Case Digests

Title: Lopez vs. CA G.R. No. 144573, September 24, 2002 Facts: Private respondent Atty. Romeo A. Liggayu, Manager of the Legal Department and Resident Ombudsman of the PCSO was administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman with: 1) Violation of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), for issuing a subpoena without authority purportedly in relation to OMB-0-99-0571 entitled, FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU versus MANUEL MORATO, et al. ; and 2) complicity in the anomalous contracts entered into by PCSO and Golden Lion Films for the production of 1,092 episodes of Ang Pangarap Kong Jackpot, subject matter of OMB0-99-0571 and 0572 entitled, FFIB vs. MANUEL MORATO, et al. and OMB-ADM-0-990254 entitled, FFIB vs. ISRAEL G. ESTRELLA, et al. The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the charge against him with regards the anomalous contracts however he was found guilty from issuing a subpoena without authority. The penalty of 6 months suspension without pay is imposed upon him by the office. His motion for reconsideration was denied and so he file for a petition for review before the Court of Appeals and prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/and or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the execution of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman. On March 8, 2000, petitioners implemented the suspension of private respondent. However on March 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the Office of the Ombudsman from implementing the suspension order against private respondent. Thereafter private respondent filed an amended petition impleading the herein petitioners. On May 18, 2000, a resolution was issued granting private respondents prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against the execution of private respondents suspension.In the same resolution, petitioners were asked to explain why they should not be cited in contempt of court for failing to comply with the Temporary Restraining Order dated March 16, 2000.

Petitioners manifested through an explanation that they could not have complied with or implemented the TRO since they were not yet parties to the case at the time of its issuance and that the same was rendered moot and academic by petitioners suspension on March 8, 2000. Herein private respondent is reinstated to his position pending the appeal as ordered by the CA.

In the present recourse, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in enjoining the execution of petitioners suspension pending appeal. The petitioners also averred that the stay of execution pending appeal from the order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman violates the equal protection clause for being unfair to government employees charged under the Civil Service Law, where the decisions in disciplinary cases are immediately executory.

Issue: Whether or not the decision of CA violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling: No, the CA did not violate the equal protection clause. Rule III Section 7 of the Provisionary Rules of the Office of the Ombudsman states that-Where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770. This means that unless the penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension imposed is of not more than one month or a fine not equivalent to one month salary it shall not be final or executory. The law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order, directive or decision. The penalty imposed on private respondent for Conduct Prejudicial To The Best Interest of The Service

was six (6) months and one (1) day suspension without pay. Considering that private respondent appealed from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, the stay of execution of the penalty of suspension should therefore issue as a matter of right. Thus, there is no violation of the equal protection clause. The case is dismissed and the CA's resolution is hereby affirmed. Note: the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is applied in this case with regards to the application of Sec 27. The express mention of the things included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers. Title: Phil.REC vs. the Secretary, DILG G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003 Facts: Petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA) is an association of 119 electric cooperatives throughout the country filed a class suit in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269. P.D. No. 269 aims to promote, encourage and assist all public service entities engaged in supplying electric service, particularly electric cooperatives by giving every tenable support and assistance to the electric cooperatives coming within the purview of the law. Accordingly, Section 39 of P.D. No. 269 provides for the following tax incentives to electric cooperatives: SECTION 39.Assistance to Cooperatives; Exemption from Taxes, Imposts, Duties, Fees; Assistance from the National Power Corporation. Pursuant to the national policy declared in Section 2, the Congress hereby finds and declares that the following assistance to cooperative is necessary and appropriate: (a)Provided that it operates in conformity with the purposes and provisions of this Decree, cooperatives (1) shall be permanently exempt from paying income taxes, and (2) for a period ending on December 31 of the thirtieth full calendar year after

the date of a cooperative's organization or conversion hereunder, or until it shall become completely free of indebtedness incurred by borrowing, whichever event first occurs,shall be exempt from the payment (a) of all National Government, local government and municipal taxes and fees, including franchise, filing, recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in any court or administrative proceeding in which it may be a party, and (b) of all duties or imposts on foreign goods acquired for its operations, the period of such exemption for a new cooperative formed by consolidation, as provided for in Section 29, to begin from as of the date of the beginning of such period for the constituent consolidating cooperative which was most recently organized or converted under this Decree: Provided, That the Board of Administrators shall, after consultation with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, promulgate rules and regulations for the proper implementation of the tax exemptions provided for in this Decree.

(For the implementation of P.D. No. 269 in 1971, the National Economic
Development Council and the NEA entered into a six (6) loan agreements with the Government of the US. Section 6.5 of A.I.D. Loan No. 492-H-027 dated November 15, 1971 provides:xxx '(b) any commodity procurement transactions financed hereunder, are not exempt from identifiable taxes, tariffs, duties and other levies imposed under laws in effect in the country of the Borrower.') On the other hand, the pertinent provisions of the Local Government code provides: Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A.

