LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner vs . HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO,Respondents.G.R. No.

173614September 28, 2007THIRD DIVISIONFacts: On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and TrinidadCatli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogioand petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogioand Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.[3] They begot seven children. On 1 May2004, Trinidad died.[5] On 26, in her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived togetheras husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted fromthe requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, allsurnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further contendedthat the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized bythe Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the groundthat it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.Issue: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case.Ruling: Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo . Nonetheless, all is not lostfor respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory orintestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successionalright, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestateheirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceasedspouse filed in the regular courts.WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of themarriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.

G. R. No. 155043: Arturo Abalos vs Dr. Galicano Macatangay Jr 30 September 2004, 439 scra 649 Sales Option Earnest Money Arturo and Esther Abalos are husband and wife. They own a parcel of land in Makati. On June 2, 1988, Arturo, armed with a purported Special Power of Attorney, executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in favor of Galicano in which Arturo acknowledged he received a P5k check from Galicano as earnest money to be deducted from the purchase price and that

Arturo binds himself to sell the land to Galicano within 30 days from receipt of the P5k. The purchase price agreed upon was P1.3 M. The P5k check was dishonored due to insufficiency. Apparently, Esther and Arturo have a rocky relationship. Esther executed a SPA in favor of her sister and that she is selling her share in the conjugal property to Galicano. It was alleged that that the RMOA is not valid for Esthers signature was not affixed thereto. And that Esther never executed a SPA in favor of Arturo. Galicano informed the couple that he has prepared a check to cover the remainder of the amount that needs to be paid for the land. He demanded that the land be delivered to him. But the spouses failed to deliver the land. Galicano sued the spouses. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contract of sale between Arturo and Galicano. Whether or not the subsequent agreement between Galicano and Esther is binding and that it cured the defect of the earlier contract between Arturo and Galicano. HELD: No. No matter how the RMOA is looked upon, the same cannot be valid. At best, the agreement between Arturo and Galicano is a mere grant of privilege to purchase to Galicano. The promise to sell is not binding to Arturo for there was actually no consideration distinct from the price. Be it noted that the parties considered the P5k as an earnest money to be deducted from the purchase price. Taking arguendo that it was a bilateral promise to buy and sell, the same is still not binding for Galicano failed to render a payment of legal tender. A check is not a legal tender. Taking arguendo that the P5k was an earnest money which supposedly perfected a contract of sale, the RMOA is still not valid for Esthers signature was not affixed. The property is conjugal and under the Family Code, the spouses consents are required. Further, the earnest money here is not actually the earnest money contemplated under Article 1482 under the Civil Code. The subsequent agreement between Esther and Galicano did not ratify the earlier transaction between Arturo and Galicano. A void contract can never be ratified.

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996 ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZVALDEZ, respondents. FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion,

the

children

filed or

joint the

affidavit property

expressing regime

desire should

to be

stay based

with on

their

father.

ISSUE: Whether

not

co-ownership.

order of the rulings: AntonioValdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, 1 in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition.Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code.In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:

Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply. 3 (Emphasis supplied.) In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said: Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership. The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

METROPOLITAN BANK V PASCUAL G.R.No. 163744, February 29,2008 FACTS: During the union of Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga, Florencia bought from a 250squaremeter lot with a 3-door apartment in Makati City. TCT No. 156283 was issued in the name of Florencia,"married to Nelson Pascual a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual. In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the nullity of marriagebased on the psychological incapacity of Nicholson. RTC rendered a decision declaring their marriage nulland void. The couple separated without liquidating their conjugal partnership. On April 30, 1997, Florenciatogether with spouses Nortberto and elvira Oliveros obtained a loan of P58M from petitioner MetropolitanBank and Trust Co.(Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses executed severalREMs on their properties, including one bought by Florencia in Makati City. Among the documents Florenciasubmitted to procure the loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTCdecision and a document denominated as waiver that Nicholson purportedly executed. The waiver, made infavor of Florencia, covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentallyinclude the lot in question. Florencia and the spouses failed to pay their loan obligation when it fell due andso Metrobank initiated foreclosure proceedings under Act No. 3135, as amended, before the Office of theNotary Public of Makati City. Subsequently, Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of the sale on 3issues of Remate. At the auction sale, Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder. Nicholson learned of theforeclosure proceedings and so it filed before the RTC in Makati City a complaint to declare the nullity of themortgage of the disputed property. He alleged that the property, which is still a conjugal property, wasmortgaged without his consent. In its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, Metrobank alleged thatthe disputed lot, being registered in Florencia's name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted havingapporved the mortgage in good faith.RTC- declared the REM invalid- Metrobank had not overcome the presumptive conjugal nature of the lot lot being conjugal property, it may not be validly encumbered by Florencia without Nicholson'sconsent- deed of waiver is found to be fatally defective, Nicholson denied executing the same and thesignature of the notarizing officer was a forgery, waiver doc was allegedly executed a little over 3 mos.before the issuance of the RTC decision re: the nullity of their marriage* RTC dismissed Metrobank's counterclaim and cross-claim againtst the ex-spouses.* Metrobank's motion for reconsideration was denied, so punta sya kay CA.CA- affirmed with modification the RTC's decision- deleted moral damages and atty's fees* Metrobank moved for reconsideration (masigasig!!!) but was denied by the CA. ISSUE: 1. W/N the REM is void for the property mortgaged by Florencia is still a conjugal property2. W/N Metrobank is a motgagee in good faith RULING: The petition is partly granted.1. Yes. but only with respect to the 1/2 undivided portion of the property belonging to Nicholson.In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little lessthan two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the former spouses when themortgage was given is the provision of Art. 493.(check mo full text o kaya codal) .Under it, Florencia has theright to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property even without theconsent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undividedportion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undividedhalf.The conclusion would have, however, been different if Nicholson indeed duly waived his share in theconjugal partnership. But, as found by

