11 23 12 0204 Respondent's Amended Supplemental With Ex 1 Attached All 2025 Bate Stamped Pages of It BF

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incorporate by reference all that contained in the Orders to support a finding of notice to Mirch
as to what was up for inquiry in that matter. Couglin adopts that approach herein and
incorporates by reference all of his filings in the Nevada Supreme Court since 8/20/11,
particularly those in 60838 (especially that of 6/10/12, 6/18/12, and 8/13/12) and all of those in
61901, 60302, 61383, 54844, 60331, etc.).
Conclusion:
Please consider those issues set forth in more detail in the attachments.
Dated this November 23rd, 2012:
__________________________
Zachary Barker Coughlin
- 2/4 -
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL TO RESPONDENT'S EMERGENCY MOTION TO SET ASIDE, ALTER OR AMEND
ALL ORDERS SO FAR BY NNDB, SBN, PANEL, OR BOARD, AND NOTICE OF IRREGULARITIES OF
PROCEEDINGS THUS FAR and SUPPLEMENT TO VERIFIED ANSWER OR RESPONSE TO WHATEVER
EXTENT COUGHLINS SPECIAL APPEARANCE TO CONTEST SUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE, PROCESS,
SERVICE OF PROCESS, SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT, ETC.,ETC., HAS BEEN RUN OVER

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proof of service/certificate of mailing
i zach coughlin hereby declare that i Iax Iiled (in accordance with the permission previously given me
by those with the requisite authority to so issue it) and placed this AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL
TO RESPONDENT'S EMERGENCY MOTION TO SET ASIDE, ALTER OR AMEND ALL
ORDERS SO FAR BY NNDB, SBN, PANEL, OR BOARD, AND NOTICE OF
IRREGULARITIES OF PROCEEDINGS THUS FAR and SUPPLEMENT TO VERIFIED
ANSWER OR RESPONSE TO WHATEVER EXTENT COUGHLINS SPECIAL
APPEARANCE TO CONTEST SUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE, PROCESS, SERVICE OF
PROCESS, SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT, ETC.,ETC., HAS BEEN RUN OVER in the
mail with postage, and or transmitted a digital copy to all oI those who have either expressly or
implicitly agreed to service via digital transmission (plus Pat "Salieri" King told me the SBN takes
anything I Iile and provides a stamped copy to all 5 member oI the Panel immediately and that I could
rely on that), in the mail Ior pickup...
dated november 23rd, 2012.
zach coughlin
respondent
- 3/4 -

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index to exhibits:
1. exhibit 1: various relevant materials two thousand, two hundred and twenty Iive (2,2025) pages, bate stamped
- 4/4 -

http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=8a4a9f2d-6c5e-11e... Page 1 of 57
RE: response to grievance from NV Attorney
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Mon 3/12/12 9:15 AM
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Cc: David Clark (DavidC@nvbar.org); Glenn Machado (GlennM@nvbar.org)
March 12, 2012
To: Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
I am in receipt of your email below, requesting additional time to respond. Please be advised that
your response to the grievance, including the email letter below, become part of the record and may
eventually be reviewed by a disciplinary panel. With that said, it is important that we receive your
response. Pursuant to your request, you are granted until Friday, March 16, 2012 by 3:00pm to
deliver your written response to the State Bar Office in Reno.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel
From: Zach Coughlin [mailto:zachcoughlin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 5:45 PM
To: Patrick King; Glenn Machado; David Clark
Subject: response to grievance from NV Attorney
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.... http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.... 3/23/2012
000001
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
775 328 6045 fax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
State Bar of Nevada
P.O. Box 50
Las Vegas, NV 89125-0050
600 E. Charleston Blvd.
Las Vegas, NV 89104
sent by fax and email only to:
Reno Office: 775 329 0522
Las Vegas Office: 702 385 2878
DavidC@nvbar.com, PatrickK@nvbar.com, GlennM@nvbar.com
March 9, 2012,
Dear Bar Counsel Clark, Assistant Bar Counsel King and Assistant Bar Counsel Machado ,
I only just now received the letter, dated February 14th, 2012 that Assistant Bar Counsel King
sent me, wherein the grievance filed by Richard G. Hill, Esq. is set forth. Mr. King wrote,
"please respond in writing to this grievance within ten (10) days from the date of this letter."
000002
I am requesting an extension of time to respond to this matter. I literally just received this
mailing from you within the last hour, and was unaware of this prior to that. Further, I hope I
can demonstrate to you and the State Bar of Nevada that circumstances at least somewhat
beyond my control have prevented me from receiving my mail in an orderly and consistent
fashion. These circumstances resulted in two different Domestic Violence Protection Orders
being granted to me against my former housemates by Master Edmondson of the Second
Judicial District Court in FV12-00188 and FV12-00187. Further, the electricity to my location
was interrupted from one week (though I attempted to get NV Energy to accept payment from
me for services) from February 3rd to February 20th, 2012, incident to one of the individuals
against whom a protection order was issued attempting to prevent me from obtaining electrical
service. Additionally, the same individuals against whom these protection orders were issued
interfered with my access to my mail from the USPS, and it has taken some time to get the
USPS Postal Inspectors to release my mail to me and or allow me to receive mail at my
location.
Please note that I did recently send Bar Counsel David Clark and Assistant Bar Counsel Glenn
Machado a written request that the State Bar of Nevada please help me in remaining aware of
any correspondence being sent me from the State Bar while I work to get my mailbox situation
settled (please see below):
On February 22nd, 2012 I wrote to Bar Counsel Clark and Assistant Bar Counsel Machado that
"I had to move recently and moved in with two individuals who I ultimately wound up getting
Protection Orders against, and they have interfered with my ability to receive my mail with
absolute certainty (I have received much of my mail, and have pending
correspondences/requests with the Postmaster for Reno, NV to obtain a permanent and newly
rekeyed lock and key to access my mailbox...I have been informed by USPS Reno Postmaster
agent named Mr. Heister that if I fax him proof of my location at 1422 E. 9th St. #2, he will then
allow me to get a mailbox key made...I faxed him proof and will call him again tomorrow to see
how much longer I must wait....if its much longer I will make alternate arrangments, however, I
am an electronic filer in both courts that I am appearing in (NVB and WCDC)...). I am writing
to ask that any correspondences/notices etc. that you or the State Bar of Nevada may have
for me or may have mailed to me be, if possible, copied to me via my fax number or email
address."
I feel strongly that Mr. Hill's allegations are ones I will wish to contest vigorously, and I hope I
am afforded an opportunity to do so. There is a lot more to this situation than Mr. Hill indicates.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
000003
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
Contact
Sent: Fri 3/16/12 9:09 AM
March 16, 2012
Zachary Coughlin
Dear Zach,
Thank you for sending me your reply to the grievance filed by Richard Hill. From
your explanation it is clear that things are not as they should be. Please call me
ASAP so that we can take the appropriate action to help you and to stop these
types of disturbing complaints.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel (775) 328-1384
RE: Contact
Sent: Fri 3/16/12 2:42 PM
Dear Zach,
000004
Thank you for your email. I really need for you to call me. Please call me so we can setup a time to
meet.
Thank you.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel 7753281384
To: Patrick King; clarkd@nvbar.org; Glenn Machado
Subject: RE: Contact
Mr. King,
I have not sent you my Reply to the Grievance. You gave me until today, and I am
finishing it up. Additionally, I was subject to what I believe is a wrongful eviction
yesterday, and would like additionaly time to respond to Richard HIll's grievance,
which he appears to be filing on behalf of various third parties, and his associate,
who doesn't bother to sign it. Basically, Mr. HIll constantly seeks to leverage courts,
police, and now, Bar Counsel, to further his nefarious approach to litigation, rather
than roll up his sleeves and find some law in favor of his positions and apply actual
facts to them, rather than make up things or quote to third parties and other hearsay (I
never made contact with or touched Mr. Hill, I never climbed on anyone's truck, Mr.
Hill is not a licensed mental health professional, yet he sounds like a walking DSM-
IV when he writes of me). I will submit something to you today in response to Hill's
grievance, with the caveat that I am requesting more time, in part due to the fact that
the Washoe County Sheriff's Deputies have just yesterday, minutes before my
hearing in Judge Beesley's courtroom, unlawfully stormed into my location at 1422
E. 9th St, #2, with guns drawn and pointed at me, without previously identifying
themselves as law enforcement in any way, and demanding I grab a few things in a
couple minutes and leave. This unlawful eviction was pursuant to an eviction
hearing held that morning by Reno Justice Court Judge Jack Shroeder, the
same Judge who screamed at me "do you want to go to jail" when I attempted to
address in any way whatsoever Richard Hill's abuse of process in getting a Order of
Protection from Judge Schroeder in a scant 40 minutes, and having me arrested on
1/12/12 (two days before Hill's grievance was sent to you), at the extension
hearing on January 31, 2012, where Hill admitted he didn't have a good reason for
seeking an extension and withdrew his application. I wanted to address Hill's abuse
of process for the record, Judge Schroeder decided to scream at me instead. It was
000005
reminscent of Judge Nash Holmes telling me, on the record, in Reno Municipal Court
case 11 TR 26800 that she would have me arrested and placed in jail if I said Richard
G. Hill's name one more time. I cross examined RPD Sargent Tarter about whether
he had a retaliatory motive in ticketing me outside Hill's office on 11/15/11 after Hill
refused to give me my driver's license, and I reported to Sargent Tarter that RPD
Officer Chris Carter had admitted to taking bribes from Richard Hill.
Actually, there is some footage of the "terror" Richard G. Hill was exposed to that
necessitated him seeking a Protection Order (the "RPD made him" do it, honest):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gBu9zflGALE
I don't know why Sargent Sifre (whom makes more money than a District Court
Judge) should be so upset with lawyers like me, who work in the foresclosure
defense field (you might see if Geof Giles, Esq. thinks I am quite the "Yosemite
Sam" caricature of a cartoon villian that Richard G. Hill paints me to be, or if
Thomas J. Hall thinks that much of Rich and his "tactics", which are like those of a
malignant frat boys armed with daddy's pleadings). After all, Sargent Sifre has
benefitted from foresclosure defense work:
http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2011/01/29/nevada-dist-court-quiet-title-viable-sifre-
v-wells-fargo-bank/
Regardless, I have not "ghostwritten" any pleadings for Mr. Gessin or anybody else.
I am listed as attorney of record on adversary proceedings for Gessin, though the
only things I ever filed for him clearly indicated that I was not appearing as attorney
of record and that the Answers to the Complaints in those two adversary proceedings
were being submitted on an "unbundled services" arrangement. The bankruptcy
court nonetheless listed me as attorney of record and I have been and am in the
process of having that changed. I have communicated with clerk Holly Estes and
filing office supervisore Debbie Gallagher in those regards.
I need more time to research and investigate the other allegations Hill makes, though
I do not wish you to infer and admission on my part to any allegation by Hill.
I have researched this service of eviction Order issues extensively, it relates to the
Hill matter, and I believe the WCSO and Hill are not following the law.
I am not sure why you wrote what you did at 9:09 am this morning considering you
granted me until 3:00pm today to file my response, which I intend to along with a
request for more time to supplement it:
From:Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Mon 3/12/12 9:15 AM
March 12, 2012
000006
To: Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
response. Pursuant to your request, you are granted until Friday, March 16, 2012 by 3:00pm to deliver
your written response to the State Bar Office in Reno.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
775 328 6045 fax: 949 667 7402
000007
State Bar of Nevada
P.O. Box 50
Las Vegas, NV 89104
March 9, 2012,
Dear Bar Counsel Clark, Assistant Bar Counsel King and Assistant Bar Counsel
Machado ,
I only just now received the letter, dated February 14th, 2012 that Assistant Bar
Counsel King sent me, wherein the grievance filed by Richard G. Hill, Esq. is set
forth. Mr. King wrote, "please respond in writing to this grievance within ten (10)
days from the date of this letter."
I am requesting an extension of time to respond to this matter. I literally just
received this mailing from you within the last hour, and was unaware of this prior to
that. Further, I hope I can demonstrate to you and the State Bar of Nevada that
circumstances at least somewhat beyond my control have prevented me from
000008
receiving my mail in an orderly and consistent fashion. These circumstances resulted
in two different Domestic Violence Protection Orders being granted to me against my
former housemates by Master Edmondson of the Second Judicial District Court in
FV12-00188 and FV12-00187. Further, the electricity to my location was interrupted
from one week (though I attempted to get NV Energy to accept payment from me for
services) from February 3rd to February 20th, 2012, incident to one of the individuals
against whom a protection order was issued attempting to prevent me from obtaining
electrical service. Additionally, the same individuals against whom these protection
orders were issued interfered with my access to my mail from the USPS, and it has
taken some time to get the USPS Postal Inspectors to release my mail to me and or
allow me to receive mail at my location.
Please note that I did recently send Bar Counsel David Clark and Assistant Bar
Counsel Glenn Machado a written request that the State Bar of Nevada please help
me in remaining aware of any correspondence being sent me from the State Bar
while I work to get my mailbox situation settled (please see below):
On February 22nd, 2012 I wrote to Bar Counsel Clark and Assistant Bar Counsel
Machado that "I had to move recently and moved in with two individuals who I
ultimately wound up getting Protection Orders against, and they have interfered with
my ability to receive my mail with absolute certainty (I have received much of my
mail, and have pending correspondences/requests with the Postmaster for Reno, NV
to obtain a permanent and newly rekeyed lock and key to access my mailbox...I have
been informed by USPS Reno Postmaster agent named Mr. Heister that if I fax him
proof of my location at 1422 E. 9th St. #2, he will then allow me to get a mailbox key
made...I faxed him proof and will call him again tomorrow to see how much longer I
must wait....if its much longer I will make alternate arrangments, however, I am an
electronic filer in both courts that I am appearing in (NVB and WCDC)...). I am
writing to ask that any correspondences/notices etc. that you or the State Bar of
Nevada may have for me or may have mailed to me be, if possible, copied to me
via my fax number or email address."
I feel strongly that Mr. Hill's allegations are ones I will wish to contest vigorously,
and I hope I am afforded an opportunity to do so. There is a lot more to this situation
than Mr. Hill indicates.
Sincerely,
000009
http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=8a4a9f2d-6c5e-1... Page 10 of 57
Zach Coughlin"
From: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
To: lstuchell@washoecounty.us; mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov;
cdbaker@richardhillaw.com; jboles@callatg.com; bbuckley@lacsn.org; daolshan@yahoo.com;
jsoderlund@nlslaw.net; jdelikanakis@swlaw.com; jgoodnight@washoecounty.us;
jbosler@washoecounty.us; bdogan@washoecounty.us; mechols@maclaw.com; mclarkson@puc.nv.gov
Subject: Evictions RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2012 12:14:01 -0800
Subject: RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 11:40:39 -0800
From: LStuchell@washoecounty.us
To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com
CC: mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us
Mr. Coughlin
Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was personally served by
Deputy Machen by posting a copy of the Order to the residence. The residence was
unoccupied at the time.
000010
Liz Stuchell, Supervisor
WCSO Civil Section
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 2:58 AM
To: Stuchell, Liz; Kandaras, Mary; nvrenopd@coplogic.com; Silva, Roxanna;
kadlicj@reno.gov; fourthestate@gmail.com; jamesandreboles@msn.com
Subject: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Dear IA Supervisor Stuchell and DDA Kandaras,
I realize you will likely not read all of this. The main thing is I am respectfully
requesting that you confirm with Deputy Machem that he did, in fact, "personally
serve" the Summary Eviction Order on me at 121 River Rock St., Reno 89501 on
November 1, 2011 at 4:30 pm, in connection with performing the lockout. It is my
position that I was not "personally served" and I am trying to figure out whether
Deputy Machem is lying or whether the phrase "personally served" means something
other than what I believe it means, etc., etc. I appreciate your attention to this.
I am writing to inquire about and complain with regard to an Affidavit of Service
filed by or for WCSO Deputy Machem with respect to the service of a Order
Granting Summary Eviction against me (in my law office where non-payment of rent
was not alleged, no less in violation of NRS 40.253 and where a $2,275 rent escrow
deposit was foisted upon me in violation of 40.253(6), especially where a stay of
eviction was not granted even while the RJC held on to most all my money...).
My issue with the WCSO is that Machem's Affidavit of Service indicates that he
"personally served" me, which kind of reminds me of all that robo-signing and
MERS fraud I come across in my day job (and do you wonder how many attorneys in
the foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with who are watching and
witness the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?), which includes being a
foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it? Did Machem "personally serve" me the
Summary Eviction Order? Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served" in
000011
compliance with all time related rules because it was done in the "usual custom and
practice of the WCSO. What, exactly, is the "usual custom and practice of the
WCSO? I hear a lot about this "within 24 hours" stuff. So, I go hunting for some
black letter law to support what those at the RJC and in the clueless community at
large (which often includes Nevada Legal Services and Washoe Legal Services, the
people you guys had such trouble actually serving in the lawsuits I filed, which may
have actually helped improved legal services in this community, if they were not
dismissed due to insufficiency of service of process, even where the IFP required the
WCSO to served the defendants....). Anyway, back to the "within 24 hours"
phraseology: "
This whole business about The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt
of the order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary
Eviction was signed by October 27th, 2011. That language is only found in situations
inapplicable to the current one. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the
only sections of NRS 40 where this within 24 hours language occurs, and those
situations only apply where, in:
40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b) Advise
the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful
detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of the
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order
and,
40.253(5)(a): 5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the
landlords agent may apply by affidavit of complaint for eviction to the justice court
of the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial
premises are located or to the district court of the county in which the dwelling,
apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has
jurisdiction over the matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the
of the order. The way these summary eviction proceedings are being carried out in
Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law. There
is not basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in this
case. The above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language
are inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where
the Tenant did file an Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen.
To require Nevada's tenants to get up and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the
order (what does that even mean? The use of terms like rendition, rendered,
notice of entry, pronounced, is absent here, and this receipt of the order
language is something rarely found elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV
statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a
000012
Complaint within 90 days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which
follows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing receipt of such a letter, when actual
receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon the
days for mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In Abraham
v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the record did
not reflect when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on
November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on
November 30, 2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding Saturdays and
Sundays. In order to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must
exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue
letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome Center v.
Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)(granting
plaintiff an additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).... ...
Dear Washoe County Sheriff's Office,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Service_of_process
"Substituted service
When an individual party to be served is unavailable for personal service, many
jurisdictions allow for substituted service. Substituted service allows the process
server to leave service documents with another responsible individual, called a
person of suitable age and discretion, such as a cohabiting adult or a teenager. Under
the Federal Rules, substituted service may only be made at the abode or dwelling of
the defendant.[4] California, New York,[5] Illinois, and many other United States
jurisdictions require that in addition to substituted service, the documents be mailed
to the recipient.[5] Substituted service often requires a serving party show that
ordinary service is impracticable, that due diligence has been made to attempt to
make personal service by delivery, and that substituted service will reach the party
and effect notice.[5]"
I am pretty sure "personally served" means you served the person in person, not that
a person named Machem went and posted a notice on a door, personally himself. See,
I think you guys are thinking of the "person" in the word personally as applying to
000013
the server, when in all instances I have ever seen it used in the law, the "person" part
of "personally" applies to the person being served. Help me out here, Mary.
https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspx?cid=43084638f32f5f28&resid=43084638F32F5F28!
1897&parid=root
Also, does the WCSO have a position on what type of service is required of eviction
orders prior to the WCSO or whoever does it, being able to conduct a lockout?
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/courtrules/nrcp.html
NRCP RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER... (c) Default
Judgments: Defendant Not Personally Served. When a default judgment shall have
been taken against any party who was not personally served with summons and
complaint, either in the State of Nevada or in any other jurisdiction, and who has not
entered a general appearance in the action, the court, after notice to the adverse party,
upon motion made within 6 months after the date of service of written notice of entry
of such judgment, may vacate such judgment and allow the party or the partys legal
representatives to answer to the merits of the original action. When, however, a party
has been personally served with summons and complaint, either in the State of
Nevada or in any other jurisdiction, the party must make application to be relieved
from a default, a judgment, an order, or other proceeding taken against the party, or
for permission to file an answer, in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (b)
of this rule.
Okay, so, really, you guys do this for a living, right...you serve people things....and
sign Affidavits under penalty of perjury and stuff, and you are telling me you believe
"personally served" can included situations where the person was not there?
Okay.....You do know that, like, a Summons and Complaint need to be "personally
served" in the sense that, say Machem, would need to see that person and serve it on
them (I don't think they have to take the paper, they don't need to agree to accept
service, but Machem does need to see that person, in person, personally when he is
swearing under penalty of perjury that he "personally served" somebody. Usually
"personally served" is only done in the case of the first thing filed (unless there is an
IFP) in a case, the Summons and Complaint. Thereafter, typically, people just effect
000014
"substituted service" because its cheaper, less of a hassle, and "personal service" is
only required for serving the pleadings that start a case, the Summons and Complaint.
Wow....Okay, so this is my whole point, these state sponsored lockouts under color
of state law should not be being done so fast, unless you guys "personally serve" the
tenant, I feel the law is quite clear, you have to effect "substituted service" which,
under NRCP 6(a) and NRCP 6(e) and NRCP 5(b)(2) (and NRCP, not JCRCP is
applicable to eviction matters according to NRS 118A) the tenant cannot be deemed
to have received or constructively received the Order until the 3 days for mailing has
passed.
Personal service by process server
Personal service is service of process directly to the (or a) party named on the
summons, complaint or petition. In most lawsuits in the United States, personal
service is required to prove service. Most states allow substituted service in almost all
lawsuits unless you are serving a corporation, LLC, LLP, or other business entity; in
those cases, personal service must be achieved by serving (in hand) the documents to
the "Registered Agent" of a business entity. Some states (Florida) do not require that
the documents actually be handed to the individual. In California and most other
states, the documents must be visible to the person being served, i.e., not in a sealed
envelope. If the individual refuses to accept service, flees, closes the door, etc., and
the individual has been positively identified as the person to be served, documents
may be "drop" served, and it is considered a valid service. Personal service of process
has been the hallmark for initialing litigation for nearly 100 years, primarily because
it guarantees actual notice to a defendant of a legal action against him or her.
Personal service of process remains the most reliable and efficacious way to both
ensure compliance with constitutionally imposed due process requirements of notice
to a defendant and the opportunity to be heard. [2]^ The National Law Review: The
Continuing Relevance of Personal Service of Process
And even if something indicates Coughlin "knew" about the Order, much like in the
case of Coughlin's that was dismissed where the Washoe County Sheriff's didn't
manage to get the "personal service" of the Summons and Complaint done in time, or
"sufficiently", opposing counsel in that matter could tell you that "actual notice" is
not a substitute for compliance with the service requirements.
000015
Which is nice because folks like Richard G. Hill, Esq. have less of an opportunity to
game the system and swoop in with lockout then assert a bunch of hooey about NRS
118A.460 "reasonable storage, moving, and inventorying expenses" subjecting the
tenant's personal property to a lien. Richard G. Hill insisted on throwing away the
last thing my beloved grandmother gave me before she died 2 years ago in the town
dump. He and his contractor lied about so many things, including the fact that they
used my own damn plywood to board up the back porch of the property, then
submitted a bill to the court in an exhibit for $1,060 for "securing" the property
(which doesn't really apply to NRS 118A.460's "reasonable storage moving and
inventorying expenses" like it is required to...further, the charged me $900 a month
for storage and sent me a bill for such prior to my arrest for trespassing at the 121
River Rock location,...well if they charged me $900 to have a home law office there,
then how is it someone could be trespassing if they are being charged the full rental
value for "use and occupancy of the premises"? Further, even if it was a storage
situations, there are sections of NRS 118A devoted to evicting someone from a
storage facility, not arresting them for trespass, and certainly not a custodial arrest
where the RPD Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez admit they never issued a warning
to me or asked me to leave prior to conducting a custodial arrest (which required
$800 of bail, great!, and 3 days in jail, no less). This is especially poor form where
Officer Carter admitted to me that he takes bribes from Richard Hill. Hey, if Officer
Carter did not say that to me, go ahead and sue me, my man....I'm waiting.....that's
what I thought.
He can say he was joking all he wants, but it ain't no joking ass situation to me when
you are arresting me and causing a google search result for my name to show an
arrest....that's damaging the only thing I have of monetary value (my professional
reputation and name). It ain't no stand up hour when you are putting me in cuffs, bro.
And Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to properly query Hill as to whether he
had sent me, prior to the trespassing arrest, a bill for the "full rental value" of the
property, a value that, at $900, was the same charge for the full "use and occupancy"
of the premises. And Richard G. HIll, Esq. was too busy chortling and filling out the
Criminal Complaint to bother setting them straight, despite my cues, I guess.
Now, add to that malfeasance the fact that Judge Sferrazza let Casey Baker, Esq.
prepare the Order, which means faithfully put to writing what the Judge announced,
not attempt to steal $2,275 for your Californian Beverly Hills High School graduate
neurosurgeon client by slipping in something the judge never said, ie, that the
000016
neurosurgeon gets to keep the $2,275 that Judge Sferrazza order the tenant to pay
into the Reno Justice Court as a "rent escrow" deposit required to preserve the right
to litigate habitability issues. Now, nevermind the fact that Judge Sferrazza actually
did not have the jurisdiction to require that (there is not JCRLV 44 in Reno, that's a
Vegas rule, and if Reno wants a rule like that of its own JCRCP 83 requires the RJC
to publish it and get it approved by the Nevada Supreme Court first....period.). Okay,
so, to take it a step even further, Baker's order goes on to say "but the $2,275 won't
be released to the neurosurgeon yet, "instead that sum shall serve as security for
Coughlin's cost on appeal, pursuant to Nevada JCRCP 73...". But wait, doesn't that
mean Coughlin then gets a Stay of Eviction during the pendency of the Appeal? Isnt'
that was a security that large must be for? Because the "Appeal Bond" is set by
statute at only a mere $250....so holding on to 10 times that much of Coughlin's cash
must have been for the "Supersedeas Bond" mentioned a yielding one a Stay of
Eviction in NRS 40.380 and 40.385.
I know, I know, its confusing because actually those sections force the landlord, his
attorneys and the RJC to choose between viewing Coughlin as a residential tenant
whose rent is less than $1,000, and whom therefore is only required to post a measly
supersedeas bond of $250 (and remember, a supersedeas bond equals a stay of
eviction equals not trespassing) or the the other choice is to view Coughlin as a
commercial tenant, which would allow charging a higher supersedeas bond (except
for that pesky part about his rent being under the $1,000 required by the statute to do
so, his rent being only $900), except, darn it, old Richard G. Hill, Esq. and Casey
Baker, Esq. elected to pursue this summary eviction proceeding under a No Cause
Eviction Notice, which is not allowed against a commercial tenant (ie, you can't evict
a commercial tenant using the summary eviction procedures set forth in NRS 40.253
unless you alllege non payment of rent and serve a 30 Day Non Payment of Rent
Notice To Quit, which they didn't because they "are just taking the path of least
resistance here, Your Honor (insert their smug chuckling and obnoxious/pretentious
"can you believe this guy?" laughter and head shaking...).
NRS 40.380 Provisions governing appeals. Either party may, within 10 days, appeal
from the judgment rendered. But an appeal by the defendant shall not stay the
execution of the judgment, unless, within the 10 days, the defendant shall execute
and file with the court or justice the defendants undertaking to the plaintiff, with two
or more sureties, in an amount to be fixed by the court or justice, but which shall not
be less than twice the amount of the judgment and costs, to the effect that, if the
judgment appealed from be affirmed or the appeal be dismissed, the appellant will
pay the judgment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use and occupation of the
property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiff during the pendency of the
000017
appeal. Upon taking the appeal and filing the undertaking, all further proceedings in
the case shall be stayed.
So, why on earth is the City Attorney's Office still trying to try Coughlin on the
trespass charge for which he endured a custodial arrest and for which old Richard
Hill is still filing Motion's to Show Cause on in the appeal of the summary eviction
matter in CV11-03628? Why, oh why? Does the Reno City Attorney's Office have
some sort of vested interest in keeping Coughlin down, busy, besotted, encumbered,
or otherwise? It, why, it couldn't be because Coughlin has a really good wrongful
arrest cause of action against the Reno Police Department, could it?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PR7q4OI5b0
And, well, yeah the Washoe County Sheriff's Office didn't quite get those Summons
and Complaints served in that one case Coughlin was suing his former employer in,
the one where Coughlin was granted an Order to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, which
required the Washoe County Sheriff's Office to serve the Summons and
Complaints....But what does that have to to with the 6 days Coughlin spent in jail on
the arrest shown in the youtube video above? Its not like the Washoe County jailed
videotaped a scene where they were forcing Coughlin to get naked and put on a green
dress. What's that? It is? They did do that? Really? No...What? They also forced him
to simulate oral and anal sex with deputies, in the guise of some ridiculous
"procedure" necessary to insure Deputy safety? Oh, wow. And they retaliated against
him for failing to answer their religious preference interrogation questions by placing
him in an icy cold cell for hours at a time, refusing him medical care despite his
plaintive cries for help, while wearing a thin t-shirt? Wow. They didn't jam a taser
needle in his spine for extended periods of time, though, did they? Your kidding!
Whats next, your going tell me Sargent Sigfree of the Reno PD ordered a custodial
arrest on Coughlin for "jaywalking" while Coughlin was peacefully filming, from a
public spot, Richard G. Hill's fraudulent contractor Phil Howard destroying and
taking to the town dump items of enormous sentimental value to Coughlin that he
was prevented from retrieving from the property during the scant time he was
allowed to (after he paid $480 worth of a lien for what he knew not, because, despite,
ol' Contractor Phil's fraudulent $1,060 bill for "securing" the back porch (with screws
facing the outside, inexplicably, and a window unit a/c left in the window facing the
sidewalk near the Lakemill Lodge, secured by nothing but duct tape
It is kind of a combo neon sign that says "Burglarize this Place, Everybody!"),
000018
Coughlin's former home law office was burglarized on December 12, 2011 while
Richard G. Hill was holding its contents (including, tackily, Coughlin's client's files,
like the ones for the foreclosure defense actions, etc.), asserting his "lien". A lien for
"storage" where the charge for storage, $900, was the same as the charge for "full use
and occupany" was. However, that $900 a month for "storage" also included another
$1,060 charge for "securing" (and that bill actually listed "fixing a leak in the
basement...neither of which seem to have much to do with the "reasonable storage,
moving, and inventorying" expenses such a lien is provided for under NRS
118A.460....). Jeez, your probably going to tell me Sargent Sigfree ordered another
custodial arrest on Coughlin just two days after the jaywalking arrest, for the same
fact pattern that Master Edmondson granted Coughlin's applications for Protections
Orders against based upon the battery and assaults that his former housemates
committed. Because, Sargent Sigfree thinks its "misuse of 911" for Coughlin to call
when he returns home at night and his dog has mysteriously disappeared, and his
housemates make menacing commentary about it. Surely, Coughlin, a former
domestic violence attorney would have nothing helpful to add to Sargnet Sigfree's
expert opinion that "animal abuse is not domestic violence" (tell that to NRS 33.010,
Sarge) and that its, rather, "a matter for animal control" and that Sargent Sigfree was
"trying to help" Coughlin by arresting him, again, and necessitating the $1,500 bail
associated with the gross misdemeanor charge, "Misuse of 911" because, as Sargent
Sigfree told Coughlin "you keep putting yourself in situations where you are
victimized" so it was necessary to arrest Coughlin in that regard.
But hey, at least NV Energy hasn't refused to let Coughlin get any electrical service
for the past week since those with the Protection Orders against them cancelled the
service and NV Energy shut it off, without providing any notice to Coughlin, right.
Nevermind. But...but surely when NV Energy shut of the power to Coughlin's home
law office on October 4th, 2011, just hours prior to the bad faith "inspection" with
videographer of Coughlin' s home law office that Casey Baker, Esq. thought so very
necessary one day before Coughlin's Tenant Answer was due...surely NV Energy did
not leave the back gate to Coughlin's home law office open and speed off, Coughlin's
beloved mountain bike suddenly missing (the one the parents of his girlfriend of 5
years gave him)? Well, NV Energy is probably not retaliating against Coughlin for
complaining about that by refusing him electric service for the past seven days, you
would have to assume....
NRS 40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains possession of
premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to
NRS 40.253:
000019
1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be
obtained by filing with the trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to cover the
expected costs on appeal. A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction of the
appellate court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of that court as the suretys agent
upon whom papers affecting the suretys liability upon the bond may be served.
Liability of a surety may be enforced, or the bond may be released, on motion in the
appellate court without independent action. A tenant of commercial property may
obtain a stay of execution only upon the issuance of a stay pursuant to Rule 8 of the
Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure and the posting of a supersedeas bond in the
amount of 100 percent of the unpaid rent claim of the landlord.
2. A tenant who retains possession of the premises that are the subject of the appeal
during the pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount
provided in the underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes
due. If the tenant fails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings for
a summary eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253.
NRS 40.390 Appellate court not to dismiss or quash proceedings for want of form. In
all cases of appeal under NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, the appellate court shall
not dismiss or quash the proceedings for want of form, provided the proceedings
have been conducted substantially according to the provisions of NRS 40.220 to
40.420, inclusive; and amendments to the complaint, answer or summons, in matters
of form only, may be allowed by the court at any time before final judgment upon
such terms as may be just; and all matters of excuse, justification or avoidance of the
allegations in the complaint may be given in evidence under the answer.
NRS 40.400 Rules of practice. The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil
Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals
and new trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220
to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections.
But, back to the Sheriff's Office. And, I am not really buying the idea that you guys
don't know NRCP 4 through 6 like the back of your hand, but....hell, maybe you
don't. But, clearly the language in NRS 40 about how the Sheriff may "remove tenant
from the property within 24 hours of receipt of the Order" do not apply where the
Tenant filed a Tenant's Answer and showed up to the Hearing and litigated the
matter. Especially where, as here the lease had not terminated, by its terms, but was
rather renewed. This is particularly true where NRS 118A prevents so terminating a
holdover tenant's lease for a retaliatory or discriminatory purpose
000020
I would hate to see people start to think the Washoe County Sheriff's Office is cutting
corners on the whole "personally served" thing (just so a landlord could get what they
want quicker), just like I would hate for people to think the Reno Municipal Court is
letting the bottom line get in the way of providing that whole Sixth Amendment
Right To Counsel where jail time is even a possibility thing. And, hey, if the RMC
denies an indigent attorney the Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel, the finds him
guilty of NRS 22.030, Summary Contempt Commited in the Presence of the Court,
and the puts him in cuffs when the Trial ends, summarily sentencing him to 3 days in
jail for violating NRS 22.030, well....that's no big deal, right, I mean, the RMC
technically kept its promise that the underyling charge, though technically it could
result in incarceration would not...because the incarceration was for a whole dang
different charge, ie, Summary Contempt in the presence of the Court....and so what if
the whole zealous advocate thing and the denying the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel thing and the Summary Contempt thing don't go so well together....Or if 6
court employees had to stay til 9pm getting paid overtime at the RMC to get 'r done...
NRCP 4: "(d) Summons: Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be
served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with such
copies as are necessary. Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the summons
attached to a copy of the complaint as follows:...(6) Service Upon Individuals. In all
other cases to the defendant personally, or by leaving copies thereof at the
defendants dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process. [As amended; effective January 1, 2005.] (e) Same: Other Service. (1)
Service by Publication. (i) General. In addition to methods of personal service, when
the person on whom service is to be made resides out of the state, or has departed
from the state, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the state, or by
concealment seeks to avoid the service of summons, and the fact shall appear, by
affidavit, to the satisfaction of the court or judge thereof, and it shall appear, either by
affidavit or by a verified complaint on file, that a cause of action exists against the
defendant in respect to whom the service is to be made, and that the defendant is a
necessary or proper party to the action, such court or judge may grant an order that
the service be made by the publication of summons. Provided, when said affidavit is
based on the fact that the party on whom service is to be made resides out of the
state, and the present address of the party is unknown, it shall be a sufficient showing
of such fact if the affiant shall state generally in such affidavit that at a previous time
such person resided out of this state in a certain place (naming the place and stating
the latest date known to affiant when such party so resided there); that such place is
the last place in which such party resided to the knowledge of affiant; that such party
000021
no longer resides at such place; that affiant does not know the present place of
residence of such party or where such party can be found; and that affiant does not
know and has never been informed and has no reason to believe that such party now
resides in this state; and, in such case, it shall be presumed that such party still
resides and remains out of the state, and such affidavit shall be deemed to be a
sufficient showing of due diligence to find the defendant. This rule shall apply to all
manner of civil actions, including those for divorce"
I guess it don't matter much to me which one of you pays me my damages for the
wrongful eviction, illegal lockout, whether its the landlord, his attorney, or the
Sheriff's Office. Your money is always good with me.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 11:40:39 -0800
Mr. Coughlin,
Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was personally served by
Deputy Machen by posting a copy of the Order to the residence. The residence was
unoccupied at the time.
WCSO Civil Section
000022
MERS fraud I come across in my day job (and do you wonder how many attorneys in
the foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with who are watching and
witness the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?), which includes being a
000023
phraseology: "
and,
receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon the
days for mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In Abraham
000024
v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the record did
not reflect when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on
November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on
November 30, 2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding Saturdays and
Sundays. In order to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must
exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue
letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome Center v.
Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)(granting
plaintiff an additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).
Further, despite what the inaccurate handouts of Nevada Legal Services may say
about this 24 hours and the applicability of the JCRCP to cases like these, NRS
40.400 Rules of practice, holds that :The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil
to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections. As such
NRCP 6(a),(e) applies to the Order of Summary Eviction that WCSO Deputy
Machem alleged, under penalty of perjury, that he "personally served" upon me on
November 1, 2011. That is a lie by Mr. Machem, unless "personally served" is
defined in a rather impersonal way and or Machem and I have totally different
understanding of the definition of "personally served", which may be the case. Or,
perhaps the Sheriff's Office is busy and doesn't want to wait around to "personally
serve" every tenant it wishes to evict. Fine, then just use the "mail it and allow three
days" rule in NRCP 6(e)...the landlord's might not like it, but they can use that
frustration as an incentive not to jump to litigating every disagreement about
habitability that a tenant brings to them. You may not realize how ridiculous some
landlord's get. In my case, I offered to fix basic things that clearly implicated the
habitability rules in NRS 118A.290 and the Californian neurosurgeon, Beverly Hill
High School graduate landlord balked and complained then hired and attorney four
days into a dispute.....at which point the rules against contacting represented parties
prevented much in the way of real settlement discussion, particularly where opposing
counsel has continuously demonstrated a complete indifference to pursuing
settlement (why would he at the rates he bills hours at?). I just don't think the
Sheriff's Office needs to sully its image or damage the citizen tenants of Washoe
County in the name of pleasing people like Dr. Matt Merliss or Richard G. Hill, Esq.
I AM REQUESTING, IN WRITING, THAT BOTH OF YOUR OFFICES
INVESTIGATE THIS AND PROVIDE A SWORN AFFIDAVIT FROM MR.
MACHEM THAT ADMITS THAT I WAS NOT PERSONALLY PRESENT
WHEN HE SERVED THE ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION IN RJC
REV2011-001708 ON 11/1/12 AT 4:30 PM (ACCORDING TO HIS AFFIDAVIT
OF SERVICE). YOU NEVER KNOW, I MIGHT HAVE IRREFUTABLE PROOF
THAT I WAS SOMEWHERE ELSE AT THAT TIME, SO, BE CAREFUL. There
simply is not anything specific in Nevada law addressing how such Summary
000025
Eviction Orders are to be served and carried out. The sections dealing with
NRS 40.253 Unlawful detainer: Supplemental remedy of summary eviction and
exclusion of tenant for default in payment of rent....
6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless
of the information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the
affidavit permitted by subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a
hearing, after service of notice of the hearing upon the parties, to determine the
truthfulness and sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided for in this section. If
the court determines that there is no legal defense as to the alleged unlawful detainer
and the tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order
for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant....
7. The tenant may, upon payment of the appropriate fees relating to the filing and
service of a motion, file a motion with the court, on a form provided by the clerk of
the court, to dispute the amount of the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant
to NRS 118A.460 or 118C.230 for the inventory, moving and storage of personal
property left on the premises. The motion must be filed within 20 days after the
summary order for removal of the tenant or the abandonment of the premises by the
tenant, or within 20 days after:
(a) The tenant has vacated or been removed from the premises; and
(b) A copy of those charges has been requested by or provided to the tenant,
whichever is later.
8. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall schedule a
hearing on the motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days after the filing of the
motion. The court shall affix the date of the hearing to the motion and order a copy
served upon the landlord by the sheriff, constable or other process server. At the
hearing, the court may:
(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460 or
118C.230 and any accumulating daily costs; and
(b) Order the release of the tenants property upon the payment of the charges
determined to be due or if no charges are determined to be due...."
I also want to know why NRS 40. 253(8) was not followed with respect to my
November 17th, 2011 filing of a Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien. Why
didn't the WCSO serve notice, as required by NRS 40.253(8) upon the landlord's
attorney Richard Hill? Why didn't I get a hearing within the 10 days called called for
000026
by that section (to get back my client's files no less), but rather, I had to wait a full 33
days to get a hearing, and service of notice of the hearing was not effectuated, as
required by NRS 40.235(8), by the WCSO. Why?
Please provide an indication, in writing, of the names and case numbers for the last
20 incidences when the WCSO has served notice of a hearing set pursuant to NRS
40.253(8). What's that? The WCSO has NEVER served such notice? Yet the WCSO
is there with bells on (or Machem is) to lie in Affidavits of Service to lock out the
citizen tenants of Washoe County impermissilby early vis a vis NRCP 5(b)(2) and
NRCP 6(e)? Why is that? Is it a conspiracy? Does money talk? When I was arrested
for trespassing on November 12th, 2011 by RPD Officer Chris Carter and Sargent
Lopez, Carter admitted to me that "Richard Hill pays him a lot of money and
therefore he arrests whom Richard Hill says to and does what Richard Hill says to
do...." Both Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to investigate, despite prompting,
whether Richard Hill has sent the tenant/arrestee a bill or demand letter in bill for the
full rental value of the property, $900 per month, under some interpretation of the
"reasonable storage, moving, and inventorying expenses" collectable by a landlord
under a personal property line set forth in NRS 118A.460 (one could also interpret
such a bill as Hill's withdrawing or eradicating the Order of Summary Eviction itself,
which was not "personally served" by the Washoe County Sheriff (despite what their
Affidavit of Service says...I wasn't even there at the time they changed the locks...and
so the Summary Eviction Order was not properly served under NRCP 6, and despite
the Reno Justice Court impermissibly converting $2300 of my money under a "rent
escrow" Order its required I comply with in order to litigate habitability issues in a
summary eviction proceeding under NRS 40.253, despite NRS 40.253(6)'s express
dicate against such an Order (unless, pursuant to JCRCP 83, a justice court gets such
a rule, like Justice Court Rule of Las Vegas (JCRLV) Rule 44, published and
approved by the Nevada Supreme Court, which the RJC has not, rather, the RJC
applies all these insidious secret "house rules" (like forcing tenants to deliver
themselves to the filing office to submit to personal service notice of a summary
eviction hearing within, like, 12 hours of the Tenant filing a Tenant's Answer or
Affidavit in response to an eviction Notice, rather than the service requirements of
such notice following NRCP 6 (days for mailing, etc., etc., in other words, in the RJC
everything is sped up imperissilby to help landlord's out, and the NV. S. Ct ruling in
Glazier and Lippis clearly contemplate personal liability against the Court and or
Judges themselves for so doing)....A Qui Tam action or something a la Mausert's in
Solano County, I believe, in California, would be very interesting...Still haven't heard
anything from the Reno PD about the various complaints I have filed with them in
writing related to the wrongful arrests, excessive force and other misconduct
committed against me, though they did arrest me the other day for calling
911incident to some domestic violence for which I was granted to Extended
Protection Orders against my former housemates....old Sargent Sigfree ordered that
arrest, as he did two days prior when he ordered a custodial arrest of me for
"jaywalking".
000027
Funny thing, I never heard anything back from the RPD about complaints like the
following one:
From:
NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent:
Wed 9/07/11 10:51 PM
****DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS E-MAIL****
We're sorry the following problem was found during review
of your submitted report T11005956:
THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT HOWEVER
THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE OFFICER'S
SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL BE ADDRESSED.
Thank you,
Officer WOZNIAK,
Reno Police Department
What is interesting there is that at least I was provided the name of an officer, a
"Wozniak" (though I have been unable to confirm the existence of
such an RPD Officer...
or whether " THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT
HOWEVER THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE
OFFICER'S SUPERVISOR AND IT WILL BE
ADDRESSED."
000028
What is more strange is that I submitted several online police reports to the Reno PD
(a couple of which asserted complaints against various Reno PD officers, or asked
why RDP Officer Carter, whom admitted taking bribes from Richard G. Hill, Esq. at
the time of my custodial arrest for trespassing (the one where Richard Hill signed a
Criminal Complaint for trespass, then Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to
follow up on my imploring them to ask Hill whether he has recently sent me a bill for
the "full rental value" of the property, the same amount that had been charged for the
"use and enjoyment" of the premises, $900, in comparision to what NRS 118A.460
may deem "reasonable storage" expenses for which a lien is available to a landlord,
though NRS 118A.520 has outlawed rent distraints upon tenant's personal
property....Regardless, between January 8 - 12th, 2012, and was arrested twice by the
Reno PD shortly after submitting these written complaints to the Reno PD.
Actually, upon being released from jail on November 15th, 2011, incident to the
custodial trespass arrest, I went to Richard HIll's office to get my wallet and driver's
license. He refused to provide it to me until late November 22nd, 2011. Hill called
the Reno PD on the 15th (or maybe I did because he was withholding my state issued
ID, the one I would need to rent a room, drive my car, and my wallet, which is kind
of useful in such situations....). Anyways, Sargent Tarter of the Reno PD showed up,
he went inside Hill's office with Hill for quite some time and the result was Tarter
telling me to leave. I did, but while driving down St. Laurence towards S. Virginia
(Hill's office is at 652 Forrest St. 89503 and would have required turning down the
wrong way of a one way street, Forrest, to go back to Hill's Office (so clearly I was
not headed to Hill's office) Sargent Tarter began tailing me, then he pulled me over,
then he gave me a ticket, in retaliation if you ask me for reporting RPD Officer
Carter admitting that he takes bribes from Hill to Sargent Tarter minutes earlier. Uh,
well, anyways, another Sargent calls me later that night, taking the "good cop" role.
But upon informing him of what RPD Officer Carter told me about Hill paying him
money to arrest people during the 11/12/11 trespassing arrest, that Sargent
immediately informed me that, despite this being the first he heard of that, he was
sure that was not happening....I guess RPD Officer Carter is trying to explain away
his comments about Richard Hill paying him money to arrest people by dismissing
them as sarcasm, a joke, said in jest, whatever....but I don't see how that situation (a
license attorney getting arrested for a crime, a conviction for which would result in
that attorney being required to report said conviction to the State Bar of Nevada
under SCR 111, etc., and possibly resulting in a suspension of that attorney's license
to practice law, or worse...) is all that jocular of a situation. Combine that with the too
quick to dismiss my reports of bribery by Richard Hill to officer Carter to the RPD
Sargent who called me on 11/15/11 regarding the retaliation by Sargent Tarter that I
complained of, and I don't think it is all that unreasonable for anyone to take RPD
Officer Carter at his word regarding Richard G. Hill, Esq. paying him money to
arrest whom Hill says to arrest. Add to that Sargent Sigfree ordering my arrest for
000029
jaywalking (by a trainee RPD Officer) on January 12th, 2011 (custodial arrest, bail of
$160 emptied my bank account out, or pretty close to it) while I was peacefully
filming from a public spot Richard G. Hill, Esq's contractor Phil Howard, whom had
submitted bills in courts records and filings under the lien for "reasonable storage
moving and inventorying" found in NRS 118A.460, even where old Phil used my
own plywood at the property to board up the back porch (curiously leaving the
screws holding up the plywood exposed to exterior of the property where anyone
could easily unscrew them, and also leaving in a window unit ac secured only by
ducttape in a window facing a sidewalk by the LakeMill Lodge....which resulted in
$8,000 at least of my personal property being burglarized from my former home law
office on Decmeber 12th, 2011 while Hill was asserting a lien on all my personal
property found therein (and my client's files, which arguably are not even my
property, but rather, the client's property). Hill went on to place what he believes to
be my social security number in court records, on purpose, despite his signing an
Affirmation pursuant to NRS 239B.030 that that was not the case (attaching a two
page report to the RPD as an Exhibit). Then Hill and his contractor Phil Howard both
committed perjury when the signed Declarations attesting that I had climbed on the
contractors truck or ever touched Hill. Hill lies constantly, whether under penalty of
perjury or now, so I don't have time to rebut every little lie he makes (he makes me
out to comes across as a Yosemite Sam caricature of a human being in his filings
when he describes me...).
Further, why am I arrested for trespassing and not those from Nevada Court Services
where they went behind closed gate the the backyard of my home law office and
banged on window extremely loudly for 40 minutes at a time 3 times a day, one guy
ringing the doorbell, one guy moving around all other sides of the property banging
on the windows, peering in closed blinds, and affecting a phony "color of law" tone,
resemblance, and verbal communications, misleadingly announcing that they were
"Court Services, come out now!", wearing their pretend Sheriff outfits, big
equipment saddled belts (including firearms, I believe, and radios), etc. ,etc.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQ132q2O7DY
Add to that that Nevada Court Services Jeff Chandler drives by in his Monster Truck
baring his personalized "NCS" license plate while I am in the RPD squad car,
handcuffed, outside my former law office at 121 River Rock, at the time of the
1/12/12 jaywalking arrest and the appearances are troubling. Now, add to that that
Lew Taitel, Esq. was my court appointed public defender in the Reno Municipal
Court in the trespass case, and that Judge Gardner had refused to provide me the
names of prospective appointed defense counsel (I wanted to run a conflicts check) at
my arraignment (where Marshal Mentzel barked at me in a threatening tone, using
menacing language), whereupon Taitel was appointed as my defense attorney and
000030
filed a notice of appearance, and received my confidential file, pc sheet, arrest
reports, ssn, etc....only its turns out that Taitel shares and office and a receptionist
with Nevada Court Services and they list him and his picture on their website as
"associated with" their Process Server corporation, despite the prohibition lawyers
face against fee sharing with non-lawyers. Then, Taitel somehow manages to get out
of defending my case without filing a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, despite that
being required by the Reno Municipal Court Rule 3(B):
RMCR Rule 3(B): Authorization to Represent (B): An attorney desiring to withdraw
from a case shall file a motion with the court and serve the City Attorney with the
same. The court may rule on the motion or set a hearing.
But, perhaps most troubling of all is the implication that the Reno City Attorney's
Office, which defends actions against the City of Reno Police Department and its
Officers, has a vested interest in discrediting me in advance of the wrongful arrest
lawsuit that the Reno City Attorney's office knew was imminent at the time of all of
the above incidents, relating to the following August 20th, 2011 wrongful arrest by
RPD Officer's Duralde and Rosa. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PR7q4OI5b0
So, that's what attempting to coerce a suspect's consent to an impermissible search
sounds like? Add to that that the trespassing case is before Judge Gardner, whom
most recently was employed with the Reno City Attorney's Office.
And, you know what is funny? Officer Del Vecchio cuffed me and placed me in his
squad car last summer after he terrified me and another gentleman who had bicycles.
He veered across the road and screeched his squad car to a halt, jumped out, and did
some other stuff, then demanded my name and ID...and the lawyer in me didn't like
that that much, and he didn't like me not wanting to give it to him. This occurred
right in front of my home law office in the summer of 2011. He cuffed me and told
me I was going to jail for something about a light on the front of my bicycle (the one
NV Energy likely stole when the shut off my power, unnoticed, on October 4, 2011)
despite my bike actually having such a light....but then Del Vecchio's partner did him
a solid and talked some sense into him, and I humbled it up for Del Vecchio and we
both let it go, and I didn't go to jail....Until Del Vecchio was present supervising
some Officer's training at the scene of my custodial (9 hour) jaywalking arrest) on
1/12/12. But Del Vecchio, I guess either didn't want to or wasn't able to talk some
sense into Sargent Sigfree.....and then Sargent Sigfree (the spelling is likely off) had
me arrested and charged with a gross misdemeanor, "Misuse of 911" just two days
later, on January 14th, 2011 when I called 911 to report that my roommates were
laughing menacingly when I asked them why my dog was missing (I had also been
chased up to my room numerous times since moving in with these people, something
I had to do because so much of my money had been taken up with bail or lost
earnings due to all these wrongful arrests and abuse of processes mentioned
000031
above...also these housemates had chased me with a ten inch butcher knife, two of
my tires were slashed, I was locked out all night on New Years Even when these
changed the locks at around midnight, had my furniture thrown in the street, property
stolen, coffee thrown on me, destroying my smart phone in the process, etc.,
etc...And despite the housemate having an outstanding arrest warrant, and animal
abuse being listed amongst the elements of domestic violence, Sargent Sigfree told
me he was arresting me because I "keep putting yourself in these situations", like,
where I am a victim, and that he was "trying to help you", he said with a smirk and a
laugh to his fellow RPD Officers, whom then proceeded to use excessive force
against me. I guess he was helping me by saddling me with a gross misdemeanor
with a $1,500 bail, especially where its been arranged for Court Services, or pre-Trial
Services to forever deny me an OR, despite my meeting the factors for such set forth
in statute (30 year resident, entire immediate family lives here, licensed to practice
law in Nevada, etc., etc)...I guess it should not be too much of a surprise to me that
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts failed to address the perjury of all three of her
witnesses or that her fellow Reno City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens lied to
me about whether or not the Reno City Attorney's Office even had any
documentation related to my arrest or whether it would in the month before my
arraignment, despite that fact that subsequent productions of discovery tend to
indicate that the Reno City Attorney's Office did have those materials at the time. I
could be wrong about some of this...But that would require and awful lot of
coincidences.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the
electronic Communications Privacy Act 18 U S C 2510-2521 and may contain
000032
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From: PatrickK@nvbar.org
Subject: Contact
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 16:10:24 +0000
March 16, 2012
Zachary Coughlin
Dear Zach,
Thank you for sending me your reply to the grievance filed by Richard Hill.
From your explanation it is clear that things are not as they should be.
Please call me ASAP so that we can take the appropriate action to help
you and to stop these types of disturbing complaints.
000033
RE: more on the way
Sent: Fri 3/16/12 3:15 PM
Dear Zach,
I would appreciate it if you would simply call me.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel 7753281384
To: Patrick King; David Clark; Glenn Machado
Subject: more on the way
RE: Gessin ghostwriting issue
Sent: Mon 3/19/12 9:28 AM
Cc: David Clark (DavidC@nvbar.org)
Goof Morning Mr. Coughlin,
Yes, I did suggest some urgency in having a meeting with you. I would like to have an opportunity to sit
down and talk with you. Please let me know if you are agreeable to meet with me on an informal basis
000034
so we can talk about the process that has been initiated.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel (775) 3281384.
Sent: Monday, March 19, 2012 3:25 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: Gessin ghostwriting issue
Dear Mr. King,
I do not understand. I provided you a ton of information and documentation in my Response to Hill's
grievance, and, after emailing me six hours prior to the deadline to do so saying you already received
my Response (which you had not, and which I had informed you that you had not but would be
recieving it), you know call and or write me less than a day after receiving my voluminous Response and
want to meet urgently. This sends a strong message that you did not put much time into analyzing my
response, which would tend to indicate such a meeting would lack traditional due process protections,
would it not? I have already been attacked by a Character and Fitness Committee member while he
owned the Spearmint Rhino strip club in Las Vegas, and where the Committee promised to get me the
names of "three attorneys who will handle your case on a pro se basis" but where only one name was
provided, and that name wound up being and attorney would extracted soem approximately $7,000 i his
fees and the fees of a gambling addiction specialist (both of whom admitted to being extremely close
personal friends of Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly, Esq. who then owned the
Spearmint Rhino strip club. Next, Christiansen and Sanft bungled several deadlines and client
confidences related to extremely sensitive information, whereupon, finally, Director of Admissions
Eichman made the unilateral decision to refrain from submitting my case for review, despite her receipt
of my Request for Reconsideration. Finally, Christiansen's legal assistant Kelly Huff wrote me explaing
that I had failed to provide their office with the Request for Reconsideration that I sent it on 9/15/03,
despite my having fax confirmation proof of this and despite a subsequent copy of the file provided by
Christiansen's office proving they had recieved such a Request, and that is was received by them on
9/15/03. I do not mean to be standoffish, Mr. King, but it is what it is. How Ms. Eichman's rationale for
her action is different than what any attorney might say upon blowing some deadline or otherwise
having a client's file fall behind a filing cabinet for a couple years, is really not at all clear to me.
As to my official address with the State Bar and receiving my mail, the USPS is likely going to be sued
for the handling of my mail, should it become clear that any client matters where prejudiced in light of
what has been deplorable conduct by the station involved.
Further, as to Hill's Motion for Order To Show Cause, please see the attached copy of Hill's application
for an Order of Protection, then compare it to Hill's other filings wherein he suddenly backs off his
assertion that I was "climbing on the contractor's truck". Hill lied when he wrote that. I did not climb
on anybody's truck. Hill merely did not want me to film all that he was throwing away, especially given
that he was throwing away unique items that had both monetary and sentimental value and because he
000035
had no good reason for refusing to allow me to take those items other than spite and an attempt to get
me to sign away my security deposit, which Hill still has not returned. Further, Hill is not licensed under
the FDCPA as a debt collector yet attempts to so practice, as such, this grievance should focus on that
as well. Hill needs to answer for his lies about me allegedly "making contact" with him, about me
allegedly "climbining on the contractors truck", about his abusing the TPO process to gain advantage in
a litigation (ie, to prevent evidence collection and discovery), about his abuse of process in seeking to
get me arrested and signing a criminal complaint where service of the evictio order was insufficient, and
regardless, Hill had vitiated its import anyway by billing me for the same amount as the "full use and
occupancy" (and I have a video of Hilll admitting to this and his firms 11/10/11 letter admits to that as
well. Further, as for his Motion for Order to Show Cause, as it relates to an alleged contempt on my
part in failing to abide by the 1/11/12 Order from in CV11-03628, well, NRCP 6(e) requires that 3 days
for mailing be accorded even for electronic filings. As such, any activity on my part of 1/12/12 clearly is
irrelevant as service was not effectuated at that point and there is not allegation that any "personal
service" was undertaken. That being the case, here is another basis for grievance against Hill,
especially his continually filing documents not based in fact or law, as here.
Some more regarding Hill's grievance. Hill clearly attempts to mislead when he suggest that the
Supplemental I filed in the Carpentier's foreclosure defense matter was incorrectly filed there. Clearly, I
intended to file it there and the attached email I sent to Hill explains clearly why I copied him on it
(because I foresaw Hill filign a Bar grievance for "ex parte communications" based upon some idea that
arguments made in one case that bare some connection to another case would be a basis for Hill crying
foul, and, as seen in Hill's "ghostwriting" grieviance, its a very low standard for crying foul that Richard
has, which is typical of all the most feckless attorneys. That email indicated to Hill and his staff:
One, I would like to reserve my objection to "Good Samiritan" Richard G. Hill purporting to file
grievances on behalf of the public in general or Mr. Gessin, or whoever it is Richard is doing this for. I
suspect Richard is doing this for the same reason he does so many other things: to keep opposing
counsel busy with responding to all spineless paper pushing that Richard G. Hill is so very well known for
throughout Northern Nevada legal circles. Nonetheless, important issues are brought up in Mr. Hill's
grievance. To a great extent, I foresaw these issues long ago and attempted to address them
appropriately. I often get clients who are on their third or fourth attorney. Mr. Gessin was one such
client. By that time they all want to sue their former attorneys, and feel quite burned by the fees they
have paid. Mr. Gessin was a good example of this and he wished to proceed on an unbundled services
arrangement, or a flat fee per motion/opposition/pleading basis, etc. From the very, very long time
that went by between my passing the July 2001 Nevada Bar Examination and being admitted to practice
in March of 2005, the issue of the legality of ghostwriting for pro se litigants was something I was
somewhat aware of, but I don't believe I ever did. I am somewhat disappointed that I was not
industrious enough to get anywhere close to doing such a thing but mostly I was just so demoralized by
not having a license and from the rape that the character and fitness committee and Kelly, and
Christiansen and Eichman et al committed upon me that I mostly just worked for Thomas J. Hall, Esq.
for about $0.89 per hour (just kidding, I love Tom) doing legal research in the Washoe County Law
Library while the librarians glared at me and let me know how very disappointed they were that I, or
any member of the public, really, had interrupted their solitude.
So now it seems there is a tough situation where, on one hand, as a now licensed attorney, there is
some taboo to "ghostwriting" (necessitating such lucrative activities as responding to grievances filed by
opposing counsel like Richard G. Hill, Esq.....and I sure hope you will countenance the grievances I am
filing against Hill, Christiansen, Sanft, Kevin Kelly, Eichman, etc, with the same seriousness that your are
taking Richard G. Hills. I notice Richard G. Hill, Esq. has a funny way of being able to get the police
(and some others that I probably shouldn't mention) to take his complaints just a little bit more seriously
than they take others. I would also like to file a grievance against all three of the public defenders I
have been appointed in the trespass case in Reno Municipal Court for 11 CR 26405, Lew Taitel, Roberto
Puentes, and Keith Loomis. Each have thoroughly failed to zealously advocate on my behalf, with
Loomis calling my arguments vis a vis the procedural requirements for serving eviction orders in
000036
thoroughly contested summary eviction proceedings "frivolous" despite being provided the attached 22
page memorandum detailing those arguments and despite the procedures requiring as much set forth in
the Anvui decision of the Nevada Supreme Court. I would also like to file a greivance against Deputy
Reno City Attorney Ormaas for her blase indication that she cared not about any admission of bribery on
the part of Reno Police Officer Chris Carter, and that she would not be following up on that, even where
it bared some relation to the citation in 11 TR 26800 issued by Sargent Tarter, for which I cross
examined Sargent Tarter as to whether he did so in retaliation for my reporting Officer Carters
admission of accepting bribes from Richard G. Hill. Instead, I believe Deputy City Attorney Ormaas and
City of Reno Marshal Hiney (the spelling might be a bit off) conspired to have Judge Nash Holmes have
me arrested for summary contempt in Order to obtain my cell phones, which upon information and
belief, Ormaas and Hiney believe might contain "evidence" of misconduct on both of their parts. Hiney
attempted to serve me Notice of Hearing on Motion for Order to Show Cause in the appeal of the
Richard G. Hill, Esq. eviction matter (one of three instances of "triple jeopardy" Hill has me facing
here....this Bar grievance, the criminal complaint in 11 CR 26405, and, actually, multiple Orders to Show
Cause (one in the Trial Court in RJC Rev201--001708 and one in the associated Appeal in CV11-
03628). However, the actual Affidavit of Service that the WCSO filed for the Notice of Hearing Marshal
Hiney attempted to serve me (please inquire with Chief Marshal Roper, perhaps?) was actually signed by
the same WCSO Deputy Machem that swore, under oath, in his 11/7/11 Affidavit of Service in the
eviction case RJC REv2011--001708 that he "personally served" the Order of Summary Eviction. The
attached 22 page memorandum sent to various individuals and the admission of WCSO Civil Section
Supervisor Liz Stuchell that, in their mind, "personally served" can mean a lot of things that it has never
meant in any legal settings, is provided for background. I also wish this to begin a grievance against
Deputy Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts for what I believe may be several violations on her part of the
rules relative to prosecutorial misconduct, especially those involving suborning perjury, including that of
Officer Kameron Crawfor saying in 11 CR 22176, that I did not provide him my drivers license, and
therefor issuing me a citation would not be an option, but rather, my failure to provide my driver's
license buttressed his proable cause finding justifying a search incident to arrest. However, Roberts, in
11 CR 22176 and later on appeal in CR11-2064, had in her possession Wal-Mart AP video from the
interrogation room clearly showing me providing Officer Kameron Crawford my driver's license and other
evidence supports a finding that he had it (including dispatch reports and the information culled by
Officer Kameron from the driver's license and placed on the arrest report, which Officer Crawford later
lied about, saying he got that information at the WCSO, which is clearly contrary to established protocol
and privacy policies). One more grievance against Reno City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens for
lying to me on the phone about whether the City of Reno had the arrest report from the September 9,
2011 arrest at Wal-mart from the Reno Sparks Indian Colony in 11 CR 22176. I wish for all of these
grievances to go forward now, but I may provide supplementary materials in support thereof later.
Additionally, she has the "purchased receipt" that showed it had the very UPC number that both
Frontino and Crawford swore under oath that it did not.
Barrie Althoff, Limiting the Scope of Your Representation: When Your Client Wants, or Can Afford, Only
Part of You, Washington State Bar News (Jun. 1997).
Anthony P. Capozzi, Responding to the Pro Per Crisis, California Bar Journal (Feb 2004).
Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited Appearances Can Provide an Ethically
Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se Litigants, The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics,
Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer 2007).
Kim Prochnau, Slicing the Onion: Rules of Professional Conduct and Court Rules Make It Easier for
Private and Non-Profit Legal Practitioners to Provide "Unbundled" Legal Services, Washington State Bar
News (Apr. 2003).
Bradley A. Vauter, Unbundling: Filling the Gap, Michigan Bar Journal, Vol. 79, at 1688 (2000).
Books and Reports
Caught in the Middle: 2003 Report and Recommendations of the North Carolina Bar Association Pro Se
Task Force (Dec. 2003).
Challenge to Justice: A Report on Self-Represented Litigants in the New Hampshire Courts, New
000037
Hampshire Supreme Court Task Force on Self-Representation (Jan. 2004).
Ethics Issues Regarding the Concept of Unbundled Legal Services (Memorandum), Rob Bare, Nevada
State Bar (Mar. 31, 1999).
Family Law Limited Representation Risk Management Materials, Limited Representation Committee,
California Commission on Access to Justice (January 12, 2004).
Handbook on Limited Scope Legal Assistance, ABA Section of Litigation (2003).
Pro Se Litigants: The Challenge of the Future, Massachusetts Probate and Family Court Department Pro
Se Committee Report (Dec. 1999).
Report and Recommendations on "Unbundled" Legal Services, Commission on Providing Access to Legal
Services for Middle Income Consumers, New York State Bar Association (Dec. 2002).
Report of the Unbundled Legal Services Special Committee II, Florida Bar Association (Jul. 26, 2002).
Report on Limited Scope Legal Assistance with Initial Recommendations, Limited Representation
Committee of the California Commission on Access to Justice (Oct. 2001). Appendix
Self Represented Litigants in the Virginia Court System, Supreme Court of Virginia Pro Se Litigation
Planning Committee, Enhancing Access to Justice Report (Sept. 2002).
Unbundling Legal Services: A Guide to Delivering Legal Services a la Carte, Forrest S. Mosten, American
Bar Association (2000).
Cases
Melvin Finance, Inc. v. Artis, 157 N.C. App. 716, 2003 WL 21153426 (N.C.App.)
Defendant retained an attorney on a limited basis, following an action filed by the plaintiff to recover
costs on a defaulted loan. Limited representation attorney agreed to file responsive pleadings and
negotiate a settlement agreement, and filed a notice of limited appearance. While the defendant
received notice of a scheduled hearing and forwarded it to his limited representation attorney, neither
defendant nor attorney appeared at the hearing and, consequently, an arbitration award was entered for
the plaintiff. Defendant filed a motion to set aside judgment, which was denied. On appeal, the
defendant claimed the limited representation attorneys failure to appear at the hearing amounted to
excusable neglect and that the judgment should be set aside. The court found that since the defendant
received notice of the hearing and had retained the attorney on a limited basis, that the limited
representation attorneys conduct did not constitute excusable neglect. The lower court decision was
affirmed.
Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 868 F.Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1994)
Former sheriff department workers bring sexual harassment suit against county sheriff in his individual
and official capacities. Attorney representing sheriff enters limited appearance on behalf of his official
capacity. Court finds that attorney cannot enter limited appearance on behalf of sheriff's official capacity.
Attorney representing sheriff must act for the entire person, including individual and official capacities.
Entering such limited appearance is not competent and zealous representation as required by ethical
rules as it leaves officer undefended on individual capacity claims. Court further finds that ghostwriting
of documents for pro se litigants may subject lawyers to contempt of court. Ghostwriting gives litigants
unfair advantage in that pro se pleadings are construed liberally and pro se litigants are granted greater
latitude in hearings and trials. Ghostwriting also results in evasion of obligations imposed on attorneys
by statute, code, and rule, and involves lawyers in litigants' misrepresentation of pro se status in
violation of ethical rules.
Ricotta v. California, 4 F.Supp.2d 961 (S.D. Cal. 1998)
Attorney licensed in the State of California did not violate procedural, substantive, and professional rules
of a federal court by lending some assistance to friends, family members, and others with whom she
shared specialized knowledge. Attorney performed research and prepared rough drafts of portions of pro
se litigant's pleadings in an action against various official defendants, but did not sign the documents.
Because attorney did not gather and anonymously present legal arguments with the actual or
constructive knowledge that plaintiff would use them in court, and because attorney did not engage in
extensive, undisclosed participation that permitted plaintiff to falsely appear as being without
professional assistance, attorney had not violated any rules.
Sharp v. Sharp, 2006 WL 3088067 (Va.Cir.Court)
Complainant and respondent were co-tenants of real estate property. The respondent appeared pro se
000038
during a hearing before the commissioner in chancery, but then hired an attorney who appeared in a
limited capacity at several other hearings. On appeal, the court sought to determine whether or not the
attorney could appear in a limited capacity and whether the attorneys appearance qualified him as
official "attorney of record". The court found that it was not bound by agreements made between client
and attorney and that a court may "require more of an attorney than mere compliance with the ethical
constraints of the Rules of Professional Conduct". The court found that the attorney could make a
motion to withdraw once he completed the tasks agreed upon, but that the court had ultimate discretion
in granting the withdrawal.
Streit v. Covington & Crowe, 82 Cal.App. 4th 441 (2000)
In a lawsuit, plaintiffs counsel of record requested that another firm make a "special appearance" at a
summary judgment motion, appearing on behalf of counsel of record. Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice
suit after a summary judgment was entered against her, arguing that the special appearance created an
attorney-client relationship. The appellate court found that an attorney making a special appearance
represents the clients interests and has a professional attorney-client relationship with the client.
Further, the voluntary appearance created a limited representation status and not a true "special
appearance".
Court Rules
Alaska
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 81, expressly permits limited appearances and governs attorney
withdrawal.
Arizona
Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure 9(B), governs limited representation and attorney withdrawal in
family law proceedings.
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 5.2, governs limited representation and attorney withdrawal in
vulnerable adult exploitation actions. California
California Family and Juvenile Rules 5.71, governs application to be relieved as counsel.
California Civil Rule 3.36, governs notice and application to be relieved as attorney.
Colorado
Colorado Rule of County Court 311(b), requires lawyers to disclose assistance in document preparation
but clarifies that such disclosure does not create an entry of appearance.
Delaware
Delaware Family Court Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2), governs limited appearance, service and attorney
withdrawal in family law matters.
Florida
Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, Rule 12.040, governs Limited Appearance, Withdrawal or
Limiting Appearance, Scope of Representation, Preparation of Pleadings or Other Documents, Notice of
Limited Appearance, and Service.
Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure 12.750, governs the operation of self-help programs within family
courts.
Iowa
Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure enabling unbundled services include:
z RCP 1.404(3), expressly permitting limited appearances so long as the court is notified;
z RCP 1.404(4), governing termination of limited appearance;
z RCP 1.423, requiring lawyers who prepare pleadings in limited representation to sign them and
clarifying that signing a pleading does not constitute an appearance;
z RCP 1.442(2), establishing the requirements for service on attorney who has made a limited
appearance.
Maine
Maine Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(c), explicitly allows limited representation and allows a lawyer to
file a limited appearance if the client consents in writing.
000039
Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 11 governs limited appearances.
Missouri
Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16 (c), governs attorney withdrawal for limited representation.
Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure 55.03, permits a lawyer to draft pleadings without disclosure and
clarifies appearance and withdrawal of attorney in limited representation.
Nebraska
Nebraska RPC 501.2, governs limited representation, attorney assisted document preparation and
attorney withdrawal.
Nevada
Rules of Practice of the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, Rule 5.28 requires signed
pleadings, notice of the limited representation to the court and governs the procedure for withdrawal.
New Hampshire
New Hampshire Rules of Civil Procedure enabling unbundled services include:
z RCP 3, requiring that pleadings and communication be furnished to both client and limited
representation attorney until withdrawal of limited appearance;
z RCP 17, governing appearance, attorney withdrawal and document preparation assistance.
New Mexico
New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct 16-303(E), requires lawyer to disclose scope of
representation to court.
Utah
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 74(b), governs attorney withdrawal following limited appearance.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 75, expressly permits limited appearances after client consents in writing.
Vermont
Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure 79.1(1), governs appearance, withdrawal and service.
Vermont Rule of Family Procedure 15(h) governs limited appearances, withdrawal and service in family
law matters.
Washington
Washington Civil Rule 4.2, expressly permits a limited entry of appearance.
Washington Civil Rule of Limited Jurisdiction 4.2, governs limited appearances.
Washington Civil Rule 11, permits a lawyer who assists with drafting to rely on the self-represented
party's representation of facts.
Washington Civil Rule of Limited Jurisdiction 11, permits a lawyer who assists with drafting to rely on the
self-represented party's representation of facts.
Washington Civil Rule 70.1, expressly allows limited appearances in litigation.
Washington Civil Rule of Limited Jurisdiction 70.1, expressly allowing limited appearances in litigation.
Wisconsin
Milwaukee County Family Division Rule 5.6 expressly permits limited appearances.
Wyoming
The Uniform Rules of the District Court of the State of Wyoming, Rule 102 governs appearance and
withdrawal for unbundled representation.
Ethics Opinions
Los Angeles Cnty Bar Ass'n Prof. Resp. and Ethics Comm. Ethics Op. 483
An attorney may limit the attorney's services by agreement with a pro per litigant to consultation on
procedures and preparation of pleadings to be filed by the client pro per. A litigant may be either self-
represented or represented by counsel, but not both at once, unless approved by the court. In order for
attorney to specially appear on behalf of the litigant before the court for a limited purpose, the attorney
should comply with all applicable court rules and procedures of the particular tribunal.
Delaware State Bar Assn Op 2006-1
A lawyer may be required to perform beyond the term of a limited scope representation agreement if
the Court requested, or the Clients circumstance warranted such action. In most circumstances, an
agreement to withdraw from representation would not violate any ethics requirement as long as the
000040
lawyer provides adequate advice to Client concerning the scope of representation. In family court, the
Courts permission may be needed to withdraw from simple divorce petitions in certain circumstances.
D.C. Bar Op. 330 (2005)
Unbundling of legal services is permissible under D.C. Rule 1.2 ( c ), provided the client is fully informed
of the limits on the scope of the representation and these limits do not prevent the provision of
competent service. If a party is proceeding pro se, opposing counsel should treat that party as
unrepresented unless and until that counsel receives reasonable notice of representation from the party
or her lawyer.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n Prof. Conduct Comm. Op. 849 (1983; Affirmed 1991)
An attorney may agree in advance with his or her client to limit the scope of the attorney's
representation and draft pleadings without appearing or taking any part in any of the proceeding itself,
provided that the client gives his or her fully informed consent to such limitation of employment and the
attorney takes whatever steps may be necessary to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client's rights.
Maine State Bar Ethics Opinion No. 89 (1988)
A lawyer is not required to sign a complaint or enter an appearance as counsel of record when
representation is solely limited to preparation of the complaint.
Missouri Bar Ass'n Advisory Op. 940161
It is impermissible for a lawyer to draft responsive pleadings to an unrepresented opposing party in a
divorce. However, a lawyer may draft an entry of appearance if the lawyer includes a letter indicated
that he or she represents the opposing party and that the unrepresented party should obtain counsel.
New York State Bar Ass'n Op. 613 (1990)
A lawyer who does not appear as counsel of record for a pro se litigant may prepare responsive
pleadings and demands for financial disclosure, provided the lawyer investigates the matter adequately.
North Carolina State Bar RPC 114 (1991)
Legal services attorneys may provide legal advice and drafting assistance to pro se litigants without
appearing as counsel of record. If court approved pleading forms exist, attorneys may make them
available to individuals wishing to proceed pro se.
Bd. of Prof. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn. Op. 2005-F-151
Attorneys may offer limited representation through a pro se clinic if they obtain clients consent,
preferably in writing. Attorneys may draft proceedings for clients, if the attorney notifies the Court that
counsel has assisted a pro se litigant. The phrase "Prepared with Assistance of Counsel" is
recommended for inclusion on such pleadings in a prominent manner. Attorneys who draft proceedings
need not appear and represent the client.
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm. Op. 08-01 (2008)
A lawyer may provide legal assistance to litigants appearing before tribunals pro se and help them
prepare written submissions without disclosing or ensuring the disclosure to others of the nature or
extent of such assistance. Undertaking to provide limited legal help does not generally alter any other
aspect of the attorneys professional responsibilities to the client.
As to the ghostwriting, its tough, because, for clients who want to pay very little (after, say, in Gessin's
case he paid McKenna allegedly $15K to wind up with an Order from an Arbitrator and District Court
Judge denying a Trial De Novo based upon a bad faith failure to participate in litigation in one case, then
in the other, Gessin paid Hill something like $20K only to be slammed car crash style into settlement by
Hill's advice when Gessin couldn't stomach paying anymore of HIll's fees, settling for the amount
originally sought by Mr. Hall's client). So, clients like that want a deal, want to pay piece meal or go the
unbundled route, but filing all those Motions to Withdraw, and Proposed Orders, and Affidavits, add to
the costs where the fee is not really being increased any. There is much literature dealing with this:
Please accept this as a supplement to the grievance filed by Richard Hill, Esq. My recollection of my
involvement with Gessin is that I filed two Answers to very similar Adversary Complaints in NVB and two
Motions to Dismiss in those same cases, involving the two women represented by Glade Hall, Esq., both
on an "unbundled services" basis, and the pleadings themselves indicated the were filed as
an "unbundled service". This was my first filign in NVB, and I was not registered or trained as an
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electronic filer at that point. Further, Gessin hired me to provide other unbundled services, inlcuding
writing (and, to my understanding at the time, filing under my own signature) something in the vein of a
NRCP Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment from judgments in cases involving the same two
women Taitano ne Moore, and Rissone, both, again, represented by Glade Hall, Esq.
It may be the case that Richard Hill is correct that I was goign against some rule or law by sending one
demand letter to Glade Hall concerning an outstanding $500 sanction aware. I believe I drafted an
Order To Show Cause for this, but am not sure it was filed by me. About the time I provided Gessin my
signed final draft of that and a few other closely related motions, he pretty much wanted to part ways, I
believe. I think this was around mid-November and there was some issues with Richard HIll withholding
my client files, some of which may have included Gessin's, then Hill would say he would give me my
client files without any demands or lien needing satisfying prior to doing so, and that he would do the
same with my wallet and identification, but then he would change his mind and demand what to me
seems that I satisfy a rent distraint that has been outlawed by NRS 118A.520 (though there is a very old
BK case, circa 1980 or so that may suggest such distraints are still permissible against commercial
tenants, and my hybrid, home law office situation, plus the fact that I do still have a business license for
Zachary Coughlin's Memory Foam Mattresses (something I started during the 4 years I was hoping to
get a law license and finding employment very, very difficult to obtain, during which Mike Rowe wrote
me stern letters, Pete Christiansen and Mike Sanft -ignored me and shewed me to their legal assistant
Kelly Huff, and Director of Admissions Patrice Eichmann made the unilateral decision to ignore the
Request for Reconsideration of my Application for Admission that I timely submitted on 9 15 03 in
connection with the end of the deferment period set forth in the Court's December 2002 Order....) and
at least some research and development was ongoing in that regard. Whether I was a commercial or
residential tenant was an important issue in the eviction matter and the mixed use of the property likely
only made the statute all the more difficult to interpret.
However, I do recall that Gessin told me he withdrew his bankruptcy, so that may negate Hill's assertion
that I was wrongful in sending a demand letter to Hall regarding the old sanction and or filing a Motion
for Order To Show Cause. Gessin is a crafty guy, though I am not sure I entirely share Hill's view of
him. However, Hill apparently received about $20-25K in attorney's fees from Gessin in a case that the
plaintiff was only seeking about $25K in to begin with, and upon Gessin ceasing to be willing to pay Hill
and Baker for more litigating, they promptly suggested he settle for something near $30K (which, of
course, was upsetting to Gessin, in a manner that is similar to how Dr. Merliss seems to feel in the
eviction matter). But, to be fair to Hill, those parties likely bare some responsibility for choosing to take
the risky path that is litigation.
Gessin also became a registered efiler about the time he basically terminated my representation of him.
My email to Gessin below shows that I was somewhat suspicious of the fact that he seemed to all the
sudden want to go our separate ways after I had been working on these very involved (to me at the
time they seemed really involved) NRCP 60(b) Motions, and it is ironic, somewhat that Hill accuses me
of ghostwriting because my email to Gessin essentially anticipates that, and, to some extent, my later
filing Notices of Appearance as Attorney of Record in several of Gessin's various cases involving these
two women was done to attempt to counteract any appearance of that. Gessin seemed upset that I
filed those appearances, and actually got very pushy about me trying to undo them, and eager to avoid
prejudicing his ability to file timely 60(b) motions, I undertook to do what I could to make it so he could
file on his own (ie, having an Attorney of Record on one's case often results in the filing office refusing
to let them file anything on their own...).
On Wed, Dec 7, 2011 I wrote to John Gessin's email address the following:
"To: John Gessin <jd.gman@yahoo.com>
John,
Here is Van Lydegraf's voice message. Again, I have not talked to him and I forwarded you the only email or
writing I ever sent him. I am leaning towards filing an Errata on your cases today to get it so I am not attorney
of record. Which do you prefer? I am not sure which would accomplish your goals quicker, but keep in mind,
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RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
I believe a Motion to Withdraw is the typical thing, not a Notice of Withdrawal? Have you found any research
in this regard? Please indicate in writing which you prefer or the preferred manner you would like to see me
pursue accomplishing your goals, which, to my understanding, include being in pro per on this case. I sense
you are uncomfortable, but please know I maintain extremely high fidelity to my clients, unbundled or
otherwise, okay? I am unsure how me filing the 60b's etc would have been much different with respect to
what you seem upset about...did you never intend for me to file? Were you looking for a "ghost writer"? I
was not of the understanding that I was being hired as a "ghostwriter" and I do recall some indication that such
a thing is either prohibited or discouraged by the Rules of Professional Responsibility....Regardless, the most
important thing is to avoid prejudicing your case, and I feel I have made great efforts to achieve that. If you
want to file something, just do it, don't wait for any withdrawal, etc. I will make all reasonable efforts to see
that you are allowed to file whenever and whatever you want, and not be weighed down by any attorney of
record designation.
Sincerely,"
I currently have a Motion to Withdraw pending in the two Adversary Proceedings where I believe I was
incorrectly listed as Attorney of Record for Gessin.
Sent: Wed 3/21/12 11:35 AM
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
The allegations against you are serious and put into question your competence to practice
law. I would like to meet with you so that I can talk with you about the allegations and see if
there is a way
to assist you.
If you do not meet with me, then the Office of Bar Counsel will be forced to make decisions
without the benefit of actually getting to sit down and talk with you.
Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel.
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Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 8:31 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: hello from Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. King,
The Reno Munic Court is still withholding both of my cells phones and some others items, so calling you
is problematic. I can check voice mail by email, such as:
"Bye, hey jack is packing. How are you doing. My assistant Bar Council and we've
been sharing some emails. I would like to hear from you, so we can talk on the phone
if you could please call me at (775) 328-1384 Thanks a lot. Bye. "
Until then, could we communicate in writing please. I provided you a great deal of
material in response to Hill's grievance, and I feel that should take you more than one
hour to appropriately review, so....
Also, I have filed a motion to withdraw in Gessin's Bankruptcy AP cases and a Reply
to Opposition, though I don't really know what in the hell that matters or why
Richard Hill is able to leverage your office to make busy work for me by making
completely unsupported "ghostwriting" accusations, etc., etc.
Sincerely,
Sent: Thu 3/22/12 10:50 AM
Good Morning Mr. Coughlin,
I sorry to hear that you are having to deal with some extremely tough circumstances. Please
come see me as soon as you can.
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Sincerely,
Patrick King
Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2012 2:31 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: RE: hello from Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. King,
I appreciate the seriousness of the process and want to show it the respectd it
deserves. I take what I do very, very seriously. If you can give me some time, it
would help. Due to the recent eviction (and that is an area of law where I am doing
important work that often goes neglected...the societal cost to Nevadans subject to
this ultra fast summary evictions, on top of the procedurally questionable manner in
which they are carried out and served, is immense...sure it might help pay some RPD
Sargents more than District Court Judges, but its done on the backs of real human
beings suffering, etc....).
I had a hearing today where I represented a client in a UIFSA matter. He needs me.
My representation is very important to his life. He is a committed father who has
been dealt some extremely tough circumstances. I think I have only received
something like $500 from this client so far, and have done enough work to make that
less than minimum wage, etc..
I do want to meet with you. It would be most prudent though, for my clients and
myself, if you and the State Bar could afford me some time to tend to the immediate
need to get a new living space and office, attend and defend the "quadruple jeopardy"
abuse of process that Richard Hill is orchestrating, and otherwise protect my client's
interests. I am not refusing to speak with you on the phone or meet in person. My
two phones are still being held by the Washoe County jail, under an Order by RMC
Judge Nash Holmes, so....The USPS Golden Valley Station has retaliated against me
by interferring with my mail, though I have taken all reasonable steps to counter that,
including securing a new PO BOX, which I added as my public address on the Bar's
online portal days ago, but for which I still do not see a change reflected. The
Federal Torts Claims act has likely been violated by USPS Golden Valley Station
supervisors Terry James and Buck Hyde, whom took it upon themselves to play
judge and jury incident to a complicated eviction process that I have recently been
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litigating against Park Terrace Townhomes HOA and Western Nevada Management
and Gayle Kern, LTD. It involves respondeat superior liability, etc., etc. Western
Nevada Management knew of and orchestrated, and received approval from the Park
Terrace HOA to have the two individuals who I rented from live at the 1422 E. 9th
St. 89512 location. This involved a Robyn Badalato, then a property manager at
Park Terrace. For some reason, when her boss found out about this, she started
crying, saying she was going to be fired, etc., etc.. Then she apparently resigned.
This was litigated in an interruption of essential services (electricity) complaint I
filed recently. The HOA and Sue King admitted these things, yet they want to turn
right around and disclaim an responsibility for anything, pursue a summary eviction
despite the facts not lining up with the Glazier case sufficient to allow such, etc.,
etc.
I can sit down and talk with you whenever you want. However, I am writing to
explain why this week or the immediate future would prevent a hardship for me with
regard to scheduling such a meeting. Please no that is not a reflection upon my
respect for you, the State Bar, your office, or this process, but rather indicative of the
realities faced by businesses subject to summary evictions where the non payment of
rent is NOT alleged, something which the law is supposed to forbid under NRS
40.253, but for which the Reno Justice Court has now subjected me to TWICE in
three or four months....
I hope you can understand though, that deadlines are running, Richard Hill has me
facing quadruple jeopardy via his abuse of processes, etc. I have a hearing on that
this week. But I am not some young punk who is going to come in and let Jon Bailey
blow a lot of intimidation and hot air at him for his millionaire buddy Mark Tratos
(whom had to admit under oath, that he had previously "lost" other student's papers
in his illustrious career as an adjunct professor. And that was also confirmed by
Anderson and Morishita, two former patent attorney associates for Mr. Tratos. Also,
Mr. Tratos lost or "failed to receive" Jessica Wolf's paper in that 2002 Cyber Law
course, but I don't recall the State Bar of Nevada raping her. Further, Tratos wrote
me asking for "another copy of your paper", which implies he received one. Then he
went on to ask for detail about the paper, what it was about etc., clearly implying he
did have possession of the one I turned in with only my "blind grading" social
security number, etc. (he had a student in the class who worked for his firm,
he probably interpreted my adherence to the "blind grading" setup that was utilized in
every other course I took at Boyd as a personal affront, etc....To me it is disturbing
that the State Bar of Nevada had allowed Mark Tratos to so leverage the resources of
the State Bar to wreck shop on my life, while, apparently, no real inquiry has ever
been made as to whether Tratos did so inappropriately. He was "on vacation in
Europe" according to my "pro bono" attorney Pete Christiansen (and so did not
appear at the June 2002 conclusion of the hearing before the C&F Committtee, whom
was referred by Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly, whom owns
the strip club, The Spearmint Rhino, or did at the time. I believe in Senator
Grassley's "sunshine and transparency" in government, and in this grievance process
too.
000046
Sincerely,
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 18:36:13 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
The allegations against you are serious and put into question your competence to practice law. I would like to
meet with you so that I can talk with you about the allegations and see if there is a way
to assist you.
If you do not meet with me, then the Office of Bar Counsel will be forced to make decisions without the benefit of
actually getting to sit down and talk with you.
To: Patrick King
Dear Mr. King,
"Bye, hey jack is packing. How are you doing. My assistant Bar Council and
we've been sharing some emails. I would like to hear from you, so we can
talk on the phone if you could please call me at (775) 328-1384 Thanks a lot.
Bye "
000047
RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Until then, could we communicate in writing please. I provided you a great
deal of material in response to Hill's grievance, and I feel that should take
you more than one hour to appropriately review, so....
Also, I have filed a motion to withdraw in Gessin's Bankruptcy AP cases and a
Reply to Opposition, though I don't really know what in the hell that matters
or why Richard Hill is able to leverage your office to make busy work for me
by making completely unsupported "ghostwriting" accusations, etc., etc.
Sincerely,
Sent: Fri 3/23/12 10:17 AM
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
I have repeatedly expressed my interest in having a meeting with you to discuss the grievances
against you. You claim to be too busy to meet with me, yet you have time to write lengthy emails and
apparently to do legal research.
You asked if Mr. Hill has standing to file a grievance against you. Not only does he have
standing to file a grievance, as a lawyer in Nevada he may have an ethical obligation to report to the
State Bar. As I have explained to you, the grievances against you came not only from Mr. Hill but also
from Judges from different Courts. These grievances, and the evidence attached with them, rather
clearly puts into question your competence to practice law. As I have explained to you, I will make the
evidence and exhibits available to you when you come to inspect them at my office. I will not send
you reports or document, especially since you claim your mail is being compromised.
As for the grievances you have made, nothing that you have submitted appears to show an
ethical violation that could be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is the standard of proof
000048
required in disciplinary matters. As such, at this time we have not opened any files based on the
information you have submitted.
Sincerely,
Patrick King
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 9:12 AM
To: Patrick King; cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
Subject: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
American Jurisprudence Trials
Database updated April 2011
Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceedings
31 Am. Jur. Trials 633 (Originally published in 1984)
III Attorney-Client Grievances
10 In general
11 Sources of complaints and grievances; checklist
12 Former criminal clients
13 Particular problem clients
14 Fee disputes; checklist of factors of reasonableness
15 Arbitration; forms
16 Fee dispute committee hearings; illustrative testimony
Chapter 13 debtors' attorney violated Nevada rule of professional conduct defining
professional
misconduct to include engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
000049
misrepresentation
and engaging in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice, where attorney,
acting in bad faith,
filed documents which he or someone in his office generated to falsely certify
debtors' completion of
required credit counseling course and which he knew, or should have known, that
debtors did not
sign or otherwise adopt, and also certified documents as being completed by debtors.
11 U.S.C.A.
109; Nev.Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4. In re Pagaduan, 429 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 2010).
Mr. King, could you please update me on that status and progress of the various
grievances I filed recently in addition to providing a detailed summary of the content
of all of your correspondences, written or otherwise, and telephone communciatiosn
with Richard Hill or anyone with his office. Further, please state whether Casey
Baker is part of the grievance, as Hill asserts he is filing it on Mr. Baker's behalf.
Sincerely,
Or, is Hill attempting to leverage the State Bar of Nevada's Bar Counsel to create
"busy work" for opposing counsel?
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
Sent: Fri 3/23/12 10:56 AM
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
Please come to see me and I will show you the letter and documents from the Court.
000050
Patrick King
To: Patrick King
Subject: RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
Mr. King,
This is the very first time you allege anyone other than Mr. King filed
or alleged a grievance. Please provide any documentation or proof
related to these apparent communications from judges that you are only
now bringing up.
Sincerely,
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 17:18:34 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
000051
Sincerely,
Patrick King
10 In general
000052
Chapter 13 debtors' attorney violated Nevada rule of professional conduct
defining professional
misconduct to include engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation
and engaging in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice, where
attorney, acting in bad faith,
required credit counseling course and which he knew, or should have known,
that debtors did not
sign or otherwise adopt, and also certified documents as being completed by
debtors. 11 U.S.C.A.
109; Nev.Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4. In re Pagaduan, 429 B.R. 752
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
Mr. King, could you please update me on that status and progress of the
various grievances I filed recently in addition to providing a detailed summary
of the content of all of your correspondences, written or otherwise, and
telephone communciatiosn with Richard Hill or anyone with his office.
Further, please state whether Casey Baker is part of the grievance, as Hill
asserts he is filing it on Mr. Baker's behalf.
Sincerely,
Or, is Hill attempting to leverage the State Bar of Nevada's Bar Counsel to
create "busy work" for opposing counsel?
000053
Sent: Fri 3/23/12 12:08 PM
March 23, 2012
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
Just moments ago I received an email letter from the Clerk of the Court in
Department 3. She said that you appeared wearing pajamas over your clothes
and were demanding and argumentative. Apparently I will be receiving a report
from the Marshals. As Assistant Bar Counsel I would like to help you. However,
my primary responsibility is to protect the public and the administration of
justice by insuring that Nevada Lawyers are complying with standards required
of the profession. It appears that you are not. I believe that there are ways to
get you assistance that may protect your license to practice law. I would sure
appreciate the opportunity to talk with you about resources and assistance that
may help you through this difficult time.
To: Patrick King
Mr. King,
now bringing up.
000054
Sincerely,
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 17:18:34 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
Sincerely,
Patrick King
000055
10 In general
000056
Sincerely,
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Outlook Print Message
file:///R|/...1%20email%20to%20ballardd@reno.gov%20regarding%20longoni%2022176%2026800%200204%200435.htm[11/16/2012 4:21:20 PM]
Close Print
where to pay and how much
From:Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 12/16/11 10:44 PM
To: plongoni@charter.net
Dear Ms. Longoni,
I have left you several messages. I wish to pay whatever it is I have to pay to get this appeal
transcript going and to preserve all my rights to review of the decision in RMC 11 cr 22176. Further,
I would like a copy of the audio from the hearing as soon as possible. Please provide specific detailed
instructions as to how to pay and how much and anything else I need to do.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
817 N. Virginia St. #2
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-
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review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is
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no reply from Transcriptionist
Sent: Wed 12/21/11 12:02 AM
To: renomunirecords@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov
000080
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Dear RMC,
It is my understanding the Judge Howard's order regarding email does not extend to the address to
which I am sending this correspondence: renomunirecords@reno.gov which is the email address filing
office supervisor Donna Ballard indicated to me was acceptable for sending correspondence and
filings to the RMC in lieu of faxes. I am writing because the email address I was provided for RMC
"official transcriptionist" Pam Longoni yielded a "return to sender/failed transmission" message when
I wrote to the email address provided for her: plongoni@charter.net. Further, please see the
forwarded email below that I sent to Ms. Longoni. I have not received a return call from her
regarding my recent messages to her. I was told by a RMC filing office counter employee that I must
get the transcript through Ms. Longoni, as she is the "official transcriptionist" for the RMC. Please
confirm that I am no able to have another certified court reporter or transcriptionist create the official
transcript and indicate by what date this must be done, how it must be done, etc.
I was told by RMC filing office staff, including Ms. Ballard, that the RMC would not accept any
filings fees, bonds, or any other payments from me in relation to the underlying case 11 CR22176 2I
or the appeal of that matter given that the RMC was holding the bail money I paid into the court. If
this is not the case or if I must pay anything into the RMC to ensure that my appeal goes forward,
please indicate as much in writing and with particularity. If I am able to use any other
transcriptionists and or the RMC has a list of such with contact information, please provide such in
writing.
Sincerely,
/s/Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Defendant/Appellant
000081
Subject: where to pay and how much
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 22:44:37 -0800
Dear Ms. Longoni,
transcript going and to preserve all my rights to review of the decision in RMC 11 cr 22176. Further,
I would like a copy of the audio from the hearing as soon as possible. Please provide specific detailed
instructions as to how to pay and how much and anything else I need to do.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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note: Coughlin's
property
lists his
driver's
license
despite RSIC
Officer
Crawford's
testimony
11/30/11
11CR22176
file:///R|/...2012%20TRIBAL%20POLICE%20CANNOT%20MAKE%20MISDEMEANOR%20ARRESTS%200204%2022176.htm[11/23/2012 3:39:43 AM]
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Tribal Police not allowed to arrest for misdemeanors FW:
Case No. RCR2011-063341
From: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Sent: Sun 11/11/12 8:40 AM
To: homerj@reno.gov (homerj@reno.gov); complaints@nvbar.org (complaints@nvbar.org);
hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov (hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov); robertsp@reno.gov
(robertsp@reno.gov); kadlicj@reno.gov (kadlicj@reno.gov); fflaherty@dlpfd.com
(fflaherty@dlpfd.com); patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); tsusich@nvdetr.org
(tsusich@nvdetr.org); wongd@reno.gov (wongd@reno.gov); ormaasa@reno.gov
(ormaasa@reno.gov); bonyr@reno.gov (bonyr@reno.gov); skauc@reno.gov (skauc@reno.gov);
davidc@nvbar.org (davidc@nvbar.org); drakej@reno.gov (drakej@reno.gov); je@eloreno.com
(je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com); mike@tahoelawyer.com
(mike@tahoelawyer.com); nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net);
skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com)
How exactly is it that both City Attorney Pamela Roberts, Esq. and Chris Hazlett-
Stevens, Esq. did not violate RPC 3.8 or otherwise prosecute for arrests that were not
lawful
in RMC 11 CR 22176 (Indian Tribe police custodial arrest for misdemeanor? Not
lawful under NRS 171.1255, and even if they were RPD, which they are not, its not like
they charge Coughlin with something other than petty larceny a la NRS 171.136(2)...
Further, can you provide me an indication of how it was lawful for RSIC Officer's
Kameron Crawford or Donnie Braunworth to arrest me on 9/9/11 (and Wal-Mart's
Thomas Frontino made explicitly clear in his testimony at trial on 11/30/11 that neither
he nor any of Wal-Mart's staff in any way effected a custodial arrest of Coughlin on that
date) for a misdemeanor given the following:
NRS 171.1255 Arrest by officer or agent of Bureau of Indian Affairs or police officer employed by Indian
tribe.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, an officer or agent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs or a
person employed as a police officer by an Indian tribe may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant
delivered to him or her, or may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) For a public offense committed or attempted in the officer or agents presence.
(b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross misdemeanor, although not in the officer
or agents presence.
(c) When a felony or gross misdemeanor has in fact been committed, and the officer or agent has
reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
000093
(d) On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony or gross misdemeanor
by the person arrested.
(e) When a warrant has in fact been issued in this State for the arrest of a named or described person
for a public offense, and the officer or agent has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested
is the person so named or described.
(f) When the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed
a battery upon that persons spouse and the peace officer finds evidence of bodily harm to the spouse.
2. Such an officer or agent may make an arrest pursuant to subsection 1 only:
(a) Within the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony for an offense committed on that
reservation or colony; or
(b) Outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony if the officer or agent is in fresh
pursuit of a person who is reasonably believed by the officer or agent to have committed a felony
within the boundaries of the reservation or colony or has committed, or attempted to commit, any
criminal offense within those boundaries in the presence of the officer or agent.
For the purposes of this subsection, fresh pursuit has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 171.156.
(Added to NRS by 1985, 452)
While Ormaas made sure to get judicial notice taken of jurisdiction in 11 TR 26800, it doesn't seem
Pamela Roberts, Esq. did in the Indian Colony Wal-Mart matter...Why is that, Pam? Tribal land? Never
determined if Coughlin had even an ounce of tribal blood? RSIC Officers not entitled to make custodial
arrests for misdemeanors, even, apparently, one's committed right in their presence? So, even if
Coughlin did refuse to provide his driver's license (which has been proven to be a lie, and perjury
suborned by Pam Roberts as to the testimony of Wal-Mart's Frontino and the RSIC Officer's Crawford
and Braunworth via police reports, dispatch recordings (AND PLEASE BE ADIVSED, AS ITS WITHIN THE
2 YEARS, THAT THE CITY OF RENO, THE SOUTH DISPATCH CENTER FOR ECOMM OR WASHOE
COUNTY, OR WHOEVER IT IS THAT HANDLES THE RSIC DISPATCH CALLS, IT ON A LITIGATION HOLD
NOTICE. COUGHLIN DEMANDS (AND THE DISPATCH/ECOMM SOUTH DISPATCH CENTER WILL GET
ITS NRS 174.345 SUBPOENA IN THE MAIL FOR A MISDEMEANOR SOON ENOUGH) THAT THE
CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS MAINTAIN ANY AND ALL RECORDINGS, LOGS, OR OTHER DOCUMENTATION
OR MEDIA IN ANY WAY CONNECTED TO ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER,
ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO THE ARREST OF 9/9/11 AT THE RSIC WAL-MART IN RENO NEVADA
NEAR GLENDALE AND W. 2ND ST.
So, all these arrests by the RSIC police of alleged shoplifters at Wal-Mart...Sling Bla...er, Officer
Braunworth testified that there was lots of them (sounds like Wal-Mart and the RSIC have the whole
"find a way to get a search incident to arrest" thing down part, while avoiding any wrongful arrest
liability against the deep pocket tenant Wal-Mart by avoiding any "shopkeeper's privilege" type citizen's
arrests (or trying to use just as much intimidation and coercion as Frontino and the gang can muster,
while seeking to claim not to have effected a citizen's arrest later in court, given setting the RSIC up to
handle those types of lawsuits is arguably a better long term loss mitigation approach for these long
term business partners, Wal-Mart and their partner/landlord the RSIC.
So, please enlighten me. How is it these RSIC Officers are making all these custodial arrests for simple
misdemeanors? And just where in the audio transcript of the Trial (you might want to have RMC house
000094
transcriptionist Pam Longoni finally get around to making a transcript and providing it to Coughlin, as
the handouts the RMC itself provides defendants baring Longoni's and the RMC's "down
payment"/transcript hostage rules are tantamount to extortion in violation of NRS 189.030. Then there
is the bit about the RMC and or other discovering over $700K was "missing", and the attempts to chalk
it up to "data entry" errors. Please get that transcript to me right away, and transcripts of every other
hearing I have ever had in the RMC, including the one on or around February 2nd, 2012 or so where
RMC court appointed defender Roberto Puentes successfully argued for an Order Granting His
Withdrawal (five Withdrawals by court appointed counsel of Coughlin, four via an Order Granting a duly
filed Motion (though these guy's Motions wouldn't pass my 7th grade English Class's bi-weekly writing
assignment in my days at Swope Middle School) and Hon. W. Gardner starts to divulge, only after
Coughlin's prompting, bit by bit some of the patent conflicts that should have prevented him from ever
ruling on a single motion in that case 11 CR 26405. With such lack of vigor from the RMC's court
appointed defense counsel, could a class action lawsuit agains them, the RMC, and or the City of Reno
be a possibility someday? Certainly is a nice lil side gig $7K a month those guys get...and all these
prosecutions and trips to jail this year certainly have afforded an opportunity to see the "operation" up
close.
Also, you know, as to lots of these arrests, like say the July 3rd, 2012 arrest by RPD Officer Alan
Weaver and now Sargent Brian Dye in 12 CR 12420 (wherein two RMC court appointed counsel have
already sought and obtained Orders Granting Their Withdrawal, one, by Keith Loomis, one by Henry
Sotelo, the latter in violation of the stay in NRS 178.405) the legitimacy of effecting a custodial arrest is
completely suspect considering:
ARREST: BY WHOM AND HOW MADE
NRS 171.124 Arrest by peace officer or officer of Drug Enforcement Administration.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 and NRS 33.070 and 33.320, a peace officer or an
officer of the Drug Enforcement Administration designated by the Attorney General of the United States
for that purpose may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him or her, or may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) For a public offense committed or attempted in the officers presence.
(b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross misdemeanor, although not in the officers
presence.
(c) When a felony or gross misdemeanor has in fact been committed, and the officer has reasonable
cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
(d) On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony or gross misdemeanor
by the person arrested.
(e) When a warrant has in fact been issued in this State for the arrest of a named or described person
for a public offense, and the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested is the
person so named or described.
2. A peace officer or an officer of the Drug Enforcement Administration designated by the Attorney
General of the United States for that purpose may also, at night, without a warrant, arrest any person
whom the officer has reasonable cause for believing to have committed a felony or gross misdemeanor,
and is justified in making the arrest, though it afterward appears that a felony or gross misdemeanor
has not been committed.
000095
So back to the Wal-Mart RSIC arrest...the charge sheet doesn't say Coughlin was arrested for anything
other than petty larceny....but:
NRS 171.136 When arrest may be made.
1. If the offense charged is a felony or gross misdemeanor, the arrest may be made on any day, and at
any time of day or night.
2. If it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m., except:
(a) Upon the direction of a magistrate, endorsed upon the warrant;
(b) When the offense is committed in the presence of the arresting officer;
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the
public and:
(1) There is a warrant of arrest against the person; and
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting
officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for another alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person
makes an arrest immediately after the offense is committed;
(e) When the offense charged is battery that constitutes domestic violence pursuant to NRS 33.018 and
the arrest is made in the manner provided in NRS 171.137;
(f) When the offense charged is a violation of a temporary or extended order for protection against
domestic violence issued pursuant to NRS 33.017 to 33.100, inclusive;
(g) When the person is already in custody as a result of another lawful arrest; or
(h) When the person voluntarily surrenders himself or herself in response to an outstanding warrant of
arrest.
So, on exactly what basis was the July 3rd, 2012 arrest made by the RPD? The police report says the
arrest was made for "disturbing the peace", yet the only allegation of anything remotely in the "officer's
presence" relates to the minor traffic citation the City of Reno is clinging to in attempts to mitigate the
Sec. 1983 damages here. However, the RPD admits at least one vehicle was between their's and
Coughlin's and Sooudi et al (besides making an incomprehensibly stupid decision to briefly file an
amended complaint for trespassing where even the RPD was smart enough to realize that was a poor
choice given Coughlin still had lease at Northwind, and thus a pat claim of right defense to any trespass
allegation absent something like the manufactured protection order that RPD Officer Weaver coerced
Milan Krebs into obtaining, just like Weaver attempted to get Superior Storage's Matt Grant to do,
shortly after Weaver, in full view of Welch, Sargent Miller, and other RPD Officer's, on September 21st,
000096
2012, threatened to come up with yet another fraudulent "failure to secure a load on one's vehicle"
arrest of Coughlin). So, even though Weaver and Dye are stuck with their statements in the written
reports, wherein they allege to have arrest Coughlin for "disturbing the peace" only to then tack on
"citations" for the two traffic offenses (and the "proof of insurance" citation, even after Officer Weaver
admits to being provided a high definition pdf picture on a 5 inch smart phone screen with a policy
number, etc., only to be amplified by the July 5th, 2012 bail hearing racket tearing (a tennis reference
for Jill Drake, Esq.,... for shame, really Jill, really, really unimpressed).
Please remit a certified check for $450,000 in satisfaction of these torts committed upon Coughlin,
under color of law.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
To: homerj@reno.gov; complaints@nvbar.org; hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov;
kadlicj@reno.gov; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; patrickk@nvbar.org; tsusich@nvdetr.org
Subject: RE: Case No. RCR2011-063341
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2012 20:36:27 -0800
couldn't open them, and I don't accept service of anything form you... See Allison
Ormaas comments on 3/12/12 in 11 tr 26800 with respect to your offices violation of
the RMC Rules to the extent there is not difference technologically anymore between
an email and a fax:
Rule 5: Motions/Pleadings by Facsimile
A. All rules and procedures that apply to motions/pleadings filed in person at the court shall also apply to motions/pleadings filed by
facsimile, except as otherwise specified in this rule.
B. All motions/pleadings filed by facsimile will only be accepted through the clerk's office (775-334-3824).
C. Except by prior court approval, a motion/pleading by facsimile shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages in length, including the cover sheet
and exhibits. A document shall not be split into multiple transmissions to avoid the page limitation.
D. Each transmitted page shall bear sequential numbers in the transmission.
E. All persons are eligible to use motion/pleading-by-facsimile procedures.
F. All motions/pleadings filed by facsimile must be accompanied by a cover sheet which must include the persons name, address, fax
number and telephone number.
G. All facsimile motions/pleadings filed by an attorney must include the attorney's name, the firms name, address, fax number and
telephone number. In addition, the attorneys state bar number must be conspicuously displayed on the cover sheet.
H. All motions /pleadings filed by facsimile must be accompanied by proof of service. Service may be accomplished by facsimile when
the receiving party is a governmental agency, an attorney, or with the consent of the receiving party. If service of the
motion/pleading is accomplished by facsimile the 3-day allowance for mailing shall not be computed into the time for response.
I. A defense attorney filing a motion/pleading in the first instance must also file a proper authorization to represent.
J. Any motion /pleading received by the court after 4:30 p.m. or on a non-court day shall be filed on the following court day.
000097
Rule 6: Continuances
No continuance shall be granted, including a stipulated continuance, except for good cause. A motion or stipulation for continuance must
state the reason therefore and whether or not any continuance has previously been sought or granted.
Further, Please consider Pamela Roberts attempts to mislead the Court and opposing counsel where (despite Rich HIll getting a
continuance agree to by then court appointed defense counsel Lew Taitel, whose business partners Coughlin was suing in CV11-03015
and or CV11-03126, Taitel agreed to a continuance, in violation of Coughlin's speedy trial right, where Hill needed to go on a six week
vacation in 11 cr 26405) Roberts at first agreed, in writing, to a continuance in response to Coughlin's request for one in 11 CR 22176, but
then retaliated against Coughlin's pointing out her RPC 3.8 violations on the day of Trial, 11/30/12 by refusing the stipulate to a continuance
an blaming it on the Court.
Pursuant to RMCR Rule 5(H), the City Attorney's Office does not have my consent to service via any means
other than the traditional snail mail, usps, or personal service. And I am not currently included amongst those
who are "attorneys", so you are stuck with that. Your office on the other hand, fits within both the
'governmental agency" and "attorney exceptions"...someone needs to tell Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Esq. that
becuase he has lied numerous times, on the record about not being served where he has been. Take, for
instance
Further, does your office represent any of the RMC's court appointed defenders? Taitel, in 11 CR 26405, failed
to follow RMC Rules in withdrawing from representation:
Rule 3: Authorization to Represent
A. Attorneys representing defendants shall promptly serve written notice of their appearance with the City Attorney and file the same
with the Court.
B. An attorney desiring to withdraw from a case shall file a motion with the court and serve the City Attorney with the same. The court
may rule on the motion or set a hearing.
Further, these RMCR's seem to change out of the blue, is there some record of what changes were made and when?

Hazlett-Steven's lies, in part, helped secure a dismissal of my appeal in cr12-1262 (the appeal of the Richard G. Hill eviction trespass
case). Also, you will want to query the RMC's D2 and Lisa Gardner as to why Coughlin has a confirmation of delivery of his timely under
NRS 189.010 Notice of Appeal in 11 cr 26405, yet D2 failed to file it, and the appeal in cr12-1262 was dismissed in light of the combination
of both asserting, in one way or another, that the Notice of Appeal was not received in a timely manner. The delivery confirmations say
otherwise.
Please remit $250,000 in the form of a certified check to the address below within 10 days in settlement of these torts. SBN, please
provide to me the grievance number associate with this new grievance that is created upon the successful transmission of this email.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
000098
utbound fax report
Inbox x
Jun 27
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successfully sent to 14021bda-178b-448f-afcc-1af150604a18general693298 ( 17753344226).
Your Fax was delivered @ 08:54:28 PM on 2012-06-27.
xoxo,
The Voxox Team
This message was intended for renoattorney@gmail.com. Want to control which emails you receive from Voxox?
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Jun 27
Hi zachcoughlin,
Jun 28
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was delivered @ 08:13:34 AM on 2012-06-28.
Jun 28
Hi zachcoughlin,
Jun 28
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successfully sent to 3ad3f15b-3a33-4863-a6cd-7934ec8f8b32general693298 ( 17753343859).
Voxox noreply@voxox.com
to me
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000161
Close Print
where to pay and how much
no reply from Transcriptionist
Sent: Fri 12/16/11 10:44 PM
Dear Ms. Longoni,
transcript going and to preserve all my rights to review of the decision in RMC 11 cr 22176.
Further, I would like a copy of the audio from the hearing as soon as possible. Please provide
specific detailed instructions as to how to pay and how much and anything else I need to do.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product
or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure,
000162
Sent: Wed 12/21/11 12:02 AM
To: renomunirecords@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Dear RMC,
It is my understanding the Judge Howard's order regarding email does not extend to the address to
which I am sending this correspondence: renomunirecords@reno.gov which is the email address
filing office supervisor Donna Ballard indicated to me was acceptable for sending correspondence and
filings to the RMC in lieu of faxes. I am writing because the email address I was provided for RMC
"official transcriptionist" Pam Longoni yielded a "return to sender/failed transmission" message when
I wrote to the email address provided for her: plongoni@charter.net. Further, please see the
forwarded email below that I sent to Ms. Longoni. I have not received a return call from her
regarding my recent messages to her. I was told by a RMC filing office counter employee that I
must get the transcript through Ms. Longoni, as she is the "official transcriptionist" for the RMC.
Please confirm that I am no able to have another certified court reporter or transcriptionist create the
official transcript and indicate by what date this must be done, how it must be done, etc.
I was told by RMC filing office staff, including Ms. Ballard, that the RMC would not accept any
filings fees, bonds, or any other payments from me in relation to the underlying case 11 CR22176 2I
or the appeal of that matter given that the RMC was holding the bail money I paid into the court. If
this is not the case or if I must pay anything into the RMC to ensure that my appeal goes forward,
please indicate as much in writing and with particularity. If I am able to use any other
transcriptionists and or the RMC has a list of such with contact information, please provide such in
writing.
Sincerely,
/s/Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Defendant/Appellant
000163
Subject: where to pay and how much
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 22:44:37 -0800
Dear Ms. Longoni,
transcript going and to preserve all my rights to review of the decision in RMC 11 cr 22176.
Further, I would like a copy of the audio from the hearing as soon as possible. Please provide
specific detailed instructions as to how to pay and how much and anything else I need to do.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 229-6737
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
000164
000165
Close Print
RE: arraignment
From: Dogan, Biray (BDogan@washoecounty.us)
Sent: Fri 2/24/12 4:29 PM
Your case has been continued. I will send the new court date by mail.
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 6:36 AM
To: Dogan, Biray
Subject: arraignment
'Sup Biray,
I went and got the arraignment done today....Judge Pearson informed me we have a
mandatory 2/27 1:30 STATUS Conference RJC with in rcr12-065630
However, I already had a "Trial" set in bench trial 11 tr 26800 RMC (ticket number 544281) 1pm feb 27th Judge
Holmes (talk to cashiers) right of way stop sign, can you get a continuanc brokered on the status conference.
Judge Pearson said you are my attorney of record in this matter, though you haven't been communicating with me
much far as I can tell and you guys hung up on me last we spoke.
Hope to hear from you, amigo,
000166
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000184
****** IMPORTANT NOTICE - READ THIS INFORMATION *****
PROOF OF SERVICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
A filing has been submitted to the court RE: CV11-03628
Judge: PATRICK FLANAGAN
Official File Stamp: 02-08-2012:16:34:48
Clerk Accepted: 02-08-2012:16:35:22
Court: Second Judicial District Court - State of Nevada
Case Title:
ZACHARY COUGHLIN VS. MATTHEW
MERLISS (D7)
Document(s) Submitted: Ord to Show Cause
Filed By: Kathryn Sims
You may review this filing by clicking on the
following link to take you to your cases.
This notice was automatically generated by the courts auto-notification system.
If service is not required for this document (e.g., Minutes), please disregard the below language.
The following people were served electronically:
ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ. for ZACH
COUGHLIN
CASEY BAKER, ESQ. for MATTHEW MERLISS
RICHARD HILL, ESQ. for MATTHEW MERLISS
The following people have not been served electronically and must be served by traditional
means (see Nevada electronic filing rules):
000185
F I L E D
Electronically
02-10-2012:01:49:40 PM
Joey Orduna Hastings
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 2758134
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F I L E D
Electronically
02-10-2012:01:49:40 PM
Clerk of the Court
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A filing has been submitted to the court RE: CV11-03628
Judge: PATRICK FLANAGAN
Clerk Accepted: 02-10-2012:13:50:37
Case Title:
ZACHARY COUGHLIN VS. MATTHEW
MERLISS (D7)
Document(s) Submitted: Notice of Entry of Ord
- **Continuation
Filed By: RICHARD HILL, ESQ.
ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ. for ZACH
COUGHLIN
CASEY BAKER, ESQ. for MATTHEW MERLISS
RICHARD HILL, ESQ. for MATTHEW MERLISS
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Document Code:
Zach Coughlin
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9
th
St. #2
Reno, NV 89512
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
Attorney Ior Pro Se Attorney PlaintiII Denied Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
CITY OF RENO;
PLAINTIFF,
vs.
ZACH COUGHLIN;
DEFENDANT.
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Case No: 11 TR 26800
Dept No: 3
NOTICE OF APPEAL OF SUMMARY CONTEMPT ORDER; MOTION TO RETURN
PERSONAL PROPERTY CONFISCATED BY RENO MUNICIPAL COURT AND ITS
MARSHALS; MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND TO ALTER OR AMEND SUMMARY
CONTEMPT ORDER
COMES NOW, DeIendant, Zach Coughlin, by and through himselI and Iiles the above title
document on his own behalI.
The undersigned means to show nothing but respect Ior this Court, especially considering
Your Honor holds the honor oI being one oI the Iirst 100 women ever admitted to practice law in our
state, 75th. See Exhibit 1. Like Your Honor, my Iather has a background in Iootball (he played
Iullback Ior Tulane Irom 1964-1968, on scholarship Irom Dayton, Ohio). One thing that we don't see
in Iootball too much is a team hiring a liIetime oIIensive coordinator to be the team's deIensive
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NOTICE OF APPEAL OF SUMMARY CONTEMPT ORDER; MOTION TO RETURN PERSONAL PROPERTY CONFISCATED
BY RENO MUNICIPAL COURT AND ITS MARSHALS; MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND TO ALTER OR AMEND
SUMMARY CONTEMPT ORDER
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Document Code:
Zach Coughlin
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9
th
St. #2
Reno, NV 89512
Tele: 775-338-8118
Fax: 949-667-7402
Attorney Ior Pro Se Attorney PlaintiII Denied Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
IN THE RENO MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
CITY OF RENO;
PLAINTIFF,
vs.
ZACH COUGHLIN;
DEFENDANT.
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Case No: 11 TR 26800
Dept No: 3
MOTION TO RETURN CELL PHONES; MOTION TO SET ASIDE SUMMARY
CONTEMPT ORDER; AND NOTICE OF APPEAL OF SUMMARY CONTEMPT ORDER
COMES NOW, DeIendant, Zach Coughlin, by and through himselI and Iiles the above title
document on his own behalI. I am not messin' with 75. To be 75 meant one had to be 100 times
better than one's Iellow male attorneys seeking admission to the Nevada Bar at the time. I was
Iortunate enough to work around Karen D. Dennison, Esq. Ior a very, very short time, so I know what
incredible talent and Iortitude those Iirst 100 possess. http://nsla.nevadaculture.org/index.php?
optioncomcontent&taskview&id744&Itemid418
Personally, I hate to even begin to argue against anything 75 might lean towards. However,
"my back is to the wall, I gotta brawl", so I do that. When I obvioulsy have to, which is not clear to
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MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER AND NOTICE OF APPEAL OF SUMMARY CONTEMPT ORDER; and MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE HOWARD;
NOTICE OF INSUFFICIENTY OF RECORD ON APPEAL
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
ZachCoughlinhotmail.com
TO:
City oI Reno Marshal Division
ATTN: ChieI Marshal Roper and Marshal Dayton
Iaxed to: (775) 334-3824
March 19, 2012,
Dear ChieI Marshal Roper and Marshal Dayton,

A WCSO Deputy inIormed me that my property was being held in evidence, including a
Ilip phone style cell phone, and an HTC g2 smartphone in addition to a micro sd
memory card, and an electric shaved, according to that Deputy. However, now it
appears once again your oIIice has the property. Marshal Harley was accusatory during
the search incident to the summary contempt arrest, making allegations Ior which he had
not basis in Iact. Further he was abusive and hostile. Please place a copy oI this written
complaint in his employment Iile. Additionally, he clearly whispered into Deputy City
Attorney Ormaas's ear during the Trial in 11 TR 26800, then was evasive regarding what
he whispered. Additionally, Marshal Harley was evasive regarding whom told him to
serve me and whome provided the document (connected to a Richard G. Hill, Esq.,
matter no less, much like the summary contempt Iinding). Subsequently, WCSO Deputy
Machem Iiled a sworn aIIidavit indicating that he personally served me that very
document that Marshal Harley attempted to serve me while I was communicating with
Deputy City Attorney Ormaas, who indicated she did not care about any admissions oI
bribery by Richard G. Hill, Esq., to the City oI Reno Police incident to an arrest in 11
CR 26405, in the RMC, a case wherein Hill signed a criminal trespass complaint against
me. The citations in 11 TR 26800 were purported to be in retaliation Ior my reporting
this admission oI bribery to Sargent Tarter outside Richard Hill's oIIice on 11/15/11
when I appeared there to retrieve my wallet, driver's license, client Iiles, etc. aIter being
released Iorm jail incident to the 11/12/12 custodial arrest Ior trespass (because a citation
1/2
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just wouldn't do). Please see the attached 22 page explication oI these matters, placing it
along with these correspondence in Marshal Harley's personnel and employment Iiles.

I would like a written response detailing the chain oI custody oI all the property Ior all
times since the arrest, and itemized listing oI the property, and an indication oI when, iI
ever, I will be inIormed oI why it is being held and when, iI ever, it will be returned to
me, and and indication oI what exactly has been done with this property, including
whether an viewing or copying oI the contents has been undertaken or will remain in
anyone's possession other than mine.

Sincerely,
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
2/2
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F I L E D
Electronically
03-30-2012:04:14:37 PM
Clerk of the Court
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Close Print
Due Process concerns related to the "grievances"
Sent: Sat 3/24/12 1:28 AM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org
4 attachments
3 23 12 FAX TO BAR COUNSEL PATRICK KING NEVADA BAR.pdf (55.3 KB) , 3 19 12 fas to
rmc marshals regarding property wcso.pdf (40.0 KB) , Pages from mary barker rmc 11 tr
26800 order denying motion for return of bond.pdf (508.2 KB) , notice of appeal 11 tr
26800 rmc and Motion for reconsideration set aside etc.pdf (2.6 MB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
PO Box 60952
RENO, NV 89506
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
TO: Patrick King, Esq.
State Bar of Nevada Assistant Bar Counsel
sent via email to: PatrickK@nvbar.org
March 23, 2012
Dear Assistant Bar Counsel King,
I have a few question I would like to respectfully submit to you. What have you done to ascertain whether the
Marshal's have a vested interest in discrediting me? I would like you to forward me all communications from
anyone in Department Three. I would like for you to obtain a copy of the hearing today, wherein Judge Flanagan
concluded the hearing by quoting to something I wrote (it was the only thing he mentioned after indicating that he
wished to speak to the attorney's in this matter after dismissing the witness, the lying contractor for Richard G.
Hill, Phil Stewart, who has offered perjured testimony numerous times on Mr. Hill's and his client's behalf. Judge
Flanagan quote something I wrote in a filing in 11 TR 26800, where the Judge, Dorothy Nash Holmes, a lifetime
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prosecutor and or warden of a prison (or something along those lines) had me arrested and confiscated my
property, including a smart phone (and a smart phone these days could store the entire contents of a law firm's
files and a law library in one), my less advanced cell phone, my premium electric shaver and other items. My car
was towed during the summary 5 day jail stay Judge Nash Holmes found appropriate, costing me $300 to get it out
of the lot (also lost a client that would have brought in a substantial amoutn of money, by my standards anyway).
A $100 bail was paid to get me out of jail on the fourth day (thus avoiding a fifth day) and accepted by the RMC,
yet, I was not released and the RMC has decided to keep the money anyways.
Yesterday I went to the RMC to pick up a copy of the audio transcript of the 2/27/12 Trial in that matter 11 TR
26800. After asking some questions of filing office supervisor Donna Ballard and a front counter clerk named
Daniel, wherein both agree with me that some of the ways things were done done at the Reno Municipal Court
lacked transparency, a system of checks and balances, and other fundamental notions of due process and fair play,
all of the sudden, two beefy City of Reno Marshals in their mid 20's decided, unilaterally, it seems, to ask me to
leave, as Ms. Ballard certainly had expressed nothing in the way of discontent with our conversation, nor had
Daniel. While I was leaving I could clearly hear Marshal Thompson lying extensively into his radio, trying to
manufacture some sort of report of a scene were there had been none, other than that put on by the City of Reno
Marshals, whom have lied extensively about whether or not they ever took possession of a micro sd card incident
to the full body all pockets, belligerent, accusatory search they performed incident to the summary contempt
finding and arrest of 2/27/12. I request that you ask for a copy of Marshal Harley's employment file from BOTH
the RMC and the City of Reno Marshals Division and see if they put in my letter and complaint in that regard.
Or, do you "find that the burden of proof in the various grievances I have filed with you has not been met, that all
the evidence needed for a conviction has not been presented to your lap with a bow? Did Mr. Hill present such
proof, meeting such a burden. Clearly, the only thing you provided to me from Mr. Hill was an EXCERPT of his
1/14/12 letter to you, which reference numerous shadowy previous phone calls between the two of you (are you
Mr. Hill's hand picked Bar Counsel, or was this case assigned randomly? Does Mr. Hill get to pick which RPD
Sargents and Officers show up for his calls for help? Have you made any inquiry to ascertain this. Why does
Richard Hill constantly file a peremptory challenge anytime he is assigned to Judge Adam's Department 6,
apparently? Did the innuendo and hearsay Richard G. Hill, Esq. Mentioned in his unsigned, unsworn letter to you
of 1/14/12 provide you sufficient proof to meet the clear and convincing evidence stand you indicate that the
grievances I filed did not? How do the copies of electronic correspondences between myself, State Bar of Nevada
Director of Admissions Patrice Eichman, Peter Christiansen, Esq., and Michael Sanft, Esq.,'s legal assistant Kelly
Huff, wherein she explicitly admits to her firm committing malpractice in my case, fail to provoke even a scintilla
of investigation into a grievance from or the State Bar of Nevada?
And the impropriety implicated by Kevin Kelley's conduct, and Mr. Christiansen's later lying under oath at the
June 2002 Character and Fitness Committee hearing for which he feels he satisfied the $5,000 he received in
payment (well, okay, he did file an 8 page pre-hearing brief that rehashed factual recitations from various previous
filings of the Committee, then did manage to cite to the Claiborne case, which concerned a former judge, not an
applicant for admission to the bar, and he did fail to subpoena percipient witness Mark Tratos, or any of the
relevant faculty from Boyd School of Law, and he did screw up the affidavits of the students witnessing me
turning in the hard copy of the paper, and his office did forward a correspondence about alcoholism to the State
Bar despite an express indication by the client atop of it that said not to do so, and his office did mistate whether
they ever turned in the second Consent Agreement send with confirmation to them on September 27
th
, 2004 in a
November 2004 email, so....wait, are you really saying there isn't enough there for a grievance FROM A CLIENT
FILING ONE AGAINST HE WHO WAS COMPENSATED $5,000 TO REPRESENT HIM (THOUGH
CHRISTIANSEN LIED UNDER OATH AND SAID IT WAS ON A PRO BONO BASIS, IN ACCORD WITH
THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY STRIP CLUB SPEARMINT RHINO OWNING CHARACTER AND
FITNESS COMMITTEE MEMBER KEVIN KELLEY, ESQ., WHOSE BEST FRIEND WAS THE
PSYCHOLOGIST THE APPLICANT WAS STEERED TO IN THE ADMISSIONS PROCESS)? BUT, YOU
ARE SAYING PURSUING A GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE AND, APPARENTLY, FORMAL HEARING
INCIDENT TO THE ATTEMPT TO FILE A GRIEVANCE BY A KNOWN SCANDALOUS OPPOSING
ATTORNEY RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., AGAINST MYSELF, IN A MATTER FOR WHICH I AM NOT AN
ATTORNEY OF RECORD (PRO SE ATTORNEY LITIGATNS, APPARENTLY, CANNOT RECEIVE
ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDS UNDER THE SELLERS CASE, SO HOW CAN THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BE APPLIED TO ANY OF MY CONDUCT IN A CASE WHERE I AM A PRO
SE LITIGANT?)? It sure is curious how you find sufficient proof to pursue Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s grievance
against me, yet, you claim that all the grievances I filed do not warrant any sort of investigation on your part. Very
curious, indeed...
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You wrote: "As Assistant Bar Counsel I would like to help you. However, my primary responsibility is to protect
the public and the administration of justice by insuring that Nevada Lawyers are complying with standards
required of the profession. It appears that you are not."
I would like you to specify in detail exactly what forms the basis of your assertions in those a statements, as
heretofore you seem to rely upon only the unsigned, unsworn, hearsay cited to by Richard G. Hill and some
apparent grievances filed by judges, to which you have not previously informed me of or offered any proof
thereof, despite your incorrect assertion that you have done so. If you, as you wrote that you did, previously
provide any indication or documentation in support of these "grievances" filed by Judges, please provide support
therefor in explicit written detail with supporting documentation and proof service.
You further wrote, and I seek explication and specificity with regard to details and attribution incident to the
allegations therein contained that:
" I have repeatedly expressed my interest in having a meeting with you to discuss the grievances against you. You
claim to be too busy to meet with me, yet you have time to write lengthy e-mails and apparently to do legal
research." Would you say, Mr. King, that you would very much prefer it if I had done NO legal research prior to
meeting with you?
You go on to write "You asked if Mr. Hill has standing to file a grievance against you. Not only does he have
standing to file a grievance, as a lawyer in Nevada he may have an ethical obligation to report to the State Bar. As
I have explained to you, the grievances against you came not only from Mr. Hill but also from Judges from
different Courts."
That statement casts extreme doubt upon everything you have said to me, Mr. King, and everything you will say to
me. Please provide the requested proof of any grievances against me that came from "Judges from different
Courts". You do realize, Sir, that some "Judges in Different Courts" have pulled drivers over recently and
impersonated a highway patrol officer, and that some Clerks of Court have embezzled $250,000 from the public
fisc? And, just to be clear, you truly do not find anything worthy of a grievance per Mr. Taitel's curious
appearance/disappearance as attorney of record, failure to do a conflicts check, failure to subsequently disclose
such a failure and the tangible harm it has done to me vis a vis my suing Nevada Court Services and his sharing
an office, receptionist, and being listed on the Nevada Court Services web site as "associated with" their business
entity? Didn't Mr. Taitel have a recent ethics investigation pursuant to some run for judicial office?
Also, Judge Nash Holmes indicated at trial, and this is a direct quote, that she "doesn't care about corruption, or
bribery, retaliation, or police misconduct"...well, that is as close to a direct quote as I can make given the fact that
the RMC, just yesterday refused to provide me a copy of the audio transcript from the 2/27/12 Trial in 11 TR
26800, presided over by Judge Nash Holmes, after a length disappearance by her immediately before calling my
case, and after hearing all the other matters on that stacked docket, and after denying my request for a continuance
but granting Deputy City Attorney Allison Ormaas's request for one to "speak" with Reno Police Department
Sargent Tarter, whose cross examination formed the basis for my arrest and incarceration incident to the summary
contempt finding. The cross examination focused on whether Sargent Tarter had retaliated against me for reporting
the bribery admission by RPD Officer Chris Carter (he admitted Richard G. Hill, Esq. bribes him) to Sargent
Tarter while at the scene of my attempts to get Richard G. Hill to turn over my client's files and my wallet and
state issued identification. If you want to put your name on the line over this, Mr. King, and you think we still live
in a world with very little transparency, who am I to tell you any different.
You further wrote: "These grievances, and the evidence attached with them, rather clearly puts into question your
competence to practice law." Please narrow down which parts of which grievances you feel so implicate my
competence, in explicit written detail.
You further wrote: "As I have explained to you, I will make the evidence and exhibits available to you when you
come to inspect them at my office." Mr. King, please indicate when it was and in what form or method you
communicated this offer to "make the evidence and exhibits available to you when you come to inspect them at
my office"? Please further explain why on earth I would only be allowed to inspect them at your office and how
that does not create and overly bullying and intimidating scenario departing entirely from fundamental notions of
due process. Please just fax and email (both please) the entire contents of all these materials to me. I am likely
suing the USPS and some of its local postal inspectors and or station supervisors under the Federal Tort Claim Act
and while I have taken every prudent step to ensure the timely delivery of my mail (I have a ton of evidence and 000236
documentation in support of this), I am EXPLICITLY indicating to you that I wish for you to fax and email me all
of these materials rather than send them through the mails (USPS, UPS, Fed-Ex, etc, etc.).
You then wrote: "I will not send you reports or document, especially since you claim your mail is being
compromised. " I am appalled that you would write this, and offended really. Please email and or fax them to me.
I have communicated with the USPS and my change of address has been processed (there was a delay through no
fault of my own) and if you refuse to send these to me via email or fax, the go ahead and mail them to my new PO
BOX, though taking that tact will likely only make your conduct throughout this proceeding further suspect. Such
as when you wrote:
" As for the grievances you have made, nothing that you have submitted appears to show an ethical violation that
could be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is the standard of proof required in disciplinary matters.
As such, at this time we have not opened any files based on the information you have submitted. " Please indicate
how, exactly, Richard G. Hill's grievance met such a standard of proof where the one's I submitted did not.
Further, while you have indicated that I have not responded to your request to meet with you (which is not the
case), you only just, for the first time, today, even mentioned anything about any judges filing or corresponding
anywith with or to you, and you have failed to provide any documentation of such or copies thereof sufficient to
satisfy my Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation, etc. Please do so.
Sincerely,
/S/
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
CC: DavidC@nvbar.org
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 19:10:10 +0000
March 23, 2012

Dear Mr. Coughlin,

Just moments ago I received an e-mail letter from the Clerk of the Court in Department 3. She
said that you appeared wearing pajamas over your clothes and were demanding and
argumentative. Apparently I will be receiving a report from the Marshals. As Assistant Bar
Counsel I would like to help you. However, my primary responsibility is to protect the public
and the administration of justice by insuring that Nevada Lawyers are complying with standards
required of the profession. It appears that you are not. I believe that there are ways to get you
000237
assistance that may protect your license to practice law. I would sure appreciate the
opportunity to talk with you about resources and assistance that may help you through this
difficult time.


To: Patrick King
Mr. King,
This is the very first time you allege anyone other than Mr. King filed or alleged a
grievance. Please provide any documentation or proof related to these apparent
communications from judges that you are only now bringing up.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar
No: 9473
000238
F I L E D
Electronically
08-28-2012:04:32:12 PM
Clerk of the Court
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000260
egualized, In
As Mr. ]oshI has ouered to pay mese debt, he shall
2 solely and separauly responIble for th payment of $,7J.0to 5t.Mary's
3 and $0.0to Rema
4 m. Debt - There was no doumenm presented as to
me debt owIng to AshIk ânaby (sp7) for buying plane tIckets for the ]oshI famly.
b urther, as me ony evIdence provIded regardIng me $,00.00debt to Rod and Meen
Fowler IndIcates saId debt was Incmred for the benefIt of Mr. |oshI's mother. As
Mr. ]oshi has agreed to mke on both of these debL, they shah henceforth be his sole and
9 separa responsibity.
10 n. General Debt - There was no evIdence other than
J J tesumonial evIdence to establIsh communIty debL. As w.]oshI has offered to pay any
12 remaIning commumty debt in his name dat Is hereafter ouLtandIng saId debt shall be
J3 the sole and separate responsIbIlIty of Mr. ]oshi.
14 The Court notes N.]oshI has lIkely Incurred an unegual distrIbutIon of me
1 communIty debt In thIs case. The Court hnds hIs teumonial acguIescence at nal to take
1b on this debt Is a compellIng reason to make an ungua| dIstrbutIon of the comunIty
17 debl
l J
19 The smtutory mandate for alimony is mt It b ]ust and eguItable.
20 !?.15(!)(a). AlImony Is an uItable award to serve the poslecree needs and
21 rIghL of the former spouse. !!2 Mev. 2 P.2d !6 (!). Although
22 pot-decree income need not
O
000261
1
!ursuant IKb !25.!50(8), mere are (!!) me court shal| consider in
7 awarding
w. |ohi presented no in support oI her reguest Ior alimony omer than
4 her own testimona| that she raued me had
educahonal opportuniues, and put her dreams on hold while married. w.|oshi ttiIied
tht she is healthy and D always worked. 1here was no to any oI th
7 Iactors in IK5 !?.!50(8) in Ms. |oshi's presentation and in support oI an
8 awmd oI spousal support.
V 1he Court IinOs that the parti prendy ea approimately the same amount,
10 Ms. |oshi eam $2,458 per monm and N. |ohi eaned approximate|y $J,!25 Qmonth
1 1 in , but teshIied he i s working subsmntia|ly less i n 2O and has Iued Ior
1Z unemployment benmits the bgnning oI March 200. lK5 !25.!50(8)(a) 1e
pardes have been mared 2! yeam and Ns. |oshi has always been employo dunn that
14 hme. lK5 !25.!50(8)(d) . Ms. |oshi obtained a collee degree prior to mrriae and
15 Mr. ]os has a hh school degee. lK5 !25.!50(8)(h)). Both parues are healthy and
1 able to work. IK5 !?.!50(8)(k)).
17 Based upon the evidence presented and the applicable law, this Court dos not
1D blieve w.|osh is entitled to an award oI alimony.
1V 4. !ees
7 1hs Court en|oys disceuon to award attomey `5 Iees in a divorce acuon.
7 lKb !?.!50(J); !!4 lev. 5 !.Zd 52 (!8).) pursuant to
77 lK5 !8.0!0(2)(b), the court D aumori to order
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LtH11tLA1tL1NA1LML
Z to 5(b), I tht I an
3 Court, tht on me day ot ApH, 2O, I hled me foregoin
4 wth the Clerk t!e which wll snd a ling to the
tollowing:
7 Document CRDER ATER TRIAL

8
]OHN I. 5IR!!GGATE E
V
ZACHARY . CCUGHLIM F
1
1
17
13
14
1
1
T7
18
1V
7
21
22
23
24
000265
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
PO Box 60952
RENO, NV 89506
tel: 775 338 8118
Iax: 949 667 7402
State Bar oI Nevada Assistant Bar Counsel
sent via email to: PatrickKnvbar.org
March 23, 2012
I have a Iew question I would like to respectIully submit to you. What have you done to
ascertain whether the Marshal's have a vested interest in discrediting me? I would like you to Iorward
me all communications Irom anyone in Department Three. I would like Ior you to obtain a copy oI the
hearing today, wherein Judge Flanagan concluded the hearing by quoting to something I wrote (it was
the only thing he mentioned aIter indicating that he wished to speak to the attorney's in this matter aIter
dismissing the witness, the lying contractor Ior Richard G. Hill, Phil Stewart, who has oIIered perjured
testimony numerous times on Mr. Hill's and his client's behalI. Judge Flanagan quote something I
wrote in a Iiling in 11 TR 26800, where the Judge, Dorothy Nash Holmes, a liIetime prosecutor and or
warden oI a prison (or something along those lines) had me arrested and conIiscated my property,
including a smart phone (and a smart phone these days could store the entire contents oI a law Iirm's
Iiles and a law library in one), my less advanced cell phone, my premium electric shaver and other
items. My car was towed during the summary 5 day jail stay Judge Nash Holmes Iound appropriate,
costing me $300 to get it out oI the lot. A $100 bail was paid to get me out oI jail on the Iourth day
(thus avoiding a IiIth day) and accepted by the RMC, yet, I was not released and the RMC has decided
to keep the money anyways.
Yesterday I went to the RMC to pick up a copy oI the audio transcript oI the 2/27/12 Trial in
that matter 11 TR 26800. AIter asking some questions oI Iiling oIIice supervisor Donna Ballard and a
Iront counter clerk named Daniel, wherein both agree with me that some oI the ways things were done
done at the Reno Municipal Court lacked transparency, a system oI checks and balances, and other
Iundamental notions oI due process and Iair play, all oI the sudden, two beeIy City oI Reno Marshals in
their mid 20's decided, unilaterally, it seems, to ask me to leave, as Ms. Ballard certainly had expressed
nothing in the way oI discontent with our conversation, nor had Daniel. While I was leaving I could
clearly hear Marshal Thompson lying extensively into his radio, trying to manuIacture some sort oI
report oI a scene were there had been none, other than that put on by the City oI Reno Marshals, whom
have lied extensively about whether or not they ever took possession oI a micro sd card incident to the
Iull body all pockets, belligerent, accusatory search they perIormed incident to the summary contempt
Iinding and arrest oI 2/27/12. I request that you ask Ior a copy oI Marshal Harley's employment Iile
Irom BOTH the RMC and the City oI Reno Marshals Division and see iI they put in my letter and
complaint in that regard.
1/4
000266
Or, do you "Iind that the burden oI prooI in the various grievances I have Iiled with you has
not been met, that all the evidence needed Ior a conviction has not been presented to your lap with a
bow? Did Mr. Hill present such prooI, meeting such a burden. Clearly, the only thing you provided to
me Irom Mr. Hill was an EXCERPT oI his 1/14/12 letter to you, which reIerence numerous shadowy
previous phone calls between the two oI you (are you Mr. Hill's hand picked Bar Counsel, or was this
case assigned randomly? Does Mr. Hill get to pick which RPD Sargents and OIIicers show up Ior his
calls Ior 'help? Have you made any inquiry to ascertain this. Why does Richard Hill constantly Iile a
peremptory challenge anytime he is assigned to Judge Adam's Department 6, apparently? Did the
innuendo and hearsay Richard G. Hill, Esq. Mentioned in his unsigned, unsworn letter to you oI
1/14/12 provide you suIIicient 'prooI to meet the 'clear and convincing evidence stand you indicate
that the grievances I Iiled did not? How do the copies oI electronic correspondences between myselI,
State Bar oI Nevada Director oI Admissions Patrice Eichman, Peter Christiansen, Esq., and Michael
SanIt, Esq.,'s legal assistant Kelly HuII, wherein she explicitly admits to her Iirm committing
malpractice in my case, Iail to provoke even a scintilla oI investigation into a grievance Irom or the
State Bar oI Nevada?
And the impropriety implicated by Kevin Kelley's conduct, and Mr. Christiansen's later lying
under oath at the June 2002 Character and Fitness Committee hearing Ior which he Ieels he satisIied
the $5,000 he received in payment (well, okay, he did Iile an 8 page pre-hearing brieI that rehashed
Iactual recitations Irom various previous Iilings oI the Committee, then did manage to cite to the
Claiborne case, which concerned a Iormer judge, not an applicant Ior admission to the bar, and he did
Iail to subpoena percipient witness Mark Tratos, or any oI the relevant Iaculty Irom Boyd School oI
Law, and he did screw up the aIIidavits oI the students witnessing me turning in the hard copy oI the
paper, and his oIIice did Iorward a correspondence about alcoholism to the State Bar despite an express
indication by the client atop oI it that said not to do so, and his oIIice did mistate whether they ever
turned in the second Consent Agreement send with conIirmation to them on September 27
th
, 2004 in a
November 2004 email, so....wait, are you really saying there isn't enough there Ior a grievance FROM
A CLIENT FILING ONE AGAINST HE WHO WAS COMPENSATED $5,000 TO REPRESENT HIM
(THOUGH CHRISTIANSEN LIED UNDER OATH AND SAID IT WAS ON A 'PRO BONO
BASIS, IN ACCORD WITH THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY STRIP CLUB SPEARMINT
RHINO OWNING CHARACTER AND FITNESS COMMITTEE MEMBER KEVIN KELLEY, ESQ.,
WHOSE BEST FRIEND WAS THE PSYCHOLOGIST THE APPLICANT WAS 'STEERED TO IN
THE ADMISSIONS PROCESS)? BUT, YOU ARE SAYING PURSUING A GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURE AND, APPARENTLY, FORMAL HEARING INCIDENT TO THE ATTEMPT TO
FILE A GRIEVANCE BY A KNOWN SCANDALOUS OPPOSING ATTORNEY RICHARD G.
HILL, ESQ., AGAINST MYSELF, IN A MATTER FOR WHICH I AM NOT AN ATTORNEY OF
RECORD (PRO SE ATTORNEY LITIGATNS, APPARENTLY, CANNOT RECEIVE ATTORNEY'S
FEE AWARDS UNDER THE SELLERS CASE, SO HOW CAN THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT BE APPLIED TO ANY OF MY CONDUCT IN A CASE WHERE I AM A PRO SE
LITIGANT?)? It sure is curious how you Iind suIIicient 'prooI to pursue Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s
'grievance against me, yet, you claim that all the grievances I Iiled do not warrant any sort oI
investigation on your part. Very curious, indeed...
You wrote: "As Assistant Bar Counsel I would like to help you. However, my primary
responsibility is to protect the public and the administration oI justice by insuring that Nevada Lawyers
are complying with standards required oI the proIession. It appears that you are not."
I would like you to speciIy in detail exactly what Iorms the basis oI your assertions in those a
statements, as heretoIore you seem to rely upon only the unsigned, unsworn, hearsay cited to by
Richard G. Hill and some apparent grievances Iiled by judges, to which you have not previously
2/4
000267
inIormed me oI or oIIered any prooI thereoI, despite your incorrect assertion that you have done so. II
you, as you wrote that you did, previously provide any indication or documentation in support oI these
"grievances" Iiled by Judges, please provide support thereIor in explicit written detail with supporting
documentation and prooI service.
You Iurther wrote, and I seek explication and speciIicity with regard to details and attribution
incident to the allegations therein contained that:
" I have repeatedly expressed my interest in having a meeting with you to discuss the grievances
against you. You claim to be too busy to meet with me, yet you have time to write lengthy e-mails and
apparently to do legal research." Would you say, Mr. King, that you would very much preIer it iI I had
done NO legal research prior to meeting with you?
You go on to write "You asked iI Mr. Hill has standing to Iile a grievance against you. Not only
does he have standing to Iile a grievance, as a lawyer in Nevada he may have an ethical obligation to
report to the State Bar. As I have explained to you, the grievances against you came not only Irom Mr.
Hill but also Irom Judges Irom diIIerent Courts."
That statement casts extreme doubt upon everything you have said to me, Mr. King, and
everything you will say to me. Please provide the requested prooI oI any grievances against me that
came Irom "Judges Irom diIIerent Courts". You do realize, Sir, that some "Judges in DiIIerent Courts"
have pulled drivers over recently and impersonated a highway patrol oIIicer, and that some Clerks oI
Court have embezzled $250,000 Irom the public Iisc? And, just to be clear, you truly do not Iind
anything worthy oI a grievance per Mr. Taitel's curious appearance/disappearance as attorney oI record,
Iailure to do a conIlicts check, Iailure to subsequently disclose such a Iailure and the tangible harm it
has done to me vis a vis my suing Nevada Court Services and his sharing an oIIice, receptionist, and
being listed on the Nevada Court Services web site as "associated with" their business entity? Didn't
Mr. Taitel have a recent ethics investigation pursuant to some run Ior judicial oIIice?
Also, Judge Nash Holmes indicated at trial, and this is a direct quote, that she "doesn't care
about corruption, or bribery, retaliation, or police misconduct"...well, that is as close to a direct quote as
I can make given the Iact that the RMC, just yesterday reIused to provide me a copy oI the audio
transcript Irom the 2/27/12 Trial in 11 TR 26800, presided over by Judge Nash Holmes, aIter a length
disappearance by her immediately beIore calling my case, and aIter hearing all the other matters on that
stacked docket, and aIter denying my request Ior a continuance but granting Deputy City Attorney
Allison Ormaas's request Ior one to "speak" with Reno Police Department Sargent Tarter, whose cross
examination Iormed the basis Ior my arrest and incarceration incident to the summary contempt
Iinding. The cross examination Iocused on whether Sargent Tarter had retaliated against me Ior
reporting the bribery admission by RPD OIIicer Chris Carter (he admitted Richard G. Hill, Esq. bribes
him) to Sargent Tarter while at the scene oI my attempts to get Richard G. Hill to turn over my client's
Iiles and my wallet and state issued identiIication. II you want to put your name on the line over this,
Mr. King, and you think we still live in a world with very little transparency, who am I to tell you any
diIIerent.
You Iurther wrote: "These grievances, and the evidence attached with them, rather clearly puts
into question your competence to practice law." Please narrow down which parts oI which grievances
you Ieel so implicate my competence, in explicit written detail.
You Iurther wrote: "As I have explained to you, I will make the evidence and exhibits available
to you when you come to inspect them at my oIIice." Mr. King, please indicate when it was and in
what Iorm or method you communicated this oIIer to "make the evidence and exhibits available to you
when you come to inspect them at my oIIice"? Please Iurther explain why on earth I would only be
allowed to inspect them at your oIIice and how that does not create and overly bullying and
intimidating scenario departing entirely Irom Iundamental notions oI due process. Please just Iax and
3/4
000268
email (both please) the entire contents oI all these materials to me. I am likely suing the USPS and
some oI its local postal inspectors and or station supervisors under the Federal Tort Claim Act and
while I have taken every prudent step to ensure the timely delivery oI my mail (I have a ton oI evidence
and documentation in support oI this), I am EXPLICITLY indicating to you that I wish Ior you to Iax
and email me all oI these materials rather than send them through the mails (USPS, UPS, Fed-Ex, etc,
etc.).
You then wrote: "I will not send you reports or document, especially since you claim your mail
is being compromised. " I am appalled that you would write this, and oIIended really. Please email
and or Iax them to me. I have communicated with the USPS and my change oI address has been
processed (there was a delay through no Iault oI my own) and iI you reIuse to send these to me via
email or Iax, the go ahead and mail them to my new PO BOX, though taking that tact will likely only
make your conduct throughout this proceeding Iurther suspect. Such as when you wrote:
" As Ior the grievances you have made, nothing that you have submitted appears to show an
ethical violation that could be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is the standard oI prooI
required in disciplinary matters. As such, at this time we have not opened any Iiles based on the
inIormation you have submitted. " Please indicate how, exactly, Richard G. Hill's 'grievance met such
a standard oI prooI where the one's I submitted did not. Further, while you have indicated that I have
not responded to your request to meet with you (which is not the case), you only just, Ior the Iirst time,
today, even mentioned anything about any judges Iiling or corresponding anywith with or to you, and
you have Iailed to provide any documentation oI such or copies thereoI suIIicient to satisIy my Sixth
Amendment Right to ConIrontation, etc. Please do so.
Sincerely,
/S/
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
4/4
000269
F I L E D
Electronically
03-27-2012:08:56:46 AM
Clerk of the Court
000270
000271
000272
000273
000274
000275
000276
000277
000278
F I L E D
Electronically
08-16-2011:01:34:07 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
000279
000280
F I L E D
Electronically
02-08-2012:04:34:48 PM
Clerk of the Court
000281
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Report SeIection Criteria
Case ID: CR12-1018
Docket Start Date:
Docket Ending Date:
Case Description
Case ID: CR12-1018 - ERIK CHRISTOPHER WARREN VS CITY OF SPARKS (D1)
Filing Date: Wednesday, June 13th, 2012
Type: MO - OTHER MUNICIPAL COURT CRIMINAL
Status: DISPOSED - Case Disposed
ReIated Cases
No related cases were found.
Case Event ScheduIe
No case events were found.
Case Parties
Seq # Assoc Expn Date Type ID Name
2 Appellant 1196900 WARREN, ERIK
CHRISTOPHER
Address: unavailable Aliases: none
3 4 Respondent SPARKS CITY OF SPARKS
Address: 431 Prater Way
P. O. Box 857
Sparks NV 89432
Aliases: none
4 3 City Attorney 8022 Chavez, Esq., Wendy
Address: Sparks City Attorney's
OIIice
431Prater Way
Sparks NV 89431
Aliases: none
5 Judge D1 BERRY, HONORABLE 1ANET
000287
1.
Docket Entries
Filing Date Description Name Monetary
13-JUN-2012
02:29 PM
Appeal Irom Municipal's
Court
WARREN, ERIK CHRISTOPHER
Entry: MUNICIPAL COURT APPEAL PROCEEDINGS
13-JUN-2012
04:09 PM
** Exhibit(s) ...
Entry: APPELLANT'S EXHIBIT 1 (CD RECORDING)
18-JUN-2012
03:47 PM
Ord Ior BrieIing Schedule
Entry: Transaction 3025878 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 06-18-2012:15:48:08
18-JUN-2012
03:49 PM
ProoI oI Electronic Service
28-JUN-2012
04:49 PM
Mtn Ior Extension oI Time
Entry: MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE OPENING BRIEF
09-JUL-2012
11:42 AM
Reply...
Entry:
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE
OPENING BRIEF - Transaction 3066448 - Approved By: JYOST : 07-09-
2012:12:14:50
09-JUL-2012
12:16 PM
000288
10-JUL-2012
02:39 PM
Transcript
Entry: TRIAL - TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL
16-JUL-2012
04:29 PM
Mtn to Compel... WARREN, ERIK CHRISTOPHER
Entry: MOTION TO COMPEL TRIAL COURT TO TRANSMIT TRANSCRIPTS
16-JUL-2012
04:29 PM
Mtn to Strike... WARREN, ERIK CHRISTOPHER
Entry: MOTION TO STRIKE DEFECTIVE TRANSCRIPT
19-JUL-2012
02:13 PM
Request Ior Submission
Entry:
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE OPENING BRIEF - Transaction
3096479 - Approved By: AZION : 07-19-2012:14:23:51 DOCUMENT TITLE:
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE OPENING BRIEF - PARTY
SUBMITTING: CHESTER ADAMS ESQ DATE SUBMITTED: 07-19-12
SUBMITTED BY: AZION DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
19-JUL-2012
02:25 PM
20-JUL-2012
11:07 AM
Response...
Entry:
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL TRIAL COURT TO
TRANSMIT TRANSCRIPTS - Transaction 3098623 - Approved By: AZION : 07-20-
2012:11:13:09
20-JUL-2012
11:07 AM
Response...
Entry:
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFECTIVE
TRANSCRIPT - Transaction 3098625 - Approved By: AZION : 07-20-2012:11:17:41
000289
20-JUL-2012
11:14 AM
20-JUL-2012
11:19 AM
02-AUG-2012
12:26 PM
Tickle End Code
Entry: none.
20-AUG-2012
10:43 AM
Entry:
MOTION TO COMPEL TRIAL COURT TO TRANSMIT TRANSCRIPTS (NO
PAPER ORDER PROVIDED) - Transaction 3158248 - Approved By: MCHOLICO :
08-20-2012:11:36:02 PARTY SUBMITTING: ROSALBA I. ARANGO-JOHNSON,
ESQ. DATE SUBMITTED: 8/20/12 SUBMITTED BY: MCHOLICO DATE
RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
20-AUG-2012
10:45 AM
Entry:
MOTION TO STRIKE DEFECTIVE TRANSCRIPT (NO PAPER ORDER
PROVIDED) - Transaction 3158254 - Approved By: MCHOLICO : 08-20-
2012:11:37:51 PARTY SUBMITTING: ROSALBA I. ARANGO-JOHNSON, ESQ.
DATE SUBMITTED: 8/20/12 SUBMITTED BY: MCHOLICO DATE RECEIVED
JUDGE OFFICE:
20-AUG-2012
11:37 AM
20-AUG-2012
11:39 AM
000290
20-AUG-2012
03:05 PM
Complet
Entry: none.
20-AUG-2012
03:05 PM
Complet
Entry: none.
20-AUG-2012
03:05 PM
Complet
Entry: none.
20-AUG-2012
03:16 PM
Remanded JC Further
Proceeding
Entry: none.
20-AUG-2012
03:17 PM
Ord Remanding ...
Entry:
TO JUSTICE COURT - Transaction 3161203 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 08-20-
2012:15:19:05 REMANDED 08/29/12 - CERTIFIED COPY OF ORDER and CD
RECORDING LABELED CITY EXHIBIT 1 - JYOST
20-AUG-2012
03:22 PM
10-SEP-2012
03:03 PM
Order ...
Entry:
IN RESPONSE TO JUDGE SPOO'S LETTER - Transaction 3206021 - Approved By:
NOREVIEW : 09-10-2012:15:14:23
10-SEP-2012
03:20 PM
000291
10-SEP-2012
03:30 PM
Other Manner oI Disposition
Entry: none.
11-SEP-2012
12:40 PM
General Receipt
Entry: none.
000292
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Hotmail Print Message
Close Print
RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of
11/1/2011
From: Stuchell, Liz (LStuchell@washoecounty.us)
Sent: Tue 2/07/12 11:40 AM
Cc: Kandaras, Mary (mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us)
Mr. Coughlin,

Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was personally served by Deputy Machen by posting a
copy of the Order to the residence. The residence was unoccupied at the time.

WCSO Civil Section

To: Stuchell, Liz; Kandaras, Mary; nvrenopd@coplogic.com; Silva, Roxanna; kadlicj@reno.gov; fourthestate@gmail.com;
jamesandreboles@msn.com
lstuchell@washoecounty.us mkandara@da.washoecounty.us
000302
I am writing to inquire about and complain with regard to an Affidavit of Service filed
by or for WCSO Deputy Machem with respect to the service of a Order Granting
Summary Eviction against me (in my law office where non-payment of rent was not
alleged, no less in violation of NRS 40.253 and where a $2,275 rent escrow deposit
was foisted upon me in violation of 40.253(6), especially where a stay of eviction was
not granted even while the RJC held on to most all my money...).
"personally served" me, which kind of reminds me of all that robo-signing and MERS
fraud I come across in my day job (and do you wonder how many attorneys in the
foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with who are watching and witness
the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?), which includes being a
phraseology: "
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of
the order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary
Eviction was signed by October 27
th
, 2011. That language is only found in situations
000303
and,
sheriff or constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of
the order. The way these summary eviction proceedings are being carried out in Reno
Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law. There is not
basis for effectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in this case. The
above two sections containing the within 24 hours of receipt language are
inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where the
Tenant did file an Affidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not often seen. To
require Nevada's tenants to get up and get out within 24 hours of receipt of the
statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must file a Complaint
within 90 days of receipt of a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which follows NRCP
5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing receipt of such a letter, when actual receipt is not
shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon the days for
mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In Abraham v. Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the record did not reflect
when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on November
24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on November 30,
2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding Saturdays and Sundays. In order
to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust
administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of a right to sue letter. See
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S.
147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)(granting plaintiff an additional
three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).
Further, despite what the inaccurate handouts of Nevada Legal Services may say about
this 24 hours and the applicability of the JCRCP to cases like these, NRS 40.400
Rules of practice, holds that :The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil 000304
and new trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to
40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections. As such
NRCP 6(a),(e) applies to the Order of Summary Eviction that WCSO Deputy Machem
alleged, under penalty of perjury, that he "personally served" upon me on November 1,
2011. That is a lie by Mr. Machem, unless "personally served" is defined in a rather
impersonal way and or Machem and I have totally different understanding of the
definition of "personally served", which may be the case. Or, perhaps the Sheriff's
Office is busy and doesn't want to wait around to "personally serve" every tenant it
wishes to evict. Fine, then just use the "mail it and allow three days" rule in NRCP
6(e)...the landlord's might not like it, but they can use that frustration as an incentive
not to jump to litigating every disagreement about habitability that a tenant brings to
them. You may not realize how ridiculous some landlord's get. In my case, I offered
to fix basic things that clearly implicated the habitability rules in NRS 118A.290 and
the Californian neurosurgeon, Beverly Hill High School graduate landlord balked and
complained then hired and attorney four days into a dispute.....at which point the rules
against contacting represented parties prevented much in the way of real settlement
discussion, particularly where opposing counsel has continuously demonstrated a
complete indifference to pursuing settlement (why would he at the rates he bills hours
at?). I just don't think the Sheriff's Office needs to sully its image or damage the
citizen tenants of Washoe County in the name of pleasing people like Dr. Matt Merliss
or Richard G. Hill, Esq.
MACHEM THAT ADMITS THAT I WAS NOT PERSONALLY PRESENT WHEN
HE SERVED THE ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION IN RJC REV2011-001708
ON 11/1/12 AT 4:30 PM (ACCORDING TO HIS AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE). YOU
NEVER KNOW, I MIGHT HAVE IRREFUTABLE PROOF THAT I WAS
SOMEWHERE ELSE AT THAT TIME, SO, BE CAREFUL. There simply is not
anything specific in Nevada law addressing how such Summary Eviction Orders are
to be served and carried out. The sections dealing with
6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3,
regardless of the information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord 000305
of the affidavit permitted by subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall
hold a hearing, after service of notice of the hearing upon the parties, to determine the
for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the
tenant....
whichever is later.
8. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall
schedule a hearing on the motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days after
the filing of the motion. The court shall affix the date of the hearing to the motion
and order a copy served upon the landlord by the sheriff, constable or other
process server. At the hearing, the court may:
(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460
or 118C.230 and any accumulating daily costs; and
Please provide an indication, in writing, of the names and case numbers for the last 20
incidences when the WCSO has served notice of a hearing set pursuant to NRS
000306
Lopez, Carter admitted to me that "Richard Hill pays him a lot of money and therefore
he arrests whom Richard Hill says to and does what Richard Hill says to do...." Both
Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to investigate, despite prompting, whether Richard
Hill has sent the tenant/arrestee a bill or demand letter in bill for the full rental value
of the property, $900 per month, under some interpretation of the "reasonable storage,
moving, and inventorying expenses" collectable by a landlord under a personal
property line set forth in NRS 118A.460 (one could also interpret such a bill as Hill's
withdrawing or eradicating the Order of Summary Eviction itself, which was not
"personally served" by the Washoe County Sheriff (despite what their Affidavit of
Service says...I wasn't even there at the time they changed the locks...and so the
Summary Eviction Order was not properly served under NRCP 6, and despite the
Reno Justice Court impermissibly converting $2300 of my money under a "rent
escrow" Order its required I comply with in order to litigate habitability issues in a
summary eviction proceeding under NRS 40.253, despite NRS 40.253(6)'s express
dicate against such an Order (unless, pursuant to JCRCP 83, a justice court gets such a
rule, like Justice Court Rule of Las Vegas (JCRLV) Rule 44, published and approved
by the Nevada Supreme Court, which the RJC has not, rather, the RJC applies all
these insidious secret "house rules" (like forcing tenants to deliver themselves to the
filing office to submit to personal service notice of a summary eviction hearing within,
like, 12 hours of the Tenant filing a Tenant's Answer or Affidavit in response to an
eviction Notice, rather than the service requirements of such notice following NRCP 6
(days for mailing, etc., etc., in other words, in the RJC everything is sped up
imperissilby to help landlord's out, and the NV. S. Ct ruling in Glazier and Lippis
clearly contemplate personal liability against the Court and or Judges themselves for
so doing)....A Qui Tam action or something a la Mausert's in Solano County, I believe,
in California, would be very interesting...Still haven't heard anything from the Reno
PD about the various complaints I have filed with them in writing related to the
wrongful arrests, excessive force and other misconduct committed against me, though
they did arrest me the other day for calling 911incident to some domestic violence for
which I was granted to Extended Protection Orders against my former
housemates....old Sargent Sigfree ordered that arrest, as he did two days prior when he
ordered a custodial arrest of me for "jaywalking". 000307
following one:
From:NvRenoPd@coplogic.com
Sent: Wed 9/07/11 10:51 PM
THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT HOWEVER THIS
REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE OFFICER'S SUPERVISOR
AND IT WILL BE ADDRESSED.
Thank you,
Officer WOZNIAK,
ADDRESSED."
follow up on my imploring them to ask Hill whether he has recently sent me a bill for
the "full rental value" of the property, the same amount that had been charged for the
"use and enjoyment" of the premises, $900, in comparision to what NRS 118A.460
may deem "reasonable storage" expenses for which a lien is available to a landlord,
though NRS 118A.520 has outlawed rent distraints upon tenant's personal
000308
Actually, upon being release from jail on November 15th, 2011, incident to the
ID, the one I would need to rent a room, drive my car, and my wallet, which is kind of
useful in such situations....). Anyways, Sargent Tarter of the Reno PD showed up, he
went inside Hill's office with Hill for quite some time and the result was Tarter telling
me to leave. I did, but while driving down St. Laurence towards S. Virginia (Hill's
office is at 652 Forrest St. 89503 and would have required turning down the wrong
way of a one way street, Forrest, to go back to Hill's Office (so clearly I was not
headed to Hill's office) Sargent Tarter began tailing me, then he pulled me over, then
he gave me a ticket, in retaliation if you ask me for reporting RPD Officer Carter
admitting that he takes bribes from Hill to Sargent Tarter minutes earlier. Uh, well,
anyways, another Sargent calls me later that night, taking the "good cop" role. But
upon informing him of what RPD Officer Carter told me about Hill paying him money
to arrest people during the 11/12/11 trespassing arrest, that Sargent immediately
informed me that, despite this being the first he heard of that, he was sure that was not
happening....I guess RPD Officer Carter is trying to explain away his comments about
Richard Hill paying him money to arrest people by dismissing them as sarcasm, a
joke, said in jest, whatever....but I don't see how that situation (a license attorney
getting arrested for a crime, a conviction for which would result in that attorney being
required to report said conviction to the State Bar of Nevada under SCR 111, etc., and
possibly resulting in a suspension of that attorney's license to practice law, or worse...)
is all that jocular of a situation. Combine that with the too quick to dismiss my
reports of bribery by Richard Hill to officer Carter to the RPD Sargent who called me
on 11/15/11 regarding the retaliation by Sargent Tarter that I complained of, and I
don't think it is all that unreasonable for anyone to take RPD Officer Carter at his
word regarding Richard G. Hill, Esq. paying him money to arrest whom Hill says to
arrest. Add to that Sargent Sigfree ordering my arrest for jaywalking (by a trainee
RPD Officer) on January 12th, 2011 (custodial arrest, bail of $160 emptied my bank
account out, or pretty close to it) while I was peacefully filming from a public spot
Richard G. Hill, Esq's contractor Phil Howard, whom had submitted bills in courts
records and filings under the lien for "reasonable storage moving and inventorying"
found in NRS 118A.460, even where old Phil used my own plywood at the property to 000309
board up the back porch (curiously leaving the screws holding up the plywood
exposed to exterior of the property where anyone could easily unscrew them, and also
leaving in a window unit ac secured only by ducttape in a window facing a sidewalk
by the LakeMill Lodge....which resulted in $8,000 at least of my personal property
being burglarized from my former home law office on Decmeber 12th, 2011 while
Hill was asserting a lien on all my personal property found therein (and my client's
files, which arguably are not even my property, but rather, the client's property). Hill
went on to place what he believes to be my social security number in court records, on
purpose, despite his signing an Affirmation pursuant to NRS 239B.030 that that was
not the case (attaching a two page report to the RPD as an Exhibit). Then Hill and his
contractor Phil Howard both committed perjury when the signed Declarations attesting
that I had climbed on the contractors truck or ever touched Hill. Hill lies constantly,
whether under penalty of perjury or now, so I don't have time to rebut every little lie
he makes (he makes me out to comes across as a Yosemite Sam caricature of a human
being in his filings when he describes me...).
ringing the doorbell, one guy moving around all other sides of the property banging on
the windows, peering in closed blinds, and affecting a phony "color of law" tone,
"Court Services, come out now!", wearing their pretend Sheriff outfits, big equipment
saddled belts (including firearms, I believe, and radios), etc. ,etc.
Lew Taitel, Esq. was my court appointed public defender in the Reno Municipal Court
in the trespass case, and that Judge Gardner had refused to provide me the names of
prospective appointed defense counsel (I wanted to run a conflicts check) at my
arraignment (where Marshal Mentzel barked at me in a threatening tone, using
filed a notice of appearance, and received my confidential file, pc sheet, arrest reports,
ssn, etc....only its turns out that Taitel shares and office and a receptionist with Nevada 000310
Court Services and they list him and his picture on their website as "associated with"
their Process Server corporation, despite the prohibition lawyers face against fee
sharing with non-lawyers. Then, Taitel somehow manages to get out of defending my
case without filing a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, despite that being required by
the Reno Municipal Court Rule 3(B):
that that much, and he didn't like me not wanting to give it to him. This occurred right
in front of my home law office in the summer of 2011. He cuffed me and told me I
was going to jail for something about a light on the front of my bicycle (the one NV
Energy likely stole when the shut off my power, unnoticed, on October 4, 2011)
both let it go, and I didn't go to jail....Until Del Vecchio was present supervising some
Officer's training at the scene of my custodial (9 hour) jaywalking arrest) on 1/12/12.
But Del Vecchio, I guess either didn't want to or wasn't able to talk some sense into
Sargent Sigfree.....and then Sargent Sigfree (the spelling is likely off) had me arrested
and charged with a gross misdemeanor, "Misuse of 911" just two days later, on
January 14th, 2011 when I called 911 to report that my roommates were laughing
menacingly when I asked them why my dog was missing (I had also been chased up to 000311
my room numerous times since moving in with these people, something I had to do
because so much of my money had been taken up with bail or lost earnings due to all
these wrongful arrests and abuse of processes mentioned above...also these
housemates had chased me with a ten inch butcher knife, two of my tires were
slashed, I was locked out all night on New Years Even when these changed the locks
at around midnight, had my furniture thrown in the street, property stolen, coffee
thrown on me, destroying my smart phone in the process, etc., etc...And despite the
housemate having an outstanding arrest warrant, and animal abuse being listed
amongst the elements of domestic violence, Sargent Sigfree told me he was arresting
me because I "keep putting yourself in these situations", like, where I am a victim, and
that he was "trying to help you", he said with a smirk and a laugh to his fellow RPD
Officers, whom then proceeded to use excessive force against me. I guess he was
helping me by saddling me with a gross misdemeanor with a $1,500 bail, especially
where its been arranged for Court Services, or pre-Trial Services to forever deny me
an OR, despite my meeting the factors for such set forth in statute (30 year resident,
entire immediate family lives here, licensed to practice law in Nevada, etc., etc)...I
guess it should not be too much of a surprise to me that Reno City Attorney Pam
Roberts failed to address the perjury of all three of her witnesses or that her fellow
Reno City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens lied to me about whether or not the
Reno City Attorney's Office even had any documentation related to my arrest or
whether it would in the month before my arraignment, despite that fact that subsequent
productions of discovery tend to indicate that the Reno City Attorney's Office did
have those materials at the time. I could be wrong about some of this...But that would
require and awful lot of coincidences.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473
000312
RE: IFP Coughlin Service of Complaints WLS employment law;
landlord tenant case
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain
confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended
recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on
the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain
information that is privileged, attorney work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended
recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the
contents of this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s),
please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone
other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable privilege.
From: Stuchell, Liz (LStuchell@washoecounty.us)
Sent: Mon 12/05/11 12:32 PM
Mr. Coughlin,

Per your demand stated in the e-mail received from you on November 7
th,
all document packets that were provided by
you were assembled and served by November 16
th
. Affidavits of Service were sent to your new address that you
provided on November 30
th
. Affidavits with case numbers were sent directly to the court. Last week copies of those
were sent to you free of charge. You also will receive original Affidavits of Service of documents that did not have case
numbers.

Any further inquiries should be made to our Civil Attorney, Mary Kandaras at the District Attorneys Office.

Liz Stuchell
WCSO Civil Section

Sent: Sunday, December 04, 2011 2:53 AM
To: Silva, Roxanna; Stuchell, Liz
Subject: RE: IFP Coughlin Service of Complaints WLS employment law; landlord tenant case
Dear Ms. Stuchell and Ms. Silva,
I don't mean to be a jerk, I am under inordinate stress right now (not that that is anybody's problem but mine).
The citation below would tend to indicate that your office might, MIGHT, have a duty to photocopy the 000313
electronic versions I sent and serve them in a manner that the opposing attorneys will not respond to by filing
"Motions to Dismiss" based upon illegibility or bad copying/printing. They object to the 9 pages per page
stuff...In an ideal world your office would serve one page per page of these things, after you print them out,
etc...If you can do that, I would of course be extremely grateful, if you can't, I am of course let to scratch and
claw my way through this lawsuit like every other thing in my life as an IFP who can seemingly be curbstomped
by the older richer attorneys whenever they feel like it (and who have some dubious help in doing so). One
interesting thing is that one of the employment cases, etierh cv11-01955 or cv11-01986 (whichever was filed on
June 27th with an IFP) has to be served within 120 days of WHEN? The docket seems to suggest the Complaint
in that IFP case was only entered on or around August 11th, 2011, which would obvioulsy changed the 120 days
calculation, however, whether the filing date relates back to the IFP is something I have never been able to get a
clear answer on anywhere....
Thank You,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Licensed in Nevada and USPTO
2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an
agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that
any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This
message is confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged, attorney
work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that
any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the contents of this
information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the named recipient(s),
please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any form immediately. Receipt
by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work product, or other applicable
privilege.
Subject: RE: IFP Coughlin Service of Complaints WLS employment law; landlord tenant case
Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2011 08:52:29 -0800
From: RSilva@washoecounty.us
You and I are the only ones who got this. Is he asking us to serve more docs?

Sent: Wednesday, November 30, 2011 6:37 AM
To: Silva, Roxanna; Stuchell, Liz
Subject: IFP Coughlin Service of Complaints WLS employment law; landlord tenant case
"The defect in service (that the photocopy of the complaint provided was too
faint) was not attributable to the plaintiff, but to court personnel, who are
responsible for making copies of the initial pleadings for IFP litigants".
McKENZIE v. AMTRAK M OF E, 777 F.Supp. 1119.
000314
Please serve a full, one page per page copy of each complaint to each defendant in all of
the matters for which I have provided you IFP proof, summons, and complaints.
PLEASE NOTE I HAVE A NEW ADDRESS.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Licensed in Nevada and USPTO
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not
the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you
have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the
contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This message is confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and
may contain information that is privileged, attorney work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you
are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted
to be taken in reliance on the contents of this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in
error, or are not the named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any
copies in any form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client,
work product, or other applicable privilege.
000315
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Close Print
WLS
From: Paul Elcano (pelcano@washoelegalservices.org) You moved this message to its current
location.
Sent: Wed 5/06/09 9:38 AM
Dear Zach,

You are correct about the letter being delivered on April 20
th
, I misread my timeline. My decision is limited to the
hearing conduct. You have proffered nothing that indicates that the way you acted in court is in any way related to any outside
event. Your 50 page motion for reconsideration before Judge Gardner has not linked your conduct in any way to an outside
event. You have refused to give me a time and date to meet once again, and I will issue my determination tomorrow morning
at 9:00 am.

Access to your computer materials, will be made at a convenient time and place with our office manager, executive
director or designee and our computer specialist present. This is a business computer, and without further research I will not
give you access to it privately. You have been given a tape of the two Joshi hearings. To date, you have not agreed to meet
at any time and place to discuss these hearings; and you have not specifically requested any identified items, documents etc.
that were related to your conduct in this hearing. Your series of questions about the Board is irrelevant. The Board delegated
this matter to me to handle as a personnel matter.

-Paul
000326
F I L E D
Electronically
01-20-2012:02:35:37 PM
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000330
IAW OFF|CE
R|CHARD C. HIII
J Howcvcr, thc captIon ot thc documcnt, as wc as most ot its contcnt, IndIcatcs that hc
2 pcrhaps intcndcd to hc It In thc LuQ8nl!8t . uU8S 1nG!ng casc (Casc No. C\O8-
3 O1)O@). On intormatIon and bcict, thc documcnt cndcd up bcIng actuay hcd In thc
4 Lut8n|!8t casc.
b 21. Ot partIcuar notc to thIs Court, howcvcr, Is thc hrst six pagcs ot Coughins
"suppcmcnta rcpy, whcrcIn CoughIn dcscrIbcs, In somc dctaI, thc cvcnts ot January 12,
7 2O12.
22. On Janua 1), 2O12, Coughin hcd two documcnts In this casc. Lach
9 documcnt was cntitcd ÒppositIon to MotIon tor Attorncy's Ic.` Thcrc Is not, and has
J 0 ncvcr bccn, any motion tor attorncy's tccs hcd in this casc In this court. CoughIn's
JJ opposItIon Is a tugItIvc documcnt, It vioatcs Kuc 11 and Ncvada KIC j. : (mcritorious
J2 contcntion), and shoud bc strickcn by thc coun. It Is ony worth mcntonIng hcrc bccausc
J3 it coutaIns thc samc -pagc rant about thc cvcnts ot January 12, 2O12 as docs hIs caricr
J4 "suppcmcnta rcpy. `
Jb 2j. Kctcrcncc is madc to thc dccaratIon ot IhIip Btcwan, attachcd hcrcto as
J LXHIBIT _ .
J7 2q. Rctcrcncc is madc to thc DccaratIon ot Kichard G. HI, Lsg., aHachcd
J hcrcto as LXHIBIT .
J9
20 1. Rctcrcncc is madc to NRB 22.O1O: "Thc toowIng acts or omIssions sha bc
2J dccmcd contcmpts: . . . . Disobcdicncc or F055tc0 tO uU uW wrIt, OF00F, ruc
22 or proccss issucd by thc court or judgc at chambcrs. (Lmphasis addcd.)
23 2. Rctcrcncc Is madc to NRB 22.OjO(2), which provIdcs: "2. It a contcmpt Is
24 not commIttcd in thc immcdiatc \cw and prcscncc ot thc court or judgc at chambcrs, an
2b amdavit must bc prcscntcd to thc court or judgc ot thc tacts constItuting thc contcmpt, or
2 a statcmcnt ot thc tacts by thc mastcrs or arbitrators.
27

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000331
LW OFF|CE
R|CHARD G. H|LL
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2 On Dcccmbcr 2:, 2O::, Judgc 5tcrrazza ot thc Kcno Justicc Court cntcrcd an
3 ordcr that, among othcr things, aowcd Mcriss to disposc ot anything ch at thc Iropcrty
4 ahcr :OO p.m. on Iriday, Dcccmbcr 2j, 2O::. 88 LXHIBIT 2. On January ::, 2O:2, this
b Court dcnicd Coughins motion tor a tcmporary rcstraining ordcr, and, in so doing,
amrmcd Judgc 5tcrrazzas prcvious ordcr. 88 LXHIBIT j. Whcn Mcriss attcmptcd to
compy with thc courts ordcrs, Coughin attcmptcd to p rcvcnt him trom doing so.
Coughin cvcn attcmptcd to trauducnty cnist thc poicc to aid him in his chorts to thwart
9 this Courts and thc Kcno Justicc Court's dircctivcs. Coughins actions constitutc contcmpt
J0 ot court undcr NK5 22.O:O(j). Thc amdavits contcmpatcd by NK5 22.OjO(2) arc attachcd
JJ hcrcto 3 LXHIBIT and LXHIBIT . Thc torm ot thc ordcr Mcriss 3K thc court to cntcr
J2 is attachcd hcrcto as LXHIBIT .
J3 WHLKLIOKL, Mcriss prays tor an ordcr ot this court rcguiring dctcndant,
J4 ZCHAKY BAKILK COUGHLIN, to appcar and show causc why hc shoud not bc hcd in
Jb contcmpt ot this court undcr NK5 22.O:O(j) tor his rcsistancc to this court's awtuy
J cntcrcd ordcr; and tor such othcr, turthcr and additiona rcict as sccms just to thc court
J7 in thc prcmiscs.
J AFRTON OtSORDI IO NB RQM.OO
J9 Thc undcrsigncd docs hcrcby amrm that thc prcccding documcnt docs not
20 contain thc socia sccurity numbcr ot any pcrson.
k
2J DATLD this day ot January, 2O:2.
22
23
24
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2
27
KICHAKD G. HILL, LTD.
CA5LY . BA
KICHAKD G.
2 Iorcst 5trcct
Kcno, Ncvada 8@O@
Attorncys tor Iaintih
|ost Oic 0ox 2551
2 HBRC, Novada 896O6
(776) 340-O888
Fax(775) 348-O868

000332
|AW OFF|CE
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4 at Kcno, Ncvada, in a scacd cnvcopc, postagc prcpaid, a truc and corrcct copy ot thc
b torcgoing b0cOU0 OtOU OV LV00V tO bUOW LuU50 to:

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l0U mC mI. L0UgDID S0IU DC UIU D0l D0VC 0 CC D0DC.
! . bD0Ily lDCIC0HCI, ICCCIVCU 0D0lDCI C0 !I0m mI. blCW0Il. C W0S 0l lDC
lI0DS!CI Sl0lI0D. mI. L0UgDID D0U Sl0CU DIm H0m CDlCIIDg. mI. L0UgDID D0U C0CU lDC
0ICC, 0DU l0U lDCm lD0l mI. blCW0Il D0U Sl0CD DIS [L0UgDIDS) 0SSCSSI0DS, 0DU lD0l
Z lDCy WCIC ID lDC lIUCK.
Z 1O. ImmCUI0lCy UI0VC l0 lDC lI0DSICI Sl0lI0D. YDCD g0l lDCIC, mI.
ZZ L0UgDID W0S ICSCDl, 0DU DCIDg C0IU0DCU 0W0y Dy lW0 KCD0 10ICC LC0IlmCDl 0HCCIS.
Z PHCI ICSCDlCU lDC 0ICC 0HCCIS WIlD lDC KCD0 JUSlICC L0UIlS LCCCmDCI 21,2O11 0IUCI,
Z9 0DU lDIS C0UDS J0DU0] 11, 2O12 0IUCI, mI. blCW0Il W0S 00WCU l0 I0CCCU. lDCD
Z IClUIDCU l0 my 0HICC.
Z 11. PI0XIm0lCy 1j mIDUlCS 0lCI, ICCCIVCU 0D0lDCI C0 H0m mI. blCW0Il,
Z! WD0 ID!0ImCU mC lD0l mI. L0UgDID W0S 0l lDC KIVCI K0CK I0CI|. ImmCUI0lCy UI0VC
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000342
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Z ID lDC SlICCl WIlD DIS VIUC0 CmCI, yCIDg DU SCICmIDg l mC, lDC 0ICC, DU mI.
blCWIl.
9 1. D lDC UVICC 0! lDC 0ICC 0HCCI 0D lDC SCCDC, lDCD WCDl l0 lDC KCD0
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DIm !I0m IClUIDIDg l0 lDC KIVCI K0CK I0CIly 0I !UIlDCI DISSIDg mI. blCWIl DU DIS
! CICW. !ICU 0Ul lDC J1 CIW0IK DU IClUIDCU l0 KIVCI K0CK. mI. L0UgDID WS ICUy
ID CUSl0Uy. C WS ID lDC DCK 0! SQUU CI. YDCD DC SW mC, DC DCgD SWCIIDg DU
yCIDg. C WS SCICmIDg l lDC 0ICC DU W0UU D0l C00CIlC WIlD lDCm. ICCCIVCU
C l0 IClUID l0 lDC KCD0 JUSlICC L0UIl l0 IClIICVC lDC J1, WDICD SUDSCQUCDly gVC l0
D K1L 0HCCI, WD0 SIU DC W0UU SCIVC mI. L0UgDID l lDC )I.
Z 1q. DVC CIS0Dy ICVICWCU CXDIDIlS 1-q l0 lDC IDSlDl m0lI0D, DU CCD
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9 1. mI. L0UgDIDS DCDYI0I WS CCUlCU l0 UISIUl lDC ICm0V 0! UCDIIS
!I0m lDC D0mC. C0UDlCU D0 CSS lDD 1 Ul0m0DIC SClS ID lDC DSCmCDl, IDCUUIDg WDl

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1. UCCIC UDUCI CDQ 0! CI)UIy lDl lDC !0ICg0IDg IS lIUC DU C0IICCl.
M1LD OISOBDI IO DM 2QM.OO
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000343
F I L E D
Electronically
03-30-2012:04:14:37 PM
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 2859996 1
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hIS CSc IS H QQc IOm bcHO JuSlICc LOuIl (bJL) dd IHVOVcS lhc SU I
cVIClIOH O lcHHl, IHlI ZFLFb` Ll\L1 (LOu_hIH), uHdcI bb LhQlcI +.
LuIIcHly DcOIc lhIS LOuIl Ic lhIcc mllcIS, O WhICh hVc DccH Hy DIIccd Hd SuDmIllc
OI dcCISIOH.
hc ISl mllcI IS LOu_hIHS ul|un Cndcr PKC Jz(J lu mcnd ur ukc dd|l|unu
|nd|ng8 u[ ucl, ur, lcd |n lhc llcrul|vc, ul|un Cndcr PKC JV lu llcr ur mcnd lh
ZZ Crdcr Lcny|ng ul|un lu rcvcnl L|8pu8ul u[ cr8unul rupcr{. hc ScCOHd mllcI I
Z ccHdHl FL Lb1bbS (cIISS ) ul|un [ur cuvc lu |lc n8wcr|ng Dr|c[ |
Z+ !xcc88 u[ |vc ugc8. hc lhIId Hd H mllcI IS lhc QIlIcS ppcllulc Dr|cj, IHCudIH
ZJ LOu_hIHS Cpcn|ng Dr|c[0d cIISSS n8wcr|ng Dr|cj hIS LOuIl WI ddIcSS cCh O lhcS
Z mllcIS IH D.
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Thc partcs arc !amIar wth thc !acts and proccduraI hstory of ths casc. Thus, ths Court wII rcctc ncthcr th
!acts nor proccduraI hstory unIcss dong so s ncccssary to ths Court's dctcrmnaton.
1
000344
1 L a00 L
Z Jhc OD]cCl O LOu_hIHS ul|un Dcd OH JHuIy , Z1Z QQcIS lO Dc lhIS LOuIl
Crdcr dlcd JHuIy 11, Z1Z. 1H lhl Crdcr, lhIS LOuIl dcHIcd LOu_hIHS cmcI_cHCy IcQucS
+ OI lcmQOIIy IcSlIIHIH_ OIdcI. LOu_hIH mdc lhc IcQucSl HcI Jud_c bcIIZZ O bJ
J cHlcIcd H Crdcr OH cCcmDcI Z1, Z11, IH WhICh hc OIdcIcd. (1) LOu_hIH lO Qy +. l
cIISS OI SlOI_c O hIS QcISOH QIOQcIly DclWccH OVcmDcI 1, Z11 Hd OVcmDcI 1, Z11
Hd (Z) LOu_hIH Sh hVc CCcSS lO lhc QIcmIScS HOm V. .m. lO J. Q.m.
cCcmDcI ZZ, Z11 Hd cCcmDcI Z, Z11 lO IcmOVc hIS QcISOH QIOQcIly.
V LOu_hIH CImS lhIS LOuIlS JHuIy 11, Z1Z Crdcr IS CcIy IHCCuIlc lO lhc cXlcH
M IS QuIQOIlS lO DHd lhl lhc uHdcISI_Hcd mdc Hy _IccmcHl lO WIVc hIS ScCuIIly dcQOSIl I
11 cXChH_c OI ddIlIOH CCcSS lO lhc QIOQcIly. (1. Ol. l Q. 1Z.) 1H ddIlIOH, LOu_hIH VcI
1Z COuDSc OI cIISS mIScd lhIS LOuIl Dy CImIH_ LOu_hIH WS QcImIllcd lO IcmOVc QcISOH
1 QIOQcIly HcI J . Q.m. LOu_hIH HhcI c_cS COuHSc OI cIISS DOIdcd uQ lhc QIcmIScS
1+ IHSl j cd| ChIH Hd QdOCK OH lhc DCK _lc, Hd lcI llcmQlcd lO Dc SuIl OI lhc dISQOS
1J COSlS O IcmOVIH_ lhc QIOQcIly, O WhICh QIcVcHlcd LOu_hIH IOm IcmOVIH_ lhc IlcmS IH lh
1 DISl QCc. (1. Ol. l Q. 1+.) LOHScQucHly, LOu_hIH COHlcHdS lhIS LOuIlS Crdcr ShOud D
1 mcHdcd OI lcIcd uHdcI bL JZ OI JV lO IHCudc lhcSc c_lIOHS S ddIlIOH DHdIH_S O
1 Cl.
1V LOHVcIScy, IH hIS Cppu8|l|un Dcd OH cDIuIy , Z1Z cIISS VcIS LOu_hIH IS l
Z IlICulc WhICh 1HdIH_S hc WHlS mcHdcd uHdcI bL JZ. LVcH I LOu_hIH dId IlICul
Z1 SuCh DHdIH_S, hOWcVcI, cIISS COHlcHdS IcIc uHdcI bL JZ(D) IS HOHclhccSS uHVIDc l
ZZ LOu_hIH DcCuSc lhIS LOuIlS Crdcr dId HOl COHlIH DH ]ud_mcHl, S lhl Iuc IcQuIIcS.
Z bImIIy, cIISS COHlcHdS LOu_hIH IS HOl cHlIlcd lO IcIc uHdcI bL JV(c) DcCuSc H
Z+ ]ud_mcHl hS cVcI DccH cHlcIcd Dy lhIS COuIl IH lhIS CSc, SO lhcIc IS HO ]ud_mcHl OI lhIS COuIl l
ZJ lcI OI mcHd. (c. lQQH l Q. Z.) 1H ShOIl, cIISS COHlcHdS LOu_hIHS ul|un CKS H
Z cVIdcHlIIy DSIS, IS HOHScHSc . . . Dcd OHy lO dcy lhIS mllcI Hd dIIVc uQ ccS, Hd I
Z COmQclcy dcVOId O Hy mcIIl WhlSOcVcI, lO lhc cXlcHl Il IS cVcH dcCIQhcIDc.
Z
Z
000345
1 lQQH l Q. 1, Z.) 1H ICl, cIISS CImS LOu_hIH ShOud Dc SuD]cCl lO
Z VcXlIOuS IlI_lIOH lClICS. (c1 lQQH l Q. .)
FHcI IcVIcWIH_ lhc QIlIcS QcdIH_S Hd lhc cXhIDIlS llChcd lhcIclO, Hd Hc
+ IcVIcWIH_ lhIS LOuIlS JHuIy 11, Z1Z Crdcr, lhIS LOuIl hS _cHcd IIOm LOu_hIHS u/|u
J CcIlIH ddIlIOH HdIH_S OI ICl lhl LOu_hIH COHlcHdS ShOud Dc IHCudcd Dy mcHdmcHl O
lcIlIOH IH lhIS LOuIlS Crdcr. \lImlcy, hOWcVcI, lhIS LOuIl HdS lhc Crdcr I
uHDcHdDc OI uHlcIDc uHdcI lhc bucS LOu_hIH CIlcS DcCuSc SId Crdcr dOcS HOl COHlI
H QQcDc ]ud_mcHl, OI dISQOSIlIOH lhl IcSOVcS OI lhc QIlIcS CImS.
V bImmOHS L V. bID 1HC., Z+ .d 11, 11 (cV. Z11
1 (cXQIHIH_ ]uIISdIClIOH lO COHSIdcI H QQc IIOm lhc dISlIICl COuIl dcQcHdS OH WhclhcI lh
11 dISlIICl COuIl hS cHlcIcd H ]ud_mcHl), cc V. LN 11 cV. +Z+, +Z, VV .Z
1Z +1, +1 (Z) (dcHIH_ H ]ud_mcHl S ]ud_mcHl lhl dISQOScS OI lhc ISSuc
1 QIcScHlcd IH lhc CSc, Hd cVcS HOlhIH_ IOI lhc HluIc COHSIdcIlIOH OI lhc COuIl, cXCcQl IO
1+ QOSl-]ud_mcHl ISSucS SuCh d llOHcyS IccS Hd COSlS.). FS COHScQucHCc, lhIS LOuIl Hd
1J IcIcI uHdcI bL JZ OI JV IS uHVIDc lO LOu_hIH.
1 FlhOu_h bImmOHS Hd L N IHVOVc QQcS lO lhc cVd buQIcmc LOuIl IIOm lh
1 dISlIICl COuIl, lhIS LOuIl HdS lhc ]uIISdIClIOH QIIHCIQcS HHOuHCcd IH lhOSc CScS SO QQy l
1 lhc dISlIICl COuIl WhcH lhc dISlIICl COuIl COHSIdcIS QQcS IIOm lhc ]uSlICc COuIlS, S Wc
1V WhcH lhc dISlIICl COuIl COHSIdcIS mOlIOHS uHdcI bL JZ OI JV, S Wc hVc IH lhIS CSc.
Z hcIcIOIc, lhIS LOuIl COHCudcS LOu_hIHS ul|un Cndcr PKC Jz(J lu mcnd ur uk
Z1 dd|l|unul |nd|ng8 u[ ucl, ur, lcd |n lhc llcrul|vc, ul|un Cndcr PKC JV lu llcr O
ZZ mcnd lhc Crdcr Lcny|ng ul|un lu rcvcnl L|8pu8ul u[ cr8unul rupcr{ IS .
2 caVc 0 c tc 0 XccSS 0 Vc
Z+ 1H I_hl OI lhc VOumIHOuS IcCOId IH lhIS CSc (WhICh cXCccdS Z, Q_cS), IHCudIH
ZJ cH_lhy DIIcIS cd Dy LOu_hIH,
2
lhIS LOuIl HdS _OOd CuSc cXISlS lO _Hl cIISS cVc lO
Z
Z
Z
Ths Court acknowIcdgcs McrIss's compIant that CougIn has voIatcd thc pagc Imts contancd n Orders o
ths Court, as wcII as thc IocaI ruIcs. Howcvcr, pursuant to ths Court's Iongstandng poIcy of consdcrng cascs L
thc mcrts, as opposcd to dsmssng thcm for proccduraI rcasons, ths Court wII ovcrIook such voIatons n th
pacuIar casc.

000346
1 H HSWcIIH_ DIIc IH cXCcSS O 1Vc Q_cS. 1H ddIlIOH, lhIS LOuIl dcHIcS cIISSS mOlIOH l
Z SlIIKc lhc cXCcSS mlcII 1cd Dy LOu_hIH Hd SO dcHIcS cIISSS IcQucSl OI cVc lO Dc
SuQQcmcHl DIIc lO mccl lhc I_umcHlS COHlIHcd IH lhl cXCcSS mlcII.
+ tcS
J FS mcHlIOHcd QIcVIOuSy, lhIS CSc IHVOVcS lhc SU Iy cVIClIOH O LOu_hIH IOm 1Z1
bIVcI bOCK blIccl, bcHO, N VJ1 (lhc IOQcIly). FHcI lWO hcIIH_S IH bJL IH WhIC
LOu_hIH c_cd dccHScS O hDIlDIIly, IclIlIOH, Hd dISCIImIHlIOH, Jud_c bcIIZZ
d]ud_cd LOu_hIH SU IIy cVIClcd IOm lhc IOQcIly QuISudl lO bb +.ZJ() Dy Crdc
V dlcd lClODcI Z, Z11. bQcCIDCy, Jud_c bcIIZZ OuHd cIISS QIOQcIy lcImIHlc
1 LOu_hIHS lcHHCy Hd lhcIcHcI QIOQcIy ScIVcd LOu_hIH WIlh HOlICc O uHWH dclIHcI.
11 Jud_c bcIIZZ HIlhcI OuHd LOu_hIH Icd lO QIcScHl Hy cVIdcHCc lhl cIISS Clcd IH H
1Z QIOhIDIlcd, dISCIImIHlOIy, OI IclIlOIy ShIOH S c_cd Dy LOu_hIH, OI OlhcIWISc.
1 (bcIIZZ, J., LSc O. bLNZ11-1, lCl. Z, Z11.)
1+ FS IcSul, LOu_hIH WS OIdcIcd lO VClc lhc QIcmIScS Dy lClODcI 1, Z11 l J.
1J Q.m. LOu_hIH Icd lO dO SO. c SO Icd lO IcmOVc hIS QcISOH DcOH_IH_S. LOHScQucHly
1 cIISS SOu_hl QcISOH QIOQcIly IcH OI SlOI_c O LOu_hIHS QcISOH DcOH_IH_S IH lh
1 IOQcIly IOm lhc QcIIOd O OVcmDcI 1, Z11 lO OVcmDcI 1, Z11. LOu_hIH Dcd mOlIO
1 lO COHlcSl lhc IcH. lH cCcmDcI Z1, Z11, Jud_c bcIIZZ OIdcIcd LOu_hIH lO Qy lO cIIS
1V +. S II Hd IcSOHDc COmQcHSlIOH OI cIISSS SlOI_c O hIS QcISOH DcOH_IH_S.
Z (bcHZZ, J., LSc O. bLNZ11-1, cC. Z1, Z11.) Jud_c bcIIZZ SO _IHlc
Z1 LOu_hIH CCcSS lO lhc IOQcIly lO IcmOVc hIS QcISOH DcOH_IH_S Dy cCcmDcI Z, Z11
ZZ J . Q.m. LOu_hIH Icd lO dO SO. FS IcSul, cIISS hIIcd COHlIClOI lO dISQOSc O
Z LOu_hIHS QcISOH DcOH_IH_S. LOu_hIH QQccd.
Z+ LOu_hIH Dcd hIS Cpcn|ng Dr|c[ (1IIc1) OH cDIuIy , Z1Z.
4
cIISS Dcd hI
ZJ n5cr|ng Dr|c[ (bcSQOHSc) OH cDIuIy Z+, Z1Z. hIS LOuIl lOOK lhc mllcI uHdc
Z
Z
Z
8cc notc 2, McrIss madc ths rcqucst n !oomotc l4 o! hs Answering Brief dscusscd ia.
Ths pIcadng rcpIaccd Opening BricJCoughIn prcvousIy Icd two days carIcr. ConscqucntIy, ths Court wI
ucat ths brc! as thc opcratvc pIcadng. H addton, on Fcbruary 7, 2012 CoughIn Icd a Supplement l
Appellants Opening Brief to whch hc attachcd cxhbt contanng a CD o! audo rccordngs.
+
000347
1 SuDmISSIOH OH cDIuIy Z, Z1Z. hIS lIdcI HOW OOWS. FS QIcImIHIy mllcI, hOWcVcI
Z lhIS LOuIl HOlcS Il IS lhc ISSuc O SummIy cVIClIOH Hd lhc Judgc bcIIZZS lClODcI Z, Z11
Crdcr lhl QIcScHly COHCcHS lhIS LOuIl.
5
+ blHdId O bcVIcW
J lH CIVI QQcS IOm ]uSlICc COuIlS lO dISlIICl COuIlS, CSc muSl HOl Dc lIIcd HcW.
JLbL Z(C). hclhcI OH QQc l lhc cVd buQIcmc LOuIl HOm dISlIICl COuIl, OI O
QQc l dISlIICl COuIl IOm ]uSlICc COuIl, OWcI COuIlS HdIHgS WI HOl Dc dISluIDcd O
QQc uHcSS lhcy Ic CcIy cIIOHcOuS Hd Ic HOl DScd OH SuDSlHlI cVIdcHCc. LIDcIHI V
V 11 cV. 1Z1, 1Z+, J .Zd J+, J+Z (1VV+).
1 jF|H OIdcI gIHlIHg SummIy cVIClIOH uHdcI bb +.ZJ() ShDud Dc IcVIcWcd O
11 QQc DScd uQOH lhc SlHdId OI IcVIcW O H OIdcI gIHlIHg SU Iy ]udgmcHl uHdcI bL
1Z J DcCuSc lhcSc QIOCccdIHgS Ic HOgOuS. L V. L.. L, 1Z cV. Z1Z
1 Z1J, 1 .d +J, + (Z). bU Iy ]udgmcHl IS QIOQcI OHy I HO gcHuIHc ISSuc O
1+ mlcII Cl cXISlS Hd lhc mOVIHg QIly IS cHlIlcd lO ]udgmcHl S mllcI O W. EV. b. L!V
1J . J(C) Scc OOd V. 1Z1 cV. Z+, ZV, 1Z1 .d 1Z, 1ZV (ZJ). h
1 mOVIHg QIly DcIS lhc IHIlI DuIdcH O QIOVIHg lhcIc IS HO gcHuIHc ISSuc O mlcII Cl. IH
1 V. 1V cV. Z1, Z-Z, J .Zd JJ, J (1VV).
1 lHCc lhc mOVIHg QIly SlIScS lhIS DuIdcH, hOWcVcI, lhc DuIdcH ShIHS lO lhc HOHmOVIH
1V QIly lO ShOW lhc cXISlcHCc O gcHuIHc ISSuc O mlcII Cl. d. l Z. hIc lhc QcdIHg
Z Hd lhc IcCOId muSl Dc COHSlIucd IH lhc Ighl mOSl VOIDc lO lhc HOHmOVIHg QIly, lhc QIl
Z1 muSl dO mOIc lhH SImQy ShOW lhcIc IS SOmc mclQhySIC dOuDl S lO lhc OQcIlIVc ClS
ZZ OOd, 1Z1 cV. l ZV. O VOId hVIHg SummIy ]udgmcHl cHlcIcd gIHSl Il, lhc QIly muSl
Z
Z+
ZJ
Z
Z
Z
L appcaI, CougIn's Brief spans !orty-scvcn pagcs ad contans scvcraI aIIcgatons and cIams. Many o! thcs
cIams touch upon coIIatcraI ssucs Ikc, !or cxampIc, aIIcgcd rcIatonshps bctwccn McrIss's counscI and Ia
cn!orccmcnt, aIIcgcd unconsttutonaI acts o! cty cmpIoyccs undcr MoncII v. o! Soc. 4J \.8. 5
(l78), and McrIss' s aIIcgcd dsntcrcst n compIants hom pcopIc Ikc CoughIn and othcrs assocatcd wt
CoughIn. As such, ths Court wII not addrcss thcsc ssucs. In addton, bccausc CoughIn !aIcd to tmcIy Ic h
notcc o! appcaI rcgardng thc pcrsonaI propcrq Icn, scc NR8 40.25J(8), and bccausc CoughIn's notcc o! appca
!aIs to dcnt( an crror rcgardng thc court's proccdurc n scttng a hcarng on ths ssuc, ths Court wII no
consdcr ths ssuc.
J
000348
1 Dy 1dVIl OI OlhCIWISC, SCl OIlh SQCCIC ClS dCmOHSlIlIH_ lhC CXISlCHCC O _CHuIHC ISSu
Z OI lII. 1d.