No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are
hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. Section 234. Exemptions from real property tax.The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax: xxx '(d) All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R.A. No. 6938;' and xxx 'Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons whether natural or juridical, including all

government-owned and controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon effectivity of this Code.' Petitioners contend that pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 269, they are exempt from payment of local taxes, including payment of real property tax. With the passage of the Local Government Code, however, they allege that their tax exemptions have been invalidly withdrawn. In particular, petitioners assail the constitutionality of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code on the ground that the said provisions discriminate against them, in violation of the equal protection clause. Further, they submit that the said provisions are unconstitutional because they impair the obligation of contracts between the Philippine Government and the United States Government. A temporary restraining order was issued by the Court(SC) with regards to implementation of sections 193 and 234 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code. Issues: Whether or not Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code contravenes with the equal protection clause.

Ruling: No, there is no violation of the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable classification. For a classification to be valid/reasonable it must be: (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The court uphold the classification in the LGC. First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as amended, and cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. These distinctions are manifest in at least two material respects which go into the nature of cooperatives envisioned by R.A. No. 6938

and which characteristics are not present in the type of cooperative associations created under P.D. No. 269, as amended. A cooperative under R.A. No. 6938 is defined as: [A] duly registered association of persons with a common bond of interest, who have voluntarily joined together to achieve a lawful common or social economic end, making equitable contributions to the capital required and accepting a fair share of the risks and benefits of the undertaking in accordance with universally accepted cooperative principles. The above definition provides for the following elements of a cooperative: a) association of persons; b) common bond of interest; c) voluntary association; d) lawful common social or economic end; e) capital contributions; f) fair share of risks and benefits; g) adherence to cooperative values; and g) registration with the appropriate government authority. Cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, the members do not make substantial contribution to the capital required. It is the government that puts in the capital, in most cases.

b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives Cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation. The extent of government control over electric cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended, is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. The incurred loans of NEA from various sources to finance the development and operations of the electric cooperatives would be repaid to the government. Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is germane to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that every local government unit shall enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of power by local governments is beyond regulation by Congress. Thus, while each government unit is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue, Congress, in light of its broad power to tax, has the discretion to determine the extent of the taxing powers of local government units consistent with the policy of local autonomy. Section 193 of the Local Government Code is indicative of the legislative intent to vest broad taxing powers upon

local government units and to limit exemptions from local taxation except for a) local water districts; b) cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938; and c) non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions. Futhermore, Sec 234 specifically enumerates entities which are exempt to Real Property taxes. Finally, Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code permit reasonable classification as these exemptions are not limited to existing conditions and apply equally to all members of the same class. Exemptions from local taxation, including real property tax, are granted to all cooperatives covered by R.A. No. 6938 and such exemptions exist for as long as the Local Government Code and the provisions therein on local taxation remain good law. WHEREFORE,the instant petition is DENIED and the temporary restraining order heretofore issued is LIFTED. Note: There is No Violation of the Non-Impairment Clause To fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial. What constitutes substantial impairment->A law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void(Clemons v. Nolting). Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with respect to non-parties. All six agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax treatment of the proceeds of the loan and properties and commodities acquired through the loan. Thus: Section 6.5. Taxes and Duties. The Borrower covenants and agrees that this Loan Agreement and the Loan provided for herein shall be free from, and the Principal and interest shall be paid to A.I.D. without deduction for and free from, any taxation or fees imposed under any laws or decrees in effect within the Republic of the Philippines or any such taxes or fees so imposed or payable shall be reimbursed by the Borrower with funds other than those provided under the Loan.

To the extent that (a) any contractor, including any consulting firm, any personnel of such contractor financed hereunder, and any property or transactions relating to such contracts and (b) any commodity procurement transactions financed hereunder, are not exempt from identifiable taxes, tariffs, duties and other levies imposed under laws in effect in the country of the Borrower, the Borrower and/or Beneficiary shall pay or reimburse the same with funds other than those provided under the Loan. A plain reading of the provision quoted above readily shows that it does not grant any tax exemption in favor of the borrower or the beneficiary either on the proceeds of the loan itself or the properties acquired through the said loan. It simply states that the loan proceeds and the principal and interest of the loan, upon repayment by the borrower, shall be without deduction of any tax or fee that may be payable under Philippine law as such tax or fee will be absorbed by the borrower with funds other than the loan proceeds. Further, the provision states that with respect to any payment made by the borrower to (1) any contractor or any personnel of such contractor or any property transaction and (2) any commodity transaction using the proceeds of the loan, the tax to be paid, if any, on such transactions shall be absorbed by the borrower and/or beneficiary through funds other than the loan proceeds. Beyond doubt, the import of the tax provision in the loan agreements cited by petitioners is twofold:(1) the borrower is entitled to receive from and is obliged to pay the lender the principal amount of the loan and the interest thereon in full, without any deduction of the tax component thereof imposed under applicable Philippine law and any tax imposed shall be paid by the borrower with funds other than the loan proceeds and (2) with respect to payments made to any contractor, its personnel or any property or commodity transaction entered into pursuant to the loan agreement and with the use of the proceeds thereof, taxes payable under the said transactions shall be paid by the borrower and/or beneficiary with the use of funds other than the loan proceeds. The quoted provision does not purport to grant any tax exemption in favor of any party to the contract, including the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions simply shift the tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan agreements to the borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the withdrawal by the Local Government Code under Sections 193 and 234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners does not impair the obligation of

