NguyndochnhkhinVNCHbsp

1975
(theotiliu:TaBchc,BQucPhng,CIAv...)

Qua tuyn bcatngWestmoreland (tiNamCali9.1995), vmctiu

chin lc ca M , nn ng ta khng c tin qun ra Bc , khng
c phng mnHCM [23]
. Vyulmctiuchinlc caM
trongchin tranhVit Nam? Nhm tr licuhivanu , ngi vit
tm kim ti liu , c kt thnh bi vit ny gin ngi chuc
chng c d dng a ra nhn nh v vn m TngWesty nura
1995. Nhng trc khi bn n ti trn, ngi vit xin b tc thm
thngtin v cu hi nu"AiralnhrtqunkhiPleikuKontum1975",
vbivit gi nbnctrc y. Trong bi vit ny, bnc
coi qua tuynb ca cc T Lnh VngnhTngTrng,TngPh,
Tng Nam ni r chnh TT Thiul ngiralnhtritthoi.Ngoi
rasch ca tc gi FrankSnepp 1977 vTiliuCIAcngb2009(CIA
and The Generals) cng ng quan im vi cc Tng T Lnh Vng
qui trch nhim cho TT Thiul ngi ra lnh rt qun khi QK I v II
nm 1975
[1]
. Cn i Tng Vin l ngi c mt trong cc phin hp
viTT Thiu trongvic tiphi tr... cng ln ting. Cconvnvin
dn,ctrchtcunTheFinalCollapsecatcgiCaoVnVin.

V nguyn nhn VNCH b sp , trong cun The Final Collapse tc gi

tngthut kh chi tit nguynnhnxagndnnsthtbicacuc
chinVit Nam,thdnh tintc vhucn,thiuthitbqunscung
ng cho chin tranh, m theo tc gi cng l nguyn donn stht
bi. V cn nguyn do no khc dnnvic VNCH bsphaykhng,
xin c ht bi vit ny viti liu dn chng trcht ti liu TiMtTa
Bch c ,giimtv cng b2002, v The Pentagon Papers , ti liu ti
mt v chin tranh Vit Nam

c B Quc Phng gii mt v cngb

vongy13Jun.2011

[2]

thisr.

MtonvntrongtcphmcaiTngVinvit:


" KhngaithyrvnhntngthngThiu.Khingikhch
cui cng ca quc hi Hoa K ri Vit Nam, tng thng Thiu
bit ngay VNCH khng cn hy vng g v khon tin 300 triu
qun vin ph cp. Tng thng Thiu cng bit qun vin cho
VNCH trong tng lai s thnchkhng th nhiuhnv tng
thng Thiu da nhiu quyt nh ca ng vo nhng suy lun
: nhng g ng ta cng quyt t chi hnh ng trong sut
hai nm qua,byging philm. Tngthng Thiuquytnh
tiphitrqunidavophntVNCHcthbovc.
[]
Vi nhng quyt nh c sn, ngy 11 thng 31975 mt ngy
saukhiBanMThutbtncngtngthngThiumithtng
Trn Thin Khim, c vn an ninh quc gia, trung tng ng
Vn Quang v tc gi n dinh tng thng n sng v bn
lun. Sau khi ba nc dn ra vcc ngi hu ribn,tng
thngThiu lyramtbn nhv bt u cuctholunvi
nhng tng trnh v tnh hnh chin s m ba ngi khch
hon ton tng tn. Nixongvtnhhnh chins,tngthng
Thiu i ngay vo vn vi quyt nh: "Vi kh nng v lc
lng chng ta ang c, chc chn chng ta khng th bo v
c tt c lnh th chng ta mun bo v." Nh vy, chngta
nn ti phi tr lc lng v bo v nhng vng ng dn, tr
ph,vnhngvngtmithtsquantrng"[
3]

Trong cun sch The Final Collapse c thut lihaiphin hp trc khi
rt qun khi Pleiku v Kontum . l phin hp ngy 11 thng 3 nm
1975,xcnhn c shindinca TTThiu,TTKhim,TngQuang
vTngVin,coinhlphinhptrb.Cnphinhp
ti Cam Ranh ngy 14 thng 3 nm 1975, c ghi :
The same

personalities who had attended the palace meeting three days earlier
accompanied Thieu to Cam Ranh : Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem , Lt.
Gen Dang Van Quang, and I.
Cnghilccnhnvtcmttrc