+ hIS LOuIl hS ICVICWCd O lhC QIlICS QCdIH_S Hd lhC CXhIDIlS llChCd lhCIClO
J hIS LOuIl SO hS COHSIdCICd O lhC QIlICS ICCVHl I_umCHlS. FHCI lhIS ICVICW d
COHSIdCIlIOH, lhIS LOuIl WI HOl dISluID Jud_C bCIIZZS lClODCI Z, Z11 Crdcr _IHlIH
SU Iy CVIClIOH. hIS LOuIl HdS lhl Crdcr WS DSCd OH SuDSlHlI CVIdCHCC Hd Il WS HO
CCIy CIIOHCOuS. huS, lhIS LOuIl COHCudCS CIISS hS mCl hIS IHIlI DuIdCH O QIOVIH_ lhCI
V IS HO _CHuIHC ISSuC O mlCII Cl IC_IdIH_ WhClhCI LOu_hIH WS SU IIy CVIClCd QIOQCIy
1 LOHSCQuCHly, lhC DuIdCH ShIHS lO LOu_hIH lO ShOW lhC CXISlCHCC O _CHuIHC ISSuC O mlCII
11 Cl.
1Z FlhOu_h LOu_hIH IISCS SCVCI CImS Hd mKCS HumCIOuS C_lIOHS IH hIS Dr|c
1 LOu_hIH IS lO QICSCHl ddIlIOH ClS rcluIcd Iu h|8 dc[cn8c8 ru|8cd |n KJC lhl UHdCImIHC U
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000351
60302: Case View
Disclaimer: The information and documents available here should not be relied upon as an
official record of action.
Only filed documents can be viewed. Some documents received in a case may not be
available for viewing.
Some documents originating from a lower court, including records and appendices, may not
be available for viewing.
For official records, please contact the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Nevada at (775) 684-
1600.
Case Information: 60302
Short Caption:
COUGHLIN VS. WASHOE
LEGAL SERVICES
Classification:
Civil Appeal - General -
Other
Related
Case(s):
60317, 60838, 60975
Lower Court
Case(s):
Washoe Co. - Second
Judicial District -
CV1101896
Case Status: Briefing Reinstated
Disqualifications: Hardesty
Panel
Assigned:
Panel
Replacement:
To SP/Judge: SP Status: Exempt
Oral Argument:
Oral
Argument
Location:
Submission Date:
How
Submitted:
+ Party Information
+ Due Items
Docket Entries
Date Type/Subtype Description Pending Document
02/27/2012
Filing Fee - Filing Fee
Waived
Appeal Filing fee waived. In
Forma Pauperis.
02/27/2012
Notice of Appeal
Documents - Notice of
Appeal
Filed Notice of Appeal. Appeal
docketed in the Supreme Court
this day. (Docketing statement
mailed to counsel for appellant.)
12-06119
02/27/2012
Other - Disqualification of
Justice
Justice James W. Hardesty
disqualified from participation
in this matter. Disqualification
Reason: Voluntary Recusal.
Issued Notice of Referral to
Settlement Program. This
000352
file:///R|/...0a%20NEW%20temp/5%201%2009%20elcano's%20pelcano@washoelegalservices.org%200435%2060302.htm[11/23/2012 1:16:39 AM]
Close Print
WLS
location.
Sent: Fri 5/01/09 8:52 AM
Cc: Kathy Breckenridge (kathy@kbreckenridgelaw.com)
1 attachment
ltrCoughlin2ndDraft.doc (30.5 KB)
Letter attached.
000353
Dear Zach,
I have been authorized by the Board to handle this matter.
1. Your current suspension was a result of the order entered by Judge Gardner in
the Joshi matter;
2. Suspension means that you are no longer to participate as a lawyer in any case
assigned to you by WLS until further notice. You may appear on your own
behalf to litigate the order of sanctions entered by Judge Gardner. If any
lawyer contacts you about a WLS case you must refer them to Caryn
Sternlicht or Marc Ashley;
3. According to the Courts order, you were sanctioned for arguing incessantly,
being unprepared, making sarcastic and derogatory remarks to the Court, and
for rude and disrespectful conduct. You were personally fined $934 as a result
of this conduct;
4. I could not evaluate your conduct at trial until I received the tape of the
hearing; this tape was promptly ordered, and was finally received on
Thursday, April 23
rd
. I have not yet reviewed this tape in its entirety.
5. You have requested a copy of your personnel file. This has been made
available to you;
6. We have delivered a copy of the tape of the Joshi matter to you;
7. You requested a formal response to your complaint concerning Rhonda. This
was investigated by me within 48 hours of your complaint. There is no
question that your office behavior (which included yelling, and calling her a
hall monitor, etc.) upset her, and as a direct result she made a comment to you.
She was counseled as to the type of language she used, and specifically told
that even though she was upset this language (bite me) was not appropriate
for the workplace. I did not realize you wanted a formal response to this
incident. Please consider this your formal response. I am unaware of any
specific written complaints other than the one you made to me about Rhonda.
Please provide me with copies of all other written complaints sent by you to
me prior to the entry of Judge Gardners order. Please make sure they are
dated. I will review them and indicate to you what the disposition of those
matters may be.
000354
8. Counseling for difficulties in office interaction had already been scheduled
when I received Judge Gardners order. You did not appear for the mandatory
meeting at which I announced this counseling;
9. We have received a copy of a 50 page motion for reconsideration you filed in
the Joshi matter. I will review this in its entirety. If there is any other written
material you want me to review in determining whether or not your
employment should continue with WLS you must provide it to me by 5:00 pm
Monday, May 4
th
. I will be happy to pick up any such material at a reasonable
time and place if you are not comfortable emailing it to me.
Based on the forgoing I will be taking the following action:
1. I will review the tape in the Joshi matter, your fifty page motion for
reconsideration and any other written material you provide to me. If your conduct
was as represented by Judge Gardner you will be terminated. This termination
will be based exclusively on the manner in which you conducted this hearing, and
will not be related to any ultimate outcome regarding the sanctions order. WLS
can not maintain an employment relationship with a lawyer who argues
incessantly, appears unprepared and makes sarcastic and derogatory remarks to
the court, and otherwise conducts his or her case in a rude and disrespectful
manner. This determination will be made by me by 10:00 am Wednesday
morning, May 6, 2009.
2. If the hearing tape does not justify Judge Gardners order WLS will require you to
participate in the previously referred to employee counseling pursuant to the
directives of our industrial psychologist. This counseling is currently going on
with other employees at WLS. The counselor will determine the extent to which
you will participate and maintain a case load. You will maintain your employment
status, and will receive pay and benefits throughout this course of counseling.
3. If you wish to discuss any resolution of this matter between now and Wednesday
morning at 10 am I will be available to meet with you at any convenient time and
place, including this weekend. You may bring any person you would like to a
resolution discussion. I will come alone unless you request otherwise.
This has been sent to you by email. Please advise me as to the address to which a hard
copy of this transmittal should be delivered.
Sincerely,
Paul Elcano
000355
60302: Case View
Case Search
Participant Search
02/27/2012
Notice/Outgoing - Notice
of Referral to Settlement
Program
appeal may be assigned to the
settlement program. Timelines
for requesting transcripts and
filing briefs are stayed.
12-06121
02/27/2012
to File Case Appeal
Statement/Civil
Issued Notice to File Case
Appeal Statement/Civil. Due
date: 10 days.
12-06126
02/27/2012
Settlement Notice -
Notice: Exemption from
Settlement Program
Issued Notice: Exemption from
Settlement Program. It has been
determined that this appeal will
not be assigned to the
settlement program.
Appellant(s) 15 days transcript
request form; 120 days opening
brief:
12-06222
03/09/2012
Order/Incoming - District
Court Order
Filed District court order. Copy
of Order Denying Motion to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis filed
in district court on 3/8/2012 and
Case Appeal Statement or, Pled
in the alternative, Motion for
Extension of Time to Correct
Deficiencies in Appeal Papers.
Y 12-07769
03/26/2012
Motion - Motion to
Dismiss Appeal
Filed Motion to Dismiss
Appeal.
12-09480
03/26/2012
Notice/Incoming - Notice
of Appearance
Filed Notice of Appearance
(Brian A. Gonsalves appearing
on behalf of respondent Crisis
Intervention Services).
12-09496
04/09/2012
Motion - Response to
Motion
Filed Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss.
12-11097
04/13/2012
Notice of Appeal
Documents - Case Appeal
Statement
Filed Case Appeal Statement. 12-11962
04/16/2012
Motion - Reply to
Response
Filed Reply in Support of
Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
12-12020
05/31/2012 Order/Procedural - Order
Filed Order Dismissing Appeal
in Part. We dismiss this appeal
as to CIS, only. Appellant shall
have 11 days from the date of
this order to file and serve his
(1) transcript request form or
certificate that no transcript will
be requested, and (2) docketing
statement.
12-17190
06/14/2012
Transcript Request -
Certificate of No
Transcript Request
Filed Certificate of No
Transcript Request.
12-18622
06/14/2012
Docketing Statement -
Docketing Statement
Filed Docketing Statement. 12-18740
000356
60302: Case View
06/27/2012
to File Opening Brief and
Appendix
Issued Notice to File Opening
Brief and Appendix. Due Date:
15 days.
12-20249
07/13/2012
Notice/Incoming - Notice
of Appearance
Filed Notice of Appearance
(Joseph Garin and Shannon
Nordstrom of Lipson Neilson
Cole Seltzer & Garin appearing
on behalf of respondents).
12-22194
07/13/2012
Motion - Motion to
Dismiss Appeal
Filed Respondents' Motion to
Dismiss Appeal.
Y 12-22195
07/25/2012 Motion - Motion
Filed Motion for Permission to
File Opening Brief After
Deadline has run and
Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss.
Y 12-23543
07/26/2012
Motion
Filed Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss (and request for 15
days extension to file opening
brief and appendix).
Y 12-23572
07/31/2012
Motion
Filed Response to Plaintiff's
Motion for Permission to File
Opening Brief After Deadline
Has Run and Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss.
Y 12-24165
08/03/2012
Motion - Reply to
Response
Filed Reply in Support of
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss
Appeal.
Y 12-24569
000357
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
In Re Matter oI:
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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Supreme Court No: 60838
OPPOSITION TO PETITION OF BAR COUNSEL FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION FROM
THE PRACTICE OF LAW PURSUANT TO SCR 111 AND REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME TO SUPPLEMENT THIS OPPOSITION
COMES NOW, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ., and Iiles the above named
document and moves this Court Ior the relieI requested herein. This Iiling is Iurther based upon the
papers and pleadings on Iile herein and in the case in the trail court and the appeal in the District
Court and the Memorandum oI Points and Authorities submitted herewith and any oral argument this
Court may desire. And, quickly, in case this is the last thing I get to do in the law, I would like to
take this opportunity to make and plea that Nevada courts consider the ground-breaking holdings in a
Iew recent Ioreclosure deIense cases concerning National Banking Act preemption in light oI the
recent Dodd-Frank Act implementation. Bank oI America, likes to have its subsidiary Recontrust
- 1/20 -
OPPOSITION TO PETITION OF BAR COUNSEL FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF
LAW PURSUANT TO SCR 111 AND REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO SUPPLEMENT THIS
OPPOSITION
Electronically Filed
Jun 11 2012 08:19 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
Clerk of Supreme Court
Docket 60838 Document 2012-18155
000381
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THE FOLLOWING OPPOSITION TO SUSPENSION AND
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seek to avoid our state's law by claiming it is a "national bank" and thereIore not subject to laws like
NRS 649.171, which requires a Ioreclosure trustee to have a license Irom our state.
In re Johnson, 460 B.R. 234, 247 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011) (Iinding no conIlict preemption
where the state law did not signiIicantly impair the bank's ability to collect on its debt); National
Bank preemption issue is a red-herring because the Congress intended that National Banks be exempt
Irom regulation as to loan origination, and not as to recovery when the loan is in deIault. While a
subsidiary oI Bank oI America like Reconstrust has constituted itselI as a National Bank, which is an
utter sham, such machinations should be disregarded by Nevada courts. Protection Ior National Banks
was provided, in order to put them on a level playing Iield vis-a-vis state chartered institutions, when
it came to interacting with the public in making loans. State law remedies have always been a subject
oI regulation by the state and local authorities. The 'hows', 'whys' and 'whereIores' oI loan
enIorcement have been leIt up to the states. Some states have anti-deIiciency laws on Ioreclosed
mortgages, and some do not. Some twenty one (21) states require judicial Ioreclosure, while the rest
do not. Federal law has no power to interIere with this aspect oI the banking industry, and never has.
Foreclosure trustees like Reconstrust may not simply Iree itselI oI these inconvenient consequences.
To rule that "national banks" like Reconstrust could avoid the technicalities oI Nevada Ioreclosure
law, while other Ioreclosure companies cannot, would be to conIer a competitive advantage that
would probably run aIoul oI the antitrust laws. The area oI enIorcement oI debts to national banks,
has never been the subject oI preemption. BAC has attempted to clothe its subsidiary Reconstrust
with the power oI preemption, ie,. to ignore state law, when it comes to Ioreclosure law. The extent to
which a national bank may avoid compliance with state law, has very recently been decided in the
case oI; Bell v. Countrywide Bank NA et ai, (U.S.D.C. Ut., March 15, 2012|. The Iederal court went
into a detailed analysis oI "preemption" in holding that Reconstrust was not exempt Irom compliance
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with local, Utah law when it Ioreclosed upon property Ior Bank oI America. The parallel with the
laws oI Nevada is unmistakable. "Utah statutes require banks- including Utah-chartered banks- to
Ioreclose deeds oI trust only thru identiIied trustees. The question Ior decision is direct: Does
ReconTrust, a Texas corporation, and by deIinition a "national bank" -although it neither takes
deposits nor makes loans -have the power to conduct non-judicial Ioreclosures in Utah trust deeds on
real property located in Utah without complying with Utah statutes? The direct answer is no. It does
not have such power." slip opinion at pp 9.
Bank oI America, likes to have its subsidiary Recontrust seek to avoid our state's law by
claiming it is a "national bank" and thereIore not subject to laws like NRS 649.171, which requires a
Ioreclosure trustee to have a license Irom our state. On March 13, 2012, the United States District
Court Ior the Northern District oI West Virginia aIIirmed the stricter analysis now required under the
Dodd-Frank Act Ior determining whether a consumer claim brought against a bank is preempted by
the National Bank Act ("NBA"). The district court did so when it reversed the orders oI the United
States Bankruptcy Court Ior the district dismissing three separate adversary proceedings against
Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. ("Capital One") as preempted under the NBA. Meluzio v. Capital One
Bank (USA), N.A., 1:11cv58, 1:11cv59, 1:11cv33, 2012 WL 847324 (N.D.W. Va. 2012). The
consolidated appeals oI James Meluzio, Mary and Thomas Romeo and Tina and Jason Jones (col-
collectively "the debtors") stemmed Irom their allegations that Capital One violated West Virginia
state law by continuing its collection calls aIter being inIormed that the debtors had retained counsel.
Capital One moved to dismiss their state law claims as preempted by the NBA. On March 7, 2011 the
Bankruptcy Court concluded that the claims were preempted under the doctrine oI conIlict
preemption and granted the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the district court Iound that aIter the
Bankruptcy Court issued its decision, the legal analysis governing preemption by the NBA had
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dramatically changed because oI the enactment oI the Dodd- Frank Act and the publication oI the
amended regulations by the OIIice oI the Comptroller oI the Currency ("OCC"). Prior to the Dodd-
Frank Act, the NBA contained no express preemption provision. The Dodd-Frank Act introduced a
new provision, eIIective July 21, 2011, that addressed NBA preemption. The new provision codiIies
the standard set Iorth in Barnett Bank oI Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, Fla. Ins. Comm'r, 517 U.S.
25 (1996). In Barnett, the Supreme Court concluded that the state statute allowed banks to engage in
practices Iorbidden by the Iederal statutes and consequently the state statutes were "an obstacle to the
accomplishment" oI the purposes oI the Iederal statute. Both the Dodd-Frank Act and the OCC
regulation tie preemption to the Barnett standard. Accordingly, courts must now determine whether
the state statute either (1) imposes an obligation on a national bank that is in direct conIlict with
Iederal law, or (2) stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution oI the Iull purposes and
objectives oI Congress.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
With respect to the alleged Wal-Mart petit larceny oI a chocolate bar and some cough
medication drops/melts: the accused did not go into the store and grab those items and leave. The
Wal-Mart associate testiIied that the accused ate the chocolate bar (and that he saw me take it oII the
shelI in the candy isle) while the accused was shopping Ior any paid Ior approximately $90 oI other
groceries. However, the UPC oI the chocolate bar Irom the receipt in question shows it was an ice
cream bar, meaning it wouldn't have been in the candy isle, but rather the reIrigerated isle. Thus, the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard applicable to that criminal case appears not to have been met
where, amazingly, the multimillion dollar establishment, Wal-Mart, with literally hundreds oI
cameras placed strategically throughout the store, claimed in the trial court that no video Iootage
exists or ever existed oI any oI the events testiIied to at trial beyond the 2 videos propounded oI the
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interactions between the accused and Wal-Mart loss prevention staII and Reno Sparks Indian Colony
police in a 5 by 8 by 12 interrogation room utilized by Wal-Mart. Oddly, the video Irom the
interrogation room show the RSIC OIIicers being handed a CD or DVD by the Wal-Mart loss
prevention associate upon their exiting the interrogation room. So, the only evidence being the
alleged eye witness testimony oI the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate, his credibility undermined
by the Iact that he testiIied, under oath, that he personally saw the accused select the chocolate bar
Irom the candy isle, then consume it while walking throughout the store shopping. Again, the UPC
Irom the wrapper oI the chocolate bar item allegedly stolen clearly reveals that the UPC belongs to a
reIrigerated item, an ice cream bar, thereIore undermining the Wal-Mart associates claim to have
witnessed the accused select it Irom the shelI in the candy isle, which is not reIrigerated.
Further, the only other piece oI allegedly incriminating evidence was the Iruit oI an
impermissible search. The RSIC OIIicer testiIied that he only made and arrest, and thereIore
conducted a search incident to arrest in light oI the accused's alleged reIusal to provide his driver's
license. However, the two videos oI the detention and search in the Wal-Mart interrogation room
clearly reveal the accused providing that same RSIC oIIicer his driver's license and the OIIicer
radioing in the driver's license number to run a routine check, and the arrest report clearly contains the
driver's license number oI the accused and other inIormation culled Irom the RSIC oIIicer's review oI
the driver's license. Further, the partial contents oI a cough melt package was Iound in the accused
pockets. However, the receipt Ior the $90 oI groceries and sundries the accused purchased
immediately prior to the arrest bares and entry with the exact same UPC oI the cough melts Iound in
the accused's pocket.
Then, the Wal-Mart witness admitted, under oath while testiIying, that he could not hear
whether or not the accused told the cashier ringing up the some $90 oI items purchase whether the
- 5/20 -
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accused had or had consumed a certain a quantity oI the cough medication drops/melts. The Wal-
Mart loss prevention associate Iurther testiIied that it was a common and accepted practice at Wal-
Mart Ior shoppers to inIorm cashiers oI the number or quantity oI a certain item they were purchasing
rather than have the cashier ring up each oI the duplicative items one by one. Further, the Walmart
and Indian Colony OIIicer testiIied that on the receipt Ior the items the accused did pay Ior, the UPC
oI the type oI cough medication melts they say the accused stole did not appear, however, a review oI
that receipt clearly shows that that UPC Ior cough melts is an entry on that receipt. Also, amazingly,
the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate testiIied that he could glean, Irom 30 yards away, each and
every item the cashier rung up Ior me and that those items did not include such a box oI the cough
medication melts. However, the accused showed in court and in exhibits that the receipt Ior the items
the accused purchased did have one item with the same UPC as the exact type oI cough medication
melts. So the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate admitted neither he nor anyone at Wal-Mart could
say that they could hear whether the accused told the cashier a quantity to ring up Ior the cough
medication melt box with the same UPC as the ones Wal-Mart alleges were stolen or consumed while
shopping.... Further, the Indian Colony OIIicer testiIied that he only arrested the accused and
conducted a search incident to arrest because the accused didn't provide the accused's driver's license
to him. However, the video oI the Wal-Mart interrogation room interview clearly shows the accused
giving the oIIicer the accused's driver's license and him radioing it in to his dispatch and him taking
down the DL number and other inIormation oII oI it. Further, the receipt Irom the $90 oI groceries the
accused paid Ior contains an entry with the UPC oI the exact type oI cough medication melts that the
oIIicer Iound in the accused's pocket upon conducting the search incident to arrest. The Wal-Mart
associate and Indian Colony OIIicer both testiIied that the receipt did not contain an entry Ior the
cough drops, but the copy oI the receipt in the police report and discovery and a review oI the UPC
- 6/20 -
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and subsequently looking up the item assigned that Universal Parcel Code clearly shows that a box oI
those cough medication melts were, in Iact, included on that receipt. the accused am all Ior owning up
to things but this wasn't a "walked into the store, grabbed some stuII, tucked under one's shirt, and
dashed away" type situation. Plus Wal-Mart's loss prevention staII had told the accused just weeks
beIore they would retaliate against the accused by having the accused banned Irom all their stores Ior
arguing with their customer service personnel about a curious practice wherein Wal-mart staII and
managers seem to "Iorget" or 'Iavorably remix the terms oI their store's return policy and or claim
that policy is a "courtesy" rather than a bargained Ior term included in a contract Ior the sale oI goods:
http://www.enotes.com/consumer-issues-reIerence/purchases-and-returns
The accused makes no admission oI guilt to the charge Ior which a conviction was entered.
However, to the extent the question oI guilt is already decided, mitigating circumstances do exist
here. The accused was unable to aIIord a medication he takes sometime in August 2011 because he
could not aIIord it due to Iact that his then domestic partner oI Iour and a halI years essentially stole
approximately two months oI rent Irom him beIore moving out in late June 2011. The accused helped
this domestic partner Iinish her Iinal 3 years oI college (in many ways, including Iinancial), in the
Iour and halI years they were together, whereupon she (who discovered she had early onset insulin
dependent diabetes at 11 years old and is dealing with other issues exacerbated by that condition)
promptly ended to relationship and began moving out just 2 days aIter graduating Irom college.
There is more to that aspect oI this situation, mitigating Iactors, but the undersigned's desire to protect
the privacy rights oI others, though materials have been provided to Bar Counsel in that regard.
Further, it is possible that police and prosecutorial misconduct played some role in this
conviction (the City oI Reno Attorney's OIIice indicated it had received nothing in relation to the
September 9
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, 2011 arrest when the accused called on or about September 15
th
, 2011, however,
- 7/20 -
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subsequent discovery suggest that the RSIC Iaxed all or portions oI the police report to the City
Attorney's OIIice on September 13
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, 2011. Regardless, the accused was denied a copy oI arrest
reports and witness statements by the RMC, the City Attorney's OIIice, and the RSIC Police
Department Ior an entire month Iollowing the arrest, whereupon it was only propounded aIter the
October 10
th
, 2011 arraignment, thereby prejudicing the accused's ability to mount a deIense.
Additionally, the Reno City Attorney prosecutor put on testimony by the RSIC OIIicer concerning the
alleged Iailure oI the accused to provide his driver's license to the oIIicer, and thereby justiIying a
custodial arrest and concomitant search incident to arrest, where the prosecutor was in possession oI
video clearly showing the accused providing that oIIicer his driver's license). Further, it may be that
the Reno Municipal Court was remiss in not contemplating some alternative court in any way, or
otherwise alerting the accused to the possibility thereoI, especially where the accused was denied the
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel (Bar Counsel's Exhibit 1 contains a printout Irom the RMC
indicating that the accused did not wish to have court appointed counsel, however, the Motion Ior
Court Appointed Counsel and AIIidavit oI Indigency the accused Iiled in the trial court suggest
otherwise, as does the Motion Ior Reconsideration oI the Denial oI Counsel the accused also Iiled in
the trial court), particularly where it seems clear the accused established his indigency, and was
allegedly wrongIully evicted Irom his Iormer home law oIIice less than one month prior to the trial
date (in an eviction Irom a commercial rental where the non-payment oI rent was not alleged and
where the only eviction notice served was a No Cause Eviction notice....NRS 40.253 expressly
Iorbids the use oI summary eviction proceedings against commercial tenants where the non-payment
oI rent is not alleged or noticed), Ior which the accused's request Ior a continuance was denied,
despite his indicating to the trial court that opposing counsel in the eviction matter was applying an
unlawIul rent distraint under NRS 118A.520 to exculpatory materials and other materials supporting
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the accused's contention that Wal-Mart personnel had made express threats oI retaliation against the
accused just a short time beIore the arrest in response to the accused's complaining about the Iailure
oI Wal-Mart personnel to Iollow or admit to awareness oI the existence oI the express terms oI Wal-
Mart's return policy.
Additionally, Judge Elliot's Order in the appeal oI this matter seems to apply a civil standard
to the issue oI whether the RMC was to create transcripts oI the Trial in the appeal (ans bill the
accused later, rather, Judge Elliot's Order cites a civil statute that allows the court to not even begin
making the transcripts until they have been paid Ior, however, this was a criminal matter, and this, in
conjunction with the accused's being denied the accused's right to counsel, incarcerated Ior three days
under a summary contempt ruling stemming Irom this very trial, and and some alternative sentencing
court option not being broached in any way, may provide some avenue Ior arguing that a temporary
suspension Irom the practice oI law is not warranted.
The accused reported this arrest to his physician, and the physician's and pharmacy records
conIirmed that the accused called and canceled his August 2, 2011 appointment and indicated he
would not be Iilling his prescriptions. This was largely due to the expense oI these prescriptions
being prohibitive in the context oI the dissolution oI the Iour and a halI year relationship with his
domestic partner and her absconding with multiple months worth oI rent, the discovery oI which by
the landlord in August 2011 quickly led to a contentious summary eviction proceeding (the landlord
did not plead the Iailure to pay rent in an apparent attempt to avoid the necessity oI litigating the
Iailure to cure habitability issues reported by the tenant and ignored by the landlord). The accused is
now back on those medications and under the care oI his physician and progressing well.
- 9/20 -
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000389
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Lastly, the undersigned reported the conviction in the trial court, while an appeal was pending
in District Court to Bar Counsel. The undersigned reported the conviction to Bar Counsel on his own
and, as Iar as the undersigned knew at the time, prior to Bar Counsel being aware oI the conviction.
Further, depending upon how the length oI time between the rendition or notice oI entry oI the
conviction and when the undersigned reported the conviction to Bar Counsel is measure, the
undersigned arguably timely complied with the 'within 30 days dictate oI SCR 111 (only introduced
in 2007, and perhaps somewhat diIIicult to Iind given that the Rules oI ProIessional Conduct might
seem a more apt place to look Ior such a reporting requirement...), and iI not, then the undersigned
was only a Iew days beyond the 'within 30 days requirement, all while Iiling an appeal and litigating
a contentious summary eviction Irom the undersigned Iormer home law oIIice.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
The accused hereby request to have all the arguments and memorandum on Iile in the trial
court and District Court appeal incorporated by reIerence herein, particularly with respect to the
denial oI court appointed deIense counsel. Perhaps the most salient question here is: iI this
conviction is serious enough to take away one's law license, the how could the charge not be serious
enough to deserve court appointed deIense counsel or a jury trial where the accused established his
indigency and was evicted Irom his Iormer home law oIIice (wrongIully, in light oI NRS 40.253's
prohibition against utilizing summary eviction proceedings against commercial tenants where the
non-payment oI rent is not alleged and only a No Cause Eviction Notice was served) just days prior to
the trial in the matter Irom which this conviction springs?
Though not permitted to be cited as precedent under SCR 123, Iootnote 3 in the opinion Irom
In Re Noel Gage indicates 'FN3. Even though an opposition to the petition is not expressly permitted
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by the rules, bar counsel does not oppose Gage's Iiling oI an opposition. The undersigned submits
this Opposition in the spirit oI that Iootnote and asks this Court not to view that as a violation oI SCR
123.
STATE v. NEVENS. 197 N.J. Super. 531 (1984). 485 A.2d 345. The judicial system must
once again rely on the trial courts as the gatekeeper. The Legislature has established a selI-regulating
provision in the Code that can be used to protect against Irivolous prosecutions under the 1991 Act.
The gap-Iiller measure is the de minimis inIraction provision, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11. It provides: The
assignment judge may dismiss a prosecution iI, having regard to the nature oI the conduct charged to
constitute an oIIense and the nature oI the attendant circumstances, it Iinds that the deIendant's
conduct: a. Was within a customary license or tolerance, neither expressly negated by the person
whose interest was inIringed nor inconsistent with the purpose oI the law deIining the oIIense; b. Did
not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law deIining the oIIense
or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation oI conviction; or c. Presents such
other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the Legislature in Iorbidding
the oIIense. The assignment judge shall not dismiss a prosecution under this section without giving
the prosecutor notice and an opportunity to be heard. The prosecutor shall have a right to appeal any
such dismissal. |N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11.| The statute, with modiIications, was modeled aIter MPC 2.12. 1
Final Report, supra, source or reIerence note to 2C:2-11, at 23. The draIters oI the MPC
summarized the historical basis Ior that section as a 'kind oI unarticulated authority to mitigate the
general provisions oI the criminal law to prevent absurd applications. 2 Final Report, supra,
commentary to 2C:2-11, at 74. Our courts have not hesitated to use that statute to terminate a
potential prosecution when the charge has been trivial or the prosecution would have been absurd.
State v. Brown, 188 N.J.Super. 656, 671, 458 A.2d 165 (Law Div.1983); see, e.g., State v. Zarrilli,
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216 N.J.Super. 231, 240, 523 A.2d 284 (Law Div.) (dismissing charge oI underage consumption oI
alcoholic beverage where the deIendant took a sip oI a Iriend's beer), aII'd, 220 N.J.Super. 517, 532
A.2d 1131 (App.Div.1987); State v. Nevens, 197 N.J.Super. 531, 534, 485 A.2d 345 (Law Div.1984)
(dismissing theIt charge stemming Irom the deIendant's taking oI a Iew pieces oI Iruit Irom a buIIet
table); State v. Smith, 195 N.J.Super. 468, 477, 480 A.2d 236 (Law Div.1984) (stating that statute
avoids an injustice 'in a case oI technical but trivial guilt).
In State v. Nevens, Mr. Nevens and his wiIe, aIter eating lunch at the Cornucopia BuIIet in
the Golden Nugget in Atlantic City, decided to leave the buIIet with several pieces oI Iruit and eat
them outside Ior dessert. Mr. Nevens was later stopped on the boardwalk by hotel security guards and
charged with theIt oI two bananas, an orange, an apple and a pear. The court held that Nevens was not
stockpiling Iood since he did not attempt to take enough Iood to satisIy one additional meal Ior either
himselI or his wiIe and characterized the entire inIraction as de minimis. In State v. Smith, the
deIendant was charged with shopliIting three pieces oI bazooka bubble gum valued at $. 15 Irom a
"7-11" convenience store. ' The deIendant moved Ior a dismissal oI his prosecution based upon the
"de minimis" doctrine. The court noted that "|i|n the milieu oI bubble gum pilIerage the only cases
more trivial were those involving two pieces or one"' and subsequently dismissed the case.'
Constitutional Rights The protection oI an individual's constitutional rights is another area oI
the law wherein the courts disagree on the subject oI the applicability oI the de minimis doctrine.
Some courts hold that constitutional rights are so sacred in our system oI justice that they can never
be compromised, regardless oI how small the invasion. In Hessel v. O'Hearn, the Seventh Circuit
Court oI Appeals succinctly summed up the de minimis doctrine and constitutional rights and noted
that any violation oI substantive constitutional rights-such as the right to Ireedom oI speech, or the
right to be Iree Irom unreasonable searches and seizures entitles a prevailing plaintiII to at least
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nominal damages. Thus, the court intimated that even the smallest oI intrusions are actionable. 977
F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1992). Id. At 301-02, 304.
People v Curtis (2003) NY Slip Op 51717(U), 2 Misc 2d 1003(4), 784 NYS 2d 922:.
'deIendant was observed by the deponent store detective at a Stop & Shop store, to take a bottle oI
Advil valued at $6.59, place it in her pocket book and walk out oI the store without paying Ior the
medication. DeIendant was arraigned on March 3, 2003, at which time the court, sua sponte,
dismissed the complaint in the Iurtherance oI justice pursuant to CPL 170.40. The People moved by
aIIirmation dated March 21, 2003 to reargue the determination oI the court and DeIendant submitted
papers in opposition dated April 30, 2003. At hearing, the parties stipulated that deIendant has had no
prior contacts with the criminal justice system, is a well respected public school teacher who has
taught kindergarten Ior 21 years and at the time oI the incident her liIe was consumed by her role as
sole caregiver Ior her terminally ill husband, who died prior to the hearing date. It was also noted at
hearing that deIendant had been removed Irom working in the classroom by her employer as a result
oI her arrest. Following hearing, the court adheres to its original determination and dismisses the
complaint in the Iurtherance oI justice pursuant to CPL 170.40 Ior the reasons hereinaIter stated. The
current language oI CPL 170.40 reIlects the historical shiIt in power to dismiss pending cases in the
Iurtherance oI justice Irom the executive branch oI government to the judiciary. With the enactment
oI Sections 663, 664 and 671 oI the Code oI Criminal Procedure in 1881, the New York State
Legislature replaced the common law doctrine oI "nolle prosequi", which granted to the prosecutor
discretion to discontinue a prosecution in progress, by permitting the court to dismiss an indictment
"in the Iurtherance oI justice." See People v. Rickert, 58 N.Y.2d 122, 126 (1983); People v. Clayton,
41 A.D.2d 204, 206 (2d Dep't 1973); Peter Preiser, Practice Commentary, in N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law ss
170.40 (McKinney 1993); Sheila Kles, Criminal Procedure II: How Much Further is the Furtherance
- 13/20 -
OPPOSITION
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oI Justice?, 1989 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 413, 414. The district attorney retains the prerogative to
prosecute people who commit crimes. People v. Zimmer, 51 N.Y.2d 390, 394. However, "one oI the
reIorms eIIected through the years |*2|in the procedure to dismiss accusatory instruments in the
interest oI justice was to remove the power to do so Irom the oIIices oI the District Attorney and
Attorney-General and lodge it, instead, in the courts alone." 58 N.Y.2d at 131. The Iormer statutory
language oI CPL 170.40 and CPL 210.40 required a "sensitive balance between the individual and the
State" and "the use oI the statute depended only on principles oI justice, not on the legal or Iactual
merits oI the charges or even on the guilt or innocence oI the deIendant." People v. Clayton, 41
A.D.2d 204, 206 (2d Dep't 1973). However, the antecedent statutes which granted power to the court
to dismiss a criminal action in the interest oI justice Iailed to provide speciIic guidelines Ior the
exercise oI that power. In People v. Belge, 41 N.Y.2d 60 (1976), the Court oI Appeals called Ior
amendment oI CPL 210.40, arguing that "|t|o the extent that the section now Iails to prescribe
speciIic criteria Ior the responsible exercise oI the discretion granted by the section and Iails to
require the court to articulate the manner and extent to which the particular case meets such criteria, it
is open to misuse and eIIective appellate review is made diIIicult, iI not impossible." 41 N.Y.2d at 62.
The Legislature responded to the court's concerns with the amendments to CPL 170.40 and CPL
210.40 promulgated in 1979. 58 N.Y.2d at 127. In reviewing the current language oI CPL 170.40, as
amended in 1979, the Court oI Appeals noted: "Throughout its history, and no less today, its thrust,
even to the disregard oI legal or Iactual merit, has been 'to allow the letter oI the law graceIully and
charitably to succumb to the spirit oI justice'" 58 N.Y. at 126 quoting People v. Davis, 55 Misc.2d
656, 659. Thus, despite the creation oI statutory criteria which the court must consider in the
application oI CPL 170.40, the underlying historical considerations oI looking beyond the legal and
Iactual merits oI the case to avoid injustice by granting dismissal in the Iurtherance oI justice have
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OPPOSITION
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remained intact. ...the de minimis value oI the item taken, a $6.59 bottle oI Advil pain medication,
which occasioned a de minimis harm, allows the court to regard the character, history and personal
circumstances oI deIendant in order to Iairly balance her interest against that oI the community.
In the instant case, there is some comparision to the Advil theIt. The cough medication melts
allegedly consumed (and there is some argument to be made that any consumption in the store more
oI a vandalism or destruction oI property or sampling rather than a technical petit larceny) contain
dextromethorphan, and ingesting an entire box or two oI those Duract DXM 30mg cough melts would
likely render one to be incapable oI Iorming the intent necessary to violate the petit larceny section oI
the Reno Municipal Code, 8.10.040, in addition to easing or dissociating one Irom the uncomortable
eIIects oI coming oII oI one's, say, antidepressants too rapidly Sec.. 8.10.040. - Petit larceny. It is
unlawIul Ior any person to take or carry away the property oI another with the intent to deprive the
owner oI his property therein, in any value less than $250.00, and Ior his conviction thereIor, he shall
be Iined in an amount not more than $1,000.00 and/or be incarcerated not more than six months. In
addition to any other penalty, the court shall order the person to pay restitution. Further, there is some
question as to whether the conviction is a void judgment considering the arrest occurred on
reservation land and the Reno City Attorney prosecutor Iailed to establish jurisdiction in that the race
oI the accused and whether or not the accused had any tribal blood (which would thereIore make
tribal court the appropriate court oI jurisdiction) was established.
"Ancient doctrines have survived in legal Iorums where they make common sense, serve the
public at large, and at the same time do not disserve the ends oI justice .... , This general principle has
been illustrated in this Article regarding the enduring legacy oI the legal maxim, "de minimis non
curat lex," the law cares not Ior triIles. Schlichtman v. N.J. Highway Auth., 579 A.2d 1275, 1279
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990). To be clear, the undersigned does not consider stealing anything
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OPPOSITION
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Irom anyone, a triIle. Just as conducting searches that are violative oI the Fourth Amendment are not
acceptable, just as lying on the witness stand in an attempt to procure a conviction is not acceptable,
just as putting on testimony that a prosecutor knows to be Ialse is not acceptable, just as Iailing to
timely provide an accused access to the police report and witness statements, just as denying an
accused in a criminal prosecution his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel where jail time is a
possibility, only to then sentence the accused to three days oI jail is likely violation oI the spirit oI the
Sixth Amendment...
However, the privilege oI being an attorney typically requires more oI one than is acceptable
Irom the general public. Attorney who commits act oI proIessional misconduct by shopliIting will be
censured, where, at time oI incident, attorney judgment was suIIiciently impaired to cause her
aberrational conduct and where attorney has sought and obtained appropriate psychological help.
McKinney Judiciary Law 90; N.Y.Ct. Rules, 691.2. Matter oI Mongioi, 213 A.D.2d 107, 631
N.Y.S.2d 77 (2d Dep't 1995). Conviction oI class B misdemeanor oI theIt and admission to charge
oI shopliIting warranted 24"month suspension Irom practice oI law, stayed on condition that attorney
commit no Iurther acts oI theIt, where attorney had no prior disciplinary record, restitution was made
in both instances, he was well-regarded as competent and talented lawyer, he had recently lost his
employment, he was receiving treatment Ior personal and emotional stress, including intensive
treatment since time oI incidents, he made Iull and Iree disclosure in disciplinary investigation and
was cooperative toward proceedings, he admitted conduct in both petitions, and he was contrite and
remorseIul. Rules Ior Lawyer Discipline, Rule 1.2, subd. A(2); Standards Ior Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, Standard 9.3. Application Ior Disciplinary Action 113 A.L.R. 1179 Page 340 113 A.L.R.
1179 (Originally published in 1938) 1997 ND 234, 571 N.W.2d 370 (N.D. 1997). Attorney
convictions Ior shopliIting and his Iailure to report one oI those convictions to Bar Association when
- 16/20 -
OPPOSITION
000396
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speciIically questioned warranted suspension Irom practice oI law Ior 18 months, with one year oI
suspension stayed pending successIul completion oI one-year probation period and appropriate
counseling. Code oI ProI.Resp., DR 1"102(A)(3, 4, 6), DR 1"103(A). Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fidler,
83 Ohio St. 3d 396, 1998-Ohio-39, 700 N.E.2d 323 (1998).
Factually, there is more to this case than is gone into in detail here, however, the undersigned
has presented Bar Counsel with medical records, treatment undergone, continuing monitoring and
support sources, other mitigating Iactors, and other conIidential inIormation which may assist this
Court in ruling on this matter.
Further, the District Court in the appeal oI this matter, indicated that the setting oI a hearing
Ior the appeal was merely and imaginary exercise, as no hearing would take place, as a matter oI
course, despite one seemingly being required by NRS 189.
Concerning appeals Irom justice to district court, NRS 189.030(1) provides: "The justice shall,
within 10 days aIter the notice oI appeal is Iiled, transmit to the clerk oI the district court the
transcript oI the case, all other papers relating to the case and a certiIied copy oI his docket."
However, NRS 4.410(2) provides: "The Iees Ior transcripts and copies |oI justice's court proceedings|
must be paid by the party ordering them. In a civil case the preparation oI the transcript need not
commence until the Iees have been deposited with the deputy clerk oI the court." Braham v. Dist. Ct.,
103 Nev. 644, 747 P.2d 1390 (1987).
Finally, the undersigned acknowledges that he needs to do better overall, and guard more
closely against acting in any manner which might give oII even the appearance oI impropriety, and
take stronger precautions to insure that he is Iinancially solvent enough to absorb the sorts oI slings
- 17/20 -
OPPOSITION
000397
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and arrows that one should expect to come their way in this world without a reoccurence oI the
circumstances detailed herein.
CONCLUSION
The undersigned asks this Court, respectIully, to consider not suspending his law license and
to allow the undersigned additional time to supplement this Opposition.
AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby aIIirm that the preceding document does not contain the social security
number oI any person.
RespectIully submitted this: May 24th, 2012,
/s/ Zach Coughlin, signed electronically
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Pro Per Attorney
- 18/20 -
OPPOSITION
000398
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DECLARATION OF ZACH COUGLIN IN SUPPORT OF THE FOREGOING DOCUMENT
1. This Declaration is made pursuant to the provisions oI NRS 53.045, I am presently in the State oI
Nevada and I declare under penalty oI perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct.
2. Declarant is the Attorney in the above titled action.
3. Declarant avers that the Iactual statements set Ior above in the Ioregoing document are, to the
best oI his knowledge and understanding, accurate.
4. I, Zach Coughlin, am available to testiIy, iI necessary, as to these matters. I declare under penalty
oI perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct.
Dated this May 24
th
, 2012
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
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OPPOSITION
000399
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ProoI oI Service:
On this date, I, Zach Coughlin electronically served a true and correct copy oI the Ioregoing
document to all registered electronic Iilers, and to those whom are not I placed a true and correct copy
oI the Ioregoing document in the usps mail on this date:
Patrick O. King, Esq. Assistant Bar Counsel
9456 Double R. Blvd Suite B
Reno, NV 89521
Dated this May 24th, 2012
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
- 20/20 -
OPPOSITION
000400
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In Re Matter oI:
Nevada Bar No: 9473
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUPPLEMENT OR AMEND EMERGENCY MOTION TO ALTER
OR AMEND, OR SET ASIDE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION AND NOTICE OF SUPREME
COURT CLERK'S FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE OPPOSITION TO BAR COUNSEL'S PETITION
FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION
document and moves this Court Ior the relieI requested herein. This Iiling is Iurther based upon the
papers and pleadings on Iile herein and in the case in the trail court and the appeal in the District
Court and the Memorandum oI Points and Authorities submitted herewith and any oral argument this
Court may desire. Alternatively, Coughlin requests that the Court set aside his temporary suspension
pursuant to SCR 111(7) and reIuse to countenance the SCR 117 Petition as well. By way oI the
showing oI good cause Coughlin attempts to set Iorth herein. Beyond any mitigating Iactors, the
good cause is this: Ior the law to work, there needs to be environment where bullying opposing
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND EMERGENCY MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND, OR SET ASIDE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION AND NOTICE OF SUPREME COURT CLERK'S FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE
OPPOSITION TO BAR COUNSEL'S PETITION FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION and SCR 117 Petition
Jun 18 2012 09:24 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
000401
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counsel still have to earn their victories, rather than leverage committees, clubs, Iorces, and enIorcers
to put points on the board Ior them through innuendo, nanny-stating, abuse oI process, etc., etc. This
case is a lot more important than me. I know I am an insigniIicant cog in this sphere, but what is at
stake here is the perception and the reality as to whether a cliquish tyranny overrides the principles
upon which the black ink in this Court's opinions Ilow.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The undersigned (Coughlin) submitted to the Supreme Court oI Nevada's electronic Iiling system
an Opposition to Bar Counsel's petition on or about May 24
th
, 2012, as an original matter given the
online system would not allow Iilings in the case itselI (60838). The Clerk's OIIice reIused to Iile,
mark as received, or, apparently, in any way make the Justices oI this Court away oI the Opposition.
Only aIter the undersigned reputation has been sullied by news outlets Iar and wide (an article
appeared in papers in at least three diIIerent cities, separated by the vast expanse oI our state) did the
Clerk's OIIice allow Coughlin to Iile something in an attempt to tell his side oI the story here and
avoid the prejudice that would be done his child custody, Ioreclosure deIense, bankruptcy, and other
other clients should Coughlin's law license be suspended, even temporarily.
NRCP RULE 5. SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS....NRCP
5(e), Filing With the Court DeIined: 'The Iiling oI pleadings and other papers with the court as
required by these rules shall be made by Iiling them with the clerk oI the court, except that the judge
may permit the papers to be Iiled with the judge, in which event the judge shall note thereon the Iiling
date and Iorthwith transmit them to the oIIice oI the clerk. A court may by local rule permit papers to
be Iiled, signed or veriIied by electronic means that are consistent with technical standards, iI any,
that the Judicial ConIerence oI the United States establishes. A paper signed by electronic means in
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000402
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compliance with the local rule constitutes a written paper presented Ior the purpose oI applying these
rules. The clerk shall not reIuse to accept Ior Iiling any paper presented Ior that purpose solely
because it is not presented in proper Iorm as required by these rules or any local rules or practices.
NRCP 5(e).
Further, NRCP 5(e) holds that: "(e).. The clerk shall not reIuse to accept Ior Iiling any
paper presented Ior that purpose solely because it is not presented in proper Iorm as required by these
rules or any local rules or practices."
With regard to the WDC Iiling oIIice/ eFlex staII reIusing to Iile papers submitted Ior Iiling,
please consider:
Sullivan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court In and For County oI Clark, 904 P.2d 1039, 111 Nev.
1367 (Nev., 1995): 'This proper person petition Ior a writ oI mandamus seeks an order Irom this
court directing the Eighth Judicial District Court to Iile petitioner's application to proceed in Iorma
pauperis and his civil complaint. 1 On July 25, 1995, we ordered the state to Iile an answer to this
petition. The state's answer was Iiled on August 11, 1995. 2 Documentation submitted by petitioner to
this court establishes that petitioner submitted to the clerk oI the district court Ior Iiling an application
to proceed in Iorma pauperis and a civil complaint on May 15, 1995. Although the application Ior
leave to proceed in Iorma pauperis was in proper Iorm and was sworn to under penalty oI perjury, the
clerk oI the district court did not Iile that application. 3 The Iailure to Iile the application was in
violation oI the clear statutory mandate that such an application be Iiled. NRS 12.015(1) provides that
"|a|ny person ... may Iile an aIIidavit |seeking leave to proceed without payment oI Iees|." Further,
we have repeatedly instructed the clerk oI the Eighth Judicial District Court that such documents must
be Iiled. See Bowman v. District Court, 102 Nev. 474, 728 P.2d 433 (1986) (clerk has a ministerial
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000403
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duty to accept and Iile documents iI those documents are in proper Iorm; clerk must not exercise any
judicial discretion); Barnes v. District Court, 103 Nev. 679, 748 P.2d 483 (1987) (prisoner's right oI
access to court cannot be denied on basis oI indigency); Huebner v. State, 107 Nev. 328, 810 P.2d
1209 (1991) (clerk must create an accurate record oI all pleadings submitted Ior Iiling, whether or not
the documents are actually Iiled); Whitman v. Whitman, 108 Nev. 949, 840 P.2d 1232 (1992) (clerk
has no authority to return documents submitted Ior Iiling; instead, clerk must stamp documents that
cannot be immediately Iiled "received," and must maintain such documents in the record oI the case);
Donoho v. District Court, 108 Nev. 1027, 842 P.2d 731 (1992) (the clerk oI the district court has a
duty to Iile documents and to keep an accurate record oI the proceedings beIore the court); Grey v.
Grey, 111 Nev. 388, 892 P.2d 595 (1995) (clerk oI district court admonished Ior Iailure to keep
accurate record oI documents submitted Ior Iiling).
Petitioner alleges that the district court has reIused to Iile his application and has returned it
with directions to provide more inIormation regarding employment. Indeed, petitioner has attached to
his petition Ior a writ in this court his original application as it was returned to him. Attached to the
top oI the document is a "post-it" note with the handwritten notation: "application denied incomplete
inIo-employment currently." 4 The state inIorms us that the note was written by "the chieI judge." In
addition, petitioner alleges, and the allegation is apparently true, that along with his "denied"
application Ior leave to proceed in Iorma pauperis, his civil complaint was returned to him unIiled.
Finally, petitioner alleges, and has attached documentation to support the allegation, that judges' law
clerks oIten return to prisoners unIiled motions along with letters purporting to rule on the legal
suIIiciency oI those motions. The state argues in its answer to this petition that "petitioner's
application ... was denied on the basis that the address oI the Petitioner which was later given to the
Court by Petitioner ... did not appear to be a jail and that such inIormation was contrary to the
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inIormation shown in the application which stated that the Petitioner was in prison. The 'out oI jail'
address suggested an ability oI the Petitioner to be employed." This vague reIerence to an "out oI jail"
address is not explained in the documents beIore this court. Nevertheless, the state's assertion that
petitioner's application was denied is incorrect. The handwritten notation on petitioner's unIiled
application clearly does not constitute a proper judicial disposition oI that application. Further, the
action oI the clerk oI the district court in returning petitioner's application and civil complaint to him
unIiled is in direct violation oI this court's instructions to the clerk oI the district court in Whitman v.
Whitman, 108 Nev. 949, 840 P.2d 1232 (1992). This court has several times conIirmed the absolute
obligation oI the district courts to Iile documents submitted to them and to preserve the right oI
citizens to access to the courts, whether indigent or not. Barnes v. District Court, 103 Nev. 679, 748
P.2d 483 (1987); Huebner v. State, 107 Nev. 328, 810 P.2d 1209 (1991).
Indeed, in Donoho v. District Court, 108 Nev. 1027, 842 P.2d 731 (1992), a case directly
analogous to this case, we held that the clerk oI the district court violated the rights oI an indigent
party when she neglected to Iile a motion Ior leave to proceed in Iorma pauperis and a motion Ior
relieI Irom a deIault judgment. SpeciIically, we stated: "|T|he clerk |oI the district court| had an
absolute duty to Iile the motion Ior leave to proceed in Iorma pauperis and to clearly stamp the date oI
receipt oI the other documents on the documents. Further, the clerk had a duty to keep an accurate
record oI the case pending beIore the district court." Id. at 1029, 842 P.2d at 733 (citation omitted;
emphasis added). Thus, petitioner's application Ior leave to proceed in Iorma pauperis must be Iiled.
II, on subsequent review oI the application, the district court determines that petitioner has not shown
he is indigent, the district court may order petitioner to provide Iurther inIormation or may deny the
application in an appropriately Iiled written order. II, on the other hand, the district court grants the
application, the district court must then proceed to require the Iiling oI petitioner's other documents
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and to consider them in due course. Donoho, 108 Nev. at 1030, 842 P.2d at 733. OI course, Ior statute
oI limitations purposes, the complaint would have to be considered Iiled on the date oI actual receipt
by the clerk oI the district court. To continue the analysis, with respect to petitioner's civil complaint
which he is attempting to Iile concurrently, the district court clerk had an absolute obligation to stamp
the document "received" and to record the date on which the document was in Iact received at the
courthouse. See Huebner v. State, 107 Nev. 328, 810 P.2d 1209 (1991). This the clerk oI the district
court did. However, the clerk then had a duty to maintain a copy oI the received document in the
record oI the case, whether or not the document is ever Iiled. Whitman v. Whitman, 108 Nev. 949,
840 P.2d 1232 (1992).
This, the clerk neglected to do. While Huebner dealt with the timeliness oI a notice oI appeal,
the rationale compelling this court's ruling in Huebner, that all documents must be marked received
and dated, applies with equal Iorce to a party's submission oI a complaint. "The legal rights oI the
parties to litigation, whether acting in proper person or through counsel, oIten turn on the date oI
receipt by the clerk oI the district court oI documents and pleadings." Huebner, 107 Nev. at 330, 810
P.2d at 1211. Although the clerk oI the district court stamped the notice oI appeal "received" on
December 30, 1991, the clerk did not Iile the notice oI appeal. Instead, the clerk oI the district court
returned appellant's notice oI appeal to appellant because it was not accompanied by a Iiling Iee and,
although the notice was accompanied by a motion Ior leave to proceed on appeal in Iorma pauperis,
appellant's aIIidavit in support oI that motion was apparently not signed. Consequently, there is no
record oI the submission oI appellant's timely notice oI appeal. We note that the clerk oI the district
court Iiled appellant's motion Ior leave to proceed on appeal in Iorma pauperis on the date oI receipt,
December 30, 1991, and that the district court eventually granted that motion. We have previously
stated that "it is extremely important that the clerk oI the district court keep an accurate record oI the
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date oI receipt oI every document submitted to the clerk, regardless oI whether the document is in the
appropriate Iorm. Indeed, it is a gross dereliction oI duty Ior the clerk oI the district court to neglect
this ministerial duty." Huebner v. State, 107 Nev. 328, 330, 810 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1991) (Iootnote
omitted). In this case, the clerk oI the district court has Iailed to keep any record oI the date oI receipt
oI appellant's notice oI appeal; instead, the clerk stamped the document "received" and returned it to
appellant. The clerk oI the district court had no authority to take such action.
Although the clerk oI the district court had no duty to Iile appellant's notice oI appeal beIore
appellant paid the requisite Iiling Iee or was relieved oI the duty to pay the Iiling Iee by order oI the
district court, see NRS 19.013(2), the clerk had a duty to receive the document and to keep an
accurate record oI the case pending beIore the district court. Particularly in this case it was essential
that the notice oI appeal be retained in the record, because we have held that a notice oI appeal is
eIIective on the date oI receipt by the district court clerk. See Huebner v. State, |108 Nev. 952| 107
Nev. 328, 810 P.2d 1209 (1991). Rather than returning the notice oI appeal to appellant, the clerk oI
the district court should have retained the notice oI appeal in the record, and should have inIormed
appellant by letter oI any perceived deIiciencies in the document. 4 Appellant could then have taken
whatever action was appropriate to pursue his appeal. In light oI the Ioregoing, we conclude that
appellant timely submitted to the clerk oI the district court a notice oI appeal Irom an appealable order
oI the district court, and that appellant's timely notice oI appeal is not contained in the record due to
the inappropriate action oI the district court clerk. Accordingly, we grant appellant's petition Ior
rehearing, and we proceed to address the merits oI this appeal. Id. At 1232-1234. See, also, Barnes v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court oI State oI Nev., In and For Clark County, 748 P.2d 483, 103 Nev. 679
(Nev., 1987). Footnote 3 in In Re Noel Gage seems to suggest (and that is an unpublished opinion,
and so, hopeIully it is not a violation to mention it hear, rather than 'cite to it under SCR 123...) an
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Opposition may be allowable. It would be nice to get a chance to give my side beIore 10 diIIerent
news outlets tell the tawdry tale oI the attorney who shopliIted a candy bar and some cough
drops. None oI them called me Ior a quote. Newspapers and television outlets aren't the only ones
with a voice anymore, though: http://www.youtube.com/watch?vVGChI8l3eKo
2. In the trial court matter in Reno Municpal Court, Wal-Mart associate, Thomas Frontino,
testiIied that the accused ate the chocolate bar (and that personally eyewitnessed Coughlin take it oII
the shelI in the candy isle) while the accused was shopping Ior and paid Ior $83.82 oI other sundries.
However, the UPC oI the chocolate bar Irom the receipt in question shows it was an ice cream bar,
meaning it wouldn't have been in the candy isle, but rather the reIrigerated/Irozen Iood isle. Thus,
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applicable to that criminal case appears not to have been met
where, amazingly, the multimillion dollar establishment, Wal-Mart, with literally hundreds oI
cameras placed strategically throughout the store, claimed in the trial court that no video Iootage
exists or ever existed oI any oI the events testiIied to at trial beyond the 2 videos propounded oI the
interactions between the accused and Wal-Mart loss prevention staII and Reno Sparks Indian Colony
police in a 5 by 8 by 12 interrogation room utilized by Wal-Mart. Oddly, the video Irom the
interrogation room show the RSIC OIIicers being handed a CD or DVD by the Wal-Mart loss
prevention associate upon their exiting the interrogation room. So, the only evidence being the
alleged eye witness testimony oI the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate, his credibility undermined
by the Iact that he testiIied, under oath, that he personally saw the accused select the chocolate bar
Irom the candy isle, then consume it while walking throughout the store shopping. Again, the UPC
Irom the wrapper oI the chocolate bar item allegedly stolen clearly reveals that the UPC belongs to a
reIrigerated item, an ice cream bar, thereIore undermining the Wal-Mart associates claim to have
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witnessed the accused select it Irom the shelI in the candy isle, which is not reIrigerated. See Exhibit
1.
3. Further, the only other piece oI allegedly incriminating evidence was the Iruit oI an
impermissible search. RSIC OIIicer Kameron CrawIord testiIied that he only made an arrest, and
thereIore conducted a search incident to arrest in light oI the accused's alleged reIusal to provide his
driver's license. However, the two videos oI the detention and search in the Wal-Mart interrogation
room clearly reveal the accused providing that same RSIC oIIicer his driver's license and the OIIicer
radioing in the driver's license number to run a routine check, and the arrest report clearly contains the
driver's license number oI the accused and other inIormation culled Irom the RSIC oIIicer's review oI
the driver's license. Further, the partial contents oI a cough melt package was Iound in the accused
pockets. However, the receipt Ior the $83.82 worth oI groceries and sundries the accused purchased
immediately prior to the arrest bares andentry with the exact same UPC oI the cough melts Iound in
the accused's pocket.
4. Then, the Wal-Mart witness admitted, under oath while testiIying, that he could not hear whether
or not the accused told the cashier ringing up the some $83.82 worth oI items purchased whether the
accused had or had consumed a certain a quantity oI the Duract Cough Melts while shopping. The
Wal-Mart loss prevention associate Iurther testiIied that it was a common and accepted practice at
Wal-Mart Ior shoppers to inIorm cashiers oI the number or quantity oI a certain item they were
purchasing rather than have the cashier ring up each oI the duplicative items one by one. Further, the
Wal-Mart and Indian Colony OIIicer testiIied that on the receipt Ior the items the accused did pay Ior,
the UPC oI the type oI cough medication melts they say the accused stole did not appear, however, a
review oI that receipt clearly shows that that UPC Ior cough melts is an entry on that receipt. Also,
amazingly, the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate testiIied that he could glean, Irom 30 yards away,
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each and every item the cashier rung up Ior me and that those items did not include such a box oI the
cough medication melts. However, the accused showed in court and in exhibits that the receipt Ior the
items the accused purchased did have one item with the same UPC as the exact type oI cough
medication melts. So the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate admitted neither he nor anyone at Wal-
Mart could say that they could hear whether the accused told the cashier a quantity to ring up Ior the
cough medication melt box with the same UPC as the ones Wal-Mart alleges were stolen or
consumed while shopping.... Further, the Indian Colony OIIicer testiIied that he only arrested the
accused and conducted a search incident to arrest because the accused didn't provide the accused's
driver's license to him. However, the video oI the Wal-Mart interrogation room interview clearly
shows the accused giving the oIIicer the accused's driver's license and him radioing it in to his
dispatch and him taking down the driver's license number and other inIormation oII oI it.
5. Lastly, the undersigned reported the conviction in the trial court, while an appeal was
pending in District Court to Bar Counsel. The undersigned reported the conviction to Bar Counsel on
his own and, as Iar as the undersigned knew at the time, prior to Bar Counsel being aware oI the
conviction. Further, depending upon how the length oI time between the rendition or notice oI entry
oI the conviction and when the undersigned reported the conviction to Bar Counsel is measure, the
undersigned arguably timely complied with the 'within 30 days dictate oI SCR 111 (only introduced
in 2007, and perhaps somewhat diIIicult to Iind given that the Rules oI ProIessional Conduct might
seem a more apt place to look Ior such a reporting requirement...), and iI not, then the undersigned
was only a Iew days beyond the 'within 30 days requirement, all while Iiling an appeal and litigating
a contentious summary eviction Irom the undersigned Iormer home law oIIice.
6. At Trial, at 2:52:25 pm, in the audio transcript submitted into evidence by Coughlin in the
Record on Appeal (ROA) in the Iorm oI a cd oI the audio recording, Frontino testiIied under oath as
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Iollows with regard to what he and Coughlin discussed upon Frontino instructing Coughlin to go with
him back to the asset protection interrogation room:
City Attorney Pam Roberts: What speciIic inIormation did you ask oI Mr. Coughlin?
Thomas Frontino: IdentiIication, his name birth date, social security number.
City Attorney Pam Roberts: And did he provide any oI that inIormation to you?
Thomas Frontino: No, he did not.
City Attorney Pam Roberts: Based upon his unwillingness to provide that inIormation did you take
any Iurther action?
Thomas Frontino: Yes, we called the police, the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Tribal Police
Department. They usually arrive within ten minutes, I believe my statement reIlects it was less than
that.
However, it was not long beIore Frontino contradicted that testimony, becoming
uncomIortable with Coughlin's line oI questioning.
7. Here is an attempt at making a transcript, since the RMC chose not to prepare one and Iorward it
on to the District Court in the Appeal (CR11-2064) as required under Nevada law, within 10 days oI
the Iiling oI a notice oI appeal. Judge Elliot managed to excuse that by citing to a civil statute, but he
also applied NRCP 6(e) Ior the computation oI time in a criminal appeal Ior the purposes oI
calculating the deadline to Iile a notice oI appeal, so it was kind oI a wash.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
NRS 171.1255 Arrest by officer or agent of Bureau of Indian Affairs or police officer
employed by Indian tribe.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, an oIIicer or agent oI the Bureau oI Indian
AIIairs or a person employed as a police oIIicer by an Indian tribe may make an arrest in obedience
to a warrant delivered to him or her, or may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) For a public oIIense committed or attempted in the oIIicer or agent`s presence.
(b) When a person arrested has committed a Ielony or gross misdemeanor, although not in the
oIIicer or agent`s presence.
(c) When a Ielony or gross misdemeanor has in Iact been committed, and the oIIicer or agent has
reasonable cause Ior believing the person arrested to have committed it.
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(d) On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, oI the commission oI a Ielony or gross
misdemeanor by the person arrested.
(e) When a warrant has in Iact been issued in this State Ior the arrest oI a named or described
person Ior a public oIIense, and the oIIicer or agent has reasonable cause to believe that the person
arrested is the person so named or described.
(I) When the peace oIIicer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a battery upon that person`s spouse and the peace oIIicer Iinds evidence oI bodily harm
to the spouse.
2. Such an oIIicer or agent may make an arrest pursuant to subsection 1 only:
(a) Within the boundaries oI an Indian reservation or Indian colony Ior an oIIense committed on
that reservation or colony; or
(b) Outside the boundaries oI an Indian reservation or Indian colony iI the oIIicer or agent is in
Iresh pursuit oI a person who is reasonably believed by the oIIicer or agent to have committed a
Ielony within the boundaries oI the reservation or colony or has committed, or attempted to commit,
any criminal oIIense within those boundaries in the presence oI the oIIicer or agent.
For the purposes oI this subsection, 'Iresh pursuit has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS
171.156.
NRS 171.136 When arrest may be made:...
2. II it is a misdemeanor, the arrest cannot be made between the hours oI 7 p.m. and 7 a.m.,
except:
(b) When the oIIense is committed in the presence oI the arresting oIIicer;
(c) When the person is Iound and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the
public and:
(1) There is a warrant oI arrest against the person; and
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause Ior the arresting oIIicer
to stop, detain or arrest the person Ior another alleged violation or oIIense;
(d) When the oIIense is committed in the presence oI a private person and the person makes an
arrest immediately aIter the oIIense is committed;
Sec. 8.10.040. - Petit larceny.
'It is unlawIul Ior any person to take or carry away the property oI another with the intent to
deprive the owner oI his property therein, in any value less than $250.00, and Ior his conviction
thereIor, he shall be Iined in an amount not more than $1,000.00 and/or be incarcerated not more
than six months. In addition to any other penalty, the court shall order the person to pay restitution.
The arrest in this matter Iails on every element oI NRS 171.126(2)(b)-(d). Further, while it
is quite questionable to inIer evidence oI guilt based upon the Iruit oI an impermissilble search oI
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Coughlin's pockets (which allegedly revealed one halI oI the contents oI one package oI Duract
Cough Melts (6 melts in a Ioil sheet), especially where Coughlin had just paid Ior (and the receipt
Ior $83.82 conIirms this) a package oI the exact product allegedly consumed, the Duract Cough
Melts (UPC 073221630093). This is particularly true where there was not evidence in the record or
testimony oIIered that the contents oI Coughlin's shopping bag Irom the $83.82 worth oI items paid
Ior, did or did not include an opened and or halI Iull package oI those very Duract Cough Melts).
To the extent that RMC Judge Howard reIused to let Coughlin testiIy on his own behalI at trial,
such an utter paucity oI evidence to support the allegations, combined with the myriad instances
where the testimony oI Wal-Mart's Frontino and that oI RSIC Police OIIicers CrawIord and
Braunworth, is particularly troubling, especially to the extent that the City oI Reno and the Reno
Municipal Court arguably have a vested interest in limiting the costs associated with providing
deIense counsel to indigent parties (Coughlin was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
under Argersinger, where, as here, even the possibility oI jail time exists- and Coughlin served 3
days in jail in connection with this trial court matter City Attorney Pam Roberts: Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)) and collecting the Iines associated with convictions. This Iirst oIIense
allegation oI shopliIting, Ior some $14.00 oI merchandise, resulted in a $400 Iine and 3 days in jail,
all with no Sixth Amendment deIense counsel costs attendant to the prosecution.
It would be Ialse to say the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate Thomas Frontino made an
arrest himselI, and especially dubious to assert that Frontio met the requirement oI . There was no
allegation oI that at the trial. The RSIC OIIicers CrawIord and Braunsworth made the arrest, as
such, NRS 171.126 is inapplicable. Even iI it were applicable, Wal-Mart's Frontino's testimony was
so riIe with unsupported, contradictory, and disengenous statements as to vitiate any support Ior
any allegation that Frontino was entitled to arrest Coughlin, under NRS 171.126(1) Ior 'a public
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oIIense committed or attempted in the person's presence.(he 'personally witnessed Coughlin take
a refrigeratea ice cream bar oII the shelI in the candy isle and consume it was shopping Ior other
items? Frontino could see (he admitted he could not hear what was said between Coughlin and the
Wal-Mart cashier, whom Wal-Mart Ieigned an inability to locate or determine the identiIy oI) every
item rung up by the cashier ana off the top of his heaa know that none of those items bore a UPC
with the same number as the Duract Cough Melts Frontino allegea Coughlin consumea while
shopping?...Further, Frontino's testimony about how he 'personally witnessed Coughlin consume
the cough drops while shopping is inconsistent with his testimony that Wal-Mart policy did not
permit Frontino to Iollow Coughlin into the restroom at Wal-Mart and that, thereIore, Frontino lack
a basis Ior making Iurther attempts to investigate any suspicion he had with respect to the Duract
Cough Melts, thereIore leaving Wal-Mart and Frontino to hinge their hopes oI leveraging the RSIC
Police to conduct an unlawIul search oI Coughlin. To the extent that Frontino admitted neither he
or anyone Wal-Mart may have sought to testiIy at trial could hear what was said between Coughlin
and the cashier, Frontino's vantage point does not meet the 'in the person's presence standard
required by NRS 171.126(1), though Frontino still signed the Criminal Complaint swearing that he
had such a basis Ior making his allegations.
NRS 171.126(1) : ' Arrest by private person. A private person may arrest anotheCity Attorney Pam
Roberts: 1. For a public oIIense committed or attempted in the person`s presence.
RSIC OIIicer CrawIord's written report demonstrates a proIound lack oI appreciation Ior the
probable cause requirement, while at the same time, displaying a cunning, and craIty approach to
spinning the nexus between probable cause, detaining a suspects, citizen's arrest, Iourth amendment
exceptions, and NRS 171.123. In his written report (included in the attached Exhibit 2, a
collection oI the discovery propounded by the City oI Reno, Iinally, well over one month aIter the
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arrest and aIter Coughlin had made numerous attempts to get a copy oI such materials, Irom, and in
person and by writing, the RSIC Police Iorce (meeting with Sargent Avansino and being reIused
such documentation), the Reno Municipal Court, the City oI Reno City Attorney's OIIice-on
approximately September 15
th
, 2011 Coughlin spoke with Deputy City Attorney Christopher
Hazlett-Stevens and inquired as to the availability oI such witness statements, police reports, or any
other materials Irom Wal-Mart, the RSIC, or anyone else and was told by Hazlett-Stevens that the
City Attorney's OIIice had not and would not receive such materials until aIter the arraignment in
this matter, which was set Ior some 30 days aIter the arrest (September 9
th
, 2011 to October 10
th
,
2012)...Coughlin pleaded with Hazlett-Stevens to just 'double check and ask everyone else in the
oIIice iI any such discovery or documentation had been provided to the City Attorney's OIIice and
Hazlett-Stevens indicated he would, and thereaIter conIirmed to Coughlin that no such items had
been received, and Iurther, that Coughlin had not right to them prior to the arraignment, in any
event, either Irom the City Attorney's OIIice, the RMC, or the RSIC Police Department. However,
the Iax headers and dates on the discovery later provided by the City Attorney's OIIice certainly
seems to indicate that such materials were Iaxed to the City Attorney's OIIice by the RSIC Police
Department on September 13
th
, 2011, however, the page numbers and page counts would seem to
indicate some materials were not propounded).
In his 'Arrest Report and Declaration oI Probable Cause Irom September 9
th
, 2011, RSIC
OIIicer CrawIord writes:On 9/9/11 at about 21:21 hours I responded to 2425 E. 2
nd
St., Reno, NV
89502 Ior a Petit Larceny. Upon my arrival I met with Asset Protection Associate Thomas
Frontino, whom made a citizens arrest Ior Petit Larceny. Frontino was in possession oI the stolen
items. Frontino's testimony at trial, however, clearly indicated he had only asked Coughlin to meet
with him, not that Frontino had 'immediately made a 'citizen's arrest right aIter the commission
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oI the alleged crime. Further, iI Frontino had made such a 'citizen's arrest and 'was in possession
oI the stolen items, then why did it take Iive minutes oI interrogation by the RSIC OIIicers and a
pat down beIore the technical point oI arrest by CrawIord, and why did CrawIord need to explain
his decision to arrest, and conduct a search incident to arrest, and basis Ior probable cause Iinding to
do so, upon some alleged Iailure by Coughlin to provide his driver's license? The discovery
propounded a month later still did not have any Magistrate or Judicial OIIicer's signature approving
the probable cause Iinding, despite the 48 hour requirement that such be issued.
However, in his 'Incident Report, made a day later, RSIC OIIicer CrawIord writes:
'On 9/9120 11 at approximately 2 121 hours, OIIicer Braunworth and I were
dispatched to 2425 East Second Street Reno, NY 89502 Ior a report oI a petit
larceny. Upon our arrival we met with WaI-Mart Asset Protection Associate
Thomas Frontino who stated, he observed a white male adult, identified as
Zachary Coughlin, walking through the store opening various items and
discarding them in the garbage can. Frontino stated, he also observed
Coughlin eat a candy bar while walking through the store. Coughlin passed all
points oI sale inside oI Wal-Mart and exited. Coughlin was then detained by
Frontino Ior petit larceny. Please reIer to Frontino's Statement Ior Iurther
inIonnation. OIIicer Braunworth asked Coughlin iI he had any weapons on his
person and Coughlin stated, he did not. I asked Coughlin iI I could have
permission to search his person Ior weapons. Coughlin gave me consent, but
stated do not go into my pockets. l searched the outer clothing oI Coughlin and
Iound no weapons on him. I then proceeded to ask Coughlin questions pertaining
to issuing him a citation Ior petit larceny.
Coughlin however, reIused to answer my questions relating to a citation and
became uncooperative. Coughlin was then placed under arrest Ior petit larceny. I
began my search incident to arrest on Coughlin and Iound cough drops still
wrapped in his pockets. Frontino was able to conIirm they were the same cough
drops that came Irom the opened cough drop boxes Irom inside the store that were
unpaid Ior. At approximately 2200 hours, I transported Coughlin to the Washoe
County Detention Facility and booked him Ior Reno Municipal Code 8.10.040
petit larceny. At approximately 2122 hours, I cleared the incident with no Iurther
incident
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OIIicer CrawIord testiIied at trial that Coughlin reIused to provide his driver's license,
however, this Incident Report merely mentions Coughlin allegedly reIusing to 'answer my
questions pertaining to issuing a citation? Why the remix come trial time? Could it be thata
suspect's allegedly Iailing to provide an OIIicer a response to his querry oI 'whom do you work Ior
does not quite justiIy the older 'I had to arrest him under NRS 171.123 because I couldn't be sure oI
his identiIy approach, especially where the OIIicer was given the suspect's driver's license, and ran
a NCIS check on it by calling his dispatch, wrote the driver's license number down on his
contemporaneous Arrest Report and Declaration oI Probable Cause, and where the OIIicer is clearly
seen being handed the driver's license by Coughlin in the Wal-Mart interrogation room video? Any
why is it that no other video exists to support any oI Wal-Mart and Frontino's allegation oI
Coughlin consuming this or that or opening this or that, or throwing this or that away. II this had
been a slip and Iall case you can bet Wal-Mart would have videos Irom more angles than a replay oI
a great catch in the Super Bowl, with their stores having literally hundreds oI those ceiling mounted
camers evenly dispersed throught the store and clearly visible to all. Oh, and, suprise, surprise,
there is no audio on either oI the Interrogation Room videos provided by Wal-Mart, despite their
loss prevention associates carrying around recording devices throughout the entire incident, and the
RSIC Iailed to provide any such recordings as well and indicated none exist.
How exactly was Frontino able to 'conIirm they were the same cough drops that came Irom
the opened cough drop boxes Irom inside the store? Did these 'cough drops' have a serial number
attached to them? Maybe the inIerence is that these 'cough drops were oI the type one would Iind
in a box with the UPC that appears on both receipts in Exhibit 1 (the receipt Ior $14.72 containing
the entries Ior the items allegedly consumed while shopping Ior any paying Ior the entries on the
receipt Ior $83.82), however, at trial, testimony was the unsupportable and disengenous position
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that Frontino knew they were the exact 'cough drops that were Iormerly in the boxes that Frontino
had gathered, and not Irom the box oI the same Duract Cough Melts (again, bearing the same UPC)
that appeared on Coughlin's $83.82 receipt.
Lacking any real probable cause to arrest, especially Ior the alleged misdemeanor not
committed in the OIIicer's presence, aIter 7 p.m., (see, below, NRS 171.124(1)(a))), RSIC OIIicer
CrawIord, a trainee being overseen by OIIicer Braunworth, who could barely remember his own
name on the witness stand at trial, was leIt to the dubious at best allegation that he had to make an
arrest because Coughlin Iailed to provide his driver's license( this assertion was dubious at best, and
Iraudulent police misconduct done under color oI state law best, considering this occurred at a retail
property owned by the same entity, the Reno Sparks Indian Colony, that owns and runs the RSIC
police Iorce, and which partners with and rents to land on which this Wal-Mart sits, to its business
partner, Wal-Mart, considering that the interrogation room videos propounde by the City oI Reno
itselI, and Iilmed by Wal-Mart clearly show OIIicer CrawIor being handed Coughlin's driver's
license by Coughlin and CrawIord's written report has, in CrawIord's own handwriting, the exact
driver's license number belonging to Coughlin on the 'suspects inIormation portion oI the report,
in addition to other inIormation taken directdly oII oI the driver's license Coughlin provided to
CrawIord). Further, Coughlin's attempts to obtain the dispatch calls and records and any 911 calls
made by Wal-Mart, where met with contradictory responses and obIuscation. Nonetheless, upon
inIormation and belieI, such records would show what the interrogation room video shows, ie,
OIIicer CrawIord using his radio to call into dispatch and run a check Ior priors on Coughlin
utilizing Coughlin's drivers license number. Indeed, the NCIS reports and records likely are
required to show when such a report was run and by whom, and OIIicer CrawIord's subsequent
mincing assertion on the witness stand that the Washoe County Jail provided him Coughlin's
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driver's license number is not only counter to privacy laws and Washoe County Jail policy and
procedure, it is also blatantly Ialse and a pathetic attempt to game the system under color oI state
law. To the extent that City oI Reno Deputy Prosecutor Pamela Roberts, Esq., was in possession oI
these interrogation room videos and continue to Iacilitate OIIicer CrawIord's apparent perjury, or, at
least, glaring 'mis-rememberance, it should mitigate any anger or retaliation made against
Coughlin Ior attachign as an exhibit to a pretrial motion the various law reviews related to
prosecutorial misconduct that Iormer prosecutor, RMC Judge Howard, seemed to Iind so oIIensive
and oIIputting.
A minute by minute chronology reveals that the $83.82 receipt was issued at 21:14 on
September 9
th
, 2011. The $14.74 receipt that Wal-Mart created to support its valuation oI the items
allegedly consumed while shopping but not paid Ior was created some ten minutes later at 21:24
(military time, 24 hour clock). The RSIC Police OIIicers Cameron CrawIord and The time
stamping on the two Interrogation Room videos provided by Wal-Mart indicate the interrogation
ran Irom 21:17 to 21:39. Coughlin provided RSIC OIIicer CrawIord his driver's license at
approximately 21:23 (the 6 minute 49 second mark oI the Interrogation Room video). CrawIords
Incident Report indicates he transported Coughlin at 22:00 to the Washoe County Jail. The
Interrogation Room videos made by Wal-Mart (the one's where Frontino is seen high Iiving a Wal-
Mart cohort, and seen giving the RSIC oIIicers a cd/dvd, despite the Iact that later on both Wal-
Mart's Frontino and the RSIC OIIicers CrawIord and Braunworth testiIied that other than the two
Interrogation Room videos, no other videos were provided to the RSIC PD, nor was any other
relevant action caught on video Irom that night. Wal-Mart's Thomas Frontino's Supplemental
Witness Statement Form is dated September 9
th
, 2011 with a time oI 22:13 and lists his 'Residence
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Address as 2425 E. Second St., Reno 89502, which is the address given Ior the Wal-Mart as well,
in violation oI the Sixth Amendment Right oI ConIrontation.
Wal-Mart's Thomas Frontino, Loss Prevention Associate's 'Supplemental Witness Statement
Form oI September 9
th
, 2011, with a time completed handwritten in as 22:13 (10:13 p.m.) reads:
'On 09/0912011 at about 8:45 PM I noticed a male customer who I had
previous encounters with who we had Iollowed Ior suspicious activities in
the past. As I Iollowed him around the store he made his way back and
Iorth across the store. He selected various items such as candy and cough
medicine and some various other Iood items. He opened two packages oI
cough drops and concealed the contents inside his pockets. He then threw
the packaging to the cough drops in two diIIerent garbage cans in the
store. One in the candy aisle and one in the soda aisle.
He also selected a chocolate bar which he proceeded to open and eat
throughout the store. When he was Iinished shopping he went to register
17 and paid Ior the rest oI the merchandise that he had selected. He did
not however make any attempt to pay Ior the chocolate bar and cough
drops he had selected. He concealed the wrapper to the candy in the cart
and covered it with sanitizer wipes. He then exited the Iacility via the
grocery doors.
Once completely outside the Iacility, I approached him with Stanley
Cunningham and identiIied myselI as Wal-mart asset protection and
inIormed him that I needed him to reenter the Iacility so that we would be
able to complete our investigation. He was compliant at this time and
Iollowed us to the oIIice. At this time became non compliant. The police
arrived on scene and took over the investigation. When asked by the
oIIicers iI he would consent to a pat down he complied. Also aIter he was
placed under arrest by the oIIicer his belongings were emptied Irom his
pants pockets and we were also able to recover some oI the cough drops
that he had concealed on his person. He then became very non-compliant
with the oIIicers questioning. He was arrested and removed Irom our
Iacility. He was also tresspased at this time Irom all Wal-Mart Iacilities.
Video evidence will also be compiled.
NRS 171.124(1)(a)):Arrest by peace oIIicer or oIIicer oI Drug EnIorcement
Administration.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 and NRS 33.070 and 33.320, a
peace oIIicer or an oIIicer oI the Drug EnIorcement Administration designated by
the Attorney General oI the United States Ior that purpose may make an arrest in
obedience to a warrant delivered to him or her, or may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
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(a) For a public oIIense committed or attempted in the oIIicer`s presence.
NRS 171.123 Temporary detention by peace oIIicer oI person suspected oI
criminal behavior or oI violating conditions oI parole or probation: Limitations.
1. Any peace oIIicer may detain any person whom the oIIicer encounters
under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is
committing or is about to commit a crime.
3. The oIIicer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain
the person`s identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the person`s
presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself or herself, but
may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.
NRS 171.1231 Arrest iI probable cause appears. At any time aIter the onset
oI the detention pursuant to NRS 171.123, the person so detained shall be arrested
iI probable cause Ior an arrest appears. II, aIter inquiry into the circumstances
which prompted the detention, no probable cause Ior arrest appears, such person
shall be released.
NRS 171.123 Temporary detention by peace oIIicer oI person suspected oI criminal behavior
or oI violating conditions oI parole or probation: Limitations.
1. Any peace oIIicer may detain any person whom the oIIicer encounters under
circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is
about to commit a crime.
2. Any peace oIIicer may detain any person the oIIicer encounters under circumstances
which reasonably indicate that the person has violated or is violating the conditions oI the
person`s parole or probation.
3. The oIIicer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain the person`s
identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the person`s presence abroad. Any
person so detained shall identiIy himselI or herselI, but may not be compelled to answer any
other inquiry oI any peace oIIicer.
4. A person must not be detained longer than is reasonably necessary to eIIect the
purposes oI this section, and in no event longer than 60 minutes. The detention must not
extend beyond the place or the immediate vicinity oI the place where the detention was Iirst
eIIected, unless the person is arrested.
(Added to NRS by 1969, 535; A 1973, 597; 1975, 1200; 1987, 1172; 1995, 2068)
NRS 171.1231 Arrest iI probable cause appears. At any time aIter the onset oI the
detention pursuant to NRS 171.123, the person so detained shall be arrested iI probable cause
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Ior an arrest appears. II, aIter inquiry into the circumstances which prompted the detention, no
probable cause Ior arrest appears, such person shall be released.
Wal-Mart's Frontino's sworn Criminal Complaint, however, Iails to make any indication oI
just how he knew or why he believed Coughlin violated RMC 8.10.040. To the extent that Frontino
writes, in his own hand, that the items 'taken or carried away (despite Frontino, iI not the various
news outlets covering this case, actually testiIying that he 'watched Coughlin consume the chocolate
bar while shopping) included a 'chocolate bar when the UPC oI the receipt Ior the allegedly stolen
items, provided by Wal-Mart, actually reveals that UPC to belong to a 'Magnum Double Caramel Ice
Cream Bar, the Complaint Iails to pled with the sort oI speciIicity necessar to sustain a prosecution,
much less the temporary suspension oI one's law license. Attorney's conduct in continuing to cross-
examine police oIIicer aIter judge had ruled that police log was not admissible was not contempt
where attorney claimed that he was trying to impeach witnesses' memory, not lay Ioundation Ior
admission oI log, so that his conduct could not be said to be willIul. United States v Giovanelli (1990,
CA2 NY) 897 F2d 1227. Resort to summary disposition oI criminal contempt proceeding under Rule
42(a), Federal Rules oI Criminal Procedure, is permissible only when express requirements oI rule are
met and when there is compelling reason Ior immediate remedy or when time is oI essence. Thus,
attorney's conviction Ior criminal contempt in pursuing line oI questioning Iorbidden by court would
be reversed, since record showed that there was no compelling need Ior immediate remedy provided
by Rule 42(a), Federal Rules oI Criminal Procedure, and that trial court, by its own actions, did not
consider time to be oI essence; trial court should have observed "normal" procedure" oI notice and
hearing, provided by Rule 42(b), Federal Rules oI Criminal Procedure. U.S. v. Moschiano, 695 F.2d
236, 12 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 124 (7th Cir. 1982). See United States v Turner (1987, CA11 Ala) 812
F2d 1552, 14.
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NRS 171.102 Complaint deIined; oath or declaration required. The
complaint is a written statement oI the essential Iacts constituting the public
oIIense charged. It must be made upon:
1. Oath beIore a magistrate or a notary public; or
2. Declaration which is made subject to the penalty Ior perjury.
In his testimony during the November 30
th
, 2011 trial, Thomas Frontino apparently
realized that he needed to say something to the eIIect that he 'personally witnessed Coughlin
'consuming the cough drops in the store. So, Thomas Frontino testiIied, under oath, the he
personally witness Coughlin consuming the cough drops throughout the store ('He opened two
packages oI cough drops and concealed the contents inside his pockets...). However, in his
Supplemental Witness Statement Form, Frontino does not say that. There is no mention oI seeing
Coughlin consume any cough drops throughout the store. In Iact, at trial, Frontino slipped up and had
to admit that oIIicial Wal-Mart policy prevented him Irom Iollowing Coughlin into the restroom
while he was shopping, which was unIortunate, according to Frontino, because he wanted to see iI
Coughlin did anything with the cough drops in the restroom, but could not. At trial, Frontino decided
it would just be more expeditious and accomplish his goals quicker to say that he 'personally eye
witnessed Coughlin consuming the cough drops while shopping.
Frontino then goes on to indicate that Coughlin 'also selected a chocolate bar which he
proceeded to open and eat throughout the store. At trial Frontino took great care to make clear that
he 'personally eye witnessed Coughlin select 'that exact chocolate bar Irom the 'candy isle.
Frontino was nonplussed when, on cross examination, it was pointed out to him that the UPC Ior the
'chocolate bar Irom the candy isle was actually the UPC Ior an ice cream bar Irom the
reIrigerated/Irozen Iood isle.
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Frontino then indicates that Coughlin 'did not however make any attempt to pay Ior the
chocolate bar and cough drops he had selected. However, at Trial, Frontino had to admit that he was
too Iar away Irom Coughlin and the cashier to hear whether or not Coughlin made any attempt to pay
Ior either the 'chocolate bar or the 'cough drops. Frontino was sure to attest, under oath, at trial,
that he was absolutely sure and completely able to tell Irom his vantage point some approximately 30
yards Irom register 17 where Coughlin paid Ior the items he selected while shopping to ascertain that
none oI the items the cashier rang up had the same UPC as, say, the cough drops. However, Exhibit 1
clearly shows that Frontino was, 'wrong about that given that both the receipt Ior $14.72 and the
receipt Ior $83.82 have an entry Ior the same Duract Cough Melt 'cough drops (containing 12
lozenges (2 separate Ioil sheet with 6 lozenges on each sheet) with 30 mg Dextromethophan HBr
(DXM) in them.
Wal-Mart's Frontino then writes that 'He concealed the wrapper to the candy in the cart and
covered it with sanitizer wipes. However, Frontino then testiIied that there was absolutely no video
evidence supporting that accusation, despite the Iact that the areas around cashiers are typically
subject to particularly high video scrutiny. Frontino testiIied that he review the video Irom all
cameras wherein Coughlin appeared in the store that day and that nothing was captured on video.
Frontino cannot be said to have made an arrest 'immediately aIter the alleged inIraction
occurred where, in his Supplemental Witness Statement he writes: 'inIormed him that I needed him
to reenter the Iacility so that we would be able to complete our investigation. He was compliant at this
time and Iollowed us to the oIIice. At this time became non compliant. The police arrived on scene
and took over the investigation.
Frontino's written statement is noticeably devoid oI any assertions concerning the questioning
by the RSIC OIIicers and the probable cause analysis and inquiry attendant thereto. Frontino
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's written Statement concludes by noting that 'video evidence will also be compiled. Indeed, in the
Interrogation Room video Frontino is seen handing a cv/dvd to the RSIC OIIicers.
With respect to these Duract Cough Melt 'cough drops... So, each package would contain
360mg oI DXM, which, iI ingested rapidly would give one's brain the dissociative eIIects attendant to
drinking an entire large bottle oI cough syrup, however, given the Iact that such Duract Cough Melts
are a candy like lozenge that literally dissolves in second, the method oI delivery oI such a high
dosage oI DXM could potentially result in severe incapacitation and or mental impairment, oI a
dissociative nature, quite rapidly, so much so, that this sort oI item was pulled Irom the shelves
several years ago when Zicam originally manuIacture and distributed them. DXM is used in clincial
trials to treat patients with conditions ranging Irom Iibromyalgia to PTSD, and is included in the class
oI medications known as dissociatives that Campral is in as well. Campral (acamprosate) is a
medication prescribed to alcoholics that is intended to lessen or curb the 'phenomenon oI craving
associated with alcoholism. Acamprosate is thought to stabilize the chemical balance in the brain that
would otherwise be disrupted by alcoholism, possibly by antagonizing glutamatergic N-methyl-D-
aspartate receptors and agonizing gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) type A receptors. Williams,
SH. (2005). "Medications Ior treating alcohol dependence". American Family Physician 72 (9):
17751780. PMID 16300039. http://www.aaIp.org/aIp/20051101/1775.html.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dextromethorphan
('Dextromethorphan has also Iound other uses in medicine, ranging Irom pain relieI to psychological
applications....DXM is also used recreationally. When exceeding label-speciIied maximum dosages,
dextromethorphan acts as a dissociative hallucinogen. Its mechanism oI action is via multiple eIIects,
including actions as a nonselective serotonin reuptake inhibitor|3| and a sigma-1 receptor|4||5|
agonist and the action oI its major metabolite dextrorphan as an NMDA receptor antagonist,
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producing eIIects similar to those oI the controlled substances ketamine and phencyclidine (PCP),|6|
as well as the active metabolite 3-methoxymorphinan, which produces local anesthetic eIIects in rats
with a potency above dextrorphan but below dextromethorphan itselI. Hou, C; Tzeng, J; Chen, Y;
Lin, C; Lin, M; Tu, C; Wang, J (2006). "Dextromethorphan, 3-methoxymorphinan, and dextrorphan
have local anaesthetic eIIect on sciatic nerve blockade in rats". European Journal oI Pharmacology
544 (1-3): 106. DOI:10.1016/j.ejphar.2006.06.013. PMID 16844109...Uncompetitive NMDA
receptor (PCP site) antagonist...During the 1960s and 1970s, dextromethorphan became available in
an over-the-counter tablet Iorm by the brand name Romilar. In 1973, Romilar was taken oII the
shelves aIter a burst in sales because oI Irequent misuse, and was replaced by cough syrup in an
attempt to cut down on abuse. See, White, William. "The DXM Experience".
http://www.erowid.org/chemicals/dxm/Iaq/dxmexperience.shtml. Retrieved December 21,
2010; AJ Giannini. Drugs oI Abuse--Second Edition. Los Angeles, Practice Management InIormation
Corp, 1997.) See, also: http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/d/Ieature/i/1500/c/28282/ Jamero, D.
The emerging role oI NMDA Antagonists in Pain Management. US Pharmacist. 2011. Jobson
Publishing. Posted to Medscape.com on 6/22/2011.
Coughlin has provided the State Bar oI Nevada's Bar Counsel (though Mr.Susich and Mr.
King's recent SCR 117 petition do not seem to acknowledge that, and Iurther misstate a number oI
very material Iacts, like this suddenly new allegation that the locks to Coughlin's Iormer law oIIice
were broken when Coughlin was arrested Ior criminal trespass in the quasi basement under the house,
a 'basement which never had any locks....but in the SCR 117 King and Susich make it sound like the
locks to the interior oI the Iormer home law oIIice had been broken into, which has never been
alleged previously or supported by any Iactual allegations or speciIics), and his Iather, Dr. Timothy
D. Coughlin, MD, (a Iamily practitioner based in Reno, NV, with a practice emphasis on addiction
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medicine and a Iormer President oI the Nevada Health ProIessionals Assistance Foundation and past
President oI the Nevada Academy oI Family Physicians, and various impaired physician's diversion
programs) with a complete certiIied prescription history dating back to late 2007 which shows that
Coughlin did not Iill his Buproprion/anti-depressant prescription both in April 2009 (when Coughlin,
a Iormer domestic violence unit attorney Ior legal aid non-proIit Washoe Legal Services, and WLS
parted ways) and that Coughlin stopped Iilling his Buproprion prescription in August 2011, and that
subsequently Coughlin was twice charged with petit larceny within a period oI 19 days (Iirst on
August 20
th
, 2011 by the Reno Police Department, Ior which Coughlin spent roughly 7 days in jail
awaiting a release on his own recognizance) and against in the matter underpinning this Iiling, the
arrest at Wal-Mart on September 9
th
, 2011. Coughlin's domestic partner oI Iour and halI years and he
parted ways sometime in June 2011 and Coughlin became aware oI several months rent allegedly
being own their neurosurgeon landlord, Dr. Matthew J. Merliss, MD, sometime in mid-August.
While in jail incident to the August 20
th
, 2011 arrest (Ior, essentially, possession oI lost or
mislaid iPhone as petit larceny, a matter Ior which Coughlin asserts his innocence and Ior which a
video Io the arrest and exculpatory evidence has been available all year on youtube.com) Coughlin
was served with a No Cause Summary Eviction Notice Ior his Iormer home law oIIice. NRS 40.253
explicitly Iorbids utilizing summary eviction proceedings against commercial tenants unless the non-
payment oI rent is alleged and a Non-Payment oI Rent Eviction Notice is served. Landlord Merliss,
and his attorney's Richard Hill, Esq., and Casey Baker, Esq., decided to proceed with a No Cause
eviction Notice rather than be required to litigate the habitability issues Ior which a paper trail exists
and Ior which Merliss Iailed to address issues related to apropriately served 14 day notice to cure
habitability issues complaints and other matters.
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Coughlin has attended Lawyer's Concerned Ior Lawyers since early 2003 and is active in the
recovery community, though there has been some diIIiculty in straddling the line between the old
school hard line AA'ers and those in the psychiatric community who recognize the danger in say, not
treating adult ADHD with anything other than a 12 step program, and instead Iacing the risk oI selI
medicating via abusing substances not necessarily indicated as appropriate treatment modalities and
outside the setting oI a trained proIessional such as Coughlin's current psychiatrist, Dr. Suat Yasar,
whom took over Coughlin's treatment Irom Dr. Mujahid Rasul, whom passed away in September
2010, and whom Coughlin has made aware oI his various arrests and diIIiculties this year and whom
takes an active role in seeing that Coughlin continues progressing his recovery Irom what has
admittedly been a disappointing and regrettable year.
Coughlin regularly receives treatment Irom Dr. Suat Yasser and has resumed the treatment
modalities that were yielding eIIicacious results prior to the unexpected money troubles that resulted
in Coughlin not being able to aIIord either oI his medications beginning in early August 2011.
Coughlin, at that time, did make several inquiries with Nevada Adult Mental Health (NAMHS) but
one oI the medications Coughlin takes was not one Ior which NAMHS would be able to provide
anything in the way oI Iinancial help given budget constraints, and the other medication was not so
expensive such that it seemed all that worthwhile to go through a somewhat invasive and privacy
threatening intake process at NAMHS rather than to attempt to continue to pay out oI pocket Ior that
medication (which incidentally and inexplicable, tripled in price shortly thereaIter despite our sagging
economy and its long oII patent statuts).
Coughlin maintains his innocence with respect to the August 20
th
, 2011 petit larceny charge
('iPhone Iound on ground by man, man threatens to throw a phone he picked up in the river iI
someone doesn't claim it right away, Coughlin thereaIter attacked by a gang oI skateboarders
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claiming the iPhone to be theirs), and will shortly Iace trial in that matter, given the intransigence
displayed by the District Attorney's OIIice and the Mental Health Court vis a vis some oI the issue
explicated above and despite the Iact that the iPhone's owner, a Cory Goble, 24, oI Reno, NV,
recently battered Coughlin with a lit cigarette in a parking lot where Goble had accosted Coughlin,
unexpectedly, and despite the Iact that a multitude oI video evidence exists tending to indicate that
Goble and his associates lied on numerous occasions to 911 operators and the police in order to have
Coughlin arrested where, quite arguably, Coughlin did not commit a crime. While spending 7 days in
jail beginning August 19
th
, 2011, and returning home to an impermissible summary eviction Irom his
Iormer home law oIIice (a commercial tenancy explicitly allowed under the Lease Agreement in
question) may have created a set oI circumstances making it tempting to shopliIt Iood or necessaries
Irom Wal-Mart, Coughlin maintains that he is not guilty oI the alleged petit larceny Irom Wal-Mart
and is currently pursuing an appeal oI the matter with the Nevada Supreme Court in case number
60630.
With respect to matters which may bring into doubt the validity oI the conviction in the trial
court judgment in RMC 11 CR 26800: In the appeal to the District Court in CR11-2064, Judge Elliot
utilized a civil statute in excusing the RMC Irom its Iailure to Iorward to the District Court a copy oI
the transcript oI the audio recording oI the trial and to Iorward such to the District Court within ten
days oI the Iiling oI the Notice oI Appeal. Further, Coughlin made numerous attempts to order such a
transcript and was thwarted in his attempts to do so by the RMC's express dictate that only the RMC's
transcriptionist oI choice, Pam Dongoni, would be permitted to perIrom the transcribing duties, and
Ms. Dongoni hung up the phone on Coughlin and reIused to provide inIormation related to where and
in what method oI payment Coughlin could pay Ior the transcript and assure its production. Further,
the RMC reIused to timely provide Coughlin a copy oI the audio recording oI the trial until well aIter
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the deadline Ior Iiling tolling motions or a Notice oI Appeal had passed, and Iurther, the RMC Iailed
to notate in the certiIied docket (which is not available to litigants during these matters, and attempts
by Coughlin to so obtain such a docket has resulted in the City oI Reno Marshals threatening
Coughlin and Iorcing him to leave the courthouse and writing disengenous letters to Bar Counsel.
The RMC Marshals were also involved in a scenario wherein Coughlin's smartphone was 'booked
into evidence Ior 37 days (and returned with all the data previously on it wiped clean, with the
interim seeing various contradictory statements regarding the chain oI custody oI the phone and data
thereon between the RMC, WCSO, and City oI Reno Marshals, and Washoe County District
Attorney's OIIice) incident to a Iive day incarceration oI Coughlin, stemming Irom a summary
contempt committed in the presence oI the Court in a violation Trial, 11 TR 26800 (3 moving
violations were issued to Coughlin upon Coughlin being told by the Reno PD to leave the oIIice oI
opposing counsel in the eviction Irom his Iormer law oIIice (Richard G. Hill, Esq., opposing counsel
to Bar Counsel King recently in the Milsner v Carstarphen decision oI this Court issued in March
2012, and whom Iiled a grievance with Bar Counsel in a letter to King dated February 14
th
, 2012
wherein Hill details an arrest oI Coughlin that had not proceeded to trial, much less a conviction Ior
which Coughlin would be required to report under SCR 111, and in which Hill makes baseless
accusations oI 'ghostwriting by Coughlin Ior one Ior whom Coughlin was listed as attorney oI
record. Further, the recent, and extremely prejudicial and inaccurate conIidential SCR 117 Disability
Petition by Bar Counsel and or Mr. Susich is seemingly largely cribbed Irom Hill's Motion Ior
Attorney's Fees incident to the appeal oI the summary eviction Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law
oIIice (a 'wrong site surgery oI the courtroom variety Hill litigated on behalI oI his CaliIornian
Beverly Hills neurosurgeon client, wherein Hill proceeded with a summary eviction against a
commercial tenant where the non-payment oI rent was not alleged nor was any eviction notice
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provided other than a No Cause Eviction Notice). In that Motion Ior Attorney's Fees, Hill somehow
attempts to at once claim Coughlin's Iilings in the appeal in CV11-03628 were at once so baseless as
to be sanctionable, yet, also, at the same time, apparently well Iounded enough to require Hill to run
up some $43,000 in attorney's Iees charged to Merliss (Ior the period oI time Iollowing the November
3, 2011 Iiling oI a Notice oI Appeal oI the Order oI Summary Eviction in RJC 2011-001708), on top
oI the $20,000 in attorney's Iees Hill and Baker sought to recover ('mistakenly citing to an attorney's
Iees in a landlord tenant context statute related only to situations where a tenant was manuIacturing
controlled substances at the rental, rather than admitting that NRS 69.030 Iorbid Hill and Baker Irom
getting attorney's Iees in a landlord tenant trial court matter, much less a summary eviction, much less
$20,000 worth oI them). Bar Counsel King displayed a particularly troubling resistance to
countenancing any oI the grievances against other attorneys Coughlin then asserted, yet steadIastly
continued to devote Bar resources to addressing Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s dubious basis Ior Iiling
multiple grievances against Coughlin, contributing one oI the legs to a Iour part quadruple jeopardy
approach Hill took, wherein Hill Iiled Motion Ior Orders to Show Cause beIore Judge SIerrazza in the
Trial Court, beIore Judge Flanagan on Appeal, Iiled a TRO with Judge Schroeder in Justice Court,
and had Coughlin arrested Ior jaywalking and criminal trespass (the trespass arrest on November 12
th
,
2011 resulted in the resetting oI the Trial in the RMC case resulting in the petit larceny conviction
involved in the SCR 111 Bar Counsel Petition (where Coughlin was not told to leave or 'warned to
leave the Iormer home law oIIice and where the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice lied in a sworn
written aIIidavit in attesting to have 'personally served Coughlin the Order oI Summary Eviction
(Deputy Machem, November 7
th
, 2011 AIIidavit on Iile) only to later have WCSO Supervisor Liz
Stuchell admit that her oIIice considers it 'personal service Ior Deputy Machem to tape a document
to one's door when they are not home. NRS 40.253 requires either personal or constructive service.
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'The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriII or constable oI the county to
remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order... is inapplicable to this situation, where
an Order Granting Summary Eviction was signed by October 27th, 2011. That language is only Iound
in situations inapplicable to the current one. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the only
sections oI NRS 40 where this 'within 24 hours language occurs, and those situations only apply
where, in:
40.253(3)(b)(2): ' 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b) Advise
the tenant: .. (2) That iI the court determines that the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul
detainer, the court may issue a summary order Ior removal oI the tenant or an order
providing Ior the nonadmittance oI the tenant, directing the sheriII or constable oI the
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order
and,
40.253(5)(a): '5. Upon noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the
landlord`s agent may apply by aIIidavit oI complaint Ior eviction to the justice court oI
the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile home or commercial premises
are located or to the district court oI the county in which the dwelling, apartment,
mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over the
matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriII or constable oI the
county to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order.
The way these summary eviction orders are being carried out and 'served in Washoe County
presently shocks the conscience and violates Nevada law. There is not basis Ior eIIectuating a
lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in the case oI the undersigned's Iormer home law
oIIice. The above two sections containing the 'within 24 hours oI receipt language are inapplicable,
as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where the Tenant did Iile an AIIidavit
and did contest this matter to a degree not oIten seen. To require Nevada's tenants to get up and get
out 'within 24 hours oI 'receipt oI the order (what does that even mean? The use oI terms like
'rendition, 'rendered, 'notice oI entry, 'pronounced, is absent here, and this 'receipt oI the
order language is something rarely Iound elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV statutory
citations, and in employment law litigation where one must Iile a Complaint within 90 days oI
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'receipt oI a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which Iollows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in imputing
receipt oI such a letter, when actual receipt is not shown, by applying a 'constructive notice
standard that relies upon the days Ior mailing extension oI time Ior items served in the mailing, etc.).
In Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the record did not
reIlect when the plaintiII received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on November 24,
2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on November 30, 2006, based on three
days Ior mailing aIter excluding Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim under either Title
VII or the ADA, a plaintiII must exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90 days oI receipt oI
a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(I)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown,
466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)(granting plaintiII an additional three
days Ior mailing pursuant to Rule 6).
With respect to any mention oI '24 hours and the applicability oI the JCRCP to cases like
these, NRS 40.400 Rules oI practice, holds that :The provisions oI NRS, Nevada Rules oI Civil
Procedure and Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials,
so Iar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions oI NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, apply to
the proceedings mentioned in those sections. As such NRCP 6(a),(e) applies to the Order oI
Summary Eviction that WCSO Deputy Machem alleged, under penalty oI perjury, that he "personally
served" upon me on November 1, 2011.
ATTEMPT AT PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL
Here is the undersigned's attempt to type out, word Ior word, the beginning oI the proceeding
in this matter (Coughlin's indigency has prevented securing the production oI a certiIied transcript and
hopeIully it is obvious to the reader the points at which the undersigned interlineates commentary or
analysis within the transcription itselI, typically always set oIII by parenthesesis. Further, the For The
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Record version oI the audio oI the petty larceny trial is available Ior Iree download here, as are the
two Interrogation Room videos oI the September 9
th
, 2011 arrest at Walmart and the discovery
produced by the City Attorney and the receipt Ior $83.82, showing the UPC Ior the cough drops did
appear on the receipt, contrary to Frontino and OIIicer CrawIords testimony.):
https://skydrive.live.com/redir?resid43084638F32F5F28!921
(Beginning oI audio transcript at 2:12 p.m.)
Marshall: all rise department Ior the Reno Municipal Court staII session the Hon.
Judge Howard:presiding
Hon. Judge Howard: Be seated everyone
Roberts: Your Honor last cases is City verses Zachary Coughlin: 11 CR 22176 Mr.
Coughlin would you step Iorward please?
Hon. Judge Howard: all right this is the time and place set Ior trial in regard to a
petit larceny alleged to been committed on September 9 oI this year complaint alleges
that said deIendant on or about September 9 2011 at Wal-Mart 2425 E. 2nd St. city oI
Reno state oI Nevada did take carrying away Wal-Mart property valued at less than
$250 with the intent to deprive Wal-Mart oI said property said property consisted oI
cough drops and a chocolate bar, Mr. Coughlin, is that your understanding oI the
charge?
Coughlin: I believe so Your Honor
Hon. Judge Howard: all right part both parties ready to proceed at this time
Robert: Yes, Your Honor
Coughlin: no Your Honor I'm not ready to proceed
Hon. Judge Howard: why not
Mr. Coughlin: Well, there is a variety oI reasons, Your Honor
Hon. Judge Howard: you have to speak up iI you want me..
Coughlin: yes sir Your Honor, there's a variety oI reasons, sir, I would say chieI oI
which is that it unlawIul rent distraint is currently being applied to my Iiles that are
necessary to deIend this case I was evicted in justice court case REV2011-001708
recently, besides having an impermissible rent escrow deposit applied to me in that
case.
Hon. Judge Howard: what does that have to do with this case?
Coughlin: recently I have been aIIected all my Iiles
Hon. Judge Howard: right
Coughlin: all my Iiles incident to the deIense oI this case are currently being withheld
under in an impermissible rent distraint in violation oI NRS 40.253 and 118 a.460
Hon. Judge Howard:what else you have other than this what else you have, as a basis
Ior not being prepared?
Coughlin: I made numerous attempts to contact the Reno City Attorney's oIIice and
Ms. Roberts in attempts to discuss this matter
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Hon. Judge Howard: Ms. Roberts
Coughlin: and I have not been able to reach her
Hon. Judge Howard: or that sound basis Ior a continuance maybe she doesn't speak to
she is not required to
Coughlin: Iurther there's a good deal oI discovery that needs to be undertaken in this
regard Wal-Mart has been obstructive, as well as (unintelligible)
Hon. Judge Howard: what items oI discovery
Coughlin: well I'd like to take some depositions as well have them respond to some
subpoena duces tecums I had served on them
Hon. Judge Howard: what else?
Coughlin: the same could be said Ior the Reno Sparks Indian Colony and this is a
complex case in terms you have the Indian colony renting property to Wal-Mart while
employing the same police patrolling the property on which they have a Iinancial stake
in whether make an arrest there's Fourth Amendment issues involved in this case as
well is 42 section 1983 abuse oI process's and police misconduct in terms oI attempting
to obtain consent to an impermissible search through coercive means this is not a
simple case...civil recovery abuses are being alleged on the part oI Wal-Mart attempted
state actors.. also, and I probably can't put into words, Your Honor, how truly
disruptive this eviction has been... I was evicted Irom my home oIIice. I am an
attorney in the state oI Nevada my client Iiles are currently, I don't even know iI I
should call them my Iiles or my client's Iiles are being withheld under an impermissible
rent distraint. Also, I was sexually assaulted by a bailiII in court the other day
Hon. Judge Howard: in this court
Coughlin: in Justice Court
Coughlin: all oI these matters contribute to an unduly burdensome environment in
which my ability to deIend this case has been unduly prejudiced in the extreme
Hon. Judge Howard:I am going to deny the request to continue I guess whether this is a
complex case is in the eye oI the beholder, I don't typically Iind that these matters are
as complex as you've indicated they are on that as well that much oI the argument that
you made here relating to sexual assault oI a bailiII and another court your inability to
possess control your client Iiles have no relevance in my mind to proceeding with the
charges and petty larceny alleged to have occurred at Wal-Mart on September 9
Coughlin: not just my client Iiles or materials needed to deIend this case are being
withheld
Hon. Judge Howard: I interrupt you sir, don't interrupt me.
Coughlin: Yes, sir.
Hon. Judge Howard: Additional note that the last hearing November 14 the city was
present with three witnesses the matter was continued, and we initially indicated that
we would note Mr. Coughlin's Iailure to appear we ordered a bench warrant and $1000
cash bail only to discover, unIortunately Ior Mr. Coughlin, that he was in custody so
the matter was reset. I think there's been suIIicient time to prepare Ior trial in this
matter so we will proceed with trial all witnesses please stand and raise your right hand
so you can be sworn please
Coughlin: iI I can just make my objections Ior the record, Sir?
Hon. Judge Howard: standing objections
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Coughlin: Ms. Roberts has agreed to a continuance submitting a written agreement to
the continues this matter
Howard:Ms. Roberts
Roberts: he initially had asked Ior a motion to continue sometime ago I went was Ior
the 14th and I did not object at that time am I think you sent me an e-mail aIter the 14th
and I said I would not object but Your Honor so at that time I did not object he has
Iiled additional motions with additional allegations that I think should be stricken and
not considered by this court and I'd like to withdraw my lack oI opposition to
continuance
Hon. Judge Howard: will in any event this court is not going to agree to the stipulation
iI there was a stipulation to continue with witnesses here Ior second time they're ready
to proceed this is case going Iorward, and we will swear in the witnesses
Marshall: I swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth
Witnesses: Yes, sir.
Marshall: They've been sworn.
Hon. Judge Howard: All right Mr. Coughlin do I need to go over the procedure here
today?
Coughlin: Yes, sir.
Hon. Judge Howard: the city has a burden oI prooI and as such will allow Ms. Roberts
to proceed with its case in chieI initially she can do so by calling one more witnesses to
the witness stand you have an opportunity to cross examine each oI those witnesses
once she has completed she can also oIIer any physical or documentary evidence that
she Ieels is relevant obviously subject to any objections that you might have to
relevancy. Once the city has concluded its case you will have an opportunity to present
a deIense. I highlight the word opportunity because I think you understand there is no
requirement that you present any evidence whatsoever and should you choose not to
testiIy this court there's no inIerence as to your guilt or innocence based on your
decision not to testiIy on the other hand you have an absolute right to oIIer testimony
in the Iorm oI witnesses including yourselI realizing that each oI those witnesses will
be subject to cross-examination by the city attorney in Iact iI you have any additional
evidence physical or documentary that you would like me to review in most
circumstances I will do so subject once again to any objections that the city attorney
and he might have to that evidence once the two oI you have submitted your respective
cases I will allow both oI you to make closing arguments once concluded this court
will render a decision as your guilt Ior your innocence do understand?
Coughlin: I do have a question, Your Honor. You mentioned that I would be able to
present evidence iI that evidence is being withheld Irom me at this point and it's
pending the resolution oI a motion Ior return oI personal property in Justice Court I
would be precluded Irom action accessing that evidence?
Hon. Judge Howard: I've ruled on that already, have I not?
Coughlin: It sounded like you said it didn't matter.
Hon. Judge Howard: I don't Iind that it's relevant to go Iorward with the trial today.
Coughlin: so iI I have video evidence oI retaliatory intent by Wal-Mart?
Hon. Judge Howard:you should've brought it with you today.
Coughlin: but iI it's being withheld impermissibly under the law?
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Hon. Judge Howard: we are going Iorward today I have addressed the issue you can
bring it up on appeal iI you Ieel that the decision oI the Court is improper, understood?
Coughlin: Yes, Sir,Your Honor.
Hon. Judge Howard: Mr. Coughlin, lets you and I have an agreement today that we
will be respectIul oI one another you can tender any objections that you may have I do
not want you to be repetitious iI you made an objection or a presentation and I've ruled
on it except that and let's move on. Do we have an understanding?
Coughlin: I do however to the extent that you've told me that my liIe and career are not
worth a continuance because it might cost a Wal-Mart associate another trip to the
court house I don't see where we are being respectIul oI me,Your Honor.
(2:27 PM)
Hon. Judge Howard: Very good, please proceed.
Roberts: Your Honor, can I invoke exclusionary rule asked Thomas Frontino.
Coughlin: Your Honor, may I just interject and address a couple preliminary motions
in limine and exclusionary motions?
Hon. Judge Howard: What?
Coughlin: I ask that any oI the discovery that there Reno City Attorneys provided be
excluded under them motion in limine/ exclusionary rule and that we Iully brieI the
issues there and iI beIore any such such discovery is admitted into evidence.
Howard: What is your motion in limine?
Coughlin: to exclude the the written statements oI Mr. Frontino and the
Hon. Judge Howard: On what basis?
Coughlin: that the search was violative oI the Fourth Amendment.
Hon. Judge Howard: City, a response?
Roberts: I think he needs to articulate how they invoke the Fourth and FiIth
aAmendments rather than just make bald assertion that they've violative.
Hon. Judge Howard: Well, I am going to deny your request.. NRS 170.4125 motions
are required to be made prior to trial you Iailed to do that in written Iorm and I am not
going to consider them at this point in time because there have the obvious eIIect oI
continuing this preceding today and I think that's what you're going aIter.
Coughlin: and I'll just interject an objection.
Hon. Judge Howard: I don't want to hear anything Iurther, its denied.
Coughlin: I need to enter my objections Ior the record.
Hon. Judge Howard: Mr. Coughlin, I have given you Iair warning iI you continue to
persist in this line oI perIormance I'm going to hold you in contempt (2:29 PM)
Coughlin: I won't be bullied into not entering my objections on the record.
Hon. Judge Howard: This matter will be continued because you're going to be placed
in custody now, you've been given Iair warning, let's proceed.
Coughlin: Your Honor may I enter my objections in the record to preserve them Ior the
record on appeal?
Hon. Judge Howard: Go ahead.
Coughlin: It seems as though you've just told me that I may not because you just told
me you are going to have to be arrested iI I do so I am a little scared to do that at this
point Your Honor and I move Ior your recusal Irom this case on that basis
Hon. Judge Howard: denied.
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Coughlin: Okay,then can I enter my objections Ior the record and state the basis Ior my
objections Ior the motions in limine?
Hon. Judge Howard:Mr. Coughlin: let's proceed, make your objections on the record
now, go ahead.
Coughlin: Okay, I don't mean to provide a reason to get angry.. Those motions were
submitted, I believe I have submitted those motions in writing.
Hon. Judge Howard: and they have been denied.
Coughlin: well it seemed as though a second ago Your Honor said that they had not
been submitted in writing
Hon. Judge Howard: All right! (pounds Iist on desk making very loud sound,
courtroom microphone malIunctions with Ieedback Ior a period oI time )
(2:30:06: p.m.)
Coughlin: Iurther there is a coercive attempt to procure consent to a search based upon
not consenting. Probable cause was buttressed upon a Iailure to not consent to search
which as you stated earlier, Your Honor, asserting one's FiIth Amendment or Fourth
Amendment right cannot be used to inIer evidence oI guilt or to buttress a probable
cause Iinding Ior a search, particularly Ior a search that occurs prior to arrest.
Hon. Judge Howard: anything Iurther?
Coughlin: I do.. I am terribly shaken by what you said to me, Sir, and it's aIIected my
ability to concentrate right now and deIend my case given the 0 to 60 in one second
approach that I have witnessed you take with me today in terms oI threatening me with
contempt upon the Iirst attempt I believe I made to preserve and objections Ior the
record Iurther I believe my motion Ior reconsideration the denial oI appointed counsel,
but it was never ruled on. There is a Sixth Amendment right to counsel where the
possibility oI jail time is.
Hon. Judge Howard: your initial motion has been previously denied. I'll deny it
again in regard to motion Ior counsel I'll deny it again Ior the record that is Iounded
upon Scott versus Illinois which held that where an indigent individual, as you claim
you are, is not going to be sentenced to jail time, there is no requirement oI the
appointment oI counsel.
2:47:33 pm
Roberts: AIter you identiIied yourselI as Wal-Mart asset protection what did you say to him
Thomas Frontino: I identiIied myselI as asset protection and that I needed to talk to him about some
items that he had taken Irom our Iacility.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: And did he say anything to you at that time:
Thomas Frontino: He pretended...He did not say anything, however he did come with us back into the
store
2:48:33 pm
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Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Did you place Mr. Coughlin in custody, did you place handcuIIs on
him at that time?
Thomas Frontino: No, we did not touch him in any way, He was simply Iollowing our directions at
that point.
2:49:31
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: When you were walking Mr. Coughlin back to the AP OIIice was
he in handcuIIs?
Thomas Frontino: No, he was not.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: and were you escorting him in any way, did you have your arm
around him in any way?
Thomas Frontino: No, we did not.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Once you were in the AP oIIice, did you ask him any question or
have Iurther discussion.
Thomas Frontino: I asked him about the items he concealed and he reIused to cooperate any Iurther
with our investigation....He just continued to say that he didn't do it when I asked him about the candy
bar and cough drops.
2:50:47
Zach Coughlin: Objection, Best Evidence Rule, why rely on Frontino's vague recollections rather than
use any oI the video tape.
2:51:19:
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Did you ask Mr. Coughlin any more questions relevant to this
situation?
Thomas Frontino: I asked him Ior his inIormation so we could enter it into our system.
2:52
argue about exclusionary rule regarding witness, Hazlett-Stevens in there watching, mention Howard
made a woman leave earlier, all witnesses are male, etc.
2:52:25 pm
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: What speciIic inIormation did you ask oI Mr. Coughlin?
Thomas Frontino: IdentiIication, his name birth date, social security number.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: And did he provide any oI that inIormation to you?
Thomas Frontino: No, he did not.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Based upon his unwillingness to provide that inIormation did you
take any Iurther action?
Thomas Frontino: Yes, we called the police, the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Tribal Police
Department. They usually arrive within ten minutes, I believe my statement reIlects it was less than
that.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Were you present when the OIIicers decided to put handcuIIs on
Mr. Coughlin
Thomas Frontino: Yes.
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Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Prior to placing the handcuIIs, did you observe the OIIicers place
their hands in Coughlin's pockets?
Thomas Frontino: No.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: What were the items you believe Mr. Coughlin had taken Irom
Wal-Mart?
Thomas Frontino: chocolate bar and two packages oI cough drops.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: were you able to recover those items.
Thomas Frontino: Uh, he consumed the chocolate bar and he consumed some oI the cough drops as
well but we were able to get the packaging to everything.
Zach Coughlin: Objection, Ioundation
Hon. Judge Howard: Denied,
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Did you recover the packaging Ior the cough drops?
Thomas Frontino: Yes, I did.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: So you were able to tell what type oI cough drop it was?
Zach Coughlin: Objection, Ioundation.
Hon. Judge Howard: Overruled.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: did you recover the candy bar wrapper that was associate with the
candy bar you saw Mr. Coughlin consume?
Thomas Frontino: Yes, I did, and prepared a receipt to indicate what they value oI those items are by
taking the exact wrapper oI the item and preparing a traning receipt so we can get the exact value oI
what they sell Ior in Reno
2:56:59
Zach Coughlin: Objection hearsay
Hon. Judge Howard: Overruled! Did you hear me, Sir? Did you hear that?
2:57:17
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Did you actually conduct the scanning oI those items to creat the
training receipt
Thomas Frontino: I don't have a cashier number so I go with them and stand with them and watch
while they scan the items to create the receipt (check the tape to see).
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: So you actually observe them going through the motion oI
scanning the items and preparing the receipt?
Thomas Frontino: Yes, I do.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Wish to enter as Exhibit 1 the receipt
Zach Coughlin: Objection: Ioundation and authentication, best evidence rule
Hon. Judge Howard: denied.
Thomas Frontino: identiIies it as a training receipt with a list oI items which he consumed or removed
Irom the Iacility, including the chocolate bar and the cough drops, I have the actual receipt with me
and that photocopy is consistent with it.
Zach Coughlin: objection basis oI lack oI Ioundation, authentication, best evidence rule, he is not
qualiIied to testiIy with regard to the business practices oI his employer in this particular
circumstance, relevancy, to what extent is this probative.
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? Anything Irom Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: on jurisdiction? Indian Colony land, anyone with
a drop oI tribal blood must be tride in tribal court.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: He personally observed this document being produced by the
maching and saw the items that he saw consumed or stolen by the deIendant scanned into the register.
Hon. Judge Howard: Objection overruled, admitted.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: no Iurther questions oI this witness
Cross oI Frontino: 3:01:00
Zach Coughlin: Mr. Frontino will you state your social security number Ior the record.
Hon. Judge Howard: he doesn't have to provide that.
Zach Coughlin: Your Honor, I do not believe you are practicing law on behalI oI the City Attorney's
OIIicer he.
Hon. Judge Howard: beIore he speaks his ssn into the record...I am going to prevent it
Zach Coughlin: objection to the court's sua sponte practicing law on behalI oI the city attorney's
oIIice.
Zach Coughlin: Mr. Frontino didn't you have a social security number on a piece oI paper with my
name on it prior to the police arriving? (3:02:07)
Thomas Frontino: I do not recall.
C:So in you LP room did you have any piece oI paper with what you thought was my name, social
security number, or other personally identiIiable inIormation already Iilled out.
Thomas Frontino: At the time you had only given us your name, that was it.
Zach Coughlin: Objection, non responsive.
Hon. Judge Howard: You asked the question, you got a response, your objection overruled, denied.
Zach Coughlin: so are you lying when you say I provided you my name?
Zach Coughlin: So, just to be clear, you are stating here under penalty oI perjury under oath, that prior
to the police arriving I gave you my name?
Thomas Frontino: I am saying that we did not have the evidence required... we did not have the
inIormation required, so whether you gave me your name or not was...was not the point, you were
uncooperative and that is why we notiIied police.
Zach Coughlin: Okay, just a second ago you testiIied that I gave you my name prior to the police
arriving, now it seems you are backing oII oI that a little bit, Mr. Frontino...and you are smiling
smugly.
Thomas Frontino: I don't remember whether you gave me your name or not at Iirst, I know you did
not give me the inIormation required Ior us to complete our investigation, that is why police were
notiIied.
Zach Coughlin: Okay, so you just lied earlier when you said 'yes, Ior sure I gave you my name prior
to the police arriving and that you didn't already have my name on a piece oI paper and what you
thought was my social security number written on a piece oI paper right there on your desk, in the
loss prevention oIIice? Were you lying right there, Mr. Frontino?
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Objection, complex question.
Hon. Judge Howard: Its a complex question, lets ask a question, not a series oI questions in narrative
Iorm.
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Zach Coughlin: is it true that you just testiIied earlier that you did not have my name written on a
piece oI paper in your oIIice immediately upon bringing me back to it.
Thomas Frontino: I believe I did have your name but I do not remember conclusively whether or
not...I know that I did not have enough inIormation to complete my investigation.
Zach Coughlin: Okay, so earlier when you testiIied that you didn't have my name on a piece oI paper,
but then that the only way you got my name prior to the police arriving, was by me oIIering it, you
were lying? Under penalty oI perjury? I don't know why you are smiling, Sir? There's nothing Iunny
about perjury.
Hon. Judge Howard: I don't see that as a smile, let's let the record be clear.
Thomas Frontino: I'm not quite understanding your question perhaps. I am saying that I did not have
enough inIormation to proceed with my report without notiIying police.
Zach Coughlin: Okay, well, I'll just write these questions down real simple.
Hon. Judge Howard: is that a question?
Zach Coughlin: I am making it a question right here.
Hon. Judge Howard: What you are doing is you are being argumentative, what I want you to do is ask
him questions.
Zach Coughlin: Were you lying when you said earlier that you didn't have what you thought was my
name
Thomas Frontino: No, I was not lying, I believe that I was making a statement that I still believe was
true...I believe you gave me your name and only your name at the time.
Zach Coughlin: Okay, so just a minute ago when you said 'now, I'm not sure whether you gave you
me your name or not? Which is it? The tape oI this testimony right here will show that at Iirst you
said you didn't have my nme?
Hon. Judge Howard: there is a question beIore him, I believe, let's see iI he can address it.
Thomas Frontino: What was the question?
Zach Coughlin: Did you already testiIy today that you did not know my name when you brought me
back to the LP room.
Thomas Frontino: When I brought you back to the room, no I did not have your name?
Zach Coughlin: Did you have a name that you believe might be mine?
Thomas Frontino: Yes because you gave us a...a name, but without proper identiIication it is Wal-
Mart policy to call the police.
Zach Coughlin: So, now you are saying I gave you a name?
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Your Honor, asked and answered.
Zach Coughlin: Its been answered in several contradictory ways...
Hon. Judge Howard: Sustained, ask another question...
Zach Coughlin: At Iirst its 'you didn't give a name, then its 'you gave us a name then its 'I'm not
sure iI you gave a name then its you smiling some more...
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Objection, Your Honor, he's testiIying...
Hon. Judge Howard: Mr. Coughlin, I have told you that I am not going to allow you to present
argument at this time, let's get along with another line oI questions..
Zach Coughlin: Okay, but I'm conIused...
Hon. Judge Howard: Another line oI questions, the record is clear...
Zach Coughlin: Do you recall having a piece oI paper with a name that you believe might be mine, on
your desk, immediately upon bringing me into what you call the asset protection room?
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Thomas Frontino: When we brought you back into the room our normal procedure is to get out our
inIormation collection Iorm and to get inIormation Irom our suspect, we asked you your name, all oI
your...
Zach Coughlin: Objection, Your Honor, I am not asking him was he was seeking to have collected
Hon. Judge Howard: What Mr. Coughlin is asking...its my understanding he's asking you iI you had a
piece oI paper on your desk with his name on it when he was brought back to the room? Is that
correct?
Zach Coughlin: With my name already on it.
Thomas Frontino: No....(nervous laughter Irom Frontino)..Absolutely not...I must have
misunaerstooa the question beIore, but absolutely no.
C:You didn't have a piece oI paper, Sir, with my name and social security number on it?
Thomas Frontino: Already on it when you Iirst entered the room? No.
Zach Coughlin: Yeah...yeah.
Thomas Frontino: Absolutely not.
Zach Coughlin: Did you have a piece oI paper with my name on it?
Zach Coughlin: Something similar to my name on it?
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Objection, how would he know what name is similar to yours..
Hon. Judge Howard: Speculative...
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Speculative, yes
Hon. Judge Howard: Sustained.
Zach Coughlin: Similar in terms oI one or two letters being diIIerent out oI 20 or so letters..
Hon. Judge Howard: Mr. Coughlin...Mr. Coughlin...proceed with another line oI inquiry.
Zach Coughlin: Okay, did you have a piece oI paper with a name already on it when you brought me
into the oIIice.
Hon. Judge Howard: Asked and answered...did you hear what I just said?
Zach Coughlin: I believe that was a diIIerent question, Sir. I didn't ask iI it had my name, I asked iI it
had 'a name on it.
Thomas Frontino: There is other people's names on the desk, so chances were, yes, there was another
piece oI paper with somebody's name on it, somewhere on the desk.
Zach Coughlin: And you have video oI this?
Thomas Frontino: There is video oI the oIIice at that time.
Zach Coughlin: Would have have those pieces oI paper?
Thomas Frontino: There's a lot oI paper...I didn't know which one you wanted me to bring.
Zach Coughlin: So, you are saying, under oath, that there wasn't a piece oI paper with my name or a
name that is substantially similar to it, in the oIIice already, at the time you brought me in there.
Thomas Frontino: When I brought you in our oIIice there was no piece oI paper with your name on it
or a name that was substantially similar.
Zach Coughlin: I will remind you that you are under oath, Sir. (3:10:37 pm)
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Objection, badgering
Zach Coughlin: Your Honor, I'm, uh...I do have respect Ior you, Sir. And I am not trying to waste the
Court's time with this next question, but I am trying to Iigure out what Mr. Frontino's Iinal testimony
is with regard to whether I oIIered him my name prior to the police getting it. Mr. Frontino, is it your
testimony that I oIIered you my name prior to the police arriving?
Thomas Frontino: I do not remember iI you speciIically gave us your name at the time.
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Zach Coughlin: Did you testiIy earlier today that I did give you my name prior to the police arriving?
Thomas Frontino: I believe you might have, but I...but I do not recall conclusively enough to say
'yes, Ior sure you did or 'no, you did not give us you name beIore the police arrived.
Zach Coughlin: Did you think you knew what my name might be?
Thomas Frontino: Absolutely not.
Zach Coughlin: Prior to the police arriving?
Zach Coughlin: Did you testiIy earlier that you had had 'previous interactions with mean indicate so
in your written statement provided to the police?
Thomas Frontino: I had seen you previous times...
3:12:09 pm
Thomas Frontino: Yes, I had had previous interactions with you...I had never spoken to you though.
Zach Coughlin: Had you had previous discussions with any other Wal-Mart employees or
supervisors, or loss prevention or asset protection individuals?
Thomas Frontino: Yes, I have.
Zach Coughlin: Did my name ever come up?
Thomas Frontino: No, it did not.
Zach Coughlin: How did you reIer to me and how did those co-workers reIer to me?
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Objection, I don't know what he is talking about, when did this
conversation happen, who was he talking to?
Hon. Judge Howard: Overruled.
Thomas Frontino: We generally reIerred to you as the 'laptop switcher, um Ior switching RAM and
hard drives and things like that...
3:13:34 pm
Zach Coughlin: and who made that statement?
Thomas Frontino: ap associates and electronics assocites and electronics associates.
Zach Coughlin: what are their names?
Thomas Frontino: Stanley Cunningham and there is another Iemale who works in electronics, Jessie.
Zach Coughlin: Jessie What?
Thomas Frontino: I don't know here last name. I believe Alexis Trundy who now works t diIIerent
Iacility. My supervisor Anthony Rickerson.
Zach Coughlin: who is the gentlemn with shaved head, seems to be mybe Customer Service
Manager or an assistant store manger
Hon. Judge Howard: what is the relevance to this line oI questioning.
Zach Coughlin: well, the Jessie, that Frontino reIers to ...there was an incident where she accused me
oI something nd this CSM or sernior walmart manager came over and was ble to veriIy that her
accusations were unIound or baseless.
Hon. 1udge Howard: I don't see any relevance, and yes, its ~sua sponte, I m not going to allow
this line of inquiry. Lets speed up this process, ask another question.
Zach Coughlin: Yes, Sir, okay, just quickly, state the objection...He is making these accusations
that are prejudicial and to the extent I have a right to rebut them I wish to do so...
Hon. 1udge Howard: I have ruled on it already ask another question.
Zach Coughlin: Okay, so you had a nickname Ior me but you had no idea what my name or identiIy
was?
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Thomas Frontino: I had seen you beIore and I had Iollowed you beIore, but, no, nobody knew your
name that I knew oI.
Zach Coughlin: any nobody had a name that they thought might be mine?
Thomas Frontino: I cannot speak to what other people thought? But you can testiIy as to what they
told you
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: that would be hearsay your honor?
Hon. Judge Howard: sustained.
Zach Coughlin: Habit, hearsay exception, business practice, custom, or policy.
3:16:57
Thomas Frontino: on the day in question Stanley Cunningham was the only other person working Ior
asset protection.
Zach Coughlin: Okay, so is it your testimony that immediately upon my entering the store you began
to Iollow me?
Thomas Frontino: No, I did not say that. I Iollowed you immediately upon seeing you, and Iollowed
you Ior approximately halI and hour to an hour and I personally witnessed you select open and
consume a candy bar and select, open, and conceal two packages oI cough drops.
Zach Coughlin: Did you tell the police that night that you personally saw the accused consume the
candy bar, but you did you Iail to mention anything about 'personally seeing anything with regard to
the cough drops?
Thomas Frontino: I did not Iail to make that note to them, I stopped you speciIically Ior the candy
bar, because aIter consuming the candy bar and concealing the cough drops you went into the
bathroom with the cough drops, which, per Wal-Mart policy I had to then say 'well I can't stop him
Ior the cough drops because you could have Ilushed the cough drops, you could have done whatever
you wanted with the cough drops, however, I stopped you Ior the candy bar and that is why I stopped
you... we recovered more walmart merchandise later. It did not aIIect the charge in any way.
Zach Coughlin: any you say this was a candy bar.
Thomas Frontino: it was a chocolate...substance, I can give you the exact item, the receipt should be
on camera view Irom when you entered the AP oIIice.
Zach Coughlin: and you say you saw me select it?
Thomas Frontino: I did see you select it.
Zach Coughlin: Irom where?
Thomas Frontino: From the candy isle...Irom...the ice cream endcap and ...the candy isle.
Zach Coughlin: is it a candy isle or an ice cream isle?
Thomas Frontino: its the same...place...cuz there's the...ice cream..endcap...that has...the candy isle.
Zach Coughlin: can you be more speciIic in regard to where in the store you say...
Thomas Frontino: when you enter the Iacility its about Iour isles, so about 40 Ieet when you pass the
registers you hang a leIt, and that's where all oI our candy-type substances are.
Zach Coughlin: The candy isle? Endcap? Was it on an endcap?
Thomas Frontino: You selected it Irom the candy isle, theres the ice cream endcap andthen the candy
isle, you selected it Irom their.
Zach Coughlin: What's an 'endcap?
Thomas Frontino: It caps oII the end oI an isle
Zach Coughlin: so you are saying it wasn't selected Irom the candy isle?
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Thomas Frontino: I'm saying it was selected from the candy isle. There's an ice cream endcap, go
leIt there, and then there's the candy isle.
Hon. Judge Howard: Alright, I have heard enough, continue with another line oI questioning, we have
heard repeatedly that he observed you select it Irom the candy isle, which is also associated with the
ice cream isle. He has explained to you what an endcap is, let's go Iorward.
Zach Coughlin: I believe this is very probative, Your Honor.
Hon. Judge Howard: Why? What's the relevance.
Zach Coughlin: I can tell you, Sir, but in order to
Hon. Judge Howard: I want you to explain it right now, what's the relevance?
Zach Coughlin: in Order to have my ability to impeach his testimony, Your Honor, there is some
leeway that would be helpIul in order to have him put some answers on the record
Hon. Judge Howard: What is the relevance oI this line oI inquiry.
Zach Coughlin: I can tell you that...
Hon. Judge Howard: II you can't state it I am going to make you move on.
Zach Coughlin: I can state it, Sir, but to state it beIore I am able to get him put some things on the
record impairs my ability to impeach him.
Hon. Judge Howard: Finding no relevance to this line oI inquiry I am not going to allow it.
Zach Coughlin: I will tell you the relevance..
Hon. Judge Howard: I am not going to allow it, move on!
Zach Coughlin: Your Honor, I didn't say I wouldn't reveal the relevance..
Hon. Judge Howard: Move On! I have given you every opportunity to reveal the relevance oI this line
oI inquiry...
Zach Coughlin: I don't believe you have, Your Honor...
Hon. Judge Howard: You Iailed to do it...I am not going to allow it
Zach Coughlin: I will state the relevance right now.
Hon. Judge Howard: No, its too late now, move on!
Zach Coughlin: Wow.
Hon. Judge Howard: We are not playing a game here.
Zach Coughlin: Wow.
Hon. Judge Howard: The next 'Wow that you make in these proceedings...under these
circumstnces,Sir, I m telling you now it demens the Court, I have given you every leeway possible
and you continue to push the buttons, now...either move on...ask another question.
Zach Coughlin: Yes, sir. So, the candy bar was taken Irom the endcap on the end oI the candy isle,
you say?
Thomas Frontino: No, you took it Irom the candy isle.
Hon. Judge Howard: Did you understand...Hold on...Did you understand my admonishment about this
line oI questioning?
Zach Coughlin: I believe so, Sir.
Hon. Judge Howard: Then why did you go right back to it and ask about the candy bar on the endcap
Zach Coughlin: I am asking him about it Ior impeaching him with regard to where this quote unquote
candy bar was selected Irom
Hon. Judge Howard: I don't want to hear anything else about the endcap or the isle, let's go Iorward.
Zach Coughlin: I'll just preserve my objection Ior the record, Your Honor, Mr. Frontino has testiIied
under oath that this 'candy bar was taken Irom an ice cream endcap on the end oI the candy isle, but
the video evidence would suggest that its taken Irom somewhere entirely diIIerent, that would tend to
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undermine Mr. Frontino's testimony, impeach his character, and every other Iactual assertion he has
made here today.
Hon. Judge Howard: Do you have that evidence here today in your possession? Answer yes or no.
Zach Coughlin: I am not sure.
Hon. Judge Howard: You don't know whether you have that evidence in your possession?
C:That's....or whether Wal-Mart will provide it
Hon. Judge Howard: Mr. Coughlin, you are telling me, I want to be clear about this, that you are
uncertain as to whether you personally possess this video tape?
Zach Coughlin: I though you said whether I possess evidence that would impeach what he said and
testiIied to as to where the candy bar was
Hon. Judge Howard: are you in possession oI a video tape, yes or no?
Zach Coughlin: oI a video tape? Sir, I am unclear on what you are...But, Wal-Mart does have
cameras all over the store, so, whether or not I am, I would think it would be Iairly easy Ior Wal-Mart
to show where this alleged candy bar was taken Irom and whether that jibes with what Mr. Frontino
has just said.
Hon. Judge Howard: Mr. Coughlin, I am going to hold you in contempt at this point in time, I think
that you have derogated the authority oI the Court with unproIessional conduct repeatedly, you've
been given every opportunity to have this matter expedited and proceed to trial and have a just Iinding
but you continue to interIere with that process. I make a Iinding that you are guilty oI direct
contempt, I am going to hold oII with imposition until this proceeding is resolved. Alright, you can
continue your line oI inquiry.
Zach Coughlin: Your Honor, I need to use the restroom.
Hon. Judge Howard: I beg your pardon?
Zach Coughlin: I need to use the restroom.
Hon. Judge Howard: We will take a Iive minute recess, I am going to remain here on the bench.
Zach Coughlin: Sir, I will be quick. (3:26:52 pm)....
(3:35:52 pm)
Hon. Judge Howard: We are back on the record. Mr. Coughlin has had an opportunity to use the
Iacilities and we will proceed.
Zach Coughlin: Thank you, Your Honor, Mr. Frontino, are you aware oI whether or not you were
being tape recorded or video taped.
Thomas Frontino: Yes, I am, there's camera throughout the store and signs letting customers know
they are being tape.
Zach Coughlin: So, there's camera's throughout the store.
Thomas Frontino: There's not cameras everywhere in the store, primarily in high theIt or saIety
related areas.
Zach Coughlin: Was there any audio tape made?
Thomas Frontino: And, did you or anyone associated with Wal-Mart make any audio tapes in
connecdtion with this situation?
Zach Coughlin: No.
3:37:27 pm
Zach Coughlin: Did Wal-Mart provide video tape to Ms. Roberts?
Thomas Frontino: I provided evidence to Ms. Roberts
Zach Coughlin: In Iact, in your statement, in the discovery provided by the City Attorney, you stated
that video evidence would be compiled?
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Zach Coughlin: and what did you provide.
Thomas Frontino: I provided evidence Irom within the oIIice.
Zach Coughlin: by that do you mean just video evidence Irom the room in which you took the
accused to.
Thomas Frontino: I took video images oI the room to which I took the accused to.
Zach Coughlin: Just that though?
Thomas Frontino: just that, yes. That is all we compiled, yes.
Zach Coughlin: why?
Thomas Frontino: because the primary, the only reson...we don't generally record video Ior Iourteen
dollr petty larceny incidents, um...we did tht speciIically this time because oI accustion that were
made towards the oIIicers.
Zach Coughlin: accustions by whom?
Thomas Frontino: accustion you had made toward the oIIicers...you had made accusation that they
were making an unlawIul search oI your person.
Zach Coughlin: speciIically, what was unlawIul about it.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Objection calls Ior a legal conclusion.
Hon: Judge Howard: sustained, sustined
Zach Coughlin: I am not asking it Ior the purposes oI obtaining a legal conclusion, but merely Ior
him to restate what was said.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: that's not the way he asked that question, Your Honor.
Hon. Judge Howard: ask another question.
Zach Coughlin: Yes, Sir, Your Honor. Did anyone, including myselI, that was in that room that time,
speciIiy in any way as to what was impermissible about such a search?
Thomas Frontino: No you did not.
Zach Coughlin: so your testimony is that accustions were made that the search was impermissible
Thomas Frontino: correct
C; but nothing more speciIic was said?
Thomas Frontino: no.
Zach Coughlin: was there any commentary about the impermissilbty oI conditioning search based
upon the Iailure to consent to such search?
Zach Coughlin: well, wouldn't that contradicts what you just said with regard to whether any speciIics
were said with respect to what was impermissible about the search.
Hon. Judge Howard: I'll allow it.
Zach Coughlin: Mr. Frontino, it seems though, again, that your testimony contradicts the testimony
you made not even three mintues prior. (3:40:33).
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: is that a question, Your Honor?
Zach Coughlin: I'm asking him to explain.
Hon. Judge Howard: Stop!. I will allow it. Do you understand it?
Thomas Frontino: I believe I do understand it. I can go through it Irom the beginning to end iI you
like. There was point in time where you made an accusation that you had not given consent to
search, and it was at that time that OIIicer CrawIord said make note, and I believe its in my police
statement, that there was notation that your pockets were searched aIter you were placed under arrest.
Zach Coughlin: Okay, correct me iI I'm wrong, but this is wht I just heard you say 'there was no
dialogue or speciIics mentioned about what was impermissible about such a search, but then upon
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Iurther questioning you indicted tht there was some dialogue about how it was impermissible to
condition the search based upon the reIusal to give consent Ior the search, to use reIusal to give
consent as a basis Ior the search.
Thomas Frontino: You are completely misunderstanding what I said then.
Zach Coughlin: Well, I would say, 'oI course I am because you have given three diIIerent
contradictory answers.
Hon. Judge Howard: being argumentative, let him resond to the question, go ahead.
Thomas Frontino: can you repeat the question.
Zach Coughlin: can you explain how it could not be contradictory Ior you to originally testiIy that
basing the permissibliy oI the serach upon Iailure to give consentto the search was not discussed, and
then you testiIied that is was discussed, and then now you are testiIying that it wasn't discussed?
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: objecdion calls Ior a conclusion.
Hon. Judge Howard: do you understand.
Thomas Frontino: I don't think I do.
Zach Coughlin: was there a discussion related to whether it was illegal to base the search upon a
Iailure to consent to a search, and you said yes.
Thomas Frontino: I will respond as best I am able to. Perhaps its best to start with they asked iI they
could do a weapon pat down search, you consented to that, they did an outside pat down. AIter you
became non compliant, and uncooperative with the investigation and asked Ior an attorney, you were
placed under arrest. They arrested you put handcuIIs on you, whatever they do, they then emptied
your pockets, as they do with every other person they put under arrest, at which time we then
recovered more stolen merchandise, which was the cough drops...It was at that time that you said I
didn't consent to a search, your can't, I ...I didn't give you consent to search me.
Zach Coughlin: Do you Ieel, Mr. Frontino, that ever time I put Iorth to you the inconsistency and
contradicdtions in your testimony that you respond by talking about things that are completely
unrelated.
Thomas Frontino: No, because I believe that's completely related.
Zach Coughlin: now, what did you tell the police when they arrived.
Thomas Frontino: I told the police that I had stopped you Ior shopliIting the chocolate item but that I
also believed you had cough drops on your person but that I also believed you had cough drops on
your person but that you had gone into the restroom but that I did not have positive evidence that you
still had some in your possession even though you had consumed some and disposed oI the
packaging to them.
(here Frontino contradicdts himselI Irom sentence to sentence. He doesn't have positive evidence oI
the cough drops being what? Possessed, consumed? But by the next sentence he is attesting that
Coughlin had 'consumed some 'disposed oI the packaging to them. So, where Wal-Mart policy
apparently won't let Frontino do somethig with the bathroom, Frontino attempts to leverage the
police Iorce to do that which his employer's policy Iorbids?
Zach Coughlin: have you discussed your testimony her today with the two Indian Colony OIIicers?
Thomas Frontino: No, I have not.
Zach Coughlin: where you sitting with them Ior about an hour beIore court?
Thomas Frontino: probably Ior about halI an hour (3:45:35).
Zach Coughlin: Were you laughing and joking together?
Thomas Frontino: Yes, we were.
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C:are you close to or do you have a personal relationship with those oIIicers?
Thomas Frontino: No, I do not, but there are very Iew tribabl police oIIicers so we tend to work with
them Iairly regularly
Zach Coughlin: okay, so your testimony is, here, under penalty oI perjury...I don't know why you are
smiling, thats not very Iunny, you wouldn't apprecIiate going into an operating roomand seeing a
surgeon joking around?
Thomas Frontino: I have just been reminded several times.
Zach Coughlin: Your testimony here today is that you provided statements, both oral and written, to
the two Indian Colony oIIicers, Irom the time they arrived until the time they leIt, that you personally
witnessed something with regard to the cough drops. Was your testimony that you told the oIIicers
that you personally witnessed the accused doing something with the cough drops?
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: asked and answered.
Zach Coughlin: in your written statement, what did you indicate with respect to the cough drops?
H I don'tremember, iI I had the statement with me maybei t would.
Zach Coughlin: when the police arrived on the scene, did you make statements to the police regarding
previous interactions with the accused?
Thomas Frontino: I believe I did make the statements that I had Iollowed you in that past, that I had
seen you in the past select and consume a package oI M&M's, that you had a long standing history
with the store, that our management had already wanted to have you trespassed but had that Iar Iailed
to have an opprotunity to do so.
Zach Coughlin: Was the reason they wanted to have the accused trespassed based upon a retaliatory
motive in conjunction with the accused's attempts to hold Wal-Mart to the Return Policy which is
incorporated into all sales they make and which is clearly and expressly displayed both in the stores
and on Wal-Mart's website.
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: I am going to object calls Ior him to speculate into the minds oI the
managers as to why they wanted to trespass him.
Hon. Judge Howard: Do you know anything about that?
Thomas Frontino: I can speak to some oI it, Irom my side, technically there are two diIIerent
operations in the store, there are operations that deal with customers, and there is asset protection
which we are technically Iield asociates, so we had our own reasons Ior wanting to have you
trespassed Irom the Iacility based upon our own dealings with you, we meaning my manager Anthony
Rickerson, Sean who is another assitant manager who is aware oI you, Alodia, who is another
assistant manager who signed your trespass Iorm.
Zach Coughlin: When you say we, are you just reIerring to individuals who work with you in your
particular AP group or in your particular Wal-Mart store?
Thomas Frontino: We do communicate between stores via email, we all have access to the same
database called apis A P I S.
Zach Coughlin: Did you communicate about me with other stores or did anybody else at your store?
Thomas Frontino: not to my know knowledge.
C:, so iI the West 7
th
St. Walmart made a retaliatory threat to the accused in conjunction with the
accused pointing out that the managers, who had been there Ior over ten years, seem to conveniently
'Iorget the Return Policy whenever the numbers don't work out in a way that makes them happy, is
that something you would have never been inIormed oI
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: objection , relevance
Hon. Judge Howard: what is the relevance oI this?
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Zach Coughlin: retaliatory motive, speciIically Ior Irontino or others to lie
Thomas Frontino: I get paid...
Hon. Judge Howard: Hold on, hold on. Objection sustained. I have given you a great deal oI latitude.
We have had this witness testiIy Ior over an hour. We are going ot get through this trial tongith. The
court has a perogative to expedite this proceeding. In the Iuture iI you inquire into matters that are
not relevant, whether or not the city objects, I am going to cut you oII.
Zach Coughlin: are you aware that an ap associate Irom Walmart made threats to the accused that he
would retaliate against they accused Ior trying to assert his rights under the Return Policy that
Walmart puts Iorth to customers, by having him banned Irom all walmarts and or maliciously
prosecuted.
Thomas Frontino: no, other than previous to court that several things were mentioned beIore that, no.
(3:53:47 pm)
Zach Coughlin: so you never communicated about the accused with any other walmart.
Thomas Frontino: we don't communicate directly through Apis its simply a database. I have never
receive a picture or an email about you.
Zach Coughlin: have you Ielt any pressure Irom your managers to retaliate against someone, maybe a
documentary Iilmmaker who is investigating
Hon. Judge Howard: you don't have to answer that question, that is irrelvant to this proceeding.
Another question.
Zach Coughlin: Do you believe your employer retaliates against individuals who shine light on their
employers Iailure to abide by their own Return Policy?
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: objection Relevanace
Hon. Judge Howard: sustained.
Zach Coughlin: so the issue oI whether his employer is pressuring him to retaliate is not relevant
Hon. Judge Howard: thats right, I don't Iind it relevant, ask another question!
Zach Coughlin: so stanley cunningham was on break?
Thomas Frontino: yes, he was on lunch break.
Zach Coughlin: so, right when the accuse came into the store, you began tailing him, was anyone
watching the Iilmwhile you were tailing?
Thomas Frontino: no
Zach Coughlin: so nobody's watching the video/Iilm?, its just being recorded?
Thomas Frontino: its being recorded so iI its need we can go back to it and acquire it, in larger stores
with high theIt that have pan tilt zoom cameras.
Hon. Judge Howard: We are just concerned with what is going on here!
Thomas Frontino: okay.
Zach Coughlin: your store does not have pan tilt zoom cameras?
Thomas Frontino: no, sir.
Zach Coughlin: did you watch any or attempt to watch any video oI watch you allege was done with
the cough drops?
Thomas Frontino: no, I did not.
Zach Coughlin: why not?
Thomas Frontino: because I generally don't based upon $14.00 dollar petty larceny.
Zach Coughlin: but iI your employer could get sued Ior wrongIul arrest or damge to ones'
proIessional repution couldnt it become bigger issue thn Iourteen dollar petit larceny
Hon. Judge Howard: he has answered the question as to why he did not review the video tape:
Zach Coughlin: and I am asking a Iollow up question.
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Hon. Judge Howard: ask another question!$##$#$! I am not going to allow that question! It has
no relevance!!!`&*##$#
Zach Coughlin: do you have any duty to ascertain whether or not the allegation you make and
whether any arrests you make are based in Iact or supported by admissible evidence
Thomas Frontino: absolutely.
Zach Coughlin: does that duty not include bothering to look at the video?
Thomas Frontino: it did not have anything to do with bothering to look at the video, it had to do more
with looking at the places where I knew you had selected to conceal items, there not being speciIic
video evidence down those isles, because we don't have a lot of slip incidents in the candy isle,
walmart elects not to put a video camera in that isles.
Zach Coughlin: where do you alleged each item was speciIically selected, opened, and then
concealed.
Thomas Frontino: The candy item you selected, opened, and consumed while walking around the
store.
Zach Coughlin: it was selected Irom an endcap you said Irom the candy isle
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: objection, that was not his testimony.
Hon. Judge Howard: that was not his testimony.
Zach Coughlin: I'm sorry, could I.
Hon. Judge Howard: no, its asked and answered, iI you don't remember it you can review the
transcript later. Go Iorward with another question.
Zach Coughlin: oh, I'll be reviewing the transcript later. Where was the candy bar selected?
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Your Honor, asked and answered.
Thomas Frontino: in the candy isle.
Zach Coughlin: so not on an endcap, but somewhere within the isle itselI.
Zach Coughlin: the candy bar was. Was it...and what item was that? You say it was a candy bar?
Thomas Frontino: It was a...yes, it was a chocolate item, I believe...I believe it had caramel inside it, I
didn't inspect it, it had already been consumed. I have a picture oI the wrapper.
Zach Coughlin: and we have a number Ior it, a number Ior the bar code
Thomas Frontino: the UPC, yes, the bar code, the number on the receipt, yes, that's correct.
Zach Coughlin: would it be correct to say on the receipt its the third item down, magndblcrml number
007756713282
F: Yes, that is correct
C: okay, but you don't know what exact item that is.
F: Um, its the item that I have a picture oI right here, based upon the UPC code usually I can discern
them
C: He's not entering that into evidence at this point I don't believe so, I don't know, iI the Court's
accepting it
H; it hasn't been oIIered yet\
c: the bailiII took it Irom the witness and gave it to the judge, I'll note Ior the record
I: no, he has the receipt
r: no he didn't, that's not the correct record, the document the Judge has is Exhibit 1.
C: Hh, I'm sorry that was not the picture my mistake, I'm sorry, you were talking about the picture so
it seemed you were
F: no, it was not the picture
3:59:55
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4:00:00 p.m.
Zach Coughlin: okay, so this was taken Irom somewhere in the middle oI the candy isle, you
personally witnessed that, right, you just testiIied to that correct?
Thomas Frontino: that you took it Irom the candy isle, yes, I couldn't tell you how Iar down exactly I
didn't pace it out.
Zach Coughlin: Oh...but, oh...okay...you said you 'personally eye witnessed this
Thomas Frontino: yes, but I don't take measuring tapes aIterwords....or...
C:okay but generally you could say 'right on the edge oI the isle or 'somewhere closer to halI way.
Something like that, right? Because you...you are telling us...
Hon. Judge Howard: do you know exactly where it was? (4:00:33)
Thomas Frontino: Yes, I do...it was Irom....it was Irom...the candy isle.
Zach Coughlin: okay, but its not about 'where its Irom...wer're saying under penalty oI perjury you
are saying that you 'personally eye witnessed the
Hon. Judge Howard: is there a question?
Zach Coughlin: yeah.
Hon. Judge Howard: where is it?
Zach Coughlin: I want to veriIy, where did he personally eye witness it.
Thomas Frontino: I was standing at the end oI the isle and you selected it.
Zach Coughlin: was I standing right next to you?
Thomas Frontino: OI course not.
Zach Coughlin: okay then, well could you please be a little more speciIic.
Hon. Judge Howard: Could you be more speciIic as to where he picked up the item?
Thomas Frontino: All oI our...I believe it was one oI our nicer chocolates, it wasn't a Snickers or
anything, and it was selected in that Iirst 4 to 8 Ioot section, because each section itselI is Iour Ieet, so
it was selected Irom in there.
Zach Coughlin: Irom the candy isle?
Thomas Frontino: Yes, you selected several items Irom the candy isle, some oI which you purchased,
some oI which you leIt at the cash register.
Zach Coughlin: And you are saying you then saw me...that particular item whose bar code whoe
barcode we just entered into the record, you saw me open that and then consume it.
Thomas Frontino: I am saying yes, I saw you open it and consume it. You had a stack (4:01:35 p.m.;
Frontino starts to realize his is totally eIIed here) oI....oI....candy bars and other Iood items, that you
selected a bunch oI items and put them in your cart, and then you.... then....sumbh....
(4:01:44 pm Frontino trips all over his thoughts and words and utters some quasi word while he
tries to think his way out of the shitpin he just walked himself into)
...t selected that one item out oI your car, and you opened it and consumed.
(4:01:49 pm)
Zach Coughlin: Okay, and iI that item is a refrigeratea item, would it make any sense Ior it to be in
the candy isle, where there is no reIrigeration?
(4:01:58 pm)
Thomas Frontino: There...there is on the endcap. (OH, GREAT POINT FRONTINO, TRY TO
BRING THE OLD ENDCAP BACK INTO NOW THAT YOU NAILED YOURSELF INTO
THE FIRST 4 BY 8 FOOT SECTION SPECIFICITY YOU REACHED FOR
EARLIER!)...that, that....that...that's my point...you selected a lot oI items and put them all down.
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Zach Coughlin: But your testimony under oath, under penalty oI perjury was that you saw the accused
take that particular item, not from the enacap, but Irom the Iirst 4 to 8 Ioot section oI the candy isle,
which is not reIrigerated, right?
Thomas Frontino: Correct.
Zach Coughlin: So, iI that item, iI we pulled up that item and that bar code and its shows its a
reIrigerated ice cream chocolate caramel conIection, would that indicate you were inaccurate in what
you were telling the court?
Thomas Frontino: You could have easily picked it up Irom the candy isle?
(4:02:45 p.m., hear Frontino's lying voice crack when he says the word ~isle, not even able to
summons a halfway convincing delivery of his sad attempt to crawl out of the quicksand)
Zach Coughlin: The ice cream bar Irom the canay isle? Wouldn't it be melted, wouldn't you think?
II it hd been sittin' there in the cndy isle?
Hon. Judge Howard: Is that a question? Is that your question?
Zach Coughlin: I am asking, does that make sense to you, iI this item, iI it is established this..
Thomas Frontino: I am saying you selected...
Zach Coughlin: I am not Iinished with my question, Sir.
Hon. Judge Howard: You are Iinished! You're done! Go ahead and respond.
Thomas Frontino: I am saying you selected several items and placed them all into the cart, um...yes, I
may have been mistaken, because you placed them all into the cart and then you did not proceed to
directly open the package aIter you selected it, you put it into the cart and selected it Irom various
other items that were put into the cart.
Zach Coughlin: So, iI that item was an ice cream bar that would melt iI it wasn't reIrigerated and it
was selected where you say it was selected...that would be somewhat unusual wouldn't it, Ior a
reIrigerated item to be selected Irom an isle that doesn't have reIrigeration?
(4:03:50 p.m.)
F: to be completely honest? At a Walmart? No, no, it wouldn't be that unusual.
(4:04:12 p.m.)
Zach Coughlin: Would it be possible to review the video Irom that date in question and the isle in
question to see iI the item in question...
Thomas Frontino: There are no video evidence oI any oI the reIrigerated isles or the candy isle,
however, per Walmart policy you would have had to subpoena that inIormation.
Zach Coughlin: And the litigation hold notice I placed you on at the time oI the arrest? You didn't
respond to that?
Thomas Frontino: Well, uh..I ...I don't know oI a litigation hold notice?
Zach Coughlin: Wherein you were inIormed oI your duty to maintain....
Thomas Frontino: I was never inIormed:
Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts: Objection, Your Honor. This is an A.P.A. That doesn't know...
Hon. Judge Howard: Sustained, sustained. Yes, go Iorward, another question.
Zach Coughlin: So...you...destroyed all the video evidence?
Thomas Frontino: No, I did not destroy the evidence, it is automatically recorded over aIter several
months.
Zach Coughlin: has it been several months?
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Thomas Frontino: I would have to check back with my store to see its still on there or not, it
automatically aIter time records over itselI
Zach Coughlin: Please do, and I will note Ior the record that I am hereby inIorming you and
requesting...
Hon. Judge Howard: Ask another question! Ask another question!!!
Zach Coughlin: So you don't know whether...you are saying there are no cameras above the candy
isle?
Hon. Judge Howard: Asked and answered!
Zach Coughlin: Okay. Is there something that looks like a camera above the candy isle?
F: I believe there might be one at the action ally, but I can't be sure that there is. There is another one
that actually points toward the meat department, but not down towards the candy isle
C: did you make any attempt to ascertain whether or not any oI these selecting, opening, or
concealing acts were caught on tape?
F: I did look iin the soda isle to see iI I could see you throwing and opening and throwing away the
coguh drop package and there waw not video there, the other package you threw away in the candy
isle and there's not video there.
C: there's not video there?
F: correct
c: meaning?
F: there...no...video...there.
C: okay so your saying its not a case oI there's video but it doesn't show anything, its a matter oI
there's just plain no video
I: correct there's not an image oI that area that recorded.
C: so your store doesn't record the candy isle?
4:06:42
H: Asked and answered. He's testiIied repeatedly that there's no video on the candy isle, ask another
question.
C: what are those things on the ceiling at Walmart that look like, like, uh, I mean...I always assumed
they were cameras...they are like these little round orbs with a kind oI little black pupil type look
surrounded by maybe a white plastic ring and they are interspersed all throughout the store they
would seem colloqually surveillance video, most people think or loss prevention cameras? What are
those things there are robably several hundred throughout Walmart
F; those are video cameras Ior the better part...some stores have Ialse cameras that are simply the
pupil as you described..um..
c does your store
I my store I do not believe has any Ialse cameras
c so iI ther's cameras approximately every isle
r objection theres no testimony that there cameras approximately every isle
h i'll allow the question go ahead
c; is there cameras just about aove every isle
I as I have said beIore, no, pretty much down the netire grocery isle there is not one camera shing
down any oI the actual isles thaty have the meat department produce deli and alcohol. Other than that
there is not a camera in any oI the grocery isles'. We have camerass shining down the action allies, so
on the sides, but non oI them shind down the isles
c okay, so...do any oI these trash cans...are any oI them...you alleged something with regard to the
trash cans and the cough drops, is that correct
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I: yes, you through the packaging to the cough drops into two separate trash cans.
Z and your're saying with regard to the cough drops is it accurate to say that you testiIied that you
personally witnessed the accused select the cough drops Irom some point in the store?
F yes, you selected them Irom the shelI in the pharmacy department
c where...where abouts is that
I um it was cold medicine it was in the cold medicine part oI pharmacy its actually the Iirst isle in
pharmacy right past the isle with Iemine hygeine and condoms on the right, on the right side, on the
right side oI the isle we have all oI our cough drops and cold medicine. That is where you selected
the cough drops Irom.
C does it seem c urious to you that your store appears to have a couple hundred cameras interspersed
thorought it yet neither you nor your employer have managed to gather any oI the video evidence
which might support your testimony?
F no, Ior the same reason that I gave earlier, we don't generally complile video evidence on such a
minor incident, and incident we wouldn't have even called the police had you cooperated with...its
that minor
c: are you saying you conditioned your calling the police based upon a lack oI cooperation
I yes I am
I such as?
F not cooperating
c: but could you be more speciIicallyI I had detained you Ior shopliIting you maintained yoru
innocence, which is acceptable, however without inIormation to pursue our case against you we have
to also call police so that they can assist us.
(Around 4:10:55 Frontino tries to say the wouldn't have called the cops if suspect had
cooperated, but then he defines cooperating I a way that enables walmart to proceed with their
ase against one and mentions that they would call the police to accomplish that...more
contradictory stuff. So, which is it, Frontino? Would you have let the suspect go if he had
provided the ~information you desired and ~cooperated or did you need to ~information
and ~cooperation to ~pursue your case against the accused? Talking out fo his ass again.)
c your testimony is that the accused made some statements maintiaing his innocence? Is that
correct?
F yes, thats correct?
F; yes that's correct?
C is that consistent with yoru written statements
f: I don't know whats in my...i would have to look at my written statement, I don't know if I put
that in my written statement or not.
C and your saying.. some, uh, other candy items were selected and purchased
f correct
c do you have the receipt of the items that were purchase
f; no I do not.
C; did you ever have it
f no, it is still in the walmart's database.
C were you able to verify whether or not those other items were purchased? Those other candy
items or whether in fact the receipt has other candy items
f we watched you rign up all of your items, at no time did you present...
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c who is we?
F Stanley Cunningham and I, because Stanley..by the time you were at the register, Stanley was
now with me to make our apprehension because as policy we have two people so as he came back
Irom lunch you were at the register and he was with me. So perhaps it better if I say I witnessed
your transaction
c the truth is best, so rather than saying ~you and Stanley the chaning it to ~I, just say the
truth.
H Mr. Coughlin I have repeatedly advised you against arguing with the witness. Makign the
facial expressions which you just did, which you previously chastized Mr. Frontino for. I am
going to once again admonish you and warn you against such further actions. I have done so
repeatedly. Go forward.
C Yes, sir
H; with cuation
c Mr. Frontino it seems to me that you have just testified that you and Mr. Cunningham
witnessed the accused ring up the items and then you changed your testimony to indicate that
Mr. Cunningham was actdually not there to witness that.
R; objection thats not what he testified to You Honor
f: thats not what I am saying I'm saying I cannot speak to what he saw even though he was
standing next to me watching you
c did you did you just say
f; but he is not here to say that so I will say that I witnessed you
c well did you just testify that he wasn't back from break yet? From lunch?
f no that is not what I testified. I testified that he was back from break at the time you were at
the register.
C so when you said perhaps it better if I just say ~I witnessed, why did you make that
statement?
F because I was assuming that you were going to again question me about the using ~we
because I can't speak for ~we
c okay an dyou didn't make any statement to the effecdt that you should only say ~I because
Mr. Cunningham had not actually returned from lunch yet?
F no I did not make that statement.
C and if we reviewed the tape that won't be shown? The tape of this hearing?
r objection, I don't understand the questionable
h I don't understand either. Sustained. Ask another question.
C so where did you see the cough drops? You say you saw them selected in the pharmacy isle?
F correct
c then at what point did you see them...where you personally witnessed them being opened?
F you opened one item in the candy isle and discarded the package and you opened the second
package in the soda isle and discarded the package.
C so was it a case of opening the package and discarding it right away?
F on both cases you did not open them both at the same time. You opened one in the basket
discarded the package, you pretended to blow your nose with the paper towel that was above
the garbage can, pulled down the paper towel, you then put the package inside the paper towel
and then placed both items together the paper towel concealing the cough drop package into the
garbage can.
C and you personally witnessed this?
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F I personally witnessed this
c not on video...but with your own eyes?
F with my own eyes.
C how close were you?
F at that point I was standing on the endcap and you were standing just inside the isle
c nd this would be the candy isle?
F: so how many feet away would you say you were
f A few feet maybe...
c I don't know what a few feet means, does that mean less than ten would you say?
F definitely less than ten it was probably somewhere around 3.
c you were three feet away, you were at the endcap and the accused was where?
f I was at the endcap and were just inside the isle at the garbage can. Would you like...uh.
C and you weren't obscured in any way?
F no I was not
c you were in plain sight
f uh, I was hiding, I was not standing next to the garbage can.
C okay, so you said you were not obscured and then you said you were hiding
f my line of sight was not obscured, my body was obscured from your vision
c okay, and how is that possible was there some hole in the isle you peered through
f theres, theres the endcaps that have shelves so what we will do is we will either crouch down
or we will stand stall and look wherever we need to look through the gap and we get close
enough to it and the props in the shelves don't obscure our vision at all and alls the people that
were really looking for us they would see is our eyes, but that's if they were really looking for
us.
C so there's no products on the shelves that would impede your view of that?
F there are products on the shelves and there are times when there are products that could
obscure our vision, however, we don't choose those isles...we don't choose those endcaps to look
through as it obscures our vision
c well are there situations where you don't have a choice with respect to which endcap you look
through
f No.
c so, how is that possible, are you able to arrange where people take things
f We simply do not catch everyone.
C: and you say there was no attempt made to pay for the chocolate bar or the cough drops?
F: correct?
C: And how were you able to ascertain that?
F You did not attempt to pay for them, you concealed the items...the packaging that had the
UPC's in garbage cans, you also concealed the packaging to the wrapper underneath cart
sanitizer wipes in the corner of your cart.
C did you hear any discussions between the cashier and the accused?
F No, I did not.
C Did anybody that you know of at Walmart
R Your Honor, calls for speculation
H that you know of
f That I know of? No.
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C Did you make any efforts to ascertain whether the accused and the cashier had any
discussions with respect to the items
f No
c Is there ever a situation where an individual at Walmart selects and item and its damage or
something is wrong with it and they don't purchase it?
F Yeah, but they don't eat it also.
C Is there ever a situation where someone takes a bite of something and finds it tastes bad or
maybe an Odwalla drink has a rotten taste to it
H what is the relevance of the question?
C Well, Mr. Frontino is asserting that this items were opened.
H It was a package...did you indicate an ~olive?
C: No, I was referring to what he's...
H what item were you referring to in your question specifically, what was it?
C All. all three items... the cough drops and the candy bar which...or what Mr. Frontino calls
the ~candy bar which, I believe the UPC actually reveals is a refrigerated item.
H What is the relevance to your inquiry
C well in order to establish all the elements of the charge, one is ~intent.
H Intent?
C Yes, and if there is not an intent...
H How do those other situations relate to whether you intended to conceal, consume the items in
question here?
C I am asking Mr. Frontino what he does to ascertain whether or not there was, in fact, the
requisite intent or whether or not someone who is accused of these crimes might have sampled
something and found it to be unsaleable?
(4:20:42 p.m.)
H It has no relevance to these proceedings, it has no relevance.
C Okay, and I'll just preserve my objection to that for the record, I do believe it goes to...
H You keep talking over my rulings, and I have warned you about that haven't I. I have
indicated that you have an opportunity and you've expressed your understanding of your right
to appeal. The next time that you talk over one of my decisions or rulings, I am going to hold
you in contempt again, you have fair warning.
C I am sorry, Your Honor, I was always under the understanding that if I did not specifically
state my objection for the record, I would be precluded from later on arguing that on appeal, I
don't mean to disrespect you, Sir.
H Ask another question. I have made myself clear, you understand it. Ask another question.
C In your written statement you stated that the accused was initialy compliant but then became
non-compliant, in what way did the accused become non compliant?
F You would not provide us with any information in regards to yourself so that we would not be
able to enter you into our database, as I have previously stated.
C Okay, but then earlier you testified that the accused offered you his name, how is that
consistent.
F As I have previously stated, whether you have given us your name or not that is not enough
information for us to complete our investigation and to enter you into our system, as I have
stated before.
C Well, okay, that's fine...but my question didn't relate to that. My question related to how you
can stand here under oath and say one thing that inconsistent with something else you've said.
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To wit: you said earlier that the accused offered his name to you prior to the police arriving,
then just now, you described the accused as non-compliant, in part, because he to offer his
name to you. My question is: how is that non inconsistent and indicative of a lack of veracity
attendant to your testimony today, Mr. Frontino?
R Objection, Your Honor, that goes to argument.
H I am going to allow the question up to the point that it goes to veracity, which is a
determination that I make, not you, go ahead.
F as I believe I have stated earlier, I do believe you gave us your name, but I would not swear
my life on the fact that you gave us your name, however, even if you had given us your name,
you did not give us enough information for us to complete our investigation, so therefore, we
had to notify Tribal Police.
C Okay so when you say your are finding some non-compliance on the part of the accused and
the attendant consequence to that, ie, your calling in the police...what you assert was the non-
compliance in your earlier testimony, was that there was a failure to give a name....but that
might not be it, apparently, according to your testimony. So, was there any other non-
compliant behavior?
F You wouldn't give us your information, that was it.
C Information meaning?
F Name, address, identification, all items that you had on your person, but were unwilling to
share with us.
C So you are saying that a failure to provide those materials at Walmart will result in calling
the police?
F Anybody that fails to produce a valid form of identification will result in us calling the police.
C And...calling the police saying what...the person refused to give their identification?
F No, we call the police because at that point, Walmart pursues their right to pursue criminal
charges, and you are not on trial for not giving a name, you are on trial for petty larceny, so at
that point Walmart...
H He's answered the question, thank you.
(4:25:43 p.m.)
C So is refusing to allow Walmart to search the contents of one's bag or the plastic bag that
their purchases are in, is that also a basis for callign the police?
F We never search individuals, per policy Walmart does not search individuals
H His question is, is that a basis for contacting the police?
C So the well known practice of having someone stand by the door and say lets me check your
receipt against the contents of your bag...does that occur at Walmart?
F Uh, yes it does.
C Okay so if someone refuses to allow Walmart to search the contents of their platic bag and
their receipt...if someone refuses to consent to that search, what is your policy?
F To let them leave.
C So, someone can refuse to consent to that search and you let them leave?
F Correct.
C Have you ever detained someone for refusing to consent to such a search?
F If I were working and the door and failed to observed selection, concealment, and
consumption of those items, we never make stops based on those, so, if somebody's at the door,
its more of an insurance policy to check receipts...nobody is ever detained, um...
c There wasn't a lawsuit against Walmart recently
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f I couldn't speak to
H What is the relevance? What is the relevance to this line of inquiry. We are speaking about,
as I understand it, loss prevention officer and his observations and a greeter and what the
greeter can do. Do you see those as exactly the same thing?
C I see them as an overall policy on Walmart's part to condition whether or not they are going
to take retaliatory action based upon whether a customer is consenting to impermissible
searches and seizures.
H Alright. I don't see them as the same or even similar. Its not relevant.
C Yes, Sir, I'll move on.
H It's not relevant, ask another question.
C You say that you overhead some discussions between the Indian Colony Officers and the
accused with regard to the accused failure to consent to a search....having a consequence of the
accused being arrested for not consent....
f; No, Sir, you were not placed under arrest until you asked for a lawyer.
C Okay, so you are saying the accused asking Ior a lawyer was, uh, mentioned by the OIIicers as
having a consequence...
r Objection, calls Ior hearsay
c I'm...uh...excited utterance
r Your Honor, that's not an excited utterance.
H Sustained.
C Mr. Frontino has testiIied as to what they OIIicers have said, at length, previously.
H well...uh...just because the prosecutor has chosen not to objectd at certain times and has now
objected to what the OIIicers have said based upon hearsay, you still have to get over that hurdle, and
she may have even indicated relevance, once again, but in any event, I am sustaining her
objection.
C Can I just enter, respectIully, Your Honor, a pattern and practice argument, habit, hearsay
objection?
H Move on!
C So, just to be clear, Your Honor, I can ask Mr. Frontino about what he heard the OIIicer say in
regard to whether or not they were conditioning arrest upon Iailure to consent to..
r Objection, calls Ior hearsay
H II you can, iI you can...provide me with a hearsay exception, number one, and number two provide
me with a relevance as to why that's relevant, yes, absolutely, so go Iorward.
C I Ieel it is relevant, Your Honor, because the results oI the search, the Iruit oI the poisonous tree,
Iactor in heavily in the Reno City Attorney's case, without that...their case rests on...I don't know
what.. and whether or not these cough drops..
H So, beIore you go on, your argument is the Iruit...I take it...what are the Iruits here?
C Well in their arrest report they mention that the search incident to arrest yielded some cough drops,
not cough drops in a container or some packaging, but just some cough drops..and...
H So, iI you were succesIul and you Got that thrown out, on what basis would the case Iall?
C Well, its....
H As Iruit oI the poisonous tree?
C Well, I believe the actus reus would be lacking...the property itselI...the physical evidence, would
not be there to the extent its alleged to be physical evidence, that would not be available
H Alright, I understand...now give me the response to the hearsay objections
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c: I believe one is that its a statement against interest to the extent that this Walmart is rented out by
those OIIicer's employers to Walmart, the property Mr. Frontino testiIied earlier, that there is a close
working relationship with these Indian Colony Police, so much so that they are able to sit and have
jovial conversation and laughter Ior approximately 45 minutes prior to trial. They all may potentially
Iace a giant liability Ior a 1983 cause oI action Ior a wrongIul arrest, as such, there is a possibility that
they are acting in concert and that any statements made by Indian Colony Police are necessariliy
imputed to Walmart and thereIore are a statement against interest.
H; Okay, alright, any response Irom the City?
R First oI all, Your Honor, Mr. Frontino testiIied that he witnessed the deIendant, I believe, consume
some oI the cough drops, and regardless oI whether there were any cough drops Iound in his pocket,
that that observation is not negated...we may not be able to ascertain the value oI the cough drops
because we wouldn't have the package... in addition, even iI the cough drops and the evidence related
to the cough drops was excluded that would not apply to the candy bar or the chocolate item that Mr.
Frontino reIerred to. Regarding the hearsay exception, I don't believe the Iact that he may be even
best Iriends with one oI the OIIicers makes or meets the hearsay objection, it doesn't meet any oI
exceptions under the hearsay rule, there is no such thing as Iear oI liability and the OIIicer is not a
litigant in this matter, maybe a Iuture litigant at some poitn with Mr. Coughlin, it certainly is not the
case today.
C: Your Honor,
H No, nothing Iurther. I haven't Iound any hearsay objection, nor do I Iind this particularly relevant,
its sustained ask another question.
C: Alright, Your Honor, and I will just preserve the objection for the record that its not being
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that it does hae indicia of reliability given the
contemporaneous nature of the statement, particularly with regard to it being a performative
utterance.
(Oh, man, did that half court shot at the buzzer piss 1udge Howard off, to the point where he
has to bash someone just for having the industry to leverage technology)
H: Ask another question! I gave you every opportunity to give me your argument. What you have
done now it say 'well, you know what? I have gone to my little laptop and I've got some additional
inIormation that I want to present... and I have repeatedly indicated to you: one shot, I make the
ruling, we move on....and ONCE AGAIN, you've gone behind my ruling and added additional
inIormation. Ask the question, Sir!
C: Okay, and also just to the extent that commands are not hearsay. Mr. Frontino, did you make
any statements to the accused that you would bargain with the accused and that iI he gave you back
this or that item you would let him go...
I No, I did not.
C Do you ever make such statements?
F I believe you are reIerring to the Iact that aIter I had already had the police there I had said that had
you cooperated then they would not have been involved. Per policy, we could have allowed you
leave the Iacility upon putting your inIormation into our system.
(4:36:26 p.m. Note: Frontino uses the word choice ~allowed you to leave, which clearly
indicates the accused not being there entirely voluntarily)
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C How is that diIIerent?
F How is what diIIerent?
C It seems as though my question was: Did you make any statements that, 'iI you cooperate and you
gives us this back, we will let you go... and you said, no, and then you said, 'basically, no, I told you
iI you would have cooperated, we would have let you go and it seems as though you are saying those
are diIIerent thing...
I had you not removed stuII Irom our Iacility we wouldn't have detained you? Its a 'iI you hadn't
done this, we wouldn't have...
H: stop, stop, stop... Go ahead.
C My question to you, Sir, is: can you explain to me how there's Iundmentl diIIerence between your
assertion that you aia not say 'II you cooperate and give the stuII back then you'd let the accused
go, and your subsequent assertion that 'they accused was only arrested because he didn't cooperate
and give the stuII back?
R Your Honor, that's not what he said.
H I'll let him respond. Overruled. Go ahead.
F So, what I...uh..I believe your question was asking me iI I tried to bargain with you...and I never
tried to bargain with you...the diIIerence to me was that I was stating the Iact that had you done
this...had you simply given us identiIication, per Walmart policy under the...under what we had in
Iront oI us...we could have allowed you to leave our Iacility by just putting you into our system...
C And did you also make the statement that 'had you simply given the items back
I I don't believe I made the statement that 'had you simply given the items back...no...I believe I was
pretty explicit by stating that had you cooperated...we wouldn't have given a rat....
c By 'cooperated did you mean both: give your identiIication AND given the items back?
F Um...I...primarily just wanted your inIormation...
I: I am not asking you what you wanted, Sir, I am asking you what you said.
F Um.... ~cooperation means ~cooperation in whole...um...had you not given the items
back...it wouldn't have changed....
(4:38:52 p.m )
c Okay, that seems incongruous... 'cooperation...
r Well, objection, Your Honor, how's he going to give the items back that he's already eaten?
So, I mean, I think its a ridiculous line of questioning anyway
H It's not relevant, but he continues on this path, ask another question!
(4:39:03 p.m. OH, ITS PRETTY RELEVANT, THOUGH....One, the big ~smoking gun,
allegedly, in the police report is that the fruit of the poisonous tree, the one foil sheet of 6 Duract
Cough melts, exacty one half of a package like those sold at Wal-Mart, was culled from the
Fourth Amendment violating search of Coughlin's pockets...a search which -Frontino admits
only took place immediately after Coughlin indicated he wanted an attorney. So, crafty vet
Pam Robert's non-sequitur about how ~what's the point if he already at the stuff anyways,
aside, clearly, Frontino wanted some Duract Cough Melts back. And 1udge Howard was only
to eager to chime in with his assessment that Roberts point was such a good one, despite the fact
that pretty much the prosecutions whole case came down to one sheet of 6 Duract Cough Melts
being found in Coughlin's short's pockets. Further, the search extended to all sorts of cargo
pockets, arguably well beyond the scope allowable for such a search incident to arrest. There
has to be a line somewhere. A body cavity search would have been impermissible, right? Then's
there's Frontino's whole... ~I was wanting to get the identification...tip toeing around
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whether he bargained with the old ~give us the stuff back, and it's all good and especially
wanting to stay away from the whole, let us coerce a confession out of you, under the guise that
we will let you go, only to reneg on the deal once you incriminate yourself....Then Frontino trips
up by admitting he views ~cooperation to mean ~cooperation in whole, ie, giving the
identification and giving the stuff back, or at least, giving a confession. Clearly, with Frontino,
anything less than confessing, consenting to a search, and giving something back is tantamount
to being non-compliant, and failing to cooperate...at which point he calls his buddies on the
Tribal Police Force ot come in and do the impermissible searching)
c So do know whether or not the items that were on the receipt the accused got upon paying for
items what was on that receipt?
F I believe I already told you ~no.
(4:39:39 p.m.)
C I believe you did, Sir. So my question is, so you don't know whether or not three, four, or five
boxes of cough drops were on it.
F Um...there was no cough drops rung up because I was in plain sight.
C There was no cough drops rung up on the receipt? I am not talking about the receipt of the
allegedly stolen items...I am talking about the receipt for somewhat for $70 or $80 around there,
for the items the accused paid for.
F I couldn't speak for every...
H Stop! You have already answered the question, I know it. Asked and answered, ask another
question.
C Okay, he just said there was no cough drops on the receipt, that's correct?
f: Cough drop...
H Stop! I have ruled! Ask another question.
C Okay...Do you know whether the accused made any statements to the cashier which resulted in the
cough drops being put on the receipt?
F She would have had to hand key them in, so type in the receipt, so...in terms oI verbal
communciation I would not have been able to hear, but she would have had to hand key in the
items...um...based oII oI a UPC that she would have had to have memorized or that you would have
had to have memorized..
(4:40:41 p.m.)
c Okay, but if she had rung up one package of cough drops, she could have just...if one had have
been purchased and rung up, and then, say the accused said, ~oh, there was a couple more,
then she could have just hit the times 2, times 3 button for quantity...
f Um...I don't believe the cash registers....whether or not they still allow that or not...its against
policy for them to do that though.
C Okay, so you say ~whether they STILL allow that...so does that indicate that, to your
knowledge that, in the past, such a practice had occurred?
F Yes, they could.
F For instance, if someone bought four packages of diet cokes, 12 packs, and they didn't want to
lift each of those heavy packages up, they say: ~I had four of these, then the cashier could scan
one of them and they could say: ~okay, and there's three more and cashier would hit ~quantity
times 3 or something like that...?
f Yes, they could, but not in that order, but yes they could...
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c And your testimony today is you do not know whether any such statements were made
regarding
f No, I was not in earshot of the communication that you guys had, as I stated earlier...
c Oh, I didn't realize that is what you stated...so you are saying that you were not within earshot
of the transaction between the accused...
H He testified to that previously, MOVE ON!
C Okay, was anybody that you are aware of at Walmart...?
R Not, asked and answered...
H Not...asked and answered and its not relevant, 'nother question!
(4:42:40 p.m., man, 1udge Howard certainly is helpful to prosecutor Roberts, constantly
chiming in with objections of his own like the above relevancy objection, although, its hard to
understand how that would not be relevant, given it could potentially go directly to whether or
not the accused made an indication to the cashier as to the quantity of cough drops purchased,
etc....).
c Do you know whether the accused not only bought a package of the very cough drops that are
alleged to be stolen here but also made statements to the cashier with respect to an additional
quantity of the same item being purchased?
H Now, he indicated that he could not hear the discussion between you and the cashier? Do you
recall that testimony? Yet, you turn right around and ask him that question once again...
c Because, I see...
h Ask another question!
C Your Honor, its because I see..
H Ask another question!
C Did you earlier say you could hear what was said between the cashier and the accused?
F No, I did not.
C Okay, so a review of the tape won't show that.
F No.
c So, is it possible that...and just to clarify...you said you don't know what's on the...let's clal is
the $80 receipt...you don't know what items were on that?
F on the receipt Ior the $80 oI items you purchased at the Iacility, no I do not know what items were
on that
(4:43:54 p.m. Oh, man, here 1udge Howard sees it coming and really, really wants to try to
stop it from happening....must try to bully defendant out of pointing out another in a line of
salient incongruities in Frontino's testimony, here, it concerns the fact that Frontino testified
earlier that he knew no cough drops were rung up by the cashier, yet just above he testified that
he didn't know what items were on that receipt...only to turn around and assert that his ~spidey
vision or whatever enable him to discern from the women's clothing section each and every
item rung up)
c So you don't know whether or not there is
h He doesn't know what items are on the receipt
c Okay, but earlier he testified that he knew that the receipt didn't have an entry for a box of
cough drops
H Ask another question! ASK ANOTHER QUESTION!!#$#$#4
C Okay, earlier, did you testiIy that you knew a box oI that same UPC Ior those cough drops was
NOT on the $80 receipt?
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F I watched your transaction and I did not see the identical cough drops rung up on your
receipt..
c You the transaction...you were able to see it closely enough...yet you weren't able to
any of the transaction?
F That is correct?
C Do you have some hearing problems?
F No, I do not.
C Do you have super powerful vision?
F I can simply see Iarther than I can hear people speaking at normal voice.
C About how Iar where you Irom the point oI ringing up the items on the $80 receipt?
F Uh...probably about thirt Ieet behind you....behind the registers...
c Okay, so, where you....when you say behind the registers, is that...would that put you closer to the
back oI the store or the Iront oI the store?
F Um...the Iront oI the store..
c Near the entrance...
I Uh...no, by back oI the store/Iront oI the store, your talking about Iront to back its not relevant to the
exits.
C I guess its...is it Iair to say the Iront oI the store is where the exits are?
F Yes.
C Entrance and the exits at the Iront oI the store/
I Yes.
C Okay, so, can you give me some indication where you were located at the time the items were
being rung up?
F at the time you were speciIically being rung up, I was standing in women's apparel, which is
directly behind the registers, its about twenty Ieet away Irom the registers...
c You said you were about thirty Ieet away
I Correct, I was in women's apparel.
C So...but then you said twenty Ieet?
R Your Honor, he's really being argumentative, he explained where he was, that then...um...he's
splitting hairs...the women's department was twenty Ieet away, but then he said he was thirty Ieet
away, there's no inconsistency...I don't think there is either...here's the deal, Mr. Coughlin, we started
the testimony oI this witness at approximately 2:40, and not it is approximately 4:44 pm, I want you
to expedite your cross examination, which has been quite extensive, and the court's granted you a
great deal oI leeway, and I want you to move towards wrapping this up. I don't want to hear
questions that have already been addressed previously, with that you may proceed.
C I'm sorry Your Honor, would it be possible to help me Iind my place on whether the last objection
was ruled on...oh yeah, I remember is was about twenty to thirty Ieet I was seeking clariIication with
regard to
H the objection was sustained.
C Mr. Frontino, Irom your vantage point Irom, in your words, about thirty Ieet away Irom where this
was being rung up, when you were located in the women's apparel section compared to the register
number 17, maybe...
I Uh...I believe it was 17 because it was the cigarette isle iI I remember correctly..
c You were saying you were able to discern each and every item that was rung up on that $80 receipt
and veriIy to yourselI that none oI those items had the same UPC as the cough drops or the 'candy
bar...
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(4:48:31 p.m.)
f I couldn't tell you that every single item was verified, however, I had the packaging to the
cough drops, and I was specifically looking for the cough drops beign purchased...um...I didn't
care if there was other candy items being purchased because they did not match the cough
drops that I had in my hand...
c So you say you were not able to discern every item purchased, while at the same time you
were able to discern that none of the items purchased had the same UPC as the cough drops?
F None of them had the same packaging therefore I could make the observation that they could
not have the same UPC, so...no I could not read the UPC but they were not the same items as
they one's I had...
c Okay, so if the accused was able to present the $80 receipt and it had the exact same UPC as
the cough drops, that would directly contradict what you are saying, wouldn't it, Sir?
F Yes, it would.
(4:49:35 p.m.)
c So, just to be clear, you have testified here today, that you are absolutely sure that the $80
receipt does not have the item with any entry with the same UPC and therefore the same
packaging, as the cough drops, and that if such a receipt is presented, with the same UPC, then
your testimony would necessarily be impeached
r Objection, that's now calling for...uh...legal conclusion regarding whether he's impeached or
not.
H Sustained.
C Withdraw that aspect with regard to whether he is impeached or not...Then...your testimony
would be inaccurate?
F I would say if you were able to provide a valid receipt from that exact transaction, then, yes, it
would
c And do you know who the cashier was on that transaction?
F I do not know who the cashier was, no.
C Do you or anyone you are aware of at Walmart ask that cashier whether any statements were
made by the accused with regard to whether there were a quantity to add on any purchase?
F Not to my knowledge, no.
c Did you make any attempts to query that cashier in that regard?
F No.
c And, nobody else, to your knowledge, at Walmart did?
F No.
C Does that seem reckless to you?
(4:51:28 p.m.)
r Objection
H Sustained
(1udge Howard rules on the objection before Roberts even state her basis, again and again, in
her favor)
C 1ust a moment ago you said, with respect to your discerning from thirty feet away in the
women's clothing isle, what
was purchased at a particular cash register, from behind a six foot four, two hundred and fifty
pound man, where you were standing...you were able to see?
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f I was not behind, um...um...is there a question...um I was behind the cash register, I was not
behind you... I was standing in women's apparel, so unless you were standing on the conveyor
belt, you wouldn't be blocking my view..
(4:52:09 p.m.)
c So would you say you were directly behind the conveyor belt?
F I would say that I was...probably not 90 degrees behind it...I didn't measure, but I was behind
it, and I could see the items that were being purchased...
c Each and every one of them
f Yes
c And you were able to remember each and every one of those items for which and $80 receipt
was made?
f Absolutely not. I...I...I am not saying that I remember currently every item that you
purchased...I know that you did not have items that our purchased that matched the items you
selected and consumed.
C Well, that brings up, earlier you said that ~I didn't discern or verify whether you had
purchased the same candy items, I was focused on making sure you hadn't purchased an item
with the same UPC as the cough drops...that's what you said earlier, correct?
R Uh...um...uh...Objection, again, he's not restating the testimony accurately.
H Is that what you testified?
F I testified that I watched and I was primarily only looking for the items that I had seen you
select and conceal or consume
C Isn't it accurate to say that your testimony earlier was that you were primarily only looking
for the cough drops...and then you made a statement about not caring whether the candy...
H Is this a complex question once again? ASK A QUESTION.
C Okay, earlier your statements with regard to what you were primarily concerned with, did
they not specifally limit your concerns to the cough drops?
F They were primarily concerned with the cough drops because the chocolate item was still left
and hidden in the cart.
C I am just asking you, Sir, about your earlier testimony, not your state of mind about what
you, what you feel about the events or your recollections, just what you testified to earlier...is it
fair to say that what you testified to earlier was that ~I was primarily only concerned about
making sure that the cough drops or an item of the same UPC was not being purchased...to
the exclusion of not caring whether or not similar candy items were being purchased? Did you
not say that on the record today?
F I believe that I said earlier that I was concerned with the items that you had selected and
consumed...um....the cough drops were a primary concern, but, you also did not ring up
anything that included the chocolate item.
C Yet, earlier, didn't you testify that a number of candy items were selected and later
purchased?
F Yes.
C But, now your are saying, that your were somehow able to verify and discern from thirty feet
away that that particular candy item was not...the UPC for that, was not also included on the
$80 receipt.
F I was primarily only concerned with the cough drops, I was watching for the candy, the
wrapper...the candy was still in the cart.
c And that's where I have an objection, non-responsive.
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H Are you done?
C No, Sir, I am not, I just objected to the Iact that he didn't answer the question I asked. Everytime he
gets cornered he starts talking about irrelevant stuII.
(4:55:43 p.m.)
H If your tendering that objection to the Court, its overruled.
C Were you able to verify, from your position of some thirty feet away, that the candy item
alleged to have been stolen...and the UPC for that candy item, was not included on the $80
receipt?
F I was unable to verify, other than the fact, that it was not hand keyed in, it was never
presented for scanning...
c Okay, but similar to the cough drops, you were not able to verify that the same item was key
in, or an item with the same UPC was key in, and upon that a quantity number was added to
the receipt to reflect the purchase of the item, the chocolate item, you are alleging was stolen?
F You selected two packages of cough drops and one candy bar, and...and... one of that identical
chocolate item, and no more, so had...there where no other items for her to be able to ring up
(4:56:56 p.m.)
c Well earlier you testified that a number of chocolate items were purchased?
F Those specific ones.
C Well you also testified that you had no idea, specifically, what was on the $80 receipt?
F Correct, I do not know what was on your $80 receipt.
C Well, I think its geometry or something from high school, the transitive property of this and
that would suggest that how could he not know whats on the
H ITS ARGUMENTATIVE!
C Well, I am asking him..
H ITS ARGUMENTATIVE!^#$$#
c Sir, how can you know something was not on the receipt iI you testiIied that you don't know what
was on the receipt?
F Because I saw how many of the items you selected.
C Okay, can you give us a specific number now and specifically identify in some way what those
items were?
(4:57:59 p.m.)
F you selected the two packages of cough drops that I have pictures of an a receipt for, and you
selected the chocolate item.
(NOTE: he says two packages of cough drops...BUT WOULDN'T THAT MAKE 3 BOXES IF
YOU ADD THE ONE ON THE $80 RECEIPT?)
c Okay, and then theres was...I selected another $80 worth of stuff?
f You selected other candy items, yes, and you paid for some of them and you left some of them
at the register.
C Okay, and how do you know that amongst those paid for was not an item with the same
UPC?
(4:58:20 p.m BAM 1UDGE HOWARD SLAMS SOMETHING DOWN ON HIS BENCH)
H Asked and answered a hundred times. I don't know why you continue to beat this horse, I
really truly don't. Ask another question. Mr. Coughlin, you have ten minutes remaining in the
cross examination of Mr. Frontino. I think that's where you are headed in any event. Argue it
on appeal. And currently let the record reIlect that it is now Iive minutes to Iive and that Iive minutes
aIter Iive Mr. Coughlin's testimony, or cross examination, rather, will be terminated.
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C Okay. Did you make any statements to the OIIicer about... 'we...I guess you said 'we and then
we speculated about whom you meant by 'we about how 'we've been watching the accused, and we
Iirst became aware oI, or worried...took notice oI him...when he took a photograph oI a television,
and... then you named speciIically a manager, a blond haired lady in her late Iorties...Did you make
such statements?
F Never have I made such statements.
(5:00:25 p.m.)
c Did you make statements to the Indian Colony OIIicers with respect to previous interactions with
the accused that elicited your consternation?
F Uh...watch does 'consternation mean?
C It means your were suspicious oI him, so you were watching him?
I Yes.
C Can you speciIy in detail what those statements were?
F That we had had issues with the DeIendant in the past that...we had been hoping to trespass him Ior
suspected activies in the
store Ior suspected hardware swapping with laptops and things oI that nature...I had previously seen
you and Iollowed you beIore, but did not detain you because I was honestly hoping Ior more...I was
hoping there would more than a package oI M&M's. So, I had my own reasons to Iollow you beIore
the incident in question.
C Okay, so you're saying you made no statements to the Indian Colony OIIicers with respect to
suspicion being aroused by either you or someone you work with at Walmart including a Manager
who is a Iemale related to the taking oI a photograph oI a Ilat-screen television?
F I personally know nothing oI the photograph. This is the Iirst thing I have heard oI it.
C I am not asking you what you know about the photograph, I am asking you about the statements
you made to the Indian Colony Police.
(5:02:13 p.m. Check to see Police were asked about the photograph)
I Uh...no, I did not make a statement about a photograph.
C Okay, so iI someone had been tape recording that interaction between you and the Indian Colony
Police, and it revealed that you did make such a statement, would that mean that you are lying now?
F Yes, iI that was the case, iI there was video evidence, that would be the case.
C Or audio, okay....So, you say, at some part oI the store, you witnessed not only the cough drops
being opened, but then concealed?
F Correct.
C Did you ever witness the cough drops being consumed?
F Some oI them were consumed in the store.
(5:03:10 p.m.)
H And his response was 'some oI them were consumed in the store.
C Which doesn't speciIy whether he 'witnessed them...it might be speculation...its a curious way to
phrase it
h Did you observe him to consume the items within the store?
F Yes, Sir, I did.
C So, to be clear, you are not saying, that you observed the accused consumed the cough drops
in the store?
(5:03:38 p.m THIS IS THE FIRST TIME FRONTINO DECIDES TO SAY HE WITNESSES
THE COUGH DROPS BEING CONSUMED. AT ALL OTHER TIMES HE STOPPED
SHORT OF SAYING ~CONSUMED AND INSTEAD WENT WITH ~SELECTED AND
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CONCEALED, WHEREUPON HE ALSO MADE MENTION OF THE ACCUSED
ENTERING THE RESTROOM AND HOW WALMART POLICY DID NOT ALLOW FOR
HIM TO FOLLOW IN TO THE RESTROOM)
c So, to be clear, you are now saying that you observed the accused consume the cough drops in the
store?
F Yes, Sir, I am.
C Where did that occur?
F Throughout the store.
C SpeciIically, where?
F You were....in....um...household cleaning chemicals...electronics....you were throughout the store
domestics...you were throughout the store...consuming Iood.
C Okay, now you are saying ~consuming food
(5:04:08 p.m.)
f Cough drops. You were consuming cough drops... you were consuming the chocolate.
C Are you sure which was being consumed? It sounds as though...
I I am sure both were being consumed.
C And how are you sure?
F I watched you do it.
C How many were consumed?
F I didn't count.
C So you were able to watch, but you weren't able to discern how many?
R Objection, he said he didn't count, Your Honor.
H Sustained.
C So, how many cough drops were recovered?
F Uh....part oI one package...it was approximately six out oI one oI the packages that were recovered?
C Okay, so how many are in each package?
(5:04:59 p.m)
F I would have to look.. I don't recall how many were in each package...They were attached...they
were in blister packs
c. Not enough to make two packages?
F No, not enough to make two packages?
C Well then how are you able to assert that two were stolen?
I Because you opened two, and you concealed the contents oI two.
C And your store's policy is...what? You said something about a bathrooom and not being able to...
h Asked and answered...go on
c Okay, so, is it your store's policy that iI you aren't able to recover the items, you still assert and
aIIect an arrest charging that the items were stolen?
F Will you ask the question again?
C Yeah. How do you know two packages were stolen iI you only recovered part oI one?
F I made an assumption that both were stolen.
C And did you have any evidence oI that assumption?
F You selected and concealed the contents of two packages...that was my assumption. The
packages were thrown in the garbage, which would render us unable to account Ior them...
(5:06:27 p.m. THIS IS INTERESTING BECAUSE HERE FRONTINO CLASSIFIES HIS
TESTIMONY AS BOTH AN EYE WITNESS ACCOUNT OF COUGH DROPS BEING
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CONSUMED, ONLY TO THEN CHARACTERIZE THE DECISION TO CHARGE FOR THE
COUGH DROPS AS TO BE PREMISED UPON HIS 'ASSUMPTION THAT HE MADE, THAT
THE COUGH DROPS WERE CONSUMED IN THE RESTROOM...SO, WHICH IS IT,
FRONTINO, DID YOU ACTUALLY PERCEIVED THE CONSUMPTION WITH YOUR OWN
EYES, OR DID YOU HAVE TO 'ASSUME THEY WERE CONSUMED WHILE THE SUSPECT
WAS IN THE RESTROOM?)
(5:06:50 p.m.)
c Well, iI the contents oI two packages were stolen, even iI some oI them were consumed...surely you
would have recovered some wrappings or something that would add up to two packages incident to
the impermissible search, wouldn't you? Yet, you didn't. How is that possible to say ~two were
concealed, yet only part of one was recovered upon a full search.
(5:07:11 p.m. NEXT, IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT FRONTINO SAYS 'WHETHER
THE REST WERE EATEN OR THE REST WERE FLUSHED IN THE TOILET... WHICH
INDICATES A LACK OF CERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER THEY WERE EATEN OR
CONSUMED...YET JUST A MINUTE AGO FRONTINO, AFTER APPARENTLY DEDUCING
THAT THE CASE WOULD BE MUCH STRONGER IF HE WOULD JUST SAY HE SAW THE
COUGH DROPS BEING CONSUMED, DID, IN FACT, TESTIFY THAT HE WAS AN EYE
WITNESS TO THE COUGH DROPS BEING CONSUMED....WHICH BEGS THE QUESTION:
WHY DOES FRONTINO THEN TALK ABOUT HOW HE MADE AN 'ASSUMPTION AND
THEN GO ON TO POSTULATE AS TO 'WHETHER THE REST WERE EATEN OR THE REST
WERE FLUSHED IN THE TOILET...WALMART LOST THAT PROPERTY....)
I Whether the rest were eaten or the rest were Ilushed in the toilet, Walmart lost that property.
C So, on what basis do you call the State down to arrest somebody?
(5:07:29 p.m. Y like instances like )
F Based upon the chocolate bar, I made that statement clear earlier.
C Okay, but you still charging two packages oI cough drops where you have nothing but an
assumption to speak to one and a halI packages worth oI the contents oI the cough drops.
H Question?
C Yes, do you have anything to support what was charged, that two were stolen when you only
recovered after full search what you allege to be half the contents of one?
Roberts objection asked and answered
Howard if you can respond please do
fronting no I mostly have I believe I stated earlier I assumed you had removed both from the
facility because you threw the packaging to both away and concealed both, um, you did
consumed some in the facility I didn't count how many that was
Coughlin okay were you ever made aware or have any knowledge oI any arguments between the
accused and the customer service counter with respect to the enIorcement oI the return policy
Roberts objection relevance
Howard relevance and at this point it's 5 min. aIter Iive and so we will end cross examination you
could save that issue Ior appeal or make a record that this inquiry has been replete with non-relevant,
repetitious inquiry in Wigan and at this point thank you very much
Howard Call you next witness
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Coughlin Can I just preserve my objection that I have more questions Ior the witness just dismissed
Roberts I call OIc. CrawIord as a witness
Coughlin Your Honor was my understanding court hours end at Iive? is that not the case nuclear to
have prior commitments
Howard we are going to continue on I think I told you earlier when I said we were can have this
matter resolved tonight
Coughlin so are we how long could we possibly be here tonight
Howard till we Iinish
Coughlin well I was relying upon posted court hours that say court ends at Iive
Howard will continue will continue
Coughlin I don't know that I can state Your Honor
Howard proceed with your case
Roberts oIIicer CrawIord please please state your Iull name and spell your last name Ior the record
CrawIord Kameron Lane CrawIord
Coughlin Your Honor may I use the restroom in
Howard will take it you've got until 510 don't be late
Coughlin my clock says it's a time now
Howard Sir, you better get going and you've got until Iive ten on this clock right here we are going to
proceed at that time the court will remain on the bench (5:10:52 p.m.)
Howard we are back on the record it is approximately 511 and we will proceed Ms. Roberts
Roberts oIIicer CrawIord what is your job
CrawIord IMO tribal police oIIicer Ior the Reno Sparks Indian colony
Roberts and how long have you been employed with the Indian Colongy
Coughlin just quickly I will enter my objections Ior the record with regard to anything oIIicer
CrawIord may wish to testiIy with under the exclusionary rule objections are
Howard I can't hear you sir
Coughlin I am sorry Your Honor I am very light-headed and I think I need to eat something my blood
sugar is I'm having trouble I am very tired and lightheaded I probably need to eat something
Howard I can hear you now go ahead
C I was restating my objections Ior the record that we've gone over some link with Mr. Frontino but
now wish to apply them to oIIicer Cameron CrawIord you know all the exclusionary rule objections
Howard Sir I am having diIIiculty understanding what your objection is the city imposed and
requested the rule oI exclusion I granted that so what is your check shims to this witness
Coughlin the city requested a role oI exclusion?
Howard:
Robert Your Honor I requested
Coughlin I'm conIused I which incarcerated their goals? They want a rule oI exclusion?
Howard what is your objections Sir?
Coughlin well I am seeking to exclude Irom being entered into evidence Iruit oI the poisonous tree
the alleged Iruit
Howard that request is denied overruled go ahead please
Roberts oIIicer CrawIord how long have you been employed by the Reno Sparks in: eight
CrawIord a little over three months now
Roberts on September 9 oI 2011 reviewing training
CrawIord I was yes
Roberts and Hoosier training oIIicer
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CrawIord oIIicer Donnie Braun worth
Roberts and his CD oIIicer that some hallway
CrawIord yes
Roberts and were UN oIIicer Braunworth dispatch to 2425 E. 2nd St. the Walmart located there
CrawIord yes
Roberts and is that Walmart in the city oI Reno (5:17:47 p.m. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE
THAT ROBERTS DOES NOT REQUEST HERE FOR THE COURT TO TAKE JUDICIAL
NOTICE AS TO JURISDICTION, AND THERE IS A SALIENT POINT IN DISPUTE WITH
RESPECT TO WHETHER THE CITY NEEDED TO ESTABLISH THAT COUGHLIN HAS NO
INDIAN OR TRIBAL BLOOD OR AFFILIATION AND THAT TRIBAL COURT IS NOT THE
APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR SUCH AN ARREST, WHERE, AS HERE, IT occurred ON TRIBAL
LAND)
CrawIord yes, it is.
Roberts and when you arrived there with oIIicer Braunworth did you come in contact with the suspect
Ior shopliIting
CrawIord yes we did
Roberts where was that suspect located when you Iirst make contact with him
CrawIord will in the Walmart security oIIice
Robertsand you remember Mr. Fontenot was present at that time that you make
contact with the suspect
CrawIord yes he was
Robert since you recognize the suspect that he made contact with on September 9 is the press in the
courtroom today
CrawIord yes he is
Roberts would you please state what he is wearing and ratesetting
CrawIord is wearing a dark colored soup with the dark-colored shirt and a setting where the deIendant
would be sitting
Howard the record will reIlect that CrawIord identiIied Mr. Coughlin
Roberts when you Iirst make contact with Mr. Coughlin had you on was he standing sitting or what
CrawIord he was sitting down on a bench
Roberts okay and it was any kind handcuIIs restraints
Roberts
roberts and when you approach the suspect you have to ask him any questions or have a discussion
with him
crawIord I did ask him questions
Roberts and what questions should you ask him
CrawIord I advised him why I was there that Walmart had called because they suspected he had taken
property I then told him that it was my decision to either write up the citation or take him to jail and
that I would preIer to write him a citation so I didn't jam up our Boulevard with unnecessary people
going up there(5:19:28 p.m.) I asked him speciIic questions because he did not have ID on him at the
time I asked him questions like what Richard date oI birth where do you live so I could run them
through dispatch to make sure he didn't have any warrants also to Iill out the citation oI he reIused to
provide those provide that inIormation