the courts a quo, the April 9, 1995 deed of waiver allegedly executedby Nicholson three months prior to the dissolution of the marriage and the conjugal partnership of gains onJuly 31, 1995 bore his forged signature, not to mention that of the notarizing officer. A spurious deed of waiver does not transfer any right at all, albeit it may become the root of a valid title in the hands of aninnocent buyer for value.Metrobanks right, as mortgagee and as the successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the1/2 undivided portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in question, Metrobank may ask for thepartition of the lot and its property rights "shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to [the bank] inthe division upon the termination of the co-ownership."This disposition is in line with the well-establishedprinciple that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.2. No, as per CA. Sabi ni SC no need to discuss na teh!In view of the resolution on the validity of the auction of the lot in favor of Metrobank, there is hardly a needto discuss at length whether or not Metrobank was a mortgagee in good faith. Suffice it to state for the noncethat where the mortgagee is a banking institution, the general rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of the landneed not look beyond the four corners of the title is inapplicable.Unlike private individuals, it behooves banksto exercise greater care and due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of the property offered as security and the validity of the mortgagors title must bestandard and indispensable part of the banks operation. A bank that failed to observe due diligence cannotbe accorded the status of a bona fide mortgagee as here.But as found by the CA, however, Metrobanks failure to comply with the due diligence requirement was notthe result of a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity or breach of a known duty for some interest or ill-willthat partakes of fraud that would justify damages. MBTC vs PASCUALGR 163744Facts: R e s p o n d e n t N i c h o l s o n P a s c u a l a n d Florencia Nevalga were married o n January 19, 1985. During the u n i o n , F l o r e n c i a b o u g h t f r o m s p o u s e s C l a r i t o and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lotw i t h a t h r e e door apartment standing t h e r e o n l o c a t e d i n M a k a t i C i t y . T h e T r a n s f e r Cer t if icat e of T it le (T CT )covering the purchased lot (Lot no. 156283) was issued in the name of F l o r e n c i a m a r r i e d t o N e l s o n P a s c u a l a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.I n 1 9 9 4 , F l o r e n c i a f i l e d a s u i t f o r t h e declaration of nullity of marriage underA r t i c l e 3 6 F C , w / c w a s g r a n t e d b y t h e Q u e z o n C i t y R T C i n 1 9 9 5 . I n t h e s a m e decision, the RTC, inter alia , ordered thed i s s o l u t i o n a n d l i q u i d a t i o n o f t h e e x spouses conjugal partnership of gains,w/c the latter failed.O n A p r i l 3 0 , 1 9 9 7 , F l o r e n c i a , t o g e t h e r w i t h s p o u s e s N o r b e r t o a n d E l v i r a O l i v e r o s , o b t a i n e d a P 5 8 m i l l i o n l o a n from petitioner Metro politan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure theobligation, Florencia and the spousesOliveros executed several r e a l e s t a t e m o r t g a g e s ( R E M s ) o n t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s , including one lot no. 156283. Due to thefailure of Florencia and the sps Oliverost o p a y t h e i r l o a n o b l i g a t i o n , M B T C foreclosed the property.Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, beforethe Makati RTC a Complaint to declaret h e n u l l i t y o f t h e m o r t g a g e o f t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y , a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e property, which is still conjugal property,was mortgaged without his consent.M B T C a l l e g e d t h a t t h e d i s p u t e d l o t , b e i n g r e g i s t e r e d i n F l o r e n c i a s n a m e , was paraphernal. Florencia was declaredin default. The RTC rendered