3 ngy thi u thp tngTng Thng Thiunhp tiCam Ranhngy

14.3.1975
[4]

Vi phn trchdnb tc tin tc ca Tng Vin nu trnhyvngvn

kh rrt,ai phi chutrch nhim vv ra lnh rt qun,v ThTng
TT Khimbit hay khngbitvic rtqun tng sng t, ngi vit
bi xinnhng bn c thmnh .
( Cun sch caTngVinnutrn
phthnh1983).

Vtinhthnchinu...
tcgiCaoVnVinnhnnh:

" Ngh li vic qua, cu hi l min Nam c sng st nu

chng ta khng p dng k hoch ti phi tr lc lng qun s
haykhng. By gi nithsri,nhng tcgi tinminNam
c nhiu c hi hn nu khng thc hin ti phi tr. Tinh thn
chin u caqun i VNCH v nhndnb hydit lktqu
trc tip ca k hoch ti phi tr. Khng c k hoch , c l
qunicachngtakhngtanrnhanhnhvy."

Nhngctinhthnchinumkhngcphngtinth...

" l ci nhn v phng din qun s trong giai on ngn

hn. Sau Ban M Thut tc gi ngh CSBV s lm p lc c
c mt chnh ph lin hip v tng thng Thiu c th chp
nhn. Nhng d chuyn c xyra,ch lmthoncnh
ha hon tm b nht thi: cng sn s tip tc tm cch ly
thm tqua chinthngqunsbtVNCHnhng bthm
v chnh tr. Liu VNCH c chu ni nhng p lc trong mt
thigian di hay khng" Tcginghcutr listythucvo
s qun vin ca HoaKcungcp choVNCH.Mtsthtkhng
th chi ci lquniVNCHshtnvnhin liuvothng
61975nukhngnhncsqunvinphtri.Vmtqun

iskhng thnochinu nukhng c nhngtrangbcn

thitchinu."

[3]

Phng tin phc v cho qun i th li b l thuc vo nc ngoi, v

VNCH khngc kh nng tlc... TrongkhithQucHiMctngn
khon vin tr qun s ...on vn Tng Vin vit v kh nng qun
i VNCH cn cm c ni trong ngn hn nu khngtritthoiPleikuv
Kon tum, nhng trong di hn th cn c vin tr qun s t pha M.
iu ny ph hp vi c tnh tnh bo cu vin chcDIA, l nu c
phng tin qun sthqunBcVitkhcth mcuctngtncng
trong thi gian khong 6 thng ti :
" ..
.Ford continued to lobby a
skeptical Congress for millions of dollars in military aid, and DIA's
analysis enmeshed the Agency in the middle of the aid debate. An
appraisal published on January 10 by Charles Desaulniers,
DIA's most
senior Southeast Asia analyst, noted that while an allout offensive
wasunlikelyinthenextsixmonths,
TheSouth'sarmedforces..."

onvntrn ctrchtcun TheVietNamCauldron

[5]
docquan
Tnh BoQun i M cng b nm2012. Trong tiliuny cng bnv
sctgimvintrcho VNCHphhpvinhngchititmTngVin
nura.

Cn nguynnhn n lm Sign tht th l s rt quni M ra

khi VN th theo yu cu cu Trung Cng v quyn li chung ca hai
nc M TQ. iu ny c ghi li trong bin bn phin hp gi TS
Kissinger v Th Tng Chu n Lai ngy 9 thng 7 nm 1971
:
"
I can
assure you that we want to end the war in Vietnam through
negotiations, and that
wearepreparedtosetadateforthewithdrawal
of all our forces from Vietnam and Indochina as you suggested
before.
"

on vn trn trich trong cc bin bn chuyn i TQ ca TS Kissinger

nm1971.

(
Trch

tiliuTaBchc)
[6]

Sang nm 1972, Tng Thng Nixon chnh thc thm TQ, v bin bn
phinhpgiTngThngNixonvThTngChuconghi:

"...PrimeMinisterChou:
Indochinaasawhole.