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(THIS WHOLE BUSINESS ABOUT PREFERRING TO WRITE A CITATION SEEMS ALL THE
MORE PHONY IF WRITING A CITATION WOULD NOT TYPICALLY ENTAIL
CONDUCTING A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST)
Robert so in order to cite summonsed arrest you need out certain inIormation to Iill out the citation
CrawIord guest muskrat
Roberts and what pieces oI inIormation you need to have
CrawIord date oI birth, Social Security number, place oI employment, contact phone number stuII
like that
Roberts their Iull name?
CrawIord their Iull name, yes
Roberts and did he provide any oI that to you when you asked
CrawIord he did provide his Iull name yes
Roberts so other than his Iull name he didn't provide you with any other inIormation Ior you to Iill
out the citation?
CrawIord I believe he may have provided his address or the city you live I apologize may provide the
city he lived another one that he reIused all questions
Roberts said there was insuIIicient inIormation to issue a citation
CrawIord no maam
Roberts did you or oIIicer Braunworth conduct a search oI the suspect?
CrawIord oIIicer Braun worth asked him iI he had any weapons on him he said he did not we asked
him iI we could go ahead and make sure that he did not have any weapons on them he said we could
Roberts okay let me ask you and let me stop you just right there, at this point you know he's there Ior
what type oI charge
CrawIord Petty larceny
Roberts and is that routine Ior you to ask about whether or not iI you are going to take someone into
custody ask whether not they have any weapons
CrawIord yes it is
Roberts and is it routine Ior you to conIirm assuming they consent to Pat Donna make sure that they
don't have any weapons
CrawIord yes it is
Roberts and that's what you do with this particular suspect?
CrawIord correctly told me not to go into his pockets but that I could search Ior weapons so I search
the outer clothing oI his pockets to make sure he didn't have any weapons he did not have weapons
Roberts so he limited his consent
CrawIord yes he did
Roberts any respect to that limitation
CrawIord yes ma'am
Roberts did that happen beIore or aIter you were asking him questions concerning the inIormation
you needed to Iill out the citation?
(5:21:51 p.m.)
CrawIord aIter
Roberts at some point did you continue to try to get inIormation so that she could Iill out a citation
CrawIord I believe I asked him several times Ior inIormation and tried to explain to him that the
citation would be better that it would be better to take a citation than going to jail all he had to do was
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provide me this inIormation. His argument was that it was the same exact charge and that I wasn't
helping him and all. I said well it you wouldn't have to go to jail you could go home tonight and he
still reIused to answer any questions and asked Ior an attorney.
(5:22:11 p.m.)
( Here, OIIicer CrawIord is lying under oath. He is attesting that he oIIered to simply write a citation,
and thus spare the accused the custodial arrest, iI only the ACCUSED WOULD 'PROVIDE HIS
INFORMATION, AND SPECIFICALLY, OFFICER CRAWFORD IS INDICATING THAT HE
DID NOT PREMISE THE DECISION BETWEEN ISSUING A CITATION OR EFFECTING A
CUSTODIAL ARREST (AND, OF COURSE, CONDUCTING A SEARCH INCIDENT THERETO
THAT ARREST) UPON WHETHER OR NOT THE SUSPECT ADMITTED GUILT AS TO THE
PETTY LARCENY CHARGE. HOWEVER, THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED ON
SEPTEMBER 9TH, 2011 AT WALMART. BOTH FRONTINO AND CRAWFORD
SPECIFICALLY INDICATED TO THE ACCUSED THAT IF HE WOULD ONLY ADMIT HIS
GUILT, THEY WOULD ISSUE HIM A CITATION, AND, THEREFORE, HE COULD AVOID A
TRIP TO PARR BOULEVARD AND A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST;. THIS IS LIKELY
THE MAIN APPEALABLE ISSUE IN THIS CASE, IE, WHETHER THE POLICE CAN BASE
THE DECISION TO ARREST, RATHER THAN ISSUE A CITATION UPON WHETHER OR
NOT THE SUSPECT CONFESSES GUILT, RATHER THAN UPON SOME REASONABLY
ARTICULATED SUSPICION).)
Roberts okay so once he asked Ior the attorney was was your decision-making process?
CrawIord I advised him that I could no longer asking any questions I mean I could have asked him
questions related to date oI birth and stuII like that but I couldn't asking questions about the crime and
then placed him under arrest Ior petty larceny because he reIused to give the inIormation to Iill out
the citation or to run his name Ior warrants and he was placed under arrest at the time.
(5:22:45 p.m. THE ABOVE REPRESENTS WHAT I FIND MOST OBJECTIONABLE ABOUT
THIS CASE. COUGHLIN (ACCORDING TO BAR COUNSEL PATRICK O. KING, COUGHLIN
'USED TO BE AN ATTORNEY AND KING THINKS ITS JUST 'TERRIBLE, SAID IN A
REAL MOCKING/DERISIVE TONE BY KING TO COUGHLIN, THAT COUGHLIN IS 'NO
LONGER AN ATTORNEY...KING ALSO HAS MADE A GREAT DEAL OF FALSE AND
MISLEADING STATEMENT TO AND ABOUT COUGHLIN AND REFUSED TO PROVIDE
COUGHLIN COPIES OF MOST OF WHAT WAS PROVIDED TO KING INCIDENT TO THE
VARIOUS 'GRIEVANCES FILED BY RICHARG G. HILL, ESQ. AND JUDGE DOROTHY
NASH HOLMES (WHOSE BOUNTY OF MATERIALS PROVIDED TO KING INCLUDE ITEMS
THAT HOLME'S FELLOW RENO MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE, HONORABLE JUDGE
WILLIAM GARDNER, RECEIVED FROM #! !$%&' SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUDGE LINDA GARDNER, IN THE FORM OF A 3 YEAR OLD SANCTION ORDER ISSUED
BY HON. LINDA GARDNER AGAINST COUGHLIN, FOR WHICH COUGHLIN FILED A
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, AND WAS, ACCORDING TO HIS THEN
EMPLOYER, WASHOE LEGAL SERVICES, AND ITS EXECTUTIVE DIRECTOR PAUL
ELCANO, FIRED FOR, AND ONLY FOR, THE CONDUCT BEFORE JUDGE LINDA
GARDNER THAT LED TO HER ISSUING SANCTIONS AGAINST COUGHLIN IN A DIVORCE
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TRIAL WHEREIN HE REPRESENTED A VICTIM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INCIDENT TO
HIS POST AS A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ATTORNEY WITH WLS.)
Coughlin sorry I just would like to interject here with an objection to the extent that any inIormation
gleaned a recovered Ior an arrest Ior a misdemeanor that did not occur within the oIIicers present
should be excluded the actus reus involved in this crime charge is alleged to have occurred outside oI
this oIIicers presence and NRS provides that iI that is the case no custodial arrest is permissible as
such any search incident to arrest any such custodial arrest should be excluded
Howard Ms. Roberts
Roberts Your Honor this oIIicer attempted to build the issue the suspect a citation and it's his own
actions that prevented him Irom doing's just that because he can't Iill out the citation iI he doesn't
know the inIormation that the deIendant in the suspect in this case was unwilling to give to him there
was a complainant that observed the misdemeanor action and what he is doing is aIIecting arrest
based upon statement oI an eyewitness that was right there I don't believe there was an unlawIul arrest
by this police oIIicer.
(5:24:02 p.m.)
Howard the objection is overruled Mr. Coughlin precipitated the need to arrest him by reIusing to
provide the needed inIormation Ior the citation, go ahead
Roberts OIc. CrawIord when you aIter you
Coughlin on just Internet objection that that is a Iactual determination that has apparently been ruled
upon prior to any counter evidence the ignited or my being given any chance to so admit such counter
evidence
Howard you will have an opportunity to cross-examine this was
Robert I just wondered how long it way beIore I got interrupted beIore I asked my next question
(5:24:05 p.m)
Roberts OIc. CrawIord
Howard let me say and this is Ior your beneIit once again we will have a hearing in regard to content
once this proceeding is concluded so every time you engage in one oI these unproIessional acts I'm
keeping count and we will address them at the end oI this trial one thing has nothing to do with the
other I will make a separate and independent decision in regard to guilt or innocence but I have
already made a Iinding in regard to contempt with that go ahead and proceed
Coughlin and I'll enter an objection with regard to the Iact that...
Howard I don't want to hear anything from you at this point time!#`&^$$&`^!$
Coughlin at the possibility oI jail time exist I have a right to counsel
(So, THAT MAY BE THE EVEN BIGGER APPEALABLE ISSUE HERE. FALSE
IMPRISONMENT
NRS 200.460 DeIinition; penalty.
1. False imprisonment is an unlawIul violation oI the personal liberty oI another, and
consists in conIinement or detention without suIIicient legal authority.
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2. A person convicted oI Ialse imprisonment shall pay all damages sustained by the
person so imprisoned, and, except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, is guilty oI a
gross misdemeanor.
NRS 171.126 Arrest by private person.
A private person may arrest another:
1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
2. When the person arrested has committed a Ielony, although not in his presence.
3. When a Ielony has been in Iact committed, and he has reasonable cause Ior
believing the person arrested to have committed it.
City Attorney Roberts oIIered testimony Irom both Frontino and OIIicer CrawIord
purporting to establish that Frontino did not make a citizen's arrest. However, Frontino did inIorm
Coughlin in an extremely hostile and authoritative tone that Coughlin 'had to 'come with
Frontino back to the loss prevention room in order Ior Wal-Mart to 'complete this investigation.
Coughlin clearly Ielt he had no choice in the matter and that any Iailure to comply with Frontino's
dictates would be equivalent to resisting a shopkeeper's privilege to make a type oI citizen's arrest.
To the extent Wal-Mart and Frontino are viewed to have made the arrest, under NRS 171.104, then
Coughlin clearly (both oI the Interrogation Room videos establish that Coughlin handed his State oI
Nevada driver's license to OIIicer CrawIord, despite OIIicer's CrawIords, sworn, express testimony
to the contrary. In so doing and providing his name and address to OIIicer CrawIord (and
Coughlin's address is clearly indicated on his driver's license as well) Coughlin provided all the
required inIormation set Iorth in NRS 171.1774 Ior the issuance oI a citation aIter arrest by a
private person under NRS 171.1772.
NRS 171.104 Arrest deIined; by whom made.
An arrest is the taking oI a person into custody, in a case and in the manner authorized
by law. An arrest may be made by a peace officer or by a private person.
NRS 171.1772 Issuance of citation after arrest by private person.
Whenever any person is arrested by a private person, as provided in NRS 171.126, Ior
any violation oI a county, city or town ordinance or state law which is punishable as a
misdemeanor, such person arrested may be issued a misdemeanor citation by a
peace officer in lieu of being immediately taken before a magistrate by the peace
officer if:
1. The person arrested furnishes satisfactory evidence of identity; and
2. The peace oIIicer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person arrested will
keep a written promise to appear in court.
NRS 171.1774 Form and contents of citation: When issued after arrest by private
person.
1. In those instances described in NRS 171.1772, the peace oIIicer summoned aIter the
arrest shall prepare a misdemeanor citation manually or electronically in the Iorm oI a
complaint issuing in the name oI 'The State oI Nevada or in the name oI the
respective county, city or town, and containing:
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(a) A notice to appear in court;
(b) The name and address of the person;
(c) The state registration number oI his vehicle, iI any;
(d) The oIIense charged, including a brieI description oI the oIIense and the NRS or
ordinance citation;
(e) The time when and place where the person is required to appear in court;
(I) Such other pertinent inIormation as may be necessary; and
(g) The signatures oI the private person making the arrest and the peace oIIicer
preparing the citation.
NRS 171.124 Arrest by peace oIIicer or oIIicer oI Drug EnIorcement Administration.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 and NRS 33.070 and 33.320, a
peace oIIicer or an oIIicer oI the Drug EnIorcement Administration designated by the
Attorney General oI the United States Ior that purpose may make an arrest in
obedience to a warrant delivered to him or her, or may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) For a public oIIense committed or attempted in the oIIicer`s presence.
(b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross misdemeanor,
although not in the officer`s presence.
NRS 171.124(1)(b): '(b) When a person arrested has committed a Ielony or gross
misdemeanor, although not in the oIIicer`s presence was clearly violated here by OIIicers CrawIord
and Braunworth. The charged crime, 'petty larceny RMC 8.10.010, is a simple misdemeanor, and
it was not alleged to have occurred in the oIIicer's presence. Enter OIIicer CrawIord's perjury about
Coughlin Iailing to provide OIIicer CrawIord his license. Enter a nationally published Associated
Press story title 'Reno Attorney Suspened Ior ShopliIting. Enter vast damage to Coughlin's
proIessional reputation and personal liIe, including the instant temporary suspension and looming
Disciplinary Board Iormal hearing. Then there is the blood in the water sharks like Richard G. Hill,
Esq. prey upon, leveraging to their advantage with all the innuendo they can muster (Hill made tacky
allegations oI Iinding a 'crack pipe and a bag oI weed in Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice, though
Hill never did manage to produce a picture oI such items or explain what he did with them or why he
did not call the police to report the crime oI possession...certainly Richard has called the Reno Police
Department or Bar Counsel at every other possible opportunity, so....But at least Hill made his Ialse,
deIamatory, and declasse allegations against one whom has put in the hard time amongst those
lawyers concerned Ior lawyers (and a Iew judges) whom have stared things down that someone oI
Hill's depth would Iind to be an unIathomable abyss. Without the alleged crime being committed in
their presence, these Tribal Police OIIicers (and OIIicer CrawIord was in his Iirst two weeks on the
job at the time oI this arrest, and still a trainee, which is obvious by the way he grabs Coughlin's
shopping bag out oI Coughlin's lap at least twice prior to the technical point oI arrest, as evinced on
the two Interrogation Room videos) had to attempt to game the system some by oIIering perjured
testimony that is clearly contradicted by the two Interrogation Room videos that prosecutor City
Attorney Pam NiIong, er, Pamela Roberts, Esq., oIIered to Judge Howard, despite the Iact that SHE
KNEW IS WAS FALSE. WHY DOESN'T BAR COUNSEL ACCEPT MY GRIEVANCE
AGAINST PAM ROBERTS? DOES SHE PLAY WITH SOME NET THAT THE REST OF US
SOLO PRACTITIONERS ARE NOT GRANTED? IS SHE A PROTECTED MEMBER OF SOME
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ESTABLISHMENT, LIKE ALL THE PUBLIC DEFENDERS WHOM ARE SEEMINGLY HELD
TO AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT STANDARD OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT THAN ARE
THOSE THE SUBJECT OF THE 'GRIEVANCES FILED BY RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ., (on
behalI oI Iormer client's that Hill throws under the bus, no less, and oI course aIter having extracted
some $20,000 in Iees Irom....) and Judge Nash Holmes? Why is it that Bar Counsel Patrick King so
quickly dismisses the various grievances Coughlin Iiled aIter the inspiration provided by Hill? II
Coughlin's law license is taken away over a candy bar, allegedly stolen on a Saturday night and
nowhere near the practice oI law...then what should Robert's punishment be Ior oIIering material
testimony by a police oIIicer that she knew to be Ialse about an incredibly salient aspect oI her case
in chieI?
Clearly, the overly chummy Frontino and OIIicer's Braunworth and OIIicer CrawIord (all
who were palling around with each other Ior over 45 minutes in the hallway prior to trial and all who
remained at the courthouse until 8:30 p.m. to hear the verdict -and Frontino was done testiIying by
5:10 p.m., and City Attorney Robert's invoking the rule oI exclusion prevented him Irom passing the
time as a spectator) were 'gaming the system, wishing to eIIect a search incident to a custodial
arrest and to cover their tracks aIterwards to make it all appear by the book, what with their constant
use oI buzz words delivered in the least natural tone imaginable upon the witness stand in response to
City Attorney Roberts prompting (and aIter a good 45 minute does oI coaching by City Attorney
Roberts immediately prior to trial).)
Roberts OIc. CrawIord when you place a suspect under arrest what did you physically do what are the
steps that you take to put someone in custody
CrawIord once we have the suspect in handcuIIs physically search them he search incident to arrest
per policy among
Roberts did you do that in this case
CrawIord I did yes
Roberts and where the handcuIIs put in Iront oI them are behind him
CrawIord behind him
Roberts and once you place them behind his back you did conduct a search incident to arrest?
CrawIord yes
Roberts and what is the rationale Ior doing that
CrawIord to protect the oIIicer it's a saIety issue Irom him getting into the patrol car or protecting
himselI in case he has any weapons so he doesn't hurt an oIIicer or himselI
(5:26:35 p.m. ITS FUNNY, BECAUSE SOME MIGHT SAY THE TERRY PAT DOWN
WEAPONS SEARCH TESTIFIED TO EARLIER SHOULD HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THE
OBJECTIVES OFFICER CRAWFORD JUST MENTIONED, BUT, GUESS NOT...EVEN
THOUGH AT THIS POINT THE DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE HIS HANDS CUFFED BEHIND
HIS BACK)
Roberts and when you conducted a search incident to arrest did you Iind any items related to the
nature the petty larceny that was alleged by Frontino
CrawIord yes we did
Roberts what did you see
CrawIord we Iound cough drops and a wrapper oI cough drops in his pocket
Roberts okay when you are there prior to being placed under arrested the deIendant make any
statements to you regarding his guilt or innocence
CrawIord he did not know
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Roberts did the deIendant complains you about Walmart's treatment oI them
CrawIord yes he did
Roberts was that beIore or aIter he was placed under arrest
CrawIord aIter the arrest long aIter
Roberts when you put him when you took him to their place aIter aIter you did the search incident to
arrest what did you do next
CrawIord I escorted him to the patrol vehicle and placed them in the back
Roberts and where did you transport him to
CrawIord Washoe County SheriII's oIIice
Roberts was the transport Irom Walmart to Washoe County Jail uneventIul
CrawIord uh...it was
Roberts or
CrawIord or eventIul I apologize you I was eventIul
Coughlin objection leaving the witness obviously
Howard also state that
Roberts did anything happen on the way to the jail with a suspect in your car
CrawIord beIore we leIt Walmart he kicked the window one time and was told to stop. He did stop.
(5:28:17 p.m.)
Coughlin objection coaching the witness
Howard overruled
Roberts what else to do
CrawIord he started throwing himselI around the back I asked him beIore we went to Washoe County
SheriII's OIIice on or oII he thought it was more comIortable to have it oII even though our policy is
to put them into a seatbelt I was trying to be polite to him because we're having so many issues I
didn't actually want to have to reach across him to put on to begin with up to Park Boulevard when he
did start turn itselI around the backseat oI the car saying we were trashing him around
Howard apparently Ior the record we will indicate that Mr. Coughlin apparently Iound this testimony
humorous
Coughlin No, sir, that is not correct
Howard apparently Iound this testimony humorous...
Coughlin I don't acknowledge that characterization as correct.
Roberts OIc. CrawIord aIter he threw himselI around in the back oI your patrol car was there any
thing else that happens beIore you got the jail involving the suspect
CrawIord to statements he made about us trying to take advantage oI the working man's dollar in
reconstruction and colony thinks that nature just statements
Roberts I have no Iurther questions Ior this witness
Howard Mr. Coughlin cross examination oI OIc. CrawIord
Coughlin OIc. CrawIord you realize you're under oath center
CrawIord yes
Coughlin so were you lying when you said you oIIered to put a seat belt on the accused
CrawIord No, sir.
Coughlin You weren't lying?
CrawIord No, sir
Coughlin did the accused point out to you during the Ireeware car ride to our on 395 at speeds in
excess oI 50 miles an hour that it was negligent Ior you and your partner to Iail to both put a seatbelt
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on the accused or oIIer to and Iurther negligence was exhibited in your Iailure to do so once the
accused requested you do iI so put a seatbelt on the accused
CrawIord sorry I'm conIused on the question
Roberts that's a complex question
Howard is a complex question is done it repeatedly
Coughlin do you recall the accused making statements to you during the car ride to par
CrawIord yester
Coughlin to the car right aren't clued a trip on Highway 395 in excess oI 50 miles an hour
CrawIord yester
Coughlin did he just make statements with regard to your Iailure to provide a seatbelt
CrawIord yester
Coughlin did the accused ask iI he could have a seatbelt?
CrawIord Nosair
(5:31:20 p.m.)
Coughlin what statements did he make with respect to the seatbelt
CrawIord devices that were being negligent with respect not providing a seatbelt even though he told
us he did want one and that it was a violation oI state law and that we were violating it even though
he told a student while on
Coughlin are you aware oI whether any recordings were made concerning the content oI the
conversation between you your partner and the accused
CrawIord no sir we do not have audio in our patrol car
Coughlin I did not ask you whether you have audio sir I asked you whether you are aware whether or
not any such audio recordings were made by you, or the State or by some punk with a smart phone
CrawIord no I cannot
Coughlin and you know you're under oath
CrawIord Yes, sir.
Coughlin so you're saying about the accused said something like that he didn't Ieel very comIortable
traveling in excess oI speeds 50 mi./h on the Ireeway without a seat belt
CrawIord I believe the accused did say that
Coughlin did you perceive the loan
CrawIord Nosair
Coughlin why not
CrawIord because it's not policy to pull over on the side oI the Ireeway to put a seatbelt on with
Coughlin okay did you make any attempts to do so aIter pulling oII Ireeway
Howard Mr. Coughlin we have been down this road beIore but what is the relevance with regards
your guilt or innocence on the petty larceny oI whether or not you are provided seatbelt?
Coughlin I would like to
Howard sir don't interrupt how does that go your guilt or instance oI the shirt oI petty theIt
Coughlin maybe we could ask Ms. Roberts that since she's the one who asked these questions in the
Iirst place she's the one who brought up the seatbelt on the ride over and all the stuII ...and I didn't see
you sua sponte object to her...
Howard Ms. Roberts
Roberts grinding object to the relevance the testimony I listened Irom loss oI star CrawIord dealt with
the noncompliant nature and attitude oI the deIendant Mr. Coughlin also known as the accused and I
think that goes to the credibility and the consistency in the testimony oI Mr. Francine who also
testiIied about his lack oI cooperation and compliance
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Howard okay Coughlin give you the last word go ahead
Coughlin who were talking about the objection here? And this is your objection Your Honor?
Howard okay the testimony is not relevant go ahead and go to another line oI questioning
Coughlin well it was relevant when Ms. Roberts was asking about seatbelts and stuII okay sir you
said under oath that the accused kicked the window
CrawIord I believe yes
Coughlin you believe so
CrawIord he either... The accused either kicked the window or hit it with his head I'm assuming
he...he kicked it
Coughlin hit it with his head you say?
CrawIord one oI the two yes
Coughlin but earlier you said you were sure that he kicked the window you sat here as a man with a
badge under oath and told this court that you knew the accused kickea a window and now now it's you
believe... Might've been his head...mighta been his Ioot....I just don't know... is that true?
Crawford know it was his foot
(5:35:25 p.m.)
Coughlin now you're sure. But which is it with his Ioot I believe it was his Ioot Earth said it was his
Ioot
Howard question
Coughlin Which is it?
CrawIord Let me clarify. The window was kicked one time extremely hard. The second time
either the back window or the far passenger-side window was also hit and made a loud noise.
The first time it was either kicked with his foot or the accused's head. There was a footprint on
the window; however, which window was hit with his foot or his head is unknown. It was
either one of the other
(5:35:58 p.m. GOOD GAWD WAS THAT A SHAKEY DEPICTION OF THINGS THAT MIGHT
HAVE HAPPENED MIXED WITH FACTUAL TIDBITS CONNOTING CERTAINTY, DRESSED
DOWN BY INCONSISTENCY AND CONJECTURE...A Judge can only jump in with sua sponte
objections to save such Iloundering witnesses so much....and that's aIter OIIicer CrawIord says: 'Let
me clariIy...? Wow.)
Coughlin Do you ever have anyone else in the car whose Iootprint it could've been.
Coughlin nope I keep my car clean.
Coughlin I didn't ask you iI you keep your car clean, partner. I asked you iI you ever had anybody
else in the car...
Roberts objection Your Honor he has to question and then he answered in said no and then explained
Howard sustained
Coughlin okay, so you keep your car clean
CrawIord yes
Coughlin what time oI the day did you clean your Windows on that day?
Howard asked another question, that's irrelevant.
Coughlin okay, what hour did you clean your car on that day?
CrawIord oh that depends on the day I work graveyard
Coughlin I didn't ask you about anything I said on that day
CrawIord on that day what kind I clean my window
Coughlin yet
CrawIord it wasn't my patrol car
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Coughlin go well so you keep your car clean but this wasn't your patrol car so I guess when you say
something about your car it's kind oI a non sequitur because we weren't dealing with your car here
were we so the Iootprint could've been Irom somebody else given that it wasn't your car and who
knows whether or not the person whose car it was keeps there's clean?
Roberts Your Honor is there question there? I'm objecting
Howard ask a question You are running out oI time use your time wisely go ahead ask another
question.
Coughlin you said I had to be the key is Iootprint because you keep your car clean correct
CrawIord yes
Coughlin then you said it wasn't your car
CrawIord you said it was my car,
Coughlin No, no, no....your testimony was the car that was used Ior the arrest was not your car
correct?
CrawIord yes
Coughlin so than how would you know whether or not the Iootprint on the window was the
accused's?
CrawIord it had to oI been yours
Coughlin On what basis do you say it had to oI been the accused?
CrawIord Because I don't remember somebody else kicking that car window within the time the
accused was arrested~
Coughlin Okay, but did you inspect the car window Ior Iootprints when you took possession oI the
car that day?
CrawIord No.
Coughlin So how can you be sure that there wasn't a Iootprint on the car window already?
Crawford I guess I'm not.
(5:38:09 p.m.)
Coughlin yeah but you just said you were and that it had to oI been mine right?
CrawIord you kicked it
Coughlin was it a head butt or a kick, Sir, because you didn't even seem to sure oI that?
CrawIord it was a kick to the driver side passenger or rear window....
(5:38:25 p.m.)
Coughlin so it's a kick now, and not a head butt?
CrawIord possibly ahead but to the passenger side rear win in our windows are tinted you can't see
very well
Coughlin okay did you take any photographs oI this phone Iootprint
CrawIord neurosurgeon were not church registration property nor did any destruction oI property
that's when the photographs were taken
Coughlin okay seven session the relevancy oI this
Howard I don't Iind it relevant debated dead horse go ahead and write iI you will you're beating a
dead horse go and ride it but you have a limited amount oI time that cut you oII so that once again
repetitive questions nonrelevant questions so you go ahead
Coughlin surgeon you make statements the a in Fiji and consents to the search that he would be
arrested
CrawIord Yes, sir.
Coughlin you are under Oath, Sir.
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Howard you have asked and he answered the question ask another one
Coughlin did you make any statements to the accused that there was some scenario under which he
would not be arrested
CrawIord I did I advised him that he can have a citation instead oI being arrested I think that is what
you are asking...so yes.
Coughlin so what were the conditions Ior that?
CrawIord I just need your personal inIormation so the court would have proper contact inIormation
and date oI birth and stuII to get ahold oI you.
(5:40:16 p.m. So, here, OIIicer CrawIord testiIies that Coughlin Iailed to provide his date oI birth and
the citation was not possible however the interrogation videos clearly show Coughlin providing his
Nevada drivers license to OIIicer CrawIord, and all drivers license have the drivers date oI birth listed
clearly on them and the arrest report Iilled out by OIIicer CrawIord clearly lists Coughlin's date oI
birth, just as it is listed on Coughlin's driver's license. Further, CrawIord Arrest Report and
Declaration oI Probable Cause clearly have cribbed other inIormation Irom Coughlin's driver's
license, such as hair and eye color, height, and weight.)
Coughlin's you're saying that the accused did not provide that information?
Crawford yes I am saying that.
Coughlin so how did you get the accused name?
Crawford Uh... you gave it, Sir.
(5:40:20 p.m. Here, OIIicer CrawIord continues his astounding streak oI contradicting himselI and
his stated certainty Irom one sentence to the next by indicating that the 'accused did not provide that
inIormation only to then, one sentence later, admit that OIIicer CrawIord got Coughli's name Irom
Coughlin himselI. What is the obvious subtext here is that Wal-Mart's Frontin is using 'cooperate
and 'non-compliant in much the same way that these two Tribabl Police OIIicers are using 'provide
your inIormation Ior a citation...ie, 'conIess your guilt, or we will have you arrested and search.
One must conIess their guilt to be cooperative, compliant, and to be said to have provided the
'inIormation necessary to issue a citation, period. Frontino could be seen throwing buzz words and
careIully coached/craIted phrases around earlier in his testimony when he took care to point out that it
is 'acceptable Ior the accused shopliIter to 'maintain their innocence. Well, good. Well good)
Coughlin did Mr. Frontino tell you the accused name
CrawIord he might have, yeah, I don't recall really, but he might oI, yeah, iI he already had it
(5:40:25 p.m.)
Coughlin do you recall whether he had a name that was the excuse
CrawIord JenniIer Corbett
Coughlin Junior: and Mr. Iriend tonight in a paper brought his desk
CrawIord yes he did have stuII on paper
Coughlin what was said
CrawIord I think it was just his notes on times and things like that and a copy oI the receipt oI what
the accused had potentially took but oI now I'm not too sure
Coughlin today included in personally identiIiable inIormation like the accused's name?
NOTE: the Trial in 11 CR 22176 in RMC goes on Ior about 2 more hours, though they are
largely devoid oI substantive content, mostly just OIIicer Braunworth struggling to remember
anything about anything that every happened ever.
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With respect to the upcoming criminal trespass matter and some other matters brought up in
the SCR 117 Petition (which, would seem to oI had a highly prejudicial pall cast over the instant SCR
111 Petition). Coughlin has repeatedly been harassed this year by Nevada Court Services, which may
be committing the unauthorized practice oI law in the eviction services context. NCS lists Lew Taitel
as its 'StaII Attorney and indicates he is 'associated with their business organization. Incidentally,
Mr. Taitel is also employed by the Reno Municipal Court as an in house public deIender...which is
interesting because he was appointed to represent Zach Coughlin, Esq. (recently suspended Irom the
practice oI law and the subject oI an SCR 117 Petition instigated by Bar Counsel Patrick King and
Richard G. Hill, Esq (King and Hill were opposing counsel together on a recent high proIile case,
Milsner v Carstarphen, a published decision oI the N. S. Ct.). Hill's practice Iocuses on collections
law, similar to Taitels. King has steadIastly reIused to provide Coughlin an opportunity to even view
or review (much less obtain a copy) oI the voluminous materials provided to King by Judge Dorothy
Nash Holmes (whom apparently gave Bar Counsel King Linda Gardners Order aIter, by his own
admission, Judge William Gardner got the Order Iorm his sister Linda and gave it to Judge Nash
Holmes. Hon. William Gardner inIormed Coughlin in April that he "couldn't remember" iI he was
aware oI Judge Nash Holmes letter to the State Bar oI Nevada concerning Coughlin. Judge Nash
Holmes sentenced Coughlin to 5 days in jail Ior summary contempt. Coughlin was never provided a
copy oI the Order Judge Nash Holmes allegedly issued on on March 28th, 2012, until Coughlin Iound
it attached to a SCR 117 Petition. Judge Nash Holmes allegedly delayed the start oI Coughlin's traIIic
ticket Trial in 11 TR 26800 to meet and conIer with Biray Dogan oI the Washoe County Public
DeIender's OIIice and Zach Young, Esq. oI the Washoe County District Attorney's OIIice Hill signed
a criminal complaint Ior criminal trespass and had Coughlin arrested at Coughlin's Iormer law oIIice
(Irom which Coughlin was subject to a wrongIul summary eviction Irom a commercial tenancy,
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instituted just prior to Coughlin's arrest and conviction Ior petit larceny oI a candy bar Irom a Wal-
Mart, a story which was picked up by the associated press and has run in newspapers as Iar away as
Indiana. Hill and his associate Baker tried to steal the "rent escrow" oI $2,275 which Judge SIerrazza
Iorced Coughlin to deposit in a summary eviction proceeding, in direct contravention to NRS
40.253(6), and totally illegal under Nevada law, in that JCRCP 84 requires the Reno Justice Court to
publish and get the Nevada Supreme Court to sign oII on such a rent escrow in summary eviction rule
like JCRLV 44 prior to contravening the express dictates oI a statutory scheme like that Iound in NRS
40.253. where the nonpayment oI rent was not alleged and the only Notice served was a No Cause
Eviction notice, see NRS 40.253).
Anyways, Coughlin has an upcoming criminal trespass trial in Reno Municipal Court in case
RMC 11 CR 26405, to be presided over by Judge William Gardner, whose sister is Judge Linda
Gardner, with whose April 2009 Order Ior Sanctions under NRS 7.085 Patrick King has only just
recently use to Iorm the basis oI a grievance against Coughlin, though King reIuses to divulge who
submitted or Iiled or why such an old Order Ior Sanctions, received by the Bar on March 15th, 2012.
Further, Judge William Gardner reIuses to recuse himselI Irom Coughlin's Criminal trespass
trial, set Ior June 18th, 2012, (and the spectre oI Judge Gardner sentencing Coughlin to an extended
incarceration is somewhat necessitating this Iiling, which is not as polished as it would be otherwise)
even though he has a Iamilial relation with Judge Linda Gardner, whom Coughlin Iiled a Mandamus
action against in response to the April 2009 sanctions by Judge Linda Gardner against Coughlin.
Further, Judge William Gardner worked Ior the City oI Reno as a prosecutor as recently as two years
ago and Coughlin has a pending litigation, anticipated Iuture litigation, and or a past matter wherein
the City oI Reno and the City Attorney's oIIice are arguably parties thereto:
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http://www.ccwashoe.com/public/ckpublicqrydoct.cpdktrptIrames?backtoP&caseidCV11-
03126&begindate&enddate
CV11-03126 - ZACH COUGHLIN VS. MATT MERLISS, M.D. et al.
Filing Date: Wednesday, October 26th, 2011 Type: GC - GENERAL CIVIL
But, certainly, the Reno Justice Court is listed as a party, and Nevada Court Services is listed
as a party, and Lew Taitel is listed as Nevada Court Services's "StaII Attorney" and "associated with"
their company, shares a Iax line, apparently a receptionist, and an address and oIIice space. When
Coughlin was arrested Ior jaywalking while peaceIully Iilming Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s contractor's
crew throwing away his heirlooms, the owner oI NCS, JeII Chandler, drove over to the site oI the
arrest and watched
Moet Further, and Judge William Gardner is aware oI this an has Iailed to take any action, the
the and RMC public deIender appointed to Coughlin, Lew Taitel, Esq., received Coughlin's
conIidential discovery and was listed as Coughlin's attorney oI record, only to mysteriously have
Roberto Puentes, Esq., substituted in as counsel (until Judge Gardner granted his withdrawal because
the case was "hard"), and despite the Iact that Taitel violated RMC Rule 5 when he Iailed to Iile a
motion in writing requesting his withdrawal as attorney oI record.
Judge Nash Holmes has recently copied and pasted pretty much the entire contents oI the
Rules oI ProIessional Conduct into an Order in 11 TR 26800 (a traffic citationtrial) wherein she
alleges she has Iound Coughlin in "criminal contempt", and stopped the proceeding pending her
sending the State Bar oI Nevada boxes oI materials she Ieels indicate Coughlin's "decompensating",
materials that included Iilings Irom the criminal trespass matter Judge William Gardner is presiding
over involving Coughlin, wherein Richard Hill signed the criminal complaint, 11 CR 26405. Again,
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Judge William Gardner "couldn't remember" iI he knew anything about his RMC co-judge Judge
Nash Holmes, sending anything to or communicating with the State Bar oI Nevada about Coughlin's
alleged "decompensating". Judge Nash Holmes did scream at Coughlin in open court that she would
have Coughlin arrested iI he said Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s name one more time, despite the Iact that the
issue oI RPD Sargent Tarter retaliating against Coughlin Ior Coughlin pointing out to him that just
days beIore an Reno Police Department OIIicer Chris Carter had, perhaps in jest, indicated that he
takes bribes Irom Richard G. Hill, Esq. in exchange Ior "doing what Richard Hills says to do and
arresting who he says to arrest". Judge Nash Holmes exclaimed, on the record, in 11 TR 26800, that
she doesn't "care about retaliation, or bribery, or police misconduct" (the RMC has reIused to provide
a copy oI the audio oI that Trial to Coughlin despite at least 3 written request and attempts to pay
being made by Coughlin and the State Bar oI Nevada Bar Counsel Patrick King, whom was providing
a copy oI that audio, has similarly rebuIIed Coughlin's requests to even review, much less, copy the
audio oI that Trial, which is a "public record".
Incidentally, at that Trial, Judge Nash Holmes suddenly demanded oI Coughlin, Iollowing a
restroom brake wherein she reIused to allow Coughlin to take his yellow legal pad with him to the
restroom, as to whether Coughlin has a "recording device" and whether he was "recording" at that
time. Pretty much immediately thereaIter Judge Nash Holmes, in perhaps a pretextual eIIort to eIIect
a search incident to arrest and allow herselI to be absolutely sure oI all that was on Coughlin's person
and whether it may have included a recording device that was recording at that time, decided that
Coughlin had committed summary contempt in her presence, and sentenced him to 5 days in jail,
beginning right then, and denied a stay. Judge Nash Holmes also kept a $100 bond Irom Coughlin's
mother despite the Iact that the Washoe County Jail did not release Coughlin prior to the expiration oI
the 5 days.
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RMC Marshall Scott Coppa, whom was in the party transporting Coughlin to Washoe County
Jail with the smart phone and micro sd card that seemed to disappear Ior quite a while and travel back
and Iorth between the jail, the RMC, and, perhaps the WCDA, and maybe some others places, only to
Iinally make its way back to Coughlin some 37 days later with all the data wiped...that Marshal
Coppa, sent the State Bar oI Nevada a letter complaining that Coughlin wanted to see the docket in a
RMC case and that Coughlin was "asking questions" and stuII and just, generally, not getting the
whole police state thing Marshall Coppa and Harley, et al, like to get on with down there at the RMC.
Coughlin,'s Public DeIender, Biray Dogan, Esq., and his boss, Jeremy Bosler and Jim Leslie,
have reIused to respond to Coughlin's inquiries as to why and whether Dogan met with Reno
Municipal Court Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes (whose staII could not locate her Ior a good 40 minutes
while Coughlin and RPD Sargent John Tarter waited Ior the 1:00pm Trial to start in 11 TR 26800,
wherein Tarter had issued Coughlin three traIIic tickets immediately aIter telling Coughlin to leave
Richard G. Hill's oIIice, where Hill was withholding Coughlin's state issued identiIication (driver's
license) and Coughlin's wallett and client's Iiles, as well has computer hard drives (at least one hard
drive was accessed during the 6 weeks it and Coughlin's client's Iiles remained in Hill's possession
(Hill had to go on vacation Ior 6 weeks, so, despite the dictate oI a hearing within 10 days oI
Coughlin's November 16th, 2011 Iiling oI a Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien under NRS
40.253(7)-(8), a hearing was not held until December 20th, 2011, at which time Judge SIerrazza made
Coughlin pay $480 Ior "storage Iees" oI his personal property, despite the Iact that its was only stored
Ior 17 days and would Iit in a 10 x 30 storage shed that would normally cost about ($100 per month)
and despite Hill having admitted that the site oI Coughlin's Iormer law oIIice was burglarized on
December 12th, 2012, and that Hill was not sure what you like this girl hot all was stolen, except that
he did notice the 62 inch DLP HDTV was missing as well as some other Ilat screens, high end audio
- 90/95 -
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equipment, and that the law oIIice looked completely torn asunder.
With Coughlin's conviction by Judges Gardner and Nash Holmes' Reno Municipal Court co-
judge, Judge Kenneth Howard (whom also sentenced Coughlin to 3 days in jail Ior "summary
contempt, though apparently, unlike Judge Nash Holmes, not contempt oI a "criminal" nature) in
RMC 11 CR 22176, the incident to the Wal-Mart "candy bar and cough drops" petit larceny matter
Ior which Coughlin was convicted and had his law license suspend recently, making it into a story by
the Associate Press (AP), published in locales as Iar away as Indiana, it will be interesting to see
whether any oI the above makes a candy bar look a little .
Finally, the undersigned acknowledges that this submission is rather lengthy, however, the
undersigned's and his Iamily's lives were negatively aIIected in the extreme back in 2002 when he
took the 'advice oI the Character and Fitness Committee and went with 'one oI the three pro bono
attorney's we will provide you the names oI... (only one name was provided, it cost $5,000, there
exists a transcript oI the hearing he attended wherein he mentions that his representation was pro
bono, then Iails to clariIy that he was actually getting paid $5,000, and thereaIter passed oII the case
to his Iirst year associate, whereupon it promptly languished until, allegedly, this Court decided to
grant Coughlin a license in September oI 2004 (as the recent SCR 117 Petition states), however, due
to that attorney's negligent representation, an angry sounding letter Irom the Chairman oI the
Character and Fitness committee in January 2003 essentially telling Coughlin to quit being a squeaky
wheel, and perhaps another instance oI the Director oI Admissions deciding not to Iorward on some
key document provided her to this Court Ior review (as she did at the end oI this Court's deIerment
period in September 2003 in connection with Coughlin's application Ior a license to practice
law...)...so the undersigned submits the materials herein in an eIIort to demonstrate his competence as
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a proIessional, and extreme desire to remain a licensed member oI the State Bar oI Nevada, and to
have the temporary suspension set aside.
%
The undersigned asks this Court, respectIully, to consider setting aside its temporary
suspension oI his law license and to allow the undersigned additional time to supplement this
Opposition and heavily edit and prooI read it, and respectIully apologizes Ior the rough draIt quality
oI this work, but points to the exigencies present requiring that it be submitted so...
RespectIully submitted this: June 18th, 2012,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Pro Per Attorney
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DECLARATION OF ZACH COUGHLIN IN SUPPORT OF THE FOREGOING DOCUMENT
Nevada and I declare under penalty oI perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct, subject to the
caveat that this Iiling needs much more prooI reading, however, the exigency oI the undersigned
criminal trespass trial within a matter oI hours and the spectre oI Hon. Judge Linda Gardner's brother
Hon. Judge William Gardner incarcerating the undersigned at length presents a situation wherein this
Iiling is somewhat rushed. Coughlin wishes Ior this to apply to the SCR 117 petitoin as well.
2. Declarant is the Attorney in the above titled action.
Dated this June 18th, 2012
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
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ProoI oI Service:
document to all registered electronic Iilers, and to those whom are not I placed a true and correct copy
oI the Ioregoing document in the usps mail on this date:
Reno, NV 89521
Dated this June 12th, 2012
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
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INDEX TO EXHIBITS
1. Exhibit 1: The two Wal-Mart receipts Irom September 9
th
, 2011, one Ior $83.82, representing items
selected and paid Ior and one Ior $14.72, representing items allegedly consumed while shopping and
not paid Ior, and prooI oI the exact item represented by the various Universal Parcel Codes (UPC)
indicated on the respective receipts; Iour (4) pages.
2. Exhibit 2: Discovery propounded by the City oI Reno City Attorney's OIIice in RMC 11 CR
22176, including RSIC OIIicer CrawIord's 'Arrest Report and Declaration oI Probable Cause and
his 'Incident Report and Wal-Mart's Thomas Frontino's signed, sworn Criminal Complaint; seven
(7) pages.
- 95/95 -
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EXHIBIT 1
000496
U
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000497
NOTE: this is a "receipt" for the allegedly stolen or consumed items
propounded in discovery by the Reno City Attorney
000498
Magnum Ice Cream Bar Nutrition Information | ShopWell
file:///D|/...20ie%20and%20firefox/7756713282%20magnum%20double%20caramel%20single%20ice%20cream%20bar.htm[6/11/2012 3:07:34 PM]
Scan foods to get your nutrition info at home or in the store!
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Magnum Ice Cream Bar
S, Double Caramel 3.38 oz
Share on email
Tweet
Ingredients:
Ice Cream: Milk, Cream, Sugar, Whey, Mono and Diglycerides, Locust Bean Gum, Vanilla Bean Specks,
Carrageenan, Natural Flavor, Annatto Extract (Color), Caramel Color, Belgian Milk Chocolate Coating: Sugar,
Chocolate Liquor, Cocoa Butter, Milk, Milk Fat, PGPR (Emulsifier), Soy Lecithin (Emulsifier), Natural Flavor,
Caramel Sauce: Water, Sugar, Corn Syrup, High Fructose Corn Syrup, Nonfat Milk Solids, Coconut Oil
Modified Corn Starch, Caramel Color, Salt, Mono & Diglycerides (Emulsifier), Carrageenan, Soybean Oil
Sodium Citrate, Potassium Sorbate (Used to Protect Quality), Natural Flavor, Chocolatey Coating: Coconut
Oil, Sugar, Cocoa, Soy Lecithin (Emulsifier), Vanilla Extract.
Personalize this Nutrition Label
Nutrition Facts
Serving Size 1.0 bar (95 g)
Servings Per Container 1
http://www.shopwell.com/magnum-ice-cream-bar-s-double-
caramel/ice-cream-popsicles/p/7756713282
NOTE: the URL listed above for this page ends with
the UPC of this "Magnum Double Caramel Ice Cream
Bar", 7756713282 (the "zero" at the start of that
number on the $14.72 Wal-Mart receipt is
traditionally left off of UPC notations, as here).
This frozen or refrigerated item would not be
found in "the candy isle" as Thomas Frontino swore
that he "personally eye witnessed"
Coughlin select it from "the candy isle"
and also swore that none of Wal-Mart's
legion of cameras captured any of that
activity on video...
000499
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DECLARATION PURSUANT TO NRS 53.045 BY ZACH COUGHLIN ON 11/23/12: I ZACH COUGHLIN HEREBY
SWEAR UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT CLERK OF COURT OF THE SBN PETERS/SBN/NNDB/PANEL GAVE ME PERMISSION TO
FAX FILE IN THIS MATTER UPON WHICH I REASONABLY RELIED, AND THEY FURTHER SWORE THE 8/23/12 CERTIFIED
MAILING WOULD NEVER BE USED A PROOF OF SERVICE UNDER SCR 109 AND FURTHER THEY INDICATED THAT I
WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO PAY SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM OR WITNESS FEES AND THAT, EVEN THOUGH
MY LAW LICENSE IS TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED, I WAS ACCORDED THE THE POWER TO ISSUE SUBPOENAS
_______________________
NOTE: EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE PLACING MY DECLARATION ON TOP OF PETERS AFFIDAVIT AND EASE OF COMPARING
ZACH COUGHLIN, RESPONDENT
000520
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YOUR LABEL NUMBER SERVICE STATUS OF YOUR ITEM DATE & TIME LOCATION FEATURES
70102780000354296264 Delivered November 17, 2012, 12:44 pm RENO, NV 89506 Certified Mail
Notice Left November 08, 2012, 4:56 pm RENO, NV 89512
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000521
Note by Z Coughlin: this certified mailing contain the 11/7/12 Order
by Chair Echeverria on SBN's Motion to Quash Subpoenas on Peters and
King and on RMC Judges etc. and Supplemental DowSoE for Beesley and
Elcano
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70102780000354295458 Delivered November 08, 2012, 10:28 am RENO, NV 89521 Certified Mail
Notice Lef t November 07, 2012, 1: 17 pm RENO, NV 89521
Notice Lef t October 10, 2012, 11:09 am RENO, NV 89505
Arrival at Unit October 10, 2012, 8: 18 am RENO, NV 89503
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October 10, 2012, 4: 51 am RENO, NV 89510

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70102780000354295472 Delivered October 27, 2012, 9: 39 am RENO, NV 89506 Certified Mail
Notice Lef t October 22, 2012, 5: 03 pm RENO, NV 89512
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000523
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70102780000354295472 Delivered October 27, 2012, 9: 39 am RENO, NV 89506 Certified Mail
Notice Lef t October 22, 2012, 5: 03 pm RENO, NV 89512
Processed t hrough
USPS Sort Facilit y
Depart USPS Sort
Facility
October 16, 2012 RENO, NV 89510
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000528
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000531
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70102780000354295458 Delivered November 08, 2012, 10:28 am RENO, NV 89521 Certified Mail
Notice Lef t November 07, 2012, 1: 17 pm RENO, NV 89521
Notice Lef t October 10, 2012, 11:09 am RENO, NV 89505
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000532
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WLS
location.
Sent: Fri 5/01/09 8:52 AM
1 attachment
Letter attached.
000533
Dear Zach,
the Joshi matter;
of this conduct;
Thursday, April 23
rd
available to you;
matters may be.
000534
Monday, May 4
th
Sincerely,
Paul Elcano
000535
Docket Report Results - Not an Official Document
Report Selection Criteria
Case ID: DV08-01168
Docket Start Date:
Docket Ending Date:
Case Description
Case ID: DV08-01168 - ASHWIN JOSHI VS. BHARTI JOSHI (D14)
Filing Date: Tuesday , July 01st, 2008
Type: DO - DIVORCE - NO CHILDREN
Status: CLOSED - Case Closed
Related Cases
FV08-01910
Case Event Schedule
Case Parties
6 3,10 Plaintiff/Counter-Deft @1144868 JOSHI, ASHWIN

7 11,12 Defendant
Counterclaimant
@1144866 JOSHI, BHARTI

9 Judge D14 GARDNER, HONORABLE
LINDA
Address: P. O. BOX 30083
RENO NV 89520
Aliases: none

10 6 Attorney 4391 Sternlicht, Esq., Caryn
R.
Address: WASHOE LEGAL
SERVICES
Aliases: Sternlicht, Esq., Caryn R
000536
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000537
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000539
000540
State Bar Of Nevada
file:///R|/1%20a%20NEW%20temp/190%20judge%20nash%20holmes%20mcgeorge%201977%2026800%2000696%2012420%20063341%20065630.htm[11/23/2012 2:04:11 AM]
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FIND A LAWYER
{ Back to Search Results }
Dorothy N. Holmes
Company:
Reno Municipal Court
Address:
P.O. Box 1900
~
Reno
,
NV
89505
Phone Number:
7753343822
Fax number:
~
Email:
No information provided
Website:
http://www.reno.gov
Admit Date:
09/17/77
Law School:
McGeorge
Specialization:
000541
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Print Close
Why no Casey Baker, Esq., Allison Ormaas, Esq., WCSO Deputy Machen, or
RMC Marshal Harley, WCPD Biray Dogan, DDA Zach Young
Sent: Thu 11/01/12 5:39 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); fflaherty@dlpfd.com (fflaherty@dlpfd.com); davidc@nvbar.org
(davidc@nvbar.org); complaints@nvbar.org (complaints@nvbar.org); tsusich@nvdetr.org (tsusich@nvdetr.org);
je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com); skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com);
mike@tahoelawyer.com (mike@tahoelawyer.com); nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net)
Dear Mr. King,
I am writing to formally complaint about your, once again, reneging on an offer you have made to
allow me access to certain materials.
Please explain your repeated misrepresentations to me regarding the "access" you will allow me to the materials
I am entitled to view, and those you have made offers in writing to me to allow me to view and or review.
I think you might find that the attached video of Sargent Lopez pretty much vitiates the criminal trespass
conviction (and that conviction, and all of Judge Nash Holmes orders are void in light of there violation of NRS
178.405 vis a vis NRS 5.010 and the admission in Judge Nash Holmes March 14th, 2012 letter to the SBN, and
beyond that In re Oliver and the fact that Judge Nash Holmes admits on the record to be basing her Order's
upon conduct not committed in her "immediate presence" (an allegation of having a RMC Marshals look
"Peeping Tom" style through a bathroom stall doesn't cut it)... Interesting that you have chosen to subpoena
your former Attorney General's coworke Dan Wong rather than City Attorney Ormaas (given her presence at
the 2/27/12 11 TR26800 Trial from which the "summary criminal contempt" order stems, and the allegations of
her and that RMC Marshal Harley (whom violated the "courthouse sanctuary" doctrine in one of the worst
ways imaginable with his barging in on a plea bargain session to "personally serve" a Notice of Order to Show
Cause on behalf of Richard G. Hill (and the 11 tr 26800 case involved traffic citations immediately after RPD
Tarter told Coughlin to leave Hill's office, albeit without his wallet, keys, client's files, or state issued
identification....) then to have the same
WCSO Deputy Machen who lied about personally serving the lockout order on Coughlin (in the eviction
involving Hill) again lie in his 3 7 2012 Affidavit attesting to have served the notice of the 3 23 12 ORder to
Show Cause hearing (the one RMC Marshal Harley served for him, then got all jumpy and whispering in
Ormaas's, and, apparently while Coughlin was in the restroom, made allegations to Judge Nash Holmes (and
afterwards incident to the SITA) seeking to cover up his misconduct and that of Ormaas. Claiborne is not
going to allow you to feign ignorance, Mr. King, nor is the proof of receipt of all my emails and writings and
media. Have fun reviewing it all.
Regardless, its not "summary contempt" if all essential elements of the allegation, under any iteration of NRS
22 are not alleged to have occurred in the "immediate presence" of the Judge...where, as here, that is not the
case, those RMC Marshal are going to have to sign their names to affidavits like the big boys they strut around
acting like they are, behaving in a menacing and intimidating manner that is wholly inconsistent with
traditional notions of the type of comportment required of officers of the court.
Again, today, you have reverted to your old tricks. I want everything, not just that which you or
000564
Clerk/Investigator Peters deem "related' to the SCR 105 "Complaint" (which has three case numbers on it ng12-
0204, ng12-0434, and ng12-0435). Both you and Peters get real evasive when it comes times to answer for
who submitted or filed the ng12-0435 grievance consisting of a three year old Order by Family Court Judge
Linda Garnder, yet which bares a file stamp of March 15th, 2012 by the SBN...then there is Judge Linda
Gardner's brother, RMC Judge William Gardner refusing to recuse himself from the criminal trespass case,
resulting in a conviction. I would think the attached videos pretty much demonstrate perjury by Richard G. Hill
considering the various Declarations and Application for a TPO, bar grievances, police reports, and Motions for
Orders to Show Cause he filed or signed on to....Mr. King, is this what the SBN needs right now? A SCR 105
Complaint by you coyly including this January 12th, 2012 "jaywalking" arrest, yet refusing to utter Hill's name
in connection with it?
Some selected past correspondences with Mr. King detailing his reneging on offers:
Mr. King, one of of our recent discusson you promised to send me something in writing informing me as to who exactly was on the screening
panel. You have failed to uphold that promise as well. Further, you and Clerk/Investigator Peters have remained evasive and contradictory
respecting who filed NG12-0435, when, and under what circumstances it came to be a grievance. I think you will find that a review of the
hearings you finally provided in 11 CR 26405 (April 10th and May 8th, 2012) will yield some really intersting statements on the record by Keith
Loomis, Esq. (your Minden associate) and Judge William Gardner of the RMC (brother to Family Court Judge Linda Garnder, whose 2009
sanctions order was file stamped by the SBN on March 15th, 2012 and is now called NG12-0435, though neither you nor Peters will say anything
all that sensible about the genesis of that grievance, etc. Judge Gardner makes some pretty curious statements respecting the competency analysis,
the decision to plow ahead with a Trial Setting on March 7th, 2012 for April 10th, 2012 (interesting considering Coughlin filed the Notice of
Appeal of the final, appealable "summary criminal contempt" conviction on that same date, March 7th, 2012 that now forms part of the asis for
Judge Nash Holmes ng12-0434 "decompensating" grievance, incident to her March 14th, 2012 letter to the SBN....you might want to have Judge
Gardner's statements on the record from 4/10/12 and 5/8/12 and Loomis's transcribed, as your possession of the audio thereof arguably puts a
Claiborne-esque duty upon you to inquire as to the candor and veracity of some of those statements, especially vis a vis the "meetings" Gardners
being the RMC's "Administrative Judge", etc., etc. Further, you have refused to allow me access to a number of materials that neither you nor
Peters deem "part of the complaint" (the SCR SBN v Coughlin complaint...though to the extent one or more of ng12-0204, ng12-0434, 0435
mention the RMC, arguably, I am entitled to anything at all related to me, whether submitted by the WCSO, RMC, City of Reno, City of Reno
Marshals, etc.
There are grievances against Dogan, Loomis, Young, Ormaas, Roberts, Hazlett, etc., etc., and given the SBN's and NNDB's known predilection
against bifurcating hearings, why not have those individuals show up on November 14th, 2011 in the name of adminitrative economy? I am to
financially strapped to arrange for all of their appearances, but I believe my requesting a waiver herein, or that the SBN or NNDB so arrange for
these barristers to appear, combined with the duties attendant to Mr. King being a prosecutor (Brady Rule RPC 3.8, simple duty of fairness to
opposing counsel, etc., etc.) might dictate that they so be obliged to appear. Certainly Dogan and Young could shed some light on the
communications to the RMC and Judge Nash Holmes that made her holding the Trial on 2/27/12, hours after Dogan and Young successfully
obtained an Order for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin in RCR2012-065630, appear to be plainly violative of NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010
(as was Young's filing an Opposition later that day, baring a file stamp time over 90 minutes after that found on the Order for Competency
Evaluation. As for WCSO Machen, why, he is practically indispensable here. You got him and Baker doing the November 1, 2011 eviction
lockout, you got him with the phony Affidavit of Service he failed thereto on 11/7/11, you got Machen having RMC Marshal Harley serving the
Notice of Order to Show Cause Hearing on Couglin on 2/27/12 while Coughlin and Ormaas haggled over the fines for the Richard Hill traffic
citation trial before Judge Nash Holmes (I would think getting the audio of the other cases on Judge Holmes' docket at 1:00 pm on 2/27/12 will
reveal what I heard her administrative assistant say...something along the lines of "I am going to start the record now so I don't forget to
later...followed by a substantial period of no one being able to find Judge Nash Holmes, comments directed to how odd that was, etc., etc.) all
occurring at the exact same time that Dogan and Young were holding their clandestine status conference on 2/27/12 at 1:30 pm...which didn't stop
Judge Nash Holmes from continuing on to hold the 11 TR 26800 traffic citation trial, at which she suspended the proceedings at 4 pm or so, and
had Coughlin cuffed and taken straight to a 5 day jail stay (and despite her protestations of concern for Coughlin's client's welfare, she gave the
idea of a stay extremely short shrift, indeed). Funny how that Order immediatly follow Coughlin saying "RPD Sargent Tarter lied when...."
BOOM. STOP. Summary criminal contempt conviction....5 day jail stay. Judge Nash Holmes even kept the $100 Coughlin's Mother paid to
get him out a day early, despite the jail not releasing Coughlin. Wow, indeed.
Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org) Add to contacts 3/27/12 To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)This
sender is in your safe list. Sent: Tue 3/27/12 9:24 AM To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) March 27, 2012 Dear Mr.
Coughlin, Perhaps you are not fully aware of your behavior. At our brief meeting yesterday I perceived you as very hostile and even threatening.
Under those circumstances I felt it better to terminate the meeting. If it was not your intent to appear hostile or to attempt to intimidate me then
000565
you might consider how I perceived your conduct. I had intended to try to listen to you and determine how my office could best help you address
the grievances that I have received. You said you did not have time and simply wanted to argue about your receipt of e-mail or mail. I did not
say that I did not care if you received the information I sent to you, I said I did not care how your received it, so long as you received it. I do care
that you receive the information that I send to you. As I attempted to explain, I will be meeting with a panel to have them make a determination
about the grievances that have been made against you by Mr. Hill and the Judge from Department 3 that you read at my office. I have asked for a
written response to those grievances. In response I received many e-mails with attachments. I will soon be sharing the grievances with a
disciplinary panel and will advise them of your responses to date. I will keep you advised of the panels determination. Sincerely, Patrick King
Actions Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com) 3/26/12 To: patrickk@nvbar.org, glennm@nvbar.org, davidc@nvbar.org Dear Mr. King,
This correspondence is sent to confirm that I visited the Double R Blvd. offices of the State Bar of Nevada today and attempted to be provided
access the the various "other different judges" grievances that I, prior to last Friday, was completely unaware of. I have sent you several written
correspondences detailing the tampering and other problems with my USPS mail incident to the two domestic abuser attacks I have been subject
to since approximately 1/1/12, and ask that you copy my on all correspondences or document production via email and fax. Today, you showed
me a two page letter from Judge Nash Holmes. Did you interpret it to be a "grievance"? How is that designation arrived at? You refused to
identify the names of any other judges from whom you have received any other similar such materials and further refused to allow me to view
and such items. I asked for a copy of the large box of documents, and other FOIA request materials and you refused. Further, you told me you
didn't care I received anything you sent me and stated that I did not have a right to review such complaint letters, grievances, or other materials,
prior to being questioned by you and before any such meeting. I informed you that I am considering different attorneys to represent me right
now, and indicated I need these materials to prepare for any future meeting with you. My records incidate that your letter of 3/16/12 is inaccurate
to the extent it indicates that I was copied on that letter via email on that date. Please let me know if you received any sort of "return to sender"
letter for that mailing. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473 2012 Microsoft Terms Privacy Developers English (United States)
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org) This sender is in your safe list. Sent: Mon 4/02/12 3:57 PM To: zachcoughlin@hotmail.com Dear Mr.
Coughlin, I have opened 3 disciplinary files against you. They are identified by number below: NG12-0204 Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq. Bar No.
9473 (2005) Mr. Hill NG12-0435 Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq. Bar No. 9473 (2005) Judge Holmes NG12-0434 Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq. Bar No.
9473 (2005) Judge Gardner You have received the grievance from Mr. Hill and also the grievance from Judge Holmes. The Grievance from
Judge Gardner relates to her Order After Trial in the case of Ashwin Joshi v Barti Joshi, Case Number DV08-01168, wherein she describes
your conduct at pages 12 and 13. I have received certified copies of the contempt orders, a certified copy of the conviction at Wal-Mart, and an
incident report from Marshals Thompson and Coppa regarding your conduct on March 22, 2012. I also have the recordings of the court
proceedings at issue. At this time, I do not expect to be providing you with any additional information. If you have additional information that
you want me to be made aware of in response to the grievances identified above please feel free to mail them to me. Sincerely, Patrick King,
Assistant Bar Counsel
\
From: Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org) This sender is in your safe list.
Sent: Thu 4/19/12 2:28 PM
April 19, 2012
Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
A screening panel of the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Panel met on Tuesday April 10, 2011 to address the grievances filed against you. The panel
directed me to proceed to a formal disciplinary hearing. As such, I will be preparing a formal Complaint.
000566
I understand from the e-mail below, that you do not believe you should have been found guilty of the theft at Wal-Mart and that you should not
have been found in contempt of Court. However, it must concern you that you were found in contempt of Court by more than one Judge in two different trials.
You wanted to know how I learned of or obtained a copy of Judge Gardners Order after trial that was filed in 2009. It was sent to me by the clerk of the court
at my request, pursuant to my investigation.
It would help me and perhaps yourself, if you would respond and explain why you were convicted of theft and why you were held in contempt of
Court. You may be well served to explain what remedial measures you are taking to make sure you do not repeat the conduct complained about. I cannot give
you legal advice. However I can suggest you cooperate with Bar counsels investigation and that you respond specifically to the allegations contained in Judge
Holmes and Richard Hills grievance letters to the office of Bar Counsel.
Patrick King
Zach has 8 files to share with you on SkyDrive. To view them, click the links below.
SAM_0190_mpeg4 rpd hill sifre jaywalking 11 cr 26405 11 tr 26800 rmc.mp4
011412 RJC RCR2012-065630 RCR2011-063341 RCR2012-067980 Reno Police Department Sargent Paul Sifre arrests Reno Attorney for misuse of 911
second arr.3gp
zach's arrest 009 26405 1708 26800 03628.flv
zach's arrest 011 26405 1708 26800 03628.flv
zach's arrest 010 26405 1708 26800 03628.flv
10 4 12 ORDER STRIKING document filed in error on 10 2 12 and returning document 26800 0204 0434 nash 00696 26405.pdf
10 29 12 notice of errata and SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 26405 1708 26800 0650630.pdf
Download all
Subject: Records
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 16:04:21 +0000
Your disciplinary file is being sent to the printer to be copied. I am having the documents bate stamped and the printing company will
mail them to you.
Formal proceeding are taking place at the state bar office so you will not be permitted in the building.
000567
SBN NNDB November 14th, 2012 Hearing Coughlin FW: Records
Sent: Thu 11/01/12 5:45 PM
To: skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com); mike@tahoelawyer.com (mike@tahoelawyer.com); nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net
(nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net)
skent@skentlaw.com, mike@tahoelawyer.com, nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net
To: patrickk@nvbar.org; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; davidc@nvbar.org; complaints@nvbar.org; tsusich@nvdetr.org; je@eloreno.com; cvellis@bhfs.com
Subject: RE: Records
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 16:43:30 -0700
Dear Mr. King,
000568
resulting in a conviction
the decision to plow ahead with a Trial Setting on March 7th, 2012 for April 10th, 2012 (intersesting considering Coughlin filed the Notice of
Marshals, etc.
000569
\
Sent: Thu 4/19/12 2:28 PM
April 19, 2012
Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
Patrick King
EMAILS TO PATRICKK@NVBAR.ORG PATRICK KING BAR COUNSEL.pdf
000570
emails from ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com to Patrick King patrickk@nvbar.org since 3 23 12.pdf
emails since 3 23 12 from patrickk@nvbar.org Patrick King Bar Counsel State Bar of Nevada.pdf
5 4 09 attachment to wlc elcano email gardner 26405 01955 60302 ltrCoughlin2ndDraft.pdf
5 7 09 termination letter from wls elcano linda gardner zachcoughlin040709.pdf
5 6 09 email from wls ed elcano 26405 60302 garnder 01955 10896 60302 26800 60317 54844.pdf
11TR26800 RMC 022712 031412_20120312-1033_01cd003b8f0851d0.mp3
11CR26405 050812 Loomis_20120508-1104_01cd2d0a627f5f90.mp3
11TR26800 RMC 022712 031412_20120227-1507_01ccf5618f76c460.mp3
3 16 12 ng12-0434 SBN King letter containing RMC Judge Nash Homes 3 14 12 grievance against Coughlin and ng12-0435 linda gardner sanction from 4
10 09 26800 00696 54844.pdf
2 14 12 SBN KING LETTER WITH HILL GRIEVANCE ATTACHED RCR2011-063341 RPD RMC 11 CR 00696 WCSO SUSICH ME.pdf
11cr26405 puentes 041012_20120410-0903_01cd16f8c3aa49b0.mp3
rpd sargent lopez i have a question for you 11 cr 26405 00696 26800.wmv
2 27 12 and 3 8 12 Affidavits of Service by WCSO Machen in 1708 and 03628 26800 00696 marshal harley.pdf
rerevised exhibit 1 26405 61901 WITH BATES NUMBERING.pdf
12-32685 10 15 12 scr 111(4) in re coughlin petition criminal trespass conviction 61901 26405 1708 26800 12420 hill sbn.pdf
Download all
Subject: Records
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 16:04:21 +0000
mail them to you.
FW: Why no Casey Baker, Esq., Allison Ormaas, Esq., WCSO Deputy Machen,
or RMC Marshal Harley, WCPD Biray Dogan, DDA Zach Young
Sent: Thu 11/01/12 5:45 PM
(nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net)
000571
To: patrickk@nvbar.org; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; davidc@nvbar.org; complaints@nvbar.org; tsusich@nvdetr.org; je@eloreno.com; cvellis@bhfs.com;
skent@skentlaw.com; mike@tahoelawyer.com; nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net
Subject: Why no Casey Baker, Esq., Allison Ormaas, Esq., WCSO Deputy Machen, or RMC Marshal Harley, WCPD Biray Dogan, DDA Zach Young
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 17:39:53 -0700
Dear Mr. King,
resulting in a conviction. I would think the attached videos pretty much demonstrate perjury by Richard G. Hill 000572
considering the various Declarations and Application for a TPO, bar grievances, police reports, and Motions for
Orders to Show Cause he filed or signed on to....Mr. King, is this what the SBN needs right now? A SCR 105
Complaint by you coyly including this January 12th, 2012 "jaywalking" arrest, yet refusing to utter Hill's name
in connection with it?
Some selected past correspondences with Mr. King detailing his reneging on offers:
the decision to plow ahead with a Trial Setting on March 7th, 2012 for April 10th, 2012 (interesting considering Coughlin filed the Notice of
Marshals, etc.
There are grievances against Dogan, Loomis, Young, Ormaas, Roberts, Hazlett, etc., etc., and given the SBN's and NNDB's known predilection
against bifurcating hearings, why not have those individuals show up on November 14th, 2011 in the name of adminitrative economy? I am to
financially strapped to arrange for all of their appearances, but I believe my requesting a waiver herein, or that the SBN or NNDB so arrange for
these barristers to appear, combined with the duties attendant to Mr. King being a prosecutor (Brady Rule RPC 3.8, simple duty of fairness to
opposing counsel, etc., etc.) might dictate that they so be obliged to appear. Certainly Dogan and Young could shed some light on the
communications to the RMC and Judge Nash Holmes that made her holding the Trial on 2/27/12, hours after Dogan and Young successfully
obtained an Order for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin in RCR2012-065630, appear to be plainly violative of NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010
(as was Young's filing an Opposition later that day, baring a file stamp time over 90 minutes after that found on the Order for Competency
Evaluation. As for WCSO Machen, why, he is practically indispensable here. You got him and Baker doing the November 1, 2011 eviction
lockout, you got him with the phony Affidavit of Service he failed thereto on 11/7/11, you got Machen having RMC Marshal Harley serving the
Notice of Order to Show Cause Hearing on Couglin on 2/27/12 while Coughlin and Ormaas haggled over the fines for the Richard Hill traffic
citation trial before Judge Nash Holmes (I would think getting the audio of the other cases on Judge Holmes' docket at 1:00 pm on 2/27/12 will
reveal what I heard her administrative assistant say...something along the lines of "I am going to start the record now so I don't forget to
later...followed by a substantial period of no one being able to find Judge Nash Holmes, comments directed to how odd that was, etc., etc.) all
occurring at the exact same time that Dogan and Young were holding their clandestine status conference on 2/27/12 at 1:30 pm...which didn't stop
Judge Nash Holmes from continuing on to hold the 11 TR 26800 traffic citation trial, at which she suspended the proceedings at 4 pm or so, and
had Coughlin cuffed and taken straight to a 5 day jail stay (and despite her protestations of concern for Coughlin's client's welfare, she gave the
idea of a stay extremely short shrift, indeed). Funny how that Order immediatly follow Coughlin saying "RPD Sargent Tarter lied when...."
BOOM. STOP. Summary criminal contempt conviction....5 day jail stay. Judge Nash Holmes even kept the $100 Coughlin's Mother paid to
get him out a day early, despite the jail not releasing Coughlin. Wow, indeed.
000573
\
Sent: Thu 4/19/12 2:28 PM
April 19, 2012
Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
000574
Patrick King
011412 RJC RCR2012-065630 RCR2011-063341 RCR2012-067980 Reno Police Department Sargent Paul Sifre arrests Reno Attorney for misuse of 911
second arr.3gp
zach's arrest 009 26405 1708 26800 03628.flv
zach's arrest 011 26405 1708 26800 03628.flv
zach's arrest 010 26405 1708 26800 03628.flv
10 4 12 ORDER STRIKING document filed in error on 10 2 12 and returning document 26800 0204 0434 nash 00696 26405.pdf
10 29 12 notice of errata and SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 26405 1708 26800 0650630.pdf
Download all
Subject: Records
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 16:04:21 +0000
mail them to you.
SBN still has not provided Coughlin access to the materials he is entitled to to
prepare for 11/14/12 Hearing
Sent: Fri 11/02/12 10:36 PM
(nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net); patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); fflaherty@dlpfd.com (fflaherty@dlpfd.com);
000575
davidc@nvbar.org (davidc@nvbar.org); complaints@nvbar.org (complaints@nvbar.org); tsusich@nvdetr.org
(tsusich@nvdetr.org); je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com)
33 attachments
all emails to loomis 26405 12420 26800 00696 065630 063341.pdf (779.8 KB) , 2 28 12 Contempt Order Nash 26800
26405 065630 00696 063341 bf size reduced.pdf (449.9 KB) , 11cr26405 puentes 041012_20120410-
0903_01cd16f8c3aa49b0.mp3 (5.1 MB) , NvRenoPd@coplogic.com rpd police reports by coughlin 063341 duralde carter
lopez sifre 1708 26405 26800.htm (145.0 KB) , rpd carter police report 11 cr 26405 puentes loomis 1708 merliss rmc
gardner cr12-0376 mh12-0032 650630 063341 rpd lopez carter police report 11 13 12-2.pdf (6.3 MB) , 3 3 12 attached
to loomis email and filed in rmc final motion to dismiss 11 cr 26405 26800 065630 063341.pdf (442.6 KB) , goodnight
jgoodnight@washoecounty.us 5 2 12 email regarding hazlett loomis mhc 178.405 063341 26405.htm (16.3 KB) , all
emails from keith loomis keithloomis@earthlink.net between 2 27 12 and 8 10 12 26405 26800 00696 063341
065630.htm (322.8 KB) , 3 7 12 rmc 11 cr 26405 loomis gardner 178.405 Coughlin Trial Setting 26800 00696 063341
065630.pdf (321.4 KB) , 8 9 12 Loomis second Motion to withdraw 12 cr 12420 rmc see also 26405.pdf (229.2 KB) ,
State Bar Of Nevada nvbar casey baker 1708 26405.htm (42.7 KB) , 5 6 09 email from wls ed elcano 26405 60302
garnder 01955 10896 60302 26800 60317 54844 dd.pdf (15.3 KB) , 11 16 2011 email from reno city attorney
roberts.htm (16.3 KB) , WCSO Beckman, Debi Campbell, Cummings, Hodge Statements on property sezied from Reno
Attorney by Reno Munic Court Judge Nash Holmes.pdf (150.3 KB) , ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com emails to
puentes@aol.com.pdf (222.1 KB) , pam roberts on her duty.pdf (812.0 KB) , Patrick King sbn grievance letter of 3 16 12
and Judge Nash Holmes greivance of 3 14 12 rmc 11 TR 26800.pdf (575.8 KB) , proof of clandestine status conference
on 2 27 12 dogan young nash holmes schroeder rcr2012-065630 rjc rmc rpd wcso wcpd wcda - Copy.pdf (1644.4 KB) ,
proof of faxing notice of appeal to both rmc gardner and reno city attorney hazlett-stevens.pdf (14.5 KB) , proof picture
of personally delivering notice of appeal to city of reno hazlett 6 27 12 in cr12-1262 11 cr 26405.pdf (43.9 KB) , records
request and subpoena to RSIC.pdf (71.2 KB) , records request to rsic police.pdf (65.8 KB) , rmc 12 cr 12420 Loomis
motion to withdraw as counsel 8 9 12 City of Reno v Coughlin.pdf (926.9 KB) , Motion for Continuance to Reno City Atty
Roberts RMC.pdf (448.9 KB) , ORDER RELEASING PROPERTY 11 TR 26800 3 30 12 nash rmc rjc rpd wcso king clark
marked as recd back by rmc 4 13 12 return to sender pthoa hy.pdf (287.1 KB) , letter to bar counsel regarding rmc and
reno city attorney complaints with loomis emails.pdf (329.3 KB) , ex 1 to motion to set aside dismissal cr12-1262.pdf
(2.5 MB) , CR12-1262-3093668 (Opposition to Mtn ...).pdf (92.5 KB) , CR12-1262-3117150 (Ord Dismiss Appeal
Remand).pdf (73.9 KB) , CR12-1262-3119416 (Exhibit 1).pdf (2.7 MB) , 6 28 12 email to hazlett stevens showing what
was served notice of appeal 11 cr 26405 cr12-1262.pdf (12.8 KB) , 12 14 11 fax to Puentes re WCSO Affidavit of Service
REV2011-001708.pdf (24.9 KB) , 5 6 09 email from elcano wls stating his decision is limited to hearing conduct before
judge linda gardner rmc 26405 26800 60302.htm (10.3 KB)
Dear Panel Members and Bar Counsel,
I called Mr. King (he directed me to call Panel Chair Echeverria) today to seek clarification regarding an earlier approval he
relayed to me from Chief Bar Counsel David Clark, wherein Mr. Clark advised me that I, even though I am a temporarily
suspended attorney, have been given permission by the Office of Bar Counsel to issue subpoenas in connection with this
disciplinary matter (ng12-0204, ng12-0434, ng12-0435...odd, can't recall a single other "case" in all my legal research that had
three case numbers....especially where an Order Denying a Motion to Bifurcate was issued, even before the 5 days for me to file
a Reply to the Opposition (given NRCP is expressly applicable to these matters under the SCR's)...Am I going to find out that
my filings are "too long" under a view that assumes this is "one case" even though there are "three grievance case numbers" in
the caption, and where each "grievance" is fairly rambling? And where the SBN's King purports this hearing to involve that
which the N. S. Ct. Ordered to occur in response to its temporary suspension Order incident to the SCR 111 Petition for the
petty larceny of a "candy bar and some cough drops" (ie, the Court order that matter, 60838, referred to the Board for a "hearing
at which the sole issue to be determined" would be my punishment for that which was noticed and adjudicated in the 60838 SCR
111 Petition. I believe you are all now violating Nevada Law in persisting in your denial of my right to such a hearing wherein
the "sole issue" is such, but rather trying to jam me up with this "combo hearing" that seeks to encompass a great deal of
disparate claims (many of which are pending criminal charges, and therefore, entirely outside of your jursisiction at this point,
and your deigning to address them interferes with the orderly administration of justice in those pending criminal prosecutions, as
evinced by Judge Sferrazza's refusal to testify at the November 14th, 2012 Hearing...which is problematic considering Judge
Sferrazza presided over the civil summary eviction matter in RJC Rev2011-001708 that is intimately connect to ALL THREE of
the grievances included in King's reckless, negligent, compromised SCR 105 "Complaint". For instance:
NG12-0204: Richard G. Hill's January 14th, 2012 letter to Bar Counsel King (whom he had just worked on the Milsner v.
Carstarphen matter with (http://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2012/51631.html )
Today, King admitted to being unaware of who Casey Baker, Esq. is. King also admitted to not having read any of my filings
in any of these connected matters, only to then suggest an analogy along the lines of if a woman is raped a lot, she is probably a
whore and deserves it or wanted it, given the sheer mathematical improbability of any one woman getting raped over and over,
and how King just doesn't get paid enough to stick his nose into some gangbang, what with the chances of getting himself
involved in doing the right thing where it is just so much easier to sit back and pretend that the Claiborne decision (explicated
extensively in my attached August 13th, 2012 Petition) does not permit Bar Counsel to just throw its hands up and suggest that a
Muni Court conviction (even, in RMC 11 CR 26405, presided over by the brother of the judge whose sanctions Orders is before
you in NG12-0435, and where the brother refused to recuse himself from that criminal trespass conviction incident to the lies and
000576
or attempts to mislead a tribunal by Casey Baker, Esq. and Richard G. Hill at the June 18th, 2012 criminal trespass trial incident
to the civil eviction from Coughlin's former law office in RJC Rev2011-001708. Asst. Bar Counsel King also admitted that he
had failed to even view the video taped admission by RPD Sargent Lopez that she, Hill, Merliss, and RPD Officer Carter lied in
order to effectuate the wrongful arrest leading to Couglin's conviction by the brother of the sister whose 2009 sanctions Order
against Coughlin only became a grievance on March 14th, 2012 (apparently King adopts Ching as to whom can be an SCR 105
complainant, and therefore within the statute of limitations, when it comes to Gardner's April 2009 Order, but not when it
involves misconduct by a Chairman of the Character and Fitness Committee of the SBN, Spearmint Rhino owner Kevin Kelly,
Esq., whom also owns a Las Vegas Strip Club that gives cabbies $10 million dollars a year to funnel tourists to it's doors from
the airport, and the misconduct of Peter Christiansen, Jr. and Mike Sanft, and others incident to Coughlin's application for
admission in Nevada, including that of then Director of Admissions Patrice Eichmann, made all the more feasible by the conduct
of Mike Smiley Rowe, Esq. and the fraudulent conduct of Mark Tratos and Mary LaFrance) when RMC Judge Nash Holmes (in
response to prompting by the SBN) passed that three year old Order (attorneys get sanctioned all the time, such orders do not
become grievances as a matter of course, and the SBN has admitted it keeps no central record of any such grievances) on to Bar
Counsel after receiving it from her co-RMC Judge, and the brother of the family court judge issuing the sanction order...at right
about the time that Coughlin filed that March 7th, 2012 Notice of Appeal (and there is plenty of case law to establish that a
"summary criminal conviction" is a final appealable Order, and the RMC is fraudulently conspiring with transcriptionist Pam
Longoni to violate NRS 189.010-030 by demanding payment up front for such transcripts by indigent criminal defendants, and
Longoni and the RMC's fraud in that regard resulted in Judge Elliot denying Coughlin's appeal of the Wal-Mart candy bar petty
larceny conviction in cr11-2064, wherein Judge Elliot actually cites to a civil statute related to transcript preparation to justify the
RMC's fraud, seen elsewhere in CR12-1018, further the RMC "lost' Coughlin's Notice of Appeal of the 11 cr26405 criminal
trespass conviction appeal (despite Coughlin having digitial confirmation of the receipt of that fax by the RMC, and where RMC
Rules allows service thereof via that means upon both the Court and the City Attorney (and Hazlett-Stevens lied about that as
well, in addition to the lies he told respecting whether the City Attorney had received anything from the RSIC following
Coughlin's Wal-Mart arrest) in the "summary criminal contempt" Order stemming from the traffic citation (California roll) trial
connected to Coughlin reporting the admissions of bribery by Richard Hill (RPD Officer Carter stated as much during the
November 13th, 2011 criminal trespass arrest, now part of the SCR 105 Complaint, incorporated by reference, one must suppose,
by Hill's NG12-0204 grievance) to the Sargent who retaliated against Coughlin by issuing three traffic citations, for Coughlin so
reporting such admissions by the arresting officer in the trespass matter to the Sargent who issued the traffic citations to Coughlin
incident to Coughlin going to Hill's office to retrieve his keys, wallet, client's files, and goverment issued identification after
being release from 3 days in jail incident to the wrongful criminal trespass arrest.
Mr. King is beyond incorrect is stating that he will be able to simply point to a criminal conviction and declare that no inquiry
into the legitimacy of that conviction may be made. There is a wealth of case law and precedent that holds otherwise, and Mr.
King has previously been made aware of that. This is true especially where the convictions at issue completely fail to evince
even baseline level of regard for traditional notions of due process. Simply put, some might say the members of this Panel ought
think rather hard before tying their reputations to the mast that is the extremely low bar required to get a conviction in the Reno
Municipal Court these days....and further, the Panel would be well advised to avoid letting Mr. King lead it down that primrose
path wherein one believes they will be entitled to merely accept a municipal court conviction as conclusive proof of misconduct
or otherwise rule irrelevant any inquiry into the circumstances attendant to such a matter. This will be particularly true where
Mr. King seeks to, in his SCR 105 Complaint, allege matters not even charged in that Municipal Court criminal trespass
proseuction. How Mr. King will be able to allege his RPC 3.8 violating allegations respecting "breaking and entering" or
"broken locks" are relevant or admissible where Coughlin's dissection of the illegitimacy of the Walmart candy bar petty larceny
conviction (supposedly part of the SCR 105 Compalint....and mentioned in Hill's NG12-0204 grievance...which brings to mind
the question...what of matters not mentioned in any of the three grievance numbers? How are they eligible for inclusion in some
SCR 105 "Complaint' that lacks a unique case number of its own?) Regardless, it is November 2nd, 2012 and my defense has
been irreversibly prejudiced by the refusal of Bar Counsel to allow me to access the materials at the SBN that are my right to
under the SCR, thus bringing the legitimacy of the entire November 14th, 2012 hearing into doubt, to which any argument that I
should be made to fit the bill for Bar Counsel's bungling and fraudulent failure to follow the rules applicable to this matter, in
addition to its own written attestations, is entirely unsupportable.
Regardless, Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s hench man, Casey Baker, Esq., now that the heat is on and he and Hill's avarice driven
misdeeds are finally facing the oversight they deserve, has now suddenly fled back to Kentucky:
http://www.nvbar.org/lawyer-detail/11271
It was Baker whom Hill used to file the November 21st, 2011 and January 20th, 2012 filings in RJC Rev2011-001708 and the appeal thereof in CV11-03628 to
make the allegatons that Hill himself knew unwise to make in his own regard within a sworn Declaration...So, despite Hill, not Baker, having the eye witness
knowledge of such events (like whether the RPD identified themselves as law enforcement and issued to Coughlin a lawful warning to leave at the risk of a
criminal trespass citation or arrest prior to the landlord kicking down the door to a quasi "basement" under the property that Baker's own testimony at the June
18th, 2012 trespass trail admits lacked any sort of exterior lock, and thus would require no "breaking of any sort" of the type both Susich and King suddenly felt
the need to allege when considering how terribly compromised their 60975 Petiton and the instant SCR 105 "combo-grievances" (kind of like a "due process
000577
value meal" that Pat King is serving up, and asking this Board to co-sign...which, apparently the Chairman finds fitting....what's next, are you going to have lawyers
dress up in Hot Dog on a Stick employee uniforms (you know, rainbow colors, the spinning thing atop the hat, etc.) too? Is that how little the property right of a
law license (case law declares it as much under the Fourteenth Amendment, and any willful deprivation thereof by this Board, including a deprivation of the due
process required to impinge thereupon, can subject the members of this Board the 42 USC Sec. 1983 liability, especially where, as her, what appears to be a
coordinated effort to obstruct justice and proceed impermissibly under color of law for the self interested aims of those leveraging such positions is apparent.
RICO.
I am writing to request confirmation of what I believe Mr. Clark has previously rule, ie, that I, as an indigent respondent herein, am not required to pay witnesses
any sort of "witness fee" in issuing and or serving subpoenas and subpoens duces tecums upon them in connection with the November 14th, 2011 Hearing in
this matter. I feel Hill's then associate Casey Baker, Esq's testimony will be particular necessary to this hearing (especially where Hill admits himself that he was
not present at the purported November 1st, 2011 "lockout" in the eviction matter (and the service of an receipt by the WCSO with respect to any such lockout
Order is of material relevance, as NRS 40.253 requires such an Order be carried out "within 24 hours of receipt" thereof...and Baker's testimony at the June 18th,
2012 criminal trespass trial, in combination with previous statements by the Washoe County Sheriff's Office (and please add these individuals and matters to my
designation fo witnesses and summary of evidence to be presented) Supervisor Liz Stuchell, Roxy Silve, Deputy Machen, and administrators, supervisors, and
clerks at the Reno Justice Court (RJC) add up to the fact that it was Hill, Baker, and the WCSO, and RPD that were trespassing, not Coughlin, at Coughlin's former
home law office. Attached it the video taped admission by RPD Sargent Lopez respecting the lies by her, RPD Officer Carter, Hill, Merliss, and Baker leading to
Coughlin's arrest and conviction for criminal trespass. Keith Loomis will need to answer for his failure to fulfill the Sixth Amendment in that regard, in addition to
the content of the unapproved and impermissible "meeting" with RMC Judge Gardner and City of Reno Prosecutor wherein, upon information and belief, an
"approach" to handling the criminal trespass trial of Coughlin was "developed" shortly before the April 10th, 2012 Trial date in that criminal trespass matter (a
Trial date which violated Nevada law, anyways, in that it was set and held during the pendency of an Order for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin in violation of
NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010). Any trier of fact that wishes to attempt to pull the wool over Coughlin's eyes, make incongruous and patently compromised, often
sua sponte relevancy rulings, or otherwise cook up a due process value meal may wish to ask RMC Judge Gardner how the recent filings by Coughlin in 61901
and the RMC 11 CR 26405 are tasting right about now. Or get Judge Howard's inpute with respect to the analysis of his work in 60838. And Judge Nash
Holmes may be able to provide some insight as to how that approach served her, particularly where her "criminal summary contempt" order was made during
the pendency of an Order for Competency Evaluation, and cites to alleged conduct committed outside her immediate presence (and that's the thing about
"summary adjudications"....the are so arbitary and devoid of due process that the requirements attendant thereto must be stricly adhered to....so when Judge
Nash Holmes in here Orders in 11 TR 26800 of 2/28/12 and 3/12 3/13, and 3/13/12 refers to some RMC Marshal allegedly peering, Peeping Tom style, through a
bathroom stall wherein Coughlin was during a restroom break within that trial, her Order fails to adhere to the dictate that each element of any conduct she
deigns to summarily rule upon be committed in her "immediate presence"...otherwise, someone would have to sign an Affidavit like a grown up, and Coughlin
would be entitled to a hearing, and likely appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment before some Bar Counsel like King could attempt to prop up any such
"conviction" in an attempt to lend it an air of respectiability, especially where that Marshal Harley (whom King conveniently has failed to subpoena) had his own
self interested reasons for seeking to discredit Coughlin (RMC Marshal Harley violated the "courthouse sanctuary" rule and contributed to an appearance of
impropriety where he served Coughlin an Order to Show Cause incident to one of Hill's fraudulent Motions seeking to abuse process in hopes of remaining
competitive with an actual attorney like Coughlin (rather than a known hack like HIll whom inherited a law practice from his father and who legion of local
attorneys accuse of unneccesarily running up fees on his clients by purposefully overcomplicating litigations and engendering an adversarial stance amongst
litigants designed to line Hill's pockets, and those of, apparently, even his legal assistans, whom drive $130,000 Mercedes v12 SL-600 sport coupe convertibles to
crack inspections of law offices incident to impermissible summary evictions of commercial tenants where Hill chose to proceed under a No Cause Eviction Notice
(along with Baker) rather than a Non Payment Notice, and therein committed a "wrong site surgery" (in a litigation sense, to borrow some of the parlance of the
landlord, Dr. Merliss's field, wherein he is a Neurosurgeon/Neurologist in Chico, CA, apparently armed with enough money to choose to run up $60,000, as of
April 2012 in fees ot HIll and Baker in these matters rather than settle with Coughlin for the $1,500 Coughlin offered him).
Please add to the witness list all the individuals mentioned in the various filings I have provided you, including, but not limited to RPD Officers Duralde, Rosa,
Alaksa, Weaver, Look, Travis Warren, and Leedy, RPD Sargent Tarter,Lopez, Sifre, Oliver Miller, Dye, and Bradshaw, Hill's Associate Casey Baker, Sheri Hill, and to
be deterimined members of HIll's staff (particulary those with knowledge of any matters connected to the receipt of either of the Eviction Orders by the WCSO in
the eviction matter, WCPD Jim Leslie, Biray Dogan, Joe Goodnight, Walmart Thomas Frontino and ASM John Ellis, and a yet to be determined AP Associate whom,
along with Ellis, made express threats to retaliate against Coughlin with abuse of process similar to the petty larceny candy bar conviction in 60838 that currently
forms the only basis for the suspension of Coughlin's law license and for which this Panel and the SBN are violating Nevada law in persisting in refusing to follow
the dicates of both the Supreme Court Rules of Nevada and the Court's June 7th, 2012 Order in 60838, but rather, like Clerk/"reluctant" Investigator Peters, are
allowing themselves to be led down that primrose path that Pat King finds to pleasurable to take the unwitting along in his social climbing and life of ease and
comfort, devoid of honor or intergrity, approach to life...Also, to the extent then Panel considers a pending criminal prosecution up for inquiry in a disciplinary
proceeding, included in potential witness call may call are Nicole Watson, Lucy Byington, Nate Zarate, Cory Goble, the individual whose phone number is
7753786673, Colton Templeton, Robert Dawson, Nick Duralde, Ron Rosa, Thomas Alaksa, Savannah Montgomery, Linda Gray, Kelly Odom, Kariann Beechlker, RPD
Officer Schaur and any others present at arrest of 1/14/12 for "misuse of emergency communications", and of the 5-6 officers whom, along with RPD Duralde
pulled Coughlin over upon his release from jail on 1/13/12 for the 1/12/12 "jaywalking" arrest made upon the fraudulent assertions of Richard HIll, RJC Judge
Jack Schroeder (whom evicted Coughlin from Park Terrace and granted Hill the protection order incident to the jaywalking arrest and who yelled "do you want to
go to jail" at Coughlin at the extension hearing when Coughlin broached the topic of Hill's abuse of process, and whom wrongfully granted the 6/27/12 Eviction
Order in RJC Rev2012-001048 despite the deficient 5 day notice listing the wrong court to file a tenan'ts affidavit (a requirement under NRS 40.253, and despite
Coughlin's numerous calls and 6/26/12 email to the RJC, SJC, RPD and WCSO, also Jeff Nichols and Peter Eastman and Paul Freitag, Esq. (involved in SBN King's
impermissilbe disclosures and slanderous statements concerning Coughlin and the NVB (which King also made to his boss in front of Coughlin, David Clark, and
which have proven to be baseless, despite King ticking such off amongst the top 2 reasons for the SCR 105 Complaint he alleged he would hurriedly throw
together upon Coughlin serving King, the SBN, Clark and Peters the August 13th, 2012 filing in 60838 and 61426, now before the N. S. Ct.). Also, Richard Cornell,
Tom Hall, Geof Giles, and Michael Lehrners, Judge Joe Van Walraven and others all whom have indicated, to one degree or another, that Hill's conduct incident
to this eviction matter and concomitant appeal is deplorable and entirely consistent with the way Hill has comported himself throughout his 33 year career, which
began with is inheriting a large scale law practice from his father, and continued on with Hill effecting the manner of a 10 year old boy entrusted with flying a
747 full of people, to this day. Add to the witness List Paul Elcano of WLS, Judge Steven Elliot, Judge Patrick Flanagan, Hale Lane/Holland and Hart's Anthony
Hall and Tim Lukas, Richard Elmore, Judge Scott Pearson, Judge Peter J. Sferrazza (though he indicated on 10/22/12 that he declined the SBN's request that he
testify, citing his sitting on the pending criminal prosecution in RCR2011-063341), the RJC's Bonnie Cooper and "Nevi", Chief Bailiff Michael Sexton, RMC Chief
Marshal Roper and Marshal Deighton, Marshal Thompson, Marshal Coppa, WCDC Van der Wal, Beatson, Hoekstra, Cheung, unnamed deputies. Further, please
add Western Nevada Management's Sue King, Jared Scalise, and Park Terrace Townhomes Association attorney Gayle Kern, Esq., Roberto Puentes, Lew Taitel, the
RMC's Matthew Fisk and Cassandra Jackson, Donna Ballard, Judge Howards past legal assistant, Judge Nash Holmess legal and administrative assistant, Martin
Crowley or Martin Weiner or whichever attorney is was Judge Nash Holmes was sued for wiretapping in the past, the RMC counter clerk "Daniel" and "Thom",
WDC Chief Appeals Clerk Matheus, Joey Orduna Hastings, Chief Judge David Hardy, Justice Hardesty (whom was one of only three Justices signing the June 7th,
2012 temporary suspension Order, but whom recused himself from 60302 and 60317, the wrongful termination suit against Washoe Legal Services (see attached
letters from WLS's Executive Director citing Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin as the "sole reason" for Coughlin's firing (her brother,
RMC Judge William Gardner refused to recuse himself from the criminal trespass conviction mentioned in in King's SCR 105 Complaint, and King admitted two
000578
weeks ago that he was unaware that the two Judge Gardners were brother and sister or related whatsoever, or that Judge Nash Holmes was a prison warden or
something similar for ten years, and a lifelong prosecutor besides that (in addition to all other RMC Judges and all RMC court appointed defenders).
Also, I never received any Notice of Intent to Take Default from the SBN, and herein lodge my objection to any Order by this Panel that cites thereto.
Additionally, SBN's Peters has indicated no other respondents have ever been made to pay witness subpoena fees, and further Peters and the SBN have
repeatedly failed to adhere to agreements they have made with Coughlin (including the failure of the SBN to resend a certified mail copy of the SCR 105
Complaint incident to the agreement between Peters and Coughlin on or about September 11th, 2012.
Sincerely,
Sincerley,
skent@skentlaw.com, mike@tahoelawyer.com, nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net, patrickk@nvbar.org; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; davidc@nvbar.org;
complaints@nvbar.org; tsusich@nvdetr.org; je@eloreno.com; cvellis@bhfs.com
Subject: RE: Records
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
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From:
Sent: Wed 9/07/11 10:51 PM
THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT HOWEVER THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE OFFICER'S
Thank you,
Officer WOZNIAK,
000579
From:
Sent: Sun 1/08/12 1:35 AM
tracking number is T12000219.
system.
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Sun 1/08/12 2:25 AM
system.
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Sun 1/08/12 2:47 AM
To: ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM
system.
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Tue 1/10/12 12:29 AM
system.
000580
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Tue 1/10/12 1:04 AM
system.
Online Officer
Your Online Police Report 120100300 Has Been Approved
From:
Sent: Wed 1/11/12 3:09 PM
1 attachment
report-120100300-0.pdf (76.4 KB)
Your report has been approved report and the permanent number of the case is
120100300.
the delicate information in his report has been replaced for *** to support isolation in this email.
Thank you for using our online reporting system and please contact us with any suggestions you have for improving
our system.
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Wed 1/11/12 3:29 PM
1 attachment
report-120100300-1.pdf (76.4 KB)
Your report has been approved supplemental report and the permanent number of the case is
120100300.
our system.
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Wed 1/11/12 3:29 PM
To: ZACHCOUGHLIN@HOTMAIL.COM
1 attachment
report-120100300-2.pdf (62.7 KB)
120100300.
000581
our system.
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Wed 1/11/12 3:32 PM
1 attachment
report-120100300-3.pdf (64.5 KB)
120100300.
our system.
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Wed 1/11/12 3:35 PM
1 attachment
report-120100302-0.pdf (81.2 KB)
120100302.
our system.
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Fri 6/08/12 4:39 PM
****THIS IS AN UN-MONITORED MAIL BOX****
in your email within approximately ten business days.
system.
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Fri 6/08/12 4:45 PM
000582
system.
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Mon 6/11/12 4:10 PM
1 attachment
report-120103420-0.pdf (71.4 KB)
120103420.
our system.
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Mon 6/11/12 4:11 PM
1 attachment
report-120103420-1.pdf (70.9 KB)
120103420.
our system.
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Fri 9/21/12 8:09 PM
system.
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Fri 9/21/12 8:49 PM
000583
system.
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Thu 10/04/12 3:42 PM
1 attachment
report-120105605-0.pdf (10.8 KB)
120105605.
our system.
Online Officer
From:
Sent: Thu 10/04/12 3:54 PM
1 attachment
report-120105605-1.pdf (8.6 KB)
120105605.
our system.
Online Officer
Print Close
RE: release of information to my attorney
From:Goodnight, Joseph W (JGoodnight@washoecounty.us)This sender is in your safe list.
Sent: Wed 5/02/12 4:45 PM
Mr. Coughlin,
MHC has received your referral and diagnosis from Ascent NBI. The MHC coordinator indicated that your case will be added to Friday's staffing and your
application "looks fine." I take that to indicate that you'll likely be accepted. I have a call in to DDA Young to re-open negotiations. This is what I intend to
present for a global resolution:
Parties will agree to transfer jurisdiction of RCR11-063341 (RJC Misdemeanors) to MHC. DDA Young will defer prosecution of RCR12-065630 (misuse of
911) and upon successful completion of MHC, will dismiss with prejudice. City prosecutor in Reno Municipal Court case (Trespass) will defer prosecution
and upon successful completion of MHC, will dismiss with prejudice (your attorney, Mr. Loomis, should advise you regarding this case).
Is that acceptable to you? If not, please let me know immediately.
000584
Sincerely,
Joe Goodnight
**********************************************************
Joseph W. Goodnight
Deputy Public Defender
(775) 337-4839
jgoodnight@washoecounty.us
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain confidential
information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby
notified that you have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this information is
strictly prohibited.
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 2:28 PM
To: Goodnight, Joseph W
Subject: FW: release of information to my attorney
Joe,
Here is Yassars assistants update. I am in favor of a global resolution. regarding mental health court, do they attemt to take
over ones medical care or second guess ones doctor on health care matters? what is the worst case scenario with mental
health court? lets say one does not do well in it, does that defendnat then get tried in justice court as they would have before
entering mental health court? can the mental health court sentence one to jail?
thanks,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 3961, RENO, NV, 89505, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
> From: megan@ascentreno.com
> To: ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
> Subject: RE: release of information to my attorney
> Date: Wed, 2 May 2012 14:22:06 -0700
>
> Zach,
> I have not had time to type up the letter due to the high volume of patients and calls in the office. I will get to the letter as soon as I get a chance . The
attorneys office did call prior to you showing up in the office and due to that I did not have a release to talk with them regarding your diagnosis or
treatment I told them I would have to get that first.
>
> Megan Sredy
>
> Megan Sredy
> Patient Coordinator
> Ascent NBI & TMS Center
> 540 West Plumb Lane, Suite 1A
> Reno, NV 89509
> Phone (775) 322-4666; Fax (775) 322-4747
>
>
> IMPORTANT:
> This message (including any attachments) may contain confidential, proprietary, privileged and/or private information. The information is intended to be for
the use of the individual or entity designated above. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please notify the sender immediately, and delete
the message and any attachments. Any disclosure, reproduction, distribution or other use of this message or any attachments by an individual or entity other
than the intended recipient is prohibited.
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: zach coughlin [mailto:ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2012 2:06 PM
> To: ecek@ascentreno.com; megan@ascentreno.com
> Subject: release of information to my attorney
>
> From: zach coughlin <ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com>
> Subject: release of information to my attorney
> Phone: 7753388118
>
> Message Body:
000585
> ----------------------
>
> My attorney sent me the following earlier today
>
> > Mr. Coughlin,
> > I have not received anything from Dr. Yassar's office. I called again and left a message with them to contact me regarding the release. I'd like
confirmation of the diagnosis today so I can submit your MHC application (again, due on Wednesday for staffing/acceptance meeting on Friday). Would you
like me to try submitting your application without the diagnosis? Perhaps this would achieve a conditional acceptance pending receipt of the diagnosis. Let
me know.
> > Sincerely,
> > Joe Goodnight
> >
> > PS - I don't know about your second question regarding RMC contact.
> >
> > **********************************************************
> > Joseph W. Goodnight
> > Deputy Public Defender
> > (775) 337-4839
> > jgoodnight@washoecounty.us
>
>
>
>
>
> Note, above is Joe Goodnights telephone number and email.
>
>
>
> --
> This mail is sent via quick contact form on Ascent Reno Psychiatry http://ascentrenopsychiatry.com
>
Print Close
RE: rmc 11 cr 26405 you are appointed counsel? for puentes ne taitel?
From:Keith Loomis (keithloomis@earthlink.net)
Sent: Mon 2/27/12 3:27 PM
To: 'Zach Coughlin' (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Mr. Coughlin:
E-mail works well for me.
Keith Loomis
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net
Subject: rmc 11 cr 26405 you are appointed counsel? for puentes ne taitel?
hi, i guess Mr. Loomis was appointed as my 3rd defense attorney in RMC case 11 cr 26405. I have not heard anything about this case, and
the RMC indicated they had nothing scheduled. Please communicate with me only via email or fax please, having issues with my mail
incident to domestic violence committed against me my fax is 949 667 7402. thanks,
Zach Coughlin
court date
Sent: Mon 3/05/12 4:09 PM
000586
Mr. Coughlin:
I have requested that court set your trespass case for trial in about 30 days. I will let you know the date and time as soon as I know.
Keith Loomis
RE: court date
Sent: Wed 3/07/12 4:36 PM
Mr. Coughlin:
On what grounds, other than those already set forth in your existing motion, do you believe a motion to dismiss should be filed?
Keith Loomis
Subject: RE: court date
Mr. Loomis,
Please copy me on any and all correspondences, filing, or other documentation or verbal requests,
correspondences, etc. that you submit to the Court, including the one you reference below. Please
do not follow Taitel's tact of agreeing to requests or failing to oppose motions without even
attempting to obtain my permission to in advance thereof.
I would like for you to draft a Motion to Dismiss in this case for me review.
Thanks,
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No: 9473
From: keithloomis@earthlink.net
Subject: court date
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2012 16:09:19 -0800
Mr. Coughlin:
000587
I have requested that court set your trespass case for trial in about 30 days. I will let you know the date and time as soon as I know.
Keith Loomis
RE: court date
Sent: Fri 3/09/12 10:14 AM
No worries. Made me laugh.
Couple of questions:
Did you file an appeal from Justice of the Peace Sferrazzas eviction order?
If yes, has it been resolved?
Did Sferrazza announce at the close of the hearing on the 25
th
that he was granting the eviction and ask Hill/Baker to provide a written order?
Did you ever see the eviction order posted by WCSO
If yes, when?
What is relevance of personnel files of Carter or Lopez?
How is Dr. Merliss testimony material to the defense of this case?
Keith Loomis
Dear Mr. Loomis,
I apologize Sir for what I am sure comes across as rudeness on my part. You seem like a good
guy, and you have great hair. I simply don't have time, money or energy to do any of this the
polite way given the "uniqueness" of this situation....Please just know I mean you no disrespect.
Would you please file a request or Motion for the Personnel File of RPD Officer Chris Carter and
Sargent Monica Lopez as well as supboena from the RPD all the volumns of crap Richard Hill has
given them on this in addition to noticing the court and City Atty as to Richard HIll being a
witness, subpoena him (though the earlier continuance would appear to imply he already is) AND
000588
SUBPOENA THE OLD CALIFORNIA NEUROSURGEON WHO CAN GET HIS OUT DOWN HERE FOR
THE TRIAL AND A DEPOSITION PRIOR THERETO, ETSPECIALLY CONSIDERING THAT THE VARIOUS
POLICE REPORTS AND MOTIONS FOR ORDERS TO SHOW CAUSE QUOTE MERLISS AS SAYING HE
WAS AT THE PROPERTY IN THE "WEEKS PRECEEDING" THE ARREST, ETC., ETC. (THE STUFF BOBBY
PUENTES GOT YOU WHEN HE COPIED YOU MY FILE, IE MY FAXES TO BOBBY, SET THIS OUT
CLEARLY). iF THESE FOOLS WANT TO HAVE ME ARREST AND ATTEMPT TO RUN A TRAIN ON ME,
THEN THEY CAN PUT THE TIME AND WORK IN AND NOT PHONE IT IN FROM CALI AND HAVE
THEIR RENT-A-LYCAN rICHARD HILL DO IT.
ALSO PLEASE FILE A MOTION TO dismiss based upon denial of right to a speedy trial, spoliation of
evidence, etc....
PEACE
Trial Date
Sent: Fri 3/09/12 10:44 AM
1 attachment
Coughlin Trial Setting.pdf (771.8 KB)
See attached
RE: Trial Date
From:Keith Loomis (keithloomis@earthlink.net)This sender is in your safe list.
Sent: Mon 3/12/12 9:26 AM
I can do that if there is a good reason to vacate the date. What is the reason?
Keith
Subject: RE: Trial Date
Please file something with the court seeking to vacate that trial date and explaining that you failed
to even once consult with your client prior to setting it.
Subject: Trial Date
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 10:44:17 -0800
000589
See attached
RE: court date
Sent: Mon 3/12/12 10:02 AM
This e-mail is sent to address the grounds you identified as forming the basis of a motion to dismiss. As you know there is both a constitutional right and a
statutory right to a speedy trial. This case is nowhere close to a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The statute does provide for a right to
trial within 60 days of arraignment in municipal court. NRS 178.556(2). In this circumstance the court may dismiss the complaint. The statute requires,
however, that the trial not have been postponed at the request of the defendant. It is my understanding that the January 10, 2012, trial date, was postponed
at your request. If that is true then there are not grounds to dismiss on the basis of a violation of a right to speedy trial.
Dismissal based on spoliation is a civil concept. It has not been applied to criminal cases in Nevada as of yet. See Higgs v. State, 126 Nev. Adv. Opn 1
(2010). Rather defendants in criminal cases are protected from the loss of evidence in the hands of the prosecution by the doctrine of due process.
Consequently you might have a basis to request dismissal if the City Attorneys Office lost evidence, in its possession material to the case. In such case if the
City acted in bad faith or with connivance or if you were prejudiced by the loss then there may be grounds on which to base a dismissal. Please advise as to
what evidence was lost and how it was lost.
You have not identified any other grounds as a basis for dismissal. If you believe there are other grounds, let me know.
Thanks
Keith Loomis
Dear Mr. Loomis,
I apologize Sir for what I am sure comes across as rudeness on my part. You seem like a good
000590
guy, and you have great hair. I simply don't have time, money or energy to do any of this the
polite way given the "uniqueness" of this situation....Please just know I mean you no disrespect.
Would you please file a request or Motion for the Personnel File of RPD Officer Chris Carter and
Sargent Monica Lopez as well as supboena from the RPD all the volumns of crap Richard Hill has
given them on this in addition to noticing the court and City Atty as to Richard HIll being a
witness, subpoena him (though the earlier continuance would appear to imply he already is) AND
SUBPOENA THE OLD CALIFORNIA NEUROSURGEON WHO CAN GET HIS OUT DOWN HERE FOR
THE TRIAL AND A DEPOSITION PRIOR THERETO, ETSPECIALLY CONSIDERING THAT THE VARIOUS
POLICE REPORTS AND MOTIONS FOR ORDERS TO SHOW CAUSE QUOTE MERLISS AS SAYING HE
WAS AT THE PROPERTY IN THE "WEEKS PRECEEDING" THE ARREST, ETC., ETC. (THE STUFF BOBBY
PUENTES GOT YOU WHEN HE COPIED YOU MY FILE, IE MY FAXES TO BOBBY, SET THIS OUT
CLEARLY). iF THESE FOOLS WANT TO HAVE ME ARREST AND ATTEMPT TO RUN A TRAIN ON ME,
THEN THEY CAN PUT THE TIME AND WORK IN AND NOT PHONE IT IN FROM CALI AND HAVE
THEIR RENT-A-LYCAN rICHARD HILL DO IT.
ALSO PLEASE FILE A MOTION TO dismiss based upon denial of right to a speedy trial, spoliation of
evidence, etc....
PEACE
RE: Trial Date
From:Keith Loomis (keithloomis@earthlink.net)You moved this message to its current location.
Sent: Wed 3/14/12 2:35 PM
Dear Mr. Coughlin:
My obligation under Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2 is to abide by a clients decision concerning the objectives of representation and, as required
by Rule 1.4 to consult with the client as to the means by which the objectives of representation are to be pursued. In a criminal case the lawyer shall abide
by the clients decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial whether the client will testify.
Under Rule 1.4 (a)(5) a lawyer shall consult with the client about any relevant limitations on the lawyers conduct when the lawyer knows that the client
expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
Under Rule 2.1. In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the clients
situation.
Under Rule 3.1. A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for
doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for a defendant in a
criminal proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.
000591
Under Rule 3.2(a) and (b). A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.
The duty stated in paragraph (a) does not preclude a lawyer from granting a reasonable request from opposing counsel for an accommodation, such as an
extension of time, or from disagreeing with a clients wishes on administrative and tactical matters, such as scheduling depositions, the number of depositions
to be taken, and the frequency and use of written discovery requests.
Under Rule 8.4(d) It is misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct which is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
These, and others, are the professional rules I operate under in providing legal representation to you in case number 11 CR 26405, a case in which you are
charged with the crime of trespass. It is my understanding that your objective in this criminal case is that you be acquitted of the crime of trespass. That is
my purpose in representing you. I am happy to work towards that outcome to the best of my ability. It is my opinion, however, that much of what you ask
to be done is not in compliance with the above rules. Accordingly, I will not be filing a motion to dismiss based upon NRCP 6(a) and (b), I see that
argument as frivolous. I will not be proceeding with the summoning of an out-of-state witness (Merliss) unless you can establish his materiality to the
defense. Nor will I be subpoenaing the personnel records of law enforcement personnel unless you can establish to my satisfaction why they are relevant to
this case. I have no intention at this time of conducting any depositions in the case or sending requests for production of documents or interrogatories in
the case. I see these actions as unduly burdensome on the judicial system, and unwarranted by anything you have provided to this point. I also see them as
frivolous and an attempt to utilize the criminal justice system to accomplish objectives not relevant to my purpose in representing you.
If you are dissatisfied with the limitations I perceive to exist regarding my representation of you, you are welcome to terminate my representation of you.
You may then ask the Court to appoint a new lawyer to represent you.
It is my understanding that Deputy Machem will be testifying in the case along with Richard Hill and Casey Baker.
I do think that there are some interesting angles to the case upon which a defense can be based and I will be pursuing those angles. I have asked you in
previous e-mails to provide information which I believe will be helpful to the defense of your case.
I advise you that the City has offered to recommend time-served as a sentence if you enter a no-contest plea to trespass. It is also my understanding that
you have other criminal cases pending in both Reno Justice Court and in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. It is my understanding
further that all of the criminal cases can be resolved in a single plea to a misdemeanor offense if you will obtain psychological counseling. It is my obligation
to inform you of the availability of these resolutions to the present criminal case in which I provide representation. I will, of course, abide by your decision as
to whether to accept these resolutions or not.
I note that there is a psychiatric evaluation scheduled for you in 2
nd
Judicial District Court Case No. CR12-0376 on April 3, 2012. The outcome of that
evaluation could have an important impact on this case. I am asking that you authorize a release of the information contained in the evaluation to me so
that I may determine what impact it could have on your behalf in this case.
I remain prepared to represent you in the trespass case. I think that a trial of the case will be interesting. My representation, however, is circumscribed by
the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct.
Keith Loomis
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 4:29 PM
Dear Mr. Loomis,
000592
In your motion to dismiss, I would like you to really focus on and set forth to the court the fact that the eviction
order needed to be served in compliance with NRCP 6(a) and 6(e). NRS 40.400 Rules of practice. The provisions of NRS, Nevada
Rules of Civil Procedure and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials, so far as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections.
The language about "removing the tenant with in 24 hours of receipt of the order" is only applicable to those situations where the tenant does
not file a Tenant's Answer or Tenant's Affidavit. I did file such a Tenan'ts Affidavit, and litigated the matter thoroughly. In those situations,
NRS 40.400 requires NRCP to apply, specifically NRCP 6(a) and 6(e), and clearly WCSO Machem (please subpoena and identify as
witnesses Mary Kandaras, Esq. of the WCDA Civil Disvision, WCSO Deputy Machem, and WCSO Civil Division supervisor Liz Stuchell for
the trial in this matter, and further send out a request for production and subpoena duces tecum to the WCDA and the WCSO askign them to
specify, in writing and in detail, the exact procedures and policies in place with respect to the service and conducting of such lockouts (ie, not
default lockouts where there is not a summary eviction hearing, but one's like the present one, where there was a Tenant's Answer and hearing
held, etc....). Be sure to ask whether the are aware of what "personally served" means, and whether they mail the Orders on top of merely
posting them to the door. Further, I have been told that the WCSO has a policy or penatly system in place whereby the deputies must get
these lockouts performed "within 24 hours of receipt of the order" the receipt being the WCSO's receipt, and not the tenant's receipt. I don't
ncessarily read the statute that way, but....the WCSO policy and punishment system would be at least some indication of what the legislature
meant (I guess, but I dont' really think so, though, you will note that Hill was left with nothing but citing to the "usual and customary practice
of the WCSO" in serving the Eviction ORders and performign lockouts, I believe, because the law does not contain much to support Hill's
contention and therefore he wishes to see the WCSO "customary practices" being given the weight of law.
Please see some specific selections attached from the eviction matter. I know, I know, you want to curtail the scope of your representation to
an immaculate degree....but Hill can clearly be seen in his various Motion to Show Cause, State Bar Grievances, Temproary Protection Order
Applications, etc., etc., to be a punk who doesn't much like competing on an even playing field, like any good private schooler, he would
rather sick an attack dog on somebody than get in the octogon and go toe to toe mentally. Regardless, Hill shows a continual desire to subvert
NRCP 6(e), which applies to service of documents filed elecronically in the Second Judicial District Court. He would rather withhold
opposing counsels computers, laptops, client files, driver's license, etc. The last thing he wants is to go argument for argument, research for
research, writing for writing. Private school and daddy's pleading bank. Hill files a Motion to Show caue allegeing Coughlin subvreted an
Order that was filed on January 11th, 2012 with Couglin's action of January 12th, 2012. Under NRCP 6(e), the Order Denying the TRO had
not even been served yet, and there has been no indidcation that Hill gave the Order at the town dump to anyone other than an RPD Officer.
Further, it is not all that clear why Hills Motion for ORder to Show Cause deserves a full blown hearing when D7 does not indicate a hearing
will be accorded to the appeal. This is particularly suspect given that Anvui sets forth that appeals in summary eviction matters are done on a
trial de novo basis.
There are a number, but how about your complete lack of communication with me prior to so setting that date.
How about Mr. Taitel and Mr. Puentes's failure in this matter and the prejudice to my case so created? How about
your failing to identify yourself as the public defender to a room full of defendants in jail at the arraignment?
There are other reasons as well, including, but not limited to, your resistance to subpoena the materials I have and
am requesting.
I wish for you to subpoena the personnel files of both RPD Sargent Monica Lopez and Officer Chris Carter. I wish
for you to list Dr. Merliss as a witness and subpoena his appearance and appropriately notice the City of Reno in
that regard, same goes for Richard Hill and Casey Baker (Baker, by letter dated November 10th, 2011 demands the
full rental value for the property as "storage" under NRS 40.253, while also asserting he will go after moving and
inventory costs, in addition to Hill's contractor Phil Stewarts later ridiculous charges and perjury. Please subpoena
Stewart as well.
Most importantly subpoena Washoe County Sheriff's Office Deputy Machem to testify and serve a subpoena
dueces tecum, requests for production, and interrogatories seeking records and responses from the WCSO as set
forth in the letter I sent Liz Stuchell (see attached) on or about February 10th, 2012. You see, the WCSO and
Deputy Machem may be committing a fraud upon the public by repeatedly filing affidavits of service that attest to
personal service where Liz Stuchell, of the WCSO admits that they clearly do not know, or choose to "remix" the
legal meaning of "personally serve".
Further, please inform the City of Reno and appropriately notice the same as to the existence and intent to offer
into evidence a video of Richard Hill, Esq., admitting that he and his firm, on behalf of Dr. Merliss, were withholding
the accused personal property, in addition to the client's files from the former commercial lease home law office of
the accused and asserting a lien, under NRS 40.253 for "storage", however, as the video tape shows, Hill admits to
charging the undersigned the same $900 per month rent as was charged for the "full use and occupancy" of the 000593
premises at 121 River Rock St., Reno, NV 89512. Hill further demands that property be removed in a certain order,
regardless of whether his articifically inflated lien was paid or not. Additionally, Hill committed fraud upon the
court in a number of instances and filed false police reports wherein he alleges that he agreed to or otherwise
made available to the accused items such as the accused's clients files (and for a time wallet and state issued
driver's license) where, clearly, without requiring any payment by the accused, however, clearly, the facts show that
Hill never actually lived up to those assertions and repeatedly failed to show provide such items absent payment of
his artifically inflated lien.
Further, I wish for you to divulge and provide notice that it is available for pickup and that we intent to introduce
into evidence a video of RPD Sargent Monica Lopez admitting that she and RPD Officer Carter did not identify
themselves as police officers or otherwise ask the accused to leave 121 River Rock St. on the date of the arrest prior
to Merliss opening the door to the basement. This is apparently in direct contradiction to the sworn filings made
by Richard Hill, Esq. in his affidavits attached to his various Motions to Show Cause, the Reply to Opposition
thereto, Opposition to TRO, etc., etc. (in RJC Rev2011-001708 and the appeal in CV11-03628). For that reason
alone Merliss' presence is required. He was a precipient witness and you are asking me why he should be there?
You have a duty to zealously advocate on my behalf, Mr. Loomis. You are paid, by the public, to do so. Please
divulge any prior associations you have with anyone employed by or workign as an independent contractor with
the RMC and or the Reno City Attorney, including anyone you went to law school with or attended the same law
school as, within a 5 year period.
Further, I wish for you to file a motion seeking a mistrial or otherwise requiring the recusal of the RMC and further
disclosing why it is that Judge Gardner seemingly has recused Judge Dilworth (why wouldn't Judge Dilworth recuse
Judge Dilworth?) in one case, without detailing why exactly, while Judge Gardner apparently is intent on remaining
on in 11 CR 26405, despite the fact that an apparent conflict exists, one which he only disclosed upon prompting
from the accused, with respect to Judge Gardner's very recent employment with the Reno City Attorney's office and
the existing and or brewing litigation (or, at least, possible litigation) between the accused and the City of Reno,
Reno City Attorney, and possibly, the RMC.
Zach Coughlin, Esq., 1422 E. 9th St. #2, RENO, NV 89512, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402; ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com Nevada Bar No:
9473
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2012 09:26:35 -0700
I can do that if there is a good reason to vacate the date. What is the reason?
Keith
Please file something with the court seeking to vacate that trial date and explaining that you failed
to even once consult with your client prior to setting it.
000594
Subject: Trial Date
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2012 10:44:17 -0800
See attached
RE: i was evicted 3 15 12, i need a continuance
Sent: Wed 3/28/12 2:03 PM
Dear Mr. Coughlin:
This message is sent to address issues raised in the e-mail you sent on 3-26-12.
1. Please note that you are free to send the communications you send to me, to anyone else you desire. You should be aware that sending your
communications to other parties will cause your communications to me to lose their attorney-client confidentiality.
2. For what specific purposes do you need a continuance? A continuance purely for the purpose of delay is not a proper reason for a
continuance.
3. Whether you are entitled to e-mail the Reno Municipal Court is not my concern. That is a problem to be addressed between you and the
Court.
4. Ms. Drake is no longer the attorney handling your case for the Reno City Attorneys Office. Your case is now being handled by Christopher
Hazlett-Stevens, Esq.
5. In response to your question regarding the weaknesses of the trespassing case I offer the following:
a. The complaint is deficient in that if fails to set forth the elements of the crime of trespass. It fails to identify whether your presence on
the premises was for the purpose to vex or annoy the owner or occupant of the premises or whether it was an entry onto the premises
after a warning not to so trespass. This is probably easily remedied by an amendment at the time of trial. Nevertheless these are
alternative theories on which a trespass case can be pursued and the defendant is entitled to know on which theory or theories a case
is being prosecuted in advance of showing up for trial.
b. You filed an appeal on October 19, 2011, apparently, of the order made by Justice of the Peace Sferrazza on October 13, 2011. That
order denied your request for a continuance and granted summary eviction unless you filed a deposit with the court. Typically the
courts lose jurisdiction to rule on other matters in the case once an appeal is taken. It is clear from the court records that this appeal
was pending before the Second Judicial District Court at the time the court held a hearing on the unlawful detainer on October 25,
2011. It may well be that the Justice Court lost jurisdiction to hold the eviction hearing while the appeal was pending.
c. I am working on some other thoughts.
6. If you are dissatisfied with the way I am representing you, you remain free to seek a new attorney.
7. Another chuckle regarding my ownership of strip clubs. I dont own or have any ownership interest in any strip clubs, brothels, adult book
stores or movie houses. I guess that leaves me free to moralize.
8. I still dont see the importance of Dr. Merliss. The request for payment of an amount equal to rent, was for storage of your personal property.
You are entitled to contest the amount of the storage fee, which you did. There is no credible evidence anywhere which suggests that anyone
intended to reopen or create a new tenancy allowing you to retain possession of the premises.
9. Dr. Merliss is an out of state witness. In order to compel his appearance, his testimony must be material. NRS 174.425(1). It does not appear
000595
that his testimony is material under the information you have provided Further, under NRS 174.425(2) he is entitled to be paid his subsistence
and travel expenses incurred in coming to Nevada. Are you prepared to pay those expenses in advance of his coming to Nevada?
10. I dont intend to fax or e-mail to you, your full file in this case. You already have everything with the exception of a couple of items which I
mailed to your old address. I will send them again to your new address. If you want to review the file you are welcome to do so at my office. If
you want copies of anything in the file you may mark the items. After giving you a cost estimate, for which I require payment in advance, we
will provide you with copies of the marked items.
Keith Loomis
Sent: Monday, March 26, 2012 10:33 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; stermitz@sbcglobal.net; jmd@randazza.com; jboles@callatg.com; kristiemanning@yahoo.com;
kadlicj@reno.gov
Subject: i was evicted 3 15 12, i need a continuance
Dear Mr. Loomis,
I was wrongfully evicted on 3 15 12, and I need a continuance in the criminal trespass matter that
you set overly quickly against my express wishes anyway. My ability to collect evidence necessary
to my defense and otherwise prepare has been adversely affected. Additionally, I don't feel as
though you are performing in an appropriate manner as defense counsel, but rather you seem
stuck in your prosecutorial ways, too quick to look for any excuse whatsoever to bury one's case,
so I think you have forced a split here, which further prejudices my case and augers towards a
continuance. Please move for one immediately and copy me on my entire file by email and fax
please. Additionally, please seek clarification from the RMC as to whether I am allowed to ever
send an email to renomunicrecords@reno.gov. Please note, today, Judge Flanagan denied Richard
Hill's latest frivolous motion.
Did you know that Kevin Kelly, of the State Bar of Nevada's Character and Fitness Committee for at
least the last decade owns and runs the Spearmint Rhino strip club in Las Vegas:
http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/Mar-06-Wed-2002/news/18241452.html
I know I always like my three hour tours of heavy handed moralizing from someone who runs a
monolithic strip club in Las Vegas.
You are on the State Bar of Nevada's fee dispute committee, aren't you Mr. Loomis? Do you own
any strip clubs?
Mr. Loomis, which of the elements of the trespass charge RMC 8.10.040 do you feel are weakest
for Deputy City Attorney Jill Drake, whom I informed about the admission by Reno PD Officer
Chris Carter that Richard G. Hill, Esq. bribes him, but for which Ms. Drake indicated a complete
lack of interest and expressed that she would not be following up on that report of bribery of a
RPD Officer. Mr. Kadlic, please place a copy of this correspondence in Jill Drake's personnel file.
Additionally please place one in Allison Ormaa's personnel and employment file too, in addition to
Deputy City Attorney Dan Wong's employment file, as all three of those Deputy City Attorney's
000596
were provided that report and all three indicated they did not care and had no intention of
following up or otherwise investigating the admission by RPD Officer Chris Carter that Richard G.
Hill, Esq. bribed him. I think the failure to follow up by any of these 3 Deputy City Attorney's
relates to any future negligent hiring, training, and supervision claims that the Reno City Attorney
may need to defend against when representing the Reno PD like it did in the Eeof v. Pitsnogle
case:
http://www.lvrj.com/news/reno-official-accused-of-witness-tampering-116586528.html
You know, Deputy City Attorney Ormaas's decision to push on for that $70
traffic ticket is looking more and more interesting. \\
Oh, and, Mr. Loomis, Dr. Merliss presence is necessary because his
understanding of the extent to which his attorney, Richard G. Hill, Esq. had
effectively rescinded any eviction Order by sending a bill for the same
amount as full use and occupany of the location at 121 River Rock St. goes to
the substance of the elements found in RMC 8.10.040 as well as the
credibility of both Merliss and Hill.
Sincerely,
RE: i was evicted 3 15 12, i need a continuance
Sent: Thu 3/29/12 4:59 PM
Mr. Coughlin:
I previously sent you the setting slip for your trial in this matter by e-mail on March 9, 2012. That setting slip set your trial for April 10, 2012 at 8:00
a.m. in Dept 2 of the Reno Municipal Court.
I am available to meet. Best times for me next week are Monday afternoon, Thursday afternoon or Friday morning. Let me know which is best for you
and I will set aside time for an appointment.
No I am not going to send you my case plan in writing with reference to citations and copies of legal research etc. (You might take cognizance of the
fact you sent my last discussion of your case to the Reno City Attorneys Office-notoriously poor strategic and tactical move on your part).
No skin in the game.
000597
Keith Loomis
Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2012 12:04 PM
Subject: RE: i was evicted 3 15 12, i need a continuance
Mr. Loomis,
Can you please indicate to me, via email, if there is a Trial Date or any other court date set in this
matter, and, if so, provide the Date and Time. I would like to meet with you, when are you
available to do so? Also, please indicate in writing what your plan is for this case and what you
have done to zealously advocate on my behalf, including specifics regarding any legal research
you have culled (and please provide citations and copies of the research gathered to me,
preferably by email). In your duties on the State Bar of Nevada's Fee Dispute Committee, have
you ever had a fee dispute from a client of a public defender? Do public defenders have any skin
in the game?
Sincerely,
RE: City of Reno Marshal Division Harrassment, hanging up phone on me, RMC
seizing Reno Attorney's smart phone and cell phone etc. in court after cross examing
RPD on bribery and retaliation
Sent: Thu 3/29/12 5:05 PM
Dear Mr. Coughlin:
There has not been, as of yet, a trial as to which a mistrial could be declared in this case. A motion for mistrial is consequently premature.
I am only representing you as to your trespass case over which Judge Gardner is presiding. I am not representing you in regards to any other criminal
case over which any other Reno Municipal Court Judge is presiding. If you believe there are grounds to seek the recusal of Judge Gardner in regards to
your trespass case, please identify what those grounds might be.
Keith Loomis
Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2012 2:44 PM
Subject: FW: City of Reno Marshal Division Harrassment, hanging up phone on me, RMC seizing Reno Attorney's smart phone and cell phone etc. in court
after cross examing RPD on bribery and retaliation
000598
Importance: Low
Dear Mr. Loomis,
Please file a motion for a mistrial and a motion to conflict out any RMC Judge from hearing any criminal case where I am a defendant.
Thanks,
To: dgentile@gordonandsilver.com; renodirect@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov; rcornlaw@150.reno.nv.us; stermitz@sbcglobal.net; office@bdjlaw.com;
defense@freeman-law.com; ed@npri.org; mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us; mark@markmausertlaw.com
Subject: City of Reno Marshal Division Harrassment, hanging up phone on me, RMC seizing Reno Attorney's smart phone and cell phone etc. in court after
cross examing RPD on bribery and retaliation
Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2012 14:39:17 -0700
Dear City of Reno,
Please place a copy of this in Marshal Coppa's and the other Marshal who transported me to jail
on 2/27/12's employment/personnel file as he was the one who went into a backroom of the "Sally
Bay" at the jail after whispering in the WCSO Deputy Cheung's ear. Please ask him about the bag
with the micro sd card, the various contradictory statements made by RMC staff, Reno Marshals,
and WCSO staff with respect to the chain of custody of the seized property, with particular
attention focused on Marshal Harley's statements concerning any micro sd card, Debi Campbell's
assertions in that regard, what Pam Willmore heard WCSO Deputy Hodge admit with respect to
the WCSO retention of the micro sd and other property, comparing that with any recordigns of
that conversation that may exist, and further referencing the statements of Ms. Campbell,
Cummings, and Beckman, while also reviewing any recordings made of telephone conversations
with WCSO Detention Facility Staff shortly after Coughlin was released from jail on
Please find new attachments herein including the emailed responses of WCSO agents Cummings,
Debi Campbell, and Trish Beckman.
To: renodirect@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov; rcornlaw@150.reno.nv.us; stermitz@sbcglobal.net; office@bdjlaw.com; defense@freeman-law.com
Subject: City of Reno Marshal Division hanging up phone on me, RMC seizing Reno Attorney's smart phone and cell phone etc. in court after cross examing
RPD on bribery and retaliation
Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2012 14:05:54 -0700
Dear City of Reno and Mr. Jeanney,
I was told by the Washoe County Sheriff's Office to call the City of Reno Marshal's division to
inquire about the return of the personal property that was seized from me incident to a 2/27/12
arrest for summar contempt during the traffic trial in 11 tr 26800 before Judge Nash Holmes. I
called the number held out as the Marshals Division contact number http://reno.gov/index.aspx?page=223
And a "Bill" answered the phone, was evasive, indicated he did not work for the Marshal's division,
would not give me any contact information for a Marshal, any Marshal, told me he wasn't going to
000599
answer me stupid questions, and hung up on me.
I called back and I believe it was Marshal Harley who answered (though I am not sure) and he
answere the phone in an unprofessional manner, guessing as to my identity in some show of
menace. Rather than tjust answer the phone like a professional and provide me the number for
Marshal Dayton, as I was requesting, this individual refused to provide the number, answered the
phone on a "gotcha" type way where there was nothing to "gotcha", then hung up the phone on
purpose after declaring that he would not give me Marshal Dayton's number or take a message.
Please place a copy of this correspondence/complaints in "Bill" of court security for the Reno
Munic Court, and Marshal Harley's file and follow up this grievance. I am available to comment on
this unprofessional conduct further. Please also find attached other recent complaints I have
submitted regarding the Marshal Division and place them in the individual's complained of
employment/personnel files. There will be no ability to allege a lack of knowledge of this conduct
in any future negligent hiring, training, and supervision lawsuit incident to any misconduct
alleged. I a requesting that a full scale investigation/inquiry be conducted pursuant to the various
conflicting, and inconsistent statement made with respect to the seized personal property
(inlcuding my phones, etc.). You might want to consider whether any Washoe County Sheriff's
Deputies have made statements that will conflict with anything the City of Reno may say from hear
on out. Given problems associated with my recently being adjudge a victim of domestic violence
(my vulnerability in that regard made moreso by Judge Nash Holmes seizing my cell phones and
attempt to have my incomed reduced through jeopardizing my law license, etc.) please correspond
with my in writing only and only by email and or fax.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Name JAMES MENZEL
Position
Marshal
Reno
Notice
The City of Reno failed to report the cost of employee health care benefits. Only the cost of retirement benefits is
included within the "Benefits" category for this jurisdiction.
Year 2009
Base Pay $60,609.42
Detail page for JAMES MENZEL
Overtime and
Callback $622.67
Collected
Total Pay $63,750.96
000600
Benefits
$22,425.49
Accumulated
Total Pay &
$86,176.45
Benefits
State Government: Salaries, CAFRS, Main Contracts Page, State Financial Documents
Education: CCSD Warrants, NSHE Budgets
Politicians: 2010 Transparency Survey, Congressional Disbursements
Connect: Facebook, Twitter
About Us: Contact Us, FAQ, Disclaimer
TransparentNevada is provided by the Nevada Policy Research Institute as a public service.
Detail page for JOEL HARLEY
Name JOEL HARLEY
Position
7821 - Marshal
Reno
Year 2010
Base Pay $85,323.07
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$6,755.56
Other Pay $478.65
Benefits Accumulated N/A
Total Pay & Benefits $124,126.82
Detail page for JUSTIN ROPER
000601
Name JUSTIN ROPER
Position
7819 Marshal Commander
Reno
Year 2010
Base Pay $107,914.00
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$0.00
Other Pay ($2,697.89)
Total Pay $105,216.11
Name JAMES MENZEL
Position
Marshal
Reno
Notice
The City of Reno failed to report the cost of employee health care benefits. Only the cost of retirement benefits is
included within the "Benefits" category for this jurisdiction.
Year 2009
Base Pay $60,609.42
Detail page for JAMES MENZEL
Overtime and
Callback $622.67
Collected
Benefits
$22,425.49
Accumulated
Total Pay &
$86,176.45
Benefits
000602
Detail page for JOEL HARLEY
Name JOEL HARLEY
Position
7821 - Marshal
Reno
Year 2010
Base Pay $85,323.07
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$6,755.56
Other Pay $478.65
Detail page for JUSTIN ROPER
Name JUSTIN ROPER
Position
7819 Marshal Commander
Reno
Year 2010
000603
Base Pay $107,914.00
Overtime and
Callback Collected
$0.00
Other Pay ($2,697.89)
Total Pay $105,216.11
RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Sent: Tue 8/07/12 9:55 AM
Zach
Why dont you move to represent yourself. That way you will be completely satisfied with the services you provide yourself and can do all of the
things you believe are necessary.
If you want me to continue to represent you, what I asked you to provide to me was a description of the events which lead to the charge of disturbing
the peace. I still need that description.
Keith Loomis
000604
Sent: Monday, August 06, 2012 3:54 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
Subject: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Dear Mr. Loomis and City Attorney Kadlic and Deputy City Attorney Drake,
I am writing to request that you file some motion to alter, amend, reconsider, set aside, or modify my bail in the case stemming from my JUly 3, 2012 arrest
for distrubing the peace, failure to provide proof of insurance, and failure to secure a load. I am writing to request that you file a pre trial motion (Motion to
Dismiss, request for a pre trial motion and bail motion, and motion to supress police report based upon the DTP arrest occuring for alleged conduct outside the
officer's presence). If you will not file these motion (and please provide me a draft of such motions for my review prior to filing them as well as prior to
making any communication on my behalf to either the RMC or the City of Reno Prosecutor), please provide me a written indication of your rationale for so
refusing, and then please file a Motion to Withdrawal as soon as practicable. I ask this respectfully.
The police showed up to the hearing, yet I was not noticed of that fact in advance, or of the hearing itself. Further, Judge Gardner explicilty indicated he was
basing his decision to raise the bail based upon "public safety" and "concern for the defendant's safety", which are impermissible rationale for so increasin
one's bail.
NRS
178.498. Many courts use a bail schedule to determine the amount, but note the
initial amount can be increased if good cause is shown. NRS 178.499. Additionally, in
determining the amount of bail, the judge should look at the following factors (NRS
178.498):
x The nature and circumstances of the offense charged
x The defendants financial ability to post bail
x The defendants character; and
x The factors listed in NRS 178.4853.
Bail can not be excessive. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. It should be limited to a
reasonable amount designed to ensure the defendants presence in court. It should not
be a corrective or preventative detention device.
NRS 178.484. The Court should take care in imposing any restrictions on a defendants constitutional rights (i.e.,
search and seizure) and only imply such restrictions if warranted by the underlying facts
of the alleged crime. Section 11 of NRS 178.484 describes the document that must
be signed by the defendant before he/she can be released on bail.
000605
My bail hearing contained what seems to be an impermissible coercive attempt to condition my release or the possibility thereof upon my providing
confidential medical records (Lake's Crossing etc) to the Reno Municipal Court, even where the same judge presiding over the bail hearing found me
competent enough to face a criminal trepass trial less than two weeks before teh bail hearing in 11 CR 26405.
The friend of mine who posted my bail, Jared Swanson, has a serious form of cancer and a one year old baby. I request a reduction of the bail for his benefit
and for the proof of insurance charge to be dismissed, as (and I am trying to avoid this in any way I can), if I am rearrested, such a proof of insurance charge
may present another basis for imposing an unduly burdensome bail upon me, as it did on July 5th, 2012 where, despite my having produced a legible pdf
copy of my proof of insurance card on my large screened zoomable smart phone, Officers Weaver and Dye still charged me with that violation, and the bail
was subsequently increase. Further, none of the events or accusations forming the basis of the distrubing the police charge occurred in the officer's presence,
and the police report contains no indication whatsoever that the arrest was made based upon NRS 171.1771. I provided Officer Weaver my driver's license
prior to the arrest. I did not
refuses to give a written promise to appear in court as provided in NRS 171.1773.
When a person is believed to have committed a misdemeanor offense, the peace officer has the discretion to
either issue a citation or arrest and detain the person. NRS 171.1771 states that a person can be arrested if
his identity is questionable or if the peace officer does not believe the person will appear in court. A person
can also be arrested for a misdemeanor offense if a warrant has been issued.
Additionally, I am requesting that you file a Motion to Dismiss the Disturbing the Peace charge based upon a lack of evidence and or insufficiency of pleading
in that the allegations do not amount to a prima facie case of a DTP violation. Further, please subpoena and or collect the Protection Order application filed
by Milan Krebs on July 5th, 2012, and interview Krebs as to why he mentions Coughlin often carrying around a large knife in a menacing manner in that
protection order application, yet completely failed to mention that in his July 3rd, 2012 police report. Additionally, please determine why Kreb's TPO
appliication has a different style of handwriting on the caption compared to the descriptive sections, indicating someone pushed the filing of the TPO on Krebs,
perhaps his employer, Northwind Apartments or the RPD, which has in the days preceding the arrest threatend to arrest Coughlin for criminal trespass if he
returned to any part of the premises of Northwind Apartments, in consideration of Coughlin's eviction from unit 29, despite the fact Coughlin still had a valid
right to go to his other two rentals, units 45 and 71, in addition to the fact that Northwinds essentially withdrew or rescinded its June 28th, 2012 eviction of
Coughlin by posting an Amended 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice on unit 29 on June 28th, 2012 shortly after Coughlin pointed out to Northwinds and Nevada
Courts Services that the July 14th, 2012 5 Day notice was not "personally served" (NCS's R. Wray lied about effecting personal service, as he could not
possibly have verified someone of "suitable age and discretion" was within the windowless room with a metal door closed and locked and where no Wray
admits that he received no verbal response from the unit or anyone therein upon his knocking on the door and or attempting to break into the unit, please see
Soldal v. Cook County in that regard, a US S. Ct case) and therefore Coughlin would have had until at least noon on July 28th, 2012 to file a Tenant's Answer,
whereas the eviction/lockout/arrest of June 28th, 2012 took place two hours before noon at 10 am).
Additionally, RPD Officer Weaver had previously attempted to break into one of my rentals at Northwind at a time when he lacked a warrant and or an exigent
rationale for doing so, much less an eviction Order. I just want this case to be dismissed and to try to move on in life, and difuse the tensions incident to this
case.
I did not disturb the peace at Northwinds as alleged, nor did I make the threats Kreb's accuses me of or stalk him or follow him in a threatening manner at
any time. Additionaly, I never broke into nor did I ever attempt to break into Krebs' truck, and in fact, I filed a police report in June 2012 reporting
extortionate threats by another maintenance man at Northwinds ("Luke" is his name, I believe) and Northwind's Manage Dwayne Jakob, wherein they
threatened to make such a spurious allegation, but subsuquently refrained from doign so when it apparently occurred to them that I may have excuplatory
video evidence disproving such an allegation as well as capturing their baseless and extortionate threats and accusations. Additionally, please subpoene the
police reports I filed with the RPD and any emails I sent to any officers (including Weaver, Barnes, Sargent MIiller, LIeutenant Brown) and any reports of or
recording of phone conversations I had with any of those RPD personnel. Further, please see the attached june 26th, 2012 email to the RPD, WCSO, RJC,
Sparks Justice Court and others pointing out the insufficiency of the 5 day Notice drafted and posted by non-lawyers Nevada Court Services, in that under
NRS 40.253 it listed the wrong forum for the tenant to file a Tenant's Answer, and under the Aiken decision of the Nevada Supreme Court and NRCP 60(b)(4),
any lockout order stemming therefrom is void for lack of jurisdiction.
1. If the offense charged is a felony or gross misdemeanor, the arrest may be made on any day, and at any time of day or night.
000606
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the public and:...
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for another alleged violation
or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense is committed;...
Krebs did not immediately arrest me under NRS 171.136(2)(d), nor was the DTP arrest for an offense alleged to have occurred in the officer's presence.
the attached videos are of the incident on June 5th, 2012, not from July 3rd, 2012, but they support my contentions and the relevancy of subpoening the
police incident reports and other documentation should this case not be dismissed, nolle prosequi, de minimis, etc....
I will forward to you my emails to the RPD et all from June 26th, and July 2nd, 2012. I realize their tone was not a smart one to take or appropriate and am
only sending them in hopes of having this matter dismissed. I do not have any interest in pursuing anything like Wheeler v Cross 344 Fed Apps 420 ( (2008.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
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000607
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000608
Sent: Mon 6/11/12 4:10 PM
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120103420.
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RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Sent: Tue 8/07/12 4:25 PM
000609
You have already had two bail hearings. You are out on bail now. I decline to file a new request for a bail hearing.
I will be out of town on vacation from Friday August 10 and will return on Monday Aug. 20. That makes attendance at a bail hearing problematic and
unlikely to be heard before your trial.
I do think the complaint fails to allege the charge of disturbing the peace. I will make the motion to dismiss it at the time of trial.
The fact that the officer did not observe you committing a misdemeanor means he was not entitled to arrest you. You have a civil claim
against RPD and the officer. That does not mean the charge of DTP is subject to dismissal.
I will review the case involving Mr. Krebs and his request for a temporary protective order.
I need your description of what happened on the 3
rd
of July. Will you provide it?
Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 3:38 PM
To: Keith Loomis
Subject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Are you refusing to file the motions o requested?
-----Original Message-----
From: Keith Loomis
Sent: 7 Aug 2012 16:55:44 GMT
To: 'Zach Coughlin'
Subject: RE: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Zach
Why dont you move to represent yourself. That way you will be completely satisfied with the services you provide yourself and can do all of the
things you believe are necessary.
If you want me to continue to represent you, what I asked you to provide to me was a description of the events which lead to the charge of disturbing
the peace. I still need that description.
Keith Loomis
000610
Sent: Monday, August 06, 2012 3:54 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
Subject: request for a pre trial motion and bail motion
Dear Mr. Loomis and City Attorney Kadlic and Deputy City Attorney Drake,
I am writing to request that you file some motion to alter, amend, reconsider, set aside, or modify my bail in the case stemming from my JUly 3, 2012 arrest
for distrubing the peace, failure to provide proof of insurance, and failure to secure a load. I am writing to request that you file a pre trial motion (Motion to
Dismiss, request for a pre trial motion and bail motion, and motion to supress police report based upon the DTP arrest occuring for alleged conduct outside the
officer's presence). If you will not file these motion (and please provide me a draft of such motions for my review prior to filing them as well as prior to
making any communication on my behalf to either the RMC or the City of Reno Prosecutor), please provide me a written indication of your rationale for so
refusing, and then please file a Motion to Withdrawal as soon as practicable. I ask this respectfully.
The police showed up to the hearing, yet I was not noticed of that fact in advance, or of the hearing itself. Further, Judge Gardner explicilty indicated he was
basing his decision to raise the bail based upon "public safety" and "concern for the defendant's safety", which are impermissible rationale for so increasin
one's bail.
NRS
178.498. Many courts use a bail schedule to determine the amount, but note the
initial amount can be increased if good cause is shown. NRS 178.499. Additionally, in
determining the amount of bail, the judge should look at the following factors (NRS
178.498):
The nature and circumstances of the offense charged
The defendants financial ability to post bail
The defendants character; and
The factors listed in NRS 178.4853.
Bail can not be excessive. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. It should be limited to a
reasonable amount designed to ensure the defendants presence in court. It should not
be a corrective or preventative detention device.
NRS 178.484. The Court should take care in imposing any restrictions on a defendants constitutional rights (i.e.,
000611
search and seizure) and only imply such restrictions if warranted by the underlying facts
of the alleged crime. Section 11 of NRS 178.484 describes the document that must
be signed by the defendant before he/she can be released on bail.
My bail hearing contained what seems to be an impermissible coercive attempt to condition my release or the possibility thereof upon my providing
confidential medical records (Lake's Crossing etc) to the Reno Municipal Court, even where the same judge presiding over the bail hearing found me
competent enough to face a criminal trepass trial less than two weeks before teh bail hearing in 11 CR 26405.
The friend of mine who posted my bail, Jared Swanson, has a serious form of cancer and a one year old baby. I request a reduction of the bail for his benefit
and for the proof of insurance charge to be dismissed, as (and I am trying to avoid this in any way I can), if I am rearrested, such a proof of insurance charge
may present another basis for imposing an unduly burdensome bail upon me, as it did on July 5th, 2012 where, despite my having produced a legible pdf
copy of my proof of insurance card on my large screened zoomable smart phone, Officers Weaver and Dye still charged me with that violation, and the bail
was subsequently increase. Further, none of the events or accusations forming the basis of the distrubing the police charge occurred in the officer's presence,
and the police report contains no indication whatsoever that the arrest was made based upon NRS 171.1771. I provided Officer Weaver my driver's license
prior to the arrest. I did not
refuses to give a written promise to appear in court as provided in NRS 171.1773.
When a person is believed to have committed a misdemeanor offense, the peace officer has the discretion to
either issue a citation or arrest and detain the person. NRS 171.1771 states that a person can be arrested if
his identity is questionable or if the peace officer does not believe the person will appear in court. A person
can also be arrested for a misdemeanor offense if a warrant has been issued.
Additionally, I am requesting that you file a Motion to Dismiss the Disturbing the Peace charge based upon a lack of evidence and or insufficiency of pleading
in that the allegations do not amount to a prima facie case of a DTP violation. Further, please subpoena and or collect the Protection Order application filed
by Milan Krebs on July 5th, 2012, and interview Krebs as to why he mentions Coughlin often carrying around a large knife in a menacing manner in that
protection order application, yet completely failed to mention that in his July 3rd, 2012 police report. Additionally, please determine why Kreb's TPO
appliication has a different style of handwriting on the caption compared to the descriptive sections, indicating someone pushed the filing of the TPO on Krebs,
perhaps his employer, Northwind Apartments or the RPD, which has in the days preceding the arrest threatend to arrest Coughlin for criminal trespass if he
returned to any part of the premises of Northwind Apartments, in consideration of Coughlin's eviction from unit 29, despite the fact Coughlin still had a valid
right to go to his other two rentals, units 45 and 71, in addition to the fact that Northwinds essentially withdrew or rescinded its June 28th, 2012 eviction of
Coughlin by posting an Amended 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice on unit 29 on June 28th, 2012 shortly after Coughlin pointed out to Northwinds and Nevada
Courts Services that the July 14th, 2012 5 Day notice was not "personally served" (NCS's R. Wray lied about effecting personal service, as he could not
possibly have verified someone of "suitable age and discretion" was within the windowless room with a metal door closed and locked and where no Wray
admits that he received no verbal response from the unit or anyone therein upon his knocking on the door and or attempting to break into the unit, please see
Soldal v. Cook County in that regard, a US S. Ct case) and therefore Coughlin would have had until at least noon on July 28th, 2012 to file a Tenant's Answer,
whereas the eviction/lockout/arrest of June 28th, 2012 took place two hours before noon at 10 am).
Additionally, RPD Officer Weaver had previously attempted to break into one of my rentals at Northwind at a time when he lacked a warrant and or an exigent
rationale for doing so, much less an eviction Order. I just want this case to be dismissed and to try to move on in life, and difuse the tensions incident to this
case.
I did not disturb the peace at Northwinds as alleged, nor did I make the threats Kreb's accuses me of or stalk him or follow him in a threatening manner at
any time. Additionaly, I never broke into nor did I ever attempt to break into Krebs' truck, and in fact, I filed a police report in June 2012 reporting
extortionate threats by another maintenance man at Northwinds ("Luke" is his name, I believe) and Northwind's Manage Dwayne Jakob, wherein they
threatened to make such a spurious allegation, but subsuquently refrained from doign so when it apparently occurred to them that I may have excuplatory
video evidence disproving such an allegation as well as capturing their baseless and extortionate threats and accusations. Additionally, please subpoene the
police reports I filed with the RPD and any emails I sent to any officers (including Weaver, Barnes, Sargent MIiller, LIeutenant Brown) and any reports of or
recording of phone conversations I had with any of those RPD personnel. Further, please see the attached june 26th, 2012 email to the RPD, WCSO, RJC,
Sparks Justice Court and others pointing out the insufficiency of the 5 day Notice drafted and posted by non-lawyers Nevada Court Services, in that under
NRS 40.253 it listed the wrong forum for the tenant to file a Tenant's Answer, and under the Aiken decision of the Nevada Supreme Court and NRCP 60(b)(4),
any lockout order stemming therefrom is void for lack of jurisdiction.
000612
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the public and:...
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for another alleged violation
or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense is committed;...
Krebs did not immediately arrest me under NRS 171.136(2)(d), nor was the DTP arrest for an offense alleged to have occurred in the officer's presence.
the attached videos are of the incident on June 5th, 2012, not from July 3rd, 2012, but they support my contentions and the relevancy of subpoening the
police incident reports and other documentation should this case not be dismissed, nolle prosequi, de minimis, etc....
I will forward to you my emails to the RPD et all from June 26th, and July 2nd, 2012. I realize their tone was not a smart one to take or appropriate and am
only sending them in hopes of having this matter dismissed. I do not have any interest in pursuing anything like Wheeler v Cross 344 Fed Apps 420 ( (2008.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
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6/11/12
From:
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120103420.
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From:
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000617
RE: respectfully submitted
Sent: Wed 8/08/12 2:43 PM
Zach:
I reviewed the file in the Krebs protective order application. It is interesting in that there is not one reference by Mr. Krebs to a belief that you were
trying to provoke him to engage in violence or a violation of law. Those appear to be solely the words of Office Weaver.
I subsequently received your 100 page e-mail and do not intend to review it at length as most of the material appears irrelevant. What I
gather from it is that you are once again not happy with my representation and want me to withdraw. I think there is merit to that request. It appears
that our relationship has broken down and that you are asking me to engage in conduct that will result in violations of the rules of professional
conduct. Those include Rules 3.1, 3.2 , 4.4 and possibly others. I also fundamentally disagree with some of your requested actions in that so far you
have refused to provide your description of what happened on July 3, 2012 with Mr. Krebs. It also appears that your repeated demands are making my
representation unreasonably difficult. It would be helpful; if I can represent in the motion to withdraw that you are willing to waive the 60 day rule for
trial, so that a new attorney can be appointed to represent you and have enough time to prepare your case. Please respond whether you will agree to
that waiver. If not I will simply file the motion without the representation and hope for the best.
Keith Loomis
Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2012 11:01 PM
To: keithloomis@earthlink.net; jleslie@washoecounty.us; zyoung@da.washoecounty.us; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov
Subject: FW: respectfully submitted
Zach Coughlin
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Tel 775 338 8118
Fax 949 667 7402
To: weavera@reno.gov; barnesm@reno.gov
Subject: respectfully submitted
Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2012 16:41:49 -0700
Dear Officer Weaver and Officer Barnes,
I am respectfully submitting this supplementary material to the police report I submitted to you in
person on June 6, 2012 regarding the assault I was the victim of at the hands of maintenance staff
member Luke of Northwind Apartments on June 5th, 2012, and the attempts at unlawful entry
committed by Northwind Manager Dwayne Jakob on or about June 4, 2012.
000618
I am attaching an article you may find of interest regarding the intersection of landlord tenant law
and police work, vis a vis criminal/civil matters and the fine distinctions that sometimes arise. I
didn't see anything in there on Officer Weavers fine hypothetical regarding entry without
permission when a burglary may be occurring. That situation probably does not come up that
often because hardly anybody but the police would be brave enough to enter such a dangerous
situation.
I appreciate the brave service both of you provide. I am attaching this materials just because they
are interesting to me and may be to you and in no way wish for so attachign these to be
interpreted as a criticism of either of your police work.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Motion to Withdraw
Sent: Fri 8/10/12 11:07 AM
To: Zach Coughlin (ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com)
1 attachment
SKMBT_C35312081011000.pdf (164.4 KB)
Motion to Withdraw is attached
Keith Loomis
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RE: motion for continuance
From:Pamela Roberts (robertsp@reno.gov)
Sent: Wed 11/16/11 5:12 PM
To: Zach Coughlin (zachcoughlin@hotmail.com)
Mr. Coughlin, you should have already received a notice regarding the availability of discovery and request for reciprocal discovery. You just need to call
ahead at 334-2050 and arrange to pick it up. You are entitled to copies of all the reports and witness statements and video we may have on this case. Since
I am not calling any additional witnesses that are not already mentioned in the reports/statements, I am not obligated to send you an additional list of
witnesses. I am also not obligated to do any further investigation or interviews. Pam Roberts.
From: Zach Coughlin <zachcoughlin@hotmail.com>
To: <robertsp@reno.gov>
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 15:35:48 -0800
Subject: RE: motion for continuance
Ms. Roberts,
Thanks for your reply. Please ascertain from Walmart whether any Walmart employees had, previous to
this incident, made any threats respecting maliciously having the accused banned from Walmart's incident
to a disagreement over Walmart staff and managers curious practice of "forgetting" their return policy,
despite some individuals having worked there over 10 years....Further, I believe it relevant and part of your
duty to provide exculpatory information to ascertain whether the RSIC police officer made statements
wherein he attempted to coerce a consent to an impermissible search and further buttressed his probable
cause finding to conduct a search incident to arrest, expressly, in words, to the accused, upon the accused's
failure to consent to such a search.
000627
Please provide a list of any witnesses you intend to call at trial, including a summation of the matters the
will testify to, in addition to producing a copy or making available for reproduction any documentation,
audio, video, or other materials intended to be used in any way at trial.
Thank You,
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 10:36:45 -0800
From: robertsp@reno.gov
Subject: Re: motion for continuance
Mr. Coughlin, we were closed on Friday and I have just read your email. If you have not received confirmation from the Court that your trial date has been
continued, you will need to appear this afternoon at 1:00 pm in Courtroom B of the Reno Municipal Court. We can discuss your case further at that time
and if we are unable to resolve the case, you can ask the Court again for a continuance and I won't object. However, it is the Court's decision to grant
your motion to continue.
It is also the Court's decision whether to appoint you a legal defender. I do not plan to ask for jail time, so the Court is not required to appoint you an
attorney. In addition, you have no right to a jury trial in a misdemeanor case.
I hope your housing situation improves. See you this afternoon. Pam Roberts, Deputy City Attorney.
From: Zach Coughlin <zachcoughlin@hotmail.com>
To: <robertsp@reno.gov>
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2011 01:40:53 -0800
Subject: motion for continuance
Dear Counselor Roberts,
I believe you are the prosecutor for the case against me, State v. Coughlin, which I believe is still set for
trial on November 14th, I think at 1pm. I am not totally sure that there is a duty to serve you on such a
thing, but I filed a Motion for Continuance and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel sometime within
about the last 10 days, I would say. I believe I attempted to copy you on it, but have recently been evicted
and its been a very difficult time in terms of coordinating paperwork, etc., etc. I apologize for any
inconvenience this may have cause you. I am unsure of whether the November 14th trial is still set to take
place. I believe fairness dictates that it be continued to a later date. I have request counsel but have yet to
receive any, or wait, I was denied a request to receive counsel because Judge Howard said there is not a
6th amendment right to counsel where, even though jail time is technically a possibility, the state does not
anticipate seeking jail time...or something like that, however, I found some cases that say I should still get
counsel appointed, especially where I show I am indigent, and I believe I qualify as indigent rather easily.
Can and would you agree to a continuance? I believe I tried to contact about this prior to filing my
Request for a Continuance. I maintain my innocence in this case and feel any sort of conviction,
especially one involving any sort of theft based charge, would work a terrible injustice and greatly
damage my reputation and employment prospects. I want a jury trial, too.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
** Notice** This message and accompanying documents are covered by the electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, and may contain
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you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this
000628
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attorney work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you are notified that any disclosure,
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WLS
From:Paul Elcano (pelcano@washoelegalservices.org)You moved this message to its current location.
Sent: Wed 5/06/09 9:38 AM
Dear Zach,
You are correct about the letter being delivered on April 20
th
, I misread my timeline. My decision is limited to the hearing conduct. You have
proffered nothing that indicates that the way you acted in court is in any way related to any outside event. Your 50 page motion for reconsideration before
Judge Gardner has not linked your conduct in any way to an outside event. You have refused to give me a time and date to meet once again, and I will
issue my determination tomorrow morning at 9:00 am.
Access to your computer materials, will be made at a convenient time and place with our office manager, executive director or designee and our
computer specialist present. This is a business computer, and without further research I will not give you access to it privately. You have been given a tape
of the two Joshi hearings. To date, you have not agreed to meet at any time and place to discuss these hearings; and you have not specifically requested
any identified items, documents etc. that were related to your conduct in this hearing. Your series of questions about the Board is irrelevant. The Board
delegated this matter to me to handle as a personnel matter.
-Paul
FW: Mr. King's assertion in his 3/16/12 letter
Sent: Sat 11/03/12 3:00 AM
To: togninim@reno.gov (togninim@reno.gov); joey.hastings@washoecounty.us (joey.hastings@washoecounty.us);
joey.orduna@washoecounty.us (joey.orduna@washoecounty.us); david.hardy@washoecounty.us
(david.hardy@washoecounty.us); patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com);
mike@tahoelawyer.com (mike@tahoelawyer.com); nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net);
fflaherty@dlpfd.com (fflaherty@dlpfd.com); davidc@nvbar.org (davidc@nvbar.org); complaints@nvbar.org
(complaints@nvbar.org); tsusich@nvdetr.org (tsusich@nvdetr.org); je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com
(cvellis@bhfs.com)
4 attachments
11cr26405 puentes 041012_20120410-0903_01cd16f8c3aa49b0.mp3 (5.1 MB) , 11CR26405 050812 Loomis_20120508-
1104_01cd2d0a627f5f90.mp3 (15.1 MB) , 5 11 09 wls elcano washoe legal services dismissal letter citing Judge Linda
Gardner's Order sole cause 26405 26800 00696.pdf (902.5 KB) , 5 6 09 email from wls ed elcano 26405 60302 garnder
01955 10896 60302 26800 60317 54844 dd.pdf (15.3 KB)
Dear Judge Hardy, Chairman Susich, Clerk of Court Orduna Hastings, Bar Counsel, and Ms. Tognini, and Members of the Panel,
It is plain from my interactions with Patrick King that the irony of Richard G. Hill, Esq's allegations of my "ghostwriting" are
richest when considering the apparent "ghost-grievancing" going on here, especially with respect to the genesis of NG12-0435,
the grievance consisting of Family Court Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning a domestic violence attorney
$1,000, personally, where failed to follow Judge Linda Gardner's orders to seek to intimidate his battered spouse immigrant client
into accepting the marital settlement agreement offer of one John Springgate, Esq. (a chimera of sorts where Mr. Springgate's 000629
client would agree to be responsilbe for a collection of third party credit card debt for which he was the sole signatory and for
which even under and extremely unlikely "doctrine of the neccessaires, assuing my client lost on a "waste of marital assets",
approach, my client, Ms. Joshi, would be very unlikely to ever face judgment or execution in connection with such third party
credits card debts. I failed to cave to Judge Linda Gardner's bullying demands, and even where she yelled at me and my client in
the impromptu "settlement conference" she decided to hold 10 minutes before the Trial (Judge Linda Gardner yelled at me to
"shut up" in front of my client, then proceeded to tell Ms. Joshi "don't listen to your attorney!" in an angry, hostile, and
belligerent tone), and instead cited to an ALR article that presents the position I took as the majority viewpoint in American
jurisprudence with respect to the duty of a domestic obligation not being permissibly set off with a mere debt, particularly a third
party unsecured credit card debt, such as those for which Mr. Joshi was the sole signatory. Apparently Judge Gardner agreed
with John Springgate's whining about how he "needed to be able to know how much to charge for his time" or something along
those lines (Mr. Springgate indicated that Coughlin's failing to immediately accept Springgate's settlement offer was screwing up
Springgate's whole profit margin, and therefore contrary to the orderly administration of justice, or something along those lines,
at which point Springgate moved for sanctions (despite not having served a 21 day safe harbor filing ready NRCP 11 motion),
which, in John's words was tantamount to "sending a shot across your bow", a bloodsport sort of analogy one might expect from
a semi-professional fencer like Mr. Springgate. I was fired from Washoe Legal Services and told by its Executive Director that
the decision was based solely on Judge Linda Gardner's Order....which was odd given she and Master Edmondson and at least
one other judge had given Elcano positive reviews of my work less than two months prior to that. Elcano, though, did, at the
time of reporting those positive reviews mention that he goes "way back" with Linda Gardner, and that "she owes" him because
"he did her a big favor a long time ago", etc., etc.
Anyways, Bar Counsel King has recently indicated that he was completely unaware that Linda Gardner is the sister of the RMC
Judge William Gardner who refused to recuse himself from the criminal trespass conviction I sustained incident to a custodial
arrest at my former home law office, wherein the opposing counsel Richard G. Hill, Esq., has been caught lying on tape
regarding whether any warning was given to me to leave, and whether the RPD identified themselves as law enforcement and
issued a lawful order to leave the premises prior to the landlord kicking down a door to a "basement" that was, according to Hill's
associate, not even a part of the property (or included in the part of the property contained within any exterior doors to the
premises.
Despite the statements of RMC Judge Gardner in the audio cds that King himself finally admitted to me to possessing and
receiving from RMC Judge Nash Holmes (after several instances of King lying about his willingness to allowing me to review
the materials Judge Nash Holmes and others slipped to the SBN, King finally was forced to turn over at least a few of those
items. Included amongst them were the hearings before Judge William Gardner on 4/10/12 and 5/8/12 wherein RMC Judge
William Gardner admits that his sister is none other than Family Court Judge Linda Gardner, and that his sister passed him her
April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin (which Coughlin filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus challenging in 54844,):
http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=22746
Washoe Legal Services fired Coughlin, citing Judge Linda Gardner's Order sanctioning Coughlin as the sole reason for its doign
so. Couglin sued WLS for wrongful termination, and Judge Elliot dismissed Coughlin's lawsuit without reaching the merits of
the Complaint, but then decided to sanction Coughlin for his lawsuit allegedly lacking "merit" anyways...go figure. Judge Elliot
also incarcerated Coughlin from April 19th, 2012-April 26th, 2012 based upon some fraudulent letter by Lake's Crossing, and
some Motion for Revocation of Bail made by DDA Zach Young at a time when NRS 178.405 forbid his making any motions
given that all proceedings must be stayed during the pendency of an Order for Competency Evaluation. Amazingly, in her
3/16/12 letter to the SBN, Judge Nash Holmes is still mentioning how she and the RMC are furiosly trying to set for Trial the
case stemming from teh custodial "jaywalking" arrest of Coughlin on January 12th, 2012 incidnet to the lies by Richard G. Hill,
Esq. to the RPD on that date. It is curious that that matter 11 CR 00696 was all of the sudden transferred to Judge Nash Holmes
on February 27th, 2012, the same day Judge Nash Holmes was purportedly made aware of the 2/27/12 Order for Competency
Evaluation of Coughlin in RCR2011-063341 (relative, at the very least, to the communications between Tognini and the WCPD,
at the very least). Additionally, Second Judicial District Chief Appeals Clerk denied Coughlin's 2/27/12 filing of a Motion for
Extension of Time to effectuate service in the wrongful termination lawsuit by Coughlin against Elcano (whom Judge Linda
Garnder "owes a big favor", according to Elcano) in CV11-01955 (before Judge Elliot).
Further, to the extent Judge Elliot's remanding Coughlin into custody to coerce his consent to divulging extremely private
medical information is somehow a contempt Order, then the "letter" or "evaluation under seal" of 4/18/12 by Lakes Crossing Dr.
Bill Davis and Dr. Sally Farmer must be in the form of an affidavit. It was not. Further, Coughlin called Dr. Davis from the
booking room at the jail and Dr. Davis attempted to weasel out of the consequences of his professional misconduct, done under
color of law, by alleging that he "didn't write the 4/18/12 letter filed with the Court" but merely signed it and was not responsible
for it being filed with the court. To the extent the assertions in that 4/18/12 letter are outright lies (they are...the letter indicates
Coughlin outright refused to provide basic medical information, which is not true, Coughlin indicated he would "need to check
his records" in response to one initial question, and then mentioned that some professional, particularly physicians, face an
000630
inability to obtain malpractice insurance if word gets out that they take anti-depressants. Somehow Dr. Davis and Dr. Farmer
interpreted such a statement to allow themselves to file a letter with the Court alleging that Coughlin "threatened one of the
evaluators with legal action". No wonder Lake's Crossing insists on doing a Terry Stop style "pat down" search on each and
everyone forced to go there by the Courts to get a Competency Evaluation (the RJC and WCPD have it set up so that one must
utilize the services of Lake's Crossing for any such evaluation) and maintain a strick ban on any sort of smart phones or cellular
phones within their evaluation rooms (how difficult it would be for Dr. Davis and Dr. Farmer to lie with seeming impunity, as
they did in their 4/18/12 "evaluation" filed with the Court in CR12-0376, should their subjects be readily able to reveal the
dishonesty of these evaluators via some recording impeachign their credibility. To the extent Judge Elliot found Coughlin in
contempt of court (which he apparently did in response to Coughlin inquiring into the scope and extent of such a Competency
Evaluation rather than submitting to a blank check inquest into his mental health and medical records incident to a retaliatory
Motion for Competency Evaluation on 2/27/12 by a public defender upset that Coughlin had criticized his failing to show up to a
court date even after that attorney, Biray Dogan had filed a Notice of Appearance and met with the client to discuss the case
RCR2012-065630, for over an hour and a half just one week previous to that missed court appearance, and where DDA Young
was clearly retaliating against Coughlin for Coughlin filing a Motion for Sanctions against Young just days previous to that in a
different case.
Regardkess. Marilyn Tognini is now being listed as a witness Coughlin intends to call at his November 14th, 2012 NNDB
hearing at the State Bar of Nevada Offices at 9 am, and any other person whom Judge Nash Holmes may be referring to in her
attached grievance against Coughlin (wherein she manages to allude to some hearsay about Coughlin living in his car despite the
fact that Coughlin was clearly still living at 1422 E. 9th St. at the time Judge Nash Holmes letter to the SBN was written,
3/14/12, even where Judge Nash Holmes feigns an inability to readily make contact with Coughlin, depsite neither she nor the
RMC calling, emailing or faxing Coughlin, or managing to mail the 2/28/12 Order to the address all other RMC Departments
then had for Coughlin. Regardless, that 3/14/12 grievance goes on to demonstrate Judge Nash Holmes profound lack of respect
for or knowledge of the dictates of NRS 178.405, or the legal principles, in general, related to refraining from proceeding with
prosecutions where the competency of the accused is in doubt in the mind of the trier of fact. Further, the SBN's Bar Counsel
Patrick King (whom, again, managed to just in the last couple weeks indicate that he was unaware that Judge William Gardner
and Judge Linda Gardner are brother and sister, or even related, despite King receiving from the RMC's Judge Nash Holmes a
box of materials that included multiple hearings in the criminal trespass proseuction of Coughlin that Judge William Gardner
(then RMC Administrative Judge, whom admitted to "at least one meeting" wherein he and the other RMC Judges discussed
Coughlin, along with Chief Marshal Roper, only for Judge Gardner to then attempt to say with a straight face that he "was not
sure whether he was" aware of this or that, or had any knowledge of the grievance Judge Nash Holmes filed against Coughlin
with the SBN (despite that 3/14/12 letter to the SBN by Judge Nash Holmes expressly purporting to be written on behalf of
herself and ALL the other RMC Judges, whose "full cooperation" she assures she can deliver to the SBN in seeking to discredit
Coughlin and in so doing assist the City of Reno in addressing the multiple wrongful arrests of Coughlin in the preceding
months.
Regardless, the communications between the Washoe County Public Defender and the RMC, including Ms. Tongini and Judge
Nash Holmes, and what exactly Judge William Gardner was made aware of, and what he passed from his sister, Judge Linda
Gardner, on to Judge Nash Holmes, and what Judge Nash Holmes passed onto Bar Counsel King is now of material relevance,
and brings into play the issue of the level of candor with opposing counsel King exhibits in his 4/19/12 correspondenc with
Coughlin when he purports to only have recieved Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order for Sanctions on 3/15/12 (and that
"5" in the "15" looks shaky, Pat), wherin King wrote: "It was sent to me by the clerk of the court at my request, pursuant to my
investigation." Which Clerk of Court, Mr. King? Clerk of Court Orduna Hastings? Then there is Judge Elliot dismissing Coughlin's lawsuit
against Washoe Legal Services, then incarcerating Coughlin between April 19th and April 26th, 2012 (during which time Richard G. Hill and
Casey Baker filed their Motion for Attorney's Fees of $40,050 incident to the appeal of a summary eviction in CV11-03628, which Coughlin's
former co-worker Judge Flanagan awarded Baker and Hill, after Judge Flanagan refused to recuse himself even where Coughlin pointed out
the necessity of his so doing. Then Judge Elliot denied Coughlin's appeal of RMC Judge Howard's conviction of Coughlin for "petty larceny of a
candy bar and some cough drops" in 11 CR 22176 (the sole basis for the current temporary suspension of Coughlin's law license, incident to a
trial where the Reno City Attorney Pamela Roberts offered perjured testimony from Wal-Mart's Thomas Frontino and RSIC Officer Kameron
Crawford that Crawford was justified in conducting a custodial arrest and search incident thereto for an alleged misdemeanor offense,
occurring after 7 pm, outside the presence of the officer, in light of Coughlin failure to provide the officer his driver's license. City Attorney
Roberts had been provided by the RSIC a video tape showing Coughlin providing Crawford his driver's license, and Coughlin's booking
inventory sheet lists his drivers license (despite Officer Crawfords sworn testimony that Coughlin did not have one on his person at the time,
even where Wal-Mart's video shows Crawford copying down Coughlin's information off the driver's license Coughlin provided to Offier
Crawford, and where Wal-Mart admits that it did not effect a citizen's arrest of Coughlin, and therefore NRS 178.1255 required an application
of the exclusionary rule to any partial package of "cough drops" found in Coughlin's pockets upon a search incident to arrest (and even that is
not all that necessary to prove Coughlin's innocence given that the RSIC Officer and Wal-Mart's Frontino testified incorrectly that the receipt
for the $83.82 worth of groceries that Coughlin selected and paid after his allegely consuming a "candy bar and some cough drops" while
000631
shopping, did, in fact have an entry for that exact UPC of Duract Cough Melts ("cough drops"), contrary to the sworn testimony of both Wal-
Mart's Frontino and the RSIC's Crawford). But none ofthat mattered much to Judge Elliot, as he denied Coughlin's appeal based on some civil
statute related to a litigant being required to pay for a transcript up front, even where, in criminal matters, the RMC is required to transmit the
record on appeal and order the production fo the transcripts within 10 days of the filing of a Notice of Appeal, pursuant to NRS 189.010-030,
regardless of whether the criminal defendant pays for the transcript up front. See CR12-1018 for other instances of teh RMC and its "exclusive
trancriptionist" Pam Longoni perpetuating a fraud on the public (the RMC indicates Longoni is the only transcriptionist they will allow, and
demand that she be paid up front....Longoni hung up on Coughlin multiple times and otherwise prejudiced Coughlin's appeal by refusing to
prepare his transcript even where Coughlin would pay up front for the transcripts, in CR11-2064. Judge Elliot then dismissed Coughlin's appeal
of the criminal trespass conviction by Judge William Gardner in CR12-1262 where the RMC and Lisa Wagner failed to file the 6/28/12 Notice of
Appeal Coughlin has confirmation that the RMC and City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens recieved, though both maintain a dubious position counter
to such irrefutable proof.
Additionally, one of the aspects of Richard G. Hill's grievance with the SBN against Coughlin, memorialized in NG12-0204 (one of the three greivances forming
Mr. Kings SCR 105 SBN v. Couglin Petition) alleges some sort of "ghostwriting" on Coughlin's part for a former client of Coughlin's John Gessin. This is plainly
not true, though some confusion may have arisen given the fact that at about the time Gessin and Couglin parted ways, Gessin apparently paid for and signed
up for an E-flex account (apparently non-attorneys may do so?). Hill's allegations respecting Gessin are baseless and ironic given the fact that Coughlin filed
Notice of Appearance as Gessin's attorney in various matters, and even sent Gessin a correspondence wherein he warns Gessin that he will not tolerate any
appearance of ghostwriting (what can an attorney do when a client pays him money, drafts of NRCP 60(b) Motions are worked up extensively over a period of
time, then the client decides he wants to part ways, and takes with him those drafts? File a Notice of Appearance so there is at least some paper trial?). It would
be helpful to addressing Hill's allegations vis a vis "ghostwriting" for Gessin if the Second Judicial District Court would present or allow for inspection anything it
may have tending to shed light on such allegations.
Here is one correspondence Coughlin sent then client John Gessin refuting the allegations that Hill made to the SBN in his attached 1/14/12 grievance against
Coughlin (attached to the SBN King's 2/14/12 letter to Coughlin):
"Subject: NOTICES OF APPEARANCES
John, Let me know whats going on, i got a new temporary address and phone number. theres is some
ghostwriting taboos, so...if you want me to withdraw thats fine, whatever, its all good
Zach Coughlin, Esq."
Further, in her 10 4 12 order in 11 TR 26800, Judge Nash Holmes continues to refuse to allow Coughlin to appeal a final appealable order convicting
him of "summary criminal contempt", even though Judge Holme's Order specifically relies upon alleged conduct, and an essential element thereof, not
occuring in here "immediate presence", and where there is no Affidavit by her Marshal (Judge Nash Holmes states on the record in 11 TR 26800 that an
RMC Marshal (apparently Marshal Harley) followed Coughlin into the restroom during a break in the Trial Judge Nash Holmes begrudingly granted
Coughlin (though she ordered him to leave his yellow note pad in the courtroom?) whereupon Marshal Harley played Peeping Tom through a bathroom
stall and alleges to have spied Coughlin "dissassembling a smartphone", which Judge Nash Holmes took as an opportunity to find "by clear and
convicing" evidence that Coughlin "lied" "under oath" in response to her impromptu, sua sponte, interrogation of Coughlin immediately following that
bathroom break (and soon after RMC Marshal Harley (who violated the "courthouse sanctuary" dictates against serving Coughlin Judge Flanagan's
Order to Show Cause for a 3/23/12 Hearing on Richard G. Hill's Motion in the eviction appeal in CV11-03628 while Coughlin and City Attorney Ormaas
where haggling over plea details immediately prior to the traffic citation trial in 11 TR 26800 (incident to Coughlin being told to leave Hill's office
upon arriving their to retrieve his keys, wallet, and driver's license, and client's file upon being released from three days in jail incident to a criminal
trespass complaint Hill signed against Coughlin, which the RPD committed misconduct in subjecting Coughlin to a custodial arrest for, especially in
light of the video taped admission of Sargent Lopez and the matrials presented in Coughlin's recent filings in 61901 and 11 CR 26405). RMC Marshal
Harley took it upon himself to aid WCSO Deputy Machen in filing a false Affidavit of Service in Harley's handing Coughlin, on behalf of Hill, a
document Hill paid the WCSO to serve on Coughlin (an how unseemly and bullying to attempt to serve it at the traffic citation trial, appearance of
impartiality and impropriety be damned, Caplow, regardless.). And City Attorney Ormaas may have been whispering in Harley's ears given her
apparent concern or her responses to Coughlin asking her, shortly before the trial commenced, if she planned to follow up on or in any way document
the admissions to accepting bribes from Richard Hill made by the officer effecting the custodial criminal trespass arrest, RPD Officer Chris Carter, Jr.
(whom will apparently attest that he was jesting, though its not clear what is funny about arresting an attorney for trespass at his former home law
office where the WCSO admits it lied in filing an Affidavit of Service attesting to having "personally served" Coughlin such an Eviction Order.
I appreciate this opportunity to clarify my subpoena.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
000632
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
Subject: RE: Mr. King's assertion in his 3/16/12 letter
Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2012 21:29:10 +0000
April 19, 2012
Zach Coughlin
Dear Mr. Coughlin,
have been found in contempt of Court. However, it must concern you that you were found in contempt of Court by more than one Judge in two different
trials. You wanted to know how I learned of or obtained a copy of Judge Gardners Order after trial that was filed in 2009. It was sent to me by the clerk
of the court at my request, pursuant to my investigation.
Court. You may be well served to explain what remedial measures you are taking to make sure you do not repeat the conduct complained about. I cannot
give you legal advice. However I can suggest you cooperate with Bar counsels investigation and that you respond specifically to the allegations contained
in Judge Holmes and Richard Hills grievance letters to the office of Bar Counsel.
Patrick King
Sent: Monday, April 16, 2012 5:41 PM
Subject: Mr. King's assertion in his 3/16/12 letter
Dear Bar Counsel,
One thing that I am not sure I have ever pointed out, is that my then live in girlfriend of over 4 years stole about 2 months worth of my portion of our rent from
me (our arrangement was I would give her the money, she would forward it on to the landlord) in the period between May-July 2011. I sacrificed a great deal
and paid lots of her tuition, and she broke up with me and moved out on or around May 18th, 2011, about 3 days after we hosted her entire family for her
graduation from UNR. I did not know about her stealing my portion of the rent or failing to pay her own portion until August 2011, as the landlord was on an
extended vacation and failed to communicate any deficiency in the rent until mid-August, 2011, and the eviction in RJC REV2011-001708 from my former home
law office ensued within less than a week of his communicating this deficiency. He and his counsel, Richard G. Hill, Esq. and Casey Baker pursued a No Cause
Notice of Eviction because there was a wealth of support for me contention that habitability issues, fix and deduct, and the landlord's failure to cure, in addition to
personal property damage done by the landlord's landscaping crew and a provision in the lease holding the landlord liable for such, indicated it would "be the path
000633
of least resistance" to simply seek a No Cause Eviction. The only problem in their attempt to circumvent the law (even though they still threatened to seek back
rent in another forum after getting their No Cause, summary eviction) was the fact that the Lease Agreement specifically allowed for me to have a commercial law
office there, and NRS 40.253 makes impermissible a summary eviction against a commercial tenant unless the non-payment of rent is Notice, which, of course
Baker and Hill chose not to do....and it was about the time that Hill started to understand that his "wrong site surgery" for his neurosurgeon landlord client might
subject Hill and his firm to some malpractice liability, that Hill started writing letters to bar counsel attempting to start some grievance on behalf of Gessin (whom
Hill did not find so objectionable when Gessin was Hill's client and Hill was milking over $20K from Gessin) for "ghostwriting" even though I was listed as Attorney
of Record on several different Gessin cases, etc., etc.
Anyway, I deny guilt on each an every allegation made against me by Hill, Judge Nash Holmes, and whoever else has filed a grievance or complaint and also with
respect to any criminal charge against me, including that which resulted in a conviction in 11 CR 22176, which, I think will ultimately reveal was replete with
prosecutorial misconduct, lying by the Wal-Mart loss prevention associate, and lying by the two RSIC police officers, in additional to abuse of discretion and other
errors by Judge Howard.
I am writing to report that I did not receive Mr. King's 3/16/12 letter until a substantial time after it was sent. The postmark on that 3/16/12 letter from Assistant
Bar Counsel King (please see attached picture of the letter and envelope) indicates it was mailed 3/16/12, and the letter indicates it was not faxed to me (despite
my numerous written requests that such a practice be done in consideration of the problems I have encountered in the USPS violations of the Federal Torts
Claims Act and incident to the domestic violence I have been subjected to, in FV12-00188 and FV12-00187, which included interference with my mail).
I timely filed an Official Change of Address with the USPS. Additionally, I made numerous appearances at both the Golden Valley USPS Station and the Downtown
Reno Post Office in and attempt to make every diligent effort to receive my mail. I have been threatened by and lied to by the supervisors of the Golden Valley
Station USPS Station. I had a hearing related to a landlord tenant dispute on 3/15/12 (which makes Judge Nash Holmes assertion, in her 3/14/12 letter that I was
living in my car at that time rather suspect, given my home law office was located at the property which was the subject of that hearing and which I was still
located at on 3/14/12...of course, Judge Nash Holmes provides no attribution for such hearsay in her extremely reckless assertion) in RJC REV2012-00374 (the
matter for which Gayle Kern sent a property manager who lacked even a law license to litigate on her behalf, or on that of the HOA which Kern has now decided
to appear for, despite her being listed a the PTTHOA Resident Agent for sometime and despite Kern being a named party in the lawsuit in RJC Rev2012-000374.
My point is, I did not receive Mr. King's mailing of 3/16/12, in a timely manner, and as such, I am requesting more time to respond to it. Additionally, I note that
Mr. King, in that 3/16/12 letter, writes "I am enclosing with this letter copies of a grievance letter, from the Municipal Court and a copy of an Order from District
court....I will make available for your review and inspection the supporting documents and audio recordings."
However, as I have previously written, Mr. King has not made "available for (my) review and inspection the supporting documents and audio recordings". I wish
to have a copy of all such "supporting documents and audio recordings", and failing a copy being provided, I wish to be allowed the access to conduct a "review
and inspection" of "the supporting documents and audio recordings" that Mr. King promised to afford me. At no time has Mr. King ever allowed me such access.
In addition, Mr. King now informs me that he has opened a grievance on behalf of Judge Linda M. Gardner, incident to a Order for Sanctions she entered in April
2009. Mr. King has refused to indicate to me who submitted this Order for Sanctions or otherwise provided it to Bar Counsel as a Complaint or Grievance or
otherwise. I believe someone necessarily must file the complaint or grievance. Further, I believe I am entitled to know whom that is, and when such was filed.
Additionally, Mr. King has, so failed to provide a copy or any access to any purported complaint by the City of Reno Marshal's division incident to my accessing
justice, or attempting to, on March 22nd, 2012. I am again requesting that I be so provided as much.
I filed an Official USPS Change of Address on March 12, 2012, in anticipation of a change of address incident to a landlord tenant hearing set for March 15th,
2012, and further, in response to hostility, retaliation, lies, and threats made by the USPS Golden Valley Station supervisors Buck Hyde, Terri James, and a "Ms."
Passot. Some mail, like Mr. King's 3/16/12 letter to me, was eventually forwarded to me (Mr. King's letter has 3 different yellow stickers affixed, one atop the
other, on it by the USPS), however, some mail, like several Orders of the Reno Municipal Court, were not forwarded on to me, but rather, apparently, returned to
the Reno Municipal Court. Nonesuch Orders were returned to the RMC in time for Judge Nash Holmes 3/14/12 letter to Mr. King, as such, I have no idea what
Judge Nash Holmes is referring to when she describes difficulty contacting me (the attempts by Judge Nash Holmes and the RMC apparently did not included
either email or fax or a phone call, however....).
There has been little rhyme or reason as to what mailings the USPS simply returned to the sender (such as a mailing from the RMC dated 3/14/12) and which
mailings it ultimately forwarded on to me (at my then PO BOX 60952, please note, I have a new PO BOX, that I intened to keep for a substantial period of time, it
is PO BOX 3961, Reno 89505...), such as a 3/13/12 mailing from the Reno Justice Court, which was forwarded on to my then PO BOX 60952 (albeit that envelope
has 3 yellow stickers stacked atop each other as well, the farthest one down indicating a forwarding date of 3/21/12, then next sticker indicating a hold, and the
final sticker atop the stack indicating a forwarding date of 3/28/12....).
I stayed in a weekly motel for an extended period of time following my November 2011 No Cause eviction from my former home law office, and there was
difficulties in filing a Change of Address incident to that given that the Address being changed from was permanently assigned to a business, a motor lodge.
Further, some problem cause Bank of America to temporarily deny my attempts to change my address on file online, and rather require that I mail Bank of
America a signed letter requesting as much, all the way to Florida. That resulted in delays in filing an online Change of Address with the USPS, given the USPS
demands the online changes be made with one's own debit card, and that they debit card bare the same billing address as the location one is filing a change of
address from, or else, the USPS, will process such a request, but it will add 7-10 days to tohe processing time. I chose that option given mailign a letter to Bank
of America in Florida would have taken just as long. IN the interim I went to the Golden Valley USPS Station and explained these circumstances and the
supervisor, beyond calling me a "squatter" in advance of the hearing in RJC REv2011-000374 (and refusing to divulge whom had been providing information to
them resulting in such a prejudicial view of my tenancy at 1422 E. 9th St. #2, Reno 89512), informed me that while my Change of Address to my then PO Box
60952 was being processed, my mail would be held at the Golden Valley Station and that I could retrieve it there for the next 7-10 days. When I returned in the
following days, a supervisor named Buck Hyde literally assaulted me, and he and two other supervisors there, Terri James and "Ms. Passot" informed me they
were "Feds" and didn't have to put up with any crap from an attorney related to state laws like NRS 118A.190, though they couldn't cite specifically to any section
of Title 39 of U.S. Code justifying their refusal to allow me a mailbox key to my former home law office at 1422 E. 9th St. #2.
Sincerely,
000634
convicting attorney of summary criminal contempt during pendency of Order
for Competency Evaluation
Sent: Sat 11/03/12 3:14 AM
(cvellis@bhfs.com)
5 attachments
11TR26800 RMC 031412_20120312-1033_01cd003b8f0851d0.wmv (10.3 MB) , 10 25 12 61901 opposition (1)
FILESTAMPED 61901 SCR 111(4) In Re Coughlin.pdf (225.1 KB) , 61901 10 29 12 amendedemmental.pdf (230.2 KB) ,
Patrick King sbn grievance letter of 3 16 12 and Judge Nash Holmes greivance of 3 14 12 rmc 11 TR 26800.pdf (575.8
KB) , exhibit 1 with cover page part 1 of 3 61901 10 25 12 filing.pdf (8.0 MB)
togninim@reno.gov; joey.hastings@washoecounty.us; joey.orduna@washoecounty.us; david.hardy@washoecounty.us; patrickk@nvbar.org;
skent@skentlaw.com; mike@tahoelawyer.com; nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; davidc@nvbar.org; complaints@nvbar.org;
tsusich@nvdetr.org; je@eloreno.com; cvellis@bhfs.com
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
RE: convicting attorney of summary criminal contempt during pendency of
Order for Competency Evaluation
Sent: Sun 11/04/12 12:34 AM
(cvellis@bhfs.com)
Dear SBN,
I have set my email to add to my blocked sender list any "bounce back" or error messages that might be sent me
in response to your antiquated email system having any sort of file size limitations resulting in a rejection of a
transmission that pretty much an old free gmail or hotmail account could accept. So, your on notice of that and
your apparent purposeful Luddite stance (reminds me of "Investigator" Peters mentioning how reluctant she is
to investigate anything) is not something I will be receiving any notice of so you might want to adjust your
email system accordingly.
I have an idea, how about you implement a "salary size limitation" on your paychecks until you cease pursuing
outdated and dubious plausible deniability constructs?
000635
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
To: togninim@reno.gov; joey.hastings@washoecounty.us; joey.orduna@washoecounty.us; david.hardy@washoecounty.us; patrickk@nvbar.org;
skent@skentlaw.com; mike@tahoelawyer.com; nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; davidc@nvbar.org; complaints@nvbar.org; tsusich@nvdetr.org;
je@eloreno.com; cvellis@bhfs.com
Subject: convicting attorney of summary criminal contempt during pendency of Order for Competency Evaluation
Date: Sat, 3 Nov 2012 03:13:58 -0700
togninim@reno.gov; joey.hastings@washoecounty.us; joey.orduna@washoecounty.us; david.hardy@washoecounty.us; patrickk@nvbar.org;
skent@skentlaw.com; mike@tahoelawyer.com; nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; davidc@nvbar.org; complaints@nvbar.org;
tsusich@nvdetr.org; je@eloreno.com; cvellis@bhfs.com
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
Zach Coughlin has shared a folder with you
Sent: Tue 11/06/12 9:46 AM
To: skent@skentlaw.com
Exhibit 1 to 11 3 12
Supplement to
Coughlin's List of
View photos
You are invited to view Zach's album. This album has
147 files.
031209 part 2 of 2 dv08-01168 54844 01955 01896 60302 60317 ng12-0435 26405
031209 part 1 of 2 dv08-01168 54844 01955 01896 60302 60317 ng12-0435 26405
0223121 PTTHOA 1 of 2 RJC Rev2012-000374.asf
0223121 PTTHOA 2 of 2 RJC rev2012-000374.asf
122011 rjc rev2011-001708 part 1 seg 2 of 2 hearing on motion to contest personal property lien merliss v coughlin1.wmv
031709 dv08-01168 54844 cv11-01955 cv11-01896 60302 60317 Joshi divorce trial Judge L Gardner coughlin mandamus wls 08h24m39s.wmv 000636
031709 dv08-01168 54844 cv11-01955 cv11-01896 60302 60317 Joshi divorce trial Judge L Gardner coughlin mandamus wls 08h17m06s.wmv
from blse 6 29 12 15 wcso machen and northwind moment of arrest and ncs.mp4
071612 rjc rcr2011-063341 rcr2012-065630 rcr2012-067980 dogan bosler leslie goodnight young rpd rmc wcso Trial continued coughlin.wmv
082712 coughlin2 plea bargain hearing rjc rcr2012-063341 iphone leslie goodnight young rpd rmc wcso.wmv
031709 dv08-01168 54844 cv11-01955 cv11-01896 60302 60317 Joshi divorce trial Judge L Gardner coughlin mandamus wls 10h22m12s.wmv
082712coughlin3 plea bargain hearing rjc rcr2012-063341 iphone leslie goodnight young rpd rmc wcso.wmv
082712 coughlin1 plea bargain hearing rjc rcr2012-063341 iphone leslie goodnight young rpd rmc wcso.wmv
082912 coughlin1 RJC RCR2011-063341 iPhone Trial Leslie Young Bosler rpd rmc wcso Duralde Goble Zarate testimony.wmv
082912 coughlin2 RJC RCR2011-063341 iPhone Trial Leslie Young Bosler rpd rmc wcso Duralde Goble Zarate testimony.wmv
082912coughlin3 RJC RCR2011-063341 iPhone Trial Leslie Young Bosler rpd rmc wcso Duralde Goble Zarate testimony.wmv
090512coughlin3 rjc rcr2012-063341 iphone leslie goodnight young rpd rmc wcso duralde.wmv
Share your files with
(No Subject)
Sent: Tue 11/06/12 9:46 AM
To: (skent@skentlaw.com) (skent@skentlaw.com); (mike@tahoelawyer.com) (mike@tahoelawyer.com);
(nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net) (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net); (patrickk@nvbar.org) (patrickk@nvbar.org); (fflaherty@dlpfd.com)
(fflaherty@dlpfd.com); (davidc@nvbar.org) (davidc@nvbar.org); (complaints@nvbar.org) (complaints@nvbar.org);
(tsusich@nvdetr.org) (tsusich@nvdetr.org); (je@eloreno.com) (je@eloreno.com); (cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com)
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
Zach has a file to share with you on SkyDrive. To view it, click the link below.
11 5 12 SUPPLMENTSAL TO 0204.pdf
Emergency Ex Parte Motion NG12-0204, 0434,0435
Sent: Sun 11/11/12 4:13 AM
To: (skent@skentlaw.com) (skent@skentlaw.com); (mike@tahoelawyer.com) (mike@tahoelawyer.com);
(nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net) (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net); (patrickk@nvbar.org) (patrickk@nvbar.org); (fflaherty@dlpfd.com)
(fflaherty@dlpfd.com); (davidc@nvbar.org) (davidc@nvbar.org); (complaints@nvbar.org) (complaints@nvbar.org);
(tsusich@nvdetr.org) (tsusich@nvdetr.org); (je@eloreno.com) (je@eloreno.com); (cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com)
from:
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St. 000637
Reno, NV 89512
tel and fax 949 667 7402
I do not consent to service or notice of anything electronically in this proceeding, but I do appreciate being copied on such things via email
and fax)
Emergency Ex Parte Motion NG12-0204, 0434,0435
please find attached 88 page Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss or Quash or Otherwise Challenge Sufficiency of Service
and of Process, of Complaint and Notice of Intent to Take Default and DoWSoE; and Preserving for Appeal Objection to All other Due Process
Violations; and UNDER PROTEST...RESPONSE TO COMPLAINT
submitted for filing with the State Bar of Nevada on November 9th, 2012
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
Zach has a file to share with you on SkyDrive. To view it, click the link below.
11 9 12 response under protest 0204 and various motions and notices 0204 etc.pdf
FW:
Sent: Sun 11/11/12 7:50 AM
(nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net); patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); fflaherty@dlpfd.com (fflaherty@dlpfd.com);
davidc@nvbar.org (davidc@nvbar.org); complaints@nvbar.org (complaints@nvbar.org); tsusich@nvdetr.org
(tsusich@nvdetr.org); je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com)
3 attachments
10 31 12 0204 Pre Hearing Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgement and Memorandum of Law (Responsive
Pleading).pdf (10.4 MB) , 10 31 12 subpoena on peters and waiver of service.pdf (541.5 KB) , ex x harris silverman
coughlin garin 0204 11 11 12.pdf (9.8 MB)
Nice to see my friend Steve back in the game. And the SBN stipping to a dismissal of its SCR 116 appeal rights...
Please find attached the file stamped versions of the 10 31 12 subpoena duces tecum for which SBN Laura Peters signed a waiver
of service or similar
and the 10 31 12 Pre Hearing Motion to Dismiss Summary Judgment/Memorandum of Law (Response)
Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2012 11:28:12 -0700
From: silverman@silverman-decaria.com
Subject: re: FW: please find enclosed my Petition under SCR 102(4)(d) and SCR111(7)
I think this is waaaaay too complex and detailed. Give them a procedural history and whether there is a final judgment in the crim case and point out that your
temporary suspension is akin to a permanent death of your practice. Or, if true, say you fucked up and/or were fucked up from lack of drugs and you are sorry
and you now have access to your meds and are ok. I can't think this pleading is going to help you much...it is too long, repetitive and does not seem to deal with
why the temp suspension is sijmply wrong or harsh. If you can't make your case in 3-5 pp, you can't make your case in 35. You do seem to be a good lawyer,
however. At bottom, Steve Harris took hundreds of thousands of dollars and had no temp suspension; you stole a candy bar (at worst). WTF.
000638
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
Tribal Police not allowed to arrest for misdemeanors FW: Case No. RCR2011-
063341
Sent: Sun 11/11/12 8:40 AM
To: homerj@reno.gov (homerj@reno.gov); complaints@nvbar.org (complaints@nvbar.org); hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov (hazlett-
stevensc@reno.gov); robertsp@reno.gov (robertsp@reno.gov); kadlicj@reno.gov (kadlicj@reno.gov); fflaherty@dlpfd.com
(fflaherty@dlpfd.com); patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); tsusich@nvdetr.org (tsusich@nvdetr.org);
wongd@reno.gov (wongd@reno.gov); ormaasa@reno.gov (ormaasa@reno.gov); bonyr@reno.gov (bonyr@reno.gov);
skauc@reno.gov (skauc@reno.gov); davidc@nvbar.org (davidc@nvbar.org); drakej@reno.gov (drakej@reno.gov);
je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com); mike@tahoelawyer.com
(mike@tahoelawyer.com); nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net); skent@skentlaw.com
(skent@skentlaw.com)
How exactly is it that both City Attorney Pamela Roberts, Esq. and Chris Hazlett-Stevens, Esq. did not violate
RPC 3.8 or otherwise prosecute for arrests that were not lawful
in RMC 11 CR 22176 (Indian Tribe police custodial arrest for misdemeanor? Not lawful under NRS 171.1255,
and even if they were RPD, which they are not, its not like they charge Coughlin with something other than
petty larceny a la NRS 171.136(2)...
Further, can you provide me an indication of how it was lawful for RSIC Officer's Kameron Crawford or
Donnie Braunworth to arrest me on 9/9/11 (and Wal-Mart's Thomas Frontino made explicitly clear in his
testimony at trial on 11/30/11 that neither he nor any of Wal-Mart's staff in any way effected a custodial arrest
of Coughlin on that date) for a misdemeanor given the following:
NRS 171.1255 Arrest by officer or agent of Bureau of Indian Affairs or police officer employed by Indian tribe.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, an officer or agent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs or a person employed as a police officer by an
Indian tribe may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him or her, or may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross misdemeanor, although not in the officer or agents presence.
(c) When a felony or gross misdemeanor has in fact been committed, and the officer or agent has reasonable cause for believing the person
arrested to have committed it.
(d) On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony or gross misdemeanor by the person arrested.
(e) When a warrant has in fact been issued in this State for the arrest of a named or described person for a public offense, and the officer or agent
has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested is the person so named or described.
(f) When the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a battery upon that persons spouse and the
peace officer finds evidence of bodily harm to the spouse.
(a) Within the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony for an offense committed on that reservation or colony; or
(b) Outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony if the officer or agent is in fresh pursuit of a person who is reasonably
believed by the officer or agent to have committed a felony within the boundaries of the reservation or colony or has committed, or attempted to
commit, any criminal offense within those boundaries in the presence of the officer or agent.
000639
For the purposes of this subsection, fresh pursuit has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 171.156.
(Added to NRS by 1985, 452)
While Ormaas made sure to get judicial notice taken of jurisdiction in 11 TR 26800, it doesn't seem Pamela Roberts, Esq. did in the Indian Colony
Wal-Mart matter...Why is that, Pam? Tribal land? Never determined if Coughlin had even an ounce of tribal blood? RSIC Officers not entitled
to make custodial arrests for misdemeanors, even, apparently, one's committed right in their presence? So, even if Coughlin did refuse to provide
his driver's license (which has been proven to be a lie, and perjury suborned by Pam Roberts as to the testimony of Wal-Mart's Frontino and the
RSIC Officer's Crawford and Braunworth via police reports, dispatch recordings (AND PLEASE BE ADIVSED, AS ITS WITHIN THE 2
YEARS, THAT THE CITY OF RENO, THE SOUTH DISPATCH CENTER FOR ECOMM OR WASHOE COUNTY, OR WHOEVER IT IS
THAT HANDLES THE RSIC DISPATCH CALLS, IT ON A LITIGATION HOLD NOTICE. COUGHLIN DEMANDS (AND THE
DISPATCH/ECOMM SOUTH DISPATCH CENTER WILL GET ITS NRS 174.345 SUBPOENA IN THE MAIL FOR A MISDEMEANOR
SOON ENOUGH) THAT THE CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS MAINTAIN ANY AND ALL RECORDINGS, LOGS, OR OTHER
DOCUMENTATION OR MEDIA IN ANY WAY CONNECTED TO ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER,
ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO THE ARREST OF 9/9/11 AT THE RSIC WAL-MART IN RENO NEVADA NEAR GLENDALE AND W.
2ND ST.
So, all these arrests by the RSIC police of alleged shoplifters at Wal-Mart...Sling Bla...er, Officer Braunworth testified that there was lots of them
(sounds like Wal-Mart and the RSIC have the whole "find a way to get a search incident to arrest" thing down part, while avoiding any wrongful
arrest liability against the deep pocket tenant Wal-Mart by avoiding any "shopkeeper's privilege" type citizen's arrests (or trying to use just as
much intimidation and coercion as Frontino and the gang can muster, while seeking to claim not to have effected a citizen's arrest later in court,
given setting the RSIC up to handle those types of lawsuits is arguably a better long term loss mitigation approach for these long term business
partners, Wal-Mart and their partner/landlord the RSIC.
So, please enlighten me. How is it these RSIC Officers are making all these custodial arrests for simple misdemeanors? And just where in the
audio transcript of the Trial (you might want to have RMC house transcriptionist Pam Longoni finally get around to making a transcript and
providing it to Coughlin, as the handouts the RMC itself provides defendants baring Longoni's and the RMC's "down payment"/transcript hostage
rules are tantamount to extortion in violation of NRS 189.030. Then there is the bit about the RMC and or other discovering over $700K was
"missing", and the attempts to chalk it up to "data entry" errors. Please get that transcript to me right away, and transcripts of every other hearing
I have ever had in the RMC, including the one on or around February 2nd, 2012 or so where RMC court appointed defender Roberto Puentes
successfully argued for an Order Granting His Withdrawal (five Withdrawals by court appointed counsel of Coughlin, four via an Order Granting
a duly filed Motion (though these guy's Motions wouldn't pass my 7th grade English Class's bi-weekly writing assignment in my days at Swope
Middle School) and Hon. W. Gardner starts to divulge, only after Coughlin's prompting, bit by bit some of the patent conflicts that should have
prevented him from ever ruling on a single motion in that case 11 CR 26405. With such lack of vigor from the RMC's court appointed defense
counsel, could a class action lawsuit agains them, the RMC, and or the City of Reno be a possibility someday? Certainly is a nice lil side gig
$7K a month those guys get...and all these prosecutions and trips to jail this year certainly have afforded an opportunity to see the "operation" up
close.
Also, you know, as to lots of these arrests, like say the July 3rd, 2012 arrest by RPD Officer Alan Weaver and now Sargent Brian Dye in 12 CR
12420 (wherein two RMC court appointed counsel have already sought and obtained Orders Granting Their Withdrawal, one, by Keith Loomis,
one by Henry Sotelo, the latter in violation of the stay in NRS 178.405) the legitimacy of effecting a custodial arrest is completely suspect
considering:
ARREST: BY WHOM AND HOW MADE
NRS 171.124 Arrest by peace officer or officer of Drug Enforcement Administration.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3 and NRS 33.070 and 33.320, a peace officer or an officer of the Drug Enforcement Administration
designated by the Attorney General of the United States for that purpose may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him or her, or
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) For a public offense committed or attempted in the officers presence.
(b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross misdemeanor, although not in the officers presence.
(c) When a felony or gross misdemeanor has in fact been committed, and the officer has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to
have committed it.
(d) On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony or gross misdemeanor by the person arrested.
000640
(e) When a warrant has in fact been issued in this State for the arrest of a named or described person for a public offense, and the officer has
reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested is the person so named or described.
2. A peace officer or an officer of the Drug Enforcement Administration designated by the Attorney General of the United States for that purpose
may also, at night, without a warrant, arrest any person whom the officer has reasonable cause for believing to have committed a felony or gross
misdemeanor, and is justified in making the arrest, though it afterward appears that a felony or gross misdemeanor has not been committed.
So back to the Wal-Mart RSIC arrest...the charge sheet doesn't say Coughlin was arrested for anything other than petty larceny....but:
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the public and:
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for
another alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense is
committed;
(e) When the offense charged is battery that constitutes domestic violence pursuant to NRS 33.018 and the arrest is made in the manner provided in
NRS 171.137;
(f) When the offense charged is a violation of a temporary or extended order for protection against domestic violence issued pursuant to NRS
33.017 to 33.100, inclusive;
(h) When the person voluntarily surrenders himself or herself in response to an outstanding warrant of arrest.
So, on exactly what basis was the July 3rd, 2012 arrest made by the RPD? The police report says the arrest was made for "disturbing the peace",
yet the only allegation of anything remotely in the "officer's presence" relates to the minor traffic citation the City of Reno is clinging to in
attempts to mitigate the Sec. 1983 damages here. However, the RPD admits at least one vehicle was between their's and Coughlin's and Sooudi et
al (besides making an incomprehensibly stupid decision to briefly file an amended complaint for trespassing where even the RPD was smart
enough to realize that was a poor choice given Coughlin still had lease at Northwind, and thus a pat claim of right defense to any trespass
allegation absent something like the manufactured protection order that RPD Officer Weaver coerced Milan Krebs into obtaining, just like Weaver
attempted to get Superior Storage's Matt Grant to do, shortly after Weaver, in full view of Welch, Sargent Miller, and other RPD Officer's, on
September 21st, 2012, threatened to come up with yet another fraudulent "failure to secure a load on one's vehicle" arrest of Coughlin). So, even
though Weaver and Dye are stuck with their statements in the written reports, wherein they allege to have arrest Coughlin for "disturbing the
peace" only to then tack on "citations" for the two traffic offenses (and the "proof of insurance" citation, even after Officer Weaver admits to
being provided a high definition pdf picture on a 5 inch smart phone screen with a policy number, etc., only to be amplified by the July 5th, 2012
bail hearing racket tearing (a tennis reference for Jill Drake, Esq.,... for shame, really Jill, really, really unimpressed).
Please remit a certified check for $450,000 in satisfaction of these torts committed upon Coughlin, under color of law.
Sincerely,
000641
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
To: homerj@reno.gov; complaints@nvbar.org; hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov; robertsp@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov; fflaherty@dlpfd.com; patrickk@nvbar.org;
tsusich@nvdetr.org
Subject: RE: Case No. RCR2011-063341
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2012 20:36:27 -0800
couldn't open them, and I don't accept service of anything form you... See Allison Ormaas comments on
3/12/12 in 11 tr 26800 with respect to your offices violation of the RMC Rules to the extent there is not
difference technologically anymore between an email and a fax:
Rule 5: Motions/Pleadings by Facsimile
A. All rules and procedures that apply to motions/pleadings filed in person at the court shall also apply to motions/pleadings filed by facsimile, except as otherwise specified
in this rule.
B. All motions/pleadings filed by facsimile will only be accepted through the clerk's office (775-334-3824).
C. Except by prior court approval, a motion/pleading by facsimile shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages in length, including the cover sheet and exhibits. A document shall not
be split into multiple transmissions to avoid the page limitation.
D. Each transmitted page shall bear sequential numbers in the transmission.
E. All persons are eligible to use motion/pleading-by-facsimile procedures.
F. All motions/pleadings filed by facsimile must be accompanied by a cover sheet which must include the persons name, address, fax number and telephone number.
G. All facsimile motions/pleadings filed by an attorney must include the attorney's name, the firms name, address, fax number and telephone number. In addition, the
attorneys state bar number must be conspicuously displayed on the cover sheet.
H. All motions /pleadings filed by facsimile must be accompanied by proof of service. Service may be accomplished by facsimile when the receiving party is a
governmental agency, an attorney, or with the consent of the receiving party. If service of the motion/pleading is accomplished by facsimile the 3-day allowance
for mailing shall not be computed into the time for response.
I. A defense attorney filing a motion/pleading in the first instance must also file a proper authorization to represent.
J. Any motion /pleading received by the court after 4:30 p.m. or on a non-court day shall be filed on the following court day.
Rule 6: Continuances
No continuance shall be granted, including a stipulated continuance, except for good cause. A motion or stipulation for continuance must state the reason therefore and whether
or not any continuance has previously been sought or granted.
Further, Please consider Pamela Roberts attempts to mislead the Court and opposing counsel where (despite Rich HIll getting a continuance agree to by then court appointed
defense counsel Lew Taitel, whose business partners Coughlin was suing in CV11-03015 and or CV11-03126, Taitel agreed to a continuance, in violation of Coughlin's speedy
trial right, where Hill needed to go on a six week vacation in 11 cr 26405) Roberts at first agreed, in writing, to a continuance in response to Coughlin's request for one in 11 CR
22176, but then retaliated against Coughlin's pointing out her RPC 3.8 violations on the day of Trial, 11/30/12 by refusing the stipulate to a continuance an blaming it on the Court.
Pursuant to RMCR Rule 5(H), the City Attorney's Office does not have my consent to service via any means other than the traditional snail mail,
usps, or personal service. And I am not currently included amongst those who are "attorneys", so you are stuck with that. Your office on the
other hand, fits within both the 'governmental agency" and "attorney exceptions"...someone needs to tell Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Esq.
that becuase he has lied numerous times, on the record about not being served where he has been. Take, for instance
Further, does your office represent any of the RMC's court appointed defenders? Taitel, in 11 CR 26405, failed to follow RMC Rules in
withdrawing from representation:
Rule 3: Authorization to Represent
A. Attorneys representing defendants shall promptly serve written notice of their appearance with the City Attorney and file the same with the Court.
B. An attorney desiring to withdraw from a case shall file a motion with the court and serve the City Attorney with the same. The court may rule on the motion or set a
hearing.
Further, these RMCR's seem to change out of the blue, is there some record of what changes were made and when?
Hazlett-Steven's lies, in part, helped secure a dismissal of my appeal in cr12-1262 (the appeal of the Richard G. Hill eviction trespass case). Also, you will want to query the RMC's
D2 and Lisa Gardner as to why Coughlin has a confirmation of delivery of his timely under NRS 189.010 Notice of Appeal in 11 cr 26405, yet D2 failed to file it, and the appeal in
000642
cr12-1262 was dismissed in light of the combination of both asserting, in one way or another, that the Notice of Appeal was not received in a timely manner. The delivery
confirmations say otherwise.
Please remit $250,000 in the form of a certified check to the address below within 10 days in settlement of these torts. SBN, please provide to me the grievance number associate
with this new grievance that is created upon the successful transmission of this email.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
utbound fax report Inbox x
Voxox noreply@voxox.com Jun 27
to me
Hi zachcoughlin,
xoxo,
The Voxox Team
This message was intended for renoattorney@gmail.com. Want to control which emails you receive from Voxox?
Get Voxox: http://download.voxox.com and adjust your Notifications in the Settings/Preferences window. Voxox by
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to me
Hi zachcoughlin,
to me
Hi zachcoughlin,
to me
Hi zachcoughlin,
to me
Hi zachcoughlin,
Your Fax was successfully sent to 3ad3f15b-3a33-4863-a6cd-7934ec8f8b32general693298 ( 17753343859).
000643
000644
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000646
response to grievance from NV Attorney
Sent: Fri 3/09/12 5:44 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org; glennm@nvbar.org; davidc@nvbar.org
1 attachment
3 9 12 fax to State Bar of Nevada Bar Counsel requesting extension of time to respond to
Richard G. Hill, Esq. grievance.pdf (61.6 KB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
775 328 6045 fax: 949 667 7402

State Bar of Nevada
P.O. Box 50
Las Vegas, NV 89104


March 9, 2012,
Page 1 of 147 http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=dfc328a6-141c-443...
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me for services) from February 3rd to February 20th, 2012, incident to one of the individuals
location.

address."


Sincerely,

000648

RE: Contact

Zach Coughlin

Sent: Fri 3/16/12 1:39 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org; clarkd@nvbar.org; glennm@nvbar.org
1 attachment
THE 2 11 12 email to WCSO RPD Reno City Attorney Hill NPUC Hill et al b.pdf (137.8 KB)
Mr. King,

I have not sent you my Reply to the Grievance. You gave me until today, and I am
finishing it up. Additionally, I was subject to what I believe is a wrongful eviction
yesterday, and would like additionaly time to respond to Richard HIll's grievance,
which he appears to be filing on behalf of various third parties, and his associate,
who doesn't bother to sign it. Basically, Mr. HIll constantly seeks to leverage courts,
police, and now, Bar Counsel, to further his nefarious approach to litigation, rather
than roll up his sleeves and find some law in favor of his positions and apply actual
facts to them, rather than make up things or quote to third parties and other hearsay (I
never made contact with or touched Mr. Hill, I never climbed on anyone's truck, Mr.
Hill is not a licensed mental health professional, yet he sounds like a walking DSM-
IV when he writes of me). I will submit something to you today in response to Hill's
grievance, with the caveat that I am requesting more time, in part due to the fact that
the Washoe County Sheriff's Deputies have just yesterday, minutes before my
hearing in Judge Beesley's courtroom, unlawfully stormed into my location at 1422
E. 9th St, #2, with guns drawn and pointed at me, without previously identifying
themselves as law enforcement in any way, and demanding I grab a few things in a
couple minutes and leave. This unlawful eviction was pursuant to an eviction
hearing held that morning by Reno Justice Court Judge Jack Shroeder, the
same Judge who screamed at me "do you want to go to jail" when I attempted to
address in any way whatsoever Richard Hill's abuse of process in getting a Order of
Protection from Judge Schroeder in a scant 40 minutes, and having me arrested on
1/12/12 (two days before Hill's grievance was sent to you), at the extension
hearing on January 31, 2012, where Hill admitted he didn't have a good reason for
seeking an extension and withdrew his application. I wanted to address Hill's abuse
of process for the record, Judge Schroeder decided to scream at me instead. It was
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reminscent of Judge Nash Holmes telling me, on the record, in Reno Municipal
Court case 11 TR 26800 that she would have me arrested and placed in jail if I said
Richard G. Hill's name one more time. I cross examined RPD Sargent Tarter about
whether he had a retaliatory motive in ticketing me outside Hill's office on 11/15/11
after Hill refused to give me my driver's license, and I reported to Sargent Tarter that
RPD Officer Chris Carter had admitted to taking bribes from Richard Hill.

Actually, there is some footage of the "terror" Richard G. Hill was exposed to that
necessitated him seeking a Protection Order (the "RPD made him" do it, honest):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gBu9zflGALE

I don't know why Sargent Sifre (whom makes more money than a District Court
Judge) should be so upset with lawyers like me, who work in the foresclosure
defense field (you might see if Geof Giles, Esq. thinks I am quite the "Yosemite
Sam" caricature of a cartoon villian that Richard G. Hill paints me to be, or if
Thomas J. Hall thinks that much of Rich and his "tactics", which are like those of a
malignant frat boys armed with daddy's pleadings). After all, Sargent Sifre has
benefitted from foresclosure defense work:
http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2011/01/29/nevada-dist-court-quiet-title-viable-sifre-
v-wells-fargo-bank/

Regardless, I have not "ghostwritten" any pleadings for Mr. Gessin or anybody else.
I am listed as attorney of record on adversary proceedings for Gessin, though the
only things I ever filed for him clearly indicated that I was not appearing as attorney
of record and that the Answers to the Complaints in those two adversary proceedings
were being submitted on an "unbundled services" arrangement. The bankruptcy
court nonetheless listed me as attorney of record and I have been and am in the
process of having that changed. I have communicated with clerk Holly Estes and
filing office supervisore Debbie Gallagher in those regards.

I need more time to research and investigate the other allegations Hill makes, though
I do not wish you to infer and admission on my part to any allegation by Hill.

I have researched this service of eviction Order issues extensively, it relates to the
Hill matter, and I believe the WCSO and Hill are not following the law.

I am not sure why you wrote what you did at 9:09 am this morning considering you
granted me until 3:00pm today to file my response, which I intend to along with a
request for more time to supplement it:
From:Patrick King (PatrickK@nvbar.org)
Sent: Mon 3/12/12 9:15 AM
000650
March 12, 2012

To: Zach Coughlin

Dear Mr. Coughlin,

response. Pursuant to your request, you are granted until Friday, March 16, 2012 by 3:00pm to deliver
your written response to the State Bar Office in Reno.




Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
775 328 6045 fax: 949 667 7402
000651

State Bar of Nevada
P.O. Box 50
Las Vegas, NV 89104


March 9, 2012,


me for services) from February 3rd to February 20th 2012 incident to one of the individuals
000652
location.

address."


Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin"

000653


To: lstuchell@washoecounty.us; mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us; drakej@reno.gov; kadlicj@reno.gov;
cdbaker@richardhillaw.com; jboles@callatg.com; bbuckley@lacsn.org; daolshan@yahoo.com;
jsoderlund@nlslaw.net; jdelikanakis@swlaw.com; jgoodnight@washoecounty.us;
jbosler@washoecounty.us; bdogan@washoecounty.us; mechols@maclaw.com; mclarkson@puc.nv.gov
Subject: Evictions RE: WCSO Deputy Machem's "personally served" Affidavit of 11/1/2011
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2012 12:14:01 -0800

Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 11:40:39 -0800

Mr. Coughlin

Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was personally served
by Deputy Machen by posting a copy of the Order to the residence. The residence
was unoccupied at the time.

WCSO Civil Section

000654



MERS fraud I come across in my day job (and do you wonder how many attorneys
in the foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with who are watching and
witness the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?), which includes being
a foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it? Did Machem "personally serve" me
the Summary Eviction Order? Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served"
in compliance with all time related rules because it was done in the "usual custom
and practice of the WCSO. What, exactly, is the "usual custom and practice of the
phraseology: "
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40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b)
Advise the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an
unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or
an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or
constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
order
and,
receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon
the days for mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In
Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the
record did not reflect when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter
was issued on November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period
commenced on November 30, 2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding
Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA,
a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of
a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome
Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)
(granting plaintiff an additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).... ...

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Dear Washoe County Sheriff's Office,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Service_of_process
"Substituted service

When an individual party to be served is unavailable for personal service, many
jurisdictions allow for substituted service. Substituted service allows the process
server to leave service documents with another responsible individual, called a
person of suitable age and discretion, such as a cohabiting adult or a teenager. Under
the Federal Rules, substituted service may only be made at the abode or dwelling of
the defendant.[4] California, New York,[5] Illinois, and many other United States
jurisdictions require that in addition to substituted service, the documents be mailed
to the recipient.[5] Substituted service often requires a serving party show that
ordinary service is impracticable, that due diligence has been made to attempt to
make personal service by delivery, and that substituted service will reach the party
and effect notice.[5]"

I am pretty sure "personally served" means you served the person in person, not that
a person named Machem went and posted a notice on a door, personally himself.
See, I think you guys are thinking of the "person" in the word personally as applying
to the server, when in all instances I have ever seen it used in the law, the "person"
part of "personally" applies to the person being served. Help me out here, Mary.

https://skydrive.live.com/redir.aspx?cid=43084638f32f5f28&resid=43084638F32F5F28!
1897&parid=root

Also, does the WCSO have a position on what type of service is required of eviction
orders prior to the WCSO or whoever does it, being able to conduct a lockout?

http://www.leg.state.nv.us/courtrules/nrcp.html

NRCP RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER... (c) Default
Judgments: Defendant Not Personally Served. When a default judgment shall have
been taken against any party who was not personally served with summons and
complaint, either in the State of Nevada or in any other jurisdiction, and who has not
entered a general appearance in the action, the court, after notice to the adverse party,
upon motion made within 6 months after the date of service of written notice of entry
of such judgment, may vacate such judgment and allow the party or the partys legal
representatives to answer to the merits of the original action. When, however, a party
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has been personally served with summons and complaint, either in the State of
Nevada or in any other jurisdiction, the party must make application to be relieved
from a default, a judgment, an order, or other proceeding taken against the party, or
for permission to file an answer, in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (b)
of this rule.

Okay, so, really, you guys do this for a living, right...you serve people things....and
sign Affidavits under penalty of perjury and stuff, and you are telling me you believe
"personally served" can included situations where the person was not there?
Okay.....You do know that, like, a Summons and Complaint need to be "personally
served" in the sense that, say Machem, would need to see that person and serve it on
them (I don't think they have to take the paper, they don't need to agree to accept
service, but Machem does need to see that person, in person, personally when he is
swearing under penalty of perjury that he "personally served" somebody. Usually
"personally served" is only done in the case of the first thing filed (unless there is an
IFP) in a case, the Summons and Complaint. Thereafter, typically, people just effect
"substituted service" because its cheaper, less of a hassle, and "personal service" is
only required for serving the pleadings that start a case, the Summons and
Complaint. Wow....Okay, so this is my whole point, these state sponsored lockouts
under color of state law should not be being done so fast, unless you guys
"personally serve" the tenant, I feel the law is quite clear, you have to effect
"substituted service" which, under NRCP 6(a) and NRCP 6(e) and NRCP 5(b)(2)
(and NRCP, not JCRCP is applicable to eviction matters according to NRS 118A)
the tenant cannot be deemed to have received or constructively received the Order
until the 3 days for mailing has passed.

Personal service by process server

Personal service is service of process directly to the (or a) party named on the
summons, complaint or petition. In most lawsuits in the United States, personal
service is required to prove service. Most states allow substituted service in almost
all lawsuits unless you are serving a corporation, LLC, LLP, or other business entity;
in those cases, personal service must be achieved by serving (in hand) the documents
to the "Registered Agent" of a business entity. Some states (Florida) do not require
that the documents actually be handed to the individual. In California and most other
states, the documents must be visible to the person being served, i.e., not in a sealed
envelope. If the individual refuses to accept service, flees, closes the door, etc., and
the individual has been positively identified as the person to be served, documents
may be "drop" served, and it is considered a valid service. Personal service of
process has been the hallmark for initialing litigation for nearly 100 years, primarily
because it guarantees actual notice to a defendant of a legal action against him or her.
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Personal service of process remains the most reliable and efficacious way to both
ensure compliance with constitutionally imposed due process requirements of notice
to a defendant and the opportunity to be heard. [2]^ The National Law Review: The
Continuing Relevance of Personal Service of Process

And even if something indicates Coughlin "knew" about the Order, much like in the
case of Coughlin's that was dismissed where the Washoe County Sheriff's didn't
manage to get the "personal service" of the Summons and Complaint done in time, or
"sufficiently", opposing counsel in that matter could tell you that "actual notice" is
not a substitute for compliance with the service requirements.

Which is nice because folks like Richard G. Hill, Esq. have less of an opportunity to
game the system and swoop in with lockout then assert a bunch of hooey about NRS
118A.460 "reasonable storage, moving, and inventorying expenses" subjecting the
tenant's personal property to a lien. Richard G. Hill insisted on throwing away the
last thing my beloved grandmother gave me before she died 2 years ago in the town
dump. He and his contractor lied about so many things, including the fact that they
used my own damn plywood to board up the back porch of the property, then
submitted a bill to the court in an exhibit for $1,060 for "securing" the property
(which doesn't really apply to NRS 118A.460's "reasonable storage moving and
inventorying expenses" like it is required to...further, the charged me $900 a month
for storage and sent me a bill for such prior to my arrest for trespassing at the 121
River Rock location,...well if they charged me $900 to have a home law office there,
then how is it someone could be trespassing if they are being charged the full rental
value for "use and occupancy of the premises"? Further, even if it was a storage
situations, there are sections of NRS 118A devoted to evicting someone from a
storage facility, not arresting them for trespass, and certainly not a custodial arrest
where the RPD Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez admit they never issued a warning
to me or asked me to leave prior to conducting a custodial arrest (which required
$800 of bail, great!, and 3 days in jail, no less). This is especially poor form where
Officer Carter admitted to me that he takes bribes from Richard Hill. Hey, if Officer
Carter did not say that to me, go ahead and sue me, my man....I'm waiting.....that's
what I thought.

He can say he was joking all he wants, but it ain't no joking ass situation to me when
you are arresting me and causing a google search result for my name to show an
arrest....that's damaging the only thing I have of monetary value (my professional
reputation and name). It ain't no stand up hour when you are putting me in cuffs, bro.
And Officer Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to properly query Hill as to whether
he had sent me, prior to the trespassing arrest, a bill for the "full rental value" of the
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property, a value that, at $900, was the same charge for the full "use and occupancy"
of the premises. And Richard G. HIll, Esq. was too busy chortling and filling out the
Criminal Complaint to bother setting them straight, despite my cues, I guess.

Now, add to that malfeasance the fact that Judge Sferrazza let Casey Baker, Esq.
prepare the Order, which means faithfully put to writing what the Judge announced,
not attempt to steal $2,275 for your Californian Beverly Hills High School graduate
neurosurgeon client by slipping in something the judge never said, ie, that the
neurosurgeon gets to keep the $2,275 that Judge Sferrazza order the tenant to pay
into the Reno Justice Court as a "rent escrow" deposit required to preserve the right
to litigate habitability issues. Now, nevermind the fact that Judge Sferrazza actually
did not have the jurisdiction to require that (there is not JCRLV 44 in Reno, that's a
Vegas rule, and if Reno wants a rule like that of its own JCRCP 83 requires the RJC
to publish it and get it approved by the Nevada Supreme Court first....period.). Okay,
so, to take it a step even further, Baker's order goes on to say "but the $2,275 won't
be released to the neurosurgeon yet, "instead that sum shall serve as security for
Coughlin's cost on appeal, pursuant to Nevada JCRCP 73...". But wait, doesn't that
mean Coughlin then gets a Stay of Eviction during the pendency of the Appeal? Isnt'
that was a security that large must be for? Because the "Appeal Bond" is set by
statute at only a mere $250....so holding on to 10 times that much of Coughlin's cash
must have been for the "Supersedeas Bond" mentioned a yielding one a Stay of
Eviction in NRS 40.380 and 40.385.

I know, I know, its confusing because actually those sections force the landlord, his
attorneys and the RJC to choose between viewing Coughlin as a residential tenant
whose rent is less than $1,000, and whom therefore is only required to post a measly
supersedeas bond of $250 (and remember, a supersedeas bond equals a stay of
eviction equals not trespassing) or the the other choice is to view Coughlin as a
commercial tenant, which would allow charging a higher supersedeas bond (except
for that pesky part about his rent being under the $1,000 required by the statute to do
so, his rent being only $900), except, darn it, old Richard G. Hill, Esq. and Casey
Baker, Esq. elected to pursue this summary eviction proceeding under a No Cause
Eviction Notice, which is not allowed against a commercial tenant (ie, you can't evict
a commercial tenant using the summary eviction procedures set forth in NRS 40.253
unless you alllege non payment of rent and serve a 30 Day Non Payment of Rent
Notice To Quit, which they didn't because they "are just taking the path of least
resistance here, Your Honor (insert their smug chuckling and obnoxious/pretentious
"can you believe this guy?" laughter and head shaking...).

NRS 40.380 Provisions governing appeals. Either party may, within 10 days, appeal
from the judgment rendered. But an appeal by the defendant shall not stay the
000660
execution of the judgment, unless, within the 10 days, the defendant shall execute
and file with the court or justice the defendants undertaking to the plaintiff, with two
or more sureties, in an amount to be fixed by the court or justice, but which shall not
be less than twice the amount of the judgment and costs, to the effect that, if the
judgment appealed from be affirmed or the appeal be dismissed, the appellant will
pay the judgment and the cost of appeal, the value of the use and occupation of the
property, and damages justly accruing to the plaintiff during the pendency of the
appeal. Upon taking the appeal and filing the undertaking, all further proceedings in
the case shall be stayed.

So, why on earth is the City Attorney's Office still trying to try Coughlin on the
trespass charge for which he endured a custodial arrest and for which old Richard
Hill is still filing Motion's to Show Cause on in the appeal of the summary eviction
matter in CV11-03628? Why, oh why? Does the Reno City Attorney's Office have
some sort of vested interest in keeping Coughlin down, busy, besotted, encumbered,
or otherwise? It, why, it couldn't be because Coughlin has a really good wrongful
arrest cause of action against the Reno Police Department, could it?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PR7q4OI5b0

And, well, yeah the Washoe County Sheriff's Office didn't quite get those Summons
and Complaints served in that one case Coughlin was suing his former employer in,
the one where Coughlin was granted an Order to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, which
required the Washoe County Sheriff's Office to serve the Summons and
Complaints....But what does that have to to with the 6 days Coughlin spent in jail on
the arrest shown in the youtube video above? Its not like the Washoe County jailed
videotaped a scene where they were forcing Coughlin to get naked and put on a
green dress. What's that? It is? They did do that? Really? No...What? They also
forced him to simulate oral and anal sex with deputies, in the guise of some
ridiculous "procedure" necessary to insure Deputy safety? Oh, wow. And they
retaliated against him for failing to answer their religious preference interrogation
questions by placing him in an icy cold cell for hours at a time, refusing him medical
care despite his plaintive cries for help, while wearing a thin t-shirt? Wow. They
didn't jam a taser needle in his spine for extended periods of time, though, did they?
Your kidding! Whats next, your going tell me Sargent Sigfree of the Reno PD
ordered a custodial arrest on Coughlin for "jaywalking" while Coughlin was
peacefully filming, from a public spot, Richard G. Hill's fraudulent contractor Phil
Howard destroying and taking to the town dump items of enormous sentimental
value to Coughlin that he was prevented from retrieving from the property during the
scant time he was allowed to (after he paid $480 worth of a lien for what he knew
not, because, despite, ol' Contractor Phil's fraudulent $1,060 bill for "securing" the
back porch (with screws facing the outside, inexplicably, and a window unit a/c left
in the window facing the sidewalk near the Lakemill Lodge, secured by nothing but
000661
duct tape

It is kind of a combo neon sign that says "Burglarize this Place, Everybody!"),
Coughlin's former home law office was burglarized on December 12, 2011 while
Richard G. Hill was holding its contents (including, tackily, Coughlin's client's files,
like the ones for the foreclosure defense actions, etc.), asserting his "lien". A lien for
"storage" where the charge for storage, $900, was the same as the charge for "full use
and occupany" was. However, that $900 a month for "storage" also included another
$1,060 charge for "securing" (and that bill actually listed "fixing a leak in the
basement...neither of which seem to have much to do with the "reasonable storage,
moving, and inventorying" expenses such a lien is provided for under NRS
118A.460....). Jeez, your probably going to tell me Sargent Sigfree ordered another
custodial arrest on Coughlin just two days after the jaywalking arrest, for the same
fact pattern that Master Edmondson granted Coughlin's applications for Protections
Orders against based upon the battery and assaults that his former housemates
committed. Because, Sargent Sigfree thinks its "misuse of 911" for Coughlin to call
when he returns home at night and his dog has mysteriously disappeared, and his
housemates make menacing commentary about it. Surely, Coughlin, a former
domestic violence attorney would have nothing helpful to add to Sargnet Sigfree's
expert opinion that "animal abuse is not domestic violence" (tell that to NRS 33.010,
Sarge) and that its, rather, "a matter for animal control" and that Sargent Sigfree was
"trying to help" Coughlin by arresting him, again, and necessitating the $1,500 bail
associated with the gross misdemeanor charge, "Misuse of 911" because, as Sargent
Sigfree told Coughlin "you keep putting yourself in situations where you are
victimized" so it was necessary to arrest Coughlin in that regard.

But hey, at least NV Energy hasn't refused to let Coughlin get any electrical service
for the past week since those with the Protection Orders against them cancelled the
service and NV Energy shut it off, without providing any notice to Coughlin, right.
Nevermind. But...but surely when NV Energy shut of the power to Coughlin's home
law office on October 4th, 2011, just hours prior to the bad faith "inspection" with
videographer of Coughlin' s home law office that Casey Baker, Esq. thought so very
necessary one day before Coughlin's Tenant Answer was due...surely NV Energy did
not leave the back gate to Coughlin's home law office open and speed off, Coughlin's
beloved mountain bike suddenly missing (the one the parents of his girlfriend of 5
years gave him)? Well, NV Energy is probably not retaliating against Coughlin for
complaining about that by refusing him electric service for the past seven days, you
would have to assume....

NRS 40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains possession of
premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to
NRS 40.253:
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1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be
obtained by filing with the trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to cover the
expected costs on appeal. A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction of the
appellate court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of that court as the suretys agent
upon whom papers affecting the suretys liability upon the bond may be served.
Liability of a surety may be enforced, or the bond may be released, on motion in the
appellate court without independent action. A tenant of commercial property may
obtain a stay of execution only upon the issuance of a stay pursuant to Rule 8 of the
Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure and the posting of a supersedeas bond in the
amount of 100 percent of the unpaid rent claim of the landlord.

2. A tenant who retains possession of the premises that are the subject of the appeal
during the pendency of the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in the amount
provided in the underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it
becomes due. If the tenant fails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new
proceedings for a summary eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant
to NRS 40.253.

NRS 40.390 Appellate court not to dismiss or quash proceedings for want of form. In
all cases of appeal under NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, the appellate court shall
not dismiss or quash the proceedings for want of form, provided the proceedings
have been conducted substantially according to the provisions of NRS 40.220 to
40.420, inclusive; and amendments to the complaint, answer or summons, in matters
of form only, may be allowed by the court at any time before final judgment upon
such terms as may be just; and all matters of excuse, justification or avoidance of the
allegations in the complaint may be given in evidence under the answer.

NRS 40.400 Rules of practice. The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil
to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections.

But, back to the Sheriff's Office. And, I am not really buying the idea that you guys
don't know NRCP 4 through 6 like the back of your hand, but....hell, maybe you
don't. But, clearly the language in NRS 40 about how the Sheriff may "remove tenant
from the property within 24 hours of receipt of the Order" do not apply where the
Tenant filed a Tenant's Answer and showed up to the Hearing and litigated the
matter. Especially where, as here the lease had not terminated, by its terms, but was
rather renewed. This is particularly true where NRS 118A prevents so terminating a
holdover tenant's lease for a retaliatory or discriminatory purpose.
000663

I would hate to see people start to think the Washoe County Sheriff's Office is
cutting corners on the whole "personally served" thing (just so a landlord could get
what they want quicker), just like I would hate for people to think the Reno
Municipal Court is letting the bottom line get in the way of providing that whole
Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel where jail time is even a possibility thing. And,
hey, if the RMC denies an indigent attorney the Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel,
the finds him guilty of NRS 22.030, Summary Contempt Commited in the Presence
of the Court, and the puts him in cuffs when the Trial ends, summarily sentencing
him to 3 days in jail for violating NRS 22.030, well....that's no big deal, right, I
mean, the RMC technically kept its promise that the underyling charge, though
technically it could result in incarceration would not...because the incarceration was
for a whole dang different charge, ie, Summary Contempt in the presence of the
Court....and so what if the whole zealous advocate thing and the denying the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel thing and the Summary Contempt thing don't go so
well together....Or if 6 court employees had to stay til 9pm getting paid overtime at
the RMC to get 'r done...

NRCP 4: "(d) Summons: Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be
served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with such
copies as are necessary. Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the summons
attached to a copy of the complaint as follows:...(6) Service Upon Individuals. In all
other cases to the defendant personally, or by leaving copies thereof at the
defendants dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process. [As amended; effective January 1, 2005.] (e) Same: Other Service. (1)
Service by Publication. (i) General. In addition to methods of personal service, when
the person on whom service is to be made resides out of the state, or has departed
from the state, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the state, or by
concealment seeks to avoid the service of summons, and the fact shall appear, by
affidavit, to the satisfaction of the court or judge thereof, and it shall appear, either
by affidavit or by a verified complaint on file, that a cause of action exists against the
defendant in respect to whom the service is to be made, and that the defendant is a
necessary or proper party to the action, such court or judge may grant an order that
the service be made by the publication of summons. Provided, when said affidavit is
based on the fact that the party on whom service is to be made resides out of the
state, and the present address of the party is unknown, it shall be a sufficient showing
of such fact if the affiant shall state generally in such affidavit that at a previous time
such person resided out of this state in a certain place (naming the place and stating
the latest date known to affiant when such party so resided there); that such place is
the last place in which such party resided to the knowledge of affiant; that such party
no longer resides at such place; that affiant does not know the present place of
000664
residence of such party or where such party can be found; and that affiant does not
know and has never been informed and has no reason to believe that such party now
resides in this state; and, in such case, it shall be presumed that such party still
resides and remains out of the state, and such affidavit shall be deemed to be a
sufficient showing of due diligence to find the defendant. This rule shall apply to all
manner of civil actions, including those for divorce"

I guess it don't matter much to me which one of you pays me my damages for the
wrongful eviction, illegal lockout, whether its the landlord, his attorney, or the
Sheriff's Office. Your money is always good with me.

