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CJS 90 Trusts, Section 162 Intention of Creator or Settlor Footnote 18: Violation of intent; substitution of discretion: "Neither court nor beneficiary not legislature is competent to violate settlor's intent and substitute its discretion for that of settlor"- Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Price....." Footnote 18 it further says, "Intent as law of trust: The intent, or intention, of the settlor of the trust is the law of the trust." CJS 90 Trusts, Section 162 Intention of Creator or Settlor: Footnote 18. Rights created; powers reserved: "(1) In determining what rights are created by a trust instrument, the intent of the creator is controlling." CJS 90 Trusts, Section 162 Rights created; powers reserved (1) In determining what rights are created by a trust instrument, the intent of the creator is controlling. ...(2) In interpreting a trust to determine what rights are created or what powers are reserved, intent of settler is controlling. Book 90 CJS Trusts: Section 164 Construing Instruments Together - Instrument exercising power of appointment. "Where a trust agreement provides for a power of appointment, the instrument exercising the power is read into the agreement." Book 90, Trusts, section 173 Purposes of Trust: Footnote 75 states: "The intent and purpose of the settlor of the trust is the law of the trust." CJS Book 90 "Trusts" Section 203 Merger of Estates: "As a general rule, where the legal and equitable estates in trust property unite in the same person, there is a merger of such estates and the trust is terminated." However, a merger does not take place until the legal and equitable titles vest in the same person; and it is essential that the equitable interest of no other person shall intervene." "Moreover, the legal and equitable estates must be coextensive and commensurate with each other, or at least the legal estate must be more extensive or comprehensive than the equitable estate. Furthermore, even where the legal and equitable titles are both vested in the same person equity will under certain conditions refuse to recognize a merger which might well exist in law, as where such result would be contrary to the intention of the trustor and would destroy a valid trust." : Corpus Juris Secundum Book 90 "Trusts", Section 161, Rights of Construction states: "It is a rule of equity that once a trust is created it is thereafter to be treated as a trust." Trust CJS 90, 2000 ed Sec. 205 Intention of creator or Settlor. The primary, or cardinal, rule in the construction of trusts is that the court must, if possible, ascertain and effectuate the intention of the creator, so far as it appears reasonably certain and consistent with rules of law, or consonant with the limitations of law, and unless forbidden by law, public policy, or good morals. The intention of the creator controls in the construction of trusts or the intention governs or prevails, when it is not inconsistent, or in conflict, with established rules or principles of law or some positive rule of law, or public policy. A construction enabling the trustees, in their discretion, to frustrate, rather than carry out, the settlors intention will not be adopted unless the language and tenor of the trust instrument admit of
Complete and incomplete trusts. It has been held that perfect or complete voluntary trusts are enforceable in equity, but incomplete or promissory trusts are not.
Jurisdiction of parties. Generally speaking, jurisdiction of the parties is essential to equitys power to determine controversies with respect to the establishment and enforcement of trusts, and such jurisdiction may be acquired in accordance with general rules.
(2) Nature of Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to establish and enforce a trust is original and inherent in a court of equity, and according to some authorities the jurisdiction of equity is held to be exclusive, except insofar as a court of law may, by statute, or by rules of court, be given jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction to establish and enforce a trust, particularly in case of a strict trust, is original and inherent in a court of equity, and such court may also be vested with statutory jurisdiction of the subject. The inherent jurisdiction of equity can be limited or ousted only by valid, express, legislative enactment. According to some authorities, the jurisdiction of equity is held to be exclusive, except insofar as a court of law may, by statute or by rules of court, be given jurisdiction. This exclusive jurisdiction may be limited to a class of trusts technical and continuous in their nature which cannot be enforced or efficiently administered by any other tribunal, permitting law and equity to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with respect to some trusts. It has been declared that the distinguishing characteristic would seem, in the main, to be the adequacy and efficiency of the legal remedy, and in some states, as discussed infra subsection b (4) of this section, it is held that a court of equity has jurisdiction to enforce a trust, only where there is not an adequate remedy at law. In cases where equity and the courts of law have concurrent jurisdiction of the subject matter it has been held that the exercise of equitable jurisdiction rests in judicial discretion.