President Nixon: Mr. Prime Minister, the problem of Vietnam is one that
no longer should divide us. The Prime Minister has suggested that if we
could move more quickly this would be a wise, and as he points out,
courageous thing to do.
This is a possibility which we have
considered,.
.."

Tng Thng Nixon cng nhc li li ngh ca Th Tng Chul sm

gii quytvn VN,v rngvn VN s khng cn chia r hainc
...(
Trch
tiliuTaBchc)
[7]

Ngoi ra cn mt l do rt qunMkhi VN
,l:
"Igreatlyrespect
the PrimeMinister'sviewsonthissubject
becausethisissimplyanissue
on which the only gainer in having the war continue is the Soviet
Union. Theywant the U.S. tieddown.
They, ofcourse, want to getmore
and more influence in North Vietnam asa result. Fromall the intelligence
we get they should we say may even be egging on the North
Vietnamesetoholdoutandnotsettle."

V pha Trung Quc coi vn VN khng quan trng bng vn Lin

X, Th Tng Chu mun bit quan im ca M i vi Lin X... Tr
liv vn Lin X,TngThngNixonchobit nutiptcchintranh
thli th s nghing v pha LinX, vLinXmun M xalytiVN.
(
Trch
tiliuTaBchc)
[8]

VchuynMTrunghptcchngLinX


Vo nm 1979 ng ng Tiu Bnhi M, ng ta hho chngLinX,
ku gi M hp tc
" tri con gu Bc cc "
, v c on ghitrong cun
MuLcngTiuBnhnhsau:

"Trong tnh hnh khngc hy vng hahon vi Lin x, ngkhngth

khng k tha chin lc quc t ca nhng nm cui i Mao Trch
ng: Lin hip vi M cng ngn chn d tm bnh trngca Lin
x. Phng php ny qu nhin em li hiu qu. Qua vic ng sang
thm M u nm 1979, LinxgithiimlngkhiTrungqucdybi
hcchoVitNam"
[9]

Cho nn c th ni , chintranh ti Vit Nam c nh hng nstanr

cu khiXVit1989, v cthcoiycnglmctiuchinlc ca
Mkhiem chintranhchng giiphng(CounterInsurgency Program
CIP)
[10]
voVitNamnm1961nhmchngLinX,v trc,nm
1960Lin x chnVNphtngchintranhgiiphng
[11]
nhti
liu The Pentagon Papers
[12] c B Quc Phng M gii mt
13.6.2011phiby.

(MtTrnDTGPMNVNrai20.12.1960).

Mt yu t khc lin quan n tiu tng cng nn ghi li rng

ng d lun . Pha M hai ln tchi khngk kt thacqun
s htng (MutualDefenseTreaty)viVNCH.Lnuvo nm1957
[13] L dot chi pha M vinc vVNCH nmtrongkhiSEATO
Th nhng , Phi Lut Tn l nc cng nmtrong khi SEATO
[14]
th
M lik kt Mutual DefensevincPhi ngy30.8.1951
[15]
. Ngoira
M cng k kt Tho Hip Qun S H Tng vi cc nc khctrong
vng nh Nam Hn, Nht Bn v i Loan
[16]
Vlnthhai vonm
1961 VNCH nhc li yucu Mk ThaHip QunS
[17
]
,vVNCH
ch mun nhn vin tr qun s, m khng mun M a qun i M
vo Vit Nam
[18]
. Kt cuc dn ncuc o chnh 1963 ,v Chnh
Ph k nhim chp thuncho Ma qun vo VitNam Mthc
hin chin lc CIP .
iu ny ph hp vi Counter Insurgency
ProgramcaM ra 1961,chngt rng M chxdng VNCHnh
lchintrngnhmchngLinXquachintranhgiiphngdoLinX

khixng(1960).