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2012 11:40:39 -0800

Mr. Coughlin,

Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that day was personally served
by Deputy Machen by posting a copy of the Order to the residence. The residence
was unoccupied at the time.

WCSO Civil Section

000665



MERS fraud I come across in my day job (and do you wonder how many attorneys
in the foreclosure defense game I am in constant contact with who are watching and
witness the potential RICO violations this writing mentions?), which includes being
a foreclosure defense attorney. So which is it? Did Machem "personally serve" me
the Summary Eviction Order? Richard G. Hill, Esq. likes to argue that I was "served"
in compliance with all time related rules because it was done in the "usual custom
and practice of the WCSO. What, exactly, is the "usual custom and practice of the
phraseology: "
000666
40.253(3)(b)(2): 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 must: ...(b)
Advise the tenant: . (2) That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an
unlawful detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or
an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or
constable of the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the
order
and,
receipt is not shown, by applying a constructive notice standard that relies upon
the days for mailing extension of time for items served in the mailing, etc.). In
Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the
record did not reflect when the plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter. The letter
was issued on November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period
commenced on November 30, 2006, based on three days for mailing after excluding
Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim under either Title VII or the ADA,
a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90 days of receipt of
a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome
Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)
(granting plaintiff an additional three days for mailing pursuant to Rule 6).
000667

Further, despite what the inaccurate handouts of Nevada Legal Services may say
about this 24 hours and the applicability of the JCRCP to cases like these, NRS
40.400 Rules of practice, holds that :The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil
to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings mentioned in those sections. As such
NRCP 6(a),(e) applies to the Order of Summary Eviction that WCSO Deputy
Machem alleged, under penalty of perjury, that he "personally served" upon me on
November 1, 2011. That is a lie by Mr. Machem, unless "personally served" is
defined in a rather impersonal way and or Machem and I have totally different
understanding of the definition of "personally served", which may be the case. Or,
perhaps the Sheriff's Office is busy and doesn't want to wait around to "personally
serve" every tenant it wishes to evict. Fine, then just use the "mail it and allow three
days" rule in NRCP 6(e)...the landlord's might not like it, but they can use that
frustration as an incentive not to jump to litigating every disagreement about
habitability that a tenant brings to them. You may not realize how ridiculous some
landlord's get. In my case, I offered to fix basic things that clearly implicated the
habitability rules in NRS 118A.290 and the Californian neurosurgeon, Beverly Hill
High School graduate landlord balked and complained then hired and attorney four
days into a dispute.....at which point the rules against contacting represented parties
prevented much in the way of real settlement discussion, particularly where opposing
counsel has continuously demonstrated a complete indifference to pursuing
settlement (why would he at the rates he bills hours at?). I just don't think the
Sheriff's Office needs to sully its image or damage the citizen tenants of Washoe
County in the name of pleasing people like Dr. Matt Merliss or Richard G. Hill, Esq.
MACHEM THAT ADMITS THAT I WAS NOT PERSONALLY PRESENT
WHEN HE SERVED THE ORDER FOR SUMMARY EVICTION IN RJC
REV2011-001708 ON 11/1/12 AT 4:30 PM (ACCORDING TO HIS AFFIDAVIT
OF SERVICE). YOU NEVER KNOW, I MIGHT HAVE IRREFUTABLE PROOF
THAT I WAS SOMEWHERE ELSE AT THAT TIME, SO, BE CAREFUL. There
simply is not anything specific in Nevada law addressing how such Summary
Eviction Orders are to be served and carried out. The sections dealing with

6. Upon the filing by the tenant of the affidavit permitted in subsection 3, regardless
of the information contained in the affidavit, and the filing by the landlord of the
affidavit permitted by subsection 5, the justice court or the district court shall hold a
hearing, after service of notice of the hearing upon the parties, to determine the
000668
for removal of the tenant or an order providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant....
whichever is later.
8. Upon the filing of a motion pursuant to subsection 7, the court shall schedule a
hearing on the motion. The hearing must be held within 10 days after the filing of the
motion. The court shall affix the date of the hearing to the motion and order a copy
served upon the landlord by the sheriff, constable or other process server. At the
hearing, the court may:
(a) Determine the costs, if any, claimed by the landlord pursuant to NRS 118A.460
or 118C.230 and any accumulating daily costs; and
Please provide an indication, in writing, of the names and case numbers for the last
20 incidences when the WCSO has served notice of a hearing set pursuant to NRS
000669
Lopez, Carter admitted to me that "Richard Hill pays him a lot of money and
therefore he arrests whom Richard Hill says to and does what Richard Hill says to
do...." Both Carter and Sargent Lopez refused to investigate, despite prompting,
whether Richard Hill has sent the tenant/arrestee a bill or demand letter in bill for the
full rental value of the property, $900 per month, under some interpretation of the
"reasonable storage, moving, and inventorying expenses" collectable by a landlord
under a personal property line set forth in NRS 118A.460 (one could also interpret
such a bill as Hill's withdrawing or eradicating the Order of Summary Eviction itself,
which was not "personally served" by the Washoe County Sheriff (despite what their
Affidavit of Service says...I wasn't even there at the time they changed the
locks...and so the Summary Eviction Order was not properly served under NRCP 6,
and despite the Reno Justice Court impermissibly converting $2300 of my money
under a "rent escrow" Order its required I comply with in order to litigate habitability
issues in a summary eviction proceeding under NRS 40.253, despite NRS 40.253
(6)'s express dicate against such an Order (unless, pursuant to JCRCP 83, a justice
court gets such a rule, like Justice Court Rule of Las Vegas (JCRLV) Rule 44,
published and approved by the Nevada Supreme Court, which the RJC has not,
rather, the RJC applies all these insidious secret "house rules" (like forcing tenants to
deliver themselves to the filing office to submit to personal service notice of a
summary eviction hearing within, like, 12 hours of the Tenant filing a Tenant's
Answer or Affidavit in response to an eviction Notice, rather than the service
requirements of such notice following NRCP 6 (days for mailing, etc., etc., in other
words, in the RJC everything is sped up imperissilby to help landlord's out, and the
NV. S. Ct ruling in Glazier and Lippis clearly contemplate personal liability against
the Court and or Judges themselves for so doing)....A Qui Tam action or something a
la Mausert's in Solano County, I believe, in California, would be very
interesting...Still haven't heard anything from the Reno PD about the various
complaints I have filed with them in writing related to the wrongful arrests,
excessive force and other misconduct committed against me, though they did arrest
me the other day for calling 911incident to some domestic violence for which I was
granted to Extended Protection Orders against my former housemates....old Sargent
Sigfree ordered that arrest, as he did two days prior when he ordered a custodial
arrest of me for "jaywalking".

following one:

From:


Sent:
000670
Wed 9/07/11 10:51 PM
THIS IS NOT THE FORUM FOR THIS TYPE OF COMPLAINT HOWEVER
THIS REPORT WAS PRINTED AND PASSED ON TO THE OFFICER'S
Thank you,
Officer WOZNIAK,
ADDRESSED."

follow up on my imploring them to ask Hill whether he has recently sent me a bill
for the "full rental value" of the property, the same amount that had been charged for
the "use and enjoyment" of the premises, $900, in comparision to what NRS
118A.460 may deem "reasonable storage" expenses for which a lien is available to a
landlord, though NRS 118A.520 has outlawed rent distraints upon tenant's personal

000671

Actually, upon being released from jail on November 15th, 2011, incident to the
ID, the one I would need to rent a room, drive my car, and my wallet, which is kind
of useful in such situations....). Anyways, Sargent Tarter of the Reno PD showed up,
he went inside Hill's office with Hill for quite some time and the result was Tarter
telling me to leave. I did, but while driving down St. Laurence towards S. Virginia
(Hill's office is at 652 Forrest St. 89503 and would have required turning down the
wrong way of a one way street, Forrest, to go back to Hill's Office (so clearly I was
not headed to Hill's office) Sargent Tarter began tailing me, then he pulled me over,
then he gave me a ticket, in retaliation if you ask me for reporting RPD Officer
Carter admitting that he takes bribes from Hill to Sargent Tarter minutes earlier. Uh,
well, anyways, another Sargent calls me later that night, taking the "good cop" role.
But upon informing him of what RPD Officer Carter told me about Hill paying him
money to arrest people during the 11/12/11 trespassing arrest, that Sargent
immediately informed me that, despite this being the first he heard of that, he was
sure that was not happening....I guess RPD Officer Carter is trying to explain away
his comments about Richard Hill paying him money to arrest people by dismissing
them as sarcasm, a joke, said in jest, whatever....but I don't see how that situation (a
license attorney getting arrested for a crime, a conviction for which would result in
that attorney being required to report said conviction to the State Bar of Nevada
under SCR 111, etc., and possibly resulting in a suspension of that attorney's license
to practice law, or worse...) is all that jocular of a situation. Combine that with the
too quick to dismiss my reports of bribery by Richard Hill to officer Carter to the
RPD Sargent who called me on 11/15/11 regarding the retaliation by Sargent Tarter
that I complained of, and I don't think it is all that unreasonable for anyone to take
RPD Officer Carter at his word regarding Richard G. Hill, Esq. paying him money to
arrest whom Hill says to arrest. Add to that Sargent Sigfree ordering my arrest for
jaywalking (by a trainee RPD Officer) on January 12th, 2011 (custodial arrest, bail
of $160 emptied my bank account out, or pretty close to it) while I was peacefully
filming from a public spot Richard G. Hill, Esq's contractor Phil Howard, whom had
submitted bills in courts records and filings under the lien for "reasonable storage
moving and inventorying" found in NRS 118A.460, even where old Phil used my
own plywood at the property to board up the back porch (curiously leaving the
screws holding up the plywood exposed to exterior of the property where anyone
could easily unscrew them, and also leaving in a window unit ac secured only by
ducttape in a window facing a sidewalk by the LakeMill Lodge....which resulted in
$8,000 at least of my personal property being burglarized from my former home law
office on Decmeber 12th, 2011 while Hill was asserting a lien on all my personal
property found therein (and my client's files, which arguably are not even my
property, but rather, the client's property). Hill went on to place what he believes to
be my social security number in court records, on purpose, despite his signing an
Affirmation pursuant to NRS 239B.030 that that was not the case (attaching a two
000672
page report to the RPD as an Exhibit). Then Hill and his contractor Phil Howard both
committed perjury when the signed Declarations attesting that I had climbed on the
contractors truck or ever touched Hill. Hill lies constantly, whether under penalty of
perjury or now, so I don't have time to rebut every little lie he makes (he makes me
out to comes across as a Yosemite Sam caricature of a human being in his filings
when he describes me...).

ringing the doorbell, one guy moving around all other sides of the property banging
on the windows, peering in closed blinds, and affecting a phony "color of law" tone,
"Court Services, come out now!", wearing their pretend Sheriff outfits, big
equipment saddled belts (including firearms, I believe, and radios), etc. ,etc.

Lew Taitel, Esq. was my court appointed public defender in the Reno Municipal
Court in the trespass case, and that Judge Gardner had refused to provide me the
names of prospective appointed defense counsel (I wanted to run a conflicts check)
at my arraignment (where Marshal Mentzel barked at me in a threatening tone, using
filed a notice of appearance, and received my confidential file, pc sheet, arrest
reports, ssn, etc....only its turns out that Taitel shares and office and a receptionist
with Nevada Court Services and they list him and his picture on their website as
"associated with" their Process Server corporation, despite the prohibition lawyers
face against fee sharing with non-lawyers. Then, Taitel somehow manages to get out
of defending my case without filing a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, despite that
being required by the Reno Municipal Court Rule 3(B):

000673

that that much, and he didn't like me not wanting to give it to him. This occurred
right in front of my home law office in the summer of 2011. He cuffed me and told
me I was going to jail for something about a light on the front of my bicycle (the one
NV Energy likely stole when the shut off my power, unnoticed, on October 4, 2011)
both let it go, and I didn't go to jail....Until Del Vecchio was present supervising
some Officer's training at the scene of my custodial (9 hour) jaywalking arrest) on
1/12/12. But Del Vecchio, I guess either didn't want to or wasn't able to talk some
sense into Sargent Sigfree.....and then Sargent Sigfree (the spelling is likely off) had
me arrested and charged with a gross misdemeanor, "Misuse of 911" just two days
later, on January 14th, 2011 when I called 911 to report that my roommates were
laughing menacingly when I asked them why my dog was missing (I had also been
chased up to my room numerous times since moving in with these people, something
I had to do because so much of my money had been taken up with bail or lost
earnings due to all these wrongful arrests and abuse of processes mentioned
above...also these housemates had chased me with a ten inch butcher knife, two of
my tires were slashed, I was locked out all night on New Years Even when these
changed the locks at around midnight, had my furniture thrown in the street, property
stolen, coffee thrown on me, destroying my smart phone in the process, etc.,
etc...And despite the housemate having an outstanding arrest warrant, and animal
abuse being listed amongst the elements of domestic violence, Sargent Sigfree told
me he was arresting me because I "keep putting yourself in these situations", like,
where I am a victim, and that he was "trying to help you", he said with a smirk and a
laugh to his fellow RPD Officers, whom then proceeded to use excessive force
against me. I guess he was helping me by saddling me with a gross misdemeanor
with a $1,500 bail, especially where its been arranged for Court Services, or pre-
Trial Services to forever deny me an OR, despite my meeting the factors for such set
forth in statute (30 year resident, entire immediate family lives here, licensed to
practice law in Nevada, etc., etc)...I guess it should not be too much of a surprise to
me that Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts failed to address the perjury of all three of
her witnesses or that her fellow Reno City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens lied
to me about whether or not the Reno City Attorney's Office even had any
documentation related to my arrest or whether it would in the month before my
000674
arraignment, despite that fact that subsequent productions of discovery tend to
indicate that the Reno City Attorney's Office did have those materials at the time. I
could be wrong about some of this...But that would require and awful lot of
coincidences.

Sincerely,

Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473

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Subject: Contact
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 16:10:24 +0000
000675

Character and Fitness, Kevin Kelly, Pete Christiansen,
Patrice Eichman

March 16, 2012

Zachary Coughlin

Dear Zach,

Thank you for sending me your reply to the grievance filed by Richard Hill. From
your explanation it is clear that things are not as they should be. Please call me
ASAP so that we can take the appropriate action to help you and to stop these
types of disturbing complaints.


Sent: Fri 3/16/12 1:48 PM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org; davidc@nvbar.org; glennm@nvbar.org
Dear Bar Counsel,

I write respectfully asking an inquiry be conducted into whether Kevin
Kelly indicated at my June 2002 hearing that 3 pro bono attorney's
name would be provided to me, but that only one was, Peter S.
Christiansen, and that, despite Christiansen saying he was doing my
case on a pro bono basis, he was paid at least $5,000, and pretty much
the only work he or his office did was attend the June 2002 hearing, and
000676

more on the way
that Christiansen and Kelly are very, very close, and that they sent me
to a psychologist who specializes in gambling addictions (I have never
really even gambled) who cost approximately another $2,000....Then
Ms. Eichman failed to submit my application for admission or my
Request For Reconsideration (sent to her and Christiansen's office on
September 15th, 2003, as confirmed by my fax records, in additional to
being mailed to them) to the Nevada Supreme Court. There are
numerous other issues that deserve a grievance there, including whether
Christiansen supervised the newly licensed Sanft in any way, whether a
writing wherein I addressed alcoholism was forward to the Bar despite
the express dictate that it not be, whether second Consent Agreement
sent to the Christiasens on 9/27/04 was ever forwarded to the Bar.
Additionally, Mike Rowe wrote very stern letters to me basically telling
me not to follow up on things, whereupon my attorney's and Ms.
Eichman failed to follow up on things, essentially tying my hands in the
matter. I intend to supplement this grievance with additional matters
soon, but wish it to begin now.

Sincerely,

Zach Coughlin

Sent: Fri 3/16/12 2:59 PM
5 attachments
hill is lying about thinking I accidentally filed the wrong thing in carpentier case.pdf (45.4 KB) ,
CV11-03628-2633891 (Reply...).pdf (164.9 KB) , CV11-03628-2625640 (Mtn for TRO).pdf (153.5
KB) , CR11-2064-2676094 (Opposition to Mtn ...).pdf (171.6 KB) , CR11-2064-2682479
(Supplemental ...).pdf (153.7 KB)

000677

supplement to Richard Hill thing
Sent: Fri 3/16/12 3:14 PM
To: glennm@nvbar.org; davidc@nvbar.org; patrickk@nvbar.org
15 attachments
final motion to dismiss 11 cr 26405 3 3 12.pdf (698.4 KB) , hill is lying about thinking I
accidentally filed the wrong thing in carpentier case.pdf (45.4 KB) , 3 16 12 fax to wcso re
eviction park terrace hill etc.pdf (1761.7 KB) , CV11-03628-2633891 (Reply...).pdf (164.9 KB) ,
CV11-03628-2625640 (Mtn for TRO).pdf (153.5 KB) , 6.4.10 letter to Hall from Casey Baker
describing same things Richard HIll does.pdf (57.1 KB) , CR11-2064-2676094 (Exhibit 2).pdf
(130.1 KB) , CR11-2064-2676094 (Opposition to Mtn ...).pdf (171.6 KB) , CR11-2064-2682479
(Supplemental ...).pdf (153.7 KB) , from nv supreme court website on eviction stay packet
instructions.pdf (28.0 KB) , Eviction Procedure - Washoe County Sheriff's Office - 911 Parr Blvd,
Reno, Nevada.pdf (80.9 KB) , CV11-03628_2750229 Machem up to his old tricks again.pdf (26.9
KB) , What Every Civil Litigator Needs to Know About Criminal Law.pdf (122.8 KB) , 3 7 12 11 TR
26800 rmc NOTICE OF APPEALS ETC MOTION.pdf (1301.3 KB) , JOHN TARTER
TransparentNevada year city failed to report.pdf (25.7 KB)
Dear Bar Counsel,

Material in this supplement also serves to fulfill my own RPC 8.3 duty with respect
to the misconduct of any other attorney's (or those who are licensed as attorneys but
maybe are employed in some alternate capacity currently) whose conduct in these
materials is so deserving. I will try to phone into Mr. King as he requested, though
Judge Nash Holmes recently converted my phones to the Reno Municipal Court after
they were booked into property at the Washoe County Jail, who thereafter made
several contradictory statements as to whether the City of Reno Marshals came and
took those and other items out of secured property or evidence and did what they
may or whether such materials remained with the Jail and or whether the Jail actually
even considers whether there might be a conflict of interest in releasing such
property to these Marshals or the RMC. One thing I do know is that I did not offer
those materials into evidence and am not sure Judge Nash Holmes should be doing
so on my behalf, or on behalf of the prosecutor. When I say prosecutor, I should
clarify, I mean Deputy City Attorney Ormaas, and not Judge Holmes.

I have other materials I will be providing to supplement this and other grievances in
short order.

Sincerely,

000678

Gessin ghostwriting issue
Sent: Mon 3/19/12 3:24 AM
19 attachments
THE 2 11 12 email to WCSO RPD Reno City Attorney Hill NPUC Hill et al b e.pdf (137.8 KB) , 1 13
12 email to Hill copying Hill on Supplemental filed in Carpentier case to avoid any ex parte
allegations.pdf (78.9 KB) , 1 13 12 email to Hill copying Hill on Supplemental filed in Carpentier
case to avoid any ex parte allegations.htm (12.5 KB) , CV11-03628-2658302 (Mtn Ord to Show
Cause).pdf (88.0 KB) , CV11-03628-2688476 (Opening Brief).pdf (99.9 KB) , CV11-03628-2690815
(Opening Brief).pdf (358.9 KB) , CV11-03628-2690998 (Mtn for Extension of Time).pdf (102.5
KB) , CV11-03628-2696056 (Ord to Show Cause).pdf (62.0 KB) , CV11-03628-2697022
(Opposition to Mtn ...).pdf (63.1 KB) , CV11-03628-2704374 (Reply to in Opposition).pdf (133.1
KB) , CV11-03628-2704375 (Reply to in Opposition).pdf (129.8 KB) , CV11-03628-2728621
(Motion ...).pdf (50.8 KB) , CV11-03628-2728630 (Answering Brief).pdf (178.6 KB) , CV11-03628-
2728630 (Exhibit 1).pdf (239.9 KB) , CV11-03628-2728630 (Exhibit 2).pdf (178.1 KB) , CV11-
03628-2728630 (Exhibit 3).pdf (183.2 KB) , CV11-03628-2728630 (Exhibit 4).pdf (492.6 KB) ,
CV11-03628-2728630 (Exhibit 5).pdf (431.4 KB) , CV11-03628-2728630 (Exhibit 6).pdf (225.1 KB)

Dear Mr. King,

I do not understand. I provided you a ton of information and documentation in my Response to Hill's
grievance, and, after emailing me six hours prior to the deadline to do so saying you already received my
Response (which you had not, and which I had informed you that you had not but would be recieving it),
you know call and or write me less than a day after receiving my voluminous Response and want to meet
urgently. This sends a strong message that you did not put much time into analyzing my response,
which would tend to indicate such a meeting would lack traditional due process protections, would it
not? I have already been attacked by a Character and Fitness Committee member while he owned the
Spearmint Rhino strip club in Las Vegas, and where the Committee promised to get me the names of
"three attorneys who will handle your case on a pro se basis" but where only one name was provided,
and that name wound up being and attorney would extracted soem approximately $7,000 i his fees and
the fees of a gambling addiction specialist (both of whom admitted to being extremely close personal
friends of Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly, Esq. who then owned the Spearmint
Rhino strip club. Next, Christiansen and Sanft bungled several deadlines and client confidences related
to extremely sensitive information, whereupon, finally, Director of Admissions Eichman made the
unilateral decision to refrain from submitting my case for review, despite her receipt of my Request for
Reconsideration. Finally, Christiansen's legal assistant Kelly Huff wrote me explaing that I had failed to
provide their office with the Request for Reconsideration that I sent it on 9/15/03, despite my having fax
confirmation proof of this and despite a subsequent copy of the file provided by Christiansen's office
proving they had recieved such a Request, and that is was received by them on 9/15/03. I do not mean
to be standoffish, Mr. King, but it is what it is. How Ms. Eichman's rationale for her action is different
than what any attorney might say upon blowing some deadline or otherwise having a client's file fall
behind a filing cabinet for a couple years, is really not at all clear to me.
000679

As to my official address with the State Bar and receiving my mail, the USPS is likely going to be sued for
the handling of my mail, should it become clear that any client matters where prejudiced in light of what
has been deplorable conduct by the station involved.

Further, as to Hill's Motion for Order To Show Cause, please see the attached copy of Hill's application
for an Order of Protection, then compare it to Hill's other filings wherein he suddenly backs off his
assertion that I was "climbing on the contractor's truck". Hill lied when he wrote that. I did not climb on
anybody's truck. Hill merely did not want me to film all that he was throwing away, especially given that
he was throwing away unique items that had both monetary and sentimental value and because he had
no good reason for refusing to allow me to take those items other than spite and an attempt to get me
to sign away my security deposit, which Hill still has not returned. Further, Hill is not licensed under the
FDCPA as a debt collector yet attempts to so practice, as such, this grievance should focus on that as
well. Hill needs to answer for his lies about me allegedly "making contact" with him, about me allegedly
"climbining on the contractors truck", about his abusing the TPO process to gain advantage in a litigation
(ie, to prevent evidence collection and discovery), about his abuse of process in seeking to get me
arrested and signing a criminal complaint where service of the evictio order was insufficient, and
regardless, Hill had vitiated its import anyway by billing me for the same amount as the "full use and
occupancy" (and I have a video of Hilll admitting to this and his firms 11/10/11 letter admits to that as
well. Further, as for his Motion for Order to Show Cause, as it relates to an alleged contempt on my part
in failing to abide by the 1/11/12 Order from in CV11-03628, well, NRCP 6(e) requires that 3 days for
mailing be accorded even for electronic filings. As such, any activity on my part of 1/12/12 clearly is
irrelevant as service was not effectuated at that point and there is not allegation that any "personal
service" was undertaken. That being the case, here is another basis for grievance against Hill, especially
his continually filing documents not based in fact or law, as here.

Some more regarding Hill's grievance. Hill clearly attempts to mislead when he suggest that the
Supplemental I filed in the Carpentier's foreclosure defense matter was incorrectly filed there. Clearly, I
intended to file it there and the attached email I sent to Hill explains clearly why I copied him on it
(because I foresaw Hill filign a Bar grievance for "ex parte communications" based upon some idea that
arguments made in one case that bare some connection to another case would be a basis for Hill crying
foul, and, as seen in Hill's "ghostwriting" grieviance, its a very low standard for crying foul that Richard
has, which is typical of all the most feckless attorneys. That email indicated to Hill and his staff:

One, I would like to reserve my objection to "Good Samiritan" Richard G. Hill purporting to file
grievances on behalf of the public in general or Mr. Gessin, or whoever it is Richard is doing this for. I
suspect Richard is doing this for the same reason he does so many other things: to keep opposing
counsel busy with responding to all spineless paper pushing that Richard G. Hill is so very well known for
throughout Northern Nevada legal circles. Nonetheless, important issues are brought up in Mr. Hill's
grievance. To a great extent, I foresaw these issues long ago and attempted to address them
appropriately. I often get clients who are on their third or fourth attorney. Mr. Gessin was one such
client. By that time they all want to sue their former attorneys, and feel quite burned by the fees they
have paid. Mr. Gessin was a good example of this and he wished to proceed on an unbundled services
arrangement, or a flat fee per motion/opposition/pleading basis, etc. From the very, very long time that
went by between my passing the July 2001 Nevada Bar Examination and being admitted to practice in
March of 2005, the issue of the legality of ghostwriting for pro se litigants was something I was
somewhat aware of, but I don't believe I ever did. I am somewhat disappointed that I was not
industrious enough to get anywhere close to doing such a thing but mostly I was just so demoralized by
not having a license and from the rape that the character and fitness committee and Kelly, and
000680
Christiansen and Eichman et al committed upon me that I mostly just worked for Thomas J. Hall, Esq. for
about $0.89 per hour (just kidding, I love Tom) doing legal research in the Washoe County Law Library
while the librarians glared at me and let me know how very disappointed they were that I, or any
member of the public, really, had interrupted their solitude.

So now it seems there is a tough situation where, on one hand, as a now licensed attorney, there is some
taboo to "ghostwriting" (necessitating such lucrative activities as responding to grievances filed by
opposing counsel like Richard G. Hill, Esq.....and I sure hope you will countenance the grievances I am
filing against Hill, Christiansen, Sanft, Kevin Kelly, Eichman, etc, with the same seriousness that your are
taking Richard G. Hills. I notice Richard G. Hill, Esq. has a funny way of being able to get the police (and
some others that I probably shouldn't mention) to take his complaints just a little bit more seriously than
they take others. I would also like to file a grievance against all three of the public defenders I have
been appointed in the trespass case in Reno Municipal Court for 11 CR 26405, Lew Taitel, Roberto
Puentes, and Keith Loomis. Each have thoroughly failed to zealously advocate on my behalf, with Loomis
calling my arguments vis a vis the procedural requirements for serving eviction orders in thoroughly
contested summary eviction proceedings "frivolous" despite being provided the attached 22 page
memorandum detailing those arguments and despite the procedures requiring as much set forth in the
Anvui decision of the Nevada Supreme Court. I would also like to file a greivance against Deputy Reno
City Attorney Ormaas for her blase indication that she cared not about any admission of bribery on the
part of Reno Police Officer Chris Carter, and that she would not be following up on that, even where it
bared some relation to the citation in 11 TR 26800 issued by Sargent Tarter, for which I cross examined
Sargent Tarter as to whether he did so in retaliation for my reporting Officer Carters admission of
accepting bribes from Richard G. Hill. Instead, I believe Deputy City Attorney Ormaas and City of Reno
Marshal Hiney (the spelling might be a bit off) conspired to have Judge Nash Holmes have me arrested
for summary contempt in Order to obtain my cell phones, which upon information and belief, Ormaas
and Hiney believe might contain "evidence" of misconduct on both of their parts. Hiney attempted to
serve me Notice of Hearing on Motion for Order to Show Cause in the appeal of the Richard G. Hill, Esq.
eviction matter (one of three instances of "triple jeopardy" Hill has me facing here....this Bar grievance,
the criminal complaint in 11 CR 26405, and, actually, multiple Orders to Show Cause (one in the Trial
Court in RJC Rev201--001708 and one in the associated Appeal in CV11-03628). However, the actual
Affidavit of Service that the WCSO filed for the Notice of Hearing Marshal Hiney attempted to serve me
(please inquire with Chief Marshal Roper, perhaps?) was actually signed by the same WCSO Deputy
Machem that swore, under oath, in his 11/7/11 Affidavit of Service in the eviction case RJC REv2011--
001708 that he "personally served" the Order of Summary Eviction. The attached 22 page memorandum
sent to various individuals and the admission of WCSO Civil Section Supervisor Liz Stuchell that, in their
mind, "personally served" can mean a lot of things that it has never meant in any legal settings, is
provided for background. I also wish this to begin a grievance against Deputy Reno City Attorney Pam
Roberts for what I believe may be several violations on her part of the rules relative to prosecutorial
misconduct, especially those involving suborning perjury, including that of Officer Kameron Crawfor
saying in 11 CR 22176, that I did not provide him my drivers license, and therefor issuing me a citation
would not be an option, but rather, my failure to provide my driver's license buttressed his proable cause
finding justifying a search incident to arrest. However, Roberts, in 11 CR 22176 and later on appeal in CR
11-2064, had in her possession Wal-Mart AP video from the interrogation room clearly showing me
providing Officer Kameron Crawford my driver's license and other evidence supports a finding that he
had it (including dispatch reports and the information culled by Officer Kameron from the driver's license
and placed on the arrest report, which Officer Crawford later lied about, saying he got that information
at the WCSO, which is clearly contrary to established protocol and privacy policies). One more grievance
against Reno City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens for lying to me on the phone about whether the
City of Reno had the arrest report from the September 9, 2011 arrest at Wal-mart from the Reno Sparks
Indian Colony in 11 CR 22176. I wish for all of these grievances to go forward now, but I may provide
supplementary materials in support thereof later. Additionally, she has the "purchased receipt" that
000681
showed it had the very UPC number that both Frontino and Crawford swore under oath that it did not.

Barrie Althoff, Limiting the Scope of Your Representation: When Your Client Wants, or Can Afford, Only
Part of You, Washington State Bar News (Jun. 1997).
Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited Appearances Can Provide an Ethically
Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se Litigants, The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Vol.
20, No. 3 (Summer 2007).
Kim Prochnau, Slicing the Onion: Rules of Professional Conduct and Court Rules Make It Easier for Private
and Non-Profit Legal Practitioners to Provide "Unbundled" Legal Services, Washington State Bar News
(Apr. 2003).
Books and Reports
Caught in the Middle: 2003 Report and Recommendations of the North Carolina Bar Association Pro Se
Task Force (Dec. 2003).
Challenge to Justice: A Report on Self-Represented Litigants in the New Hampshire Courts, New Hampshire
Supreme Court Task Force on Self-Representation (Jan. 2004).
Ethics Issues Regarding the Concept of Unbundled Legal Services (Memorandum), Rob Bare, Nevada State
Bar (Mar. 31, 1999).
Family Law Limited Representation Risk Management Materials, Limited Representation Committee,
California Commission on Access to Justice (January 12, 2004).
Pro Se Litigants: The Challenge of the Future, Massachusetts Probate and Family Court Department Pro Se
Committee Report (Dec. 1999).
Report and Recommendations on "Unbundled" Legal Services, Commission on Providing Access to Legal
Services for Middle Income Consumers, New York State Bar Association (Dec. 2002).
Report on Limited Scope Legal Assistance with Initial Recommendations, Limited Representation
Committee of the California Commission on Access to Justice (Oct. 2001). Appendix
Self Represented Litigants in the Virginia Court System, Supreme Court of Virginia Pro Se Litigation
Planning Committee, Enhancing Access to Justice Report (Sept. 2002).
Unbundling Legal Services: A Guide to Delivering Legal Services a la Carte, Forrest S. Mosten, American Bar
Association (2000).
Cases
Defendant retained an attorney on a limited basis, following an action filed by the plaintiff to recover
costs on a defaulted loan. Limited representation attorney agreed to file responsive pleadings and
negotiate a settlement agreement, and filed a notice of limited appearance. While the defendant
received notice of a scheduled hearing and forwarded it to his limited representation attorney, neither
defendant nor attorney appeared at the hearing and, consequently, an arbitration award was entered for
the plaintiff. Defendant filed a motion to set aside judgment, which was denied. On appeal, the
defendant claimed the limited representation attorneys failure to appear at the hearing amounted to
excusable neglect and that the judgment should be set aside. The court found that since the defendant
received notice of the hearing and had retained the attorney on a limited basis, that the limited
representation attorneys conduct did not constitute excusable neglect. The lower court decision was
000682
affirmed.
Former sheriff department workers bring sexual harassment suit against county sheriff in his individual
and official capacities. Attorney representing sheriff enters limited appearance on behalf of his official
capacity. Court finds that attorney cannot enter limited appearance on behalf of sheriff's official capacity.
Attorney representing sheriff must act for the entire person, including individual and official capacities.
Entering such limited appearance is not competent and zealous representation as required by ethical
rules as it leaves officer undefended on individual capacity claims. Court further finds that ghostwriting of
documents for pro se litigants may subject lawyers to contempt of court. Ghostwriting gives litigants
unfair advantage in that pro se pleadings are construed liberally and pro se litigants are granted greater
latitude in hearings and trials. Ghostwriting also results in evasion of obligations imposed on attorneys
by statute, code, and rule, and involves lawyers in litigants' misrepresentation of pro se status in violation
of ethical rules.
Attorney licensed in the State of California did not violate procedural, substantive, and professional rules
of a federal court by lending some assistance to friends, family members, and others with whom she
shared specialized knowledge. Attorney performed research and prepared rough drafts of portions of pro
se litigant's pleadings in an action against various official defendants, but did not sign the documents.
Because attorney did not gather and anonymously present legal arguments with the actual or
constructive knowledge that plaintiff would use them in court, and because attorney did not engage in
extensive, undisclosed participation that permitted plaintiff to falsely appear as being without
professional assistance, attorney had not violated any rules.
Complainant and respondent were co-tenants of real estate property. The respondent appeared pro se
during a hearing before the commissioner in chancery, but then hired an attorney who appeared in a
limited capacity at several other hearings. On appeal, the court sought to determine whether or not the
attorney could appear in a limited capacity and whether the attorneys appearance qualified him as
official "attorney of record". The court found that it was not bound by agreements made between client
and attorney and that a court may "require more of an attorney than mere compliance with the ethical
constraints of the Rules of Professional Conduct". The court found that the attorney could make a motion
to withdraw once he completed the tasks agreed upon, but that the court had ultimate discretion in
granting the withdrawal.
In a lawsuit, plaintiffs counsel of record requested that another firm make a "special appearance" at a
summary judgment motion, appearing on behalf of counsel of record. Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice
suit after a summary judgment was entered against her, arguing that the special appearance created an
attorney-client relationship. The appellate court found that an attorney making a special appearance
represents the clients interests and has a professional attorney-client relationship with the client.
Further, the voluntary appearance created a limited representation status and not a true "special
appearance".
Court Rules
Alaska
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 81, expressly permits limited appearances and governs attorney
withdrawal.
Arizona
Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure 9(B), governs limited representation and attorney withdrawal in
family law proceedings.
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 5.2, governs limited representation and attorney withdrawal in vulnerable
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adult exploitation actions. California
Colorado
Colorado Rule of County Court 311(b), requires lawyers to disclose assistance in document preparation
but clarifies that such disclosure does not create an entry of appearance.
Delaware
Delaware Family Court Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2), governs limited appearance, service and attorney
withdrawal in family law matters.
Florida
Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, Rule 12.040, governs Limited Appearance, Withdrawal or Limiting
Appearance, Scope of Representation, Preparation of Pleadings or Other Documents, Notice of Limited
Appearance, and Service.
Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure 12.750, governs the operation of self-help programs within family
courts.
Iowa
z RCP 1.404(3), expressly permitting limited appearances so long as the court is notified;
z RCP 1.404(4), governing termination of limited appearance;
z RCP 1.423, requiring lawyers who prepare pleadings in limited representation to sign them and
clarifying that signing a pleading does not constitute an appearance;
z RCP 1.442(2), establishing the requirements for service on attorney who has made a limited
appearance.
Maine
Maine Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(c), explicitly allows limited representation and allows a lawyer to
file a limited appearance if the client consents in writing.
Missouri
Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure 55.03, permits a lawyer to draft pleadings without disclosure and clarifies
appearance and withdrawal of attorney in limited representation.
Nebraska
Nebraska RPC 501.2, governs limited representation, attorney assisted document preparation and
attorney withdrawal.
Nevada
Rules of Practice of the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, Rule 5.28 requires signed
pleadings, notice of the limited representation to the court and governs the procedure for withdrawal.
New Hampshire
z RCP 3, requiring that pleadings and communication be furnished to both client and limited
representation attorney until withdrawal of limited appearance;
z RCP 17, governing appearance, attorney withdrawal and document preparation assistance.
New Mexico
New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct 16-303(E), requires lawyer to disclose scope of representation
to court.
Utah
000684
Vermont
Vermont Rule of Family Procedure 15(h) governs limited appearances, withdrawal and service in family
law matters.
Washington
Washington Civil Rule 11, permits a lawyer who assists with drafting to rely on the self-represented
party's representation of facts.
Washington Civil Rule of Limited Jurisdiction 11, permits a lawyer who assists with drafting to rely on the
self-represented party's representation of facts.
Wisconsin
Wyoming
The Uniform Rules of the District Court of the State of Wyoming, Rule 102 governs appearance and
withdrawal for unbundled representation.
Ethics Opinions
An attorney may limit the attorney's services by agreement with a pro per litigant to consultation on
procedures and preparation of pleadings to be filed by the client pro per. A litigant may be either self-
represented or represented by counsel, but not both at once, unless approved by the court. In order for
attorney to specially appear on behalf of the litigant before the court for a limited purpose, the attorney
should comply with all applicable court rules and procedures of the particular tribunal.
A lawyer may be required to perform beyond the term of a limited scope representation agreement if
the Court requested, or the Clients circumstance warranted such action. In most circumstances, an
agreement to withdraw from representation would not violate any ethics requirement, as long as the
lawyer provides adequate advice to Client concerning the scope of representation. In family court, the
Courts permission may be needed to withdraw from simple divorce petitions in certain circumstances.
D.C. Bar Op. 330 (2005)
Unbundling of legal services is permissible under D.C. Rule 1.2 ( c ), provided the client is fully informed
of the limits on the scope of the representation and these limits do not prevent the provision of
competent service. If a party is proceeding pro se, opposing counsel should treat that party as
unrepresented unless and until that counsel receives reasonable notice of representation from the party
or her lawyer.
An attorney may agree in advance with his or her client to limit the scope of the attorney's
representation and draft pleadings without appearing or taking any part in any of the proceeding itself,
provided that the client gives his or her fully informed consent to such limitation of employment and the
attorney takes whatever steps may be necessary to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client's rights.
A lawyer is not required to sign a complaint or enter an appearance as counsel of record when
representation is solely limited to preparation of the complaint.
It is impermissible for a lawyer to draft responsive pleadings to an unrepresented opposing party in a
000685
divorce. However, a lawyer may draft an entry of appearance if the lawyer includes a letter indicated that
he or she represents the opposing party and that the unrepresented party should obtain counsel.
A lawyer who does not appear as counsel of record for a pro se litigant may prepare responsive
pleadings and demands for financial disclosure, provided the lawyer investigates the matter adequately.
Legal services attorneys may provide legal advice and drafting assistance to pro se litigants without
appearing as counsel of record. If court approved pleading forms exist, attorneys may make them
available to individuals wishing to proceed pro se.
Attorneys may offer limited representation through a pro se clinic if they obtain clients consent,
preferably in writing. Attorneys may draft proceedings for clients, if the attorney notifies the Court that
counsel has assisted a pro se litigant. The phrase "Prepared with Assistance of Counsel" is recommended
for inclusion on such pleadings in a prominent manner. Attorneys who draft proceedings need not
appear and represent the client.
A lawyer may provide legal assistance to litigants appearing before tribunals pro se and help them
prepare written submissions without disclosing or ensuring the disclosure to others of the nature or
extent of such assistance. Undertaking to provide limited legal help does not generally alter any other
aspect of the attorneys professional responsibilities to the client.

As to the ghostwriting, its tough, because, for clients who want to pay very little (after, say, in Gessin's
case he paid McKenna allegedly $15K to wind up with an Order from an Arbitrator and District Court
Judge denying a Trial De Novo based upon a bad faith failure to participate in litigation in one case, then
in the other, Gessin paid Hill something like $20K only to be slammed car crash style into settlement by
Hill's advice when Gessin couldn't stomach paying anymore of HIll's fees, settling for the amount
originally sought by Mr. Hall's client). So, clients like that want a deal, want to pay piece meal or go the
unbundled route, but filing all those Motions to Withdraw, and Proposed Orders, and Affidavits, add to
the costs where the fee is not really being increased any. There is much literature dealing with this:

Please accept this as a supplement to the grievance filed by Richard Hill, Esq. My recollection of my
involvement with Gessin is that I filed two Answers to very similar Adversary Complaints in NVB and two
Motions to Dismiss in those same cases, involving the two women represented by Glade Hall, Esq., both
on an "unbundled services" basis, and the pleadings themselves indicated the were filed as
an "unbundled service". This was my first filign in NVB, and I was not registered or trained as an
electronic filer at that point. Further, Gessin hired me to provide other unbundled services, inlcuding
writing (and, to my understanding at the time, filing under my own signature) something in the vein of a
NRCP Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment from judgments in cases involving the same two
women Taitano ne Moore, and Rissone, both, again, represented by Glade Hall, Esq.

It may be the case that Richard Hill is correct that I was goign against some rule or law by sending one
demand letter to Glade Hall concerning an outstanding $500 sanction aware. I believe I drafted an Order
To Show Cause for this, but am not sure it was filed by me. About the time I provided Gessin my signed
final draft of that and a few other closely related motions, he pretty much wanted to part ways, I believe.
I think this was around mid-November and there was some issues with Richard HIll withholding my client
files, some of which may have included Gessin's, then Hill would say he would give me my client files
without any demands or lien needing satisfying prior to doing so, and that he would do the same with
my wallet and identification, but then he would change his mind and demand what to me seems that I
000686
satisfy a rent distraint that has been outlawed by NRS 118A.520 (though there is a very old BK case, circa
1980 or so that may suggest such distraints are still permissible against commercial tenants, and my
hybrid, home law office situation, plus the fact that I do still have a business license for Zachary
Coughlin's Memory Foam Mattresses (something I started during the 4 years I was hoping to get a law
license and finding employment very, very difficult to obtain, during which Mike Rowe wrote me stern
letters, Pete Christiansen and Mike Sanft -ignored me and shewed me to their legal assistant Kelly Huff,
and Director of Admissions Patrice Eichmann made the unilateral decision to ignore the Request for
Reconsideration of my Application for Admission that I timely submitted on 9 15 03 in connection with
the end of the deferment period set forth in the Court's December 2002 Order....) and at least some
research and development was ongoing in that regard. Whether I was a commercial or residential
tenant was an important issue in the eviction matter and the mixed use of the property likely only made
the statute all the more difficult to interpret.

However, I do recall that Gessin told me he withdrew his bankruptcy, so that may negate Hill's assertion
that I was wrongful in sending a demand letter to Hall regarding the old sanction and or filing a Motion
for Order To Show Cause. Gessin is a crafty guy, though I am not sure I entirely share Hill's view of him.
However, Hill apparently received about $20-25K in attorney's fees from Gessin in a case that the plaintiff
was only seeking about $25K in to begin with, and upon Gessin ceasing to be willing to pay Hill and
Baker for more litigating, they promptly suggested he settle for something near $30K (which, of course,
was upsetting to Gessin, in a manner that is similar to how Dr. Merliss seems to feel in the eviction
matter). But, to be fair to Hill, those parties likely bare some responsibility for choosing to take the risky
path that is litigation.

Gessin also became a registered efiler about the time he basically terminated my representation of him.
My email to Gessin below shows that I was somewhat suspicious of the fact that he seemed to all the
sudden want to go our separate ways after I had been working on these very involved (to me at the time
they seemed really involved) NRCP 60(b) Motions, and it is ironic, somewhat that Hill accuses me of
ghostwriting because my email to Gessin essentially anticipates that, and, to some extent, my later filing
Notices of Appearance as Attorney of Record in several of Gessin's various cases involving these two
women was done to attempt to counteract any appearance of that. Gessin seemed upset that I filed
those appearances, and actually got very pushy about me trying to undo them, and eager to avoid
prejudicing his ability to file timely 60(b) motions, I undertook to do what I could to make it so he could
file on his own (ie, having an Attorney of Record on one's case often results in the filing office refusing to
let them file anything on their own...).


John,
Here is Van Lydegraf's voice message. Again, I have not talked to him and I forwarded you the only
email or writing I ever sent him. I am leaning towards filing an Errata on your cases today to get it so
I am not attorney of record. Which do you prefer? I am not sure which would accomplish your goals
quicker, but keep in mind, I believe a Motion to Withdraw is the typical thing, not a Notice of
Withdrawal? Have you found any research in this regard? Please indicate in writing which you prefer
or the preferred manner you would like to see me pursue accomplishing your goals, which, to my
understanding, include being in pro per on this case. I sense you are uncomfortable, but please
know I maintain extremely high fidelity to my clients, unbundled or otherwise, okay? I am unsure
how me filing the 60b's etc would have been much different with respect to what you seem upset
about...did you never intend for me to file? Were you looking for a "ghost writer"? I was not of the
understanding that I was being hired as a "ghostwriter" and I do recall some indication that such a
000687



Print
z copying you to avoid any ex parte accusations
thing is either prohibited or discouraged by the Rules of Professional Responsibility....Regardless, the
most important thing is to avoid prejudicing your case, and I feel I have made great efforts to
achieve that. If you want to file something, just do it, don't wait for any withdrawal, etc. I will make
all reasonable efforts to see that you are allowed to file whenever and whatever you want, and not
be weighed down by any attorney of record designation.

Sincerely,"

I currently have a Motion to Withdraw pending in the two Adversary Proceedings where I believe I
was incorrectly listed as Attorney of Record for Gessin.
Close
Sent: Fri 1/13/12 7:41 AM
To:
rhill@richardhillaw.com; cdbaker@richardhillaw.com; sgallagher@richardhillaw.com;
knielsen@richardhillaw.com; shill@richardhillaw.com
Attachments:
1 attachment
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY TO OPPOSITION CV08-01709 1 13 12.pdf (162.9 KB)

Zach Coughlin, Esq.
1422 E. 9th St. #2
RENO, NV 89512
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
Nevada Bar No: 9473

000688

supplement to response to grievance

hello from Zach Coughlin
2521, and may contain confidential information intended for the specified individual (s) only. If you are not the intended recipient or an
agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that
any review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. This
message is confidential, intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain information that is privileged,
attorney work product or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient(s), you
are notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on the
contents of this information is prohibited and may be unlawful. If you receive this message in error, or are not the
named recipient(s), please notify the sender, delete this e-mail from your computer, and destroy any copies in any
form immediately. Receipt by anyone other than the named recipient(s) is not a waiver of any attorney-client, work

Sent: Mon 3/19/12 4:05 AM
1 attachment
rcp 2012-000018 D3 Hill v Coughlin Protection Order back.pdf (22.6 MB)

Dear Mr. King,
Please see attached.

Sent: Wed 3/21/12 8:30 AM
Dear Mr. King,



000689


Sincerely,

Sent: Thu 3/22/12 2:01 AM
Mr. King,

I did not categorically characterize all "allegations" in any way, so there has been no
statement from me as to whether they are "serious" or not. I do prefer doing things
in writing. Ms. Eichman wanted to talk on the phone in 2003 when it came time to
explain why she failed to honor the documents I submitted in response to her express
instructions to so submit. I met with Jon Bailey in 2002 and found it to be an
appalling experience. Lots of people taking up for Mark Tratos, despite a wealth of
evidence to suggest he was playing games with my career to feed his own ego. Lots
of faux offense taking at my pointing that out by Bailey and Mike Rowe. Tratos was
a millionaire at the time. I was riding a ten speed for transportation and had just
finished law school.

I would like to know what you have done with the various grievances I filed? Are
you meeting with the attorneys against whom I have filed a grievance? I am looking
for indications from you that this process will be conducted in a fair manner with
sufficient due process protections. I was evicted at gunpoint by the Washoe County
Sheriffs on 3/15 (this is the standard practice of the WCSO and had nothing to do
with anything I did, I was compliant and docile when the Sheriff's broke into my
location with guns drawn in their attempts to carry out the service of process of a
Summary Eviction Order and a lockout...). I have hearings this week, etc. I can
meet with you anytime the week of April 23rd, through April 27th, 2012. When are
you available?

Sincerely,

000690


Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 18:36:13 +0000

Dear Mr. Coughlin,

there is a way
to assist you.



To: Patrick King

Dear Mr. King,
000691




Sincerely,

Sent: Thu 3/22/12 2:02 AM
Mr. King,

I am preparing a Supplemental Response to the grievance and will have it to you as
soon as possible, though it may take a few weeks.

Sincerely,


Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 18:36:13 +0000

Dear Mr. Coughlin,

000692
there is a way
to assist you.



To: Patrick King

Dear Mr. King,



Sincerely,

000693

Sent: Thu 3/22/12 2:30 AM
Dear Mr. King,



need to get a new living space and office, attend and defend the "quadruple
jeopardy" abuse of process that Richard Hill is orchestrating, and otherwise protect
my client's interests. I am not refusing to speak with you on the phone or meet in
person. My two phones are still being held by the Washoe County jail, under an
Order by RMC Judge Nash Holmes, so....The USPS Golden Valley Station has
retaliated against me by interferring with my mail, though I have taken all reasonable
steps to counter that, including securing a new PO BOX, which I added as my public
address on the Bar's online portal days ago, but for which I still do not see a change
reflected. The Federal Torts Claims act has likely been violated by USPS Golden
Valley Station supervisors Terry James and Buck Hyde, whom took it upon
themselves to play judge and jury incident to a complicated eviction process that I
have recently been litigating against Park Terrace Townhomes HOA and Western
Nevada Management and Gayle Kern, LTD. It involves respondeat superior
liability, etc., etc. Western Nevada Management knew of and orchestrated, and
received approval from the Park Terrace HOA to have the two individuals who I
rented from live at the 1422 E. 9th St. 89512 location. This involved a Robyn
Badalato, then a property manager at Park Terrace. For some reason, when her boss
000694
found out about this, she started crying, saying she was going to be fired, etc., etc..
Then she apparently resigned. This was litigated in an interruption of essential
services (electricity) complaint I filed recently. The HOA and Sue King admitted
these things, yet they want to turn right around and disclaim an responsibility for
anything, pursue a summary eviction despite the facts not lining up with the Glazier
case sufficient to allow such, etc., etc.


this week. But I am not some young punk who is going to come in and let Jon
Bailey blow a lot of intimidation and hot air at him for his millionaire buddy Mark
Tratos (whom had to admit under oath, that he had previously "lost" other student's
papers in his illustrious career as an adjunct professor. And that was also confirmed
by Anderson and Morishita, two former patent attorney associates for Mr. Tratos.
Also, Mr. Tratos lost or "failed to receive" Jessica Wolf's paper in that 2002 Cyber
Law course, but I don't recall the State Bar of Nevada raping her. Further, Tratos
wrote me asking for "another copy of your paper", which implies he received one.
Then he went on to ask for detail about the paper, what it was about etc., clearly
implying he did have possession of the one I turned in with only my "blind grading"
social security number, etc. (he had a student in the class who worked for his firm,
he probably interpreted my adherence to the "blind grading" setup that was utilized
in every other course I took at Boyd as a personal affront, etc....To me it is disturbing
appear at the June 2002 conclusion of the hearing before the C&F Committtee,
whom was referred by Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly,
whom owns the strip club, The Spearmint Rhino, or did at the time. I believe in
Senator Grassley's "sunshine and transparency" in government, and in this grievance
process too.

Sincerely,

000695

Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 18:36:13 +0000

Dear Mr. Coughlin,

there is a way
to assist you.



To: Patrick King

Dear Mr. King,

000696



Sincerely,

Sent: Thu 3/22/12 12:29 PM
Thank Mr. King,

I will. Things are coming together quickly though I have faced many
obstacles. I may have mentioned this already, but I did file a Motion to
Withdraw in the two Gessin Adversary Proceedings in NVB. However,
in the meantime, as I understand it, I have a duty to represent Mr.
Gessin, even despite his indications that he doesn't necessarily want me
to, that doing so is unnecessary (he apparently is in the process or
already has had his main BK case withdrawn, though I pointed out to
him, that does not necessarily make moot the adversary
proceedings...). It has been a good lesson in how very important that
attorney of record designation is. However, I did learn a lot of lessons
about that with Mr. Christiansen as my attorney in 2002-2004, along
with the extent to which a proper, detailed fee agreement setting forth in
explicit detail the scope of one's representation is very, very important.

Sincerely,

000697

Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2012 17:51:20 +0000


I sorry to hear that you are having to deal with some extremely tough circumstances. Please
come see me as soon as you can.

Sincerely,

Patrick King

To: Patrick King

Dear Mr. King,
000698
need to get a new living space and office, attend and defend the "quadruple jeopardy"
abuse of process that Richard Hill is orchestrating, and otherwise protect my client's
interests. I am not refusing to speak with you on the phone or meet in person. My
two phones are still being held by the Washoe County jail, under an Order by RMC
Judge Nash Holmes, so....The USPS Golden Valley Station has retaliated against me
by interferring with my mail, though I have taken all reasonable steps to counter that,
including securing a new PO BOX, which I added as my public address on the Bar's
online portal days ago, but for which I still do not see a change reflected. The
Federal Torts Claims act has likely been violated by USPS Golden Valley Station
supervisors Terry James and Buck Hyde, whom took it upon themselves to play
judge and jury incident to a complicated eviction process that I have recently been
litigating against Park Terrace Townhomes HOA and Western Nevada Management
and Gayle Kern, LTD. It involves respondeat superior liability, etc., etc. Western
Nevada Management knew of and orchestrated, and received approval from the Park
Terrace HOA to have the two individuals who I rented from live at the 1422 E. 9th
St. 89512 location. This involved a Robyn Badalato, then a property manager at
Park Terrace. For some reason, when her boss found out about this, she started
crying, saying she was going to be fired, etc., etc.. Then she apparently resigned.
This was litigated in an interruption of essential services (electricity) complaint I
filed recently. The HOA and Sue King admitted these things, yet they want to turn
right around and disclaim an responsibility for anything, pursue a summary eviction
despite the facts not lining up with the Glazier case sufficient to allow such, etc.,
etc.
this week. But I am not some young punk who is going to come in and let Jon Bailey
blow a lot of intimidation and hot air at him for his millionaire buddy Mark Tratos
(whom had to admit under oath, that he had previously "lost" other student's papers
in his illustrious career as an adjunct professor. And that was also confirmed by
Anderson and Morishita, two former patent attorney associates for Mr. Tratos. Also,
Mr. Tratos lost or "failed to receive" Jessica Wolf's paper in that 2002 Cyber Law
course, but I don't recall the State Bar of Nevada raping her. Further, Tratos wrote
me asking for "another copy of your paper", which implies he received one. Then he
000699
went on to ask for detail about the paper, what it was about etc., clearly implying he
did have possession of the one I turned in with only my "blind grading" social
security number, etc. (he had a student in the class who worked for his firm,
he probably interpreted my adherence to the "blind grading" setup that was utilized in
every other course I took at Boyd as a personal affront, etc....To me it is disturbing
appear at the June 2002 conclusion of the hearing before the C&F Committtee, whom
was referred by Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly, whom owns
the strip club, The Spearmint Rhino, or did at the time. I believe in Senator
Grassley's "sunshine and transparency" in government, and in this grievance process
too.
Sincerely,


Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 18:36:13 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,

The allegations against you are serious and put into question your competence to practice law. I would like to
meet with you so that I can talk with you about the allegations and see if there is a way
to assist you.

If you do not meet with me, then the Office of Bar Counsel will be forced to make decisions without the benefit of
actually getting to sit down and talk with you.


000700

Change of Address
To: Patrick King

Dear Mr. King,
"Bye, hey jack is packing. How are you doing. My assistant Bar Council and
we've been sharing some emails. I would like to hear from you, so we can
talk on the phone if you could please call me at (775) 328-1384 Thanks a lot.
Bye. "
Until then, could we communicate in writing please. I provided you a great
deal of material in response to Hill's grievance, and I feel that should take
you more than one hour to appropriately review, so....
Also, I have filed a motion to withdraw in Gessin's Bankruptcy AP cases and a
Reply to Opposition, though I don't really know what in the hell that matters
or why Richard Hill is able to leverage your office to make busy work for me
by making completely unsupported "ghostwriting" accusations, etc., etc.
Sincerely,
Sent: Thu 3/22/12 1:46 PM
Dear Mr. King,

Please note my new address. I attempted to change this online at the
Bar's online portal several days ago, yet it still has not updated. My
000701

does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
new mailing address is:

PO BOX 60952
RENO NV 89506

Also, as I mentioned to you in a previous written correspondence, I did write to Bar Counsel
previously in an attempt to fulfill my duties under SCR 111. At least one of the allegation in
Mr. Hill's greivance related to a criminal charge that has yet to be adjudicated. Is it your's or the
Bar's position that I must reply to or otherwise defend myself in this grievance setting prior to
having an opportunity to do so in the case wherein such a charge is found itself? If it is, can you
provide some citation to the authority for such a position?

Sincerely,

Zach Coughlin, Esq., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, tel: 775 338 8118, fax: 949 667 7402;
Sent: Fri 3/23/12 9:12 AM
To: patrickk@nvbar.org; cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
10 In general
000702

FOIA REQUEST; Motion to Dismiss Grievance for lack of
standing

Chapter 13 debtors' attorney violated Nevada rule of professional conduct defining professional
misrepresentation
and engaging in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice, where attorney, acting in bad
faith,
filed documents which he or someone in his office generated to falsely certify debtors'
completion of
required credit counseling course and which he knew, or should have known, that debtors did
not
sign or otherwise adopt, and also certified documents as being completed by debtors. 11
U.S.C.A.
Nev. 2010).


Sincerely,


Sent: Fri 3/23/12 9:30 AM
000703
Dear Mr. King,

Please accept and respond to this FOIA REQUEST seeking for you to produce any
and all documentation and or a summary of any correspondence, written or otherwise
(including the many telephone calls referenced in Hills 1/14/12 letter to you) from
Richard HIll or anyone with his office, or anyone else, EVER, in any way involving
me, in connection with ANY matter.

I am focusing on 24. The role of retained counsel; in generalNegotiations with
bar counsel... and wish to meet with you soon. I have to prepare for and attend
several hearings in the coming days, and will update you as to my availability in
short order. This is also a Motion to Dismiss the grievance Hill filed for a lack of
standing, and for failure to state a valid claim. Further, please note, that I previously
contact Bar Counsel Clark and Assitant Bar Counsel Machado, via written
communication and telephone to comply with my obligation under SCR 111. Any
other reports by Hill are not to the point where I have a SCR 111 Obligation (other
than perhaps a summary contempt Order against me from 2/27/12, for which I have
provided written indication of to you in my response to Hill's grievance, though I do
not believe that Order falls within the purview of SCR 111.

I wish to register my objection to the fact that Richard Hill did not sign his
"grievance". I do not believe he even has standing to file a greivance. He was never
my client. Under RPC 8.3, I do not believe a "greivance" is the appropriate means of
fulfilling such a duty, nor do I believe Richard Hill (or Casey Baker, Esq. whom he
purports to speak for and file on behalf of) have a good faith basis in making any
complaint of any sort, and rather, are impermissibly attempting to circumvent the
process of my having my day in court with respect to any outstanding criminal
charges (particularly where non involved contact with any clients, and none are
felony charges). Please provide some indication in writing of your stance in this
regard.

21. The role of retained counsel; in generalPlan of action
A thorough review of the file is a vital prerequisite to an effective plan of action, which,
ideally,
should be outlined immediately upon the conclusion of the interview with the accused
attorney. A
typical plan of action might be as follows:
[] Reduce all fee considerations to writing
If a proper understanding between counsel and client concerning attorney's fees for the
000704
representation
has not been arrived at in the initial interview, it should be immediately settled and
reduced
to writing.[25]
[] Establish a fund for costs
A fund for costs normally will include enough money for a refund of the client's fees, court
transcripts, if necessary, and incidental expenses such as photocopying costs and long
distance
calls. Ninety percent of all grievances can be settled with a fund of $1,000 or less. Thus, it
becomes
obvious that most disciplinary actions against attorneys are unnecessary and could have
been easily avoided by their early retention of a competent lawyer. While the accused
cannot
settle the matter, an objective attorney, acting in the best interest of the accused, usually
can.
[] Communicate with bar counsel
Counsel must remember that the investigating bar attorney is usually in private practice,
prominent
in his field and very busy. His sole desire is to have the matter disposed of fairly and
promptly, so that he can tend to his own practice. Early and diplomatic communication
with him
is often an important first step toward settling the grievance.
[] If permissible, talk to the complainant
If the complainant is not represented by an attorney, he should be promptly interviewed.
However, the complainant should not be contacted by telephone; the defense attorney
should visit
him in person. If the canons of ethics permit, the conversation should be taped, provided
counsel
bears in mind that many states provide that taping a conversation without the knowledge
of the
000705
person being taped is illegal and a violation of ethical standards. Most attorneys prefer to
conduct
the interview with the tape recorder in plain sight. The best method the author has found
to get the
complainants to open up is to simply say: "I need to hear your side of the story, I need to
find out
what really happened. You folks may be totally correct, and if so, I need to know that, to
advise
my client."
If possible, and particularly if the defense attorney is a notary public, a sworn statement
should
be taken, preferably in the handwriting of the complainant, as to all the facts and details
of the
complaint. If possible, alternatives for settlement should be included in the statement.
A checklist of questions, compiled from the accused attorney's file will be helpful. The
more detail
counsel can bring out, the better. Counsel should not hesitate to let relatives give their
version
of what the complainant has said to them. Often such version will not only be at variance
with the truth, but it may vary from complainant's later version.
A determination should be made as to whether the complainant is mentally stable and
whether
he will be an effective witness before the committee. The cross-examination should be
drawn up
from the tapes or from the notes taken of the interview.
[] Meet and talk with the prosecutor
The meeting should not be tape-recorded, as most prosecutors will object to such activity
as devious.
In any case, attorneys should be able to deal with one another on a professional basis. All
the
possibilities should be explored with the prosecutor. A determination should be made as to
whether
000706
the case would be accepted for criminal prosecution taking into consideration the amount
of
money involved.
If the matter is due to be presented to the grand jury, and the prosecutor is not agreeable
to a delay
in presenting it, defense counsel should consider writing a letter to the grand jury since
this can be
helpful in delaying the proceedings. There is danger in writing such a letter, however.
Federal
grand juries should not be contacted, since to contact them directly is a violation of federal
law,
and in some cases, state law. Research may be required to determine if counsel may
approach the
local grand jury.
Occasionally, the attorney-client can avoid an indictment against him by making some
sort of refund.
Where this is the case, a brief delay may be afforded defense counsel to allow him to
discuss
the matter with his client. Counsel, of course, should take full advantage of such delay.
With
an indictment pending, he should advise his client strongly that standing on principle is
futile.
22. The role of retained counsel; in generalHandling related malpractice and criminal
charges
Where a claim of malpractice has not been formally presented against the client but
circumstances
indicate that one will be, counsel should communicate with the client's legal malpractice
insurance
carrier and notify it of a potential malpractice claim. This is necessary to satisfy the
requirement in
most policies that the company be notified in the event the insured attorney is in
possession of information
000707
which reasonably leads him to believe that a malpractice claim may be filed against him.
The provision is designed to allow the malpractice insurance carrier as much time as
possible to investigate
a potential claim even though it might not result in a malpractice suit.[26]
A charge of malpractice can be expected to follow when a grievance complaint successfully
shows dereliction of duty on the part of the attorney. However, an attorney representing
the complainant
occasionally will file a malpractice suit against the attorney before the grievance is heard,
hoping thereby to benefit by using the pressure of the disciplinary proceeding to improve
his bargaining
position in the malpractice action. This may actually be unethical on his part since an
attorney
may not use the threat of criminal, or even quasi-criminal action to settle related civil
litigation.
Therefore, since the grievance complaint is considered quasi-criminal in some
jurisdictions,[27] it
would follow that an attorney should not take advantage of the grievance process to settle
his civil
suit for malpractice against the accused attorney.
Although insurance counsel will be concerned mainly with settlement of the malpractice
claim,
counsel for the accused attorney should point out that a good result in the grievance
hearing will
make settlement of the malpractice suit easier. Some insurance attorneys are sympathetic
and may
agree to use some of their client's resources to settle the grievance as well as the
malpractice suit. Of
course, counsel can expect that the client's malpractice insurance will be cancelled even if
the accused
attorney prevails.
Up until recent times, most people did not consider a conviction of driving while
intoxicated a
000708
crime of moral turpitude, particularly where there was no incident connected thereto that
caused loss
of life, serious injury, or property damage to a third person. Similarly, simple negligence
in driving
leading to a collision or possession of a small amount of marijuana has not been
considered moral
wrongdoing. Grievance committee members take a similar attitude, being concerned not
with the
moral principles involved, but only with preventing a recurrence of the incident.[28]
During the course of the investigation, the probabilities of criminal litigation will become
obvious.
Actual criminal prosecution is the exception, however. Nonetheless, if defense counsel feels
that
a criminal investigation is likely to result in an indictment, then the possibility of an
agreed to resignation
from the bar in exchange for no prosecution should be considered.[29]
Cooperation in the form of a client interview should not be given to a criminal
investigator. This
does not, of course, mean that defense counsel should be discourteous or uncooporative in
supplying
documents that are easily obtainable at the county clerk's office. It is simply better
practice to not permit
the attorney-client to be interviewed by a criminal investigator, for the probabilities of the
client
becoming rude and hostile are very high.
If the accused attorney has a good explanation, or has made full restitution, or has
otherwise acted
equitably, defense counsel might consider communicating with the grand jury.[30]
However, this
course of action is hazardous for two reasons. First, in all federal investigations it is a
crime to communicate
or attempt to communicate with the grand jury. The same effect can be had by simply
writing
000709
a letter to the Assistant United States Attorney handling the grand jury presentment and
request-
ing that the client be permitted to appear before him and the grand jury for questioning,
in the hopes
of preventing an indictment. Of course, he cannot be compelled to appear before the
grand jury unless
either full or use immunity is granted; but since most of such appearances would be on a
"request"
basis, he would thus waive his Fifth Amendment rights, and his statements before the
grand
jury would be admissible at a criminal trial.
The obvious danger of the client's testifying before the grand jury is that the he may make
serious
admissions during the course of the questioning. Thus, it goes without saying that before a
grand jury
appearance, the accused attorney should be thoroughly prepared and should confer often
with counsel,
who in most states is not allowed to be present in the grand jury room with his client. Such
conferences
should be reasonable, and should not be held after each question.
Of course, the district attorney usually has the power not to permit the appearance of the
client
before the grand jury; but in most cases, he will welcome it. If he intends to indict
regardless of the
testimony, then the statements of the accused attorney are recorded under oath and his
story can be
investigated. The prosecutor can, if this grand jury does not indict, present the same
information to
the next grand jury, without the presence of the accused. On the other hand, if the
prosecutor is truly
fair minded, an appearance by the client may explain any ambiguous points,
and preclude an indictment.
[Top of Section]
000710

24. The role of retained counsel; in generalNegotiations with bar counsel
Quite often bar counsel will be a well-known practicing attorney with a large, prominent law
firm, that is, an attorney who can afford to take time off for bar-related activities. He is likely to
be
middle-aged, wealthy, conservative, and quite busy with his own private practice. He is also
unlikely
to be sympathetic to an unrepresented accused attorney, and will find it difficult to understand
the
problems of young, sole practitioner, for he customarily represents corporate clients, insurance
companies,
and banks. He will probably do no divorce or criminal work, and he is likely to be highly
specialized
in his own practice.[31] His goal will be to dispose of the matter as painlessly and as quickly
as possible, and he will resent lack of cooperation or a hostile attitude. By the time retained
counsel
enters the case, the accused attorney may have had two or three bitter confrontations with this
attorney,
and he may have given him no cooperation nor shown any contrition. The attitude of the
investigating
attorney is likely to be guarded, if not hostile.[32]
The considerable powers of bar counsel should be understood: he has the authority to file formal
charges and set the case for hearing, or he may dispose of it without further investigation. He
may sit
on a case indefinitely, or he can see that it is thoroughly prosecuted, even getting assistance of
the attorney
general's office or the local district attorney. Indeed, occasionally bar counsel may coordinate
his efforts with the local United States Attorney or district attorney for the purpose of
prosecuting a
particular attorney for perjury or for some breach of fiduciary duty. He may even suggest to the
district
000711
attorney that the case be presented to a grand jury.
It is therefore obvious that early in the case, retained counsel must communicate, in a friendly
way with the committee's attorney. He should first determine whether the client has offended
him and
make necessary apologies, although this courtesy will not always fall on receptive ears. If bar
counsel
is irreversibly opposed to the client because of personal animosity, however, he may be
amenable to
replacement by another attorney. This should be requested in a tactful way.
As a general rule, the committee's counsel will be pleased to suggest prompt methods of
settlement.
If he makes specific suggestions, they should be complied with if at all possible. This is true
even where they resolve doubts in matters of equity in favor of the complainant. The
investigator has
the power to see that his wishes are enforced. Concrete steps should be proposed and efforts
made to
determine the bar counsel's attitude toward possible rehabilitation through Alcoholics
Anonymous or
psychotherapy treatment or whatever is appropriate of a medical or educational nature.
Everything that should obviously be done should be done promptly. For example, if a refund of
a
few hundred dollars is clearly in order, it should be done speedily. It is wise to coordinate such
efforts
with the committee's staff personnel.
Sometimes a proposed written agreement for an immediate specific refund, or attendance at
ethics
seminars or remedial courses, to be completed within a given period of time, will be favorably
received.
Trickery or failing to live up to agreements made are almost certain to have bad results.
Therefore it is particularly important that any restitution promised be promptly paid.
Occasionally,
000712
the curative action is simplicity itself, and a request for a letter of apology to the complainant or
the
immediate turning over of a file to substitute counsel should be promptly complied with.
However,
the most important points to make with the investigating bar attorney, where there is no defense
under
the facts of the case, are contrition, cooperation, and corrective measures.
There will be cases, however, where the client has committed no wrongful act and is innocent. It
should be explained to the bar attorney that innocence will be the defense and that it will be
vigorously
pursued. Weaknesses in the complainant's case, his or her past criminal or psychiatric history
should be pointed out, and an inquiry made as to what steps are necessary to settle the matter
under
those circumstances.
In some jurisdictions, the investigating bar attorney is a full-time employee of the state bar
association,
the attorney general's office or an employee of the local judicial district. The approach in that
case will probably be somewhat different. Whereas the committee member participating in the
investigation
is seldom compensated for his work, counsel employed by a state bar association or the attorney
general's office always is. The only exception would be a "special prosecutor" appointed to
handle a particular, and usually quite spectacular, case. This is rare, but when it does occur, it
usually
involves a political figure or a judge.
An investigating attorney who is employed full time to investigate and prosecute grievances will
be harder to deal with. He is less likely to be sympathetic to the accused attorney, particularly if
he
has a record of prior disciplinary action. Nonetheless, most of these grievance committee
prosecutors
have more than enough work, and they tend to concentrate their efforts on the worst offenders,
those
000713
who have been least cooperative, or those who have offended them.
Retained counsel can expect closer cooperation with federal criminal or state and local district
attorney
investigators if the investigating committee attorney is a state or bar association employee.
Committee counsel acts as the prosecutor, and he may have had considerable experience
working
with the Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation or comparable state
office,
and he may have been a former prosecutor himself. If such an investigating attorney is handling
the
matter, a quick determination must be made of the probability of criminal prosecution, and
possibly
serious, adverse tax consequences.[33]
Regardless of whether the investigating attorney is a committee member or a state bar or
attorney
general's employee, the duty of all investigating or prosecuting attorneys is the same: to do
justice.
They are bound by the code of professional responsibility just as others are. Regrettably, they do
not
seem to enjoy hearing that from defense counsel, and reminding them of their ethical duties will
be
irritating. Nonetheless, most of these investigating attorneys have a heavy workload, and they
do tend
to concentrate their efforts on those attorneys who are the most obnoxious, the most infamous,
and
the least cooperative.
Retained defense counsel must also make an early determination on whether to supply evidence
that may build part of a criminal prosecution in the hopes of gaining leniency before the bar
association
at the risk of more severe detriment to his client if criminal charges are formally pursued. Such
decisions are never easy.
000714
In any event, it is generally good practice at the beginning of representation for an attorney-
client
accused of professional misconduct to contact the grievance or hearing committee's counsel and
advise
him that he may expect full cooperation from counsel and the client, any undelivered file will be
forwarded immediately to the former client or substitute counsel, an informal or formal reply, as
appropriate,
will be promptly submitted, and some inquiry about settlement or some other disposition of
the matter will be made without the filing of formal charges.
25. The role of retained counsel; in generalSettlement or disposition without hearing;
form
of release
Settlement is the ideal goal in every case. Seldom can any good come from having a hearing.
Even though the accused attorney claims complete innocence, the committee members may
wonder
why the matter was not disposed of earlier. They are quite aware of the fact that such matters
do not get to the hearing stage without the recommendation of the investigating bar attorney,
who
must have found evidence of wrongdoing to justify filing formal charges. Thus, the defense is
faced with a suspicion of some act of misconduct. Logically, therefore, the goal of avoiding a
hearing is the most desirable one, and the approach taken should be one that is least likely to
lead
to a hearing. It makes little sense to set one's goal for a hearing when the use of diplomacy can
avoid it. Settlement is possible only up to a point prior to the hearing, however. Once the
hearing
commences, it is usually too late for the accused attorney to settle with the complainant. The
most
satisfactory and beneficial settlements are those reached within two weeks of the filing of the
complaint.
The potential for various settlement possibilities are plentiful, but, unfortunately, they are
000715
usually
predicated on a commodity in short supply for most attorneys: money. Often it will be necessary
for the client to contact family members and give promissory notes for loans in order to bargain
with cash that may be easily replaced, rather than his license, which cannot.
It should be noted that while it is unethical conduct to "buy off" complaining witnesses, nearly
all
states provide that if the district attorney either approves or encourages a civil settlement, then
disciplinary proceedings may be avoided. Retained counsel must make certain he violates none
of
the canons of ethics himself. The key to avoiding trouble is to be open and candid with all
concerned.
Retained counsel should immediately make clear to the accused attorney that he is to take no
action
whatever following representation, and a careful inquiry should be made to determine what
action he has taken to date. Invariably, steps will have to be taken to straighten out the harm that
he may already have done.
The single most important ingredient for success is the attitude of the accused attorney. If the
grievance committee receives the impression that he is merely interested in a "dodge" to avoid
the
consequences of his acts, then great difficulty can be expected. If on the other hand the accused
is
genuinely contrite, both in his words and his actions, few committees are likely to take severe
action,
even in serious cases. On the other hand, some attorneys may attempt some sort of cover-up.
They may lie to the committee or may otherwise do great disservice to their own cause when
they
are not represented.
It should always be kept in mind that a contrite attitude by the accused attorney is a difficult one
for a grievance committee to resist, particularly when it is coupled with a clear and definite plan
000716
of corrective action.
Contrition, however, must always be coupled with cooperation, and cooperation must always be
coupled with corrective action. Should one of these elements be missing, a good result cannot
be
expected. Once defense counsel takes the client firmly in hand, directs a corrective-action
program,
and, most importantly, establishes and maintains a good relationship with bar counsel, he
may expect good results, even in serious cases.
The key task for the retained attorney is to coordinate the defensive effort with the goal toward
receiving
for the accused the least amount of punishment. For example, the investigating attorney
for the grievance committee should be informed that the money in dispute has been returned,
and
that the young attorney is facing considerable trouble with the district attorney's office for the
drunk-driving, collision, and the marijuana possession. It may be appropriate in such case, to
suggest
that the committee take no action until the criminal matter is exposed of.
If the client is uninsured, and many will be, defense counsel should seek to settle as much of the
case as he can by the mere payment of money as opposed to disciplinary proceedings. This, of
course, does not mean fraudulent claims should be paid. If the claimant comes into the hearing
room with unclean hands, having attempted to extort an unfair cash settlement, the committee is
entitled to know. However, in the given fact situation, there is a claim for a large sum of money
the complainant allegedly lost in profit from the sale of the piece of property. A full
investigation
may be required. Did the complainant have full title to the property, free and clear? Was there a
bona fide written offer? Did the complainant have the right to sell the property without the
approval
of other heirs? A malpractice carrier must certainly know the answer to these questions before
parting with any money.
000717
The district attorney's office should be approached with a similar offer: "Because of the DWI
and
marijuana case, the accused attorney is in trouble with the grievance committee. If a civil
settlement
with the persons who sustained damage in the car wreck can be reached, would the district
attorney be willing to dismiss the case?" Where changes of misconduct involve theft, it is best
to
make the district attorney aware of settlement negotiations and secure his participation to avoid
potentially serious problems in a related criminal proceeding.
The person most important to an overall settlement will be the investigating attorney. The key to
success is to decide at an early stage upon a specific, reasonable, and achievable course of
action,
and to stick with it. If promises for payment of damages or refunds to clients are made, they
must
be honored, to avoid displeasure of the grievance committee. Plans should be made to raise the
necessary funds, and an overall plan to solve all the problems of the accused attorney in one
settlement,
if possible, should be made. These plans often include requiring attendance at Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings, psychotherapy with a psychiatrist or clinical social worker, or, in cases
of
negligence or extreme ignorance, attendance at legal ethics classes, continuing legal education
programs, or other remedial or curative activities. In such cases, the sooner the corrective action
is undertaken, the more likely good results can be had. Many of the best plans are implemented
months before the hearing.
Persuading the investigating bar attorney to propose a solution acceptable to all the parties is
tantamount
to a successful defense. Throughout the attempts at settlement, the bar attorney should be
informed of the status of negotiations, and the position of the accused attorney should be shown
as one of reasonableness. If the investigating attorney is made aware that the complainant is
seeking
000718
thousands of dollars when he lost only a few hundred, he very well may suggest that only the
few hundred be refunded, and may agree to a dismissal of the grievance.
Set forth below is a suggested form of release by the complainant on receipt of the amount
agreed
to in settlement:
Form of release:
RELEASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, ____________,[complainant] of ____________[address], in consideration of the sum
of
____________[amount of settlement] to me in hand paid by ____________[attorney], the
receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged and conferred, and recognized as adequate by these presents,
for myself, my heirs, executors and administrators, release and forever discharge the said
____________[accused attorney] of and from all manner of debts, demands, obligations,
liabilities,
suits, and causes of action, whatever, against him, the said ____________[accused attorney],
in my own right, at the time of executing these presents.
[Date, subscription, and other formal parts omitted.]
Dismissal of the hearing should always be a part of any settlement, and all offers should be
made
known to the investigating attorney and subject to his approval. This will insure his good will;
only rarely will he interpose an objection. However, the defense attorney should not take up too
much of bar counsel's time. Bar counsel is usually busy with his private practice; he has his own
cases to handle. He will not appreciate lengthy discussions with the defense attorney over
strategy
or the petty details of the looked for solution.
Many jurisdictions provide for a "letter of caution," which is sometimes nothing more than an
informal
000719
"if-it's true-you-should-not have-done-it." In other words, the bar is simply pointing out
that the accused attorney is on thin ice, has gotten the attention of the grievance committee, and,
while the matter may not be serious enough for full inquiry, his conduct could and should
improve.
In some jurisdictions, the investigating attorney himself has the authority to issue a letter
of caution.[34]
In some jurisdictions, previous letters of caution may be used to enhance punishment, in others
they may not. In some cases the letter of caution may be issued without a complete
investigation,
based only on the complaint of the former client and the answer of the accused. A letter is
frequently
issued when the accused attorney is not cooperative as to a minor inquiry. Often the lack
of cooperation is the central theme of the letter of caution. Nonetheless, the letter of caution
falls
into the milder end of the discipline range provided by law, and many attorneys can withstand
receiving
the letter with only modest wear on their nerves. Usually the issuing of the letter is the
end of the matter.
When Bates v. Arizona Bar Association[35] was decided by the United States Supreme Court,
many advertising taboos fell for the legal profession. The limits which the advertising must
observe,
rather than all advertising, then became the issue. While advertising under certain circumstances
was held to be proper by the United States Supreme Court, it did not approve of solicitation.
Where advertising leaves off and solicitation begins is unclear in many cases.
Attorneys who advertise seem to have far more grievances lodged against them than lawyers
who
do not. Because of the conservative nature of the members of the grievance committee, it is
usually
best to attempt to settle an advertising grievance by ceasing an activity that is questionable. If
000720
an advertising violation goes to the grievance committee, harsh punishment may follow.
However, because the law is uncertain as to legal advertising, some grievance committees might
be willing to forego discipline if the accused attorney agrees to discontinue the activities
disapproved
of. There is a question whether such agreements are enforceable, but because of the uncertain
state of the law it should be assumed that they are enforceable. The agreements should be
drawn up with specificity to indicate the extent of advertising that will be allowed.

28. Formal charges
[Cumulative Supplement]
Formal charges of professional misconduct should not be recommended by bar counsel
without
notifying the attorney who is accused of unethical or illegal conduct.[43] The notice need
not be given
immediately, however; it can await the outcome of the bar's investigation into the
allegations.[44]
Following the investigation, the proceedings may be disposed of, without formal charges
being
filed, in one of three ways[45] all of which require the recommendation of bar counsel and
the concurrence
of the chairman of the grievance or hearing committee.[46] (1) The proceedings may be
dismissed
if there is insufficient probable cause to believe misconduct has occurred.[47] (2) An
admonition
may be issued if there is probable cause to believe that misconduct has occurred but the
problem
is minor and isolated.[48] (3) Probation can be imposed, with or without an admonition, if
there is
probable cause to believe misconduct has occurred for which probation is appropriate.[49]
Furthermore,
if there is a civil or criminal proceeding pending in which the respondent is a party and
000721
which
involves the same subject matter (conduct), the disciplinary proceedings may be stayed if
that is appropriate.[
50] A stay will be appropriate where the respondent will suffer prejudice in the pending
proceeding should the disciplinary action proceed immediately and where the grievance
committee
hearing may be expedited by evidence adduced in the criminal or civil matter.[51]
Formal proceedings against the accused attorney are warranted where there is probable
cause to
believe misconduct has occurred which is neither minor nor isolated and probation is not
appropriate
or where the respondent does not agree to a recommendation of admonition or probation.
[52] The
charges are prepared by bar counsel who is required to file with the disciplinary board
and serve on
the respondent a written statement of the charges giving a fair and adequate notice of the
nature of the
alleged misconduct.[53] Once the formal charges are filed, the proceedings are no longer
confidential
and are open to the public except for deliberations of the hearing committee, disciplinary
board or
court and information the hearing committee has ordered kept confidential.[54] After the
charges
have been filed, the matter is referred to a specific grievance or hearing committee.[55]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
No due process errors occurred during the grievance committee proceedings investigating
an attorney's
behavior, where attorney alleged that notice of the hearing was untimely and charges
against
him were vague, because grievance committee proceedings are principally investigatory
and comparable
000722
to proceedings before a grand jurythey are nonadversarial and there is no right of
confrontation
or cross-examination; the attorney under investigation is not entitled to a bill of
particulars until
the grievance committee completes its investigation. In this context, at a reasonable time
before a
finding of probable cause is made, the attorney will be advised of the conduct under
investigation and
the rules which may have been violated; in addition, the attorney must be given all
materials considered
by the committee and an opportunity to make a written statement regarding the alleged
misconduct
under R Reg Fla Bar 3-7.4(g). In any event the notice actually given was sufficient where
the
attorney received notice of the rules allegedly violated 13 days before the hearing was
scheduled, and
he was represented by counsel at the hearing and had an opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses. The
Florida Bar v. Swickle (1991, Fla) 589 So 2d 901, 16 FLW S737, later proceeding (US) 117
L Ed 2d
101, 112 S Ct 929, supp op (US) 118 L Ed 2d 203, 112 S Ct 1552.
Evidence supported the finding of panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys
that attorney
engaged in illegal conduct, as an aggravating factor for purposes of imposing discipline,
even
though criminal charges were not filed against attorney; attorney admitted that he
exposed himself to
administrative assistant for district court, statute defined lewd and lascivious behavior as
"publicly
exposing a sex organ or exposing a sex organ in the presence of a person who is not the
spouse of the
offender and who had not consented thereto," administrative assistant was not attorney's
spouse, and
000723
the American Bar Association's (ABA) standards did not require that an attorney be
charged or convicted
by law enforcement before his or her conduct could be considered illegal. West's K.S.A.
213508(a)(2). In re Depew, 237 P.3d 24 (Kan. 2010).
Discipline of attorney who engaged in conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice
and
placed personal interests above those of clients would be limited to censure where medical
evidence
showed he suffered from mild neurological dysfunction due to cerebral aneurysm at time
of misconduct,
years of exemplary practice preceded affliction, he acknowledged misconduct, and he
demonstrated
willingness to take appropriate steps to prevent recurrence. Re Kiley (1991, 4th Dept) 170
App Div 2d 90, 572 NYS2d 601.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
29. Response; form
Within a prescribed period of time following service of the formal charges, the respondent
should
file a written reply or answer with the board or committee and serve a copy of it on bar
counsel.[
56] Allegations that are not disputed should be admitted to narrow the issues at the
hearing and
denials of fact should be separately stated. Moreover, if the respondent chooses to refuse
to answer
an allegation on constitutional or other grounds, the ground of such refusal should be
explicitly
asserted.[57] Counsel should note that the failure to answer the charges timely may be
treated as an admission of their truth.[58]
000724
It should be kept in mind that the reply itself is admissible in both civil, criminal, and
disciplinary
proceedings. The records of the grievance committee themselves are not usually subject to
discovery
proceedings, as they are almost always allowed to be secret by statute. However, the
accused
will be required to send a copy of the reply to the complainant, which may be introduced,
in
evidence at a subsequent civil trial for malpractice, or at a criminal proceeding.
Many jurisdictions require that the reply be sworn to, and some provide that failure to file
a
timely reply is in itself grounds for disciplinary proceedings. At the very least, the failure
to file a
timely reply will irritate the investigating attorney and the committee, and this conduct
will be reported
to the committee and may be viewed as lack of cooperation. Where failure to reply is in
and of itself an admission that all charges are true and correct, the statement of charges
alone can
be the basis for disciplinary proceedings.
A good deal of thought and effort must go into the reply, and a well-drafted answer may
result in
no further action by the investigating attorney. For example, legal research into the
various issues
may result in finding cases that exonerate the defendant in the particular fact situation. A
motion
to dismiss should then be filed with the answer, citing the appropriate authority. In
preparing the
reply, counsel should attach to a motion to dismiss photocopies of important favorable
cases or a
brief in support. If no research is offered, none will be done by the committee on behalf of
the client.
An amazing number of attorneys are unaware of the fact that there has been considerable
litigation
000725
over the years regarding what is and what is not unethical conduct, and formal published
ethics
opinions have been issued by many committees for decades. There is a wealth of authority
that
can be cited. Moreover, most state bar associations have on file advisory opinions from
their ethics
committees. These can sometimes be of immense use, especially where the accused
attorney
actually may have relied upon a prior ethics opinion in trying to conform his behavior to
the right
canon. The problem is that advisory opinions may not be binding, and authority from
other states
or jurisdictions may be cited only as persuasive authority. Finally, the American Bar
Association
has issued numerous opinions over the years, and provides materials that may be
purchased for
ethics law research. The bar association's opinions carry considerable weight.[59]
Generally, there is no required form for a reply. A typical and acceptable method is to go
through
the allegations and admit those that should be admitted, to identify those as to which
corrective
action has been taken (such as returning the file to the client or to his new attorney), to
deny those
that should be denied and to deny for lack of information or belief other allegations as
appropriate.
A reply similar to answering requests for admissions or interrogatories may be
appropriate.
The second part of the reply should consist of a brief on the issue of whether the conduct
complained
of is (a) a crime or act of moral turpitude; or (b) conduct that normally would subject the
accused to disciplinary action.
Based on the factual background of the article, an appropriate response to formal charges
might
000726
be composed as follows:
[Caption of forum, title of case and other formal parts omitted.]
ANSWER TO FORMAL CHARGES
1. The allegations of paragraphs ____________ of the formal charges are admitted.
2. The allegations of paragraphs ____________ are denied without qualification or
reservation.
3. In response to the remaining allegations, respondent cannot admit or deny the truth of
the allegations
for lack of sufficient information and belief. He therefore denies those allegations subject,
however, to the following factual statement, which is offered in defense of the formal
charges and
in mitigation of punishment as to any charges and allegations found to be true:
a. I was formally the attorney for the complainant. I advised him at the time I accepted the
case
that I would also need a contractual relationship with his two sisters, and he has never had
them
contact me. I felt uneasy with probating the will without the participation of the two
sisters, and I
did not know how to get in touch with them. He gave me a retainer of $500. Attached
herewith
please find a photocopy of the check for $500, which I have sent to his new counsel since
he has
now made arrangements for another attorney.
b. I admit that I did not return his file to him when he first requested it because I did not
know I
was required to do so. I have apologized to the complainant with an explanation. [Attach
copy of
letter.]
c. I admit sending the letter to the complainant referred to in his complaint as I
mistakenly
thought that I was entitled to hold the file until I had been compensated for the time I had
000727
spent
on the case. I was mistaken as to my obligations, and I have stated my regret for any
inconvenience
this has caused the complainant.
d. ____________[Other statements as appropriate].
Particularly when the defense attorney has not been permitted much time to prepare a
reply, or the
accused attorney has filed his own reply, an amended reply may be appropriate. In most
cases,
there are no bar rules to prevent this. Occasionally the grievance committee will frown on
very
late replies, especially those filed just before the hearing.
The best use of the amended reply is to bring to the committee's attention legal precedents
not
previously shown to them, and particularly any legal authority that the defense attorney
feels is
compelling. [] Practice Hint: The money to fund any costs or refunds should be placed in
the defense
attorney's trust account, and a written statement from the accused attorney should be
taken
granting the attorney full and exclusive power to disperse the money in settlement of the
case, in
his discretion.
Virtually all jurisdictions require that a written answer to the grievance be filed within a
certain
time limit. Most jurisdictions allow a minimum of 7 days, and some allow up to a
maximum of
60. Nearly always the time by which a reply must be filed is included in the notice of
formal
charges. In many cases, however, with as much as 30 or 40 hours of investigating and
preparation
000728
to do, a timely answer cannot be made. Rather than filing a late answer, it is always
appropriate to
call the investigating attorney and ask for an extension of time in which to file the answer.
It
nearly always will be granted. Indeed, this may be a wise consideration in most cases. The
bar association
grievance committee is anxious to have the accused attorney submit to their authority
and control. Resisting it invariably results in its taking a harsher stance. Therefore, a
request for a
delay in filing a response has the advantage of allowing a more thorough investigation that
will
produce a better and more detailed reply and in letting the committee know that the
accused attorney
has submitted himself to their committee's jurisdiction.
A case may present itself where the complainant seeks a large and unjustified refund from
the accused
attorney or otherwise seeks to take unfair advantage of him. This is not uncommon,
particularly
among "con men," who may have succeeded in this ploy in the past. The interview with
the
accused attorney will sometimes reveal that the complainant is an accomplished liar who
is adept
at adjusting his testimony to accomplish his goal. In such cases, a vague answer to the
grievance
may be advantageous.
As a general rule, the committee does not like the holding back of information, but neither
does it
like its offices being used for purposes of extortion. Further, the majority of virtually all
committees
is made up of lawyers, and they are likely to appreciate good tactics. There are exceptions,
however, and prudent practice requires that the appropriate approach be taken.
[] Case Illustration: A client paid his attorney a flat fee for defense in a fraud case. When
000729
the litigation
was satisfactorily concluded, the client demanded half of the fee back, claiming that the
attorney had told him that he expected to lose, that that fee would include the costs of an
appeal,
and that if the case was won at the trial stage he would give him a 50 percent refund.
Defense
counsel investigated the matter after the demand was first made but before the grievance
was
filed, and checked the complainant's litigation records at the courthouse, discovering that
other attorneys
had defended the complainant in fraud actions as well. He contacted them and learned
that two had been approached along the same lines; one paid back half of the money to
avoid a
grievance, and the second made a small adjustment in the fee. A purposely vague answer
was
filed, and, at the hearing, the complainant was allowed to tell his story to the committee
and
cross-examination solidified it. Then, to the surprise of the complainant, the two attorneys
against
whom he had made the same threat several years before were presented as witnesses.
Since there
were two witnesses to the attorney's employment agreement, the attorney and his
secretary, and a
signed written contract that provided as the attorney stated, the fundamentals for
presentation of a
perjury charge existed and the record was turned over to the appropriate authorities. The
complainant's
protests that his previous extortions were privileged communications were overruled by
the committee.
Cases:
000730
Attorney who on 3 separate occasions refused to cooperate in committee's investigation of
client
complaints, until it became necessary to procure subpoena directing his appearance for
examination
under oath, would be censured despite mitigating factor that he was in midst of
terminating longstanding
marriage during period in question, since failure to cooperate in investigation of alleged
misconduct constitutes misconduct in and of itself, and warrants discipline. Re Feit (1989,
3d Dept)
156 AD2d 810, 549 NYS2d 829.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
30. Motion to dismiss; illustrative forms
The scope of motions to dismiss grievances is limited only by the ingenuity and experience
of the
defense attorney. They can take practically any form, but should, if possible, be supported
with
case citations and a brief in support. Forms for two typical motions, (a) motion to dismiss
on the
ground of res judicata, and (b) a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, are set forth
below:
MOTION TO DISMISS (RES JUDICATA)
[Caption of tribunal, title of case and other formal parts omitted.]
TO THE HONORABLE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE:
NOW COMES ____________, the Respondent in this action, and would show the
committee as
follows:
I.
The complaint of ____________, complainant in this cause, is substantially the same as
was
000731
found in her suit for legal malpractice against the respondent filed on ____________,
20___, and
tried to a jury on ____________, 20___. The jury made findings entirely favorable to the
defendant
in that cause (respondent herein) and the court entered a judgment for the defendant and
taxed
all costs against the plaintiff (complainant herein) and said costs have yet to be paid.
II.
Copies of the plaintiff's pleadings, the defendant's answer, and a certified copy of the
judgment in
that cause are attached herewith as respondent's Exhibits "A", "B", and "C", and are
herein incorporated
for all purposes by reference.
III.
Respondent urges that virtually all issues presented to this committee were presented in
____________ court, and resolved by the rules of evidence and that the respondent was
shown as
a matter of law to have been guilty of no professional misconduct.
IV.
The complainant herein attempts a collateral attack upon that final judgment (Exhibit
"C") which
should not be permitted as a matter of law. Respondent respectfully urges that
administrative
hearings such as those held by the grievance committee may not attack facts conclusively
established
in court.
V.
Further, respondent respectfully submits that the grievance committee should not set itself
up in a
position above the courts and should not disregard the findings already made.
000732
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondent prays that this grievance be
forthwith
dismissed with prejudice and for all other further relief to which he may show himself to
be justly
entitled.
As a general rule, the committee is interested in hearing only from an attorney who has
discovered
unethical conduct, law enforcement authorities, the victim of the unethical conduct, but
no others. In a surprisingly large number of cases, friends, neighbors or, particularly in
divorce
cases, relatives of the person they see as aggrieved will attempt to interpose their will. If
tactfully
handled, these cases can often be dismissed quite early.
As a practical matter, there are no formal requirements for "standing." Anyone aware of
unethical
behavior may report it to the grievance committee. However, most committees receive
complaints
from third parties that generate unnecessary work for them, and, as a general rule, they
are not
sympathetic to interlopers. They wish to hear from the client or a person who claims to
have been
victimized by the attorney.
MOTION TO DISMISS (LACK OF STANDING)
[Caption of tribunal, title of case and other formal parts omitted.]
TO THE HONORABLE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE:
NOW COMES ____________, respondent, by and through his attorney of record, and
shows as
follows:
I.
000733
Respondent represented ____________, a citizen of Mexico, in litigation against
____________,
a citizen of the United States. Respondent had an attorney/client relationship with
____________
[plaintiff], and pursued the matter vigorously. Copies of the pleadings filed against the
defendant
in that case prepared by respondent are attached herewith as Exhibit "A" and
incorporated for all
purposes.
II.
The defendant in that case filed an answer, a copy of which is attached herewith as Exhibit
"B"
and incorporated herein for all purposes.
III.
Respondent proceeded to take depositions and to prepare for trial but, because of
distances, was
unable to maintain close contact with the plaintiff, his client.
IV.
The complainant in this cause is a friend of the plaintiff. The plaintiff often stayed at her
home
while visiting in the United States. Gradually the plaintiff seemed to lose interest in the
litigation,
and stopped paying attorney's fees to respondent. The complainant then attempted to
usurp the
perogatives of the plaintiff, at first by carrying messages to the respondent, then by taking
independent
action, and then by attempting to exercise her independent judgment as to how the case
should be handled.
V.
In time, a dispute arose between the complainant, who had no legal right to interfere in
the lawsuit,
000734
and the respondent, who respectfully suggested to her that he preferred to do business
with
his client only and that legal matters and questions of strategy should be left to the
plaintiff and
the respondent. To this, the complainant took great exception.
VI.
Respondent then filed a motion to withdraw, giving the plaintiff sufficient time to make
other arrangements
for counsel. The motion for and order permitting withdrawal as attorney of record is
attached herewith as respondent's Exhibit "C," and incorporated herein for all purposes.
VII.
Nonetheless, the complainant continued to assert her wish to control the litigation and the
obligation
of the respondent to represent what had come to be, in her mind, her case. Respondent
refused
to communicate with her, and returned the file to his client in Mexico.
VIII.
Complainant refused to accept the court's order permitting withdrawal, and she has
continued to
call the respondent to insist upon a full accounting of all money expended, or an
explanation as to
why the case has not been tried.
IX.
Respondent has never had an attorney-client relationship with the complainant, and he
respectfully
suggests that she lacks standing to bring a complaint on charges of professional
misconduct
against him.
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the respondent in this case respectfully
requests that
000735
the complaint of this complainant be dismissed with prejudice, and the further prays for
all such
relief, both general and equitable, to which he may show himself to be justly entitled.
31. Discovery
For a limited period following the filing of an answer, both bar counsel and the respondent
should
be afforded reciprocal discovery of matters not privileged.[60] During this period there
should be a
mutual exchange of (1) names and addresses of all persons having knowledge of relevant
facts, (2)
non-privileged information and evidence relevant to the charges or the respondent, and
(3) other material
that may be shown to be relevant and material. Protective orders should be available to
prevent
unwarranted discovery.[61]
While many of the state bar enabling acts make no specific provision for discovery, as a
general
rule, a meeting with the investigating attorney will produce all the discovery necessary to
prepare for
the hearing. Furthermore, not only has the accused attorney an absolute right to a copy of
the complaint
lodged against him, and to all later amended complaints, but in most states, the accused
has a
right to a list of the witnesses who will appear against him, and in many states the bar
rules provide
that a summary must also be given of their expected testimony. The accused attorney also
will have
subpoena power to compel the attendance of witnesses, including hostile witnesses, police
officers
and court personnel.[62]
000736
In a particularly serious case, where the state rules of criminal procedure provide for little
in the
way of discovery, and if it appears that the loss of the accused attorney's law license is all
but certain,
the defense attorney may choose to make the tactical choice of using the grievance
proceeding as a
discovery tool for the upcoming criminal trial. This is particularly true when an
indictment has been
returned without the opportunity to conduct a preliminary hearing as provided by federal
law, or an
"examining trial" provided by a code of criminal procedure in most states.
If such a move is made, the defense attorney will often choose to have his client invoke his
Fifth
Amendment rights, and he will not testify. He cannot be compelled to testify if there is
criminal litigation
pending. If a disbarment suit is pending, his deposition can usually be taken, and his
refusal to
be deposed can be used against him at the disbarment trial, but not at a criminal trial. The
exercise of
the Fifth Amendment right may not be used for impeachment.[63]
If the defense attorney's strategy is along those lines, he should request that the committee
postpone
its decision until after the criminal trial is completed. Even though the request will seldom
be
granted, it can do no harm to ask. If the request for a delay of the grievance proceedings is
granted
until after the criminal trial, and there is an acquittal, this outcome should be brought to
the attention
of the committee immediately.
In most jurisdictions, even though the investigating bar attorney may not have an absolute
right to
pre-hearing discovery, cooperation with him is usually best. However, such cooperation
does not require
000737
the defense attorney to build the prosecution's case, and extensive cooperation may very
well
result in that being done. Thus, defense counsel must walk a fine line between proceeding
so as to irritate
the committee by refusing to turn over documents, or cooperating and hoping that the
matter
will not be prosecuted. It is always a difficult choice.
Cases:
Attorney was not entitled to invoke privilege against self-incrimination when ordered to
file list
of all monetary sanctions imposed against him by any federal court since sanctions were
public orders
and attorney did not explain how information could incriminate him. In re Maurice (1995,
CA7)
73 F3d 124.
57. Conviction of crime
Many states provide for automatic disbarment upon proof of a felony conviction. The
term "conviction"
tends to have a very broad application. Some states provide for automatic disbarment in
the
case of a conviction for a crime of moral turpitude, and, in others, for all felonies. Crimes
of moral
turpitude include all crimes of theft, but there is some question as to whether it includes
the frequently
encountered crimes of income tax evasion and nonfiling of returns. There are cases that
have
decided both ways.[36]
Some states do not specifically provide for disbarment in case of a misdemeanor
conviction, even
000738
if it does involve moral turpitude. Nonetheless, most grievance committees will take
considerable interest
in the situation where an attorney suffers such a conviction. Since the bar rules vary
greatly
from one state to another, only an examination of the statutes and rules in one's
jurisdiction can answer
the questions likely to come up concerning the sanctions that may be imposed.
The bar association ordinarily is required to be notified whenever a lawyer is convicted of
a serious
crime, such as a felony or an offense involving moral turpitude.[37] The investigating bar
attorney
will then prepare a proposed order of interim suspension and will notify the attorney
when the
matter will be be presented to the court,[38] and will file formal charges against the
attorney based on
the conviction.[39] Since an interim suspension is not a formal disposition of the
accusation formal
charges need to be filed, but they should not be heard until all avenues of appeal of the
criminal conviction
have been exhausted.[40]
When presented with the interim order of suspension for a conviction of serious crime, the
court
will immediately suspend the attorney regardless of the pendency of an appeal.[41] A
certified copy
of the judgment of conviction is conclusive evidence that the lawyer has committed the
crime
charged, and the sole issue at the hearing is the nature and extent of the discipline to be
imposed.[42]
If the lawyer has been convicted of a minor offense, the bar association will treat notice of
the conviction
like it would the receipt of any other complaint against an attorney.[43]
The respondent may be able to consent to being disciplined while disciplinary proceedings
are
000739
pending if he admits the truth of the charges in writing.[44] He may then, if he desires,
save time and
further trauma by stipulating to specified discipline.[45] Thus, if the charges are admitted
in writing,
counsel and the client should be able to agree on the nature and extent of the discipline
imposed, subject
to the approval of the hearing committee, and, ordinarily, also subject to review by the
disciplinary
board and the court.[46]
The criminal law of many states often contains various types of non-final adjudication and
punishments.
The titles of these punishments include "deferred adjudication," "conditional discharge,"
"unimposed probation," "probation," and others. The attitude of the grievance committee
members
should not be based upon the type of punishment method out in criminal court. In all
probability, the
grievance committee can still take action against the attorney during this interlocutory
period. As a
general rule, if an attorney is under any kind of restraint by a court, whether the
judgment is final or
not, the committee is apt to regard it as "probation" and take action consistent with
suspension or disbarment.
A federal suspended sentence is a final conviction for most purposes, including grievance
procedings.[47]
Cases:
Two-year suspension from practice of law, with credit for time served under interim
felony suspension
but with reinstatement conditioned on completion of federal supervised release, was
appropriate
for attorney who engaged in conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law based
on
000740
his conviction for transportation and importation of obscene matters; although mitigating
factors included
lack of prior discipline, cooperation in disciplinary proceedings, and evidence of good
character,
Supreme Court also considered severity of attorney's crime as measured by 15-month
prison term
and three years of supervised release. 18 U.S.C.A. 1462(a); BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a,
d, e);
Code of Prof.Resp., DR 1-102(A)(6) (2006). Disciplinary Counsel v. O'Malley, 935 N.E.2d
5 (Ohio
2010).
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[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
58. Diversion-type programs
An increasing number of states are taking a very enlightened approach: they are
requiring the accused
attorney, if he is to avoid disbarment or suspension, to promptly take continuing legal
education
or remedial courses concerning legal ethics that are designed to teach the to attorney to
avoid the
type of activity that resulted in his appearance before the grievance committee. A frequent
requirement
is attendance at state bar ethics programs. Other typical requirements are law school
courses on
legal ethics or other academic work to correct deficiencies.
Usually these corrective action programs are in lieu of discipline; that is, if the attorney
will agree
to participate, a decision or sanctions may be postponed for a given period of time,
normally one
year.
000741
Another proposal, seldom applied, has been to allow the attorney to resign from the bar
but require
him to retake the state bar examination as his "punishment.". If he passes, he may be
relicensed.
This normally requires a period of study, participation in a bar review course, and other
remedial
work that may go a long way toward solving his problems.[48]
Where alcohol has been a factor in the misconduct of the accused attorney, a committee
may occasionally
postpone a determination until after restitution has been made or an agreed alcohol abuse
treatment program has been completed, as the case may be. Often the hearing will be put
off for as
little as two weeks, and sometimes for as much as a year or two, to see how the accused
progresses.
Committees are reluctant to require specific programs, but when a specific program is
required, the
most frequent one is a hospitalization program or membership and active participation in
Alcoholics
Anonymous.[49]
[] Case Illustration: In a recent case in Illinois,[50] an alcoholic attorney, who had
converted his
client's funds, made restitution, claimed that he had been rehabilitated, and showed that
he was regularly
attending meetings of Alcoholics Anomymous. Taking the view that the accused attorney's
alcoholism
was a physical and mental impairment that substantially hampered his ability to practice
law
competently, but was not an indication of his moral weakness, the court reduced from 30
months to 6
months the disciplinary board's recommended suspension period as a reward for his effort
to overcome
his impairment, on condition, however, that he continue attending regular meetings of
Alcoholics
000742
Anonymous or of a lawyer's assistance program under a probationary supervision for an
indefinite
period both before and after his suspension. The court added that if the accused attorney
had remained
an active alcoholic it would have disbarred the attorney, particularly if it were not shown
that
alcoholism contributed to his wrongdoing.
Occasionally a "suspended suspension" is imposed, conditioned upon the attorney not
being arrested
for anything, including driving while intoxicated, public intoxication, or any alcoholic-
related
episode for a given period, sometimes for as long as five years.
The action of the bar in these programs is commendable, for without seeking punishment,
they are
requiring treatment. Their attitude can only be praised, as it both protects the public and
insures treatment.
The typical grievance committee, however, is usually less sympathetic to narcotics use and
thus to
enrollment in a narcotics abuse program. Normally, when the attorney has reached this
stage with a
narcotics problem, he also has a criminal prosecution pending. The defense may be
reluctant, under
such circumstances, either to admit to narcotics use or to offer evidence of the
respondent's willingness
to rehabilitate, since such evidence may well be available to use at the criminal trial. The
criminal
trial, of course, should be given higher priority than the grievance proceeding.
Nonetheless, some
committees will take an enlightened view and will postpone proceedings until the
attorney's narcotics
problem is solved.
It is only to be expected that certain drug problems are likely to be met with more
sympathy than
000743
others. Use of marijuana is one thing, but use of cocaine, methamphetamines or heroin is
another; and
in the latter case, little sympathy can be expected from committee members. Indeed, in
most narcotics
cases, the committee will be hearing the disciplinary matter after a conviction has been
had in the
criminal trial court, and the best that defense can expect to do for the client is to have his
suspension
run concurrent with a probation or prison term.
It is becoming more common, however, for grievance committees to suspend imposition of
punishment
pending completion of psychiatric treatment or hospitalization. This enlightened view has
been slow in coming, under the theory that the first consideration of the bar should be
protection of
the public.
Many state bar acts provide for suspension of an attorney during a disabling illness or for
transfer
to inactive status in case of a disability.[51]
Virtually all the cases involving diversion programs are the result of problems related to
mental
illness or alcoholism. An agreed psychiatric treatment program may be permitted in cases
with a high
rate of recovery, such as a reactive depression or manic-depressive disease, but permanent
suspension
pursuant to statute for illness or disability is likely to continue for those disorders which
carry a poor
prognosis, such as schizophrenia. Counsel should take note and not prove too much.
Committees are
primarily interested in protecting the public. For example, when the misconduct charged
is minor and
will result in a short suspension, counsel must take into consideration that proof of a
serious mental
000744
illness in defense or mitigation may lead to an indefinite suspension for mental or
emotional disability.
Cases:
Monitored probation: Reinstatement to practice of law was warranted conditioned on attorney
being monitored by a mental health professional who would report to Character and
Fitness Committee,
where attorney complied with order of suspension, attorney possessed sufficient
professional
capabilities and qualifications to practice law, attorney showed by clear and convincing
evidence that
he was of good and moral character and that his readmission would not be a detriment to
legal profession,
but Committee expressed concern about potential pressures that attorney would
encounter upon
re-entry into profession. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.510(2). Bowling v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 54
S.W.3d
160 (Ky. 2001); West's Key Number Digest, Attorney and Client 61.
Where an attorney neglected five cases of clients seeking relief in bankruptcy and suffered
from
alcoholism and depression, the attorney is suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for
two years,
but the suspension is stayed and he is placed on probation under the following conditions:
monitoring
by an attorney, biannual report by psychiatrist, compliance with disciplinary rules, and
participation
in the Ohio Lawyer's Assistance Program and in alcohol abuse counseling. Cincinnati Bar
Ass'n v.
Wolosin, 71 Ohio St. 3d 611, 646 NE2d 455.
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[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
000745
59. Reprimand
The mildest form of sanction is an admonition or informal reprimand, sometimes called a
public
reprimand. Ordinarily, it is imposed by the bar attorney or bar counsel with a consent of
the respondent
and without the filing of formal charges.[52] It is a private form of discipline, although a
summary
may be published in a bar publication without identifying the accused attorney. It is
recorded,
moreover, and may be offered as evidence of past discipline on the issue of punishment in
subsequent
disciplinary proceedings against the admonished lawyer.[53] A formal reprimand is
imposed by the
court after formal charges have been filed in cases of relatively minor misconduct.[54]
This type of
discipline exists in various forms in nearly all states. Often, no record of the Admonition is
kept. Although
some record may be retained by the committee, the action is not made public. Normally,
this
course of action is taken when full restitution has been made and the accused attorney has
been both
cooperative and contrite and gives sincere assurances to the committee that no future
recurrences are
likely. It falls into the milder end of the punishment spectrum and should be considered as
a relatively
desirable one in the context of negotiation. In other words, counsel may wish to suggest an
informal
reprimand to the bar to chasten the accused, without harming him financially or publicly.
Often these
informal reprimands are issued to older and highly regarded members of the bar who
have breached a
canon of ethics by an unintentional act from which they did not profit financially.
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000746
A formal reprimand is in the nature of public disgrace. It is occasionally coupled with a
requirement
for restitution, and is sometimes only given in lieu of a suspension if full restitution and a
corrective
course, such as continuing legal education or a new bookkeeping system is adopted by the
accused.
Usually the formal reprimand is published in a state bar journal, and copies of the
reprimand
are sent to the judges and administrative officers and magistrates in the district.
The effect of a formal reprimand can be devastating to some individuals. Suicide by the
accused
attorney prior to the reprimand being published is not unheard of. On the other hand,
some attorneys
seem to not mind the public reprimand at all. The notoriety does not seem to bother them,
and they
regard the sanction as a mild one. These are the attorneys the grievance committee can
expect to hear
from again.
A judicial reprimand normally occurs when the attorney is guilty of contempt or some
other
breach of ethics in the presence of the court, such as destroying evidence or harassing a
witness. In
these cases, the only record that is normally kept is in the contempt proceedings
themselves. The
types of contempt are actual and constructive contempt, and civil and criminal contempt.
A full discussion
of these subjects is beyond the scope of this article. Occasionally a judge will notify the
grievance committee of the breach and occasionally will instruct the grievance committee
to take appropriate
action. In such cases, the lawyers on the committee, ever anxious to please the court, can
be
expected to take firm and prompt action against the attorney in question.
000747
In a few states, the complainant must file suit to discipline the attorney if he does not agree
to the
committee's action, or the attorney must file suit to set aside discipline imposed by the
committee.
This is the rule in Texas and a few other states. In such cases, after a trial, the judge (not
the jury) is
required to announce what discipline should be ordered. Generally, if it has gotten this
fare, hopes of
a mere judicial reprimand are generally gone, but occasionally a court will impose this
type of punishment
and the lawyer who is prosecuting the case will agree to it. It is a matter of public record,
and
constitutes a significant disgrace for the attorney in question. Actual judicial reprimands
are fairly
rare, and most judges go through their entire career without ever ordering one.
Cases:
Attorney would be publicly reprimanded for neglect of client's business where letter of
mitigation
attested to "substantial personal and emotional difficulties," including financial
hardships, foreclosure
of family residence, and stress of relocating family and practice. People v. Smith (1988,
Colo) 757
P2d 628.
Review Panel reprimand was appropriate disciplinary sanction for attorney's lack of
diligence in
client's Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, which lack of diligence exposed client to injury, i.e.,
the bankruptcy
complaint was dismissed but the bankruptcy court later reinstated it and terminated
attorney's
representation of client; in mitigation, the attorney's misconduct was not a cause of client's
loss of her
000748
home two years later for failure to make payments, attorney had practiced bankruptcy
law for over 15
years, he had no history of discipline, and since the filing of the disciplinary grievance he
had filed
numerous bankruptcy complaints without objection. State Bar Rules and Regulations,
Rule 4102(d),
Rules 1.3, 3.2. In re Robinson, 288 Ga. 30, 701 S.E.2d 142 (2010).
Where attorney failed to file income tax return for three year period, court, in finding that
failure
was caused by either negligence or ignorance and that attorney had otherwise
unblemished professional
reputation, held that such action warranted censure. Re Towles (1983) 98 Ill 2d 179, 74 Ill
Dec
625, 456 NE2d 127.
Public reprimand was warranted due to attorney's violation of the rules of professional
conduct by
intentionally withholding documents from client given the absence of a prior disciplinary
record for
attorney, the fact that he did not have a dishonest or deceitful motive in regards to his
client in withholding
the documents, and the fact that client was not harmed by his actions. Md.Rule 16812,
Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.4, 1.16(d), 8.4(a). Attorney Grievance Com'n of Maryland
v. Edib,
415 Md. 696, 4 A.3d 957 (2010).
See Petition for Disciplinary Action against Wylie (1991, Minn) 464 NW2d 720, supra 9
Probation.
Public reprimand was appropriate sanction for attorney who violated professional
conduct rules
relating to communication in his representation of client in personal-injury action, and
who also
failed to inform client that attorney did not maintain professional liability insurance,
where attorney
000749
had a long career with no previous disciplinary action. Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 1.4;
Code of
Prof.Resp., DR 1104(A) (2006). Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Godles, 2010-Ohio-6274, 943
N.E.2d 988
(Ohio 2010).
Public reprimand of attorney was warranted, in attorney disciplinary case in which
attorney admitted
misconduct and cooperated with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC), where
attorney, in
a series of real estate transactions, prepared an inaccurate Department of Housing and
Urban Development
(HUD) statement, disbursed funds prematurely, unreasonably delayed in filing deeds, and
failed to respond to clients' requests for information, in violation of the professional rules.
Appellate
Court Rule 407, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 4.1, 5.3, 8.4(a, e). In re
Martin, 389
S.C. 467, 699 S.E.2d 695 (2010).
Public reprimand, conditioned upon attorney's completion of 10 ethicsapproved
continuing legal
education (CLE) credits within 12 months and, within 60 days, his payment of costs for
attorney disciplinary
proceeding, was appropriate sanction for attorney's representation of criminal defendant
in
matter for which he previously had attorneyclient relationship with victim, who shared
sensitive information
regarding alleged sexual assault by defendant; attorney's failure to recognize ethical issues
involved reflected lack of awareness of or attention to his clients' rights and his
responsibilities as
lawyer to guard sensitive information. SCR 20:1.9(a). In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against
Kostich, 2010 WI 136, 793 N.W.2d 494 (Wis. 2010).
Public reprimand and order to pay restitution were appropriate sanctions for attorney's
000750
misconduct
in failing to communicate with client about the status of his criminal case, failing to
explain a matter
to the extent necessary to permit client to make informed decisions, failing to take steps
reasonably
practicable to protect client's interests, and failing to refund an unearned fee. SCR 20:1.4
(a, b),
20:1.16(b, d) (2005). In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Blise, 2010 WI 34, 782 N.W.2d
407
(Wis. 2010).
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
60. Suspension
Many committees completely disregard the great financial and emotional cost that the
client has
already suffered and order a suspension from practice for a specific time. The minimum
suspension is
usually 30 days, and the maximum normally is three to five years. In many states, the
maximum time
is fixed by statute.[55]
About the best an attorney can hope for, if he has been convicted of a crime and placed
under a
suspended sentence or on probation, is to have the time affixed by the court run
concurrently with the
time of his suspension. For example, should the respondent be given six months probation
for driving
while intoxicated, a common punishment would be a suspension to run concurrently with
the probation
time. Some states permit probation on the suspension, based upon future good behavior.
[56]
000751
Often the committee is unwilling to settle for a mere suspension and will insist on
disbarment.
This is particularly true in cases where the accused attorney has been sent to prison. Some
states require
disbarrment by statute in case of conviction for any felony, or for any crime of moral
turpitude.
Others require suspension during probation.
The conditions for readmission sometimes can be bewildering. Occasionally, the
suspension will
last only as long as the accused attorney needs to complete a course in ethics at a local law
school, or
to obtain a divorce. Such cases usually involve some degree of emotional illness. Very often
a condition
precedent to reinstatement after suspension in the bar is complete restitution. Such a
sentence always
causes great financial hardship to the attorney in question.
The order of suspension normally will include language to preclude the attorney from
offering or
giving legal advice except for himself and forbids him from sharing offices with attorneys
or holding
himself out to be an attorney during the period of the suspension. If the order of
suspension is not
honored by the disciplined attorney, subsequent disbarment is certain.
Occasionally a governmental office, the United States' Attorney's Office, the Internal
Revenue
Service, the district attorney's office or the grievance committee may have a very strong
case, but
may be willing to drop criminal and disbarment proceedings in exchange for an agreed
suspension.
Normally the minimum suspension period is 15 days, and the maximum is likely to be five
years.
Sometimes reapplication or a retaking of the bar examination is required for
reinstatement. An agreed
000752
suspension from practice should always be considered when the prosecutor has a very
strong case,
particularly where criminal prosecution is possible.
Cases:
Attorney who continued to practice law following court order of suspension was not
entitled to attorney
fees for cases on which he and his associates worked after suspension order, since order
was
not ambiguous, there was no evidence that he acted in good faith, and he ignored language
of disciplinary
rule and of only reported federal case on point. Cooper v. Texaco, Inc. (1992, CA5 La) 961
F2d 71.
Failure of attorney to file probation reports with state bar while on professional probation
arising
from misconduct warranted imposition of outright suspension and revocation of
professional probation.
Potack v. State Bar (1991) 54 Cal 3d 132, 284 Cal Rptr 335, 813 P2d 1365, 91 CDOS 6674,
91
Daily Journal DAR 10141.
Six-month suspension was warranted for attorney who violated Bar Rules regarding
conflicts of
interest, providing competent representation, and prohibiting conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. West's
F.S.A. Bar
Rules 4-1.1, 4-1.4(b), 4-1.7(b), 4-8.4(c, d). The Florida Bar v. Shankman, 41 So. 3d 166
(Fla. 2010).
Three year suspension was warranted for attorney who engaged in misconduct by
representing
clients with unwaivable conflicts of interest and making misrepresentations to client.
West's F.S.A.
000753
Bar Rules 41.7(a), 41.9(a), 41.16(a)(1), 44.1(a), 48.4(c). The Florida Bar v. Scott, 39
So. 3d
309 (Fla. 2010).
Three-year suspension, with reinstatement on conditions, was warranted for attorney
whose conduct
in representing client charged with violation of municipal ordinance, filing numerous
frivolous
appeals and petitions for certiorari or habeas corpus, telling client to stop requesting
information
about the representation, continuing the representation after client had discharged him
and without informing
client that he was continuing to file motions and petitions in the matter, refusing to
respond
to discovery requests, and refusing to cooperate in disciplinary investigation, violated
rules requiring
attorney to provide competent representation, abide by client's decision concerning
objectives of representation,
keep client reasonably informed, not continue representation in the event of a significant
risk of conflict of interest, not continue representation if discharged by client, and not
assert a claim
or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. State Bar Rules and Regulations, Rule
4102(d),
Rules 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.4, 1.7(a), 1.16(a), 3.1. In re Millard, 288 Ga. 449, 704 S.E.2d 779 (2011).
Three month suspension from the practice of law was warranted, in disciplinary action in
which
attorney filed a petition for voluntary discipline prior to the filing of a formal complaint
against attorney,
where attorney, who suffered from emotional distress bordering on depression at the time
of the
incidents at issue due to a personal child support case, did not have a dishonest or selfish
motive and
acknowledged the wrongful nature of his conduct. In re Polk, 288 Ga. 63, 701 S.E.2d 161
(2010).
000754
Six-month suspension was warranted for attorney whose failure to timely respond to a
court order
and discovery requests resulted in default judgment against clients, who did not inform
clients of de-
fault judgment, and who stated falsely during disciplinary process that the litigation was
resolved by
settlement, where attorney had two prior instances of discipline. State Bar Rules and
Regulations,
Rule 4102(d), Rules 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 8.4(a)(4); State Bar Rules and Regulations, Rule 4103.
In re
Hardwick, 288 Ga. 60, 701 S.E.2d 163 (2010).
Attorney's commission of mortgage fraud and entry of guilty plea to felony offense
warranted
two-year suspension from practice of law, with reinstatement conditioned upon
consultation with
State Bar Law Office Management Program, agreement to implement Program's
directives in connection
with the reestablishment of law office, and attendance of first Ethics School conducted by
Office
of General Counsel after date of reinstatement. West's Ga.Code Ann. 168102(2), 16
8105(a).
In re Suttle, 288 Ga. 14, 701 S.E.2d 154 (2010).
Indefinite suspension without possibility of reinstatement for 12 months was warranted
for attorney
who, among other things, failed to timely file both federal and state income tax returns.
Committee
on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Asso. v. Bertelli (1988, Iowa) 422
NW2d
175.
Three-year suspension was appropriate sanction for attorney's misconduct in driving
under the influence
of alcohol (DUI), committing aggravated battery, driving recklessly, and leaving the scene
of
000755
resulting accident, where attorney caused both personal injury and property damage.
Sup.Ct.Rules,
Rule 226, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4(b). In re Frahm, 241 P.3d 1010 (Kan. 2010).
Indefinite suspension was appropriate sanction for attorney who waived oral argument
before the
Court of Appeals without client's knowledge or authorization, failed to diligently and
promptly represent
his clients, failed to adequately communicate with clients, repeatedly accepted fees and
failed
to perform the work that he was paid to perform, failed to reduce contingency fee
agreement to writing,
failed to properly account for and refund unearned fees, failed to file timely written
response to
eight disciplinary complaints, and failed to properly notify two clients following his
suspension from
practice of law. Sup.Ct. Rules, Rule 207(b), 218(a); Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 226, Rules of
Prof.Conduct,
Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.5(a, d), 1.15(b), 1.16, 8.1(b). In re Thomas, 241 P.3d 104 (Kan.
2010).
Two-year suspension, as opposed to indefinite suspension, was appropriate sanction for
attorney's
misconduct that included conviction for attempt to obstruct a police officer's official duty,
falsely
telling police officers that interviewee whom attorney accompanied to interview had
rewound and recorded
over tape of interview, and not making reasonable efforts to correct misunderstanding of
interviewee
that attorney was representing him, where attorney lacked prior disciplinary record and
had
good reputation among peers in county bar. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 226, Rules of
Prof.Conduct, Rules 4.3
, 8.4(bd). In re Millett, 241 P.3d 35 (Kan. 2010).
One-year suspension from the practice of law was warranted in attorney disciplinary case,
000756
where
attorney subjected five administrative assistants for district court to sexual harassment,
and he attempted
to minimize the seriousness of his conduct, in violation of the professional rules.
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 226, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4(d, g). In re Depew, 237 P.3d 24
(Kan. 2010)
.
Attorney's conduct in agreeing to represent client in grandchild visitation dispute and
medical
malpractice action, only to neglect each separate action and ignore client despite receipt of
upfront
payment of fees in the amount of $1,650, coupled with her failure to respond to bar
complaint, warranted
one-year suspension from practice of law and order requiring attorney to pay client
restitution
of all unearned fees. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Whitlock, 324 S.W.3d 415 (Ky. 2010).
Attorney's conduct in continuing to practice law during disciplinary suspension, by
representing
client in a domestic case, coupled with his failure to respond to informational requests
during ethics
investigation, in violation of professional rules, warranted one-year suspension from
practice of law.
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 3.4(c), 5.5(a), 8.1(b). Kentucky Bar
Ass'n v.
Grider, 324 S.W.3d 411 (Ky. 2010).
Suspension of 60 days was warranted for attorney whose conduct, in failing to contact
client or
keep him advised of deadlines or court events, failing to return paperwork to client, failing
to timely
file paperwork in Social Security disability appeal, resulting in dismissal of appeal, failing
to respond
to discovery in personal injury case, resulting in dismissal of case with prejudice, and
000757
failing to respond
to bar complaint, violated rules requiring attorney to act with reasonable diligence, keep
client
reasonably informed, return client materials, and requiring attorney to respond to
disciplinary authorities.
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 8.1(b). Kentucky Bar
Ass'n v. Bryant, 318 S.W.3d 96 (Ky. 2010).
Suspension of 181 days, requiring a reinstatement by the Supreme Court before
resumption of
practice and a review by Character and Fitness Committee of an application for
reinstatement, was
warranted for attorney who failed to return an unearned $1,000.00 retainer after being
suspended
from practice and who failed to respond to Bar complaint, where attorney had three prior
suspensions
and a prior public reprimand. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 3.130, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules
1.16(d), 8.1(b);
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rules 3.505(1), 3.510(1). Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Leadingham, 317 S.W.3d
583 (Ky.
2010).
Ninety-day suspension was appropriate sanction for attorney's misconduct in
misrepresenting to
the grantor of a mortgage that had been assigned to attorney's client that he had prepared
a mortgage
release and sent it to client, duplicating this lie to Bar Counsel on two separate occasions,
and improperly
withdrawing fund from his trust account by drawing a check payable to cash, where
attorney
had no duty to draft mortgage release for the grantor, attorney did not aggravate offense
involving
check payable to cash by misusing those funds for personal financial gain, attorney
conceded wrongdoing
000758
before Court of Appeals and appeared willing to take responsibility for his actions, and
attorney
assisted his counsel in procuring the necessary mortgage release from his client. Md.Rule
16609
(b); Md.Rule 16812, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 4.1(a)(1), 8.1(a), 8.4(c, d). Attorney
Grievance
Com'n of Maryland v. Brown, 415 Md. 269, 999 A.2d 1040 (2010).
Attorney's mental and emotional state due to marital problems would be mitigating factor
in discipline,
but attorney would nevertheless be suspended from practice for indefinite period for
allowing
statute of limitations to run, delaying return of funds, failing to keep sufficient funds in
trust account
to pay obligations, and failing to cooperate with investigators. Re Tessler (1990, Mo) 783
SW2d 906.
One-year suspension was appropriate sanction for attorney's misconduct in offering
discounted
legal fees to three female bankruptcy clients and a family member of another client in
exchange for
sexual favors of various kinds, considering that none of the grievants accused attorney of
forcing
them to endure any unwanted physical contact or even attempting to do so, none felt
sufficiently pressured
that she even considered giving in, none sought therapy or treatment to overcome the
experience,
none suggested the incidents were traumatic, none pursued criminal charges, nothing
suggested
the grievants were especially vulnerable or more in distress because of the nature of their
legal matters
than were other categories of clients, and attorney had a prior history of disciplinary
infractions.
In re Witherspoon, 203 N.J. 343, 3 A.3d 496 (2010).
Attorney diagnosed with "major depressive disorder without psychosis" would be
000759
suspended
pending determination of capacity to defend herself against charges of neglect, failing to
respond to
inquiries from client and opposing counsel, and failure to cooperate with Bar
investigation. Re Wunderlich
(1988, 3d Dept) 141 App Div 2d 971, 530 NYS2d 636, motion gr (3d Dept) 149 App Div 2d
809, 540 NYS2d 340.
Two-year suspension with one year stayed, conditioned upon no further violations, two
years of
monitored probation upon attorney's return to practice, and eight hours of continuing
legal education
in law-office management were warranted as sanction for attorney's conduct, failing to
appear or appearing
tardily for hearings before municipal court, leaving one hearing early despite judge's
specific
instruction to remain, resulting in multiple contempt citations against attorney, and failing
to respond
to letters from disciplinary authorities, in violation of rules requiring reasonable diligence
in representing
a client, prohibiting undignified or discourteous conduct that is degrading to a tribunal,
prohibiting
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, prohibiting conduct that
adversely reflects
on the lawyer's fitness to practice law, and cooperation with a disciplinary investigation.
Rules
of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.3, 3.5(a)(6), 8.4(d, h); Government of the Bar Rule V(4)(G).
Mahoning
County Bar Ass'n v. Sakmar, 2010-Ohio-5720, 938 N.E.2d 355 (Ohio 2010).
Indefinite suspension was appropriate sanction for attorney who was convicted of three
counts of
theft based on stealing approximately $22,000 from three banks, who failed to notify any
Ohio disciplinary
000760
authority of his conviction, and who failed to respond to disciplinary investigation. Rules
of
Prof.Conduct, Rules 8.1(b), 8.3(a), 8.4(b). Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Newman, 2010-Ohio-
5034, 937
N.E.2d 81 (Ohio 2010).
Two-year suspension from practice of law, with one year stayed on conditions, was
appropriate
sanction for attorney who prepared trust document for elderly client naming attorney's
own children
as beneficiaries, obtained loan from same client without advising her of risks of making
unsecured
loan and failed to repay loan, and in another matter received checks for fees from a
guardianship account
without first obtaining approval from probate court, where only mitigating circumstance
was
lack of prior disciplinary record, while aggravating factors included a pattern of
misconduct involving
multiple offenses of taking advantage of an elderly and vulnerable client for personal gain.
Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 3.4(c), 8.4(d, h); Government of the Bar Rule V(4)(G);
BCGD
Proc.Reg. 10(B); Code of Prof.Resp., DR 1102(A)(5, 6), 5101(A)(1, 2), 5104(A) (2006).
Disciplinary
Counsel v. Shaw, 2010-Ohio-4412, 935 N.E.2d 405 (Ohio 2010).
Two-year suspension, with one year stayed on conditions, was warranted for attorney
whose conduct,
failing to remit to his employer law firm over $7,000 in fees, resulting in a conviction for
theft,
violated rules prohibiting a lawyer from committing an illegal act that reflects adversely
on the lawyer's
honesty or trustworthiness, prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation,
prohibiting conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, and prohibiting
000761
conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. Rules of
Prof.Conduct, Rule
8.4(bd, h). Disciplinary Counsel v. Kraemer, 2010-Ohio-3300, 931 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio
2010).
Two-year suspension with 18 months conditionally stayed, instead of entirely stayed two-
year
suspension, was appropriate sanction for attorney who, by using crack cocaine, violated
disciplinary
rules barring conduct prejudicial to administration of justice and conduct adversely
reflecting on fitness
to practice law; despite such mitigating factors as lack of prior disciplinary record,
absence of
dishonest or selfish motive, and cooperation in disciplinary proceeding, mitigating factor
of a chemical
dependency was absent, and aggravating factors included attorney's terminating
participation in
Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (OLAP) and failure to appreciate seriousness of his
conduct.
Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4(d, h). Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Peskin, 2010-Ohio-1811, 927
N.E.2d
598 (Ohio 2010).
Six-month stayed suspension was appropriate for attorney who violated disciplinary rules
by representing
a client's daughter, without daughter's knowledge or consent, in action by creditor to
recov-
er debt on credit card issued to client in daughter's name without her knowledge; 12-
month stayed
suspension recommended by parties was predicated in part on charges that had been
dismissed,
harsher sanction than public reprimand was justified because client's daughter had to
employ counsel
to vacate judgment for creditor and also had wages garnished, and mitigating factors
included lack of
000762
prior disciplinary record, lack of dishonest or selfish motive, and full cooperation in
investigation.
Rules of Prof. Cond., Rules 1.7(a)(2), 1.16(a)(1), 5.4(c), 8.4(d). Disciplinary Counsel v.
Mamich,
2010-Ohio-1044, 928 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 2010).
One-year actual suspension, as opposed to a stayed suspension, was appropriate sanction
for attorney
who testified falsely that he had not removed certain files or information from his office, in
his
former law firm's action to enjoin alleged violation of the nonsolicitation and
nondisclosure covenant
of his employment agreement, and who destroyed firm documents to conceal his
possession of them;
mitigating factors of a lack of prior discipline and a good reputation were outweighed by
aggravating
factors including a pattern of misconduct involving multiple instances of lying and
misrepresentation
under oath, as well as attorney's refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of his conduct.
Rules of
Prof.Conduct, Rule 3.4(a), 8.4(c, d, h); BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B). Disciplinary Counsel v.
Robinson,
933 N.E.2d 1095 (Ohio 2010).
Two-year suspension, with one year conditionally stayed, was appropriate sanction for
attorney
who engaged in misconduct by submitting false and fraudulent billing for her appointed-
counsel services.
Code of Prof.Resp., 1102(A)(4, 5, 6), 2106(A) (2006). Toledo Bar Assn. v. Stahlbush, 933
N.E.2d 1091 (Ohio 2010).
Indefinite suspension, and requirement that prior to reinstatement attorney provides
proof to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that he is mentally fit to return to the practice of
law, was appropriate
000763
sanction for attorney who recklessly filed court documents containing unfounded
accusations
against two judges, misused his power as an attorney to issue subpoenas to further his
personal
agenda, misused his authority as a notary public, and accused three judges and a
prosecutor of engaging
in improper ex parte communications; mitigating fact that attorney had no prior
disciplinary record,
made full and free disclosure to the board, and was professional, respectful, and
cooperative
during disciplinary proceedings did not outweigh the aggravating effect of having
demonstrated a dishonest
and selfish motive, abusing his position as a lawyer, making false and dishonest
accusations
against judges and prosecutors, and providing false and dishonest explanations of his
actions. Code of
Prof.Resp., DR 1102(A)(4 to 6), 7106(A) (2006); Government of the Bar Rule IV(2);
Rules of
Prof.Conduct, Rules 3.1, 3.5(a)(6), 8.2(a), 8.4(c, d). Disciplinary Counsel v. Pullins, 127
Ohio St. 3d
436, 2010-Ohio-6241, 940 N.E.2d 952 (2010).
Suspension from practice of law for two years, with final six months stayed on condition
that, attorney
make full accounting and full restitution to affected clients and return all client files within
90
days of suspension, was warranted as sanction for attorney's misconduct in failing to act
on behalf
clients, respond to clients, or refund unearned fees to clients; as factors in aggravation,
attorney acted
with a selfish motive, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, caused harm to vulnerable
clients, and initially
failed to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation, but in mitigation, attorney had no
disciplinary
000764
record, relinquished his bankruptcy court electronic case filing privileges and complied
with other
bankruptcy sanction orders, and ultimately cooperated in the disciplinary process. Rules
of
Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.3, 1.4(a)(3, 4), 1.15(d), 1.16(e), 8.4(d, h). Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn.
v. Gresley,
127 Ohio St. 3d 430, 2010-Ohio-6208, 940 N.E.2d 945 (2010).
Attorney's conduct in failing to participate in the discovery process and by failing to
respond to a
motion for default judgment resulted in a judgment in excess of $330,000 against her
clients and in
failing to timely prosecute a second client matter which resulted in the dismissal without
prejudice of
that client's complaint warranted one-year suspension of license to practice law with six
months
stayed based on certain conditions. Code of Prof.Resp., DR 6101(A)(3) (2006); Rules of
Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.3, 1.16(c, d), 3.4(c). Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Johnson, 127
Ohio St. 3d
97, 2010-Ohio-4832, 936 N.E.2d 938 (2010).
Attorney's mishandling of his personal injury client's funds warranted suspension from
the practice
of law for one year with entire year stayed, conditioned upon his continued treatment for
depression
due to his father's death by a psychologist/psychiatrist for duration of suspension, where
misconduct
was an isolated incident in his nineteen years of practice and attorney settled accounts of
client's
medical bills, showed remorse, and cooperated fully with investigation. New York DR 9-
102(A),
(B)(3, 4). Toledo Bar Assn. v. Kramer, 89 Ohio St. 3d 321, 731 N.E.2d 643 (2000); West's
Key Number
Digest, Attorney and Client 58.
000765
While Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court may
properly
consider attorney's mental illness at the time of alleged misconduct as a mitigating factor
in determining
what sanction should be imposed, the mental illness provisions for summary suspension
are not
intended to be used by attorney in a disciplinary action to avoid suspension for violations.
Government
of the Bar Rule V, 7. Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Komarek, 84 Ohio St. 3d 90, 702 N.E.2d 62
(1998).
Attorney's misconduct in mishandling clients' trust account funds in violation of rules of
professional
conduct warranted two year suspension from the practice of law, where attorney
disbursed settlement
sums to her clients, but in many cases failed to make full payments to third party medical
providers, a client was unable to apply for credit due to a tax lien placed by a medical
provider due to
attorney's actions, and another client did not receive settlement funds, and attorney had
prior disciplinary
history, though attorney fully accepted responsibility for her actions. Appellate Court
Rule
407, Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.15, 8.4(a, d, e); Appellate Court Rule 413,
Lawyer Disciplinary
Enforcement, Rule 7(a)(1, 6). In re Hardee-Thomas, 706 S.E.2d 507 (S.C. 2011).
Attorney's admitted misconduct in three separate disciplinary matters, each involving a
general
failure to diligently protect the rights of his clients and mismanagement of his caseload
over a period
in which he worked for two separate law firms, resulting in, for example, dismissal of a
personal injury
action by operation of statute of limitations, preventing a client from appealing an order
denying
000766
postconviction relief, and a failure to properly account for unearned fees in other cases,
warranted
two-year suspension from practice of law. In re Holcombe, 697 S.E.2d 600 (S.C. 2010).
Attorney's admitted misconduct in two disciplinary matters, in one case failing to
diligently pursue
postconviction relief matter while neglecting his duty to communicate with his client or his
family,
and in another case mismanaging his client trust accounts by commingling personal funds
with
client funds resulting in bounced check, warranted two-year suspension from practice of
law, retroactive
to date of interim suspension, resulting in a nine-month remaining term, conditioned upon
attorney's
completion of legal ethics and law practice accounting training, in addition to various
steps
towards treatment of his severe depression. In re Ginn, 697 S.E.2d 572 (S.C. 2010).
Definite suspension of two years, plus restitution, was warranted as a sanction for attorney
who
entered Agreement for Discipline by Consent, admitting misconduct in failing to keep
clients reasonably
informed of the status of litigation, failing to hold unearned client funds in trust account,
failing
to return unearned fees to client, failing to respond to client requests for information,
failing to appropriately
terminate client representation, and failing to respond to a lawful demand for information
from disciplinary authority. In re Moody, 387 S.C. 352, 692 S.E.2d 906 (2010).
In attorney disciplinary proceedings for misconduct arising from mishandling of client
funds, appropriate
sanction was retroactive two-year suspension where unethical conduct stemmed from poor
judgment brought on by manic depressive depressed episode and medical evidence
showed attorney
was recovering from depressed episode through treatment with antidepressant drug. Re
000767
Howle (1988)
294 SC 244, 363 SE2d 693.
One-year suspension from practice of law was appropriate sanction for attorney's
misconduct in
connection with his representation of multiple clients, including providing dilatory
responses relating
to client matters, using worthless check drawn on unapproved trust account to reimburse
client for
unearned fees, repeatedly failing to maintain his trust account properly, tendering
worthless checks to
United States Court of Appeals, failing to file appeal for client or inform her of his
oversight, filing
of frivolous appeals, practicing law while his license was suspended, and failing to notify
clients and
tribunals that his license was suspended; in aggravation, victims were vulnerable, and
attorney had
prior disciplinary offense, selfish motive by failing to return unearned fees, pattern of
neglect and
dilatory conduct constituting multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of
conduct,
and indifference to making restitution to clients. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 8, Rules of
Prof.Conduct, Rules
1.3, 1.4(a, b), 1.15(a), 4.4(a), 8.1(b). Flowers v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 314
S.W.3d
882 (Tenn. 2010).
Attorney's misconduct in affiliating himself with a nonlawyer who gave legal advice in
connection
with a living trust scam targeted at seniors warranted two-year suspension from practice
of law;
although disbarment was presumptive sanction, attorney attempted to remediate the
harm caused by
his misconduct, such that disbarment was not necessary to protect the public or educate
other lawyers.
000768
In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Shepard, 239 P.3d 1066 (Wash. 2010).
Four-month suspension was appropriate sanction for attorney's misconduct in billing the
State
Public Defender for work he did not actually perform, continuing to practice law after
receiving notice
of his administrative suspension for failing to comply with his continuing legal education
requirements,
willingly misleading a sitting judge about whether or not he had a valid law license, failing
to refund unearned fees, and failing to respond to the Office of Lawyer Regulation, where
attorney
committed these ethical violations while overextended professionally and trying to
maintain his
practice during the break-up of his legal partnership. SCR 20:1.16(d), 20:3.3(a)(1), 20:8.4
(c),
22.03(2), 31.10(1); . In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis, 2011 WI 3, 793
N.W.2d 884
(Wis. 2011).
Two-year suspension from the practice of law was warranted as sanction for attorney who
stipulated
to committing professional misconduct by his conviction for possession of narcotic drugs
and
felony bail jumping; attorney had prior disciplinary history and engaged in a pattern of
misconduct,
and attorney admitted his misconduct, expressed remorse, and was undergoing voluntary
drug treatment
and monitoring. SCR 20:8.4(b). In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Compton, 2010 WI
112,
787 N.W.2d 831 (Wis. 2010).
31 AMJUR TRIALS 633 Page 152

000769


Sent: Fri 3/23/12 10:38 AM
Mr. King,
now bringing up.

Sincerely,


Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 17:18:34 +0000

Dear Mr. Coughlin,


000770


Sincerely,

Patrick King


10 In general

000771

FOIA Request RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file
a grievance
Chapter 13 debtors' attorney violated Nevada rule of professional conduct defining
professional
misrepresentation
and engaging in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice, where attorney,
acting in bad faith,
required credit counseling course and which he knew, or should have known, that
debtors did not
sign or otherwise adopt, and also certified documents as being completed by debtors.
11 U.S.C.A.
Nev. 2010).


Sincerely,


Sent: Fri 3/23/12 4:57 PM
000772
3 attachments
State Bar of Nevada Character and Fitness Committee Grievance Christiansen Eichman, Kevin
Kelly Mike Sanft for Bar Counsel.pdf (379.4 KB) , Character and Fitness Committee Member
Kevin Kelly, ESq..htm (6.4 KB) , Reno's Hawkins, Ormaas & van Winkle - Biggest Little Act in the
World Babelation ormaas.htm (72.0 KB)
Dear Mr. King,
this is a subpoena and a FOIA Request, requesting that you send to me, in writing,
via email and fax a copy of any documentation (such as a copy of the email from
Department 3 you mentioned in your last email, in addition to these
"communications from judges" that you only mentioned for the first time today, yet
claim to have noticed me of in the past). You see, this is exactly why is would be
disadvantageous to communciate with you on the telephone (something you and I
have never done). When I began asking Director of Admissions Patrice Eichman (a
licensed attorney) uncomfortable questions related to her breach of her duties and
negligence (if not more) between 2001-2005, she didn't want to correspond in
writing anymore, but preferred talkign on the phone...

Please add the attached materials to my grievance against Eichman, Michael Sanft,
Kevin Kelly of the C&F Committee and both Peter Christiansen's (father and son).

I believe you may have violated my Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel by failing to
copy me on and or inform me of your communications with judges prior to your
email of today, wherein you incorrectly mention that you previously did so, which
you did not. I think it might be appropriate for you to recuse yourself from this
matter given some of your ommissions and conduct thus far.

Sincerely,

Zach Coughlin


Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 19:10:10 +0000

March 23, 2012
000773
Dear Mr. Coughlin,

Just moments ago I received an email letter from the Clerk of the Court in
Department 3. She said that you appeared wearing pajamas over your clothes
and were demanding and argumentative. Apparently I will be receiving a report
from the Marshals. As Assistant Bar Counsel I would like to help you. However,
my primary responsibility is to protect the public and the administration of
justice by insuring that Nevada Lawyers are complying with standards required of
the profession. It appears that you are not. I believe that there are ways to get
you assistance that may protect your license to practice law. I would sure
appreciate the opportunity to talk with you about resources and assistance that
may help you through this difficult time.


To: Patrick King

Mr. King,
now bringing up. In your March 23, 2012 email to me you wrote: " As I
have explained to you, the grievances against you came not only from Mr. Hill but also from
Judges from different Courts." This is not true. That is the first you ever communicated
anything like that to me, unless you can point to something in the written record between
us. With respect to your refusal to pursue any of the grievances I filed, please indicate
specifically what about Mr. Hill's grievance met the standard you cite to, as well as specifically,
for each attempted filing of a grievance, indicate where mine failed to meet that standard,
with details and specifics, and an indication of any research of investigation you conducted in
that regard.
Sincerely,
000774

Sincerely,

Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 17:18:34 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,




Sincerely,

Patrick King

000775

10 In general

000776
Sincerely,


Las Vegas Review-Journal
Wednesday, March 06, 2002
Copyright Las Vegas Review-Journal
COLUMN: John L. Smith
Spearmint Rhino owners expanding empire with British
invasion

Whether you consider topless cabarets acceptable adult
diversions or shadowy dens of iniquity, you have to admit the
Spearmint Rhino club has one catchy name
000777
It's probably safe to say its patrons are unlikely to confuse it
with other topless joints, and surely that's the way Spearmint
Rhino's owners like it. It turns out developing brand loyalty is
important, whether you're selling breakfast cereal or babes and
boobs.
It must be working. These days, the Spearmint Rhino empire is
rapidly expanding. From clubs in California, to one in Las
Vegas, the company has created something of an American
invasion in England, where majority owner John Gray has
opened six clubs with plans for up to 100 more.
With that kind of expansion in mind, there's talk that
Spearmint Rhino might begin selling stock as a publicly traded
company. It makes you wonder what those stockholder
meetings might look like. I'm willing to bet they'd be well
attended.
In Las Vegas, the club operates with a somewhat confused
ownership status. Admittedly, I'm the one confused.
Although it is listed on the company's Web site as one of
several Spearmint Rhino clubs, the Las Vegas cabaret is
officially not owned by Gray, but by local attorney Kevin
Kelly, Gray's long-time partner Thomas Nabarrette, and
Mumtaz Ali. When asked about the ownership issue, and the
fact the Las Vegas club was listed on the Gray-owned
company Web site, Kelly said it was possible Nabarrette had
worked out an agreement with his friend to advertise the club
on the Internet.
Makes sense, but it doesn't exactly explain why the only
reference to the topless company on the secretary of state's
Web site lists Gray as secretary and treasurer of The Spearmint
Rhino Worldwide Inc. The Las Vegas club is owned by K-Kel
Inc., which lists Kelly and Ali as officers, but not Nabarrette.
No matter. The Las Vegas Spearmint Rhino officially is not
owned by Gray. Which is probably a good thing considering
Gray's controversial past, which was recently profiled by
reporters Adrian Gatton and Paul Lashmar in the Independent
newspaper of London.
The story caught the topless entrepreneur attempting to rewrite
his personal history. In the Feb. 17 article, Gray was quoted
briefly denying his criminal past -- he has a couple convictions
in California for making a false statement to win a military
contract and bouncing checks -- before fessing up to reporters.
The boss also failed to explain why he once used several
aliases, including Johnny Win, John Luciano, and John
000778


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Luciano Gianni.
Gray served six months in jail, according to the newspaper,
and emerged with plans to expand his topless bar empire. Next
stop, Las Vegas. Although that move officially did not work
out, and Gray's name is not listed on the local paperwork, it did
not deter him from hopping overseas, where he has taken
England by storm as the sole director of Spearmint Rhino
Companies of Europe Ltd. According to the Independent,
Gray's clubs are popular with businessmen and a favorite site
for office parties.
Possibly standing in the way of his expansion plans in England
are those pesky background details, which he apparently didn't
disclose in much detail to licensing authorities.
A year ago, police reported that, in their opinion, "activity
within the club, intentionally or otherwise, borders on offenses
of prostitution and permitting the keeping of a brothel."
In Las Vegas, police have uttered similar phrases for decades.
Every few years, an undercover vice unit compiles enough
evidence of whispered propositions and backfields in excessive
motion to make headlines and a few arrests. Beyond a little
embarrassment and some attorney fees, the club owners are
rarely ruffled.
It's probably only a coincidence that the topless operators
perennially rank among the top donors to local political
campaigns, showering thousands of dollars on favorite
candidates and maintaining close contact with their public
official friends thereafter.
Somehow, Gray didn't officially make the grade in Las Vegas.
Hey, our loss is England's gain.
John L. Smith's column appears Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday
and Sunday. E-mail him at Smith@lvrj.com or call him at 383-
0295.

This story is located at:
http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/Mar-06-Wed-
2002/news/18241452.html
000779
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000780

It is government and its officials and employees who are REQUIRED to prove the guilt of a
charge and conviction. That RELIEVES the one charged of ANY burden to PROVE his or her
innocence. Government employees are held to a HIGHER standard. A people are either FREE
from their government (from each other) or they are controlled subjects of a government and its
public employees that illegally or unethically parcels out freedom as it sees fit. NEVER
underestimate others bad experiences. The structure of an expose, a complaint, a whistle-
blower, is ALWAYS the story of how the birds came HOME to roost. Happenings and ideology
that previously would never have been disseminated are now readily found with a simple
Google search. A Google search is just a search for a person's credentials AND integrity.

Here's more NEGATIVE publicity about Nevada. Here's MORE of why others now like to call
Nevadans, Renoites and Washoe County residents rednecks, hicks, goat-ropers, stupid, morons,
douche-bags, illiterate, alcoholics, lazy, shiftless, druggies, racist, sexist, thieves, incompetent,
fraudsters, asleep-at-the-wheel, corrupt, and on and on. Nevada's, Reno's and Washoe County's
public officials and public employees give them AMPLE reason to . Like
here.. The effects of negative publicity on Nevada, Reno and Washoe County have
rarely been on the radar of its legislators and governors . or even mayors, city and county
employees, police officers, attorneys, judges, sheriffs, district attorneys, county commissioners,
police chiefs, city councils.

Why is that? That was Dennis Myers at the Reno News & Review who first wrote that. With so
MANY people now running OUT of Nevada, Dennis observation and complaint remains valid.
Why dont Nevada, Reno, Washoe County public officials and public employees take in to
account negative publicity to Nevada? How does Reno Police Officer Jay Hawkins, Reno
Deputy City Attorney Alison M. Ormaas and Reno Judge Jim van Winkle pay their community
and neighbors back for the damage each has done to the reputation of their neighbors and
community?

The result of any expose is that individuals and organizations are suddenly finding their
000781
previously hidden illegal, corrupt, unethical, lazy, or immoral behaviors, and their secrets,
avarice, cravings, or even mistakes, suddenly and rightfully very publicly front and center.
Integrity, or its' lack, is immediately exposed in a simple Google search.

Technology is a common ground for sharing viewpoints, both pro and con. As more people are
tuned in to the electronic age it has become increasingly more difficult for the bad practices of
any business and its owners, managers and employees, no matter how remote or small their
marketplace is, to continue without being noticed, as was the case. People of all levels and of
experience share their opinions concerning the various pluses and minuses of various businesses
and its owners, managers and employees. Many businesses, owners, managers and employees
are just not coming out well in these news group discussions.

Because Due Process is A Constitutional Issue, a civil RIGHT, and one of the oaths ALL public
officials AND public employees take is to uphold and protect the Constitution, ALL public
officials AND public employees are held to a HIGHER standard, fiduciary. In this case it is
clear Reno Police Officer Jay Hawkins, Reno Deputy City Attorney Alison M. Ormaas and
Reno Judge Jim van Winkle each FAILED to exercise reasonable care, each VIOLATED
several laws, EACH violated their fiduciary duties and, each displayed INappropriate conduct.

To the tune Youre a Mean One Mr. Grinch here its youre a Mean One Reno Police Officer
Jay Hawkins, Youre a Mean One Reno City Attorney Alison Ormaas and, Youre a Mean One
Reno Municipal Court Judge Jim Van Winkle.

In America, there is a legal presumption of innocence until proven guilty. If there is any HINT
of presumption of guilt then Due Process is NOT followed and civil rights are violated. For civil
charges or convictions against ANY American citizen there must be a clear and convincing
preponderance of evidence. Preponderance is 50.000001% or more. For criminal charges or
convictions against ANY American citizen there must be a clear and convincing beyond a
reasonable doubt of the evidence.

The maxim that the King can do no wrong has no place in our American system of government.
In America, its Semper pro Populus. That means Fiduciary Duties, Color of Law and Public
Service governs those on the public dole as Jay Hawkins, Alison Ormass and Jim van Winkle.

In 2009, Reno PUBLIC employee Jay Hawkins RECEIVED tax dollars to the staggering sum of
$132,088.14.

000782
In 2009, Reno PUBLIC employee Alison Ormaas RECEIVED tax dollars to the staggering sum
of $77,903.25.

In 2009, Reno PUBLIC employee Jim Van Winkle RECEIVED tax dollars to the staggering
sum of $187,668.36.

Fiduciary duties are ethical or legal duties one party has to another. Broadly, these duties
include duties of loyalty and duties of care to OTHERS. A PUBLIC official and PUBLIC
employee has ANOTHER fiduciary duty to act in CITIZEN's benefit because citizens are the
beneficiary NO public official OR public employee can simply sit back and watch the
beneficiary, you the citizen fall into greater difficulty or hardship.

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Submitted by Retired Professor on Fri, 08/26/2011 - 7:26pm.

Only in Reno.

Today I was swimming on my back during the public posted lap swim hours at Northwest Pool
when two eleven-year-old boys threw a weighted grenade at me then came into my lane. That
frightened me. It was also disturbing my peace and harassing me. I reminded them as I had
when they had done the same thing earlier this summer, that this time is for the public posted
lap swim. These two eleven-year-old boys smirked and smugly informed me the lifeguards
there had told them they could. That offended my sense of personal dignity and my sense of
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safety. They then again threw a weighted grenade at me. These two eleven-year-old boys set
upon me in a hostile and aggressive way with a weapon. Already a physically disabled veteran,
I had a reasonable apprehension of an immediate harmful or offensive contact such as my eye
being taken out, my nose broken or teeth broken by this leaded grenade.

The City of Reno lifeguards were careless as they failed to supervise these boys which City of
Reno manager Justin Klatt told me later the City of Reno assumes with the children at the city
pool. City of Reno manager Justin Klatt informed me of this when he refused to give me the
boys' names or parent contact info. The two eleven-year-old-boys' behavior and City of Reno
employees carelessness and failure to supervise these boys caused me apprehension and
mental / emotional distress.

City of Reno manager Justin Klatt told me that the weighted grenades, a foreseeable weapon at
the public pool when used unsupervised by children, are okay at the City of Reno Northwest
Pool. These weighted grenades are not ever okay when they are thrown at others. These two
eleven-year-old-boys' behavior and employees at the City of Reno Northwest Pool was
unreasonable due to the foreseeable harm these weighted grenades could do when used by
children who are not being properly supervised.

The City of Reno and its employees owe a duty of care to those who will use its products and
services such as its public pools, so as to render itself and its employees accountable for
negligent / careless work. I was swimming during the posted lap swim when these boys,
whether they did it it intentionally or not, attacked and frightened me with a weighted grenade,
after smugly informing me the lifeguards there said it was okay.

Reno Police Officer Jay
Submitted by Exploited Renoite on Mon, 08/22/2011 - 6:18pm.
Reno Police Officer Jay Hawkins, Reno Deputy City Attorney Alison M. Ormaas and Reno
Judge Jim van Winkle are also Conspicuous Consumptionists AND thieves of tax dollars NOT
theirs.
City of Reno Manager Julee
City of Reno Manager Julee Conway and City of Reno Supervisor Joseph Wilson are
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also Conspicuous Consumptionists AND Thieves of Tax Dollars NOT Theirs.
It was I think three years

It was I think three years ago that Fred Wolf saved his wife's life at the City of Reno Northwest
public pool. The City of Reno lifeguard, Mike Freeman was awol and Fred and a couple of the
swimmers saved Jean Wolf. Only in Reno does one get promoted for dereliction of duty, being
awol and endangering another's life. Yet that is exactly what City of Reno Supervisor Joseph
Wilson did, he promoted City of Reno employee Mike Freeman. For which City of Reno
Manager Julee Conway promoted City of Reno employee Joe Wilson. In 2009, City of Reno
Manager Julee Conway was paid tax dollars of $173,125.00 with a fully funded benefits
package. How many in the private sector are getting that sweetheart of a deal? In 2010, it got
even sweeter at $187,025.19, an 8% increase / tax funded raise during The Great Recession.
How many in the private sector are getting that sweetheart of a deal and an 8% raise? In 2009,
City of Reno Supervisor Joseph Wilson was paid tax dollars of $89,339.90 with a fully funded
benefits package. In 2010, that went to $98,247.91 for a 10% tax funded raise during The Great
Recession. We Renoites are being bled to death / exploited by our City of Reno public
employees!
Social order rests upon the
Submitted by Marian on Sun, 08/21/2011 - 7:22pm.
Social order rests upon the stability and predictability of conduct of which keeping promises is
a large item. Roscoe Pound.
Mitchell Wright and Kent B. Hanson are Reno, Nevada attorneys. Thomas and Cheryl
Hanneman went to see them in Counselor Mitchell Wright and Counselor Kent Hansons
capacity as attorneys. They chose Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent Hanson because
Counselor Mitchell Wright advertised himself as a real estate attorney, and Counselor Kent
Hanson is a former Nevada State Deputy Attorney General for the Nevada Real Estate Division.
According to the Hannemans, when they showed up for their appointment, Counselor Kent
Hanson told them the secretary had just walked out. Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent
Hanson offered to trade their legal services for Mrs. Hanneman immediately starting as their
secretary. The Hannemans accepted. Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent Hanson immediately
hired an independent real estate expert for a written review.
The Hannemans soon found out why the former secretary had walked out. Counselor Mitchell
Wright and Realtor wife were having an on-going drama. Counselor Mitchell Wrights wife is
Karen Wright, a Reno Sparks Association of Realtors Realtor with Prudential Nevada Real
Estate What is it with the off-the-wall character of real estate agents Prudential Nevada Real
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Estate hires?
Instead of Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent Hanson doing as they had promised, legal
services for the Hannemans, they were involved in a high drama. That drama was tearing apart
their lives, destroying their legal practices, screwing their legal clients, and endangering the
safety of the tenants and visitors to the building where their law offices are at.
Mrs. Mitchell Wright drove by the front of the legal offices in their truck. Mr. Mitchell Wright
saw that and he went running out the front door. Mrs. Mitchell Wright parked the truck in back
and came in the back door. She went directly to her husbands office and started packing up
stuff. Mr. Mitchell Wright walked in and their yelling and swearing at each other was heard
throughout the building and parking lot.
Mrs. Mitchell Wright got into the drivers seat of their truck and started the engine. Her husband
tried to open the door but found it locked. He reached in through the open window trying to
unlock the door. Mrs. Mitchell Wright closed the window trapping her husbands arm. She
drove off with her husband trotting along side while they continued yelling and swearing at each
other. That was quite the site as Counselor Mitchell Wright wears ill-fitting dark suits as he has
a large stomach, and very high-heeled cowboy boots.
Counselor Kent Hanson then came running out the back door of the law offices yelling for Mrs.
Hanneman and the receptionist to call 911! Reno lawyer Kent B. Hanson then went running
after the truck dragging his colleague Mitchell Wright. By that time, most of the neighborhood
heard and saw what was going on.
Counselor Mitchell Wright then fell as his arm was released. Counselor Kent Hanson helped
him back to the office.
Counselor Mitchell Wright, a Mormon, was swearing what a sick bitch she is and Counselor
Kent Hanson, also a Mormon, was urgently asking, Mitch, Mitch where are your guns?! What
about your guns?!
This drama in various forms continued. Counselor Mitchell Wright missed filing deadlines and
court dates. Guns were waved around. A divorce was out there. A restraining order was out
there. Any client of Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent B. Hanson or any other attorney in
the building that came in for their cases only heard about Mitch and Karen Mitchells drama.
The receptionist and other tenants in the building complained to the landlord. The landlord was
forced to threaten eviction of Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent B. Hanson.
Then Reno lawyer, attorney, Counselor Mitchell Wright was observed with his pants down, on
top of his Prudential Nevada Realty Reno Sparks Association of Realtors wife on top of his law
office desk.
Seems the Mitchells were either going for each others throats or their crotches.
Image problem for Reno?
000786
Submitted by El G on Wed, 08/17/2011 - 5:52pm.

Image problem for Reno? Hmmmmm ... Reno's City Attorney Alison Ormaas is involved in
fraud, steering, bullying, intimidation, perjury, incompetence, trampling on civil rights,
stupidity, laziness, and being a mean one. Maybe all that is a problem, where you're at, but it is
not a problem obviously in Reno, Nevada. What's wrong with you?

Reno understands that Reno's City Attorney Alison Ormaas does not need to be weighed down
by all this. When is the last time the local media mentioned any of this? Exactly. After all, she is
City Attorney Alison Ormaas and she has her life to lead.

So what if City Attorney Alison Ormaas is hanging out banging Reno while keeping these fires
burning? City Attorney Alison Ormaas is not going to spank and choke herself. So what if City
Attorney Alison Ormaas needs a father figure and a diet? Nick Lachey needs someone to do
bullet shots with at Hyde.

In fact, we should thank City Attorney Alison Ormaas for reminding us what it means to be
Renoites. I hope Reno City Attorney Alison Ormaas's gruesome behavior is not an omen for the
future state of our town. If throwing your neighbors, colleagues and community under the
wheels of the bus is right, I am scared to know what wrong is.

(This article is dedicated to the loving memory of Ms. Anna Nicole Smith. We can only pray
that Elton John will eulogize her, and City Attorney Alison Ormaas with yet another version of
that candle song on national TV. Goodbye, Vickie Lynn, your dealers will miss you.) Even
Porky Bully is a hard-bitten middle aged jaded soul who has seen the true ugliness of the real
world and knows there is only one way to survive and that is by doing just what City Attorney
Alison Ormaas has done.

Is it still sarcasm when I have to explain it?

El G, that's with one G.
000787

Image problem for Reno? Hmmmmm ... Reno's police officer Jay Hawkins is involved in fraud,
steering, bullying, intimidation, perjury, incompetence, trampling on civil rights, stupidity,
laziness, and police brutality. Maybe all that is a problem, where you're at, but it is not a
problem obviously in Reno, Nevada. What's wrong with you?

Reno understands that Reno's police officer Jay Hawkins does not need to be weighed down by
all this. When is the last time the local media mentioned any of this? Exactly. After all, he is
police officer Jay Hawkins and he has his life to lead.

So what if police officer Jay Hawkins is hanging out banging Reno while keeping these fires
burning? police officer Jay Hawkins is not going to spank and choke himself. So what if police
officer Jay Hawkins needs a father figure and a diet? Nick Lachey needs someone to do bullet
shots with at Hyde.

In fact, we should thank police officer Jay Hawkins for reminding us what it means to be
Renoites. I hope Reno police officer Jay Hawkins's gruesome behavior is not an omen for the
future state of our town. If throwing your neighbors, colleagues and community under the
wheels of the bus is right, I am scared to know what wrong is.

that Elton John will eulogize her, and police officer Jay Hawkins with yet another version of
that candle song on national TV. Goodbye, Vickie Lynn, your dealers will miss you.) Even
Porky Bully is a hard-bitten middle aged jaded soul who has seen the true ugliness of the real
world and knows there is only one way to survive and that is by doing just what police officer
Jay Hawkins has done.


000788

Image problem for Reno? Hmmmmm ... Reno's judge James van Winkle is involved in fraud,
steering, bullying, intimidation, trampling on civil rights, stupidity, laziness, and asleep in court.
Maybe all that is a problem, where you're at, but it is not a problem obviously in Reno, Nevada.
What's wrong with you?

Reno understands that Reno's judge James van Winkle does not need to be weighed down by all
this. When is the last time the local media mentioned any of this? Exactly. After all, he is judge
James van Winkle and he has his life to lead.

So what if judge James van Winkle is hanging out banging Reno while keeping these fires
burning? judge James van Winkle is not going to spank and choke himself. So what if judge
James van Winkle needs a father figure and a diet? Nick Lachey needs someone to do bullet
shots with at Hyde.

In fact, we should thank judge James van Winkle for reminding us what it means to be Renoites.
I hope Reno judge James van Winkle's gruesome behavior is not an omen for the future state of
our town. If throwing your neighbors, colleagues and community under the wheels of the bus is
right, I am scared to know what wrong is.

that Elton John will eulogize her, and judge James van Winkle with yet another version of that
candle song on national TV. Goodbye, Vickie Lynn, your dealers will miss you.) Even Porky
Bully is a hard-bitten middle aged jaded soul who has seen the true ugliness of the real world
and knows there is only one way to survive and that is by doing just what judge James van
Winkle has done.


000789

Image problem for Reno? Hmmmmm ... Reno's Lawyer now Reno judge Bridget Robb-Peck, is
involved in fraud, steering, bullying, perjury, intimidation, filing false documents, sewer
service, and having opposing counsel's client's U.S. mail forwarded to her office where she then
tells the Postal Inspector who tracked down the mia mail, why no, I never let anyone know the
opposing counsel's client's U.S. mail was forwarded to my office. Why should I? Maybe all that
is a problem, where you're at, but it is not a problem obviously in Reno, Nevada. What's wrong
with you?

Reno understands that Reno's Lawyer now Reno judge Bridget Robb-Peck does not need to be
weighed down by all this. When is the last time the local media mentioned any of this? Exactly.
After all, she is Reno's lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget Robb-Peck and she
has her life to lead.

So what if lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget Robb-Peck is hanging out
banging Reno while keeping these fires burning? Reno lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's
judge Bridget Robb-Peck is not going to spank and choke herself. So what if Reno's Lawyer
Bridget Robb Peck needs a father figure and a diet? Nick Lachey needs someone to do bullet
shots with at Hyde.

In fact, we should thank Reno lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget Robb-Peck,
for reminding us what it means to be Renoites. I hope lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's
judge Bridget Robb-Peck's gruesome behavior is not an omen for the future state of our town. If
throwing your neighbors, colleagues and community under the wheels of the bus is right, I am
scared to know what wrong is.

that Elton John will eulogize her, and lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget
Robb-Peck with yet another version of that candle song on national TV. Goodbye, Vickie Lynn,
your dealers will miss you.) Even Porky Bully is a hard-bitten middle aged jaded soul who has
seen the true ugliness of the real world and knows there is only one way to survive and that is
by doing just what Reno lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget Robb-Peck has
done.


000790
Bonnie S. Weber wears her
Submitted by Broother on Tue, 08/09/2011 - 5:38pm.

Bonnie S. Weber wears her religion, Christianity, on her political sleeve these what last 30
years. It is obvious that sinning is the part part of redemption for Christian dissimulator and
Washoe County Commissioner incompetent Bonnie S. Weber. Same for the other Christian
Washoe County Commissioners. Mortal sin removes the presence of Christ in the sinners soul.
It not only hurts the sinner, but also hurts those affected by the sinner's desecration. Christians
are required to judge one another (1 Corinthians 5:12-13; John 7:24). In these several past year's
bad economy, these unholy pay raises of our elected officials and appointed public employees
are sins. Sin is a master to whom one becomes enslaved (John 8:34). Only the truth will set one
free (John 8:32). Sin is blinding (John 9:39-41). The consciences reprimands are harder to hear
the more one sins (cf. Hebrews 3:12-13). Positive influences and opportunities are removed
when one disregards the longsuffering and goodness of God (cf. Luke 8:12; Romans
1:20,21,24,26,28; 2:4-5). Only humble submission and sincere and total obedience to Jesus
Christ will remedy one's sins. And that's ;) no urban legend.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sin is the breaking of God's law. When you sin, you offend God because it is His law that you
have broken. God's laws reflect the moral purity of His nature. Therefore, God's Law is a
reflection of the character of God. God's law is not arbitrary a it is based on God's holiness.
Greed, which these sacrilegious pay raises are, and the profane obesity of so many of our
elected public officials and appointed public employees, are the mortal sin of taking more than
your fair share because they break God's Law. The mortal sin of gluttony does not just have to
do with overeating, of which so many of our obese elected public officials and appointed public
employees obviously do. The mortal sin of gluttony is excess, taking / using more than your fair
share, in anything like these unholy pay raises. A mortal sin is an act or thought which turns
one away from God and turns one toward something ungodly instead like these self-serving
unholy pay raises and being obese. When someone chooses mortal sin, they freely choose to
forfeit heaven and choose hell. And that's ;) no urban legend.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The sins of Sodom and Gomorrah were rape, inhospitably, hatred of strangers and making
slaves of guests. Christ said, Wisdom 19:13, the sin of Sodom was a "bitter hatred of strangers"
and "making slaves of guests who were benefactors." The "making slaves of guests who were
benefactors" is exactly what these blasphemous pay raises are. Our elected public officials and
appointed public employees have made unholy slaves of us with their profane pay raises to
themselves.
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000791
Proverbs 28:7 declares, He who keeps the law is a discerning son, but a companion of gluttons
disgraces his father. Proverbs 23:2 proclaims, Put a knife to your throat if you are given to
gluttony.
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Appetites are an analogy of one's ability to control oneself. If one is unable to control their
appetites, they are unable to control behaviors such as lust, covetousness, anger. See
Deuteronomy 21:20, Proverbs 23:2, 2 Peter 1:5-7, 2 Timothy 3:1-9, and 2 Corinthians 10:5.)
The ability to say no to anything in excess, which these pay raises and obesity clearly are,
self-control is one of the fruits of the Spirit common to all believers (Galatians 5:22). And
that's ;) no urban legend.
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There are several reasons why greed and gluttony are deadly sins.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greed and gluttony signs of mistrust of God. They are expressions of doubt that God will
provide all that you need. You are disbelieving Jesus when He promises that God will provide
everything you need (Luke 12:22-31).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greed and gluttony promotes crime. More crimes have been committed due to greed and
gluttony than any other deadly sin. Greed and gluttony drives people to steal, lie and kill in
order to acquire more.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greed and gluttony are the pinnacles of selfishness. Greed and gluttony ruin marriages,
destroy friendships, and divide families all in the selfish pursuit of gratifying ones self. Greed
and gluttony are the opposite of charity, generosity and love any Christian virtue. One's greed
and gluttony disregard all other people and animals and puts falsely high importance on the self:
they are forms forms of self-worship.
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One that sins lives to please self rather than God.
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"I am going to do things my way and that's it - period." This is the sin to control situations in
order to have one's way to live or do as they please rather than as God pleases.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Rebellion is going off the set standard and disrupting the harmony between God and man. It is
000792

going against the normal use of things that God has given to man.
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A refusal to submit to God and His word concerning excess, such as don't be filled with wine
and food or pay raises, but be filled with the Spirit.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Where there is excess to one or more, there is waste of God's Law. And that's ;) no urban
legend.
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ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN;

Appellant.
vs.
MATT MERLISS, MD; MATTHEW J.
MERLISS LIVING TRUST;

Respondents
.
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District Court No: CV11-03628
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE IN FORMA PAUPERIS OR FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME TO PAY FILING FEE
Appellant Coughlin submits this Motion on his own behalI requesting the above titled relieI.
FACTS
1. The Trial Court in RJC Rev2011-001708 granted Coughlin's Motion to Proceed on Appeal
IFP.
LAW
NRAP RULE24.PROCEEDINGS IN FORMA PAUPERIS
(a) LeavetoProceedonAppealinFormaPauperis.
(1) MotionintheDistrictCourt.Except as stated in Rule 24(a)(3), a party to a district court
action who desires to appeal in Iorma pauperis shall Iile a motion in the district court. The party
shall attach an aIIidavit that:
- 1/5 -
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS OR FOR AN EXTENSION OF
Aug 27 2012 09:17 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
000794
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(A)shows in the detail prescribed by Form 4 in the Appendix oI Forms the party`s
inability to pay or to give security Ior Iees and costs;
(B)claims an entitlement to redress; and
(C)states the issues that the party intends to present on appeal.
(2) ActionontheMotion.II the district court grants the motion, the party may proceed on
appeal without prepaying or giving security Ior Iees and costs. II the district court denies the
motion, it must state its reasons in writing.
(3) PriorApproval.Apartywhowaspermittedtoproceedinformapauperisinacivil
districtcourtactionmayproceedonappealinformapauperiswithout Iurther authorization,
unless the district courtbeIore or aIter the notice oI appeal is IiledcertiIies that the appeal is not
taken in good Iaith or Iinds that the party is not otherwise entitled to proceed in Iorma pauperis and
states in writing its reasons Ior the certiIication or Iinding.
(4) NoticeofDistrictCourt`sDenial.The district court clerk shall immediately notiIy the
parties and the Supreme Court when the district court does any oI the Iollowing:
(A)denies a motion to proceed on appeal in Iorma pauperis;
(B)certiIies that the appeal is not taken in good Iaith; or
(C)Iinds that the party is not otherwise entitled to proceed in Iorma pauperis.

(5) MotionintheSupremeCourt.A party may Iile a motion to proceed on appeal in Iorma
pauperis in the Supreme Court within 30 days aIter service oI the notice prescribed in Rule 24(a)
(4). The motion shall include a copy oI the aIIidavit Iiled in the district court and a copy oI the
district court`s statement oI reasons Ior its action. II no aIIidavit was Iiled in the district court, the
party shall include the aIIidavit prescribed by Rule 24(a)(1).
(b) Reserved.
(c) LeavetoUseOriginalRecord.A party allowed to proceed on appeal in Iorma pauperis
may request that the appeal be heard on the original record without reproducing any part.
Any Order by the District Court certiIying that Coughlin is not otherwise entitle to proceed in Iorma pauperis di
dnot suIIiciently state the rationale, or a supportable rationale Ior such a certiIication in writing, in any sort oI detail
suIIicient to statisIy the above rule Further, it is unconconstitutional to deny parties an opprotunity to appeal such denails
under NRS 12.015.
Dated this day 26th day oI August, 2012.
RespectIully Submitted By:
LAWOFFICEOFZACHARYBARKERCOUGHLIN,ESQ.
ZACHARYBARKERCOUGHLIN,ESQ.
NevadaBarNo.9473
P.O.Box3961
Reno,NV89505
Telephone:775.338.8118
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Fax:949.667.7402
ProseAppellant
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PROOFOFSERVICE
I am a resident oI the State oI Nevada, over the age oI eighteen years. My business address is
PO BOX 3961. On August 26th, 2012, the Iollowing document(s) were served on the party(ies)
below:
APPELLANT'SMOTIONTOPROCEEDINFORMAPAUPERIS
X By United States Mail- a true copy oI the document(s) listed above Ior collection and mailing
Iollowing the Iirm's ordinary business practice in a sealed envelope with postage thereon Iully prepaid
Ior deposit in the United States mail at Reno, Nevada addressed as set Iorth below unless the recipient
can technically be served electronically, then they were so served electronically.
X By Facsimile Transmission - the transmission was reported as complete and without error. A
copy oI the transmission report, properly issued by the transmitting machine, is attached to the hard
copy. The names and Iacsimile numbers oI the person(s) served are as set Iorth below.
RICHARDG.HILL,ESQ.
652ForestSt.
Reno,Nevada89509
Telephone:(775)348-0888
Fax:(775)348-0858
AttorneyforRespondentMerliss
ZACHARYBARKERCOUGHLIN,ESQ.
ProseAppellant
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INDEXTOEXHIBITS
1.EXHIBIT1:DRAFTOFAPPELLANT'SOPENINGBRIEFAPPELLANTWISHESTO
HAVEFILEDthirtysix(36)pages
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000798