(3) Extent of Jurisdiction. Equitys jurisdiction over trusts in plenary, and when its jurisdiction is properly invoked it will afford full relief with respect to the protection and preservation of the trust property and of the rights of all parties concerned.
The jurisdiction of equity over trust estates is plenary. When its jurisdiction is properly invoked it will afford full relief with respect to the protection and preservation of the trust property, and of the rights of all parties concerned. Thus, where it becomes necessary to the complete relief in a particular case, an equity court may not only construe the trust, but will aid a discovery of the instrument creating the trust, and will also aid the discovery of the trust funds sought to be recovered. A court of equity has jurisdiction, when it becomes necessary for the protection and preservation of the trust to appoint or to
On Appeal from the 334th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2009-29112 A suit to quiet title is equitable in nature, and the principal issue in such suits is the existence of a cloud on the title that equity will remove. Florey v. Estate of McConnell, 212 S.W.3d 439, 448 (Tex. App.Austin 2006, pet. denied) (quoting Bell v. Ott, 606 S.W.2d 942, 952 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1980, writ refd n.r.e.)). A cloud on legal title includes any deed, contract, judgment lien or other instrument, not void on its face, that purports to convey an interest in or makes any charge upon the land of the true owner, the invalidity of which would require proof. Wright v. Matthews, 26 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. App.Beaumont 2000, pet. denied). A suit to quiet title enable*s+ the holder of the feeblest equity to remove from his way to legal title any unlawful hindrance having the appearance of better right. Florey, 212 S.W.3d at 448 (quoting Thomson v. Locke, 1 S.W.112, 115 (Tex. 1886)). http://4closurefraud.org/2011/05/02/tx-quiet-title-appeal-victory-against-mers-mortgageelectronic-registration-systems-v-nancy-groves/
"5 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., 121; 360. So vast is the number and variety of suits in Chancery, that it is impossible for a Solicitor to find a precedent for every case, even if it existed; but he who has -the maxims mastered is saved much of the drudgery of hunting precedents. Out of the twenty-six letters of the alphabet, by permutations and combinations, are made the countless multitudes of words and sentences written by earth's millions since writing was invented. So, out of a few fundamental maxims can be deduced the rules which, by proper application, will determine the, equities of the vast proportion of equitable suits instituted in Chancery. Melius est petere fontes quam sectari rivulas. (It is better to seek the fountains [the maxims of the law] than to follow the rivers [hunt for adjudications based on maxims.]
Opinion filed March 3, 1973. We are not impressed by the argument of defendant that this cause of action does not sound in fraud. True, the plaintiffs did not use the word "fraudulent" until the amended petition was filed; however, a trustee who breaches or repudiates a trust agreement commits an act which necessarily encompasses fraud. To determine whether the plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered the fraudulent acts of A.H. Jennings, Jr., more than two years prior to the filing of this action requires an examination of the record. 208 Okla. 655 (1953) 258 P.2d 649 BYRD v. MARLIN. No. 34536. Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
June 16, 1953. Fraud is the arch enemy of equity, and a court of equity will relieve against a judgment obtained by imposition or fraud. * * * It matters little as to the mode or manner in which fraud is effected. A court looks to the effect, and asks if the result is a consequence of the fraud. For any description of mala fides
"`Where fraud relates to the conduct of the suit, as where it prevents a party from asserting his rights, there is no fair adversary proceedings, and equity will interfere. The courts commonly speak of the former class as intrinsic and of the latter as extrinsic fraud, etc. Thus, it is generally said that it is extrinsic fraud, mistake, and the like which are grounds for relief.'