Sau 48 nm k t ngy lt Chnh Ph Ng nh Dim (1963), ngy

13.6.2011 pha B Quc Phng M cho cng b ti liu ti mt v chin
tranh Vit Nam chnh thc tha nhn hon ton chu trch nhim v
cuc ochnh 1963, v cn tha nhn
vic lt Chnh phDim
lm tng trch nhimcachngta l cand voshnhthnhnn
mt nc Vit Nam mthcchtlkhngcngilnho
[19].
(Ngoi
ra, cn mt yu t v v lt ch I VNCH, theo CIA, ngNhu ra "gii
php" Bc Nam 1963
.
Nu gii phpBcNam thnh hinthc thCIP program ca
M dngVN chngLinX s khngth pdng c,v Chnhph Dimchng
vic a qun i Mvo VN, v ttmng li ha gii vi minBc chmdt
chin tranh. TheoCIA:
htinrng
gii phpha giivinhngngicngmt
dntcvnhayhnlciutrcplccangaibang(M)
[
20]

Nay th nn I v II VNCH sp , ngi vit xin ghi licu ni

ca ng Ng nh Nhu trckhi b st hi(1963):
"...
bi v ng ta(
N. Dim ) t chi lmtchnhphbnhn.
"(parcequ'ilrefused'tre
un gouvernement puppet )
[21] .
V tuyn b tchccaTTThiu
(1975)
:
...tht ha, thiu cng bng, thiu tn ngha, v nhn o, t mt
ng minh ang chu au kh
[22]
suy xt v sphn ca mt
ncnhctiu.

oVn

Tiliuthamkho:
[1]

Aira lnh rt qunkhiPleikuKontum 1975, TngPh hayTTThiuv tiliu
CIA(2009)vitgvvny?

[2]
Ti liu b bo ch phanh phui 1971 nhng khng y . Ton b ti liu The
Pentagon Papers cgiimt v cng b vongy 13Jun.2011vlu bnvnti
Vnkhqucgiaonline:
http://www.archives.gov/research/pentagonpapers/
[3]

Trch trong bndch cunschcutcgiCaoVnVin,doNguynKPhong
dch ,yl phntrchonNhngNgyCuiCuaVNCHngtrntVietBo vo

nm 2008,
( v tonbn dchcun:
Nhng Ngy Cui ca VNCH Nguyn tcThe
FinalCollapse
)

[4]

Trch trongThe Final Collapse do Trung Tm US Army CenterMilitaryHistory

post online , tuy nhin khi v link ny thi phidownload sch hi mtcng,cho
nn tin li cho bn c tham kho , ngi post biuploadsch v y
The
Final Collapse, GenCao Van Vien
...
, Cng xin ni thm, nu bnc muntmsch
v chin tranh VN th v link sau, ghi tn sch hay tn tc
gi:
http://www.history.army.mil/catalog/search.html ,th d:ghi ch Cao VanVienthi
schcatcgishinravdownloadxung,hocghich VietnamWar thimts
sch cu cc TngM khc shin ra hin ti trong trangweb ca Qun S Hoa
KonlinechmicschcaTngVin)

[5]
TheVietnamCauldronDefenceIntelligenceintheWarforSouthEastAsia
[6]

TiliuTiMtTaBchc:
TL.1
vcctiliukhclinquan:
TL.2
,
TL.3
[7]

TiliuTiMtTaBchc:

TL1
Feb.22,72
[8]TiliuTiMtTaBchc
TL1Feb.22,72vccbinbnkhclinquann
chuyn i TQ ca TT Nixon 1972, xin post tt c ra y bn c tin b tham
kho:
TL2Feb.23.72
,
TL.3Feb.24.72
,
TL.4Feb.23.72

[9]

Muu Luoc Dang Tieu Binh chg 7 ,nu muncoitoncunschthvy:
Mu
LcngTiuBnh
).

[10]
(The Kennedy Counter Insurgency Program
)
The problems of dealing with
Moscowwere far more pressing than those relatedto Vietnam.AfeelingthatAmerica's
position intheworld hadbeenerodedbytheUSSRprevailedKennedywasparticularly
determined to regain American strength, prestige and influence. Anything which could
be construed as American weakness visavis the USSR was to be avoided. This
affected policy toward Vietnam."
( trch antrong :
The Kennedy Counterinsurgency
Program Pentagon Papers p.IV.B.1 trang 1 s bngctri l trang10/197) (
cngb2011