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ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN; )
)
Appellant. )
) Supreme Court No: 60331
vs. )
)
MATT MERLISS, MD; MATTHEW J. District Court No: CV11-03628
Respondents
.
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF SET FORTH HEREIN
LAW OFFICE OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
P.O. Box 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Telephone: 775.338.8118
Fax: 949.667.7402
Pro Se Appellant
RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ.
652 Forest St.
Reno, Nevada 89509
Telephone: (775) 348-0888
Fax: (775) 348-0858
Attorney for Respondent Matthew 1. Merliss
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APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
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ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN;
Appellant.
vs.
)
)
)
)
)
Respondents
The undersigned counsel oI record certiIies that the Iollowing are persons and entities as
described in NRAP 26.1(a) and must be disclosed. These representations are made in order that
judges oI this court may evaluate possible disqualiIication or recusal. Counsel oI record Ior Appellant
Zachary Barker Coughlin aka Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq., certiIies that Appellant is an individual
with no corporate parents, private or public, and no stock evidencing an ownership interest in
Appellant, other than Appellant, no other party aIIiliated with Appellant has an interest in the
outcome oI this case. The only law Iirm or attorney to appear Ior Appellant in this appeal and
proceedings below is Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 9473
P.O. Box 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Telephone: 775.338.8118
Fax: 949.667.7402
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
I. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ......................................................................... 5
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................... 5
A. BrieI Nature OI The Case ........................................................................................ 5
B. Procedural History OI The Case .............................................................................. 5
C. Relevant Facts .......................................................................................................... 6
D. Standard oI Review..................................................................................................6
III. ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................... 6
A. Summary OI The Argument ......................................... 6
B. THE LOWER COURTS ERRED IN ISSUING/UPHODLING A SUMMARY
EVICTION ORDER IN THE FACE OF ESTABLISHED LEGAL DEFENSES, CLEAR
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS, PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
DEFICIENCIES, MISTAKES OF LAW, ETC., ETC. .................................7
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 15
V. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................ 17
VI. CERTIFICATE OF MAILING...................................................................... 20
didn't get to Iile Reply to Respondent's Answering BrieI oI 2 24 12 because RMC Judge Nash
Holmes (whom Iiled grievance against Coughlin with State Bar Iormign the basis oI pending SCR
117 Disability Petition) Iinding Coughlin in "summary criminal contempt" second aIter Coughlin
testiIied that a RPD Sargent lied in connecdtion with Couighlin being issued three traIIic citations
immediately aIter being told by the RPD to leave Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s law oIIice, where Coughlin
went to request Irom Hill the return oI Coughlin's driver's license and wallet and client Iiles Iollowing
Coughlin spending three days in jail pursuant to Hill's having the RPD arrest Coughlin Ior criminal
trespass at the Iormer law oIIice, despite a Iraudulent AIIidavit oI Service by the WCSO Machen
claiming he "personally served" the Eviction Order, Iailure ot comply with NRCP 6(e), NRS 40.400,
and where the RPD OIIicer arresting Coughlin admitted to Coughlin that he took bribes Irom Hill
(that RPD OIIicer may have been being sarcastic or not, but arresting an attorney Ior criminal trespass
incident to an eviction Irom his home law oIIice is hardly time to make jokes)...Coughlin served a 5
day jail stay, incident to that traIIic citation Trial beIore Judge Nash Holmes in 11 TR 26800,
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wherein, at one point, Judge Nash Holmes stated to Coughlin, "II you say Richard Hill's name one
more time I am going to put you in jail Ior contempt!"
n a later case in which oIIicers assisted a landlord in a dispute with a tenant, the court Iound that
they were not entitled to qualiIied immunity on a Ialse arrest claim. In Radvansky v. Olmsted Falls,
#03-3798, 395 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 2005), police arrested a man...Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois, #91-
6516, 506 U.S. 56 (1992) involved a Iamily that lived in a mobile home that they owned, which stood
on rented land in a trailer park. While Iormal eviction proceedings were pending, the owners oI the
land and their agent proceeded to Iorcibly evict the tenants. At the request oI the landlord`s agent,
deputies Irom the SheriII`s Department were there at the eviction. The Iamily claimed that the
deputies knew that the eviction was illegal and that there was no eviction order Irom a court, but that
they reIused to take their complaint Ior criminal trespass or interIere with the eviction process. They
allegedly told the Iamily that it was 'between the landlord and the tenant.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
Cases
Marcuse v. Del Webb Communities, 123Nev. 278, 163 P.3d 462 (2007).
Pine v. Leavitt, 1968, 445 P.2d 942, 84 Nev. 507.
Sawyer v. Sugarless Shops, Inc., 1990, 792 P.2d 14, 106 Nev. 265, rehearing denied.
Tschabold v. Orlando, 1987, 737 P.2d 506, 103 Nev. 224.
Gomez v. Independence Management oI Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276 (D.C. 2009)
Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 368 (D.C.1993)
Edwards, supra note 18, 130 U.S. App. D.C. at 141, 397 F.2d at 702
Hollins v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n, 760 A.2d 563, 579-80 (D.C.2000)
Hamilton v. Howard University, 960 A.2d 308, 315-16 (D.C.2008); Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP, 799 A.2d 381, 386 (D.C.2002); Hollins, 760 A.2d at 571.
Bantz. v. Montgomery Estates, Inc. 163 Wis.2d 973, 978, 473 N.W.2d 506,508 (Ct.App. 1991)
State Industrial Ins. Sys. v. United Exposition Servs. Co., 109 Nev. 28, 30 (1993).
Dredge Corp. v. Husite Co., 1962, 369 P.2d 676, 78 Nev. 69,
Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 2002, 57 P.3d 82, 118 Nev. 706,
Sarpy v. de la Houssaye, 217 So.2d 783 (La.App., 1969).
NGA #2 Ltd. Liability Co. v. Rains, 1997, 946 P.2d 163, 113 Nev. 1151.
Walker v. American Bankers Ins. Group, 1992, 836 P.2d 59, 108 Nev. 533.
Paullin v. Sutton, 102 Nev. 421,724 P.2d 749 (1986).
In re America, 252 P.3d at 693 (citing Buzz Stew, 124 Nev. at 228).
Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212,215,163 P.3d 405 (2007).
NJCRCP 76A.
Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122 Nev. 849, 138 P.3d 525 (2006).
Gibelliniv. Klindt, HONev. 1201, 1204,885 P.2d 540 (1994) (emphasis added).
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Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Bibb, 76 Nev. 332,335,353 P.2d 458 (1960).
Schuck v. Signature Flight Support oINevada, Inc., 126 Nev. (Adv.Op. 42),245 P.3d 542,544-545
(Nov. 4, 2010)
Statutes/Rules/Law Reviews
NRCP 6(e)
NRS 40.400
NRS 118A.355...
NRAP RULE8
NJCRCP 72A.
NRS 118A.490
JCRCP 110
JCRLV 44,
NRS 40.253(6).
NRS 118A.490
NRCP Rule 11
NRS 69.050
NRS 7.085
NRS 118A.510
118A.290
NRS 118A.360
NRS 118A.380
NRS 118A.210
NRS 108.475
NRS 40.760
See Kimberly E. O'Leary, The Inadvisability oI Applying Preclusive Doctrines to Summary
Evictions, 30 U. Tol. L. Rev. 49, 72 (1998) ("|T|he realities oI landlord-tenant practice make the use
oI preclusive doctrines in these actions especially problematic."); Rosemary Smith, Locked Out: The
Hidden Threat oI Claim Preclusion Ior Tenants in Summary Process, 15 SuIIolk J. Trial & App.
Advoc. 1, 25 (2010).
Gagliardi v. Williams, 834 F.2d 81 (1986).
Sellers v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Ct., 119 Nev. 256, 71 P .3d 495 (2003)
Awarding Attorney's Fees to Pro Se Litigants Under Rule 11, June, 1997, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2308,
Jeremy D. Spector.
I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES: Amongst the issues in this appeal is whether the Reno Justice
Court erred in granting a summary eviction oI appellant, ZACHARY COUGHLIN ("COUGHLIN")
by its Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Law, and Order Ior Summary Eviction ("FFCL&O") dated
December 27, 2012. See Record on Appeal ("ROA") at Vol. II, pp. 75-80. EXHIBIT 1 hereto, and,
whether the District Court in CV11-03628 similarly erred in Iailing to upholding the Summary
Eviction Order and ruling, by its Order oI June 25th, 2012 in CV11-03628 in Iavor oI Respondent
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MATT MERLISS' s ("Merliss") Motion for Attorneys Fees, awarding $42,050 in attorney's Iees against a
pro se litigant Ior an appeal oI a Summary Eviction Oraer..
1. Whether the lower court erred in Iinding, as a matter oI law, that Appellant tenant had
raised no legal deIense whatsoever and granted summary eviction pursuant to NRS 40.253 where
Appellant established a material issue oI Iact or law in meeting the summary judgment standard vis a
vis the deIenses oI retaliation and habitability, and Iurther where tenant plead and established that he
was a commercial tenant (p. 240 oI ROA, Tenant's Answer identiIies rental as "PlaintiII's home law
oIIice", etc...and that Respondent Iailed to allege the non-payment oI rent, and impermissibly Iorced
Appellant to make a "rent escrow deposit" with the Lower Court. ?
2. Whether the District Court committed an error oI law when it continued to hold a "Trial"
despite Iailing to accord the Notice Ior a Trial called Ior by JCRCP 110?
whether the RJC Filing OIIice handing Coughlin a Notice oI Appeal Iorm in response to his
speciIic request Ior one to appeal in this particular summary eviction proceeding vitiates any
attorney's Iee award, to whatever extent one is permissible anyways, given the $15.00 limitation
preprinted on that RJC Notice oI Appeal Iorm.
3. Whether the District Court and Justice Court erred in ruling that, since Coughlin's retaliation
deIense was based , in part, on alleged "habitability" issues, the court was within its jurisdiction when it
required him to deposit, pursuant to NRS 40.355(5), the amount oI rent Coughlin claimed he had withheld Ior
those reasons, beIore he would be allowed to substantiate them with evidence, even where the Reno Justice
Court has not published and had approved a corollary to JCRLV 44, and thus, under JCRCP 84, may not so
require a rent escrow deposit, in violation oI NRS 40.253(6).5
4. Whether, whats good Ior the goose is good Ior the gander, ie, iI Respondent can beneIit
Irom Coughlin being Iorced to deposit a "rent escrow" into the RJC (even where Respondent did not
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plead the non-payment oI rent), was it permissible Ior the Lower Courts to prevent Coughlin Irom
bringing his counterclaims pursuant to NRS 118A.490?
5. Whether a pro se attorney litigant can recover attorney's Iees under an NRCP Rule 11
sanctions Motion.
6. Whether the Lower Court was divested oI jurisdiction upon the Iiling oI a Notice oI Appeal
eceived" in docket on October 18th and Iiled October 19th, 2011) in the interim between
(marked "r
the Summary Eviction Hearing on October 12th, 2012 and the "Trial" on October 25th, 2011
7. Does Rule 11 apply to a Summary Eviction notice under the 'causing to be Iiled language
attached to Irivolous litigation constraints in cases like that Iound in the 834 F.2d 81 Gagliardi v.
Williams (1986).
8. Can a pro se litigant, who happens to be an attorney licensed in the state where the action is
brought, be sanctioned under NRS 7.085, even where some prohibition may apply against an attorney
representing himselI receiving attorney's Iees? Is that not an untenable situation where someone like
Baker can 'have it both ways? Sellers v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Ct., 119 Nev. 256, 71 P .3d 495
(2003), but, see: NOTE. Awaraing Attorneys Fees to Pro Se Litigants Unaer Rule 11, June, 1997, 95
Mich. L. Rev. 2308, Jeremy D. Spector.?
9. Whether attorney's Iees sanctions are recoverable under NRS 69.050 and or NRS 7.085 on
an appeal Iroma Summary Eviction Order.
10. Whether Respondent's attorneys impermissibly redacted portions oI their bills submitted
alogn with and Motion Ior Attorney's Fees Sanctions, and whether Respondent need have "actually
incurred" such bills Ior the purposes oI recovering them under a sanctions Motion (particularly, iI
Respondent had actually engaged counsel on a Ilat Iee basis or otherwise would not actually be
subject to collection Ior any such bills incurrea).
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11. Whether, by invoking a habitability/retaliation NRS 118A.510 and 118A.290 deIense in a
No Cause Summary Eviction subjects a tenant a requirement to deposit "rent escrow" with a Justice
Court a la NRS 118A.355?
12. Whether it was reversible error Ior the Lower Court to apply NRS 118A.355(5) and
require tenant in Summary Eviction to make rent escrow deposit where Justice Court had yet to
"establish by local rule a mechanism by which tenants may deposit rent withheld...", in violation oI
both NRS 40.253(6), and JCRCP 83, especially where no corollary to LVJCR Rule 44 did not exist in
the Reno Justice Court at the time, and especially where tenant was denied his right to pursue
counterclaims under NRS 118A.490 and where tenant had already appropriately Iixed and deducted
such amounts under NRS 118A.360 and 118A.380?
13. Whether is was reversible error to award Respondnet a pro rata award Ior "storage" costs
under NRS 118A.460 that was oI a value equal to the amount previously charged Ior "Iull use and
occupancy", under NRS 118A.210, especially where tenant was then subject to custodial arrest and
conviction Ior criminal trespass, despite the import oI NRS 108.475: Use oI storage space Ior
residence prohibited; eviction; nature oI Iacility; eIIect oI issuance oI document oI title Ior property;
and NRS 40.760: Summary eviction oI person using space in Iacility Ior storage as residence, and
where Respondent Iailed to respond to appropriately respond to tenant's requests Ior an opportunity to
retreive his personal property.
14. Whether the Lower Court erred in reIusing to allow tenant to pursue counterclaims (even
those expressly permitted under the Lease Agreement with regard to the landscaper's property
damage) under NRS 118A.490:
"Actions based upon nonpayment oI rent: Counterclaim by tenant; deposit oI rent
with court; judgment Ior eviction.
1. In an action Ior possession based upon nonpayment oI rent or in an action Ior
rent where the tenant is in possession, the tenant may deIend and counterclaim Ior
any amount which the tenant may recover under the rental agreement, this chapter, or
other applicable law."
15. Whether NRS 118A.355 is even implicated (assuming the Iailure oI the RJC to create a
local rule is not dispositive) to the extent Appellant invoked NRS 118A.360 appropriately multiple
times over the tenancy, which exceeded one year, and Ior amounts up to those allowed under that
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section and where any bar to litigating habitability Iound in NRS 118A.355(5) does not extend to
those proceeding under other sections oI 118A, such as 118A.360, 118A.390, and 118A.510?
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Brief Nature of The Case: This is an appeal Irom an Second Judicial District Court,
Washoe County, order granting summary eviction in Iavor oI Respondent Matthew Joel Merliss, MD.
The Honorable Patrick Flanagan presided.
B. Procedural History of The Case: The Lease Agreement ("LEASE") Ior the home at 121
River Rock, Reno, Nevada (the "PROPERTY") can be Iound at ROA, Vol. V, pp 129-132. EXHIBIT
6 hereto. There was one hearing on October 13th, 2011 and a Trial on October 25th, 2011. The Iirst
hearing was on October 13, 2011, and lasted 90 minutes. A continuation oI that hearing that was
reIerred to as a Trial, noticed as a Trial, in writing by the RJC, occurred on October 25, 2011, and
lasted several hours. The purpose oI the Iirst hearing was to be a summary eviction proceeding an see
iI a genuine issue oI meterial Iact or law existed, ie, to "determine the truthIulness and suIIiciency
oIthe tenant's and the landlord's aIIidavits," to determine whether there is any "legal deIense as to the
alleged unlawIul detainer," and whether "the tenant is guilty oI an unlawIul detainer". On October
13th, 2011 PlaintiII, represented by CASEY BAKER, ESQ. DeIendant, ZACHARY COUGHLIN
appeared Ior a Summary Eviction hearing beIore Judge SFERRAZZA. Hearing held. Tenant's Motion
to Continue Denied. II tenant posts rent oI$2,275.00 by 9:00 am, Monday (so says the Docket at page
2 oI ROA, Vol. 1. Coughlin did so deposit pretty much all the money in the world available to him as
such a rent escrow. Coughlin submitted Ior Iiling a Notice oI Appeal on October 18th, 2011, which
the RJC Iiled on October 19th, 2011, divesting it oI jurisdiction when consiering the RJC also had
more than enough oI Coughlin's money to cover any Iees, bonds, etc. Then, Respondent arranged Ior
another one oI his ex parte "lets get an Order allowing us to barge in an inspect a law oIIice
unnoticed" deals. October 26th, 2011 Motion to Set Aside Eviction Order Iiled. mm SUBMITTED
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and DENIED. November 1, 2011 Emergency Appeal and Motion to Stay Eviction Iiled and
SUBMITTED. Letter requesting last hour oI CD Iiled., November 3rd, another Notice oI Appeal
Iiled. ROA, Vol. 1, page 2.
Coughlin Iiled a whole diIIerent appeal in Irom that Justice Court case, which may well make
CV!1-03628 completely void: CV11-03051 ZACH COUGHLIN VS. MATT MERLISS ET AL (D1)
19-OCT-2011
C. Relevant Facts: The relevant Iacts are those Irom the Complaint. CV11-
01896.. Those Iacts, which must be accepted as true, are as Iollows:
1. Contrary to the assertion in Repondent's Answering BrieI in CV11-03628 at page 5 (ie, that
"Coughlin aIIirmatively waived any argument that NRS Chapter 118A does not apply by basing his entire
defense (retaliation/habitability) on what he alleged were violations oI that chapter...." (Coughlin Note: one,
there is more to the deIense, and two, Coughlin didn't say 118A didn't apply, just that NRS 40.253 is not
permissible against commercial tenant's where the non-payment oI rent is not pled, particularly Ior the events
under which this matter rose at the times oI relevant import and consdering what law then applies).
Respondent continued: "Additionally, since Coughlin never timely raised the argument below, it cannot
Iorm the basis Ior any relieI on appeal..." But, the Iact is, Coughlin did raise that argument, in his October
17th, 2011 Iiling (see page 97-99 oI ROA, Vol. 1), and at the hearing, and in other Iilings. It is Respondent
who nows must Iact the Iact that his Iailure to raise his arguments in opposition to that position put Iorth by
Appellant bar him Irom now so doing. (See Respondent's Opposition, Iailing to so counter Coughlin's
argument, at page 108, ROA, Vol.1). But "|p|arties `may not raise a new theory Ior the Iirst time on appeal,
which is inconsistent with or diIIerent Irom the one raised below.'" Dermody v. City oI Reno, 113 Nev. 207,
210, 931 P.2d 1354, 1357 (1997) (quoting Powers v. Powers, 105 Nev. 514, 516, 779 P.2d 91, 92 (1989)). This
rule is not meant to be harsh, overly Iormalistic, or to punish careless litigators. Rather, the requirement that
parties may raise on appeal only issues which have been presented to the district court maintains the eIIiciency,
Iairness, and integrity oI the judicial system Ior all parties. Boyers v. Texaco ReIining and Marketing, Inc., 848
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F.2d 809, 812 (7th Cir.1988). This is the case becaue Coughlin plead and established that he was a
commercial tenant even beyond the October 17th, 2011 Iiling....(p. 240, 248 oI ROA, Vol. 1,
Tenant's Answer identiIies rental as "PlaintiII's home law oIIice", etc...:"especially in light oI the
recent bad Iaith attempts to inspect with recording equipment plaintiff's home law office hours aIter
having the power shut oII at plaintiff's home law office where landlord had, apparently, a delinquent
utility bill assigned to the property tenant rents, and where no notice was provided to tenant oI the
impending interruption oI essential services, causing attorney tenant Coughlin's law practice
damages." Additionally, at page 11 oI the Answering BrieI, Respondent admits that the REntal
Agreement permitted Coughlin's commercial use oI the property, regardless oI Respondent's attempts
to make arguments in the record based upon what Respondent's think some witness who never
testiIied might have said had she done so.... Also, in the ROA Vol 2. page 86-110, 125, 130-135.
Coughlin put into the record and evidence prooI related to a City oI Reno housing/building code
ordinance being violated by the overly tall weed growth in the law at the Iormer home law oIIice
(Iurther, under Anvui, complicated issues oI contractual interpreation not well suited to summary
judgment). "Reno City Charter reIerence; Reno Municipal Code (20 rages)- Authority to adopt
uniIorm codes, ~ 2.110. Sec. 14.04.100. - International ReSidential Code. The 2006 Edition oI the
International Residential Code including Appendix Chapters G and H Copyright 2006 by the
International Code Council marked as "Exhibit C"; together with such changes to the Residential
Code, as are necessary to make the same applicable to the conditions in the city which arc marked
"Exhibit B"; all oI which is adopted by reIerence and incorporated herein and made a part hereoI as iI
set Iorth in Iull. (Ord. No. 6092, ~ 3, 2-11-09)". Further, the ROA, Vol 1. at pages 209 -230 presents
photographic evidence put into the record by Coughlin supporting his habitability, retaliation, and
other claims, including photos oI the overgrown weeds and toxic mold on the insulation, the perosnal
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property oI Coughlin's damaged by Respondnent's agent (Ior which Respondnet is expressly liable
under the Lease Agreement), crumbling steps, broken window, etc., etc. Additionally, emails
between Coughlina and Merliss conIirming the habitability notice and Iailure to cure and submission
oI itemized bills to Respondent are Ioudn therein at ROA Vol 1. page 248.. Evidence supporting the
urine sludge wax toilet ring problem, page 98 ROA, vol. 1. Further, the record is complete with these
emails between Appellant and Respondent at ROA, Exhibits A-I and 1-9, pages 107-115. and
Especially Tenant's Exhibit 8 at pages 158-172 oI ROA, Exhibits A-I and 1-9, which clearly reveal
that Respodent was notice on all the various issues alleged and Iailed to adequately cure or responde
thereto, and ultimately, retaliated against Coughlin Ior pointing that out and asserting the rent
deductions he was entitled to or damages pursuant to the Lease Agreement, particularly when
reviewing the audio cd oI the cross examination Io Merliss that will be provided to this Court.
2. On page 242-243 oI the ROA, Vol. 1, in his Tenant's AIIidavit Coughlin alleges that: "3 In an
email to the exact address listed Ior Richart Hill, Esq. at nvbar.org and Irom which an email was
received, Zach Coughlin sent to Richard Hill, Esq. (the attorney whom both Hill and Merliss directed
tenant to, in writing, Iorward all Iuture correspondences) date August 17
th
, 2011 (21 day harbor beIore
Iiling Motion Ior Sanctions on September 6, 2011), the tenant wrote 'HopeIully Matt has copied you
on all our previous correspondences...but knowing Matt, he probably has Iorgotten about them or
doesn't realize they were ever delivered, etc. Anways, I probably have copies oI all oI them, many oI
which are notices to Iix things, etc., ...We are both attorneys and I wish to do my part to avoid getting
into court and looking like we haven't done the leg work necessary to pin down the areas oI
contention and eliminate doubt with regard to things that are easily established, such as the written
notices I have sent Matt that have gone without response, Ior things like, a broken window, broken
sprinkler system, fallen insulation, etc. Further, Matt approved things like repairing the
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crumbling front steps, etc. He provided directions such as "get two estimates and choose the
cheapest one and deduct it Irom the rent..." Well, repairing crumbling steps is not super cheap. Matt
seems to have Iorgotten about these written deals entirely... where does that leave Matt's estimate oI
what I owe? The steps have been repaired. As has the garbage disposal and other items. The
window is still broken, Matt never responded to requests Ior the cost oI noxious weed ordinance
Iine avoiding landscaping the previous season (I would, Ior now, take the same $350 I agreed to this
season, which is surely less than Matt paid the crew oI 4 men to service the neighboring house Ior 8
hours recently) with jagged edges of glass exposed, and an entryway with grip strips and wooden
planks that are in disrepair. I have a law oIIice to run and cannot both pay rent and be the pro bono
handyman Ior the absentee landlord while he is oII traveling to Amsterdam and Bangkok. I made a
very reasonable oIIer to Matt to Iix it. I made an incredibly reasonable oIIer to Matt to have the
seasonal noxious weed ordinance Iine avoiding weeding taken care oI Ior $350, which he
enthusiastically agreed to, then a landscaping crew promptly came and ripped up a faux grass
installation that had cost me a great deal of time and money to put in place, then refused to put
that personal property back on my rental property at all, leaving it on the sidewalk and in the
street. 700 square Ieet oI Iaux grass (actually high density woolen green carpet that is Iar more
expensive than simple "astroturI") is not something you want to just leave out in the street, and it is
deIinitely something you don't want to have to move and install twice, especially while your landlord
is apparently so well oI that he can agree to a a $350 rent deduction Ior the exact same thing he later
hires a landscaping crew to do while he is in the Phillipeans, again.... Coughlin alerted landlord on
several occasions oI a serious problem with insulation that had Iallen in the basement under the
house, Irom the ceiling, and in some cases, onto ground, which did not have a vapor barrier and thus
cultivated some mold on the insulations. Coughlin incurred $500 expense in removing the
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offending fallen mold ridden insulation and dealing with higher heating and air conditioning
costs as a result, thereby entitling Coughlin to such a rent deduction of $500 at the very least, iI
not more in associated damages, some oI which are likely unknown at this point due to Merliss's
inattentive nature as a landlord..." See page 242-243 oI the ROA, Vol. 1.
3. ROA Vol 1, p. 244: "On August 26, 2011, the Baker received a telephone call Irom
Coughlin. During that telephone conversation, Mr. Coughlin mentioned, aIter painstakingly polite
attempts to get Baker to actually converse with his client and ascertain whether or not the amounts
Merliss was alleging were owed, were in Iact, owed , and to otherwise diligently review all the
written materials sent between landlord and tenant to ascertain the validity oI those debts and the
likely deIenses thereto, in accordance with Baker's responsibilities as a lawyer representing Merliss,
and that, should Baker Iail to do so, tenant might be Iorced to Iile a Rule 11 sanctions motion against
the Baker and Merliss iI Merliss did not retract the aIorementioned notices or otherwise agree to some
extension oI time devoted to avoiding the waste oI judicial resources. Coughlin urged Baker to be
careIul representing Merliss, noting that Merliss had been rather absent minded as a landlord, was
apparently not very detail oriented, and oIten gave oII an air oI entitlement as iI to say 'you, tenant,
are my pro bono property manager and shall handle all the little details oI having things Iixed,
arranging Ior inspections and estimates, etc, that is, iI you are lucky enough to receive a response
Irom me at in regard to the various little people problems you Ieel I should address, as I am oIt out oI
the country, in places like Bangkok and Amsterdam, and really can't be bothered with anything more
than having you pay my mortgage entirely and thank me Ior the hospitality I have oIIered you in
allowing you to do so. Coughlin noted to Baker that such clients oft-times get attorney's in
trouble, particularly with regard to Rule 11 violations, especially when a litigation involves
something of such primary importance to a litigant as his home/office. Coughlin queried Baker
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as to what, exactly, Baker had done to veriIy that the debts Merliss was alleging were 'based in law
or Iact. Baker was curiously evasive and or non responsive in the various questions Coughlin posed
in this respect when he was not displaying a complete an utter lack oI knowledge with regard to the
disputes between landlord and tenant, including whether his client had agreed to any rent deductions,
had been made aware oI any property damage caused by the landlord's agents or employees, had
Iailed to cure any habitability issues his client had been inIormed oI in writing Ior a period over 14
days since past, etc..."
4. ROA, Vol. 1, p 245: "8. Tenant Coughlin has been damaged personally, proIessionally, and
economically, and emotionally by DeIendant's actions. 9. Coughlin alerted Green Action, Darlene
Sharpe and Landlord Merliss oI the property damage done to Coughlin's personal property by Green
Action in or around June, 2011. The Lease Agreement between Coughlin and Merliss speciIies that
Merliss will be liable Ior property damage he causes to tenant's property."
5. Tenant's AIIidavit, ROA, Vol. 1, p 245: "Coughlin obtained the directed estimates Ior the
repair oI the crumbling stairs/steps/risers at the home/oIIice's entryway steps. Following Merliss's
instructing yielded a cost oI $1,250 Ior the repair oI the stairs. A $350 rent deduction Ior one seasons
oI noxious weed ordinance was agreed to in writing by Merliss, another was agreed to implicitly Ior a
total yard work rent deduction oI $750. This is all detailed in painstakingly clear emails to and Irom
the landlord and tenant attached to the original Tenant's Answer. Similarly, the disposal repair came
to $125. Coughlin's law practice, and liIe in general, has been adversely impacted a great deal by
Merliss's misdeeds as a landlord. Somehow, however, globe trottin' CaliIornian With a Trust Fund
Merliss thinks Coughlin has exhibited an 'attitude oI entitlement in this situation. Merliss has
curiously reIrained Irom holding all non white males at all involved in this action accountable Ior
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their acctions, including Iormer co-tenant, Green Action Lawn Service, and Darlene Sharpe. This
may entail a housing discrimination claim..."
6. Contrary to the assertions oI Respondent's Counsel in Respondent's BrieI in CV11-03628,
Coughlin did in Iact invoke NRS 118A.490 in his Tenant's AIIidavit, at p.262, ROA, Vol. 1.
(Respondent's Answering BrieI, page 8, in CV11-03628: " Coughlin complains that it was reversible
error Ior the "trial court" to apply NRS 118A.490. He does not cite to anywhere in the ROA to support his
allegation that that statute was ever applied by the court."
7. Tenant provided respondent Iix and deduct notices and itemized statements under NRS 118A.290,
118A.360, and NRS 118A.380, 118A.390, and 118A.510. CITE TO ROA regarding mold (insulation heating
and Iilth), toilet ring plumbing (Iilth and plumbing), back door lock, broken window, crumbling stairs, weed
ordinance, criminal law violations oI landscapers...
8. At one hearing, RJC Judge SIerrazza admitted, on the record, that the RJC Judges had a meeting in
response to arguments brought up by Coughlin concerning the lack oI an established local rule vis a vis NRS
118A.355(5), and NRS 40.253(6), admitting that no such rule, technically, had been promulgated, published,
and approved by the Nevada Supreme Court.
9. Coughlin clearly preserved his objection to the lower court exceeding the jurisdiction accord it
under NRS 40.253(6) at ROA, Vol. 1, p 95-96, clearly invoked NRS 118A.290 (page 98 oI ROA,
Vol.1), Respodent clearly only served a 5 day unlawIul detainer notice oI the No Cause Eviction
variety and thereIore Iailed to allege non-payment oI rent against this commercial tennant (p. 269
ROA Vol.1) and Coughlin clearly pled that he was a commercial tenant (p. 160-164, 196, 240, ROA
Vol. 1, and page 9-11, ROA Vol. 2, and as set Iorth previously above). It is patently dishonest an
violative oI the Rules oI ProIessional conduct regarding candor to a tribunal and Iairness to opposing
counsel Ior Respondent's counsel to suggest they are blind sided by the argument that this summary
evicdtion involved a commercial tenant. However, Respondnent's counsel does just that in its
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Answering BrieI in CV11-03628 (p. 6 oI that Answering BrieI): "3. Granting a no-cause summary
eviction against a "commercial" tenant Coughlin now argues that he was a "commercial" tenant, and
thereIore not subject to summary eviction. He Iirst raised this argument in his "opposition to motion
Ior order to show cause," which he Iiled on December 5, 2011, six weeks aIter the eviction was
granted 31. ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 253-261. (That is not true Coughlin raised the issue in the Justice
Court case, both in the hearing and in his Iiling oI October 17th, 2011, plead as a commercial tenant,
and cited to the law Iorbidding the use oI summary eviciton procedures against commercial tenants
where the non-payment oI rent is not noticed or alleged...Iurther NRCP 60(b)(4) will allow Ior
challenging the Eviction Order as void Ior lack oI subject matter jurisdiction (NRS 40.400 makes
NRCP applicable). Merliss addressed it in his reply Iiled the Iollowing day.32 First, Coughlin has
the law wrong. Summary evictions are available against a tenant oI any property that is subject to
NRS Chapter 118A, which Merliss' property unquestionably was.33 (well, actually, not against
commercial tenant's where the non-payment oI rent is not pled or noticed, as here).
And, actually, and this is awesome, really, Coughlin did in Iact raise the whole issue oI NRS
40.253 Iorbidding the use oI a summary eviction procedure against a commercial tenant where the
non-payment oI rent is not alleged in his Emergency Motion Iiled October 17th, 2011, page 99, ROA,
Vol. 1: "In most cases, the landlord can choose whether to lile a summary or I011l1al eviction action.
However, there are circumstances under which summary eviction cannot be used. For instance.
summary eviction is not available for: 2) Eviction of commercial tenants for other than
nonpayment of rent (See NRS 40.254) Using location for a "commercial" law practice, you Iiled
a no cause, ie, "Ior other than nonpayment oI rent. not based in law or Iact, Rule 11, plus this escrow
thing gets put asunder." Plus, at page 108-115 oI the ROA Vol. 1, Respondent Iailed to ever address
Coughlin's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed under a summary eviction statute
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against a commercial tenant where the non-payment oI rent was not notice or pled....So, under Polk,
Respondent's Iailure to Iile any opposition to that argument is taken as an admission. At some point,
Court's sua sponte chipping in arguments on behalI oI this tag team oI Respondent's attorney's and
their phalanx oI legal assistants who make enough to push Mercedes SL600 sport couples equipped
with V12 engines, when considering all that is in opposition to lil' ol crazy Zach Coughlin's legal
dribble....well, it all just seems kind oI unIair, doesn't it. Also, page 259 oI Vol. 4. oI the ROA makes
clear that Coughlin preserved his arguments related to the voidness oI any summary eviction order
where the "service" thereoI was as deeply Ilawed as the attempted service in this matter oI such an
Order.
10. Page 97-98 oI the ROA, Vol. 1 show Coughlin established materials issues respecting the
discrimination claim and retaliation Ior reporting criminal law violations and code violations: "also
complained about the workers he was hiring, noxious weed ordinance, mold inIestation, window is
essential service, saIety hazards, oh, and the landscaping crew came on my property and committed
the taking and carrying away oI property which was mine, that is arguably tantamount to theIt, so I
complained oI a criminal law. Hiring unlicensed and or undocumented workers is similarly a
violation. Insulation is an essential service and a habitability issue."....Also, Page 9-12, ROA Vol. 2:
"NRS l 18a.510 prevents Dr. Merliss Irom relaliating against the undersigned Ior seeking redress Ior
these complaints the undersigned is protection Irom retaliation Ior reporting include: criminal
mayhem, destruction oI property, toxic mold inIestation, insuIIicient and damaged insulation, a
broken window that has exposed sharp shards oI glass remaining attached to the caulking, broken
kitchen sink disposal, a Iallen ceiling light Iixture. Additionally, a washing machine that twice
Ilooded the living room carpet, when repaired by and Ilooded again by "
Antonio" (who did not clean up the water that Ilooded the Iloors, the undersigned did, with the
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undersigned's wet/dry shopvac in addition to placing Iour Ians out to dry the Iloors and prevent
molding oI the carpet and its underlayment),...additional protected complaints included crumbling
stairs to the Iront entrance oI the home law oIIice, rotting wood and peeling grip strips on the wooden
deck directly beIore the Iront door, crumbling brick steps in the backyard, extreme noxious weeds
sprouting up on both properties owned by Dr. Merliss (which also create extremely painIul goatheads
dried out weed carcasses that are real hazard to dog's paws). Dr. Merliss remarked in writing about
how much more he like dealing with the undersigned's Iormer co-tenant,...(who took Coughlin's share
oI the Final two months she lived at the residence and Iailed to Iorward it on to Dr. Merliss, but who
did subsequently arrange to make payments with Dr. Merliss, an interesting double dipping scenario
being created whereby Dr. Merliss could potentially recoup much more than he Ieels he is owed).
(Former Co-Tenant) is halI Mexican, ...the undersigned has made a protected complaint that he is
being discriminated against on the basis oI his inclusion in several protected class, ie, his race,
national origin, and sex, where Dr. Merliss Iinds (Coughlin's Iormer Co-Tenant) a Iresh breeze, he
Iinds the undersigned an "entitled" thorn in his side, "keeping him away Irom the important work he
is doing in his medical practice." Similarly, Dr. Merliss is unable to hold Darlene Sharpe, a Iemale,
or the Green Action Lawn Service crew and its owner, all Hispanic, accountable Ior the property
damage they caused and which ms. sharpe encouraged, despite the Iact that the Green Action Lawn
Service crew was aware oI the lawn carpeting at the undersigned's residence prior to making their bid
to work on the landscaping/weeds at that residence. That crew was well aware oI the lawn carpeting
Irom the entire day 6 oI them spent weeding the house Dr. Merliss owns next door to the
undersigned's residence ... the Green Action crew admitted to Coughlin (and Coughlin was
prevented from submitting video and audio recordings into the record by 1udge Sferrazza,
despite the salient importance to Coughlin's counterclaims any statements they made would have as to
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whether Dr. Merliss is responsible Ior or ratiIied the property damage to coughlin careIul wool green
law carpet installation, which was laid, cut, and notched around the house and exterior Ience in a very
exacting manner, only to be converted by the green action crew and leIt in the street and sidewalk
near the house, creating a theIt hazard and exigent situation in which the undersigned's law practice
suIIered economic damages and Coughlin was required to take immediate action to mitigate the
damages." Further, the retaliation and discrimination claim is preserved and supported a ROA Vol. 2,
page 13: "The time-line oI Coughlin's written complaints, established in excruciating detail in the
attached chronological collection oI time stamped emails between landlord and tenant clearly
establishes a retaliatory motive and intent on Dr. Merliss's part. indeed, Dr. Merliss on numerous
occasions reIerred to the undersigned as "entitled". A retaliatory animus is clearly evinced in such
statements, and as such the actual damages allowed under nrs 118A should be granted..."
11. Coughlin clearly preserved Ior appeal his objection to being denied the right to assert
counterclaims within the summary eviction proceeding, much less within the "Trial" oI October 25th,
2011. See. ROA, Vol. 1, page 133-136. See Kimberly E. O'Leary, The Inadvisability oI Applying
Preclusive Doctrines to Summary Evictions, 30 U. Tol. L. Rev. 49, 72 (1998) ("|T|he realities oI
landlord-tenant practice make the use oI preclusive doctrines in these actions especially
problematic."); Rosemary Smith, Locked Out: The Hidden Threat oI Claim Preclusion Ior Tenants in
Summary Process, 15 SuIIolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 1, 25 (2010).
D. Standard of Review
"|A|n order granting summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be reviewed on appeal based
upon the standard Ior review oI an order granting summary judgment under NRCP 56 because these
proceedings are analogous. Anvui. Purpose oI summary judgment rule is not to deprive litigants oI
their right to trial on merits iI they really have issues to try. NRCP 56(c). Pine v. Leavitt, 1968, 445
P.2d 942, 84 Nev. 507; Summary judgment is drastic remedy. NRCP 56(c). Pine v. Leavitt, 1968, 445
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P.2d 942, 84 Nev. 507. Documentary evidence, hearing and determination on a motion for
summary judgment, documentary evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, and all of the nonmoving party's statements must be accepted as true and a
district court may not pass on the credibility of affidavits. Sawyer v. Sugarless Shops, Inc., 1990,
792 P.2d 14, 106 Nev. 265, rehearing denied. Genuine issue oI material Iact precluding grant oI
summary judgment in Iavor oI employer ...presented by employer's evidence that employee was
injured in a Iight ... and testimony by the injured employee... Tschabold v. Orlando, 1987, 737 P.2d
506, 103 Nev. 224.
Trial court's jurisdiction in summary proceeding Ior eviction oI a tenant was divested, and
jurisdiction oI court oI appeal attached, upon timely Iiling oI appeal bond, and trial court thereaIter
had no jurisdiction in matter except as to certain matters not pertinent to appeal and to test surety on
appeal bond. Sarpy v. de la Houssaye, 217 So.2d 783 (La.App., 1969); Mack-Manley v. Manley,
122 Nev. 849, 138 P.3d 525 (2006).
Gomez v. Independence Management oI Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276 (D.C. 2009): "In 19.
We have said in another context that a claim oI 'a retaliatory motive is a question oI Iact Ior the jury
(or the judge in a non-jury trial), and, like other types oI claims in which motive or intent is in issue,
is not well suited to disposition on a motion Ior summary judgment. Arthur Young & Co. v.
Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 368 (D.C.1993) (reIerring to a claim oI retaliatory action under the
DCHRA); see Edwards, supra note 18, 130 U.S. App. D.C. at 141, 397 F.2d at 702 ('The question oI
permissible or impermissible purpose is one oI Iact Ior the court or jury). We have said the same
thing about claims oI discrimination, see, e.g., Hollins v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n, 760 A.2d
563, 579-80 (D.C.2000), but we have, on occasion, upheld a trial court grant oI summary judgment in
Iavor oI a deIendant accused oI discrimination. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Howard University, 960 A.2d
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308, 315-16 (D.C.2008); Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, 799 A.2d 381, 386
(D.C.2002); Hollins, 760 A.2d at 571. We thereIore do not Ioreclose the possibility that, on a properly
supported record, the trial court may dispose oI a deIense oI retaliatory eviction at the summary
judgment stage. When the statutory presumption oI retaliatory action has been triggered, however, the
record would have to establish, under the standards that govern summary judgment, that the landlord
has rebutted it by clear and convincing evidence." Whether a particular set oI Iacts gives rise to a
legal deIense is a question oI law. See Bantz. v. Montgomery Estates, Inc. 163 Wis.2d 973, 978, 473
N.W.2d 506,508 (Ct.App. 1991) (whether Iacts IulIill a particular legal standard is a question oI law).
Questions oI law are reviewed de novo. State Industrial Ins. Sys. v. United Exposition Servs. Co., 109
Nev. 28, 30 (1993). A motion Ior summary judgment may be supported not only by the pleadings but
by discovery procedures, demand Ior admissions, aIIidavits and depositions. NRCP 56. Dredge Corp.
v. Husite Co., 1962, 369 P.2d 676, 78 Nev. 69, certiorari denied 83 S.Ct. 39, 371 U.S. 821, 9 L.Ed.2d
61. On a motion Ior summary judgment, non-moving party's statements must be accepted as true, all
reasonable inIerences that can be drawn Irom the evidence must be admitted, and neither the trial
court nor Supreme Court may decide issues oI credibility based upon the evidence submitted in the
motion or the opposition. Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 2002, 57 P.3d 82, 118 Nev. 706,
rehearing denied, reconsideration en banc denied, certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 82, 540 U.S. 817, 157
L.Ed.2d 34. In deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, evidence must be viewed in light
most Iavorable to party against whom summary judgment is sought, and Iactual allegations, evidence,
and all reasonable inIerences in Iavor oI that party must be presumed correct. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
56(c). NGA #2 Ltd. Liability Co. v. Rains, 1997, 946 P.2d 163, 113 Nev. 1151. In considering
motion Ior summary judgment, district courts must construe evidence presented in light most
Iavorable to party against whom summary judgment is sought; all oI nonmovant's statements must be
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accepted as true, and district courts may not pass on credibility oI aIIidavits. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
56(c). Walker v. American Bankers Ins. Group, 1992, 836 P.2d 59, 108 Nev. 533. "Evidence
supported Iinding that landlord's eviction oI tenant was retaliatory Ior her complaints concerning
persistent plumbing problems and condition oI common areas. n.r.s. 118a.510. Paullin v. Sutton, 102
Nev. 421,724 P.2d 749 (1986).
III. ARGUMENT; A. Summary Of The Argument:
The lower court erred when it issued an order oI summary eviction. Coughlin presented
suIIicient evidence to raise the legal deIense oI habitability and retaliation, and ambiguous questions
oI Lease interpretation. Coughlin also presented ample evidence oI a genuine legal dispute between
the parties centering on the interpretation oI what constituted damages caused by "agents" oI the
landlord (Ior which the Lease Agreement calls Ior the landlord's liability, which engendered a
retaliatory eviction here upon a rent oIIset being properly asserted) under the lease. Once this legal
deIense was raised, the lower court should have declined to issue a summary eviction order under
NRS 40.253.
B. THE LOWER COURTS ERRED IN ISSUING/UPHODLING A SUMMARY
EVICTION ORDER IN THE FACE OF ESTABLISHED LEGAL DEFENSES, CLEAR
1URISDICTIONAL DEFECTS, PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
DEFICIENCIES, MISTAKES OF LAW, ETC., ETC.
'10.SUBLEASING: Resident may not assign, sublet, or transIer his interest, no any part
thereoI without prior written consent oI management, which will not be unreasonably withheld.
Resident further may use the premises for any commercial enterprise, but not for any purpose
which unlawful.
'11. OCCUPANCY: Occupancy oI the premises is limited to 2 adults ? Children, and shall be used
Ior a residence and Ior other purposes....
'13. UTILITIES: Resident agrees to pay Ior the Iollowing utilities: Gas x Electricity x Oil, Light
x, Heat x, Energy x, Other, Resident's responsibility Ior these begins at the commencement oI
this agreement. See attached transIer oI account Addendum (note: there is no such TransIer oI
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Account Addendum attached to the Lease Agreement). Utilities not payable by the Resident will be
paid by the Management.
Further, ambiguity exists with respect to Sections 3 and 20 oI the Lease Agreement and state
law concerning retaliation and the voiding oI lease terms that are unconcionable. As such, the import
oI Section 20 is vitiated in light oI Section 3 and the retaliatory conduct oI the landlord. That being
the case, NRS 40.360(3)'s dictates that 5 days elapse Irom entry oI order (Ior leases that have not
terminated by their terms) made this order and the lockout void and present reversible error, as well
as a lack oI subject matter jurisdiction.
'20 TERMINATION: This Agreement and the tenancy hereby granted may be terminated by
either party within 30 days oI the deIined termination date (reIer to Paragraph 2), or any time
thereaIter by giving the other party not less than thirty (30)day prior notice in writing or as otherwise
allowed by the laws oI the State oI Nevada (ReIer to Paragraph 1 and 9 Ior monetary liabilities).
Amibiguity suIIicient to deIeat summary judgment was argued and supported by evidence
(includign RMC Code on a noxious weed ordinance, weed height, and pictures clearly showing the
weeds exceeded the permissible weed heights, in conjunction with the Iollowing Lease Agreement
section:
'22 MAINTENANCE, REPIARS, OR ALTERATIONS:...Tenant will irrigate and maintain any
surrounding grounds, including lawns and shrubbery, if they are for the tenant's exclusive
use. ... Owner will be responsible for the cost of any retrofitting required by governmental
agencies.
Respondent put on absolutely no evidence, authority, or argument, really, that the weeds
should be considered tenant's problem in light oI the above. Regardless, Respondent waived any such
claim by agreeing to pay Tenant to do the weeding, only Respondent or his 'property manager
messed that up by also hiring Green Action Lawn Service to do the same (and Respondent actually
testiIied under oath that he paid that crew $2,000 to do the same thing he paid Appellant $350 to
do...). The only problem is that landscaping crew damaged Appellant's personal property and cause
lost business, proIits, and consequential damages, all supported by testimony and documentary
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evidence. And the Lease Agreement makes Respondent liabile Ior such, or at least suIIicient
ambiguity exists in that regard to preclude the summary judgment on that issue the Trial Court made:
'23. DAMAGES TO PREMISES: II the premise are damaged by time or through any other cause
which renders the premises untenantable, either party will have the right to terminated this Agreement
as the date on which the damage occurs.
Written notice oI termination will be give to the other party within IiIteen (15) days aIter occurrence oI such damage.
Should such damage or destruction occur as the result oI negligence oI Tenant, or his/her invitee, then only the Owner will
have the right to terminate. Should this right be exercised by her Owner or Tenant, the rent in the current month will be
prorated between the parties as oI the date the damage occurred. Any prepaid rent and unused security deposit will be
reIunded to Tenant. II this Agreement is not terminated, then Owner will prompt;y repair the premises and there will be a
proportionate reduction oI rent until the premises are repaired and ready Ior Tenant's occupancy. The proportionate
reduction will be based on the extent which repairs interIere with Tenant's reasonable use oI the premises.
-2. Whether the tenancy was 'expired or 'terminated such that NRS 40.360(3) would be
implicated? The Lease Agreement is actually strongly in support oI a Iinding contrary to that made
by Judge SIerrazza, where, at Subsection 3 it reads:
'3. HOLDOVER: Under Nevada law this Rental Agreement and any changes properly
agreed to will remain in effect on a monthly basis after the initial term. A 30 day
written notice to vacate must be issued by the Resident prior to vacating anytime during or
aIter the initial term oI this agreement. IF improper notice or no notice to vacate is given
by Resident, Resident is liable Ior prorated rent until lawIul termination and Management
may deduct this Irom the Security Deposit on hand, or collect any money due by other
lawIul means.
The Lease Agreement expressly provides that Appellant could use the premises Ior any
purpose. Further, the previous tenant used the premises Ior a commercial purpose (a drug and alcohol
rehabilitation counseling service, Basic Addiction Services), and the zoning Ior the premises allows
Ior the same. There did exists some ambiguity with respect to whose responsibility it was to tend to
the 'noxious weed ordinance violating (and Ior which a proper habitability complaint was made
under NRS 118A.290, and Appellant testiIied that he reported to 'Reno Direct the violation oI RMC
three-times yearly weeds, as the Lease Agreement states that 'the tenant shall take care oI the lawn
and surrounding premises. However, the term 'lawn traditionally connotes grass. There was no
grass at the premises, rather a poor mixture oI dirt and diIIuse decomposed granite. Clearly, the
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Lease Agreement is not clear with respect to whose responsibility it was to pay Ior or to tend to weed
care. Another instance oI ambiguity in the Lease Agreement as issue in this matter related to whether
the tenancy 'terminated upon the expiration oI one year or whether the Lease Agreement
automatically renewed.
Additionally, Appellant respectIully submits that the October 27
th
, 2011 Order is not in
compliance with Nevada Law inasmuch as it calls Ior execution oI the eviction within 24 hours oI
service oI it. NRS 40.360 states that "When the proceeding iI Ior an unlawIul detainer aIter the deIault
in the payment oI rent, and the lease agreement under which the rent is payable has not by its terms
expired, execution upon the judgment shall not be issued until the expiration oI 5 days aIter entry oI
the judmgent...." 'NRS 40.360 (3). Execution and enIorcement. When the proceeding is Ior an
unlawIul detainer aIter deIault in the payment oI the rent, and the lease or agreement under which the
rent is payable has not by its terms expired, execution upon the judgment shall not be issued until the
expiration oI 5 days aIter the entry oI the judgment, within which time the tenant, or any subtenant, or
any mortgagee oI the term, or other party interested in its continuance, may pay into court Ior the
landlord the amount oI the judgment and costs, and thereupon the judgment shall be satisIied and the
tenant be restored to the tenant`s estate; but, iI payment, as herein provided, be not made within the 5
days, the judgment may be enIorced Ior its Iull amount and Ior the possession oI the premises. In all
other cases the judgment may be enIorced immediately. So, to the extent the RJC chose to read into
Respondent's case what was not plead or argued (the RJC seemed to want to create a non-payment oI
rent Order where such a claim was not plead, in which case, turnabout is Iair play, and the October
27
th
, 2011 Order is void Ior lack oI jurisdiction in that is goes against the dictates oI NRS 40.360 (3)
regarding execution and enIorcement. Further, NRCP 62(d), NRS 40.385, and NRAP 7 provide that
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execution oI an Order shall be stayed pending appeal as long as a bond or equivalent security in the
sum oI $250 to cover costs oI appeal is Iled with the district court. The RJC held on to $2,275 oI
Appellants money, more than enough to cover the $250 appeal bond and any reasonable supersedeas
bond (and NRS 40.385 strongly asserts that a supersedeas bond oI only $250 was all required oI
Appellant where his rent was less than $1,000, as here). Appellant may obtain a stay pending appeal
by complying with the provisions oI NRS 40.385. This statute (at the relevant time in question)
provided that iI an appeal is taken Irom an order oI summary eviction entered pursuant to NRS
40.253, "a stay oI execution may be obtained by Iiling with the trial court a bond in the amount oI
$250 to cover the expected costs on appeal." NRS 40.385(1). The statute Iurther provides that iI the
subject lease is Ior commercial property and the monthly rent exceeds $1,000, the district court "may,
upon its own motion or that oI a party, and upon a showing oI good cause, order an additional bond to
be posted to cover the expected costs on appeal." Id. Judge SIerrazza's November 7, 2011 Order,
purporting to release to Appellant what had earlier been classiIied as satisIying both the appeal bond
and supersedeas bond, in addition to resetting the amount such a supersedeas bond would entail to an
impermissibly high Iigure, outside the jursidiction available to the RJC where the Appellant's rent was
under $1,000, and also where the appellant was a commercial tenant and non-payment oI rent was not
alleged.
NRS 118A.360 :" the tenant may deduct from his or her rent the
actual and reasonable cost or the fair or reasonable value of the work, not
exceeding the amount specified in this subsection."
NRS 118A.380 Failure of landlord to supply essential items or services.
1. II the landlord is required by the rental agreement or this chapter to supply
heat, air-conditioning, running water, hot water, electricity, gas, a functioning
door lock or another essential item or service and the landlord willIully or
negligently Iails to do so, causing the premises to become unIit Ior habitation, the
tenant shall give written notice to the landlord speciIying the breach. II the
landlord does not adequately remedy the breach, or use his or her best eIIorts to
remedy the breach within 48 hours, except a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday,
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aIter it is received by the landlord, the tenant may, in addition to any other
remedy:
(a) Procure reasonable amounts of such essential items or services during
the landlord`s noncompliance and deduct their actual and reasonable cost
from the rent;
(b) Recover actual damages, including damages based upon the lack oI use oI
the premises or the diminution oI the Iair rental value oI the dwelling unit;
NRS 118A.290 Habitability of dwelling unit.
1. The landlord shall at all times during the tenancy maintain the dwelling unit
in a habitable condition. A dwelling unit is not habitable iI it violates provisions
of housing or health codes concerning the health, safety, sanitation or fitness
for habitation of the dwelling unit or if it substantially lacks:
(a) EIIective waterprooIing and weather protection oI the rooI and exterior
walls, including windows and doors.
(b) Plumbing facilities which conformed to applicable law when installed
and which are maintained in good working order.
(c) A water supply approved under applicable law, which is:
(1) Under the control oI the tenant or landlord and is capable oI producing
hot and cold running water;
(2) Furnished to appropriate Iixtures; and
(3) Connected to a sewage disposal system approved under applicable
law and maintained in good working order to the extent that the system can be
controlled by the landlord...
(d) Adequate heating facilities which conIormed to applicable law when
installed and are maintained in good working order....
(g) Building, grounds, appurtenances and all other areas under the landlord`s
control at the time oI the commencement oI the tenancy in every part clean,
sanitary and reasonably Iree Irom all accumulations oI debris, filth, rubbish,
garbage, rodents, insects and vermin.
(h) Floors, walls, ceilings, stairways and railings maintained in good repair.
(i) Ventilating, air-conditioning and other Iacilities and appliances, including
elevators, maintained in good repair iI supplied or required to be supplied by the
landlord."
Coughlin presented evidenc Iound in the ROA and Exhibits as set Iorth herein that
present a material issue oI Iact as to the above statutory sections and the emails and testimony and
other circumstances indicate relatiation and discrimination.
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C. The District Court Committed Reversible Error When it Failed to...
IV. CONCLUSION: The Lower Courts committed reversible error by summarily evicting
Coughlin's in a manner that denied Coughlin a multitude oI statutorily required protections, while at
the same time, impermissibly remixing the law to the utter beneIit oI landlord and his counsel.
Dated this day 26th day oI August, 2012, RespectIully Submitted By:
Nevada Bar No. 9473
P.O. Box 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Telephone: 775.338.8118
Fax: 949.667.7402
Pro se Appellant
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ENDNOTES
1.See FFCL&O at 1
2.NRS 40.253(6). FFCL&O at 4, ~3.
3.See FFCL&O at 3, ~9 et seq. See, also, ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266; ROA, Vol. V, pp. 194-198.
4.NRS 40.253(6).
5.ROA, Vol. I, p. 153.
6.ROA Vol. III, pp. 229-233.
7.ROA, Vol. III, pp. 18-33.
8. Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212,215,163 P.3d 405 (2007).
1.Torrealba v. Kesmitis, 124 Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008).
2.NJCRCP 76A.
3.Gibelliniv. Klindt, HONev. 1201, 1204,885 P.2d 540 (1994) (emphasis added).
4.NJCRCP 72(c).
5.Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Bibb, 76 Nev. 332,335,353 P.2d 458 (1960).
6. Anvui.
7. NRS 40.253
8.CI., Schuck v. Signature Flight Support oINevada, Inc., 126 Nev. (Adv.Op. 42),245 P.3d 542,544-545 (Nov. 4, 2010)
9.CI., NJCRCP 74(b).
18.Id.
1.See NRS 40.253(6).
2.ROA, Vol. I, p. 153.
1.See, NJCRCP 104 ("Prior to the holding oI a hearing Ior summary eviction, the justice shall determine the method oI
service oI notice oI the hearing on both parties.")
1.NRS 40.253(6).
2. NRS 40.253
3.Accord, Lee v. GNLVCorp., 116 Nev. 424,427,996 P.2d 416 (2000) (the important inquiry is on "what the order or
judgment actually does, not on what it is called.")(emphasis in original).
4.ROA, Vol. III, pp. 230-233.
5.NRS 1 18A.355(l)(d). ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266.
27.Id.
1.See FFLC&O at ~~11-11.1.
2. Anvui.
30. FFCL&O at ~~12-12.l.
1.ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 253-261.
2.See, "Supplemental Justice Court Appeal Proceedings," at 2
3.NRS 40.254.
4.See FFCL&O beginning at ~9. See, also, ROA, Vol. I, pp. 238-266.
5.Marcuse v. Del Webb Communities, 123 Nev. 278, 163 P.3d 462 (2007).
6.Schuck. ROA, Vol. VI, p.183.
37. Schuck.
1.ROA, Vol. III, pp. 153-160.
2.ROA, Vol. IV, pp.2, 22-23.
40. ROA, Vol. III, p. 5. 4!. Reno Newspapers, Inc.
1.ROA, Vol. I, pp. 274-275.
2.NRS 12:015. Casper v. Huber, 85 Nev. 474,456 P.2d 436 (1969).
3.NJCRCP 73A(a).
4.ROA, Vol. II, pp. 85, 2.
5.ROA, Vol III, pp. 218-219; Vol. II, pp. 4, 27.
47. Marcuse.
1.ROA, Vol. II, p. 3.
2.ROA, Vol. II, pp. 4, 27
3.ROA, Vol. IV, pp. 210-211.
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4.CI., Schuck.
5.ROA, Vol. II, p. 85.
6.CI., Schuck
1.CI., Schuck.
2.CI., Gibellini.
56. NJCRCP 76A, Reno Newspaper, Inc.; NRS 40.253(6). "
CV11-03051 ZACH COUGHLIN VS. MATT MERLISS ET AL (D1) 19-OCT-2011 03:06 PM AIIidavit ...
COUGHLIN, ZACHARY Entry: AFFIDAVIT OF POVERTY (DEFENDANT) - NOTICE OF
APPEAL FROM RENO JUSTICE COURT19-OCT-2011 03:06 PM Request Ior Submission
COUGHLIN, ZACHARY Entry: DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS (DEFENDANT) (PAPER ORDER PROVIDED) PARTY SUBMITTING: ZACH
COUGHLIN DATE SUBMITTED: 10/19/2011
19-OCT-2011 05:06 PM Mtn Proceed Forma Pauperis COUGHLIN, ZACHARY Entry: NOTICE OF
APPEAL FROM RENO JUSTICE COURT 01-NOV-2011 03:29 PM Motion ... COUGHLIN,
ZACHARY Entry: AMENDED MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 01-NOV-2011 03:29 PM Request Ior Submission
COUGHLIN, ZACHARY Entry: DOCUMENT TITLE: AMENDED MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS (NO PAPER
ORDER) PARTY SUBMITTING: ZACH COUGHLIN DATE SUBMITTED: 11/01/11
SUBMITTED BY: DJ DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:08-NOV-2011 10:19 AM Ord Deny in
Forma Pauperis; 08-NOV-2011 10:25 A 08-NOV-2011 02:38 PM Ex-Parte Mtn... COUGHLIN,
ZACHARY Entry: EX PARTE EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY AND SET ASIDE SUMMARY
EVICTION ORDER 3-NOV-2011 04:51 PM Mtn Proceed Forma Pauperis COUGHLIN, ZACHARY
Entry: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF IFP; OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION TO
PROCEED INFORMA PAUPERIS08-DEC-2011 12:03 PM Ord Denying Motion Entry: Transaction
2634258 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 12-08-2011:12:04:1320-DEC-2011 05:09 PM Ord Denying
Motion Entry: FOR RECONSIDERATION OF IFP; OR ALTERNATIVELY MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPER
Regarding the inspection oI the premises just prior to the lockout (and NRS 40.253(6) does not allow
such an Order, yet, again Judge SIerrazza does some yoga Ior Richard Hill, Esq., despite the October
27
th
, 2011 hearing not being notice Ior a Motion Ior Inspection), Respondent's eviction was
retaliatory, with Respondent lawyering up, ceasing communication with Appellant less than 24 hours
aIter Appellant asserted his rights under the Lease Agreement to notice oI such inspection or entry by
the landlord or his agents...:
'25. INSPECTION: Resident agrees to grant management the right to enter the premise as all
reasonable times and Ior all reasonable purposed including showing to the perspective residents,
buyers, loan oIIicers or insurance agents or others with lawIul business therein and Ior east one
maintenance inspection each month. In accordance with NRS requirements, Managements agrees to
give Resident twice the twenty (24) hour notification requirement for entry.
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'28. LIABILITY: management shall not be liable Ior any damage or injury to Resident or any other
person or to any property occurring on the premises or any part thereoI, or in common ares thereoI,
unless such liability is based on the negligent acts or omission of management, his agent, or
employee, but Resident will not agree to hold management harmless Irom any claims Ior damages
iI caused by the negligent acts or omissions oI the Resident or his guests.
Yet, Baker and Hill wasted everybody's time and money subpoening handymen and others to
testiIy about their attempts to enter the premises with less than 24 hours notice given. Further,
Section 28 oI the Lease Agreement makes clear that Respondent bore liability Ior the torts and or
property destruction oI Green Action Lawn Service upon Appellant's property, and associated
damages, or at least provides enough support to beat a summary judgment motion. The Trial Court
ruled otherwise and doing so was reversible error. Further, video evidence was introduced wherein
the supervisor Ior Green Action Lawn Service admits to taking orders Irom Darlene Sharpe oI
Dickson Realty vis a vis Respondent's wishes and intentions.
Further the 10/27/11 Order Ior Summary Eviction is void in that is attempts to undue that
which was agreed to in the Lease Agreement:
'30. TENANCY TERMINATION:. Resident shall allow Management to inspect the premises in
the Resident's presence to verify the condition of premises and contents....32. INSURANCE: It
is agreed that TENANT may obtain RENTERS INSURANCE AS LANDLORD'S or his Agent's
insurance supplements cover oI TENANT'S Property.
Appellant was aIIorded no such opportunity.
Further, Appellant alleged violations oI NRS 118a.510's anti-retaliation dictate. Respondent's
testimony was extremely unconvincing. In Iact, he contradicted himselI several times and was Iorced
to admit that he did receive the May 14, 2010 email and high resolution photographs Irom Appellant
detailing the moldy insulation (which qualiIies, according the the Trial Court, as a habitability issue
under NRS 118a.Appellant alleged discrimination in this matter and Respondent Iailed to rebut the
presumptions such allegations created:
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V. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE: I hereby certiIy that this brieI complies with the
Iormatting requirements oI NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeIace requirements oINRAP 32(a)(5) and the type
style requirements oINRAP 32(a)(6) because:
|x| This brieI has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeIace using OpenOFIice in 12 Times
New Roman; I Iurther certiIy that this brieI complies with the page- or type- volume limitations oI
NRAP 32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts oI the brieI exempted by RAP 32(a)(7)(C), it is either:
| | Proportionately spaced, has a typeIace oI 14 points or more and contains words; or
| | Monospaced, has 10.5 or Iewer characters per inch, and contains words or lines oI text; or |X|
Does not exceed 30 pages
Finally, I hereby certiIy that I have read this appellate brieI, and to the best oI my knowledge,
inIormation, and belieI, it is not Irivolous or interposed Ior any improper purpose. I Iurther certiIy that
this brieI complies with all applicable Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure, in particular, NRAP
28( e)(1), which requires every assertion in the brieI regarding matters in the record to be supported
by a reIerence to the page oI the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be Iound. I
understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brieI is not in
conIormity with the requirements oI the Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure.
Dated this day 24th day oI August, 2012.
Nevada Bar No. 9473
P.O. Box 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Telephone: 775.338.8118
Fax: 949.667.7402
Pro se Appellant
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I am a resident oI the State oI Nevada, over the age oI eighteen years. My business address is
PO BOX 3961. On August 26th, 2012, the Iollowing document(s) were served on the party(ies)
below:
X By United States Mail- a true copy oI the document(s) listed above Ior collection and mailing
Iollowing the Iirm's ordinary business practice in a sealed envelope with postage thereon Iully prepaid
Ior deposit in the United States mail at Reno, Nevada addressed as set Iorth below.
X By Facsimile Transmission - the transmission was reported as complete and without error. A
copy oI the transmission report, properly issued by the transmitting machine, is attached to the hard
copy. The names and Iacsimile numbers oI the person(s) served are as set Iorth below.
RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ.
652 Forest St.
Reno, Nevada 89509
Telephone: (775) 348-0888
Fax: (775) 348-0858
Attorney for Respondent Merliss
I declare under penalty oI perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct.
Pro se Appellant
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DECLARATION OF ZACH COUGLIN IN SUPPORT OF THE FOREGOING DOCUMENT
Nevada and I declare under penalty oI perjury that the Ioregoing is true and correct.
2. Declarant is the PlaintiII in the above title action.
Dated this August 26th, 2012
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Appellant
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Oct 05 2012 09:42 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
000836
laura
Laura LauraLaura
000837
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In Re Matter oI:
Nevada Bar No: 9473
.
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MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR
COUNSEL AND, POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY
COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN`S SCR 102(4)(d)
PETITION IN CASE 61426
document and moves this Court, or the Board, Panel, Bar Ior the relieI requested herein. This Iiling
is Iurther based upon the papers and pleadings on Iile herein and in the companion case beIore the
Nevada Supreme Court in 60838 and 61426.
FACTS
1. Patrick King, Esq., Bar Counsel oI the North, and NNDB Chairman J. Thomas Susich
continue to display an alarming lack oI appreciation Ior due process, basic Iairness, and other notions
oI Iair play and substantial justice...and now seeks to subvert the express ruling oI the Nevada
- 1/62 -
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING IMPROPER ATTEMPT BY BAR COUNSEL AND,
POSSIBLY, NNDB TO DELAY AND OBSTRUCT HEARING REQUIRED BY COURTS JUNE 7TH, 2012 ORDER
IN CASE 60838 AND COUGHLIN'S SCR 102(4)(d) PETITION IN CASE 61426
Oct 05 2012 09:40 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
000838
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Supreme Court in its June 7th, 2012 Order by turning the Hearing that has already been set (as
conIirmed by the SBN's Laura Peters, in writing) Ior September 25th, 2012 into a "due process combo
pack express package" wherein all the various matters set Iorth in King's Complain shall also be
addressed, despite the Order by the Nevada Supreme Court and the text oI SCR 111 very clearly
indicating the "sole purpose" oI the hearing will be to determine the punishment Ior the one criminal
conviction contained in Bar Counsel's SCR 111 petition oI May 10, 2012 in 60838 and where an
"immediate hearing" is Iurther required in light oI Coughlin's SCR 102(4)(d) Petition Iiled, and
unopposed by the SBN in 61426.
2. SBN Clerk oI Court oI the Laura Peters has assured Coughlin that no service oI any SBN v
Coughlin Complaint has been eIIected as oI this date and that Coughlin is in no danger oI deIaulting
Ior Iailure to answer any such Complaint. However, Clerk oI Court Peters indicated to Coughlin that
she did not Iile Coughlin's September 17th, 2012 Motion to Dismiss in light oI directions Irom Bar
Counsel Patrick O. King, Esq., and Iurther, NNDB Chairman, J. Thomas Susich has made similar
indications oI the extent to which King is attempting to circumvent procedural rules attendant to these
matters and cause Coughlin Iurther damages and delay, particularly with regard to the dictates oI SCR
116. The scheduling oI the hearing is the domain oI the NNDB and is not to be handed oI to the
prosecutor here, Bar Counsel Pat King. Peters, King, and Clark have all admitted that King and
Clark are seeking to circumvent the procedural rules and Order related to the scheduling and holding
oI the hearing in response to the Court's June 7th, 2012 Order in 60838 and with regard to the
"immediate hearing" required upon Coughlin's August 13th, 2012 Petition in SCR 61426, which Bar
Counsel has Iailed to Oppose, and Ior which, thereIore, Coughlin is entitled to the relieI he therein
sought, ie, the dissolution oI the temporary suspension oI his license to practice law.
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3. By and Order oI the Nevada Supreme Court on June 7th, 2012 Coughlin's constitutionally
protected property right, his law license, was temporarily suspended: "Pursuant to SCR 111,
temporary suspension and reIerral to the appropriate disciplinary board are mandatory when an
attorney has been convicted oI a "serious" crime, which includes theIt. SCR 111(6)-(8). Accordingly,
pursuant to SCR 111(8), we reIer this matter to the appropriate disciplinary board Ior the institution oI
a Iormal hearing beIore a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent
oI the discipline to be imposed. Furthermore, pursuant to SCR 111(7), we hereby temporarily suspend
attorney Zachary B. Coughlin Irom the practice oI law in Nevada, pending Iinal disposition oI the
disciplinary proceedings."
4. In a written communication Irom SBN Clerk oI Court Laura Peters on July 26th, which
was cc'd to Bar Counsel Patrick King, Clerk Peters wrote: " Mr. Coughlin: I have been contacted by
Tom Susich oI the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board. I understand that you would like to schedule
a Iormal hearing in your matter. I have gathered some available dates in September and October let
me know what will work Ior you: September 25, 26 or 27 October 15, 16, 17, 18, 30 or 31 Thank you,
Laura Peters". In an written correspondence Irom Coughlin to Clerk oI Court Ior the SBN Peters:
"Subject: Hearing... Dear Ms. Peters, Please set the hearing date as soon as possible Ior any matter
involving me that has been reIerred to the bar or the disciplinary panel. thanks Zach Coughlin". The
SBN's Peters responded, in writing, on August 17th, 2012, to Coughlin: "RE: Hearing...Zach: How
about September 25th, work Ior you?". Coughlin responded to Peters, in writing, on August 17th,
2012: "That works thanks" with a copy oI Peter's correspondence oI August 17th, 2012 setting Iorth
the September 25th, 2012 Hearing date. Coughlin wrote to NNDB Chairman J. Thomsas Susich, Esq.
on September 11th, 2012 indicating, in writing: " The hearing is set Ior... Hearing date... I look
Iorward to our Hearing on September 25th, 2012. Zach Coughlin".
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4.1 Upon inIormation and belieI, in early May 2011, prior to any SCR 111 Petition or SCR
105 Complaint being Iiled, Bar Counsel violated SCR Rule 121(5) ConIidentiality: "5. Temporary
suspension under Rule 102(4). In the event that the state bar Iiles a petition with the supreme court Ior
the temporary suspension oI an attorney beIore a Iormal complaint is Iiled in the underlying
disciplinary proceeding, then the matter shall be treated as confidential. II the court grants the
petition, then the matter shall become public upon entry oI the order granting the petition. If the
court denies the petition, then the matter shall remain confidential until a formal complaint is
filed or the matter is otherwise concluded."
5. On September 11th, 2012, in a telephone conversation with Coughlin, SBN Clerk oI Court
conIirmed that the hearing previously noticed, set, and schedule Ior September 25th, 2012 was "still
scheduled" and "on the calendar". During that conversation, Clerk oI Court Peters admitted that
"there is a hearing set Ior the 25th (oI September), we set that just on the SCR 111 Petition. Now
there is a Complaint and I think that Pat and David want to combine it, I didn't know that at the time
that I set your hearing date." Coughlin then asked Peters "So, the hearing is still set on the
calendar?". Peters responded "on the calendar it is". Then Peters indicated that "as soon as the
Hearing was set, they (Pat King and David Clark) said 'oh, wait, wait, we want to combine it with the
Complaint's Hearing as well, so they Iiled a Complaint and I served it on you." when I set your
hearing (Ior September 25th, 2012), I did not know that David (Bar Counsel David Clark) and Pat
(Pat King) wanted to combine that (hearing on the SCR 111 and SCR 102(4)(d) Petitions in 60838
and 61426) with a SBN v. Coughlin Complaint the SBN has been threatening to Iile against
Coughlin)".
6. Bar Counsel King has continually reIerred to Coughlin, as a "Iormer attorney", oIten when
speaking directly to Coughlin, and has Iurther mentioned to Coughlin that Coughlin has been
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"disbarred", while speaking in a mock devastated tone when mentioning the sadness King would
himselI Ieel iI Coughlin lost his law license, which echoed the venomous chill in the air when David
Clark recalled to Coughlin, regretIully about that one time an attorney committed suicide beIore Clark
got a chance to prosecute him, and that regret, to be clear, was due to missing the chance to prosecute
that attorney prior to the suicide. King is apparently unaware that disbarments were made irrevocable
in Nevada in 2008 or the Iact that one is still "an attorney" during a temporary suspension oI one's law
license.
7. Coughlin appeared at the northern oIIicer the State Bar Ior the calendared, agreed upon,
noticed, and set September 25, 2012 Hearing notice to him and the NNDB's Chairman Susich and
required by this Court's June 7th, 2012 Order and SCR 111(8). While Coughlin sat waiting in the
lobby out walked Clerk oI Court Peters and Bar Counsel Patrick King, King holding a stack oI papers
then handing them to Clerk Peters, and King whom greeted Coughlin and entere a conversation that
when approximately like this:
King: Zach.
Clerk Peters: I am supposed to hand you this Complaint.
King: Your're served (motioning to Clerk Peters to hand Coughlin the stack oI papers). You are
oIIicially served. She's the Court Clerk. You're served.
Coughlin: Aw.. I think one has to be served by a non-party under SCR 109.
King: No, you're served ,she's the Clerk oI Court, so take it. She's serving you, your are oIIicially
served and so I will issue a deIault judgment against you iI you don't accept it.
Peters: I mailed it out.
Coughlin: Is my hearing going to be held right now?
King: First, take this.
Coughlin: What about my Hearing that's what I'm here Ior right now.
King: First, take this.
Coughlin I think you actually can't serve people when they are showing up Ior a Hearing.
King yes I can absolutely can,
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Coughlin: I have cases that say you can't.
King: I absolutely can things don't go your way because you don't accept responsibility (King grabs
the stack oI papers Irom Peters and attempt to insert them into Coughlin's suit jacket aIter pulling the
middle button on Coughlin's blazer away Irom Coughlin's torso, whereupon King gives up on that
approach). I'll drop it at your Ieet here your served (King bends down and places the stack oI papers
on top oI Coughlin dress shoes).
Coughlin you are a party though it has to be a non-party that's the law
King: Zach. don't play games!
Coughlin: It's not a game, Pat, it's the law.
Peters: Zach, please?
Coughlin: Where is my hearing?
King: Hi Paula where you witness that I'm serving or that rather Laura is serving Zach Coughlin with
the Complaint.
Paula: Sure? (looking bewildered beyond all measure).
King Here is this, take it, take it, Zach.
Coughlin: We go to have my hearing today?
King: First order oI business is Ior you to accept the Complaint
Coughlin: For you may be Pat, but you're not the one who hasn't had a law license last Iour months
over a candy bar so.
King are going to take the complaint it's a Iormal complaint I'm been a deIault you him him. You can
pretend you didn't get it else is take a deIault
Coughlin: Pat I Iiled a motion to dismiss. Seems like you are trying to put Clerk oI Court Peters in
kind oI a bad spot.
King No, you haven't Iiled it it's been rejected,
Coughlin: By who, the prosecutor? The prosecutor rejected it, Pat?
King: Listen the Clerk oI Court Peters rejected it because it doesn't say what it's dismissing. You are
not even acknowledging that you have been served so take the Complaint and then you can answer it.
You're been served right now
Coughlin: well I guess you're Iree to argue that, that you a party that is serving me.
King: No, the Court clerk is serving you. Your at the State Bar oIIice being served with a Complaint
Coughlin I I've got cases this the you can serve a criminal deIendant when they show up to a civil
proceeding
King: This is State Bar.
Coughlin: Oh, I get it. We're playin' prison rules, huh? Like in that movie The Cable Guy when Jim
Carrey is playing pickup ball and says "Oh, we're playing prison rules" to the guys who just Iouled
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him so hard? I guess, we are "playin' 'prison rules'" down here at the State Bar, huh? Are we going to
have my hearing today? Because the Hearing is limited in scope and purpose, right?
King: Zach listen to the Court Clerk.
Coughlin: Okay.
Peters: when you and I talked about the date Ior September 25 that was a tentative thing I have not
Iormally notice that I never did
King: Because you did not answer the complaint because you did not answer the complaint by me
explain Mr. Coughlin the suspension that you receive Irom the Supreme Court which is their order
saIety oI a problem with the Supreme Court.
Coughlin I did with the SCR 102(4)(d) Petition? Why didn't you answer that, Pat? Now, I win on
that on deIault, too?
King: That's the Supreme Court they suspended you pending...pending a disciplinary Complaint
which is what that is (motioning to a stack oI papers King had earlier laid at Coughlin's Ieet).
Coughlin: So this is a new Complaint Iiling?
King know the suspension is pending the disciplinary action that I bring. I have not Iiled any
disciplinary action they suspended you pending disciplinary action him this is disciplinary and him
(motioning to the stack oI papers on the ground).
Coughlin: SCR 111(8) and the Supreme Court's order said that the hearing is limited to the sole
purpose oI determining Mr. Coughlin's punishment Ior that upon which the SCR 111 Petition was
brought.
King: it does not say that, it says 'pending a disciplinary action by the State Bar'
Coughlin: I am talking about the "hearing beIore the Disciplinary Panel" under SCR 111(8) and the
Court's June 7th, 2012 Order, that is diIIerent than some hearing Under an SCR 105 Complaint. That
the whole import oI the language in SCR 111(8), which the Court quotes exactly in its June 7th, 2012
Order Ior Temporary Suspension oI Law License where it reads, "the supreme court shall"..."reIer the
matter to the appropriate disciplinary board Ior the institution oI a Iormal hearing beIore a hearing
panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the extent oI the discipline to be imposed".
King: Listen to me, I am trying to help you. That Complaint (pointing at the stack oI papers on the
ground) is the Complaint that we will have the Hearing on...
Coughlin: We are having a Hearing today, and iI we don't, you deIault, and I get my license back.
King: II you answer that Complaint, then..you will have the right to appear at a Hearing and argue
your case to the Disciplinary Panel. II you do not Iile a VeriIied Answer to the Complaint, then we
will move Iorward, and proceed on a deIault basis, and the Panel may accept every allegation in the
Complaint as true.
Coughlin: So you reIused to Iile the Motion to Dismiss I submitted Ior Iiling?
King: What Motion to Dismiss?
Coughlin: The one Clerk Peters said you told her not to Iile.
King: I didn't tell...I don't tell the Court Clerk what to do...
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Coughlin: I sent it to you Pat. What Motion to Dismiss?
King: What are you asking to be dismissed? It doesn't say what you are asking to be dismissed. You
can't have it both ways, Zach.
Coughlin: Pat, do you have a case number,? Do you have a case number on that, on that, Pat?
King: Pick it up and read it. Pick it up and read it.
Coughlin: I can wait around her a little while longer Ior you to get my Hearing going, but at some
point I think I would be justiIied in assuming you are reIusing to proceed with or hold the Hearing
you set and noticed, so...you might want to get Chairman Susich or somebody down here and get this
Hearing, here, happenin', Pat.
LAW AND LEGAL ARGUMENT
A state cannot exclude a person Irom the practice oI law in a manner or Ior reasons that
contravene the due process or equal protection clauses oI the Fourteenth Amendment. 105. Due
process requirements; notice and opportunity to be heard
An attorney is entitled to due process in disciplinary proceedings concerning his or her
conduct.|FN1| Due process in disciplinary proceedings requires that the attorney be given notice oI
the proceeding and an opportunity to deIend at a hearing, and that the proceeding be essentially Iair.
|FN2| Due process requires that, in an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the attorney must be notiIied
oI clear and speciIic charges and must be aIIorded an opportunity to anticipate, prepare, and present a
deIense.|FN3| The precise procedural protections oI due process vary, depending upon the
circumstances, because due process is a Ilexible concept unrestricted by any bright-line rules.|FN4|
An attorney is not denied due process where he or she voluntarily leaves the hearing with Iull
knowledge that the proceedings will continue in his or her absence.|FN5| There is no denial oI due
process where an attorney is served with a complaint and requests Ior admissions beIore the bar Iiles
the complaint in the supreme court where the rules do not require that the complaint be Iiled beIore it
is served.|FN6| In addition, an attorney's due process rights are not violated, even though the attorney
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is not allowed to attend a grievance committee meeting, iI the attorney is served with notice oI the
bar's charges and is aIIorded an opportunity in the disciplinary hearing to be heard.|FN7|
A statute providing Ior automatic disbarment oI an attorney Ior conviction oI an oIIense involving
moral turpitude does not violate due process iI the attorney has notice oI the disbarment proceedings,
and is able to present his or her position to the board on proIessional responsibility and argue that his
or her crimes did not involve moral turpitude.|FN8|
What is important is that the disciplinary board's recommendations put the attorney on notice oI the
charges he or she must answer to the satisIaction oI the court.|FN9| As to the discipline imposed, due
process requires that an attorney Iacing discipline be permitted to explain the circumstances oI the
alleged oIIense and to oIIer testimony in mitigation oI any penalty
to be imposed.|FN10|
Where the evidence at the hearing discloses misconduct not charged in the original notice, the bar
may move to amend the notice to conIorm to the prooI, but iI no such motion is made, the attorney
may be disciplined only Ior the misconduct alleged in the original notice.|FN11|
An attorney may be temporarily suspended without a pre-suspension hearing where the risk oI
erroneous deprivation is minimized by provisions allowing the attorney to continue his or her existing
practice Ior a speciIied time and allow Ior immediate hearing and prompt resolution oI the matter.
|FN12|
Due process requires a court to provide notice and opportunity to be heard to an attorney prior
to imposing a liIetime ban on the attorney's pro hac vice status in the court's local division.|FN13|
Attorney suspended Irom practice oI law was not deprived oI due process by state court
disciplinary procedure, as would warrant imposition oI diIIerent discipline in reciprocal discipline
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proceeding, Ior attorney's ethics violation in misleading lower court in underlying inheritance action
by Iiling motion to withdraw Iunds consigned in lower court Ior client, but Iailing to disclose that
client had died and misstating that there were no minors involved, since attorney had Iull notice and
opportunity to be heard in state court disciplinary proceeding. In re Oliveras Lopez De Victoria, 561
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009).
Attorney was not denied due process at presentment beIore trial court in disciplinary
proceeding by admission oI complainant's testimony at earlier hearing beIore reviewing committee;
complainant was unavailable, and attorney had a Iull and Iair opportunity to and in Iact did cross
examine complainant at hearing beIore review committee. Statewide Grievance Committee v.
Johnson, 108 Conn. App. 74, 946 A.2d 1256 (2008), certiIication denied, 288 Conn. 915, 954 A.2d
187 (2008).
Attorney was properly notiIied oI disciplinary proceeding, and the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to
proceed, where hearing notiIication was sent by both regular and certiIied mail to attorney's last
address on Iile with the Clerk oI Appellate Courts and both mailings were returned, marked "not
deliverable as addressed," and same notice was mailed to Colorado address that attorney had listed in
a responsive pleading in a prior disciplinary action, and that notice was also returned, marked "return
to sender." Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 215. In re Lober, 241 P.3d 81 (Kan. 2010).
Attorney had no due process right to jury trial in discipline proceeding, even though license to
practice law was a property right. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. In re Gargano, 460 Mass. 1022, 957
N.E.2d 235 (2011).
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Supreme Court observes due process in exercising disciplinary jurisdiction over an attorney, but
disciplinary proceedings are not encumbered by technical rules and Iormal requirements. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14. In re Disciplinary Action against Garcia, 792 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 2010).
Attorney's conviction Ior two misdemeanor counts oI theIt warranted immediate suspension oI
attorney's license under disciplinary rule authorizing immediate suspension pending Iinal disposition
oI disciplinary proceeding predicated upon conviction Ior serious crime. In re Disciplinary Action
Against Fisher, 2008 ND 151, 754 N.W.2d 802 (N.D. 2008).
The standards oI due process in an attorney disciplinary proceeding are not equal to those in a
criminal matter. Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St. 3d 521, 2008-Ohio-91, 880 N.E.2d
467 (2008). |FN1| The Florida Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1999). |FN2| Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 20 L. Ed. 646, 1871 WL 14737 (1871); Jaen v. Coca-Cola Co., 157 F.R.D. 146,
31 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 178 (D.P.R. 1994). |FN3| In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marshall, 160
Wash. 2d 317, 157 P.3d 859 (2007). |FN4| Steinert v. Winn Group, Inc., 440 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir.
2006). |FN5| Colangelo v. State Bar, 53 Cal. 3d 1255, 283 Cal. Rptr. 181, 812 P.2d 200 (1991).
|FN6| The Florida Bar v. Daniel, 626 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1993). |FN7| The Florida Bar v. Committe,
916 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1098, 126 S. Ct. 1890, 164 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2006).
|FN8| In re Krouner, 920 A.2d 1039 (D.C. 2007). |FN9| Zauderer v. OIIice oI Disciplinary Counsel
oI Supreme Court oI Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 85 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1985). |FN10| The
Florida Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1999). |FN11| Edwards v. State Bar, 52 Cal. 3d 28,
276 Cal. Rptr. 153, 801 P.2d 396 (1990). |FN12| In re Lamm, 116 N.C. App. 382, 448 S.E.2d 125
(1994), decision aII'd, 341 N.C. 196, 458 S.E.2d 921 (1995). |FN13| Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399
F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 873, 126 S. Ct. 381, 163 L. Ed. 2d 167 (2005).
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SCR Rule 119. Additional rules oI procedure.
1. Record. The record oI a hearing shall be made available to the attorney at the attorney`s expense
on request made to bar counsel. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83
S. Ct. 1175, 10 L. Ed. 2d 224, 2 A.L.R.3d 1254 (1963).
2. Time limits not jurisdictional. Except as is otherwise provided in these rules, time is
directoryand not jurisdictional. Time limitations are administrative, not jurisdictional. Failure to
observe directory time intervals may result in contempt of the appropriate disciplinary
board or hearing panel having jurisdiction, but will not justify abatement of any disciplinary
investigation or proceeding.
3. Other rules oI procedure. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, the Nevada RulesoI Civil
Procedure and the Nevada Rules oI Appellate Procedure apply in disciplinary cases.
The undersigned (Coughlin) submitted to the Supreme Court oI Nevada's electronic Iiling
system an Opposition to Bar Counsel's petition on or about May 24
th
, 2012, as an original matter
given the online system would not allow Iilings in the case itselI (60838). The Clerk's OIIice
reIused to Iile, mark as received, or, apparently, in any way make the Justices oI this Court away oI
the Opposition. Only aIter the undersigned reputation has been sullied by news outlets Iar and wide
(an article appeared in papers in at least three diIIerent cities, separated by the vast expanse oI our
state) did the Clerk's OIIice allow Coughlin to Iile something in an attempt to tell his side oI the
story here and avoid the prejudice that would be done his child custody, Ioreclosure deIense,
bankruptcy, and other other clients should Coughlin's law license be suspended, even temporarily..
SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS....NRCP 5(e), Filing With the
Court DeIined: 'The Iiling oI pleadings and other papers with the court as required by these rules
shall be made by Iiling them with the clerk oI the court....The clerk shall not refuse to accept for
filing any paper presented for that purpose solely because it is not presented in proper form
as required by these rules or any local rules or practices. NRCP 5(e). Coughlin is not
accused oI stealing $755,000 candy bars Irom a client yet he was temporarily suspended and his
suspension has now lasted over Iour months. Only aIter the undersigned reputation has been sullied
by news outlets Iar and wide (an article appeared in papers in at least three diIIerent cities, separated
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by the vast expanse oI our state) did the Clerk's OIIice allow Coughlin to Iile something in an
attempt to tell his side oI the story here and avoid the prejudice that would be done his child
custody, Ioreclosure deIense, bankruptcy, and other other clients should Coughlin's law license be
suspended, even temporarily...
It is the oIIicial duty oI the clerk oI a court to record (Nash v. Campbell County Fiscal
Court, 2011 WL 1620587 (Ky. 2011). |FN2| ) or Iile all the papers in a cause presented by the
parties, and to indorse the correct date oI the Iiling on them. Estate oI Johnson v. Ciarpelli, 71
A.D.3d 1482, 896 N.Y.S.2d 752 (4th Dep't 2010); In re Simmonds, 271 S.W.3d 874 (Tex. App.
Waco 2008)The duty is purely ministerial (Benson v. District Clerk, 331 S.W.3d 431 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011) (writ oI habeas corpus) and the clerk may not refuse to perform except on the order
of the court. Cave v. Elliott, 190 Md. App. 65, 988 A.2d 1 (2010); In re Smith, 270 S.W.3d 783
(Tex. App. Waco 2008).
It is important to note that Coughlin has already had a very important attempted Iiling
rejected by the Clerk oI the Supreme Court oI Nevada, and now Bar Counsel Patrick King, Esq. is,
according to Clerk oI Court oI the State Bar oI Nevada, Laura Peters, telling her not to Iile somethign
Coughlin has submitted Ior Iiling.
Further, Coughlin served his SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in SCR 61426 and his SCR111(10)
Motion to Dissolve Temporary Suspension upon both Bar Counsel Ior the North, Patrick King and
Bar Counsel Ior all oI Nevada and the main Southern OIIice oI the SBN, David Clark on August
13th, 2012, with both consenting to waive any personal service by a non party rule under SCR 109,
and Iurther, where Clerk oI Court Laura Peters signed a "Notice oI Receipt" oI those documents that
also bore a heading that it was a "ProoI oI Service". See attached in Exhibit 1. So, the SBN wants to
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deem Peters "not a party" suIIicient to serve Coughlin with something requiring personal service, but
does not want Peters to be deemed "a party" suIIicient that her signature attesting to a "Notice oI
Receipt" eIIectuates any SCR 102(4)(d) requirement that a "Petition shall be served on Bar
Counsel"? Or, the SBN has just Iailed to timely respond to Coughlin's August 13th, 2012 SCR
102(4)(d) Petition in 61426 and his SCR 111(10) Motion to Dissolve Temporary Suspension in
60838, both served on the SBN and NNDB Chairman J. Thomas Susich that very day, August 14th,
2012.
Rule 104(3). State bar counsel....
'3. A grievance against bar counsel or bar counsel`s staff shall be investigated at the direction
oI the president oI the state bar and heard by the board oI governors. A decision oI the board oI
governors against bar counsel may be appealed to the supreme court under the Nevada Rules oI
Appellate Procedure.
SCR 105(2):. 'Commencement oI Iormal proceedings. Formal disciplinary proceedings are
commenced by bar counsel Iiling a written complaint in the name oI the state bar. The complaint
shall be sufficiently clear and specific to inform the attorney of the charges against him or
her and the underlying conduct supporting the charges. A copy oI the complaint shall be
served on the attorney and it shall direct that a veriIied response or answer be served on bar
counsel within 20 days oI service; the original shall be Iiled with bar counsel`s oIIice. The time to
respond may be extended once by the chair Ior not more than 20 days Ior good cause or upon
stipulation oI the parties. In the event the attorney Iails to plead, the charges shall be deemed
admitted; provided, however, that an attorney who Iails to respond within the time provided may
thereaIter obtain permission oI the appropriate disciplinary board chair to do so, iI Iailure to Iile is
attributable to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
The SBN has admitted, via Clerk oI Court Laura Peters, that not only has the SBN
agreed to and already set Ior hearing the reIerral to the Board called Ior in the Nevada Supreme
Court`s June 7
th
, 2012 Order Temporarily Suspending Coughlin`s License to Practice Law, but also
that any SBN v. Coughlin Complaint Bar Counsel Pat King wishes to throw together at the last
minute in an attempt to skirt the limits oI the jurisdiction granted the Board in the Court`s June 7
th
,
2012 Order, given King`s stated intention to attempt to make a 'combo-hearing out oI the Hearing
called Ior in that Order, despite its 'sole purpose language and the same Iound in SCR 111(8), in
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addition to the Iact that given Coughlin`s Petition in 61426, under SCR 102(4)(d), requires an
immediate hearing, and that Petition was duly served on August 13
th
, 2012, both on the Board via
Chairman Susich and both oIIices oI the SBN, via Clark and King, and Peters personal receipt
thereoI, which the SBN has still Iailed to respond to (much less challenge the reconsideration motion
in 60383, etc. (who is talking about who`s competence, again?)...
Further, it is a virtual certainty, given Pat King`s established modes., that any such
Complaint he Iiles, upon it being properly served and not insuIIicient due to illegibility oI the
photocopies oI any exhibits (take it Irom me given 60302 and 60317, I know...) will be wholly
insuIIicient in that it will in no way comply with SCR 105(2), and so, as a preemptive measure,
please be advised that any such Complaint ought take particular care to state who brought what
grievance, and avoid conclusory assertions about something 'lacking legal merit or otherwise
broadly 'demonstrating incompetence.
Further, any assertions by the SBN that sending such a Complaint via certiIied mail,
especially where a phone call to SBN Clerk oI Court Peters on September 14
th
, 2012 yield her giving
Coughlin the SBN`s word that given the SBN`s apparent attempt to serve Coughlin via CertiIied
mail some Complaint Pat King apparently Iollowed through on in his promise to thrown together
haphazardly in hopes oI deIeating any due process accorded the hearing on September 25
th
, 2012,
would not require a response at least until the SBN receives back as unclaimed some second
attempted certiIied mailing under SCR 109.
Proceedings instituted a long time aIter the commission oI the act complained oI are
regarded with disIavor. In re Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 1, 474 P.2d 116 (1970). Bar Counsel is
purportedly, and ever so conveniently seeking delay Coughlin`s procedural rights to a hearing on the
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temporary suspension oI his law license (which has already lasted longer than the NNDB`s
punishment Ior an attorney who admitted to misappropriating about 755,000 candy bars, Irom his
clients, during the course oI his duties as an attorney rather than, allegedly, on a Saturday night at a
Wal-Mart an in no way connected to the practice oI law, and under circumstances that indicate the
conviction stemmed Irom a proceedign wholly devoid oI due process, and where the appeal thereto
was improperly dismissed based upon a Iailure oI the RMC to order the transcripts produced within
10 days (the District Court cited to a civil statute in blaming Coughlin Ior Iailing ot point to a
transcript in his Appeal BrieI where the RMC`s practice oI demanding indigent deIendants use one
and only one court approved transcriptionist and pay her up Iront is violative oI Nevada law.
Since it is essential that the bar and the public perceive the process oI the discipline oI an
attorney as Iair, orderly, and rational, and implicit in this perception is the timely and eIIicient
resolution oI complaints. In re Grossman, 448 Mass. 151, 859 N.E.2d 423 (2007). A delay in
bringing disciplinary proceedings against an attorney it is to be placed into context as a
mitigating factor to be balanced against a number of aggravating factors. In re Disciplinary
Proceeding Against Boelter, 139 Wash. 2D 81, 985 P.2d 328 (1999).
The purpose oI the attorney disciplinary process is not to punish the oIIender|FN4| but to
protect the public. Attorney Grievance Com'n oI Maryland v. GoII, 399 Md. 1, 922 A.2d 554 (2007),
reinstatement granted, 2007 WL 2128391 (Md. 2007). The principal reason Ior attorney discipline is
to preserve the conIidence oI the public in the integrity and trustworthiness oI lawyers in general. In
re Scanio, 919 A.2d 1137 (D.C. 2007) Attorney discipline is designed to protect the public, the legal
proIession, and the legal system and to deter other attorneys Irom engaging in unproIessional
conduct. In re Non-Member oI State Bar oI Arizona, Van Dox, 214 Ariz. 300, 152 P.3d 1183
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(2007). Thus, the judgment of a disciplinary proceeding must be fair to the attorney. The
Florida Bar v. Cox, 718 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1998).
The purpose oI the temporary suspension oI a lawyer is more than disciplinary; it is also
intended to prompt a response to the board's inquires so the disciplinary action may proceed in a
timely and inIormed Iashion. Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Fields, 790 N.W.2d
791 (Iowa 2010).
Upon inIormation and belieI, in early May 2011, prior to any SCR 111 Petition or SCR 105
Complaint being Iiled, Bar Counsel violated SCR Rule 121(5) ConIidentiality: "5. Temporary
suspension under Rule 102(4). In the event that the state bar Iiles a petition with the supreme court
Ior the temporary suspension oI an attorney beIore a Iormal complaint is Iiled in the underlying
disciplinary proceeding, then the matter shall be treated as conIidential. II the court grants the
petition, then the matter shall become public upon entry oI the order granting the petition. II the court
denies the petition, then the matter shall remain conIidential until a Iormal complaint is Iiled or the
matter is otherwise concluded." In early May 2012 Coughlin received a disturbing phone call Irom a
client wherein the exact same inIormation regarding some purported "taking away your right to
practice in (REDACTED) Court" was mentioned by the client, despite not such deprivation oI
Coughlin's right to practice in said (REDACTED) Court ever being mentioned by anyone other than
Bar Counsel Pat King (whom reIerenced such a non-existent Order to Coughlin and ChieI Bar
Counsel David Clark during an inIormal three hour meeting Coughlin had with those Bar Counsel in
Reno on August 13th, 2012, while serving the SCR 102(4)(d) and SCR 111(10) Iilings by Coughlin).
King is simply wrong, recklessly and negligently so, and in violation oI SCR 111. King needs to
stop behaving like a Iall semester Ireshman high school girl with no selI esteem taken by every
letterman walking past her wearing a Iootball jersey to school on a Friday game day, eager to be
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accepted by the "in crowd" with the "juice" in Nevada legal circles (and overly willing to be used Ior
even the most loathsome oI chores, like, say a SCR 117 Petition Ior a Judge whom had Coughlin
arrested Ior "criminal summary contempt), and, rather, IaithIully uphold the duties oI his OIIice, as
the integrity oI the legal proIession in this State requires it. No such "Order" was ever entered by the
(REDACTED) Court, and it is obvious that King had improper communications with Coughlin's then
client.
Such an anticipated SBN v Coughlin SCR 105 Complaint, according to King, will be based
largely upon Coughlin allegedly wearing "pajama bottoms" to the Reno Municipal Court Iiling
counter one day while inquiring about a parking ticket or some other non-sensensical high school
jibberish, will contain more oI the same reckless and lacking in Ioundation mentions oI "breaking
into" the Iormer law oIIice and "broken locks" despite the Iact that no Iactual support exists Ior such
an allegation, there were no "broken locks" ever mentioned by anyone (and iI Hill is willing to make
up Iinding a "bag oI weed and crack pipe" along with describing what Hill's own videos show to be
vitamins as a "large quantity oI pills", then you know Richard G. Hill, Esq. would have been all over
any "broken locks" at the Iormer home law oIIice, yet, there simply were none, not that that would
stop Pat King or J. Thomas Susich Irom cobbling together such an allegation in the SCR 117 Petition
in 60975) along with something about Coughlin being subject to a custodial arrest Ior "jaywalking"
by the Reno Police Department while Coughlin was Iilming Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s contractor's crew
loading up a dump truck with items oI personal property then located in Coughlin's Iormer home law
oIIice (the arrest occurred shortly aIter Coughlin discovered that Hill's contractor, Phil Stewart, had
used Coughlin's own distinctive plywood to "secure" or "board up the property" in December 2011,
Ior which the landlord was ultimately awarded costs, $1,060 oI which were based upon Stewart's
invoice Ior "securing the property", which included the cost oI plywood, and "Iixing a leak in the
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basement" despite NRS 118A.460 only allowing costs Ior "moving, storing, and inventorying" a
tenant's personal property), which Coughlin was unable to remove during the scant 13 hours he was
aIIorded to do so by the Reno Justice Court's Order Iollowing a Hearing on Coughlin's November
16th, 2011 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien (the Hearing was not set or conducted with the
"10 days" required by NRS 40.253(7)-(8) because Richard G. Hill, Esq. needed to go on a six-week
vacation shortly aIter Coughlin's November 16th, 2011 Iiling (in a matter now on appeal in SCR
60331 and 61838, wherein, somehow, a commercial tenant, Coughlin (whom was both running a law
practice and Coughlin Memory Foam, a Ioam mattress business Irom his home, which was
previously utilized Ior commercial purposes by a drug and alcohol rehabilitation counseling business
and is zone Ior mixed use purposes) was summarily evicted based upon a No Cause Eviction Notice
only (ie, the non-payment oI rent was neither noticed, pled, nor argued by the landlord) despite the
clear dictate against the use oI summary eviction proceedings against commercial tenants not based
upon the non-payment oI rent (Bench Book stuII) set Iorth in NRS 40.253. The December 21st,
2011 Order "Resolving" Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien actually required
Coughlin to pay the exact same amount oI rent Ior 17 days (November 1 to November 17th, 2011),
$480 (ie, pro-rated Irom the $900 per month rental agreement) as Coughlin would have under a "Iair
rental value", Ior the "Iull use and occupancy oI the premises" despite the Iact that Hill somehow
signed a Criminal Complaint Ior Trespass Against Coughlin, on November 13th, 2011 despite any
Summary Eviction Order not being served in accordance with NRS 40.400 (and thereIore NRCP 5
and 6(e) vis a vis the "within 24 hours" oI "receipt" oI the lockout order, and, thereIore, any such
lockout that had occured being rendered a nullity or pursuant to a void Order) and where the Washoe
County SheriII's OIIice Civil Process Service Supervisor Liz Stuchell has admitted in writing that the
AIIidavit oI Service Iiled November 7th, 2011 by Deputy Machen, attesting to having "personally
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served" the Summary Eviction Order on November 1st, 2011, was, in Iact, purportedly merely posted
to the door oI Coughlin's Iormer law oIIice while Coughlin was not home, at which point a Soldal v.
Cook County violating illegal lockout occurred. In a February 7th, 2012 written correspondence to
Coughlin, Stuchell wrote: "Mr. Coughlin, Our records indicate that the eviction conducted on that
day was personally served by Deputy Machen by posting a copy oI the Order to the residence. The
residence was unoccupied at the time. Liz Stuchell, Supervisor WCSO Civil Section". The text oI
NRS 40.253 speaks to service oI Lockout Orders: 'The court may thereupon issue an order directing
the sheriII or constable oI the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the
order... is inapplicable to this situation, where an Order Granting Summary Eviction was signed by
October 27th, 2011 (though not mailed to Coughlin until aIter the November 1, 2011 lockout had
allegedly already occured). That language is only Iound in situations inapplicable to the one incident
that in the summary eviction Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice. NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2), and
NRS 40.253(5)(a) are the only sections oI NRS 40 where this 'within 24 hours language occurs, and
those situations only apply where, in: 40.253(3)(b)(2): ' 3. A notice served pursuant to subsection 1
or 2 must: ...(b) Advise the tenant: .. (2) That iI the court determines that the tenant is guilty oI an
unlawIul detainer, the court may issue a summary order Ior removal oI the tenant or an order
providing Ior the nonadmittance oI the tenant, directing the sheriII or constable oI the county to
remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order and, 40.253(5)(a): '5. Upon
noncompliance with the notice: (a) The landlord or the landlord`s agent may apply by aIIidavit oI
complaint Ior eviction to the justice court oI the township in which the dwelling, apartment, mobile
home or commercial premises are located or to the district court oI the county in which the dwelling,
apartment, mobile home or commercial premises are located, whichever has jurisdiction over the
matter. The court may thereupon issue an order directing the sheriII or constable oI the county to
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remove the tenant within 24 hours aIter receipt oI the order. The way these summary eviction
proceedings are being carried out in Reno Justice Court presently shocks the conscience and violates
Nevada law. There is not basis Ior eIIectuating a lockout the way WCSO's Deputy Machem did in
this case. The requirements attendant to serving Summary Eviction Orders and conducting lockouts
are Iound in NRS 40.253 in two sections containing the 'within 24 hours oI receipt language are
inapplicable, as those situations do not invoke the present circumstances, where the Tenant did Iile
an AIIidavit and did contest this matter to a degree not oIten seen. To require Nevada's tenants to get
up and get out 'within 24 hours oI 'receipt oI the order (what does that even mean? The use oI
terms like 'rendition, 'rendered, 'notice oI entry, 'pronounced, is absent here, and this 'receipt
oI the order language is something rarely Iound elsewhere in Nevada law-see attached DMV
statutory citations, and in employment law litigations where one must Iile a Complaint within 90
days oI 'receipt oI a Right To Sue Letter, a situation which Iollows NRCP 5(b), and NRCP 6(e) in
imputing receipt oI such a letter, when actual receipt is not shown, by applying a 'constructive
notice standard that relies upon the days Ior mailing extension oI time Ior items served in the
mailing, etc.). In Abraham v. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 553 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2009), the
record did not reIlect when the plaintiII received his right-to-sue letter. The letter was issued on
November 24, 2006. The court calculated that the 90-day period commenced on November 30, 2006,
based on three days Ior mailing aIter excluding Saturdays and Sundays. In order to bring a claim
under either Title VII or the ADA, a plaintiII must exhaust administrative remedies and sue within 90
days oI receipt oI a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(I)(1). See Baldwin County Welcome
Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (granting plaintiII an
additional three days Ior mailing pursuant to Rule 6).... Further, as seen in the Anvui case, there is
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some argument respecting not eIIecting a lockout Ior at least 5 days where a lease has not expired by
its terms, as Coughlin's arguably had not.
However, in his January 20th, 2012 Second Motion Ior Order to Show Cause, Richard G.
Hill, Esq. did not get all bogged down in legal research and stuII, instead he just pointed out:
"FACTS SHOWING CONTEMPT OF COURT 6. EXHIBIT 1 (the Summary Eviction Lockout
Order) was served on Coughlin on November 1, 2011 by the Washoe County Sheriffs Department
in its customary manner, by posting same on the front door of the property in the manner
customary for evictions in Washoe County. The locks to the premises were changed at that time,
thereby ejecting and dispossessing Coughlin oI possession oI the Property." Hill went on to lie again
in that January 20th, 2012 Motion when he equated his oIIer to let Coughlin get some oI the
personalty Coughlin was unable to remove, due largely to Hill Iailing to remove the chain link
padlock Irom the backyard gate that Hill had only just installed in time Ior the 13 hours Coughlin had
to remove his property in exchange Ior Coughlin waiving his rights to the $700 damage deposit
Coughlin provided upon moving in, where Hill spins it: "12. On Friday, December 23, 2011,
Coughlin had a crew oI helpers, and made progress. Nonetheless, Coughlin Iailed to remove all oI
his belongings Irom the Property. Coughlin Iailed to remove his things despite having been given
additional time to do so aIter the time set by the Reno Justice Court in its order oI December 21,
2011 (EXHIBIT 2) had expired." Apparently, to Hill, at least one has " Iailed to remove all oI his
belongings Irom the Property. Coughlin Iailed to remove his things despite having been given
additional time to do so" where Hill threatens to have one arrested Ior criminal trespass or larceny (oI
their own stuII, arguably) iI one is on the property one minute past 5 p.m., unless one waives any
right to their damage deposit (which neither Hill nor the Landlord eve did return, nor did they
comply with the requirement that they provide an itemized statement indicating an application
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thereoI justiIying such a Iailure to return such deposit within 30 days....and Hill does not want to get
into whether his conduct is violative oI the FDCPA or whether he is licensed a as debt collector). In
that Motion, Hill continued on: "13. On December 30, 2011, Coughlin moved this Court Ior a
temporary restraining order to prevent Merliss Irom disposing oI the items he (Coughlin) had
abandoned on the Property. Coughlin's motion was Iully brieIed, and the Court entered its order
denying the motion on January 11, 2012. A true and correct copy oI this Court's January 11,2012
order is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 3. 14. On Thursday, January 12, 2012, in accordance with
EXHIBIT 2 and EXHIBIT 3, a licensed contractor hired by Merliss began cleaning up the Property
and disposing oI the abandoned items still remaining there. 15. Early that aIternoon, while the
contractor was hauling the Iirst oI several loads oI abandoned property to the transIer station (dump)
Ior disposal, Coughlin stopped the contractor in traIIic and attempted to prevent him Irom carrying
out his task. 16. SpeciIically, Coughlin stood in Iront oI the contractor's vehicle in an eIIort to
prevent him Irom proceeding to the transIer station. Coughlin threatened to sue the contractor.
Coughlin climbed up on the contractor's vehicle. Coughlin then called the police and Ialsely told
them that the contractor had stolen his possessions, and that the contractor had tried to run him over.
Coughlin's acts were speciIically calculated to prevent the contractor Irom disposing oI the
abandoned property, and to Irustrate and interIere with Merliss' compliance with this Court's January
11, 2012 order. 17. When Mr. Hill oI the undersigned's oIIice was notiIied oI the Ioregoing, he went
to the transIer station and presented EXHIBIT 2 and EXHIBIT 3 to the police. The contractor was
then allowed to proceed. 18. However, beIore the contractor could return to the River Rock Property,
Coughlin was there. He had his video camera and was walking up and down the street screaming and
yelling at the police, the contractor, and Mr. Hill, once Mr. Hill arrived. At the instruction oI the
police, Mr. Hill then obtained a temporary protective order ("TPO") again~t Coughlin Irom the Reno
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Justice Court. Coughlin ended up being arrested and taken to jail that day as a result oI his antics at
the transIer station and the Property."
The thing is, and Coughlin would sure like to get the 911 tapes (or, more likely, with Hill, any
recordings that may exist oI Hill calling somebody in particular he may have had in mind with the
RPD) oI calls by Coughlin (and iI Wal-Mart can call 911 over a candy bar, or a skater board over an
iPhone he seems to have set down on the concrete ground in downtown Reno, then skaterboarded oII
some 100 yards away Ior suIIiciently long period oI time to seem to have been pretty much the only
person not to have heard somebody who picked it up threaten to throw it is in the river iI it went
unclaimed can call 911 (and make up a bunch oI lies on the spot Ior the purpose oI manipulating the
police into assuages the skateboarders own negligence vis a vis the iPhone) is it unreasonable Ior
Coughlin to call 911 upon happening, totally by chance, to cross paths with Hill's contractor while
driving, catching site oI a huge dump truck Iull oI Coughlin's personal property headed towards the
town dump? Hill admits the Order denying Coughlin's Motion Ior a TPO (and hey, Iamily heirlooms
are pretty Iungible, right? Who needs a TPO Ior that? And its not like the landlord could just accept
rent in the meantime, or that the property still remains unrented to this day, some 11 months aIter the
lockout, and apparently, some $60,000 worth oI attorney's Iees paid to Hill Ior a two bedroom home
that appraises at around $90,000 currently, iI that. And Hill's Iantastic legal work ("wrong site
surgery" and all) was surely worth the risk oI a wrongIul eviction lawsuit (and check out those
potential damages under Winchell v. SchiII, 124 Nev. 938, 193 P.3d 946 (2008), not that the loss oI a
patent attorney's career could amount to all that much). Regardless, its not all that colorable Ior Hill
to allege Coughlin was violating some Order entered on January 11th, 2012 by Coughlin's conduct oI
January 12th, 2012 when NRCP 6(e) provides that 3 days Ior mailing is to be accorded to account Ior
the service oI Iilings, even Iilings electronically served on registered eIilers like Coughlin. Its
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similar to Hill wanting a criminal trespass arrest where NRCP 6(e)'s three days Ior mailing where no
personal service was accomplished (by way oI NRS 40.400) and Hill's et al did not even comply with
the constructive service requirements oI mailing the summary eviction lockout order prior to Hill's
breaking into Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice on November 1st, 2011, with the help oI the
WCSO, in violation oI Soldal v. Cook County where Coughlin was not accorded the "24 hours"
cushion aIter Coughlin's "receipt" oI the lockout order mentioned in this Court's own packets on the
service oI Lockout Orders, which Hill himselI attached as a subsequent exhibit recently...It gets
Iunnier. The civil division oI the Justice Court and the SheriII's OIIice think that whole "within 24
hours" language in NRS 40.253 means "within 24 hours" oI the SheriII's "receipt" oI the Order Irom
the Justice Court...While other's think it is "within 24 hours" oI the tenant's receipt oI the Order Irom
the SheriII...and this Court's oIIicial Iorms and instructions seem to imply that "at least 24 hours"
Irom "receipt" oI the lockout Order must be accorded to a tenant. Who knows? But, it is not clear,
as Hill suggests, that the "usual custom and practice oI the Washoe County SheriII's OIIice" is black
letter law upon which Bar grievances, custodial criminal trespass arrests, multiple Motion Ior Order
To Show Cause, tens oI thousands oI dollars in attorney's Iees sanctions against a pro se appellant,
etc. are warranted. Somehow the District Court Iound a way to sanction Coughlin with $40,050
worth oI attorney's Iee in that appeal oI the summary eviction without holding a single hearing, well,
other than the Hearing on Hills Order to Show Cause, which was denied when Coughlin destroyed
Hill's contractor Phil Stewart on cross-examination. (Really, Phil? Really? You could Iell "a
depression" in your 2 ton loaded to capacity dump truck upon Coughlin allegedly "climbing up on
it", though you indicated you had already "alighted Irom the vehicle", but, wait, you could see
Coughlin's head above the tailgate walls in your rear view mirror (which doesn't seem to be there on
any the many videos oI the events oI that day. And even iI such a mirror where present on Stewart's
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truck, that doesn't really explain how all the personalty stacked up so high in the truck bed (replete
with specialized add-on high stack retaining walls) wouldn't obscure any purported view oI
Coughlin's head high above the area above the specialize hydraulic dump truck's tailgate, conIirming
Stewart's mere suspicion that Coughlin climbed on his truck. Coughlin swears under oath he did not
climb on Stewart's truck. Hill needed a little "Iact" to spice up his Motion to Show Cause just
enough, and "Coughlin climbed up on the truck" was "just the ticket", and Stewart did not mind
going along Ior the ride, so long as... And none oI the many videos Irom that day actually show any
oI the Yosemite Sam cartoon villian type behavior Hill attributes to Coughlin in his wonderIully
imaginative Motion Ior Order to Show Cause and or Application Ior Order oI Protection concerning
the events involved in the jaywalking custodial arrest Hill had Coughlin subjected to on January
12th, 2012.
Much like Hill's contractor, Phil Stewart, Ilat out lying in an aIIidavit when he swore
Coughlin "climbed up on" his truck, Hill similarly lied in an aIIidavit about Coughlin, apparently
while "engraged" making "physical contact" with Hill. On Page 2 oI Hill's AIIidavit attach to his
Motion Ior Order to Show Cause, January 20th, 2012, Hills attests: "5. On Friday, December 23,
2011, we unlocked the house at 9:00 a.m. as ordered. We overlooked the chain on the back gate.
There was nobody at the house when we were there. At approximately noon, my staII inIormed me
that an enraged Mr. Coughlin had called the oIIice screaming that he could not get in the back yard.
When I Iinished the meeting I was in, I immediately went over and unlocked the back gate. Coughlin
had a small crew. He charged at me and made physical contact. He was enraged. We leIt. When we
returned at 5:00 p.m., Mr. Coughlin was screaming and yelling obscenities. He drove oII in a small U
-Haul. His crew remained. We walked the property with them. The inside .ground Iloor was mostly
cleared oI all but a big TV. The basement had been cleared somewhat, but there was still a lot oI
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"junk. " We could not access the attic. We went outside. I told Coughlin's crew they could remove
anything and everything outside, iI they would only try to rehang the gate that Mr. Coughlin had
taken oII the hinges beIore we could get over to unlock it. I told them I would lock the gates in the
morning.
That is really interesting. Compare the above to the Iollowing excerpt Irom page 3 oI Hills
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition in CV11-03628, the appeal oI the summary eviction Order: "12. While
at the property to remove the padlock, Coughlin, on more than one occasion, screamed proIanities at
Merliss' counsel, and, at one point, charged Mr. Hill and attempted to physically intimidate him.
At least the audio oI this incident was captured on tape. 13. Nevertheless, at 5:00 p.m. on Friday,
December 23,2011, counsel granted Coughlin and his agents additional, unfettered, and
unlimited access to the outside of the property to remove any remaining items." Whereas in his
January 20th, 2012 sworn Declaration Hill goes so Iar as to indicate Coughlin "made physical
contact" (which is a damn lie anyways), in Hill's then associate Casey Baker, Esq.'s NRCP 11 signed
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition, HIll's associate Baker will only go so Iar as to say that Coughlin, "at
one point, charged Mr. Hill and attempted to physically intimidate him." Baker was standing directly
next to Hill during the interacation wherin Hill swore, under penalty oI perjury, that Couglhin "made
physical contact" with Hill). Sounds like Casey Baker, Esq. was not quite willing to "spice up" the
story line as Hill himselI was. Casey probably did not have enough reason to sign on to the lies
about Coughlin "climbing on" the contractor's truck. In Hill's Application Ior a Protection Order
against Coughlin Hill slips up and claims that Coughlin was "climbing on the contractor's truck,
picking through the contents" back at Couglin's Iormer home law aIter the interaction at the "transIer
station" (town dump), whereas Hill's contractor indicated in his AIIidavit that the alleged "climbing"
on his truck occurred at the "transIer station". However, both Hill and his contractor, Phil Stewart
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indicate that the Reno Police Department "requested" that Hill Iiled a Protection Order Application
against Coughlin. II that is true, its improper. The RPD can provide individuals inIormation about
seeking one, but when the RPD goes a step Iurther and starts urging individuals to Iile protection
order applications, or, as has recently been the case with RPD OIIicer Alan Weaver and Sargent
Oliver Miller, whom, upon inIormation and belieI, urged Northwind's apartment maintenance man
Milan Krebs to sign a Iraudulent criminal complaint against Coughlin Ior "disturbing the peace" on
July 3rd, 2011, and again urged Superior Mini Storage's Matt Grant to sign a similar baseless
"disturbing the peace" criminal Complaint against Coughlin on approximately September 21st, 2012
then there is more than a little indication that the RPD is out oI control and attempting to incite
members oI the public to sign Iraudulent criminal complaints based upon a retaliatory animus by the
RPD towards Coughlin. OIIicer Weaver and Sargent Dye showed up to an unnoticed July 5th, 2012
bail hearing Ior Coughlin, presided over by Judge Linda Gardner's brother RMC Judge William
Gardner (whom received Coughlin's timely Notice oI Appeal oI the criminal trespass conviction,
under NRS 189.010, yet Iailed to Iorward it on to the District Court, which somewhat recently
dismissed Coughlin's appeal in that matter, wherein Sargent Dye and OIIicer Weaver testiIied under
oath, with City Attorney Jill Drake singing backup, the the eIIectd that, despite bail only being valid
based upon one reason in Nevada (to secure the deIendant's attendance at trial) the "public health and
saIety" dictated increasing the cash required to bail out Couglin TENFOLD, Irom a bondable $1,415
to a CASH ONLY $3,000. Consequently, upon Judge Gardner so impermissibly raising Coughlin's
bail, alleging a "public health and saIety" rationale Ior so doing, Couglin was Iorced to spend 18 days
in jail, wherein the opportunity to timely contest the $40,050 attorney Iees award to Richard Hill
incident to the summary eviction appeal ran, all while Coughlin was denied any opportunity to access
justice or Iile documents Irom jail, and where Coughlin sustained signIicant damages, Iinancial and
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otherwise, and where the jail reIused to transport Coughlin to a hearing on a landlord tenant matter
wherein he was a named party. The extent to which local law enIorcement is willing to play "kick
the can" with an attorney, particularly where Bar Counsel Pat King is so willing to join the chorus, is
troubling, and indicates the judiciary need issue a clarion call out to announce the extent to which
such misconduct can not, and will not, be tolerated. Such a retaliatory animus towards Coughlin by
the RPD is likely due to his September 7th, 2011 Complaint with respect to a wrongIul, retaliatory,
and Iraudulent arrest by RPD OIIicer Nicholas Duralde, which was accompanied by extortionate
threats by RPD OIIicer Ron Rosa that iI Coughlin didn't cooperate they would "call the Nevada Bar
and let them know how you cooperated with our investigation. How's that runnin' Ior ya?" While
Duralde testiIied that he did not hear or recall Rosa's coercive threats to Coughlin just prior to the
arrest, the Iact that Duralde echoed those threats by saying "Now, I can arrest you Ior larceny. Now,
I can do a search incident to arrest. How's that?" tends to undermine Duralde's contention that "he
doesn't recall" hearing anything like what OIIicer Rosa was capture on tape saying to Coughlin just
prior to the arrest. Upon making a Fourth Amendment violating arrest completely lacking in
probable cause, and smugly "joking" to Coughlin about the "beneIits" associated with charging
Coughlin with a "Ielony", (at the time oI the August 20th, 2011 arrest, the Ielony larceny amount
limit was $250 and above) compared to a misdemeanor (under some halI baked "grand larceny" oI an
allegedly lost or mislaid or abandoned three year old iPhone 3G that the alleged victim testiIied was
only then worth "about $80-100" on eBay or Craigslist), ie, search incident to custodial arrest
possible where probable cause lacking to arrest, or even reasonable suspicion missing to do a pat
down, where alleged crime occured outside oIIicer's presence, aIter 7 p.m., and no citizens arrest
immediately eIIectuated, particularly where Coughlin himselI made a 911 call prior to OIIicer's
arriving and where video Irom minutes prior to oIIicer arriving reveal Coughlin suggesting the 8-12
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hostile late teens to early twenties skater boarders relax, stay peaceIul, reIrain Irom assaulting and
battering Couglin, and wait Ior the police arrive so a lawIul, peaceIul resolution could be attained
(with Coughlin even cautioning the youths about a then recent tragic death occurring not Iar Irom
that location).
Further Hill just Ilat out lies in his January 3rd, 2012 Opposition to Amended Motion Ior
Emergency Restraining Order. Well, he did tell the truth when he wrote, on page 3: "11. On Friday,
December 23,2011, counsel Ior Merliss neglected to remove the padlock to the back gate oI the
property." That is true, he did do that, and it did prevent Coughlin Irom removing all his property
during the scant 13 hours Coughlin had to move it. But, when Hill swears, on page 3, that:
"Coughlin's access to the house itselI was never hindered.:" he is just "sippin' drank" or something,
as, obviously Iailing to remove a lock on a gate gonna tend to have that eIIect, now...and when Hill
swears: " 13. Nevertheless, at 5:00 p.m. on Friday, December 23,2011, counsel granted Coughlin and
his agents additional, unIettered, and unlimited access to the outside oI the property to remove any
remaining items. The only condition placed on that access was that Coughlin's helpers agreed to
replace the gate on its hinges as best they could. Coughlin and his agents Iailed to remove the
remainder oI Coughin's property Irom the yard that night, and Iailed to put the gate back on the
hinges." Coughlin was never made aware oI any such "oIIer" by Hill, and, even iI he had been, hey,
it's the "outside oI the property", Rich, people generally put their valuables insiae, you know?
Then the HIll prevarication and obIuscation express kicks into overdrive, when, in his
January 3rd, 2012 Opposition he continues on: "C. Coughlin is Not Entitled to A Stay Coughlin
claims to have deposited $250 with the justice's court pursuant to NRS 40.385, although he has not
provided any prooI in support oI his claim. Attached hereto as EXHIBIT 10 is a true and correct
copy oI the justice's court's docket as oI December 19, 2011. That docket shows that Coughlin paid a
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Iiling Iee Ior his appeal on December 12, 2011, in the amount oI $216.00." Well, actually, Judge
SIerrazza waived the Justice Court's $24.00 Iiling Iee, and the $216.00 represents the District Court's
Iiling Iee, and its not really clear whether that date is when the check was cashed by the District
Court, or whether the Justice Court held on to the check Ior quit4e awhile beIore shipping it along
with the ROA to the District Court, etc., etc. Hill continues: "It is entirely unclear Irom the Iollowing
entries oI that docket whether or when Coughlin ever paid an additional $250.00 under NRS 40.385."
That might, technically be true, Rich, to the extent that you wrote it on January 3rd, 2012, and are
sneakily indicating that you are looking at an old docket Irom the Justice Court Irom December 19th,
2012, even though Coughlin made a big deal to you and the Justice Court, in writing, that he was
depositing the $250.00 supersedeas bond mentioned in NRS 40.385, on December 22nd, 2011, a Iact
which Hill himselI mentions in his own Iilings...So, kind oI a lack oI candor to the tribunal there to
make all this argument based upon some old docket and the extent to which it Iails to reveal or
"make clear" matters to which Hill had ready written notice oI via his own e-Flex account and
service oI Iilings upon him connected thereto, in addition to Coughlin's Iaxes, emails, and there
might have even been a service oI a Notice oI Posting Supersedeas Bond (need to check on that
more), etc. in connection with the depositing on December 22nd 2012, the $250 required Ior a stay
during appeal oI a summary eviction in NRS 40.385. And, actually, Hill slipped up a bit there, in
light oI the Iollowing: And, actually, Hill, in his January 20th, 2012 Iiling, admitted that Coughlin
sent him that December 22nd, 2011 email notiIying him oI the posting oI the $250 supersedeas bond
seeking a stay, when he admits, on page 3: "11. Pursuant to EXHIBIT 2, Coughlin was provided
access to the Property on Thursday, December 22, 2011. That day, Coughlin sent an email to the
undersigned and 1udge Sferrazza, in which he essentially announced that he was entitled to a
stay, and to return to and continue in possession of the Property. 1udge Sferrazza quickly
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responded by email, and reminded Mr. Coughlin that the stay had been denied." Found in
Exhibit 1 is the December 22nd email to Hill's OIIice that alerts them to the posting oI $250 ,
speciIied as a "supersedeas bond", with a citation to NRS 40.385:
Hill's January 3rd, 2012 Opposition continues, on page 8: "Even iI Coughlin eventually paid
some amount toward an appeal bond, it was not in time to stay the eviction during this appeal. To do
that, a proper motion must be made and granted, and the bond posted, prior to the lockout. The
lockout here occurred on November 1, 2011. By the time Coughlin managed to Iind that statute and
pay any money to the court, he had been locked out oI the property Ior six weeks. As such, any
request Ior a stay was, and is, moot. At this point, Coughlin does not have any rights in either the real
or personal". Oddly, Anvui saw a stay granted aIter a lockout was conducted, and Hill (RPC 3.1
"meritorious contention" issues) cites to no legal authority Ior his contention that "to stay the eviction
during this appeal...a proper motion must be made and granted, and the bond posed, prior to the
lockout." Citation? None.
Despite Hill's strange approach oI not actually indicating that his oIIice did not get an
December 22nd, 2011 email notiIying them oI the posting oI $250 Ior a supersedeas bond seeking a
stay under NRS 118A.385 (but rather, Hill Iocuses on what one cannot glean Irom looking at a dated
docket...), Hill's OIIice was made aware oI such matters, in writing, in the Iollowing December 22nd
email to Hill's OIIiee: "...Further, this is all moot at this point as I have Iiled a Supersedeas Bond of
$250, and according to NRS 40.385, I automatically get a stay of eviction and am entitled to
return to the property and continue in possession. The statute sets the Supersedeas Bond
(which yields a stay) at $250 if rent is under $1000, unless the Court wishes to rule that I am a
commercial tenant. However, if the court does rule that I am a commercial tenant, the No
Cause Eviction Notice in this case, under NRS 40.253 makes a Summary Eviction Proceeding
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impermissible, as Summary Eviction Proceedings are not allowed against commercial tenants
where only a No Cause Eviction Notice is filed. Its one or the other, but Mr. Hill and Baker
cannot have it both ways. Further, the Courts Order of December 21, 2011 is just that, and
Order, its not an agreement, its not a settlement, etc, etc. and the audio record clearly reflects
that. NRS 40.385 Stay of execution upon appeal; duty of tenant who retains possession of
premises to pay rent during stay. Upon an appeal from an order entered pursuant to NRS
40.253: 1. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a stay of execution may be obtained
by filing with the trial court a bond in the amount of $250 to cover the expected costs on
appeal. In an action concerning a lease of commercial property or any other property Ior which
the monthly rent exceeds $1,000, the court may, upon its own motion or that oI a party, and upon a
showing oI good cause, order an additional bond to be posted to cover the expected costs on appeal.
A surety upon the bond submits to the jurisdiction oI the appellate court and irrevocably appoints the
clerk oI that court as the surety's agent upon whom papers aIIecting the surety's liability upon the
bond may be served. Liability oI a surety may be enIorced, or the bond may be released, on motion
in the appellate court without independent action. 2. A tenant who retains possession oI the premises
that are the subject oI the appeal during the pendency oI the appeal shall pay to the landlord rent in
the amount provided in the underlying contract between the tenant and the landlord as it becomes
due. II the tenant Iails to pay such rent, the landlord may initiate new proceedings Ior a summary
eviction by serving the tenant with a new notice pursuant to NRS 40.253. Sincerely, Zach Coughlin,
Esq.".
Oh, and Hill and Stewart admit to this in a video. Richard Hill's contractor, Ior some strange
reason, removed a ladder Coughlin owns Irom the property, preventing Coughlin's access to the attic
upon his being allowed that scant 13 hours to remove his property (and the attic had been renovated
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to allow Ior storage oI a considerable amount oI property. II Coughlin was Hill he would have called
the RPD to report the "larceny" oI his ladder by Hill, in a RICO thing with his contractor. But Hill
escaped prosecution that time, over they whole ladder deal. It never was made clear why the
contractor removed the ladder Irom the property, other than, perhaps, like the applying oI a lock to
the backyard gate, make it even more unlikely that Coughlin would be able to remove all he needed
to, especially given the limited Iunds Ior moving vehicles and hired help, in the scant 13 hours
allowed under the December 21st, 2012 Order.
Things have just gotten too ridiculous where an attorney's license gets placed in jeopardy Ior
saying "Wow" in court (or King threatens to buttress an SCR 105 Complaint upon such scandalous
behavior while the RPD can violate the Fourth Amendment while making threatening, coercive
statements and smugly, menacingly joking to an arrestee (whom dared ask iI the oIIicer actually had
reasonable suspicion to conduct such an evasive Terry Stop style weapons check pat down on one
whom himselI called 911 to report an attack by skater youths, while holding his Pekingness and
bicycle, which the skaters were trying to rob the attorney oI when they weren't "jokingly" making
sudden attempts to reach into the attorney's pockets) about overcharging an arrest to get around the
dictates against conducting a custodial arrest and search incident thereto Ior some ill supported petty
larceny oI an iPhone, allegedly occuring aIter 7 pm, outside the oIIicer's presence, based upon some
"lost, mislaid, or abandoned" property Iact pattern worthy oI a law school Iinal exam where someone
Iinds an iPhone on the ground in downtown Reno, oIIers it up to the denizens oI a downtown skate
plaze shortly beIore midnight on a Saturday, then threatens to "throw it in the river" iI someone does
not claim it immediately, which eventually leads to an attorney being attacked by a group oI youthIul
skateboards making up every lie they can think oI to prevent any inIerence that said iPhone was
abandoned and or rescued Irom waste or destruction or that assaulting and battering one who does
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not immediately turn over an iPhone to a hostile, violent group oI 8 to 12 late teens early twenties
skaterboards yelling things like "give us the phone Iaggot". Further, in Nevada, a larcenous intent
must exist at the time one takes possession oI lost or mislaid property. "A taking with the intention
oI returning the property, or a taking without the intent to permanently deprive the owner oI his
property, will not amount to larceny, even though the perpetrator, aIter gaining possession oI the
property, Iormed that intent. State v. CliIIord, 14 Nev. 72, 33 Am.Rep. 526; State v. Ward, 19 Nev.
297, 10 P. 133; Robinson v. GoldIield Merger Mines Co." Harvey v. State, 78 Nev. 417, 422-23, 375
P.2d 225, 227-28 (1962) |78 Nev. 417, Page 420| , 46 Nev. 291, 213 P. 103. The requirement that the
original taking and the Ielonious intent coexist in point oI time was properly mentioned in the written
instructions given in the instant case. Moreover, we recognize that the question oI whether the
property was originally taken with such intent is one oI Iact, the determination oI which is to be
made Irom a consideration oI all the circumstances preceding, attending and Iollowing the taking oI
the property. State v. Cudney, 47 Nev. 224, 218 P. 736.
There has already been testimony in such a pending criminal matter against an attorney the
the attorney did not attempt to Iurtively or immediately Ilee the scene where he was allegedly Iree
handed such an iPhone, and where the Witness Statements conveniently leIt out the whole bit about
the man holding the phone up and threatening to "throw it in the river" (an an admission by several
hostile witnesses that that did occur was caught on videotape) and, not only that, but actually lied an
indicated these witnesses "personally eye witnessed" the attorney just walk up and "grab" the iPhone
oII the ground, etc. Oh, also, the whole arrest was caught on tape too, as were the moments prior
thereto, and the alleged victims are clearly shown lying to 911 operators about someone "socking a
minor" to engender a more rapid and urgent police response. Never mind that the alleged "socking"
was actually Ilinching went an 18 year old, along 8-12 oI his hostile and aggressive Iriends
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attempting to rob the attorney oI his bicycle and or dog, made a "joking" and sudden movement
intended to make the attorney think the 18 year old was "reaching in" the attorney's pockets...Add to
that the Iact that they OIIicer announced to the attorney within seconds oI arriving on seen that he
was going to conduct a search incident to arrest, and only later made up a bunch oI pretextual
rationale to support conducting a Terry Stop pat down, then a search incident to arrest, while alleging
the attorney's question as to, whether the oIIicer had a suIIicient basis to conduct such a pat down or
search incident to arrest, without anything more to support a larceny probable cause analysis than an
allegation that one possessed an iPhone that was purportedly leIt on the ground, whereupon that
person called 911 upon being attacked by a group oI 8-12 immediately aIter Iailing to instantly
adhere to their threatening demands to consent to a search on one's pockets, accompanied by a touch
oI assault and battery to boot, and some hate speech. Such is not supportable, particularly where
merely penaing Ior denying one due process required under the law, and particularly SCR 102(4)(d)
and SCR 111(8) and SCR 111(10).
The Iact that the criminal trespass custodial arrest occurred at a time when Coughlin still had
not received back the $2,275 "rent escrow" the Reno Justice Court Iorced Coughlin to deposit with
the RJC in that very summary eviction proceeding/"Trial" (all while Coughlin was, at least according
to Hill, supposed to hire movers and rent a U-Haul and otherwise have suIIicient Iunds to conduct a
large scale move oI a home law oIIice aIter having just gone Irom zero to expert on landlord tenant
law litigating a "Trial" Ior a law oIIice tenant in a matters oI days...). Coughlin made such a deposit
or $2,275 "rent escrow" with the RJC on October 17th, 2011 (aIter the October 13th, 2011 summary
eviction hearing in Rev2011-001708 wherein the RJC Judge ruled that Coughlin "had established a
material issue oI Iact" as to retaliation and habitability (and perhaps discrimination, that is not clear)
and set a "Trial" (but only iI Coughlin deposited $2,275 in a "rent escrow" account with the RJC by
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October 17th, 2011) Ior October 25th, 2011 (despite a "Trial" under JCRCP 109 requiring 20 days to
respond to a Complaint, under NRS 40.251, ie, a plenary unlawIul detainer action with all the
attendant due process trimmings). Further, the Summary Eviction Order stemming Irom the October
25th, 2011 "Trial" (it was noticed as a "Trial" in writing by the Court, reIerred to as a Trial by the
Court) and the accompanying criminal trespass conviction stemming thereIrom are likely void do to
the Iact that Coughlin Iiled, on October 18th, 2011 a Notice oI Appeal (on a Iorm that, by the way,
indicated McLaughlin's exposure Ior any attorney's Iee award would be limited to $15.00, much less
the $40,050 ultimately entered against Coughlin in an attorney's Iee sanction in CV11-03628 by
Judge Patrick Flanagan. That Notice oI Appeal Iorm was provided to Coughlin by a Clerk oI the
RJC in response to a speciIic request by Coughlin Ior the Iorm to appeal the Order stemming Irom
his October 13th, 2011 summary eviction proceeding, and the Iorms on the RJC web site at the time,
under a heading oI "Notice oI Appeal" linked to that same Iorm, and did not in any way speciIy such
Iorm to only apply to appeals oI small claims actions). Coughlin's Iiling oI a Notice oI Appeal oI
that October 13th, 2011 Order Iollowing the summary eviction proceeding, under Mack v. Mack-
Manley, divested any jurisdiction oI the RJC to hold such a "Trial" on October 25th, 2011, and any
such "Trial" was void Ior lack oI jurisdiction anyway, NRCP 60(b)(4) in light oI the dictates oI NRS
40.253(6) ("shall make no Iurther Order" upon the Justice Court Iinding tenant had established a
genuine issue oI material Iact, which Judge SIerrazza indicated Coughlin had in his Order Iollowing
the October 13th, 2011 summary eviction proceeding, and again, on the record, during the October
25th, 2011 Trial, Judge SIerrazza again stated that he set the matter Ior "Trial" upon his making a
"Iinding that Coughlin established a genuine issue oI material Iact", which, under Anvui, and NRS
40.253(6), prevented Judge SIerrazza Irom making any Iurther order, and the lack oI a corollary to
Las Vegas Justice Court Rule 44 in the RJC, along with the dictates against unwritten/not approved
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by the Nevada Supreme Court and counter to express statutory mandates in NRS 118A and NRS 40
"house rules" set Iorth in JCRCP 83 should have prevented Iorcing Coughlin to make any "rent
escrow" deposit oI $2,275 right in the middle (actually aIter it should have ended) oI a summary
eviction proceeding.
JCRCP RULE83.RULES BY JUSTICE COURTS
Each justice or justice court in a township with more than one justice, by
action oI a majority oI the justices thereoI, may Irom time to time make and
amend the rules governing its practices not inconsistent with these rules.
Copies oI rules and amendments so made by any justice court shall upon
their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court, but shall not
become effective until after approval by the Supreme Court and
publication. In all cases not provided for by these rules the justice
courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with
these rules.
Further, any "Trial" in that summary eviction matter, and thereIore any
criminal trespass arrest based upon any Iailure to properly adhere to some
improperly served Lockout Order stemming thereIrom, is also void in light
oI the noncompliance with JCRCP 109: SETTING OF TRIAL IN
ACTIONS
"(a)In no case shall a trial on the merits be set less than 20 calendar
days aIter service oI summons and complaint."
To continue the temporary suspension oI Coughlin's constitutionally protected
(under the Fourteenth Amendment, a law license is a "property right") law license
based upon conjecture, hearsay, Pat King's "innocent" mistakes about "Iacts" and
various orders so terribly subject to being Iound void under NRCP 60(b)(4), etc. and a
criminal trespass conviction similarly suspect, particularly where Coughlin's Iilings
Further, Judge SIerrazza admitted that the RJC did not have a rule Ior Iorcing
Coughlin to make such a "rent escrow" deposit at the time such was ordered on
October 13th, 2011 in the summary eviction proceeding. And even iI the RJC did
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have such a rule speaking to "deposits" with the RJC, JCRRT Rule 2 makes clear that
such a rule does not apply to "landlord tenant matters":
JCRRT Rule 2. Application oI Rules. Except as otherwise provided by
statue, these rules apply to all civil proceedings Iiled in Reno Township
except small claims and landlord tenant matters.
Oh, and Hill still managed to get Coughlin subject to the November 13th, 2011 custodial
arrest (ie custodial have someone with color oI law make you strip naked and spread your buttocks
search incident to arrest, and even apparently allow a complete copying and, some times "erasing" oI
one's smart phone, separate micro sd data card, or laptop pursuant to such a "search incident to
arrest"...like what occurred on February 27th, 2012 incident to the traIIic citation trial beIore RMC
Judge Nash Holmes (whom told Coughlin she would have him arrested iI he said Richard G. Hill's
name one more time) in 11 TR 26800 2I stemming Irom the three traIIic citations RPD Sargent John
Tarter called in a diIIerent RPD OIIicer to issue Coughlin incident to Coughlin being told to leave
Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s law oIIice where Coughlin had gone (upon being released Irom jail on
November 15th, 2011) to retrieve his keys, wallet, state issued identiIication and client's Iiles Irom
Hill, whom reIused to provide such items to Coughlin, upon Coughlin being bailed oI jail aIter
spending three days there in connection with the criminal trespass arrest connected to the criminal
Complaint signed by Richard G. Hill, Esq. At that February 27th, 2012 traffic citation Trial in RMC
11 TR 26800 (and not even some juicy reckless driving thing, just a plain old "Iailure to come to a
complete stop at a stop sign/CaliIornia Roll/Boulevard Stop traIIic ticket"), Coughlin was sentenced
to Iive days jail, denied a stay (despite being a practicing attorney with actual clients depending upon
him) by RMC Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes seconds aIter Coughlin testiIied that RPD Sargent Tarter
"lied" during his testimony concerning what Coughlin's purported to be a retaliatory issuance oI
multiple traIIic citations incident to Coughlin repeating to Tarter what may have been a sarcastic
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repose to Coughlin by RPD OIIicer Chris Carter during the criminal trespass arrest Irom Coughlin's
Iormer home law oIIice just days prior, when Coughlin queried Carter iI he, too, was on Hill's
payroll. In Judge Nash Holmes written February 28th, 2012 Order Finding DeIendant in Contempt
oI Court and Imposing Sanctions (a Iive day immediate trip to jail, and a Iailure to release Coughlin
aIter the Iourth day despite the RMC accepting and Iailing to return $100 Coughlin's mother
deposited with the RMC upon an agreement being made to so release Coughlin at the end oI the
Iourth day...which was not adhered to), Judge Nash Holmes somehow Iound it Iair to impose the
Iollowing upon a pro se indigent criminal deIendant (much in line with the RMC's prerecorded
arraignment videos which basically attempt to scare any and all out oI even darign to represent
themselves beIore the RMC, especially where Keith Loomis, Esq. and the boys down there provide
such a ready lubricant to the, uh, justice the RMC dispenses: "The court had the deIendant sworn at
the beginning oI the trial, stating that the court has Iound that most selI-represented deIendants tend
to testiIy a great deal as they cross- examine opposing witnesses, so the deIendant would be under
oath Irom the start, too. exhibits were marked or admitted." That practice apparently is read to
provide support Ior some contention that Coughlin violated some RPC while appearing as a pro se
criminal deIendant in a traIIic citation Trial, where Coughlin's smart phone and micro sd card were
searched incident to his arrest Ior "summary contempt committed in the Court's presence" and
"booked into evidence" where they stayed Ior some 37 days, and where returned to Coughlin with all
the data erased, but not beIore lots oI contradictory statements were made by the SheriII's OIIice, the
City oI Reno Marshal's, the RMC, the Washoe County District Attorney's OIIice, and the Washoe
County Detention Facility regarding the chain oI custody oI that smart phone and data card, whether
it was removed Irom the evidence room at the jail and transported back to the RMC on February
28th, 2012, whether a micro sd card was even included in the property so inventoried then booked
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into evidence, and whether that micro sd card was released to an associate oI Coughlin or kept with
the smart phone Ior those 37 days. Curiously, in Judge Nash Holmes March 30th, 2012 Order
Releasing Property, that Order indicates: "IT IS ORDERED that the Washoe County SheriIIs OIIice
shall release to the DeIendant, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, three items taken Irom him on
February 27, 2012 at Washoe County Regional Detention Facility during his booking Ior
incarceration pursuant to the imposition oI a 5-day jail sentence Ior Contempt oI Court in the above-
entitled case, to wit: one Samsung Cell Phone; one T-Mobile Cell Phone; and one Braun Electric
Razor, as identiIied in Case Number WC 12-1805 and reIerred to under Control # C-47951."
That's the thing, though. There were Iour items, not three. Marshal Harley, whom made sure
he was the one doing the lookin' through oI the pockets and pattin' down oI the body and all that, he
made a big deal about how the micro sd card was not in the smart phone. Actually, Marshal Harley
pretty much rendered an Order convicting Coughlin oI this and that in conjunction with his
conducting the search incident to arrest oI Coughlin. The Iourth was a micro sd card, capable oI
holding an entire libraries worth oI books on it in digital Iormat. While the smart phone was
returned, with the micro sd data card inserted into it, it was not Iound that way during the "search
incident to arrest". The micro sd card was not inserted into the phone. Such a micro sd card can be
inserted into a Ilash drive adapter, into a digital camera, into a lot oI things, not necessarily one's
smart phone. And the Washoe County Regional Detntion Facility did not return the phone
immediately in compliaince with the Order, but rather indicated that the Washoe County District
Attorney OIIice had to give permission and or get to possess the materials Iirst, with "Maddy" oI the
WCSO indicating Coughlin need contact Mary Kandaras oI the WCDA's OIIice.
Eventually, aIter 37 days, the smart phone and micro sd card were returned to Coughlin with
all the date therein erased, but not beIore Judge Nash Holmes entered an Order accusing Coughlin,
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vaguely, oI lying (not getting all that speciIic though with respect to just what it was Coughlin was
apparently "lying" about, but some reIerence was made to rules related to the media and court
proceedings...and then a laundry list copy and pasted Irom teh RPC oI all the purported violations oI
various RPC's that Coughlin was Iound to have committed "by clear and convincing
evidence"...including such vague and entirely devoid oI any explication or Iactual rulings that
Coughlin was guilty oI demonstrating a "lack oI Iairness to opposing counsel" or "prolonging
proceedings", etc...Coughlin did report to City Attorney Allison Ormaas during a brieI plea
bargaining session immediately beIore the Trial that RPD OIIicer Carter made a statement (perhaps
said sarcastically while arresting an attorney Ior criminal trespass where the RPD reIused to issue a
citation or identiIy themselves as law enIorcement prior storming in Coughlin's Iormer law oIIice's
"basement", where a stay is mandated under NRS 118A.380, where one's rent is less than $1,000 and
damages awarded are nil, Ior no more than a $250 deposit, at a time when Coughlin had yet to be
returned the $2,275 impermissible "rent escrow" deposit Iorced upon him in a summary eviction) that
"Richard Hill pays me a lot oI money so I arrest who he says to arrest and do what he says to do"
upon Coughlin asking Carter iI he, too, was on Richard G. Hill's payroll. It appears that at some
point, perhaps while they were whispering in each other's ears (as Coughlin noted on the record
during the Trial in 11 TR 26800) during the Trial that Marshal and City Attorney Ormaas were
aIraid Coughlin may have some evidence oI Ormaas's admitting to Coughlin that she was in no way
going to Iollowing up on an statements by an RPD OIIicer that may tend to present and admission oI
accepting some improper beneIit in exchange Ior committing oIIicial misconduct under color oI law,
or otherwise document such inIormation. The RMC's Marshal Harley seemed to be upset about the
possibility that Coughlin may have some evidence oI Harley purporting to personally serve Coughlin
the Order to Show Cause in CV11-03628 (and Machen's AIIidavit oI Service Iiled March 8th, 2012
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indicates Machen "personally served" Coughlin, which not the case, as apparently Machen did not
want to wait around Ior a Iew minutes Ior Coughlin's bargaining session with City Attorney Ormaas
to end, which means Machen was cutting a corner, which is something courts and local law
enIorcement punish ordinary citizens Ior every day in Washoe County. When Marshal Harley began
to realize Coughlin's questions to him were revealing some questionable issue (so, you don't know
whoat WCSO Deputy handed you this Order to Show Cause? You have no idea? You didn't
recognize him at all? Did he "personally serve" me it, or did you, Marshal Harley? Why is this even
being personally served? And why while I am attending court on a totally unrelated matter? Is that
proper? Is that somewhat hostile and done in an attempt to embarass Coughlin at the courthouse? Is
that appropriate? Is there even a rule requiring such an "Order to Show Cause" be personally
served"? Have not Iound one yet...Especially where Coughlin was a registerd eIiler at the time, and
thereIore, likely had already been deemed served. Where the subsequent AIIidavit oI Service theIore
indicated it was actually the same WCSO Deputy Machen having "personally served" such Notice on
Coughlin, along with some impromptu questioning oI Harley as to whether such service was being
done bas To the extent City oI Reno Marshal Harley barged in to that bargaining session purporting
to personally serve Coughlin Notice oI a Hearing and or Order to Show Cause in connection with
Hill's Motion Ior Order to Show Cause in the appeal oI the summary eviction matter (which resulted
in a quadruple jeopardy cocktail courtesy oI Hill, based largely upon the same acts which resulted in
Coughlin being arrested Ior "jaywalking", and Hill getting a TPO, and Bar Counsel Pat King making
a Iederal case oI Hill's January 13th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin submitted to the SBN, wherein
Hill leads oII with an allegation that Coughlin was "ghostwriting Ior" someone Ior whom Coughlin
was listed as attorney of recora. Huh? Then Hill went to "comply with his RPC 8.3 obligation" by
reporting the conviction underpinning the current temporary suspension (something Coughlin
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himselI reported in compliance with SCR 111 prior to any knowledge oI Hill's having done so, not
that Bar Counsel bothered to mention that in its SCR 111 Petition, something this Court made note oI
a lack thereoI in its June 7th, 2012 Order).
Incidentally, RPD Sargent Monica Lopez admitted during a videotaped interview that neither
she nor her Iellow oIIice, Carter, identiIied themselves as law enIorcement while calling to Coughlin
at the basement door prior to the landlord opening it, nor requested or warned Coughlin to leave the
property prior to arresting him Irom criminal trespass Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice on
November 13th, 2011...despite Hill testiIying under oath that they did so identiIy themselves prior to
the landlord opening the "basement" door and that the RPD OIIicer did issue a warning to leave to
Coughlin or otherwise provide Coughlin a chance to heed such a warning prior to eIIecting a
custodial arrest. What makes that even more troubling is the Iact that Hill provided the City oI Reno
prosecutors video oI pretty much all events other than the "knock and identiIy themselves" as law
enIorcement Hill purports the RPD did (even where RPD Sargent Lopez indicates neither she nor
OIIicer Carter did so identiIy themselves prior to the basement door being opened by the landlord).
Amongst the videos that Hill Iilmed on November 13th, 2011 that Hill did manage to provide to City
oI Reno prosecutors was a video oI Coughlin asking OIIicer Carter and Sargent Tarter, prior to the
point oI arrest, why, iI they Ielt he was trespassing, they wouldn't simply issue a citation in lieu oI
making a custodial arrest. Hill's own video establishes that Hill's testimony during the criminal
trespass matter is extremely problematic respecting whether the RPD identiIied themselves prior to
the landlord opening the door and whether the RPD issued Coughlina warning to leave and
opportunity to heed it prior to eIIecting a custodial criminal trespass arrest. Hill had Coughlin
arrested Ior criminal trespass, even where Coughlin had to pay Ior "storage" the same amount, $480
as the Lease Agreement required Ior "Iull rental value Ior Iull use and occupancy oI the premises"
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Ior 17 days oI "storage" oI Coughlin's personal property, and even where NRS 108.475 and NRS
40.760 indicate a summary eviction is required where one is "using a storage Iacility as a residence"
(iI that was the case, which has not been established), not a criminal trespass arrest, particularly
where RPD OIIicer Chris Carter, in violating Soldal v. Cook County, expounded to Coughlin upon
his learned views on "service" oI eviction orders like some modern day Friedenthal. Then there is
the Iact that Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice was robbed oI approximately $8,000 worth oI
personalty on December 12th, 2011 (during the six week wait Ior a Hearing on Coughlin's Motion to
Contest Personal Property Lien, again, because, according to Hill, the RJC was going to postpone
setting any such hearing until Hill's six week vacation was over, despite the statutory dictate that
such a hearing be set within 10 days oI Coughlin's November 16th, 2011 Iiling oI a Motion to
Contest Personal Proeprty Lien). The December 21st, 2011 Order on Coughlin's Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien required Coughlin to rush into his Iormer home law oIIice, and take in the
specter oI it having been torn asunder and robber, with a chortling Richard G. Hill, Esq. standing on
Iilming the occasion, and quickly throw together an "inventory oI anything lost, stolen or damaged",
then hop over to Kinko's or some wi-Ii and email the RJC with such an inventory, copying Hill in the
process. Even though the statutes in Nevada are amongst the harshest towards tenants compared to
the other 49 states, the RJC, Washoe County SheriII's OIIice, Reno Police Department, and landlords
like Dr. Matthew Joel Merliss, MD (a Chico, Ca. based neurosurgeon whom graduated Irom Beverly
Hills HS) and their attorney (or, their unauthorized practice oI law committing "eviction consulting
and process service" company, like Nevada Court Services) really go the extra mile in making
Nevada a very dangerous, and perhaps, lethal, place to be a tenant. Oh, and the Judge Iinding
Coughlin guilty oI the Reno Municipal Code's version oI criminal trespass, RMC Judge William
Garnder, Iound support Ior the "when on property with an intent to vex and annoy" the owner oI a
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property version oI criminal trespass where the Judge and prosecution also maintained that Coughlin
was "secretly" going on the property (apparently Coughlin was haunting the subconscious oI the
property owner where the prosecution did not have support Ior the "Iailed to leave aIter being warned
to do so" version oI criminal trespass in RMC 8.10.010 is also the brother oI the Family Court Judge
Linda Gardner whose April 2009 Order Ior Sanctions oI Coughlin incident to Coughlin's service Ior
legal aid organizations Washoe Legal Services as a domestic violence attorney was cited as the "sole
reason" Ior Washoe Legal Service Iiring Coughlin, and which Iormed the basis Ior Coughlin's
Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus challenging said Order Ior Sanctions in 54844 and whom admitted,
on the record, in the case Ilowing Irom Coughlin's criminal trespass arrest, in RMC 11 CR 26405,
that he "passed along" to his Iellow RMC Judge Nash Holmes "his own sister's" over three years old
Order Ior Sanctions ($1,000 attorney's Iee award personally payable by Coughlin under NRS 7.085
despite Coughlin's citing to an ALR article demonstrating the position he maintained to be the
majority viewpoint in Amercian jurisprudence, ie, no setting oII "duty" such as alimony Ior
unsecured third party credit card debt where other spouse is sole signatory. A Iar Ilung doctrine oI
the necessaries threat by various unsecured debt holders, where none oI the debts are likely large
enough to engender much litigation, hardly makes vexatious a Iailure to agree to John Springgate's
proposed marital settlement agreement
. RMC Judge William Gardner reIused to recuse himselI Irom Coughlin's criminal trespass trial
despite acknowleding that he was aware that his passing on his sister's 2009 Order Ior Sanctions to
Judge Nash Holmes had resulted in a grievance being Iiled with the SBN, based upon his sister's
Order Ior Sanctions, upon Judge Nash Holmes Iorwarding said Order onto the SBN. Bar Counsel
King issued that "grievance" based upon Judge Linda Gardner's 2009 Order Ior Sanctions its own
case number, yet has continued to reIuse to speciIy how that case came to be, who Iiled the grievance
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based upon that Order, or in any other way indicated that such grievance came to be other than an
immaculate conception oI sorts.
Speaking oI RMC Judge Nash Holme's submission oI grievances and complaints to the SBN
immediately aIter Coughlin, unsuccessIully sought to invoke his right to appeal the "criminal
summary contempt" Order Judge Nash Holmes rendered on February 27th, 2011 in the Trial Ior a
traffic citation, in Coughlin's March 7th, 2012 Iiling in 11 TR 26800 oI a Notice oI Appeal (which
despite the dictates oI NRS 189.010, .020, .030, and .060 and ATTY GEN. OPINION NO. 79-4
Criminal Appeals From Municipal CourtNRS 189.010 and 189.020 (1979). The RMC has
continued to Iail to transmit Coughlin's appeal oI the criminal summary contempt Order to the
District Court. Further, Coughlin's own Washoe County Public DeIender Biray Dogan, Esq.
Then, Mr. King alleged he would point towards some pending criminal investigation as a
basis Ior a Compliant. Tell that to the indicted on Iederal compaign violation charges attorney's the
SBN is not commenting on.
Somehow, the District Court managed to Iind it equitable to sanction Coughlin $40,050 in
attorney's Iees in the appeal oI that summary eviction matter, and the judge making that ruling was
previously a member oI the same law Iirm as Coughlin, yet reIused to recuse himselI Irom the
matter. Bar Counsel King has also previously threatened (while attempting to coerce Coughlin's
assent to some snake potion SCR 117 deal when King is not busy attempting to Iabricate a SCR 105
"inIormal meeting" with Coughlin out oI a purported oIIer by King to actually let Coughlin even
view (not copy though) or "see the materials submitted along with the grievances", despite the Iact
that King stormed away Irom the Bar's Northern OIIice conIerence room seconds into Coughlin
reviewing such materials, along with all such materials being stuIIed back into their box, upon it
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becoming clear that Coughlin wished to view the materials prior to being interrogated by King other
otherwise have King deem the occasion an "inIormal meeting" under SCR 105). King seeks to
prolong a temporary suspension incident to a thoroughly deIrocked "candy bar petty larceny"
conviction (and the dismissal oI the appeal was based upon an impermissible applciation oI NRS
189.030 and NRS 4.410(2) wherein a civil statue speaking to paying up Iront Ior a transcript was
applied to justiIy dismissal a criminal appellants appeal (a growing in Nevada's courts as seen in a
similar case included in Exhibit 1) as a justiIication Ior placing a temporary suspension on Coughlin
throughout a lengthy potential SBN v Coughlin Complaint proceeding (that will be, according to
King, based upon penaing criminal charges, Coughlin wearing "pajama pants" to a Municipal Court
Iiling counter while checking on a traIIic ticket, some alleged video oI someone swearing in a police
oIIicer's presence, a non-existent/CGI-ish "Order" by a (REDACTED) Court Judge that only exists in
the mind oI Pat King (who is known Ior being rather sloppy and lazy like that, you know, when it
comes to due process and people's way oI making a living, and constitutionally protected property
rights, while bringing his dog to work to hang out in the Bar's Northern OIIice's lobby, a Great Dane,
which, admittedly, is a magniIicently regal animal, though it was not in the December 2012 Animal
Law issue like Coughlin's Pekingnese Jackson Pawluck). "Patty Ice" knows Coughlin loves him.
However, it is inappropriate Ior King to seek to prolong Coughlin's temporary suspension so
unreasonably, where, especially, King has maintained he intends to seek a "combo-hearing" that will
largely be based upon a Complaint that alleges Coughlin has penaing criminal charges: Where the
only relevant Iactual allegation contained in Disciplinary Board's aIIidavit, Iiled in support oI its
petition Ior attorney's temporary suspension Irom the practice oI law, was that a criminal indictment
had been Iiled against the attorney, this sole allegation, without more, was insuIIicient to justiIy
summary suspension and the immediate imposition oI temporary restrictions. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rules
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102, subd. 4(a), 111, subd. 1. Matter oI Monteiro, 1984, 684 P.2d 506, 100 Nev. 440. Coughlin has
not been indicted on Iederal election law/campaign contribution violations. The charges Coughlin
does currently Iace say a lot more about the prosecutors than they do about Coughlin, and the Iact
that a June 7th, 2012 email Irom Coughlin to a prosecutor was Iollowed Iour hours later by a
suspension oI this Court, signed by three Justices, one oI whom has previously recused himselI Irom
Coughlin's case appeal oI the dismissal oI Coughlin's wrongIul termination lawsuit against Washoe
Legal Services, 60302 (and granted, the Justice reIerenced has longstanding ties to and altruistic
interactions with legal aid entities throughout the state...) provides a Iurther reason Ior this Court to
consider, en banc, Coughlin's various requests to have the temporary suspension oI his law license
dissolved (Coughlin Iiled a Motion Ior Resconsideation oI the Temporary Suspension on June 11th,
2012 in light oI the Nevada Supreme Court's Iailure to Iile Coughlin's May 24th, 2012 attempt at
Iiling an Opposition to the SCR 111 Petition in 60838, in violation oI NRCP 5(e), and a August 13th,
2012 SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in 61426, in addition to a SCR 111(10) Motion to Dissolve the
Temporary Suspension oI the same date in 60838.
As to the reasonableness oI allowing Bar Counsel's attempt to subvert procedural SCR's
based upon penaing criminal cases, the RJC docket in RCR2011-063341 is incorrect in that it Iails to
detail the extent to which DDA Zach Young violated NRS 178.405 by Iiling, with a Iile stamp time
oI 2:55 pm an Opposition to DeIendant's Motion to Appear as Co-Counsel despite the Iact that DDA
Young and Coughlin's public deIender Biray Dogan, in RCR2012-065630 met in a clandestine status
conIerence on February 27th, 2012 at 1:30 pm, despite the Iact that on February 24th, 2012 (and the
Iiles documents this as well) that very MSC was continued until March 29th, 2012 in light oI a
scheduling conIlict attendant to the Iact that Coughlin had a traIIic citation trial involving Coughlin
in the RMC on that very day, February 27th, 2012 in 11 TR 26800 set Ior 1:00 pm. Bar Counsel
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King has threatened to Iile a SBN v Coughlin SCR 105 Complaint based upon a Iiling by Coughlin
incident to the deIense oI a "misuse oI 911 or emergency services", a charge that presents DDA
Young with the diIIicult tasks oI prosecuting one Ior (and some guessing is required here as DDA
Young is taken to not speciIying much oI anything in the inIormation in his Complaints) calling 911
to report Iear oI the police and or a Iailure by a 911 operator to accord such an allegation any
legitimacy...which explains why DDA Young seeks to conspire with Coughlin's public deIender
Dogan to amend such a charge to a "resisting arrest" simple misdemeanor, down Irom a gross, and
thereby leverage the threat oI a conviction oI a crime that actually, upon a conviction, would invoke
a SCR 111(6) "serious oIIense) Petition by Bar Counsel) criminal matter that has been pending since
Coughlin was subject to a custodial arrest on January 14th, 2012 at his then shared residence with
two individuals Irom whom he rented a room, and against which he was ultimately awarded Orders
oI Protection in FV12-00187 and FV12-00188. The same RPD Sargent, Paul SiIre, who ordered a
trainee, OIIicer Leedy, to eIIect a custodial arrest oI Coughlin on January 12th, 2012 at Coughlin's
Iormer law oIIice ordered Coughlin arrested again less than 48 hours later Ior the "misuse oI
emergency services" incident to Coughlin calling 911 to report the sudden disappearance oI his dog,
in the context oI weeks oI attacks by his two Iormer housmates (slashed tires, Iurniture thrown in the
street, death threats, being chased up the stairs by a man with a 10 inch butcher kniIe yelling threats,
having hot coIIee thrown on him, interIerence with his mail, etc., etc.), and despite the Iact that NRS
33.018 does deIine "domestic violence" to include violence against one's pets or animals. Sargent
SiIre indicated to Coughlin upon bringing 7 other RPD OIIicers to "respond" to Coughlin 911 call
upon the violent roomates making menacing statements and gestures in response to the
disappearance oI Coughlin's dog, that it was merely a "matter Ior animal control" and that SiIre was
arresting Coughlin because "you keep placing yourselI in situations where you are a victim", and
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despite that statement being captured on tape, DDA Zach Young continues to prosecute that case.
DDA Young and Coughlin's public deIender did seek to prevent Coughlin Irom becoming aware oI
their attempts to "reduce" that gross misdemeanor to one that woula invoke an SCR 111(6) "serious
crime" Petition by Bar Counsel iI a conviction is procured, as just because a charge is conveniently
reduced to "resisting arrest", and thereIore a "lesser oIIense" (gross misdemeanor versus
misdemeanor) does not mean the impact on one's liIe would be less, especially in light oI SCR 111.
Dogan Iailed to apprise Coughlin oI DDA Young attempt to so amend the Complaint in that Matter
in his July 31st, 2012 Iiling in RCR2012-065630, despite Coughlin previously demanding notice oI
any and all Iilings by either side. Sandwiched between the two arrests in 48 hours by RPD Sargent
SiIre, was an intervening pull over by the same RPD OIIicer whom wrongIully arrested Coughlin on
August 20th, 2011 in RCR2011-063341, Nicholas Duralde, along with 5 other cops assisting Duralde
in notiIying Coughlin that his license plate was suddenly missing, shortly aIter Coughlin was
released Irom jail, on January 13th, 2012, incident to a "jaywalking" arrest. Coughlin attempted to
submit a written complaint to the RPD regarding the retaliatory, coercive, pretextual conduct by RPD
OIIicer's Duralde and Ron Rosa, which the RPD rejected on September 7th, 2011)(and unless the
Ninth Circuit has a jewel somewhere that was missed, no matter how backwards and ignorant an
arrest is, how pretextual or baseless, even Ior "jaywalking", the police can copy, view, and search
one's laptop or smart phone (even a practicing attorney advocating on a client's behalI who gets
arrested Ior summary contempt committed in a the presence oI a Judge: Some courts have relied on
the Supreme Court`s holdings in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and United States
v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) to hold that oIIicers can search arrestees` cell phones incident to
arrest, concluding that they are part oI the arrestee`s 'person. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501
(Cal. 2011); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Young, 278 F.
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Appx. 242 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Kan. 2007).15
Robinson and Edwards, decided nearly 30 years ago, should be read narrowly in light oI the more
recent holdings in Chadwick and Gant. Searches oI the person are distinguishable Irom searches oI
electronic data stored in devices carried by the person, making Chadwick and Gant more directly
applicable).
Judge Nash Holmes has admitted in writing to communications with those involved in that
clandestine, unnoticed, violating oI attorney client privilege, February 27th, 2012 MSC in RCR2012-
065630 involving Dogan and DDA Young. However, that did not, apparently, despite the dictates oI
NRS 178.405, stop Judge Nash Holmes Irom continuing on with the traIIic citation Trial minutes later
in 11 TR 26800, wherein she sentenced Coughlin's to 5 days in jail, and denied a stay to Coughlin
despite his then representing client's as a lawyer in time sensitive matters, Iinding Coughlin's guilty oI
"summary criminal contempt" (which Coughlin had to report to the United States Patent and
Trademark OIIice and State Bar oI Nevada as a SCR 111 criminal conviction). Curiously, the Order
Ior Competency Evaluation was signed by Judge CliIton, but the RJC's Iile and docket therein
indicate that Judge Schroeder presided over the 2/27/12 1:30 pm Status ConIerence, despite the Iact
that the Iiles indicates such a conIerence was reset, on 2/24/12 to 3/29/12 (RJC Judge Schroeder
stated to Coughlin at the January 31st, 2012 Hearing on Extending the Stalking and Harassment
Protection Order Richard G. Hill, Esq received within 40 minutes oI Iiling it, on January 12th, 2012,
"do you want to go to jail" upon Coughlin attempting to broach the subject oI whether, perhaps, Hill
was abusing the TPO process to aid in preventing opposing counsel Irom collectin evidence in
support oI a damages analysis incident to a wrongIul eviction lawsuit, particularly one oI a "wrong
site surgery" variety Ior Hill's neurosurgeon client, in that Hill utilized a summary eviction
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proceeding against a commercial tenant not based upon the non payment oI rent...ie, a "wrong site
surgery" to make an analogy Hill's neurosurgeon client might easily grasp.
As to the purported "summary criminal contempt" Order by Judge Nash Holmes, it is not clear
there is such a "misdemeanor crime" in Nevada. That February 28th, 2012 Order read: "The court
Iinds that the deIendant's actions were intentional and done in utter disregard and contempt Ior the
court, and in the presence oI the court, Ior purposes oI disrupting and delaying the proceedings and
dishonoring the rule oI law and this court, and constitute the misdemeanor oI criminal contempt, a
violation oI RS 22.0 I O. Good cause appearing thereIore, the Iollowing sanctions are imposed: IT IS
ORDERED, pursuant to NRS 22.100, that the deIendant be incarcerated at the Washoe County
Regional Detention Facility Ior the term oI Iive (5) days, Iro m the time he was taken into custody on
this court's order on February 27, 2012, and that sentence shall not be reduced Ior any reason...."
NRS 22.010 Acts or omissions constituting contempts. The Iollowing acts or
omissions shall be deemed contempts: 1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent
behavior toward the judge while the judge is holding court, or engaged in judicial
duties at chambers, or toward masters or arbitrators while sitting on a reIerence or
arbitration, or other judicial proceeding. 2. A breach oI the peace, boisterous conduct
or violent disturbance in the presence oI the court, or in its immediate vicinity,
tending to interrupt the due course oI the trial or other judicial proceeding. 3.
Disobedience or resistance to any lawIul writ, order, rule or process issued by the
court or judge at chambers. 4. Disobedience oI a subpoena duly served, or reIusing to
be sworn or answer as a witness. 5. Rescuing any person or property in the custody
oI an oIIicer by virtue oI an order or process oI such court or judge at chambers. 6.
Disobedience oI the order or direction oI the court made pending the trial oI an
action, in speaking to or in the presence oI a juror concerning an action in which the
juror has been impaneled to determine, or in any manner approaching or interIering
with such juror with the intent to inIluence the verdict. 7. Abusing the process or
proceedings oI the court or Ialsely pretending to act under the authority oI an order
or process oI the court.
In Judge Nash Holmes February 28th, 2012 Order Finding DeIendant in Contempt oI Court
and Imposing Sanctions, the Order reads: "9) deIendant's lying to the court in response to direct
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questions posed by the court with regard to his recording the proceedings". No evidentiary support or
other allegation have been made by Judge Nash Holmes to support that Iinding. Further, that Order
seems to take an overly narrow view oI what is permissible subject Ior cross-examining a police
oIIicer, and at one point, Judge Nash Holmes stated, on the record, that she does not "care about
retaliation, or bribery, or corrutpion" or words substantially similar to that eIIect, and the Order itselI
suggests Judge Nash Holmes Iinds those subject wholly irrelevant to a criminal prosecution,
regardless oI the vast body oI case law devoted to retaliatory arrests, witness bias, materials not
oIIered to prove the truth oI the matter asserted, but rather the witness's state oI mind, etc., etc. That
Order included the Iollowing: "deIendant's repeatedly injecting allegations oI bribery, perjury, and
police retaliation into the matter aIter the court instructed him not to, and directed him to limit himselI
to i sues pertaining to the Iacts oI the "Boulevard Stop;" 5) deIendant's repeatedly trying to insert
"Richard Hill" into his questions and statements when such person was not relevant to the
proceedings and the deIendant had been ordered to stop discussing that...deIendant's continually
accusing the court oI denying him the right or ability to ask questions...deIendant' s Iailing and
reIusing to properly examine the witness, despite numerous admonitions by the court to stop
repeating questions, misstating answers, injecting irrelevant material, arguing with the witness and
mischaracterizing the testimony. During that proceeding Judge Nash Holmes asked Coughlin "Are
you recording this proceeding?". Coughlin preIaced his answer with an assertion that he a a
Constitutional Right now to be coerced into answering such sua sponte interrogation, but answered
truthIully that he was not recording the proceeding at the time that question was posed to him by
Judge Nash Holmes, though, to be sure, the RMC was recording the proceeding, it is a part oI the
public record, and Coughlin surely now has no means oI conIirming what exactly may have been on
his smart phone or micro sd data card given both were returned to him damaged and with all the data
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previously therein erased, though likely not beIore his privacy had been raped by various local law
enIorcement entitites perusing the contents therein under some "search incident to arrest" approach.
In a letter/complaint/grievance to the SBN Irom the RMC's Judge Nash Holmes, dated March
12th, 2012, it is written: "We are setting that case Ior trial and attempting to serve him at the most
recent address we have (1422 E. 9th St. #2 Reno NY 89512), although I heard today he may be living
in his vehicle somewhere....It is my understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a matter pending
on this attorney. My Judicial Assistant was contacted by the Washoe Public DeIender in February...
and they stated that they represent him in a Gross Misdemeanor matter in RJC...You will have the Iull
cooperation oI myselI, the other judges, and the staII oI Reno Municipal Court in your pursuit oI this
matter. Mr. Coughlin has positioned himselI as a vexatious litigant in our court, antagonizing the
staII and even our pro temp judges on the most simple traIIic and misdemeanor matters. I do think
this is a case oI some urgency, and I apologize for taking two days to get this package to you; our
IT person was ill and could not make the copies oI the audios oI Mr. Coughlin's hearings until today,
and I Ielt it was important that the audios be included in the materials to be considered by the State
Bar. On February 27, 2012, Mr. Coughlin told me he was actively practicing law and had
appointments with clients. I do not know iI that was true, but iI so, he could be causing serious harm
to the practice oI law in Northern Nevada and could be jeopardizing someone's Ireedom or property
interests...." Such concern Ior Coughlin's client's "Ireedom or property interests" did not result in
Judge Nash Holmes according any real consideration to issuing a stay oI any sort to Coughlin prior to
the immediate and unIathomably unexpected summary 5 day jail sentence incident to a traIIic citation
Trial over a CaliIornia Roll/Boulevard Stop. Why, in a letter date February 14th, 2012, when
Coughlin was still living at his Iromer E. 9th St. address, Judge Nash Holmes would have "heard he
(Coughlin) may be living in his vehicle somewhere" is curious, though not at all out oI line with
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Coughlin's past experience with the some individuals at the RMC and the City oI Reno Marshals.
Coughlin has no idea what "pro tem" Judges he ever had any interactions with at the RMC oI an
import whatsoever. The passage wherein Judge Nash Holmes apologizes Ior "taking two days to get
this package to you" implies a previous communication with the SBN, though hopeIully not the sort
oI attempts to drum up complaints where none should reasonably issue like that see with the RPD's
OIIice Weaver and Sargent Miller, or in the apparent exorting Richard Hill by the RPD to Iile a
protection order against Coughlin. Further, Judge Nash Holmes went on to issue what are likely void
"double jeopardy" violating Orders subsequent to Coughlin Iiling a notice oI appeal on March 8th,
2012 oI the Contempt Iinding. It is improtant to note, the February 28th, 2012 Order Finding
DeIendant in Contempt and Imposing Sanctions, which purports to issue a conviction Ior
"misdemeanor criminal contempt" was never received by Coughlin, despite it purportedly being
mailed to Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice address at a time that the RMC had Coughlin's then E.
9th St. address, and despite Coughlin having a change oI address on Iile with the USPS at that time
(though there were issues with getting the USPS to process or recognize that incident to the domestic
violence against Coughlin on E.9 9th St.). Regardless, Coughlin only ever Iirst even saw the
February 28th, 2012 Contempt Order, and probably even then did not realize it purported to issue
"misdemeanor criminal contempt" conviction (Coughlin still has some conIusion as to the distinction
between criminal and civil contempt and a reading oI the NRS 22.010 cited does little to alleviate that
conIusion, though Coughlin has gathered various ALRs and AmJurs on the appealability oI summary
contempt Iindings and does not belive Judge Nash Holmes Order is suIIiciently speciIic under the
Houston decision (Judge Pomeranz, handcuIIs, etc). Further, Bar Counsel King has gone on to
threaten Coughlin extensively with the use oI sections oI subsequenttly issued Orders by Judge Nash
Holmes that purport to make Iindings "by clear and convicing" evidence oI various violations oI
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RPCs Ior conduct that Judge Nash Holmes already entered an Order on February 28th, 2012. That is
double jeopardy and or law oI the case, and not a proper basis Ior delaying the hearing required under
SCR 111(8), etc. The SBN and King can have it iI they want it with Coughlin, but they ought to
have to do it in compliance with the rules, period, rather than have King get down on all Iours an
surreptiously crawl behind a standing Coughlin's knees, only to have whoever give Coughlin a swiIt
push to the torso, causing him to topple over backwards. And the SBN should be prevented Irom
doing its bit where it shows Coughlin a Ilower, prompts him to smell it, then manipulates some
apparatus built into what is actually a phony Ilower that sprays water in Coughlin's Iace. And then
there is the cans oI mixed nuts the SBN gave Coughlin that actually contained projectile conIetti sorts
oI material.
Hill applied Ior a TPO against Coughlin on January 12th, 2012 when Hill noticed Coughlin
peaceIully Iilming Irom the public sidewalk at Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice Hill's crew
throwing into a dump truck the property that Coughlin was unable to remove in the scant 13 hours
accorded him in the Order "Resolving" Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property line, on
December 24th, 2011, especially where Hill placed a chain link and padlock on the backyard gate to
Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice, making removing many, many items unIeasible. Hill Iailed to
remove the chain link padlock until only a couple hours remained to move a great deal oI property,
and said padlock was only placed on that back yard gate in the one or two days immediately prior to
the time allowed to remove property....Further, despite billing Coughlin some $1,060 Ior "securing
the property" (one would think paying $460 under NRS 118A.460 Ior "storage" oI personalty might
include "securing" it, but no, it would not...and Hill's contractor saved on expenses incident to such
"securing" by using Coughlin's own plywood to board up the back porch. Speaking oI the extent to
which Judge Nash Holmes continued on to conduct the Trial in 11 TR 26800 despite the 2/29/12
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Order Ior Competency Evaluation signed by Judge CliIton and Iile stamped 1:31 pm, despite the
statutory dictate that "the other departments" "shall suspend any other proceedings relating to the
deIendant until to deIendant is determined to be competent", Iound in NRS 178.405, DDA Young
himselI violated NRS 178.405 in that his 2/29/12 Opposition to DeIendant's Motion to Appear as Co-
counsel bares a Iile stamp oI 2:55 pm. Please correct the docket in this regard, as well as revising it to
reIlect all oI Coughlin's Iilings, which were all Iile stamped, yet are not indicated on the docket,
especially the Notice oI Appearance Coughlin Iiled, while Coughlin was still a licensed attorney, in
addition to any Substitutions oI Counsel Coughlin Iiled so very long ago (no matter what DDA
Young tries to argue about how "untimely" Coughlin's attempts to be rid oI the public deIenders
obstructive presence are).
Additionally, there is a clear retaliatory animus evince by both Dogan and DDA Young's
participation in the Feburary 27th, 2011 "clandestine" Status ConIerence where Coughlin's Iiling oI
February 17th, 2011 in that same case RCR20120-065630 That February 14th, 2012 Iiling by
Coughlin in RCR2012-065630 was attached by Pat King and or J. Thomas Susich in the SCR 117
Petition in 60975 (and King has repeatedly threatened to attach it to or reIerence it in the SCR 105
Complaint he keeps hyping in an ill advised attempt to get Coughlin to sign up Ior a SCR 117 trip)
and reIerenced by Judge Nash Holmes in her various Orders and written complaint to the SBN when
she cites Coughlin with "quoting lyrics to rock songs" in a Iiling was critical oI Dogan's work as a
public deIender Ior Coughlin, especially where Dogan was attorney oI record and Iailed to appear Ior
a hearing...Never mind that the only lyrics to any songs that were quoted by Coughlin in any Iilings
so Iar was the quotation to a rap song in the February 17th, 2012 Iiling in the case that Dogan
representea Coughlin on in Reno Justice Court, RCR2012-065630, wherein an Order Ior
Competency Evaluation was entered at 1:31 pm on February 29th, 2012, whereupon, shortly
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aIterwards, Judge Nash Holmes continued on to hold the traIIic citation Trial Irom which the
"summary criminal contempt" charge underpinning most oI Bar Counsel King's SCR 117 Petition
and Irom which most oI King's threats oI a SBN v Coughlin Complaint seem to rely (to the extent
such a Complaint would rely on anything other than King's typical legal drivel, which continually
Iails to cite to any legal authority whatsoever and evinces the work oI a man entirely unIamiliar with
Lexis, Westlaw, AmJur., ALR, ProoI oI Facts, or any other bastion oI actual lawyering. The lyric
Coughlin quoted in that February 17th, 2012 Iiling (which was necessitated by the Iact that Dogan
Iailed to appear Ior a court date on February 13th, 2012 Ior which he and Coughlin had, when they
met in person and spoke Ior over an hour about the case on or about February 7th, 2012 agreed
Dogan would appear on Coughlin's behalI and that Dogan was already "attorney oI record" in the
matter and assigned to the case) was quoted merely as a commentary on the spiritual choices one is
Iaced with various local power brokers and their agents are behaving like goons: "Okay, your a goon,
what's a goon to a goblin?". Hardly a rationale Ior pulling some lawyers ticket, Mr. King. Nor Ior
submitting a complaint questioning a lawyers competency to the SBN.
SCR Rule 111(8). Attorneys convicted oI crimes.
"8.ReIerral to disciplinary board. Upon receipt oI a petition Iiled under
subsection 4 oI this rule, demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted oI a
serious crime, the supreme court shall, in addition to suspending the attorney in
accordance with the provisions oI subsection 7 oI this rule, refer the matter to
the appropriate disciplinary board for the institution of a formal hearing
before a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined shall be the
extent of the discipline to be imposed..."
SCR Rule 102(2). Types oI discipline:
Misconduct is grounds Ior: "2. Suspension by the supreme court. A suspension of
6 months or less shall not require proof of rehabilitation; a suspension oI more
than 6 months shall require prooI oI rehabilitation to be demonstrated in a
reinstatement proceeding under Rule 116...."
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Given that the Board and the SBN are and have eIIectively denied Coughlin a timely hearing
called Ior by the Court's Order and SCR 111(8), and now have Iailed to provide an "immediate
hearing" pursuant to Coughlin's Iiled and served SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in case number 61426.
SCR Rule 116. Reinstatement: "1. Order oI supreme court required. An
attorney suspended as discipline Ior more than 6 months may not resume
practice unless reinstated by order oI the supreme court. 2.Procedure Ior
reinstatement. Petitions Ior reinstatement by a suspended attorney shall be
Iiled with bar counsel's oIIice, which shall promptly reIer the petition to the
chair oI the appropriate disciplinary board. The chair shall promptly reIer the
petition to a hearing panel, which shall, within 60 days aIter reIerral, conduct
a hearing. ...
4. Tender oI costs in advance. Petitions Ior reinstatement under this rule
shall be accompanied by an advance cost deposit oI $1,000 to cover
anticipated costs oI the reinstatement proceeding."
The 60 days mentioned above only Iurther highlights the potential Ior a contempt Iinding
where the SBN and Board have Iailed to schedule a hearing Ior this matter despite Coughlin Iiling an
Opposition to the SCR 111 Petition, or at least submitting an Opposition as early as May 24th, 2012,
and eventually getting the Court to Iile something in that vein on June 10th, 2012, which has remain
unchallenged by Bar Counsel. Bar Counsel appears rather busy with other things, and any such
overburdened condition will only be exacerbated by a protracted involvement with Coughlin, who
can rake it a little iI anyone hasn't noticed yet. King's close and prolonged involvement with Richard
G. Hill, Esq. (the were opposing counsel on one oI the biggest cases oI either oI their careers, the
March 2012 reported decision in Milsner v Carstarphen)
CONCLUSION
Please dissolve the temporary suspension oI Coughlin's law license and require the SBN to
remit whatever compensation to Coughlin this Court Ieels is just, and or, in the alternative, require the
SBN and NNDB or Panel to immediately set Ior Hearing (very soon) a Hearing limited to the dictates
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set Iorth in SCR 111(8) and this Court's June 7th, 2012 Order, ie, determining the punishment Ior the
candy bar issue, which arguably has been more than served already given the Iour months length oI
the suspension and other peripheral matters.
Declaration: I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to NRS 53.045 that,
to the best of my knowledge, the information contained herein is true and
correct.
RespectIully submitted this: October 2
nd
, 2012,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
PO BOX 3961
Reno, NV 89505
Pro Per Attorney
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ProoI oI Service:
document to all registered electronic Iilers or those otherwise consenting to electronic service in a
waiver oI the application oI NRCP as set Iorth in SCR 109, and to those whom are not I placed a true
and correct copy oI the Ioregoing document in the USPS mail on this date and or complied with all
service requirements set Iorth in SCR 109:
Reno, NV 89521
David A Clark, Esq., Bar Counsel
State Bar oI Nevada
Address: 600 East Charleston Blvd.
Las Vegas , NV 89104
Phone Number: 702-382-2200
Fax number: 702-385-2878
J. Thomas Susich, Esq., Chairman NNDB
Nevada Employment Security Division
Address: 1675 E. Prater Way, Suite 103
Sparks , NV 89434
Fax number: 775-284-9513
Dated this October 2nd, 2012
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
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In Re Matter oI:
Nevada Bar No: 9473
.
)
)
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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE OPPOSITION TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61901, OR, PLEAD
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61901; or
IN THE ALTERNATIVE; MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR TO VACATE JUDGEMENT;
HABEUS CORPUS; ARREST OF JUDGMENT,
document and moves this Court, or the Board, Panel, Bar Ior the relieI requested herein. This Iiling
is Iurther based upon the papers and pleadings on Iile herein and in the companion case beIore the
Nevada Supreme Court in 60838 and 61426.
FACTS
1.When Coughlin was in the quasi-"basement" (it isn't a room Iit Ior habitation or use under the
Housing Code (only one exit, ceiling are about 5 Ieet high in most places, Iloor was dirt when
Coughlin Iirst rented it, but he Iixed it up very nicely over time and it certainly looked like someone
could have been living in there well prior to the eviction, but Judge Gardner ruled all that stuII about
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IN THE ALTERNATIVE, OPPOSITION OR RESPONSE TO SCR 111(4) PETITION IN 61902
Oct 24 2012 12:09 p.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
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"using it as a residence" was irrelevant, except Ior the Iact he mentioned it in his Order and Hazlett let
it creep into his closing arguments....) there was not any voices calling to him (certainly the videos
Iilmed by Hill and Merliss, propounded to the City and the court appointed deIenders who reIused to
subpoena Merliss despite Hill's and the RPD's obvious motive and bias...show that neither Hill nor
Merliss, as conIirmed by Hill's Trial testiony, made any verbal incantations to Coughlin, but rather,
retreated upstairs to wait Ior the RPD...) prior to what was ultimately revealed to be the RPD arriving.
As shown with a lot more indicia oI reliability than Hill's lie Iilled June 18th, 2012 sworn testimony at
trial, in his November 21st, 2011 Declaration, Hill Iails to assert that the RPD "identiIied themselves
as law enIorcement" and issued a lawIul order to emerge Irom the basement (which is not necessarily
lawIul, even iI they identiIy themselves as law enIorcement, iI they were not given the authority to
issue it by someone having such authority, and its not clearl that either Merliss or Hill did...).
Regardless, the RPD deIinitely DID NOT "identiIy themselves as law enIorcement" prior to Merliss
kicking the door down. Rather, it is telling that in HIll's November 21st, 2011 Declaration he merely
mentions the RPD attempting to (see this dissected in glorious detail in the attached Bar grievance)
"coax Coughlin to emerge Irom the basement". And the RPD did just that. Only, they didn't identiIy
themselves as law enIorcement at any time prior to the door being kicked down. So, iI you are
Coughlin, and you have a real strong claim oI right deIense to any allegation oI trespass, then just
hearing some random voices "coaxing" him to talk to them like they are therapists or some other crap
like that is not tantamount to a "lawIul order to emerge Irom the basement" or warning to leave the
premises else be cited or arrested Ior criminal trespass. (Hill told Coughlin he was billing him the
same $900 a month as when Coughlin was there under a lease allowing Ior "Iull use an occupancy";
any eviction order was void Ior lack oI jurisdiction, Coughlin was entitled to a stay Coughlin had yet
to receive back Irom the RJC the "rent escrow" $2,275 that Judge SIerrazza, on October 27t, 2011,
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announced would be held onto by the RJC as Coughlin's "bond on appeal" (meaning the supersedeas
bond, as appeal bond's are set statutorily at $250 in such matters and supersedeas bond's are the ones
teh RJC typically makes in an amount worth "three month's rent" (ie, the RJC can't keep the money
Ior the stay, and call it that, and deny the stay...its like calling it a summary eviction hearing, but
ruling on more than possession, then ruling Coughlin established a genuine issue oI material Iact and
noticing the October 27th, 2011 date as a "Trial" in writing (Baker says on the record in that case "the
use oI the term "Trial" was unIortunate, Your Honor....", then ordering an impermissible rent escrow
deposit...not giving the 20 days to respond to a Complaint called Ior by JCRCP 109....basically giving
HIll and Merliss all the beneIits oI the quick and easy summary eviction proceeding (Coughlin was
precluded Irom making counterclaims or bringing in third party deIendants like Dickson Realty or
NV Energy or Green Action Lawn Service, etc), and Coughlin none oI the procedural protections oI a
plenary unlawIul detainer, while also attempting to aIIor HIll and Merliss the beneIits oI a plenary
unlawIul detainer (awarding back rent, attorney's Iees, landlord was able to bring a summary eviction
proceeding against a commercial tenant based only on a No Cause Notice, verboten under NRS
40.253...). Further, and this is shown on the videos Hill and Merliss Iilmed, the RPD at no time gave
Coughlin a warning to leave where Coughlin could have heeded it and leIt, or otherwise been issue a
citation in lieu oI a custodial arrest. The RPD wanted to make the big rich landlord and attorney
happy here, and neither the RPD (which was mad at Coughlin Ior Iiling a police misconduct
complaint incident to the wrongIul August 20th, 2011 arrest oI Coughlin that ain't lookin' good Ior the
State now that Coughlin got WCPD Jim Leslie booted Irom the case in RCR2011-063341) nor Hill or
Merliss were going to be satisIied with just issuing Coughlin a "warning" to leave the premises, as
they Iigure Coughlin would just heed any such warning....The RPD and Merliss/HIll were all jacked
up on revenge powder and wanted Coughlin arrested. Dr. Merliss is practically Irothing at the mouth
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(demanding "more eye contact!" Irom Coughlin in the video "Zach's arrest 0010" just beIore Dr.
Merliss commits a crime in lying to the RPD in response to Coughlin's querying those there as to who
warned him against trespassing and when, whereupon Dr. Merliss lies in order to get Coughlin
arrested, and Hill co-signs it:
Richard G. Hill, Esq. (opposing counsel in the civil eviction case Irom which this criminal trespass
trial stems) testiIied, under oath, that the Reno Police Department identiIied themselves as law
enIorcement and issued a lawIul order to leave prior to the RPD entering the door that Hill's client
Merliss kicked down after such identiIication and issuance oI a lawIul order or warning to leave the
premises was issued by the RPD. Additionally, beyond the impermissible extent to which RMC D2
Judicial Assistant Lisa Wagner Iailed to Iile Coughlin's June 28th, 2012 Notice oI Appeal (Iax Iiling
allowable under RMC Rules, any Order by Judge Gardner to the contrary spoke to pre-trial Motions
only), the Washoe County Detention Center impermissibly reIused to timely Iile Coughin's additional
Notice oI Appeal in a timely Iashion while Coughlin was wrongIully incarcerated incident to a
wrongIul arrest by the RPD, buttressed upon an impermissible bail increase (supported in Judge
Gardner's rationale by a "public health and saIety" rationale not providing a basis Ior bail under
Nevada Law), at an unnoticed impromptu bail hearing on July 5th, 2012 wherein the RMC and court
appointed deIender Keith Loomis, Esq. coerced Irom Coughlin an impermissible invasion oI
Coughlin's medical records under extremely coercive circumstances made worse by the Iraud
committed upon the court by RPD Sargent Dye and OIIicer Weaver (the arrest in that matter 12 CR
12420 was pretextual and Iraudulent, and compounded by Sargent Oliver Miller and OIIicer Weaver
subsequent misconduct incident to another Soldal v. Cook County violation on their part involving
Coughlin and Superior Mini Storage in an RJC eviction matter stemming Irom police misconduct by
Miller and Weaver on or about September 22nd, 2012.
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There was an Order For Competency Evaluation by Judge CliIton in RCR2012-065630
entered February 27th, 2012, and the Order in CR12--0376 adjudging Coughlin competent and
remanding jurisdiction back to the lower court was not entered until May 9th, 2012, yet Loomis and
Hazlett-Stevens persisted in seeking to ramrod the criminal trespass case in RMC 11 CR 26405
through...and both were well aware oI the February 27th, 2012 Order Ior Competency Evaluation and
the import oI NRS 178.405, requiring the suspension oI all proceedings during the pendency oI such
an Order, made applicabel via NRS 5.010 and the various rationale set Iorth in the attached materials.
Further, the RMC Iailed to Iile the timely Notice oI Appeal I submitted Ior Iiling on June 28th, 2012,
and which was served by delivering to the City Attorney's OIIice on June 27th, 2012 (timely within
10 days under NRS 189.010) resulting in the dismissal oI the appeal. The Iraud oI the WCSO, RPD,
City Attorney and others prevented Coughlin Irom having an appropriate chance to Iile as complete
and thorough a Motion Ior New Trial as he intended, including a wrongIul arrest on June 28th, 2012,
the WCDC denying Coughlin even a phone call Ior no reason Ior 20 hours, until aIter the RMC had
closed on Friday, June 29th, 2012, and then another wrongIul arrest on July 3rd, 2012 by the RPD,
with an impermissibly bail increase by the same Judge William Gardner whom should have recused
himselI Irom the June 18th, 2012 Trial in 11 CR 26405 in the RMC, violating oI most provision
Iound in the NRS related to bail.
Transcript oI video taken by Hill and Merliss propounded to City Attorney: Zach's arrest
010.mp4
RPD OIIicer Carter (Carter): Come on, get on up here, this is stupid. Come on, okay, well
bring your dog with you. (Carter and Sargent Lopez walk Irom the stairway to the
"basement", up the stairs through the back door oI the house, through the kitchen, past
Hill, whom is Iilming with his handheld video camera, Iollowed by Coughlin holding his
Pekingnese dog (Ieatured in the December 2012 Nevada Lawyer Animal Law issue) where
a sitting landlord Merliss is on the couch in the living room, whereupon Coughlin is
directed to sit in the chair next to the couch and the police begin questioning Coughlin as
Hill joins them in the living room.
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Carter: Why are we going through all this headache? Huh? This is where you say
something!
Coughlin: What do you want to know?
Carter: Why are you still here?
Coughlin: I don't agree to be Iilmed, Rich.
Richard HIll (Hill): Nobody asked you.
Carter: Why are you still here?
Coughlin: I'll have to talk to my lawyer
Sargent Lopez: Do you have some place or body to take the dog?
Coughlin: Yeah.
Lopez: somebody we can call Ior the dog?
Coughlin: Why?
Lopez: Because, you are gonna probably go to go to jail.
Coughlin: Why? For what?
Lopez: Trespassing.
Coughlin: Where?
Carter: Here.
Lopez: Here, you have been evicted.
Coughlin: hhhhhmmnI.
Carter: hhhhmmmnI.
Hill: You also have breaking and entereing...
Carter:No...we have trespassing, that's all we have.
Coughlin: Well, iI you Ieel I am trespassing, couldn't you just tell me to leave?
Carter: We tried....we actually Ieel that your are playing games...
Lopez: You were told not to come back....um, uh RETURN!, uh, um..and that's ,
that's ....when, um, you were told to leave and not to come back
Hill: I told you.
Coughlin: Who told me to leave?
Hill: Me.
Coughlin: When?
Merliss: We told you to leave, Zach! I deserve some eye contact, Zach!
Carter: You sittin' over there splittin' hairs? (to Coughlin).
Hill: We changed the locks!
Merliss: You sorry about all oI this?
Coughlin: I am sorry that you are upset, Dr. Merliss.
Merliss: You are sorry, Zach? You know how much you have cost me, Ior nothing?
$20,000! You are going to be arrested!
Hill: You're gonna be arrested!
Coughlin: Excuse me, I'm sorry, I don't believe that they have established that I was
warned or served...
Carter: I don't believe that we need to establish that...we are not in court anymore! M'kay?
Coughlin: Well, you have to have probable cause to arrest me...
Carter: I do have probable cause to arrest you, and iI you don't like it my name will be on
your arresting sheet..
Coughlin: I understand, sir.
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Carter: Okay, why don't you stand up and put your hands behind your back.
Lopez: What can we do with the dog (reIering to Coughlin's dog, Jackson Pawluck).
Merliss: I have two dogs, Zach.
Coughlin: What are you talking about taking him back to Chico?
Merliss: Yeah.
Coughlin:I would rather just my Iamily get the dogs.
Merliss: Okay, then call your Iamily Irom jail! This isn't your dog's Iault, Zach! You did
this! Your dog is not responsible Ior this!
Carter: (whispering in the background to Richard Hill while Merliss hold Coughlin's
Pekingnese dog in his hands, standing two Ieet Irom Coughlin's Iace) breaking and
entering is (unintelligible)
Hill: No, breaking and entering would be better because its a Ielony...
Carter: Look, Rich, come on...he's trespassing...
Hill: Alright, let's start with that...
Carter: That's all we have...
Hill: Well, you can't blame a guy Ior trying...I don't do any criminal work...
Sargent Lopez gets caught trying to play along with the lie that Merliss and Hill try to get
over, and all oI this is reiterated by Carter's statement that "we actually Ieel that you are playing
games"...which suggests that Merliss, Hill, and the RPD are playing a game oI their own...And
Carter's other statement to Coughlin ("you're sittin' over there splittin' hairs" certainly betrays the Iact
that Carter knows Coughlin has a point here, ie, that the RPD is making a very, very suspect arrest Ior
trespassing where neither the RPD, nor Hill, nor Merliss told Coughlin to leave or warned him against
a trespass charge at any time on that day, and that they only other "warnings" Hill or Merliss could
possibly argue here relate to civil eviction notices that were not served appropriately, and that do no
warn one against a criminal trespass charge (and Hazlett's reinterpretation oI the October 27th, 2011
Order attempts to mislead the court in his tortuous eIIort to make the language therein say something
it simply does not) one where they want to arrest an attorney who has either angered them by
complaining oI police misconduct recently (Coughlin Iiled a complaint with the RPD on September
7th, 2011, and more shortly thereaIter) or by contesting a summarey eviction oI a commercial tenant
where the non-payment oI rent was not plead (Ior good reason, Merliss's case was really bad on
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retaliation, habitability issues, and all the set-oIIs or Iix and deducts that had acrued, not to mention
the property damage caused by his negligence in agreeing to a weed maintenance arrangment with
Coughlin (that Coughlin chose to address through articial grass coverings oI the dirt lawn) while also,
apparently, agreeing to a deal with Green Action Lawn Care (which came to the law oIIice and tore
up the articiIical grass installation Coughlin had spent at least 3 days and hundreds oI dollars
meticulously installing, and threw it in the street, then reIused to put it back, all oI which Merliss is
responsible Ior under paragraph 23 oI the Standard Rental Agreement, which, by the way, allows Ior
Coughlin's commercial use oI the premises, and given the Hill Iailed to plead the non-payment oI rent
(because there was advantages to proceeding that way, or so Hill thought) the whole summary
eviction order that Merliss had just apparently paid Hill $20,000 to procure was likely void in light oI
the Iact that the RJC mixed too many plenary unlawIul detainer hallmarks in Iavor oI the landlrod
into what it later remixed as a "summary eviction proceeding" suIIicient to make void Ior lack oI
jurisdiction the October 25th, and October 27th, 2011 Orders, and Iurther, the October 13th, 2011
Order was void under NRS 40.253(6) to the extnet is purported to rule on more than possession (ie, it
ordered a rent escrow deposit oI the last $2,275 Coughlin had to his name, then held on to that, and
proceeded to expect Coughlin to hire a team oI movers and rent a u-Haul and pay Ior a new place, or
at least storage, all within days oI the conclusion oI an exhausting six weeks oI preparation Ior what
was essentiall y an unlawIul detainer Trial-lite, rather than a mere summary eviction proceeding.
Additionally, Coughlin's Iiling oI a notice oI appeal on October 18th, 2011 divested the RJC oI
jurisdiction, even Iurther making suspect the October 27th, 2011 Order Hill and Merliss so cling to.
Add to that the Iact that the "receipt" oI the Order beyond the "within 24 hours" allowable under the
statute, by the WCSO, in relation to the November 1, 2011 4:30 pm lockout (Baker testiIied to
October 28th, 2011, though some clariIication may be in order there (not that a relevancy objection
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wouldn't have been sustained by Judge Gardner anywhere that Coughlin sought to inquire into aspects
oI civil landlord tenant law bearing on service, notice, constructive service, and void Ior lack oI
jurisdiction or claim oI right issues (however, City Attorney Hazlett got the green light on anything he
wanted or needed to poach Irom civil eviction law during the criminal trespass trial, and even where
Coughlin's objection to Hazlett's tacky "you were living there" type questions was sustained, that
didn't prevent Judge Gardner Irom relying on the "you were living there" accusations in his order, nor
did it stop Hazlett Irom going there on closing argument, all misconduct requiring a new trial (and
timeliness oI the motions arguments are undone by the RPD and WCSO two Irauduluent arrests oI
Coughlin shortly aIter the June 18th, 2012 trial in RMC 11 CR 26405, compounded by a bail increase
by Judge Gardner that is just not supportable.
Further evidence oI the Iraud the RPD, Merliss and Hill were successIul in perpetrating this
wrongIul arrest is Hill's statement: "we changed the locks!" in response to Coughlin querying him as
to who warned him against a trespass charge and when? To the extent the RPD, Merliss and Hill then
(in sworn testimony, Carter's Supplemental Declaration, and other materials, including Hill's
November 21st, 2011 Declaration and Baker's Opposition to Motion to Contest Personal Property
Lien that Declaration is an exhibit to) Iraudulently assert that they identiIied themselves as law
enIorcement and issued a lawIul order or warning to leave prior to the door being kicked down, they
should Iace criminal prosecution. Its either them or, some might say, somebody else here should be
Iacing some misconduct allegations...And please be sure to remember that Reno City Attorney
Hazlett-Stevens had all these videos and still put on all that perjured testimony....And, a review oI
Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss and the Criminal Complaint signed by Hill reveal that the inIormation
in the Complaint does not support a probable cause analysis to satisIy Hazlett's RPC 3.8 duty, and
should have been dismissed. There is no mention oI an "warning" legally suIIicient to support a
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criminal trespass prosecution. That Complaints rads "That said deIendant on or about Nov. 13, 2011
in the City oI Reno, State oI Nevada at 121 River Rock st. the deI. Iound on the properly aIter being
evicted, all oI which is a violation oI 8.1 oI the Reno Municipal Code. I thereIore request that said
DeIendant be dealt with according to law. I hereby declare upon inIormation and belieI under penalty
oI perjury pursuant to NRS 171.102, that the Ioregoing is true and correct to the best oI my
knowledge". And it is signed by Richard Hill, Esq., oppossing counsel in a summary eviction matter
that was then on appeal in CV11-03628. Why didn't RPD Carter or Lopez sign it, especially iI what
Carter asserts in his unsworn Supplemental Declaration is true? Regardless, Carter nevers avers that
he issued Coughlin a warning to leave, and the City Attorney's certainly did not want Carter or Lopez
showing up to be cross-examined, Ior they would have been completely exposed. Upon inIormation
and belieI, the licensed attorney had served on Carter and Lopez an attorney's subpoena, that was or
should have been served upon them by Coughlin having it delivered to the Iront desk oI the RPD
downtown headquarters. Coughlin moved Ior a continuance upon their Iailure to show, and one
should have been granted. Regardless, the Iact that RPD Carter had Richard Hill sign the Complaint
says it all... Carter and Lopez know they did not issue Coughlin as lawIul order to leave, or provide
Coughlin any such chance to heed such a warning, nor did they identiIy themselves as law
enIorcement prior to Merliss kicking the door down ("we think you are playing games" "you're
splitting hairs over there" and the Iact that these RPD knew they weren't on solid enough ground to be
kicking anything down says it all). Further, Carter's probable cause sheet lies where it indicates
"DeIendant was Iound inside the house aIter being serve". Coughlin was "under" the house in an
enclosure that never had a lock and that is not technically even a "basement" given the 5 Ioot ceiling
and the Iact that it has one exit door, and had a dirt Iloor beIore Coughlin laid a vapor barrier and
carpet down there (there was a bed there, a nice Tempurpedic one Ior over a year, the whole things
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was decked out, and HIll admits as much, there was 14 luxury sedan 14 way power car seats,
Coughlin is a tinkerer patent attorney and its nobody's business what he collects, and he is no more a
"hoarder" than Richard Hill with his Iourteen Porsches). Further, upon inIormation and belieI,
prosecutorial misconduct was committed by the City Iailing to turn over exculpatory dispatch logs,
audio tapes oI dispatch calls and 911/rpd calls by Hill and between teh oIIicers and
dispatch/emergency services, particularly to the extent they shed light on Hill and Merliss' lies
regardin their having warned Coughlin to leave that day.
Let's compare Hill's assertions in the video above, with his written witness statement in
the police report, and Hill's November 21st, 2012 Declaraton (attached to Baker's equally
suspect Opposition to Coughlin's Personal Property Lien of that date in R1C Rev2011-001708,
and with Hill's 1anuary 14th, 2012 grievance letter against Coughlin to the SBN:
-1/14/12 greivance against Coughlin in Letter to Patrick King, Esq. 1anuary 14, 2012 Page 3:
"Someone had been in there since I had last been in several days before. Dr. Merliss discovered
that the baselnent door was barricaded (not locked) fronl the inside. The Reno Police
Department was summoned. They tried to coax whoever was in the basement out, without
success. After Dr. Merliss had to kick the door down, it "vas discovered that Mr. Coughlin had
broken in and was in the basement. He was arrested and is presently facing criminal trespass
charges in Reno Municipal Court. See case no. 11 CR 26405 21."
Transcript oI video: Zach's arrest 011.mp4:
Carter: (continuing his conversation with Hill) Rich, when and where was he served the
paperwork?
Hill: Um...on November 1st, I believe...
Coughlin: Where was I served?
Hill: They put it on the Iront door because you ran away (odd, given Baker testiIied Hill
was not there on November 1st with the WCSO Deputies conducting the lockout, and
Coughlin was at the Washoe County Law Library)
Carter: The paper was leIt on the 1st?
Coughlin: Sir, OIIicer, I don't believe you've established that I was served...
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Carter: That doesn't matter.
Coughlin: Or that I receivea any Lockout Order.
Hill: (chortle, chortle) Note taken.
Carter: So, October 1st, you believe?
Hill: No, November 1st.
Coughlin: By who?
Hill: Washoe County SheriII...
Coughlin: Was it in person?
Lopez; It doesn't need to be in person, actually...
Hill: You knew you were evicted! You were in Court!. You heard what the Judge said!
Carter: They just tape this stuII to the Iront door...
Hill: And you took it down oII the Iront door!
Carter: Allegealy...
Coughlin: I am not corroberating anything you are accusing me oI.
Hill: That's Iine,
Carter you don't need to....When was he supposed to be out?
Hill: by the 1st...(at this point Dr. Merliss takes the video camera Irom Rich and starts
doing some weird zoom in close up camera work oI Coughli's wrists and hands in
handcuIIs, with an inescapable homeoerotic bondage type physician control Ireak air to it
all)
Carter: (to Hill) come on, we'll do that in the car....
Carter: Hey, Rich, do you have his social security number?
Hill: Yeah, out in my car. (Coughlin then makes a phone call by having Sargent Lopez
hold a phone up to his head, trying to arrange Ior someone to care Ior his dog)
Merliss: You need to call her, Zach, about the dog!
Coughlin: You aren't an OIIicer, are you Dr. Merliss?
Merliss: I am not going to take care oI your dog?
Coughlin: (to Carter) its kind oI disrespectIul Ior him to be jumping in where an oIIicer...
Carter: Well it's disrespectIul Ior you to be here. You are not the victim, here!
Hill: Ha!
But, actually, the United States Supreme Court, in Soldal v. Cook County, might beg to diIIer
with Judge Carter's analysis...Russell v. Kalian, 414 A.2d 462 R.I.,1980 Where execution, which
was issued on May 23, specified that it was valid for 20 days, landlord and constable acted
unlawfully in evicting tenant on the execution on 1une 13, and landlord and constable had
thereby subjected themselves to liability for trespass.State v. Fanger, 665 A.2d 36 Vt.,1995 There
was suIIicient evidence to prove that deIendant, an apartment manager, entered tenant's residence
knowing he was not licensed or privileged to do so to sustain trespass conviction, although deIendant
stated he entered tenant's residence to make sure heat was on, given tenant's testimony that
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deIendant's only acts with respect to the heat was to disconnect the heat, deIendant made clear he was
there to evict tenant, and deIendant pushed open door while tenant was attempting to keep it shut,
knocking over her child in the process.
And it is in OIIicer Carter's Supplemental Declaraton where his lying really shines through,
especially aIter viewing the videos Iilmed by Merliss and Hill, which Iorm a nice counterpoint to the
remixed chronology oI events and statements (with a tough oI just Ilat out imagining things by
Carter) Iound in that writing oI Carters, which reads in relevant part: "Matthew has been to the house
several times over the past week and has observed evidence oI someone coming and going. Today he
was at the house and Iound the basement door to be locked Irom inside. Matthew contacted Richard
who responded and called the police. Sgt Lopez and I knocked on the basement door and announced
loudly "Reno Police" and called out Ior Zachary to open the door. We were met with no response.
Matthew decided he would kick the door open, and did so. I entered the doorway oI the basement and
Iound Zachary standing at the rear oI the room holding a small dog. He was hesitant to come out and
eventually did so. Zachary came upstairs and instantly started arguing his legal standing in the house,
asking me "hypothetically speaking" type questions. He then told me I was making a Ialse arrest due
to the Iact that I am on Richard Hill's payroll and he was going to sue me. I tried to explain to Zachary
that he was served eviction papers and he asked me what I could do about it iI he hypothetically didn't
get them. He then told me that he had worked a deal with Matthew to continue paying rent and that
the legal eviction was no longer valid. I again tried to explain to Zachary that a judge had signed an
order Iorcing him to leave the property and all he did was cite civil case law to me (I'm unsure iI any
oI the cases he was rambling on about even exist) and tell me that I was making a bad arrest. Due to
Zachary not believing he has done anything wrong that the Iact he believes he still has standing there
is reasonable grounds to believe Zachary will return to the house. ThereIore he did not qualiIy Ior a
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misdemeanor citation. Richard completed a statement on Matthews' behalI and signed a criminal
complaint."
State v. Lovins, 2009 WL 4723392, City Attorney Hazlett managed to Iind just about the only
one case in American jurisprudence that Iound an evicted tenant guilty oI trespass, but that case is
inapplicable to this one, becuase in the instant case, no express indication exists in the record that
tenant was "told not to return to the property", which was a requirement in Lovins, and where the
City's citation and Judge Gardner's reliance thereupon is predicated upon more than mere service or
"constructive service" (and while Judge Gardner's Order speciIically Iound Coughlin had
"constructive service" oI the eviction order, and, apparently, thereIore, suIIicient warning to support
a criminal trespass charged (despite Judge Gardner ruling irrelevant Coughlin's evidence, testimony,
and legal argument directed to just what rules apply in order to Iigure out iI one has been
"constructively served" an eviction order in Nevada in light oI AB226, the testimony beIore the
Committee on the Judiciary on March 31st, 2011, etc., etc. and the dicates oI NRS 40.400, NRCP
6(e), and NRCP 5(b)(2) vis a vis NRS 40.253(5). Tenn.Crim.App.,2009 SuIIicient evidence
supported deIendant's conviction Ior criminal trespass. The evidence showed that deIendant worked
and lived on the homeowner's Iarm property. The homeowner's termination oI deIendant and
subsequent eviction notice ordering him oII the property indicated that the homeowner's did not want
the deIendant on their property. DeIendant indicated he knew that he was not welcome on the
property. Thus, when the deIendant repeatedly drove onto the homeowner's property yelling at them,
he had already been expressly told not to return to the property. State v. Lovins, 2009 WL 4723392.
But any timeliness arguments are further undone by the newly discovered evidence
aspect, and here is one part of it. RPD Officer Travis Warren was there in 1anuary 2012 at a
RPD response to Coughlin's 911 call regarding domestic violence against him by his then
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housemates on E. 9th St.. Warren was there to witness Coughlin video record Lopez and goad
her into admitting that the RPD neither identified themselves as law enforcement or issued
Coughlin a lawful warning or order to leave. And Sargent Lopez has some integrity, so it is and
was difficult for her to play along with Hill and Merliss' fraudulent non-sense. But, add on to
the the fact that Coughlin only just discovered this weekend that RPD Warren and another
officer, and two social worker types met secretly with Coughlin's father, local family
practionern at Coughlin's medical practice's office at some point in the last six months or so.
This likely violates Palmer v. Pioneer, and further underscores the impermissible conflicts that
exist here, made worse by the violations of NRS 178.405 where convenient for various parties
involved here. Further, Dr. Coughlin is Reno City Attorney 1ohn Kadlic's longtime personal
physician and Dr. Coughlin (known as "the 1udge Whisperer" in some circles for being
involved in interventions with numerous local judges over the last 25 years(in addition to his
work with the Impaired Physicians Committee and other diversion programs) has in the past
demonstrated a complete and utter incapability to grasp the concept of boundaries when it
comes to his son, Zach Coughlin, calling up Deans of law schools (Coughlin was deposed by the
State Bar of California regarding an ill advised call by Dr. Coughlin to then Dean of UNLV"s
Boyd School of Law, Richard Morgan, in 2007), State Bars, etc., etc., and offering his various
contradictory diagnosis, all of which tend to border on Munchausen by Proxy at times (a slight
exaggeration, perhaps), though he is a wonderful father otherwise, and a very good man,
however, he is, like all doctors, deeply jealous of any lawyer and wishing he could be one, as is,
apparently, Dr. Merliss (who tried to take over 1udge Sferrazza's court room with an
impromptu cross examination of Coughlin while Merliss was on the witness stand). And,
needless to say, they are both complete and utter control freaks of the highest order. Dr.
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Coughlin married the daughter of the neurosurgeon in Morelli v. Morelli (Dr. Coughlin's sister
in law is a lawyer who sued her physician father, and that published opinion is oft cited for
some third party beneficiary point of law incident to marital settlement agreements in Nevada).
So, adding up the behind the scenes sabotage of Coughlin's life, his ability to defend in this
matter (or even get to trial with the video exhibits or proof of subpoenaing the various material
witness (Merliss, Sargent Lopez, Officer Carter, the latter two being under supboena by the
City of Reno and therefore, Coughlin arguably deserved a continuance in response to his
request given their failure to appear, to the extent Coughlin's attempts at subpoenaing them did
not technically comply with applicable rules (which Coughlin si not even sure of given the
arrest, bail, withhold medications, violat Soldal v. Cook Co., get no love from the 1ustice Court,
rinse and repeat Washoe County and the City of Reno, WCSO, RPD, RMC, R1C, City
Attorney's Office, SBN, Richard Hill, and WCDA Office have had Coughlin on in the last 14
months or so....
Regardless, justice dictates at least a hearing on this Motion for New Trial, and or to
Vacate 1udgement, or Arrest 1udgment, etc... RPD Officer Carter, Sargent Lopez, Officer
Warren and a few others (Officer Weaver, Sargent Dye, Sargent Miller) need to answer some
question, under oath...and Richard Hill and Casey Baker have a lot of 'splainin' to do...and add
to that Dr. Merliss. Otherwise...Some of the "peculiarities" attendant to this and other trials
involving Coughlin in the RMC shall, perhaps, get a bit more retrospection...
Bagwell v. 1amison, 25 S.C.L. 249, S.C.App.L.,1840 In trespass against a bailiff, for
levying under a distress warrant alleged to be void, defendant justified by plaintiff's admissions
that rent was due. Acknowledgments by the landlord, deceased, of partial satisfaction, were
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admitted in reply. State v. Riddell, 21 P.3d 128 Or.App.,2001 In prosecution for criminal
trespass in the second degree, defendant should have been allowed to attack underlying
exclusion order that precluded him from appearing in courthouse square, which defendant
contended was invalid on ground that it prohibited his constitutionally protected activity of
expressive ~freeze modeling in a public area. Hayes v. State, 79 S.E. 761 Ga.App.,1913 A
tenant who in good faith claims possession of land under a bona fide claimant of title and right
of possession cannot be convicted of trespass. O'Banion v. Com., 519 S.E.2d 817 Va.App.,1999
The statutory offense of criminal trespass requires a willful trespass; thus, one who enters or
stays upon another's land under a bona fide claim of right cannot be convicted of
trespass.O'Banion v. Com., 519 S.E.2d 817 Va.App.,1999 A ~bona fide claim of right, which
may serve as a defense to a trespass charge, is a sincere, although perhaps mistaken, good faith
belief that one has some legal right to be on the property; the claim need not be one of title or
ownership, but it must rise to the level of authorization.
The proposed amendment was not the type of an amendment which should have been
allowed under Section 157 of the 1ustice Court Act. A summary proceeding is a statutory
remedy and the petition must be strictly construed. The service of a proper notice against a
tenant holding over, is a jurisdictional fact, which must be properly `805 pleaded and proved. If
the notice is defective or insufficient, the proceeding falls. The notice cannot be amended upon
the trial and no facts can be included as a jurisdictional ground for the proceeding, which are
not included in the original notice. Under the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law Section
8585 of the Unconsolidated Laws as amended by the Laws of 1951 and the regulations of the
Temporary State Housing Rent Commission thereunder, the facts constituting the nuisance are
additional requirements of a notice to a tenant holding over. The facts upon which the landlord
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bases his claim of nuisance, are jurisdictional and a summary proceeding cannot be successfully
maintained without full compliance with the statute. A jurisdictional defect cannot be cured by
amendment. Ferber v. Apfel, 113 App.Div. 720, 99 N.Y.S. 215. If the judgment in this case
rested upon a verdict of a jury, I would consider the reception of the evidence of loud and
profane language by the tenants and the submission of that issue to a jury under the present
circumstances, reversible error. However, the Trial Court, in his decision finds, that the tenants
maintained a clothesline approximately five feet from the ground across the rear of the
premises in such a position that it was hazardous and dangerous to the landlords and to the
members of his family who were obliged to pass this clothesline in walking from the garage to
the rear entrance of the portion of the premises occupied by the landlords. He also finds, that
the tenants persisted in maintaining the clothesline in this location contrary to the wishes of the
landlords. In his decision, the Trial Court calls attention to the... N.Y.Co.Ct. 1952 Blozevich v.
Tasber 116 N.Y.S.2d 801
Tenant's failure to raise notice issue in his initial dismissal motion or to plead it with
specificity in his answer did not relieve landlord of its trial burden to establish compliance with
statutory requirements for notice to cure in summary eviction
proceeding.N.Y.Sup.App.Term,2006. W 54-7 LLC v. Schick 14 Misc.3d 49, 829 N.Y.S.2d 399,
2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 26499
Is was reversible error to rule as irrelevant Coughlin's materials on a "claim of right"
defense: License from the owner to access the premises, within meaning of statutory affirmative
defense against prosecution for criminal trespass, is satisfied by showing license from any
owner or other person authorized to license access to the premises. West's Neb.Rev.St. 28-
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522. State v. McCave, 282 Neb. 500, 805 N.W.2d 290 (2011). Further, see NRS 40.760 and
108.475.
At the time of Coughlin's arrest, he was a licensed attorney. It would not be reasonable
to expect one to litigate, basically, a plenary unlawful detainer Trial (remixed and
recharacterized as a summarey eviction proceeding over half way through) then expect them to
move out practially overnight, and expect a USPS change of address to adequately allay any
concerns about that attorney's mail being forward in time to avoid any damage to his client's
cases. It is unreasonable to suggest that the RPD can then tackle some attorney stepping foot on
the property to get his mail. And where 1udge Garner ruled all the nonsense about pajamas
(don't look like pajamas in the videos to me, Chris, or Rich) and slippers and "you were living
there (in a civil pleading HIll admits that the stuff in the basement was probably there well
before the eviction, then HIll goes on to ponder about Coughlin preferring to "spider hole"
himself in the basement, even prior to the eviction...Hill has continually demeaned Coughlin
throughout these matters and caused his client to needlessly incur fees).
Further, 1udge Gardner's Order of Conviction was so thin, he almost immediately
started to reach for guidance given by the legistlature or city counsel of something regarding
posting at intervals of this or that...there was zero testimony or evidence about the posting of no
trespassing signs...and zero testimony or citation to the effect that post an eviction notice is
tantamount to posting a no trespassing sign. They are legally distinct.
VIOLATIONS OF NRS 178.405 AND NRS 5.010 BY RENO CITY ATTORNEY AND
WASHOE COUNTY PROSECUTORS AND RMC AND WCPD COURT APPOINTED
DEFENDERS
September 8th, 2011 Order for Competency Evaluation by 1udge Schroeder in RCR2011-
063341
September 9th, 2011: Coughlin arrested at Wal-Mart in RMC 11 CR 22176 Ior petty larceny
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October 10th, 2011: Coughlin arraigned in RMC 11 CR 22176 Ior petty larceny charge
October 26th, 2011 (or a short time after depending upon entry of order) 1udge Sferrazza
declares Coughlin competent in RCR2011-063341
February 27th, 2012: file stamped at 1:31pm in RCR2012-065630 1udge Clifton signs an Order
for Competency evaluation of Coughlin
-February 27th, 2012: despite being present at the "clandestine status conIerence" (Dogan's client
Coughlin was noticed, in writing, that it had been reset to March 29th, 2012) DDA Young Iiled an
Opposition to Motion to Continue Trial Date and Motion to Appoint Co-Counsel on 2/27/12 at 2:55
pm in a companion case that he was also prosecuting, RCR2011-063341 in violation oI NRS 178.405.
In her March 13th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin, Judge Nash Holmes admits to communications
in this regard between her and the Washoe County Public DeIender's OIIice.
-February 27th, 2012: At 3:00 pm, despite the communications she admits to with the WCPD, Judge
Nash Holmes holds a trial where Coughlin is Iorced to appear as an indigent criminal deIendant
proceeding with selI representation in 11 TR 26800, which is suspened upon Judge Nash Holmes
Iinding Coughlin in "summary criminal contempt" seconds aIter he testiIies that RPD Sargetn Tarter
lied in connection with a retaliatory traIIic citations incident to Tarter telling Coughlin to leave the
law oIIice oI Richard G. Hill, Esq. on November 15th, 2012 aIter Coughlin was released Irom 3 days
in jail incident to a criminal trespass custodial arrest upon Hill lying to oIIicers and signing a criminal
complaint in 11 CR 26405 Ior criminal trespass on November 13th, 2012. Tarter ordered Coughlin to
leave aIter Hill reIused to give Coughlin his state issued drivers license or identiIication, his hard
drives/client's Iiles, his keys, or his wallet.
-Judge Nash Holmes proceeds to Iile numerous Orders
-March 5th, 2012: in RMC 11 CR 26405, the criminal trespass case Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law
oIIice the CertiIied Copy oI Docket done by the Judicial Assistant, D2's Lisa Wagner, who couldn't
quite seem to Iind or remember the Iact that Coughlin Iaxed in a Notice oI Appeal on June 28th,
2012, and her Iailure to docket that led to the dismissal oI Coughlin's appeal in CR12-1262, despite
Coughlin having electronic conIirmation oI receipt oI that Iax delivering his Notice oI Appeal to the
RMC and to City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens (whom coyly tries to assert he didn't get it or the paper
copy Coughlin personally delivered to the oIIices oI the City Attorney within the 10 days set Iorth in
NRS 189.010) Trial date set Ior April 10, 2012 by Court.
-05 March 2012: Notice OI Appearace As Co-Counsel And Motion To Dismiss Iiled deIendant. 20
March 2012: Order #1 denying deIendant's motion Iiled 13,February 2012 signed Judge William
Gardner. RMC 11 CR 26405
-21 March 2012: Order #2 denying deIendant's motion Iiled 5, March 2012 signed by Judge William
Gardner. RMC 11 CR 26405
-21 March 2012: Motion To Strike DeIendant's Motion To Dismiss Complaint Iiled by Deputy City
Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens. RMC 11 CR 26405
-10 April 2012: DeIendant appeared Ior trial with counsel Keith Loomis, Judge William Gardner
presiding. Present on behalI oI the City was Christopher Hazlett-Stevens. Several pre-trial motions
were heard. An Order Suspending Proceedings was signed. All proceedings suspended until the
question oI competence is determined. Case Status Hearing scheduled Ior 8, May 2012. RMC 11 CR
26405. See attached emails demonstrating the knowledge oI and complicity between the Washoe
County Public DeIenders, the court appointed Reno Municipal Court deIenders, the City oI Reno
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Prosecutors, Washoe County District Attorney's OIIice, RMC, RJC, and both court's Iiling oIIice's
staII and administrators respecting the existence oI these Orders Ior Competency Evaluation and the
brazen violation oI NRS 178.405 and NRs 5.010 by these individuals. Further, on April 19th, 2012,
DDA Young again violated NRS 178.405 where he moved to have Coughlin remanded to custody
(whereupon Coughlin could again have his medication suddenly withheld Irom him, all while RMC
Judge Nash Holmes seeks to leverage jail staII to get Coughlin to sign some waiver oI his medical
records privacy rights and where WCPD Biray Dogan announces conIidential HIPAA protected
medical inIormation relating to his client Coughlin into the public record, in Iront oI 40 members oI
the public gathered in D10, a transgression which WCPD Jeremy Bosler later reIused to seek to
ameliorate or strike Irom the record in any manner whatsoever).
-May 7th, 2012 in RCR2011-063341 WCPD Goodnight and DDA Young violate NRS 178.405 by
attempting TO HOLD A TRIAL in that matter during the pendency oI an Order Ior Competency
directored towards Goodnight's client, Coughlin. Goodnight manages to jam Coughlin into an ill-
advised Mental Health Court sign-up in MH12-0032, which ends badly when the MHC's Reno
Biondo commits Iraud in asserting that Coughlin was removed Irom the MHC Ior "Iailing to
Iollowing MHC policies" similar to the arguments put Iorth by Sharon Dollarhide, despite the MHC,
and perhaps Goodnight too, having given Coughlin a list oI medications it prohibits, and a contract
Ior entry into the MCH, aIter having inIormed Coughlin he was accepted into the MCH upon entering
the contract. The MCH subsequently threatened Coughlin with incarceration Ior taking a medication
is only aIter the Iact objected to, then, upon having the bargained Ior consieration, oIIer and
acceptance pointed out to it, the MCH lied and disparaged Coughlin to the RJC and others, causing
Coughlin reputational damage, and Coughlin's case was remanded to the RJC at a later date. During
this period oI time, D10 Judge Elliot Iorced Coughlin back into custody at the WCDC, where
Coughlin has been denied his medication every single one oI his 10 trips to jail this year, with no
titration down oI dosing whatsoever, even where Coughlin was willing and able to arrange Ior
delivery oI the medication at his own expense, etc.
-08 May 2012: Case Status hearing held beIore Judge William Gardner. Present on behalI oI the City
was Deputy City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Ior the deIense Keith Loomis and deIendant
Zachary Coughlin. DeIendant was Iound to be competent. DeIendant's motion to remove Keith
Loomis as counsel granted. Trial date set by the court Ior June 18,2012. RMC 11 CR 26405.
Strangely, despite Coughlin still being subject to an as yet to be ruled upon Order For
Competency evaluation and despite Coughlin having just the previous day been accepted into
Mental Health Court and the R1C case RCR2011-063341 transferred there, RMC 1udge
William Gardner jammed Coughlin both into proceeding without the Sixth Amendment Right
To Counsel and into some trial setting, even though NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 forbids it, and
even though 1udge Gardner admitted to being aware of 1udge Nash Holmes, his fellow RMC
1udge, seeking to have Coughlin's law license taken away based upon a SCR 117 Disability
Petition (1udge Nash Holmes, in her March 14th, 2012 letter/grievance to the State Bar of
Nevada, wherein she purports to speak for 1udge William Gardner and managed to pass on to
the SBN the April 2009 Order For Sanctions by 1udge William Gardner's Family Court
1udge Linda Gardner, that 1udge William Gardner passed to 1udge Nash Holmes after
receiving from his sometime in the first quarter of 2012). Incidentally, Coughlin was
previously a domestic violence attorney at Washoe Legal Services until Family Court 1udge
Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin $1,000 personally for the arguments
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he made in representing a domestic violence victim in a divorce trial were cited by WLS
Executive Director Paul Elcano as the "sole reason" for Coughlin being fired. Coughlin filed a
Petition for Writ of Mandamus in respone to that Order with the Nevada Supreme Court in
54844. Coughlin filed a Notice of Appeal of the dismissal for insufficient service of process of
his wrongful termination case against Washoe Legal Services on February 27th, 2012, and that
matter is currently on appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court in 60302. Oh, and Reno City
Attorney 1ohn Kadlic is a patient of Zach Coughlin's father, Dr. Timothy Coughlin, and the
City of Reno and or the RPD have sought to pressure Coughlin's parents into having him
"committed", despite the fact that the numerous (about 8-10 ish) wrongful arrests Coughlin has
been subjected to this year (most of which violate Soldal v. Cook County and have been
captured on video tape, amazingly) all kind oI give Mr. Kadlic a bit motivation to quiet and or
discredit Coughlin (and and arrest on June 28th, 2012 by the WCSO and various instances this year
where Iraudulent AIIidavits oI Service by the WCSO have been involved in arrests oI Coughlin give
the WCDA OIIice its own motivations).
Given that this trial setting and denial oI Coughlin's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel occurred
during the pendency oI an Order Ior Competency Evaluation oI Coughlin that the RMC, Judge
William Gardner, court appointed deIender Keith Loomis, Esq. and City Attorney's Christopher
Hazlett-Stevens, Esq. were well aware oI, the Iollowing are void: O5 June 2012: Notice OI
Appearance As Counsel ; Motion To Dismiss; Motion To Suppress; Motion For A Continuance OI
Trial And TransIer To Mental Health Court Iiled by deIendant. 18 June 2012: DeIendant appeared Ior
trial pro-per, Judge William Gardner presiding. Present on behalI oI the City was Christopher Hazlett-
Stevens. Several pre-trial motions were heard. Motion to Continue Iiled by deIendant denied. Motion
to Dismiss Iiled by deIendant denied. Motion to Suppress denied. Motion to Recuse denied. Motion
to TransIer to Mental Health Court denied. Case tried on its merits and the DeIendant was Iound
guilty oI the charge oI Trespass, a violation oI R.M.C 08.10.010. .."'Y25'2012 The DeIendant was
sentenced as Iollows: Trespass, a violation oI R.M.C 08.10.0 10. : Time Served (3 days at usual $100
a day, and a $310.00 Iine Ior a total oI $610 raked in by the RMC on a Iirst oIIense trespass charge
where typically the Iine is $305. Also, Richard G. Hill, Esq. lied under oath at that June 18th, 2012
criminal trespass Trial where he testiIied that the RPD identiIied themselves as law enIorcement and
issued a lawIul order or warning Ior Coughlin to leave the premises prior to the landlord kicking
down a door to a quasi "basement" under the Iormer law oIIice. The videos oI the arrest Iilmed by
Hill demonstrate that Coughlin was never given an opportunity to heed any warning to leave given
that day prior to a custodial arrest being eIIectuated, contrary to the Supplemental Declaration by
RPD OIIicer Chris Carter, Jr. RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez subsequently admitted that the RPD neither
identiIied themselves as law enIorcement nor issued a lawIul order to emerge Irom the basement prior
to landlord Merliss kicking down the basement door on November 13th, 2012. WCSO Civil
Supervisor Liz Stuchell has admitted in an email to Coughlin that Deputy Machen's November 7th,
2011 AIIidavit oI Service swearing to have "personally served" the RJC REV2011-001708 Summary
Eviction Order on November 1st, 2011 was "incorrect" in that to Machen "personally served" means
"posting it to the door when no one is home. However, given NRS 40.400 makes applicable NRCP
5(b)(2) and 6(e) to summary evictions (even those that are noticed by the RJC, in writing, as a "Trial"
and even where, at the October 13th, 2011 "summary eviction proceeding" the RJC ruled that
Coughlin "had met his burden oI establishing there is a genuine issue oI material Iact concerning his
retaliatory eviction deIense" and the matter was then "set Ior trial on October 25th, 2011 provided
Coughlin deposits $2,275 into the court's rent escrow account", all oI which violates JCRCP Rule 109
and NRS 40.253(6)) the lockout Deputy Machen oversaw on November 1st, 2011 was based upon a
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void Eviction Order and Decision oI October 25th, 2011 and an October 27th, 2011 Findings oI
Fact...that Hill's associate Baker testiIied as to having apparently provided receipt thereoI to the
WCSO on October 28th, 2011, and which RJC ChieI Civil Clerk Karen Stancil indicates were
transmitted to the WCSO via Iax according to the usual custom and practice oI the RJC...meaning, the
WCSO Iailed to eIIectuate a lockout "within 24 hours" oI "receipt" oI either oI those
Orders...meaning Hill and Merliss were trespassing on November 13th, 2011, not Coughlin, and they
brought the RPD along Ior the ride, whereupon the RPD eIIected a wrongIul arrest (based upon lies
by neurologist Merliss and his attorney Hill to the eIIect that they warned Coughlin to leave that day
prior to the RPD showing up, which is clearly show to be Ialse by the videos Iilmed by Hill and
Merliss themselves and Hill's subsequent testimony at the June 18th, 2012 criminal trespass trial in 11
CR 26405).
May 9th, 2012: Order finding Coughlin competent in CR12-0376, by 1udge Elliot of
Department 10 resolving the February 27th, 2012 Order for Competency Evaluation signed by
R1C 1udge Clifton and file stamped at 1:31 pm on that date.
September 5th, 2012: Order for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin by 1udge Sferrazza in
RCR2011-063341
October 2, 2012: WCPD Leslie and Dogan and DDA Young violate NRS 178.405 by swapping the
October 15th, 2012 Trial continuation/Competency Hearing Date in RCR2011-063341 with
RCR2012-065630, and setting/stipulating to a new hearing on October 22nd, 2012, and resetting the
Trial date to November 19th, 2012, but not beIore attempting to cram RCR2012-067980 onto the
calendar with RCR2012-063341 Ior October 22nd, 2012 (and Leslie and Dogan lied to Coughlin
about whether "mandatory status conIerence" was held on August 6th, 2012 in RCR2012-065630,
and RCR2012-067980, the latter at which Leslie set a Trial date oI September 18th, 2012 despite his
legal assistant Linda Gray admitting to Coughlin that Coughlin was provided no notice whatsoever oI
the August 6th, 2012 hearing date in those cases. Also, Dogan and Leslie again violated NRS
178.405 on October 2nd, 2012 where tehy reset Ior October 30th, 2012 a Motion Hearing on DDA
Young's impermissible Motion to Amend the Complaint in RCR2012-065630 (six months aIter the
arrest, no speciIic Iacts pled in either to support either charge, really). Further, Dogan Iailed to alert
Coughlin in any way to the Iact that, in his July 31st, 2012 Motion to Amend Criminal Complaint,
DDA Young attempted to, in violation oI RPC 3.8, amend the "misue oI emergency services" charge
(where Coughlin is accused oI using 911 to report police misconduct) to a charge that would provide
the District Attorney more leverage against Coughlin, a retaliatory prosecution, Ior a crime that would
damage Coughlin's law license given the import oI SCR 111(6), despite DDA Young lacking
probable cause to so amend his charge. Dogan and Young previously conspired to retaliate against
Coughlin incident to their "clandestine status conIerence" oI February 27th, 2012, which just so
happened to be the date that Coughlin Iiled a Notice oI Appeal in his case against Washoe Legal
Services 60302 and the date that Judge William Gardner transIerred jurisdiction Irom RMC D1 Judge
Dilworth to RMC D3 Judge Nash Holmes in 12 CR 000696, a case where Coughlin was subject to a
custodial arrest Ior jaywalkign on January 12th, 2012 incident to Coughli's peaceIully Iilming Richard
G. Hill, Esq.'s contractor's crew Irom a public sidewalk, disposing oI property leIt at Coughlin's
Iormer home law oIIice due to Hill locking a gate thereto during the time Coughlin was aIIorded to
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remove such property and where Hill had boarded up on oI the entrances to the property as well, in
addition to remove the only ladder to the upstairs attic/storage space at the property. On February
27th, 2012 in 11 TR 26800 Judge Nash Holmes told Coughlin she would have him thrown in jail iI he
mentioned Richard G. Hill's name one more time. On January 31st, 2012, at an extension hearing on
the TPO Richard Hill received against CoughlinI or Coughlin's alleged jaywalking on January 12th,
2012, RJC Judge Schroeder roared at Coughlin "do you want to go to jail!" when Coughlin broached
the subject oI Hill's abuse oI process. Judge Schroeder is listed in the RJC docket as presiding over
the February 27th, 2012 "clandestine status conIerence" that ultimately resulted in Judge CliIton
signing the Order Ior Competency Evaluation. It is unclear iI any actual hearing beIore a judge even
took place that day, however.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
NEW TRIAL OR MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT: NRS 176.515 ARREST OF
JUDGMENT NRS 176.525 Arrest oI judgment: NRS 176.565 Clerical mistakes. Clerical
mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as
the court orders. The RMC Iailed to Iile Coughlin June 28th, 2012 Notice oI Appeal, and that
resulted in the appeal cr12-1262 being dismissed. NRS 178.589 Use oI Iacsimile machine. The Reno
Municipal Court has sought to apply rules to Coughlin it does not apply to others, even where NRS
178.608 and NRS 178.610 Iorbid it Irom doing so. Further, Coughlin's rights to Iile the best Motion
Ior New Trial that he could and to ensure that the RMC did in Iact Iile his June 28th, 2012 Notice oI
Appeal were prejudiced by an impermissibly bail increase by Judge Gardner, unnoticed (Coughlin did
not have an attorney oI record at the time and was not appropriately noticed as to the July 5th, 2012
impromptu bail hearing at which the RPD committed Iraud, and Iurther, the "saIety oI other persons
and oI the community" argument does not accord the RPD the right to violate Soldal v. Cook County.
NRS 178.498 Amount. II the deIendant is admitted to bail, the bail must be set at an amount which in
the judgment oI the magistrate will reasonably ensure the appearance oI the deIendant and the saIety
oI other persons and oI the community, ...having regard to: 1. The nature and circumstances oI the
oIIense charged; 2. The Iinancial ability oI the deIendant to give bail; 3. The character oI the
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deIendant; and 4. The Iactors listed in NRS 178.4853. NRS 178.499 Increase in amount. 1. At any
time aIter a district or Justice Court has ordered bail to be set at a speciIic amount, and beIore
acquittal or conviction, the court may upon its own motion or upon motion oI the district attorney and
aIter notice to the deIendant`s attorney oI record or, iI none, to the deIendant, increase the amount oI
bail Ior good cause shown. 2. II the deIendant has been released on bail beIore the time when the
motion to increase bail is granted, the deIendant shall either return to custody or give the additional
amount oI bail A 2012 published and publicly disseminated Reno Municipal Court Bail Schedule
indicates criminal trespass under teh RMC 8.10.010 Trespassing carries a Iine oI $ 305. Coughlin's
Iirst oIIense criminal trespass charge incident to a civil eviction was Iined $610 by Judge William
Gardner, twice the normal amount, considering the three days oI incarceration Coughlin served
(typically credited at $100 a day) and the $310 "Iine" that Judge Gardner kept Irom Coughlin's cash
bail Ior the RMC. Another indication oI the impropriety oI Iailing to recuse himselI.
Further, Loomis and Puentes deprived me oI my right to supboena witnesses to deIend myselI
in RMC 11 CR 26405, a criminal trespass matter resulting in a criminal trespass conviction on June
18th, 2012, which I reported to Bar Counsel in compliance with SCR 111. SBN Bar Counsel King
has the audio Irom two oI the pre-trial hearings and I am attaching the audio oI the trial or linking to it
herein. It demonstrates the Iact that Dr. Merliss was a percipient, material eye witness (in Iact Dr.
Merliss lied to the RPD in eIIectuating this wrongIul arrest, and Sargent Marcia Lopez has admitted
to me, contrary to RPD OIIicer Chris Carter's police report and Richard Hill's June 18th, 2012 sworn
testimony and Casey Baker, Esq's (whom was not even there on November 13th, 2011) NRCP Rule
11 violating (given he possessed the video's taken by Dr. Merliss and his supervisory attorney,
Richard G. Hill, Esq, which were propounded to the Reno City Attorney's OIIice and which both
Loomis and Puentes had, which Iurther demonstrate their culpability. There is a suggestion that these
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"contract" court appointed deIenders put their own proIit motive above their client's rights to
subpoena witnesses and gather evidence to deIende their cases (similar to the reIusals by WCPD Jim
Leslie, Loomis reIused to procure and provide the audio oI two extremely relevant court proceedings
in the RJC, necessary to the deIense oI RMC case, which led to 18 days wrongIul incarceration oI me
Irom July 3, 2012 to July 21st, 2012 in RMC 12 CR 12420. The two RJC matters are the Milan
Krebs TPO hearing in RJC RCP2012-000287 (particularly necessary to the deIense oI that matter, in
addition to the matter Leslie represent me on incident to a wrongIul June 28th, 2012 arrest by the
WCSO in RCR2012-067980, incident to a Iraudulently procurred Summary Eviction Order
(stemming Irom the Iraudulent Declaration oI Personal Service by license process server Robert Wray
Ior Nevada Court Services, which was committing the unauthorized practice oI law (deeming
themselves an "eviction consulting and process service company" in RJC rev2012-001048, where
Wray lied about "personally serving" me a June 14th, 2012 5 day unlawIul detainer notice (he tried to
break and enter my rental #29, which had not windows and which had a locked Iront door at the time
that he and Northwind Apartments Manager Duane Jakob attempted to break and enter and committ
another trespass (as they had done previously, when they Iailed to get the City oI Reno Code
EnIorcement to do their bidding in seeking to subvert the summary eviction process, and where the
RPD, though making threats to arrest me Ior criminal trespass violative oI Soldal v. Cook County,
was taking too long to "help" Northwind out. WCPD Leslie Iailed to inIorm me or notiIy me in any
way as to the Iact that the WCDA Iiled, on August 23rd, 2012, a document listing Jakob as a witness
it intends to call in its prosecution oI me in RCR2012-067980. Further, WCPD Biray Dogan Iailed to
inIorm me in any way oI the Iact that, on July 31st, 2012, DDA Young Iiled a Motion to Amend
Criminal Complaint wherein he, lacking a RPC 3.8 probable cause basis to do so, seeks to amend his
charge in RCR2012-065630 to a charge that would invoke, upon a conviction, the reporting
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requirements oI SCR 111(6), rather than maintain the diIIicult task oI prosecuting one Ior "misue oI
911" where 911 was allegedly utilized to report police misconduct, whereupon 911 operators
purportedly eIused to document such a complaint or report in any way. Additionally, Henry Sotelo,
similar to Loomis, reIused to procure and provide to his client, Coughlin (once Loomis received his
second Order granting his withdrawal as court appointed counsel Ior Coughlin, once in RMC 11 CR
26405 (now a SCR 111(4) petition, Iiled by Bar Counsel against Coughlin on October 15th, 2012)
and again in RMC 12 CR 12420 (Loomis also reIused to send a request Ior discovery or subpoena
duces tecum to the City oI Reno or RPD Ior the various police reports Sargent Dye and OIIicer
Weaver reIerence during an impermissible, unnotice, impromptu bail hearing (wherein Jill Drake,
Esq. committed proIessional misconduct) on July 5th, 2012 (at which RMC Judge Gardner again
Iailed to recuse himselI despite the pending grievances Iiled on his behalI by Judge Nash Holmes,
NG12-0434 and NG12-0435, the latter oI which resulted Irom Judge W. Gardner's sister passing to
him, her brother, her April 2009 Order AIter trial sanction Coughlin, to RMC Judge Nash Holmes,
whom Iiled it on March 14th, 2012 with Bar Counsel, along with her admission to to communications
with the WCPD's OIIice, which the WCPD'S OIIice, including Bosler, Dogan, and Leslie, have
reIused to comment on to Coughlin in any way, aside Irom Leslie's dubious assertion that he is
completely unaware oI such.
Regardless, given the import oI NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010, the June 18th, 2012 Trial in
RMC 11 CR 26405 should have never taken place, should have never been set on May 8th, 2012
(particularly where the 2/27/12 Order Ior Competency Evaluation in RCR2012-065630, to which
Loomis admits to have been aware oI, was not ruled upon by D10 ("Tiburon" prinout sua sponte
gathered by Judge Gardner aside, where Loomis didn't manage to get one, though he did argue that an
unoIIicial online "docket" was somehow capable oI providing judicial notice oI an Order Finding
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Coughlin competent on May 8th, 2012, which is clearly violative oI NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010).
Additionally, it is preposterous to Iind that Coughlin was able to make the decision to proceed
without Loomis or other court appointed, Sixth Amendment satisIying representation, on May 8th,
2012, given the Order by D10 in CR12-0376 Iinding Coughlin competent did not get signed and
entered until May 9th, 2012. This is reminiscent oI DDA Young Iiling an Opposition to Coughlin's
Motion to Appear as Co-Counsel in RCR2011-063341 aIter the entry oI the 2/27/12 Order Ior
Competency Evaluation by Judge CliIton in RCR2012-065630 (though the docket lists Judge
Schroeder as presiding over that "clandestine" status conIerence, so deemed in light oI Coughlin
being notice in writing that it had been vacated to March 29th, 2012, in light oI the scheduling
conIlict presented by the RMC 11 TR 26800 traIIic citation trial set Ior 1:00 pm on 2/27/12 beIore
Judge Nash Holmes, which she held anyways, despite the dictates oI NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010
and the communicatiosn Judge Nash Holmes admits to in the March 14th, 2012 grievance she Iiled
on behalI oI all RMC Judges (including pro tempore ones) on March 14th, 2012, and Ior which Judge
William Gardner admits to being aware oI, as does City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens, whom makes
ridiculously mincing arguments respecting the diIIerence in being "competent" to practice law versus
being "competent" to stand trial, even where he was aware oI RCR2012-065630 and CR12-0376.
Further, upon inIormation and belieI, Hazlett-Stevens demonstrates a lack oI candor to tribunals
where he argues he was not "served" documents that he recieved via email and or Iax where the RMC
Rules allow Ior such transmissions to constitute service upon "governmental attorneys". I reserve my
right to supplement this grievance Iurther at a later date. Additionally, Mr. Sotelo violated NRS
178.405 and NRS 5.010 on September 30th, 2012 where he Iiled a Motion to Withdraw as Coughlin's
Counsel oI Record in 12 CR 12420 during a period in which a September 5th, 2012 (though it might
be Iile stamped September 7th, 2012) Order Ior Competency Evaluation oI Coughlin in RCR2011-
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063341 was entered (and which the RMC, City Attorney Sooudi, and RMC deIender Sotelo
recognized as requiring a stay oI a Motion Hearing in 12 CR 12420 on September 18th, 2012...).
Sotelo compounds his misconduct by making spurious and vague allegations against his then client
Coughlin in that Motion alluding to some "repugnant" course he alleges Coughlin wishes to maintain,
though, predictably, Sotelo Iails to provide any support Ior his egregiously prejudicial statement,
damaging oI his client's interests and deIense, all while violating NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010.
Further, given the correspondences admitted to between Puentes and Loomis with the Washoe
County Public DeIender's OIIice, and in light oI the Iact that both Loomis and Puentes are employed
by the RMC, the various Orders Ior Competency Evaluation Iiled since the Iirst one oI September
8th, 2011 regarding Coughlin, in RCR2011-063341, vitiate the import oI all subsequently void Orders
predicated upon any part oI any proceeding not stayed during the pendency oI such an Order Ior
Competency Evaluation. That means, the conviction in RMC 11 CR 22176 underpinning the SCR
111(6) petition in 60838 resulting in Coughlin's current temporary suspension oI his law license, is
necessarily void, particularly where the arraignment took place at a time (October 10th, 2011) when
Coughlin's competency was put into question, particularly where RMC deIender Lew Taitel,
appointed at Coughlin's court ordered deIense counsel beginning on November 19th, 2011, was aware
oI the pending Order Ior Competency Evaluation in RJC RCR2011-063341 at the time oI the
November 30th, 2011 Trial in RMC 11 CR 22176. resulting in Coughlin's conviction Ior petty
larceny. Included in such misconduct is Pamela Robert, Esq., City oI Reno prosecutor as well, in
addition to her coworker Allison Ormaas, particularly where she appeared and oIIered argument both
at the 2/27/12 Trial in 11 TR 26800 in the RMC, but as well as the February 12th, 2012 continuation
oI that Trial. In that regard, all oI Judge Nash Holmes purported Orders, including those Iinding
Coughlin "by clear and convincing evidence" to be guilty oI "summary criminal contempt" and other
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violations oI the Rules oI ProIessional Conduct incident to the traIIic citation trial in 11 TR 26800 on
2/27/12 that Judge Nash Holmes, despite the mandates oI NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010,
transmogriIied into a disciplinary proceeding against a pro se attorney indigent criminal deIendant
denied his Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel in a proceeding wherein jail time was ultimately
ordered, are also void, to the extent they are not already void given the divesting oI her jurisdiction
incident to Coughlin Iiling, on March 7th, 2012, a Notice oI Appeal oI that summary contempt order
as rendered (especially where the March 28th,2 2012 written Order by Judge Nash Holmes was
mailed to an address Ior Coughlin that the RMC knew was no longer good).
The Summary Eviction Order incident to a "Trial" (that's what the notice says it is, and that is
what Judge SIerrazza characterized it as on both October 13th, and October 25th, 2011, contrary to
Baker's assertions, in addition to Baker's misrepresenting the Iact that Judge SFerrazza also ruled that
Coughlin met the "summary judgment" standard required oI him already at the October 13th, 2011
"proceeding", and thereby, with the Iiling oI a Notice oI Appeal by Coughlin on Octobe 18th, 2011,
the RJC was divested oI jurisdiction to hold a "Trial" on October 25th, 2011, to the extent it lacked
jurisdiction to begin with in Iailing to comply with JCRCP 109 respecting the number oI days to
respond to a "Complaint" incident to an unlawIul detainer "Trial" and the notice requirements
incident thereto, much less the unlawIul Iorced rent escrow depositing, or the denial oI a stay, even
where the RJC held onto the $2,275 "rent escrow" deposit" under the auspices oI holding is as
Coughlin's 'bond on appeal" (necessarily meaning the "superseadeas bond, given the appeal bond is
statutorily set as $250 and only a supersedeas can be adjudicate in such a manner to be "three times
the monthly rent"...never mind the Iact that, given Coughlin's monthly rent was under $1,000, NRS
118A.385 dictates such a "supersedeas bond" be $250, unless the Court Iind's Coughlin a commercial
tenant, but in that case, given the non-payment oI rent was not pled, a summary eviction is verboten
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under NRS 40.253 anyways, so...NRCP 60(b)(4) void Ior lack oI jurisdiction, and thereIore, to the
extent the criminal trespass conviction does not Ialter on any oI these numerous other grounds...it
shall there as well.
2. Coughlin submitted Ior Iiling with the RMC, both in person in June 27th, 2012 and by Iax
on June 28th, 2012 a Notice oI Appeal, timely under NRS 189.010, which Coughlin also timely
served on the City oI Reno via personally delivering it to their oIIice and emailing and Iaxing to the
City Attorney as well, all timely. Coughlin in person attempt to Iile on June 27th, 2012 was rejected,
though he beat the "on a timer" locking oI the door to the court house prior to 5:00 pm attested to by
the WCSO. Coughlin Iax Iiled the Notice Appeal to Judge Gardner's Iax number as held out to the
public by the RMC and on the www.nvbar.org website (and has electronic conIirmation oI a
successIul transmission thereoI) on June 28th, 2012 (Coughlin was prevented Irom Iiling in person on
June 28th, 2012 a Notice oI Appeal due to a wrongIul arrest in RCR2012-067980 by the WCSO
based upon a Iraudulent aIIidavit oI service by Nevada Court Services (which is partners with RMC
deIender Lew Taitel, Esq.) licensed process server Robert Wray, and a deIective 5 day unlawIul
detainer notice, violative oI NRS 40.253 (which required such a notice to list the court to Iile a
Tenant's AIIidavit) in that it listed the wrong court to Iile a Tenant's AIIidavit in the 6/14/12 Notice
by citing Sparks Justice Court (to which Coughlin submitted such a Tenant's AIIidavit, along with
several "heads up" calls to the RJC and a 6/26/12 email to the WCSO and RJC alerting them to the
jurisdictional deIiciencies and concomitant voidness oI any RJC lockout order stemming Irom such a
deIective notice. (see Exhibit 1), Hill also testiIied that Merliss had not been at the 121 River Rock
property in the week preceding the arrest, despite OIIicer Carter's report indicating Hill or Merliss
told him otherwise. Coughlin was prevented Irom presenting his case at the June 18th 2012 trial in
light oI Iraud by the Mental Health Court (which went back on a written contract with Coughlin), an
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wrongIul imprisonment by Judge Elliot incident to an April 19th, 2012 hearing in CR12-0376
(incident to Iraud by Lake's Crossing's psychologists Sally Farmer, Ph.D. and Bill Davis, Ph.D. in an
April 18th, 2012 letter Iiled with D10 in that matter, in addition to the Iraud committed by the MHC's
Reno Biondo in lying about the reasoning Ior Coughlin's being removed Irom the MHC in MH12-
0032. Regardless, Coughlin was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel by City Attorney
Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, and RMC contract court appointed deIenders Lew Taitel (whom
violated RMC rules in Iailing to speciIy the rationale Ior his withdrawal, in addition to Iailing to own
up to his proIessional misconduct in taking on Coughlin's representation at a time when conIlict
existed in light oI Coughlin Iiling suit against Taitle's business partners, Nevada Court Services, in
CV11-03051 on October 19th, 2011), Roberto Puentes and Keith Loomis, with Loomis and the RMC
D2 violating NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 in Iailing to abide by statutory dictates respecting the
staying oI proceeding during the pendency oI an Order Ior Competency Evaluation (the RMC and
D2, in addition to Loomis were well aware oI the clandestine status conIerence between WCPD Biray
Dogan and DDA Zach Young, communicated to and or joined in on by RMC Judge Nash Holmes, as
admitted to in her March 14th, 2012 grievance to the State Bar oI Nevada, Iiled on behalI oI D2's
Judge William Gardner and his sister Judge Linda Gardner (whom's April 2009 Order Ior Sanctions
now Iorms the basis Ior an SCR 105 Complaint against Coughlin in NG12-0435, which was Iiled by
Judge Nash Holmes on behalI oI Judge William Gardner and his sister, Washoe District Family Court
Judge Linda Gardner along with the NG12-0434 grievance RMC Judge Nash Holmes Iiled on behalI
oI all RMC Judges against Coughlin on March 14th, 2012.
3. Further Washoe County SheriII's OIIice Iiled Ialse aIIidavit, by Deputy Machem, alleging
Coughlin was "personally served" eviction Sorder, however WCSO IA Supervisor Liz Stuchell has
admitted in writing (see her email to Coughlin in Exhibit 1) that "personally served", to the WCSO
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civil division, means just taping a notice to a door when no one is home, and Stuchell conIirmed in
writing that WCSO Deputy Machem indicated to her that no one was home at 121 River Rock when,
on November 1, 2011, he perIormed a lockout on Coughlin's law oIIice and alleges he posted the
Order Ior Summary Eviction on Coughlin's door.
Nevada Revised Statutes Section 176.515 - Procedure in Criminal Cases New trial
NRS 178.394 No person to be compelled to be witness against himselI or herselI in
criminal action, or to be unnecessarily restrained. By the RMC in Judge Nash Holmes and possibly
through Judge Gardner reIusing to provide Coughlin appropriate court appointed counsel, and then
reIusing to allow Coughlin to selI represent without making everything he says as a deIense attorney
or on his own behalI subject to being declared testimonial, and necessarily sworn under oath,
Coughlin ws deprived his rights under the FiIth Amendment and the above statute. Regardless, it is
unreasonable to expect Coughlin to Ieel anything other than terriIied to make arguments on his own
behalI (particularly those exposign this police misconduct) where the two previous RMC trial he was
Iorced to appear pro se in resulted in summary contempt convictions and incarcerations (which he had
to report the USPTO and SBN).
The City Iailed to put on any evidence that anybody (not the Reno Justice Court, not the
WCSO, not opposing counsel Hill or Baker, etc) actually mailed Coughlin a copy oI the Order oI
Summary Eviction prior to the illegal lockout oI November 1, 2011, thereIore making any such
lockout a legal nullity, and void, and a trespass, actually, done under color oI state law 42 USC Sec
1983, see Lynn v Desiderio....however, NRCP is made applicable to landlord tenant matters in
Nevada, and thereIore, substituted or constructive service is required (ie, 3 days Ior mailing where
personal service is not done). ThereIore, Richard Hill and Merliss were the trespassers, in addition to
the Reno Police Department OIIicer Chris Carter and Sargent Marcia Lopez, whom admitted to
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Coughlin that RPD OIIicer Chris Carter and Richard Hill and Dr. Merliss lied when they allege that
she and OIIicer Carter identiIied themselves as law enIorcement and issued Coughlin a lawIul order
or warning to leave prior to Merliss kicking the "basement" door down on November 13th, 2011, and
where Hill and OIIicer Carter allege Coughlin was given any chance to leave in response to any such
warning or that Coughlin indicated he was reIusing to take the RPD upon on any such chance to heed
any such warning. This is clearly proven by the videos Hill and Merliss took, propounded to City
Attorney Hazlett-Stevens, indicative oI proIessional misconduct on his part in oIIering perjured
testimony at trial that he knew to be Ialse, and Iurther Iailing to propound exculpatory dispatch and
911/RPD recordings revealing the extent to which Hill and Merliss are shown lying in the videos
propounded wherein they lie in asserting that they warned Coughlin oI a criminal trespass charge
prior to Coughlin's arrest on November 13th, 2011. Further, where both RJC Civil Division
Supervisor Karen Stancil and Casey Baker (in his June 18th, 2012 sworn testimony at Trial) indicate
that pursuant to Baker's admitted October 28th, 2011 transaction with the WCSO and Stancil's
admission as to the "usual pattern and practice" oI the RJC vis a vis the transmission and, thereIore,
receipt oI the Eviction Decision and Order oI October 25th, 2011 and the Findings oI Fact,
Conclusions oI Law and Order oI Summary Eviction oI October 27th, 2011 in REV2011-001708
(City's Exhibits 1 through 3) by the wCSO occurred too soon here, and thereIore these "Lockout
Orders" were stale, invalid, void, and ineIIective Ior all purposes. A claim oI right deIense is
particularly prevailing in this regard, and the admission by Hill at Trial that he communicated to
Coughlin that he was charging the same "Iair market value Ior Iull use and occupancy", some $900
per month, to Coughlin that was regularly charged under the Standard Rental Agreement makes clear
reversible error occurred where a relevancy objection was sustained directed to such a claim oI right
deIense. Further, Hazlett-Steven's and Baker demonstrated a lack oI candor to the tribunal where they
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assert the October 27th, 2011 Order indicated "shall" or some other language suIIicient to support
their contentions where it did not.
Judge William Gardner oI the Reno Municipal Court reIused to recuse himselI despite having
worked Ior the Reno City Attorney's OIIice just 2 years prior to this case, and despite his own sister,
Second Judicial District Court Family Judge Hon. Linda Gardner being involved in a State Bar
grievance against Coughlin based upon her Order Ior Sanctions against Coughlin three years prior in
a divorce trial. Coughlin Iiled a Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus challenging Judge Linda Gardner's
Order Ior Sanctions. Coughlin was Iired Irom his job at Washoe Legal Services, according to WLS
Executive Director Paul Elcano, strictly because oI Judge Linda Gardner's sanctions against
Coughlin. http://caseinIo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID22746
Please see attached the May 2009 letter Irom WLS inIorming Coughlin oI his Iiring in light oI
Judge Linda Gardners April 2009 Order Ior sanctisn in the Joshi divorce case.
Hazlett misleads the court in citing to State v. Nichols 106 Nevada 651, 790 9P. 2D 550
(1990) was purely dicta and should not oI been relied upon by this court in reaching its decision to
issue a conviction here that case, McNichols, dealt with the lawIulness oI a search by the state and
involve a criminal conviction Ior possession oI a controlled substance it simply did not involve
trespass incident to a civil eviction oI a tenant by landlord any discussion oI addiction and McNichols
related to a Ioreclosure was dicta no actual trespassers statute (in Iact, there is nothing in the opinion
to distinguish between whether a civil trespass or criminal trespass is distinguished in that dicta) was
cited to and use oI the term trespass was as a term oI art there was no distinction whether it was a
civil trespass or criminal trespass and McNichols and no real discussion by the court as to whether the
service requirements are met ,
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Further grounds Ior new trial are revealed in the extent to which Judge Gardner is bullying
Coughlin throughout the trial to avoid key areas oI inquiry, to shorten, limit, and narrow every aspect
oI everything, and in going back on his pre lunch attestations about limiting the scope oI cross, aIter
"giving you an hour to think about it", Judge Gardner commences the post lunch resumption oI th
Trial with an entirely new stance on the matter, wherein he is clearly attempting to prevent Coughlin
Irom putting testimonial evidence on the record with the threat oI yet another summary contempt
incarceration or worse (and clearly, given Judge Nash Holmes hit piece in 11 TR 26800 and the work
put in by Judge Howard, the RMC Judges are willing to put on a real show just in case their message
hasn't been heard loud enough.
This is a Iormal Complaint against all three oI the RMC public deIenders I had represent me
on that matter, Taitel, Puentes, and Loomis. Please place a copy oI this in their
employment/personnel/independent contractor Iiles and indicate whether the court appointed counsel
the RMC contracts with must pay out oI pocket (or out oI their $7k a month Irom the RMC Ior
subpoena Iees, as none oI my court appointed counsel so Iar have complied with a single request on
my part to procure and provide to me audio recordings oI hearings (please produce to me the audio
Irom the entire morning oI July 5th, 2012 (I was called up several times) Ior 12 CR 12420, actually,
please produce the audio Ior any and all court dates I have ever had at the RMC, including the one on
November 14th, 2011 where I was brought to court while in custody, but not brought in Ior the Trial
in 11 CR 22176, through no Iault oI my own, but Ior which Judge Howard later relied upon in
denying my Motion to Continue the November 30th, 2011 Trial date in that matter, which was
denied, the same day Department 2 granted the City's request to continue the criminal trespass matter
in 11 CR 26405 because Richard G. Hill, Esq., was going to be on vacation Ior six weeks (Taitel
never told me about the Motion to Continue, then violated RMC Rules by Iailing to speciIiy, in a
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written motion, the reason Ior his withdrawal...though it was likely because when Taitel took on my
case and got my social security number in my Iile on or around November 19th, 2011...I had Iiled an
IFP and proposed Complaint against Taitel's business partners, Nevada Court Services, on October
19th, 2011 in CV11-03051....though Taitel's replacement, Puentes, admitted he has similar conIlicts.
Regardless, all oI these court appointed deIenders have continually reIused to subpoena ANY
witnesses on my behalI, including PERCIPIENT EYE WITNESSES TO MATERIAL FACTS IN
DISPUTE. Such as whether the RPD identiIied themselves as law enIorcement and or issued a
lawIul order or warning to leave the property prior to the landlord kicking the door down to the
"basement" and the RPD arresting me, and whether, subsequent to the door being kicked down,
whether the RPD or landlord issued a warning to leave and or sought to issue a citation in lieu oI a
custodial arrest, which they did not, though OIIicer Carter lied about it in his police report (though the
video Hill Iilmed oI the incident betrays that), and Hill and Merliss lied about it on the video, though
Hill didn't lie in his November 21st, 2011 Declaration in the eviction matter, but Hill went on to lie on
the stand on June 18th, 2012 at the Trial in 11CR26405. 1833 Associates v. Frying Carpets Co., Inc.,
594 N.Y.S.2d 121 N.Y.City.Civ.,1992 Summary proceeding is intended as speedy means oI
recovering possession oI real property because either rent has not been paid or tenant is holding over
aIter expiration or termination oI lease term and is not an alternative to plenary action Ior money nor
is it a substitute Ior proper application Ior provisional remedy or declaratory judgment, not available
in civil court. Guidetti v. Moroze, 423 N.Y.S.2d 140 N.Y.Co.,1979 Although action seeking recovery
oI possession oI leased property Ior nonpayment oI rent and to collect said rent was properly inserted
as summary action, the owner's sale converted the summary proceeding Ior collection oI unpaid rent
into a plenary action Ior same. RPAPL 701 et seq. Velazquez v. Thompson, 451 F.2d 202
C.A.2.N.Y.,1971 Primary purpose oI summary eviction proceedings is to enable landlords to regain
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possession quickly and inexpensively and thereby avoid plenary action Ior ejectment and its incident
delays which prompted landlords to short circuit judicial process by resort to selI-help
CONCLUSION
Please expunge this SCR 111(4) petition and the SCR 105 Complaint currently stemming
Irom this wrongIul eviction and or grant this Motion Ior New Trial or Vacate the Judgement oI
Conviction and or reinstate Coughlin's appeal and apprise D10 in CR12-1262 oI Coughlin's timely
Iiling a notice oI appeal on June 28th, 2012 and timely serving the City Attorney.
DeIendant/Appelant Coughlin hereby respectIully requests all Orders, Convictions, Judgments,
Contempt Findings, etc, be amended, set aside, etc.
The undersigned does hereby aIIirm that the preceding document does not contain
the social security number oI any person. And I declare the bit about RPD OIIier Travis Warren and
others is true to the best oI my knowledge under NRS 53.045. The rest? Well, one, tape dont lie.
Two, iI Hazlett don't have to sign a declaration in putting in all his unsworn hearsay pajama-centric
tacky testimony, I shouldn't have ta.
DATED this October 24th, 2012
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
DeIendant
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ProoI oI Service:
document to all registered electronic Iilers or those otherwise consenting to electronic service in a
waiver oI the application oI NRCP as set Iorth in SCR 109, and to those whom are not I placed a true
and correct copy oI the Ioregoing document in the USPS mail on this date and or complied with all
service requirements set Iorth in SCR 109:
Reno, NV 89521
David A Clark, Esq., Bar Counsel
State Bar oI Nevada
Address: 600 East Charleston Blvd.
Las Vegas , NV 89104
Fax number: 702-385-2878
J. Thomas Susich, Esq., Chairman NNDB
Nevada Employment Security Division
Address: 1675 E. Prater Way, Suite 103
Sparks , NV 89434
Fax number: 775-284-9513
Dated this October 24th, 2012
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Pro Per Attorney
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000938
Due Process concerns related to the "grievances"
Sent: Sat 3/24/12 1:28 AM
4 attachments
3 23 12 FAX TO BAR COUNSEL PATRICK KING NEVADA BAR.pdf (55.3 KB) , 3 19
12 fas to rmc marshals regarding property wcso.pdf (40.0 KB) , Pages from mary
barker rmc 11 tr 26800 order denying motion for return of bond.pdf (508.2 KB) ,
notice of appeal 11 tr 26800 rmc and Motion for reconsideration set aside
etc.pdf (2.6 MB)
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
PO Box 60952
RENO, NV 89506
tel: 775 338 8118
fax: 949 667 7402
State Bar of Nevada Assistant Bar Counsel
sent via email to: PatrickK@nvbar.org
March 23, 2012
I have a few question I would like to respectfully submit to you. What have you
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done to ascertain whether the Marshal's have a vested interest in discrediting me? I
would like you to forward me all communications from anyone in Department
Three. I would like for you to obtain a copy of the hearing today, wherein Judge
Flanagan concluded the hearing by quoting to something I wrote (it was the only
thing he mentioned after indicating that he wished to speak to the attorney's in this
matter after dismissing the witness, the lying contractor for Richard G. Hill, Phil
Stewart, who has offered perjured testimony numerous times on Mr. Hill's and his
client's behalf. Judge Flanagan quote something I wrote in a filing in 11 TR 26800,
where the Judge, Dorothy Nash Holmes, a lifetime prosecutor and or warden of a
prison (or something along those lines) had me arrested and confiscated my
property, including a smart phone (and a smart phone these days could store the
entire contents of a law firm's files and a law library in one), my less advanced cell
phone, my premium electric shaver and other items. My car was towed during the
summary 5 day jail stay Judge Nash Holmes found appropriate, costing me $300 to
get it out of the lot (also lost a client that would have brought in a substantial
amoutn of money, by my standards anyway). A $100 bail was paid to get me out of
jail on the fourth day (thus avoiding a fifth day) and accepted by the RMC, yet, I
was not released and the RMC has decided to keep the money anyways.
Yesterday I went to the RMC to pick up a copy of the audio transcript of the
2/27/12 Trial in that matter 11 TR 26800. After asking some questions of filing
office supervisor Donna Ballard and a front counter clerk named Daniel, wherein
both agree with me that some of the ways things were done done at the Reno
Municipal Court lacked transparency, a system of checks and balances, and other
fundamental notions of due process and fair play, all of the sudden, two beefy City
of Reno Marshals in their mid 20's decided, unilaterally, it seems, to ask me to
leave, as Ms. Ballard certainly had expressed nothing in the way of discontent with
our conversation, nor had Daniel. While I was leaving I could clearly hear Marshal
Thompson lying extensively into his radio, trying to manufacture some sort of report
of a scene were there had been none, other than that put on by the City of Reno
Marshals, whom have lied extensively about whether or not they ever took
possession of a micro sd card incident to the full body all pockets, belligerent,
accusatory search they performed incident to the summary contempt finding and
arrest of 2/27/12. I request that you ask for a copy of Marshal Harley's employment
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file from BOTH the RMC and the City of Reno Marshals Division and see if they
put in my letter and complaint in that regard.
Or, do you "find that the burden of proof in the various grievances I have filed
with you has not been met, that all the evidence needed for a conviction has not
been presented to your lap with a bow? Did Mr. Hill present such proof, meeting
such a burden. Clearly, the only thing you provided to me from Mr. Hill was an
EXCERPT of his 1/14/12 letter to you, which reference numerous shadowy
previous phone calls between the two of you (are you Mr. Hill's hand picked Bar
Counsel, or was this case assigned randomly? Does Mr. Hill get to pick which RPD
Sargents and Officers show up for his calls for help? Have you made any inquiry
to ascertain this. Why does Richard Hill constantly file a peremptory challenge
anytime he is assigned to Judge Adam's Department 6, apparently? Did the
innuendo and hearsay Richard G. Hill, Esq. Mentioned in his unsigned, unsworn
letter to you of 1/14/12 provide you sufficient proof to meet the clear and
convincing evidence stand you indicate that the grievances I filed did not? How do
the copies of electronic correspondences between myself, State Bar of Nevada
Director of Admissions Patrice Eichman, Peter Christiansen, Esq., and Michael
Sanft, Esq.,'s legal assistant Kelly Huff, wherein she explicitly admits to her firm
committing malpractice in my case, fail to provoke even a scintilla of investigation
into a grievance from or the State Bar of Nevada?
And the impropriety implicated by Kevin Kelley's conduct, and Mr. Christiansen's
later lying under oath at the June 2002 Character and Fitness Committee hearing for
which he feels he satisfied the $5,000 he received in payment (well, okay, he did file
an 8 page pre-hearing brief that rehashed factual recitations from various previous
filings of the Committee, then did manage to cite to the Claiborne case, which
concerned a former judge, not an applicant for admission to the bar, and he did fail
to subpoena percipient witness Mark Tratos, or any of the relevant faculty from
Boyd School of Law, and he did screw up the affidavits of the students witnessing
me turning in the hard copy of the paper, and his office did forward a
correspondence about alcoholism to the State Bar despite an express indication by
the client atop of it that said not to do so, and his office did mistate whether they
ever turned in the second Consent Agreement send with confirmation to them on
September 27
th
, 2004 in a November 2004 email, so....wait, are you really saying
there isn't enough there for a grievance FROM A CLIENT FILING ONE
AGAINST HE WHO WAS COMPENSATED $5,000 TO REPRESENT HIM
(THOUGH CHRISTIANSEN LIED UNDER OATH AND SAID IT WAS ON A
PRO BONO BASIS, IN ACCORD WITH THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE
BY STRIP CLUB SPEARMINT RHINO OWNING CHARACTER AND
FITNESS COMMITTEE MEMBER KEVIN KELLEY, ESQ., WHOSE BEST
FRIEND WAS THE PSYCHOLOGIST THE APPLICANT WAS STEERED
TO IN THE ADMISSIONS PROCESS)? BUT, YOU ARE SAYING PURSUING
A GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE AND, APPARENTLY, FORMAL HEARING
INCIDENT TO THE ATTEMPT TO FILE A GRIEVANCE BY A KNOWN
SCANDALOUS OPPOSING ATTORNEY RICHARD G. HILL, ESQ.,
AGAINST MYSELF, IN A MATTER FOR WHICH I AM NOT AN ATTORNEY
OF RECORD (PRO SE ATTORNEY LITIGATNS, APPARENTLY, CANNOT
RECEIVE ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDS UNDER THE SELLERS CASE, SO
HOW CAN THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BE APPLIED TO
ANY OF MY CONDUCT IN A CASE WHERE I AM A PRO SE LITIGANT?)?
It sure is curious how you find sufficient proof to pursue Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s
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grievance against me, yet, you claim that all the grievances I filed do not warrant
any sort of investigation on your part. Very curious, indeed...
You wrote: "As Assistant Bar Counsel I would like to help you. However, my
primary responsibility is to protect the public and the administration of justice by
insuring that Nevada Lawyers are complying with standards required of the
profession. It appears that you are not."
I would like you to specify in detail exactly what forms the basis of your assertions
in those a statements, as heretofore you seem to rely upon only the unsigned,
unsworn, hearsay cited to by Richard G. Hill and some apparent grievances filed by
judges, to which you have not previously informed me of or offered any proof
thereof, despite your incorrect assertion that you have done so. If you, as you wrote
that you did, previously provide any indication or documentation in support of these
"grievances" filed by Judges, please provide support therefor in explicit written
detail with supporting documentation and proof service.
You further wrote, and I seek explication and specificity with regard to details and
attribution incident to the allegations therein contained that:
" I have repeatedly expressed my interest in having a meeting with you to discuss the
grievances against you. You claim to be too busy to meet with me, yet you have
time to write lengthy e-mails and apparently to do legal research." Would you say,
Mr. King, that you would very much prefer it if I had done NO legal research prior
to meeting with you?
You go on to write "You asked if Mr. Hill has standing to file a grievance against
you. Not only does he have standing to file a grievance, as a lawyer in Nevada he
may have an ethical obligation to report to the State Bar. As I have explained to
you, the grievances against you came not only from Mr. Hill but also from Judges
from different Courts."
That statement casts extreme doubt upon everything you have said to me, Mr. King,
and everything you will say to me. Please provide the requested proof of any
grievances against me that came from "Judges from different Courts". You do
realize, Sir, that some "Judges in Different Courts" have pulled drivers over recently
and impersonated a highway patrol officer, and that some Clerks of Court have
embezzled $250,000 from the public fisc? And, just to be clear, you truly do not
find anything worthy of a grievance per Mr. Taitel's curious
appearance/disappearance as attorney of record, failure to do a conflicts check,
failure to subsequently disclose such a failure and the tangible harm it has done to
me vis a vis my suing Nevada Court Services and his sharing an office, receptionist,
and being listed on the Nevada Court Services web site as "associated with" their
business entity? Didn't Mr. Taitel have a recent ethics investigation pursuant to some
run for judicial office?
Also, Judge Nash Holmes indicated at trial, and this is a direct quote, that she
"doesn't care about corruption, or bribery, retaliation, or police misconduct"...well,
that is as close to a direct quote as I can make given the fact that the RMC, just
yesterday refused to provide me a copy of the audio transcript from the 2/27/12
Trial in 11 TR 26800, presided over by Judge Nash Holmes, after a length
disappearance by her immediately before calling my case, and after hearing all the
other matters on that stacked docket, and after denying my request for a
continuance but granting Deputy City Attorney Allison Ormaas's request for one to
"speak" with Reno Police Department Sargent Tarter, whose cross examination
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formed the basis for my arrest and incarceration incident to the summary contempt
finding. The cross examination focused on whether Sargent Tarter had retaliated
against me for reporting the bribery admission by RPD Officer Chris Carter (he
admitted Richard G. Hill, Esq. bribes him) to Sargent Tarter while at the scene of
my attempts to get Richard G. Hill to turn over my client's files and my wallet and
state issued identification. If you want to put your name on the line over this, Mr.
King, and you think we still live in a world with very little transparency, who am I to
tell you any different.
You further wrote: "These grievances, and the evidence attached with them, rather
clearly puts into question your competence to practice law." Please narrow down
which parts of which grievances you feel so implicate my competence, in explicit
written detail.
You further wrote: "As I have explained to you, I will make the evidence and
exhibits available to you when you come to inspect them at my office." Mr. King,
please indicate when it was and in what form or method you communicated this
offer to "make the evidence and exhibits available to you when you come to inspect
them at my office"? Please further explain why on earth I would only be allowed to
inspect them at your office and how that does not create and overly bullying and
intimidating scenario departing entirely from fundamental notions of due process.
Please just fax and email (both please) the entire contents of all these materials to
me. I am likely suing the USPS and some of its local postal inspectors and or station
supervisors under the Federal Tort Claim Act and while I have taken every prudent
step to ensure the timely delivery of my mail (I have a ton of evidence and
documentation in support of this), I am EXPLICITLY indicating to you that I wish
for you to fax and email me all of these materials rather than send them through the
mails (USPS, UPS, Fed-Ex, etc, etc.).
You then wrote: "I will not send you reports or document, especially since you claim
your mail is being compromised. " I am appalled that you would write this, and
offended really. Please email and or fax them to me. I have communicated with the
USPS and my change of address has been processed (there was a delay through no
fault of my own) and if you refuse to send these to me via email or fax, the go
ahead and mail them to my new PO BOX, though taking that tact will likely only
make your conduct throughout this proceeding further suspect. Such as when you
wrote:
" As for the grievances you have made, nothing that you have submitted appears to
show an ethical violation that could be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
which is the standard of proof required in disciplinary matters. As such, at this time
we have not opened any files based on the information you have submitted. " Please
indicate how, exactly, Richard G. Hill's grievance met such a standard of proof
where the one's I submitted did not. Further, while you have indicated that I have
not responded to your request to meet with you (which is not the case), you only
just, for the first time, today, even mentioned anything about any judges filing or
corresponding anywith with or to you, and you have failed to provide any
documentation of such or copies thereof sufficient to satisfy my Sixth Amendment
Right to Confrontation, etc. Please do so.
Sincerely,
/S/
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Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 19:10:10 +0000
March 23, 2012

Dear Mr. Coughlin,

Just moments ago I received an e-mail leer from the Clerk of the Court in Department
3. She said that you appeared wearing pajamas over your clothes and were demanding
and argumentave. Apparently I will be receiving a report from the Marshals. As
Assistant Bar Counsel I would like to help you. However, my primary responsibility is to
protect the public and the administraon of jusce by insuring that Nevada Lawyers are
complying with standards required of the profession. It appears that you are not. I
believe that there are ways to get you assistance that may protect your license to
pracce law. I would sure appreciate the opportunity to talk with you about resources
and assistance that may help you through this dicult me.