judgmentf i n d i n g f o r N i c h o l s o n . T h e C A a f f i r m e d t h e R T C b u t d e l e t e d t h e a w a r d m o r a l damages and attorneys fees. Issue: W hether or not the subject property i s c o n j u g a l p a r t n e r s h i p p r o p e r t y u n d e r Article 116 of the Family Code. Held: The court ruled in favor of Nicholson. Thedisputed property is conjugal.While Metrobank is correct in saying thatArt. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legalp r o v i s i o n s i n c e t h e p r o p e r t y w a s a c q u i r e d p r i o r to the enactment of theFamily Code, it errs in its theory that,b e f o r e c o n j u g a l o w n e r s h i p c o u l d b e l e g a l l y p r e s u m e d , t h e r e m u s t b e a showing that the property was acquiredd u r i n g m a r r i a g e u s i n g c o n j u g a l f u n d s . Art. 160 of the New Civil Code providest h a t a l l p r o p e r t y o f t h e m a r r i a g e i s p r e s u m e d t o b e c o n j u g a l p a r t n e r s h i p , u n l e s s i t b e p r o v e [ n ] t h a t i t p e r t a i n s exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does not require proof thatthe property was acquired with funds of t h e p a r t n e r s h i p . T h e p r e s u m p t i o n applies even when the manner in whicht h e p r o p e r t y w a s a c q u i r e d d o e s n o t appear.A s N i c h o l s o n a p t l y p o i nts out, if proof o b t a i n s o n t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y d u r i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e m a r r i a g e , t h e n t h e p r e s u m p t i o n o f conjugal ownership a p p l i e s . P r o o f o f acquisition during the marital coverturei s a c o n d i t i o n sine qua non f o r t h e operation of the presumption in favor of c o n j u g a l o w n e r s h i p . W h e n t h e r e i s n o s h o w i n g a s t o w h e n t h e p r o p e r t y w a s acquired by the spouse, the fact that at i t l e is in the name of the spouse is a n i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y b e l o n g s exclusively to said spouse.

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDS SURNAMEALBA vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 164041, July 29, 2005 Facts: Private respondent Rosendo C. Herrera filed a petition for cancellation of the following entries inthe birth certificate of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr, to wit: (1) the surname Herrera as appended to thename of the said child; (2) the reference to private respondent as the father of Rosendo Alba Herrera Jr.;and (3) the alleged marriage of private respondent to all childs mother, Armi A. Alba He averred thatsuch challenged entries are false.Private respondent contended that he married only once, as evidenced by certification from NSO andCivil Registrar of Mandaluyong.The RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance the hearing was set. On the scheduledhearing the counsel from the OSG appeared but filed no opposition, Armi was not present.The court a quo rendered a decision ordering the correction of the entries in the Certification of Live Birthof Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.Armi filed a petition for the annulment of the judgment, contending that she came to know of the decisionof the RTC where the school where her son was enrolled, was furnished by private respondent with acopy of a court order directing the change of petitioners surname from Herrera to Alba. Armi contendedthat she and private respondent cohabited and after their separation, he continued to

give support to their son.Private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his purported cohabitation with Armi. Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child shall use the surname of their mother. Held: Under Art. 176 of the Family Code as amended by RA No. 9255, w/c took effect on March 19,2004, illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother , unless their father recognizes their filiation, in w/c case they may bear the fathers surname. In Wang vs. Cebu Civil Registrar it was heldthat an illegitimate child whose filiations is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and hismothers surname. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child identifies him as such. It is only whensaid child is recognized that he may use his fathers surname, reflecting his status us an acknowledgedillegitimate held.

ELNA MERCADO-FEHR vs. BRUNO FEHR [G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003] PUNO FACTS: A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacit y for inability to comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Famil y Code was filed by petitioner Elna MercadoFehr against respondent Bruno Fehr before the RTC. The RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio and ordered the dissoluti on of their conjugal partnership of property and in lieu thereof established a regime of com plete separation of property between the said spouses in accordance with the pertinent provisions of t he Family Code. As a consequence of which, an order was issued declaring a condominium unit a s the exclusive property of the respondent considering that the same was purchased by respondent w ith his exclusive funds prior to his marriage. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said ord er alleging that the condominium unit was purchased on installment basis at the time when petitio ner and respondent were living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on coownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code. Resolving said motion, the RTC held that since the marriage between petitioner a nd respondent was declared void ab initio, the rules on coownership should apply in the liquidation and partition of the properties they owned in common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code . The court, however, noted that the parties have already agreed in principle to divide the

properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof proportionately among them and their children as follows: 1/3 for petitioner, 1/3 for respondent and 1/3 for the children. It also affirmed its previous ruling that the condominium unit was acquired prior to the couple's cohabitation and the refore pertained solely to respondent. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Is the condominium unit an exclusive property of respondent? 2. Will Article 147 of the Family Code applying the rules on co-ownership apply?