[11] InNovember1960,theMoscowConferenceof CommunistandWorkers'Parties

of Socialist Countries once again declareditssupport of thesort of"just"wartheDRV
intended toprosecute. The United Stateswas identified astheprincipalcolonialpower,
and the right and obligation of communist parties to lead struggles against colonial
powers was detailed. By the time Khrushchev cited that Declaration in his "wars of

national liberation"speech,the"liberationwar"forSouthVietnamwasnearlyayearand
a half old.
(trch antrong :
Origins of theInsurgency PentagonPapers ,p.IV.A.5

trang30sbngctriltrang34/373)(cngb2011)
[12]
The PentagonPapers(DoD released13.Jun.2011Fullversion),
(opencoingay
mclc,saumuncoitngchngthdownload)

[13]

VNCHxinkThaHipQunS:

1957
[14]

SouthEastAsianTreatyOrganization
[15]

MutualDefenseTreatyvincPhiLutTn
[16]

NamHn
,
NhtBn
,v
iLoan

[17]

VNCHxinkThaHipQunSln2
Oct.1961
TaylorMissiontoVietnam

On the 18th,
Diem said he wanted no U.S. combat troops for any mission.
He
repeated his
request for a bilateral defense treaty
, more support for ARVN and
combatsupport equipment(helicopters, aircraft, etc.). ( trch an trong :
TheKennedy
Counterinsurgency Program Pentagon Papers p.IV.B.1
trang14,sbngctri l
trang23/197)(cngb2011)

[18]
1961 ( The Kennedy Counter Insurgency Program )
Negotiations with Diem
came to an end in May, not because the issues had been resolved, but because the
U.S. decided to forget trying to pressure Diem for a while and insteadtrytocoaxhim
intoreformingbywinninghisconfidence.

Consequently, the U.S.bargaining positionwas feeble. Further, Gaibraith at least,and

probably others, advised Kennedy that there was not much point to bargaining with
Diem anyway, since he would never follow through on any promises he made.
(
Galbraith favored promoting an antiDiem military coup at the earliest
convienient moment.
) Kennedy ended up settling for a set of promises that fell well
short of any serious effort to make the aid program really contingent on reforms by
Diem. Since the war soon thereafter began to look better, Kennedy never had any
occasion to reconsider his decision on combat troops
and no urgent reason to
considerGalbraith'sadviceongettingridofDiemuntillate1963.
(
trchantrong:
TheKennedyCounterinsurgency Program Pentagon Papers p.IV.B.1 trang vi ,s
bngctriltrang8/197)(cngb2011)

[19]

Forthemilitarycoupd'etatagainstNgoDinhDiem, the U.S.mustacceptits

full share of responsibility

.
( V cuc o chnh lt Ng nh Dim ,

chnhph Mphi hontonchu trchnhim.TThng81963,chng

ta ban hnh nhiu bin php , nhm cho php , tn thnh, khuyn
khchcctnglnh ngi Vit ng ralmcuc o chnh vchngta
ha hn s hon ton hu thun mt Chnh ph k nhim. Thng
101963 chng ta trc tip c tuyt v ct t vin tr dnh choDim ,
bt tnhiu n xanhchophetng lnh . Chng ta kno duy tr lin
lc vi phe o chnh xuyn sutqu trnh t lc ln khoch chon
khi tin hnh cuc o chnh , chng ta duyt k hoch hnh ng
ca h v ra
thnh phnt
n chnh ph . Cho nn, sau 9 nm cm
quyn ca Chnhph Dim bchm dtbng s mu .Vth,s
ng la ca chng ta trong vic lt Chnh ph Dim lm tng
trch nhim ca chng ta l can d vo shnh thnhnnmtnc
Vit Nam m thc cht l khng c ngi lnh o )
For themilitary coup
d'etat against Ngo Dinh Diem, the U.S. must accept its full share of responsibility.
Beginning in August of 1963 we variously authorized, sanctioned and encouragedthe
coup efforts of the Vietnamese generals and offered full support for a successor
government. In October wecut offaid to Diemin a direct rebuff,giving a green lightto
the generals. Wemaintainedclandestinecontactwiththemthroughouttheplanningand
execution of the coup and sought to review their operational plansand proposed new
government. Thus, asthe nineyearrule ofDiem came toabloodyend,our complicity
in his overthrow heightened our responsibilities and our commitment in an essentially
leaderless Vietnam. (
Trch on trong
ThePentagonPapers:OverthrowofNgoDinh
DiemIVB51Released13Jun.2011

strangviii,hayl12/126)