To: Patrick King
Mr. King,
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This is the very first time you allege anyone other than Mr. King filed or
alleged a grievance. Please provide any documentation or proof related to
these apparent communications from judges that you are only now bringing up.
Sincerely,
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Character and Fitness, Kevin Kelly, Pete Christiansen, Patrice Eichman
RE: more on the way
Sent: Fri 3/16/12 1:48 PM
Dear Bar Counsel,
I write respectfully asking an inquiry be conducted into whether Kevin Kelly indicated at my June 2002 hearing
that 3 pro bono attorney's name would be provided to me, but that only one was, Peter S. Christiansen, and that,
despite Christiansen saying he was doing my case on a pro bono basis, he was paid at least $5,000, and pretty
much the only work he or his office did was attend the June 2002 hearing, and that Christiansen and Kelly are
very, very close, and that they sent me to a psychologist who specializes in gambling addictions (I have never
really even gambled) who cost approximately another $2,000....Then Ms. Eichman failed to submit my
application for admission or my Request For Reconsideration (sent to her and Christiansen's office on September
15th, 2003, as confirmed by my fax records, in additional to being mailed to them) to the Nevada Supreme
Court. There are numerous other issues that deserve a grievance there, including whether Christiansen supervised
the newly licensed Sanft in any way, whether a writing wherein I addressed alcoholism was forward to the Bar
despite the express dictate that it not be, whether second Consent Agreement sent to the Christiasens on 9/27/04
was ever forwarded to the Bar. Additionally, Mike Rowe wrote very stern letters to me basically telling me not
to follow up on things, whereupon my attorney's and Ms. Eichman failed to follow up on things, essentially tying
my hands in the matter. I intend to supplement this grievance with additional matters soon, but wish it to begin
now.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
Saved: Fri 3/16/12 5:18 PM
Dear Mr. King,
I understand that, Sir, and I mean you no disrespect and look forward to getting to know you.
However, Ms. Eichman preferred if I would simply call her to once I started asking tougher
questions in 2003-2004. My deferment period ended in September 2003 and I followed all the
instructions provided by anyone with the State Bar of Nevada regarding how I might get my
Application for Admission considered by the Nevada Supreme Court, and I have iron clad proof
this. Mr. Christiansen (both Peter S. and Peter J considering his father had a supervisory
responsibility at the time), and Mr. Sanft (it is laughable to have transferred the responsibility of my
admission's case to Sanft two weeks after he was admitted ot practice, just out of law school, and
regardless, the file, which has been copied and delivered to those who know what to do with it
should I mysteriously "disappear" anytime soon, indicates that Christiansen's legal assistant Kelly
Huff was the only one "practicing law" on my behalf, and not even very well.
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RE: Gessin ghostwriting issue
The Spearmint Rhino has an involvement in this matter as well.
Sincerely,
Subject: RE: more on the way
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 22:17:04 +0000
Dear Zach,

I would appreciate it if you would simply call me.

Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel 775-328-1384

Subject: more on the way
Sent: Mon 3/19/12 9:28 AM
Goof Morning Mr. Coughlin,

Yes, I did suggest some urgency in having a meeng with you. I would like to have an opportunity to sit down and talk with you. Please let me know if you
are agreeable to meet with me on an informal basis so we can talk about the process that has been iniated.

Patrick King, Assistant Bar Counsel (775) 328-1384.

Sent: Monday, March 19, 2012 3:25 AM
To: Patrick King
Subject: Gessin ghostwriting issue
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Dear Mr. King,
I do not understand. I provided you a ton of information and documentation in my Response to Hill's grievance, and, after emailing me six hours prior to the
deadline to do so saying you already received my Response (which you had not, and which I had informed you that you had not but would be recieving it), you
know call and or write me less than a day after receiving my voluminous Response and want to meet urgently. This sends a strong message that you did not
put much time into analyzing my response, which would tend to indicate such a meeting would lack traditional due process protections, would it not? I have
already been attacked by a Character and Fitness Committee member while he owned the Spearmint Rhino strip club in Las Vegas, and where the Committee
promised to get me the names of "three attorneys who will handle your case on a pro se basis" but where only one name was provided, and that name wound
up being and attorney would extracted soem approximately $7,000 i his fees and the fees of a gambling addiction specialist (both of whom admitted to being
extremely close personal friends of Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly, Esq. who then owned the Spearmint Rhino strip club. Next,
Christiansen and Sanft bungled several deadlines and client confidences related to extremely sensitive information, whereupon, finally, Director of Admissions
Eichman made the unilateral decision to refrain from submitting my case for review, despite her receipt of my Request for Reconsideration. Finally,
Christiansen's legal assistant Kelly Huff wrote me explaing that I had failed to provide their office with the Request for Reconsideration that I sent it on
9/15/03, despite my having fax confirmation proof of this and despite a subsequent copy of the file provided by Christiansen's office proving they had recieved
such a Request, and that is was received by them on 9/15/03. I do not mean to be standoffish, Mr. King, but it is what it is. How Ms. Eichman's rationale for
her action is different than what any attorney might say upon blowing some deadline or otherwise having a client's file fall behind a filing cabinet for a couple
years, is really not at all clear to me.
As to my official address with the State Bar and receiving my mail, the USPS is likely going to be sued for the handling of my mail, should it become clear that
any client matters where prejudiced in light of what has been deplorable conduct by the station involved.
Further, as to Hill's Motion for Order To Show Cause, please see the attached copy of Hill's application for an Order of Protection, then compare it to Hill's other
filings wherein he suddenly backs off his assertion that I was "climbing on the contractor's truck". Hill lied when he wrote that. I did not climb on anybody's
truck. Hill merely did not want me to film all that he was throwing away, especially given that he was throwing away unique items that had both monetary and
sentimental value and because he had no good reason for refusing to allow me to take those items other than spite and an attempt to get me to sign away my
security deposit, which Hill still has not returned. Further, Hill is not licensed under the FDCPA as a debt collector yet attempts to so practice, as such, this
grievance should focus on that as well. Hill needs to answer for his lies about me allegedly "making contact" with him, about me allegedly "climbining on the
contractors truck", about his abusing the TPO process to gain advantage in a litigation (ie, to prevent evidence collection and discovery), about his abuse of
process in seeking to get me arrested and signing a criminal complaint where service of the evictio order was insufficient, and regardless, Hill had vitiated its
import anyway by billing me for the same amount as the "full use and occupancy" (and I have a video of Hilll admitting to this and his firms 11/10/11 letter
admits to that as well. Further, as for his Motion for Order to Show Cause, as it relates to an alleged contempt on my part in failing to abide by the 1/11/12
Order from in CV11-03628, well, NRCP 6(e) requires that 3 days for mailing be accorded even for electronic filings. As such, any activity on my part of 1/12/12
clearly is irrelevant as service was not effectuated at that point and there is not allegation that any "personal service" was undertaken. That being the case,
here is another basis for grievance against Hill, especially his continually filing documents not based in fact or law, as here.
Some more regarding Hill's grievance. Hill clearly attempts to mislead when he suggest that the Supplemental I filed in the Carpentier's foreclosure defense
matter was incorrectly filed there. Clearly, I intended to file it there and the attached email I sent to Hill explains clearly why I copied him on it (because I
foresaw Hill filign a Bar grievance for "ex parte communications" based upon some idea that arguments made in one case that bare some connection to
another case would be a basis for Hill crying foul, and, as seen in Hill's "ghostwriting" grieviance, its a very low standard for crying foul that Richard has, which
is typical of all the most feckless attorneys. That email indicated to Hill and his staff:
One, I would like to reserve my objection to "Good Samiritan" Richard G. Hill purporting to file grievances on behalf of the public in general or Mr. Gessin, or
whoever it is Richard is doing this for. I suspect Richard is doing this for the same reason he does so many other things: to keep opposing counsel busy with
responding to all spineless paper pushing that Richard G. Hill is so very well known for throughout Northern Nevada legal circles. Nonetheless, important issues
are brought up in Mr. Hill's grievance. To a great extent, I foresaw these issues long ago and attempted to address them appropriately. I often get clients who
are on their third or fourth attorney. Mr. Gessin was one such client. By that time they all want to sue their former attorneys, and feel quite burned by the fees
they have paid. Mr. Gessin was a good example of this and he wished to proceed on an unbundled services arrangement, or a flat fee per motion/opposition
/pleading basis, etc. From the very, very long time that went by between my passing the July 2001 Nevada Bar Examination and being admitted to practice in
March of 2005, the issue of the legality of ghostwriting for pro se litigants was something I was somewhat aware of, but I don't believe I ever did. I am
somewhat disappointed that I was not industrious enough to get anywhere close to doing such a thing but mostly I was just so demoralized by not having a
license and from the rape that the character and fitness committee and Kelly, and Christiansen and Eichman et al committed upon me that I mostly just worked
for Thomas J. Hall, Esq. for about $0.89 per hour (just kidding, I love Tom) doing legal research in the Washoe County Law Library while the librarians glared at
me and let me know how very disappointed they were that I, or any member of the public, really, had interrupted their solitude.
So now it seems there is a tough situation where, on one hand, as a now licensed attorney, there is some taboo to "ghostwriting" (necessitating such lucrative
activities as responding to grievances filed by opposing counsel like Richard G. Hill, Esq.....and I sure hope you will countenance the grievances I am filing
against Hill, Christiansen, Sanft, Kevin Kelly, Eichman, etc, with the same seriousness that your are taking Richard G. Hills. I notice Richard G. Hill, Esq. has a
funny way of being able to get the police (and some others that I probably shouldn't mention) to take his complaints just a little bit more seriously than they
take others. I would also like to file a grievance against all three of the public defenders I have been appointed in the trespass case in Reno Municipal Court
for 11 CR 26405, Lew Taitel, Roberto Puentes, and Keith Loomis. Each have thoroughly failed to zealously advocate on my behalf, with Loomis calling my
arguments vis a vis the procedural requirements for serving eviction orders in thoroughly contested summary eviction proceedings "frivolous" despite being
provided the attached 22 page memorandum detailing those arguments and despite the procedures requiring as much set forth in the Anvui decision of the
Nevada Supreme Court. I would also like to file a greivance against Deputy Reno City Attorney Ormaas for her blase indication that she cared not about any
admission of bribery on the part of Reno Police Officer Chris Carter, and that she would not be following up on that, even where it bared some relation to the
citation in 11 TR 26800 issued by Sargent Tarter, for which I cross examined Sargent Tarter as to whether he did so in retaliation for my reporting Officer
Carters admission of accepting bribes from Richard G. Hill. Instead, I believe Deputy City Attorney Ormaas and City of Reno Marshal Hiney (the spelling might
be a bit off) conspired to have Judge Nash Holmes have me arrested for summary contempt in Order to obtain my cell phones, which upon information and
belief, Ormaas and Hiney believe might contain "evidence" of misconduct on both of their parts. Hiney attempted to serve me Notice of Hearing on Motion for
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Order to Show Cause in the appeal of the Richard G. Hill, Esq. eviction matter (one of three instances of "triple jeopardy" Hill has me facing here....this Bar
grievance, the criminal complaint in 11 CR 26405, and, actually, multiple Orders to Show Cause (one in the Trial Court in RJC Rev201--001708 and one in the
associated Appeal in CV11-03628). However, the actual Affidavit of Service that the WCSO filed for the Notice of Hearing Marshal Hiney attempted to serve
me (please inquire with Chief Marshal Roper, perhaps?) was actually signed by the same WCSO Deputy Machem that swore, under oath, in his 11/7/11 Affidavit
of Service in the eviction case RJC REv2011--001708 that he "personally served" the Order of Summary Eviction. The attached 22 page memorandum sent to
various individuals and the admission of WCSO Civil Section Supervisor Liz Stuchell that, in their mind, "personally served" can mean a lot of things that it has
never meant in any legal settings, is provided for background. I also wish this to begin a grievance against Deputy Reno City Attorney Pam Roberts for what I
believe may be several violations on her part of the rules relative to prosecutorial misconduct, especially those involving suborning perjury, including that of
Officer Kameron Crawfor saying in 11 CR 22176, that I did not provide him my drivers license, and therefor issuing me a citation would not be an option, but
rather, my failure to provide my driver's license buttressed his proable cause finding justifying a search incident to arrest. However, Roberts, in 11 CR 22176
and later on appeal in CR11-2064, had in her possession Wal-Mart AP video from the interrogation room clearly showing me providing Officer Kameron
Crawford my driver's license and other evidence supports a finding that he had it (including dispatch reports and the information culled by Officer Kameron from
the driver's license and placed on the arrest report, which Officer Crawford later lied about, saying he got that information at the WCSO, which is clearly
contrary to established protocol and privacy policies). One more grievance against Reno City Attorney Christopher Hazlett-Stevens for lying to me on the
phone about whether the City of Reno had the arrest report from the September 9, 2011 arrest at Wal-mart from the Reno Sparks Indian Colony in 11 CR
22176. I wish for all of these grievances to go forward now, but I may provide supplementary materials in support thereof later. Additionally, she has the
"purchased receipt" that showed it had the very UPC number that both Frontino and Crawford swore under oath that it did not.
Barrie Althoff, Limiting the Scope of Your Representation: When Your Client Wants, or Can Afford, Only Part of You, Washington State Bar News (Jun. 1997).
Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited Appearances Can Provide an Ethically Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se
Litigants, The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer 2007).
Kim Prochnau, Slicing the Onion: Rules of Professional Conduct and Court Rules Make It Easier for Private and Non-Profit Legal Practitioners to Provide
"Unbundled" Legal Services, Washington State Bar News (Apr. 2003).
Books and Reports
Caught in the Middle: 2003 Report and Recommendations of the North Carolina Bar Association Pro Se Task Force (Dec. 2003).
Challenge to Justice: A Report on Self-Represented Litigants in the New Hampshire Courts, New Hampshire Supreme Court Task Force on Self-Representation
(Jan. 2004).
Ethics Issues Regarding the Concept of Unbundled Legal Services (Memorandum), Rob Bare, Nevada State Bar (Mar. 31, 1999).
Family Law Limited Representation Risk Management Materials, Limited Representation Committee, California Commission on Access to Justice (January 12,
2004).
Pro Se Litigants: The Challenge of the Future, Massachusetts Probate and Family Court Department Pro Se Committee Report (Dec. 1999).
Report and Recommendations on "Unbundled" Legal Services, Commission on Providing Access to Legal Services for Middle Income Consumers, New York State
Bar Association (Dec. 2002).
Report on Limited Scope Legal Assistance with Initial Recommendations, Limited Representation Committee of the California Commission on Access to Justice
(Oct. 2001). Appendix
Self Represented Litigants in the Virginia Court System, Supreme Court of Virginia Pro Se Litigation Planning Committee, Enhancing Access to Justice Report
(Sept. 2002).
Unbundling Legal Services: A Guide to Delivering Legal Services a la Carte, Forrest S. Mosten, American Bar Association (2000).
Cases
Defendant retained an attorney on a limited basis, following an action filed by the plaintiff to recover costs on a defaulted loan. Limited representation attorney
agreed to file responsive pleadings and negotiate a settlement agreement, and filed a notice of limited appearance. While the defendant received notice of a
scheduled hearing and forwarded it to his limited representation attorney, neither defendant nor attorney appeared at the hearing and, consequently, an
arbitration award was entered for the plaintiff. Defendant filed a motion to set aside judgment, which was denied. On appeal, the defendant claimed the
limited representation attorneys failure to appear at the hearing amounted to excusable neglect and that the judgment should be set aside. The court found
that since the defendant received notice of the hearing and had retained the attorney on a limited basis, that the limited representation attorneys conduct
did not constitute excusable neglect. The lower court decision was affirmed.
Former sheriff department workers bring sexual harassment suit against county sheriff in his individual and official capacities. Attorney representing sheriff
enters limited appearance on behalf of his official capacity. Court finds that attorney cannot enter limited appearance on behalf of sheriff's official capacity.
Attorney representing sheriff must act for the entire person, including individual and official capacities. Entering such limited appearance is not competent and
zealous representation as required by ethical rules as it leaves officer undefended on individual capacity claims. Court further finds that ghostwriting of
documents for pro se litigants may subject lawyers to contempt of court. Ghostwriting gives litigants unfair advantage in that pro se pleadings are construed
liberally and pro se litigants are granted greater latitude in hearings and trials. Ghostwriting also results in evasion of obligations imposed on attorneys by
statute, code, and rule, and involves lawyers in litigants' misrepresentation of pro se status in violation of ethical rules.
Attorney licensed in the State of California did not violate procedural, substantive, and professional rules of a federal court by lending some assistance to
friends, family members, and others with whom she shared specialized knowledge. Attorney performed research and prepared rough drafts of portions of pro se
litigant's pleadings in an action against various official defendants, but did not sign the documents. Because attorney did not gather and anonymously present
legal arguments with the actual or constructive knowledge that plaintiff would use them in court, and because attorney did not engage in extensive,
undisclosed participation that permitted plaintiff to falsely appear as being without professional assistance, attorney had not violated any rules.
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Complainant and respondent were co-tenants of real estate property. The respondent appeared pro se during a hearing before the commissioner in chancery,
but then hired an attorney who appeared in a limited capacity at several other hearings. On appeal, the court sought to determine whether or not the attorney
could appear in a limited capacity and whether the attorneys appearance qualified him as official "attorney of record". The court found that it was not bound
by agreements made between client and attorney and that a court may "require more of an attorney than mere compliance with the ethical constraints of the
Rules of Professional Conduct". The court found that the attorney could make a motion to withdraw once he completed the tasks agreed upon, but that the
court had ultimate discretion in granting the withdrawal.
In a lawsuit, plaintiffs counsel of record requested that another firm make a "special appearance" at a summary judgment motion, appearing on behalf of
counsel of record. Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice suit after a summary judgment was entered against her, arguing that the special appearance created an
attorney-client relationship. The appellate court found that an attorney making a special appearance represents the clients interests and has a professional
attorney-client relationship with the client. Further, the voluntary appearance created a limited representation status and not a true "special appearance".
Court Rules
Alaska
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 81, expressly permits limited appearances and governs attorney withdrawal.
Arizona
Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure 9(B), governs limited representation and attorney withdrawal in family law proceedings.
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 5.2, governs limited representation and attorney withdrawal in vulnerable adult exploitation actions. California
Colorado
Colorado Rule of County Court 311(b), requires lawyers to disclose assistance in document preparation but clarifies that such disclosure does not create an
entry of appearance.
Delaware
Delaware Family Court Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2), governs limited appearance, service and attorney withdrawal in family law matters.
Florida
Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, Rule 12.040, governs Limited Appearance, Withdrawal or Limiting Appearance, Scope of Representation, Preparation of
Pleadings or Other Documents, Notice of Limited Appearance, and Service.
Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure 12.750, governs the operation of self-help programs within family courts.
Iowa
RCP 1.404(3), expressly permitting limited appearances so long as the court is notified;
RCP 1.404(4), governing termination of limited appearance;
RCP 1.423, requiring lawyers who prepare pleadings in limited representation to sign them and clarifying that signing a pleading does not constitute an
appearance;
RCP 1.442(2), establishing the requirements for service on attorney who has made a limited appearance.
Maine
Maine Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(c), explicitly allows limited representation and allows a lawyer to file a limited appearance if the client consents in
writing.
Missouri
Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure 55.03, permits a lawyer to draft pleadings without disclosure and clarifies appearance and withdrawal of attorney in limited
representation.
Nebraska
Nebraska RPC 501.2, governs limited representation, attorney assisted document preparation and attorney withdrawal.
Nevada
Rules of Practice of the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, Rule 5.28 requires signed pleadings, notice of the limited representation to the
court and governs the procedure for withdrawal.
New Hampshire
RCP 3, requiring that pleadings and communication be furnished to both client and limited representation attorney until withdrawal of limited
appearance;
RCP 17, governing appearance, attorney withdrawal and document preparation assistance.
New Mexico
New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct 16-303(E), requires lawyer to disclose scope of representation to court.
Utah
Vermont
Vermont Rule of Family Procedure 15(h) governs limited appearances, withdrawal and service in family law matters.
Washington
Washington Civil Rule 11, permits a lawyer who assists with drafting to rely on the self-represented party's representation of facts.
Washington Civil Rule of Limited Jurisdiction 11, permits a lawyer who assists with drafting to rely on the self-represented party's representation of facts.
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Wisconsin
Wyoming
The Uniform Rules of the District Court of the State of Wyoming, Rule 102 governs appearance and withdrawal for unbundled representation.
Ethics Opinions
An attorney may limit the attorney's services by agreement with a pro per litigant to consultation on procedures and preparation of pleadings to be filed by the
client pro per. A litigant may be either self-represented or represented by counsel, but not both at once, unless approved by the court. In order for attorney to
specially appear on behalf of the litigant before the court for a limited purpose, the attorney should comply with all applicable court rules and procedures of the
particular tribunal.
A lawyer may be required to perform beyond the term of a limited scope representation agreement if the Court requested, or the Clients circumstance
warranted such action. In most circumstances, an agreement to withdraw from representation would not violate any ethics requirement, as long as the lawyer
provides adequate advice to Client concerning the scope of representation. In family court, the Courts permission may be needed to withdraw from simple
divorce petitions in certain circumstances.
D.C. Bar Op. 330 (2005)
Unbundling of legal services is permissible under D.C. Rule 1.2 ( c ), provided the client is fully informed of the limits on the scope of the representation and
these limits do not prevent the provision of competent service. If a party is proceeding pro se, opposing counsel should treat that party as unrepresented unless
and until that counsel receives reasonable notice of representation from the party or her lawyer.
An attorney may agree in advance with his or her client to limit the scope of the attorney's representation and draft pleadings without appearing or taking any
part in any of the proceeding itself, provided that the client gives his or her fully informed consent to such limitation of employment and the attorney takes
whatever steps may be necessary to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client's rights.
A lawyer is not required to sign a complaint or enter an appearance as counsel of record when representation is solely limited to preparation of the complaint.
It is impermissible for a lawyer to draft responsive pleadings to an unrepresented opposing party in a divorce. However, a lawyer may draft an entry of
appearance if the lawyer includes a letter indicated that he or she represents the opposing party and that the unrepresented party should obtain counsel.
A lawyer who does not appear as counsel of record for a pro se litigant may prepare responsive pleadings and demands for financial disclosure, provided the
lawyer investigates the matter adequately.
Legal services attorneys may provide legal advice and drafting assistance to pro se litigants without appearing as counsel of record. If court approved pleading
forms exist, attorneys may make them available to individuals wishing to proceed pro se.
Attorneys may offer limited representation through a pro se clinic if they obtain clients consent, preferably in writing. Attorneys may draft proceedings for
clients, if the attorney notifies the Court that counsel has assisted a pro se litigant. The phrase "Prepared with Assistance of Counsel" is recommended for
inclusion on such pleadings in a prominent manner. Attorneys who draft proceedings need not appear and represent the client.
A lawyer may provide legal assistance to litigants appearing before tribunals pro se and help them prepare written submissions without disclosing or ensuring
the disclosure to others of the nature or extent of such assistance. Undertaking to provide limited legal help does not generally alter any other aspect of the
attorneys professional responsibilities to the client.
As to the ghostwriting, its tough, because, for clients who want to pay very little (after, say, in Gessin's case he paid McKenna allegedly $15K to wind up with
an Order from an Arbitrator and District Court Judge denying a Trial De Novo based upon a bad faith failure to participate in litigation in one case, then in the
other, Gessin paid Hill something like $20K only to be slammed car crash style into settlement by Hill's advice when Gessin couldn't stomach paying anymore of
HIll's fees, settling for the amount originally sought by Mr. Hall's client). So, clients like that want a deal, want to pay piece meal or go the unbundled route,
but filing all those Motions to Withdraw, and Proposed Orders, and Affidavits, add to the costs where the fee is not really being increased any. There is much
literature dealing with this:
Please accept this as a supplement to the grievance filed by Richard Hill, Esq. My recollection of my involvement with Gessin is that I filed two Answers to very
similar Adversary Complaints in NVB and two Motions to Dismiss in those same cases, involving the two women represented by Glade Hall, Esq., both on an
"unbundled services" basis, and the pleadings themselves indicated the were filed as an "unbundled service". This was my first filign in NVB, and I was not
registered or trained as an electronic filer at that point. Further, Gessin hired me to provide other unbundled services, inlcuding writing (and, to my
understanding at the time, filing under my own signature) something in the vein of a NRCP Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment from judgments in cases
involving the same two women Taitano ne Moore, and Rissone, both, again, represented by Glade Hall, Esq.
It may be the case that Richard Hill is correct that I was goign against some rule or law by sending one demand letter to Glade Hall concerning an outstanding
$500 sanction aware. I believe I drafted an Order To Show Cause for this, but am not sure it was filed by me. About the time I provided Gessin my signed
final draft of that and a few other closely related motions, he pretty much wanted to part ways, I believe. I think this was around mid-November and there was
some issues with Richard HIll withholding my client files, some of which may have included Gessin's, then Hill would say he would give me my client files
without any demands or lien needing satisfying prior to doing so, and that he would do the same with my wallet and identification, but then he would change
his mind and demand what to me seems that I satisfy a rent distraint that has been outlawed by NRS 118A.520 (though there is a very old BK case, circa 1980
or so that may suggest such distraints are still permissible against commercial tenants, and my hybrid, home law office situation, plus the fact that I do still
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have a business license for Zachary Coughlin's Memory Foam Mattresses (something I started during the 4 years I was hoping to get a law license and finding
employment very, very difficult to obtain, during which Mike Rowe wrote me stern letters, Pete Christiansen and Mike Sanft -ignored me and shewed me to
their legal assistant Kelly Huff, and Director of Admissions Patrice Eichmann made the unilateral decision to ignore the Request for Reconsideration of my
Application for Admission that I timely submitted on 9 15 03 in connection with the end of the deferment period set forth in the Court's December 2002
Order....) and at least some research and development was ongoing in that regard. Whether I was a commercial or residential tenant was an important issue
in the eviction matter and the mixed use of the property likely only made the statute all the more difficult to interpret.
However, I do recall that Gessin told me he withdrew his bankruptcy, so that may negate Hill's assertion that I was wrongful in sending a demand letter to Hall
regarding the old sanction and or filing a Motion for Order To Show Cause. Gessin is a crafty guy, though I am not sure I entirely share Hill's view of him.
However, Hill apparently received about $20-25K in attorney's fees from Gessin in a case that the plaintiff was only seeking about $25K in to begin with, and
upon Gessin ceasing to be willing to pay Hill and Baker for more litigating, they promptly suggested he settle for something near $30K (which, of course, was
upsetting to Gessin, in a manner that is similar to how Dr. Merliss seems to feel in the eviction matter). But, to be fair to Hill, those parties likely bare some
responsibility for choosing to take the risky path that is litigation.
Gessin also became a registered efiler about the time he basically terminated my representation of him. My email to Gessin below shows that I was somewhat
suspicious of the fact that he seemed to all the sudden want to go our separate ways after I had been working on these very involved (to me at the time they
seemed really involved) NRCP 60(b) Motions, and it is ironic, somewhat that Hill accuses me of ghostwriting because my email to Gessin essentially anticipates
that, and, to some extent, my later filing Notices of Appearance as Attorney of Record in several of Gessin's various cases involving these two women was done
to attempt to counteract any appearance of that. Gessin seemed upset that I filed those appearances, and actually got very pushy about me trying to undo
them, and eager to avoid prejudicing his ability to file timely 60(b) motions, I undertook to do what I could to make it so he could file on his own (ie, having an
Attorney of Record on one's case often results in the filing office refusing to let them file anything on their own...).
John,
Here is Van Lydegraf's voice message. Again, I have not talked to him and I forwarded you the only email or writing I ever sent him. I am leaning towards filing an Errata on
your cases today to get it so I am not attorney of record. Which do you prefer? I amnot sure which would accomplish your goals quicker, but keep in mind, I believe a Motion
to Withdraw is the typical thing, not a Notice of Withdrawal? Have you found any research in this regard? Please indicate in writing which you prefer or the preferred manner
you would like to see me pursue accomplishing your goals, which, to my understanding, include being in pro per on this case. I sense you are uncomfortable, but please know I
maintain extremely high fidelity to my clients, unbundled or otherwise, okay? I am unsure how me filing the 60b's etc would have been much different with respect to what you
seem upset about...did you never intend for me to file? Were you looking for a "ghost writer"? I was not of the understanding that I was being hired as a "ghostwriter" and I do
recall some indication that such a thing is either prohibited or discouraged by the Rules of Professional Responsibility....Regardless, the most important thing is to avoid
prejudicing your case, and I feel I have made great efforts to achieve that. If you want to file something, just do it, don't wait for any withdrawal, etc. I will make all
reasonable efforts to see that you are allowed to file whenever and whatever you want, and not be weighed down by any attorney of record designation.
Sincerely,"
I currently have a Motion to Withdraw pending in the two Adversary Proceedings where I believe I was incorrectly listed as Attorney of Record for Gessin.
Sent: Thu 3/22/12 10:50 AM

I sorry to hear that you are having to deal with some extremely tough circumstances. Please come see me as soon as you can.

Sincerely,

Patrick King
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To: Patrick King
Dear Mr. King,
I appreciate the seriousness of the process and want to show it the respectd it deserves. I take what I do very, very seriously. If
you can give me some time, it would help. Due to the recent eviction (and that is an area of law where I am doing important work
that often goes neglected...the societal cost to Nevadans subject to this ultra fast summary evictions, on top of the procedurally
questionable manner in which they are carried out and served, is immense...sure it might help pay some RPD Sargents more than
District Court Judges, but its done on the backs of real human beings suffering, etc....).
I had a hearing today where I represented a client in a UIFSA matter. He needs me. My representation is very important to his
life. He is a committed father who has been dealt some extremely tough circumstances. I think I have only received something like
$500 from this client so far, and have done enough work to make that less than minimum wage, etc..
I do want to meet with you. It would be most prudent though, for my clients and myself, if you and the State Bar could afford me
some time to tend to the immediate need to get a new living space and office, attend and defend the "quadruple jeopardy" abuse of
process that Richard Hill is orchestrating, and otherwise protect my client's interests. I am not refusing to speak with you on the
phone or meet in person. My two phones are still being held by the Washoe County jail, under an Order by RMC Judge Nash
Holmes, so....The USPS Golden Valley Station has retaliated against me by interferring with my mail, though I have taken all
reasonable steps to counter that, including securing a new PO BOX, which I added as my public address on the Bar's online portal
days ago, but for which I still do not see a change reflected. The Federal Torts Claims act has likely been violated by USPS
Golden Valley Station supervisors Terry James and Buck Hyde, whom took it upon themselves to play judge and jury incident to a
complicated eviction process that I have recently been litigating against Park Terrace Townhomes HOA and Western Nevada
Management and Gayle Kern, LTD. It involves respondeat superior liability, etc., etc. Western Nevada Management knew of and
orchestrated, and received approval from the Park Terrace HOA to have the two individuals who I rented from live at the 1422 E.
9th St. 89512 location. This involved a Robyn Badalato, then a property manager at Park Terrace. For some reason, when her
boss found out about this, she started crying, saying she was going to be fired, etc., etc.. Then she apparently resigned. This was
litigated in an interruption of essential services (electricity) complaint I filed recently. The HOA and Sue King admitted these
things, yet they want to turn right around and disclaim an responsibility for anything, pursue a summary eviction despite the facts
not lining up with the Glazier case sufficient to allow such, etc., etc.
I can sit down and talk with you whenever you want. However, I am writing to explain why this week or the immediate future
would prevent a hardship for me with regard to scheduling such a meeting. Please no that is not a reflection upon my respect for
you, the State Bar, your office, or this process, but rather indicative of the realities faced by businesses subject to summary
evictions where the non payment of rent is NOT alleged, something which the law is supposed to forbid under NRS 40.253, but
for which the Reno Justice Court has now subjected me to TWICE in three or four months....
I hope you can understand though, that deadlines are running, Richard Hill has me facing quadruple jeopardy via his abuse of
processes, etc. I have a hearing on that this week. But I am not some young punk who is going to come in and let Jon Bailey blow
a lot of intimidation and hot air at him for his millionaire buddy Mark Tratos (whom had to admit under oath, that he had
previously "lost" other student's papers in his illustrious career as an adjunct professor. And that was also confirmed by Anderson
and Morishita, two former patent attorney associates for Mr. Tratos. Also, Mr. Tratos lost or "failed to receive" Jessica Wolf's
paper in that 2002 Cyber Law course, but I don't recall the State Bar of Nevada raping her. Further, Tratos wrote me asking for
"another copy of your paper", which implies he received one. Then he went on to ask for detail about the paper, what it was about
etc., clearly implying he did have possession of the one I turned in with only my "blind grading" social security number, etc. (he
had a student in the class who worked for his firm, he probably interpreted my adherence to the "blind grading" setup that was
utilized in every other course I took at Boyd as a personal affront, etc....To me it is disturbing that the State Bar of Nevada had
allowed Mark Tratos to so leverage the resources of the State Bar to wreck shop on my life, while, apparently, no real inquiry has
ever been made as to whether Tratos did so inappropriately. He was "on vacation in Europe" according to my "pro bono" attorney
Pete Christiansen (and so did not appear at the June 2002 conclusion of the hearing before the C&F Committtee, whom was
referred by Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly, whom owns the strip club, The Spearmint Rhino, or did at the
time. I believe in Senator Grassley's "sunshine and transparency" in government, and in this grievance process too.
Sincerely,
M
000953
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 18:36:13 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,

The allegaons against you are serious and put into queson your competence to pracce law. I would like to meet with you so that I can talk with you about the
allegaons and see if there is a way
to assist you.

If you do not meet with me, then the Oce of Bar Counsel will be forced to make decisions without the benet of actually geng to sit down and talk with you.


To: Patrick King
Dear Mr. King,
The Reno Munic Court is still withholding both of my cells phones and some others items, so calling you is problematic. I can check voice mail by email, such
as:
"Bye, hey jack is packing. How are you doing. My assistant Bar Council and we've been sharing some emails. I would like
to hear from you, so we can talk on the phone if you could please call me at (775) 328-1384 Thanks a lot. Bye. "
Until then, could we communicate in writing please. I provided you a great deal of material in response to Hill's
grievance, and I feel that should take you more than one hour to appropriately review, so....
Also, I have filed a motion to withdraw in Gessin's Bankruptcy AP cases and a Reply to Opposition, though I don't really
know what in the hell that matters or why Richard Hill is able to leverage your office to make busy work for me by
making completely unsupported "ghostwriting" accusations, etc., etc.
Sincerely,
Sent: Thu 3/22/12 12:29 PM
Thank Mr. King,
I will. Things are coming together quickly though I have faced many obstacles. I may have mentioned this
M
000954
already, but I did file a Motion to Withdraw in the two Gessin Adversary Proceedings in NVB. However, in the
meantime, as I understand it, I have a duty to represent Mr. Gessin, even despite his indications that he doesn't
necessarily want me to, that doing so is unnecessary (he apparently is in the process or already has had his main
BK case withdrawn, though I pointed out to him, that does not necessarily make moot the adversary
proceedings...). It has been a good lesson in how very important that attorney of record designation is.
However, I did learn a lot of lessons about that with Mr. Christiansen as my attorney in 2002-2004, along with
the extent to which a proper, detailed fee agreement setting forth in explicit detail the scope of one's
representation is very, very important.
Sincerely,
Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2012 17:51:20 +0000

I sorry to hear that you are having to deal with some extremely tough circumstances. Please come see me as soon as you can.

Sincerely,

Patrick King

To: Patrick King
Dear Mr. King,
I appreciate the seriousness of the process and want to show it the respectd it deserves. I take what I do very, very seriously. If
you can give me some time, it would help. Due to the recent eviction (and that is an area of law where I am doing important work
that often goes neglected...the societal cost to Nevadans subject to this ultra fast summary evictions, on top of the procedurally
questionable manner in which they are carried out and served, is immense...sure it might help pay some RPD Sargents more than
District Court Judges, but its done on the backs of real human beings suffering, etc....).
I had a hearing today where I represented a client in a UIFSA matter. He needs me. My representation is very important to his
life. He is a committed father who has been dealt some extremely tough circumstances. I think I have only received something like
$500 from this client so far, and have done enough work to make that less than minimum wage, etc..
I do want to meet with you. It would be most prudent though, for my clients and myself, if you and the State Bar could afford me
some time to tend to the immediate need to get a new living space and office, attend and defend the "quadruple jeopardy" abuse of
process that Richard Hill is orchestrating, and otherwise protect my client's interests. I am not refusing to speak with you on the
phone or meet in person. My two phones are still being held by the Washoe County jail, under an Order by RMC Judge Nash
Holmes, so....The USPS Golden Valley Station has retaliated against me by interferring with my mail, though I have taken all
reasonable steps to counter that, including securing a new PO BOX, which I added as my public address on the Bar's online portal
days ago, but for which I still do not see a change reflected. The Federal Torts Claims act has likely been violated by USPS
Golden Valley Station supervisors Terry James and Buck Hyde, whom took it upon themselves to play judge and jury incident to a
complicated eviction process that I have recently been litigating against Park Terrace Townhomes HOA and Western Nevada
Management and Gayle Kern, LTD. It involves respondeat superior liability, etc., etc. Western Nevada Management knew of and
M
000955
orchestrated, and received approval from the Park Terrace HOA to have the two individuals who I rented from live at the 1422 E.
9th St. 89512 location. This involved a Robyn Badalato, then a property manager at Park Terrace. For some reason, when her
boss found out about this, she started crying, saying she was going to be fired, etc., etc.. Then she apparently resigned. This was
litigated in an interruption of essential services (electricity) complaint I filed recently. The HOA and Sue King admitted these
things, yet they want to turn right around and disclaim an responsibility for anything, pursue a summary eviction despite the facts
not lining up with the Glazier case sufficient to allow such, etc., etc.
I can sit down and talk with you whenever you want. However, I am writing to explain why this week or the immediate future
would prevent a hardship for me with regard to scheduling such a meeting. Please no that is not a reflection upon my respect for
you, the State Bar, your office, or this process, but rather indicative of the realities faced by businesses subject to summary
evictions where the non payment of rent is NOT alleged, something which the law is supposed to forbid under NRS 40.253, but
for which the Reno Justice Court has now subjected me to TWICE in three or four months....
I hope you can understand though, that deadlines are running, Richard Hill has me facing quadruple jeopardy via his abuse of
processes, etc. I have a hearing on that this week. But I am not some young punk who is going to come in and let Jon Bailey blow
a lot of intimidation and hot air at him for his millionaire buddy Mark Tratos (whom had to admit under oath, that he had
previously "lost" other student's papers in his illustrious career as an adjunct professor. And that was also confirmed by Anderson
and Morishita, two former patent attorney associates for Mr. Tratos. Also, Mr. Tratos lost or "failed to receive" Jessica Wolf's
paper in that 2002 Cyber Law course, but I don't recall the State Bar of Nevada raping her. Further, Tratos wrote me asking for
"another copy of your paper", which implies he received one. Then he went on to ask for detail about the paper, what it was about
etc., clearly implying he did have possession of the one I turned in with only my "blind grading" social security number, etc. (he
had a student in the class who worked for his firm, he probably interpreted my adherence to the "blind grading" setup that was
utilized in every other course I took at Boyd as a personal affront, etc....To me it is disturbing that the State Bar of Nevada had
allowed Mark Tratos to so leverage the resources of the State Bar to wreck shop on my life, while, apparently, no real inquiry has
ever been made as to whether Tratos did so inappropriately. He was "on vacation in Europe" according to my "pro bono" attorney
Pete Christiansen (and so did not appear at the June 2002 conclusion of the hearing before the C&F Committtee, whom was
referred by Character and Fitness Committee member Kevin Kelly, whom owns the strip club, The Spearmint Rhino, or did at the
time. I believe in Senator Grassley's "sunshine and transparency" in government, and in this grievance process too.
Sincerely,
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 18:36:13 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,

The allegaons against you are serious and put into queson your competence to pracce law. I would like to meet with you so that I can talk with you about the
allegaons and see if there is a way
to assist you.

If you do not meet with me, then the Oce of Bar Counsel will be forced to make decisions without the benet of actually geng to sit down and talk with you.


To: Patrick King
Dear Mr. King,
M
000956
FOIA Request RE: does Richard Hill have standing to file a grievance
The Reno Munic Court is still withholding both of my cells phones and some others items, so calling you is problematic. I can check voice mail by email, such
as:
"Bye, hey jack is packing. How are you doing. My assistant Bar Council and we've been sharing some emails. I would like
to hear from you, so we can talk on the phone if you could please call me at (775) 328-1384 Thanks a lot. Bye. "
Until then, could we communicate in writing please. I provided you a great deal of material in response to Hill's
grievance, and I feel that should take you more than one hour to appropriately review, so....
Also, I have filed a motion to withdraw in Gessin's Bankruptcy AP cases and a Reply to Opposition, though I don't really
know what in the hell that matters or why Richard Hill is able to leverage your office to make busy work for me by
making completely unsupported "ghostwriting" accusations, etc., etc.
Sincerely,
Sent: Fri 3/23/12 4:57 PM
3 attachments
State Bar of Nevada Character and Fitness Committee Grievance Christiansen Eichman, Kevin Kelly Mike Sanft for Bar
Counsel.pdf (379.4 KB) , Character and Fitness Committee Member Kevin Kelly, ESq..htm (6.4 KB) , Reno's Hawkins,
Ormaas & van Winkle - Biggest Little Act in the World Babelation ormaas.htm (72.0 KB)
Dear Mr. King,
this is a subpoena and a FOIA Request, requesting that you send to me, in writing, via email and fax
a copy of any documentation (such as a copy of the email from Department 3 you mentioned in your
last email, in addition to these "communications from judges" that you only mentioned for the first
time today, yet claim to have noticed me of in the past). You see, this is exactly why is would be
disadvantageous to communciate with you on the telephone (something you and I have never done).
When I began asking Director of Admissions Patrice Eichman (a licensed attorney) uncomfortable
questions related to her breach of her duties and negligence (if not more) between 2001-2005, she
didn't want to correspond in writing anymore, but preferred talkign on the phone...
Please add the attached materials to my grievance against Eichman, Michael Sanft, Kevin Kelly of
the C&F Committee and both Peter Christiansen's (father and son).
I believe you may have violated my Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel by failing to copy me on and
or inform me of your communications with judges prior to your email of today, wherein you
incorrectly mention that you previously did so, which you did not. I think it might be appropriate for
you to recuse yourself from this matter given some of your ommissions and conduct thus far.
Sincerely,
M
000957
Zach Coughlin
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 19:10:10 +0000
March 23, 2012

Dear Mr. Coughlin,

Just moments ago I received an e-mail leer from the Clerk of the Court in Department 3. She said that you appeared
wearing pajamas over your clothes and were demanding and argumentave. Apparently I will be receiving a report from the
Marshals. As Assistant Bar Counsel I would like to help you. However, my primary responsibility is to protect the public and
the administraon of jusce by insuring that Nevada Lawyers are complying with standards required of the profession. It
appears that you are not. I believe that there are ways to get you assistance that may protect your license to pracce law. I
would sure appreciate the opportunity to talk with you about resources and assistance that may help you through this
dicult me.


To: Patrick King
Mr. King,
This is the very first time you allege anyone other than Mr. King filed or alleged a grievance. Please provide any
documentation or proof related to these apparent communications from judges that you are only now bringing
up. In your March 23, 2012 email to me you wrote: " As I have explained to you, the grievances against you came
not only from Mr. Hill but also from Judges from dierent Courts." This is not true. That is the rst you ever
communicated anything like that to me, unless you can point to something in the wrien record between us. With
respect to your refusal to pursue any of the grievances I led, please indicate specically what about Mr. Hill's
grievance met the standard you cite to, as well as specically, for each aempted ling of a grievance, indicate
where mine failed to meet that standard, with details and specics, and an indicaon of any research of
invesgaon you conducted in that regard.
Sincerely,
Sincerely,
M
000958
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2012 17:18:34 +0000
Dear Mr. Coughlin,

I have repeatedly expressed my interest in having a meeng with you to discuss the grievances against you. You claim to be too busy to meet with
me, yet you have me to write lengthy e-mails and apparently to do legal research.

You asked if Mr. Hill has standing to le a grievance against you. Not only does he have standing to le a grievance, as a lawyer in Nevada he may
have an ethical obligaon to report to the State Bar. As I have explained to you, the grievances against you came not only from Mr. Hill but also from
Judges from dierent Courts. These grievances, and the evidence aached with them, rather clearly puts into queson your competence to pracce law.
As I have explained to you, I will make the evidence and exhibits available to you when you come to inspect them at my oce. I will not send you reports
or document, especially since you claim your mail is being compromised.

As for the grievances you have made, nothing that you have submied appears to show an ethical violaon that could be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, which is the standard of proof required in disciplinary maers. As such, at this me we have not opened any les based on the
informaon you have submied.

Sincerely,

Patrick King

10 In general
Chapter 13 debtors' attorney violated Nevada rule of professional conduct defining professional
misconduct to include engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation
M
000959
and engaging in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice, where attorney, acting in bad faith,
filed documents which he or someone in his office generated to falsely certify debtors' completion of
required credit counseling course and which he knew, or should have known, that debtors did not
sign or otherwise adopt, and also certified documents as being completed by debtors. 11 U.S.C.A.
109; Nev.Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 8.4. In re Pagaduan, 429 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
Mr. King, could you please update me on that status and progress of the various grievances I filed recently in addition to
providing a detailed summary of the content of all of your correspondences, written or otherwise, and telephone
communciatiosn with Richard Hill or anyone with his office. Further, please state whether Casey Baker is part of the
grievance, as Hill asserts he is filing it on Mr. Baker's behalf.
Sincerely,
Or, is Hill attempting to leverage the State Bar of Nevada's Bar Counsel to create "busy work" for opposing counsel?
Las Vegas Review-Journal
Spearmint Rhino owners expanding empire with British
invasion
Whether you consider topless cabarets acceptable adult
diversions or shadowy dens of iniquity, you have to admit the
Spearmint Rhino club has one catchy name.
It's probably safe to say its patrons are unlikely to confuse it
with other topless joints, and surely that's the way Spearmint
Rhino's owners like it. It turns out developing brand loyalty is
important, whether you're selling breakfast cereal or babes and
boobs.
rapidly expanding. From clubs in California, to one in Las
Vegas, the company has created something of an American
invasion in England, where majority owner John Gray has
opened six clubs with plans for up to 100 more.
With that kind of expansion in mind, there's talk that Spearmint
Rhino might begin selling stock as a publicly traded company.
It makes you wonder what those stockholder meetings might
look like. I'm willing to bet they'd be well attended.
Although it is listed on the company's Web site as one of
several Spearmint Rhino clubs, the Las Vegas cabaret is
officially not owned by Gray, but by local attorney Kevin
Kelly, Gray's long-time partner Thomas Nabarrette, and
M
000960
Mumtaz Ali. When asked about the ownership issue, and the
fact the Las Vegas club was listed on the Gray-owned company
Web site, Kelly said it was possible Nabarrette had worked out
an agreement with his friend to advertise the club on the
Internet.
Makes sense, but it doesn't exactly explain why the only
reference to the topless company on the secretary of state's
Web site lists Gray as secretary and treasurer of The Spearmint
Rhino Worldwide Inc. The Las Vegas club is owned by K-Kel
Inc., which lists Kelly and Ali as officers, but not Nabarrette.
No matter. The Las Vegas Spearmint Rhino officially is not
owned by Gray. Which is probably a good thing considering
Gray's controversial past, which was recently profiled by
reporters Adrian Gatton and Paul Lashmar in the Independent
newspaper of London.
The story caught the topless entrepreneur attempting to rewrite
his personal history. In the Feb. 17 article, Gray was quoted
briefly denying his criminal past -- he has a couple convictions
in California for making a false statement to win a military
contract and bouncing checks -- before fessing up to reporters.
The boss also failed to explain why he once used several
aliases, including Johnny Win, John Luciano, and John Luciano
Gianni.
Gray served six months in jail, according to the newspaper, and
emerged with plans to expand his topless bar empire. Next
stop, Las Vegas. Although that move officially did not work
out, and Gray's name is not listed on the local paperwork, it did
not deter him from hopping overseas, where he has taken
England by storm as the sole director of Spearmint Rhino
Companies of Europe Ltd. According to the Independent,
Gray's clubs are popular with businessmen and a favorite site
for office parties.
Possibly standing in the way of his expansion plans in England
are those pesky background details, which he apparently didn't
disclose in much detail to licensing authorities.
A year ago, police reported that, in their opinion, "activity
within the club, intentionally or otherwise, borders on offenses
of prostitution and permitting the keeping of a brothel."
Every few years, an undercover vice unit compiles enough
evidence of whispered propositions and backfields in excessive
motion to make headlines and a few arrests. Beyond a little
embarrassment and some attorney fees, the club owners are
rarely ruffled.
perennially rank among the top donors to local political
campaigns, showering thousands of dollars on favorite
candidates and maintaining close contact with their public
official friends thereafter.
John L. Smith's column appears Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday
and Sunday. E-mail him at Smith@lvrj.com or call him at
383-0295.
http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/Mar-06-Wed-2002/news/18241452.html
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Reno's Hawkins, Ormaas & van Winkle - Biggest Little Act in the World
Alison M. Ormaas
attorney
biggest
city
Deputy
James
Jay Hawkins
Jim van Winkle
Judge
little
Officer
police
Politics
reno
It is government and its officials and employees who are REQUIRED to prove the guilt of a charge and conviction. That RELIEVES the one charged of
ANY burden to PROVE his or her innocence. Government employees are held to a HIGHER standard. A people are either FREE from their
government (from each other) or they are controlled subjects of a government and its public employees that illegally or unethically parcels out freedom
as it sees fit. NEVER underestimate others bad experiences. The structure of an expose, a complaint, a whistle-blower, is ALWAYS the story of how
the birds came HOME to roost. Happenings and ideology that previously would never have been disseminated are now readily found with a simple
Google search. A Google search is just a search for a person's credentials AND integrity.
Here's more NEGATIVE publicity about Nevada. Here's MORE of why others now like to call Nevadans, Renoites and Washoe County residents
rednecks, hicks, goat-ropers, stupid, morons, douche-bags, illiterate, alcoholics, lazy, shiftless, druggies, racist, sexist, thieves, incompetent, fraudsters,
asleep-at-the-wheel, corrupt, and on and on. Nevada's, Reno's and Washoe County's public officials and public employees give them AMPLE reason to
. Like here.. The effects of negative publicity on Nevada, Reno and Washoe County have rarely been on the radar of its legislators and
governors . or even mayors, city and county employees, police officers, attorneys, judges, sheriffs, district attorneys, county commissioners, police
chiefs, city councils.
Why is that? That was Dennis Myers at the Reno News & Review who first wrote that. With so MANY people now running OUT of Nevada, Dennis
observation and complaint remains valid. Why dont Nevada, Reno, Washoe County public officials and public employees take in to account negative
publicity to Nevada? How does Reno Police Officer Jay Hawkins, Reno Deputy City Attorney Alison M. Ormaas and Reno Judge Jim van Winkle pay
their community and neighbors back for the damage each has done to the reputation of their neighbors and community?
M
000962
The result of any expose is that individuals and organizations are suddenly finding their previously hidden illegal, corrupt, unethical, lazy, or immoral
behaviors, and their secrets, avarice, cravings, or even mistakes, suddenly and rightfully very publicly front and center. Integrity, or its' lack, is
immediately exposed in a simple Google search.
Technology is a common ground for sharing viewpoints, both pro and con. As more people are tuned in to the electronic age it has become increasingly
more difficult for the bad practices of any business and its owners, managers and employees, no matter how remote or small their marketplace is, to
continue without being noticed, as was the case. People of all levels and of experience share their opinions concerning the various pluses and minuses of
various businesses and its owners, managers and employees. Many businesses, owners, managers and employees are just not coming out well in these
news group discussions.
Because Due Process is A Constitutional Issue, a civil RIGHT, and one of the oaths ALL public officials AND public employees take is to uphold and
protect the Constitution, ALL public officials AND public employees are held to a HIGHER standard, fiduciary. In this case it is clear Reno Police
Officer Jay Hawkins, Reno Deputy City Attorney Alison M. Ormaas and Reno Judge Jim van Winkle each FAILED to exercise reasonable care, each
VIOLATED several laws, EACH violated their fiduciary duties and, each displayed INappropriate conduct.
To the tune Youre a Mean One Mr. Grinch here its youre a Mean One Reno Police Officer Jay Hawkins, Youre a Mean One Reno City Attorney
Alison Ormaas and, Youre a Mean One Reno Municipal Court Judge Jim Van Winkle.
In America, there is a legal presumption of innocence until proven guilty. If there is any HINT of presumption of guilt then Due Process is NOT
followed and civil rights are violated. For civil charges or convictions against ANY American citizen there must be a clear and convincing
preponderance of evidence. Preponderance is 50.000001% or more. For criminal charges or convictions against ANY American citizen there must be a
clear and convincing beyond a reasonable doubt of the evidence.
The maxim that the King can do no wrong has no place in our American system of government. In America, its Semper pro Populus. That means
Fiduciary Duties, Color of Law and Public Service governs those on the public dole as Jay Hawkins, Alison Ormass and Jim van Winkle.
In 2009, Reno PUBLIC employee Jay Hawkins RECEIVED tax dollars to the staggering sum of $132,088.14.
In 2009, Reno PUBLIC employee Alison Ormaas RECEIVED tax dollars to the staggering sum of $77,903.25.
In 2009, Reno PUBLIC employee Jim Van Winkle RECEIVED tax dollars to the staggering sum of $187,668.36.
Fiduciary duties are ethical or legal duties one party has to another. Broadly, these duties include duties of loyalty and duties of care to OTHERS. A
PUBLIC official and PUBLIC employee has ANOTHER fiduciary duty to act in CITIZEN's benefit because citizens are the beneficiary NO public
official OR public employee can simply sit back and watch the beneficiary, you the citizen fall into greater difficulty or hardship.
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Send to friendSend to friend
Only in
Submitted by Retired Professor on Fri, 08/26/2011 - 7:26pm.
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000963
Only in Reno.
Today I was swimming on my back during the public posted lap swim hours at Northwest Pool when two eleven-year-old boys threw a weighted
grenade at me then came into my lane. That frightened me. It was also disturbing my peace and harassing me. I reminded them as I had when they had
done the same thing earlier this summer, that this time is for the public posted lap swim. These two eleven-year-old boys smirked and smugly informed
me the lifeguards there had told them they could. That offended my sense of personal dignity and my sense of safety. They then again threw a weighted
grenade at me. These two eleven-year-old boys set upon me in a hostile and aggressive way with a weapon. Already a physically disabled veteran, I had
a reasonable apprehension of an immediate harmful or offensive contact such as my eye being taken out, my nose broken or teeth broken by this leaded
grenade.
The City of Reno lifeguards were careless as they failed to supervise these boys which City of Reno manager Justin Klatt told me later the City of Reno
assumes with the children at the city pool. City of Reno manager Justin Klatt informed me of this when he refused to give me the boys' names or parent
contact info. The two eleven-year-old-boys' behavior and City of Reno employees carelessness and failure to supervise these boys caused me
apprehension and mental / emotional distress.
City of Reno manager Justin Klatt told me that the weighted grenades, a foreseeable weapon at the public pool when used unsupervised by children, are
okay at the City of Reno Northwest Pool. These weighted grenades are not ever okay when they are thrown at others. These two eleven-year-old-boys'
behavior and employees at the City of Reno Northwest Pool was unreasonable due to the foreseeable harm these weighted grenades could do when
used by children who are not being properly supervised.
The City of Reno and its employees owe a duty of care to those who will use its products and services such as its public pools, so as to render itself and
its employees accountable for negligent / careless work. I was swimming during the posted lap swim when these boys, whether they did it it intentionally
or not, attacked and frightened me with a weighted grenade, after smugly informing me the lifeguards there said it was okay.
Reno Police Officer Jay
Reno Police Officer Jay Hawkins, Reno Deputy City Attorney Alison M. Ormaas and Reno Judge Jim van Winkle are also Conspicuous
Consumptionists AND thieves of tax dollars NOT theirs.
City of Reno Manager Julee
City of Reno Manager Julee Conway and City of Reno Supervisor Joseph Wilson are also Conspicuous Consumptionists AND Thieves of Tax Dollars
NOT Theirs.
It was I think three years
It was I think three years ago that Fred Wolf saved his wife's life at the City of Reno Northwest public pool. The City of Reno lifeguard, Mike Freeman
was awol and Fred and a couple of the swimmers saved Jean Wolf. Only in Reno does one get promoted for dereliction of duty, being awol and
endangering another's life. Yet that is exactly what City of Reno Supervisor Joseph Wilson did, he promoted City of Reno employee Mike Freeman. For
which City of Reno Manager Julee Conway promoted City of Reno employee Joe Wilson. In 2009, City of Reno Manager Julee Conway was paid tax
dollars of $173,125.00 with a fully funded benefits package. How many in the private sector are getting that sweetheart of a deal? In 2010, it got even
sweeter at $187,025.19, an 8% increase / tax funded raise during The Great Recession. How many in the private sector are getting that sweetheart of a
deal and an 8% raise? In 2009, City of Reno Supervisor Joseph Wilson was paid tax dollars of $89,339.90 with a fully funded benefits package. In 2010,
that went to $98,247.91 for a 10% tax funded raise during The Great Recession. We Renoites are being bled to death / exploited by our City of Reno
public employees!
Social order rests upon the
Submitted by Marian on Sun, 08/21/2011 - 7:22pm.
M
000964
Social order rests upon the stability and predictability of conduct of which keeping promises is a large item. Roscoe Pound.
Mitchell Wright and Kent B. Hanson are Reno, Nevada attorneys. Thomas and Cheryl Hanneman went to see them in Counselor Mitchell Wright and
Counselor Kent Hansons capacity as attorneys. They chose Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent Hanson because Counselor Mitchell Wright
advertised himself as a real estate attorney, and Counselor Kent Hanson is a former Nevada State Deputy Attorney General for the Nevada Real Estate
Division.
According to the Hannemans, when they showed up for their appointment, Counselor Kent Hanson told them the secretary had just walked out.
Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent Hanson offered to trade their legal services for Mrs. Hanneman immediately starting as their secretary. The
Hannemans accepted. Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent Hanson immediately hired an independent real estate expert for a written review.
The Hannemans soon found out why the former secretary had walked out. Counselor Mitchell Wright and Realtor wife were having an on-going
drama. Counselor Mitchell Wrights wife is Karen Wright, a Reno Sparks Association of Realtors Realtor with Prudential Nevada Real Estate. What
is it with the off-the-wall character of real estate agents Prudential Nevada Real Estate hires?
Instead of Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent Hanson doing as they had promised, legal services for the Hannemans, they were involved in a high
drama. That drama was tearing apart their lives, destroying their legal practices, screwing their legal clients, and endangering the safety of the tenants
and visitors to the building where their law offices are at.
Mrs. Mitchell Wright drove by the front of the legal offices in their truck. Mr. Mitchell Wright saw that and he went running out the front door. Mrs.
Mitchell Wright parked the truck in back and came in the back door. She went directly to her husbands office and started packing up stuff. Mr.
Mitchell Wright walked in and their yelling and swearing at each other was heard throughout the building and parking lot.
Mrs. Mitchell Wright got into the drivers seat of their truck and started the engine. Her husband tried to open the door but found it locked. He reached
in through the open window trying to unlock the door. Mrs. Mitchell Wright closed the window trapping her husbands arm. She drove off with her
husband trotting along side while they continued yelling and swearing at each other. That was quite the site as Counselor Mitchell Wright wears
ill-fitting dark suits as he has a large stomach, and very high-heeled cowboy boots.
Counselor Kent Hanson then came running out the back door of the law offices yelling for Mrs. Hanneman and the receptionist to call 911! Reno
lawyer Kent B. Hanson then went running after the truck dragging his colleague Mitchell Wright. By that time, most of the neighborhood heard and saw
what was going on.
Counselor Mitchell Wright then fell as his arm was released. Counselor Kent Hanson helped him back to the office.
Counselor Mitchell Wright, a Mormon, was swearing what a sick bitch she is and Counselor Kent Hanson, also a Mormon, was urgently asking,
Mitch, Mitch where are your guns?! What about your guns?!
This drama in various forms continued. Counselor Mitchell Wright missed filing deadlines and court dates. Guns were waved around. A divorce was out
there. A restraining order was out there. Any client of Counselors Mitchell Wright and Kent B. Hanson or any other attorney in the building that came in
for their cases only heard about Mitch and Karen Mitchells drama.
The receptionist and other tenants in the building complained to the landlord. The landlord was forced to threaten eviction of Counselors Mitchell
Wright and Kent B. Hanson.
Then Reno lawyer, attorney, Counselor Mitchell Wright was observed with his pants down, on top of his Prudential Nevada Realty Reno Sparks
Association of Realtors wife on top of his law office desk.
Seems the Mitchells were either going for each others throats or their crotches.
Image problem for Reno? Hmmmmm ... Reno's City Attorney Alison Ormaas is involved in fraud, steering, bullying, intimidation, perjury,
incompetence, trampling on civil rights, stupidity, laziness, and being a mean one. Maybe all that is a problem, where you're at, but it is not a problem
obviously in Reno, Nevada. What's wrong with you?
Reno understands that Reno's City Attorney Alison Ormaas does not need to be weighed down by all this. When is the last time the local media
mentioned any of this? Exactly. After all, she is City Attorney Alison Ormaas and she has her life to lead.
So what if City Attorney Alison Ormaas is hanging out banging Reno while keeping these fires burning? City Attorney Alison Ormaas is not going to
spank and choke herself. So what if City Attorney Alison Ormaas needs a father figure and a diet? Nick Lachey needs someone to do bullet shots with
at Hyde.
In fact, we should thank City Attorney Alison Ormaas for reminding us what it means to be Renoites. I hope Reno City Attorney Alison Ormaas's
M
000965
gruesome behavior is not an omen for the future state of our town. If throwing your neighbors, colleagues and community under the wheels of the bus is
right, I am scared to know what wrong is.
(This article is dedicated to the loving memory of Ms. Anna Nicole Smith. We can only pray that Elton John will eulogize her, and City Attorney Alison
Ormaas with yet another version of that candle song on national TV. Goodbye, Vickie Lynn, your dealers will miss you.) Even Porky Bully is a
hard-bitten middle aged jaded soul who has seen the true ugliness of the real world and knows there is only one way to survive and that is by doing just
what City Attorney Alison Ormaas has done.
Image problem for Reno? Hmmmmm ... Reno's police officer Jay Hawkins is involved in fraud, steering, bullying, intimidation, perjury, incompetence,
trampling on civil rights, stupidity, laziness, and police brutality. Maybe all that is a problem, where you're at, but it is not a problem obviously in Reno,
Nevada. What's wrong with you?
Reno understands that Reno's police officer Jay Hawkins does not need to be weighed down by all this. When is the last time the local media mentioned
any of this? Exactly. After all, he is police officer Jay Hawkins and he has his life to lead.
So what if police officer Jay Hawkins is hanging out banging Reno while keeping these fires burning? police officer Jay Hawkins is not going to spank
and choke himself. So what if police officer Jay Hawkins needs a father figure and a diet? Nick Lachey needs someone to do bullet shots with at Hyde.
In fact, we should thank police officer Jay Hawkins for reminding us what it means to be Renoites. I hope Reno police officer Jay Hawkins's gruesome
behavior is not an omen for the future state of our town. If throwing your neighbors, colleagues and community under the wheels of the bus is right, I
am scared to know what wrong is.
(This article is dedicated to the loving memory of Ms. Anna Nicole Smith. We can only pray that Elton John will eulogize her, and police officer Jay
Hawkins with yet another version of that candle song on national TV. Goodbye, Vickie Lynn, your dealers will miss you.) Even Porky Bully is a
what police officer Jay Hawkins has done.
Image problem for Reno? Hmmmmm ... Reno's judge James van Winkle is involved in fraud, steering, bullying, intimidation, trampling on civil rights,
stupidity, laziness, and asleep in court. Maybe all that is a problem, where you're at, but it is not a problem obviously in Reno, Nevada. What's wrong
with you?
Reno understands that Reno's judge James van Winkle does not need to be weighed down by all this. When is the last time the local media mentioned
any of this? Exactly. After all, he is judge James van Winkle and he has his life to lead.
M
000966
So what if judge James van Winkle is hanging out banging Reno while keeping these fires burning? judge James van Winkle is not going to spank and
choke himself. So what if judge James van Winkle needs a father figure and a diet? Nick Lachey needs someone to do bullet shots with at Hyde.
In fact, we should thank judge James van Winkle for reminding us what it means to be Renoites. I hope Reno judge James van Winkle's gruesome
behavior is not an omen for the future state of our town. If throwing your neighbors, colleagues and community under the wheels of the bus is right, I
am scared to know what wrong is.
(This article is dedicated to the loving memory of Ms. Anna Nicole Smith. We can only pray that Elton John will eulogize her, and judge James van
Winkle with yet another version of that candle song on national TV. Goodbye, Vickie Lynn, your dealers will miss you.) Even Porky Bully is a
what judge James van Winkle has done.
Image problem for Reno? Hmmmmm ... Reno's Lawyer now Reno judge Bridget Robb-Peck, is involved in fraud, steering, bullying, perjury,
intimidation, filing false documents, sewer service, and having opposing counsel's client's U.S. mail forwarded to her office where she then tells the
Postal Inspector who tracked down the mia mail, why no, I never let anyone know the opposing counsel's client's U.S. mail was forwarded to my office.
Why should I? Maybe all that is a problem, where you're at, but it is not a problem obviously in Reno, Nevada. What's wrong with you?
Reno understands that Reno's Lawyer now Reno judge Bridget Robb-Peck does not need to be weighed down by all this. When is the last time the local
media mentioned any of this? Exactly. After all, she is Reno's lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget Robb-Peck and she has her life to
lead.
So what if lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget Robb-Peck is hanging out banging Reno while keeping these fires burning? Reno lawyer
Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget Robb-Peck is not going to spank and choke herself. So what if Reno's Lawyer Bridget Robb Peck needs a
father figure and a diet? Nick Lachey needs someone to do bullet shots with at Hyde.
In fact, we should thank Reno lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget Robb-Peck, for reminding us what it means to be Renoites. I hope
lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget Robb-Peck's gruesome behavior is not an omen for the future state of our town. If throwing your
neighbors, colleagues and community under the wheels of the bus is right, I am scared to know what wrong is.
(This article is dedicated to the loving memory of Ms. Anna Nicole Smith. We can only pray that Elton John will eulogize her, and lawyer Bridget
Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget Robb-Peck with yet another version of that candle song on national TV. Goodbye, Vickie Lynn, your dealers will
miss you.) Even Porky Bully is a hard-bitten middle aged jaded soul who has seen the true ugliness of the real world and knows there is only one way to
survive and that is by doing just what Reno lawyer Bridget Robb-Peck now Reno's judge Bridget Robb-Peck has done.
Bonnie S. Weber wears her
M
000967
Submitted by Broother on Tue, 08/09/2011 - 5:38pm.
Bonnie S. Weber wears her religion, Christianity, on her political sleeve these what last 30 years. It is obvious that sinning is the part part of redemption
for Christian dissimulator and Washoe County Commissioner incompetent Bonnie S. Weber. Same for the other Christian Washoe County
Commissioners. Mortal sin removes the presence of Christ in the sinners soul. It not only hurts the sinner, but also hurts those affected by the sinner's
desecration. Christians are required to judge one another (1 Corinthians 5:12-13; John 7:24). In these several past year's bad economy, these unholy pay
raises of our elected officials and appointed public employees are sins. Sin is a master to whom one becomes enslaved (John 8:34). Only the truth will
set one free (John 8:32). Sin is blinding (John 9:39-41). The consciences reprimands are harder to hear the more one sins (cf. Hebrews 3:12-13).
Positive influences and opportunities are removed when one disregards the longsuffering and goodness of God (cf. Luke 8:12; Romans
1:20,21,24,26,28; 2:4-5). Only humble submission and sincere and total obedience to Jesus Christ will remedy one's sins. And that's ;) no urban legend.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sin is the breaking of God's law. When you sin, you offend God because it is His law that you have broken. God's laws reflect the moral purity of His
nature. Therefore, God's Law is a reflection of the character of God. God's law is not arbitrary a it is based on God's holiness. Greed, which these
sacrilegious pay raises are, and the profane obesity of so many of our elected public officials and appointed public employees, are the mortal sin of
taking more than your fair share because they break God's Law. The mortal sin of gluttony does not just have to do with overeating, of which so many
of our obese elected public officials and appointed public employees obviously do. The mortal sin of gluttony is excess, taking / using more than your
fair share, in anything like these unholy pay raises. A mortal sin is an act or thought which turns one away from God and turns one toward something
ungodly instead like these self-serving unholy pay raises and being obese. When someone chooses mortal sin, they freely choose to forfeit heaven and
choose hell. And that's ;) no urban legend.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The sins of Sodom and Gomorrah were rape, inhospitably, hatred of strangers and making slaves of guests. Christ said, Wisdom 19:13, the sin of
Sodom was a "bitter hatred of strangers" and "making slaves of guests who were benefactors." The "making slaves of guests who were benefactors" is
exactly what these blasphemous pay raises are. Our elected public officials and appointed public employees have made unholy slaves of us with their
profane pay raises to themselves.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proverbs 28:7 declares, He who keeps the law is a discerning son, but a companion of gluttons disgraces his father. Proverbs 23:2 proclaims, Put a
knife to your throat if you are given to gluttony.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appetites are an analogy of one's ability to control oneself. If one is unable to control their appetites, they are unable to control behaviors such as lust,
covetousness, anger. See Deuteronomy 21:20, Proverbs 23:2, 2 Peter 1:5-7, 2 Timothy 3:1-9, and 2 Corinthians 10:5.) The ability to say no to
anything in excess, which these pay raises and obesity clearly are, self-control is one of the fruits of the Spirit common to all believers (Galatians
5:22). And that's ;) no urban legend.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are several reasons why greed and gluttony are deadly sins.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greed and gluttony signs of mistrust of God. They are expressions of doubt that God will provide all that you need. You are disbelieving Jesus when
He promises that God will provide everything you need (Luke 12:22-31).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greed and gluttony promotes crime. More crimes have been committed due to greed and gluttony than any other deadly sin. Greed and gluttony drives
people to steal, lie and kill in order to acquire more.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greed and gluttony are the pinnacles of selfishness. Greed and gluttony ruin marriages, destroy friendships, and divide families all in the selfish pursuit
of gratifying ones self. Greed and gluttony are the opposite of charity, generosity and love any Christian virtue. One's greed and gluttony disregard all
other people and animals and puts falsely high importance on the self: they are forms forms of self-worship.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One that sins lives to please self rather than God.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"I am going to do things my way and that's it - period." This is the sin to control situations in order to have one's way to live or do as they please rather
than as God pleases.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rebellion is going off the set standard and disrupting the harmony between God and man. It is going against the normal use of things that God has given
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to man.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A refusal to submit to God and His word concerning excess, such as don't be filled with wine and food or pay raises, but be filled with the Spirit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Where there is excess to one or more, there is waste of God's Law. And that's ;) no urban legend.
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RE: State Bar inquiry
From: Patrice Eichman (patricee@nvbar.org)
Sent: Wed 11/17/04 1:02 PM
Mr. Coughlin,
We are having intermittent trouble sending and receiving e-mails so I think
it would be easier if you gave me a call at your convenience. I'd be happy
to go over your file so that we can figure out where we are at. My number
is 702-382-2200. Thank you. Pat Eichman
Sent: Wednesday, November 10, 2004 6:41 PM
To: patricee@nvbar.org
Subject: RE: State Bar inquiry
Dear Mrs. Eichman,
In regard to the email you sent me, included below, can you please indicate
whom you are referring to when you write that you have had ongoing
conversations with my attorney. Would this be Mr. Sanft or Mr.
Christiansen. Further, could you please let me know whatever information
you can give me regarding the content of these conversations and any
indication that was given to you by this attorney to delay the processing of
my Request for Reconsideration. When I faxed and mailed my Request for
Reconsideration to the State Bar of Nevada and Christiansen's Law Office on
September 15th, 2003, I made every attempt to indicate that I wished for my
application to be considered immediately following the October 2003
conclusion of the Court's December 2002 Deferral Order. I also expressed
the desire to have this matter moved forward as quickly as possible in
numerous phone calls to the State Bar of Nevada, the Nevada Supreme Court,
and Christiansen's Law Offices.
At no time have I ever indicated to any of the involved parties that I
wished for my Request for Reconsideration to be delayed for any period of
time. If my attorney has indicated that I, or anyone with any authority on
my behalf, was requesting that my case and the Request for Reconsideration
that was mailed and faxed on September 15th, 2003 be delayed in any way or
for any period of time, please provide me with any and all information and
documentation in this regard.
Please confirm whether the Request for Reconsideration that I presented to
the State Bar of Nevada and Christiansen's Law Office was ever presented to
the Character and Fitness Committee. If it was ever presented, please
indicate to whom it was presented and at what time. Please make Mr. Rowe,
Chairman of the Character and Fitness Committee aware that I presented my
Request for Reconsideration to the State Bar of Nevada and Christiansen's
Law Office on September 15th, 2003, in accordance with the instructions
provided by your assistant, Alexis and in order to provide support for the
Supplemental Report by the Character and Fitness Committee Chairman called
for at the October 2003 conclusion of the Court's December 2002 Deferral
Order. Please indicate whether any such Supplemental Report was provided to
the Court at the conclusion of the Deferral Period and whether Mr. Rowe was
ever provided with my Request for Reconsideration, and if not, please
indicate the reasons that the Request for Reconsideration was not provided
Page 1 of 5 http://by148w.bay148.mail.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=769044f5-3b4d-431...
000997
RE: State Bar inquiry
to Mr. Rowe.
I appreciate your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
>From: "Patrice Eichman" <patricee@nvbar.org>
>To: <zachcoughlin@hotmail.com>
>CC: "'Stacy Cate'" <stacyc@nvbar.org>
>Subject: State Bar inquiry
>Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2004 10:51:23 -0800
>MIME-Version: 1.0
>Received: from web.nvbar.org ([209.58.249.99]) by mc6-f36.hotmail.com
>with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.6713); Thu, 4 Nov 2004 10:51:30 -0800
>Received: from [209.58.249.98] by web.nvbar.org (GMS
>10.01.3241/XR7703.00.0d5ce3f3) with ESMTP id ujfbeaaa for
>zachcoughlin@hotmail.com; Thu, 4 Nov 2004 10:57:40 -0800
>X-Message-Info: JGTYoYF78jFp+IU41lLNbmV4V7lr0rt0
>X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook, Build 11.0.5510
>thread-index: AcTCnzFPIay+mDXWTSe/ztCx4/W/bw==
>X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165
>Message-Id: <18574031221516@web.nvbar.org>
>Return-Path: patricee@nvbar.org
>X-OriginalArrivalTime: 04 Nov 2004 18:51:35.0835 (UTC)
>FILETIME=[4F3F3EB0:01C4C29F]
>
>Zach,
>
>I have had ongoing conversations with your attorney regarding your file
>and I hope he was communicating with you at the time. But nothing was
>sent to the court because we were waiting for material from you or your
>attorney to send along with the petition in hopes that it would help to
>convince the court to admit you. Again, I hope your attorney
>communicated to you that the Character and Fitness Committee will be
>recommending that you be placed on a conditional admission and along
>with that recommendation we would need a consent agreement, signed by you,
which we had sent to your attorney.
>
>I have not received the signed consent agreement, and would need this
>document in order to send the petition to the Court. Since you are no
>longer represented, if you have any questions about this, please feel
>free to contact me. If you didn't receive the consent agreement and
>would like me to send another copy, please send me the address you
>would like it sent to. Again, contact me if you have any questions.
>
>Pat Eichman
000998
Sent: Thu 11/04/04 6:54 PM
Mr. Coughlin,
Perhaps you misunderstood my earlier reply. The bar did not send in the
documentation because your attorney advised us thathe was going to submit
further documentation on your behalf, therefore we were waiting for this
documentation. When I presented your case before the Character and Fitness
Committee they decided to recommend a conditional admission and therefore
have you sign a consent agreement. I have not received the consent
agreement, I will be happy to contact Christiansen's firm and or send you
another agreement. Again, the bar has done nothing to delay your case, we
have been waiting for the appropriate documents in order to proceed. Please
let me know what you would like to do as far as the consent agreement.
Pat Eichman
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2004 6:41 PM
To: patricee@nvbar.org
Subject: RE: State Bar inquiry
I have not been communicated with. This is news to me that nothing has
transpired in the last year because there are documents that have not been
sent to the court. I mailed in the request for reconsideration around the
end of September of 2003 and called the bar, the supreme court,
Christiansen's Law Office and anyone else I could think of to find out what
was taking so long. The deferral order said the Court would decide
something in October of 2003 and that came and went and I heard nothing. I
called the bar and the court and confirmed several times that there was
nothing more for me to do but wait. Obviously, this is enormously
upsetting. Months would go by where I called Christiansen's office 8 or 9
times and did not hear back from him or anyone there. It has been three and
a half years since I passed the bar exam. Christiansen's informed me that
they have sent the consent agreement in. I signed the agreement and
overnighted it to Christiansen's on September 27th. Christiansen has
recently let me know that he is no longer representing me. I am working on
a brief in support of my case and should be finished with it in a week or
so. I just cannot believe the reason nothing has happened for a whole year
is because the bar did not send in the information to the court.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
>From: "Patrice Eichman" <patricee@nvbar.org>
>To: <zachcoughlin@hotmail.com>
>CC: "'Stacy Cate'" <stacyc@nvbar.org>
>Subject: State Bar inquiry
>Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2004 10:51:23 -0800
>MIME-Version: 1.0
>Received: from web.nvbar.org ([209.58.249.99]) by mc6-f36.hotmail.com
>with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.6713); Thu, 4 Nov 2004 10:51:30 -0800
>Received: from [209.58.249.98] by web.nvbar.org (GMS
>10.01.3241/XR7703.00.0d5ce3f3) with ESMTP id ujfbeaaa for
>zachcoughlin@hotmail.com; Thu, 4 Nov 2004 10:57:40 -0800
>X-Message-Info: JGTYoYF78jFp+IU41lLNbmV4V7lr0rt0
>X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook, Build 11.0.5510
000999
bar application
>thread-index: AcTCnzFPIay+mDXWTSe/ztCx4/W/bw==
>X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165
>Message-Id: <18574031221516@web.nvbar.org>
>Return-Path: patricee@nvbar.org
>X-OriginalArrivalTime: 04 Nov 2004 18:51:35.0835 (UTC)
>FILETIME=[4F3F3EB0:01C4C29F]
>
>Zach,
>
>I have had ongoing conversations with your attorney regarding your file
>and I hope he was communicating with you at the time. But nothing was
>sent to the court because we were waiting for material from you or your
>attorney to send along with the petition in hopes that it would help to
>convince the court to admit you. Again, I hope your attorney
>communicated to you that the Character and Fitness Committee will be
>recommending that you be placed on a conditional admission and along
>with that recommendation we would need a consent agreement, signed by you,
which we had sent to your attorney.
>
>I have not received the signed consent agreement, and would need this
>document in order to send the petition to the Court. Since you are no
>longer represented, if you have any questions about this, please feel
>free to contact me. If you didn't receive the consent agreement and
>would like me to send another copy, please send me the address you
>would like it sent to. Again, contact me if you have any questions.
>
>Pat Eichman
_________________________________________________________________
Don't just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search!
http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/
Sent: Mon 3/08/04 2:55 PM
Dear Mr. Coughlin:
I am a little hesitant about replying to your e-mail due to the fact that
you are represented by an attorney, but I will give you a quick run-down on
my understanding of the status of your petition.
The last time I spoke with your attorney, Michael Sanft, on Jan. 12, 2004, I
reiterated to him that it would be to your benefit to provide the State Bar
with the actual reports from your counselor and due to the arrest for DUI,
proof of your attendance at AA meetings. I also advised him that character
reference letters would not hurt.
I have not heard from Mr. Sanft or received that information, as of this
date. While your deferral date has definitely come and gone, I feel that it
is important that you provide the above mentioned material in order to
increase your chances of being admitted to the State Bar. If you choose not
to provide the material and would like me to submit your request for
001000
admission, as is, I will submit it to the Character and Fitness Committee
for their review. As I told your attorney, I am only trying to give helpful
suggestions based on my prior experience regarding the documentation that
the Character and Fitness Committee, along with the Supreme Court, usually
require when making these types of decisions.
Please advise me of your decision regarding this matter and I will initiate
the next steps in the process. (It would also be helpful to me if you would
verify whether or not you are represented in this matter.) Thank you for
your cooperation.
Pat Eichman
001001
Company: Kevin M. Kelly, Ltd.
Address: 6029 S. Ft. Apache Rd., Suite 100
Las Vegas, NV 89148
Fax number: 702-386-2699
Email:
Website:
Admit Date: 9/25/79
Law School: New England
Specialization: None
Professional Liability
Insurance:
Yes
KEVIN M. KELLY
Attorney Active
BAR NUMBER:
1600
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only and does not include pending discipline cases. The database is frequently updated but may not be current at the time of your
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The Office of Bar Counsel strives to ensure the dissemination of timely, accurate public information concerning attorney discipline.
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001002
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001003
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001004
Most Field Goals Made, Career (Cont.)
1,357 Isaiah Dahlman (Braham, MN), 2003-06
1,346 Bill Roundtree (Wellsville-Middletown, MO), 1979-82
1,282 Charlie Vaughn (Tamms, IL), 1955-58
1,185 Cody Schilling (Ellsworth, MN), 2005-08
1,184 Daniel Cutbirth (Hurley, MO), 1995-98
1,109 Joel McDonald (Chisholm, MN), 1988-91
1,072 Norm Grow (Foley, MN), 1955-58
Season
777 Bruce Williams (Florien, LA), 1979-80
645 Bruce Williams (Florien, LA), 1978-79
506 Larry Huston (Savannah, OH), 1955-56
498 Jeremy Moore (Decatur East Baptist Park, IL), 1987-88
450 Isaiah Dahlman (Braham, MN), 2005-06
443 John Brown (Dixon, MO), 1858-59
Game
57 Johnny Morris (Portsmouth Norcom, VA), 2-22, 1961
53 Danny Heater (Burnsville, WV) vs. Widen, WV, 1-26, 1960 (att. 70)
48 Ken Robinson (Cassatt Midway, SC), 1-10, 1961
45 Kenneth Johnson (Grandfield, OK) vs. Terral, OK, 1-10, 1979 (att. 85)
45 John Battle (Chicago Cathedral, IL) vs. Evanston Roycemore, IL,
1-31, 1979 (att. 62)
44 Pete Cimino (Bristol, PA), 1-22, 1960
42 George Luke Wilson (Elsberry, MO) vs. OFallon, MO, 2-14, 1953
37 J.D. Boyer (Winona, MO) vs. Freemount, MO, 2-8, 1957
37 Harvey Babetch (Chicago Von Steuben, IL) vs. Chicago Taft, IL,
2-15, 1951
36 Sammy Esposito (Chicago Fenger, IL) vs. Chicago Carver, IL, 1-
23, 1950
Percentage Career (Minimum 900 Attempts)
73.1 Tyler Hansbrough (Poplar Bluff, MO), 2002-05 (834/1,142)
71.4 Tom McMillen (Mansfield, PA), 1967-70 (1,457/2,041)
70.4 Kyle Leeman (Putnam, CT), 1984-86 (762/1,082)
68.5 Darnell Robinson (Emeryville Emery, CA), 1990-93 (1,476/2,153)
66.0 Kyle Sanden (Thief River Falls, MN), 1992-96 (632/958)
65.8 Bret Brielmaier (Mankato Loyola, MN), 2000-04 (713/1,083)
Highest Field-Goal Percentage, Career (Cont.)
65.6 Alvan Adams (Oklahoma City Putnam, OK), 1970-72 (624/951)
65.6 Dan Vierling (St. Louis University High, MO), 1979-81 (634/966)
65.6 Noah Dahlman (Braham, MN), 2003-07 (947/1,444)
64.0 Zach Randolph (Marion, IN), 1997-2000 (674/1,053)
Percentage Season (Minimum 400 Attempts)
78.3 Bill Walton (La Mesa Helix, CA), 1969-70 (384/490)
74.5 Kevin Irving (Mountain View Liberty, MO), 1987-88 (310/416)
73.3 Kyle Leeman (Putnam, CT), 1985-86 (335/457)
72.9 Fred Johnson (Wellsville-Middletown, MO), 1985-86 (449/616)
71.2 Robert Swift (Bakersfield Garces, CA), 2002-03 (309/434)
69.0 Eric Clark (Rockford Lutheran, IL), 1993-94 (375/543)
68.3 Brent Niebrugge (Teutopolis, IL), 1993-94 (343/502)
68.0 Monte Rager (Pecatonica, IL), 1991-92 (273/401)
65.4 Zachary Coughlin (Reno, NV) 1994-95 (263/402)
65.3 Corey Williams (Batavia, IL), 1990-91 (275/421)
65.3 Rick Garrett (Centralia, IL), 1994-95 (264/404)
65.3 Zach Randolph (Marion, IN), 1999-00 (293/449)
Percentage Game (Minimum 15 Attempts)
100.0 Rich Mayer (Emery, SD) vs. Salem St. Marys, SD, 1-7, 1969 (19/19)
100.0 Jerome Gleixner (Bloomington, MN) vs. Watertown, MN, 2-3,
1953 (19/19)
100.0 Kevin Loge (Morris Area, MN) vs. Hancock, MN, 3-8, 1996 (16/16)
100.0 Ryan Focht (Villisca, IA) vs. College Springs South Page, IA, 1-27,
2009 (15/15)
MOST THREE-POINT FIELD GOALS ATTEMPTED
Career
1,443 Chad Bickley (Santa Maria Valley Christian Academy, CA), 1992-95
1,414 Anthony Hargrove (El Campo, TX), 2003-06
1,304 Taurean Moy (Memphis Booker T. Washington, TN), 1998-2001
1,100 Ryan Giehler (Bigfork, MN), 1991-94
938 Alex Bailey (Blacksburg, SC), 2000-03
936 Kevin Rhodes (Canton, IL), 1988-91
932 Garrett Thomas (Riverton, IL), 1995-98
919 Martin Wind (Cass Lake-Bena, MN), 2006-10
905 Paul Rorvig (Odessa, MO), 1997-2000
903 Andy Simpson (Alexandria Juniata Valley, PA), 1995-98
903 Jake Driscoll (Dilworth-Glyndon-Felton, MN), 2004-07
Season
537 Taurean Moy (Memphis Booker T. Washington, TN), 2000-01
Boys Basketbal l
54
HOT SHOTS In an outstanding shooting performance, Rich Mayer
(left), a 5-foot-9 senior guard from Emery, SD, was perfect from the field as
he made an amazing 19 of 19 field goal attempts in a January 7, 1969,
game with Salem St. Marys, SD. Among his baskets that night, Mayer con-
nected on a mid-court shot to end the first half. Playing only three quarters
of the contest, Mayer finished with 41 points. Chad Bickley (right) of Santa
Maria Valley Christian Academy, CA holds the national record with 1,443
three-pointers attempted and ranks second with 507 made. He also had
games where he hit 21 of 39 and 20 of 35 three-pointers.
HARDWOOD STANDOUTS As one of the top players in the country,
Tyler Hansbrough (left) of Poplar Bluff, MO, set a national record in field-
goal percentage for a career. The power forward made 834 of 1,142 shots,
good for 73.1 percent. Hansbrough went on to the University of North
Carolina, where he was an All-American and graduated as the Tar Heels
career scoring and rebounding leader. From 2002 to 2005, Randall
Carlisle (right) from Lipan, TX, made the most three-pointers in a career.
His 516 trifectas puts him nine above former record-holder Chad Bickley.
001005
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(No Subject)
RE: File: State Bar Admittance
From: Kelly Huff (khuff@christiansenlaw.com)
Sent: Mon 11/08/04 9:21 AM
Zach,
The consent agreement was hand delivered. I will follow-up on it. I
will make an extra copy of your file and mail it out to Mr. Barker as
well. I should get everything sent out to you by tomorrow. Thanks.
Kelley Huff
Christiansen Law Offices
520 South Fourth Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 384-5563
khuff@christiansenlaw.com
Sent: Mon 11/01/04 4:08 PM
Zach,
1. I will attempt to mail you another copy of your file. Please
confirm you mailing address to me in an e-mail. We have tried to mail
your file to you on two occasions the last of which was October 2003 to
the address you provided of 631 Humboldt Frt, Reno, NV 89509. Our mail
was returned. As to your request for "complete" copy of your file, we
always send complete copies of files upon the request of a client.
2. There is no itemization for the services rendered to you. Mr.
Christiansen charged you a flat fee to handle your hearings with the
State Bar which fee was paid by your father. Mr. Christiansen continued
to monitor your case as a courtesy and no such itemized records were
kept for time we did not charge you.
3. On September 10, 2003, after my conversation with Ms. Eichman's
assistant, I set forth in my e-mail to you the specific procedure for
which to have your admittance to the Stat Bar reconsidered. You were to
prepare a letter of intent and forward it to our office. No such letter
was ever received from you. The letter was due to the State bar on or
before October 1, 2003.
4. Other than an invoice from our office, I do not see a signed fee
agreement in your file. I will send you any billing records I have
along with a copy of your file when you send me confirmation of your
billing address.
M
001043
Kelley Huff
(702) 384-5563
Sent: Sunday, October 31, 2004 2:02 PM
To: Kelly Huff
Subject: Re: File: State Bar Admittance
Dear Miss Huff,
I would like another copy of my file. Please send Mr. Barker one as
well.
Please send me a thorough status report
and do not to send my file to storage. Also, I am requesting
a complete copy of my file (including all materials that your office has
recently submitted to the State Bar) and an itemization of the
services your office has rendered in regard to this matter. This is the
second time I have made such a request for an itemized statement.
I would like a response to my request of last month that your office
indicate whether it ever submitted anything to further this matter along
to
the State Bar or Supreme Court on or around the October 2003 expiration
of
the deferral order issued in December of 2002. My records indicate that
I
made repeated requests that your office do so. If no request was sent,
please indicate what, if any actions your office took to further this
matter
along between December of 2002 and the present. Please don't forget the
itemized statement of the services you have rendered at this point.
Please send me a copy of any fee agreement in your possession.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
>From: "Kelly Huff" <khuff@christiansenlaw.com>
>To: "Zach Coughlin" <zachcoughlin@hotmail.com>
>Subject: Re: File: State Bar Admittance
>Date: Wed, 27 Oct 2004 15:24:44 -0700
>MIME-Version: 1.0
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2004
>15:28:04 -0700
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Bar
>Admittance
M
001044
Re: File: State Bar Admittance
>Thread-Index: AcS8c8KjeND+3BnuS1u7pXCaabj6Iw==
>Return-Path: khuff@christiansenlaw.com
>X-OriginalArrivalTime: 27 Oct 2004 22:28:04.0264 (UTC)
>FILETIME=[39A63A80:01C4BC74]
>
>Zach,
>
>We received a letter yesterday from Bo Barker inquiring into the status
>of your file with our office. Mr. Christiansen has also reviewed the
>various e-mails sent to Mike and me with regard to your file. Per Mr.
>Christiansen, all the documentation you have submitted to our office
>along with the Stipulation you signed has been submitted to the State
>Bar of Nevada. As such, Mr. Christiansen has concluded his
>representation of your interests and will now be closing out your file
>with our office. Therefore, there is nothing to communicate to Mr.
>Barker. Although one has already been provided to you, if you would
>like another copy of your file, please contact me within the next 10
>days before your file is sent to storage. All other questions you may
>have with regard to your admittance to practice in Nevada may be
>directed to the State Bar office.
>
>If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact our
>office.
>
>Kelley Huff
>Christiansen Law Offices
>520 South Fourth Street
>Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
>(702) 384-5563
>khuff@christiansenlaw.com
>
_________________________________________________________________
FREE pop-up blocking with the new MSN Toolbar - get it now!
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Sent: Wed 10/27/04 3:28 PM
Zach,
We received a letter yesterday from Bo Barker inquiring into the status
of your file with our office. Mr. Christiansen has also reviewed the
various e-mails sent to Mike and me with regard to your file. Per Mr.
Christiansen, all the documentation you have submitted to our office
along with the Stipulation you signed has been submitted to the State
Bar of Nevada. As such, Mr. Christiansen has concluded his
representation of your interests and will now be closing out your file
with our office. Therefore, there is nothing to communicate to Mr.
Barker. Although one has already been provided to you, if you would
like another copy of your file, please contact me within the next 10
days before your file is sent to storage. All other questions you may
have with regard to your admittance to practice in Nevada may be
M
001045
RE: NV Bar Results
NV Bar Results
RE: Case Status
directed to the State Bar office.
If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact our
office.
Kelley Huff
(702) 384-5563
From: Mike Sanft (msanft@christiansenlaw.com)
Sent: Sun 10/03/04 4:19 PM
Zach, call me tomorrow. I tried to return your call on Friday, but the
number I received wasn't to your phone. Mike
Sent: Tue 9/21/04 12:58 PM
To: ZachCoughlin@hotmail.com
Zach, please call me as soon as possible. The Bar has agreed to allow
you to practice, but there are some contingencies involved. Mike
Sent: Tue 8/31/04 8:15 PM
My suggestion would be to do everything except for sending additional
apology letters. At this point, since you've already done so in the
past, there's no reason to do so again. Remember that the Bar was very
specific as to what it wanted to see from you. It did not include
apology letters.
M
001046
Case Status
RE: client correspondence`
Please cc me on everything you do send to the Bar. Thanks Zach.
Sent: Tue 7/06/04 8:54 AM
Dear Zach,
I finally spoke to Pat Eichman last week, who finally returned
to work on Wednesday, June 30th. Ms. Eichman informed me that she had
received your packet of information. Although she technically could
send the packet for the Supreme Court's final review, Ms. Eichman
advised that you include verification from your psychologist, indicating
that you have been attending sessions as per the Court's orders, as well
as demonstrate that you have been progressing in those sessions.
Additionally, Ms. Eichman recommended we include some verification from
your current employment indicating your experiences in the law thus far.
This, in Ms. Eichman's opinion, would help solidify our position that
you have been doing everything that you can to be found admissible to
the Bar.
Ms. Eichman also advised me that your application technically
does not have a deadline in which the application would be dropped;
however, she noted that the sooner we provide the above noted items to
her, the sooner it would be heard before the Court, and the sooner we
can get this issue resolved. She felt that if such items were before
the Court, the least you would get would be a probational license to
practice in Nevada. While Ms. Eichman's opinion is no wise a guarantee
that the Supreme Court would concur, we must make every effort to make
the Court's job easier to admit you to practice in Nevada. As such,
please send this paperwork to Ms. Eichman and this office as soon as
possible.
I hope all is going well for you and hope you feel free to
contact me should you have any further questions or concerns.
Sincerely yours,
CHRISTIANSEN LAW OFFICES
Michael W. Sanft, Esq.
Sent: Wed 9/10/03 9:49 AM
M
001047
Re: report
Zach,
I am responding to your e-mail as Pete is out of town and Mike is in
trial. I contacted the State Bar this morning to inquire as to how you
go about having your application for admittance reconsidered by the
Supreme Court. I was told by Ms. Eichman's assistant that you need to
prepare a letter of intent to have your application reconsidered. Said
letter must be submitted to the Bar prior to October 1, 2003. Please
forward all correspondence through our office so Pete or Mike may review
it prior thereto. Additionally, as to your previous question with
regard to your quarterly reports, the reports are due at the end of each
quarter. Therefore, your next report is due at the end of September.
Finally, in previous conversations you indicated you have misplaced your
copy of the Consent Agreement signed on September 9, 2002. I have
requested a copy on your behalf and will forward the same to you once I
receive it. Please provide me with an updated mailing address at your
convenience. I would prefer not to fax it.
Please contact me should you have any further questions.
Kelley Huff
CHRISTIANSEN LAW OFFICES
Sent: Monday, September 08, 2003 1:43 PM
To: Kelly Huff
Subject: client correspondence`
Dear Miss Huff,
I have left five telephone messages over a period of one and a half
months
and written numerous emails to Pete and Mike. This does not seem to keep
with the attorney's duty to keep clients informed and to communicate
with
clients. I wish to have some sort of corresponence from my attorney of
record. The court's order states that it is reconsidering my application
in
October of 2003.
_________________________________________________________________
Get 10MB of e-mail storage! Sign up for Hotmail Extra Storage.
http://join.msn.com/?PAGE=features/es
From: Christiansenlaw@aol.com
Sent: Mon 12/16/02 7:36 AM
Zack
M
001048
Re: (no subject)
I know you are getting frustrated. I would be. Pat Eichman has told me repeatedly
that the SCt has had the report in its possession since August. I will try and get
a confirming letter for you this week. I wish I knew how to make them go faster.
Call Kelley if you would like to come in and meet.
Pete
From: Christiansenlaw@aol.com
Sent: Wed 11/06/02 1:50 PM
Zack,
Spoke w/ Pat Eichman from out of town on Mon. She tells me the SCt has yet to sign
off on the recommendation. She thought it would be here by now and agreed to make a
call for me. Please let your father know (and you too), I have a scheduled call w/
her again on next Mon. I will let you know.
Pete
M
001049
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001101
116 NSHSRB, Boys Basketball cont.
INDIVIDUAL OFFENSE
Most Points Scored, Career
3,304 Dantley Walker, Lincoln County (2008-2011, 115 games)
2,941 Luke Babbit, Galena (2005-2008, 92 games)
2,616 Armon Johnson, Hug (2004-2007)
2,616 Prince Fowler, Western (1991-1994)
2,417 Landon Littlefield, Lake Mead (2008-2011)
2,397 Heiden Ratner, Silverado (2004-2007)
2,122 Fred Thompson, Las Vegas (1974-1976)
2,073 Darra Russell, Needles (2006-2009)
2,015 Danny Brotherson, Virgin Valley (1992-1995)
2,002 Freddie Banks, Valley (1981-1983)
1,989 Lee Hafen, Boulder City (1997-2000)
1,957 Jeff Caha, Pahrump Valley (1994-1997)
1,900 Trevor Exline, Austin (1996-1999)
1,775 Kevin Olekaibe, Cimarron-Memorial (2009-2010, 62 games))
1,752 Russ Hafen, Boulder City (n/a)
1,733 Kyle Walker, Moapa Valley (1987-1989)
1,694 Scott Brotherson, Virgin Valley (1981-1984)
1,673 Steele Hendrix, Lund (1988-1991)
1,637 Johnmin Hickey, Bishop Manogue (1998-2001)
1,581 John Seymour, Virginia City (1970-1973)
1,571 Jared Lewis, West Wendover (2005-2008)
1,555 Mitch Woods, Lowry (1971-1973)
1,470 Richard Bowler, Virgin Valley (1982-1985)
1,468 Zach Coughlin, Reno (1992-1995, 89 games)
1,421 Boomer Taylen, Fernley (1994-1997)
1,412 Matt Chism, Virgin Valley (1989-1992)
1,406 Nick Pavich, Whittell (1973-1976)
1,398 Archie Kovich, North Valleys (2005-2007)
1,383 Tyrone Burris, Pahrump Valley (1998-2000)
1,369 Travis Hansen, Smith Valley (2000-2002)
1,363 Bob Del Carlo, Virginia City (1976-1978)
1,359 Lamar Gardner, Lund (1989-1992)
1,350 Stevie Kidd, Needles (2006-2009)
1,314 Jim Summers, Douglas (1950-1952)
1.308 Scott Swingle, Mountain View (2000-2003)
1,248 DeMiyon Hall, Mountain View (1997-2000)
1,212 Roy Torrero, Jackpot (1997-2000)
1,200 Van Gibson, Fernley (1994-1996)
1,180 Lacy King, Mountain View (1998-2001)
1,172 Randy Gordon, Pahrump Valley (1975-1978)
1,153 Scott Web, Virgin Valley (1981-1984)
1,146 Kevin Brotherson, Virgin Valley (1983-1986)
1,112 Ryan Canady, Spring Creek (1994-1997)
1,112 Greg Hughes, Virgin Valley (1974-1977)
1,104 Tony Pavich, Whittell (1971-1973)
1,074 Jake Deen, Dayton (1999-2003)
1,074 Kim Nielson, Virgin Valley (1977-1980)
1,044 Adrian Guzman, Jackpot (1994-1997)
1,033 Aureliano Ruiz, Jackpot (1989-1992)
1,027 Lacy King, Mountain View Christian (1998-2001)
1,024 Tracy Horn, Gabbs (1983-1985)
1,010 Darin Weyer, Gabbs (1982-1984)
001102
x
x
NSHSRB, Boys Basketball cont. 117
Most Points Scored, Season (No. of Games)
1,185 Prince Fowler, Western (1994, 31 games)
1,123 Dantley Walker, Lincoln County (2011, 31 games)
1,061 Kevin Olekaibe, Cimarron-Memorial (2010, 31 games)
1,005 Armon Johnson, Hug (2007, 30 games)
974 Dantley Walker, Lincoln County (2010, 30 games)
901 Luke Babbitt, Galena (2008, 27 games)
864 Archie Kovich, North Valleys (2007, 27 games)
831 Lee Hafen, Boulder City (2000, 26 games)
817 Stevie Kidd, Needles (2009, 36 games)
801 Henry Thorns, Jr., Valley (2007, 29 games)
797 Hal Welch, Rancho (1978, 26 games)
782 Fred Thompson, Las Vegas (1976, 26 games)
766 Kyle Walker, Moapa Valley (1988, 30 games)
755 Steele Hendrix, Lund (1991, 21 games)
754 Greg Walker, Moapa Valley (1987, 29 games)
742 Heiden Ratner, Silverado (2005, 28 games)
729 Julian Hatcher, Wooster (2003, 25 games)
719 Johnmin Hickey, Bishop Manogue (2001, 33 games)
719 Trevor Exline, Austin (1999, 25 games)
714 Kevin Olekaibe, Cimarron-Memorial (2009, 36 games)
702 Freddie Banks, Valley (1983, 27 games)
682 Darra Russell, Needles (2009, 36 games)
661 Zach Coughlin, Reno (1995, 32 games)
655 Emmitt Thigpen, Hug (1987, 27 games)
648 Paul Walker, Hug (1985, 29 games)
643 James, Cimarron-Memorial (2007, 28 games)
638 Austin Morgan, Reno (2008)
632 Robert Hunter, Bishop Manogue (2009, 29 games)
627 Geiger, Canyon Springs (2008, 28 games)
627 McIver, Western (2005, 29 games)
605 David Bozsik, Smith Valley (2007, 30 games)
602 Jared Lewis, West Wendover (2008, 23 games)
602 Brett Kerns, McDermitt (2003, 23 games)
601 C.J. Watson, Bishop Gorman (2005, 29 games)
601 Tyrone Burris, Pahrump Valley (2000, 26 games)
595 Budweiser Hawkins, Trinity (2009, 23 games)
595 Jeff Caha, Pahrump Valley (1996, 27 games)
588 Sterling Billat, Spring Creek (2000, 26 games)
584 Nick Pavich, Whittell (1976, 23 games)
582 Kevin Walker, Moapa Valley (1991, 30 games)
575 Justyn Anderson, Mountain View (2008, 27 games)
575 Olek Czyz, Reno (2008, 29 games)
569 Boomer Taylen, Fernley (1997, 29 games)
569 Mike Burns, Chaparral (1978, 25 games)
565 Josh Goss, Dayton (2000, 27 games)
563 Wade Collie, Silverado (2009, 25 games)
562 Thorns, Valley (2006, 26 games)
562 Van Gibson, Fernley (1996, 33 games)
561 Jared Dillman, Pahrump Valley (1998, 26 games)
559 Jorge Gonzalez, Jackpot (2009, 27 games)
550 Dwayne Zaval, Gabbs (1970, 25 games)
548 Pierre Jackson, Desert Pines (2009, 26 games)
548 Andre McFarland, Durango (2006, 24 games)
542 Bob Gallagher, Virginia City (1972, 26 games)
continued...
001103
x x
Most Free Throws Attempted, Career
832 Dantley Walker, Lincoln County (2008-2011, 115 games)
680 Darra Russell, Needles (2006-2009)
619 Zach Coughlin, Reno (1992-1995, 89 games)
555 Lee Hafen, Boulder City (1997-2000)
555 Scott Brotherson, Virgin Valley (1981-1984)
529 Richard Bowler, Virgin Valley (1982-1985)
519 Danny Brotherson, Virgin Valley (1992-1995)
489 Boomer Taylen, Fernley (1994-1997)
445 DeMiyon Hall, Mountain View (1997-2000)
421 Darin Weyer, Gabbs (1982-1984)
407 Johnmin Hickey, Bishop Manogue (1998-2001)
389 Roy Torrero, Jackpot (1997-2000)
Most Free Throws Attempted, Season (No. of Games)
248 Fred Thompson, Las Vegas (1976, 26 games)
208 Darra Russell, Needles (2008, 26 game)
199 Brian Benson, Incline (1978)
197 Scott Brotherson, Virgin Valley (1984, n/a)
185 Danny Brotherson, Virgin Valley (1994, n/a)
183 Dustin Corbridge, Jackpot (2002)
182 John Drozek, Jackpot (1986)
177 Darin Weyer, Gabbs (1983, 22 games)
176 Adam Grigg, Fernley (1997, 29 games)
174 Richard Bowler, Virgin Valley (1985, n/a)
170 Kevin Vaughn, Virgin Valley (1997, n/a)
170 Bob Rudnick, Virginia City (1972, 26 games)
165 Greg Anderson, Mountain View (2003, 31 games)
160 Nick McQueen, Dayton (2003, 31 games)
156 Aaron Allen, North Valleys (2003, 28 games)
153 Bobby Nylen, Dayton (2001, 28 games)
Most Free Throws Attempted, Game
32 Darin Weyer, Gabbs (1983 vs. Gerlach)
28 Johnmin Hickey, Bishop Manogue (2000 vs. Mojave)
27 Dantley Walker, Lincoln County (2010 vs. West Wendover)
26 Bob Del Carlo, Virginia City (1977 vs. Lund)
24 Bob Gallagher, Virginia City (1972 vs. Gabbs)
23 Greg Walker, Moapa Valley (1987 vs. Pineview, UT)
20 Dustin Corbridge, Jackpot (2002 vs. Owyhee)
19 Greg Hess, Virginia City (1984 vs. Pyramid Lake)
19 Doug Wheeler, Gabbs (1971 vs. Smith Valley)
001104
x
x
124 NSHSRB, Boys Basketball cont.
Most Free Throws Made, Career
725 Dantley Walker, Lincoln County (2008-2011, 115 games)
414 Lee Hafen, Boulder City (1997-2000)
341 Boomer Taylen, Fernley (1994-1997)
292 Johnmin Hickey, Bishop Manogue (1998-2001)
258 Darin Weyer, Gabbs (1982-1984)
252 DeMiyon Hall, Mountain View (1997-2000)
Most Free Throws Made, Season (No. of Games)
211 Devanair Hogan, North Valleys (2003-2006)
142 Brian Benson, Incline (1978)
138 Bob Rudnick, Virginia City (1972, 26 games)
120 John Drozek, Jackpot (1986)
118 Darin Weyer, Gabbs (1983, 22 games)
114 Dustin Corbridge, Jackpot (2002)
107 Greg Anderson, Mountain View (2003, 31 games)
107 Nick McQueen, Dayton (2003, 31 games)
105 Sterling Billat, Spring Creek (2000, 26 games)
103 Adam Grigg, Fernley (1997, 29 games)
102 Aaron Allen, North Valleys (2003, 28 games)
Most Free Throws Made, Game
27 Darin Weyer, Gabbs (1983 vs. Gerlach)
25 of 26 Dantley Walker, Lincoln County, 2011 vs. Agassi Prep
(2010 -- 24 of 27 vs. West Wendover; 17-for-18 vs. Lake Mead)
24 of 24 Bob Gallagher, Virginia City (1972 vs. Gabbs)
21 Johnmin Hickey, Bishop Manogue (2000 vs. Mojave)
20 Greg Walker, Moapa Valley (1987 vs. Pineview, UT)
18 Mitrell Clark, Eldorado (2009 vs. Desert Pines -- 18-for-21)
18 Matt Alleman, Elko (2001 vs. Carson)
17 Lance Buoncristiani, Galena (1998 vs. Rangeview, Colo. -- 17-for-18)
17 Greg Hess, Virginia City (1984 vs. Pyramid Lake)
16 Sterling Billat, Spring Creek (2000 vs. Fernley)
16 Daryl Christopher, Western (2000 vs. South Tahoe)
15 Thomas Farmer, Spanish Springs (2005 vs. McQueen)
15 Gabe Velazquez, Fernley (1998 vs. ROP)
15 John Drozek, Jackpot (1986 vs. Carlin)
15 Bob Del Carlo, Virginia City (1977 vs. Lund)
15 Darren Bay, Virgin Valley (1977 vs. n/a)
14 of 15 Fred Preciado, Moapa Valley (1976 vs. Tonopah)
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INDIVIDUAL DEFENSE
Most Total Rebounds, Career
1,398 John Seymour, Virginia City (1970-1973)
1,266 Mitch Woods, Lowry (1971-1973)
1,019 Jeff Caha, Pahrump Valley (1994-1997)
909 Mark Kase, Moapa Valley (1973-1975)
904 Richard Bowler, Virgin Valley (1982-1985)
835 Randy Gordon, Pahrump Valley (1975-1978)
820 Josh Hanagarne, Spring Creek (1993-1996)
775 Stephen Waite, Virgin Valley (1991-1994)
749 David Hughes, Virgin Valley (1971-1974)
708 Greg Hughes, Virgin Valley (1973-1976)
696 Scott Brotherson, Virgin Valley (1981-1984)
684 Danny Brotherson, Virgin Valley (1992-1995)
678 Tyrone Burris, Pahrump Valley (1998-2000)
575 Ketesi Otuafi, Fernley (1988-1989)
556 Tim Wholey, North Valleys (2002-2005)
552 Ryan Reeder, Fernley (1994-1996)
Most Total Rebounds, Season (No. of Games)
482 John Seymour, Virginia City (1972, 26 games)
404 Dale Puckett, Cimarron-Memorial (2009, 32 games)
397 Kasey Winters, Virgin Valley (2001, 29 games)
390 Henry Thorns, Jr., Valley (2007, 33 games)
374 Richard Bowler, Virgin Valley (1985, 30 games)
373 Mike Burns, Chaparral (1978, 25 games)
371 Daxton Jim, Owyhee (2009, 27 games)
367 Greg Hughes, Virgin Valley (1976, 25 games)
366 Jones, Valley (2008, 30 games)
360 Mike Brown, Bishop Gorman (1978, 24 games)
357 David Hughes, Virgin Valley (1974, 27 games)
355 King, Liberty (2008, 27 games)
344 Stewart, Chaparral (2007, 22 games)
327 Cutright, Cimarron-Memorial (2007, 27 games)
324 Keith Olson, Douglas (2007, 24 games)
322 Michaels, Valley (2008, 31 games)
319 Stephen Waite, Virgin Valley (1994, 31 games)
315 Portz, Bishop Gorman (2005, 28 games)
313 Mike Miller, Battle Mountain (2009, 27 games)
308 Smiley, Valley (2005, 29 games)
305 Malone, Eldorado (2007, 24 games)
304 Ketesi Otuafi, Fernley (1989, 25 games)
303 Jackson, Valley (2005, 29 games)
299 Grier, Mojave (2005, 23 games)
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Canada Free Press - Printer Friendly Version
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Inside Las Vegas: Diverting passengers for profit
Nevada legalizes extortion
By Steve Miller, AmericanMafia.com
Monday, February 12, 2007
LAS VEGAS - In this2005 Las Vegas Sun photo,hundreds of local cabbies are shown blocking the Las Vegas Strip
inprotest of a bill passed by unanimous vote of the Nevada Legislaturethat would have prohibited many of them from
taking pay offs from stripclubs and other adult businesses while allowing limo and shuttle vandrivers to continue the
practice unimpeded.
After the 2005 bill was approved, former Governor Kenny Guinn vetoedit when cabbies -- on company time and using
company equipment -- shutdown the Strip and threatened to shut down the airport.
Governor Guinn claimed to have received over 500 calls and emailsasking for his veto. Using the reason
"Taxicabdrivers contribute greatly to the economy of this state," and that thebill was unfair because "It singles out and
hurts the financialwell-being of taxicab drivers" (whileallowing limo and shuttle van drivers to extort at will), he
dutifullysigned the veto while not taking into consideration the direconsequences that doing nothing would inflict on
tourists and localbusinesses.
Shortly after his veto, some taxi drivers declared victory and vowed touse the same obstructionist tactics in the futureto
accomplish their goals if the need again arises. Cab company ownersremained silent, though average citizens
complained loudly about beinginconvenienced and threatened, along with their continued complaintsabout receiving
poor taxi service in the outlying areas before thedemonstration.
Then last week, the 2007 Nevada Assembly amazinglycowered and voted 42 - 0 to supportGuinn's veto thereby
legalizing extortionthroughout the state! Maybe the casinos blocked by the protestingcabbies told their elected
representatives to acquiesce for fear offuture demonstrations on the Strip or airport. Whatever the reason, itwas one of
the biggest shockers in the history of the Silver State.
Now,other businessowners are reporting that they also are being extorted if theydepend on tourist business. These
include wedding chapels, well knownoff-Strip restaurants, pawn shops, bridal shops, and florists.Remember, the state
government is supposed to be protecting theconvenience and necessity of all citizens, not just taxi and limodrivers. But
Governor Guinn seemed to miss this fact and many smallbusinesses are left paying the price.
Now its up to our new Governor, Jim Gibbons, to straighten out thismess before a few cabbies -- through threats -- are
able to take overthe state any time they see fit by using their boss' equipment to snarltraffic and cripple the tourist
economy while leaving many localswalking or taking the bus.
Some cab and limo company owners are known to condone the practice ofsome drivers diverting passengers for profit.
It saves those owners theexpense of having to pay a living wage with benefits. It also allowsthem to claim they need
more vehicles to meet the needs of locals andconventioneers.
After no company owners complained when their equipment and personnelwere involved without permission in the
2005 civil disobedience, someobservers began to speculate that another scheme was in the works. Theyalso wondered
how our State government could be so controlled by thethreat of only one industry, and why the public's roadways
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were allowedto be used to threaten the Governor, especially when the taxi industryis supposed to be regulated by the
state?
Keepin mind that most cab and limo drivers in Vegas are moral law abidingcitizens like this driver who wrote to
INSIDE VEGAS:
"Steve:Regarding 'club runs', having driven a cab in Vegas for some 140 dayssince July of 2005, I
wouldn't rely on those 'tips' to pay for my foodbudget, much less the rent. In my experience, with only a
couple ofexceptions, when passengers desired to go to a club, they knew exactlywhere they wanted to go.
And that's just where I took them. Noquestions asked. Plus, as I understood it, any diversion of
passengerswas not only illegal, more important, it was unethical. Out of some3200 trips, there were only
two instances that I can recall being askedfor a recommendation regarding a strip bar when I collected any
extradough from having made one." - Jon
And there are many moreethical drivers who feel the same, but I understand that most of themwork the less lucrative
day shift when "club runs" are not soprevalent. After the sun goes down things change. That's when you seedozens of
idling cabs in front of every strip club up and downIndustrial Road while local citizens wait and wait and wait for a
cabto the airport. Also, the doormen at the major hotels want a cut, andwill only direct guests wishing to go to an adult
club to the cabs andlimos of drivers who give them a hefty kick back. Hotel managementlooks the other way in typical
"What happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas"style. No one seems to care that thousands of our tourists are being rippedoff,
extorted, and sometimes beat up after they arrive at an illicitsex business they may not have originally intended to visit
--something else the transportation company owners would rather not beheld liable for.
On that subject, Brent KentonJordan, the formerstrip bar bouncer turned author of the best selling novel "Stripped,"tells
INSIDE VEGAS:
"Steve: The standardcabdriver extortion rate is currently (for the past several months, andas of today)
$70.00 per head. Kevin Kelly at the Spearmint Rhino wasthe last holdout at $30.00 per head until this past
week, where hebroke down to the pressure. The Rhino, in court documents, claims theypaid out over 10
million dollars in 2005, alone (at $30.00 per head). Ican understand the spineless politicians cowing down
to these terroristcabdrivers (what else would you call a group that boycotts businesses,shuts down the strip,
and threatens to shut down the airport if theirextortion money is cut off?) but how is it that the IRS is
ignoringthis? Look at the numbers: 10 million per year from the Rhino, andsimilar amounts from
Cheetahs, the Crazy Horse, Treasures, The OlympicGarden, Sapphire, Club Paradise... (all the clubs
over thirtynowpaying, with the exception of the Palomino). Possibly fifty milliondollars per year
divided between, maybe a hundred cabdrivers who workthose areas and shifts. Millions in and out of the
clubs and cabdriverpockets without a dollar in taxes being paid. What about HomelandSecurity? Do you
suppose any of those millions are being funneled toterrorist organizations (without making any obvious
references tocabdrivers with mideast and Somali ties)?"
In the case of cab andlimo drivers diverting tourists to businesses that pay per customerdelivered, keep in mindthat
some shuttle vans have 20 or more seats!
Unscrupulousdrivers can make hundreds or possibly thousands of dollars per night byjust waiting in the queue in front
of anyIndustrial Road strip bar for patrons who want to go to another stripbar -- recommend the closest one that offers
pay offs, and drive a fewblocks down the road. In some instances, the only reason gasoline isused is to power the auto
air conditioners while vehicles sitmotionless in the queue. When they do hit the street, its only for acouple of blocks,
and the whole scenario starts over again until thesun comes up. In the meantime, radio volume is turned down, and
localresidents wonder why they can't get a cab?
Because of the current situation, there's no need for the regulatingagency known as the Nevada Taxicab Authority
(T.A.) whose only purposeis to make sure new companies don't get approved to compete withexisting cab and limo
operators who are famous for giving generouspolitical campaign contributions to Governors, and wining and dininghis
appointed T.A. commissioners.
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Nevada has strict laws that protect the exclusivity of the owners andtheir desire to squelch competition. The "Public
Convenienceand Necessity"law allows each owner to "intervene" when a new operator applies for ataxi or limo
certificate. The intervention permits company attorneys toclaim an "adverse impact" if competition was allowed -- that
theirclient would suffer financial harm with new competition. Because ofthis law that has been ruled unconstitutional
in 47 states, Nevada onlyallows several companies to ply our streets with cabs, limos, andshuttle vans. Those outsiders
who apply for certificates soon learn anexpensive lesson like that taught to Music Express Limousines, one ofthe
nation's largest limo companies, when they tried to get a permit tooperate in Clark County (Las Vegas).
It seemed that the "public's convenience and necessity" was overpoweredby the existing company's convenience and
necessity to limit legitimatecompetition.
At the time, I was fresh off the Clark County Regional TransportationCommission where I had spent four tumultuous
years exposing the $10 -$17 million per year skimmingoperation of the former transit bus system on the Strip. Like
mostformer public officials after leaving public office, I opened aconsulting business, and my first client was Music
Express.
After spending a quarter million in legal fees, a hearing was heldbefore Governor Bob Miller's appointed Nevada
Transportation ServicesAuthority. At that hearing theother limo operators sent their attorneys to plead that there would
bean "adverse impact" on their business if Music Express was allowed tooperate in Nevada.
Knowing the players on the-then Nevada TransportationServices Authority,I soon realized I would have to become a
bag man to make it work, andthat's not my style. I told my clients who immediately pulled out. Thefirm with branches
in New York, Washington D.C., LA, and San Franciscofolded their tents and left Sin City never to return. They were
toolegitimate to do business in Nevada.
Imagine the same set of rules for pizza parlors, dry cleaners, orbeauty salons? Someone who legitimately applies for a
business licensewould have to face the high powered attorneys of the neighborhoodcompetition who would appear at a
hearing officiated by a bunch of paidoff appointees of the Governor who say the new business will cause an"adverse
impact" on existing pizza parlors, dry cleaners, or beautysalons, therefore no competitive license should be granted.
Sound ridiculous? It would be in any other town. But in Sin City, it'spar for the course, at least with taxicab, limo,
shuttle van, and towtruck companies.
At present, no new "Certificate of Public Convenience andNecessity" can be issued without theapproval of the men
and women the former Governor appointed to thestate Taxi Authority or TransportationServices Authority,and many
of those same men and women are notorious for taking bribes.
Get the picture?
Taxi and limo certificates or medallions should be available to anyonewith a commercial drivers license and insurance
who wants to fulfillthe American Dream. Why doesn't Nevada allow one owner - one cabbusinesses? Or allow new
operators to own fleets? Ask our new GovernorJim Gibbons? It all depends on who he plans to appoint to his nextstate
transportation boards and commissions, and whether they enforcethe laws that are supposed to protect the public's best
interests.
Meanwhile, call at least two hours in advance for a cab to McCarranAirport if you need to catch a red eye.
Copyright Steve Miller
Steve Miller, is a former Las Vegas City Councilman. In 1991, the readers of the Las Vegas Review Journal voted him
the "Most Effective Public Official" in Southern Nevada. Miller writes internationally syndicated columns on organized
crime and political corruption for Rick Porrello's AmericanMafia.com: Visit his website at:
SteveMiller4LasVegas.com. Steve can be reached at: Stevemiller4lv@aol.com
Recent articles by Steve Miller
001109
Printed from: http://www.canadafreepress.com/2007/miller021207.htm
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1
MINUTES OF THE MEETING
OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS
October 22, 2008
A regular meeting of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Nevada was convened on October 22,
2008 via video conference at 9:15 a.m.
The following members were in attendance:
Bruce Beesley, President
Kathleen England, President Elect
Cam Ferenbach, Vice President
Nancy Allf, Immediate Past President
Connie Akridge
Larry Digesti
Frank Flaherty
Dara Goldsmith
Gregg Kamer
Alan Lefebvre
Bridget Robb Peck
Bruce Shapiro
John White
Robert Witek
State Bar Staff Present:
Rob Bare
David Clark
Patrice Eichman
Kimberly Farmer
Marc Mersol
Gale Skala
Jodi McKenzie
Guests:
Stephanie Allen
Margo Piscevich
Judge Robert Johnston
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1. CALL TO ORDER
The meeting was called to order by President Bruce Beesley at 9:15 am and a quorum was present.
2. CONSENT ITEMS
The following Consent Agenda items were accepted or approved unanimously by the Board of Governors.
Approval of Minutes of August 27, 2008
It was moved, seconded and carried to approve the minutes of August 27, 2008.
Finance Report
Admissions Report
It was moved, seconded and approved to reappoint Mark Wenzel for a three year term to the Board of Bar
Examiners effective October 2008.
It was moved, seconded and approved to reappoint Kevin Kelly, Lori Story, Dr. Gregory Brown and Dr.
Michael Levy for a three year term to the Character and Fitness Committee effective October 2008.
Report of Fee Dispute Committee/ Clients Security Fund
It was moved, seconded and approved to appoint Edward Coleman for a three year term to the Fee Dispute
Committee, Las Vegas Panel C, and effective October 2008.
It was moved, seconded and approved to appoint the following volunteers for a three year term to the Fee
Dispute Committee effective October 2008.
E. Brent Bryson Las Vegas Panel C
Bryan D. Dixon Las Vegas Panel C
Philip S. Gerson Las Vegas Panel C
Katherine Gordon Las Vegas Panel C
Margaret Crowley Reno Panel
It was moved, seconded and approved to reappoint the following members for an additional three year term
to the Fee Dispute Arbitration Committee effective October 2008.
Philip Dabeny Las Vegas Panel A
Ronald Warren Las Vegas Panel A
James Wilkerson, Sr Las Vegas Panel A
Robert Ebinger Las Vegas Panel B
Kurt Faux Las Vegas Panel B
Jeremiah Pendleton Las Vegas Panel B
E. Paul Richitt, Jr. Las Vegas Panel B
Lawrence Rouse Las Vegas Panel B
Thomas Tanksley Las Vegas Panel B
Marianne Gatti Las Vegas Panel C
Jack Hegeduis, Sr. Las Vegas Panel C
Nicolas Frey Reno Panel
James Laughton, Jr. Reno Panel
David Morris Reno Panel
Sandra O. Wilson Reno Panel
Jarold Young Reno Panel
Keith Loomis Carson City Panel
It was moved, seconded and approved to appoint James Oronoz for a three year term to the Clients Security
Fund Committee effective October 2008.
It was moved, seconded and approved to reappoint Lawrence E. Mitten for an additional three year term to
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3
the Clients Security Fund Committee effective October 2008.
Law Related Education Report
3. CLE REPORT
Kimberly Farmer reported on the status of the Bridge the Gap survey. The survey results are scheduled to
be delivered November 3, 2008. Upon review of the survey results, a subcommittee of the CLE Committee
will make recommendations on the seminar.
The CLE Committee recommends entering into a one year contract with LegalSpan as the platform for the
State Bars alternative delivery program. This will be in addition to live seminars and is one way that the
State Bar can offer CLE to the rural counties. It was moved, seconded and approved to enter into a one
year contract with LegalSpan.
After discussion concerning the term limits of the CLE Committee members set forth in the Supreme Court
rule governing the committee, it was moved, seconded and approved that the members of the committee
whose terms had expired in June 2008, will now expire in June 2009. It was moved, seconded and
approved to extend the term limit of John Albrecht until 2010. Bruce Beesley will discuss the action of the
Board regarding CLE term limits with Chief Justice Gibbons at their meeting in November.
4. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMMISSION REPORT
Justices Hardesty and Douglas request the Board of Governors to amend the State Bar mailing list policy to
allow banks which have been identified by the Commission as offering a preferred interest rate on IOLTA
funds to purchase the mailing list on a one time basis. It was moved, seconded and approved to allow banks
offering a higher interest rate on IOLTA funds the option to purchase the mailing list. It will be noted to the
following banks that they must mention the rate they are offering on IOLTA funds, the banks are not to share
the list with any other entity and the mailing list is offered only once a year. Currently the banks offering
preferred interest rates are:
Bank of Nevada
First Independent Bank
Irwin Union Bank
Nevada State Bank
U.S. Bank.
5. YOUNG LAWYERS SECTION REPORT
Stephanie Allen gave a status report on what activities the Young Lawyers Section has been offering. Ms.
Allen reported on the compensation survey. Jasmine Mehta will compile the data from the survey and send it
to the members of the section.
6. VACANCY STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ETHICS AND ELECTION PRACTICES
It was moved, seconded and approved to reappoint the following attorneys for a two year term to the
Standing Committee on Judicial Ethics and Election Practices effective December 2008.
Michael Pintar
Bernard Zadrowski
7. SECTION REVIEW
Kimberly Farmer reported on the sections of the State Bar. It was moved, seconded and approved to
approve the bylaws for the following sections.
Administrative Law
Bankruptcy
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4
Environmental and Natural Resources
Probate and Trust
It was moved, seconded and approved to approve the officers listed below for the Probate and Trust Section.
John E. Dawson Chair
J. Douglas Clark Vice-Chair
Brent Keele Secretary
Mark Solomon Treasurer
It was noted that Cam Ferenbach abstained from voting.
The Technology section is not active, nor does the section have officers or bylaws. No members of the
section have expressed interest in becoming active in the section. It was moved, seconded and approved to
retire the Technology section and transfer the sections carryover balance to the general fund.
In July 2007, The Board placed the Access to Justice Section on temporarily inactive status. It was moved,
seconded and approved to retire the Access to Justice Section and transfer the carryover balance to the
general fund. This amount will be included in the 2009 Access to Justice Commission budget.
8. HISTORY COMMITTEE
Judge Robert Johnston reported to the Board the recent status of the History Committee. He noted that
nothing has been done recently to advance this project. Judge Johnston recommends that the State Bar
organize a committee of members who would be interested in compiling the history of the State Bar. Judge
Johnston reminded the Board that in order to accumulate and compile the history, there is a financial
component. Bruce Beesley will invite members to join this committee. Board member Dara Goldsmith will
serve as the Board liaison to the committee.
9. COMMITTEE REPORTS
x Committee Ethics and Professional Responsibility
It was moved, seconded and approved to appoint the following new officers to the Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Committee. Their terms will expire December 2009.
Jeff Stempel Chair
David Merrill Vice Chair
x Bylaws Committee
Connie Akridge discussed the progress the Bylaws Committee had made in revising the bylaws. The revised
bylaws will include appendices for State Bar policies and procedures. Presented in this discussion for
information purposes were policy changes to the bylaws. Final recommendations by the committee will be
brought to the Board for approval.
10. REPORT OF PRESIDENT ELECT
Kathleen England reported on a recent site visit to Monterey, CA. Monterey is the location of the 2010 annual
convention.

11. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
ABA Delegate Report Margo Piscevich reported on the annual meeting of the ABA House of Delegates.
Ms. Piscevich recommended that the State Bar take a position on the proposed amendment of Model Rule
1.10 dealing with conflicts of interest. This discussion during the annual House of Delegates meeting was
tabled until February 2009 at the midyear meeting of the House of Delegates. The State Bar of Nevada
gave Margo Piscevich a plaque that acknowledged her years of service as the State Bar Delegate to the
ABA House of Delegates.
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5
Nevada Law Foundation Bruce Beesley reported on the Nevada Law Foundation (NLF). The
concern of the Board is that the Nevada Law Foundation has not reported any progress on the action plan
submitted to the NLF in January 2008. It was moved, seconded and approved that the Executive
Committee of the Board of Governors draft a letter to the NLF requesting a progress report on the action
plan. The Executive Committee will request input from the Court before sending the letter.
Reciprocity Rule Bruce Beesley discussed the rule change that was passed in Arizona granting lawyers
admission to practice in Arizona if there is reciprocity. It was suggested by the Board that we present this
matter to the members for discussion via a point/counterpoint article in the Nevada Lawyer.
Legal Services Legal Service providers have asked the Board of Governors to consider an alternative
dues structure for legal service attorneys, reducing their dues. Board members noted a concern over this
request; specifically where do you draw the line, and will this present issues with other attorneys in the
public sector. The Board will research salary levels of legal service providers and other issues.
The Board discussed the letter addressed to Bruce Beesley from Lissa Treadway, the chair of the Legal
Assistant Division. Ms. Treadway would like to set a goal to see a legislative definition of a paralegal
passed.
12. REPORT OF DEPUTY BAR COUNSEL
David Clark introduced Jodi McKenzie, coordinator for the State Bar advertising review committee. Mr.
Clark and Ms. McKenzie discussed the draft of the first Annual Report on Lawyer Advertising that the
Board of Governors is required to submit on December 31, 2008. The final report will be submitted to the
Board for approval at the December 2008 meeting.
David Clark reported the status on the rate search investigation.
It was moved, seconded and approved to appoint Adam Bult to the Southern Lawyer Advertising Advisory
Committee for a two year term effective November 2008. It was noted that Connie Akridge abstained from
voting.
13. REPORT OF BAR COUNSEL
The Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board has reached its capacity of members at this time. Therefore
Brandon McCoy was denied appointment to the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board and will be sent an
letter of explanation.
It was moved, seconded and approved to reappoint Conrad Claus to the Southern Nevada Disciplinary
Board for a fourth and final term expiring October 31, 2011.
It was moved, seconded and approved to accept the resignation of Robert Edd Lee.
There was an open discussion regarding the practice of the discipline department concerning reporting
attorneys to state and federal authorities who have stolen monies from their clients. The Board directed
Bar Counsel to report attorneys to state and federal prosecutors when an attorney has stolen money.
14. REPORT OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Kimberly Farmer discussed proposed changes to Supreme Court Rule 42 and SCR 106.5 Lawyers
Concerned for Lawyers program with additional noted change to rule 106.5. The rule should read
members of the Board of Governors. It was moved, seconded and approved to prepare an ADKT for each
rule change and submit to the Court for approval.
ADJOURNMENT
There being no new business before the Board the meeting was adjourned at 2:50 p.m.
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Case 2:03-cv-00557-LDG-PAL Document 2-1992135 Filed 05/19/03 Page 1 of 2
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owned by Kevin Kelly of the State Bar of Nevada's
Character and Fitness Committee
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Board of Governors Minutes December 2011
1
MINUTES
BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING
Las Vegas, NV
December 7, 2011
A regular meeting of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Nevada was convened on December 7,
2011.
The following members were in attendance:
Connie Akridge, President
Frank Flaherty, President-Elect
Alan Lefebvre, Vice President
Cam Ferenbach, Immediate Past President
Elizabeth Brickfield
Larry Digesti
Eric Dobberstein
Elana Turner Graham
Gene Leverty
Paul Matteoni
Richard Pocker
Bryan Scott
Richard Scotti
Mason Simons
Rick Trachok (ex-officio)
David Wall
John White (ex-officio)
State Bar staff present:
Kimberly Farmer
Gale Skala
David Clark
Marc Mersol
Jennifer Smith
Guests: via phone
Paola Armeni
Dara Goldsmith
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2
The meeting was called to order by President Connie Akridge at 10:30 a.m. there being a quorum present.
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS REPORT, KIMBERLY FARMER
Kimberly Farmer provided a synopsis on the revised Author Agreement presented by authors of the special
feature scheduled for the February 2012 Nevada Lawyer. The Nevada Lawyer Editorial Board submitted the
authors custom agreement to Board of Governors for approval. It was moved, seconded and carried to
permit the authors of this feature to retain any copyright. The Board discussed the policy of the Nevada
Lawyer with respect to final approval of article edits. It is the policy of the Nevada Lawyer that the Nevada
Lawyer has final approval of all edits to articles and that final edits are not submitted to authors for approval. It
was moved, seconded and approved to support the policies of the Nevada Lawyer with respect to the editorial
process. Bryan Scott abstained from voting.
Kimberly Farmer reported on the Transitioning into Practice (TIP) program. A Supreme Court order sets forth
a pilot TIP program. One of the steps to prepare for the pilot is for the Board to submit a list of mentors to the
Supreme Court for approval. Because the mentor schedule does not coincide with Board meetings Ms.
Farmer asked that the Board conduct this approval process via an email review and approval process. It was
moved, seconded and carried to conduct an email review and approval process for TIP mentor applicants.
PRESIDENTS REPORT, CONNIE AKRIDGE
Connie Akridge reported the status on the 2012 Annual Convention. The convention will be held at the Del
Coronado Hotel in Coronado, CA. June 27-30, 2012.
DISCUSSION ITEMS
The Board discussed the following question using the generative discussion process.
Could/should the Board of Governors take on a scheduled pro bono activity to promote pro bono?
It has been suggested that the Board of Governors plan a Board pro bono activity. The Board did not
schedule a Board of Governors pro bono activity during this discussion. But some thoughts and ideas that
were brought up during the discussion included:
x Will the Board be able to inspire members to take more pro bono cases by the Board setting the
example and reporting on their efforts?
x Perhaps the Board could host an Ask a Lawyer night.
x Board members could submit their pro bono activities to include in an article in the Nevada Lawyer.
REPORTS
Nevada Law Foundation, Dara Goldsmith
Dara Goldsmith provided a synopsis of the 2010 yearly audit report for the Nevada Law Foundation (NLF).
She noted that during the 2010 calendar year, sixteen organizations statewide were funded in the total
amount of $1,650,000. The goal for this year is to be able to provide more funding to organizations. Ms.
Goldsmith thanked the Board for their support.
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3
Nevada Bar Foundation Review, Dara Goldsmith
Dara Goldsmith provided an overview on the current Bylaws and Articles of the Nevada Bar Foundation
(NBF). Currently the NBF is classified as a private foundation. Ms. Goldsmith pointed out that being classified
as a private foundation is less attractive to potential donors. She also noted that being classified as a private
foundation can result in the imposition of various taxes. Connie Akridge asked that the Nevada Bar
Foundation Trustees review the NBFs Bylaws and Articles and status (private or public foundation).
Young Lawyers Section, Paola Armeni
Paola Armeni provided highlights of the Young Lawyers Section (YLS) activities. Ms. Armeni requested
approval for additional funds to the 2012 YLS budget because YLS member dues will not cover 2012
budgeted expenses. The YLS expenses are projected higher in 2012 due to the trial academy that is
presented at the annual convention and revisions to the Goldilocks program.
APPOINTMENTS
Member Benefits and Services Committee
It was moved, seconded and approved to reappoint the following members for a two year term commencing
December 2011.
Bret Whipple
Doug Clark
Shawn Pearson
Section Committee
It was moved, seconded and approved to appoint the following slate of officers and committee chairs and co-
chairs to the Intellectual Property section serving a one year term effective November 2011.
Linda Norcross, Chair
Charles Lombino, Vice Chair
Laura Bielinski, Secretary
Derek Jamison, Treasurer
Membership Chair, Richard Newman
Membership Co-Chair, Elda Sidhu
Legislative/Substantive Chair, Seaton Curran
Legislative/Substantive Co-Chair, Chad Miller
CLE Chair, Dick Schulze
CLE Co-Chair, Kim Cooper
Frank Flaherty abstained from voting.
It was moved, seconded and approved to appoint the following slate of officers and committee chairs and co-
chairs to the Administrative Law section serving a one year term effective November 2011.
John Griffin, Chair
Shane Young, Vice Chair
Shawn Elicegui, Secretary
Alicia Ashcraft, Treasurer
It was moved, seconded and approved to appoint the following Executive Committee members to the Real
Property section.
Chris Childs, two year term effective November 2011
Elizabeth Fielder, three year term effective November 2011
Mandy Shavinsky, four year term effective November 2011
It was moved, seconded and approved to appoint the following slate of officers and at-large members to the
001141
4
Environmental and Natural Resources section serving a one year term effective November 2011.
Linda Bullen, Co-Chair
Therese Ure, Co Chair
Laura Schroeder, Secretary
David Hornbeck, Treasurer
Thomas Woodworth, At-large member
Chris Mixson, At-large member
Karen Peterson, At-large member
Tom Wilczek, At-large member
Paul Matteoni and Elizabeth Brickfield abstained from voting.

Fee Dispute Arbitration Committee
It was moved, seconded and carried to approve the following reappointments to the Fee Dispute Arbitration
Committee for a three year term effective December 2011.
Robert Apple, LV Panel A
Morton Friedlander, LV Panel A
Robert Tarte, LV Panel B
Amanda Cowley, LV Panel A
Michael Federico, LV Panel C
Paul Gaudet, LV Panel B
Gregory Gordon, LV Panel B
Robert Gower, LV Panel C
David Jones, LV Panel C
Bryan Lewis, LV Panel C
Henry Rawlings, LV Panel C
Brian Shapiro, LV Panel A
Sgt. Victor Vigna (lay member), LV Panel C
It was moved, seconded and approved to appoint Joseph Went to the Fee Dispute Arbitration Committee for
a three year term effective December 2011.
Clients Security Fund
It was moved, seconded and approved to appoint the following Chair and Vice Chair to the Clients Security
Fund for a one year term.
Janet Pancoast, Chair, effective January 2012
Jeffrey Posin, Vice Chair, effective March 2012
Discipline Panels
It was moved, seconded and approved to appoint Richard Litt to Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board for a
three year term effective December 12, 2011.
It was moved, seconded and approved to remove Scott L. Smith from the Southern Nevada Disciplinary
Board effective December 7, 2011.
Lawyer Advertising Committee
It was moved, seconded and approved to appoint Taylor Randolph to the Southern Nevada Advertising
Committee for a two year term effective December 2011.
Publications Committee
It was moved, seconded and carried to approve Howard Siegel and Mark Rouse to the Publications
Committee for a three year term effective January 2012.
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5

Advisory Commission on the Administration of Justice
It was moved, seconded and approved to reappoint Larry Digesti and Phillip Kohn for an additional two year
term to the Advisory Commission on the Administration of Justice effective December 2011. Larry Digesti
abstained from voting.
Standing Committee on Judicial Ethics
It was moved, seconded and approved to reappoint Patrick Byrne, Steven Day and Carla Higginbotham for an
additional two year term on the Standing Committee on Judicial Ethics commencing January 2012. It was
moved, seconded and approved to appoint the following attorneys as members of the Standing Committee on
Judicial Ethics for a two year term commencing January 2012.
Kevin Briggs
Laurie Diefenbach
Bill C. Hammer
Standing Committee on Transitioning into Practice
It was moved, seconded and approved to appoint the following attorneys to the Standing Committee on
Transitioning into Practice. The committee will determine which members will be appointed initially for only
one year with a lifetime term of nine years in order that the committee members serve staggered terms.
Paola Armeni
Dara Goldsmith
Gregory Kamer
Ruth Miller
John Steffen
Thomas Stockard
Character and Fitness Committee
It was moved, seconded and approved to reappoint the following members for an additional three year term
to the Character and Fitness Committee effective November 2011.
Lori Story
Kevin Kelly
Dr. Gregory Brown
Dr. Michael Levy

ACTION ITEMS
October 2011 Financials/2012 Budget
Marc Mersol reported on the October 2011 financial report. Mr. Mersol presented the 2012 proposed budget.
It was moved, seconded and carried to fund the Young Lawyers Section 2012 budgeted shortfall. Larry
Digesti abstained.
It was moved, seconded and carried to approve the proposed 2012 budget.
Investment Committee
The report of the Investment Committee was tabled until January 2012.
001143
Owner of the strip club the Spearmint Rhino, K-Kel
xxxxxxxx
6
Amendment to Policies Communications
It was moved, seconded and carried to approve the following subsection 4.5 to the Policy 4: Communications
of the Bylaws of the Board of Governors.
4.5 Directed Communication with Constituency - Board members may communicate directly with members of
their constituencies. Communications may be disseminated in any media form. Mailing lists will be provided at
no cost to the Board member for such communications.
(a) Communications shall include the following statement at the beginning of the document in no smaller
than a 10 point font, Message from Your Board of Governor. This message is sent to you as a
personal opinion from your representative Board of Governor and may not represent the positions or
views of the State Bar of Nevada Board of Governors.
(b) Communication that express personal opinion must clearly state the collective decision of the Board of
Governors, if there is one, in addition to the opinion. In this instance, the communication must include
a disclaimer stating, The content of this communication is the personal opinion of the author and not
that of the Board of Governors.
(c) Communications may not include decisions reached or opinions expressed during executive session.
(d) A copy of any communication sent to members by Board members will be kept by the Executive
Director of the State Bar of Nevada.
Lawyer Advertising Yearly Report
It was moved, seconded and carried to approve the Lawyer Advertising Yearly Report scheduled to be
submitted to the Supreme Court.
CONSENT AGENDA
It was moved, seconded and carried to approve the agenda items under the consent agenda.
x Minutes of October 2011
x LaJolla Beach and Tennis Club Contract
x Attorney Resignations -- Lennie N. Gee and William A. Hehn.
EXECUTIVE SESSION
The Board entered into Executive Session at 2:45 pm and concluded the Executive Session at 3:10 pm.

ADJOURNMENT
There being no further business before the Board, the meeting adjourned at 3:10 pm.
001144
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2:03-cv-00557-LDG-PAL Jeffrey A. Rosenberg VS Spearmint Rhino, et al
Lloyd D. George, presiding
Peggy A. Leen, referral
Date filed: 05/16/2003
Date terminated: 12/02/2003
Date of last filing: 12/03/2003
History
Doc.
No.
Dates Description
Filed & Entered: 05/16/2003 Miscellaneous Document
Docket Text: MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENT civil rights cmplt obo P
Filed & Entered: 05/16/2003 Miscellaneous Document
Docket Text: MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENT mtn for prot ord obo P. to PAL
1 Filed & Entered: 05/16/2003
Terminated: 06/25/2003
Motion/Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis
Docket Text: MOTION/APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS obo P. (DISPO:
granted #3
2 Filed & Entered: 05/19/2003 Miscellaneous Document
Docket Text: MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENT ATTACHMENT to initial complaint obo P
3 Filed & Entered: 06/25/2003 Order
Docket Text: ORDER ORDER I/F/P grntd; clk of ct to file cmlt; cmolt dism; P has 30 days to file amended
cmplt. cpys dist. (snt P cpy of filed cmplt)
4 Filed & Entered: 06/25/2003 Complaint
Docket Text: COMPLAINT obo P (dismissed per ordr #3)
5 Filed & Entered: 10/23/2003 Order on Report and Recommendation
Docket Text: ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDS Ps cmplt be dism. cpys
dist.
6 Filed: 11/06/2003
Entered: 11/07/2003
Notice of Change of Address
Docket Text: NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS Envelope with Ps new address
7 Filed: 12/02/2003
Entered: 12/03/2003
Order
Docket Text: ORDER ORDER R&R (#5) adopted & Ps msplt dismissed. cpys dist.
8 Filed & Entered: 12/03/2003 Judgment
Docket Text: JUDGMENT ORDER Ps cmplt is dism. Judgmnt entered in favor of Ds & agnst P. cpys dist.
001145
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Civil/Criminal Case Records Search Results
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Location : District Court Civil/Criminal
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Record
Count:
8
Search By: Party Party Search Mode: Business Name Last Name: SPEARMINT RHINO Case Status: All Sort By: Filed Date
Case Number Citation Number Style/Defendant InfoFiled/Location Type/Status Charge(s)
01A443999 The Power Company
Inc, La Fuente Inc, et
al vs Anthony's Of
Hollywood, Pussy
Cats Inc, et al
12/17/2001
Department 23
Intentional Misconduct
Closed
02A458250 Christopher Asaro,
Michael Roman vs Las
Vegas County
Hospitality Services
10/24/2002
Department 23
Negligence - Other
Closed
05A514591 K-Kel Inc, Hachiman
LLC, et al vs SGC
Investment Holdings
LLC, Sheri's Ranch, et
al
12/15/2005
Department 29
Business Court
Closed
06A530080 Olympus Garden Inc,
Little Darlings Of Las
Vegas LLc, et al vs D
I Food And Beverage
Of Las Vegas LLC, K-
Kel Inc, et al
10/18/2006
Department 13
Business Court
Closed
08A574136 Deja Vu Showgirls Of
Las Vegas LLC, Little
Darlings Of Las Vegas
LLC vs Sky Top
Vending Inc, Two M
Inc, et al
10/22/2008
Department 11
Business Court
Open
09A583592 K-Kel Inc vs David
Riker
02/26/2009
Department 18
Breach of Contract
Closed
A-10-613508-C Selena Pelaez,
Plaintiff(s) vs.
Spearmint Rhino
Companies Worldwide
Inc, Defendant(s)
04/02/2010
Department 5
Other Civil Filing
Open
A-11-652300-C K-Kel, Inc., Plaintiff(s)
vs. Automated
Systems America,
Defendant(s)
11/28/2011
Department 6
Other Civil Filing
Open
001161
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Select A Case
This person is a party in 94 cases.
2:00-cr-00360-
RLH -RJJ
USA vs WAI SANG FUNG et al filed 10/17/00
2:00-cr-00360-
RLH -RJJ-11
Ing Ting Chan filed 10/17/00
2:00-cr-00404-
JCM-PAL
USA vs Timothy Quimby filed 11/16/00 closed 09/28/05
2:00-cr-00404-
JCM-PAL-1
Timothy Quimby filed 11/16/00 closed 09/28/05
2:01-cr-00167-
LRH -PAL
USA V. JULIO GUTIERREZ ET AL filed 04/25/01 closed 02/11/03
2:01-cr-00167-
LRH -PAL-2
Juan Chavarin filed 04/25/01 closed 02/11/03
2:01-cr-00273-
PMP-RJJ
USA vs GREGORY LEE JACKSON filed 07/25/01 closed 07/29/03
2:01-cr-00273-
PMP-RJJ-1
Gregory Lee Jackson filed 07/25/01 closed 07/29/03
2:01-cr-00332-
LRH-PAL
USA vs Jamie R. Gregory, et al filed 09/25/01 closed 07/26/06
2:01-cr-00332-
LRH -PAL-6
Dexter Tyrone Dukes filed 09/25/01 closed 10/02/03
2:02-cr-00012-
RLH -PAL
USA v. ZLATKO H. HRISTOV, ET AL., filed 01/15/02
2:02-cr-00012-
RLH -PAL-5
Zlatko Iankulov filed 01/15/02
001162
2:02-cr-00288-
PMP-RJJ
USA vs Christian Frederick Finze filed 05/22/02 closed 05/06/05
2:02-cr-00288-
PMP-RJJ-2
Joan Davis filed 05/22/02 closed 02/09/04
2:02-cr-00346-
PMP-RJJ
USA vs Christopher Wallace filed 06/21/02 closed 10/04/02
2:02-cr-00346-
PMP-RJJ-1
Christopher Wallace filed 06/21/02 closed 10/04/02
2:02-cr-00513-
PMP-RJJ
USA vs Eric Rosenquist filed 09/27/02 closed 03/21/03
2:02-cr-00513-
PMP-RJJ-1
Eric Rosenquist filed 09/27/02 closed 03/21/03
2:02-cr-00574-
RCJ -LRL
USA v. Comito et al filed 10/30/02 closed 11/03/03
2:02-cr-00574-
RCJ -LRL-2
Anthony Betances filed 10/30/02 closed 10/30/03
2:02-cr-00630-
PMP-RJJ
USA vs Eugene Washington et al filed 11/27/02 closed 01/26/04
2:02-cr-00630-
PMP-RJJ-1
Eugene Washington filed 11/27/02 closed 01/26/04
2:03-cr-00108-
JCM-PAL
USA vs David Bethley et al filed 03/11/03 closed 06/28/05
2:03-cr-00108-
JCM-PAL-4
Andrew Thomas filed 03/11/03 closed 11/07/03
2:03-cr-00220-
LDG-LRL
USA vs Juan Manuel Galaga-Aguilar filed 05/14/03 closed 12/13/04
2:03-CR-
00220-1
Juan Manuel Gallaga-Aguilar filed 05/14/03 closed 12/13/04
2:03-cr-00246-
RCJ -PAL
USA vs Jose Luis Pacheco-Velasquez, et al. filed 06/04/03 closed 02/14/06
2:03-cr-00246-
RCJ -PAL-2
Luis William Kaufman filed 06/04/03 closed 02/14/06
2:03-cr-00387-
KJD-RJJ
USA v. Maria Fe Fuertes Hunter filed 09/03/03 closed 04/17/07
001163
2:03-CR-
00387-1
Maria Fe Fuertes Hunter filed 09/03/03 closed 04/17/07
2:03-cr-00415-
HDM-LRL
USA vs Elba Valdes Hernandez filed 09/17/03 closed 02/12/04
2:03-CR-
00415-1
Elba Valdes Hernandez filed 09/17/03 closed 02/12/04
2:03-cr-00441-
RLH -LRL
USA vs Lori Jean Groce et al filed 10/07/03 closed 10/21/05
2:03-cr-00441-
RLH -LRL-6
Eric Igbinoba filed 10/07/03 closed 10/21/05
2:03-cr-00477-
PMP-PAL
USA vs Eugene Washington filed 10/29/03 closed 01/26/04
2:03-cr-00477-
PMP-PAL-1
Eugene Washington filed 10/29/03 closed 01/26/04
2:03-cr-00493-
RCJ -LRL
USA v. Fitzgerald filed 11/05/03 closed 10/25/04
2:03-cr-00493-
RCJ -LRL-1
Michael Fitzgerald filed 11/05/03 closed 10/25/04
2:03-cr-00577-
KJD-RJJ
USA vs Kohath Carroll ,et al. filed 12/23/03 closed 03/31/06
2:03-cr-00577-
KJD -RJJ-2
Graylon Dillon filed 12/23/03 closed 03/31/06
2:03-cv-01609-
JCM-PAL
VIDEOLOCITY INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. NATIVE
AMERICAN REFINING COMPANY, CAPITAL, LLC, et al.
filed 12/23/03 closed 03/26/07
2:03-ms-00038-
N/A -NA
In Re: VS Elba Valdes Hernandez filed 09/19/03
2:04-cr-00027-
PMP-RJJ
USA vs John Bradshaw et al filed 01/27/04 closed 12/05/05
2:04-cr-00027-
PMP-RJJ-2
Lance Eugene Perry filed 01/27/04 closed 12/05/05
2:04-cr-00274-
RLH -PAL
USA vs Jose Salazar Perez, et al filed 06/30/04 closed 10/21/05
2:04-cr-00274-
001164
RLH -PAL-3
Heriberto Buendia filed 06/30/04 closed 10/21/05
2:04-ms-00002-
N/A -NA
In Re: VS Danny Carlton Rackley filed 01/20/04
2:05-cr-00073-
RLH -LRL-1
Jason Todd Kindle filed 03/02/05 closed 03/09/07
2:05-mj-00730-
RJJ-RJJ-1
PATRICK K. MATHIS filed 09/12/05 closed 02/01/06
2:06-cr-00002-
RCJ -GWF-14
Frank Enochs filed 01/03/06 closed 03/13/08
2:06-cr-00056-
KJD-PAL-1
Samuel Lee Clay filed 02/15/06 closed 09/05/07
2:06-cr-00192-
PMP -LRL-1
Jan Senn filed 05/31/06 closed 01/25/07
2:06-cr-00350-
KJD-LRL-1
Daniel J. McCartan filed 10/17/06 closed 05/07/09
2:06-mj-00286-
PAL-PAL-1
Jan Senn filed 05/19/06 closed 05/31/06
2:07-ms-00074-
NA
Young filed 11/14/07
2:08-cr-00035-
JCM-LRL-1
Marino Antonio Muralles-Oliva filed 02/07/08 closed 04/07/09
2:08-cr-00171-
GMN -VCF-1
Benjamin Labee filed 06/04/08
2:08-cr-00308-
GMN -RJJ-1
Gor Krkhyan filed 11/18/08 closed 01/25/12
2:09-cr-00113-
GMN -PAL-4
Erik Dushawn Webster filed 03/17/09 closed 01/19/12
2:09-mj-00308-
Erik Dushawn Webster filed 04/13/09 closed 06/30/09
001165
PAL-PAL-1
2:88-cr-00240-
PMP-RJJ
USA vs LISBON HALL et al filed 12/14/88 closed 12/01/89
2:88-cr-00240-
PMP-RJJ-3
George Edward Brown filed 12/14/88 closed 12/01/89
2:91-cr-00313-
PMP-RJJ
USA vs CURRY JAMES WILLIAMS et al filed 12/18/91 closed 10/01/92
2:91-cr-00313-
PMP-RJJ-2
William D. Davis filed 12/18/91 closed 10/01/92
2:92-cr-00162-
HDM -N/A
USA vs William Ralph Archer, et al filed 07/15/92 closed 12/03/93
2:93-cr-00155-
PMP-LRL
USA vs Ricardo Lorenzo Crockett, et al. filed 06/01/93
2:93-cr-00155-
PMP -LRL-16
James Clark Lee filed 06/01/93 closed 10/18/95
2:95-cr-00025-
PMP -RJJ
USA vs Craig Archie, et al filed 02/01/95 closed 07/03/95
2:95-cr-00025-
PMP -RJJ-1
Craig Archie filed 02/01/95 closed 07/03/95
2:95-cr-00265-
LDG-NA
USA v. Lawrence Duane Taylor filed 10/11/95 closed 08/12/96
2:95-cr-00265-
LDG-NA-1
Lawrence Duane Taylor filed 10/11/95 closed 08/12/96
2:95-cr-00328-
PMP
USA vs CURTIS ALPHONSE BURNEY et al filed 12/07/95 closed 01/06/00
2:95-cr-00328-
PMP-11
Raymond Filosi filed 12/07/95 closed 01/06/00
2:96-cr-00219-
LDG -RJJ
USA v. Antonio Rafael Montero-Morlotti, et al., filed 09/13/96 closed 10/06/97
2:96-cr-00219-
LDG -RJJ-2
Fermin Ramirez filed 09/13/96 closed 10/06/97
2:97-cr-00172-
PMP -VCF
USA vs Geraldine Olanda Jackson, et al filed 07/30/97 closed 08/10/98 001166
2:97-cr-00172-
PMP -VCF-4
Undray Meeks filed 07/30/97 closed 08/10/98
2:98-cr-00106-
HDM-RJJ
USA vs ELI QUINTOA filed 03/25/98 closed 04/20/99
2:98-cr-00227-
LDG -LRL
USA v. ROBERT LEROY SCHILLER, ET AL filed 06/17/98 closed 02/15/00
2:98-cr-00227-
LDG -LRL-2
Raymond Filosi filed 06/17/98 closed 02/15/00
2:98-cr-00309-
KJD-RJJ
USA vs Vincent George Parks, et al. filed 08/26/98 closed 03/06/00
2:98-cr-00309-
KJD -RJJ-3
Ellis Lee Clarke filed 08/26/98 closed 09/10/99
2:98-cr-00375-
PMP -NA
USA vs Christiano DeCarlo et al filed 10/13/98 closed 03/24/00
2:98-cr-00375-
PMP -NA-6
Joshua Snellings filed 10/13/98 closed 03/24/00
2:98-cv-01016-
PMP -RJJ
John Bejarano vs. Baker, et al (DEATH PENALTY) filed 07/13/98 closed 09/01/10
2:99-cr-00114-
PMP-LRL
USA vs LEE STEPHEN MOSS filed 03/23/99 closed 11/01/99
2:99-cr-00114-
PMP-LRL-1
Lee Stephen Moss filed 03/23/99 closed 11/01/99
2:99-cr-00287-
PMP-RJJ
USA vs Geraldine Shelby, et al filed 07/14/99 closed 04/25/11
2:99-cr-00357-
RLH -LRL
USA vs Daniel Sebastian Balkun, et al filed 09/08/99 closed 12/05/01
2:99-cr-00357-
RLH -LRL-3
Curtis A. Branson filed 09/08/99 closed 12/05/01
2:99-cr-00471-
PMP -RLH
USA vs Mary Shorey filed 12/15/99 closed 03/15/00
2:99-cr-00471-
PMP -RLH-1
Mary Shorey filed 12/15/99 closed 03/15/00
001167
2:99-cr-00509-
PMP-RJJ
USA vs Vince Vecchiarino filed 12/15/99 closed 07/05/00
2:99-cr-00509-
PMP-RJJ-1
Vince Vecchiarino filed 12/15/99 closed 07/05/00
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Spearmint Rhino Adult Cabaret Company Profile - Located in Las Vegas, NV - Kevin Kelly
Spearmint Rhino Adult Cabaret
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Updated 11/15/2011 -
This profile of
Spearmint Rhino
Adult Cabaret was
created using data
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Officers
Kevin Kelly
Owner
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001203
Spearmint Rhino Adult Cabaret
Spearmint Rhino Adult Cabaret has a location in Las Vegas, NV. Active officers include Kevin Kelly.
The company's line of business includes Drinking Places, Nsk.
001204
3340 S Highland Dr
Las Vegas, NV 89109
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Officers at Spearmint Rhino Adult Cabaret

