, but none more important than McDowell being rushed into combat by Washington politics with a complicated strategy and an extremely green army.Following the relief of Gen. McDowell, General George McClellan was the first man to lead Lincoln’s new Army of the Potomac. Billed as a “young Napolean, McClellan’s early command success actually hindered him during the Civil War. As McPherson eloquently but succinctly puts it, “never having experienced failure, he feared the unknown. To move against the enemy was to risk failure. So McClellan manufactured phantom enemies to justify his demands for more troops, to explain his inaction against the actual enemy, and to blame others for that inaction.” The general was “perpetually almost but not quite ready to move. No matter how many men or weapons he head, the enemy always had more. Even when faced with irrefutable evidence that he was overestimating his opponent’s strength, McClellan refused to move against the rebels. Lincoln was disgusted with his general’s “case of the slows” and even tried to replace him in August of 1862 only to be spurned by his choice of replacement, Ambrose Burnside. After three more months of having McClellan ignore his pleas for action, Lincoln finally relinquished the general of his command and convinced General Burnside to take command of the Army of the Potomac.Burnside’s tenure as commander did not last long. His disastrous campaign against Fredericksburg after a mere two months as general and the subsequent aborted “Mud March” lost him the confidence of his subordinate generals. After first (unsuccessfully) attempting to relieve his subordinates of duty, Burnside offered Lincoln the choice of dismissing him or them. Lincoln accepted Burnside’s resignation and placed General Joseph Hooker in command.Lincoln advised Hooker that, following the failures at Antietam and Fredericksburg, he expected the general to concentrate on Lee’s Army and to commit all of his forces in battle. Unfortunately, in his first real action at Chancellorsville, Hooker failed to carry out any of the President’s orders. He had been on the attack the previous week but, following a move by Stonewall Jackson, backed off and allowed the Confederates to gain the offensive, which they used to score a decisive victory in Chancellorsville; a battle in which two of the seven Union corps did not participate. The last straw came when Hooker requested Lincoln’s permission to attack the lightly defended Richmond as opposed to following Lee’s army. After more bickering with the President’s Secretary of War, Hooker submitted his resignation, which Lincoln accepted.On his fourth day in command, General George Meade directed a successful defensive against Lee at Gettysburg, driving the Confederates out of Pennsylvania. Unfortunately for the general, he followed that victory with a missive proclaiming his desire to “drive from our soil every vestige of the presence of the invader.” To Lincoln, who was operating under the premise that “the whole country is our soil,” this statement reeked of McClellan. That statement, combined with Meade’s hesitation to follow, which allowed Lee’s army to escape, nearly caused the President to send the general a letter which would have provoked Meade’s resignation. Lincoln waited, though, mostly the Union army’s success in the west kept his mood cheerful. Meade would remain in command of the Army of the Potomac for the remainder of the war, but his power was diminished in March of 1864 when Ulysses S. Grant was appointed Lieutenant General in command of all Union armies. Grant traveled with Meade for the rest of the war and most strategic decisions himself. With Grant, Lincoln finally found the general willing to make hard war he had been looking for. The general was far more willing to accept losses, knowing that the Union had men to replace those who died, while the Confederacy did not. Under Grant’s leadership, the Union was finally able to defeat and capture Lee’s army, effectively signaling the end of the Civil War.For four years, Lincoln ordered his generals to take the offensive, to attack Lee’s army, and to stop overestimating the enemy’s numbers. For four years Lincoln’s generals failed him. Finally, under the leadership of Ulysses S. Grant, the Union army fought to win; and to defeat Lee’s army.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    The most amazing point of interest regarding this book about Abraham Lincoln is that it is the first book that basically analyzes Lincoln's position as the Commander-in-Chief. His entire administration was impacted by war starting with letters from Fort Sumter requesting aid on the day of his inauguration and ending with his assassination 6 days after General Lee surrendered at Appomattox. We have books about Lincoln's writings, his humor, his views on religion and slavery, and his ideas of how to reunite the nation, but nothing that had centered on his military role as Commander-in-Chief.Lincoln spent more time during his Presidency with matters of war - communications with his Generals in the field, visiting the troops and battlefields, international relations, and military strategy then any other aspect of his policies. Never having been a soldier (he actually only served in the military for a short period and saw no action), Lincoln spent hours studying military strategy. He had to deal with incompetent Generals who were either filled with their own thoughts of supremacy or with Generals who were afraid to move their troops. Not until Ulysses Grant was placed in the position of the General in charge did Lincoln have a leader that would eventually end the Confederacy's drive toward separation from the Union.I found this book fascinating in that the reader can see all the abilities that Lincoln had to put in place to prevent the Southern forces from completely demolishing the morale of the North and at the same using the knowledge that he had gathered from his military studies to instruct the officers in the Union Army to do what was need to win the war.After reading this book, I am really glad as an American, that at this time, Lincoln was the President of our nation. He was the man that was needed at the time and he truly completed the task that was given to him.