the borrower, the lender or the beneficiary under the loan agreements as in fact, no tax exemption is granted therein. Title: Farinas vs. Executive Secretary G.R. NO. 147387, December 10, 2003 Facts: Petitioners Rodolfo C. Farias, Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino seeks for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 9006 [The
Fair Election Act-which provides: Sec. 14. Sections 67 xxx of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) xxx are hereby repealed.] , insofar

as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides: SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office
other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position . Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

In their defense the respondents, states that Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive officials therefore it does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. A substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated as the former. Equal protection simply requires that

all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Issue: Whether or not the express repeal sec. 67 and retaining the effectivity of Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Code violates the equal protection clause. Held: No, sec. 14 of R.A. No. 9004 is not violative of the equal protection clause. The court ruled that the assumption of the petitioner is tenuous/flimsy with regards to the undue benefit given to elective officials as against the appointive ones. The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner: The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like

circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. Also under the Civil Service Commission Administrative Code of 1987 states

elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities while appointive officials are prohibited from engaging any any partisan or political activity. This shows a clear and substantial distinction between the 2 sets of officials. The legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by

them. It is also not with in the power of the court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this qualification. Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. Title: Central Bank(now Banko Central ng Pilipinas) Employees Assoc. Inc., vs. BSP G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004 Facts: On June 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the new Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old central bank of the Philippines and created a new BSP. On July 8, 2001, petitioners filed a petition for the prohibition against BSP and the Executive secretary of the office of the president to restrain respondents from further implementing the proviso in sec. 15 Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides: Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall: xxx xxx xxx (c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management. A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the

Bangko Sentrals human resource development program: Provided, That the

Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act].

Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose

positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758.[emphasis supplied]

Petitioners claimed that the above-mentioned makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz:(1) the BSP officers or those exempted

from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is a classic case of class legislation, allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position. They also contend and that it runs afoul to the constitutional mandate that no person shall be xxx denied the equal protection of the laws.
Respondent however averred that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP, and the mandate of the Monetary Board to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management. In support the SG argued that the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government.

Issue: Whether or not sec. 15 Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling: A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID. It is settled in constitutional law that the equal protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects which upon which different rules shall operate-so long as the classification is not unreasonable. Equality of

operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operations on persons merely as such, but to persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. All that is required of a valid qualifications that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSPs lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS -EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

While RA 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislatures power, the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) leeched all validity out of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653. Enactments of R.A. No. 7907, 8282, 8289, 8523, 9302 resulted to the unconstitutionality of the challenged proviso. Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the

latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL.Thus, within the class of rankand-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon. Tilte: Quinto vs COMELEC G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010 Facts: In preparation for the upcoming 2010 National Elections, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 8678 to govern the filing of Certificates of Candidacy for national and local positions. Section 4 of the Resolution reads: Sec. 4. Effects of Filing of Certificates of Candidacy. (a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. (b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position. Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted

Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. According to them, imposing automatic resignation against appointive officials who file their certificates of candidacy is offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution of the Philippines because it gives an undue advantage to elective officials who are allowed to remain in office despite the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
Issue: Whether or not the Resolutuin issued by the COMELEC is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Held: The orginal ruling of the court declared the resolution unconstitutional.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. It is said that the resolution failed to satisfy the second requisitewhuch states that it

should be germane to the purpose of the law. Majority of the original justices who decided the case agreed that If the purpose of the automatic resignation rule is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate, there is no reason to exclude elected officials from the coverage of the law. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. Thus, treating the one differently from the other should fail the test of equal protection.
After a motion for reconsideration the court upheld the constitutionality of the resolution. Nine other justices adopted Justice Punos view that these provisions satisfy the requisites of the equal protection test, especially the second requirement that it must be germane to the purposes of the law. It was emphasized that the purpose of the law is to defer to then sovereign will of the people by letting elective officials serve until the end of the terms for which they were elected notwithstanding the filing of their certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, the automatic resignation rule was imposed upon appointive officials because unlike elected politicians, appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or from taking part in any election, except to vote (Sec. 55 of the Administrative Code of 1987). More importantly, it was ruled that the resign-to-run rule on appointive officials does not violate a persons right to run for public office because such right must give way

to the substantial public interest being protected by the ruleto maintain a civil service that is impartialand free from the evils of partisan politics. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the

intervenors Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.