[20]

TheoCIA :HaingDim Nhu, ngoi vicchng aqun iM vo Vit

Nam, cntlinhviminBcnhmnghimtgiiphphogii.
.."Do,
mtthi imno ,hcthtm ra mtgiiphp chung sngviminBc,doh
tinrng
gii phpha giivinhng ngi cngmtdntc vnhayhnlci
u trc plc ca ngaibang(M )
(Theymightatsomejunctureseektowork
out a modus vivendiwiththeNorth,outofbeliefthat
adealwithkindredpeopleswas
better than submitting to foreign(US)pressures
.)
(Trchontrong
CIA:Giiphp
hogiiBcNam1963
trang2on2tiliugiimt2001)

Cho nn, vic hai ng Dim Nhu t itmtha hipviminBcccoinh l

chic inh cui cng ng vo c quan ti chn vi ch I VNCH bi ... cc

tng lnhMin Nam VN..."
If it became knownthatDiemandNhuseriouslyintended
to seek an accommodation with theNorth, this might wellprecipitate a coupattempt
bycertain South Vietnamese militaryleaders."
(Trchontrong:
CIA:Giiphp
hogiiBc Nam1963trang2,on3 )(Bnvnthitlp
ngy14.9.1963vcuc
ochnhngy
1.11.1963
giimtvcngb
Apr.2001
)

[21]

Videoclip:
>>

ngNgnhNhulntingvccvbiutnh1963

Nguyn vn li tuyn b ca ng Nhu trong video trch dn:

" l'affaire bouddhiste et
l'affaire des tudiants
ont t montes de toutes pieces et rpercutes de facon
orchestre et puissante pour intoxiquer l'opinion interieure comme l'opinion
internationale contre le gouvernement du Sud Vietnam parce que ce gouvernement
combatlecommunismeet
parcequ'ilrefused'treungouvernementpuppet
".

[22]

Videoclip:

>>

DinvntchccaTTNguynVnThiu,21.4.1975

[23] Tng Westmoreland c n NamCali vdnh cho i Radio Little

Sign phng vn V/v Tt Mu Thn 1968 v v/v tin qun ra Bc ,do
Vit Dng phng vn 9/1995 v bi phng vn loan trn bo Hn Vit
10/1995:

Tng Westmoreland:
" Chng ti bit trccuc tng cng kch s
xy ra. Vti s th tivi mi ngi khi nghli,ltinglraphi
loanbonhngtintcnynmingi.Vtibitrtr rngnhngchi
tit. Ti bit bit r rng khi no h s tn cng , v ti cng c y
nhngchitittinonhuqucacuctncngny."

" y l con ng tip t huyt mch ca min Bc vo Min Nm.

Khng may cho chng ta ng Averell Harrimanl mt ngi rt c uy tn
trong thi gian , v c thi gian tng gi chc v ph tTng Trng
Ngoi giao, v l c vn ca Tng Thng. ng Averell rt l cng rn khi
cho rng cuc chin khng c lan rng ra khi lnh th min Nam v
iu ny tr thnh chtrng ca HoaKtrongsutthigianthamgia
cuc chin timin Nam,l chng takhng pht trin cuc chinrangoi

phm vi lnh th ny. Chng ti cnhng cuc xmnhp b mt vo

ng mnHCM vtncng nhng n v Bc Vit dngcon ngny
tip t cho Min Nam, nhng chng ti khng bao gi c quyn
ct t con ng ny d chng ti d sc lm iu , vi`conng
ny l mch sng ca ch qun v vic ct t con ng ny s gim
thiucc
chinlc
cachngtirtnhiu".

Cu hi : Vy u l mc tiu
chin lc ca M khi m chin tranh
chng gii phng (CIP) tiVitNam?trlichocuhinyngivit
biisutmtiliuvcktthnhbivittrnhbynutrn.
DV
c thm cc tiliu lin h :
Nguyndo chnhkhinVNCH b sp 1975
(theotiliuBQucPhngvTaBchc)