  • Rating: 1 out of 5 stars
    1/5
    This book is touted as a look at Abraham Lincoln as the commander-in-chief during the Civil War. James McPherson, the author, has a reputation as one of America's finest writers on the Civil War based to a large extent on his authorship of Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, one of the volumes in the Oxford History of the United States. In the foreword McPherson states that this aspect of Lincoln's presidency has never been adequately covered, neglecting a very good book, Lincoln and His Generals by T. Harry Williams. Having read this I will have to go back and review Williams book which as I remember was much better than this book.Much of the focus of the book is on the relationships between Lincoln and the commanders of the Army of the Potomac. George McClellan was the commander until late 1862 and McPherson added little information or insight to my knowledge of what passed between the two men. McClellan was a great trainer of men but was always hesitant to take them into battle. The quote of Lincoln regarding McClellan that McPherson uses "He has a case of the slows" is repeated in many other sources. The generals who succeeded McClellan had were not much better. Of course they had to face Robert E. Lee.Lincoln had similar frustrations with generals in other theaters. They all wanted everything just perfect before making an attack.McPherson did add one specific item to the understanding Lincoln developed about the best strategy for the Union armies. Lincoln figured out that the Union had used their superior numbers and attack the Confederates at many points so the Confederates could not use their interior lines to transfer their forces to defeat individual attacks. It was only when Grant took supreme command of the Union armies that this strategy was adopted and the Confederates finally defeated.McPherson added very little to my knowledge of Lincoln as an individual. Lincoln is simply portrayed as a man who is continually frustrated and depressed by the failures of the army. This is how Lincoln appears in any number of books about the Civil War. In short, Mr. McPherson does not live up to his reputation as an excellent Civil War scholar in this book. I cannot give any recommendation of this book. The author only repeats what can be learned in any number of books about the subject. I have the feeling that Mr. McPherson is coasting on his reputation and had to get a book out for the anniversary year of Lincoln's birth. One star.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    An enjoyable read. The author argues that Lincoln's role as Commander-in-Chief has been neglected by historians. I don't necessarily buy this; I found that many of the ways the book highlights Lincoln's wartime leadership has been highlighted in other, broader biographies I've read on Lincoln (Team of Rivals comes to mind, most recently). It does once again reinforce your admiration for Lincoln as a a leader, particularly his judgment of character, political skills, and ability to subsume his own ego into a greater cause. A very good book.
  • Rating: 3 out of 5 stars
    3/5
    a study of lincoln as commander in chief as the military. reinforced the reality that lincoln was a very asute political leader. a fun read
  • Rating: 2 out of 5 stars
    2/5
    McPherson is an easy to read author in the same class with Bruce Catton and Shelby Foote. This book is an exploration of the emergence of the role of Commander in Chief. Lincoln created the job description for CiC under the most challenging of circumstances. This relatively short volume melds a legal history, military history, political history and social history. McPherson has a bit of a Yankee bent in his view, but not to the point of distraction.If you are a student of either the period or Lincoln and are expecting some new analysis of the emergence of the role of Commander in Chief, you will be disappointed. McPherson has nothing to offer here but a retelling of Lincoln's rocky relationship with his field commanders before he got to Grant. This is just a compilation of all of the incidents students of the period are familiar with. McPherson is a fine writer, but this is not a historian's approach to a very interesting issue.