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Kevin Kelly
Owner at Spearmint Rhino Adult Cabaret Las Vegas, NV
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Other: 53,733 (10%)
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001206
Located in Fort
Lauderdale, FL
001207
Canada Free Press - Printer Friendly Page
V2.0 - CJ Website Design
www.cj-design.com
Inside Las Vegas: Diverting passengers for profit
Nevada legalizes extortion
By Steve Miller, AmericanMafia.com
Monday, February 12, 2007
LAS VEGAS - In this2005 Las Vegas Sun photo,hundreds of local cabbies are shown blocking
the Las Vegas Strip inprotest of a bill passed by unanimous vote of the Nevada Legislaturethat
would have prohibited many of them from taking pay offs from stripclubs and other adult
businesses while allowing limo and shuttle vandrivers to continue the practice unimpeded.
After the 2005 bill was approved, former Governor Kenny Guinn vetoedit when cabbies -- on
company time and using company equipment -- shutdown the Strip and threatened to shut
down the airport.
Governor Guinn claimed to have received over 500 calls and emailsasking for his veto. Using
the reason "Taxicabdrivers contribute greatly to the economy of this state," and that thebill was
unfair because "It singles out and hurts the financialwell-being of taxicab
drivers" (whileallowing limo and shuttle van drivers to extort at will), he dutifullysigned the veto
while not taking into consideration the direconsequences that doing nothing would inflict on
tourists and localbusinesses.
Shortly after his veto, some taxi drivers declared victory and vowed touse the same
obstructionist tactics in the futureto accomplish their goals if the need again arises. Cab
company ownersremained silent, though average citizens complained loudly about
beinginconvenienced and threatened, along with their continued complaintsabout receiving
poor taxi service in the outlying areas before thedemonstration.
Then last week, the 2007 Nevada Assembly amazinglycowered and voted 42 - 0 to
supportGuinn's veto thereby legalizing extortionthroughout the state! Maybe the casinos
blocked by the protestingcabbies told their elected representatives to acquiesce for fear
offuture demonstrations on the Strip or airport. Whatever the reason, itwas one of the biggest
shockers in the history of the Silver State.
Now,other businessowners are reporting that they also are being extorted if theydepend on
tourist business. These include wedding chapels, well knownoff-Strip restaurants, pawn shops,
bridal shops, and florists.Remember, the state government is supposed to be protecting
theconvenience and necessity of all citizens, not just taxi and limodrivers. But Governor Guinn
seemed to miss this fact and many smallbusinesses are left paying the price.
Now its up to our new Governor, Jim Gibbons, to straighten out thismess before a few cabbies
Page 1 of 4 http://www.canadafreepress.com/printpage.php
001208
-- through threats -- are able to take overthe state any time they see fit by using their boss'
equipment to snarltraffic and cripple the tourist economy while leaving many localswalking or
taking the bus.
Some cab and limo company owners are known to condone the practice ofsome drivers
diverting passengers for profit. It saves those owners theexpense of having to pay a living
wage with benefits. It also allowsthem to claim they need more vehicles to meet the needs of
locals andconventioneers.
After no company owners complained when their equipment and personnelwere involved
without permission in the 2005 civil disobedience, someobservers began to speculate that
another scheme was in the works. Theyalso wondered how our State government could be so
controlled by thethreat of only one industry, and why the public's roadways were allowedto be
used to threaten the Governor, especially when the taxi industryis supposed to be regulated by
the state?
Keepin mind that most cab and limo drivers in Vegas are moral law abidingcitizens like this
driver who wrote to INSIDE VEGAS:
"Steve:Regarding 'club runs', having driven a cab in Vegas for some 140 dayssince
July of 2005, I wouldn't rely on those 'tips' to pay for my foodbudget, much less the
rent. In my experience, with only a couple ofexceptions, when passengers desired
to go to a club, they knew exactlywhere they wanted to go. And that's just where I
took them. Noquestions asked. Plus, as I understood it, any diversion of
passengerswas not only illegal, more important, it was unethical. Out of some3200
trips, there were only two instances that I can recall being askedfor a
recommendation regarding a strip bar when I collected any extradough from having
made one." - Jon
And there are many moreethical drivers who feel the same, but I understand that most of
themwork the less lucrative day shift when "club runs" are not soprevalent. After the sun goes
down things change. That's when you seedozens of idling cabs in front of every strip club up
and downIndustrial Road while local citizens wait and wait and wait for a cabto the airport.
Also, the doormen at the major hotels want a cut, andwill only direct guests wishing to go to an
adult club to the cabs andlimos of drivers who give them a hefty kick back. Hotel
managementlooks the other way in typical "What happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas"style. No
one seems to care that thousands of our tourists are being rippedoff, extorted, and sometimes
beat up after they arrive at an illicitsex business they may not have originally intended to visit --
something else the transportation company owners would rather not beheld liable for.
On that subject, Brent KentonJordan, the formerstrip bar bouncer turned author of the best
selling novel "Stripped,"tells INSIDE VEGAS:
"Steve: The standardcabdriver extortion rate is currently (for the past several
months, andas of today) $70.00 per head. Kevin Kelly at the Spearmint Rhino
wasthe last holdout at $30.00 per head until this past week, where hebroke down to
the pressure. The Rhino, in court documents, claims theypaid out over 10 million
dollars in 2005, alone (at $30.00 per head). Ican understand the spineless
politicians cowing down to these terroristcabdrivers (what else would you call a
group that boycotts businesses,shuts down the strip, and threatens to shut down
001209
the airport if theirextortion money is cut off?) but how is it that the IRS is
ignoringthis? Look at the numbers: 10 million per year from the Rhino, andsimilar
amounts from Cheetahs, the Crazy Horse, Treasures, The OlympicGarden,
Sapphire, Club Paradise... (all the clubsover thirtynowpaying, with the
exception of the Palomino). Possibly fifty milliondollars per year divided between,
maybe a hundred cabdrivers who workthose areas and shifts. Millions in and out of
the clubs and cabdriverpockets without a dollar in taxes being paid. What about
HomelandSecurity? Do you suppose any of those millions are being funneled
toterrorist organizations (without making any obvious references tocabdrivers with
mideast and Somali ties)?"
In the case of cab andlimo drivers diverting tourists to businesses that pay per
customerdelivered, keep in mindthat some shuttle vans have 20 or more seats!
Unscrupulousdrivers can make hundreds or possibly thousands of dollars per night byjust
waiting in the queue in front of anyIndustrial Road strip bar for patrons who want to go to
another stripbar -- recommend the closest one that offers pay offs, and drive a fewblocks down
the road. In some instances, the only reason gasoline isused is to power the auto air
conditioners while vehicles sitmotionless in the queue. When they do hit the street, its only for
acouple of blocks, and the whole scenario starts over again until thesun comes up. In the
meantime, radio volume is turned down, and localresidents wonder why they can't get a cab?
Because of the current situation, there's no need for the regulatingagency known as the
Nevada Taxicab Authority (T.A.) whose only purposeis to make sure new companies don't get
approved to compete withexisting cab and limo operators who are famous for giving
generouspolitical campaign contributions to Governors, and wining and dininghis appointed
T.A. commissioners.
Nevada has strict laws that protect the exclusivity of the owners andtheir desire to squelch
competition. The "Public Convenienceand Necessity"law allows each owner to "intervene"
when a new operator applies for ataxi or limo certificate. The intervention permits company
attorneys toclaim an "adverse impact" if competition was allowed -- that theirclient would suffer
financial harm with new competition. Because ofthis law that has been ruled unconstitutional in
47 states, Nevada onlyallows several companies to ply our streets with cabs, limos, andshuttle
vans. Those outsiders who apply for certificates soon learn anexpensive lesson like that taught
to Music Express Limousines, one ofthe nation's largest limo companies, when they tried to get
a permit tooperate in Clark County (Las Vegas).
It seemed that the "public's convenience and necessity" was overpoweredby the existing
company's convenience and necessity to limit legitimatecompetition.
At the time, I was fresh off the Clark County Regional TransportationCommission where I had
spent four tumultuous years exposing the $10 -$17 million per year skimmingoperation of the
former transit bus system on the Strip. Like mostformer public officials after leaving public
office, I opened aconsulting business, and my first client was Music Express.
After spending a quarter million in legal fees, a hearing was heldbefore Governor Bob Miller's
appointed Nevada Transportation ServicesAuthority. At that hearing theother limo operators
sent their attorneys to plead that there would bean "adverse impact" on their business if Music
Express was allowed tooperate in Nevada.
001210
Knowing the players on the-then Nevada TransportationServices Authority,I soon realized I
would have to become a bag man to make it work, andthat's not my style. I told my clients who
immediately pulled out. Thefirm with branches in New York, Washington D.C., LA, and San
Franciscofolded their tents and left Sin City never to return. They were toolegitimate to do
business in Nevada.
Imagine the same set of rules for pizza parlors, dry cleaners, orbeauty salons? Someone who
legitimately applies for a business licensewould have to face the high powered attorneys of the
neighborhoodcompetition who would appear at a hearing officiated by a bunch of paidoff
appointees of the Governor who say the new business will cause an"adverse impact" on
existing pizza parlors, dry cleaners, or beautysalons, therefore no competitive license should
be granted.
Sound ridiculous? It would be in any other town. But in Sin City, it'spar for the course, at least
with taxicab, limo, shuttle van, and towtruck companies.
At present, no new "Certificate of Public Convenience andNecessity" can be issued without
theapproval of the men and women the former Governor appointed to thestate Taxi Authority
or TransportationServices Authority,and many of those same men and women are notorious
for taking bribes.
Get the picture?
Taxi and limo certificates or medallions should be available to anyonewith a commercial
drivers license and insurance who wants to fulfillthe American Dream. Why doesn't Nevada
allow one owner - one cabbusinesses? Or allow new operators to own fleets? Ask our new
GovernorJim Gibbons? It all depends on who he plans to appoint to his nextstate
transportation boards and commissions, and whether they enforcethe laws that are supposed
to protect the public's best interests.
Meanwhile, call at least two hours in advance for a cab to McCarranAirport if you need to catch
a red eye.
Copyright Steve Miller
Steve Miller, is a former Las Vegas City Councilman. In 1991, the readers of the Las Vegas
Review Journal voted him the "Most Effective Public Official" in Southern Nevada. Miller writes
internationally syndicated columns on organized crime and political corruption for Rick
Porrello's AmericanMafia.com: Visit his website at: SteveMiller4LasVegas.com. Steve can be
reached at: Stevemiller4lv@aol.com
Recent articles by Steve Miller
Printed from: http://www.canadafreepress.com/2007/miller021207.htm
001211
Spearmint Rhino owners expanding empire with British invasion
Whether you consider topless cabarets acceptable adult diversions
or shadowy dens of iniquity, you have to admit the Spearmint
Rhino club has one catchy name.
It's probably safe to say its patrons are unlikely to confuse it with
other topless joints, and surely that's the way Spearmint Rhino's
owners like it. It turns out developing brand loyalty is important,
whether you're selling breakfast cereal or babes and boobs.
rapidly expanding. From clubs in California, to one in Las Vegas,
the company has created something of an American invasion in
England, where majority owner John Gray has opened six clubs
with plans for up to 100 more.
With that kind of expansion in mind, there's talk that Spearmint
Rhino might begin selling stock as a publicly traded company. It
makes you wonder what those stockholder meetings might look
like. I'm willing to bet they'd be well attended.
Although it is listed on the company's Web site as one of several
Spearmint Rhino clubs, the Las Vegas cabaret is officially not
owned by Gray, but by local attorney Kevin Kelly, Gray's long-
time partner Thomas Nabarrette, and Mumtaz Ali. When asked
about the ownership issue, and the fact the Las Vegas club was
listed on the Gray-owned company Web site, Kelly said it was
possible Nabarrette had worked out an agreement with his friend to
advertise the club on the Internet.
Makes sense, but it doesn't exactly explain why the only reference
to the topless company on the secretary of state's Web site lists
Gray as secretary and treasurer of The Spearmint Rhino Worldwide
Inc. The Las Vegas club is owned by K-Kel Inc., which lists Kelly
and Ali as officers, but not Nabarrette.
No matter. The Las Vegas Spearmint Rhino officially is not owned
by Gray. Which is probably a good thing considering Gray's
001212
controversial past, which was recently profiled by reporters Adrian
Gatton and Paul Lashmar in the Independent newspaper of London.
The story caught the topless entrepreneur attempting to rewrite his
personal history. In the Feb. 17 article, Gray was quoted briefly
denying his criminal past -- he has a couple convictions in
California for making a false statement to win a military contract
and bouncing checks -- before fessing up to reporters. The boss also
failed to explain why he once used several aliases, including
Johnny Win, John Luciano, and John Luciano Gianni.
Gray served six months in jail, according to the newspaper, and
emerged with plans to expand his topless bar empire. Next stop,
Las Vegas. Although that move officially did not work out, and
Gray's name is not listed on the local paperwork, it did not deter
him from hopping overseas, where he has taken England by storm
as the sole director of Spearmint Rhino Companies of Europe Ltd.
According to the Independent, Gray's clubs are popular with
businessmen and a favorite site for office parties.
Possibly standing in the way of his expansion plans in England are
those pesky background details, which he apparently didn't disclose
in much detail to licensing authorities.
A year ago, police reported that, in their opinion, "activity within
the club, intentionally or otherwise, borders on offenses of
prostitution and permitting the keeping of a brothel."
Every few years, an undercover vice unit compiles enough evidence
of whispered propositions and backfields in excessive motion to
make headlines and a few arrests. Beyond a little embarrassment
and some attorney fees, the club owners are rarely ruffled.
perennially rank among the top donors to local political campaigns,
showering thousands of dollars on favorite candidates and
maintaining close contact with their public official friends
thereafter.
John L. Smith's column appears Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday and
Sunday. E-mail him at Smith@lvrj.com or call him at 383-0295.
http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/Mar-06-Wed-
2002/news/18241452.html
001213
State Bar Of Nevada
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FIND A LAWYER
Kevin M. Kelly
Company:
Kevin M. Kelly, Ltd.
Address:
6029 S. Ft. Apache Rd., Suite 100
Las Vegas
,
NV
89148
Phone Number:
7023857280
Fax number:
7023862699
Email:
kevinmkellyltd@aol.com
Website:
No information provided
Admit Date:
9/25/79
Law School:
New England
Specialization:
None
Professional Liability Insurance: 001214
State Bar Of Nevada
Yes
Attorney Active
Bar Number:
1600
Overview
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001216
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Nov 09 2012 11:42 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
ZACH COUGHLIN; )
)
Appellant. )
) Supreme Court No: 60302
vs. )
)
WASHOE LEGAL SERVICES;
Appeal on all Orders Irom Lower Court
Respondents
.
NOTICE OF LACK OF ACCESS BEING ACCORDED TO APPELLANT WITH RESPECT TO
RECORD ON APPEAL UNTIL OCTOBER 23RD, 2011, AND LACK OF ACCESS TO PART 2
OF ROA REMAINS THE CASE AS OF THIS DATE, WHICH PREJUDICED APPELLANT'S
ABILITY TO PREPARE REPLY BRIEF, IN ADDITION TO HIS ABILITY TO CITE TO ROA IN
EITHER OPENING BRIEF OR REPLY BRIEF; SUPPLEMENT TO REQUEST FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME TO FILE REPLY BRIEF
Whole lotta summary evictions and summary contempts goin' round these days in Northen
Nevada legal circles, at least (even "summary criminal contempts", truly a rare species). King oI
brings to mind "summary executions"...Libya oI yesteryear. Pol Pot...okay, that's takign it do
Iar...but "summarily dismissed" Appellant truly appreciates this Court's recognition oI its own 6/7/12
- 1/45 -
NOTICE OF LACK OF ACCESS BEING ACCORDED TO APPELLANT WITH RESPECT TO RECORD ON APPEAL UNTIL
OCTOBER 23RD, 2011, AND LACK OF ACCESS TO PART 2 OF ROA REMAINS THE CASE AS OF THIS DATE, WHICH
PREJUDICED APPELLANT'S ABILITY TO PREPARE REPLY BRIEF, IN ADDITION TO HIS ABILITY TO CITE TO ROA IN
EITHER OPENING BRIEF OR REPLY BRIEF; SUPPLEMENT TO REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE REPLY
BRIEF
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Order Temporarily Suspending Coughlin Irom the practice oI law. This Court therein demonstrated
the high ideals it adheres to, recognizing (where many other local prosecutors, Courts, and court
appointed deIenders did not) that it is not permissible to try to have it both ways with respect to
matters oI that sort whether we want is talking about and ordered temporarily suspending one's law
license pursuant to a SCR 111(6) Petition or an order Ior competency evaluation in light oI NRS
178.405 and NRS 5.010.
However, Garin's Responden'ts BrieI itselI argues Coughlin's "Iailure to cite to" the Appendix
or ROA somehow disposes oI everything. yet Garin gets the beneIit oI all 5 volums oI the roa to
work with, meanwhile, coughlin is denied access thereto on multiple occasons by this Court's
electronic Iiling system, and only Iirst obtaine dpartial access thereto on Octo23, 2012...and still had
not been aIIorded access to vol 2 until today. Coughlin has done a great deal oI research on these
issues and Ieels he has a lot to do, iI given a bit more time. Plus the SBN/Panel ar jamming him up
with a 11/14/12 "combo hearing" that violates every aspect oI scr 105(2)(c) and this courts 6/7/12
order ("sole purpose" proceeding singular, scr 111(7)-(8)....elcano mcgeorge '78. rmc nash HOlmes
greivanc ng12-0435 mcgeorge '77 (see 60838 and 61426 and this matter 60302).
At the richard G. hill and casey baker triple traIIic citation trial in 11 tr 26800, the next day,
judge nash holmes entered her "Order Finding the DeIendant in Contempt oI Court and Imposing
Sanctions" on 2/28/12, wherein, amongst other things, Judge Holmes writes, on page 2 oI her Order:
"The court had the deIenant sworn at the beginning oI the trial stating that the court has Iound that
most selI-represented deIendants tend to testiIy a great dal as they cross-examine opposing witnesses
so the deIendant would be under oath Irom the start, too". One, that is ridiculous. Two, that is not as
Coughlin understood it to be (rather, Coughlin understood that iI he chose to waive his FiIth
Amendment Right and TestiIy in his case in chieI, then he would be under Oath when presenting any
such testimony. But, regardless, Coughlin did not lie, regardless oI the reckless, reprehensible,
troubling allegations that Judge Nash Holmes makes so easily later in her Order oI 2/28/12 (which
she doesn't bother to bolster with anything more than unattributed hearsay (especially consdering the
second bite at the apple, so to speak, she took in issuin another Order attemting to transmogriIy "a
simple traIIic citation trial" into a Iull blown Disciplinary Hearing (albeit a summary one, natch).
Further, don't recall ever hearing 'bout a RMC judge putting a City oI Reno prosecutor under oath
- 2/45 -
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Irom the start, and Pamela Roberts, Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Jill Drake, and Allison Ormaas sure
seem to do an awIul lot oI testiIying themselves as they cross examing witnesses (or, Ior that matter,
as they examine their own witnesses on direct. oIten asserting Iacts not in evidence, though it is
more typical Ior them to do that in their closing arguments).
"Nor does the trial judge's speculation that Appellant 'might use his closing argument to
present unsworn testimony,representation. First, although the majority opinion describes the trial
court's speculation as a legitimate concern, I would observe that the record suggests otherwise. From
all indications, Appellant committed these horrible crimes. During the court proceedings, however,
Appellant consistently maintained proper decorum and, even when he vehemently disagreed with his
appointed counsel, demonstrated that he was capable oI calmly and rationally relating his concerns to
the trial court. Further, Appellant himselI inIormed the trial court 'I know what I'm not supposed to
talk about anything other than evidence that came up in this trial. So it's not like I'm trying to testiIy
|.| In addition, both oI Appellant's appointed attorneys indicated that they would be willing to work
with Appellant to 'make sure no objectionable matter comes into the closing argument. In any event,
however, I would observe that, iI an assertion that 'the deIendant is going to do something wrong
were a basis Ior denying a deIendant's right oI selI-representation, virtually no deIendant would ever
be permitted to participate personally in his or her deIense. Accordingly, the law does not recognize
the likelihood oI a deIendant's incompetent selI-representation as a basis Ior denying the right When
delivering the closing argument, however, Appellant would be held to the same standards as a
licensed attorney, the Commonwealth would have an opportunity to object to any improper argument
or deviations Irom proper procedure, and the trial court would have been able to rule upon any such
objections and grant any relieI that it deemed appropriate. FN20 FN18. Soto, 139 S.W.3d at 857.
FN19. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2540, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581 ('It is undeniable that in most
criminal prosecutions deIendants could better deIend with counsel's guidance than by their own
unskilled eIIorts.... And, although he may conduct his own deIense ultimately to his own detriment,
his choice must be honored out oI that respect Ior the individual which is the liIeblood oI the law.);
CrawIord v. Commonwealth, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1992) ('A deIendant has an absolute right to
waive counsel and to represent himselI and no determination as to the eIIectiveness oI such
representation need be made.); Wake, 514 S.W.2d at 695 ('No one contends that an accused must be
capable oI adequately representing himselI in order to make a valid waiver oI counsel.). FN20. See
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n. 46, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581 n. 46 ('|T|he trial judge may
terminate selI-representation by a deIendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist
misconduct.). Ky.,2004. Soto v. Com. 139 S.W.3d 827.
Judge Nash goes on to write "the court Iinds that deIendant's contemptuous conduct consisted
oI his" and amongst a laundry list oI synonyms Ior "diIIicult" Judge Nash Holmes throws in a
"deceitIul" blast. then on page 3 oI her ORder amongst a lot oI things don't have time to address now
she writes "9) deIendant's lying to the court in response to direct questions posed by the court with
regard to his recording the proceedings". Huh? Please do explain Judge Nash Holmes. And please
do Iollow the aIIidavit requirement in NRS 22.010 to the extent your Order purports to rely upon
some unattributed hearsay Irom one oI your Marshals about something in a restroom (and please do
try to get the order oI events correct, ie, the one restroom break came BEFORE the only point at
which Judge Holmes went into her sua sponte interrogation oI selI representer Coughlin about
- 3/45 -
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recording and or "recording devices", which Judge Nash Holmes launched into IMMEDIATELY
Iollowing the one restroom break... and it sure would have been intersting to hear anything ORmaas
said ex parte to the Court during that break, even iI itwas Ierried to the court by a Marshal.
REgardless, Judge Holmes play by play rendered two weeks later is one oI the most disturbing,
misrepresentation Iilled discourses one could EVER come across ever, inside or outside oI the law,
considering her position and the manner in which she leverages it. good lord what the world does not
need right now is a 27 year old Ct Marshal with tatoos exposed all over his short sleeved ensconced
arms, nostrils Ilaring angrily on a daily basis at any deIendant in any way questioning being ordered
to sign things without reading them, that Marshal making $85,000 a year plus $50 in beneIits being
told he is the eyes and ears oI the court outside the courtroom and that his attestations to the court,
however murky, negligently made, not in an aIIidavit as required under NRS Ior those allegations
based upon conduct not in the court's immediate presence, or outright spurious, will necessarily result
in attorney's losing their licenses on a "summary criminal contempt basis". Judge Nash Holmes is
supposed to realize that, right? Right?
Judge Nash Holmes concludes her Order with "The court Iinds that the deIendant's actions
were intentional and done in utter disregard and contempt Ior the court, and in the presence of the
court, Ior the purposes oI disrupting and delaying the proceedings and dishonoring the rule oI law
and this court, and constitute the misdemeanor of criminal contempt, a violation of NRS
22.010. Good cause appearing thereIore, the Iollowing sanctions are imposed: It is ordered,
pursuant to NRS 22.100, that the deIendant be incarcerated at the Washoe County Regional
Detention Facility Ior the term oI Iive (5) days, Irom the time he was taken into custody on this
court's order on February 27, 2012, and that sentence shall not be reduced Ior any reason."
Huh, that's the strangest thing...
NRS 22.100 Penalty Ior contempt.
1. Upon the answer and evidence taken, the court or judge or jury, as the case may be, shall
determine whether the person proceeded against is guilty oI the contempt charged.
2. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 22.110, iI a person is Iound guilty oI contempt, a Iine may be
imposed on the person not exceeding $500 or the person may be imprisoned not exceeding 25 days,
or both.
Huh? That's weird. Judge Nash Holmes, in eIIecting the rarest oI "contempt" species (even
rarer where levied against an attorney representing a "client" even iI in 11 tr 26800 then attorney
Coughlin's selI representation may not Iit so easily into such a designation seems to be Iinding a way
to get around the Iact that lots oI the stuII she vaguely cites to in the 2/28/12 ORder (you know, the
bold Iace type-ish, gut punch, chop block, cheapshot "Iindings by clear and conv allegations that
Coughlin
Its a real tooled up Order Finding DeIendant in Contempt and Imposing Sanctiosn by Judge
Holmes iI you look close enough. You'll not a real careIul steering away Irom phrases Irom Cooke
and the line oI cases detailing how incredibly narrow an exception and application the law will permit
Ior "summary criminal contempt"...Judge Holmes Order will not contain the buzz phrases necessary
to support a "summary criminal contempt" Iinding....like "immediate presence" or "every element
under watchIul eye oI the Judge" or "the use of the summary contempt power is proper only for
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"charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's
business, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court,
are actually observed by the court, and where immediate punishment is essential to prevent
`demoralization of the court's authority' before the public." Pounders v. Watson,521 U.S. 982,
988, 117 S.Ct. 2359, 138 L.Ed.2d 976 (1977) (per curiam) (quoting In re Oliver,333 U.S. 257,
275, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948)).
Rather than mentioning "immediate presence" 1udge Holmes Order's reads "the court
held the defendant in criminal contempt of court for his behavior and activities committed in
the direct presence of this court during the trial"...
Curiously, Judge Nash supports her "summary criminal contempt" Order by mentioning a
non-summary contempt statutory section, NRS 22.010, then going onto to, apparently, legistlate Irom
the bench a little and classiIy NRS 22.010 as "criminal contempt" despite the Iact that nrs 22.010 is
not a criminal statute.
NRS 22.030 Summary punishment oI contempt committed in immediate view and presence of
court; affidavit or statement to be filed when contempt committed outside immediate view and
presence of court; disqualification of judge.
1. II a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court or judge at chambers, the contempt may
be punished summarily. II the court or judge summarily punishes a person Ior a contempt pursuant to this subsection,
the court or judge shall enter an order that:
(a) Recites the Iacts constituting the contempt in the immediate view and presence oI the court or judge;
(b) Finds the person guilty oI the contempt; and
(c) Prescribes the punishment Ior the contempt.
2. II a contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence oI the court or judge at chambers, an aIIidavit must
be presented to the court or judge oI the Iacts constituting the contempt, or a statement oI the Iacts by the masters or
arbitrators.
3. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, iI a contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence oI
the court, the judge oI the court in whose contempt the person is alleged to be shall not preside at the trial oI the contempt
over the objection oI the person. The provisions oI this subsection do not apply in:
(a) Any case where a Iinal judgment or decree oI the court is drawn in question and such judgment or decree was entered
in such court by a predecessor judge thereoI 10 years or more preceding the bringing oI contempt proceedings Ior the
violation oI the judgment or decree.
(b) Any proceeding described in subsection 1 oI NRS 3.223, whether or not a Iamily court has been
established in the judicial district.
NRS 22.010 Acts or omissions constituting contempts. The Iollowing acts or omissions shall be
deemed contempts:
1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while the judge is holding court, or engaged in judicial
duties at chambers, or toward masters or arbitrators while sitting on a reIerence or arbitration, or other judicial proceeding.
2. A breach oI the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance in the presence oI the court, or in its immediate
vicinity, tending to interrupt the due course oI the trial or other judicial proceeding.
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3. Disobedience or resistance to any lawIul writ, order, rule or process issued by the court or judge at chambers.
4. Disobedience oI a subpoena duly served, or reIusing to be sworn or answer as a witness.
5. Rescuing any person or property in the custody oI an oIIicer by virtue oI an order or process oI such court or judge at
chambers.
6. Disobedience oI the order or direction oI the court made pending the trial oI an action, in speaking to or in the presence
oI a juror concerning an action in which the juror has been impaneled to determine, or in any manner approaching or
interIering with such juror with the intent to inIluence the verdict.
7. Abusing the process or proceedings oI the court or Ialsely pretending to act under the authority oI an order or process oI
the court.
One is kind oI leIt wondering: why didn't 1udge Nash Holmes just use the summary
contempt statute that 1udge Howard cited to (NRS 22.030) incident to his sentencing Coughlin,
staring right then (no stay Ior arranging to avoid prejudice to Coughlin's clients Irom Judge Howard,
no way, Jose...nor Irom Judge Ellion on April 19th, 2012 when he put Couglin in jail Ior 8 days over
a manuIactured dispute over the terms oI a Competency Evaluation (Judge Elliot didn't think avoiding
prejudice to Coughlin's client's aIIairs was important enough to grant even the slightest stay...some
might say these Judges wanted to wreck Coughlin's career as good an awIul as possible, and weren't
aIraid to use Coughlin's client's interests in the process to do it.
Oh, may it is because oI that inconvenient stuII in NRS 22.030 about how someone gotta sign
an AIIidavit iI
This bit about it not being Coughlin's Iault he didn't know Judge Nash Holmes had via her
2/28/12 Order characterized the "contempt" to be the "misdemeanor oI criminal contempt" sort oI
"contempt" means Coughlin arguably did not violate the USPTO rule related to reporting "within 30
days" any oI a the type required by 11.25. But, within 30 days oI Iinally getting a copy oI that
2/28/12 "Finding oI Contempt and Order Imposing Sanctions" oI Judge Holmes (Coughlin only Iirst
became aware such a written Order existed upon receiving the SCR 117 Disability Petition the SBN
has tried to Iorce on Coughlin...Coughlin is Iine, he is not disabled. He is runnin' it. So, "within 30
days" oI Iinally getting that Order, Coughlin reported to the USPTO, and the same can arguably be
said oI reporting this Court's 6/7/12 temporary suspension. The only thing is that Coughlin was in
jail Irom July 3rd, 2012 to July 21, 2012 on the ridiculous and since dropped by the City oI Reno July
3rd, 2012 "disturbing the peace" charge...so arguably a tolling oI 17 days or so should be subtracted
Irom an analyses oI whether Coughlin timely reported.
It was only upon Iinding the 2/28/12 ORder attached to the SCR 117 Petition in 60975 (which
is a spurious negligent document in its own right) that Coughlin was apprised oI the Iact that Judge
Holmes had put the summary contempt Order in writing. Coughlin notiIied the United States Patent
and Trademark OIIice (USPTO wherein Coughlin is license as a Patent Attorney as oI this date, or at
least as an agent to whatever extent Coughlin's one state law license is suspended pursuant to this
Court's 6/7/12 Order in 60838).
For a patent attorney agent like Coughlin, there are di grounds Ior discipline by the USPTO:
(i) conviction oI a serious crime,16 (ii) discipline on ethical grounds by another jurisdiction or
disciplinary disqualiIication Irom participating in or appearing beIore any Federal program or
agency,17 (16 37 C.F.R. 11.25 prescribes procedures Ior interim suspension and discipline based
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upon conviction oI a serious crime or conduct inovlving moral turpitude or conviction or a criminal
oIIense involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or breach oI trust.( Ior examples, see: D2006-20,
D2007-03, D2008-01, D2008-12, D2008-23, D2009-01, D2009-05, D2009-14 and D2009-42 in the
OED Reading Room at http://des.USPTO.gov/Foia/OEDReadingRoom.jsp. These are only a Iew
examples. There are more examples in 2010 and 2011 time period. These can be viewed in the
aIorementioned OED Reading Room website.) 17 37 C.F.R. 11.24 prescribes procedures Ior
reciprocal discipline. However, OED has the option oI initiating a disciplinary action based on its
own disciplinary rules and not do a reciprocal discipline. Rule 37 C.F.R. 11.25(a) requires that a
person practicing beIore the OIIice 'shall notiIy the OED Director in writing . within thirty (30)
days . Irom the date oI a conviction oI a 'crime (underscoring added Ior emphasis).
(That 2/28/12 Order was then, under the RMC's CertiIicate oI Service, mailed to an address the RMC
knew Iull well was no longer good Ior Coughlin, and the RMC Iailed to Iax, or email or otherwise
seek to remail it to Coughlin upon receiving it back upon an "undeliverable" indication by the USPS
(despite Ieigning some real strong eIIorts to get in contact with Coughlin at the time in her 3/14/12
written grievance against Coughlin to the SBN (to be Iair, it is true that incident to Coughlin being a
victim oI domestic violence and beneIitting Irom two Orders oI Protection Irom Master Edmondson,
who really woula make a great Family Court Judge already) Coughlin's access to his mailbox was
interIerred with by his abusers and, allegedly, upon inIormation and belieI, members oI the USPS
Golden Valley Station, NV Energy (NV Energy and the USPS are no Iriends to victims oI domestic
violence or those whose lease are valid under 118A.160, as leases can be verbal in Nevada, and the
USPS and NV Energy, essentially two monopolies, should not be allowed to demand social security
cards and written lease Irom anyone, much less domestic violence victims, merely because the
numbers indicate it helps their proIit margins to adopt such an approach. Talking to you Buck Hyde,
Terri James, and "Ms. Passot". and the Iormer detective working Ior NV Energy whose name escapes,
and Sue King unauthorize practitioner oI law Ior Park Terrace Town Homes HOA and or Galye Kern,
Esq. could answer a Iew questions about the extent to which they advocated behind the scenes to
deprive Coughlin oI power in his rental (despite oIIering to pay Ior it and put it in his name upon his
Iormer housemates, whom WNM and PTTHOA admits were there with the express approval oI the
HOA Board upon recieving approval Irom Sheila Lester and the Board incident to Iormer WNM
manager Robyn Bataldo presenting a proposal directed thereto to it. and when those "tenants"(who
were arguably employees given the work Ior rent trade admitted to) rent or sublease to Coughlin....
That ain't squatting, Sheila. You might call it a subtenancy, actually. But its not "squatting"....and
anyone interIering with Coughlin's ability to get his mail during this time, roughlin January 2012
through mid March 2012, should be liable Ior any consequential damages...however, it would help iI
one could go to the RMC and ask to see a docket with RMC Marshal getting their AIIidavits out and
clandestine, rehearsed letters to the SBN out detailing how Coughlin said he was going to "depose"
the Iiling oIIice staII about the dockets....How about just print out a docket, maybe charge a
reasonable print Iee, and leave the totalitarian hostility Ior another time, Marshal Menzel, Coppa,
Harley and Townsend? And "Clerks oI Court" or Administrative Assistants calling up Bar Counsel
and reporting on this or that aspect oI an attorney's clothing when he goes to the RMC Iiling oIIice
counter to check on the status oI cases or deadlines or upcoming hearings)... There are collection
agencies and then there are courts oI law, and the distinction should always be extremely apparent to
the public.
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AIter the conviction is reported to OED by a practitioner, the Director oI OED will make a
determination as to whether the criminal oIIense constitutes a 'serious crime. Coughlin has reported
to the SBN and the USPTO the Iollowing convictions Irom the last year:
11/30/11 conviction in 11 CR 22176 Reno Municipal Court 1udge Kenneth Howard petty
larceny conviction of "candy bar and some cough drops" (allegation totalling $14.00). Judge
Gardner denied Coughlin's request Ior a continuance despite opposing counsel in the eviction case
Iorm Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice applying an unlawIul rent distraint upon exculpatory videos
proving that Wal-Mart had expressly threatened to retaliate upon Coughlin by abusing process
incident to Coughlin's complaining to Wal-Mart managers, including W. 7th St. Wal-Mart Manager
John Ellis about the apparently Iraudulence inherent to Wal-Mart's manager constantly "Iorgetting"
the Return Policy they hold out to the public and used to crush their competitors Ior years. Judge
Howard reIused Couglin even one continuance in this matter, even where the Reno Sparks Indian
Colony (which owns the land that Wal-Mart sits on and rents it to and proIit shares with that Wal-
Mart) Police Department OIIicers Kameron CrawIord and Donnie Braunworth, in addition to Wal-
Mart's Thomas Frontino, were caught lying on video tape in consideration oI their testimony at trial
that she search incident to arrest (wherein a a Iew cough drops were Iound in Coughlin's pockets) Ior
the alleged commission oI a misdemeanor, occuring outside the oIIicer's presence and aIter 7 pm at
night
6/18/12 criminal trespass conviction in 11 CR 26405 before RMC 1udge William Gardner
incident to a summary eviction of a commercial tenant where non-payment of rent was not
pled or noticed; lockout of 11/1/11 of Coughlin from his former home law office at 121 River
Rock St., Reno, NV.
2/27/12 "summary criminal contempt" conviction by RMC Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes shortly aIter
she, upon inIormation and belieI, met with other RMC Judges and was made aware oI an Order Ior
Competency Evaluation oI Coughlin, and thus requiring Judge Nash Holmes to cease persisting in the
obviously well coordinated, agenda into action that several RMC Judges (and perhaps some others)
developed against Coughlin incident to there numerous closed door meeting sessions where Judge W.
Gardner insists, somehow, local attorney Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s presence, involvement, or name
never came up once, despite Hill's Iingerprints being all over all Iour oI those prosecutions incident to
yet another retaliatory arrest and prosecution by the Reno Police Department oI Coughlin in
RCR2012-065630 ("misuse oI emergency communications"/911 calls) arrest incident to the domestic
violence Couglin and his dog, Pekingese Jackson Pawluck where a victim oI, by RPD Sargent Paul
SiIre and OIIicer Jason Schaur, with Sargent SiIre having had Coughlin arrested just over 48 hours
previously on 1/12/12 Ior "jaywalking", yep, a custodial arrest Ior jaywalking. Reno 911 in RMC
case 12 CR 00696, which Judge Linda Gardner's brother W. Gardner transIerred to Judge Nash
Holmes Department Irom another on 2/27/12 as well..
II the Director determines that the oIIense was a 'serious crime, the Director will Iile a request with
the Director oI the USPTO Ior an interim suspension oI the practitioner Irom practice beIore the
USPTO. The practitioner will have the opportunity Ior a hearing, however, the only grounds Ior not
granting the request are that (i) the crime did not constitute a serious crime, (ii) the person is not the
person who committed the crime or (iii) the ~conviction was so lacking in notice or
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opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process 37
C.F.R. 11.25(b)(3). Irrespective oI the merits oI the conviction, Iailure oI a practitioner to
advise the Director oI OED oI the conviction could subject the practitioner to discipline under 37
C.F.R. 10.23(c)(14), iI OED learns oI the conviction aIter the thirty (30) day reporting period has
expired. State law violations under the category oI reciprocal discipline Iall under suspension or
disbarment Irom practice on ethical grounds by a state under 37 C.F.R. 10.23(c)(5), or conviction
under a state law oIIense involving moral turpitude under 37 C.F.R. 10.23(c)(1). Examples oI
conduct in the category involving criminal convictions include: assault with a deadly weapon;
engaging in sexually explicit conversation with a minor over the internet; hit and run and DUI; sexual
assault; encouraging an illegal alien to come to the United States; insider trading; wire Iraud; and
possession and traIIicking oI a controlled substance. In re Tamura, D2008-23; In re Lever, D2009-14;
In re Reynolds, D1999-12; In re Maiorino, D2004-11; In re Rostoker, D2004-15; In re Marks, D2005-
05; In re Tezak, D2006-05; In re Rose, D2006-16.
Luckily Ior Coughlin, all three (or it is Iour iI you count Judge Howard Iinding Coughlin
convicted oI "summary contempt" as well as "petty larceny" in the Wal-Mart case on 11/30/11) oI his
"criminal" convictions are convictions was so lacking in notice or opportunity
to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process 37 C.F.R.
11.25(b)(3).
And, in Iact, the 11 TR 26800 "summary criminal contempt" conviction is not even a real
thing, or an actual crime in Nevada, at least not statutorily....And that's the whole point: "summary
criminal contempt" should be such a rare conviction that is shouldn't get to take up space in a
statute..When Coughlin was incarcerated, he heard some Deputies saying some things though that
indicate these sorts oI things are not all that rare at the RMC these days..."put the kid in a "hug a
thug" program one week, he's back on a jaywalking charge two weeks later...and she give him 6
months in jail? She's just beyond at this point, man....". And the 3 days Ior "summary contempt" nrs
22.030 Irom Judge Howard is "civil contempt", ie, not a crime or misdemeanor, not that Judge
Howard's Order is all that much oI a celebration oI due process particularly where he justiIied he
departure Irom Aingersigner's requirement by saying he wouldn't issue jail time (well, actually, he
said, jail time was not typical...so it wasn't like he gave a guarantee or anything as a consolation to his
both denying the Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel and even one continuance to Coughlin, whom
Judge Howard knew had just been evicted less than one month prior...and was being prosecuted Ior a
Iirst oIIense charge oI shopliIting fooa? Uh-huh. Guess the take home message is good gawd don't
you dare allege prosecutorial misconduct toward the work oI Pam Roberts. Or don't let the wrong
Iolks down at the RMC hear about it. And don't Iile a written complaint against RPD OIIicer Nick
Duralde with the askrpdreno.gov system or the coplogic thing and be unprepared a month later at
the arraingment on the wal-mart charge iI things really, really, start to go pear shaped, strangely so
even, when thrust into a trial less than a month aIter getting access to the police report (where the City
Attorney, as apparently is usually the case, has had the report Ior nearly a month already by the time
you get it) think things are going to go all that well....
Upon reviewing Coughlin's recent Iilings in 61901 and the Motion Ior New Trial in 11 CR
26405, and including the video taped admission by RPD Sargent Lopez...how can one not conclude
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that Hill, Merliss, Sargent Lopez, and OIIicer Carter, Marshal Harley, Thomas Frontino and Kameron
CrawIord and Donnie Braunworth are all in violation oI the Iollowing statutes:
NRS 199.310 Malicious prosecution. A person who maliciously and without probable cause
thereIor, causes or attempts to cause another person to be arrested or proceeded against Ior any crime
oI which that person is innocent: 1. II the crime is a Ielony, is guilty oI a category D Ielony and shall
be punished as provided in NRS 193.130; and 2. II the crime is a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor,
is guilty oI a misdemeanor.
Further, whereas Hon W. Gardner, beIore lunch during the trial on 6/18/12 presented one set
oI circumstances to Coughlin regarding Coughlin testying in his own deIense...aIter lunch (and some
apparent retooling oI his approach) Judge Gardner presented an entirely diIIerent set oI circumstances
the he announced would attach shoudl Coughlin waive his FiIth Amendment Right (and in 11 TR
26800, Judge Nash Holmes seems to see an assertion oI a Fourth or FiIth Amendment Right as a joke,
and an obvious and righteous opportunity to draw an inIerence oI guilts....and she is a Judge....Great.)
So, considering Coughlin had already been incarcerated 8 days incident to two diIIerent
"summary contempt" convictions by RMC Judges Howard and Nash Holmes incident to Coughlin's
selI representation...why would Coughlin testiIy in his own behalI in the trespass trial beIore J. W.
Gardner? What was there to gain? What there really much oI any chance that Judge Gardner was
going to be swayed by any testimony by Coughlin? Had Coughlin not already managed to get Hill
and or Baker to admit most things Coughlin would otherwise to to establish thorugh his own
testimony (ie, Hill admits to his ridiculous storage lien demands that consist oI continuing to charge
the same $900 Ior "storage" that was charged Ior "Iull use and occupancy", and the audio at the very
start oI the 11 cr 26405 court audio on 4/10/12 reveals a hilarious discussion between court appoint
deIense counsel Loomis and his "client" Coughlin wherein Loomis absolutely co-signs Richard G.
Hill, Esq.'s "double dipping" (ie Hill wants to get the big rent associate with "Iull use and occupancy"
while still precluding Coughlin Irom "use and occupancy" oI the premises. But Loomis isn't about to
argue a claim or right deIense on Coughlin's behalI there (iI Hill is charging Coughlin the same rent
as when Coughlin was entitled to "Iull use and occupancy"...then doesn't that sort oI imply Coughlin
is entitled to the "Iull use and occupancy"? One cannot imagine how intimidating it is to be in the
RMC aIter two separate summary contempt jail stays in previous selI representation contexts,
especially when one is Ilat broke, and another such stay, and all the bail revocatiosn attendant thereto
would likely wipe one out...
And in the trespass case, where Hazlett-Steven's persisted mentioning pajamas (and the video
reveals Coughlin si wearing sweats and a t-shirt...so is it not Richard G. Hill who displays a lack oI
candor to the tribunal....see also his unsupported "they taped it on the door because you ran away"
claim. Rich...your associate Casey Baker testiIied you were not there. Coughlin was not there.
Baker makes no such allegation oI Coughlin running away incident to some taping oI a lockout order
on the door or attempts to Iirst eIIect personal service thereoI. Nor does the WCSO...so really, Rich,
what do you base that on? Is this like when you said
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See, Judge Nash Holmes 2/28/12 "Order Finding the DeIendant In Contempt OI Court and
Imposing Sanctions" purports to be Iinding Coughlin guilty oI "the misdemeanor oI criminal
contempt, a violation oI NRS 22.010"...but that's the thing, though. Judge Nash Holmes is remixing
NRS 22.010 and adding the words "misdemeanor" and "criminal" to it, because they just ain't there.
Now, Judge Nash Holmes may have meant to invoke NRS 199.340, but she didn't.
NRS 199.340 Criminal contempt. Every person who shall commit a contempt oI court oI any one oI
the Iollowing kinds shall be guilty oI a misdemeanor: 1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent
behavior committed during the sitting oI the court, in its immediate view and presence, and directly
tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority;...3. Breach oI the
peace, noise or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings oI a court, jury or
reIeree;4. WillIul disobedience to the lawIul process or mandate oI a court; 5. Resistance, willIully
oIIered, to its lawIul process or mandate;"
That's interesting...its almost as iI 35 year veteran member oI the Bar, Hon. D. Nash Holmes
did some picking and choosing amongst the various civil and criminal, summary, and plenary
contempt statutes and, kind oI, made a pastiched oI what she like best Irom each one and what best Iit
her agenda with respect to Coughlin....the only thing, though, it that that is not legal, and as such, the
"conviction" Ior "misdemeanor oI criminal contempt" cannot stand. Coughlin must admit...he has
been reIerring to it as a "summary criminal contempt" conviction...when, in Iact, it doesn't seem
Judge Nash Holmes ever so characterized it...its just that...well. when you don't get a trial, or an
arraignment, or court appointed counsel, or the right to appeal, or be allowed out oI jail even where
the RMC keeps the money your mom went and paid to bail you out...its hard to think oI such a
conviction as anything other than "summary" in nature. Despotic, tyrannical, wholly inappropriate,
devoid oI the quality oI justice or any sense oI a measure and even application oI traditional notions
oI substantial justice and Iair play are some charicterizations that some might say. Not Coughlin. He
likes being out oI jail.
Stranger still is how Judge Nash Holmes goes on to support her throwing license attorney
representing himselI in a traIIic citation matter Coughlin in jail Ior 5 days, starting right then (and no
stay to arrange Ior lack oI prejudice to Coughlin's client, either) upon some application oI NRS
22.100, where in her 2/28/12 "Order Finding the DeIendant In Contempt OI Court and Imposing
Sanctions" Judge Nash Holmes writes "it is ordered, pursuant to NRS 22.100, that the deIendant be
incarcerated at the Washoe County REgion
Strange How Hazlett-Steven's in the trespass case gets to argue all this "'using it as a
residence" prejudicial Iacts not in evidence...even where Judge Gardner ruled those matters not
relevant....only Ior Judge Gardner himselI to cite to and rely on the "had your dog their" "using it as a
residence" in his decision?.....hmmmmn.....
Glover v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court oI State ex rel. County oI Clark, 220 P.3d 684 110CRIMINAL
LAW 110XXXICounsel 110XXXI(F)Arguments and Statements by Counsel 110k2134Comments on
Failure to Present Evidence or Witnesses 110k2137k. Comments by deIense on Iailure oI prosecution
to present evidence. Nev.,2009 Negative-inIerence argument made by deIense counsel during closing
- 11/45 -
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argument, that the State did not introduce voluntary videotaped unsworn statement that deIendant
made to police the day that the victim was shot because the statement would absolutely devastate the
State's case, was improper, in trial oI deIendant Ior murder in which deIendant claimed selI-deIense,
as deIense counsel was arguing Iacts not in evidence, deIense counsel was putting his personal
knowledge and belieI on the scales, State's objection to deIendant's attempt to admit the videotaped
statement, that the prior out-oI-court statement was inadmissible to bolster deIendant's in-court
testimony, was a proper hearsay objection, and it was improper Ior deIense counsel to argue a
negative inIerence based on a proper hearsay objection.
Strange How Hazlett-Steven's in the trespass case gets to argue all this "'using it as a residence"
prejudicial Iacts not in evidence...even where Judge Gardner ruled those matters not relevant....only
Ior Judge Gardner himselI to cite to and rely on the "had your dog their" "using it as a residence" in
his decision?.....hmmmmn...
Irom Judge W. Gardner's decision in the criminal trespass case 11 cr 26405:
7T11C(7;,1_.e- J.tt. -e--/. ;-. -' -- e--. 7tc'. .c. _-.
/- t- .c --/.. 7t- ,--.-.c -- --. j.-.c. -. - .- -e. ct- j...t .,.
7t- t.- ct- o.-e- -j ,---j. 7tc'. .c. ;- -- - -.- c. 7tc'. .-- t--.
t-.tc. t-c - ,..c /- -.,t - - - c . t---. (-ct ,-c.-. t.- .e-c.j.-e
ct---' . .-- -.. ....-. t---. 7t- o. ....- .. ct- -.. (e-- -.- .cc.c-.
o-ct ..,. . . .. e ,1s .. .t1. ct- ,-c .c e--.'c -.- ct/ o-.c ct- .-
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e t---' . tc ct- 1-.-c t. e-c-- . - e. _-. ---. .- e .- - /.e -j .t e
- 12/45 -
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-c.-. e -. t- -. -- - ..- , e -c.- e ,. e -c.-.
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. ct- ,-.c-e - ct- j--c e--- -j ,--,--c ctc -. te o-- . e
--c.--e c- - ;-.- o - - ,c. .. . ;../ ct- e .c . ,-.c-e. 7t--- .
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ct- ,--,--c e --t..-e ctc ct--- te o-- .- - - - . ct- ,--,--c. _-.
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;-c.- -j 1c- -j _.e-c c- . ..-- -/. ;' ..-- ;-.t e .-.. -.
e.e'c -c ctc. o.c ct- ,-c.-. t--- e.e -.--ct. ,-... ot - c- ,--.. e- -.
-c.-. c- ,--.. e- -. -.. e -. te c.t -c.-. -. te
-.c-.c..- -c.-. ctc -. .t-.te'c o- - ctc ,--,--c. 7t- ^cc- -j ;-.e
e ct- ^.,--- 1-.-c e-... - t. t ,-. T.t-cc^c-.-. .-c-e ct..
--. e ;t.- . j--c -j -. state v. McNichois, \ 0o Nev. os1 .
t--t. t--t. .. ctc jc-- .- - - - t. o-- -.. c-e. ..o.- .-c ---c-
. ct- ,--,--c .. c--.,... c--.,.. ---c- .. tc ct- ^.,--- 1-.-c
tt -e .c. e.e -c --c- -o, -c. .- -j ctc -,-cc. - -j ,-... ^-. ctc'.
,..c ct- j.-.c .-c. -. 7tc'. o-- ,--.-e o--e e-.oc. 7t---' . - .-.c. -
ctc ,--c.- -j ct- .cc.c- t. o-- ,--.-e. e ;-.t e t.- ..o.c ctc ,-.
T.t-cc^c-.-. .. ----c. And after going back on that property
numerous occasions, setting up a residence with your pet in the
basement, constitutes a separate basis independent from the
notice requirement that you went on to that property with the
intent to vex or annoy the owner. So, under any theory set Iorth by the
City, I Iind you guilty oI the charge oI Tresp.... J- ,--- - e c-
.-c-. . '
Also pretty suspect how City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens argues Coughlin can't make
argument about the Appeal (facts not in record?), when Hazlett, later on, Iollowed with this:
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"City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens: With regard to all oIthe issues Mr. Coughlin brought up in regard to
commercial residence, commercial property, notices, whether or not they can take summary eviction
proceedings against a commercial tenant, this is not the proper Iorum to decide that issue.
That, Mr. Coughlin, had an opportunity to address in Iront oI Judge SIerrazza, in his appeal in Iront oI
Judge Flanagan, which you actually did hear in evidence today. That matter is appealed, and Judge
Flanagan already denied the appeal."
And old prosecutor Hazlett was nice enough to preserve Ior the appeal, to whatever extent
Loomis having judicial notice taken at a previous hearing went out the door with Loomis, the issue oI
the RJC being divested oI jursidiction, precluded the "Trial upon Coughlin depsoiting $2,275 rent
escrow with the court, on 10/25/11" beIore the RJC Irom goign Iorward given the improt oI, say,
Mack v. Mack-Manley, or Foster dingwall, in that the RJC would be divested oI jurisdiction upon
Coughlin's Iiling a Notice oI Appeal on 10/18/11, there makign the eviction order void nrcp 60b4 lack
oI jursidiction:
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: No, it's in evidence, Your Honor. And I'll draw your attention to the part
that says, "Decision." And it also says, "Matthew Merliss present, Casey Baker -represented by Casey
Baker," and then it also indicates Zachary Coughlin present. And then I'll draw your attention to the
decision where it says "eviction granted eIIective October 31 st, 2011, at 5:00 p.m." That's what Judge
SIerrazza announced in open Court with Mr. Coughlin, according to Mr. Baker, listening, actively
listening to the Judge. He wasn't writing anything down, but he was actively listening to the Judge
when he announced that decision in open Court. And you have the Order granting eviction right there.
Now, there was another issue whether or not the proceedings were stayed pending some sort oI
appeal, but that Motion to Stay was also denied in the October 25th, 2011, hearing. And you'll see in
City's 1, it Page -1 27actually says, "Tenant's verbal motion to stay, denied." The case was over at that
point.
But here is the part oI Coughlin's cross examination where Hill truly demonstrates the
malpractice and misconduct he committed: Q So your oIIice converted it to a no cause summary
eviction notice? A More precisely, sir, the decision was made to Iorego the rent eviction and simply
do a 30-day no cause. Q Okay, and iI subsequently the tenant was considered a commercial tenant,
would that not be tantamount to sort of a wrong side legal surgery? A Well, I
don't quite understand your metaphor, sir. But the fact ofthe matter is it
was a residence. The Iact that you were illegally conducting a business there, a side issue,
number one. Number two, you didn't raise it in the Justice Court. Q You say it was a residence. Is it
zoned Ior just residential use? A I don't have any idea, sir. Q Well, why did you say it was a residence
iI you don't have something to base that upon? A That's what the lease said, and there was no lawIul
business being conducted. Q The lease said -did the lease say a commercial use was acceptable? A I
don't know, Mr. Coughlin."
A review oI the attache (partial, unoIIicial) transcript oI the summary eviction
proceeding/"Trial", along with the Appendix reveals Coughlin clearly did raise and pled the issue, and
cite to the law Iorbidding the use oI summary evictions against a commercial tenant where non
payment oI rent is neither pled nor noticed...
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I believe there is a couple quasi 60(b) basis Ior challenging the validity oI any -to the extent this Court
views the Eviction Order as a warning, which I think is kind oI the big inquiry here. Maybe not, but to
me, it seems like it's possibly what the case could come down to. To the extent the Court does
consider a valid Eviction Order appropriately served, a warning suIIicient to satisIY the criminal
trespass statute, I believe there is a couple 60(b) like basis to challenge that Order. One is brought up
by Mr. Loomis, who so astutely pointed out that under the McManley case there was a Notice oI
Appeal Iiled in the interim between the initial October 13th hearing, and then the October 25th
trial. MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: 1udge, this is getting into testimony -or evidence that's not in
testimony, testimony that's not in evidence rather. It's not there about any appeal taken. THE
COURT: Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: Well, I believe Mr. Loomis THE COURT: Your
argument is limited to the facts that were produced today at trial. MR. COUGHLIN: 1ust
today, not what Mr. Loomis Page -136- THE COURT: That's correct, today's trial. So to that
extent, the objection -and I try to give parties a great deal of leeway in closing argument, but
when you start getting far afield of what was argued, presented via facts of the trial, that's not
proper argument. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay, and I thought it was part of the record at this
point. And ifit's not too late, I'd object to the notice by email that was introduced. THE
COURT: Okay, go ahead. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Beyond that 60(b) basis, I believe there is an
additional basis in that -there is a couple. I think under the ANVUI, A-N-V-U-I-E A-N-V-U-I, which
is kind oI the main Nevada case on summary evictions oI commercial tenants. That was a restaurant
in Vegas doing a lot oI business, like $500K a month or something, and they got evicted, and it went
to the Nevada Supreme Court, and a lot oI litigation was done over that. And the holding, the take
home holding Irom that was that it's basically a summary judgment standard in the summary eviction
proceedings. The tenant merely needs to present a material issue oI law or Iact to beat a summary
judgment motion. II they do that, the Court may do nothing Iurther, and it has to go on to a
(inaudible) unlawful detainer approach. Served, 20 days to respond, discovery, all that. So,
my position would be that there's a 60(b) basis for viewing this -any summary eviction
order, as void in that I was a licensed attorney, at that time, at least, and I held that out
as my law office. I filed a tenant's affidavit that I was a commercial tenant. I pled that.
Mr. Hill testified today that he wasn't aware of that, and he didn't consider it a
particular Page -137 - 1 38- consideration, for his neurosurgeon client who had spent
$60 grand on this. That's where I'm at the analogy of the wrong side legal surgery,
because I think it could wind up potentially being fairly important to his client if it's
proven that a wrongful eviction occurred. If it's proven that yes, I did present a (inaudible)
issue oI material Iact, that this was a commercial tenancy, and to the extent judicial notice could be
taken that it was merely a No-Cause Eviction Notice that was pursued and that non-payment oI rent
was not alleged, then this could be problematic, and Mr. Hill might wish he had considered that point
whether this was a commercial tenancy, and I'm not subject to summary eviction proceedings in
40.253, and (inaudible) pay my rent as alleged as being in Iact very important."
Also whatever Baker and Hill seek to argue now, incorrectly (because they are Ilailing around,
like at the criminal trespass trial, during the gotcha moments when Coughlin points out that, despite
billing their client $60K, they don't know the case or the law all that well with respect to the narrow
Iiner points oI law that will ultimately decide the case. Sure Rich and Casey can push paper with the
best oI them, and it looks legit and sounds pretty law Iirmish and stuII...until you start to pick it apart.
- 15/45 -
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then its just junk Iood, plain and simple. Like, Ior instance, Casey Baker, Esq. gets Judge SIerrazza
to sign his FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER FOR SUMMARY
EVICIION ...: "This matter having come on regularly Ior an evidentiary hearing pursuant to NRS
40.254 and NRS 40. 253(6) on October 13, 2011, and continued on October 25,2011, beIore the
Honorable Peter J. SIerr azza, sitting without a jury; the plaintiII/landlord, Matt Merliss (HMerliss"),
having been present, and represented by counsel, Richard G. Hill, Chartered and Casey D. Baker ,
Esq. , and defendant/tenant, Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq. ("Coughlin")" Well, shoot,
Casey...way you wrote that there, sound like the tenant is an attorney practicing law out oI the spot
your landlord client is rentin' to him, don't it? Now, what that mean? Commercial tenant, No Cause
Eviction verboten unless plea non-payment of rent, they aiant, Coughlin wins, now that HIlls hollow
little reign in the trail court ana District Court has come to ana ena.
It is categorically Ialse Ior Judge Nash Holmes to assert, in the audio record on 3/12/12 the order oI
events and when she asked Coughlin her questions about recording, considering when a restroom
break took place an exactly what it is she asked Couglin and when, and what his responses were, and
when some allegations by "the Marshal" were made, what they consisted oI, etc.. on 3/12/12 in 11 tr
26800 the audio transcript reads 7 minutes into the audio record the RMC provided the SBN:
1udge Nash Holmes (Nash): It appears to me in this case that the defendant is suffering
from some extreme form of mental illness. during the trial I asked the defendant
attorney repeatedly if he was recording the proceedings he denied that vehemently a few
times and then he quote took the fifth a few other times and then he requested to be
excused to go to the bathroom and the Marshal later reported to me that while the
gentleman was in the bathroom he disassembled a recording device in his pocket and
took the memory out of it and it was later found in that, uh, by the Marshal no one else
had gone into the bathroom and that was retrieved and it was put into his possession at
the Sheriff's office and when they booked him into jail for the contempt charge that was
booked into evidence and I asked the Sheriff's office to hold that into evidence. I believe
he has violated Supreme Court Rule 229(2)(B) which was amended by ADKT 440,
August 1st, 2011...."
One Coughlin did not do anything oI the sort indicated by Judge Nash Holmes (by way oI
unattributed hearsay, like her car sleeping allegations in her 3/14/12 letter re Coughlin to the
SBN) above.
NRS 178.405 should have prevented anything said or done by Judge Nash Holmes Iollowing
her statement at the 7 minute mark that "It appears to me in this case that the deIendant is
suIIering Irom some extreme Iorm oI mental illness." Further, that which Judge Nash
Holmes had communicated to her prior to the start oI Trial on 2/27/12 in 11 tr 26800 needs to
be testiIied to under oath, rather than have Bar Counsel assert to halI baked "can't ask the
judge about her mental processes" loophole, as he has done.
City Attorney Ormaas sure could be made to explain her statements on the record regarding
whether the citation or report in 11 tr 26800 contained any mention oI retaliation, given she
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was looking right at it and given what she said in court. Also, the whispering with Marshal
Harley, and the bits about Coughlin reporting to Ormaas what RPD OFIicer Carter said to
Coughlin in 61901, and Ormaas's responses thereto on 2/27/12, and Dan Wong, ditto at an
earlier hearing on that matter...
Simply put, there was no questioning by Judge Nash Holmes oI Coughlin as to whether he was
recording anything or whether he possessed a "recording device" until AFTER the one and
only restroom break Judge Nash Holmes mentions on the audio record. And that sua sponte
interrogation oI Couglin occured IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RESTROOM BREAK, A
BREAK IN WHICH JUDGE NASH HOLMES REFUSED TO ALLOW COUGHLIN TO
TAKE HIS YELLOW LEGAL PAD WITH HIM AND WHICH OCCURED AFTER
COUGHLIN MADE A VERBAL PRESERVATION ON THE RECORD OF THE
WHISPERING IN EACH OTHER'S EARS BY CITY ATTORNEY ALLISON ORMAAS
AND MARSHAL HARLEY (WHO SEEMED A BIT UPSET ABOUT SOME OF THE
QUESTIONS COUGHLIN ASKED THEM IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE TRIAL
(DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME WHERE JUDGE NASH HOLME'S ASSISTANT
INDICATED, ON THE RECORD IN ONE OF THE OTHER CASES ON THAT STACKED
DOCKET, THAT Judge Nash Holmes just couldn't be Iound, and how odd that was...which is
odd, considering what was going on in 11 cr 22176, 11 cr 26405 12 cr 00696 and 11 tr 26800,
and rcr2012-065630 and rcr2011-063341 at the time (lots oI reasons Ior and indications that
local law enIorcement and prosecutors and public deIenders were non too happy with
Coughlin...and consider the 2/24/12 email vacating the 2/27/12 status conIerence between
young and dogan that neither YOung nor Dogan wish to testiIy about...but which seems to
have been held anyways aIter a written communication oI its being reset was transmitted to
Coughlin by Dogan, wherein, during the time Judge Nash Holmes couldn't be Iound (maybe
she was at one oI the group meetings amongst Judges about Coughlin that RMC
Administrative Judge William Gardner reIerenced on the record in 11 CR 26405? Interesting
the Notice oI Appeal in 60302 was Iiled that same day too, 2/27/12) Dogan got his ORder Ior
Competency Evaluation oI Coughlin in rcr2012-065630 (apparently in retaliation Ior
Coughlin's Iiling oI 2/21/12, and DDA Zach Young was still smarting Irom a Iiling by
Coughlin oI approximately 11/28/12, which resultd in Young promptly amending his
complaint in rcr2011-063341 to add a charge that was duplicative, even where YOung Iailure
to allege theIt or possessing/receiving "Irom another' under Staab makes his so charging
Coughlin in that iPhone case a RPC 3.8 violation, which is YOung's specialty, apparently.
That, and violating NRs 178.405, which YOung did by Iiling in rcr2011-063341 with a stamp
oI 2:55pm a Iugitive document oI his own, an Opposition to Coughlin's or the WCPD Motion
to Appear as CoCounsel on 2/27/12...nevermind YOung tried to hold a TRIAL on 5/7/12 in
that case despite the Order Iinding Coughlin competent in cr12-0376 didn't even get signed
and entered until 5/9/12...ditto the Trial seeting oI 5/8/12 in RMC 11 cr 26405, the criminal
trespass case. NOt much respect Ior nrs 178.405 (including within NRs 5.010) here in
Northern nevada..
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Coughlin didn't received the 2/28/12 Contempt ORder in 11 tr 26800 until July 2012...but did
Iile a Notice oI Appeal 3/7/12...despite "summary criminal contempt" being a Iinal appealable
order, Judge Nash HOlmes continues to reIuse to Iollow NRS 189.010-050 (so Coughlin has to
type the transcript, yay....
This brings us to the merits oI the appeal. Because a summary contempt proceeding dispenses
with procedural saIeguards ordinarily deemed essential to Iair criminal trials, decisions oI the
Supreme Court (Cooke v. United States, 1925, 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767; In Re
Oliver, 1948, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682; Harris v. United States, 1965, 382
U.S. 162, 86 S.Ct. 352, 15 L.Ed.2d 240; Johnson v. Mississippi, 1971, 403 U.S. 212, 91 S.Ct.
1778, 29 L.Ed.2d 423) and Several courts oI appeals,(United States v. Meyer, 1972, 149
U.S.App.D.C. 212, 462 F.2d 827 (collecting cases); United States v. Willett, 4th Cir. 1970,
432 F.2d 202; United States v. Peterson, 10th Cir. 1972, 456 F.2d 1135; United States v.
Marshall, 9th Cir. 1971, 451 F.2d 372. But see In Re Niblack, D.C.Cir.1973, 476 F.2d 930,
and In Re Gates, D.C.Cir. 1973, 478 F.2d 998, discussed at note 7, inIra) ave severely
constricted the scope oI the summary contempt power.
One constraint on the use oI Rule 42(a) is a requirement that there be 'need Ior immediate
penal vindication oI the dignity oI the court'. Cooke v. United States, supra, 267 U.S. at 536,
45 S.Ct. at 395. The deIendants in Cooke had written and delivered an insolent letter to a
district court judge who had just presided over several cases in which the deIendants had an
interest, and who was about to preside over other such cases. The Supreme Court, reversing
summary contempt convictions, careIully distinguished obstructive contempts in open court
Irom other Iorms oI contempt. Disturbance, violence, or disrespectIul behavior may be dealt
with summarily, iI committed in open court, because oI the need to vindicate the court's
authority on the spot. 'When the contempt is not in open court, however, there is no such right
or reason in dispensing with' normal plenary procedure. 267 U.S. at 536, 45 S.Ct. at 395.
The Court has preserved the distinction it articulated in Cooke. In Re Oliver, supra note 2,
reversed the contempt conviction oI a witness who appeared beIore a judge sitting as a one-
man grand jury in Michigan. The judge-grand jury Iound the witness in contempt Ior giving
evasive answers to his questions. The inquiry had occurred in chambers, with Iew people
present. Quoting Irom Cooke, the Court made clear that summary contempt power can
constitutionally reach 'only such conduct as created 'an open threat to the orderly procedure oI
the court and such a Ilagrant deIiance oI the person and presence oI the judge beIore the
public' that, iI 'not instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization oI the court's authority
will Iollow.' (Cooke) (267 U.S.) at 536 (45 S.Ct. 390).' 333 U.S. at 275, 68 S.Ct. 508.
Two more recent cases, Harris v. United States, supra note 2, 382 U.S. at 165, 86 S.Ct. 352,
and Johnson v. Mississippi, supra note 2, 403 U.S. at 214, 91 S.Ct. 1778, reaIIirmed, with
reliance on Cooke, the view that need oI immediate action to restore order to an ongoing court
proceeding is a prerequisite, both constitutionally and under Rule 42(a), to use oI the summary
contempt power.
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Federal law, 18 U.S.C. 401, confers upon a court the authority to punish by
imprisonment "misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice," id. 401(1), and "disobedience or resistance to its
lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command," id. 401(3). A finding of direct
contempt is appropriate only if the criminal contempt occurred in the presence of the
judge and "the judge saw or heard the contemptuous conduct and so certifies."
Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(b). Contempt in the presence of the court "must be punished on the
spot to maintain the court's authority." The use of the summary contempt power is
proper only for "charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge,
which disturbs the court's business, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct
are under the eye of the court, are actually observed by the court, and where immediate
punishment is essential to prevent `demoralization of the court's authority' before the
public." Pounders v. Watson,521 U.S. 982, 988, 117 S.Ct. 2359, 138 L.Ed.2d 976 (1977)
(per curiam) (quoting In re Oliver,333 U.S. 257, 275, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682
(1948)).As we have recognized, however, the contempt power may be abused. We have
held the summary contempt exception to the normal due process requirements, such as a
hearing, counsel, and the opportunity to call witnesses, "includes only charges of
misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's
business, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the
court, are actually observed by the court, and where immediate punishment is essential
to prevent `demoralization of the court's authority' before the public." In re Oliver,333
U.S. 257, 275 (1948) (quoting Cooke, supra, at 536). We have stressed the importance of
confining summary contempt orders to misconduct occurring in court. Where
misconduct occurs in open court, the affront to the court's dignity is more widely
observed, justifying summary vindication. See In re Green,369 U.S. 689, 692 (1962)
(relying on due process cases); Harris v. United States,382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965) (defining
boundary between summary and ordinary contempt under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 42).
It is true that courts have long exercised a power summarily to punish certain conduct
committed in open court without notice, testimony or hearing. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S.
289, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405, was such a case. There Terry committed assault on the
marshal who was at the moment removing a heckler from the courtroom. The 'violence
and misconduct' of both the heckler and the marshal's assailant occurred within the
'personal view' of the judge, 'under his own eye,' and actually interrupted the trial of a
cause then under way
That the holding in the Terry case is not to be considered as an unlimited abandonment
of the basic due process procedural safeguards, even in contempt cases, was spelled out
with emphatic language in Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed.
767, a contempt case arising in a federal district court. There it was pointed out that for a
court to exercise the extraordinary but narrowly limited power to punish for contempt
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without adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, the court-disturbing misconduct
must not only occur in the court's immediate presence, but that the judge must
have personal knowledge of it acquired by his own observation of the contemptuous
condut . This Court said that knowledge acquired from the testimony of others, or even
from the confession of the accused, would not justify conviction without a trial in which
there was an opportunity for defense. Furthermore, the Court explained the Terry rule
as reaching only such conduct as created 'an open threat to the orderly procedure of the
court and such a flagrant defiance of the person and presence of the judge before the
public' that, if 'not instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of the court's
authority will follow.' Id., at page 536 of 267 U.S., at pages 394, 395 of 45 S.Ct.
..."'For the purposes contemplated by the provision of the constitution, the presence
of the officers of the court-men whom, it is safe to say, were under the influence
of the court-made the trial no more public than if they too had been excluded.'
People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 244, 37 P. 153, 154, 42 Am.St.Rep. 108." The RMC
regularly clears the court of members of the public (as is did in 11 cr 22176, the walmart
case) and or holds Coughlin's criminal case until the very end of the last stacked docket
of the day and or locks to courts doors, so that Coughlin's Trials cannot be said to occur
in the presence of anyone other than the jUdge, the prosecutor, coughlin, and whatever
witness is testying, and an Administrative Assistant or 1udicial Assistant (to the exten
they too are are not considered "officers of the Court" and not subject to the
exclusionary rule. So the idea that these summary conempts were necessary "preserve
the dignity of the court" in front of "the public". see alston Sutton 683 f. supp at 684, in
re spencer 985 so. 2d 300, 260 f.3d at 227, in re scott 1978 wl 26483 at 3, 477 ne 2d at 260,
matter of daniels 530 a. 3d at 1273.
... In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel oI Coughlin violated in
both 11 cr 22176 and 11 tr 26800, also orders no suIIiciently detailed or capable oI being
known how to comply with, not suIIicient warning, violat Houston v Eighth Judicial District
(Nev.).
See, this is why In Re Oliver and Cooke require all elements oI "summary criminal contempt"
occur " in the "immediate presence" oI the Court. Maybe Marshal Harley and some other
Marshal have misled Judge Nash HOlmes, or maybe something worse is going on here....but
what Judge Nash HOlmes said on the recording is entirely misleading an inaccurate, iI not an
outright lie (again, maybe not a lie by Judge Nash Holmes, maybe she is repeating a lie, but
regardless her reliance on unattributed hearsay is distrubing an inappropriate, particulary
where she not only purports to issue a "summary criminal contempt" conviction against an
attorney, but also where Judge Nash Holmes appears to try to transmogriIy what she sees as "a
simple traIIic citation trial" into a Iull blown SCR 105 disciplinary hearing where she is both
Bar Counsel and the Panel...That Marshal needs to sign an aIIidavit, under NRS 22.020 and
Judge Nash HOlmes ought to have to put something on the record, under oath, in response to
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Coughlin's recent subpoena (and SBN Pat King wishes to let Judge Nash HOlmes phone in her
testimony, and it probably won't even be sworn testimony, but rather just some musings by
Judge Nash Holmes purporting to make "rulings" Iinding "by clear and convincing evidence"
all sorts oI things outside her jurisdiction) on 11/14/12, on, Partick O. King, SBN Bar Counsel
has also Iiled Motion to Quash the Subpoenas Coughlin attempted to have served on Marshal
Joel Harley, Marshal Deighton, Judge Nash HOlmes, Judge William Gardner, Judge Gardners
Administrative Assistant Lisa Wagner, who can't quite Iind the NOtice oI Appeal Coughlin
Iaxed to her (allowable under the RMC Rules) on June 28th, 2012 in 11 CR 26405 (the appeal
was dismissed under an NRS 189.010 analysis by Judge Elliot, whom also got Coughlin
appeal oI the 11 cr 22176 conviction resulting in this Court's 6/7/12 temporary suspension
Order in cr11-2064, which was denied based upon a civil preparation oI transcript down
payment rule, in that criminal appeal, where the RMC has a thing in place with this Pam
Longoni that violates Nevada law in that it reIused to give Coughlin the audio cd oI the trial
Ior some time, insisting only Longoni would be allowed to transcribe it, and that the
transcript's preparation would absolutely not start until a down payment was made. Plus, even
where Coughlin caved to the payment demands..Longoni repeatedly hung up the phone on him
and otherwise ignored his communications (there may be an issue oI the email Longoni
holding out to the public issuing a "bounceback"...but she needs to sign an aIIidavit as to
whether she put Coughlin on a blocked list, and upon inIormation and belieI, Coughlin Iaxed
his request to the number the RMC held out Ior her on her behalI too...
In her March 14th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin to the SBN (now NG12-0434, and
perhaps, NG12-0435, depending upon whom you ask and what King means by "Clerk oI
Court"...because in King's 3/23/12 email to Coughlin he apparently identiIies Ms. Marilyn
Tognoni as "Clerk oI Court oI Department 3"...whoever, wouldn't it be Second Judicial
District Court Clerk oI Court Joey Orduna Hastings that would need to send Family Court
Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin to the SBN's King Ior King
now apparent contention that the NG12-0435 "ghost grievance" consisting oI Judge L.
Gardner's April 2009 Order was not Iiled by the RMC Judges? Oh, Clerk oI Court Orduna
Hastings? Do you have anything to say about this? Judge Nash Holme's 3/14/12 grievance to
bar counsel reads:
"
Re: Zachary Barker Coughlin, Nevada Bar No. 9473
Dear Mr. Clark:
This letter constitutes a Iormal complaint oI attorney misconduct and/or disability against
Zachary Barker Coughlin. The accompanying box oI materials demonstrates some oI the
problems with the practice oI this attorney being experienced by myselI and the other three
judges in Reno Municipal Court. My two most recent Orders in what should be a simple traIIic
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citation case are selI-explanatory and are included, together with copies oI massive documents
Me. Coughlin has IaxIiled to our court in this case. Audio recordings oI two oI my hearings in
this matter are also included. He Iailed to appear Ior the second one this past Monday.
I have another traIIic case pending trial with him that was re-assigned to me based on our
Department I judge being out Ior surgery. We have multiple addresses Ior Mr. Coughlin and
can't seem to locate him between cases very easily. We are setting that case Ior trial and
th
attempting to serve him at the most recent address we have (1422 E. 9 St. #2 Reno NY
89512), although I heard today he may be living in his vehicle somewhere. We do have an
address Ior his mother, however, as she recently posted part oI a Iine Ior him.
Judge Ken Howard, Department 4, had a case on Mr. Coughlin late last year that is now on
appeal to the Second Judicial District Court. Judge Bill Gardner, Department 2, also has a
matter currently pending in his court with Mr. Coughlin as the deIendant. I have enclosed
some copies oI documents Irom those matters, in chronological order, simply because they
appear to demonstrate that he is quickly decompensating in his mental status. Our staII also
made you some audio tapes oI Coughlin in the him and him and him and him and him and him
and him him and I will him and him and him and him and him in Departments 2 and 4 so you
can hear Ior yourselI how this attorney acts in court. You can see his behavior in my traIIic
citation case does not appear to be an isolated incident.
It is my understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a matter pending on this attorney. My
Judicial Assistant was contacted by the Washoe Public DeIender in February when I had Mr.
Coughlin jailed Ior Contempt oI Court and they stated that they represent him in a Gross
Misdemeanor matter in RJC. I have no other inIormation on that.
You will have the Iull cooperation oI myselI, the other judges, and the staII oI Reno Municipal
Court in your pursuit oI this matter. Mr. Coughlin has positioned himselI as a vexatious
litigant in our court, antagonizing the staII and even our pro temp judges on the most simple
traIIic and misdemeanor matters. I do think this is a case oI some urgency, and I apologize Ior
taking two days to get this package to you; our IT person was ill and could not make the copies
oI the audios oI Mr. Coughlin's hearings until today, and I Ielt it was important that the audios
be included in the materials to be considered by the State Bar. On February 27, 2012, Mr.
Coughlin told me he was actively practicing law and had appointments with clients. | do not
know iI that was true, but iI so, he could be causing serious harm to the practice oI law in
Northern Nevada and could be jeopardizing someone's Ireedom or property interests. "
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it is instructive to consider judge William Gardner's comments on the record at the trial in the
criminal trespass matter Irom Coughlin's Iormer home oIIice again it is judge William Gardner
who is the brother oI Judge Linda Gardner whose April 2009 sanction order was cited by
Washoe legal services and named party in this matter at this sole reason Ior Iiring Coughlin
additionally Washoe legal services now employs as part oI the ECR program with Thodore
who was at one time Coughlin said on this criminal trespass matter until apparently Joe Iigured
out the Calder was doing his business partners Nevada court services table is a court-appointed
attorney by the deIendant deIense attorney by the Reno municcourt
at the 19 minutes mark oI the audio oI the 6/18/12 trial in the criminal trespass matter 11 cr
26405:
Judge Gardner: Iinally the it leaves the issue oI recusal although you have not raised in the
caption oI the pleading news.with in the party their about page do we about address this issue
beIore and I've denied that motion to recuse there is nothing raised in any oI the pleadings that
causes me to be busy in this case other than a Iair detached observer oI the Iacts oI that will be
denied Ior
Coughlin Your Honor just interject that not just preIaced that by saying Nevada doctors did
your announced any judge Your Honor and completely Iair so let's give me a lot oI conIidence
the corridor but I do believe there might be a judicial candor something this is where judge has
litigants beIore him who have a case involving a Iamily member oI the judge and some other
sphere and I think that Mike and mandatory recusal auto but I did Iind and Iollow mandamus
action adventure sister attended court in 2009 I was Iired Irom a job as iI surveillance attorney
Ior Washoe legal services was told I was Iired because oI her because oI conduct by neither
resulted in her order distilleries and starts marshaling services I did Iollow mandamus petition
response to that. Judge oI the Supreme Court Iather wasn't worthy oI more reviewer require
and responsiveness and and now there's this grievance Ior the court and I call it not be Ilipped
by: p.m. macula conception grievance because nobody can tell me who Iiled it or how the can
grievance but that order one 2009 sanction may require me to pay personally $1000 in
attorney's Iees under NRS him .085 as a consequence oI my advocacy is a domestic violence
attorney aIter number oI bus client a battered woman tenant or alimony incident to a 20 year
marriage when I was ordered to slaughter my pocket that is now grievance it upon inIormation
believed that it can grievance with the State Bar because your sister judge Linda Gardner did
the order to you whereupon you indicated that you get judge Nash Holmes whereupon judge
Nash and skipped Ior counsel along with a number oI other materials that I've not been privy
to despite my attempts to secure them Irom the Iiling oIIicer the court or Irom door counsel I
have made numerous attempts to get these recordings at antenna materials as are not directed
at
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Judge W. Gardner: thank you Mr. Coughlin let me just tell you this that case goes back to the
Family Court oI no real knowledge except that I have read the Order it is unrelated and
irrelevant to this case. I have not really discuss the merits oI this case with my sister who is a
judge in the Family Court there would've been no reason to discuss that case and even if that
would've happened it would have not, uh, um, there really is no nexus between her being a
judge hearing the case Ior Europe attorney and and my been a judge some three years later on
a case where you are a deIendant in, so the motion to recuse is denied and I think that
identiIies the issues that you Iaced in the motion you Iiled June 5, 2012 it looks like now we
are ready to go to trial is that correct, Mr. Hazlett-Stevens?"
Hazlett-Stevens that's correct Your Honor: I'll call Richard Hill to the stand "
Judge W. Gardner curiously deIines and limits to an overly narrow extent, Coughlin'
appearance beIore him, even where Coughlin had been Iorced to represent himselI in violation
oI the Sixth Amendment given the utterly Iraudulent "court appointed representation" by Keith
Loomis, Esq. as "a case where you are a deIendant in".
Then (and this also goes to the overly narrow limiting oI the conIlict analysis to seeing
Coughlin only as "a deIendnat beIore me in a criminal case" that Judge W. Gardner made
above) at the 23:20 minute mark, despite judge William Gardner admitting to being where
previously oI the Iact that Coughlin's law license had been suspended by this court on June 7,
2012 judge Gardner notes:
Judge GArdner: excuse me Mr. Hazlett Stevens let me just enter one more thing Ior the record
on that recusal analysis Mr. Coughlin limits the wording oI this case to the date I have put the
criminal complaint alleges on number oI November 13, 2011 in the city oI Reno at 121 River
Rock St. the deIendant was Iound in the property aIter being evicted on November 1, 2011
Billy other inIormation I heard about the cases been whatever was raised in the pleadings Iiled
by either you or Mr. Hazlett-Stevens, so that being the case, go ahead and proceed with your
examination oI Richard Hill"
Interesting how the complaint pleads being evicted as tantamount to a criminal trespass
warning, and Hazlett-STevens impermissibly sought to invoke State v. nichols in the broadest
oI senses (criminal trespass? civil trespass? was notice appropritately served in Nichols?
doesn't matter apparently, and Judge Gardner indicates he doesn't care what service rules apply
to evictions, as he will decide that based upon the facts as developed a trial, reIusing to allow
Coughlin to make legal argument in that regard.
in that audio Io the trial, very shortly theraIter at the 24:02 mark:
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"Coughlin: I'm sorry I don't mean minaret to Mr. Hazel Stevens but iI I can just quickly
interject her honor with respect what you just said to the extent that I am required to broach the
topic oI any discussions you had with judge Nash Holmes with respect to these matters
Gardner: I can tell you that judge Nash owns I have not discussed this with anybody. We have
not. F their have been no discussions between me and the judge about your case to protect
And, darn, Iorgot this, but there actually was a Pam Longoni prepared transcript in the appeal
oI the criminal trespass conviction (but as cr12-1018 may suggest, it can be a good idea to
double check Ms. Longoni's transcriptions Ior the RMC, she is held out as their "exclusive"
transcriptionist, and documentation is provided to appellants that ther transcript's preparation
will not even begin until a substantial down payment is made (and probably won't, i need to
check this...but probably won't be Iorward to dist court until Iull payment is made, all in
violationI oI NRS 189.030...despite whatever civil statute Judge Elliot cited in denying
Coughlin's appeal oI the walmart thing udnerlying coughlin's current suspension oI 6/7/12...in
cr11-2064...)
but, it is really interesting to note How Judge W. Gardner, nuetral arbiter oI Iact, recounts the
record in that trespass case in Longoni's transcript, especially iwth regard to the import oI NRS
178.405 in the context oI nrs 5.010 especially and considering the communications between
city atty Hazlett-Stevens, Hon. W. Gardner and then court appointed deIense counsel Keith
Loomis in a clandestine status conIerence the morning oI trial (totally unbeknownst to
Loomis's attorney client Coughlin, on 4/10/12)...
while alternately citing to Coughlin's being removed Irom mental healt court by Judge Breen,
MD as a basis Ior denying a motions on 6 18 12, only to then rule as irrelevant any argument
Coughlin made to the basis Ior that removal (which is all pointless now, as the 5/7/12 ORder
by Judge SIerrazza transIerring that iPhone case to Mental Health Court was violative oI NRS
178.405 in that the order resolving the 2/27/12 ORder Ior Competency Evaluation in cr12-
0376 did not even get signed and entered, with a Iile stamp until 5/9/12...so the whole mch
deal is void.. but check out Hon Gardners characterization oI the trial setting vis a vis the 6 18
12 trial and other key dates, skillIully dealt with, yes indeed with respect to the pendecy oI an
Order Ior Competency Evaluation during key times, Coughlin interlineations will be in bold
and in parentheses...:
"Hon. Judge Gardner: On November 13th, 2011, Mr. Coughlin was arrested
by the Reno Police Department and charged with one count oI trespassing.
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On November 14'h, 2011, Mr. Coughlin was arraigned and pled not guilty.
Trial was then set Ior December 13th, 20 11.
On November 23'd, 2011, a Motion to Continue was Iiled by
the City Attorney, a Hill motion is what I'll call it, based on an absent
witness. I believe it was Mr. Hill, not related to the Hill motion.
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: That's the original motion, yes.
THE COURT: That was not opposed by DeIendant's counsel at
the time (that would have been RMC court appoint counsel Lew Taitel,
whose business partners NEvada court Services Coughlin was suing at
the time incident to their work for Richard G. Hill and Casey Baker).
And on November 28th, I entered an order continuing the trial the Iirst time.
The trial was then reset Ior January 30th, 2012. On January 3,d, 2012, a
Motion to Continue was Iiled by Mr. Puentes, your attorney at the time. The
City Attorney did not object.
On January 18th, I -well, prior to that, beIore the ruling on that motion, on
January 18th, Mr. Puentes Iiled a Motion to Withdraw as your attorney.
On February 2nd, 2012, I scheduled a (inaudible) hearing on the Motion to
Withdraw. The motion was granted, and Mr. Loomis was appointed.
On February 13th, 2012, you filed, Mr. Coughlin, a Motion to Vacate, a
Motion for Reconsideration for Recusal.
On February 22nd, 2012, an Opposition to the Motion was Iiled by the City
Attorney.
Trial, then at that point, was ultimately reset Ior April 10th, 2012.
(that trial setting is file stamped 3/7/12 in that RMC case 11 cr 26405,
which, curiously is avoide throughout this recitation of the "docket",
which is awfully tough to get a copy of from the RMC. Now Coughlin's
11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing before the Panel and SBN involves three
grievances. ng12-0204, filed by Richard HIll, ng12-0434, filed by RMC
1udge Nash Holmes, in relation to finding Coughlin in "summary
criminal contempt" despite cooke and in re oliver and the whole "every
essential element occured within the immediate presence" etc., etc. and
despite some real slippery shadowy reconting as rendered stuff about a
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restroom break, o affidavits signed by any Ct. Marshals at to whatever it
was they said to 1udge Nash Holme and whatever remixing of the order
of bathroom breaks and search incidents to arrest, and going back to the
jail the next day to retrieve the attorney's smart phone and data card
may have actually occurred...but the talkign point is this: ON 2/27/12 IN
RCR2012-065630 ANOTHER ORDER FOR COMPETENCY
EVALUATION WAS ENTERED AS TO COUGHLIN. A couple hours
later, after 1udge Nash HOlmes was finally found by her staff, the traffic
citation trial in connection with RPD citing Couglin at Hill's law office
for 3 minor traffic ciolations 11 tr 26800 was held, despite 1udge Nash
Holmes admission in her grievance to bar counsel on 3/14/12, which
became ng12-0434....the third grievance, strangely stamped as received in
the sBN 3/15/12 with the "5" in the "15" looking a little under the
weather, is ng12-0435, and like a baby left on a doorstep after someone
rings the doorbell and runs away...its pretty murky just how that "three
year old Order in a completely unrelated case" as HOn. W. Garner
characterizes it, which he admits to passing from his sister to the other
RMC 1udges shorlty before judge Nash HOlmes submitted her "box of
materials" to the SBN along with her grievance against Coughlin (whose
filings, to her, represent the singularly most disturbing pieces of legal
work she has seen in her 35 years in this business".. because Coughlin
can be a real Kunstler)
On March 5th, 2012, Mr. Coughlin, you Iiled a motion actually captioned in
the District Court, but it made itselI -it did make itselI appropriate to our Iile.
On March 21'" you Iiled another Motion -the City Iiled a (Page -6- (oI
Longoni's transcript)
Motion to strike your motion based on no service on the City Attorney.
On January 20th, 2012 (must be referring to the ORder that says "filed in
error" and has a new file stampe of 2/20/12, one of several instances of
such "filed in error" restampings in this case and other RMC cases, here
is seems to have little important and to be a simple scrivenor stamper
error), I entered an order, number one, denying your motion that was Iiled on
February 13th, 2012. On March 21st, 2012, I entered a second order denying
your Motion to Dismiss that was Iiled on March 5th, 2012.
(if you are waiting for 1udge W. Gardner to indicate there was an Order
SEtting for Trial this crimina trespass case on 3/7/12 (setting the first
trial date of 4/10/12...at which a curious order of things went like this...Ct
finds Coughlin question of competency regarding Coughlin...then court
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grants Loomis Motion to Withdraw...huh? nrs 178.405 "stay the
proceedings', not "grant Loomis one of his many, many succesful Motion
to Withdraw in his "work" as a court appointed "defense counsel" for
the RMC)...you will be waiting a long time, becaues he never managed to
point that out....nor did he point out that the 5/8/12 stamped "Trial
Setting" (setting the 6/18/12 trial date) was also violative of nrs 178.405
vis a vis nrs 5.010 (and even without 5.010 is it) given the ORer in cr12-
0376 wasn't signed and entered until 5/9/12...but Hon. 1. Garnder does
manage to mention cr12-0376, just not the fact that all these Trial setting
and ORers granting withdraws (similar ot the one Henry Sotelo, ESq.
anothe McGeorge former prosecutor court appointed defense counsel at
the RMC got in 12 cr 12520 during the pendency of Coughlin third
Competency Evaluation ORder.)
And then on April 10th, 2012, I suspended the proceedings based on a
competency issue that had been raised in the District Court.(well, actuall it
was more than 'raise" by the 2/27/12 Order in the justice court that
Gardner's fellow RMC judge Nash HOlmes appears to reference ever so
curiosly in her 3/14/12 greivance against coughlin with the sbn) And then
at that time, at your request, Mr. Loomis was relieved as your attorney.
(request is putting is charitably...if Loomis is more of a prosecutor than
the prosecutor, is one deciding to go it along, albeit during the pendency
of a competnecy order that precludes any such violation of the attendant
stay..is that really a "request"?)
On April 26th, 2012, in District Court, Judge Elliott Iound you competent to
stand trial.
(well...isn't the order finding Couglin Competent in that case cr12-0376
actually file stamped 5/9/12? doesn't the jail rip peopel off their
medications during times liek the 8 day jail stay Couglin got from apri
19th, to april 26th, 2012 when DDA Zach Young committed one of his
many numerous violationso of nrs 178.405 in seeking to have Coughlin's
bail revocked based upon some lies in a letter filed with the court by
Lakes Crossing's Bill Davis and Sally Farmer (class ic was a jail booking
area phone call between davis and Coughlin, recorded by the jail, we'll se
if the produce it. wherein DAvis claims that he "didn't write the letter"
that bares his signature as a Ph.D. and was filed on 4/17/12 in cr12-0376
and cited to extensively by d10 1udge Steven Elliot (the judge on the
associate 60317, the companion case to the instant 60302) as a basis,
along with Young's nrs 178.405 violative Motion, for ripping a license
attorney, on the spot, with no stay, away from his practice and client's,
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with no opposition of any import, zeal, or skill by wcpd Biray Dogan, and
refusing to even consider the legal research Coughlin attempted to
submit to the court vis a vis whether these retaliatory competency
evaluations are "blank checks" into a criminal defendants entire
medical/mental health HIPAA protected records. Top it off, Biray
Dogan, just after an express direction not to by Coughlin, announces the
name of a medication Coughlin takes into the record, in front of 40
members of teh public and bar milling about, and Dogan's boss 1eremy
Bosler later refuses to move to strike or ameliorate in any way Dogan's
error. Oh, also the WCPD, and the R1C co-signs this in some instances,
maintains the position that defendnats don't have a right to know be
apprised of very important filings in their cases by their court appointe
counse...its, uh...not a duty to communicate with client's situation or
anything...at least when its a public defender, and dogan got an $8K raise
during one of the worst economic years in our nations history recently.)
On May 19th, 2012, Judge Elliott signed an Order Iinding you competent
(actually it was 5/9/12) and remanded whatever case was pending in the
Justice Court back to the Justice Court, and then I reset trial Ior June 18th,
2012, today's date. (WHOA! HOLD ON THER 1UDGE
GARDNER...about that "and then I reset trial for 1une 18th, 2012"
bit...don't you mean you set trial for 6/18/12 on the record (which the
SBN admits getting, though Pat Hill, or Richard King, er, I mean Pat
King indicates he finds it hard to listen to such stuff and do much reading
or research or anything of that sort) Becuase Hon. 1. Gardner set the
6/18/12 Trial on 5/8/12, and that was a violation of NRs 178.405. the fifth
or sixth he made in that criminal trespass case where he swears he was
able to be a "neutral arbiter of fact" despite all the conflicts attendnat to
the matters set forth herein.)
On May 7th, 2012, Judge SIerrazza assigned that case in the Justice Court to
the Mental Health Court. On May 24th, Judge Breen, the District Court
Judge, and the Judge responsible Ior the administration -him and Judge Blake,
one oI the two Judges, sent the case back to the Reno Justice Court. (at least
1udge SFerrazza lets cases go when he hands them over to the MCH,
rather then do what the RMC 1udges do, which is "stay" the
proceedings, but retain jurisdiction in the RMC rather than transfer it
the the MCH...but regardless, given the ORder resolving the 2/27/12
ORder wasn't signed and entered until 5/9/12...that 5/7/12 Order by
1udge Sferrazza was void)
Then on June 5th, you Iiled the motion we're talking about now, including the
Motion to Continue."
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(the one Hazlett-Stevens "wasn't served with", uh huh. City of Reno
Drop box that front desk security at city hall says will work for City
attorney's? that one, Hazlett-Stevens? literally every second of the 11 cr
26405 criminal trespass trial is dripping with that which really really
needs a good careful close inspection for misconduct, from the
"substance" of the 6/5/12 Motion, to the violations of the stay,the the
arguing things not in the record in closing by Hazlett-Stevens, the the
"civil eviction stuff is relevant when the prosecution needs to coopt it to
atempt to leverage a criminal trespass warning from "rendition"
(criminal law concept nrs 189.010) of an eviction order (no matter how
completely different the Order(s) may have wound up being once put
through Hill and Baker's truth factory) to all "civil eviction law is
compeltely not relevant to this criminal trespass matter...i will decide
what rules apply as to service of the eviction order by the facts as
developed through testimony at trial,...i don't want to hear you get all far
afield with legal argument about the rules applicable to civil evi tion
orders...." too bad, because you would miss the rich moments like Casey
Baker, Esq. having to admit that, despite his office biling the landlord
$60K in attorneys fees, Baker was unaware that NRS 40.400 makes
applicabe the NRCP, not the 1CRCP, to summary evictions in Nevada
(and therefore NRCP 5 and NRCP 6(e), where, as there, no personal
service of eviction order)..to Hill and Bakers sworn testimony, to the
RMc filing OFfices record keeping, to the failure to stamp in the timely
notice of appeal in cr12-1262, which resulted in a dismissal of the appeal
by...wait for it...1udge Steven Elliot)
...
COURT: Yeah, I don't know exactly what happened, Mr. Coughlin. I
appreciate that. I'm reading Irom Judge Breen's Order that "The DeIendant be
removed Irom the Mental Health Program, and that you be returned to the
Reno Justice Court Ior all Iuture proceedings."
So, whatever happened over there, which I'm not privy to, and which I don't
think really is related or relevant to this case, we're going to not delay these
proceedings by sending the case over there.
Finally, that leaves the issue oIrecusal. You have, while not raised in the
caption oI the pleading, it is identiIied in the pleadings you raised, on page
two, we've addressed this issue beIore in detail.
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I've denied that Motion to Recuse. There's nothing raised that even (inaudible)
prevents me Irom hearing this case and being a Iair, detached observer to the
Iacts oIlaw, so that will be denied.
MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, iI! could quickly enter an objection Ior the
record on that. THE COURT: Go ahead.
Pa -15
MR. COUGHLIN: And just to preIace that by saying everybody I've talked to
has indicated you're an outstanding Judge, Your Honor, and completely Iair,
so that's deIinitely given me a lot oI conIidence in the Court in that regard.
But I do believe there might be -I don't know iI it's a judicial (inaudible)
(canon, Ms. Longoni, canon....that would be another instance of an
appeable issue, like in cr12-1018 being chalked up to, by the RMC's
Longoni as "inaudible") or something that says where a Judge has litigants
beIore him who have a case involving a Iamily member oI the Judge, in some
other sphere. I don't know iI that's a mandatory recusal, but I did Iile a
mandatory habeas action against your sister, the Honorable Judge Linda
Gardner, in Family Court in 2009. I was Iired Irom my job as a domestic
violence attorney Irom Washoe Legal Services, and I was told I was Iired
because oI her -because oI the conduct by me that resulted in her order only.
It's the only reason I was Iired, according to Washoe Legal Services.
I did Iile a Mandamus Petition. It was pretty much a three judge panel, and
the Supreme Court Ielt it wasn't worthy oI, I guess, more review or requiring
a response.
And then now there is a grievance with the State Bar. I call it -not to be Ilip,
but I call it kind oI the immolate conception grievance because nobody can
tell me who Iiled it, or how it became a grievance.
But that order Irom 2009 sanctioned me requiring me to pay $\,000 attorney's
Iees, NRS (inaudible) .085. In the context oI my being a domestic violence
legal aid attorney advocating on behalI oI my client, a battered woman, trying
to get her alimony incident to a 20-year marriage with two kids, wherein I
was ordered to pay $\,000 out oI my pocket, that's now a grievance.
Page -16-
It's upon infonnation and belief it became a grievance with the
State Bar because your sister, 1udge Linda Gardner, gave the order to
you, whereupon I believe you indicated you gave it to 1udge Nash
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Holmes, whereupon 1udge Nash Holmes gave it to bar counsel, along
with a number of other materials that I have not been privy to, either in
my attempts to secure them from the filing office here at the Muni Court,
or from bar counsel, Mr. Patrick Kinney (king).
I've made numerous attempts to get these recordings and these diIIerent
materials. So, just to enter that Ior the record, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Alright, thank you, Mr. Coughlin. And let me just tell you this.
That case goes back to the Family Court, I have no real knowledge, except I
have read the Order. It's unrelated and irrelevant to this case. I have not really
discussed the merits oI this case with my sister who is a Judge in the Family
Court.
There would be no reason to discuss that case, and even iI that would have
happened, we have not -there's really no nexus between her being a Judge and
having heard a case where you're an attorney on, and my being a Judge some
three years later on a case where you are a DeIendant in.
So, the Motion to Recuse is denied. And I think that identiIies the issues
raised in your Motion Iiled June 5th, 2012. It looks like now we're ready to go
to trial, is that correct, counsel?
MR. HAZLETT -STEVENS: The City is ready, Your Honor. THE COURT:
Alright, let's go ahead and call your Iirst witness, Mr. Hazlett-Stevens.
Page -17
-
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: The City calls Richard Hill to the
stand.
MR. COUGHLIN: And, Your Honor, I don't know iI I'm supposed to intelject
this now, or not, but I believe I did subpoena some witnesses who appear
(inaudible) (uh, Pam Longoni, thats another "inaudible" on another
appealable issue, that being the failure to grant a subpoena where, if that
is the case here, Sargnet Marcia Lopez and Officer Chris Carter were
subpoened (apparently they were by the city attorney, and Coughlin
asserted he though he did subpoena them, but indicated some ambiguity
or uncertainty in that regard...but "inaudible" doesn't quite preserve the
appealable issue).
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THE COURT: Right, and we'll address that at the appropriate time.
Ultimately, Mr. Coughlin is a lawyer. B (not according the the SBN and
this Court's 6/7/12 ORder that 1udge Gardner admits to haveing been
apprised of...Coughlin couldn't issue supboenas like an attorney, post
6/7/12, could he?) You know we take these -Mr. Hill, good morning.
MR. HILL: Good morning, sir.
THE COURT: We take these matters step by step by step. There's no other
way to do it, so we'll address all legal issues as they show up in the due
course, and pursuant to protocol at trial.
So, let's swear in Mr. Hill. (Witness duly sworn). THE COURT: Have a seat,
Mr. Hill. Mr. Hazlett-Stevens, go ahead. MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Thank
you, Your Honor.
RICHARD HILL
called as a witness, having been duly sworn,
testiIied as Iollows:
DIRECT EXAMINA nON BY MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Q Good
morning, can you please state your name, and spell your last Ior the record?
Page -18
Page -19-
THE COURT: You know, Mr. Hazlett-Stevens, and Mr. -let
me make one last comment Ior the record.
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Please.
THE COURT: I know that Mr. Coughlin is an attorney. Nonetheless, he's
representing himselI.
Mr. Coughlin, let me tell you what I know about this case to date. I am
looking at a Criminal Complaint that alleges that on November 13th, 2011, in
the City oIReno, at 121 River Rock Street, the DeIendant was Iound on the
property aIter being evicted on November 1st, 2011.
The only other inIormation I know about the case is that the whatever was
raised in the pleadings Iiled, both by you and Mr. Hazlett-Stevens.(maybe
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Loomis and Puentes didn't file anything? Oh, wait, did they attach all of
Coughlin's emails to them detail the Richard HIll 1udge Nash HOlmes
nexus? Really?)
So, with that in mind, go ahead, Mr. Hazlett-Stevens. MR. HAZLETT-
STEVENS: Thank you. BY MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Q Thank you. Can
you please state your name, and spell your last Ior the record?
A Richard Hill, H-I-L-L.
Q Good, Mr. Hill, I'm going to ask you MR.
COUGHLIN: I'm sorry, I don't mean to interrupt you, Mr. Hazlett-Stevens. II!
could just quickly interject, Your Honor, given what you just said, to any
extent, I'm required to broach the topic oI any discussions you've had with
Judge Nash Holmes with respect to these
matters or -
-
THE COURT: I can tell you that Judge Nash Holmes and I have
not discussed this case with anybody, we have not. There has been no
discussions between me and the Judge about your case, the trespassing, set Ior
today.
MR. COUGHLIN: Or any other matters related to Richard Hill?
THE COURT: Or any other matters. We've never discussed any matters
related to Richard Hill at all.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay, and when you said you and your sister had never
discussed anything about me?
THE COURT: Not related to this case.
MR. COUGHLIN: I believe earlier you just said you never discussed
anything about me at all. MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Judge, you've already
ruled on this. I'm going to ask that you THE
COURT: We have ruled. Let me tell you -let me tell you what I've discussed.
We have discussed -I have not discussed with Judge Nash Holmes and I am
advised that based on some steps she's taken, there's been a matter reIerred to
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the State Bar which is under, iI not -I'm aware that you have been suspended
by the State Bar, and that that's subject to Iurther review.
To the extent that Judge Holmes has had a case in her department, as has
Judge Howard, and has myselI, we have had discussions, general discussions
related to the State Bar matter. (1udge W. Gardner is referring to the three
grievances forming the scr 105 Complaint set for a disciplinary hearing
on 11/14 12, consisting of one grievance by Hill, one by jUdge Nash
HOlmes stemming from a traffic citation trial where the citation was
issued by the rpd outside Hill's office after they told Coughlin to leave
(which he did, but the RPD wasn't satisfied so they pulled him over while
he was leaving) in 11 tr 26800, where, on the record, 1udge Nash HOlmes
threatened Coughlin with "IF you say Richard HIll's name one more
time I am going to put you in jail for contempt, do you understand me!",
and where Holmes eventually did find Couglin guilty of "summary
criminal contempt" denied a stay to a practicing attorney askign for a
chance to make alternate arrangments for his clients, and had Coughlin
cuffed, searched, and taken the the WCDC, not that gently either...only
to have the RMC Marshal return well after an period wherein the
"incident to" part of a "search incident to arrest" could be said to be
possible, to retrieve a licensed attorney's smart phone, micro sd card, and
other items...with all the date wiped or destroyed therein prior to being
returned to then licensed attorney Coughlin some 37 days later...with a
chain of custody in between deserving a whole lotta second looks (Mary
Kandaras? anything? Deputy Hodge? Marshals Coppa or Deighton?
Deputy Cheung? How about you WCSO's Debi Cummings, Brandi
Berriman, Deputy Beatson, Deputy Van der Wall, or Patricia Beckman?
Anything? Deputy Iver? No?s)
As related to my conversations with either my sister, which have been very
limited related to you, and certainly none related to your
Page 20
case, except you had a case over here, I've had no discussions with Judge
Howard, Judge Holmes, Mr. Hill, Mr. Hazlett-Stevens,(well, actually the
Hon. W. Gardner did, on the record in the first attempt at a Trial in that
trespass case on 4/10/12 admit the he, City of Reno Prosecutor Hazlett-
Stevens, eSq. Coughlin' court appointed counsel Keith Loomis, Esq. did
get together in a back room that morning and hash some stuff out....but
judge Gardner would later indicate all this stuff was very "planned out"
and done "very carefully" and whatnot) or my sister regarding this
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trespassing case. And that's by design that was careIully thought out so there's
been no discussions.
MR. COUGHLIN: And with the State Bar, I know earlier THE
COURT: I have had no conversations with the State Bar.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay, at our last hearing though you made a statement, I
believe, the disciplinary or the Bar will be meeting next week to make a-
THE COURT: I was advised by Judge Holmes that the process involving you
and the State Bar was in the process where they were going to make a
decision, which ultimately apparently they did. Those were the substances oI
those conversations, but none were related to this case, and I can tell you that
none have had any conversations regarding the witnesses in this case that
have never come up between any oI the counsel. I'm not sure they even know
who the witnesses were quite Irankly.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay, thank you.
MR. COUGHLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay, let's go ahead and proceed. BY MR. HAZLETT-
STEVENS:
Q Thank you. Mr. Hill, I'm going to ask you to make sure you speak up and
not trail oII your answers at the end. This is being recorded, so Ior appellate
purposes, or any other purpose, I'd like to get a good recording oI this.
Page -21Mr.
Hill, what's your occupation or proIession?
A
I am an attorney practicing in Reno, Nevada."
And so on and so oI.. Richard G. Hill and Casey Baker seeking to charge the
same rent as they did Ior "Iull use and occupany" as relevant to a claim oI
right deIense to the criminal trespass charge? Not relevant according to Judge
Gardner. RPD misconduct and Hill and Merliss's lies contributing to Ialse
arrest and Hill's perjured sworn testimony detailed extensively in 61901, as is
Casey Baker, Esq.'s proIessional misconduct in doing in violation oI NRCP
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11 that which Hill chickened out doing in his Declarations oI 11/21/11 and
1/20/12, until the necessity and exigency oI his misdeeds and proIessional
negligence ("wrong site surger" equals using summary eviction proceeding
where only No Cause basis pled or noticed, agains commercial tenant, in
express violation oI NRs 4.0253 and even this Court's simpliIied instructions
in the "Landlord Tenant Handbook" (really choice how the instructions to the
Iorms on lockouts seem to adopt WLS's Sasser, ASsemblyman Horne and
Frierson and Segerblom's wishes as to the "within 24 hours" languagne being
interpreted to be no sooner than "within 24 hours" which, you can be sure,
aint how summary eviction order lockouts are being carried out. Ask NVB
Judge Beesley about Coughlin's ultra sheek t shirt and tie combination under
the old blased at 2:00Pm on 3/25/12 in Cadle Company v Keller ($1.6 million
dollar debt adversary proceeding) where Coughlin manage to appear (Iinding
a dress shirt was a problem given Coughlin used the scant 5 minutes WCSO
deputies durbina and cannizzaro accorded him at 1:30 pm ish on 3/15/12 to
grab his computers, client's Iiles, medications, contacts, glasses and whatnot
aIter they broke in at gunpoint and evicted Coughlin, as they do to all citizens
oI Washoe County subject to a summary eviction order. GAyle Kern, Esq.?
paging Gayle Kern...rjc rev2012-000374) But the great thing is that Casey
Baker testiIied on 6/18/12 that:
A That's correct. Q So, the Findings oI Facts, Conclusions oI Law and
Order oI Eviction Iound in your Iavor, Mr. Merliss's Iavor, rather, and the
date oI eviction was as oI October 31" at 5:00 p.m., correct? A That's correct.
That's what we announced in Court and put on that Findings oI Fact. Q And
that Order said that anyone there aIter that date could be removed, is that
correct?
A
That was the command given to the SheriII.
Q
"Shall be removed."
A
Yes.
Page -66Page
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-67-
Q Did you serve that document on Mr. Coughlin in any Iashion? A Notice oI
Entry oI Order or anything like that? Or was that served by the Court on him?
A The way it works is the Court -aIter the Court enters the Order, the Court
Iorwards it to the SheriII. Q Okay.
A And the SheriII goes out and enIorces the order.
Q Okay, now I'm going to draw your attention to the date oI November 13th,
201 1.
THE COURT: What was that date again?
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: November 13, 2011, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay, give me just a second, counsel.
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: Certainly, Judge.
THE COURT: I'm making some notes here regarding some dates.
MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS: And I'm going to withdraw that question, Your
Honor, so iI you don't want to jot that note down, you don't have to at this
point.
THE COURT: Okay, I'm looking at something else, okay. Go ahead. Thank
you, counsel. BY MR. HAZLETT-STEVENS:
Q I'm going to draw your attention to the date oI November 1 st, 2011. Do
you recall what you were doing that day?
A Yes, I was actually oII oI work that day. I was at home.
-68-
Q Okay. A But I was basically on stand-by because I knew that the eviction
was going to happen. Q Okay, and did you actually eventually respond or
have to come to the area oI 121 River Rock?
A Yes.
Q Why?
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A The way it works, again, I'm sorry to keep doing this.
Q Please, please, please, you are educating us all.
A You have to wait Ior the SheriII to contact you.
Q Okay.
A The SheriIIs Deputies are sent out with several oI these
things on the days that they do them, however, they do them every day. You
can try to shoot Ior a speciIic time, but you are at the mercy oI the SheriIIs
Deputy's schedule. Some lockouts take longer than others. They try to give
you lead time.
I had spoken with the SheriIIs Deputy already, I believe, on Friday the 28th
Q Okay. A I believe. It was either that, or I contacted him on his cell phone.
But I came back in (inaudible) do the lockouts.
THE COURT: I'm sorry?
THE WITNESS: I came back in so we could do the lockout, to meet the
SheriIIs Deputies at the property aIter the SheriII calls. Q Okay, and so you
actually did go to 121 River Rock?
Page
A Yes.
Q And were there SheriIIs Deputies there?
A I got there Iirst.
Q Okay.
A Along with a member oI our staII.
Q Okay.
A And then two SheriII's Deputies arrived.
Q Okay.
A And then we had to wait Ior the locksmith.
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Q Okay, when the SheriII's Deputies arrived, did they
have any documents in their hand? A I believe they had -yes, they had their
copies oI the Findings oI Fact, and Order Ior Summary Eviction. Q Okay, and
do you recall what the deputies, or one or both oI those deputies did with the
Findings oI Facts and Order oI Eviction?
A Yes":
Now, combine that testimony with the Iact that the WCSO Liz STuchell, Roxy Silve, Deputy
Machen, Maureen, etc., etc. get real uncomIortable when it comes to discussing just when they
"received" either the 10/25/11 Eviction Order and Decision oI the 10/27/11 Findings oI Fact,
Conclusions oI Law....combined the the RJC's various statements respecting just how and when the
WCSO gets those eviction orders, and the usual custom and practices...combined with the WCSO's
statements about the maintenance oI the Iaxes, the Iax headers, the singular copies oI those Iaxes
being Iiled back with the court transmitting them along with the Deputies AFIidavit oI Service (like
th 11/7/11 one where Deputy Machen swore he "personally served" Coughlin, despite his supervisor
Liz Stuchell having to later admit in writing that to Machen "personally served" means "taped it to
the door when no one was home"...and you know when HIll testiIied on 6/18/12 about "they taped it
to to door because you ran away" that, given Baker's testimony that HIll was not present on that
date, 11/1/11, and Baker's Iailure to make any such allegation...that Hill was just doing more oI the
same tired innuendo and baseless accusation, conveniently made to disguise yet another situation
where his reckless pursuit oI Iee generation clashes with the rules oI proIessional conduct attendant
to his privilege to practice law.
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A great Judge SIerrazza moment at the 12/20/11 Hearing on the MOtion to Contest Personal
Property Lien...well a couple (one, to Coughlin: you have Iiled a Notice oI Appeal, I am divested oI
jursidiction, so you can go an conIuse the District Court with those arguments oI yours now..."), but
the best one, in response to Baker making essentially the "cherry pick" argument Hill makes in his
email below:
"From: Richard Hill (rhillrichardhillaw.com)
Sent: Sun 11/20/11 12:42 PM
To: zachcoughlinhotmail.com
Mr. Coughlin - you continue to lie.
You & I have spoken several times.
You call & rant at my secretary & then hang up beIore I can get on the line.
Please go back and re-read my emails to you.
You will not be allowed to cherry-pick the property & leave us with several
thousand dollars worth oI clean-up.
May I suggest that a good starting point would be Ior you to arrange a
dumpster and throw all the crap in the backyard into it??
"
Judge SIerrazza (about any anticipated cherry picking by Coughlin): Well, I think that's what the
law is, though, so he can."
What Judge SIerrazza so astutely points out there is the Iact that, one, Hill, Baker and Merliss
can only get that which the legislature set out in 118A.460...and they need to cease their unlawIul
rent distraints abolished by Nrs 118A.520 or otherwise trying to cram into nrs 118A.460,
malevolently, with utter baselessness, Iraudulently, all the things they want to get out the situation
but which the lanlord did not have the Ioresight or bargaining power to demand be a part oI the
Rental Agreement way back when.
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Futher problematic is the Iact that WAshoe Legal SErvices employee Lew Taitel (well, RMC
Iellow deIender Keith Loomis, Esq. indicated Taitel now works Ior WLS incident to the ECR
contract WLS has with the WCDA's oIIice, which arguably conIlicts the WCDA out oI prosecuting
in a retaliatory manner via DDA Zach Young oI Coughlin in three separate criminal matters
currently, all three oI which are rampant with police and prosecutorial misconduct (in RJC
rcr20122-063341, rcr2012-065630, and rcr2012-067980, and all three arrests and the oIIicila
misconduct therein is capture in audio and video recordings...no matter, DDA Zach Young presses
on headlong into his assault on liberty, and apparently, Young is really able to do some real broken
Iield running in the current atmosphere). Here's the thing, though: Taitel is business partners
withNevada Court Services, which got Coughlin arrested twice between 6/28/12 and 7/3/12 (and
Judge L. Gardner's Brother Judge W. Gardner, in conjunction with RPD OIIicer Alan Weaver and
SArgent Brian Dye and Reno City Attorney Jill Drake) manage to get Coughlin's bail magniIied a
ridiculous Iactor oI 10 Ior a completely Iraudulent and lacking even a prima Iacie/probable cause
basis Ior "distrubing the peace" to which the rpd glommed on a "Iailure to secure a load on one's
vehicle" and a "no prooI oI insurance" (RPD Alan Weaver says the statute will not allow or a 5 inch
high deIinition pdI oI one's current prooI oI insurance on a smart phone to satisIy the prooI
requirement...and Dye and Weaver, to which Judge W. Gardner agreed, though there exists no "Ior
your own health and saIety" basis Ior increasing bail as he did, magniIied Coughli's bail Irom a
bondable $1415 to a "straight cash homey" $three stacks ($3,000), keeping Coughlin jail Irom July
3 to July 21st, 2012 (whereupon Coughlin's old high school power Iorward Jared Swanson, owner
oI Western Art & Architecture and Big Sky Journal plunked down the lucre to spring Couglin Irom
the hoosegow...aIter weeks oI Coughlin trying to get through to someone, anyone, via the
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inscrutable and unIair WCDC collect calling phone system. the WCDC denied Coughlin
repeadtedly any paper to Iile any court Iilings and otherwise impermissibly denied him access to the
courts and his medication. In this environment, Coughlin asks Ior a little more time on the Opening
BrieI and Reply, and will thoroughly cite to the ROA and provide extremely good legal research on
the key issues, which will provide ample opportunity Ior this Court to clariIy points oI law in
Nevada that this State needs guidance Irom this Court on.
Conclusions
Coughlin asks this court Ior a bit more time to Iile an Opening BrieI that appropriately cites
to the ROA (an ROA now exists, and Coughln has Iinally, just today been given access to the
Iinal portion oI it by the electronic system) and a Reply BrieI (no objection to a Surreply by
Garin or WLS). Coughlin has done hours and hours oI resarch on the novel issues oI law
involved here (process, service, suIIiciency oI either, iIp status, eeoc deadlines, dismissal
without prejudice meets eeoc 90 day right to sue deadline measure Irom? legibility issues,
technology issues, what is a copy? and reliance upon Iorm's court's hold out (ie, 2nd Judicial
holds out the prooI oI service oI summons and complaint Iorm Coughlin used as suIIicient
and that Iorm calls Ior a Declaration OR and AIIidavit. etc., etc. just a bit more time needed.
Dated this November 8th, 2012,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Appellant
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Proof of Service:
document to all registered eIilers, and to those whom are not I placed a true and correct copy oI the
Ioregoing document in the usps mail on this date and as to those who were not ever even parties in the
caption oI the case yet Iiled a notice oI appearance and pleadings and asked Ior attorney's Iees and
sanctions, then called up, in some novel debt collection technique and attempted to "collect" by
threatening to report certain things to the State Bar oI Nevada (I'm looking at you Brian Gonsalves),
well, they were served in a manner appropriate to their attachment to this case and previous
arrangements respecting the acceptance oI service):
Brian Gonsalves, Esq
P.O. Box 907
Kings Beach, CA 96143
Attorney Ior Respondent Tahoe Women's Services (CRISIS INTERVENTION SERVICES)
LIPSON, NEILSON, COLE, SELTZER & GARIN JOSEPH P. GARIN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 6653 SHANNOND NORDSTROM Nevada Bar No. 8211
9080 West Post Road, Suite 100 LasVegas, Nevada 89148
TEL: (702)382-1500 FAX: (702) 382-1512
Attorney Ior Respodents WASHOE LEGAL SERVICES, a Nevada Corporation, KATHY
BRECKENRIDGE, Individually and in her capacity as Board President oI WLS, TODD
TORVINEN, Individually and in his capacity as WLS Board Member, PAUL ELCANO, Individually
and in his capacity as Executive Director oI WLS, DOES 1-100, Individually and in their capacity as
members oI the BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WASHOE LEGAL SERVICES, CARYN
STERNLIGHT, Individually and in her capacity as WLS attorney, JON SASSER, Individually and in
his capacity as WLS agent, KAREN SABO, Individually and in her capacity as WLS attorney,
MARC ASHLEY, Individually and in his capacity as WLS attorney, ZANDRA LOPEZ; Individually
and in her capacity as WLS employee;
DATED THIS: Dated this November 8th, 2012
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Appellant
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INDEX TO EXHIBITS
1. exhibit 1: related transcripts tec. three hundred and twnety pages (320).
- 45/45 -
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001262

001263
exhibit 1
Judge: Morning, please be seated.

Morning.

Judge: First matter I have is Matthew Merliss versus Zachary Coughlin. And
I do have [Casey Beare], Esq. representing the defendant. Is it
Casey Beare, Esq.?

Plaintiff: Casey Baker, Your Honor.

Judge: Oh, Baker.

Plaintiff: My office represents Dr. Merliss.

Judge: Oh, okay. You were listed in the wrong location. Alright, please be
seated. Is the plaintiff ready to proceed then?

Plaintiff: Yes, Your Honor.

Judge: Why dont you go ahead then?

Plaintiff: Thank you, sir. Your Honor, what were here on today is a 30-day
no-cause eviction that is all were on today. Under [INDISCERNIBLE
137] 40.253, Your Honor, I have copies of the landlords affidavit
here. If I may approach?

Judge: Yeah, bring it up.

Plaintiff: Yes.

Judge: But you dont have a witness?

Plaintiff: No, sir. Your Honor, the notices have been previously provided to
the court. I also have additional copies here if the court needs
them. The 30-day no-cause notice was served on August 22. The
five-day failure to vacate notice was served on September 27. Mr.
Coughlin has failed to vacate the property and thats why were
here, sir.

Defendant: Alright, sir.
1
001264
Merliss v Coughlin Transcript of 101311 and 102511 in
RJC Rev2011-001708

Defendant: Yes, sir, Your Honor. I have filed a tenancy affidavit in this matter, as
well as a motion for continuance. I'm citing exigent circumstances
such as the essential service like electricity being turned off in the
midst of the five-day period in addition to a

Judge: Well, Ill allow you to testify as to your answers of your raise your
right hand. Do you swear under penalty of perjury to tell the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

Defendant: Yes, sir, Your Honor.

Judge: Right. You can be seated and tell me what your defense is.

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor. As a preliminary matter, Your Honor, if I may
address the motion for continuance.

Judge: You may. Go ahead.

Defendant: In the midst of the five-day period, after the unlawful detainer
notice was served its my understanding I have five judicial days to
file a tenants answer. However during that time the power, the
electricity, that is to the property was shut off absent any notice to
myself and created undue difficulty in preparing to defending in this
matter and in adding the requisite third party defendants such as
the realtor/property manager. [INDISCERNIBLE 4:31] Realty, the
landscaping company and at this point, I believe NB Energy might
be a necessary party.

Judge: What does that have to do with the rent though, sir? Because what
we are here today on is the failure to pay rent.

Defendant: Your Honor, the statute to me is complicated and confusing but my
understanding of it is that Mr. Merliss or Dr. Merliss failure to
assert that he was owed rent for a good, it seems like three
months, takes this case out of the purview of the sections requiring
a depositing of a rent escrow amount and his failure to cure the
habitability issues within 40 days

Judge: Okay. Regardless of that have you paid the rent or not, first of all?
2
001265

Plaintiff: Your Honor, may

Judge: I'm sorry?

Defendant: Your Honor, thats a factual determination. I think that would need
to be made upon viewing evidence.

Plaintiff: Your Honor, may I please. We are not here on a non-payment of
rent. Your Honor, I want to be very clear

Judge: But you said a five-day notice

Plaintiff: Were here on a no-cause termination to vacate. Mr. Coughlin was
a month-to-month tenant since March 2011. We served a 30-day
no cause termination notice to vacate.

Judge: Ill have two files.

Plaintiff: Yes, sir. That was from the previous the non-payment of rent we
had a hearing a couple of weeks ago. Those were dismissed. Gone,
theyre gone.

Judge: So, which case number is still pending?

Plaintiff: This, Your Honor, this case is ends in 1708.

Judge: Right. So, 1492.

Plaintiff: Dismissed a couple of weeks ago.

Judge: Fine. That was dismissed by the landlords.

Defendant: Your Honor, may

Judge: Wait, wait. Okay. So this is the no cause eviction.

Plaintiff: Yes, sir. I have provided the court with copies of the notices the 30
day and the five day. I have a copy of the lease. Mr. Coughlin is a
month-to-month tenant and we activated the 30-day no cause right
3
001266
to terminate the lease. The lease is terminated. Mr. Coughlin failed
to vacate. What hes done is essentially re-filed his moving papers
from the previous non-payment case asking for sanctions and all
these things that were denied in the last case. If the court thinks its
relevant I'm happy to address the power issue. I dont see how
thats relevant. But weve got other issues. If Mr. Coughlin has
claims for damages against all these third parties that he is trying to
bring into this case, hes free to go make them. But thats not what
were here to do to consider today, Your Honor. And in fact, if he
has claims for damages against my client, he is free to go file a
lawsuit. But we are here only to talk about possession of the
property, Your Honor.

Judge: Alright. Okay, sir. Since Ive been educated about what this case is
about.

Defendant: Your Honor, if I can just interject. We are here on a retaliatory
eviction basis also Ive made those claims and the Justice Court
Rules do allow for counterclaims joining third party defense. In the
same action that stems from the same [INDISCERNIBLE 8:29].

Judge: Well, I dont see a counterclaim here, sir. I just see an answer,
motion for sanctions and attorneys fees.

Defendant: our Honor, theres a language within that ask for that makes
claims in damages against Mr. Merliss, the landscaping crew,
theres exhibits that support those claims.

Judge: But, getting to the 30-day no cause and putting the counterclaims
aside for a minute, do you have whats your defense to the no
cause?

Defendant: Your Honor, chiefly it would be the retaliatory eviction language
found within NRS 118A. But as a matter of procedure, I believe,
Justice Court Rule 22 with respect to the requirements for a notice
[INDISCERNIBLE 9:56] call for a 10-day period prior to a hearing
such as this. And they also call for a party not representing a
defendant who does not have an attorney such as myself. Those
situations require plaintiffs counsel to serve in writing a notice of
hearing and that has not been done in this case. What seems to
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001267
have been done in this case is shifting plaintiffs attorneys duties
under the Justice Court Rules on to the Justice Court Filing office
staff which would seem to be an inappropriate use of the Filing
offices resource. Justice Court Rule 22 (i) clearly places that burden
on Mr. Baker in this regard and it requires a 10-day period.

Judge: Are you saying you havent had 10-days notice of this hearing, sir?

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

Judge: Yes, youre saying that or yes, you have had 10 days?

Defendant: I am saying that no, I have not had 10-days notice, Your Honor.
Particularly with regard to the Justice Court Rules of Reno Township
cite Nevada Justice Court Rules procedure and they say that Rule 6
with regard to the computation of time is to be applied. Given that
the envelope in which the notice of the hearing sent from the
Justice Court, not from plaintiffs attorney as Justice Court Rule 22
(i) requires was postmarked 7
th
, Friday. Today being 13
th
is less than
10 days. In addition, [INDISCERNIBLE NRCP] requires that non-
judicial days not be included in time periods of less than five days.

Plaintiff: Your Honor, may I be heard briefly on that.

Judge: Yeah.

Plaintiff: The Justice Court Rules of Reno Township Rule 2 says, except as
otherwise provided by the statutes this rule apply to all civil
proceedings filed in Reno Township except small claims and
landlord-tenant matters. The rules dont apply, Your Honor. Rule 22
(i) does not apply to this. The policy of this court is when the tenant
files his affidavit which in this case is defective but when the
tenant files his affidavit or the landlord files his affidavit the courts
office sets the hearing usually does it by phone. The rules
Mr. Coughlin is citing dont apply. He had notice of the hearing

Judge: Well, I'm totally familiar with this, Sir. And I am going to deny that
motion because what we do is have an expedited hearing as soon
as possible which is typically one judicial day. Youve actually had
more time than that. And there is no requirement as indicated by
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counsel for the plaintiff to give you 10 days notice. Its to get a
speedy hearing date as soon as possible.

Defendant: Your Honor, if I could just ask for a clarification. When a matter has
third party defendants brought in and counterclaims made, does
that application of the Justice Court Rules seems to apply under
Rules 88 [INDISCERNIBLE 13:31] is landlord-tenant law.

Judge: Sir, youre the one who argue that you can join courter-claims in
this action without citing any authority for that position.

Defendant: I did cite such authority, Your Honor.

Judge: What is that?

Defendant: Theres I believe is Justice Court Rules. Its in my motion for
continuance. I could find it if you like, Your Honor.

Judge: If you can find, go ahead.

Defendant: Okay.

Judge: Sir, have you found it?

Defendant: I believe its Justice Court Rule 12, Your Honor.

Judge: Local rules or?

Defendant: No. In the Justice Court Rules.

Judge: Alright, I'm going to take a brief recess and get the rules. Ill be right
back.

Defendant: Thank you, Your Honor.

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001269
Judge: So Mr. Coughlin you indicated that it was Rule 12 of the justice
court rules?

Defendant: Yes Your Honor I believe its actually Rule 13 or 14; Im looking at it
now.

Judge: If you want to go ahead sir. What is a

Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor.

Judge: Rule 13?

Defendant: Rule 13 Your Honor, Rule 13 of the justice court rules and civil
procedure Your Honor in the state of Nevada speaks to
counterclaims and cross-claims. It allows me to state either a
compulsory or permissive counterclaim to the extent that the
claims made arise out of the transaction or occurrences and
subject matter of the claim. The opposing parties claim here which
is dealing with an eviction. They do arise out of the same in that
while Counsel Baker states rent is not an issue here; the retaliatory
eviction defense that I say does bring into play all those issues. With
that come in all the [failure to cure] in the subsequent rent
deductions that are allowed under the statute [inaudible 0:02:16]
tenant and myself.

Defendant: May I be heard Your Honor?

Judge: Yes and can you address Rule 81 too.

Defendant: I dont have a copy of Rule 81 in front of me Your Honor.

Judge: Well Rule 81 says these rules do not govern procedure and practice
in any special statutory proceeding in so far as they are in
inconsistent or in conflict with the procedure in practice provided
by the applicable statute.

Defendant: Yes Your Honor I think that hits the nail right on the head. This is a
summary proceeding provided by statute NRS 40.254 and NRS
40.253(6). The only issue here today is possession of the property;
the courts inquiry is very focused and has only asked you whether
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there is a legal defense to the alleged unlawful detainer. If Mr.
Coughlin has claims against third parties or my client he can make
them in a separate civil suit. What are these third parties going to
add to the discussion of possession of the property today? None.
There has been no complaint filed, there has been no point alleged.

Judge: Well I dont know what the third party complaints are but the issue
of territory eviction may or may not.

Plaintiff: Your Honor under NRS 20A.510 the burden is on Mr. Coughlin to
show retaliation, he has not done that. He has not offered any
proof that there is any sort of retaliation here. The parties, the
whole purpose of the 30 day notice and the statute and then the
lease is freedom of contract Your Honor. Once Mr. Coughlin is a
month to month tenant the landlord is free to terminate the lease
with 30 days notice Mr. Coughlin is free to move out with 30 days
notice. If we flip it around and Mr. Coughlin had given 30 days
notice and we had come down here tried to stop him from moving
this doesnt make any sense Your Honor. There has been no proof
put forward that there is any retaliation here.

Judge: Well actually I have no proof so far that the lease is over or
anything else. I dont even have a copy of the lease.

Defendant: Your Honor the statute provides that I am to provide that today and
I have copies here.

Plaintiff: Your Honor Rule 109 speaks to a 20 day period notice prior to a
hearing which I believe is applicable in this case and has not been
provided.

Defendant: Im sorry I didnt catch any of that.

Judge: He said.

Plaintiff: Rule 109 Your Honor, setting of trial and actions. Your Honor NRS
118A.510 speaks for retaliatory conduct by the landlord against the
tenant. It goes into the extent to which notice is required and up to
date to put on a defense and to litigate those claims as afforded to
[inaudible 0:05:50] turning off their power in the middle of the five
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001271
day notice period is unduly burdensome and it I believe is in
violation of the federal statutes and state statutes respecting the
appropriate notice one must give to tenants prior to shoving them
out.

Defendant: Your Honor I have a copy of the lease here would you like to see it?

Judge: Yes please.

Defendant: I attach that to my

Judge: The section you are starting to sort of apply [inaudible 0:06:24] you
are not going under summary eviction. This is a summary eviction.

Defendant: I thought you said at the outset that this was a no cause not a
summary eviction Your Honor or Mr. Baker said that?

Judge: No cause is summary. Non-payment is summary as well.

Defendant: No cause is summary as well; you know it gives 30 days versus the
five days that the non-payment gets.

Judge: You are talking about two separate notices. They gave you 30 day
notice, that you need a 30 day notice of termination of lease and
thats the no cause. Then when you dont move out then its an
unlawful detainer which is the five day notice.

Defendant: That you are saying is summary in nature Your Honor?

Judge: Yes.

Defendant: To that I filed a tenancy answer, a third party counterclaim bringing
in third parties.

Judge: Well first of all as to the third party complaint Im going to rule as I
indicated earlier that there is a specific statutory procedure in this
case which is applicable under Chapter 40 of the NRS. Therefore
you are governed by that statutory procedure which does not allow
for counterclaims to be heard. At the same time you can file a
separate independent action as indicated by counsel for the
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001272

Defendant: NRS 40 you say Your Honor does not allow for third?

Judge: Chapter 40 in a summary proceeding such as this does not allow for
counterclaims to be filed in the same action, if they are filed as
separate action. Thats under Rule 81 of the justice court rules of
civil procedure.

Defendant: You said, okay in addition to Rule 83. Your Honor I dont believe any
of those rules allow a landlord attorney of power off in the middle
of the [inaudible 0:08:52].

Judge: Im not saying they do.

Defendant: Im just putting forth that

Judge: I will allow you to testify as to what happened and why you believe
the summary eviction should not be applicable in this case. If you
establish a case to my satisfaction then I will set it over to trial,
right? But at this point you havent done that.


Judge: Youve come in to argue a motion to dismiss based on failure to
comply with notice and other issues which I denied at this point. So
you can sit down and if you want to test the fire as to why this
should not be a summary eviction I will permit you to do so.

Defendant: Even were this to go forward as a summary eviction Your Honor I
would just like to state for the record I am moving for a continuance
based upon the unduly prejudicial nature of the shutting off the
electricity in the middle of the five days that you were here.

Judge: Well you were here quite some time ago and knew all about this, so
thats denied. You first came in here to court and back in this court
dismissed the prior case in case number 1492 trying to find the date
at which

Defendant: I believe it was the 26
th
Your Honor of September the hearing
approximately.
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001273

Plaintiff: That was the 27
th
Your Honor, I remember because that was my
birthday.

Judge: Alright in any event thats been more than 20 days and I know on
that date you were fully aware of what was happening because the
plaintiff tried to proceed at that time which I denied. They
attempted to proceed on this case as well. Alright? You probably do
not remember that, sir.

Defendant: I remember the hearing Your Honor and I just, I would think there is
something that when a tenant alleges a retaliatory eviction that the
summary and extremely quick nature of this process is slowed
somewhat.

Judge: Only if the court finds that there is a meritorious defense, which I
havent done so, I havent even been presented any evidence to
persuade me that you have any meritorious defense whatsoever.

Defendant: Are you sure Your Honor?.

Judge: And I am giving you that opportunity to proceed. So do you want to
proceed or not?

Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor I have abundance of evidence in support.

Judge: Come up here and take the stand, sir.

Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor may I bring my laptop with me because it has
pictures that I intend to offer and a videotape as well?

Judge: Wait a second sir, no you may not what am asking you for is to
establish a prima facie case of retaliatory eviction through your
testimony and then if I determine and establish the prima facie case
then well set it over for trial.


Judge: So if you want to come up here. Go ahead sir.

11
001274
Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor. I believe a prima facie case has been established
with respect to the claims of retaliatory eviction. And been
supported by the various exhibits that had been attached to both
my original tenants answer and subsequent tenants answer. Just
most recent motion for continuance and specifically

Judge: I have that.

Defendant: Specifically Your Honor whats convenient here is this has all pretty
much been detailed in emails to and from the landlord and myself.
Further I took videotapes of an incident where a good deal or
property damage was done to my home law office.

Judge: Done by whom?

Defendant: The landlords, agents and if you referenced the lease I believe its
subsection 28, the lease specifically provides that any damage done
to the tenant or his property by the landlord or the landlords
agents is to bewould result in the landlord being held viable for
such damage. I can testify as to the damage done, I have a
videotape showing the landscaping crew doing the damage. The
third party defendants were involved in that to some extent. The
landlord admitted in writing that he authorized to third party
defendant Green Action Lawn Services conduct in that regard. Aside
from the property damage with respect to the landscaping incident
a prima facie case can be established.

Judge: So how was that retaliatory, what were they retaliating for?

Defendant: I believe he is evicting me Your Honor based in part on a number of
factors thats one because I complained about it. Two is

Judge: Because you complained about the lawn service?

Defendant: The conduct of Green Action Lawn Service, yes. They caused what I
believe is at least $1,000 damage. In addition the landlord failed to
ensure a number of habitability issues that were brought to light in
writing and he was given 14 days. The statute allows a deduction
from the landlord. The landlord agreed in writing to these
deductions.
12
001275

Judge: Well you have deducted three months rent.

Defendant: Thats a factual matter Your Honor that I believe is in dispute.

Judge: So you are saying you have paid the rent? Do you have the evidence
of payment of the rent today sir?

Defendant: Payment in the sense that rent deductions agreed to in writing and
worked on incident thereto amounts to a payment of the rent in
addition to

Judge: Okay well do you have evidence of that?

Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor. The stairs Mr. Merliss, the stairs to the law
office were crumbling, they were presenting a hazard and an
aesthetically displeasing appearance. Mr. Merliss agreed to a rent
deduction and the stairs were repaired, he was submitted a
statement in that regard. He subsequently filled [inaudible 0:17:12]
notices that ignored that rent deduction. Ignored the rent
deduction he agreed to in writing and the attached agreement.

Judge: Okay, sir I need to know precisely first of all how much is your rent
per month?

Defendant: $900 a month.

Judge: How much was the bill for the stairs?

Defendant: $1,250.

Judge: Anything else, offsets that you are claiming today?

Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor, the landlord agreed to a $350 offsets for taking
care of the weeds at the house I offered to

Judge: So how much was that 300?

Defendant: He agreed $350 for that season and he failed to respond to a
request for the prior season. So I believe I can argue $700.
13
001276

Judge: Well okay but you said he agreed to 350?


Judge: Okay, well I dont think you can argue beyond what he agreed to.

Defendant: Well Your Honor he never responded to a previous seasons request
in that regard after 14 days notice and I believe NRS 118A allows
her rent deduction I believe the

Judge: But habitability, what does the weeds a year ago have to do with
habitability?

Defendant: The weeds were extreme Your Honor, they created a noxious weed
ordinance hazard, they

Judge: Okay wait a second, whose responsibility is under the lease to
maintain the [CROSSTALK]?

Defendant: That person is the landlord Your Honor, in addition.

Judge: Do you have citation to the lease?

Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor and I will sight to that but even absent that his
subsequent conduct ratifies an interpretation that would deem the
landlord responsible for. I believe the noxious weed ordinance
affect in Reno specifies that its the property owners responsibility.
But the lease does speak to that Your Honor. My attachments,
there is a good deal of photographic evidence attached as exhibit
where there is three to the motion for continuance instead of a
two.

Judge: Brings up the issue of the mould and the insulation.

Defendant: All these issues are in writing attached to the original September
tenants answer where in approximately 30 pages of emails
between myself the tenant and the landlord Merliss proved that he
was provided 14 days written notice of various habitability issues
including mould growing on insulation that had fallen from the
14
001277
ceiling and hit a dirt ground that lacked vapor layer. Theres
pictures I know the printouts there are not that clear, I do have high
quality colored photographs on my laptop. Just another small
matter Your Honor, there was a matter of $125 deduction that was
agreed to for the disposal. All these deductions the landlord Merliss
has subsequently seem to have forgotten.

Judge: Okay wait a second, we have weeds the total you were claiming is
700 and now you say it is $125 for what?

Defendant: A broken kitchen garbage disposal.

Judge: Which you repaired?


Judge: You have receipts for all this?

Defendant: I have submitted statements to opposing counsel.

Judge: Alright so, if I understand this correctly you owed $2,700 in rent.

Defendant: Your Honor opposing counsel said rent is not an issue here.

Judge: No you are making it an issue. I mean you are the one who said that
Im supposed to look at this because this is in retaliation for your
complaints right?

Defendant: To the extent that an eviction is being sort, yes Your Honor. But the
issue of whether or not I own it you may not believe this but its
conceited at this point.

Judge: Conceited how?

Defendant: Or not even alleged by opposing counsel.

Judge: What they did is they dismissed the action from nonpayment of
rent. So they are not evicting you based on nonpayment of rent.
That doesnt mean and you were talking about a counterclaim
today which you wanted me to address for retaliatory eviction. And
15
001278
Im trying to find out what the retaliation was for. You are saying it
has nothing to do with rent then thats fine. What is the retaliation
about?

Defendant: Subject to NRS 118A.510 the retaliation applies because it occurred
after written notice by the tenant to the landlord of both items.
Both matters in statutes such as noxious weed ordinates as well as
complaining about habitability issues and

Judge: Retaliation is for complaining about noxious weeds?

Defendant: Noxious weeds, property damage done by the landscaping crew
and failure to cure habitability issues and the landlords parts after
14 days written notice in pass.

Judge: Okay so you have noxious weeds, landscaper damages and what
was the third?

Defendant: All these various, please fix it landlord types of written notices.

Judge: Thats not habitability; habitability is specifically defined by
statutes. So specifically what was the habitability issue, lack of heat
or?

Defendant: Your Honor I believe the insulation matter with its attended, mould
problems it comes within the essential services. I have seen some
authority that seems to suggest insulation is an essential service.
There is safety issues with regard to

Judge: Insulation is an essential service.

Defendant: Or at least I believe so in some situations or at least it speaks to
habitability, insulation does. There is a window thats remained
broken with exposed shards of glass held in by the [inaudible
0:24:30] in the window, that presents a hazard. The stairs, the
crumbling stair rises my mailman has complained about that to the
extent it looks bad, its not that safe. The wood deck to the front
entry way seems rotted out.

Judge: And these were not preexisting conditions when you moved in?
16
001279

Defendant: So sir Your Honor.

Judge: So all this happened since you lived there? The stairs rotting out.

Defendant: The concrete stairs they were patched up in a manner that seemed
to suggest that they were done by an amateur, when I moved in
they subsequently the patches fell. So not just everyit seemed like
every day another rock would be crumbling and we would sweep
them away. The riser is the part the toe would kick and not step on
and windows are crumbling they just keep crumbing just like pulling
a thread out of a sweater. So no they were not pre-existing.

Judge: So what you are saying is because you complained about these four
things the landlord might have had to evict you?


Judge: It had nothing to do with the nonpayment of rent?

Defendant: I believe it had to do with invoking the statutory right to deduct
rent.

Judge: So. Okay so prior to your exercising your statutory right to deduct
rent and you determined that the first eviction was [inaudible
0:26:37] because I think you claim retaliatory eviction based on the
first eviction did you not?

Defendant: Yes.

Judge: So your retaliatory eviction was based on these things and not your
failure to pay rent?

Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor including that you complained of the property
damage by the third party agency of the landlord and his
employees or agency.

Judge: Cross-examinations.

17
001280
Defendant: Your Honor Im happy to cross-examine or I am happy to simply
present an argument.

Judge: Anything else sir.

Defendant: No sir Your Honor.

Judge: Okay you can step down. Okay with the landlord you can make any
argument.

Plaintiff: Thank you Your Honor lets just start with the statutes Your Honor. If
I understood Mr. Coughlins testimony, his contention is that the
no-cause eviction is in retaliation for his complaints to the landlord
about habitability. I think thats what he testified to and he named
a couple of things, weeds, landscaper damage, installation,
windows. NRS 118A.290 provides what habitability is. Mr. Coughlin,
he must show among other things Your Honor that the property
substantially lacks one of these enumerated items. Effective
waterproofing, plumbing facilities, water supply, electrical lighting
outlets et cetera. There has been no testimony or any proof that
the property substantially lacks any of those things. With respect to
the weeds Your Honor. Paragraph 22 of the lease tenant will irrigate
and maintain any surrounding grounds including lawns, shrubbery if
they are for the tenants exclusive use. This is a fenced in corner lot,
they are for tenants exclusive use, he is supposed to maintain the
weeds, he didnt do it, Dr. Merliss paid somebody to come in and fix
them, thats not a habitability issue and its not even addressed.

Judge: Im sorry I am confused now; you said he shall maintain what the
weeds?

Plaintiff: Tenant will irrigate and maintain any surrounding grounds.

Judge: No I understood that.

Plaintiff: Including lawns and shrubbery if they are for the tenants exclusive
use.

Judge: So you are saying the tenant is responsible for maintaining
landscaping.
18
001281

Plaintiff: Yes, yes Your Honor thats paragraph 22 of the lease and anyway.

Judge: Have you put the lease in evidence here.

Plaintiff: Well I believe I brought a copy Your Honor I would offer it into
evidence. Mr. Coughlin also attached it to his motion for
continuance; I would offer it into evidence now Your Honor.

Judge: Alright well hang on one second because, I

Plaintiff: I had another copy here Your Honor it has been misplaced.

Judge: [inaudible 0:30:02] from this file and this case does not have the
lease but then maybe.

Plaintiff: I believe Mr. Coughlin attached a copy to this motion for
continuance filed last night.

Judge: In the last year.

Plaintiff: The last night sir.

Defendant: It was filed I believe on Monday or Tuesday.

Judge: Well Im not sure I have that motion.

Defendant: Your Honor you might have handed that to me when I was on the
stand.

Judge: Alright I do have it, I apologize.

Defendant: I will just quickly interject Your Honor.

Judge: You can wait and then when he is done you can interject but
Paragraph 22.

Plaintiff: Yes sir. Fifth line down sir, sentence starts at the end of that line
with the word tenant, probably a bad copy but

19
001282
Judge: I do see that.

Plaintiff: Your Honor just moving forward with the other items identified by
Mr. Coughlin. Insulation windows, garbage disposals.

Judge: Well the other question I heard about the weeds, he says he had
them done for 350 and there was some agreement he would get a
credit, you indicated that the landlord actually had the weeds

Plaintiff: Your Honor the

Judge: Taken down.

Plaintiff: Yes. My understanding is the only rent deduction ever agreed to by
the landlord was $350; I believe it was for June it could have been
for May, for Mr. Coughlin to deal with the weeds. That was not
disputed and in fact Your Honor if we go back to the last case, the
quantification of the rent in our five day no pay notice gives credit
for that. The court gave credit for it in its minute order. Dr Merliss
also paid landscapers to Dr Merliss also owns a property next
door. The landscapers were doing the weeds next door; there were
still weeds in Mr. Coughlins property as I understand it he didnt
care of the weeds. So landscapers also pulled the weeds over there.
Thats my understanding it has nothing to do with this proceeding.
Mr. Coughlins third party claims as he calls them have something
to do with the landscapers pulling the carpet out of his front yard or
something.

Judge: Well there were no third party [inaudible 0:33:36] files, so there are
not even an issue here.

Plaintiff: I understand sir Im trying to shed a little light on the weed
situation. There was a credit, that is the only credit Mr. Coughlin
has not shown any other agreed upon credit and whats interesting
here Your Honor is that on one hand Mr. Coughlin is arguing that
the landlord agreed to all these rent deductions and then on the
other hand he is saying that because Im claiming rent deductions
he is evicting me to retaliation. It doesnt make any sense Your
Honor, which is it and he has not presented any presented any
proof either. Under NRS 118A.510 your owner Mr. Coughlin has the
20
001283
burden to prove that the eviction was in retaliation for one of these
enumerated things. He is hanging his hat on habitability, but the
lease puts the duty on Mr. Coughlin to maintain the property, every
time he has got broken blinds or a broken window that how did the
inside pane get broken? We dont know Mr. Coughlin wont let us
inspect, he is claiming thats a habitability issue.

Judge: Well I do have a question though; the court previously ruled that he
needed to deposit the rent which he disputed. But whats your
position in respect to the requirement to deposit rent on the
alleged habitability.

Plaintiff: Your Honor I think the court got it exactly right last time requiring
Mr. Coughlin to deposit the rent into an escrow account, thats
what the rules and the statutes I believe provide. In this case
though Your Honor the only issue is possession based on a no a
cause termination of the lease. Mr. Coughlin owes rent but we are
not here to seek rent today. If there is going to be claims for rent
thats a separate civil action it is not a summary procedure

Defendant: Objection Your Honor its unduly prejudicial for Mr. [David] to be
able to interject all these accusations and then run and cry wolf
when it comes time to support them as he has done in his pleadings
as you say, opposing parties concedes this point when nothing of
the sort was done. He says Mr. Coughlin outright lies in his
pleadings he is making this allegation about a licensed member of
the Nevada Bar and he provides absolutely no support for it.

Judge: Sorry he didnt say that just now, so I know the only objection but is
there anything else?

Plaintiff: Your Honor Mr. Coughlins burden to show retaliation is under NRS
118A.510, he has the burden to show that, that my client acted in
retaliation, he has not done that, he has not pointed to any specific
piece of evidence that will show that. In order to hang his hat on
the habitability he has to fall under some category in NRS 118A.290
he has not shown that. He has not shown that the property
substantially lacks anything. He has shown that he had an issue with
some weeds or an issue with a broken window. Let me just say this
Your Honor, at the last hearing. I have here Mr. Randy Fisher who is
21
001284
a local handyman; I have with him as a witness a gentleman from
A1 Electric. We sent those people out to Mr. Coughlins property.

Defendant: I have an objection, hearsay.

Judge: I will sustain that object.

Plaintiff: Your Honor I can offer documents, invoices and authenticate them
myself because I received them from Mr. Fisher.

Judge: Well I dont think there would be any need to do that at this point.
Anything else Mr.?

Plaintiff: Your Honor only that we have tried to inspect and Mr. Coughlin has
not allowed us to, therefore he is not allowed to proceed under the
habitability statute.

Judge: Right so.

Plaintiff: Yes sir Your Honor, if I may at this time provide some further
support such as I referenced my attention to earlier with regard to
showing high quality photographs, eliciting some of these
habitability issues with regard to certainly having, some of these
pictures of mould are kind of disturbing. I dont think anybody in
this courtroom would want to live in that situation; there is not just
weed ordinance.

Judge: Well obviously you do want to live there because you are fighting
the termination.

Plaintiff: Your Honor I wouldnt want to live there with that mould stain
where it was. I submitted notice in writing not only 14 days passed
but a good time of time passed $500 was spent in eradicating the
mould issue. With respect to the habitability.

Judge: Who spent $500?

Defendant: Im sorry Your Honor?

Judge: Who spent $500?
22
001285

Defendant: I did Your Honor; I submitted a statement to Mr. Baker. Your Honor
the broken window comes within the purview of Section 0.290 of
NRS 118A in addition to the noxious weed ordinance that the City
of Reno has. Comes within language in Section 290 speaking to a
violation of the housing code or complaint thereof.

Judge: Well so how do you get around the lease, the lease requires you to
maintain the law?

Defendant: Thats Mr. Bakers interpretation of the lease Your Honor, the lease
does not say weeds. It does not say weeds, it says lawn. There is no
lawn its dirt. In that regard I have that high quality, high density
green woolen carpet to make the appearance of a sort of [inaudible
0:39:24] grass installation. A good deal of money and time we spent
so that I could have a law office that didnt have a dirt lawn. Mr.
Merliss a neurologist who has chosen to spent upwards of
apparently five grand to litigate this rather than fix a window and
stand behind the rent deductions. Who didnt show up today, who
didnt stand up in court, when you yourself Your Honor told him to
raise his right hand and stand to be sworn? He has clearly indicated
a lack of respect for this process. He has indicated a habit of kind of
shifting tasks which he seems to find minor and tedious on the
people whose responsibility it isnt to do those tasks. He is
essentially trying to mimic this pro-bono property manager. He says
go get two estimates for that little problem you alerted me to and
then deducted them. Im not at the country right now Im in
Thailand or somewhere. Well thats what landlords do, Im an
attorney thats going to take me an hour or two can I bail you $225
for that Dr. Merliss? No I cant I am just doing for free for you. You
seem to employ time honored landlord tactic of ignoring tenants
for any complaints and hoping to win by [inaudible 0:40:50] or just
make them feel like they are being tedious or you know high
maintenance. When a clear review of the 30 somewhat pages show
that I have been extremely conscientious throughout the year and a
half that I rented from Dr. Merliss. To the extent that I have
endured disgusting conditions in this place in efforts to save Dr.
Merliss money. Just to

Judge: Alright so here is the deal I think I have heard enough. I am
23
001286

Defendant: Your Honor can I show the pictures of?

Judge: I have looked at them, I see the mould.

Defendant: You cant see the mould in those reproductions.

Judge: Alright bring up any other pictures youve got, but what you said is
youve corrected that; you spent $500 to do that.

Defendant: Yes sir you honor, may I approach.

Judge: You may.

Defendant: Counsel was provided [inaudible 0:41:44] these pictures in addition
to photograph reproductions.

Judge: You are going to have to hand it to me because I cant see it in the
lighting.

Defendant: I will do a slideshow Your Honor if that will be alright. And there is a
short video where the issues of the property damage are essentially
admitted by the Green Action Lawn Service.

Plaintiff: No, Im going to object to any video of anythingit has no relevance
to possession of property today and I have never seen it.

Defendant: You were provided a copy of it counsel.

Judge: Well I am going to look at your pictures not the video so.

Defendant: Okay, Your Honor.

Judge: I do have a question Mr. Baker the rent was last paid when?

Defendant: Your Honor I would have to check, my recollection is maybe but I
dont know, again we are not seeking rent today.

Judge: No, Im understanding that but I believe it is integral to the defense
you have [inaudible 0:43:21] how much rent is owed.
24
001287

Defendant: Im not sure [inaudible 0:43:29] sir but.

Judge: Well because I believe he needs to deposit the rent less any amount
that he is entitled to credit for.

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor I agree with you.

Plaintiff: You can go to the next picture in that order [inaudible 0:43:44].

[OFF MIC CONVERSATION]

Plaintiff: June 1 the rent was due sir.

Judge: There was five months.

Plaintiff: June, July, August, September, October and I believe there is a,
there should be a credit for 350.

Defendant: For the amounts my co-tenant paid?

Judge: No, for what he is saying is undisputed is the weeds.

Defendant: I believe he is referring to [inaudible 0:44:39] who you all paid to
the landlord for June Your Honor.

Plaintiff: We can make it five full months Your Honor.

Defendant: This goes to the Rule 11 issues I am speaking off Your Honor.
Complainants and attorneys blindly files motions against [inaudible
0:44:52] without doing reasonable investigations as to whether or
not their plans are based on fact or law. Can they just churn and
burn landlord/tenant claims through the courts, collect money for
them without knowing whether or not its professional to do so.

Plaintiff: I am happy to address to the joint obligation in Mr. Coughlin and
Mr. [inaudible 0:45:24] under the lease Your Honor.

Defendant: Your Honor the pictures of the carpet being left in the street and on
the sidewalk, thats how Mr. Merliss employees left the carpet. It
25
001288
was installed in a manicured manner. They came on and for some
reason he decided to pay both me and his crew of landscapers to
do the same job. One wonders if he is so well off as a neurologist
that he can afford to have the same job done twice, or he doesnt
just accept my offer to have the window fixed for $100.

Plaintiff: Objection relevance. Its a hissy fit by him indeed.

Judge: Alright so I will give you one last chance to add anything else.

Defendant: Yes sir Your Honor I believe the retaliation argument a prima facie
case has been made specifically with regard to habitability issues,
the habitability includes safety. The crumbling stair rises clearly
presented a situation where that was an issue. Habitability includes
windows being broken that was clearly supported in writing by the
attached emails.

Judge: Alright, sir. I am going to rule now because first of all I find under
the NRS if you want to make a habitability claim you have to
deposit the rent and if it wasnt clear in my order previously I am
going to make it very clear today.

Defendant: Your Honor.

Judge: But now sir I am going to give you credit for your alleged
habitability issues. The rent that is due as of today will be 4,500. Im
going to give you credit for the stairs of 1250, weeds of 350 weeds
of 350 twice. The garbage disposal 125 and the window 150 which
comes out to 2225. In addition Im going to give you 500 credit for
the mould abatement, which is 2725. So the 4500 minus 2225 is
2275. I will continue this till tomorrow at 9:00 AM for you to
deposit the 20. It wont be tomorrow it will be Monday.

Defendant: Your Honor [inaudible 0:48:25] $1,000 claim for damage to the
landscaping installation if you wouldnt mind.

Judge: I am not going to do anything for that, but it has nothing to do with
the landlord so far as I am concerned at this point that is a third
party claim which you can proceed against the third party.

26
001289
Defendant: Your Honor the lease is

Judge: That is not habitability sir, that has nothing to do

Defendant: But the lease says he is liable for damage done on my lawn.

Judge: Who said?

Defendant: The lease says that subsection 28.

Judge: Well

Defendant: Clearly.

Judge: Not by third parties.

Defendant: It does Your Honor, it says by his agents or employees he is
responsible.

Judge: Yeah and [inaudible 0:48:58] that they are his agents I find they are
in independent contractor and so if you deposit the rent by Monday
at 9:00 oclock with the court in the amount of 2275 I will continue
this for trial on the merits to determine whether or not there really
is a habitability issue. If the rent is not deposited then there will be
no continuance the eviction will be granted forthwith on Monday
morning at 9:00 oclock. And furthermore the court is now making
any finding other than that you have made an argument about
habitability and that you are entitled to trial on that issue if you
deposit the rent. Alright but you are not entitled to trial if you dont
deposit the rent. And I have given you credit based on your
allegation which is, which I do not find was substantiated today; I
simply find that you made that allegation, that this is what you
were owed. And so if you deposit the rent then we will set this for
trial and it will be the following week after that on the same court
day. The same day of the week.

Defendant: Tuesdays and Thursday. So on the Tuesday it will be at 10:00 AM.

Judge: What day is that?

27
001290
Defendant: Well you are looking at, okay he has had until 17
th
to post the 2275
and you are saying have the hearing the following week that will be
25
th
October.

Judge: Okay 25
th
October what time?

Defendant: That would be at 10:00 oclock.

Judge: Alright, so thats the courts order and I will see you back then have
a good day.

[0:51:42]

28
001291
Judge: And we have a trial. Okay, the next is Matthew Merliss versus Casey
-- oh, I'm sorry, versus Zachary Coughlin. Casey Baker represents
the plaintiff in this matter and this was the time set for
determination on the no cause eviction and -- are the parties ready
to proceed?

Plaintiff: Just one moment, Your Honor.

Defendant: [INDISCERNIBLE 0:57] first.

Judge: Is that this? We'll hear it. Come up.

Plaintiff: I believe that would be it, Your Honor.

Judge: All right.

Plaintiff: Just to make sure [INDISCERNIBLE 1:21].

Judge: Oh, you can all be seated. I'm trying to figure out where we are
because when I -- I was contacted by counsel for the plaintiff in
respect to emergency request for conference call with -- I did not
have that. I was not here at the time when the request came in, but
I did grant an order short in time with respect to a motion to
inspect the property and I don't know if the property was inspected
or not.

Plaintiff: No, Your Honor. The property was not inspected.

Judge: And do you desire to have the inspection before going forward with
this proceeding today or no?

Plaintiff: Well, my understanding in this proceeding, Your Honor, is that this
Mr. Coughlin's chance to present -- to substantiate his legal defense
that he's trying to present here. Mr. Coughlin, after the last hearing,
deposited the rent with the court as the court ordered, so he got
himself another bite at the apple.

If Mr. Coughlin is going to proceed and present evidence of what he
claims are habitability issues, then I may ask the court to adjourn so
we can go inspect. But I've not seen anything of Mr. Coughlin since
29
001292
the last hearing, nothing has been produced, other than a couple of
motions and a notice of appeal which we do not believe is effective.

Judge: Well, it may be effective, but it doesnt stay these proceedings.

Plaintiff: No, and it's not an appeal [INDISCERNIBLE 3:45] that Mr. Coughlin
appealed anyways and no, it does not stay these proceedings.
You're absolutely correct, sir.

I guess the way I would suggest that we proceed is, if Mr. Coughlin
wants to proceed, and he presents anything and I think we need to
go inspect, then I would ask the court to adjourn. I don't want to
waste the court's time any more on this--

Judge: Right.

Plaintiff: Than absolutely necessary. And I've never seen this before. I don't
know what this is so I can't really address it, Your Honor.

Judge: And so they do have a right to respond to this, so I'm not going to
consider this today. They'll have 10 days to respond to this.

Plaintiff: Your Honor, if I may as well, there was something shoved through
my mail slot last night as well from Mr. Coughlin bearing a file
stamp of yesterday, Emergency Demand for Jury Trial and Amended
Tenant's Affidavit Answer Counter-Claim. Again, I havent had a
chance to look at this. I know it's not appropriate to have a jury trial
here and the court has already ruled that there's not been
entertaining a third party claims, this is a summary eviction. But,
again, I havent had a chance to even look at this because it's
[INDISCERNIBLE 3:45] yesterday.

Judge: All right. Well, you have 10 days to respond to that as well. So we'll
put those aside for the moment and -- now.

So, assuming you -- what the court had done at the last hearing I
had given you credit against the rent which was owed $4,500 for
the alleged habitability issues, which included a window at $150,
stairs at $1,250, weeds at $350 x 2, garbage disposal $125, mold
$500, and that together was subtracted from the $4,500. The
30
001293
offsets totaled $2,725. And that was without proof to substantiate
those claims.

So the purpose of today's hearing was to substantiate those claims
and also if you have any defense to the no cause, because the no
cause, if you don't have a lease, unless you can show it's in
retaliation it would be granted. So, this is your opportunity, number
one, to substantiate the amounts that I gave you credit for and,
further, for you to present any evidence that this no cause eviction
is, in fact, in retaliation for your complaint about the habitability.
All right? So, why dont I --

Defendant: May I proceed, Your Honor?

Judge: You may, but if you're going to be a witness, you'll need to be
sworn.

Defendant: Well, if I can make an interjectory, simply, Your Honor to address a
few--

Judge: All right. Oh, one thing I do want to ask, I have no evidence that you
are an attorney. I did check with the county bar and there was no
indication that you were, but -- in the state bar we were unable to
confirm, so what's your bar number?

Defendant: 9473 nvbar.org. In the middle page has an attorney search language
[INDISCERNIBLE 8:12] yield--

Judge: No, we werent able to access that and I don't know why. But -- so
9473 is your bar--

Defendant: Yes.

Judge: Number? All right. And as a representative of the court, I will
assume that's true, so -- and then you indicated that -- well, go
ahead. You wanted to make a statement, so go ahead.

Defendant: Yes. Yes, sir, Your Honor. Rather than having myself have another
bite at the apple and I'm responding in this situation that I've been
required to, and in doing that, it's afforded me an opportunity to
31
001294
learn quite a bit about these proceedings. Maybe the best place to
start would be to bring up Las Vegas Justice Court Rule 44.

Judge: Well, I don't think that'd be a good spot to start at all because it
doesnt apply.

Defendant: If you'll just humor me for a second, Your Honor, I'll tell you why I
think that's important. Las Vegas Justice Court Rule 44 speaks to a
situation--

Plaintiff: Your Honor, can I put my objection on the record to any discussion
of Las Vegas Justice Court Rules, please? Thank you.

Judge: Well, your objection is noted, but I will allow him to state whatever
it is you're going to say.

Defendant: Vegas [INDISCERNIBLE 9:29] enact 44 for a reason. Reno doesnt
have 44. If it wanted to, it would have to enact it and you get the
Supreme Court to sign off on it. 44 Las Vegas 2 in the context of a
summary eviction proceeding require a deposit rent escrow. If the
statute alone in NRS 118A and NRS 40.253 in combination with the
Nevada Justice Court Rules of Civil Procedure, if just those three
things alone allowed for making litigants of summary eviction
proceeding deposit monies into the rent escrow, Las Vegas would
have had no need to enact Rule 44.

We dont have Rule 44 in Reno. Reno is very different from Las
Vegas. As such, I believe that the rent escrow amount should be
returned to me. It's my understanding that in a summary eviction
proceeding, the standard for summary judgment is to be applied.

I apologize, Your Honor, for -- when last you saw me on October
17th, I listened to the hearing and it seemed like I wasnt getting to
what you wanted me to get to, which was the most important
thing, to establish material issue of facts, to make a prima facie case
that I have a legal defense to the --

Judge: Well, I accept that you did and that's why we're having the trial
today.

32
001295
Defendant: And that's -- I'm glad you bring that up. You said trial, Your Honor.
You didnt say summary eviction, you didnt say summary
execution. You said trial, plenary--

Judge: Trial on a retaliatory nature of the eviction. I assumed you made a
prima facie case on that as there's no trial on the issue. It is
summary as to whether or not you were given notice served, which
the court finds you were, with a notice to terminate your lease.

Defendant: If I can just quickly interject for the record, Your Honor--

Judge: Unless you had -- unless you have a lease to show that you're not
there at will at this point.

Defendant: There -- for the record, there was no certificate in my name, US
Postal Service certificate mailing on file with respect to a notice. In
the context of summary eviction proceedings, courts are directed to
adhere very strictly to the notes requirements given the summary
nature of it. That's one safeguard that is insisted upon.

A right to a jury trial is granted by the United States Supreme Court
from -- in summary -- in eviction cases. Jury trial is an absolute right
for all citizens in the United States. I said it's a 1970s case. I think it
might be called Pearson. I believe I cite to it in my case. I don't
know that a certificate of mailing is required whereas Mr. Baker did.
He had apparently a process server, post something on the door
and contest to that. I think that might be a [INDISCERNIBLE 12:40]
Supreme Court to clarify the statute at some point.

I know I spent too much time on that, Your Honor, but when you
say trial, it's -- well, the most important thing, Your Honor, to get
across from my point of view, is that 40.253(6) says that when the
court, as you just indicated you did imply that there is a material
issue of fact, it's a pause--

Judge: No, I didnt imply that there was. I found that you made a prima
facie case--

Defendant: That's what I'm -- that's what I meant to--

33
001296
Judge: With respect to habitability and so I set it for a trial today on that
issue. But the separate issue is whether you have any defense,
which you havent given me, to the no cause eviction, which--

Defendant: And I do and I can speak to that briefly, Your Honor, just--

Judge: They're two separate things. Well, you're not under oath, sir, so
you're arguing now and I didnt -- I let you have some latitude, but
the question is do you have any facts to present to the court today?

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor, but just one last introductory matter--

Judge: Okay.

Defendant: Is that 40.253(6) says once the court has found there's a prima facie
showing, the court must pause and convert this to a full-scale
unlawful detainer action with a complaint and the 20-days notice
incident to Rule 109 of the summary eviction proceedings, so -- and
we don't have that here.

Plaintiff: Your Honor, may I?

Defendant: And there's two cases, Anvui and Glacier--

Judge: All right.

Defendant: That speaks to that one, Investment court.

Plaintiff: May I respond, Your Honor?

Judge: Yes.

Plaintiff: Thank you. What the court specifically found at the last hearing was
that Mr. Coughlin had alleged a retaliatory habitability issue that he
had alleged, but that he had not substantiated it. Your Honor used
those exact words. So the point of today's hearing is, as I
understand it, a continuation of the--

Judge: To establish whether or not he has a prima facie case.

34
001297
Plaintiff: Exactly, to substantiate it. The court's inquiry today is under
40.253(6) whether he has a legal defense, the sufficiency of his
affidavit and his proof, not under Torrealba, the summary judgment
standard. Mr. Coughlin must transcend his allegations and show by
admissible evidence that there is a material issue of fact. That he
has a defense. That he has facts to support that defense. He's not
done that. He's resting on his allegations.

Now, the court gave him credit for those allegations and basically
said, okay, look. If you want to substantiate this, you got to put the
rent in the escrow as required by the habitability statute. That's
why we're here today. The court did not dismiss it. The court
withheld ruling on whether or not a legal defense had been
substantiated. Well, in fact, it ruled that it had not, but it gave Mr.
Coughlin another attempt, and that's why we're at.

Judge: Okay. So just so I'm clear now and I believe you have refreshed my
memory, what the inquiry today is to whether or not there is a
material issue of fact and if I find there is, Sir, then we will go
forward from there.

Defendant: Your Honor, I'll just enter an objection for the record. Counsel Baker
is telling you what your order was--

Judge: No.

Defendant: You tell us what your order is and you said it was a trial that we
were having--

Judge: Well, I said that, but I stand corrected because I do remember and I
do have the order, so we will find the order.

Plaintiff: Your Honor, the use of the word "trial" was unfortunate, but it was
very clear on the record what the point of today's hearing was.

Defendant: The trial was -- trial was in the notice as well. The notice says trial.
[INDISCERNIBLE 16:56] other bases for [INDISCERNIBLE 17:02] are
further specified in this summary judgment motion before you
because they were the previous files. Those are the [INDISCERNIBLE
17:09] complaining about criminal law violations such as converging
35
001298
[INDISCERNIBLE 17:13] lawn carpet. They include Reno Municipal
Code--

Judge: Sir, I mean at some point, you can't add stuff and keep adding in
and adding in. I mean at some point, you have to put in writing
what your specific -- and you have to give the landlord notice of
that ahead of time on the habitability.

Defendant: And that's where the plenary trial is nice in that regard, Your Honor.
I did attach an affidavit to this summary judgment motion. It seems
to me plaintiff's counsel--

Judge: Sir, I am working at this--

Defendant: -- [INDISCERNIBLE 17:50] summary nature when, in fact, that's what
they wanted. It cuts both ways.

Plaintiff: For the record, Your Honor, we are requesting a summary eviction
order based on a no cause eviction.

Defendant: And we're in a trial, so

Judge: No, we're not yet, sir. Do you have my order from the last court
[INDISCERNIBLE 18:14]?

Clerk: There was one October 15th, so I'm sure it's [INDISCERNIBLE 18:22]

Plaintiff: I might be able to find it, Your Honor. But

Judge: Well, it's got to be in this file, so -- and what happened is there's
been so many papers filed since then.

Clerk: Yeah, [INDISCERNIBLE 18:35] like a fourth file [INDISCERNIBLE
18:42]

Judge: Yeah, well, this thing is a -- this is an order October 13
th
. Tenant's
motion to continue denied. If the defendant posts rent, a trial will
be set for October 25
th
at 10 a.m. So it is a trial.

Plaintiff: Yeah.
36
001299

Judge: However, just to clarify this, sir, you're telling me that you disagree
that we can go forward with the trial today. What you want to do is
get a 20-day complaint and go to trial in that manner.

Defendant: Well, are we talking about [INDISCERNIBLE 19:52] 20 days or we
have...

Judge: No, I don't -- I'm not talking about anything. I'm just clarifying, are
you arguing today that we should not be going forward with the
trial? Because that's what I want to address first.

Defendant: I think that's -- that is set forth in my motion I filed today, Your
Honor.

Judge: Well, the motion you filed today is not timely, so the issue is your
position right now is it your desire to receive 20-days' notice and go
that way?

Defendant: You know, I think that would be most every tenant's position.
They'd like a plenary trial with like all this--

Judge: Well, the problem with that position, sir, you are going to have to
post the additional rent as of November 1
st
.

Defendant: Your Honor, 2 -- 40.253(6) if the court showing no further order
once converting this to a full-scale plenary trial.

Judge: I havent converted it to anything, sir.

Defendant: But it seems as though you're saying if that occurs, once it converts
to a plenary that you would have to post rent

Judge: No, I'm saying as a condition of doing that, I'm not going to let you
live there without -- or use the office without paying rent.

Defendant: That's Las Vegas Rule 44, where you

Judge: I don't care about Las Vegas Rule 44.

37
001300
Defendant: We don't have a corollary to that Reno, Your Honor.

Judge: And we do have a statute and we do have our own rule, sir. I don't
know why you're citing Las Vegas rules.

Defendant: Because there's no rule. The Reno Justice Court Rules Rule 2 says
they don't apply to landlord-tenant actions. So we're left with

Judge: We do have rules that allow us to accept deposit, sir.

Defendant: From 118A. NRS 118A.

Judge: Okay. So, I'm not going to argue with it. If you want, you will need
to deposit the rent for the month of November--

Defendant: Your Honor, I just--

Judge: On time.

Defendant: I just want to clarify how does that reconcile with 40.253(6)? If we
could just read the exact language of that, I can read this to you,
Your Honor. It says once the court finds a material issue has been
alleged, a prima facie showing, the court shall make no further
order and this shall be converted to a plenary trial.

Plaintiff: That's not [INDISCERNIBLE 22:27]

Defendant: Exactly.

Clerk: [INDISCERNIBLE 22:29]

Defendant: And that -- and there's two cases that interpret that, too, Anvui, the
Nevada cases, Nevada Supreme Court, Anvui and the Glacier. That's
163 P.3d 413.

Judge: Sir, I agree with you as to the issue of habitability, but not as to the
no cause eviction.

Defendant: This is extremely complicated stuff, Your Honor. I would ask that
you give yourself a chance to read this so -- this summary judgment.
38
001301
Unless you do Counsel Baker to ask you if you just come in here and
all these arcane peripheral points of the law is just -- is too much to
ask of any judge, you know, in my opinion.

Judge: Mr. Baker.

Plaintiff: Yes. Now the exact language from NRS 40.253(6) says, "If the court
determines that is -- that there is a legal defense as to the alleged
unlawful detainer, the court shall refuse to grant either party any
relief, and, except as otherwise provided in this subsection, shall
require that any further proceedings be conducted pursuant to
40.290 to 40.2 -- 420, inclusive." Those statutes contemplated
verified complaint and answer discovery trial, et cetera, Your
Honor.

However, before that language in 40.253(6), it says, "The justice
court or district court shall hold a hearing, after service of notice of
the hearing upon the parties, to determine the truthfulness and
sufficiency of any affidavit or notice provided for in that section."
That's the court's only inquiry at the hearing on a summary eviction,
the sufficiency of his legal defense. The court found specifically that
he had alleged it and if Mr. Coughlin wants to call that a prima facie
case, whatever. The court found that he alleged it, but had not
substantiated it. The court actually took a break to take a look at
the habitability statutes to come back and determine whether or
not if he wants to substantiate that, his legal defense, whether or
not he needs to deposit the rent, and that's what the court
concluded. We're still in summary eviction land.

Judge: All right. Then, sir, I agree that I have not made the requisite finding
that requires a trial at this time. And I -- what he said is absolutely
correct. That all happened.

Defendant: Will I be -- afforded an opportunity?

Judge: You're going to have the opportunity right now to convince me--


39
001302
Judge: -- that by testimony or otherwise, that in this case, you do have a
meritorious defense, all right.

Defendant: Thank you, Your Honor, and I apologize at our last hearing I wasnt
more direct in addressing that right at the outset. I was dealing with
third-party counterclaims and all this compulsory claim preclusion
issues. But that's going to happen to -- especially now I'm trying pro
se trying to navigate the summary eviction process. But to speak
that, Your Honor, I believe I can meet the Celotex Standard of
Summary Judgment. I know that's maybe federal standard and it
would be more appropriate to cite a Nevada-based one, but they're
roughly the same.

Judge: Well, what I want is testimony or factual evidence to support your
claim.

Plaintiff: And we havent sworn, sir. Thank you.

Judge: Well, I have said that already, but he's not testifying yet.

Plaintiff: Well, he's about to.

Judge: I don't know when you're ready to proceed with your case.

Defendant: I am, Your Honor.

Judge: All right. Then I will need you sworn, would you raise your right
hand?

Defendant: Okay.

Judge: Do you swear under penalty of perjury to tell the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth?


Judge: Okay. You may be seated and you can testify from there. We do
have a microphone. And any documentary evidence you want to
refer to, exhibits, et cetera will need to be presented to the court
and to defense -- I mean to the plaintiff's counsel as well.
40
001303

Defendant: Yes, sir, Your Honor. And just to interject what, for the record, I will
object to they said that this proceeding today had been noticed in
writing as a trial to me and is now being reclassified as a
continuance of summary--

Judge: First of all, sir, you objected to it being a trial so and that he -- it was
your opposition to it being a trial you called to my attention the
issue involved. You've indicated that this was not a proper time for
a trial and I agree with you. It's not the proper time for the trial. The
only purpose of this proceeding today is to determine whether or
not you have established a prima facie case to force it into a trial, all
right.

Defendant: So is that a sua sponte Rule 59 set aside that you've just done, Your
Honor?

Judge: I havent set aside anything.

Defendant: Well, you had earlier ruled that we were on a trial and now it seems
that you set that aside sua sponte under 59(a) and are calling this a
summary eviction proceeding continuation. And I think you have a
right to do that. I'm just

Judge: Well, what I'm saying is it was mischaracterized as a trial today, all
right? It was meant not to be a trial. It was meant to be exactly
what plaintiff's counsel indicated which was, a continuance of the
prior proceeding to make a determination as to whether or not you
had factual evidence to support your allegations that the court had
given you credit for.

And I'll repeat what those are. These are the allegations you made
in the last proceeding, all right? Number one, that there was a
problem with the window, which you indicated was $150 worth,
the stairs, which were $1,250, weeds

Defendant: I'm very familiar with that. I'm familiar with it, Your Honor. If I may
just take the time, I have--

Judge: Okay.
41
001304

Defendant: Things I've worked hard on to -- I'd like to get across within the time
we have.

Judge: Well, then, let's go ahead.

Defendant: Okay. Yes, Your Honor. And just to quickly interject for the record,
the order -- the ex parte order that you indicated you signed it
earlier, actually Justice Clifton's signature is on it, Your Honor. I was
not appropriately served that's why I wonder how it got to Justice
Clifton in time. But I know I'm spending more time on that. I just
want to preserve for the record because there's numerous--

Judge: I think I said I did not sign it, but--

Defendant: There's numerous strange things that have gone on and there's
numerous lack -- there's numerous instances where there's a lack of
proof of service filed on different documents, whereas the
document I received in the mail has a proof of services. Very
curious.

But to get back to the issue at hand with respect to my alleging a
legal defense, I can do that. I'll just give a quick roadmap before I
launch into testimony, Your Honor, and that would be that, one, is
habitability issues. That is a defense in terms of NRS 118A.510--

Judge: I understand the law, sir.

Defendant: Okay. My defense is that it's based on--

Judge: You're testifying as to facts--

Defendant: I asserted a violation of a code or a criminal law or some -- and one
of the codes would be habitability. If I in -- if I alleged that and the
landlord subsequently retaliates me -- retaliates against me by
evicting me on the basis of that, that's protected by the law.
Specifically, to wit, my

Judge: Sir, I'm going to interject again. You are arguing the law.

42
001305
Defendant: I'm giving you a roadmap [INDISCERNIBLE 30:29]

Judge: I understand the roadmap. What I -- it's very simple. What are the
facts--

Defendant: Okay.

Judge: Number one, did you, in fact, notify the landlord that there was a
habitability issue?


Judge: And, specifically, what was it, what date you notified him, where is
the copy of the written documentation?

Defendant: [INDISCERNIBLE 30:47] Your Honor.

Judge: And as a result of that, did the landlord, in fact, file for eviction?


Judge: And the only thing that I have before this court were two evictions
that I'm aware of. One was for non-payment of rent and the second
was a no cause eviction. So, I guess you need to convince me that
the landlord retaliated against you--

Defendant: I do and I need to get it into the record, Your Honor, and every time
I try--

Judge: Yes, and where is it? Where--

Defendant: Every time I try, I'm prevented. If I can just quickly -- if I can have
maybe 90 seconds to do that, Your Honor.

Judge: That's fine.

Defendant: Okay. I'm -- in the record I've submitted emails that Ill attest under
oath here are from Mr. Merliss to me --

Judge: They are not in the record, sir. All they are is appended to--
43
001306

Defendant: They're attached--

Judge: Briefs.

Defendant: Exhibits.

Judge: Yeah. They're not -- and you'll need to get them into the record
because they're not in the record.

Defendant: Well, okay.

Judge: They have not been admitted in evidence.

Defendant: I would like to admit those in evidence now, sir.

Judge: What documents?

Plaintiff: Objection.

Defendant: The ones evidence -- well, see, this is a summary hearing. This isnt
District Court with all the super-technical rules. I'm a pro se litigant.
I want to admit into evidence the emails that I submitted as
exhibits--

Judge: Well, sir, you know something. I am not your attorney, I do not
represent you. You are an attorney. You will need to indicate to me
which exhibit. You have the file. Come up here and grab it.

Defendant: Yes, sir, Your Honor. And I have the docket as well. I'll cite to that. It
would be the tenant's answer, Your Honor. I believe it's Exhibit 2.
It's a -- or Exhibit 1, I'm sorry. It's about 30 day collection emails to
and from -- between Mr. Merliss and I.

Judge: Well, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada has ruled that it's
not up to the judge to peruse the record and find the documents
that you're referring to. That's your responsibility, sir.


44
001307
Judge: I do have your answer. It starts off with the points and authority, so,
yeah, [INDISCERNIBLE 33:20]

Defendant: Yes, sir. That would be it. September 6th, tenant's answer.

Judge: Well, the one I have was filed October 6.

Defendant: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I -- that's what I meant. The previous case.
The [INDISCERNIBLE 33:36] September but, yes, I have a copy of it
here.

Judge: And the one I have has no exhibits attached to it.

Plaintiff: Mine, either, sir.

Judge: Huh?

Plaintiff: Mine, either.

Judge: So, October 6 has no exhibits. Then we have a Motion for
Continuance, Motion to Strike, Motion for Sanctions. That one does
have some exhibits.

Defendant: Yes, sir. I'm sorry. That's the one and it contains a lot of emails.
They are all in--

Judge: Actually--

Defendant: Chronological order wherein Mr. Merliss--

Judge: What I have, sir, attached, and it's not marked, but as index to
exhibits. Exhibit 1, four pages, Merliss entered into lease agreement
with copy and attached here. And I have 2 of 3, 3 of 5, I don't have
the entire lease, number one. Then I have Exhibit 2, which is a
bunch of pictures--

Defendant: It might be that the exhibit I'm referring to is in the 1492 case, Your
Honor, in a more complete form. That motion -- that tenant's
answer that you're looking at right now and referring to does have
a [INDISCERNIBLE 35:20] Exhibit 3 as the Darlene Sharpe
45
001308
[INDISCERNIBLE 35:21] but there was a exhibit in the original case,
1492, it's 30 pages long.

Judge: Well, we're not hearing additional case, sir.

Plaintiff: Your Honor, I'll object to any exhibits coming in from some other
case that--

Defendant: Well, at our hearing you used the other cases as a means of
indicating that I have had notice of this instant case. So if it goes
that way, what -- you know I--

Judge: I don't -- you were in the case. You were here in court. But I don't
have the exhibits you're talking about so you need to produce
them, if you have other copies of them?

Defendant: Yes, sir, Your Honor. I have them on my computer right now. Well,
to the extent we can't use the court's 1492 [INDISCERNIBLE 36:21]
to refer to that which--

Judge: You know what I'm going to do, sir? I am going to continue this and
you will have to have the exhibits ready to go.

Defendant: I do have--

Judge: What's the first available date we have?

Clerk: [INDISCERNIBLE 36:40]

Plaintiff: [INDISCERNIBLE 36:48]

Judge: Yes, sir?

Plaintiff: Your Honor, I would object to any continuance. Mr. Coughlin has
had ample notice to get his case together. He knew what this
hearing was. He is the one that's filing all these motions to his
exhibits. He has the burden. Mr. Coughlin is costing my client a
massive amount of fees --

46
001309
Judge: Well, I'll allow your client to testify today before he leaves so he
doesnt have to come back.

Plaintiff: Well, Your Honor, Mr. Coughlin has not presented a case yet.

Defendant: And it doesnt depend on -- I can testify as to what the email is
saying and--

Judge: Then testify -- you said you have exhibits.

Plaintiff: If Mr. Coughlin wants to proceed, we--

Judge: I thought you might--

Plaintiff: You might proceed--

Defendant: I agree with the continuance and I--

Judge: Well, I know you agree with it, but--

Defendant: I don't wish to see the order being changed as the last order was. I
agree with the continuance and not just--

Plaintiff: He appealed the order, Your Honor. How can he now say that he
wants the order to stay in place?

Judge: Okay. I am going to -- on this issue, I am going to move forward
because the plaintiff has objected and he has as much right to have
a hearing on this as you do, sir. So let's go forward.

Defendant: So you sustain his objection, Your Honor, and changed your order?

Judge: I didnt change my order. I am not going to continue the matter.

Plaintiff: Yes, sir.

Judge: So go ahead.

47
001310
Defendant: Your Honor, I do have some emails here. In the interest of time and
judicial economy, I would just like to testify as to what they say. At
this point, I can produce them again.

Plaintiff: Objection, hearsay.

Judge: Well, I don't even know what the purpose of the emails is, sir. The
emails from who?

Defendant: There are statements against interest so there's a--

Judge: From who, though?

Defendant: From the landlord to the tenant that's about habitability issue.

Judge: Who -- identify who the emails are from.

Defendant: They're from Matt Merliss, Matthew J. Merliss, MD, [INDISCERNIBLE
magumda]@aol.com.

Judge: Right.

Defendant: This is an email we've written back and forth over a hundred times I
estimate.

Plaintiff: I will also object on best evidence grounds, Your Honor.

Judge: Well, the best evidence of an email is the email or printout of the
email.

Defendant: I have some of the emails here. I'll--

Judge: Some -- you give me whatever you have, sir. I'm giving you a great
deal of latitude.

Defendant: All right. In the filing of October 11
th
Motion to Strike, Motion for
[INDISCERNIBLE 39:27] index to exhibit indicate -- exhibits indicates
on Exhibit 3, six pages, emails from Darlene Shape and Matt
Merliss.

48
001311
Judge: You know what, I'm going to take a five-minute recess. You get the
documents marked up here, whatever you have. At that point, we'll
go forward with.

Defendant: Yes, sir.

Judge: All of your exhibits. You should have them ready by now. So, you
mark them whatever you're relying on, whatever the proof of these
offsets are, which you said you're well aware of, but I've listed and
I'm going to list them one more time so you're clear on it. The
credits are for the window $150 so if you have an invoice for that,
the stairs $1,250, the weeds $350 x 2, which is actually, oh, plus
$250, I'm sorry, $600.

Defendant: I can claim--

Judge: $125 for the garbage disposal and $500 for the mold.

Defendant: Yes, sir. I can claim to Mr. Merliss in writing Fair Housing violations,
Reno Municipal Code violations, and Criminal Law violations, all of
which are protected under 7510.

Judge: It may be protected, but there has to be a foundation for them, sir.

Defendant: Well, I'm an attorney testifying as to that so that's--

Judge: No, I -- no, no. We're talking about something -- two different
things. I'm talking about there has to be a foundation in fact for
them. I understand what you're saying.

Defendant: [INDISCERNIBLE 40:59] 52 is the foundation of that. I'm -- you do
not believe it, but it is evidence--

Judge: Okay. Thats what I'm saying. I have to believe it by a
preponderance of the evidence. So we will come back in five
minutes and we will proceed until we get done. We'll go all day if
we have to, but you will get done, sir.

Bailiff: All rise.

49
001312
Judge: Please be seated. Mark whatever exhibits you have.

50
001313
[INDISCERNIBLE]
Whats his last name again?
Judge: Coughlin.
Coughlin?
Coughlin.
Coughlin.
Judge: And I do have a Mr. Brandon Barkhuff here from Nevada Energy in
response to a subpoena duces tecum and its my understanding all
he has to do is deliver the documents. But is there something more
involved here?
Plaintiff: Well, Your Honor. There was a power issue that happened long
after the eviction notices were served and our first hearing on this
matter itself. I dont know if Mr. Coughlin is going to try to raise
some sort of retaliation based issue for the power. He sprinkled
some of that into his motions. I wanted NV Energy here to testify
regarding why power was turned off. How long it was turned off?
What happened? Who paid the bill, which was my client?
Judge: I have to fine Mr. Coughlin and
Plaintiff: I dont know what hes going to do.
Judge: But, we will I will take him out of turn. He has to leave so.
Plaintiff: And that would be - actually it would be any suitable testifier
[INDISCERNIBLE 1:10] manager, billing, credit operations. So
Judge: But you dont so do you need him here?
Plaintiff: No--no sir I think he needs to be here for his own sake. Hes in-
house counsel, sir, for NV Energy.
Yeah, counsel for the company.
Judge: Oh, oh. Who is it that has to leave?
51
001314
Plaintiff: I do.
Judge: Oh.
Plaintiff: I flew up this morning from [INDISCERNIBLE 1:30], Your Honor, in
response to subpoena.
Judge: Well, what I'm going to do is allow you to go out of turn so we can
get this clarified.
Plaintiff: Sure. I dont even know.
Judge: Mr. Coughlin when you are not here we have a witness from
Nevada Energy with respect to the power which is something you
alleged. I'm going to allow them to testify because they have to
leave to catch a flight at 1 oclock and so they will testify then well
continue this after that to this afternoon. Youll have time to get
your documents and bring them back.
Plaintiff: I have them. Your Honor, if I can just for the record I'm objecting
to the testifying I wasnt appropriately noticed.
We dont want that. I'm good.
Defendant: May I, Your Honor. May I in response to your original I have the
exhibits I need to produce, Your Honor.
Judge: Alright. Well, you didnt get a mark in the five minutes I asked you
to.
Plaintiff: They are marked.
Judge: With the clerk? She said you havent
Plaintiff: Well, Judge, you told me I couldnt approach without you here.
Judge: Who said that?
Plaintiff: The Deputy who was here. I asked if I could set them up
[INDISCERNIBLE 2:33].
52
001315
Judge: Well, then apologize. Sit down, sir because I am allowing Nevada
Energy to testify.
Plaintiff: Yeah, Your Honor.
Judge: And just call the witness.
Plaintiff: Your Honor, I may be able to shortcut this even further. If Mr.
Coughlin is going to raise an issue about the power then I'm happy
to put them on. If he is not, personally, I dont think its relevant
because it happened long after the eviction notices were served.
There was an interruption of power service. But if Mr. Coughlin is
going to raise an issue then we need to get them on and testify.
Judge: Sir, are you going to raise an issue about the power?
Defendant: There has been a lot of things that shocked the conscience, Your
Honor, that have happened.
Judge: Well, are you going to raise an issue about power?
Defendant: Yes, sir your Honor, the interruption of essential services during the
five-day period in which I have to respond in a summary
proceeding. Yes, I am going
Judge: Okay. And that was okay. So we know that
Defendant: To the extent I can, Your Honor.
Judge: Do we assert, do we know that date that youre raising the issues
for?
Defendant: The date I'm raising it, Your Honor?
Judge: You said it was the five-day period in which you had to respond.
Defendant: I believe it was the same day Mr. Baker showed up for an inspection
with a videographer. I believe that was October 4
th
, was it Lee? In
my response [INDISCERNIBLE 3:53].
53
001316
Judge: Well, you have a you know when the five-day notice was so lets
hear the testimony so we can get this out of the way.
Plaintiff: I apologize. I [INDISCERNIBLE 4:02] purpose of representing NV
Energy on subpoena. Its Brandon Barkhuff. I'm assistant general
counsel for NV Energy. Nevada state bar number 8958.
Judge: And you are you objecting to the testimony of the witness?
Plaintiff: No.
Judge: Oh, okay.
Plaintiff: I just I have made my formal
Judge: Oh, no, no. Thats fine. I appreciate you being here. Were trying to
get you out of here.
Plaintiff: Thank you. I appreciate that, Your Honor.
Judge: So if you can send up your employee
Plaintiff: That probably be [INDISCERNIBLE Denise Tsuda 4:31], your honor.
Judge: Alright.
Plaintiff: Plaintiff calls for Miss Tsuda from NV Energy, Your Honor.
Judge: Youll come up here, maam. Well try and do this as quickly as
possible. Up to -- the stand is right over here. And
Defendant: Your Honor, just to clarify the objection. [INDISCERNIBLE 4:43] I
believe you, you indicated that I would have no opportunity to
raise -- to bring in third parties or make counter claims in this
summary.
Judge: This is not a third party counterclaim. This is a witness presumably
with respect to allegation youve made that the landlord cut-off the
power.
Defendant: What is that have to do with the purpose in this hearing?
54
001317
Judge: Purpose of this hearing was to establish whether or not you have
presented evidence convincing me that you have a prima facie case
for retaliatory eviction.
Defendant: So essentially Mr. Baker wasted theres more people stand by
having them come to the hearing to testify that conduct which
occurred after the notice of eviction was served. How will that be
retaliatory?
Judge: Sorry, you already said that it shocked the conscience. I, sir, sit
down, because I will have you escorted out of the courtroom.
Defendant: Yes, Sir.
Judge: Go ahead, sir.
Plaintiff: Your Honor, if Mr. Coughlin doesnt believe it relevant I am happy
to dismiss the witness. He raised the issue.
Judge: No, I want you to proceed at this point.
Plaintiff: Thank you, sir. Miss Tsuda would you please state your name and
spell your last name for the record?
Miss Tsuda: Denise Tsuda. T-S-U-D-A.
Plaintiff: And what do you do Miss Tsuda?
Judge: Youve already objected sir. Your objection is overruled.
Defendant: I have to state the basis to preserve [INDISCERNIBLE 6:19].
Judge: Okay youre objecting on relevance ground and your objection of
relevance grounds is overruled.
Defendant: Yes, Your honor.
Plaintiff: What do you do Miss Tsuda?
Miss Tsuda: I'm the manager billing, credit operations at NV Energy.
55
001318
Plaintiff: Okay. And you are here to pursuant to subpoena today, is that
correct?
Miss Tsuda: Yes.
Plaintiff: Okay. Did you bring documents with you?
Miss Tsuda: Yes.
Plaintiff: Okay. I'm going to ask you just a few questions about those
documents? The property were discussing here is 121 River Rock
Street, Reno, Neveda . You have your file on that property?
Miss Tsuda: Yes.
Plaintiff: Okay and specifically we want to talk about the time period from
February 2010 to present, are you prepared to do that?
Miss Tsuda: Yes.
Plaintiff: Okay, Who is Your Honor may I sit while I question?
Judge: Yes, you may.
Plaintiff: Thank you, sir. Miss Tsuda who is the customer of record for 121
River Rock Street, Reno, Nevada at this time?
Miss Tsuda: Matt Merliss.
Plaintiff: Has the has the identity of the customer of record changed at any
time from February 2010 to present?
Miss Tsuda: Yes.
Defendant: Objection, Your Honor, irrelevant.
Judge: Overruled.
Plaintiff: When did that change takes place?
Miss Tsuda: On April 6
th
2010 to June 27
th
2011 the service---
Judge: Can you repeat those dates April
56
001319
Miss Tsuda: April 6
th
2010 to June 27
th
2011 service was in the name of Melissa
Ulloa. U-L-L-O-A.
Plaintiff: So if I understand correctly that changed as of June 27 2011?
Miss Tsuda: Yes. On June 27
th
it went into the name of Matt Merliss.
Plaintiff: Can you tell us why?
Defendant: Objection, Your Honor, foundation [INDISCERNIBLE 810].
Miss Tsuda: Melissa Ulloa.
Judge: Objection overruled.
Plaintiff: Youyou answer.
Miss Tsuda: Melissa Ulloa called and requested a move out of service and that
was placed
Defendant: Objection, Your Honor, hearsay.
Judge: Objection overruled. Business record exception. Go ahead.
Miss Tsuda: The service was put back into the name of Mr. Merliss. He has what
we called as Standing Order so when a tenant moves in it goes out
of his name when a tenant moves out it goes back into Mr.
Melissas name automatically.
Plaintiff: Okay. When Miss Ulloa called, did she identify any co-tenant that
would be remaining in the property?
Miss Tsuda: No.
Plaintiff: She just said shes moving out.
Miss Tsuda: She just requested a move out order.
Plaintiff: Okay, so pursuant to the standing order it reverted back to in
Defendant: Objection, Your Honor, relevancy in foundation. Theres no
indication as witness talked to Miss Ulloa. If she is referring to some
records Id like a copy of them.
57
001320
Judge: You have an opportunity, do have records?
Miss Tsuda: I do.
Judge: Are you referring to the records?
Miss Tsuda: Yes.
Judge: And why dont you lay a foundation with respect to the records and
will put them in evidence?
Plaintiff: Miss Tsuda the testimony that you just gave regarding Melissa
Ulloas telephone call. Do you have records in your file that you
brought here today that indicate when that call took place and
what the content was?
Miss Tsuda: Yes.
Plaintiff: Okay. Can you please--
Miss Tsuda: I have this the order that was placed.
Plaintiff: Yes.
Defendant: Are those marked, Your Honor?
Judge: We are going to have a mark butbut I guess [INDISCERNIBLE 9:50]
foundation for all these records so we can get them all in and done
with. if theyre going to be admitted.
Plaintiff: Letslets do it that way. Miss Tsuda you have in your hand if I
understand correctly your entire file on this matter, is that correct?
Miss Tsuda: Yes.
Plaintiff: Okay. Are those records normally kept in the ordinary course of NV
Energys business?
Miss Tsuda: They are part of our customer information system.
Plaintiff: Okay and those were the records youll be relying on to testify
today?
58
001321
Miss Tsuda: Right.
Plaintiff: Your Honor, Ive moved to admit the file produced by Miss Tsuda
from NV Energy.
Judge: [INDISCERNIBLE 1020]
Defendant: Objection, Your Honor. I wasnt provided any evidence
[INDISCERNIBLE 10:24].
Judge: Come up and look at them.
Defendant: Come up and look at them?
Judge: Yes.
Defendant: Am I going to be given a copy? Are they marked as my exhibits
must be [INDISCERNIBLE 10:32].
Judge: Were going to mark them --
Miss Tsuda: I have two copies.
Defendant: Thank you.
Judge: Can you give him a copy?
Defendant: Do you have for the court? Doesnt the court need a copy as well.
Judge: The originals is going to be filedone copy is going to be filed as
the original with the court, the other copy is going to be given to
you. Alright, so counsel can you come up and give him his copy?
Miss Tsuda: I still got two copies.
Defendant: Is that the original?
Miss Tsuda: Yes.
Defendant: Yes I think.
59
001322
Judge: You each have a copy the other and the original have marked as
exhibit and I dont know if you havedo you have any exhibits
here?
Miss Tsuda: No, sir.
Judge: Okay, this will be plaintiff Exhibits A. If you give it me Ill have it
marked. This whole stake?
Miss Tsuda: Yes.
Judge: I'm going to have to clip them together. I do. Heres one.
Miss Tsuda: [INDISCERNIBLE 11:45].
Judge: Oh Ill take yours and I can use it for mine. Thanks alright.
Plaintiff: Thank you. Miss Tsuda do you have in your hand the documents
you produce that had now been marked as plaintiffs Exhibit A. Id
like to take a moment and walk through those if we could, please.
Miss Tsuda: The top sheet shows the three accounts that Melissa Ulloa has had
with us.
Plaintiff: Okay.
Miss Tsuda: 931 Forest is an inactive account. 221 River Rock is an inactive
account and theres an active account at 782 Grand Canyon
Boulevard.
Plaintiff: Okay. Can you please point us to the document in plaintiffs Exhibit
A that shows when Miss Ulloa called in and changed service?
Miss Tsuda: The fourth sheet back about an inch down where its say SO type
its say MVOT thats a move out order that was placed. The day that
was created was June 22
nd
for any day or when the service would
be disconnected or turned off of June 27
th
.
Defendant: Objection, Your Honor. I think theres probably some privacy basis
on which I can ascertain to have, you know, account records
whether or not I was a tenant in place certainly NV Energy is fond of
60
001323
asserting even if someones not on the bill, oh you live there. You
cant do this or that. Well, can that person assert a privacy basis for
not having
Judge: I dont know who the person is. Is she here?
Defendant: Thats my former co-tenant. So, she is not here.
Judge: I understand, but is she here to assert an objection?
Defendant: No. But, I'm here and if I was her co-tenant
Judge: Are you representing her?
Defendant: No, sir. But my point is this that NV Energy seems to Ive heard
they have a policy where they say, well you are living there. So you
cant have power in your name because you are benefitting. Well, if
they assert is that way, why couldnt that same person assert a
privacy objection to NV.
Judge: Well, first of all, I dont even know who this person is. So you said
she was your co-tenant. I'm not quite sure I know how this is linked
to the interruption of service but is there any dates that there
werent service provided to that residence or was there an
interruption of service at some point?
Miss Tsuda: There was an interruption of service for a disconnection of non-
payment on October 4
th
.
Judge: October 4
th
.
Miss Tsuda: When it was in the name of Mr. Merliss.
Judge: And that was -- for what period of time was it interrupted?
Miss Tsuda: Less than 24 hours. It was turned back on on October 5
th
.
Defendant: Can we get an exact time on that?
Miss Tsuda: I do not have an exact time on when it was turned back.
Defendant: Well, then how can you say its less than 24 hours?
61
001324
Plaintiff: Your Honor, is he cross-examining or what?
Judge: Alright. I'm just trying to ask but I just prior to October 4th, it was
in Mr. Merliss name or Dr. Merliss name from June 27
th
till
October 4
th
.
Miss Tsuda: Yes, and then its currently in his name.
Judge: Alright. So, alright.
Plaintiff: Miss Tsu, just a couple of more questions. When the service was
disconnected on October 4
th
, who paid the bill to turn it back on?
Miss Tsuda: Mr. Merliss.
Plaintiff: Do you know the amount of that bill?
Miss Tsuda: The amount that he paid was $379.99.
Plaintiff: Okay. Do you know
Defendant: Objection, Your Honor. Foundation [INDISCERNIBLE 15:53].
Judge: Well, overruled.
Plaintiff: Are you referring to the document?
Judge: Court finds that these are business records and further the best
evidences the copies of the records which have been presented to
the court and are admitted.
Plaintiff: Thank you. How long since, excuse me prior to October 4
th
, how
long since the payment had been made on the account? Can you
tell us that and identify document if you can?
Defendant: Objection, Your Honor. The relevance of this point we spent 10
minutes on this. I dont know how this has anything to do with the
reason why were here today.
Judge: Well, sir, if you had not made the argument that your service was
interrupted in retaliation it wouldnt be relevant. But you did make
62
001325
that argument. If you want to withdraw that argument I will allow
her to leave and were done with this.
Defendant: That would be post-eviction notice retaliation, is that relevant?
Judge: You were the one who said it was, sir.
Defendant: I was already served an eviction notice by the time this occurred.
Judge: Yeah, and you said in retaliation they shut off the utilities.
Defendant: I said I'm entitled to $1,000 statutory damages because that
happened and maybe damages from NV Energy because they didnt
notice the residence. And if somebody was on life support in there,
and further Id like to know why you say its less than 24 hours. And
then you say you cant tell us when it happened. How do you know?
Miss Tsuda: Because theres a date on the reconnect order [INDISCERNIBLE
17:24].
Plaintiff: [INDISCERNIBLE 17:25] I want to make sure [INDISCERNIBLE 17:27].
Okay, if its his turn to cross-examine I'm happy to have her answer
questions. If its not his turn Id ask him to follow protocol of direct
examination followed by cross-examination.
Judge: I think, is there anything he says this is not an issue. So I'm going
to excuse her and going to fine that the post-eviction retaliation is
irrelevant to these proceedings.
Plaintiff: Thank you, sir.
Judge: And youre free to go.
Defendant: Just to preserve, Your Honor. I'm not withdrawing any counterclaim
I have towards NV Energy.
Judge: Thats a separate case. You are and you have now. So far as this
court is concerned indicated that it is irrelevant to these
proceedings the no cause eviction as to whether or not there was a
retaliatory post filing landlord retaliation subsequent to the filing of
the eviction. You said that clearly, alright.
63
001326
Defendant: I'm not conceding that, Your Honor. I'm just saying the way youre
characterizing this hearing I'm objecting on the basis that if I'm not
allowed to serve counterclaims, permissive, compulsory or
otherwise, and if this is not a trial, if this is a summary proceeding
Judge: I didnt say youre not allowed to assert counterclaims. What I said
is, sir, in this proceeding and just so were clear on this, were
talking about a no cause eviction. And I said the only relevance is
whether or not the no cause eviction itself was retaliation. Youre
saying that this shut off occurred subsequent to the no cause
eviction and therefore was irrelevant. You objected to it. I agree
with you. She is free to go.
Plaintiff: Thank you, Your Honor.
Third party: Your Honor, thank you for the court [INDISCERNIBLE 19:23].
Judge: Youre welcome. So we will continue till 1:30 and the problem is I
dont know what else I have at that time so we might have to
continue to a different date.
Clerk: [INDISCERNIBLE indiscernible 19:50]
Judge: Alright, can you do that? Yes, sir?
Plaintiff: Well, Your Honor, I just for my clients sake who has to travel here
from out of state and weve got another witness subpoenaed. If Mr.
Coughlins going to present his testimony Id like to just get this
done today. He is living in a house for free.
Judge: Sir, I cannot do something if I dont have the time to do it.
Plaintiff: No, I understand. I understand.
Judge: And I did not anticipate we would be taking this long. So, I would
accommodate your client. He can appear by phone if he wishes.
Plaintiff: That would be wonderful. Thank you.
Defendant: I just log my objection to that for the record.
64
001327
Judge: Yeah, you can object, but I'm going to allow him to appear by
phone. He is here today. So far as I'm concerned we spent at least
half hour not presenting evidence on your behalf. And the next
court date, sir, and I'm talking to Mr. Coughlin, I will insist to have
all your exhibits marked and ready to go and I will allow you to
present them to the clerk. I dont know why the bell stopped you,
but I did order that you present them to the clerk. So, you should
have been able to do that. You can bring them in between now and
the next hearing whether its today or in the future. But if we go
past November 1 you will have to deposit the rent for November 1.
And I think I made that clear to you and you can object if you wish.
You can appeal my ruling if you wish. I think youve already done
that but I am not granting you a stay of these proceedings.
[22:00 24:00 LONG PAUSE]
Plaintiff: Your Honor, [INDISCERNIBLE 24:04] the clerk was doing recess I had
no idea what he wanted to do with it.
Judge: Okay. I had told him intowhile I was out to deliver them to have a
marked by a clerk and she explain to me he hadnt that so
Plaintiff: Thats my mistake I was hearing [INDISCERNIBLE 24:22]
Judge: Yeah while it was clear I wanted him to do that so-
Clerk: Theyre going to have Judge Denon doing your small claims for this
afternoon and so we can continue.
Judge: Alright, will continue at 1:30 then. And as I said, the client if hes
going to go back, can go back and appear by phone or he can stay
either way.
Plaintiff: Thank you, Your Honor.
Judge: Alright, we willsee you back at 1:30 then. Yes sir. Who are you --?
Randy Fisher: Randy Fisher. I am witness for the plaintiff. I have some spectrum
system that I need to shut off this afternoon and I do know
65
001328
[INDISCERNIBLE 25:03] if need a phone testimony by me I could do
the same.
Plaintiff: Your Honor, If I can make an offer proof here Mr. Fisher is a
handyman that was sent to the property by my office to address
habitability issues identified by Mr. Coughlin. He went to the
address after notice was given to Mr. Coughlin and Mr. Coughlin
wasnt there---
Judge: Well, why dont we just---testify by phone and when you ready?
You have a cell phone, sir?
Defendant: Your Honor, similar to most of the witnesses that are called, Mr.
Fisher was sent with less than 20 hours notice. It was e-mail notice
the lease calls for 48 hours written notice. So I dont know why his
time has been taken up. I dont know what he could possibly testify
to. The lease says 48 hours notice its a law office. It is not a college
kids dorm room where you can just barge in at any moment.
Judge: Sir, the question was-- as I understand it, he responded to your
complaint about habitability.
Judge: Which the landlord is supposed to address in quicker than 48 hours
if it is a true habitability issue. In fact, the statute clearly indicates
its going to be done within 48 hours.
Defendant: And I believe over 14 days have passed.
Plaintiff: Your Honor, I will present proof that Mr. Coughlin was given notice
within 14 days but more than forty-eight hours that Mr. Fisher was
going to be there. When Mr. Fisher got there to address the
habitability issue Mr. Coughlin wasnt there. I got the e-mails right
here. I cannot [INDISCERNIBLE 26:34].
Judge: Well then, just have your witness available by phone since hes
indicated that he could be available by phone if or either that or
arrange with him that youll do him precisely at 1:30 or something.
66
001329
But we got to hear from --at some point we have to hear from
defendant so
Plaintiff: [INDISCERNIBLE 26:57] Miss Merliss tenant was -- this is similar
what it was like being Mr. Merliss tenant constantly waiting on
him, constantly working around his schedule.
Judge: Okay. Well Ill decide that this afternoon well see you back at 1:30.
Plaintiff: Thank you.
Judge: And alright. Youre all free to go.

67
001330
Judge: Please be seated. What we are going to do, some items and some
confusion earlier this morning. I want to make it crystal clear that
this is a continued hearing pursuant to NRS 40.253 and the burden
is on the landlord first to establish a prima facie case for the
unlawful detainer action. And so Im going to have the landlord
present its evidence with respect to the lease and the no-cause
eviction. Then the defendant will have the opportunity because I
think the only issue then is whether or not this unlawful detainer
action no-cause eviction is a retaliatory eviction and you will, the
defendant will need to meet the requirements for a retaliatory
eviction as set up in the statute. And Im going to limit you to your
presentation with respect to those issues. I know you brought up a
lot of other things, one of them being a demand for a jury trial
which the court finds is not kindly and that request is denied. And,
but you will need to meet the requirements under 118A with
respect to retaliatory eviction. And if youre testifying or presenting
evidence outside that I will rule against you on those issues. So, we
will start first with the landlord and you will need to present the list
or whatever documentation you have to support the original
tenancy and that it was a month-to-month tenancy and that the
proper notice was given etc.

Plaintiff: Thank you, Your Honor. NRS 40.254, I believe, is the operative
statute here. Pursuant to the courts policies in that statute the
landlord has filed his affidavit in this matter. I dont know how
many additional copies I have here but that is in the courts files. I
believe actually Your Honor I have submitted at the last hearing
which was presented as

Judge: I have the no-cause termination notice to vacate under NRS 40.251
subsection 1.

Plaintiff: Correct.

Judge: And that ---

Plaintiff: There was a there was the no-cause termination notice to vacate
that was served on August 22nd. There is the subsequent five-day
notice of unlawful detainer summary notice of summary eviction
68
001331
that was served on September 27th. Those were fully provided to
you.

Judge: What is that? The 30-day notice was served on August 22nd.

Plaintiff: Thats correct, sir.

Judge: And I have an Affidavit of Service when I have signed by [Joel
Durban 3.50].

Plaintiff: Thats correct, sir.

Judge: Nevada Court Services.

Plaintiff: Yeah.

Judge: So, the purposes of this hearing Id like to have that marked ---


Judge: --- as landlords B.

Plaintiff: Ive got an additional copy of you need it sir or ---

Judge: Well, if you want to compare to this one make sure its ---

Plaintiff: Weve only ever had one of these.

Judge: Well, okay this will be marked as Exhibit E.

Plaintiff: Your Honor I have ---

Judge: Then I have the five-day notice of which is attached in the notice of
hearing out of the court, I dont know. Im going to we have the
notice of summary eviction which was dated ---

Plaintiff: Your Honor, there are two of those floating around here and I could
clarify for you.

Judge: I have one dated service September 27th.
69
001332

Plaintiff: Correct. There is one that I served to Mr. Coughlin on September
27th hearing. After that I went ahead and had it also served by
Nevada Court Services which is actually two.

Judge: I dont know that I have that.

Plaintiff: Here.

Judge: Okay, Im going to ask the court to mark this as Exhibit C.

Plaintiff: And your Honor, does the court have in its file, sir, the landlords
affidavit, that was provided at the last hearing but I dont know if it
was marked [6:10]

Judge: I do have a actually I dont know whose exhibit Cs are, so, did you
file exhibits like this?


Judge: Well, then ---

Plaintiff: Well, we dont file [6.30] standing like that, no. But we use this, it
looks like our coversheets.

Judge: How about unlawful, the [Gaynor 6.38] affidavit ---

Plaintiff: Yeah, looks like ---

Judge: --- signed in front of a California notary.

Plaintiff: May I pursue?

Judge: Yeah.

Plaintiff: Yes.

Judge: But this doesnt ---

Plaintiff: I believe that is the ---
70
001333

Judge: --- I actually have a date that was signed but it was signed [7:00]

Plaintiff: Yes, sir. October 10th by Matt Merliss.

Judge: Yeah.

Plaintiff: He signed as this is the full copy. Yeah, thats correct. Thats
probably exhibits to that, sir. Should be the two notices. The third
one is ---

Judge: We [7:17]

Plaintiff: Okay.

Judge: Right. Im trying to get.

Defendant: Your Honor, if I can just quickly interject an objection for the record,
Im trying [7:26] knowing with the objections but. It is in the
statute, it was fairly specific but unclear to me whether [7.35] to
mailing is required. You know, process here was involved so maybe
its not [7:41] downstairs. They attached that USPS certificate.

Judge: Thats when you post them that.

Plaintiff: Which is attached here, sir.

Defendant: Its part of the services [7.50]

Judge: Well, I dont know if sir, I havent even want that it, right now all
Im doing is having the exhibits marked.

Plaintiff: Your Honor.

Judge: If it was served by posting and mailing then it is required that they
be mailed in this certificate of mailing. If it were served in person
then its different.

Defendant: Just, just [8.10] Your Honor there might be negative [authority to
try to some -- ] because it seem like maybe if they have a process
71
001334
how to do it, we didnt have that [8:19] mailing. But I dont know
and certainly

Judge: Right.

Defendant: [8.23] your knowledge and expertise are.

Judge: I havent thought to that yet, so what ---

Plaintiff: Your Honor, this exhibit 1 and 2 goes to the landlords affidavit. For
some reason its tackled with these I dont think we did, I think
thats a courts file, the courts order and things.

Judge: Well, everything has got mixed up in here, so.

Plaintiff: Ive got fresh copy with just exhibits if you want to have [8.50]

Judge: It looks like this is the lease.

Plaintiff: Yes, that was introduced at the hearing. The only thing that goes
with the landlords affidavit is exhibit 1 and 2 which were the two
notices that you have in your hand there. And what I will point out.

Judge: Alright, wait a second. No need to point it out. So, exhibits 1 and 2
go with ---

Plaintiff: The landlords affidavit.

Judge: Which is ---

Plaintiff: It was right here.

Judge: Here?


Judge: So, this will be marked. Im going to take this exhibit 1 and 2
because were doing it says as C or this would be D. We will need
that stapled together.

72
001335
Plaintiff: The affidavit C, sir?

Judge: Huh?

Plaintiff: the affidavit in --

Judge: The landlords affidavit is D.

Plaintiff: D.

Judge: The notice of termination, no-cause termination is B; the five-day
notice unlawful detainer for failure to vacate is C.

Plaintiff: Okay. Your Honor, with ---

Judge: Before we get into that though Im trying to straighten up this file.
Im going to put my orders on the left so I can find them. Okay.
Service must be pursuant to 40.250 and 40.280 sets the method of
service. Okay, so youre on exhibit C, exhibit C is the five-day notice.

Plaintiff: Go on.

Judge: Yes.

Plaintiff: There are two of those documents. I just want the court to be clear.
On September 27th at our hearing I personally hand delivered one
of those to Mr. Coughlin. I dont know which one you have in your
hand.

Judge: Well, this one ---

Plaintiff: The [13:00] service will say.

Judge: --- is, I dont know who its signed by, to see you have to come up
and look at it. It says [J. Dortmund 13.16]

Plaintiff: Okay, thats, thats [13:19] what happened, Your Honor, was on
September 27th I handed one of these to Mr. Coughlin at the
hearing. When I get back to the office I thought perhaps thats not
73
001336
appropriate you better have it served as well. So, we had it served
this well. The court has the correct one.

Judge: Alright. Well, this one shows service by J. Dortmund.

Plaintiff: Yes.

Judge: And it indicates by posting a copy.

Plaintiff: And mailing, sir.

Judge: Where is the US certificate postal service mailing?

Plaintiff: Your Honor, I have the original here. Im going to see what these.

Judge: I do have a copy of them [14.40] envelope.

Plaintiff: Thats generally what we get back from them, sir.

Judge: But the certificate of mailing is a little form.

Plaintiff: Well, Your Honor, these the affidavit declaration of service which
is page 4 or 5. And this is US Supreme Court form. This is what they
filled out when they posted in mail. Generally they will give us a
photocopy of the envelope as well. But I dont see that on this.

Judge: So, the envelopes here I have.

Plaintiff: Okay.

Judge: But not there is the United States Postal Service certificate of
mailing. However, the statement signed by the tenant and the
witness acknowledging the tenant received the notice or B, a
certificate of mailing issued by the United States Postal Service or C,
the endorsement of a sheriff constable or other process server
stating the time and manner of service. So ---

Plaintiff: Thats what we have here, sir.

74
001337
Judge: And thats what the defendant was arguing with ambiguous but I
have ruled previously that if it is a licensed process server, the
certificate of mailing is not required if they fill out the affidavit as
they have done in this case. And, so, to the extent that that is your
objection I am going to hold that the exhibit C meets the statutory
requirements. And exhibit C is further incorporated and exhibit D
does contain the which is exhibit 1 attached to exhibit D has the
envelope showing the postage and mailing on August 22nd to
Zachary Coughlin so, and towards any doubt about it I do find it the
proper certificate has been furnished to the court. That means the
requirements for the five-day notice and five-day notice was given.
It appears more than 30 days after the exhibit B the August 22nd
which was the 30-day no cause. And then we have September 27th
actually I think I was told about the wrong document around here.
September 27th was the when I talk about the five-day notice
previously and the envelope I was actually referring to the August
22nd 30-day notice. The five-day notice was served more than 30
days after the 30-day notice so, that meets the statutory
requirements. Then we have Im going to mark as exhibit do we
have exhibit E where the okay, exhibit E is going to be the lease
agreement.

Plaintiff: Your Honor, may I ---

Judge: Well, go ahead.

Plaintiff: I have such point out sir, the landlords affidavit exhibit D is on the
form provided by this court. The US Supreme Court has, as you
know, we have these forms, the eviction notice forms. However,
they dont have an affidavit form for [19.26]. So, we submitted the
unlawful detainer affidavit exhibit D signed by Dr. Merliss. However,
going back and just looking at the stature theres a make sure were
covered NRS 40.254, I, as the landlords agent file a declaration on
October 19th which addresses the items in NRS 40.254 sub 2. I have
just one point to have to the court ---

Judge: No, I dont have that I dont believe. Where is that?

Plaintiff: That was filed on October 19th, sir.

75
001338
Defendant: [20.04] objection as to not having the landlord making that
declaration and hopefully it serve as [20:14].

Judge: Well, Im not ruling whether or not that meets the requirements
but the affidavit can be filed at the hearing. The landlords affidavit
so.

Plaintiff: Yes, which it was the last time.

Judge: Huh?

Plaintiff: Which it was the last time. I just want to be sure that his courts
form that the statutory requirements. So, when we look at NRS
40.254, it authorizes an affidavit the landlord or the landlords
agent, I signed the affidavits or the ---

Judge: But I do not find in that affidavit thats what Im trying to say. You
filed that on what date?

Plaintiff: October 19th sir, at 3:41PM.

Judge: Okay, I have a letter from you.

Plaintiff: All I have is my file stamp copy.

Judge: I have the notice of appeal to district court which was notice of
entry of order dated October 18th. And I have this declaration is
that what youre talking?

Plaintiff: Yes, declaration of Casey Baker.

Judge: Alright. Ill have that marked as exhibit F. So, we have so, let me
look at exhibit F.

Defendant: And just I quickly state for the record Your Honor, the authority for
strictly construing the proper notice requirements I know you will
[22.35] but just preserve it [22:40]

76
001339
Judge: Well, Im aware of that but what youre finding was not compliant
with the, I mean, what youre arguing was not compliant with strict
rules.

Defendant: That [22.50] with respect to if a licensed process server [] he also
have to go and spend money to certificate of mailing to me it was,
in a little bit.

Judge: The [23.00] licensed process server because they are required to
meet certain standards [23:09] get license.

Defendant: No.

Judge: Yes, the presumption is licensed process server is less likely [23.14]

Defendant: I guess just from my point of view some of the things I had
experienced recently with

Judge: Well, sorry Im overruling your objection because I do find that it
meets the strict requirements of the statutory.

Defendant: Ive just heard details of process servers going to [23.30]

Judge: Alright, sir. But thats not evidence in this hearing either.

Defendant: And [23.38] statements about [23:41].

Judge: You have the opportunity to subpoena the process server in this
case. Okay, lets just so your affidavit sir, I do need someone to
testify us to whats contained there and about the lease etc.

Plaintiff: Okay.

Judge: Since we are doing a hearing here, I do have exhibit E and you are
the counsel so I would prefer to have your client do the actual
testimony on the

Plaintiff: Thats fine, sir. The affidavit was submitted pursuant to statute as
the landlords agent and

77
001340
Judge: No, I know but you are not going to be testifying today, right?

Plaintiff: I dont think so unless we get to that.

Judge: Alright. So, the issue before me is whats alleged in your affidavit at
least that portion which starts at the, I think its page 2, starting at
paragraph 8, if we can.

Plaintiff: Yeah.

Judge: And you can remain there if you wish, Doctor, if you will please
raise your right hand. Do you swear under penalty of perjury to tell
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

Doctor: I do.

Judge: Alright. Please be seated. Would you proceed then with
examinations?

Plaintiff: Okay. Your Honor.

Judge: Maybe we can refer to exhibit E which is or whatever or you want
the landlords heres

Defendant: Well, what I need is.

Judge: exhibit D and E which has all the documents if you need.

Defendant: Yes, sir. Okay, one moment, it thought we had covered it. The last
hearing so, just trying to find my own copies.

Judge: Wow, why dont you use the courts copies so we can expedite this,
Im just trying to make sure we have a record because I do not
remember precisely what was covered at the last hearing. I do not
think that we had your affidavit wasnt even filed [26.16] at the
last hearing.

Defendant: Thats correct but the landlords affidavit was.

78
001341
Judge: Yeah, I understand but the landlords affidavit didnt have
everything in it that you allege in your affidavit.

Defendant: I understand, sir.

Judge: Alright.

Defendant: Doctor Merliss, will you please state your name as spell your last
name for the record?

Dr. Merliss: Matthew Joel Merliss, M-E-R-L-I-S-S.

Plaintiff: Thank you. And you are the owner of 121 River Rock, Reno,
Nevada?

Dr. Merliss: Yes.

Plaintiff: Okay. [26.46] whats been marked for identification purposes as
plaintiffs exhibit E. Do you recognize this, doctor?

Dr. Merliss: Yes.

Plaintiff: Okay. What is it?

Dr. Merliss: Its the altered lease agreement.

Defendant: Im sorry, objection did I get copy of this, [27.16]. Was I able to use
the courts records to because Im [27:20].

Judge: I did say you could use the courts records. I said, you had to come
get the documents from me. I couldnt find the documents they
were in your court record, sir.

Plaintiff: Thats good.

Judge: Thats the difference. I mean, I would have used your copies.

Plaintiff: I was from the old case, my mistake, Your Honor.

Judge: Okay. Proceed, sir.
79
001342

Plaintiff: Is this the lease agreement with Mr. Coughlin and Ms. Ulloa for 121
River Rock, Reno, Nevada?

Dr. Merliss: Yes.

Plaintiff: [27.55] admit plaintiffs exhibit E, Your Honor?

Judge: Any objections, sir?

Defendant: No, sir, Your Honor.

Judge: E is admitted.

Plaintiff: Thank you, sir. I want you to take a look at exhibit E, please. Can
you tell me, sir from looking exhibit E when the tenancy
commenced?

Dr. Merliss: February 2010.

Plaintiff: Okay.

Dr. Merliss: February 20th.

Plaintiff: I want you to take a look at paragraph 2, fourth line down. It says,
excuse me.

Defendant: Im sorry, objection. I was authorizing the copy?

Judge: Of the lease? You have a copy of the lease. But if you dont come up
here, Ill give you one.

Defendant: As long as it Your Honor, when I submit documents I can say well,
you got a copy of that [] summary judgment [] no problems [] the
right one but Im [] referred Counsel Bacon said

Judge: Here, please come up, sir. And this

Plaintiff: I have a copy, Your Honor. In the file

80
001343
Judge: Well, wait a second. This was furnished to you in last

Plaintiff: Last hearing.

Judge: this is I do want you to come up, I do want you to come up, sir,
and look at this. If you do not have this then I will stop and well
make copies.

Plaintiff: Yes, sir. I have it. Its just, when it comes time for me to give [29.30]
I want. [] I might need to say

Judge: As long as he has them we will

Plaintiff: Okay.

Judge: We will accommodate you but if the court doesnt have a copy I
have direct copy. These were in the court files. Alright? Okay.

Plaintiff: Thanks.

Judge: Proceed, Mr. Baker.

Plaintiff: Let me just rephrase my question. Dr. Merliss, please look at
paragraph 2 of the lease exhibit E.

Dr. Merliss: Terms?

Plaintiff: Yes. Do you see on the fourth line where the lease states
commencing on the first day of March 2010, do you see that?

Dr. Merliss: Yes.

Plaintiff: Okay. Is that your understanding when the lease began?

Dr. Merliss: Yes.

Plaintiff: And what was the term, how many months?

Dr. Merliss: Thats for 12 months.

81
001344
Plaintiff: Okay. So, if the terminal lease was 12 months and it began on
March 1, 2010 when it would have ended?

Dr. Merliss: Yes, March 1, 2011.

Plaintiff: Well. One year, right?

Dr. Merliss: Yes.

Defendant: Objection, [30.52]

Dr. Merliss: Yes, would be one year.

Judge: The objection is sustained but the answer is one year, so.


Dr. Merliss: Would be one year.

Plaintiff: Alright, thank you. So one year would be February 28, 2011, is that
correct?

Dr. Merliss: Yes.

Plaintiff: Will you please go to the next paragraph, paragraph 3, and titled
hold over, do you see that?

Dr. Merliss: Yes.

Plaintiff: Will you read the first full sentence in that paragraph? How about
the

Dr. Merliss: [31.20] agreement or any changes [properly agreed ] to will remain
in the fact on a monthly basis after the initial term.

Plaintiff: Thank you. Your Honor, this point Dr. Merliss has already
authenticated the service of the eviction notices and I believe that
covers everything in my affidavit that was different from his.

Judge: Alright. Then I will admit B, C, D, E, and F.
82
001345


Judge: And I will need the originals back from you. Do you have any cross
examination, sir?

Defendant: Yes, sir, Your Honor. Excuse me. Good afternoon Dr. Merliss, did
you ever refer to [42.44] as entitle?

Plaintiff: Objection, Your Honor. Number 1 is argumentative, number 2 is []

Judge: I didnt even hear the questions, sir, [32.50] repeat the question?

Defendant: I asked Dr. Merliss if he had ever referred either verbally or in
writing to myself, the tenant, as entitled?

Judge: Entitled?

Defendant: Entitled, [33.02] entitlement.

Judge: I dont understand the question. Entitle to what?

Defendant: Something else the types of people he prefers to rent to or employ
when no one is really paying attention?

Judge: Im going to allow the question but the doctor can answer it if he

Dr. Merliss: I can answer the question, Your Honor.

Plaintiff: Your Honor, can I put my objection on the record, please?

Judge: Yes, objection is overruled.

Defendant: Thank you. Irrelevance argumentative and [33.40]

Judge: Alright.

Dr. Merliss: Im not sending an email that Mr. Coughlin that you do have a
sense of entitlement because he want to stay in that house for free
without paying rent, if you will like youre entitled to that. Usually if
83
001346
somebody stays in a home thats leased, then they pay rent. You for
some reason, it seemed to me did not want to pay rent. And I said
no reason why not?

Defendant: Did you receive a number of emails through from me over
determine the tenancy tenancy beginning March, no, February
28, 2010 after, you know, the point where things, kind of, broke
down, did you receive a number of emails wherein I requested that
you fix some things?

Plaintiff: Thats an unfair question, [34.40] I dont understand it. Clarify and

Defendant: Did I, did you ever

Dr. Merliss: Simplify the question please.

Defendant: Sure. Did you ever get any emails from me?

Dr. Merliss: Yes.

Defendant: Okay. When would you say that started?

Dr. Merliss: I dont know, I dont remember.

Defendant: Okay. Did you ever get the can I show the witness?

Judge: Why dont you have it marked up here? Did you get him [35.08] Id
ask you to bring him.

Defendant: I didnt know when that Your Honor, Im sorry.

Judge: Well, I hear you said as soon as you get back?

Defendant: I got more of it.

Judge: How many do you have?

Defendant: Nine.

84
001347
Judge: Alright. Well, lets start with the first one, well have that marked
and you can show him that and then while you are doing it, you can
mark the rest of them.

Defendant: Okay.

Judge: Yours will be 1 through 9 and he doesnt have any marked so far,
right?

Female: Thats correct, he does not.

Judge: Okay. Well, bring him up to the court, please.

Defendant: Your Honor.

Judge: Yeah.

Plaintiff: Have we entered into Mr. Coughlins case, as this point?

Judge: No.

Plaintiff: Okay. So, were still on cross examination Your Honor, I will object
to these questions as outside the scope. The scope for the record is
[35.55].

Judge: Alright. Wait till he gets back.


Judge: Mr. Coughlin what are you going to do, its been objection that your
cross examination is limited to the scope of the direct and since this
is not relevant to the direct examination you will have the right to
call a doctor on your case in chief but at this point Im going to
sustain your objection. So unless it has to do with the notices or the
lease itself or testimony it was presented on direct, then the
objection will be sustained.


85
001348
Defendant: Yes, sir, Your Honor. As far as my recollection, speaking with [] and
evidence that firm books, [] Mr. Bakers updated recognizing the
lease to determine the tenancy what happens []

Judge: Its correct.

Defendant: So, at this point I wouldnt have anything further. We could

Judge: Alright, thats being the case do you have any other witnesses?

Defendant: Your Honor, I will have [37.32]

Judge: Well.

Defendant: I believe that the landlord has made its initial burden, to shift the
burden to

Judge: Alright.

Plaintiff: Mr. Coughlin at this point.

Judge: Okay, Mr. Coughlin, as I had indicated as I indicated upfront your
defense as I understand it is the and what we allowed was
retaliatory conduct by the landlord and thats defined as NRS
118A.520 and thats what you will need to establish for the court.
You have many things that you argue previously but they will not be
retaliation so, and I will read those out just so were clear. Right,
this, thats the wrong section.

Defendant: I think its .510.

Judge: 510, correct. And what those are are the following: the tenant has
complained in good faith of a violation of a building, housing, or
health code applicable to the premises and affecting health or
safety though a governmental agency charge with responsibility for
enforcement of that code. That is one that you alleged, I believe. B,
the tenant has complained in good faith so landlord or a law
enforcement agency of a violation of this chapter or the specific
statute then imposes a criminal penalty. C, the tenant has organized
to become a member of a tenancy union. D, a citation has been
86
001349
issued resulting from a complaint described in paragraph A. E, the
tenant instituted or defended against the judicial or administrative
proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant raised an issue of
complaints of the requirements of this chapter respecting the
habitability of the dwelling units. And F, the tenant has failed or
refused to give written consent to a regulation adopted by the
landlord after the tenant enters into the rental agreement which
requires the landlord to wait until the appropriate time as elapsed.
And G, the tenant has complained in good faith to a landlord, a
government agency or an attorney, the [care] housing agency or
other appropriate body of a violation of NRS 118.010 to 118.120
inclusive of the Fair Housing Act. And so, sir, you will be limited to
those items and you may proceed with your case at this time. And I
dont recall if youre ever sworn or not this morning. Was he
sworn?

Female: Yes, he was.

Judge: Okay. You were sworn.

Defendant: I have later remember that, Your Honor.

Judge: Huh?

Defendant: I have later remembered being sworn this morning.

Judge: Alright. Well, then Ill swear you again.

Defendant: Thank you.

Judge: Do you swear under penalty of perjury to tell the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth?

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor, I do.

Judge: Alright. You may be seated and tell me precisely what do you
retaliatory conduct was and specifically as I understand as to
retaliatory conduct were talking about is the eviction proceeding
which were here for today. Because thats the only one thats
remains. Alright?
87
001350

Defendant: Alright, Your Honor. I would wonder if, if [41.52] landscapers could
be considered [] I understand [] and there are things down here.
And Ill do my best not to make legal argument here, just testifies to
the facts because it seems like thats what you want.

Judge: Go ahead.

Defendant: With regard to 1, at building, house or health care, I didnt make
complaints and those are in writing to Mr. Merliss the email
address for which we established a regular line of communication
that would be just AOL accounts which is a [42.30] AOL.com and
these emails to which I will be referring to are found in bulk and

Judge: Wait a second, sir. A, is a complaint to a governmental agency, did
you make a complaint to a governmental agency?

Defendant: I dont are you sure that it cant just involve complaints the
landlord about health code?

Judge: No, that would be B.

Defendant: I thought B was complaint about a criminal.

Judge: Well, thats true. Well, Im sorry. A, is the tenant has complaint in
good faith of a violation of a code applicable to the premises and
affecting health or safety to a governmental agency. So, I dont
believe that means the landlord and the reason for that is, he
complained to the landlord thats well, its not covered by that
section, lets put it that way.

Defendant: That it is by a later section?

Judge: Huh?

Defendant: That it is by a later section?

Judge: Well, go ahead, you tell me. Im not doing your case for you.

88
001351
Defendant: I guess I I guess the way I [43.50] was that it was a kind of either
or a complaint to an agency because otherwise theres theres
kind of [43.57] people just go go telling on people to trying to
work things out between for the

Judge: Well, I had read quite clearly to be to a governmental agency,
which I thought you had done from what you said but

Defendant: Well, to the extend a legal services entity might be considered
that

Judge: No, thats not a governmental agency.

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor. At the moment I cant recall making any
complaints to any governmental agency, Your Honor.

Judge: Alright. Well

Defendant: But I did complain to the landlord in writing and I feel like he
reacted given retaliatory circumstances [] suggest it was retaliatory.

Judge: The only one from what youre saying looks applicable to me is E,
the tenant has instituted or defended against a judicial or
administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant raised
an issue of compliances with requirements of this chapter
respecting the habitability. Thats the only thing that I recall in all
these proceedings weve had so far that may come or [45.27]. This
statute that within the context of this statute. Unless you have
something Im missing. Because G, is a complaint to the landlord
but it has to do with fair housing which Ive never heard that you
mentioned any other discrimination.

Defendant: I havent [45.56] Your Honor.

Judge: What is your what is the discrimination that you are alleging?

Defendant: Race, sex and national origin [46.07] to classes.

Judge: What is your race, sir?

89
001352
Defendant: Caucasian, parts Irish, German.

Judge: Its not a protected class.

Defendant: Yes, it is.

Judge: Well, you will need to cite the law for me because

Defendant: Oh, that. That would be in this context Im more familiar with the
[46.35] context but and this context is a fair housing statute or
statute. And those statutes according []

Judge: Sir, I but the thing is the complaint. Do you have a copy of the
complaint to the landlord or government agency an attorney or the
fair housing agency or other appropriate of a violation of NRS
118.010 to 118.120?

Defendant: Yes, the [47.02]

Judge: Okay, well, what is the complaint, sir?

Defendant: They complaint is that [47.10] with me because me and [] he seems
to be [] anybody who is non-white male account before any fault
and the next is the facts surrounding this case.

Judge: Anyone who is non-white male?

Defendant: Yeah. [47.25] is fine with them. Antonio the handyman is fine with
him. The landscaping crew all Hispanic is fine with him. Darlene
[17.35 Sharpe], a woman realtor who seemly directed two two
different groups of people to be the same job who get paid for
twice.

Judge: Okay. What is the

Defendant: He is [47.43] with her but he want to be out.

Judge: What is the email, what is the email and where is the rate when
complained first of all?

90
001353
Defendant: Its in exhibit 8.

Judge: Exhibit 8?

Defendant: 8.

Judge: Okay, we have exhibit 8. And just so I understand that

Defendant: Quickly Your Honor, [48.06] objection the previous sections of .510
I dont believe those are not satisfied with someone complaints the
landlord, I do that makes it applicable. I dont think it called for a

Judge: Subsection (a)?

Defendant: I dont know about that but it seems like youre saying, all in one of
those sub, subsections in that statute is putting the fact by
complaining to the landlord and I would say [48.34]

Judge: And Im confused about what youre saying now. I just said that
subsection (a) does not apply if you do not make a complaint to a
governmental agency. And that is my ruling.

Defendant: I thought it was if you made a complaint involving co-section
other governmental agency.

Judge: No.

Defendant: To the landlord, to an agency.

Judge: No, it says, thats not what the statute says. It says, through a
governmental agency.

Defendant: I got it here now, Your Honor, Im sorry. I was under an impression
[49.20].

Judge: Sir, you can appeal my ruling but I am ruling that the complaint has
to be to a governmental agency, not to the landlord.

Defendant: I see right, thats clear. My mistake. But subsection (b) is where the
language have to the landlord begins to
91
001354

Judge: Thats true but then thats for criminal

Defendant: [49.45] a complaint with respect to a criminal and Ive got a number
of criminal statutes here wherein a conduct of the landscaping crew
is tantamount to mayhem, conversion, larceny, destruction of
property and while I

Judge: Okay. Sir, sir, hang on a second. Here, if you are claiming a violation
of subsection (b), then tell me precisely what it is and what
documents you have that support that.

Defendant: Yes, sir. NRS 205.220 is grand larceny, thats the taking carrying
away property of another

Judge: Then who allegedly took and carried away the property?

Defendant: The crew of men, the crew of Hispanic men that Dr. Merliss in
conjunction with the female realtor Darlene Sharpe sent to my law
office to work on weeds for which Dr. Merliss already agreed to pay
me the job. So, that sort of the double group effort [51.05]
currently it was causes no expense in that regard subsequently

Judge: No, he said he hired somebody to remove the weeds at your
property and did you file a criminal complaint, sir?

Defendant: At this point, Im ruling my options, Your Honor.

Judge: Alright, well, the individuals, did you see them take your property?

Defendant: Oh, youre right, yes sir, I videotaped it and I ask this court if I could
submit that video evidence [51.35] and I believe he said I couldnt.

Judge: And at the last hearing you could not but the question was, so you
have a videotape of an individual stealing your property?

Defendant: Stealing, uh, perhaps under a technical term, they took something
they took a lot of time and effort which was to get green, high
density, high quality wool carpet, cut and notched to fit around all
92
001355
the fence [52.16] in the house and make it so it wasnt a dirt line
and its not everybodys case.

Judge: So then how can I understand that so that they take this carpet and
take it away?

Defendant: To [52.30] the weed, so they could do their weeding.

Judge: But after they did that did they permanently deprive you of that
carpet?

Defendant: They left it in the street and refused to put it back.

Judge: And so they did not permanently deprive you the property?

Defendant: Well, my efforts to mitigate lightly pervaded a situation were yes
the trash men were taking, somebody else were taking it, and it
would be damaged.

Judge: Alright. But I did not believe that meets the requirements of NRS
205 with respect to larceny so, unless there was an attempt to
permanently deprive you of the property which by your own
testimony they left it there.

Defendant: They were intending to make it better I dont think, Your Honor. But
there are other sections of crimes against property under NRS 205
that I feel would be applicable. 206.040, entering property with
intention of damage or destroy property. 205.270, penalty for
taking property from another under circumstances not amounting
to robbery, limitation on granting of probation or suspension of
sentence.

Judge: Sir, you cant just read off the statute, you need to tell me precisely
what it was that happened and then the evidence that you
complain of it.


Judge: And then further the evidence that this subjection was caused by
that complaint.
93
001356


Judge: And then there has to be a linkage.

Defendant: I believe its quite clear on viewing the emails and the chronology
and the timing [54.08]. The emails in to and from Dr. Merliss in
exhibit 8 speaks to that with respect to the taking.

Judge: Okay, well lets go there to exhibit 8 and tell me precisely what
page youre talking about or

Plaintiff: Yes, sir. Have copies please that the attached or something that I
can refer to?

Judge: Yeah, I have these.

Plaintiff: I have no idea what those are.

Judge: Oh, here, come

Defendant: And thats telling because I would be here [54.40] reasonably
diligent investigation prior to

Judge: Sir.

Defendant: would required you do know what this is.

Judge: He doesnt --

Defendant: I believe he does, Your Honor. You cant just throw mud on the wall
and see what sticks. You need to know, youre filing some days []
law.

[Unclear]: I dont

Judge: What he is presenting so far was crystal clear, sir.

Plaintiff: He didnt present a whole lot, Your Honor.

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001357
Judge: He presented all he needs to present to establish an unlawful
detainer.


Defendant: And I can point Im sorry, I can point to the page number, Your
Honor.

Judge: What you need to because this Supreme Courts rule, its not up
to the court to fumble three of your papers and finding what youre
talking about.

Plaintiff: Yes, sir. Ill just hand it out

Judge: Alright.

Defendant: I can take a look at those.

Judge: Well.

Defendant: I have a copy for you, Casey, Im sorry. Im just a little, you know, I
just got to tell you Im an attorney, Im a [] attorney and this
process is confusing and challenging to me. So, it was like

Judge: Well, youre making it more confusing, sir.

Defendant: I wonder if its like to [55.46]

Judge: Sir, I just want you to point to me


Judge: the most egregious one you have, alright?


Judge: That you said that

Defendant: And thats as I said it starts on page 18, Your Honor.

95
001358
Judge: Page 18?

Defendant: Yes, it was constituted

Judge: I dont have any page numbers on mine.

Defendant: Yeah, [56.23]

Judge: Whats the date of it?

Defendant: The first page after the cover page will be...

Judge: Well, first page after the cover page is dated 9-6-11 or Wednesday,
August 17th of the...

Defendant: May I approach to verify would there be something wrong?

Judge: Here, sir, come up here.

Defendant: Okay. This is what I attempted to give you as exhibit 8.

Judge: 8, yeah?


Judge: And thats what I have.

Defendant: Yes, okay. You were saying the first date was

Judge: No.

Defendant: you are looking at that or?

Judge: No, well. The most current chronologically its 9-6-11 at 1:13PM.
What I was asking you where is this the most egregious example of
this.

Defendant: And you see this date [57:21] so I can refer to, thanks.

Judge: Okay.
96
001359

Defendant: It was 18 in the original pleading, Your Honor. Thats why its
[57.27].

Judge: Okay, 18. I do have page 18, so.

Defendant: Yeah.

Judge: But I do need you to back off the bench


Judge: What Im trying to find is the most egregious example of the crime
that was committed against you that you reported to the landlord.


Judge: I mean, because these cars finance or emails are addressed to the
attorney so far as I can tell.

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor. If you look at page 29, or rather, I believe page 27
begins [58.23] the first instance where I page 23, Your Honor. Its
the first instance wherein I report, this confers in or destruction of
property or some derivation of the crime to property in NRS 205 to
Dr. Merliss. It didnt take a look to Dr. Merliss.

Judge: Im sorry?

Defendant: Thats on page 23 there is a at the top of the page there is a cell
number and then theres noxious weed ordinance.

Judge: Well, what I say at the top of page 23 youre saying?


Judge: There at the top of page 23 the property damaged by Darlene
Sharpe of Landscapers, is that what youre talking about?

Defendant: Yes, sir. Counsel Baker, is this completely new and foreign to you?

97
001360
Plaintiff: Sir, my understanding is

Judge: You dont need to talk to counsel you need to talk to me. And you
are a witness, not a counselor and now so please sit down.


Judge: And tell me, sir, where this specifically that you are alleging a crime
was committed?

Defendant: Well, its its where I detail to Dr. Merliss that Ronaldo or Rolando
the Green Action lawn care crew in conjunction with Darlene
Sharpe arranged at my property taking off out of the yard and
placed it in the street then refused to put it back in spite of the fact
that they knew they would encounter that carpet from their
previous trips to work on the house Dr. Merliss owns.

Judge: Okay, so its the removal of the carpet?

Defendant: Yes, sir. And as a small businessman I can tell you that it affects my
business in a real way. I do not play with marginal margin.

Judge: Alright. Whats the next instance that you said you had multiple
crimes?

Defendant: If I did I misspoke, Your Honor.

Judge: So, its the one its the one event but multiple charges to that one
event that youre talking about?

Defendant: I have multiple complaints. Some involve criminal law, some involve
health, health care

Judge: I understand, I heard you so, so destruction of carpet, right? Is that
what youre claiming?

Defendant: It goes a bit beyond that to the extent that it was more of an
installation so it -- given the carpet to lay down and be notched and
cut right round the fence and the house was a big part of the
98
001361
expense, it would be different than just taking an ordinary square
piece carpet, its, yeah.

Judge: Well, I understand that sir, Im trying to understand though under
118A.510 subsection (d), you claim is that the carpet destruction
of the carpet constituted a crime?

Defendant: Yes, sir. And I have a video.

Judge: And alright, well I will assume for the purposes of these
proceedings then that your testimony is corroborated by that video,
right? That, in other words, Rolando removed the carpet.

Defendant: With the crew of [1.03.04] and but yes, Your Honor.

Judge: Okay. Rolando and the other four men removed the carpet and did
not replace it.

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor and Darlene Sharpe seems to be in contact with to
some extent directing [1.03.20] my condo.

Judge: The what?

Defendant: The realtor who seems to be a sort of property manager of sorts
and maybe is the lender to the house, according to Rolando. This
Darlene Sharpe [of Dixon Realty], she was in phone contact with the
Green Action Landscaping crew. And she apparently made some
disparaging marks about the carpet and maybe to the extent that it
made it more difficult for her to rent the next door upstairs
apartment and that your crew it was arrived they just left there or
kind of destroy my property and I called her and I indicated to her
that their

Judge: Alright, well, I guess Im just trying to get the gist of what your
complaint is, all right. And that is the removal of the carpet,
correct?


99
001362
Judge: Thats what youre saying constituted a crime of malicious
destruction of your property, right?

Defendant: The removal and placement in harms way.

Judge: But the crime you are alleging is malicious destruction of property,
right?

Defendant: Well, I chose about six or seven.

Judge: Well, tell me which one it is that you cant choose them today, its
the one youre complaining to the landlord though.

Defendant: I didnt call. I didnt write the landlord that I was a [1.04.45] writing
a charging complaint. I wrote him and I told him the general facts of
the situation. I dont know that the stature requires that I
specifically plea some particular subsection of

Judge: Well, it does require this court to make a finding that there was a
violation of a specific statute that imposes a criminal complaint. So,
if I dont even know what the specific statute is.

Defendant: NRS Im just reading. With respect to the criminal complaint NRS
206.330 seemed fairly on point, NRS 205.270, 206.040.

Judge: Wait, 206., what?

Defendant: 040.