HELD: 1. NO. It appears from the facts, as found by the RTC, after two years of longdistance courtship, petitioner moved in with respondent in the latter's residence in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr, was born on December 3, 1983. Th e couple got married on March 14, 1985. Prior to their marriage, they purchased on installment th e condominium unit, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. Petitioner al so signed

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs Republic of the Philippines GR No. 174689. October 22, 2007 Fact of the Case: On November 22, 2003, Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for thechange of his first name from Rommel Jacinto to Melly and sex of birth from maleto female in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. On June 4,2003, the trial court rendered in favor of petitioner as it would be more in consonancewith the principle of justice and equity. That grating the petitioner would bring muchawaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her fianc and the realization of theirdreams. ON August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, thru the office of theSolicitor General, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged thatthere is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sexalteration. Issue:

Whether or not a person born male would be entitled to change of gender on thecivil registrar and afterwards be legally capacitated to entered into marriage with anotherman. Held: No. Sex reassignment is not a ground for change of gender. There is no lawpresent that allows such in our country. Neither may entries in the birth certificate as tofirst name or sex be changed on the ground of equity. The remedies petitioner seeksinvolve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by thecourts. As to contracting marriage, our law allows only male and female with the mainreason of procreation. Sex reassignment scientifically has not yet made one completelyinto female, with the complete function for reproduction.

Estrada vs. Escritor 408 SCRA 1 (245 492 SCRA 1 (125 pages) | 22 June 2006 pages) | 04 August 2003

Topic: Freedom of Religion, Adulterous Keywords: Jehovahs Witnesses, Disgraceful and Immoral conduct

marital

relations

FACTS: - Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter in a Regional Trial Court, has been living with Quilapio (a man not her husband) for 20 years and had borne a child with this live-in arrangement. - At the instance of complainant Alejandro Estrada, respondent was charged with committing disgraceful and immoral conduct under the Revised Administrative Code. - Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses, and having jointly executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness (which allows

members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations) with Quilapio after ten years of living together, her conjugal arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has the approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct. - Prior to Escritor and Quilapios conjugal arrangement, Escritors husband left her for another woman. In 1998, this husband died. Escritor then entered the judiciary in 1999. - The Court held that benevolent neutrality and accommodation is the spirit underlying the religious clause in the Constitution and that in deciding respondents plea of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause, it is the compelling state interest test which must be applied. - The Court then remanded the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator and ordered the Office of the Solicitor General to intervene, thereafter leaving the Court the task to determine whether the evidence adduced by the State proves its more compelling interest. ISSUE: - Whether or not Soledad is administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, (i.e. living in with Quilapio)

HELD: - NO

RATIO: - The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state interests. - The OSG must then demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive means. - With the Solicitor General utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized. - The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion.

- In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.

Morigo V. PeopleFebruary 6, 2004422 Scra 376 Facts:Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete, both agreed to get married, thus they weremarried on August 30, 1990 at Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990 Lucia reportedback to Canada. In 1991 Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorceagainst the appellant, which was granted by the court.In 1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City, Bohol.On 1993 Morigo filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of maaariage inRTC of Bohol on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.Morigo was charged with Bigamy and the trial court rendered a decisionconvicting him of the crime of bigamy. Issue:Whether the marriage without marriage ceremony is valid; whether the accusedis guilty of the crime of bigamy? Ruling:The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony between Lucioand Lucia is solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.The trial court held that the marriage is void ab initio. This simply puts that therewas no marriage to begin with, and such declaration of nullity retroacts to thedate of the first marriage. In other words, for all intend and purposes, reckonedfrom the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the dateof celebration of the first marriage, the accused was under the law, nevermarried. The first element of the crime of bigamy, is that the accused must havebeen legally married, but in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was nevermarried to Lucia barrete.

Tenebro vs Court of Appeals 11112010

1 Vote Bigamy Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy. ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy. HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

TE Vs TE, G.R. No.161793DIGEST FACTS: In January 1996, Edward Kenneth Ngo-Te and Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te met.March 1996, they eloped to cebu, but as soon as their survival money was depletedthey returned to Manila.April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought both parties to a court to be married. Edwardwas 25 years old and Rowena 20.Sometime in June, Edward returned to his home to live with his parents, because hiswife did not want to live at his parents home and also suggested that they live apart.After almost four years, on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the RTC ofQuezon City for the annulment of his marriage and sited PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.Petition was denied by the lower courts, citing Republic vs. Molina, stating that theevidence fell short of the requirements for it to be considered as PsychologicalIncapacity. ISSUE: Whether PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY can be applied. HELD: YES.EDWARD was considered to have DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER.Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity,the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared nulland void. WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is G RANTED . TheAugust 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution

Ninal vs Bayadog Ninal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void? 2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death? HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void. Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.