Judge: Now what is your evidence that the landlord evicted you because
you complained about the destruction of your carpet?

Defendant: Well, it seemed as though shortly after he started to assume he
wasnt getting paid rent on the basis that he owed me for property
damage he quickly decided to evict me.

Judge: So you are saying that you didnt pay rent because of the property
damage and therefore he evicted you?

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001363
Defendant: Right, Im not saying that I didnt pay rent in that regard. I had many
other rent deductions that were agreed to in writing or that were
allowed in the statute before I even got into that his liability under
subsection 20 of the lease with regard to property damage done by
his agents or, I dont know if it says employee.

Judge: Alright, sir. I want to move this along, so Ive got that. Whats the
next complaint you have with respect to retaliatory conduct by the
landlord?

Defendant: The next complaint for which Im trying to prove prima facie case
Your Honor is that I did complain about habitability issues, code
[1.07.44] code sections dealing noxious weed ordinances, theres
pictures of the weeds that grew in exhibit 8.

Judge: Well, I think at the last proceeding we established the lease record
that you to maintain the lawn.

Defendant: Well, it says to maintain the lawn and shrubbery however there is
dirt where there would be a lawn. So, I dont know if that means

Judge: No, its not, Im going to rule against you on that so we can move on
because I think thats the tenants responsibility under the lease.

Defendant: It well, he ratified that he was going to pay me to do the weed.
So, in that sense he does a waiver of the lease.

Judge: Waiver of the

Defendant: And the lease is the lease does not mention weeds, Your Honor,
thats a fairly far jump to take from saying Im suppose to maintain
the lawn to Im suppose to prevent any Noxious Weed Ordinance
violations. Thats and further the laws of the take [1.08.45] this
destruction that its to be construed strictly against the drafter Mr.
Dr. Merliss

Judge: Okay, so where in the habitability section does it provide for
noxious weeds?

Defendant: That would be a housing or health code.
101
001364

Plaintiff: Your Honor, I will object to any testimony regarding any violations
of any code that is that requires expert testimony which Coughlin
is not a qualified as an expert. Theres no way we can prove

[UNCLEAR]: I am not [1.09.20]

Judge: Sir, let him state his objection then we can move from there. The
objection is that he is not an expert. Sir, your response.

Defendant: I am an attorney. It involves statutory codes. I looked them up.
They speak to Noxious Weed Ordinances within the Reno City
charter

Judge: Okay. What Im going to do is overrule the objection but you can
present the code but you cant testify as to whether or not it was a
violation, its up to the court to determine. But lets go to 118A.290
because whats covered under habitability is effective
waterproofing, weather protection, plumbing, water supply,
adequate heating, electrical lighting, garbage

Defendant: Your Honor, I just [1.10.40] and I dont know that I didnt complain
to an agency because I think [1:10:46] but this is not about
habitability. This is 118A.510 sub A, this is dealing with a good faith,
complain in good faith of the violation

Judge: Well, you and I want you to talk about habitability.

Defendant: Well, and I have those issues Your Honor but Im not I havent
addressed the good faith violation of building, housing or
healthcare. This sounds very similar.

Judge: Which one is that?

Defendant: Thats 118A.510 sub 1A.

Judge: And I already ruled it. You have to make the complaint to the
government agency.

Defendant: I am not sure whether or not I did. I seem to recall making a call.
102
001365

Judge: No, okay. Well, you seem to recall you dont have any evidence of
that today. And if you seem to recall how would the landlord even
know to evict you because of that, if you dont even know if you
made a complaint, sir?

Defendant: Well, I did write the landlord with respect to the weeds.

Judge: I understand but you didnt come you didnt write the landlord
[1.11.50] complain to this governmental agency about the weeds,
did you?

Defendant: I think he could have inferred that that was a possibility from my
writing.

Judge: Okay. Im not going to do that. So, go on to the next item.

Defendant: I dont just to state an objection, I dont think that the statute says
I have that

Judge: You are arguing with me, you are a witness.

Defendant: None of the court [1.12.12]

Judge: Yeah, just where are the line you are a witness, sir.

Defendant: Yeah.

Judge: Ive given a lot of latitude. You are a witness testifying as to the
facts not arguing the law. So, I tell me what else you have then
today, on the retaliatory of eviction?

Defendant: I believe weve gone over the complaints to the landlord of a
criminal statute. As far as I know there has been no citations issue.
So, section D does not apply. The tenant has instituted or defended
against it. In sub E a judicial or administrative proceeding. I did prior
his filing for eviction say all file retaliatory eviction law said against
you, I think that could be tantamount to instituted a judicial or
administrative proceeding, its allegation demand at what point
does the proceeding began I guess is the question of fact and I, in
103
001366
this regard, prima facie established [1.13.23] Im supposed to have
all issues in fact resolved. I believe in my favor to the extent there
kind of a 50-50, I think its fair and [] summary adjustment make a
prima facie case which its my understanding this is the same []
judgment as [] here. And thats fairly low standard. Its not proved
beyond reasonable doubt too sir.

Judge: Im not asking you for that, I am asking for a articulable defense
that you can tell me precisely what it is in thats subsection (f), well,
Im sorry, subsection (e). The tenant has instituted or defended
against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in
which the tenant raised an issue of compliance with requirements
of this chapter in respect to habitability.

Defendant: Yes, sir. In exhibit 8 on page 28, I point out to Dr. Merliss that hell
be sued for retaliatory eviction. To me that tantamount to
instituting a proceeding whereupon he promptly evicted me or
sought to with the help of

Judge: I thought he already was a victim.

Defendant: No, its not that point. He was still trying to convince me. The
property damage wasnt germane to the issues and that he would
check up on the insurance about it for which he never got back to
me. And kind of just, you know, soft pedaling my complaints out of
the door, I guess, or trying to ignore them away. But at that point I
feel that I was instituting a proceeding by making a litigation
demand and his subsequent conduct in hiring an attorney and
seeking to evict me is just per se classic retaliatory eviction.

Judge: Alright. Anything else, sir?

Defendant: Its not elegant at all. Its the employee goes to the boss and
complains of sexual harassment inspired the next day. Thats
essentially what we had going on here. And to analogize

Judge: We are not to analogize, sir, youre not arguing youre testifying.

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001367
Defendant: Yes, Your Honor. With respect to other bases I deal which
habitability issues and I believe when a tenant invokes the right to
do a rent deduction that is protected. I suppose that

Judge: The statute is quite clear, sir that when we do that it has to be
deposited and rearguing about this but you can appeal that.

Defendant: Your Honor, just to clarify and I know you want me to argue but
there is there is this section in the statute that it says fix it
yourself and theres no depositing going on there.

Judge: Thats a separate section. If but you dont get to deduct five
months of rent for we went through this within the last hearing
the maximum amount you claim was $2,000 something, $2,700.

Defendant: There was about 1,000 missing. My former co-tenant had paid him
approximately $900, I was missing $250 working with the [1:16:53]
in the back stairs was not addressed.

Judge: I included the stairs, sir.

Defendant: Thats the front stairs, Your Honor, the back stairs I had issues
about.

Judge: No I you cant make this up each week I see you. I finalized at the
last hearing I said, is there anything else and you indicated, no.

Defendant: And I filed a motion to correct the judgment [1.17.12] or clarify a
rule 59 motion the following Monday. There is a strong indication []
was going to go on here with Dr. Merliss. Ive got emails wherein
former cotenant, we are all inmates, she took the rent money from
me as was the practice instead of forwarding both our shares on to
Dr. Merliss she forwarded it on against my share and she made
arrangements to pay him later, wherein he ratified that or agreed
to that and apparently will collect that money. This kind [1.17.56]
collection practice argument.

Judge: And sir, were not here about the nonpayment of rent. That was
dropped.

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001368
Defendant: I alleged habitability based on and I think thats where Im getting
confused, Your Honor.

Judge: Habitability is sent out in the statures crystal clear. And

Defendant: Installation, molding installation thats habitability.

Judge: That was one

Defendant: Windows, broken windows.

Judge: Yes.

Defendant: Not only a window thing. Its a safety thing theres [1.18.33] glass.

Judge: I understand that those were alleged. But the question is, were they
repaired, number one. And number two, you were evicted because
of those things.

Defendant: Yes and I think that on the tenure all the youre entitled type
comments and the proximity and time were talking about literally
like a week after Dr. Merliss what I kind of confuse this is

Judge: Are we here to what, sir?

Defendant: Well, its like he finally came back from being out of the country for
three months notice he havent been paid rent. And I dont know if
also knows he had a bunch of emails built up over a year asking him
to fix habitability issues that he never did. And then he paused his
whatever takes up his time and imagine hes busy medical practice
he pause that and turn to me and wanted all his rent. And he didnt
want to fix any of the issues and he wanted it right then and he was
going to evict me if he didnt have like then right away. And thats
retaliatory eviction. [1.19.40] the sections of the statutes 118A that
allowed me to do rent deductions when he

Judge: Sir, where is the 14-day notice? And

Defendant: Exhibit 8, is at the [1.19.52] over

106
001369
Judge: Exhibit 8 what, what page?

Defendant: Theres probably 10 and since this throughout this 15 pages.

Judge: I want to know one.

Defendant: Okay.

Judge: Starting with one.

Defendant: The mold, the installation issue. Starting on page 19 which would be
page 2 [1.20.15].

Judge: Well, were here your saying something about replacing the baths
for $320.

Defendant: Yes, sir. And the pictures Ive submitted and showed on my laptop
at the last hearing and I emailed them to both you and Counsel
Baker today. I caught the pictures.

Judge: Well, did you fix that or not?

Defendant: Yes. After literally I would estimate months of no response from Dr.
Merliss.

Judge: Well, whose is Matt in here?

Defendant: Matt is Dr. Merliss.

Judge: So, you refer to him as Matt?

Defendant: Well, I didnt know he was a doctor until a month ago, Your Honor.

Judge: Alright. Well, anyhow Dr. Merliss and Matt are one and the same?

Defendant: Yes, sir, yeah.

Judge: And this was written on May 14, 2010?

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001370

Judge: So, its hardly retaliatory eviction for something that occurred in
May thats

Defendant: Well, the occurrence of the nonpayment or the rent deduction
didnt occur until very close in time of the retaliatory eviction. At
this point I was still being a good tenant who doesnt to want to
cause ways. I had the cotenant girlfriend who was kind of raised in a
culture where it seems like being docile was kind of a not entitled,
was the more accepted practice

Judge: Alright, you say by

Defendant: Dr. Merliss is belong..

Judge: Well, youre saying this issue had been corrected.

Defendant: Not to me, and it took my time and energy and I hadnt been paid
for it. [1.22.37]

Judge: Okay. So, you are arguing about is an upset against the rent, not a
continued habitability issue, right? I mean, habitability issue was
corrected by yourself and you would have rent for that?

Defendant: Not until

Judge: I know you started with holding rent though.

Defendant: No

Judge: about five months ago.

Defendant: Not to me, I was given the cotenant, I dont know she wasnt paying
them. Yeah, so

Judge: Well, thats not his fault.

Defendant: Well, he didnt he didnt even tell me he wasnt getting rent until
like two to three months gone by without him getting rent. Thats
how I kind of ask him
108
001371

Judge: Did you know the cotenant moved out in July?

Defendant: Yes, I knew she moved out but I knew I pay her for May and June
and July and then Dr. Merliss alerts me, hey, youre however, much
behind in May. And I alerted him hey Ive been sending you 14-day
notices to clear for the last year youve done nothing. Im working
my fingers to the bone around here

Judge: And so, okay.

Defendant: Im not -- just Im not making this up, Your Honor. I didnt start off
this way. I got to my limit, well, I was tired being the handyman. I
was tired being taken away from my law practice. I was tired, you
know, I submit these low-ball estimates to fix things and Dr. Merliss
would scoff at them.

Judge: Alright.

Defendant: Looks like you cant get anybody do anything for $50 Dr. Merliss.
And youre going to, you know, youre going to scoff at my saying,
hell, Ill do this or that for $50, you know?

Judge: Anything else, sir?

Defendant: I believe a retaliatory eviction stem also in part for my asserting
that I was, I guess, accepting I would complain about things like
the broken disposal Dr. Merliss would be in Thailand or somewhere.
He may send me an email and get two estimates, take your time
and effort to go be my property manager, get two estimates and
deduct the cheapest one. Yeah, and then when I do that then all of
a sudden there would be a lot of resistance and then pretty quickly
it was an eviction.

Judge: Alright. So the eviction which occurred in September, right?

Defendant: I believe it was August 22nd was the original.

Judge: Okay, August 22nd was the original eviction?

109
001372
Defendant: Yes, and if you look at the point in which Dr. Merliss comes back to
the country and discovers he hasnt got rent for thats several
months, theres only like a two-week window. From that time well,
he says, hey, I want some rent I think. And I dont want to do any of
these rent deductions and youre not paying me? Boom, youre
evicted, two weeks later.

Judge: So, as I understand at then, you are saying he was unaware that the
rent hadnt been paid?

Defendant: Yes, in my

Judge: How do you know that?

Defendant: Well, my neighbor [Rich Marley], he was discussing our shared
landlord Dr. Merliss, he says yes.

Plaintiff: Objection hearsay.

Judge: Alright. Objection will be sustained but

Defendant: Its my answer to hearsay would be pattern of practice
established.

Plaintiff: Unacceptable.

Judge: The issue though is this, sir, you didnt know the rent wasnt being
paid but how did you know that he didnt know the rent wasnt
being paid?

Defendant: One, he didnt call me up like most of the other landlord say, and
say where the hells my money? Two, the neighbor said, he doesnt
cash the checks for months. [1.26.40] bank account.

Plaintiff: Objection.

Judge: Alright. That will be sustained.

Defendant: Three

110
001373
Judge: Your own personal knowledge.

Defendant: He wrote me an email about it, hey, whats up with this?

Judge: What date was the email?

Defendant: That would be, it looks like August, August 11th and the first
eviction was August 22nd, so it was less than 12 days.

Judge: Well, lets see 12 days.

Defendant: From when it would seem he found out

Judge: Most people evict within five days.

Defendant: Okay, but its not like six months went by for me

Judge: What about where, what date, which page?

Defendant: Page 25, Your Honor.

Judge: Page 25.

Defendant: Yeah, the top of the page the email is still in June, theres one of the
get to estimates emails at that page, line 7. And then starting at
about line 11.

Judge: Wait, wait, slow down, sir.

Defendant: Okay.

Judge: Im at page 25, the top of the page starts off, I took a video/photo
of a jammed but Im too tired to load it to my computer right now.
Is that the page?

Defendant: Yeah. Thats it. That email looks to be from June but

Plaintiff: Im going to object to these emails on the basis that they have been
altered. I have other copies of these and for instance at line 2 of
this page
111
001374

Judge: I'm doubtful if thats a legitimate objection. You can show your
copies.

Plaintiff: Okay. Well, this is not a true and accurate copy of the email.

Judge: Alright. Well, then sir

Defendant: My answer to that objection would be anywhere where there has
been an alteration that was alerted to the reader in the document
itself

Judge: Well, show me precisely the one were talking about because these
are written -- I only see one from a Matt Merliss.

Defendant: Hes Magunda Matt Merliss.

Judge: 8-11-11, according to my records Melissa paid $600 on 5-6.

Defendant: Yeah, counseltaking about.

Judge: That leaves $300 for May, $900 for June, July, and August for a total
of $3,000. Please let me know as soon as possible when this will be
paid. If the payment is marked before 8-18, I will not charge you a
penalty otherwise, I will charge you a penalty for late payment. And
paying a rent does not depend on the alleged damage you
sustained as this is an insurance issue and its not for me. Please
keep up with communication with me and allow workers and
Darlene to enter the house. If communication falls apart, if I dont
receive a check in the timely manner, fashion or if Darlene or
workers are not allowed to enter and help you Im afraid I will have
no choice but to pursue legal recourse. I hope it does not come to
that. If necessary please talk to Melissa and decide how you will
divide the rent.

Defendant: And it will be in five days and attorneys retain until the direct all
communications are [1.29.45]

Judge: Alright.

112
001375
Defendant: That email [1:29:52] on page 31 at the bottom. So, within five days
it went from, hey you owe me some rent, no Im not going to
deduct anything, I dont have to fix anything. Hey youre in Nevada,
that keeps tenants [] over there. I heard thats why I bought houses.

Judge: And you wrote back within one day that no one other than me is to
enter the house.

Defendant: Absent prior notice. Yes, absolutely.

Judge: No, I understand. But it was not a conciliatory tone at all.

Defendant: Well

Judge: Youre blaming him for being

Defendant: The tone of our previous correspondences would suggest that Dr.
Merliss would probably assume that he could just have somebody
walk in my law office.

Judge: Alright.

Defendant: And just quickly for the record, Your Honor, I find it troubling that
Counsel Baker seemingly was aware and didnt care he was
unaware that his client had admitted to receiving $600 in that email
I believe. And Counsel Baker still send me, you know, you owe three
grand in rent notice on August 22nd. [1.31.12], you know. The
duties reasonably diligently investigate before using process and
finally, finally going to the claims.

Judge: So, youre saying you did not owe $3,000 as of August 22nd?

Defendant: No, and there been [INDISCERNIBLE] for the stairs or at least spent
$350 for the weeds and

Judge: Okay. Alright, well

Defendant: and there had been, you know, you cant just take peoples
money and slap some names in pleadings and file them in the court.
113
001376
Youve got to make sure youre not casting [INDISCERNIBLE]
question paper where its not supposed to be [INDISCERNIBLE].

Judge: Anything else, sir? Alright. Cross examination.

Plaintiff: Yes. Mr. Coughlin please turn into your exhibit 8 to page 23.


Plaintiff: Youre with me?

Defendant: Alright.

Plaintiff: I want to look at your email to Dr. Merliss dated 5-24-11, this is the
one we had been discussing, are you there?

Judge: Well, wait a sec. Because getting there now.

Plaintiff: Yes, sir. Page 23.

Judge: I have one page 23, was it?

Plaintiff: Yes, sir, 23.

Judge: Dear Mr. Merliss?

Plaintiff: No. Ah, yes, yes, Dear Mr. Merliss Im writing to let you know

Defendant: Yeah.

Plaintiff: That one. Mr. Coughlin, where in this email which continues on to
the next page, is there any complaint of a violation of a specific
statute that imposes a criminal penalty? Point it out.

Defendant: Well, I dont know, am I an expert to be able to testify that? That
couldnt testify as a housing code as an expert so what next
[INDISCERNIBLE] expert to testifying, yeah.

Plaintiff: Its your email, Im asking where you put the specific statute, where
is it?
114
001377

Defendant: You want me [1.33.22] asking me to say what is tantamount to
something being [INDISCERNIBLE] a reference to a specific statute
and I dont know as just the will [INDISCERNIBLE] Im qualified to
make that that expert testimony.

Plaintiff: You can move to strike the answers with non-responsive and ask
the court to direct the witness to answer the question, please.

Defendant: Objection

Plaintiff: Well, I will direct

Defendant: [INDISCERNIBLE] transparency.

Judge: Sir, I will direct the answer the question is to whether or not this
email in any place refers to a specific criminal statute?

Defendant: I would say in general the email refers to some sort of theft or
property destruction statute.

Plaintiff: The question is, where in the email is the specific criminal statute
reference?

Defendant: Its within the body of the text of the email. You might not be get an
answer you want but you got an answer.

Plaintiff: Okay. And what statute are you referring to in this email?

Defendant: I think that would call for an expert. I dont feel qualified to
interpret the law.

Plaintiff: There is no reference to any statute in this email, is there Mr.
Coughlin?

Defendant: Objection leading the witness [1.34.52] you can do that.

Judge: Well, I will find as a matter of fact that there is no reference to any
statute. You dont need to ask him that.

115
001378
Defendant: I will just submit that I think very strongly.

Judge: Well

Defendant: [1.35.05]

Judge: There is no statute there, sir. Ive read the whole email.

Defendant: At what are you referring do we have to have a specific
statutory

Judge: Well, no, the question was whether or not there was a

Defendant: nobody can do that. No process can do that.

Judge: I didnt ask you, sir, whether you have to have a statute, the email
does not contain a statute then I find that as a matter of fact.

Defendant: I dont know what contain a statute means if it contains a

Judge: Refers to NRS

Defendant: Time stamp [1.35.42]

Judge: Sir, youre out of order so, go ahead.

Plaintiff: Thank you, sir. Mr. Coughlin, we discussed NRS 118A.510 sub E, do
you remember that? Just a moment ago that has to do with
instituting or defending against the judicial or administrative
proceeding, do you remember that?

Defendant: Somewhat.

Plaintiff: Okay. That was only two minutes ago. Do you remember it?

Defendant: Somewhat.

Plaintiff: Is it your testimony that threatening to sue somebody is the same
as instituting or defending against a judicial or administrative
proceeding or arbitration?
116
001379

Defendant: If I I said something about making up or sending out litigation
demand notice, a letter, might be deem tantamount to instituting.

Plaintiff: Okay. Prior to August 22, 2011 did you file any lawsuit against Matt
Merliss?

Defendant: I dont feel qualified to testify the expert [INDISCERNIBLE].

Plaintiff: Your Honor.

Judge: Well, his answer is no.

Plaintiff: Okay.

Judge: I mean essentially, I mean if he doesnt know if he filed a lawsuit, he
didnt file a lawsuit.

Defendant: If earlier I couldnt testify as [1.37.12]

Judge: I didnt say you couldnt, I always said was you cannot give an
opinion as to a legal opinion. Thats up to the court. I said that you
can testify as to the facts, its a fact whether or not you file a
lawsuit, sir. Its not an opinion you did


Judge: Huh?

Plaintiff: intimately [INDISCERNIBLE] at that circumstance.

Judge: Okay. But Im not going to play games with you. If you cannot
testify you filed a lawsuit then Im going to find you did not. Alright?

Defendant: I didnt understand the question be file a lawsuit, I tried to say
institute he borrowed the language from the statute, instituting an
action.

Judge: I thought you said file a lawsuit.

117
001380
Plaintiff: I did, Your Honor. [1.37.55] in a follow-up question.

Defendant: You said prior to that.

Plaintiff: Prior to August 22nd, did you file any lawsuit against Dr. Merliss,
Matt Merliss? Yes or no?

Defendant: I have to look up what that means.

Plaintiff: Did you recall filing any lawsuit prior August 22nd against Matt
Merliss?

Defendant: I need to know what it means to file a lawsuit.

Plaintiff: Youre a lawyer, you dont know what it means to file a lawsuit?

Defendant: You dont think I know what Weed Ordinanc means, so.

Judge: The court did not sustain that objection, sir, but I said that if it was a
Weed Ordinance Violation you could testify to that, it was not that
you couldnt testify. It was you could not give an expert opinion as
to whether or not there had been a violation of a noxious weed
ordinance thats all.

Defendant: Alright. Your Honor [1.39.05]

Plaintiff: Mr. Coughlin, is it your testimony that because Dr. Merliss did not
immediately began eviction proceedings when you stopped paying
rent after May that that somehow makes this eviction retaliatory?

Defendant: I dont know that I stopped paying rent after I paid rent for May and
June.

Plaintiff: Okay, and you have [1.39.45]?

Defendant: Yes.

Plaintiff: Okay. Thats it.

118
001381
Defendant: You had read the if you read the discovery that was [1.39.50] goes
into that. So, I know you like to [INDISCERNIBLE] but I would just
invite you to do diligent inquiry by reading the discovery
propounded to you in fulfillment of your Rule 11 [INDISCERNIBLE]
to the court in a legal profession.

Plaintiff: Okay. Did you provide in cash or checks, for rent paid?

Defendant: I dont recall.

Plaintiff: You cannot recall whether you provide him with cash or checks?

Defendant: That was is that your new question because I didnt know

Plaintiff: Do you recall providing any cash or checks and you discovered that
you just referenced for any rent that you paid?


Plaintiff: Who did you [profound] that discovery to?

Defendant: Im confused as to whether youre saying that [INDISCERNIBLE]
checks you had proof of that or it doesnt seem like thats what
your second question whether this, did I give you. Well, I gave I
could [type] emails wherein your client and my former cotenant
both may what might be deemed [INDISCERNIBLE] against interest
with respect to having, you know, one [INDISCERNIBLE] he clearly
seems to accept her statement that she paid or I think he made a
statement that he received

Plaintiff: Im going to [INDISCERNIBLE] the answer Your Honor unbelievably
unresponsive. I guess at this point I dont have any further cross
examination questions.

Judge: Do you have any responsive statements, sir, testimony?


Judge: And its got to be limited to what you were asked about alright?

119
001382
Defendant: Okay. And on page 26 there was a

Judge: Page 26 of what?

Defendant: The email exhibit, exhibit 8.

Judge: Alright.

Defendant: And just to put into the record there is a exhibit photographs.

Judge: Alright. Im going to admit all of your exhibits, sir.

Defendant: Okay.

Judge: 1 through 9. So, youll have them in the record.

Defendant: And 9 is a motion I found from Nevada Legal Services attorney
named [INDISCERNIBLE] who wrote what seems to be a fairly a debt
motion covering 40.253 sub 6 which we discussed this morning
wherein it was suggested that upon a prima facie finding the court
must make no further order i.e., no rent escrow i.e., Las Vegas Rule
44 [INDISCERNIBLE].

Judge: Well, I agree with your rule 44 is not in play here.

Defendant: Your Honor, if I might just ask for some clarification and what allows
her for essentially requiring me to put an escrow [1.42.52]

Judge: The statute specifically requires it. It says, shall. It doesnt say
may, it says shall, sir.

Defendant: What statute, Your Honor?

Judge: The same statute youre talking about that requires the adoption
of

Plaintiff: 118A.355 sub 5, Your Honor.

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001383
Defendant: Thats thats not talking about a summary proceeding. Thats
talking about prior to that for some [INDISCERNIBLE] pass that.
Were in the summary proceeding at this point.

Judge: Sir, the statute allows in any case that you cannot defend the
action. Ill read it to you.

Defendant: What would be required if rule 44 in Las Vegas if the stature allow
that? [INDISCERNIBLE 1.43.40] section.

Judge: The statute requires that the rule be adopted. The section that
youre referring to is subsection and I dont know why Im arguing
law with you when youre being a witness either. So, but it says,
justice courts shall establish by local rule a mechanism by which
tenants may deposit rent withheld under paragraph (d) of
subsection 1 into an escrow account maintained or approved by the
court. A defendant does not have a defense to an eviction under
paragraph (d) of subsection 1 unless the tenant has deposited the
withheld rent into an escrow account. It doesnt say with the court.
And we do have, not in the local rule, but we do have and have at
the judges meeting adopted a process to enable tenants to deposit
the rent in escrow with the court. Because prior to that tenants
were unable to deposit their rent because they couldnt establish
an escrow account and they were coming to us. Now, if you wanted
to transfer your money to a different escrow account I have no
problem with that but its going to have to be with the Western
Title or some company like that...

Defendant: Does the Supreme Court

Judge: hold your money.

Defendant: Does the Supreme Court have to set accept those rules before the
justice court can [1.45.17]

Judge: No. If you read that statute, sir, it doesnt require that the escrow
be with the court. It does require the court to establish a local rule,
a mechanism by which tenants may deposit rent. And we did do
that, sir.

121
001384
Defendant: Im just thinking that rule 83 of the Justice Court Rules of Nevada
within it states any rules are made by any Justice Court shall upon a
[1.45.52] be furnished to the Supreme Court but shall not become
effective until or after approval by the Supreme Court in that
allegation.

Judge: Im not allowing you with this, sir. Youre right. But that has nothing
to do with todays proceeding. It has to do with the fact that it says
in that statute the same statute that

Defendant: Is that

Judge: the tenant does not have a defense to an eviction unless you
deposit that rent.

Defendant: Im

Judge: Im not going to argue with you anymore, sir.

Defendant: Im just trying see what in that numerical section of the stature. Is
that something like 355 the

Judge: Its the statute here were referring to. 118A.355 subsection 5, the
same

Defendant: 355, okay.

Judge: The same section youre referring to. Its a separate sentence.

Defendant: I refer to 253 sub 6. To me 355 is long gone. Its not per summary
proceeding.

Judge: Sir, you are defending this action right?

Defendant: Thats in the remedy section, there is a summary proceeding rule
section.

Judge: Alright.

Defendant: So, I dont know that the remedy section is applicable [1.47.10]
122
001385

Judge: Okay. Im not going to argue law with you anymore. Were done
with the argument. Do you have any other testimony, sir? You can
argue the law at the end there after you done testifying.

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor, just a quick [1.47.33] but can I just make sure will I
be able to cross exam Dr. Merliss here, sir?

Judge: Cross exam him. You did cross exam him.

Defendant: I believe it was limited [INDISCERNIBLE].

Judge: Well, you can call him in your case in chief.

Defendant: Yes.

Judge: But you havent even finished your testimony, sir.

Defendant: Okay. Well, Ill quickly do that and then if I could call Dr. Merliss.

Judge: Youll be able to, sir. But you need to finish your testimony.

Defendant: Yes, sir. Ill do that expeditiously here, Your Honor. To from my
point of view

Judge: No, sir, were talking about factual testimony, your point of view is
irrelevant. I want to hear your testimony.

Defendant: Dr. Merliss retaliated against me. I made complaints that I think are
protected by law in short order eviction proceedings were
undertaken by Dr. Merliss, [1.48.42] was hired.

Judge: Which eviction proceedings are you talking about? The one for
nonpayment of rent?

Defendant: All of them. The August 22nd original filing this, the August 16th
letter from the email from Dr. Merliss directing the contact the
law officer Richard [1.49.00] for further communications. Dr.
Merliss, I believe on several occasions referred to me in disparaging
terms, he says he is entitled and he I think he called me malignant
123
001386
in meddling at some point and, and just some other things that kind
of made me feel like I was being discriminated against for being a
white man and maybe for being an American too. Like, he kind of
prefer being with docile workers who worked under the table
maybe didnt have to pay taxes and did get many bad talk, didnt
have rights and all those crazy things that, you know, so I feel like
fair housing violation was going on. And some sex discrimination
with respect to, seemed like Darlene Sharpe could, you know,
negligently send a crew of six guys out to do the same job Dr.
Merliss had paid another guy to do and it all kind of crashed
together and Darlene Sharpe still part of the enterprise with Dr.
Merliss so far as I can tell. So, just seem like I was kind of the one
who is going to be held accountable for anything that went wrong.
And seem like a fairly strong evidence to discriminatory practice.
The I I learned Dr. Merliss on numerous occasions of problems
with the wood landing above the steps that had crumbled which
have these kind of great strip tape things on top of the wood that
were peeling, kind of creating a safety hazard wherein one, you
know, coming up or down the steps could trip or slip [1.51.07]. That
wasnt addressed. The stairs in the back of the house were also
having significant issues, that wasnt addressed despite written
request. Its not as though Ive alerted this court to every little thing
that went wrong or all that hours and hours of work I did. For
instance, one time the washing machine got a table mat stuck in
one of its interior drainage parts and it wasnt draining and Dr.
Merliss sent Antonio out. Antonio spoke little to no English and in
assessing the situation attempting to troubleshoot it he flooded the
kitchen.

Plaintiff: Your Honor, may I please [1.52.00] objection for the record. The
court was previously asked Mr. Coughlin for the entire universal
habitability type issues that he wants to address. The court can find
his testimony to those things. Hes just rambling about things that
he admits he hasnt brought up before. I just want to put my
objection on the record to any testimony about this stuff.

Judge: Sir, Im going to sustain that objection. I have listed those items at
the outset of this hearing. You said you understood clearly what
they were and

124
001387
Defendant: That incident

Judge: A washing machine was not on that list, sir.

Defendant: You read my pleadings. Its not Im going to ask him for rent, its
going to my credibility [INDISCERNIBLE] Im not a problem tenant
who wants that little thing. Ive done things to save his floors. I got
up four fence and lifted the carpets and the pad to make sure that
they dry when Antonio flooded that

Plaintiff: Same objection.

Defendant: in the kitchen. I got [1.53.00] and cleaned it up.

Judge: Objection sustained, sir.


Judge: Anything else?

Defendant: I dont think so, Your Honor, thank you.

Judge: Alright. Any further cross examination?

Plaintiff: Well, before I do, Your Honor. Did I hear Mr. Coughlin attempt to
admit exhibit 9, some motion from some other case, I would object
to that as irrelevant.

Judge: Im allowing it in.

Plaintiff: Okay.

Judge: But your objection is overruled.


Judge: Anything else, Mr. Coughlin?

Defendant: Yes, sir. [1.53.44] if I may just quickly

125
001388
Judge: No. About he had a question. Im sorry.

Plaintiff: Im still on the cross.

Judge: Youre on the cross.

Plaintiff: May I have these marked, Your Honor.

Judge: Yes.

Plaintiff: [INDISCERNIBLE 1.55.02] been marked as exhibit G, for investigation
excuse me, for identification purposes. Take a second and look at
that, please.

Defendant: I dont recognize that at all.

Plaintiff: Really? Lets turn to second page.

Defendant: Let me correct myself.

Plaintiff: Well, theres not a question pending so. You want to
[INDISCERNIBLE] for a second? Turn to the second page.

Defendant: I might recognize the thing about at being black

Plaintiff: Still no question pending.

Defendant: I thought you said, do you recognize this?

Plaintiff: Turn to second page, please. What appears to be an email from you
to MrMerlissMagunda@aol.com dated June 2, 2011 at the bottom
of that page, do you see that?

Defendant: Yes.

Plaintiff: The subject line is, garbage disposal jammed, is that right?

Defendant: Um-hmm.

Plaintiff: Okay. This is an email from you to Matt Merliss, is that right?
126
001389

Defendant: I dont know.

Plaintiff: You dont know?

Defendant: Well, I mean you can be something and I dont know what you
downloaded.

Plaintiff: Okay.

Judge: Well, I believe this same email is contained in exhibit 8.

Plaintiff: Yes, sir. In exhibit 8 page starting at the bottom of page 24 you
have exhibit 8 [INDISCERNIBLE 1.56.40]

Defendant: Page 24.

Judge: Which page?

Plaintiff: 24, sir. At the bottom of exhibit 8, page 24.

Defendant: Yeah. [1.56.55] settlement negotiation for [INDISCERNIBLE] or
something like that?

Plaintiff: Okay. Well lets just take a look at it, alright? Lets go to the bottom
of page 24 of exhibit 8. And the emails starts out, the garbage
disposal is jammed. Do you see that?

Defendant: Um-hmm.

Plaintiff: Is that a yes?

Defendant: On page 24 of 8.

Plaintiff: Yes.

Defendant: Yeah.

Plaintiff: I want you to go to the fourth line of that email, its actually on
page 25, the following page.
127
001390

Defendant: Um-hmm.

Plaintiff: At the very end of that line theres a sentence that starts with the
word i, do you see that? Do you see the word I?

Defendant: Your exhibit or my exhibit?

Plaintiff: Page 25 of exhibit 8.

Defendant: Um-hmm.

Plaintiff: Here.

Defendant: Objection, Your Honor. This is a badgering call as Mr

Judge: Thats overruled. Overruled.

Defendant: I find it, its just here.

Plaintiff: That sentence reads, I can have the crumbling places patched for
$..., otherwise I would like to fix this it is dangerous given one can
trip on the stairs. Did I read that correctly?

Defendant: From 8, it sounds like you did.

Plaintiff: Okay. Now lets go back to exhibit G.

Defendant: Are you referring to the settlement negotiation reduction?

Plaintiff: Im referring to your email. Please go back to exhibit G.

Defendant: Where some some figures were darkened for purposes of not
putting settlement negotiations [1.58.35], is that what youre
referring to?

Plaintiff: You know what Im referring to.

Defendant: I dont know, Im asking you.

128
001391
Judge: Well, the court will take notice that the $25 and the $75 have been
eliminated.

Plaintiff: Yes, sir. Thank you. The $75 offer by Mr. Coughlin to fix the stairs
which hes now claiming for $1,250 has been redacted by Mr.
Coughlin thats all Im trying to savage here.

Judge: I didnt say settlement offer. I just said its been redacted.

Plaintiff: Its not settlement offer.

Defendant: So, now you submitted a settlement offer into the record?

Plaintiff: [1.59.12] No sir, this is a demand for some sort of notification.
Thats all I have, Your Honor.

Judge: Alright. Its not a settlement offer, sir. Its no litigation pending at
the time this was written, so, anything else? Okay, did you want to
call another witness, sirs or we can

Defendant: If I can call Dr. Merliss, Your Honor.

Judge: Alright.

Plaintiff: Can I take a few seconds?

Judge: Yeah.

Plaintiff Just to go to the bathroom, please.

Judge: Sure.

Plaintiff: Your Honor, thank you.

Judge: Take a five minute recess.
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1
1 CODE: 4185
LORI URMSTON, CCR #51
2 Peggy Hoogs & Associates
435 Marsh Avenue
3 Reno, Nevada 89509
(775) 327-4460
4 Court Reporter
5
6 SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
7 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
8 HONORABLE STEVEN P. ELLIOTT, DISTRICT JUDGE
9
10 STATE OF NEVADA,

11 Plaintiff,
Case No. CR12-0376
12 vs.
Dept. No. 10
13 ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN,

14 Defendant.
_____________________________/
15

16 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

17 REPORT - PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION
18 APRIL 19, 2012; THURSDAY
19 RENO, NEVADA
20
21
22
23
24 Reported by: LORI URMSTON, CCR #51
F I L E D
Electronically
05-09-2012:09:42:24 AM
Clerk of the Court
001557
2
1 APPEARANCES:
2 For the Plaintiff: ZACH YOUNG
Deputy District Attorney
3 1 South Sierra Street
South Tower, 4th Floor
4 P.O. Box 30083
Reno, Nevada 89520
5

6 For the Defendant: BIRAY DOGAN
Deputy Public Defender
7 350 S. Center Street
P.O. Box 30083
8 Reno, Nevada 89520
9
10 For the Department of
Parole & Probation: GAIL FALCONER
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
001558
3
1 RENO, NEVADA; THURSDAY, APRIL 19, 2012; 10:20 A.M.
2 --o0o--
3 THE COURT: And then the last thing we're going to
4 take before a recess will be the Zachary Coughlin.
5 MR. YOUNG: Good morning, Your Honor.
6 MR. DOGAN: Your Honor, Biray Dogan on behalf of
7 Mr. Coughlin who is present today and out of custody.
8 THE DEFENDANT: Good morning, Your Honor.
9 THE COURT: All right. Then this matter is here on
10 a report of psychiatric evaluation. There is a letter
11 here from Sally Farmer and Bill Davis. And have you
12 received this, Mr. Dogan?
13 MR. DOGAN: Your Honor, can I have the Court's
14 indulgence?
15 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, can we approach?
16 THE COURT: Yes.
17 (A discussion was held off the record.)
18 THE COURT: Well, as a result of the hearing here
19 at the bench, the Coughlin matter will be continued to
20 the end of our docket so that we can take a recess now.
21 And the end of the docket means that it would be after
22 the 10 o'clock matter, because it's already 25 after
23 10:00 or so, and we need to get on with another matter
24 in that we have a lot of people here.
001559
4
1 All right. So court will stand in recess.
2 (A recess was taken and the following
proceedings were had at 10:45 a.m.:)
3
4 THE COURT: As our next case then, we'll go back to
5 the 8:30 docket, and let's take Zachary Coughlin again.
6 Let's see if we can conclude that matter.
7 MR. YOUNG: Good morning, Your Honor.
8 THE DEFENDANT: Good morning, Your Honor.
9 THE COURT: And then we're here to discuss the
10 letter of April 17 that was sent out really to
11 Mr. Dogan with copies to me and Mr. Young from Sally
12 Farmer and Bill Davis who are psychologists at the
13 Lakes Crossing Center.
14 And, Mr. Dogan, do you want to explain this?
15 MR. DOGAN: Yes, Your Honor.
16 THE DEFENDANT: I'm sorry, Your Honor, if I can
17 interject quickly.
18 THE COURT: I'm asking Mr. Dogan to start.
19 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, but before he puts
20 anything on the record, I'm going to ask to have him
21 withdrawn or--
22 MR. DOGAN: That would be a separate matter.
23 THE COURT: I'll go with Mr. Dogan.
24 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor.
001560
5
1 MR. DOGAN: Your Honor, if any issues are raised
2 regarding a motion to withdraw or anything dealing with
3 my representation of Mr. Coughlin, that would be a
4 separate hearing. That hearing will be under Young
5 versus State. Today we are here for one matter, and
6 that is the SB89 regarding my client's competency and
7 whether he's fit to proceed with adjudication.
8 Your Honor, I'm going to be requesting a short
9 two-week continuance in this case so that my client can
10 be evaluated by Lakes Crossing, by both Sally Farmer
11 and Dr. Davis.
12 My client has done all he can do to make his
13 scheduled appointments with both of the doctors in this
14 matter. And there have been some significant
15 difficulties with Mr. Coughlin being evaluated by both
16 of those doctors. However, I believe those
17 difficulties will be able to-- we'll iron them out and
18 we'll be able to get that competency evaluation for the
19 Court within two weeks.
20 THE COURT: So you're in essence telling me that
21 you believe at this point in time that your client is
22 willing to cooperate with an evaluator?
23 MR. DOGAN: I do, Your Honor. Your Honor, the
24 reason is because the Court has never-- we've never
001561
6
1 appeared in court. And if Your Honor orders
2 Mr. Coughlin to cooperate and to obtain the
3 evaluations, by then we should be able to have those
4 evaluations for Court.
5 The one thing that I want to prevent in this case
6 is Mr. Coughlin being remanded into the custody of the
7 Washoe County Sheriff so that he can be evaluated while
8 he's at the Washoe County Jail. That's a huge concern
9 of mine. And I do not want Mr. Coughlin to be remanded
10 to the custody of the Sheriff.
11 Your Honor, the main reason is because Mr. Coughlin
12 is a licensed attorney. He does have clients and he's
13 representing those clients. If he is remanded into the
14 custody of the Sheriff, he will not be able to pursue
15 the litigation that he must while representing those
16 individuals, and his livelihood-- it will significantly
17 impact his livelihood. And, therefore, I'm going to
18 make that request, that this matter be continued
19 briefly for two weeks, Your Honor.
20 THE COURT: Well, clearly if he's not going to
21 cooperate out of custody, putting him into custody, you
22 know, and forcibly cooperating is the alternative, so
23 it has to be considered.
24 And, Mr. Young, what is the State's position?
001562
7
1 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I think Mr. Dogan
2 accurately stated that essentially your two
3 alternatives at this point are just to continue the
4 matter out a few weeks to give Mr. Coughlin an
5 opportunity to be evaluated or alternatively remand him
6 into custody where, as you stated, it would more or
7 less seek to-- that the evaluations take place.
8 I'm going to respectfully ask that you follow the
9 latter of those two alternatives. And if I could take
10 a minute to explain why I'm making that recommendation.
11 He was released for this case on a 1,500-dollar
12 bond that he posted. And obviously, one of the
13 conditions of somebody being released, whether it's
14 bond, OR or otherwise, is conditioned upon that
15 individual's good behavior. And what we have here is
16 an individual who-- The competency evaluation was
17 filed in Justice Court February 27th. The matter was
18 set to my knowledge for April 3rd in front of Your
19 Honor for the evaluation.
20 There was the request, albeit done by e-mail by
21 Mr. Coughlin in his personal capacity, but after
22 speaking with the court staff and Mr. Dogan, I agreed
23 to continue that out to give Mr. Coughlin the
24 opportunity to get his evaluations done.
001563
8
1 We then go forward to today. And Your Honor has
2 already referenced the letter which talks about
3 threatening legal action against one of the evaluators,
4 showing up late to the scheduled appointment, taking
5 additional time to--
6 THE DEFENDANT: Object, Your Honor; hearsay.
7 THE COURT: Overruled.
8 THE DEFENDANT: Move to strike.
9 THE COURT: You're not in a position to object to
10 anything.
11 THE DEFENDANT: I understand that, Your Honor.
12 Respectfully, I submit that rather than having
13 handcuffs on me, by having Mr. Dogan as my attorney, I
14 would ask that I be allowed to represent myself.
15 THE COURT: You're in a position where, you know,
16 if you interrupt and cause trouble, you're going to be
17 taken into custody and then forcibly, you know, given
18 these evaluations, so if I were you, I would simply
19 cooperate with us and don't cause a problem.
20 All right. Mr. Young, you may proceed.
21 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, after showing up 20 minutes
22 late according to the letter, which is on file with the
23 court, he takes an additional ten minutes arguing with
24 security personnel and basically being completely
001564
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1 disruptive to the process.
2 The ironic thing about this is that this evaluation
3 is entirely for Mr. Coughlin's benefit. The threshold
4 question is: Is he competent to stand trial? But even
5 if he's-- if the evaluations come back that he is
6 competent, his attorney can use that to his benefit
7 with what's contained in the evaluations for any
8 potential negotiation purposes, sentencing, should we
9 get to that point, and the like.
10 And so through the actions of the defendant, not to
11 mention his previous statements that, one, he doesn't
12 even want to get evaluated for competency, and then
13 subsequent to that having a problem having Lakes
14 Crossing do that, at a minimum, his actions are not
15 evidencing good character as is required by his bail
16 being posted. At worst, it's completely
17 obstructionist.
18 And he is in the sole position to bring this entire
19 proceeding to a screeching halt if he continues this
20 behavior, showing up late, not cooperating with going
21 through evaluations which benefit him.
22 So based on that, Your Honor, what I would ask is
23 that you revoke the bond that was previously posted and
24 remand him into custody. We can set this for another
001565
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1 hearing consistent with the Court's calendar and the
2 evaluators at Lakes Crossing so that we can come back
3 to Your Honor and determine, which is the only
4 threshold question at this point, is he even competent
5 to go forward.
6 And, like I say, based on the actions in this case,
7 the correspondence sent to me, either cc'd or directly
8 from Mr. Coughlin, it's clear to the State that he's
9 just being an obstructionist through this entire
10 process, and so remand is appropriate to the State.
11 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Coughlin, we are at this
12 stage where you need to have this evaluation. And I
13 need to know, are you going to cooperate and go over to
14 Lakes Crossing and get the evaluation?
15 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, if I may address that
16 for a moment.
17 THE COURT: Please do.
18 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Your Honor, there's been
19 some problems in terms of working with Mr. Dogan here.
20 I haven't been copied on filings to the Court. It's
21 always been my understanding, either by Mr. Dogan or by
22 the D.A., it's always been my understanding as an
23 attorney that that's just a matter of course, you copy
24 your clients on anything you file and anything you
001566
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1 receive.
2 Mr. Bosler, after I had complained of Mr. Dogan's
3 failure to so copy me in that regard, particularly with
4 respect to, say, this order for competency eval--
5 MR. DOGAN: For the record, that was provided to
6 Mr. Coughlin.
7 THE DEFENDANT: He might have e-mailed that to me,
8 but certainly documents such as the D.A.'s opposition
9 to my motion to appear as co-counsel and have
10 Mr. Dogan, I believe, withdraw as counsel, that was
11 never forwarded on to me despite my--
12 MR. DOGAN: For the record, that was also provided
13 to Mr. Coughlin.
14 THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me, sir. I would like to
15 have my opportunity now.
16 THE COURT: Go ahead.
17 THE DEFENDANT: I have provided Mr. Dogan express
18 written indication that I wish to be copied on every
19 single filing in this matter. In addition, matters
20 which perhaps are going to be subject to a work product
21 exception which the Public Defender would not have to
22 provide me, such as e-mails between Mr. Dogan and
23 Mr. Young, but I have expressly indicated in writing on
24 numerous times that I wished to be copied on that.
001567
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1 To get back-- I know this is getting somewhat far
2 afield, Your Honor, from what you prompted me to
3 address, but this competency evaluation, I would object
4 to this competency evaluation on a number of grounds.
5 One would be res judicata. There was already a
6 competency evaluation done. I passed with flying
7 colors.
8 Judge Sferrazza thought so much it that he
9 essentially folded it up into a paper airplane and went
10 like that (indicating) and sent it right back to
11 Mr. Goodnight, and the bill along with it. Whereupon
12 Mr. Goodnight promptly-- He's a Public Defender who
13 attended to the first competency evaluation.
14 Mr. Goodnight promptly asked to be allowed to withdraw.
15 And Judge Sferrazza sagely pointed out to
16 Mr. Goodnight the inequity and disingenuous of his so
17 standing behind a request for a competency evaluation
18 only to immediately thereafter seek to withdraw,
19 essentially saying: Which is it, Mr. Goodnight? Does
20 your client need a competency eval or is he so-- he
21 doesn't need you?
22 Your Honor, there's some legal points I would like
23 to put in the record here. NRS 178, I believe it's dot
24 455, but I could be wrong, but I did copy Mr. Dogan and
001568
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1 Mr. Young on this recently in writing, says that
2 motions have to be in writing. There was no written
3 motion in this regard. I've reviewed the file in the
4 Reno Justice Court. And this is the case with both of
5 the competency evaluations that have been ordered here.
6 And both of them, I believe, demonstrate a retaliatory
7 intent on the part of the Public Defender.
8 And Mr. Hunt who was testifying here earlier, well,
9 he went into matters to which I can't-- I can't say--
10 I know Mr. Dogan. We went to high school together.
11 We're both Reno High, I believe, class of '95-ish, from
12 Swope to Reno High. And I've never known him to be a
13 Jihadist or anything or that sort. You know--
14 MR. DOGAN: A Jihadist for the Public Defender,
15 though.
16 THE DEFENDANT: He's always been a bright guy with,
17 you know, a good sense of humor. So I can't concur
18 with Mr. Hunt's statements in that regard.
19 Now, respectfully, I can submit I've been shushed.
20 I've been told, you know, things similar to what was
21 being said.
22 I understand that the Public Defender is in a very
23 funny situation. It's a very-- It's got to be very
24 difficult. And I'll just say respectfully, Your Honor,
001569
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1 I was a domestic violence attorney for a legal aid
2 organization which I believe you're aware of attendant
3 to another case in your court, but I thought that stuff
4 was heavy to deal with on an emotional level. But
5 sitting here this morning, witnessing what the bench
6 and the Public Defender and the District Attorney have
7 to deal with, that they have to do in the course of
8 their business every day, it's-- I don't want to say
9 impressive, but it makes me have even more respect for
10 the court and the Public Defender and the District
11 Attorney, because these are heavy matters. These are
12 very human issues that you deal with here.
13 And I say that respectfully. Now I'm going to get
14 to what I wanted to say, which is somewhat critical.
15 And I just prefaced it with that respect, to point out
16 that I do even more so now comprehend the enormity of
17 the-- the heaviness and the emotional burden that you
18 and those at the bar here face every day.
19 But I have been shushed a lot. I've had Mr. Dogan
20 storm away from me. Granted, it's not easy to have an
21 attorney as a client.
22 THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin, you know, I have limited
23 time today to devote to this matter, and really what
24 you are facing is that I agree that you need this
001570
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1 evaluation, I want to see it, and either you agree that
2 you'll cooperate and go over to Lakes Crossing and get
3 the two evaluations or I will revoke your bail, put you
4 into custody and then as an in-custody you will be
5 evaluated.
6 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. And just quickly
7 for the record, I'll dispense with the frilly language
8 and extemporaneous, you know, speechmaking, but there
9 was no motion here made pursuant to 178, I believe dot
10 455. There needs to be in the records with the Justice
11 Court articulating an express basis for seeking this.
12 I believe there's a retaliatory basis.
13 Just days prior to this being made, and I believe
14 improper contact being made with the Municipal Court by
15 somebody with the Public Defender's, just days prior to
16 that, I filed a motion critical of Mr. Dogan missing a
17 hearing. In that regard, I believe there also needs to
18 be a hearing. There was no hearing in either of these
19 matters.
20 THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin, are you basically telling
21 me that you're not intending to get the evaluation,
22 that you're resisting--
23 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, that's not what I'm
24 telling you. I'm saying--
001571
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1 THE COURT: Because if you're not going to do it on
2 your own, I'll put you in custody and we'll take care
3 of it that way.
4 THE DEFENDANT: I understand, Your Honor. And
5 that's not what I'm saying. What I'm saying is-- You
6 referenced this process. I believe if we're going to
7 call it a process, it needs to entail some process,
8 some due process hopefully.
9 And if I ask Mr. Dogan to conduct some Legal
10 research on-- which I have done, Your Honor, and I
11 would like to put forth some of these cases to you,
12 directed to the parameters of such competency
13 evaluation, directed to the privacy rights attendant to
14 one forced to undergo such an evaluation. I've simply
15 received no counsel or no advocacy in this regard from
16 the Public Defender. I've had meetings missed. I've
17 been told to shush. I've been told all sorts of things
18 that just frankly I'm taken aback by.
19 This evaluation, we have no idea of the scope of
20 this other than I'm given some indication by the
21 statute what it is directed to, my ability to
22 understand the proceedings, to assist Mr. Dogan in the
23 defense thereof. And there's one more element which
24 I'm blanking on right now, but it's substantially
001572
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1 similar to the first one.
2 It's not a-- it's not a blank check to
3 psychiatrists who have some sort of requirement
4 contract with the Public Defender, and I stated some--
5 or the court. I've stated some objections. I believe
6 I should be able to have a private psychologist
7 appropriately certified under NRS 178 to perform this.
8 I've been told no. I've been told I won't be
9 reimbursed in that regard.
10 But it's not a blank check, I don't believe, to
11 force me, someone who is seeking to take advantage of
12 my tax dollars at work by having my Sixth Amendment
13 right to counsel accorded to me. It's not a blank
14 check to Lakes Crossing to demand anything they want to
15 know about me, particularly when I'm involved in a
16 field where mendacious and scurrilous individuals such
17 as Richard G. Hill will co-op any sort of information
18 or innuendo--
19 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I'm going to object to this
20 as completely irrelevant.
21 THE DEFENDANT: --to further their ends.
22 THE COURT: I have to agree.
23 Mr. Coughlin, if you're telling me fundamentally
24 that you don't plan to cooperate, I'll revoke your bail
001573
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1 and put you into custody of the Washoe County Sheriff
2 and then they can get you, you know, the evaluations as
3 an in-custody person. That's what I would have to do.
4 You know, you are a very articulate man and, you
5 know, you're stating your positions on this, but your
6 positions are against what I want done.
7 THE DEFENDANT: I don't know what you want done,
8 Your Honor.
9 THE COURT: I just want you to get the two
10 evaluations at Lakes Crossing. They're the people that
11 normally do this for everybody, you know, and--
12 THE DEFENDANT: And I presented--
13 THE COURT: --that's the appropriate thing to have
14 done at this time.
15 THE DEFENDANT: And I presented twice in that
16 regard, Your Honor, and it's my understanding they just
17 flat out refuse to continue. In that regard, I believe
18 I should-- One, I dispute the accuracy of their letter
19 wholeheartedly. I find it inaccurate, I find it
20 retaliatory in tone. But I did present-- And there's
21 a case--
22 THE COURT: Well, I've never seen a letter like
23 this before. I mean, people just don't show up, that's
24 true, but once they show up, they generally, you know,
001574
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1 cooperate with the talking and taking whatever testing
2 needs to be done and get the evaluation. It's not a
3 very painful process.
4 THE DEFENDANT: And I was told-- Maybe not for
5 people who aren't very aware of constitutional rights.
6 But for someone who is burdened with the fact that they
7 went to law school, you know, it's difficult. And I
8 would submit that there's a number of cases in juris
9 prudence in this regard that speak to the extent--
10 THE COURT: Mr. Coughlin, since you're not going to
11 cooperate--
12 THE DEFENDANT: No, I will cooperate. I just need
13 to know, Your Honor--
14 THE COURT: But you're telling me you're not
15 cooperating.
16 THE DEFENDANT: No, I will. I'm telling you I
17 will. And I did, I showed up. They asked me a
18 question--
19 THE COURT: You have to show up and you have to
20 meet with the two psychiatrists or psychologists, I
21 guess, technically, whatever they are, and, you know,
22 talk to them, be responsive and get the appropriate
23 evaluation.
24 THE DEFENDANT: If they ask me to take off my
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1 clothes and appear naked, do I need to do that?
2 THE COURT: I think it's unlikely that that's going
3 to happen to you. I'm not going to speculate as to,
4 you know, totally absurd, you know, things that could
5 happen during a psychological--
6 THE DEFENDANT: If they ask me if I've ever had any
7 mental health treatment, if they ask me to have a copy
8 of any of my medical records, if they ask me any sort
9 of personal information that would normally be
10 protected--
11 THE COURT: Then you're saying you won't cooperate?
12 THE DEFENDANT: No, I didn't say that, sir. And I
13 didn't say that to Lakes Crossing either. They stormed
14 off. I said, "I'll have to check my records, let me--"
15 something like, "Let me think about that."
16 And they stormed off in anger. They said, "We're
17 done and left."
18 And it was appalling. And then to send the letter
19 they sent you, Your Honor, is appalling. I didn't
20 stand there and say: I'm refusing to tell you
21 anything. I didn't do that. Dr. Davis appeared--
22 THE COURT: Look, Mr. Coughlin, I just need to
23 know, are you going to go there and cooperate and get
24 this psychological evaluation or not? I mean, are you
001576
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1 going to do it on your own out of custody?
2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I will, but--
3 THE COURT: Okay. Well, if you are going to do
4 that and you commit to this court basically under
5 penalty of being found in contempt for failing to do
6 it, you know, I'll leave you out of custody and you can
7 get this on your own. But if you're not going to go
8 there and cooperate, I'm forced to revoke your bail and
9 put you into custody and then as an in-custody prisoner
10 you can get some psychological counseling, and, you
11 know, evaluation.
12 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I would just put forth,
13 I always intend to follow orders of the court. I would
14 like an opportunity to brief this and oppose the order
15 initially since I've been--
16 THE COURT: Well, that is denied. We're at the
17 point now where it's already determined that you're to
18 get this evaluation.
19 THE DEFENDANT: But I believe that an excusable
20 neglect analysis would auger towards allowing me to
21 replace Mr. Dogan based on his fraudulence basically or
22 his excusable neglect or something, but I have not been
23 accorded a due process right to oppose this evaluation.
24 I would like that.
001577
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1 Failing that, I would like an opportunity to brief
2 the extent to which this evaluation is a blank check to
3 Lakes Crossing. I would also like the opportunity to
4 brief the extent to which I must utilize Lakes Crossing
5 versus a private certified entity or a professional.
6 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Coughlin, after hearing you
7 argue and argue about this issue, I'm making the
8 determination that you're not going to cooperate with
9 this, and I am revoking your bail.
10 THE DEFENDANT: Sir, I will cooperate. If that's
11 what it comes down to, I--
12 THE COURT: You're going to be placed into custody
13 of the Washoe County Sheriff at this time. I revoke
14 your bail.
15 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I just respectfully ask
16 that you reconsider, and I'll do whatever you say for
17 my--
18 THE COURT: We're done with this. I'm sorry that
19 you've forced me to take this action. I don't really
20 want to put you in custody, but it's clear that you're
21 really not going to cooperate. And you're raising
22 issues about issues that seem kind of preposterous but
23 that would give you some excuse not to cooperate. So
24 you'll have to get the examination as an in-custody
001578
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1 person.
2 MR. DOGAN: Your Honor, can I make one suggestion?
3 THE COURT: Yes.
4 MR. DOGAN: As soon as those competency evaluations
5 are completed, can we have Mr. Coughlin removed or no
6 longer in custody at the Washoe County Jail?
7 THE COURT: He's going to remain in custody until
8 he can be brought back here for the hearing on
9 competence.
10 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, if I may just make one
11 request. Given your ruling, Your Honor, I basically
12 will do what you say to do, particularly--
13 THE COURT: Well, I don't believe that you will.
14 After all this, we've spent a lot of time on it, I just
15 don't believe you anymore.
16 THE DEFENDANT: Well, Your Honor, if I may move to
17 stay based on the prejudice to my clients that--
18 THE COURT: Denied.
19 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, do we want to set a new
20 date?
21 THE COURT: So let's set this out about in about a
22 month.
23 MR. DOGAN: Can we just--
24 THE COURT: And if it's done earlier, fine, but
001579
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1 let's track it for about a month is what it normally
2 takes.
3 MR. DOGAN: I understand, Your Honor. Can we just
4 have a status hearing just in case both of the
5 evaluations have been completed?
6 THE COURT: If it's done, you all can get together
7 and set it back on the calendar at that time.
8 THE CLERK: Your Honor, the first available date
9 would be May 24th at 8:30. Is that acceptable?
10 MR. YOUNG: May 24?
11 THE CLERK: Yes. Is that acceptable?
12 MR. DOGAN: It is. Thank you.
13 THE DEFENDANT: May I have those papers entered
14 into the record?
15 MR. YOUNG: Thanks, Your Honor.
16 THE DEFENDANT: That legal research on the table.
17 THE COURT: Denied.
18 (The proceedings were continued to
May 24, 2012 at 8:30 a.m.)
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001580
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1 STATE OF NEVADA )
) ss.
2 COUNTY OF WASHOE )

3
4 I, LORI URMSTON, Certified Court Reporter, in and
5 for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify:
6 That the foregoing proceedings were taken by me
7 at the time and place therein set forth; that the
8 proceedings were recorded stenographically by me and
9 thereafter transcribed via computer under my
10 supervision; that the foregoing is a full, true and
11 correct transcription of the proceedings to the best
12 of my knowledge, skill and ability.
13 I further certify that I am not a relative nor an

14 employee of any attorney or any of the parties, nor am

15 I financially or otherwise interested in this action.

16 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws
17 of the State of Nevada that the foregoing statements
18 are true and correct.
19 DATED: At Reno, Nevada, this 19th day of

20 May, 2012.

21

22 LORI URMSTON, CCR #51

23 ___________________________

24 LORI URMSTON, CCR #51
001581
A filing has been submitted to the court RE: CR12-0376
Judge: STEVEN ELLIOTT
Clerk Accepted: 05-09-2012:17:18:18
Case Title:
STATE VS ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN
(D10)
Document(s) Submitted: Order of Competency/Return JC
Filed By: Heidi Howden
PATRICIA HALSTEAD, ESQ. for STATE OF
NEVADA
ROY STRALLA, ESQ. for STATE OF NEVADA
BIRAY DOGAN, ESQ. for ZACHARY COUGHLIN
CHRIS FORTIER, ESQ. for ZACHARY
COUGHLIN
DIV. OF PAROLE &PROBATION
ZACH YOUNG, ESQ. for STATE OF NEVADA
001582
F I L E D
Electronically
05-09-2012:05:17:16 PM
Clerk of the Court
001583
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ZACH COUGHLIN;

Appellant.
vs.

Respondents
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NOTICE OF APPEARANCE AND 11 15 12 61383 Notice oI Improper Dismissal oI
Appeal, Motion Ior Reconsideration or to Reinstate Appeal, or Alter or Amend Judgement
oI Court Clerk ; Rule 103(7) challenges Ior cause and SCR 105(2)(a) Motion to remove
Panel Chair Echeverria and Panel Member Kent; Post-Hearing BrieI, or, alternatively,
Motion Ior Leave to File Post-Hearing BrieI; Motion to proceed in Iorma pauperis and Ior
immediate release oI recordings oI 11/14/12 HEARING AND WHATEVER
TRANSCRIPT MATERIALS CURRENTLY EXISTS TO BE RELEASED TO
COUGHLIN ABSENT AN PAYMENT UP FRONT WHATSOEVER; MOTION FOR
MISTRIAL; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER QUASHING
SUBPOENAS, AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO BIFURCATE; request to
combine or consolidate appeals where legally tenable this appeal with 60331 and
amendment to case appeal statmeent and clariIication oI notice oI appeal incident thereto
to indicate that D7's 3/30/12 Order in included amongst those appealed.
http://sdrv.ms/Tt4dYI
- 1/71 -
Notice oI Improper Dismissal oI Appeal, Motion Ior Reconsideration or to Reinstate
Appeal, or Alter or Amend Judgement oI Court Clerk
Nov 19 2012 12:34 p.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
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http://sdrv.ms/XmRkVL
coughlin apologizes Ior the Iormatting and length and is doing his best but this is a natural
byproduct oI bar counsel bathing in scr 106 immunity and completely destroying any notions oI Iair play
incident to the 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing, justiyin SCR 119(3) contempt snactions against bar counsel
Ior all the attendant due proceed, notice, and service violations arising therin.
included herein is an excusable neglect basis or good cause Ior reinstating the appeal beyond the Iact that the
$250 Iiling Iee was paid and the receipt and or docket show it was paid Ior this case...and an iIp is pending in
the associate 60331.
Supreme Court has obligation in disciplinary proceeding to look beyond label given to attorney's
conviction to true nature of facts, in order to determine whether underlying circumstances of
conviction warrant discipline. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 111, subd. 3. State Bar oI Nevada
v. Claiborne, 1988, 756 P.2d 464, 104 Nev. 115. Attorney And Client 39
2. Indictment
Where the only relevant Iactual allegation contained in Disciplinary Board's aIIidavit, Iiled in support oI its
petition Ior attorney's temporary suspension Irom the practice oI law, was that a criminal indictment had
been Iiled against the attorney, this sole allegation, without more, was insuIIicient to justiIy summary
suspension and the immediate imposition oI temporary restrictions. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rules 102, subd. 4(a),
111, subd. 1. Matter oI Monteiro, 1984, 684 P.2d 506, 100 Nev. 440. Attorney And Client 48
3. Serious crime
Attorney was not convicted oI 'serious crime within meaning oI rule regarding attorney suspension where
attorney did not engage in any criminal conduct whatsoever, did not engage in a conspiracy, and actually
entered plea oI nolo contendere to nonexistent oIIense. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 111, subd. 2. Sloan v. State Bar
oI Nevada, 1986, 726 P.2d 330, 102 Nev.
436. Attorney And Client 39
request to combine or consolidate appeals where legally tenable this appeal with 60331
and amendment to case appeal statmeent and clariIication oI notice oI appeal incident
thereto to indicate that D7's 3/30/12 Order in included amongst those appealed.
couglin hereby reserves all deIense under nrcp 12 g:(h) Waiver or Preservation oI Certain DeIenses.
(1) A deIense oI lack oI jurisdiction over the person, insuIIiciency oI process, or insuIIiciency oI service oI
process is waived (A) iI omitted Irom a motion in the circumstances described in subdivision (g), or (B) iI it
is neither made by motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereoI
permitted by Rule 15(a) to be made as a matter oI course.
(2) A deIense oI Iailure to state a claim upon which relieI can be granted, a deIense oI Iailure to join a party
indispensable under Rule 19, and an objection oI Iailure to state a legal deIense to a claim may be made in
any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a), or by motion Ior judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial
on the merits.
(3) Whenever it appears by suggestion oI the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction oI the
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.
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Time to add some more Richard G. Hill, Esq. chestnuts to the lie pile, especially
considering Hill's testimony under oath at Coughlin's 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing and
the Iollow sworn testimony by Hill Irom the 6/18/12 Trial, viewed in conjunction with the
statements Hill made to the RPD OIIicer Chris Carter and Sargent Marcia Lopez just prior
to and at the time oI the 11/13/11 custodial arrest oI Coughlin at his Iormer home law
oIIice Ior trespassing:
THE COURT: When Mr. Hill is here to ask some questions that I think
you've explored the possibilities, and I don't know what else you can oIIer
the Court in terms oI this case via cross-examination.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir, Your Honor. I'll wrap this up quickly. BY
MR. COUGHLIN: Q Mr. Hill, at any time on that day, November 13th,
did the owner oI the premises warn the arrestee to leave the property?
A
I think the message was communicated.
Q
Via what medium?
A
The Iact that you were handcuIIed and arrested. Didn't
you get the picture?
Q Okay, prior to the handcuIIing and the arresting, did anybody say, "You
need to leave the premises?" A I didn't hear that. Q Nobody said that? A I
did not hear that, sir. Q Did you say it? A No. Q Did Dr. Merliss? A Not
that I heard. Q Did the police? A No, not that I heard. Q So, nobody that
you heard oI warned the person
arrested Ior trespassing?
Page -1 1 0-
CopperIretti v. Shephard, 271 N.Y.S. 284 N.Y.App.Div.2.Dept.,1934
Tenant held entitled to set aside deIault judgment in summary proceedings
on showing that landlord acquired title under void judgment, irrespective
oI tenant's excuse Ior deIault or deIense upon merits.
I, Zach Coughlin, declare under penalty oI perjury, pursuant to NRS
54.045 that the Iollowing numbered statements are true and correct to the
best oI my knowledge:
1. The locksmith who did the lockout on 1/11/11 is named Sean
Cheathum oI All American Lock & SaIe P.O. Box 51869 Sparks, Nevada
89435-1869 (775) 626-5397. Mr. Cheathum indicated to mer personally
that he arrived to do the lockout that day at, 11/1/11 at 121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501 just about the time the SheriII's two Deputies and the
two landlord's agents did and that it was getting very close to 5 pm. 5 pm
represented an urgent deadline to the landlord's agents and the SheriII's
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Deputies, by which the lockout must be done, recalled Mr. Cheatum. Mr.
Cheathum indicated that the lockout occurred no earlier than 4:48 pm and
was Iairly sure that it came down to the wire in terms oI eIIecting the
lockout prior to 5 pm. Cheathum indicated that he postulated at the time
that the urgent 5 pm deadline was due to a wish by the landlord's agents
and the SheriII to avoid running into the tenant should the tenant be
coming home Irom work aIter a typical 9 am to 5 pm schedule.
Cheathum's memories oI that day are strong enough to speciIically recal
the types oI locks, the uniqueness oI the location (mentioning how it was
near the Harrah's Auto Musuem, the Section 8 Housing to the South oI
Court Street, and the Truckee River) and that the back door lock was very
easy to gain entrance through given that a key was broken oII in it, which
enable him to open or pick the lock by merely turning a screw driver
pressed to it.
2. I spoke with Maureen and Roxy Silva oI the Washoe County SheriII's
OIIice on numerous occassions. On more than one occasions Ms. Silva
slammed the phone down on me in anger. However, on other occasions
she spoke at length about the way the WCSO carries out evictions,
particularly wit respect to the "within 24 hours oI receipt oI the Order"
language in NRS 40.253. Roxy Silva, Maureen, and Civil Division
Supervisor Liz Stuchell indicated that the WCSO received the "Eviction
Order" on 11/1/11 at 8:05 am, and that the data entered in there computer
system conIirms this. Silva, "Maureen" and Stuchell also indicated that
the WCSO does not keep any records oI when it receives Eviction Orders
beyond manually inputting the time that the Orders are taken Irom the Iax
machine to which the Reno Justice Court sends such Orders (and RJC
ChieI Civil Division Clerk Karen Stancil has indicated to Coughlin that it
is the usual custom and practice oI the RJC to Iax Eviction Orders over to
the WCSO the day the are entered or the next day. There is some
conIusion over whether the 10/25/11 "Eviction Decision and Order"
signed by Judge SIerrazza on Iile stamped on that date is an "Order" and it
does appear that Ms. Stancil and Bonnie Cooper are correct in their
assertion that the typical RJC "Iorm' eviction order is on a diIIerent "Iorm"
or "template" than that 10/25/12 "Eviction Decision and Order". Whether
that means that 10/25/12 Order was not Iaxed to the SheriII in accordance
with the "usual custom and practice" oI the RJC does not seem clear, nor
has anyone with the RJC responded to requests Ior documentation or
inIormation in that regard. Former IT employee Curtis Harvey may have
some inIormation in that regard. Additionally, the RJC Iax appears to
bare an incorrect time stamping Iairly regularly. Further, ChieI Civil
Clerk Stancil's apparently correct assertion that the WCSO does not Iile
anything along with their typical one page AIIidavit oI Service (which
bares a time stamping oI sorts representing, apparently, when the lockout
was conducted...and WCSO's Deputy John Machen's AIIidavit oI Service
Iile stamped 11/7/11 indicates a time oI 4:30 pm Ior "personally serving"
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Coughlin. Locksmith Cheathum disputes Richard Hill's trial testimony in
11 CR 26405, where Hill indicates the WCSO attempted to "personally
serve" Coughlin the Eviction Order, but that Coughlin "ran away".
Cheathum indicates there was no indication any tenant was at the 121
River Rock location, nor was their any discussion by anyone there,
includign the two SheriII's Deputies and two landlord's agents to that
eIIect. Hill admits to not having even been there Ior the lockout. Casey
Baker, Esq. testiIied on 6/18/12 that he and Sheri Hill were present and
waited with the SheriII's deputies until "the locksmith Iinally arrived".
NOTE, Baker's Order oI 10/27/12 is void in that it Iails to included the
speciIic language called Ior in NRS 40.253(5), as the "within 24 hours"
language is not there, and Bakers testiIied as to this in 11 CR 26405, when
he also testiIied that he did somethign with the WCSO on October 28th,
2011 in connection with the lockout.
NOTE: COUGHLIN FILES T HIS WITH THE CAVEAT THAT, WHILE SOME SECTIONS
MAY BE A DECLARATION OR SAY SOMEYHIGN ABOUT PERJURY, COUGHLIN NEEDS MORE
TIME TO CLEAN THIS DOCUMENT UP, YET THE IMMINENT THREAT OF ATTACK AND OR
RETALIATION BY THE SBN, LOCAL PROSECUTORS, OR LAW ENFORCEMENT DICTATES
SUBMITTING THIS FILING NOW, DUE TO THE EXIGENCIES INVOLVED, WHICH EXISTS
SOLELY DUE TO THEIR MISCONDUCT AND IN NO WAY STEM FROM ANY FAILURE ON
COUGHLIN'S PART TO UNDERTAKE DUE DILIGENCE IN EVERY WAY.
Docket entry Ior the trial court matter this case was appealed Irom, cv11-03628 (a Notice oI Appeal was
Iiled, it appears on 7/30/12, though Coughlin may have Iiled one in jail, where Judge Linda Gardner's
brother (see Mandamus Petition by Coughlin against Linda Gardner in 54844 and the attached 8/17/11
recusal Order by Linda Gardner where she cites to the "I just outright hae a bias against you" judicial canon
in 2.11(a) in explianing her recusal...and that case proves, amongst other prooI that the address Coughlin was
evicted Irom was indeed being used as and held out as the location Ior Coughlin's law practice (as was the
case on the www.nvbar.org contact inIormation at the time Ior Coughlin, Ior over one year prior to the
unlawIul summary eviction the subject oI this appeal, along with the record setting attorney's Iees by Judge
Patrick Flanagan, who reIused to recuse himselI despite he and Coughlin being Iormer co-workers at Hale
Lane (now Holland & Hart) and there existing a multitude oI basis incident thereto Ior a Iinding that recusal
was mandatory) shows the impropriety oI the Clerk oI Court dismissing the appeal Ior lack oI paying a Iiling
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Iee. Couglhin was provided a receipt showing that he had paid the Iiling Iee Ior 61383, and Coughlin has an
IFP pending in 60331. The docket conIirms this in the trial court matter Irom which both oI these appeals
stem:
06-SEP-2012 04:55 PM $Notice/Appeal Supreme Court COUGHLIN, ZACHARY
Entry: APPEAL FEE PAID FOR THE 7-30-12 NOTICE OF APPEAL - IMAGE ATTACHED TO JULY
FILING
http://www.ccwashoe.com/public/ckpublicqrydoct.cpdktrptIrames?
backtoP&caseidCV11-03628&begindate&enddate
06-SEP-
2012
04:55 PM
$Notice/Appeal Supreme Court COUGHLIN, ZACHARY
Entry:
APPEAL FEE PAID FOR THE 7-30-12 NOTICE OF APPEAL - IMAGE ATTACHED
TO 1ULY FILING
The Nevada Supreme Court Docket seems to miss the part where Coughlin paid the Iiling Iee in
61383 and one has to wonder, given Richard G. Hill, Esq. testiIying beIore the NNDB that he is a member
oI at Coughlin's 11/14/12 Dsiciplinary Hearing (largely predicated upon arrests that Hill directed the RPD to
make) given the appeal in 61383 was dismissed (without a signature by an actual Justice....) just days prior
thereto. 07/31/2012Filing Fee - Filing Fee dueFiling Fee due Ior Appeal.07/31/2012Notice oI Appeal
Documents - Notice oI Appeal/Proper Person Pilot ProgramFiled Notice oI Appeal/Proper Person Pilot
Program. Filed certiIied copy oI proper person notice oI appeal.12-24129
07/31/2012Notice/Outgoing - Notice to Pay Supreme Court Filing FeeIssued Notice to Pay Supreme Court
Filing Fee. No action will be taken on this matter until Iiling Iee is paid. Due Date: 10 days.12-24133
11/07/2012Order/Dispositional - Order Dismissing AppealFiled Order Dismissing Appeal. To date,
appellant has not paid the Iiling Iee or otherwise responded to this court's notice. Accordingly, cause
appearing, this appeal is dimissed.12-35194
Zach Coughlin, plaintiII, submits this Iiling (notice/ motion /objection) on his own behalI. Judge
Dorothy Nash Holmes just lied and lied under oath at Coughlin's 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing, especially
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with regard to her assertion that she, in the traIIic citation trial in 11 TR 26800 that she held on February
27th, 2012 Irom 3:30pm to 4:45 pm, despite she and or the RMC being aware that Coughlin had been
ordered to have a competency evaluation by RJC Judge CliIton's Order oI 2/27/12, baring a Iile stampe oI
1:31 pm...which is just about the time that Judge Nash Holme's judicial assistant announced on the record in
open court that nobody with the RMC could seem to Iind Judge Nash Holmes, and how weird that
was....which was just about the time DDA Young and Biray Dogan held their "clandestine status
conIerence" in rcr2012-065630 case where DDA Young persists in his retaliatory prosecution oI Coughlin
Ior calling 911 to report police misconduct causing Coughlin to perceive an emergency being present and a
danger to his saIety...) Anyways, NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 require Judge Nash Holmes to "stay all
proceedings" when such competency issues or Orders arise...not to do what she did, which is plunge
headlong into a retaliatory intent to Iind something to convict Coughlin Ior (Judge Nash Holmes
transmogriIied a traIIic citation matter, Ior a "Boulevard Stop", ie, a "CaliIornia Roll" into a Iull blown
Disciplinary Hearing beIore the NNDB and State Bar oI Nevada aIter she was coached up by Bar Counsel
Pat King to make sure to Iind "by clear and convincing evidence" that Coughlin had violated some Rule oI
ProIessional Conduct or other (Nash Holmes decided to copy and past the whole lot oI RPC's, and then
proceeded to muse aloud in her 3/12/12 continuation oI the traIIic ticket trial in 11 tr 26800 that Coughlin
had "probably" violated this or that rule...but when it came time to sign an Order, Judge Holmes remixed that
and decided that Coughlin had done so by "clear and convicing evidence".. This traIIic citation trial stems
Irom Coughlin going to opposing counsel in the summary eviction Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice
(Richard G. Hill, Esq. and Casey Baker, Esq) aIter he was released Irom 3 days in jail incident to Richard G.
Hill's signing a criminal trespass complaint in 11 cr 26405 against Coughlin, aIter Hill and his neurologist
client, Dr. Matthew Joel Merliss were able to lie to and with the Reno Police Department's OIIicer Chris
Carter, Jr. and Sargent Marcia Lopez about whether anyone issued Coughlin a trespass warning, whether the
police identiIied themselves as law enIorcement prior to the landlord kicking the door to the basement down
(the police apparently did not Ieel strongly enough in their cause or right to be undertaking the actions they
did to kick the door down themselves...though, RPD OIIicer Carter to Coughlin later that day that "Richard
Hill pays me a lot oI money so I arrest who he says to arrest and I do what he says to do" may need some
more consternation....though don't hold your breath waiting Ior Bar Counsel Patrick O. King, Esq. to
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undertake any, or Reno City Attorne's John Kadlic, Esq., Daniel Wong, Esq., or the prosecutor who
suborned all that perjury by Richard G. Hill, Esq. on the stand, Christopher Hazlett-Stevens, Esq.(Hazlett-
Steven's was provided indisputable video evidence showing that Hill's testiony was lies, at the 6/18/12
criminal trespass trial presided over by RMC Judge William Gardner, whom reIused to recuse himselI
despite Coughlin suing his sister, Judge Linda Gardner in 54844, and Judge Linda Gardner Iiling a grievance
against Coughlin in ng12-0435 (the SBN and NNDB held a disciplinary hearing on 11/14/12 despite the
panel not even being chosen until 10/30/12...don't worry though, Chair John Echeverria was able to step in
so quickly, that beIore Chair Susich's Order announcing Echeverria as Panel Chair could be staped to the
prooI oI service, much less mailed, Chair Echeverria had denied every Motion Coughlin Iiled and granted
everything Bar Counsel King could ask Ior...with the added plus that they (Bar Counsel Patrick O. King and
NNDB Chair J. Thomas Susich and, perhaps, some others) cooked up a Panel (despite the Complaint and
List set out Iully in 61901...iI the OIIice oI the Clerk will Iile what Coughlin submitted Ior Iiling...which it
did not on May 24th, 2012 in 60838....
Why Bar Counsel Patrick O. King, Esq. and J. Thomas Susich, Esq. oI the NVDETR (conIlicted
out, or should have been via the matter oI Maureen Cole, Esq. incident to her attempts to prevent Coughlin
Irom suing Washoe Legal Services in 2009...and its kind oI hard to object to propsed Panel members when
the SBN does not serve the Complaint under SCR 109, then submits Iraudulent materials to indicate the SBN
has done so, just as Laura Peters and Patrick O. King, Esq. did with the 10/9/12 Iile stamped Notice oI Intent
to Take DeIault (which Coughlin hereby swears under penalty oI perjury that the USPS downtown Reno,
Vassar Station would not give to Coughlin in light oI it only having $1.25 worth oI postage printed out on it
in the red "Pitney Bowes" SBN style typical oI all SBN mailings (and where, and this is verIied by the
SBN's Peter's certiIicate oI mailing attached to that 10/9/12 Notice oI Intent To Take DeIault, the SBN only
sent that 10/9/12 Iile stamped NOITD via one method, certiIied mail,
Some might call it the "McGeorge MaIia" but...that is a bit much, no? However, that law school,
which is renown Ior long Iailing out over two thirds oI its class (despite glady taking their money while the
relationship lasted) may, to some, seem to produce a certian type oI lawyer or judge....the good points?
Teamwork demonstrated in spades....the bad points? Well, some might say the teamwork is mostly directed
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to retaliation, zero sum game playing, and "Iailing out" anyone who dares to cross them. Some might say
that....Coughlin is not saying that.
-more cooking up a Iine Panel and Disciplinary Hearing by King, Susich, the Washoe County SheriII's
OIIice and the Second Judicial District Court, Reno City Attorney's OIIice, and Washoe County District
Attorney's OIIice, and SBN: Judge Linda Gardner's bailiII (and she was present Ior both days oI trial in the
divorce matter wherein Coughlin, on behalI oI Washoe Legal Services represented a domestic violance
victim, and took a position supported by the majority viewpoint in American law (though WLS Executive
Director Paul Elcano claims Coughlin's perIormance in the hearing justiIied and was the "sole reason" Ior
Coughlin being Iired Irom WLS- which makes convenient (maybe that "big Iavor Linda Gardner owes"
him?) the Iact that Coughlin was really Iired Ior a variety oI reasons, and under the typical comparator
analysis in employment law, whistleblower retaliation laws, hostile work environment, discrimination, and
other laws...the way Elcano ran WLS (involved lots oI "old boys and girls network" style intimidation and
inIluence rather than any actual managerial or executive skill or rolling up oI one's sleaves...and Thursdays
always competely devoted to the skeet shooting range, and practially daily trips Irom the pharmacy to his
mother's home to deliver medications (despite most pharmacy's oIIering that service Ior Iree in Reno...and
even one instance shortly beIore Coughlin's Iiring where Elcano had Coughlin ghost write a 20 page or so
memorandum to the Nevada Department oI Taxation that may well have managed to get WLS out oI the
bind attendant to it entering a lease where the non-proIit 503(c), WLS, would be required to pay the property
taxes on behalI oI the private Ior proIit, landlord...and lots oI comparing Coughlin to Seabiscuit, constant
critiques oI and enIorcements oI a "dress code" that applied only to Coughlin, etc., etc.)...Anyways, Iinally,
aIter over 8 months oI Coughlin requesting the materials, the SBN King's arranged to have Coughlin's SCR
105(2)(c) rights raped a little less than the have been, in getting Chair Echeverria (whom works remarkably
Iast in disposing oI all oI Coughlin's motion with a denial and granting all oI Kings, and don't be Iooled...the
Chair was appointed on October 30th, 2012, by October 31st, 2012 he was signing orders disposing oI all oI
Coughlin's Motions (though upon a cross examination oI Chair Echeverria it became quite clear he had not
read practically anything oI what Coughlin worked hard on and submitted to the SBN and the Chair (and the
Chair's ruling an a motion that he was not sent by any means other then electronic service is even more
evidence oI the acceptance oI such service by the SBN and the Panel...though now the Panel and SBN are
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attempting to "have it both ways" and alternately claim that King has Iorwarded all oI Coughlin's Iiling on to
the Panel Members (but King got caught lying about that at the Hearing, to which Panel Member McGeorge
SOL class oI 1980 Stephen Kent brazenly gave King a pass and indicated he wouldn't review the exhibits
attached to Coughlin Iilings anyway, including those containing "tape don't lie" excuplatory video and audio
evidence (and even where the Panel seeks to lazily rest on the language in SCR 111 about a "conviction is
conclusive prooI" despite being presented with Claiborne and other authority (including 37 CFR 11.25(3)(a),
(c), which will likely result in the SBN and various local judges work being dissected in Iine detail in a
Iederal setting given Coughlin's being licensed to practice patent law beIore the United States Patent and
Trademark OIIice (USPTO).
Also grounds Ior a mistrail in that SBN v Coughlin Disciplinary Matter are apparent where Reno
City Attorney Crieg Skau, Esq. appears to have lied about Judge SIerrazza ordering that an Emergency Ex
Parte Motion to Quash Coughlin's Subpoenas (seen both in the disciplinary proceeding and in the petty
larceny oI an iPhone that Nicole Watson was videotaped admitting some guy Iound on the ground in
downtown Reno, and held aloIt, (and this started oII this whole ordeal with local law enIorcement on
8/20/11) oIIered it up, then announced, loudly that he was going to "throw it in the river" iI someone did not
claim it....
Any assertion by the SBN that Respondent has actual notice oI this the NOITD, the DoWSoe, or
any Supplemental to the Designation oI Witnesses, and knowledge oI such somehow excuses proper service
or process, misses the point. The Nevada Supreme Court has long acknowledged that notice oI a litigation is
not a substitute Ior proper service oI process. C.H.A Venture v. G.C. Wallace Consulting Engineers, Inc.,
794 P.2d 707, 709 (Nev. 1990). Similarly, DeIendant's notice oI this litigation does not excuse PlaintiII's
insuIIicient service and insuIIicent process process. As such the SBN's (and Hill just testiIied at the
11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing and about matters related to this appeal even therein) holding the 11/14/12 in
such a matter as to unduly prejuedice or provide excusable neglect or good cause basis Ior any Iailure on
Coughlin's part to move this appeal along. But the thing is, is that the Clerk's OIIice rejected a Iiling oI
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Coughlin's just last week that spoke to the appeal bond (in short, Richard Hill, Esq. has it, by way oI his
Iailing to comply with Nevada law respectign tenant's deposits.
So Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning attorney Coughlin personally, under NRS
7.085 (despite there being no service by McGeorge SOL Class oI 1985 opposing counsel John Springgate,
Esq. oI a Iiling ready 21 day saIe harbor NRCP 11 Motion Ior Sanctions....but rather an impromptu Motion
by Springgate during closing argument about Iacts not in evidence in support oI his Motion Ior Sanctions....
(and the Order Ior sanctions by Judge Linda Gardner took the biggest issue with Coughlin's saying, upon
being asked iI he had one oI the over 10 exhibits that were not bound or previously marked that Springgate
sought to introduce at trial. Coughlin hereby incorproates by reIerence (an niIty trick Bar Counsel King
manages to do in avoiding doing any actual work, Mirch style, by just attaching extremely suspect
convictions ("conclusive prooI oI guilt" according to King, Claiborne and Burleigh be damned), and,
though King did not actually make or reserve this argument or cite to any authority like the Mirch case to
support what he probably now wishes he had, thereIore, seek to Iind support to rebut the objections Coughlin
preserved Ior the record as to the lack oI notice, speciIicity, Iactual support Ior contentions or allegations,
service, service oI process, suIIiciency oI either service oI process (see Garin's argument in 60302...okay,
now apply those to King's blurry exhibits, which were oIten printed on both sides oI the page and contained
Iraudulent certiIicates oI mailing). The thing is Judge Linda Gardner's Pre-Trial Order itselI ruled that either
attorney in that trial, who sought to introduce more than 10 exhibits, would be required to have them bound
and marked with an index prior to trial and a copy thereoI provided to oppsoing counsel. Yet, upon
Coughlin voicing concerns that are directly related to and in support oI the rationale behind such an Order...
(Coughlin is quoted in the Order as saying, in response to whether he has some document that Springgate
sought to introduce as about his 12th or 13th Exhibit where Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order reads :
"The Court notes that at one point, aIter an exhibit had been admitted, Mr. Coughlin could not Iind the copy
provided by Mr. Springgate in discovery. Mr. Coughlin demanded a copy be provided at trial, stating: "am I
supposed to be riIling through my papers? My understanding is that you are supposed to provide a copy."
When asked iI he had the copy oI the document, Mr. Coughlin stated, "I do not know. I could spend my time
and mental energy looking around Ior Mr. Springgate 's document like I am his assistant, or we could ask
Mr. Springgate to provide a copy at the time he is seeking admission like I believe the rule states ." Again it
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would seem the nothing in the Iollowing ALR suggests that making an objection once every ten minutes or
so is sanctionable. Conduct oI attorney in connection with making objections or taking exceptions as
contempt oI court, 68 A.L.R.3d 314. Further, the District Court' s statement regarding Iactual issues (such as
a rate oI success arguing objections) is exaggerated.
Another basis Ior a mistrial here is all the lies and nonsense Irom the SBN and various local
governmental oIIices about the Subpoenas Coughlin issued and had served in the manner he was provided
authority to do so by the SBN and Panel. Also, Reno City Attorney Creig Skau Iraudulently secured
Coughlin's attendnat at in improperly notice ex parte hearing the day beIore the 11/14/12 Disciplinary
Hearing in the iphone case set Ior 11/19/12 Trial (how conveniently terribly prejudicial to deny Coughlin a
continuance either in the Disciplinary Hearing or that iphone RJC case...). Witness the Iollowign Iraudulent
manner in which Skau secured Coughlin's attendance at an improperly noticed hearing beIore Judge
SIerrazza (who was also the Judge on the summary eviction proceeding/"Trial" that represents such a serious
liability to the RJC and arguably should require Judge SIerrazza recusing himselI. Speaking oI, Iormer
WCSO Deputy Peter Eastman, aside Irom breaking an entering into Coughlin's rental Irom JeII Nichols oI
Cobblestone Masonry, and assiting Nichols in improperly evicting Coughlin through violenet "selI help"
(despite NRS 118A.160 an the attached work Coughlin did Ior Nichols in exchange Ior the rental, required
by the Iraudulently procurred summary eviction in RJC REv2012-000374 (another reason the RJC should
not be hearing cases with Coughlin as a criminal deIendant...but Peter Eastman claims to have Iormerly been
Judge SIerrazza's court room deputy in tribal court and that "Iriends in the court house" indicate that Judge
SIerrazza "has it out" Ior Coughlin or otherwise "has a problem with" Coughlin. Eastman also admits that
he and his wiIe received communicatiosn Irom SBN Bar Counsel Patrick King, Esq. that violated SCR 121
and which also slandered Coughlin, given Eastman's admission that Bar Counsel King told the Eastman's
that NVB Judge Beesley had entered an Order, as oI May 7th, 2012, barring Coughlin Irom practicing in the
NVB (which is patently untrue...and Iurther evidence oI the lengths to which Pat King will go to show his
masters he is a good little attack dog Ior the rich and powerIul in Northern Nevada, McGeorge MaIia
included, Richard G. Hill, Esq. included, etc., etc.). But, back to Skau's misconduct: From: "Creighton C.
Skau" skaucreno.gov~ To: zachcoughlinhotmail,com Cc: "Jeannie Homer" HomerJreno.gov~
Date: 11/09/2012 11:45 AM Subject: Fwd: FW: Case No. RCR2011-063341 Dear Mr. Coughlin, Please be
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advised that Judge SIeraza authorized service upon you by email in an Order. Accordingly, authorized
service has already been eIIected.
Also, Coughlin hereby states under NRS 53.045 penalty oI perjury that the Iollowing exchange
occurred between Coughlin and SBN's Laura Peters on September 11th, 2012 at 4:51 pm wherein SBN's
Laura Peters, whom has and has been by King and Clark repeatedly held out as the "Clerk oI Court Ior the
State Bar oI Nevada" and in charge oI matters relating to the Iiling oI documents (though Pat King seems to
manage to control every aspect oI these proceedings, Irom directing around NNDB Chairman Susich, to
putting Chair Echeverria where he needs him (they got a real routine goin') to directing Clerk oI Court Peters
to eIIect personal service oI the Compalint on Coughlin on 9/25/12 when Coughlin showed up Ior the
Hearing required by the Court's 6/7/12 Order and SCR 111(7)-(8) and SCR 102(4)(d) incident to 60838's
6/7/12 Order and the 8/13/12 Petition Coughin Iiled in 61426, which was served upon the SBN, both the
North and South versions, on August 17th, 2012...the same date that Peters noticed Coughlin in writing oI
the hearing she calendared Ior Coughlin, admitting it was to be Ior the "sole purpose" oI addressing the
conviction in 60838.. King also Iailed to tell the Court in his SCR 111 Petition that Coughlin complied with
SCR 111(2) in selI reporting the conviction resulting in his supsension in 60838. Anyways, here is what was
communicated between Coughlin and Peters on 9/11/12, contrary to the Iile stamped AIIidavit oI Peters in
the SBN's Iiled that was not served upon Coughlin....Coughlin swears under penalty oI perjury that the
Iollowing communciations were made between he and Peters (done in a rush due to Bar Counsel and Panel
Chair coercion and Ilauting oI SCR 105(2)(c):
"Coughlin: Now iI I did get a Complaint and I need to serve an Answer, can I
serve it just by Iaxing it to you?
Clerk Peters: Um...yeah you can.
Coughlin: I have read the rules, they seem to say you go by NRCP except Ior
( See SCR 105(4))
Peters: ...you can... but it has got to be stamped.
Coughlin: By who? The Iiling oIIice? The State Bar?
Peters: By me, I am a Court Clerk
Coughlin: Will you stamp a Iaxed document iI I Iax it in?
Peters: I can, but I need to know how I can get it back to you.
Coughlin: I have a Iax, its the one listed on the Bar's website 949 667 7402"
...
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Coughlin: ...what day is it measured Irom iI you guys Iiled a Complaint?
Peters (one the eIIect oI certiIied mailings oI the Complaints under SCR 109)
Okay i go 20 days Irom when I get that green card back, I go 20 days Irom aIter
when I get that little green card, so iI you picked it up, say last Thursday, then I
go 20 days Irom last Friday...
Coughlin: Its not 20 days Irom the Iile stamped date on the Complaint or
something?
Peters: No, I go 20 days Irom that certiIied receipt, I want you to receive the
Complaint beIore the time starts ticking. That's the way I do it?
Coughlin: and iI somebody doesn't pick up that letter, though, they'll will send it
back like aIter 15 days, and then what, you guys will go 20 days Irom then? Or
I imagine you guys might even push it a little more and say "no, its 20 days
Irom when we mailed it"
Peters: I do it Irom the receipt oI the certiIied copy, so iI you received it
yesterday it would be 20 days Irom today?
Coughlin: Irom my receipt oI the certiIied copy as evinced by my signature on
the card?
Peters: right, as soon as you sign it and that shows when you got it, that's when
the time starts..I don't starting the counting until I get the green card back with
your signature saying you received it."
...
Peters: Tom Susich's only involvement is setting the panel really....once a
Complaint has been Iiled we have 20 days or whenever until we receive the
Answer and then once we receive the Answer then we set a Panel...I have the
unclaimed Complaint I got it back September 10th, 2012...you haven't
technically received teh Complaint, even iI you may hae received the Iirst class
mail version we sent...
Coughlin: are you sure that at some point somebody with the SBN isn't going to
say "you know what, Zach, by now you have constructive notice oI the
Complaint..." and they will try to hold me to that?
Peters: Nobdy is going to do that.
Coughlin: Are you sure? Typically we playin' prison rules in bar hearings...
Peters: Nobody is going to do that. I am the one that controls that, and as Iar as
I know you didn't receive the Compliant, because I have that certiIied mail
package right here as it was returned to me...as the Clerk oI the Court oI the Bar
I am telling you that you did not recieve this Complaint, because it came back
to me unclaimed... and so I am going to send it back out, send it back to you,
and iI you pick this up and sign the green card...I will not attempt to do a Notice
oI Intent to Take DeIault beIore I sent this Complaint back out via certiIied
mailing again, and I will send this back out and stamp it tomorrow and then
when you get it in the mail and sign the green card, that is when the 20 days to
Iile
Peters trips up and says Susich sets the Panel, but then says the SBN sets the
Panel (which occurred here pretty mcuh given the SBN purports to have mailed
at the Notice oI Hearing and Designation oI Witnesses and Summary oI
Evidnece on 10/12/12 (SCR 105(2)(c) requires the Panel send those essential
Iilings, yet King and Peters did in this matter a Iul 18 days beIore Susich's order
setting the panel was even signed and stamped."
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And Patty Ice, aka Pat King, there is more oI this coming, guy...more about what you said and what you
said ChieI Bar Counsel Clark said about Coughlin's right to issue subpoenas and waiever oI witness or
subpoena Iees and the manner oI service, etc., etc. More to come, boys, more to come....And Chair
Echeverria will want to ask Theresa about that person calling themselves an "attorney" when answering the
phone Ior his oIIice...which has a name plate that sounds and looks more like a venture captial Iirm...'The
Echeverria Group"....so coughlin preserver and continues to preserve his objetion to having his case in
chieI or deIense unnecessrily cut short and not being able to call witnesses or enIorce the subpoenas given
the sudden and Iraudulent Ilipping oI the script by the panel and or sban obc clerk oI court regarding the
rules attached thereto.
Further there is new supplmental evidenc eot and witnesses to support Coguhlin's contention that the
eviction lockout was based upon a void order and Iraud is connecte thereto, with the wcso reIusing to
comply with records requests and or subpoenas, as well as the RJC., which had jammed coughlin into the
iphone trial today in rcr2011-063341, which is overly prjejducing a variety oI cases and Coguhlin's health...
Further, in light oI the declaration made by the SBN and Peters upon, upon which Coughlin
reasonably relied, the established pattern and practice oI the SBN not starting the running oI deadlines
pursuant to the service oI items under SCR 109 until the SBN gets back the signed green certiIied mail slip
must be accord to the October 27th, 2012 certiIied mailing return receipt slip that, while, it is signed by
Coughlin, it is signed by Coughlin's then housemate "Juliano" as "received by". See, Pat King...that's
called credibility....ie, not sittin' there wasting the Hearing Panel's time arguing that the audio transcripts
the RMC provided you and that you had copied Ior the Screening Panel are "irrelevant" or "not certiIied" or
"worthless becuase there is not an prohibitably expensive certiIied transcript oI that Hearing to provide
"context"...(and this aIter Pat King was caught lying about whether the April 2009 Order he sought to
introduce oI Jduge Linda Gardners (resulting Coughlin's Iiring Irom WLS...which Chair Echeverria saw no
issue having WLS's ED Elcano provide certiIication oI the Order entered some two weeks aIter the trial
that, contrary to Echeverria's remixign, Elcano did not "attend" but merely watch the tape oI (and under
King's analysis, despite paying $35 Ior the Second Judicial's tape oI that Trial, it still would not be a
"certiIied copy". The Iact that anyone lying about the tape could be cross examined provides plenty oI
"certiIication", doesn't it?
Also, so cute how Pat King, in the bate stamped copy oI the "Disciplinary File" (which Coughlin
should in no way be billed Ior given the deprivation oI his SCR 105(2)(c) rights herein, nor should Couglin
have to pay Ior any oI this Disciplinary Hearing, particulary given all the notice, service, and process
deIiciencies attendant to Pat King's impermissible attempts to cheat Coughlin out oI his due process and
thereIore obtain a result King and the SBN do not deserve.
So, its really cute how in the Disciplinary File at 02954 there is the AIIidavit oI Mailing Irom the
23rd oI August 2012, wherein Laura Peters swears, under penalty oI perjury that
Also, Pat King brought his dog to work and let it wander around the halls oI the SBN the day oI the
hearing, and he wore cargo pants along with a horriIic tie, then he sauntered up to Coughlin at a urinal and
salivated over the "pretty good grub, huh, Zach?" Patty Ice wasn't Ieelin' so chipper a day or so later when
Coughlin was interrogating him about the Iraud King committed in the bate stamped copy oI the
Disciplinary Iile, especially vis a vis the Iact that curiously, all the SBN Iilings except Ior the two most key,
the Complaint and First Designation oI Hearing Panel Members (would have been nice to have actually been
served that in accord with the rules and the policies held out by the SBN and justiably relied upon...as a
peremptory challenge would have deIinitely been issued Ior both Stephen Kent, as well as Chair Echeverria
(however, nice a men they may be outside the impermissible conIlicts oI interest they had which should have
prevented them Irom ever sitting on this Panel. So, where Coughlin now Iiles and aIIidavit (to whatever
extent he did not so Iile one or a declaration or veriIicaton previously, which is not clear) contesting the
August 23rd, 2012 AIIidavit oI Mailing Iiled by Peters...which may be undone somewhat by the October
9th, 2012 AIIidavit by Peters that is included in the Iile and Iilestamped but Ior which Coughlin was never
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sent a copy or otherwsie served (and the big box copy oI the NOITD oI 10/9/12's certiIcate oI mailing does
not indicate that any such aIIidavit was included therein, so...the Disciplinary Hearing contains a Iiling that
is Iile stamped, yet was not sent to Coughlin (and iI it was sent to Chair Echeverria or Chairman Susich,
that's misconduct. So King and Peters and the SBN have gotten all cute with this here bate stampe "copy oI
the Disciplinary File" consolation prize Ior the SBN and Panel deIenestrating Coughlin's right under SCR
105(2)c)...Peers therein swears she is "employed as a paralegl Ior the SBN. That in such capactity AIIidant is
Cutodian oI Records Ior the Discipline Department oI the State Bar oI Nevada...." Then Peters goes on to
swear that the "Complaint and First Designation oI Hearin Panel Members were served on the Iollowing by
placy a copy in an envelope which was then seald and postage Iully prepaid Ior ....despostted in the US. mail
at Rreno...."...Its odd because every other certiIeid mail Iiling in that Iile bate stamped and copied to
coughlin by the SBN a scant 6 days prior to the Hearing proudly displays the green certiIied mailing card
(well, there is a distinction between the return receipt requested" card stock card and the more squarish,
certiIied mailing square slip with a tracking number (which does not involved getting a signature Irom the
addressee...So when the SBn sent Couglin on 10/12/12 the Notice oI Hearing (which SCR 109 requires be
served in the same manner as Complaint (which entails and adoption oI the rules Peters set out to Coughlin,
including in their September 21st, 2012 conversation....so, somehow, in that bate staped Iile Ior page 02954
is that AIIidavit oI Mailing by Peters on 8/23/12 wherein she swears that the " "Complaint and First
Designation oI Hearin Panel Members were served on the Iollowing by placy a copy in an envelope which
was then seald and postage Iully prepaid Ior"...which is clearly not true and or in accord with Peters
statements to and representatiosn and agreements with Coughlin on September 11th, 2012 at 4:41pm.
"LAURA PETERS, under penalty oI perjury, being Iirst duly sworn, deposes and says as Iollows: That
AIIiant is employed as a paralegal Ior the discipline department oI the State Bar oI Nevada and in such
capacity is the custodian oI records Ior the State Bar oI Nevada; , That on September 11, 2012, at
approximately 4:45 p.m., Zachary Coughlin called AIIiant to conIirm that a hearing was still scheduled to
take place on September 25, 2012. AIIiant explained that the hearing would not take place on September
25th and that date had been scheduled prior to the Iiling oI a Iormal Complaint. Mr. Coughlin reacted as iI he
had no knowledge oI a Complaint. AIIiant then explained that, in Iact, a copy oI the Complaint, sent via
certiIied mail on August 23, 2012, Irom the Reno oIIice oI the State Bar, had been returned and marked
"unclaimed". AIIiant Iurther explained that since service had not been aIIected, a new certiIied copy would
go out the next day. AIIiant requested that when Mr. Coughlin received said copy, he should return the
postcard attached to the mailing and his twenty (20) day period in which to answer the Complaint would
start running at that point. However, in speaking to Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King, it was determined
that personal service should be aIIected upon Mr. Coughlin. Reno Carson messenger service was engaged to
attempt personal service despite Mr. Coughlin not providing the State Bar with a physical address. On
September 25, 2012, Mr. Coughlin arrived at the Reno oIIice oI the State Bar allegedly expecting a hearing
to take place. At that time, Mr. Coughlin was again told, both by AIIiant and Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick
King, that no hearing would be taking place that day and that an answer to the State Bar's Complaint had not
been received. AIIiant personally served Mr. Coughlin with a copy oI the Complaint on his visit to the Bar
oIIice on September 25th as witnessed by Paula Campbell, an employee oI the State Bar. Mr. Coughlin
insisted that the hearing which had been previously scheduled Ior that day should be taking place because he
needed to be removed Irom temporary suspension. Mr. Coughlin has also been instructed by Assistant Bar
Counsel Patrick King that he cannot Iile pleadings with the State Bar via e-mail, which he continues to
attempt. The Motion to Dismiss, which Mr. Coughlin now insists should be granted as it has gone
unopposed by the State Bar, was never presented to AIIiant Ior Iiling but was rather emailed prior to
AIIiant's conversation with Mr. Coughlin on September 11th when Mr. Coughlin under no uncertain terms
told AIIiant that he had not yet received the Complaint. FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
Dated this 91h day oI October, 2012. "
SCR 103: 7. Hearing panel members shall not participate in any proceeding in which a judge similarly
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situated would be required to abstain. Any member whose term expires while the member's
panel is considering a complaint shall remain a member until its disposition.
8. The chairs oI the hearing panels and screening panels shall deliver reprimands and sign
all
documents on behalI oI the panel to carry out the provisions oI Rules 102(6), 102(7), and
103(6).
9. A grievance received against a member oI a disciplinary board and processed in
accordance
with Rule 105(1) shall be reIerred to the other disciplinary board.
So, the policy announced by SBN PetersAs to that "received by" signature on October 27th, 2012
by "J. Juliano", under the established policies oI the SBN as set Iorthe by the SBN and Clerk oI Court
Peters during the September 27th, 2012 conversation with Coughlin wherein Peters established and
conIirms that deadlines incident to service via certiIied mailing do not begin running until she or the SBN
receives back the green certiIied mail return r eceipt requested slip that, and or until two attempts at
such certified mailing service have gone unclaimed, whereupon, a Notice of Intent to Take Default
would be sent via certified mail (and Peters indicated all such certified mailings are sent in duplicate
via first class mail as well (though, strangely, the 10/9/12 Notice of Intent to Take Default's certificate
of mailing indicates that it was sent via only one method, certified mail (ie, not also by first class
mail) and, curiosly, despite every other SBN filing in the bate stamped Discipinary File in SBN v.
Coughlin having the certified mail slip included therein, the NOITD fails to (and this is likely due to
Pat King realizing (and SCR 109 requires that the Notice of Hearing and DoWSoE of
evidence.Coughlin could probably pull a Pat King and refuse to acknowedge that the cd's Pat King
he and the SBN had a problem in that upon doing a USPS Track and ConfirmlI received Irom the
RMC were "certiIied" or otherwise appropriate Ior admitting into evidence (as to whether they are certiIied,
that depends who is doing to "deIining" oI what is certiIied...but it also begs the question, why would the
SBN be putting to a Screening Panel audio transcripts that are not certiIied? Also, the bit Irom the 2/27/12
trial in 11 TR 26800 about where Coughlin tells Judge Nash Holmes "that's quite a sound byte, Your
Honor" in response to her stating "I don't care about bribery, I don't care about corruption, I don't care
about retaliation...all I care about is the Boulevard Stop" (need to listen really closing to that Trial, or
somehow get the RMC and Longoni (whose Sunshien Reports should have never been allowed to do this
Hearing, no disrespect to Ms. Hummel, though, but a conIlict clearly exists, particulary where Coughlin's
appeal in the conviction resulting in his current suspension was denied due to the Iailur oI Longoni and the
RMC to prepare the transcript even though Nevada law required they do so upon Coughlin Iilign his Notice
oI Appeal instant to NRS 189.010-.050... that statute is not advisory...is is the law, and D10 Judge Elliot's
mentioning a civil statute's stance on the prepareation oI appeals and down payments thereto does not
change that. It is Iraud by Longoni and the RMC So, iI something is missing Irom the RMC's $35 audio
transcript that Coughlin was only able to obtain aIter draIting his own mother, Mary Barker, into the
pursuit (the RMC made up excuse aIter excuse Ior reIusing to Iill Coughlin's audio transcript request and
evne had its Marhals start manuIacturing grievances against Couglin with the RMC (see their ridiculous
"greivance" or letters to the RMC and their even more ridiculous "Incident Reports". (even Ior the limited
purposed oI demonstrating what King and Peters gave to Coughlin purporting them to be "leItovers" Irom
the Screening Panel on October 10th, 2012 that RMC Judge William Gardner obnoxiously claimed to know
so much about to Coughlin in court on 4/10/12, shortly aIter Judge Gardner announced that he and
McGeorge MaIia, class oI 2006 member Reno City Attorney Hazlett-Steven's and Coughlin's McGeorge
MaIia SOL court appointed counsel Keith Loomis, Esq. had a secret meeting that morning prior to trial in
some backroom oI the RMC where they all had a great time, uh, practicing their lines. And what a Iorced
liIeless perIormance it ultimately was when that troupe presented to indigent criminal deIendant Coughlin
and attempted to navigate their way through the murky waters oI violating NRS 178.405 (in light oI the
2/27/12 Order Ior Competency Evaluation in RCR2012-065630 that the RMC Judges were well aware oI,
incident to their "at least one meeting" when they brainstormed how to get Coughlin and the
communications between Judge Nash Holmes and the Washoe County Public DeIender and or Biray
Dogan, Esq., counsel oI record Ior Coughlin in that rcr2012-065630, whom can tell you all about how
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DDA Young violated NRS 178.405 in Iiling at 2:55pm a Iugitive document in seeking to oppose
Coughlin's Motion to Appear as Co-Counsel, despite the OR
First, despite Peters AIIidavit oI October 9th, 2011 (here is no prooI oI service oI that Peters AIIidavit on
Coughlin, and it it was served on the Panel or Chair, unbeknownst to Couglhin, that is an impermissible ex
parte communication) being Iilestamped an included in the materials that were only finally provide to
Coughlin on November 8th, 2011:08:55:54
Iurther, Coughlin one hundred percent categorically denies Pat King's unsupported allegation oI Coughlin
attempting to dodge service. One, the hearsay oI Johhno Lazetich is in the Iorm oI a bill, not a sworn
aIIidavit, and Iurther, it clearly contains mere conjecture on Lazetich's part. Further, Coughlin setn
Lazetich and his Iather's company Reno Carson Messenger Service an email and a voice mail asking what
he could do Ior them, along with emails and a Iax to the SBN oIIering to meet a process server somewhere
or otherwise assist in having the Complaint appropriately served, however, King and the SBN chose to lied
to Coughlin instead, and go back on what Peters deIinitively declared during the September 11, 2012
conversation on the telphone with Coughlin that her unserved, yet Iile stamped, October 9th, 2012
AIIidavit asserts. It is interesting that King and Peters say nothing about Iaxing motions...consdiering that
Peters clearly gave Coughlin permission to Iax Iile motions (and in accord with other such Iorms oI
electronic Iiling, Coughlin's Iax Iiled motions, and arguably email Iiled Motions (including the skydrive
link Iiles atached thereto should be made a part oI the record and the Iile and the Panel should be provided
with them and reminded that they have a duty to review them. This is true, especially Ior anything prior to
the September 25th, 2012 email by King purporting to reIuse email Iiling (and arguably, at that point, it
was too late Ior King to change the rules oI procedure set Iorth by Laura Peters and or Susich's or the
Panel's Iailure to oppose such Iilings by Coughlin. REgardless, the Iile as King had it bate stamped and
provided to Coughlin at such a very late stage (November 8th, 2012 upon the Iirst attempt to deliver it Irom
Sierra Document Processing Coughlin received it an signed Ior it, and thereby his SCR 105(2)(c) right to
inspeact "up to 3 days prior to the hearing" was violated, especially considering Coughlin was continually
reIused the opportunity to inspect such records as the SBN at every stage since Pat King's phony oIIers to
allow such in March 2012...Further, the bate stamped Formal Hearing File SBN v. Zachary B. Coughlin is
missing a number oI cd/dvd exhibits that Coughlin submitted Ior Iiling. Pat King admits to just choosing to
remove them Irom the Iile and or Iail to copy the committee on them, while at the same time maintaining
he and the SBN and Peters have demonstrated Fidelity in their stated practice oI providing everything
Coughlin Iiles to the Panel. Additionaly, Peters AIIidavit is quite Iraudulent. One. clearly a Motion to
Dismiss dated September 17th, 2012 that Coughlin has a Iax conIirmation oI and also email to Bar Counsel
and Susich was not "created prior
The Motion to Dismiss Iax Iiled on September 17th, 2011 should be Iile stamped an included in the
Iile. Why else would Laura Peters AIIidavit not indicate someting contrary to Coughlin's sworn assertion
that he was given permission to Iax Iile by the SBN? Regardless, Coughlin's hadn delivered Motion to
Dismiss oI Cctober 15th, 2012 (or it may have been October 16th, 2012, given Coughlin missed his selI
imposed deadline oI delivering to the SBN a Motion to Dismiss by midnight oI some night, and sent Clerk
PEters and email the next day indicating the prooI oI service should be adjusted in that regard. Further the
Chairs assessment that Coughli nIailed to Iile a "veriIied response or answer" or that such "may not contain
anything stated upon inIromation and belieI" is contested and just Ilat out wrong. Coughlin's signature on
page 61/62 on the Motion Ior ORder to Show Cause may be a bit high above the signature line (though
the /s/ is operative in electronic Iiling, which the SBN gave Coughlin permission to do.
Judge Linda Gardner is a liIelong prosecutor turned Judge, like her brother RMC Judge William
Gardner, like his Iellow RMC Judge whom he admitted passed the April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin
resulting in Coughlin's Iiring Irom WLS in 60302 (and a Mandamus Iiled against Linda Garnder by
Coughlin in 54844, and a grievance Iiled by both Judge Linda Gardner and Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes
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(also a liIelong prosecutor turned Judge...like Judge Kenneth Howard too) (on behalI oI all oI the RMC
Judges) against Coughlin in both NG12-0434 and NG12-0435...which along with the Richard G. Hill, Esq.
grievance (Rich was just IulIilling his RPC 8.3 duty, y'all...don't hate) in NG12-0204, SBN Bar Counsel oI
the North Pat King whipped up in a SBN v. Coughlin Complaint, that he purports to have served under SCR
109 via a certiIied mailin oI 8/23/12 that was returned to the SBN, and to which SBN Clerk oI Court Laura
Peters indicated to Coughlin would absolutely, under no circumstances, ever be used as a return oI or prooI
oI service oI the Complaint against Coughlin given the Iact that she herselI received it as returned to send on
9/10/12, and especially where she told Coughlin he coudl rely upon her then indication that she would, in
accord with the SBN's pattern and practice and established policies, resend it once again the Iollowing day
via certiIied mail, and only upon that mailing not being met with a signed certiIed mail signature oI
Coughlin's would the SBN send out a Notice oI Intent to Take DeIault, served in the same manner as that
which was attempted with the Complaint itselI. OI course, Pat King attempted to cheat the system by
turning all those SBN-Coughlin agreements into lies, because iI there is one thing Pat King will not stand Ior
it is competition or a level playing Iield. King recoils Irom such like a vampire Irom a coming sunrise.
SCR Rule 110. Subpoena power, production oI documents, witnesses, and pretrial
proceedings.
1. Issuance oI subpoenas by hearing panels and bar counsel. Bar counsel and a member
oI
a hearing panel who is also a state bar member, in matters under investigation by either,
may
administer oaths and aIIirmations and issue and compel by subpoena the attendance oI
witnesses
and the production oI pertinent books, papers, and documents. The attorney may also
compel by subpoena the attendance oI witnesses and the production oI pertinent books,
papers,
and other documents beIore a hearing panel. Subpoena and witness Iees and mileage
shall be the same as in a district court.
2. ConIidentiality stated on subpoena. Subject to the provisions oI Rule 121, subpoenas
shall clearly indicate on their Iace that they are issued in connection with a conIidential
investigation
under these rules and that it is regarded as contempt oI the supreme court or
grounds Ior discipline under these rules Ior a person subpoenaed to in any way breach
the conIidentiality
oI the investigation. It shall not be regarded as a breach oI conIidentiality Ior a
person subpoenaed to consult with counsel or to answer questions asked by bar counsel
or the
attorney to determine the Iacts known by the witness.
3. Attachment oI person Ior Iailure to obey subpoena or produce documents. Whenever
any person subpoenaed to appear and give testimony or to produce books, papers, or
other
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documents as required by subpoena, or requested to provide documents pursuant to
Rule
78.5(1)(b), reIuses to appear or testiIy beIore a hearing panel, or to answer any pertinent
or
proper questions, or to provide the requested documents, that person shall be deemed in
contempt
oI the disciplinary board, and the chair oI the disciplinary board shall report the Iact to a
district judge oI the county in which the hearing is being held or the investigation
conducted.
The district court shall promptly issue an attachment in the Iorm usual in the court,
directed to
the sheriII oI the county, commanding the sheriII to attach such person and bring such
person
Iorthwith beIore the court. On the return oI the attachment, and the production oI the
person
attached, the district court shall have jurisdiction oI the matter; and the person charged
may
purge himselI or herselI oI the contempt in the same way, and the same proceedings
shall be
had, and the same penalties may be imposed, and the same punishment inIlicted as in
the case
oI a witness subpoenaed to appear and give evidence on the trial oI a civil cause beIore
a district
court oI the State oI Nevada.
4. Contest oI subpoena. A contest oI a subpoena shall be heard and determined by the
chair
oI the appropriate disciplinary board.
5. Restriction on discovery. Discovery by the attorney, other than under Rule 105(2)(c),
is
not permitted prior to hearing, except by the order oI the chair Ior good cause upon
motion under
Rule 103(5) or Rule 103(6).
6. Prehearing conIerence. At the discretion oI the chair, a prehearing conIerence may be
ordered Ior the purpose oI obtaining admissions or otherwise narrowing the issues
presented
by the pleadings. The conIerence may be held beIore the chair or the chair's designee.
7. Deposition in lieu oI appearance. With the approval oI the chair, testimony may be
taken
by deposition or by commission iI the witness is not subject to subpoena or is unable to
attend
or testiIy at the hearing because oI age, illness, or other inIirmity.
8. ConIidentiality oI deposition. Depositions are subject to the protective requirements
and
conIidentiality provided in Rule 121.
CREDIT(S)
Added, eII. Feb. 15, 1979. As amended, eII. Jan. 2, 1996; Mar. 1, 2007.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Attorney and Client 47.1.
Westlaw Topic No. 45.
C.J.S. Attorney and Client 73, 89.
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-Judge Beesley's testimony on 11/14/12 is curious in light oI the solid thumbs up he gave the no temporary
suspension getting Stephen R. Harris, in 57507, and the Iact that Judge Beesley was hard pressed to provide
a single detail in support oI his strong contentions that Coughlin's work and Iilings beIore him in the NVB
indicated Coughlin not competent to practice there. Coughlin is a National Merit Finalist who was ranked
10th in his class at a top 80 law school, has been a licensed Patent Attorney, and passed the July 2001 State
Bar oI Nevada's Bar Examination a year beIore those matriculating as Iull time students with him to UNLV's
Boyd School oI Law in August 2001 would even take that examination, meaning he passed it aIter his
second year oI law school. Further, the attached Iilings by Coughlin beIore Judge Beesley in the NVB
clearly demonstrate a skill level beyond the baseline competency required to practice therein, something all
the more impressive given they represent the very Iirst two or three bankruptcy cases Coughlin ever took on.
It is literally a textbook example oI a solo attorney starting out and not taking on too many cases, suIIicient
to be able to extricate himselI and his client's Irom even the most unexpected calamities and circumstances
Ioisted upon them by the misconduct oI others (including having Judge Beelsey's McGeorge SOL 1977
classmate RMC Judge Nash Holmes (who was sued Ior wiretapping attorney Martin Weiner or Crowley,
Esq.), whom unlawIully and, apparently in conjunction with her Iormer coworkers at the WCDA OIIice (and
NNDB Panel Member Mary Kandaras was intimately involved in the process...in Iact WCSO Deputy
Madeline reIused to return the smart phone and sd card to Coughlin even aIter Judge Nash Holmes' Order
required the WCSO do so...with Madeline indicating she needed to get Mary Kandaras' permission Iirst
beIore complying with Judge Nash Holmes order (Iunny, didn't see Madeline getting hemmed up with an
instant incarceration and summary criminal contempt charge there...)...shortly aIter (and Pam Wilmore, Esq.
was there and heard all oI this, though her partnership or sharing oI an oIIice with McGeorge SOL 1985
John Springgate, Esq (opposing consel in 54844 April 2009 Judge Linda Gardner sanction order getting
Coughlin Iired in 60302 Irom WLS) may prevent too clear a recounting...Then WCSO Deputy Hodge got
caught in a, uh, story, about whether the micro sd card was included in the materials booked and then in the
materials released to Coughlin's Iriend, whom picke them up on 2/28/12 (interestingly...Coughlin's smart
phone and micro sd card were booked into Coughlin's property upon intake at the jail...but a Iull day later the
RMC Marshals returned (and Marshal Scott Coppa seemed to communicate and intent to do so to WCSO
Deputy Cheung when he pulled him aside into a back room in the sally bay during the conclusion oI the
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RMC Marshals transporting Coughlin to the WCDC o 2/27/12....Then Marshals Coppa and Marshal
Townsend retaliated against Coughlin's valid complaints thereto (and other criticisms oI the extent to whih
the RMC is a monument to a lack oI transparency or separation between the court's Departments and the
Court's Iiling oIIice) by Iiling a nonsensical criticism oI Coughlin's clothin choices when visiting a muni
court Iiling oIIice counter to check on a traIIic citation with the SBN...which King promptly mentioned to
Coughlin in a deliberately misleading way, via King's 3/23/12 email to Coughlin (King plays little games
with the moniker "Clerk oI Court"....King, Marilyn Tognoni is not a "Clerk oI Court"...neither is Cassandra
Jackson...and neither King nor Second Judicial District Clerk oI Court Joey Orduna that likely wound up in
Judge Flanagan issuing a rash ruling on 3/30/12 disposing oI Coughlin's appeal in the Richard G. Hill, Esq.
appeal oI the summary conviction Irom Coughlin's Iormer hom
(so as Ior cooking up a Panel...Susich and King got Panel Chair John Echeverria, whom had to admit he and
WLS's Paul Elcano were boyhood chums and that both went to StanIord University in 1966 (add to that the
Iact that Echeverria went to Hastings Law School along with WLS's Caryn Sternlicht (whom Coughlin is
suing, along with Elcano in 60302) and Reno City Attorney Pamela Roberts, Esq (whose prosecutorial
misconduct in putting on perjured testiomny by Wal-Mart's Thomas Frontino and the Reno Sparks Indian
Colony's Kameron CrawIord (asserting that a custodial arrest and search incident thereto was permissible,
despite NRS 171.1255 on some assertion that Coughlin Iailed to provide his driver's license...even where
Roberts herselI was given the "Interrogation Room" videos by Wal-Mart showing Coughlin giving his
driver's license to OIIicer CrawIord, whereupon CrawIord copies down the inIormation thereIrom onto the
Arrest Report and Probable Cause sheet and radios into his dispatch Coughlin's Nevada driver's license
number...add to that the Iact that Coughlin's detention intake property sheet lists that he was booked into jail
with his Nevada driver's license...and OIIicer CrawIord and Thomas Frontino's lies are clearly exposed,
which Pamela Robert's purposeIully allowed them to tell in her retaliatory rush to get a conviction shortly
aIter she back out oI a written agreement to a continuance...and where Judge Howard speciIically based his
reIusual to grant Coughlin a continuance upon his mistaken/incorrect belieI that it was Coughlin whom was
responsible Ior the 11/14/12 Trial date being continued. Judge Howard had to admit, later, on the record,
that he was mistaken in that regard (so instead oI declaring a mistrial, Judge Howard just admitted his
mistake and proceeded with putting Coughlin in jail Ior 3 days Ior NRS 22.030 "summary contempt" despite
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Judge Howard having Iailed to grant Coughlin's motion Ior counsel, even though the Nevada Courts oI
Limited Jurisdiction Bench Book points out that Aigersinger is mandatory authority, and thereIore,
appointed counsel is required where even the possibility oI jail time exits. In his pre-trial Order denying
Coughlin's Sixth Amendment Right, Howard ruled that Coughlin was not entitled to counsel, even where he
had established he was indigent (and evicted just days prior thereto) because "jail time is not the typical
sentence" Ior Iirst oIIense shopliIting oI a de minimis amount oI fooa. However, it is important to note that
Judge Howard did not rule out the possibility oI jail time, and thereIore Aignersinger applies. Further, Judge
Howard, who had been occupying the RMC Bench Ior 14 years at that point, announced during the rendition
oI his conviction order that, not only was the summary contempt conviction not appealable (and, oI course
no stay would be availalbe...the RMC having a perogative to expedite matters beIore it an all (so much so
that Judge Howard kept a supposedly Iinancially strapped City oI Reno StaII oI RMC Marshals and RMC
Court StaII in court on overtime pay until 9:00 pm at night in his mad rush to conclude the petty larceny
trial, Iirst oIIense, oI a de minimis amount oI fooa, Irom a megaconglomerate corporation, where the arrest
was made in violation oI NRS 171.1255, by tribal police, on land that police Iorce's employers (the Reno
Sparks Indian Colony) rent to Wal-Mart. Judge Howard reIused Coughlin (then a licensed attorney whose
property right, his law license, under the Fourteenth Amendment, would necessarily be imperiled upon an
SCR 111(6) "serious oIIense" conviction (stealing a grape would invoked that rule according to Pat
King...though Stephen R. Harris stealing $740,000 Irom his clients and using it on hookers and designer
luxury products did not, nor did it result in a temporary suspension either...and it didn't prevent Judge
Beesley Irom singing the praises oI Stephen R. Harris, Esq. in 57507 even where an improperly noticed
phoned in testiony by Judge Beesley at Coughlin's Discipilinary Hearing saw Judge Beesely (who had to
admit that he had a longtime long partnership relationship with someone Coughlin is suing, Washoe Legal
Service's Karen Sabo, Esq., whom admitted to Paul Elcano that she could never, and would never work with
Caryn Sternlicht, Esq., Iinding her personality so odious and detestable...though Ms. Sabo had no issues
expecting Coughlin to cheerIully bare the brunt oI such while he worked as a domestic violence attorney at
WLS...Also Judge Beesley is a close Iriend oI Paul Elcano's, attending a very intimate West Fourth Street
Bistro invite only WLS party in 2008 at Elcano's invitation. Upon Coughlin cross examing Judge Beesley as
to just what he was basing his sudden (and never beIore had Judge Beesley actually made and ruling or
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otherwise voiced any consternation whatsoever to Coughlin about his work respresenting client's beIore the
NVB...so it was a zero to trash Coughlin as a Disciplinary Hearing approach by the measured, impartial
jurist Beesley, who graduate Irom McGeorge SOL in 1979, right between two other witnesses at Coughlin's
11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing cook-oII thrown by Chair Echeverria and Pat King (whom wore cargo pants
to work that day, whereupon he asked the Panel to aisbar Coughlin based upon a petty larceny conviction oI
a candy bar, a criminal trespass convction that only saw a SCR 111(4) Petition (ie, King had to admit it did
not qualiIy as a "serious oIIense" despite his trying to Iind leverage by threateing to Iile an SCR 111(6) Ior
months) even where opposing counsel in this summary eviction Irom Coughlin's Iormer home law oIIice
was applying an unlawIul rent distraint under NRS 118A.520 to exculpatory videos and materials that would
demonstrate Coughlin's innosence and the Iact that on occasions previous to the 9/9/12 arrest, including on
July 7th, 2011, West 7th St Wal-Mart Assistant Store Manager John Ellis and an as yet to be indentiIied AP
Associate speciIicaly told Coughlin that they would retaliate against him via an abuse oI process (oI course
Judge Howard ruled that, even iI they did, that was not relevant) (supplemented to King's Designation oI
Witnesses 4 days beIore the Hearing oI 11/14/12, along with Judge Beesley, despite neither having anything
to testiIy to that Pat King did not know about Ior over six months...its just that, Pat King got real worried
about the Iact that he violated SCR 121 by communicating to Coughlin's then client and or his wiIe, Peter
Eastman and Pam Eastman that Judge Beesley (McGeorge SOL, class oI 1979) had issued an order
prohibiting Coughlin Irom practicing in the Nevada Bankruptcy Court Ior the District oI Nevada (which is
absolutely not true...and even iI Judge Beesley had actually wanted to at that time...he would not have the
authority to...but there is plenty oI evidence that Judge Beesley had no such intention towards any such
Order at the time oI the May 7th, 2012 communication by Peter Eastman to Coughlin that revealed that Bar
Counsel Patrick O. King has told the Eastman's that their then attorney, Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq., had been
"suspended Irom practicing in the Bankruptcy Court" in light oI Judge Beesley entering an Order so
preventing Coughlin Irom doing so. King, during a meeting with Coughlin and King's boss, ChieI Bar
Counsel David Clark on August 17th, 2012 (a three hour meeting) grew Ilustered upon Coughlin querying
him on his quizzical stated intent to have Coughlin disbarred...whence Coughlin asked King just what sins
supported such a motive...amongst the Iirst two things King mentioned to Coughlin and Clark was the Iact
that the NVB Judge Beesley had entered an Order prohibiting Coughlin Irom practicing in Bankruptcy
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Court....This was "news" to Coughlin, whom had never been served any such Order, and had never heard
any such thing besides Irom his Iormer clients (the Eastman's, whom were extremely late in making a
number oI payments to Coughlin in exchange Ior his hard work and respresentation oI Peter
Eastman)...Shortly aIter Coughlin was told oI Bar Counsel's violation oI SCR 121. Incident to Judge
Beesley (McGeorge School oI Law, class oI 1979) presiding over the Cadle Company v. Robert Keller
adversary proceedig in NVB (10-05104) Coughlin Iiled a Motion For Continuance wherein he attached
materials revealing that Judge Beesley's McGeorge School oI Law classmate, Reno Municipal Court Judge
Dorothy Nash Holmes (McGeorge School oI Law 1977) had violated Nevada law in purporting to rule that
NRS 22.010 was "the misdemeanor oI criminal contempt" (actually, criminal contempt in Nevada is Iound at
NRS 199.340...but that statute doesns't speciIically allow Ior a "summary" Iinding oI guilt, so, instead, Judge
Nash Holmes too the bits she liked out oI it, then renamed it NRS 22.010
NRS 22.010 Acts or omissions constituting contempts. The Iollowing acts or omissions shall be
deemed contempts:
1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while the judge is holding court,
or engaged in judicial duties at chambers, or toward masters or arbitrators while sitting on a
reIerence or arbitration, or other judicial proceeding.
2. A breach oI the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance in the presence oI the court, or
in its immediate vicinity, tending to interrupt the due course oI the trial or other judicial
proceeding.
3. Disobedience or resistance to any lawIul writ, order, rule or process issued by the court or judge
at chambers.
4. Disobedience oI a subpoena duly served, or reIusing to be sworn or answer as a witness.
5. Rescuing any person or property in the custody oI an oIIicer by virtue oI an order or process oI
such court or judge at chambers.
6. Disobedience oI the order or direction oI the court made pending the trial oI an action, in
speaking to or in the presence oI a juror concerning an action in which the juror has been
impaneled to determine, or in any manner approaching or interIering with such juror with the intent
to inIluence the verdict.
7. Abusing the process or proceedings oI the court or Ialsely pretending to act under the authority
oI an order or process oI the court.
NRS 22.030 Summary punishment oI contempt committed in immediate view and presence oI
court; aIIidavit or statement to be Iiled when contempt committed outside immediate view and
presence oI court; disqualiIication oI judge.
1. II a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence oI the court or judge at
chambers, the contempt may be punished summarily. II the court or judge summarily punishes a
person Ior a contempt pursuant to this subsection, the court or judge shall enter an order that:
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(a) Recites the Iacts constituting the contempt in the immediate view and presence oI the court or
judge;
(b) Finds the person guilty oI the contempt; and
(c) Prescribes the punishment Ior the contempt.
2. II a contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence oI the court or judge at
chambers, an aIIidavit must be presented to the court or judge oI the Iacts constituting the
contempt, or a statement oI the Iacts by the masters or arbitrators.
3. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, iI a contempt is not committed in the immediate
view and presence oI the court, the judge oI the court in whose contempt the person is alleged to be
shall not preside at the trial oI the contempt over the objection oI the person. The provisions oI this
subsection do not apply in:
(a) Any case where a Iinal judgment or decree oI the court is drawn in question and such judgment
or decree was entered in such court by a predecessor judge thereoI 10 years or more preceding the
bringing oI contempt proceedings Ior the violation oI the judgment or decree.
(b) Any proceeding described in subsection 1 oI NRS 3.223, whether or not a Iamily court has been
established in the judicial district.
NRS 199.340 Criminal contempt. Every person who shall commit a contempt oI court oI any one
oI the Iollowing kinds shall be guilty oI a misdemeanor:
1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior committed during the sitting oI the court, in its
immediate view and presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the
respect due to its authority;
2. Behavior oI like character in the presence oI a reIeree, while actually engaged in a trial or
hearing pursuant to an order oI court, or in the presence oI a jury while actually sitting in the trial
oI a cause or upon an inquest or other proceeding authorized by law;
3. Breach oI the peace, noise or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings oI
a court, jury or reIeree;
4. WillIul disobedience to the lawIul process or mandate oI a court;
5. Resistance, willIully oIIered, to its lawIul process or mandate;
6. Contumacious and unlawIul reIusal to be sworn as a witness or, aIter being sworn, to answer
any legal and proper interrogatory;
7. Publication oI a Ialse or grossly inaccurate report oI its proceedings; or
8. Assuming to be an attorney or oIIicer oI a court or acting as such without authority.
But, actually, contrary to Judge Beesley's sworn testimony at the 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing,
Judge Beesley could have somehow ruled in a manner seeking to regulate Coughlin's appearances beIore his
Court, or providing, in any manner whatsoever, some indication to Coughlin as to any sort oI displeasure
with Coughlin's perIormances therein (which Judge Beesley absolutely never did) prior to Judge Beesley
(upon being supplemented to the Designation oI Witnesses list Iour days prior to the 11/14/12 Disciplinary
Hearing related to Coughlin's lawsuit against WLS and Paul Elcano (McGeorge SOL, Class oI 1978, and
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thereIore a classmate oI both Judge Beesley and Judge Nash Holmes, in addition to a class mate oI Panel
Member Stephen Smiley (McGeorge SOL, Class oI 1980, whom., therIore, was necessarily a class mate oI
RMC Judge Kenneth Howard (McGeorge SOL, class oI 1981....and speaking oI Panel Member Kent...he
glared at Coughlin continuously throughout the 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing and upon Pat King being
caught in several lies that day (King told the panel an Order , the one that got Coughlin Iired Irom Washoe
Legal Services over three years ago but which suddenly became a grievance when teh RMC Judges decided
to do their hit piece on Coughlin's liIe and law license because they got scared that their Court and the
Municipality that owns it, and the police Iorce and Marshals that is leverages against the citizenry to collect
a tax disguised as justice (and the RMC had $700K or so turn up missin' in 2011, and explained that away by
saying the shortIall was do to data entry errors and stuII) was a certiIied copy when it was not....no matter,
Elcano's boyhood chum and Iellow StanIord '66 alumni Panel Chair Echeverria allowed Elcano to provide
certiIication oI the Order in light oI Elcano claiming to have "reviewed the video tape oI the Trial" (which
Echeverria tried to remix into "having attended the Trial" that led to Coughlin Iiling a Mandamus Petition
against Judge Linda Gardner in 54844... Which was odd considering that Chair Echeverria reIused to admit
into evidence the certiIied copy oI the audio oI the 11 TR 26800 traIIic citation trial on 2/27/12 Couglin
oIIered into evidence (Chair Echeverria reIused to allow Coughlin to testiIyin to it being a certiIied copy or
otherwise even look at the cd itselI which Coughlin had to have his mother buy Irom the Reno Muncipal
Court aIter months oI the RMC and Judge Nash Holmes reIusing to let Coughlin purchase a copy oI it. That
certiIied copy was to be used to impeach the lies by Judge Nash Holmes in the traIIic citation trial Holmes
held despite her admitting (see the 3/14/12 grievance against Coughlin Judge Nash Holmes sent to the SBN
"on behalI oI all the RMC Judges"...which is odd because one oI those Judges William Gardner tried to
pretend he wasn't aware oI that, and just barely contained himselI Irom holding the trespass trial on
4/10/12....though he did manage to violate NRS 178.405 numerous other times himselI (including the 3/8/12
trial setting, and teh March 8th, 2012 Trial Setting the matter Ior 6/18/12 despite the Order on the
Competency Evaluation not having been signed and entered until 5/9/12....yet Judge Nash Holmes
constantly seeks to play hype man to some alleged "authority" and proIound knowledge she Ieels she
possesses with respect to mental health care and competency issues in general. Tell that to her 3/14/12
grievance to the SBN, wherein she manages to write:
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"This letter constitutes a Ionnal complaint oI attorney misconduct and/or
disability against Zachary Barker Coughlin. The accompanying box oI materials
demonstrates some oI the problems with the practice oI this attorney being
experienced by myselI and the other three judges in Reno Municipal Court . My
two most recent Orders in what should be a simple traIIic citation case are selI-
explanatory and are included, together with copies oI massive documents Mr.
Coughlin has Iax-Iiled to our court in this case. Audio recordings of two of my
hearings in this matter are also included. He Iailed to appear Ior the second one
this past Monday. I have another traIIic case pending trial with him that was re-
assigned to me based on our Department 1 judge being out Ior surgery. We have
multiple addresses Ior Mr. Coughlin and can't seem to locate him between cases
very easily. We are setting that case for trial and attempting to serve him at
the most recent address we have (1422 E. 9th St #2, Reno NY 89512),
although I heard today he may be living in his vehicle somewhere. We do
have an address Ior his mother, however, as she recently posted part of a fine
for him. Judge Ken Howard Department 4 had case on Mr. Coughlin late last year
that is now on appeal to the Second Judicial District Court Judge Linda Gardner,
Department 2, also has a matter currently pending in his court with Mr. Coughlin
as the deIendant. I have enclosed some copies oI documents Irom those matters,
in chronological order, simply because they appear to demonstrate that he is
quickly decompensating in his mental status. Our staII also made you some audio
tapes oI Coughlin hearings in Departments 2 and 4 so you can hear Ior yourselI
how this attorney acts in court. You can see his behavior in my traIIic citation
case does not appear to be an isolated incident.
You will the Iull cooperation oI myselI the other judges, and the staII oI
Reno Municipal Court in your pursuit oI this matter. Mr. Coughlin has positioned
himselI as a vexatious litigant in our court, antagonizing the staII and even our pro
temp judges on the most simple traIIic and misdemeanor matters. I do think this is
a case oI some urgency and I apologize Ior taking two days to get this package to
you; our IT person was ill and could not make the copies oI the audios oI Mr.
Coughlin's hearings until today, and I Ielt it was important that the audios be
included in the materials to be considered by the State Bar. On February 27, 201
Mr. Coughlin told me he was actively practicing law and had appointments with
clients. I do not know iI that was true, but iI so, he could be causing serious harm
to the practice oI law in Northern Nevada and could be jeopardizing someone's
Ireedom or property interests. Please contact me iI you need any other
inIormation. My direct line is 775-334-3823 and my cell phone is 775-250-0330"
And regardless oI whether the materials the RMC's Nash Holmes provided King
are certiIied (good gawd they should be considering what it is she is trying to do with
them!, Coughlin was entitled to have them admitted Ior the purpose oI showing what King
was provided by Nash Holmes with "the Iull cooperation oI" her and "the ohter three RMC
Judges"
AT the 11/14/12 Hearing Judge Nash Holmes lied when she testiIied that she
"started asking Coughlin questions about whether he was recording the proceeding or
whether he had a recordign device and he immediately go all sneakity and then said no, he
was not and didn't have a recording device, then he switched up his story and said that
was, get this, a "FiIth Amendment" thing...then he immediately asked to go to the
restroom, and I let him, but ORder RMC Marshal Harley to go with him, and reIused to
allow Coughlin to take anything with him, even his yellow legal pad, and Marshal Harley
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reported to me that Coughlin disassembled a smart phone or recording device in the
restroom and hid parts oI it there, which the Marshals later discovered aIter Coughlin was
handcuIIed and arrested, and I think Coughlin probably lied about whether he was
recording the proceeding, so I Iound by "clear and convincing" evidence that Coughlin
violated all these rules oI proIessional conduct that I conversed with Bar Counsel about,
and I am not trying to take Bar Counsel's place or nothin', but I am just tryin' a chip in an
do my part to make the public saIe Irom this "attorney" whose writing is the most
Irightening and unorthdox display oI immense, immense talent that I have ever had the
misIortune oI having been subjected to..." (Chair Echeverria was terriIied oI the prosepct
oI the cook oII, er, Disciplinary Hearing being recorded, and reIused to allow Coughlin to
do so, lying that it was being record by the court reporter, though now Sunshine
Reporting, whose reporte Carol Hummel did the trancribing, is saying no recording was
made, and that, yes RMC "exclusive"transcritpinist Pam Longoni is amongst there
employees and that (and this combines with 1udge Linda Gardner's current and then
deputy on the April 2009 trial being the deputy assigned the the 11/14/12 Discipinary
Hearing (what did I tell you? Can Patty Ice stacks a deck for hisself or what?
Tommy Susich, too. You just don't mess with the NV DETR or Maureen Cole, right
Tommy?). See attached materials related to the RMC and Longonis continuously
violating Nevada law in NRS 189.010-050 regarding the preparation of criminal
indigents transcripts on appeal.
TRANSCRIPTS ON APPEAL/OTHERS CASSANDRA 1ACKSON Interim Court
Adminisu-ator 1'UST1i'i ROPEI Chief Marshal - Depanmcnt of Alternative Sentenc
ing If you wish to order a transcript of your proceedings in the Reno Municipal
Court, you may do so by contacting Pam Longoni at (775) 530-5251. The following
information is provided to assist you in placing an order for a transcript: I. Orders
will require the date of the court appearance, type of proceeding, (trial, arraignment,
etc.), department number in which the proceeding was held, and also include the
appropriate deposit as indicated below. Payment may be made by check or money
order. No transcript will be prepared until the required deposit is received. ---~
7..,eost. Appeal transeripts are billed at $4.10 per page, which includes an original (to
be filed willi District Court), one copy for the appeilant, and one copy for the
opposing counsel. Transcripts ordered for purposes other than appeal, where only
one copy and original transcript is required, are billed at $3.00 per page. 3. Deposits.
Deposits required are as follows: $75.00 for arraignment/sentencing; a minimum
deposit of$200.00 for any trial transcript; and a minimum deposit of$500.00 for very
lengthy trials (those lasting more than three hours). NO TRANSCRIPT IS
CONSIDERED TO BE OFFICIALLY ORDERED, AND COMMENCEMENT OF
TRANSCRIPTION WILL NOT BEGIN, UNTIL RECEIPT OF THE REQUIRED
DEPOSIT. 4. Follow-up on Transcript Preparation. You will be notified when your
transcript has been prepared. If the actual cost of the transcript is less than the
amount of the deposit paid, a iefund will he issued with the transcript. And, likewise,
any outstanding balance due after completion of the transcript must be paid before
the Original is filed with District Court or any copies released. 0 refunds of deposits
will be given for transcripts once they have been prepared and no responsibility will
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be taken for the dismissal of any -appeal by District Court because no Original was
filed due to non payment of an out~ !and ing balance due. 5. Questions. Pam Longoni
will be happy to answer any qustions you may have"
Panel Chair Ilat out reIused to let a single piece oI evidence be admitted that would in any way call
into legitimacy the convictions at issue in that Disciplinary Hearing. Supreme Court has obligation in
disciplinary proceeding to look beyond label given to attorney's conviction to true nature oI Iacts, in order to
determine whether underlying circumstances oI conviction warrant discipline. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 111, subd.
3. State Bar oI Nevada v. Claiborne, 1988, 756 P.2d 464, 104 Nev. 115. Attorney And Client 39 2.
Indictment Where the only relevant Iactual allegation contained in Disciplinary Board's aIIidavit, Iiled in
support oI its petition Ior attorney's temporary suspension Irom the practice oI law, was that a criminal
indictment had been Iiled against the attorney, this sole allegation, without more, was insuIIicient to justiIy
summary suspension and the immediate imposition oI temporary restrictions. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rules 102, subd.
4(a), 111, subd. 1. Matter oI Monteiro, 1984, 684 P.2d 506, 100 Nev. 440. Attorney And Client 48 3. Serious
crime Attorney was not convicted oI 'serious crime within meaning oI rule regarding attorney suspension
where attorney did not engage in any criminal conduct whatsoever, did not engage in a conspiracy, and
actually entered plea oI nolo contendere to nonexistent oIIense Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 111, subd. 2. Sloan v.
State Bar oI Nevada, 1986, 726 P.2d 330, 102 Nev. 436. Attorney And Client 39 4. Suspension oI rule In
interest oI justice, Supreme Court suspended court rule requiring it to order suspension oI attorney upon
receipt oI certiIicate oI his conviction where attorney was impeached Iederal judge, who was arguably
beyond Supreme Court's jurisdiction, and attorney had voluntarily reIrained Irom practice oI law aIter his
release Irom incarceration, pending resolution oI disciplinary proceeding. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 111. State Bar
oI Nevada v. Claiborne, 1988, 756 P.2d 464, 104 Nev. 115. Attorney And Client 39
Further, SBN Bar Counsel King lied continuously to Coughlin, every step along the way, in the
disciplinary matter. King's lies are too numerous to Iully detail here, but, one was with regard to the
Iollowing, where King wrote to Coughlin about two grievances and an "Order" he had received: "The
grievances include supporting evidence in the Iorm oI: audio oI your conduct in court proceedings. I am
enclosing with this letter copies oI a grievance letter, Irom the Municipal Court and a copy oI an Order
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from District Court Please respond to allegations pertaining to your conduct. I will make available Ior your
review and inspection the supporting documents and audio recordings." King lied Ior months about this
purported oIIer to "make available Ior your review and inspection the supporting documents and audio
recordings". Simply put, Pat King is a cheap cheater. He cheats constantly in his role as Bar Counsel,
perverting and descreatign SCR 105(2)(c) at every turn, lying constantly to opposing counsel and
Respondent's (King told Coughlin that David Clark had given Coughlin permission to issue subpoenas Ior
the Disciplinary Hearing, suspended attorney or not, only to then Iile Ex Parte Motions to Quash the
Subpoenas based upon their not being issued by a licensed attorney...and Chair Echeverria grants King's Ex
Parte Motions the day they are Iiled...but admits to having not even bothered to read those Iiled by Coughlin.
Clearly, stogie smokin' Boss Hog Echeverri had Iailed to review the multitude oI materials Coughlin
provided him. And clearly King had lied (and in Iact, once caught doing so at the hearing, was reduced to
back peddling Iuriously) to Coughlin (as did Peters) when they asserted that everything Coughlin Iiled with
the SBN was copied and provided to all the Panel Members (whose addresses the SBN reIused to provide to
Coughlin, as did the SBN reIuse to provide any set oI rules oI procedure that the Panel had adopted under
SCR 105. King was caught at the Hearing upon cross examination by Coughlin, having to admit that he did
not provide the CD/DVD's that Coughlin attached to his various Iilings. Panel Member Stephen Kent
responded by announcing that he did not care that King lied about copying the Panel members on the
cd/dvds attached as exhibits to Coughlin's Iiling and that, even iI King had so attached those cd/dvds, Kent
wouldn't have review them anywas. However, 1980 graduate oI McGeorge School oI Law Stephen Smiley
Kent, Esq. (a perIect choice by King and Susich Ior the Panel given the apparent connection to Mike Smiley
Rowe, Esq (whom Coughlin named in a grievance related to the Iraudulent conduct by the SBN incident to
his application Ior admission) and the act that, a McGeorge SOL 1980 graduate would necessarily have
strong ties to Judge Howard (McGeorge '81), Keith Loomis (McGeorge '82, and Ior whom the grievance
Coughlin Iiled against King disposed oI with great quickness and shallow rationale), as well as Judge Nash
Holmes, McGeorge '77, Judge Beesley, McGeorge '79, WLS's Paul Elcano, McGeorge '78, etc., etc.. Kent,
besides glaring at Couglhin throughout the Disciplinary Hearing also attempted to take the spotlight oII the
lie that Coughlin had just caught Bar Counsel King and Clerk Peters in when the Panel members and King
admitted that King and the SBN had Iailed to provide copies oI the exhibits Coughlin attached to his Iilings,
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despite the SBN having agreed to do so and represented to Coughlin that it would. Kent announced,
brazenly, that he didn't care iI King copied him or the panel on the attachments to Coughlin's Iilings or that
King has indicated to the Panel that he was so copying the Panel on the entirety oI Coughlin's Iilings, yet did
not point out that he actuall, was not, choosing to excise the dvd/cd attachments to those Iilings (and it does
not seem clear that King even did in Iact have teh SBN copy the Panel member on all oI Coughlin's Iilings,
particulary where Laura Peters had previously told Coughlin he could Iile by email or Iax, and that the SBN
would never attempt to assert that the 8/23/12 certiIied mailing would be prooI oI or return oI service. Once
the SBN makes a representation, SCR 109 goes out the window, and it is shameIul that Pat King was Iully
aware oI that representation, and co-signed by his September 25th, 2012 attempts to get Coughlin to show
up the the SBN Ior a hearing that was noticed and calendared to Coughlin and Susich Ior 9/25/12...only Ior
King to reIuse to hold the hearing, and instead seek to jam a bunch oI other matters into a "combo-hearing"
including pending criminal charges in violation oI Monteiro. Furhter Burleigh was violated in ever way due
process wise, and the Panel outright Ilouted Nevada Law by reIusing to recognize Claiborned. And so
curious how the dismissal oI this appeal is not signed by a Justice, and occurs just in time Ior the
Disciplinary Hearing. (to go along with Michael Johnson apparently checking his twitter or Iacebook
acount on his smartphone Ior most oI the day....the only Panel members who displayed any proIessionalism
at all were Clark Vellis, Esq. and laymember Karen Pearl, though it was entirely inappropriate Ior any oI
them to agree to sit Ior the hearing at all given the per se violations oI SCR 105(2)(c), and thus, the total lack
oI jurisdiction to hold such a hearing. He is literally the cheapest, sleaziest attorney I have ever come across
in my liIe...and I have dealt with Richard G. Hill, Esq. and Casey Baker, Esq. Pat King is literally more
chicanerous than anyone I have every witnessed in my liIe. He has this Disciplinary Hearing thing sewn up
to the point where he revels in SCR 106 immunity so much so that he brazenly lies at every turn, and
encourages, and oIten Iorces "Clerk oI Court/Investigator" Laura Peters to lie as well, which she does readily
and oIten (telling Coughlin that she had the authority to and di so grant Coughlin the right to issue and have
served subpoenas without paying witness Iees, and Iurther, that Respondent's never pay witness Iees in these
Disciplinary Hearings (good luck Iiguring out which rules apply, as clearly the NRCP do not, given Chair
Echeverrias utter disregard Ior the NRCP and all oI SCR 105(2)(c), typically done while Echeverria cackles
and smiles menacingly at the Respondent, plays grab ass with his boyhood chum Elcano, and smokes a big
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old stogie, Boss Hog style during the numerous "breaks" he insisted were a better use oI the time Ior a
Hearing than aIIording Couglin an opportunity to, say, ask Judge Nash Holmes question about her
participation in the "clandestine status conIerence" on 2/27/12 wherein the Order Ior Competency Evaluation
was directed to Coughlin in rcr2012-065630 or the "strategy sessions" and "meetings" the RMC Judges and
court appointed deIenders (like Loomis and City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens,Esq admit to having with Judge
William Gardner in the morning, secret to Coughlin prior to the 4/10/12 Trial date in the trespass matter
(which was set Ior Trial by Loomis and the RMC on 3/8/12 at a time when both tyhe RMC, Judge W.
Garnder, Loomis, and City Attorney Hazlett-Stevens knew Iull well that there was the 2/27/12 Order Ior
Competency Evaluation pending against Coughlin in RCR2012-065630 (and NRS 178.405 vis a vis NRS
5.010, in combination with Judge Nash Holmes accustation "on behalI oI all RMC Judges" in her 3/14/12
greivannce against Coughlin (and Judge W. Gardner lied on the record during the April 10th, 2012 "Trial"
and Motion Hearing in 11 CR 26405 when he alleged that none oI Judge Nash Holmes Orders or her
grievance letter the the SBN mentioned any "competency" issues related to Coughlin. Perhaps what is so
distrubing is the extent to which these Judges lies are so easily disproven, indicating they have very little
regard Ior the idea that this judicial system will ever take them to task Ior so doing. (and he reIused to allow
Coughlin more than and hour and a halI to put on his case, most oI which was, oI course, wasted listening to
Echeverria rule as irrelevant or inadmissible every single piece oI evidence Coughlin sought to introduce,
even a certiIied copy oI the audio oI the Trial n 11 TR 26800 that would prove that Judge Dorothy Nash
Holmes lied and lied during her testimony. Not only did Coughlin have the audio cd that King Iinally gave
to him
SCR Rule 105. Procedure on receipt oI complaint.
2. Commencement oI Iormal proceedings. Formal
disciplinary proceedings are commenced by bar counsel
Iiling a written complaint in the name oI the state bar. The
complaint shall be suIIiciently clear and speciIic to inIorm
the attorney oI the charges against him or her and the
underlying conduct supporting the charges. A copy oI the
complaint shall be served on the attorney and it shall direct
that a veriIied response or answer be served on bar counsel
within 20 days oI service; the original shall be Iiled with
bar counsel's oIIice. The time to respond may be
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extended once by the chair for not more than 20 days
for good cause or upon stipulation of the parties. In the
event the attorney Iails to plead, the charges shall be
deemed admitted; provided, however, that an attorney who
Iails to respond within the time provided may thereaIter
obtain permission oI the appropriate disciplinary board
chair to do so, iI Iailure to Iile is attributable to mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
(a) Challenges to and ad hoc appointments of panel
members. The complaint shall be served with the list of
members of the appropriate disciplinary board. The
attorney, or each iI more than one, and bar counsel may
exercise Iive peremptory challenges each to the people on
the list by delivering such in writing to bar counsel on or
beIore the date a response to the complaint is due. "
(COUGHLIN HEREBY EXCERCISE HIS RIGHT TO
PEREMPTORILY REMOVE PANEL CHAIR
ECHEVERRIA AND McGeorge SOL Class oI 1980
Stephen Smiley Kent (and anyone who went to McGeorge
Ior that matter, or even applied there) (whose classmates at
McGeorge include RMC Judge Kenneth Howard, who
denied Coughlin even one continuance in the Iirst oIIense
petty larceny oI a de minimis amount oI Iood Irom a Wal-
Mart at a time when Coughlin was besieged with an
unlawIul summary eviction Irom his Iormer home law
oIIice, and had an impermissible NRS 40.253(6) violating
"rent escrow" deposit oI $2,275 required by the RJC just to
preserve Coughlin's right to litigate at the 10/25/12 "Trial"
Date (the RJC, noticed in writing the parties on the Iact that
that was a "Trial" date in light oI Judge SIerrazza's ruling at
the 10/13/11 summary eviction proceeding based upon a
No Cause Notice only (ie, non payment oI rent was not
pled, making Hill and Baker's use oI the summary eviction
process violative oI nevada law against commercial tenant
Coughlin, particularly where Coughlin held the address out
to the public under SCR 79 as his law oIIice, where Iilings
such as the one on 8/10/11 by Coughlin on behalI oI then
client Robert Bell (in the matter that Judge Linda Gardner
recused herselI Irom citing judicial cannon 2.11(a) (just
admitting a Ilat out bias against Coughlin) as the basis Ior
doing so) in Iv11-02864 and the associated TPO
demonstrate via the 121 River Rock address in the caption
Ior then attorney Coughlin that the location was Coughlin's
law oIIice, and that Coughlin was a commercial tenat, who
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possessed a law license at the time and where it is not clear
the "home oIIice" exception to any requirement to have a
City or STate business license, particulary where Coughlin
was making less than $28,500 per year, attach in any way...
Coughlin objections to Panel Chair Echeverria's
participation go beyond the evident impartiality
demonstrated in all his various quick Iire approvals oI
King's Motions (including Motions to Quash Subpoenas
that Iail to recongize the lies King and the SBN told
Coughlin with Respect to ChieI Bar Counsel Clarks, Kings
and Clerk oI Court Peters representations to and
agreements with Couglin vis a vis the application and
interpreation oI SCR 110. "Subpoena power, production so
documents, witnesses, and pre-trial proceedings"...
Challenges to any member Ior cause under Rule 103(7)
shall be made as soon as possible aIter receiving either
actual or constructive notice oI the grounds Ior
disqualiIication, and shall be made by motion to the chair
in accordance with these rules. In no event will a motion
seeking the disqualiIication oI a member be timely iI the
member has already heard, considered or
ruled upon any contested matter, except as to grounds
based on Iraud or like illegal conduct oI which the
challenging party had no notice until aIter the contested
matter was considered. Any challenge that is not raised in a
timely manner shall be deemed waived.
The chair may make ad hoc appointments to replace
designated panel members in the event challenges or
disqualiIication reduce the number to less than the number
required Ior the hearing panel. Ad hoc appointees shall be
subject to disqualification under Rule 103(7) and any
remaining peremptory challenges unexercised by either
the attorney(s) or bar counsel. A hearing panel as Iinally
constituted shall include a non-lawyer.
"(b) Assignment Ior hearing; venue. Following service of a
responsive pleading, or upon failure to plead, the
matter shall be assigned by the chair of the disciplinary
board to a hearing panel...."
There has not even been service of the complaint yet!!!!
Peters 10/9/12 Affidavit and Coughlin's various filings
and 11/19/12 Affidavit establish that conclusively.
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(c) Time to conduct hearing; notice of hearing;
discovery of evidence against attorney. The hearing
panel shall conduct a hearing within 45 days of
assignment and give the attorney at least 30 days'
written notice of its time and place. The notice shall be
served in the same manner as the complaint, and shall
inform the attorney that he or she is entitled to be
represented by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and
to present evidence. The notice shall be accompanied by
a summary prepared by bar counsel of the evidence
against the attorney, and the names of the witnesses bar
counsel intends to call for other than impeachment,
together with a brief statement of the facts to which
each will testify, all of which may be inspected up to 3
days prior to the hearing. Witnesses or evidence, other
than for impeachment, which became known to bar
counsel thereafter, and which bar counsel intends to use
at the hearing, shall be promptly disclosed to the
attorney. For good cause shown, the chair may allow
additional time, not to exceed 90 days, to conduct the
hearing.
(d) Quorum; time Ior decision oI panel; votes required to
impose discipline. Any Iive members oI the panel shall be a
quorum. The hearing panel shall render a written
decision within 30 days of the conclusion of the hearing,
unless post-hearing briefs are requested by either bar
counsel or the attorney and allowed by the panel or
requested by the chair , i n which event the decision shall
be rendered within 60 days oI the conclusion oI the
hearing. The decision shall be served pursuant to Rule
109(1), accompanied by the panel's Iindings and
recommendation, all oI which shall be Iiled with bar
counsel's oIIice. A decision to impose or recommend
discipline requires the concurrence oI Iour members oI the
panel.
COUGHLIN REQUESTS A LEGITIMATE
OPPORTUNITY TO PUT A MORE APPROPRIATE
VERIFIED ANSWER OR RESPONSE ON FILE IN THIS
MATTER...FURTHER, COUGHLIN HEREBY
REQUEST AN OPPORUTNITY TO SUBMIT A POST
HEARING BRIEF...EVEN THOUGH THE HEARING
HE STILL REQUESTS BE STRIKEN OR VIEW MORE
AS A INTRODUCTORY MEETING...AND COUGHLIN
REMIND THE COMMITTEE THAT UPON THE
HEARING DATE OF 11/14/12 BEING RULE AS VOID
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FOR LACK OF DUE PROCESS, NOTICE, SERVICE,
PROCESS, JURISDICTION, ETC...THE PANEL WILL
SOON RUN UP AGAINST THE "WITHIN 45 DAYS OF
ASSIGNMENT" DICTATE
(e) Rules oI evidence; support oI panel's decision. The rules
applicable to the admission oI evidence in the district
courts oI Nevada govern admission oI evidence beIore a
hearing panel.
Evidentiary rulings shall be made by the chair oI the panel,
iI one has been designated, or by the chair oI the
appropriate disciplinary board prior to such a designation.
The findings of the panel must be supported by clear
and convincing evidence. And under SCR 104(3) and
SCR 103(7) Coughlin seeks to have SBN King removed
or conflicted out of this case for all the greivance
drumming up, for his impermissible communications
with Coughlin's then client's the Eastman's in early
may 2012, for feeding 1udge Nash Holmes the "by clear
and convincing evidence" standard inserted into her
3/12/12 Order transmogrifying the trafficat case to a a
summary disciplinary hearing (and her testimony on
11/14/12, you could tell, was already anticipating the
jeers and offering mea culpas in that regard, or at least
caveats to spare...
(I) Court reporter. All Iormal hearings shall be reported by
a certiIied court reporter, which cost may be assessed
against the attorney pursuant to Rule 120. Any party
desiring to have any other disciplinary proceedings
reported must arrange in advance Ior a certiIied court
reporter at the party's own expense.
Zach Coughlin, J.D.
Patent Agent, USPTO
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tele and Fax: 949-667-7402
November 17th, 2012,
RE: LITIGATION HOLD NOTICE REGARDING EVERY RECORDING,
DOCUMENT, DRAFT OF ANY SORT, OR PIECE OF DATA COLLECTED WITH
RESPECT TO THE ILLEGALLY HELD DISCIPLINARY HEARING OF 11/14/12 AT
THE STATE BAR OF NEVADA, AT WHICH CAROL HUMMEL WAS THE COURT
REPORTER OF RECORD AND FOR WHICH IT HAS BECOME KNOWN THAT PAT
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KING HAS A COPY OF THE RECORD OF THE PROCEEDING ALREADY AND
THEREFORE HAS BEEN GIVEN YET ANOTHER IMPERMISSIBLE ADVANTAGE
REQUIRING ANY RECORDINGS, ROUGH DRAFTS, WRITTEN TRANSCRIPTS,
OR AUDIO TRANSCRIPTS BE IMMEDIATELY TURNED OVER TO COUGHLIN
NOTICE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN ZACH COUGHLIN AND SUNSHINE
REPORTING SERVICES GIVEN SUNSHINE'S ADMISSION THAT PAM LONGONI
IS ON ITS STAFF AND MS. LONGONI'S DIRELECTION OF HER DUTIES IN 11 CR
22176, WHICH RESULTING IN A DISMISSAL OF COUGHLIN'S APPEAL IN CR11-
2064 AND THE CURRENT TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF COUGHLIN'S LICENSE
TO PRACTICE LAW IN 60838
John Peter Echeverria, Esq., Panel Chair
Echeverria Law OIIice/Echeverria Group
9432 Double R Blvd.
Reno , NV 89521
Tel: 7757864800 Fax : 7757864808 JEELORENO.com
State Bar oI Nevada, OIIice oI Bar Cousnel
David Clark, Esq., ChieI Bar Counsel
Las Vegas: 600 E. Charleston Blvd
Las Vegas, NV 89104 Phone: 702-382-2200 Fax: 702-385-2878
Patrick O. King, Assistant Bar Counsel
9456 Double R Blvd, Suite B
Reno, NV 89521 Tel: 775-329-4100 Fax: 775-329-0522
Dear Chair Echeverria, Panel Members, and SBN OIIice oI Bar Counsel,
Please provide to me immediately all materials (including the sound recording) oI
the 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing that Pam Longoni coworker and Sunshine Reproting
Services employee, CCR Carol Hummel was the CCR on at the State Bar oI Nevada Irom
approximately 8:30 am to approximately 6 pm. As you are aware, I have a conIlict with
Pam Longoni that likely will entail substantial litigation, to whatever extent there is not
already litigation ongoing. Please review the attached materials Ior more explication in
that regard. However, while I am not purporting to give you legal advice, I believe it was
wrong Ior that Iirm to work the 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing. I am writing to request to
be given immediately, and absent any sort oI payment or agreement whatsoever, all
materials recording, transcribed, reported, or otherwise collected in any way by Sunshine
Reporting Services and or Carol Hummel at that 11/14/12 Hearing and any other materials
connected thereto, including correspondence or agreements with the State Bar oI Nevada,
the Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board, and the Panel (including Panel Chari John
Echeverria, Esq. and the Echeverria Group) in addition to the materials Pat King himselI
has.
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DUE TO MR. KING'S AND LAURA PETERS THREATS OF ABUSE OF
PROCESS (INCLUDING CALLING THE POLICE FOR SPURIOUS REASONS OR
PURSUING A PROTECTION ORDER, I AM HEREBY SERVING THE SBN, KING,
PETERS, AND PANEL CHAIR ECHEVERRIA A STAY AWAY ORDER OF MY
OWN. ANY ENTREATIES ONTO MY PROPERTY, WHICH IS MARKED WITH A
LARGE "NO TRESPASSING" SIGN, MUST BE APPROVED IN ADVANCE AND
REQUIRE A PHONE CALL PRIOR THERETO AND EXPRESS APPROVALY BY
ZACH COUGHLIN AND ONLY ZACH COUGHLIN. FURTHER, COUGHLIN
HERERBY DEMANDS THAT ALL OF HIS FAX FILINGS BE FILESTAMPED AND
THAT A COMPLETE COPY OF THE RECORD AND DISCIPLINARY FILE BE
PROVIDED TO COUGHLIN, INCLUDING HIS OWN FILINGS, AND THAT THE
SBN COMPLY WITH THE STATES RULES AND POLICIES IT ARTICULATED TO
COUGHLIN ON ITS OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE PANEL AND
BOARD AND PANEL CHAIR, BY PROVIDING COMPLETE COPIES OF
EVERYTHING COUGHLIN HAS SUBMITTED (INCLUDING THE CD/DVDS
ATTACHED AS EXHIBITS) TO ALL PANEL MEMBERS.
I am indigent, severly so, and the State Bar oI Nevada and Chair Echeverria, some
might say, are Iraudulently attempting to take away my Fourteenth Amendment property
right, my law license, chieIly through their numerous violations oI SCR 105(2)(c) and and
any other due process rules, law, or concepts they can desecrate. There simply was no
colorable basis Ior ruling that I was not permitted to record the proceedings...although,
neither the DCR nor NRCP appear to have any rules either prohibiting the recording oI
Disciplinary Proceedings (made applicable via SCR 105(4), unless the Panel has enacted
some unpublished rules that it has so Iar reIused to give me, as is the case with the SBN.
FURTHER, THE SBN AND NNDB PANEL AND ITS CHAIR, AND HIS LAW
OFFICE AND ECHEVERRIA GROUP ARE HEREBY PLACED ON A LITIGATION
HOLD NOTICE. PAT KING MAKES CUTE JOKES LIKE "WHAT'S A LITIGATION
HOLD NOTICE"...ITS SOMETHING THAT WILL SUBJECT YOU TO CONTEMPT,
PAT, NEVERMIND YOUR ILLUSIONS RESPECTING SCR 106 AND YOUR
"UNLIMITED IMMUNITY"...MR. KING, I AM HEREBY ONCE AGAIN PLACING
YOU ON NOTICE THAT LITIGATION IS LIKELY TO ARISE REQUIRING YOU TO
MAINTAIN AND TURN OVER AT SOME POINT THE MANILA ENVELOPE THAT
THE SBN PLACED INSUFFICIENT POSTAGE ON IN MAILING OUT ON 10/9/12
(OR AT LEAST PRINTING THE RED PITNEY BOWES POSTAGE THEREON ON
THAT DATE...AND PLEASE REALIZE, THE SBN DID NOT SEND THAT NOITD
BY FIRST CLASS MAIL IN ADDITION TO A CERTIFIED MAILING...PROBABLY
SOME TACTICAL DECISION BY KING TO GAIN AN ADVANTAGE, CHECK THE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING...THE LITIGATION HOLD NOTICE EXTENDS TO
ALL CALL RECORDS BETWEEN THE SBN IN ANY WAY WITH CHAIR
ECHEVERRIA OR OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PANEL, INCLUDING ACTIVITIES
INVOLVING LAURA PETERS. CHAIR ECHEVERRIA'S STAFF LEFT COUGHLIN
A PHONE CALL IN RESPONSE TO HIS INQUIRY REGARDING A MUNDANE,
NON-SUBSTANTIVE MATTER (DEENA, NOT TERESA, AND YOU WILL WANT
TO REVIEW NRS 199.340(7) REGARDING SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS),
AND DEENE COMMUNICATE IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THE CHAIR WOULD
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NOT SPEAK TO COUGHLIN, EVEN THOUGH HE IS PROCEEDING WITH SELF
REPRESENTATION AND IT IS MORE THAN COMMON FOR RESPONDENT'S
COUNSEL TO REGULARLY COMMUNICATE WITH THE CHAIR. I HAVE READ
ALL THE DECISIONS AND GRABBED THE RECORDS ON APPEAL. PLEASE
IMMEDIATELY PROVIDE ME A COPY OF ANY PROCEDURAL RULES THE
BOARD HAS ADOPTED INCIDENT TO SCR 105 AND EXPLAING WHY THE
10/9/12 AFFIDAVIT OF LAURA PETERS IS FILE STAMPED, YET WAS NEVER
SENT TO COUGHLIN. PLEASE FURTHER EXPLAIN WHY THE "DISCIPLINARY
FILE" HAS BEEN DOCTORED TO EXCLUDE THE GREEN CERTIFIED MAIL
TAGS FOR THE COMPLAINT (WHICH USPS TRACK & CONFIRM REVEALS WAS
NEVER SIGNED FOR BY COUGHLIN, AND IN FACT, JUST AS CLERK PETERS
ADMITTED ON SEPTEMBER 11TH, 2012 AT 4:55 PM, WAS RETURNED TO SEND
AND SIGNED FOR BY THE SBN ON 9/10/11. PLEASE HAVE CLERK PETERS
FILL OUT A NON FRAUDULENT RETURN OF SERVICE OR PROOF OF SERVICE
OF THE COMPLAINT REFLECTING HER DECLARATION OF SBN AND PANEL
RULES AND POLICY TO THE EFFECT THAT THE 8/23/12 CERTIFIED MAILING
WOULD NEVER BE PUT FORTH AS PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE
COMPLAINT....WHICH LEAVES THE SBN AND PANEL TO EXPLAIN WHY KING
UNILATERALLY ALTERED THE DECLARATIONS MADE BY PETERS TO
COUGHLIN RESPECTING THE PROCEDURAL POLICIES AND ADOPTED RULES
AND PRACTICES OF THE BOARD, SBN, AND PANEL IN THESE DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS, INCLUDING HER ATTESTATION THAT SHE HAD AUTHORITY
TO REPRESENT TO COUGHLIN THAT NO TIME DEADLINES WOULD RUN FOR
ANY EVENT WHOSE SERVICE REQUIRED COMPLIANCE WITH SCR 109
(MEANING ALL MATTERS MENTIONED IN SCR 105(2)(C), MEANING THE
NOTICE OF THE HEARING WAS DEFICIENT, GIVEN COUGHLIN'S SIGNATURE
INDICATES A DATE OF 10/27/12, IE, FAR LESS THAN THE "AT LEAST 30 DAYS"
BEFORE THE HEARING MAY TAKE PLACE (17 DAYS IS NOT EVEN CLOSE),
AND THE Designation oI Witnesses and Summary oI Evidence is not listed in the
certiIicate oI mailing, nor is it Iile stamped upon a review oI the bate stamped Iiled box
that somehow took 7 days to copy (because Pat King needed to go back through it and
remove the certiIied mailing slips Ior which the SBN had not secured a signature Irom
Coughlin, including the NOITD (because the SBN placed insuIIicient postage thereon, and
Tim, counter attendant at the Downtown Reno Station would not release that 10/9/11
NOITD unless Coughlin paid the SBN's postage, which he clearly is not required to
do...Further, the Supplemental DoWSoE was not served in accord with SCR 109
considering the policies, rules, and practices the SBN, NNDB, and Panel held out to
Coughlin and upon which he justiIiably relied. Basically, the entire hearing must be
thrown out, mistrial, recusal oI Echeverria and Kent, and King is conIlicted out too.
My issues with Ms. Longoni related primarily to her hanging up on me on more
than one occasion in December 2011 when I was attempting to comply with the dictates
she and the Reno Municipal Court put Iorth to criminal appellant's, including ones like me
who were indigent at that time.
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I need the materials I am requesting above immediately, TIME IS OF THE
ESSENCE with respect to a number oI actions I must take to preserve my rights, and even
the roughest draIt oI the transcript and the audio recordings made that day are completely
vital to my protecting my rights. I believe you would be substantially mitigating your
potential liability by having these emailed to me immediately, though you should consider
getting counsel Irom your own attorney in that regard.
Further, I believe your Iirm and or Ms. Longoni may still be required to prepare
and provide to me the transcript Ior 11 CR 22176, (I am providing you via a cd/dvd in the
mail and a link to a SkyDrive contaning the audio thereIor) as well as the transcript Ior 11
TR 26800 (a notice oI appeal was Iiled on 3/7/12 and again sometime thereaIter, and
during that time the RCM continued its illegal practice oI holding Ms. Longoni out as the
only court reporter it would release the audio recordings to (certiIied or not), and Iurther,
as demonstrated by the attached handout given to all criminal deIendant appellants by the
RMC, Ms. Longoni and the RMC maintained a practice that was violative oI NRS
189.030:
NRS 189.030 Transmission oI transcript, other papers, sound
recording and copy oI docket to district court.

1. The justice shall, within 10 days after the notice of
appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk of the district court the
transcript of the case, all other papers relating to the case and
a certiIied copy oI the docket.

2. The justice shall give notice to the appellant or the
appellant's attorney that the transcript and all other papers
relating to the case have been Iiled with the clerk oI the district
court.

3. II the district judge so requests, beIore or aIter receiving the
record, the justice oI the peace shall transmit to the district
judge the sound recording oI the case.
I am prepared to move Iorward with respect to pursuing whatever lawIul action I
may take in connection with this impermissible conIlict oI interest (which I believe I can
prove you knew Iull well about) in addition to the misconduct by Ms. Longoni in
connection with RMC 11 CR 22176. Nice touch having Judge Linda Gardner's courtroom
deputy work the hearing.
Coughlin hereby demands that the SBN comply with the agreement and rules
requiring the SBN reveal the names oI the Screening Panel members Irom the hearing on
or about 4/10/12. Pat doesn't get around to saying he meant the "Clerk oI Court" oI a
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Department in the RMC, even though the Order is Irom D14 oI the Second Judicial
District Court (whose courtroom deputy worked the 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing along
with one oI Pam Longoni's co-workers...Carol Hummel (no oIIense to Ms. Hummel...I
blame Pat King and or Susich here, as King is now backing out oI an agreement to
indicate who was on the Screening Panel and the Panel Ior the Hearing was obviously
hand picked to arrive at the most biased crowd available or possible.
3. Review by supreme court.
(a) Time and manner oI appeal. A decision oI a hearing
panel shall be served on the attorney, and service shall be
deemed Notice oI Entry oI Decision Ior appeal purposes.
Except as provided in Rule 105(3)(b) a decision is Iinal and
eIIective 30 days Irom service, unless an appeal, is taken
within that time. To the extent not inconsistent with these
rules, an appeal Irom a decision oI a hearing panel shall be
treated as would an appeal Irom a civil judgment oI a
district court and is governed by the Nevada Rules oI
Appellate Procedure.
(b) De novo review oI public discipline. Except Ior
disbarments by consent pursuant to Rule 112 or a public
reprimand agreed to in writing by the attorney pursuant to
Rule 113, a decision recommending a public reprimand,
suspension or disbarment shall be automatically reviewed
by the supreme court. Review under this paragraph shall be
commenced by bar counsel Iorwarding the record oI the
hearing panel proceedings to the court within 30 days oI
entry oI the decision. Receipt oI the record in such cases
shall be acknowledged in writing by the clerk oI the
supreme court.
The attorney and bar counsel shall have 30 days Irom the
date the supreme court acknowledges receipt oI the record
within which to Iile an opening brieI or otherwise advise
the court oI any intent to contest the hearing panel's
Iindings and recommendations. II an opening brieI is Iiled,
brieIing shall thereaIter proceed in accordance with NRAP
31(a). Extensions oI time to Iile brieIs are disIavored and
will only be granted upon a showing oI good cause. The
parties shall not be required to prepare an appendix, but
rather shall cite to the record oI the disciplinary
proceedings. II no opening brieI is Iiled, the matter will be
submitted Ior decision on the record without brieIing or
oral argument.
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4. Rules oI procedure. The chairs, aIter consulting with
their respective disciplinary boards, may adopt rules oI
procedure, subject to approval by the board oI governors.
1. In general
Violations oI proIessional conduct rules not charged in attorney disciplinary complaint
could not be considered by Supreme Court. In re Discipline oI SchaeIer, 2001, 25 P.3d
191, 117 Nev. 496, modiIied on denial oI rehearing 31 P.3d 365, certiorari denied 122
S.Ct. 1072, 534
U.S. 1131, 151 L.Ed.2d 974. Attorney And Client 52 SO COUGHLIN OBJECTS TO
KING AND ECHEVERRIA'S ATTEMPTS TO TURN THE 11/14/12 HEARING IN
TO SOME SUMMARY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDIGN FOR DECLARATION
MAKING IN THEIR PRESENCE, WHETHER LEVERAGING PAST FILINGS
REBRANDED OR NOT...
2. Due process
Procedure in which Board oI Governors, the body responsible Ior Iinances oI bar
association, Iunctioned as IactIinder in disciplinary proceeding against attorneys,
involving costs which were substantial and which were recoverable by state bar only
upon Iinding oI misconduct, violated due process. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rules 85, 85, subd. 2,
86, subds. (1-4, 7, 12), 104, subd. 7 (1978); U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. Matter oI Ross,
1983, 656 P.2d 832, 99 Nev. 1, rehearing denied 668 P.2d 1089, 99 Nev. 657. Attorney
And Client 54; Constitutional Law 4273(3)
Individual members oI disciplinary board had no personal Iinancial stake in outcome oI
their deliberations and no executive responsibilities Ior Iinances oI state bar which
would be inconsistent with due process requirements Ior disciplinary proceedings,
despite potential Ior recovery by bar oI Iines and costs. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rules 86, 103,
subds. 1, 3; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend.
14. Burleigh v. State Bar oI Nevada, 1982, 643 P.2d 1201, 98 Nev. 140. Constitutional
Law 4273(3)
State cannot exclude person Irom practice oI law without due process oI law.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14. Burleigh v. State Bar oI Nevada, 1982, 643 P.2d 1201, 98
Nev.
140. Constitutional Law 4273(1)
Practice oI a proIession is valuable property right, oI which one cannot be arbitrarily
deprived. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14. Burleigh v. State Bar oI Nevada, 1982, 643 P.2d
1201, 98 Nev.
1
4. Degree oI prooI
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Ethical violations by attorney must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re
Discipline oI SchaeIer, 2001, 25 P.3d 191, 117 Nev. 496, modiIied on denial oI
rehearing 31 P.3d 365, certiorari denied 122 S.Ct. 1072, 534 U.S. 1131, 151 L.Ed.2d
974. Attorney And Client 53(2)
In bar disciplinary matters, higher degree oI prooI is required than in ordinary civil
proceedings; clear and convincing evidence must support any Iindings oI misconduct.
Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 105, subd. 2(e). In re Discipline oI Drakulich, 1995, 908 P.2d 709,
111 Nev. 1556. Attorney And Client 53(2)
In determining questions oI Iact, higher degree oI prooI is required in disciplinary
matters han in ordinary civil proceedings; standard is whether Iindings are supported by
clear and convincing evidence. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 105, subd. 2(e). In re Discipline oI
StuhII, 1992, 837 P.2d 853, 108 Nev. 629. Attorney And Client 53(2)
To determine questions oI Iact, higher degree oI prooI is required in attorney
disciplinary matters, than in ordinary civil matters; standard is whether Iindings are
supported by clear and convincing evidence. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 105, subd. 2(e). Gentile
v. State Bar oI Nevada, 1990, 787 P.2d 386, 106 Nev. 60, certiorari granted 111 S.Ct.
669, 498 U.S. 1023, 112 L.Ed.2d 662, reversed 111 S.Ct. 2720, 501 U.S. 1030, 115
L.Ed.2d 888. Attorney And Client 53(2)
5. Recommendation oI board
Although recommendations oI disciplinary panel are persuasive, Supreme Court is not
bound by panel's Iindings and recommendation, and must examine record anew and
exercise independent judgment, in attorney disciplinary proceeding. In re Discipline oI
SchaeIer, 2001, 25 P.3d 191, 117 Nev. 496, modiIied on denial oI rehearing 31 P.3d
365, certiorari denied 122 S.Ct. 1072, 534 U.S. 1131, 151 L.Ed.2d 974. Attorney And
Client 57
Disciplinary board's recommendation is not Iinal and binding upon Supreme Court, even
though attorney has consented in writing to Board's decision. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 105,
subd. 3(b). Matter oI Kenick, 1984, 680 P.2d 972, 100 Nev. 273. Attorney And Client 57
6. Continuances
Attorney was not entitled to continuance oI second hearing date in attorney disciplinary
proceedings to obtain counsel, on basis that second hearing was reset Ior January 4, not
later in the month, and attorney not able to Iind new counsel because no one wanted to
work on his case over the holidays, where attorney stated on the record that he needed no
more than one week's notice oI the continued hearing, and was aware Irom November 17
that he needed to Iind counsel immediately, attorney was notiIied no later than
December 6 oI new hearing date, and even Irom December 6, attorney had Iour weeks to
obtain new counsel and to prepare Ior the continued hearing. In re Discipline oI
SchaeIer, 2001, 25 P.3d 191, 117 Nev. 496, modiIied on denial oI rehearing 31 P.3d
365, certiorari denied 122 S.Ct. 1072, 534 U.S. 1131, 151 L.Ed.2d 974. Attorney And
Client 54
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ASSUMING THERE HAS BEEN SERVICE OF THE COMPLAINT,
WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SHOW, COUGHLIN REQUEST HIS FIRST
CONTINUANCE...
Sup. Ct. Rules, RULE 105, NV ST S CT RULE 105
NRCP RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS
WHEN AND HOW PRESENTEDBY PLEADING OR
MOTIONMOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
PLEADINGS
(a) When Presented.
(1) A deIendant shall serve an answer within 20 days aIter
being served with the summons and complaint, unless
otherwise provided by statute when service oI process is
made pursuant to Rule 4(e)(3).
Coughlin was never served with the Summons and
Complaints under SCR 109, and Bar Counsel cited no
authority to support its apparent contention that merely
mailing a certiIied mailing purporting to included the
Complaint is suIIicient, especially where, as here, Bar
Counsel and the SBN made representations Coughlin was
permitted to reply upon to the eIIec that the 8/23/12
certiIied mailing Bar Counsel asserts would never be
oIIered as prooI oI or return oI service.
(2) A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim
against that party shall serve an answer thereto within 20
days aIter being served. The plaintiII shall serve a reply to
a counterclaim in the answer within 20 days aIter service oI
the answer or, iI a reply is ordered by the court, within 20
days aIter service oI the order, unless the order otherwise
directs.
(3) The State oI Nevada or any political subdivision
thereoI, and any oIIicer, employee, board or commission
member oI the State oI Nevada or political subdivision, and
any state legislator shall Iile an answer or other responsive
pleading within 45 days aIter their respective dates oI
service.
(4) The service oI a motion permitted under this rule alters
these periods oI time as Iollows, unless a diIIerent time is
Iixed by order oI the court:
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(A) if the court denies the motion or postpones its
disposition until the trial on the merits, a responsive
pleading shall be served within 10 days after notice of
the court`s action;
Chair Echeverria's Order purporting to require
Couglin file averified Response in less time than allotted
upon any purported ruling on Coughlin's Motion to
Dismiss, makes holding the Hearing on 11/14/12 and
and Order connected thereto void (even whether Bar
Counsel has perpetrated a fraud in standing behind a
certificate of mailing that is knows is not true as to the
October 9th, 2012 certified mailing only (in contrast to
practically everything else the SBN mailed, according to
its certificate's of mailing, the SBN sent the 10 9 12
Notice of Intent to Take Default by certified mial only,
ie, it was not sent via first class mail as well).
(B) iI the court grants a motion Ior a more deIinite
statement, a responsive pleading shall be served within 10
days aIter service oI the more deIinite statement.
(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a
claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is
required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) insufficiency of process,
(4) insufficiency of service of process, (5) failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, (6) Iailure to
join a party under Rule 19. A motion making any oI these
deIenses shall be made beIore pleading iI a Iurther pleading
is permitted. No deIense or objection is waived by being
joined with one or more other deIenses or objections in a
responsive pleading or motion. II a pleading sets Iorth a
claim Ior relieI to which the adverse party is not required to
serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at
the trial any deIense in law or Iact to that claim Ior relieI.
II, on a motion asserting the deIense numbered (5) to
dismiss Ior Iailure oI the pleading to state a claim upon
which relieI can be granted, matters outside the pleading
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
shall be treated as one Ior summary judgment and disposed
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oI as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Couglin presented all the above bolded deIense and
Chair Echeverria did not dispose oI all such Motions made
by Coughlin.
...
(d) Preliminary Hearings. The deIenses speciIically
enumerated (1)-(6) in subdivision (b) oI this rule, whether
made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion Ior
judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) oI this rule shall be
heard and determined beIore trial on application oI any
party, unless the court orders that the hearing and
determination thereoI be deIerred until the trial.
(e) Motion Ior More DeIinite Statement. If a pleading to
which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or
ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required
to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for
a more definite statement before interposing a
responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the
deIects complained oI and the details desired. II the motion
is granted and the order oI the court is not obeyed within 10
days aIter notice oI the order or within such other time as
the court may Iix, the court may strike the pleading to
which the motion was directed or make such order as it
deems just.
(I) Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a party beIore
responding to a pleading or, iI no responsive pleading is
permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party
within 20 days aIter the service oI the pleading upon the
party or upon the court`s own initiative at any time, the
court may order stricken Irom any pleading any insuIIicient
deIense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation oI DeIenses in Motion. A party who
makes a motion under this rule may join with it any other
motions herein provided Ior and then available to the party.
II a party makes a motion under this rule but omits
thereIrom any deIense or objection then available to the
party which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the
party shall not thereaIter make a motion based on the
deIense or objection so omitted, except a motion as
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provided in subdivision (h)(2) hereoI on any oI the grounds
there stated.
|As amended; eIIective September 27, 1971.|
(h) Waiver or Preservation oI Certain DeIenses.
(1) A deIense oI lack oI jurisdiction over the person,
insuIIiciency oI process, or insuIIiciency oI service oI
process is waived (A) iI omitted Irom a motion in the
circumstances described in subdivision (g), or (B) iI it is
neither made by motion under this rule nor included in a
responsive pleading or an amendment thereoI permitted by
Rule 15(a) to be made as a matter oI course.
(2) A deIense oI Iailure to state a claim upon which relieI
can be granted, a deIense oI Iailure to join a party
indispensable under Rule 19, and an objection oI Iailure to
state a legal deIense to a claim may be made in any
pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a), or by
motion Ior judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the
merits.
(3) Whenever it appears by suggestion oI the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction oI the subject
matter, the court shall dismiss the action.
Also available at that link is the transcript Irom the criminal trespass Trial on 6/18/12
where HIll and Baker testiIy, beIore Judge L. Gardner's (whom recused herselI Irom a
case Coughlin represented Robert Bell in, Iiled August 11, 2011, which Iurther proves that
Coughlin was a commercial tenant practicing law at the 121 River Rock address,
something pled in Coughlin's Tenant's AIIidavit and set Iorth repeatedly ad nausuem
throughout the trial court case, which Hill mistakenly alleges, in his lie Iilled testimony at
the criminal trespass trial, that Coughlin "did not plead" that he was a "commercial tenant"
in the trial court eviction case. Wrong, Mr. Hill. The record is quite clear that Coughlin
did. And Judge L. Gardner's recusal (and Judge Flanagan's Presidency oI the SBN during
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a period oI time in which Coughlin now has pending grievances against members oI the
Character and Fitness Committe Iurther complicates matters and augured Ior a recusal,
beyond the apparent bad mouthing oI Coughlin by Judge Flanagan and Coughlin's Iormer
Iirm, where they were both a part oI at the same time in 2005, to the CBX (unless the CBX
is lying or bluIIing, which is entirely possible, as anyone who has ever met a bar counsel
could tell you) is just another reason why recusal was appropriate. Additionally, the
lockout pursuant to the eviction Order, whether the Eviction Decision and ORder oI
October 25th, 2011 or the Findings oI Fact, Conclusions oI Lw....oI 10/27/11 (depending
on how one view NRS 40.253's "within 24 hours" dictate) was either perIormed to early or
too later, and thereIore the Order was stale or
void at time WCSO Machen and Baker conduted the lockout. (too early under the analysis
respecting the application, via nrs 40.400 oI NRCP 5 and NRCP 6 requiring 3 days Ior
mailing Ior "constructive service" oI such and Order, and beyond that the Second Judicial
District Court appears to have reIused Ior Iiling Irom Couglin a Iiling that may have
operated as a MOtion to STay under NRAP 8 sometime between October 26th, 2011 and
November 2nd 2011 in CV11-03051 or CV11-03126, in violation oI Whitman, Sullivan,
Donoho and NRCP 5(e)'s dictate against clerk's rejecting Iilings regardles oI what a local
rule says) or the lockout was conduct too late in light oI the testimony by Baker
concerning how and when the wCSO received the lockout order or either oI the eviction
orders (Baker indicated his oIIice relied upon the usual practice oI the RJC to transmit it to
the wCSO, but curiously the RJC seems to now assert is has no record oI such a
transmission, and the WCSO is lawyering up when it comes to such inIormation.
Herman v. Style Line Greetings, Inc., 289 So.2d 876
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La.App.4.Cir.,1974Where eviction proceeding was taken under advisement and judgment
oI eviction was rendered on Iollowing day and out oI presence oI counsel, statute
providing that iI court Iinds
lessor or owner entitled to relieI sought, court shall render immediately a judgment oI
eviction
ordering delivery oI possession oI premises to lessor or owner had not been complied with
and judgment was invalid. LSA-C.C.P. art. 4732.
Richard G. Hill, Esq. and Casey Baker, Esq. (who has now conveniently absconded back to
Kentucky now that his lies have imperiled Coughlin's law license (see Coughlin's recent Iiling in 61901 and
60838 Ior more explication thereoI) Iailed to comply with Nevada law respecting the return oI Coughlin's
security/damage/cleaning deposit ($500 Ior security/damage, $200 Ior "cleaning" deposit, with the Standard
Rental Agreement giving Coughlin certain options thereto). Coughlin is indigent (largely due to the Iraud oI
Baker, Hill, and their client, Dr. Matt Merliss, MD) and asks this Court to recognize that the Iailure oI the
landlord to comply with Nevada law vis a vis the itemization or return within 30 days oI the deposits should
IulIill any $500 bond on appeal, and then some. Further, the Reno Justice Court is still reIusing to return the
$250 Coughlin deposited with it in compliance with NRS 118A.380 and 118A.385 (Iurther, it is not clear
how NJCRCP 72 or 73 could apply to summary eviction (even ones like this one that were notice, in writing,
by the RJC, as a "Trial" aIter Judge SIerrazza had ruled that Coughlin had met his NRS 40.253 burden to
prove there was a "genuine issue oI material Iact", both at and Iollowing the 10/13/11 "summary eviction
proceeding" and during the Iirst part, at least, oI the "Trial" which curiously transmogriIied into, apparently,
something other than a Trial when Baker managed to point out, the consequences thereoI. Regardless,
Coughlin Iiled a Notice oI Appeal on October 18th, 2011 (and see also the appeal and associated general
civil Complaint in the District Court). Also, court clerk's Michelle Purdee and or Lori Matheus seemed to
reIuse to Iile in a document Irom Coughlin sometime between October 17th to November 1st, 2011 that may
have arguably operated as a NRAP 8 Motion to Stay, in violation oI the dictates in Nevada law against court
clerk's unilaterally reIusing to Iile things, like in Whitman, Sullivan, Dohono, Barnes, and their progeny.
Further,
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Now the SBN intends to hold a hearing on November 14th, 2012 pursuant to its SCR 105
Complaint against Coughlin wherein all subpoena by Coughlin are sought quashed, even where the SBN
states that Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes will appear by phone to answer question (but apparently not testiIy,
and she hasn't recused herselI Irom the two matters she has Coughlin as a criminal deIendant beIore her in)
(Coughlin totally objects ot Judge Nash Holmes phoning it in, especially where her 3/14/12 grievance to the
SBN in ng12-0434 and the possible ghost-grievancing done in ng12-0435 (in concert with RMC jUdge W.
Gardner and his sister WDC Family Court Judge LInda Gardner and SBN's Pat King and Laura Peters in
attempts to allow RMC W. Gardner to avoid recusing himselI Irom the richard hill signed criminal trespass
complaint in 11 cr 26405...It may be necessary to check up on rmc judge w. gardner's 2/27/12 order
transIerring jurisdiction oI the richard hill incuced january 12th, 2012 custodial arrest oI coughlin Ior
jaywalking in RMC 12 cr 00696 (and consider all the copying and or erasing oI Coughlin's laptops,
smartphones, and data cards incident to all this arrests under State v. Diaz, including the in court arrest on 11
30 11 with rmc judge howard in RMC 11 cr 22176 (which resulted in this Court's 6/7/12 temporary
suspension oI Coughlin's law license) (summary contempt Ior saying "wow"...and the 2/27/12 arrest by reno
marshals (marshal harley lied during the SITA and issued directive to another marshal to go repeat his lie to
Judge Nash Holmes....Iinding a smartphone during a SITA does not entitle Harley to bark out "got tell judge
nash holmes Coughlin lied! He was recording!....or Ior judge Nash Holmes to later, in the tape Irom the
3/12/12 hearing in 11 tr 26800 to indicate some marshall told her he saw Couglin dissessmbling a smart
phone in the bathroom stall (this would have been beIore Judge Nash Holmes even asked Coughlin any
questions regarding recording or recording devices...whatever she means by "recording device" (wouldn't
every laptop brought with any deIendant or lawyer be a "recording device" under Judge Holme's apparent
analysis?) to testiIy with regard to Respondent's conduct in connection with Case No. 11-TR-26800 12 in
Reno Municipal Court.
Incident to Judge Nash Holmes "summary criminal
contempt" Order against Coughlin within the traIIic
citations issued to Coughlin outside Richard Hill's law
oIIice aIter Coughlin showed up to get his Marshal harley
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violating the courthouse sanctuary rule, on behalI oI wcso
deputy machen, whom hill sent to the 2/27/12 trial
regarding the richard hill traIIic citations oI 11/15/11 to
serve coughlin the ORder to show cause Ior the 3/23/12
Hearing in the richard hill eviction appeal in cv11-03628,
based upon a Iraudulent motion to show cause and
declaration Iiled by Hill, his associate Casey Baker, and
Hill's trusy licensed contractor, NBI's Phil Stewart
to having been inIormed by the Washoe County Public DeIender's OIIice oI the Order Ior
Comptency Evaluation directed to Cogulin in RCR2012-065630 (the retaliatory "misuse oI 911" custodial
arrest and prosecution incident to an arrest made by the same RPD Sargent SiIre, on 1/14/12, who ordered
Couglin arrested by then trainee OIIicer Wesley Leedy (whom applied excessive Iorce to Coughlin, out oI
the blue and prior to any sort oI warning, along with another dishonorable and shameIul RPD OIIicer Travis
Look, all captured on video tape as well (though Panel Chair ruled all oI that inadmissible as well...though
that pending jaywalking prosecution was not ruled irrelevant or dismissed Iorm King's Complaint.
Somehow, Chair Echeverria accepted Kings argument that video taping oI events did not provide reliable
evidence oI what happened...rather, having Richard Hill and the McGeorge MaIia come in an wrech shop on
a career oI Coughlin's that was many years in the making (and all in Nevada mine you, Irom kingdergarten
through law school) (in February 2009 Elcano had admitted to Coughlin that he asked several judges,
including Master Edmonson and Judge Linda Gardner what they thought oI Coughlin's work beIore them
and that both oI those judges gave Coughlin a positive review....and at that time Elcano also stated that "and
Judge Linda Gardner owes me because I did a big, big Iavor Ior her a long time ago...so iI she say's your all
right, then...". Elcano has also Iinally managed to get WLS's Iingers in the pie that is the ECR program that
is partners with the Washoe County District Attorney's OIIice with in denying indigent criminal deIendants
their Sixth Amendment Rights (an RMC Court appointed deIender, Lew Taitel, was originally Coughlin's
appointed counsel in the Donnie and Marie conIlict yet no recusal criminal trespass complaint signed by
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Richard Hill (whom also got Coughlin subject to a custodial arrest Ior "jaywalking" on January 12th, 2012,
incident to Hill lying to RPD OIIicers that Coughlin "has lost his appeal" (though the appeal was not decided
until 3/30/12...Further, Hill Iiled a Declaration on 1/20/12 in that appeal CV11-03628 which clearly contains
numerous lies when reviewing the video tape oI that incident....and 61901 Iurther provides video evidence oI
the extent to which Richard G. Hill, Esq. is allowed to terrorize the citizenry oI Washoe County with his lies
and Rambo litigation tactis, all with more than a little enabling by a cadre oI local judges) and the court
appointed deIender Ior Couglin (Keith Loomis, Esq., McGeorge SOL, Class oI 1982) who has managed to
collect a paycheck while twice reIusing to advocate on Coughlin's behalI (garnering two Orders granting his
withdrawal by RMC Judges, one, in the criminal trespass cases (61901) that Judge William Gardner reIused
to recuse himselI on, stemming Irom Richard G. Hill, Esq. lying to and with the police in 11 CR 26405, even
where Judge Gardner then had a pending grievance against Coughlin (NG12-0435, wherein Judge Nash
Holmes Iiled one on "behalI oI all the RMC Judges, Irom whom you will have our Iull cooperation" and
assitance in carrying out a scheme to discredit and destroy Coughlin that they "planned out" "very careIully"
(Judge Nash Holmes lied during Coughlin's 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing when she testiIied under oath that
she had (because oI some unattributed hearsay that Panel Chair Echeverria would not let Coughlin ask
Iollow up questions on) "heard Coughlin likes to record things" and that upon her questioning about whether
he was recording the proceedings and or had a recording device Coughlin during that traIIic ticket trial,
Holmes testiIied that Coughlin immediately grew very shitIy and uncomIortable and asked to be allowed to
use the restroom, whereupon Holmes ordered RMC Marshal Joel Harley to Iollow Coughlin into the
bathroom, whereupon Judge Nash Holmes testiIied that Marshal Harley witnessed Couglin disassembling a
recording device in the bathroom and leaving a portion oI it in the bathroom, which the RMC Marshal
discovered later). One, that is a god damn lie. Coughlin did not disassemble anything in the bathroom.
Two, Judge Nash Holmes lied under oath when she testiIied that she asked Coughlin any questions
whatsoever about recording devices or recording the proceedings prior to the ONE restroom break that Judge
Nash Holmes allowed beIore she had Coughlin arrested Ior the "misdemeanor oI criminal contempt...NRS
22.010" . Judge Nash Holmes lied during her sworn testimony in saying that the one restroom break came
AFTER she interrogated Coughlin about whether he had an recording devices or was recording . The
certiIied audio oI the Trial clearly reveals there was one, and only one restroom break and that, clearly,
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Judge Nash Holmes asked Coughlin questions related to recording or having recording devices only AFTER
that one restroom break. Judge Nash Holmes clearly lied during her testimony in that regard, seeking to
rewrite the orders oI events in an attempt to suggest that she interrogated Coughlin (sua sponte, oI course, as
is her wont, wherein she mixes in her experiences as a prison warden type with her liIelong devotion to
being a prosecutor, wiretapping attorneys, etc., etc....ask Henry Sotelo, Esq., the RMC deIender that says he
leIt the law Ior awhile completely given what a terrible taste was leIt in his mouth aIter working under her
while she was the Washoe County District Attorney in 1993-1996 or so...or ask the Washoe County Deputy
whom Coughlin overhead, during one oI his several trips to the Courthouse (it wasn't Cummings, and it
wasn't the Hawaiian one, but it was the other one) reveal the extent to which he Ielt Judge Nash Holmes was
completely out oI her mind and inordinately punitive, sentencing a youth whom she had the week previous
"put in some hug a thug program" to six months in jail Iollowing his reappearring beIore her one week later
aIter having bee arrested Ior "jaywalking". (As to her 2/28/12 and 3/12/12 Orders speaking to the
"contempt conviction" actually, Judge Nash Holmes just chose the most penal aspects oI a variety oI
criminal and civil contempts statutes, along with making a pastiche oI theose sanctions requiring the least
due process attendant thereto, and also managaed to transmogriIy the "simple traIIic citation trial" into a Iull
blow Disciplinary Hearing, whereupon on February 12th, 2012, she took another bite at the apple (not
satisIied with her 2/28/12 Contempt Finding and Order oI Sanctions or the Iact that she and her Court
promised Coughlin's mother that her payng $100.00 would get Coughlin released one day early on the
unIathomable 5 day jail sentence she ordered to start immediately aIter Coughlin testiIied that "RPD Sargent
Tarter lied when he..." (BOOM...Coughlin didn't even get to Iinish his sentence...Judge Nash Holmes
immediately Iound Coughlin in contempt and had him cuIIed, and laughed at the idea oI granting any sort oI
stay to allow Coughlin, then a licensed attorney, and opportunity to make arrangements Ior his client's
interests to avoid being prejudiced. Judge Kenneth Howard, (McGeorge SOL, '81), while noting that it
"saddened him" to think oI the 3 day contempt incarceration that he himselI ordered upon Coughlin to start
immediately Iollowing the 11/30/11 rendition oI the conviction oI petty larceny oI a "candy bar and some
coughlin drops" (at the Wal-Mart that is on land rented Irom the Indian Colony, in an arrest made by tribal
police Ior a misdemeanor-Wal-Mart's Thomas Frontino testiIied that neither he nor anyone with Wal-Mart
made a citizens arrest on 9/9/11 oI Coughlin) that violated the law in that NRS 171.1255 Iorbids tribal police
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Irom making arrests other than those Ior gross misdemeanors and Ielonies. whom appears to be related to
Michael Smily Rowe, Esq, a person whom Coughlin had indicated would invoked a conIlict upon a showing
oI suIIicient connection thereto...)
SBN cLERK OF cOURT Laura Peters (the SBN has filed not proof of service of the
summons and complaint sufficient to satisfy SCR 109 in view of the representations made
by the State Bar of Nevada, including those by Laura Peters on the phone and in writing
to Coughlin and found in Peters Affidavit on file in this matter. The first alleged certified
mailing of 8/23/12 is not sufficient to show service where Peters herself (and this is
spoken to in her affidavit) represented that the SBN would not be attempting to use it to
proof service of any sort of the Complaint, but rather, Peters would send, soon after
September 11th, 2012 a certified mailing copy of the SCR 105 SBN v zach Coughlin
complaint to Coughlins SCR 79 address, and that the complaint would not be deemed
served or by the SBN, nor would the SBN attempt to represent in any way that it had
been served, until zach coughlin had signed the return receipt requested and or certified
letter signature card and it had been received by the SBN.
2. 11/14/12 hearing go forward, which it clearly should not, at least not in its current
unbifurcated, due process violating, unnoticed, no service of the 10/9/12 NOtice of Ntent
to Take Default, no "at least 30 days" service of the Designation of Witness and Summary
of Evidence BY THE PANEL, NOT BY THE SBN, BAR COUNSEL, OR THE CLERK
OF THE SBN, under SCR 105(2)(c)
Herman v. Style Line Greetings, Inc., 289 So.2d 876
La.App.4.Cir.,1974Where eviction proceeding was taken under advisement and judgment
oI eviction was rendered on Iollowing day and out oI presence oI counsel, statute
providing that iI court Iinds
lessor or owner entitled to relieI sought, court shall render immediately a judgment oI
eviction
ordering delivery oI possession oI premises to lessor or owner had not been complied with
and judgment was invalid. LSA-C.C.P. art. 4732.
Dear Bar Counsel and Panel Members,
Please Iind attached my Emergency Ex Parte Motion (perhaps not "ex parte" given Bar Counsel was
provided it). Also, please note, the October 9th, 2012 certiIicate oI mailing by the SBN Ior the Notice oI
Intent to Take DeIault was never served on me in any way shape or Iorm until I received the copy oI the
"entire" Iile Iorm Sierra Legal Duplicating. The State Bar oI Nevada knows this. They put the wrong postage
on the certiIied mail envelope containing the Notice oI Intent to Take DeIault. When I went to pick it up
"Tim" USPS counter attendant at the Vassar Postal Station here in downtown Reno reIused to allow me to
pick up that certiIied mailing given that is was about $5.00 deIicient in postage. I did not have $5.00 and it is
not be responsibility to pay it, as Iar as I know. In Iact, I have asked the Bar and this Panel to allow me to
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proceed in Iorma pauperis in this matter, and am doing so again here (I am Ilat broke, I have a 1996 Honda
Accord, rent a room Ior $300 a month, have less than $200 in my bank account, no stocks, no bonds).
I have been mislead or lied to by the SBN in numerous ways in this proceeding. I was told I could issue
subpoenas despite being a suspended attorney (and there is case law that says even when suspended, one is
still an "attorney"). I was told I would not be required to pay subpoena Iees. I was told the August 23rd, 2012
certiIied mailing would absolutely not be used to prove prooI oI service oI the Complaint in this matter, SBN
v. Coughlin. Yet a review oI the Iiles reveals that the SBN and Panels only Return oI Service (and see SBN
Ethics Committee Member Joseph Garin's recent BrieI in 60302 seeking to dismiss my entire wrongIul
termination lawsuit against Washoe Legal Services) Ior a real ironic example oI just why the hearing on
November 14th, 2012 must not go Iorward. It is Iraudulent Ior the State Bar oI Nevada to stipulate with me
that the August 23rrd, 2012 certiIied mailing oI the Complaint is alleges was sent and that Clerk oI Court
Peters admits to having received back on September 10th, 2012 would never be cited to as eIIecting service
oI the Complaint upon me or otherwise put Iorward as prooI oI return oI service etc. Now the SBN seeks to
get around the inconvenient Iact that, instead oI holding my hearing on September 25th, 2012 (Clerk Peters
told me it was on the calendar, I was noticed oI it in writing, I agreed to that date Ior the Hearing amongst a
choice oI dates, etc..) Bar Counsel King attempted to shove a document he alleges was the Complaint in my
suit jacket, then persisted in ordering Clerk oI Court Peters (whom King alternately claims to have
separation Irom and no authority over with ordering her not to Iile my Motion to Dismiss, attempting to
reneg on stipluations and representations made by the SBN, etc). Further, it is wrong Ior Clerk oI Court
Peters to be signing the certiIicates oI mailing Ior both the SBN and Ior the Panel Chair. Additionally, under
SCR 105(2)(c), it is the Panel that must send the Respondent the Notice oI Hearing "at least 30 days" prior to
the Hearing date, and that Notice must include with it the Designation oI Witnesses and Summary oI
Evidence, and it must be served in the same manner as the Complaint. It is impermissible Ior Pat King to
attempt to mail out the Notice oI the Hearing and Designation oI Witnesses weeks beIore the Panel is even
announced (how can you possibly be pretending to take your duty as a Panel member seriously when you are
essentially showing up the day oI the Iirst game, skipping all the practices and pre-season games....we all
saw how that turned out Ior Bret Farve in his last season. It is appalling to me that you intend to hold this
hearing given these blatant violations oI SCR 105(2)(c), but when you add to that the Iraudulent conduct oI
Pat King, in Iailing to amend his and or Clerk oI Court Peters certiIicate oI mailiing or return oI service Ior
the purported certiIied mailing (and, contrary to the SBN's established practice detailed in the certiIicates oI
mailing I have review upon Iinally being granted a copy oI the "Iile", though, the rule says I get to go to the
SBN's oIIices and review certain things "up to three days"...not have Pat King and Laura Peters manuIacture
some nonsense about why I am not allowed at the building or otherwise violating my rights (which is
something King and Peters do everytime they get caught violating the rules.) Further, I have been (and some
might say this was largely by design) jammed into having this Disciplinary Hearing on November 14th,
2012 in impermissible proximity to the petty larceny trial in rcr2011-063341 (see Montiero Ior why it is not
even appropriate Ior King to be seeking to Iorce me to prejudice my deIense in that matter) on November
19th, 2012, in Department 2, beIore Judge SIerrazza, whom presided over the summary eviction/unlawIul
detainer "Trial" Irom my Iormer home law oIIice that the criminal trespass arrest, jaywalking arrest (King's
Complaint doesn't manage to speciIy that the January 12th, 2012 arrest was Ior jaywalking outside my
Iormer home law oIIice shortly aIter my collecting video evidence revealed the Iraud attendant to Hill's
contractor havig used my own plywood to board up the back porch oI the property....Hill, also, at that time,
went and got a TPO that was based largely upon an outright lie, ie, that I "climbed up on" the contractor Phil
Stewart's truck). I believe this Panel should review (I cannot aIIor the $35 to $70 Ior the video oI the two
hearings on Hill's Motion Ior Order to Show Cause oI January 20th, 2012 (the Order to Show Cause was
served by RMC Marsm hal Harley, despite what WCSO Deputy Machen said he personally served in his
aIIidavit (Machen also lied about personally serving the eviction lockout order Ior HIll, and HIll lied at the
trespass trial when he testiIied that Machen "posted it on the door becaues you ran away", Hill also lied at
trial when he alleged the Reno PD announced themselves as law enIorcement and issued a lawIul order to
emerge Iorm the basement prior to the landlord kicking in the door, and Hill also lied about whether anyone
that day warned Coughlin to leave the property prior to Hill's signing the criminal complaint to aIIect a
custodial arrest Ior criminal trespass).
Additionally. I moved recently, and updated my SCR 79 address in compliance with that Supreme Court
Rule well within the 30 days oI my moving. Further, I Iiled an oIIicial Change oI Address with the USPS,
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and that caused delays in receiving my mail incident to the typical Iorwarding procedures oI the USPS, and I
have the yellow stickers on the envelopes to prove it. Further, besides submitting an oIIicial Change oI
Address Iorm to the Vassar Station on October 5th, 2012, Coughlin wrote the SBN on October 14th, 2012,
and provided his new 1471 E. 9th St. mailing and physical address, in addition to updating the online portal
and the NV CLE Board even prior to that, all in compliance with SCR 79.
"We nevertheless conclude that discipline orders appearing in the Nevada Lawyer may
be cited to this court for the limited purpose of providing examples of the discipline
imposed in similar fact situations. This approach has also been taken by several other
courts. n22
n22 See. e.g., Berman v. City of Daly City, 21 Cal. App. 4th 276, 26 Cal. Rptr, 2d 493,
496 n.5 (Ct. App. 1993); Marez v. Dairyland ns. Co., 638 P.2d 286, 289 n.2 (Colo. 1981);
Manderfeld v. Krovitz, 539 N.W.2d 802, 807 n.3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995): Leisure Hills of
Grand Rapids v. DHS, 480 N.W.2d 149, 151 n.3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)." LAUB.
Then there is Judge Hardesty being a one oI the three Justices signing the 6/7/12 Order that
temporarily suspended Coughlin's law license over a conviction Ior petty theIt oI "a candy bar and some
cough drops" (despite the recently reinstated Stephen R. Harris, Esq. not having a temporary suspension
even where he admitted to, upon being Iorced to by his wiIe law partner, misappropriating some $740,000
and using it on...(NVD Judge Beesley's, a Bankruptcy Judge in Federal Court who has a specialization in
"Creditor's Rights" listed on his contact page at www.nvbar.org, (McGeorge Law School class oI 1979,
meaning he attended with Reno Municipal Court Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes name was supplmeneted to
the Designation oI Witness by a November 7th, 2012 Iiling by Bar Counsel King...which means Couglhin
did not have much notice at all that Beesley would testiIy. Neither did, apparently, Judge Beesley, as, Ior
one testiIying as to whether a man shoudl retain his law license and the Judge being willing to so weigh in
with deIinitive opinions (even where a multitude oI conlIicts oI interests where present that should have
arguably precluded him Irom so doing under the canons oI his proIession....Nash Holmes/McGeorge
connection, Karen Sabo/Beesley Peck/Coughlin suing Washoe Legal Services/ Beesley close personal Iriend
oI Elcano's angle) Judge Beesley sure didn't have much in the way oI speciIics to support his strong
opinions. IN Iact, he seemed to trip up on things rather easily and wish to vague it all way when Coughlin
pressed Ior speciIics. One thing that seems particularly untoward is the extent to which Judge Beelsey Iailed
to, in any way, mention the extremely noticeable Iiling (made accesible to all via the RECAP plugin on
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FireIox Ior those using Pacer, wherein Judge Beesley's McGeorge Class mate (they were one year apart and
are almost exactly the same age) Dorothy Nash Holmes illegally conIiscating an pro se attorney deIendant's
smart phone and micro sd data card, well aIter any period Ior her Marshals to conduct a "search incident to
arrest" and without any warrant or Order made available to Coughlin was mentioned and extensive
supporting documentation was provided Ior in the adversary proceeding 10-05104 Cadle Company v. Keller.
Further, Coughlin dispalyed a proIound level oI proIessionalism in connection with the John Gessin
adversary proceedings, particulary where Coughlin owned up to the extent to which the rules oI court as
currently applied in the NVD make one attorney or record regardless oI whether the agreement between
attorney and client is oI an "unbundled services" nature, and regardless oI Gessin himselI telling Coughlin he
was monitoring the case on Pacer, did not want Coughlin to work any Iurther on the case, etc.... Gessin soon
became Panel Member Shelly O'Neill's client.
Regardless, a review oI Coughlin's Iiling in the three NVB cases wherein Coughlin practice beIore
Judge Beesley will reveal extremely comptenet work. Perhaps what Judge Beesley was unable to elucidate
speciIically in support oI his contentions (which, again, sought to accomplish through a leveraging oI the
Coe Swobe/mental health care apparatus that which is not supportable through more straighIorward means)
is that Judge Beesley's McGeorge SOL Class oI 1977 class mate, RMC Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes'
extremely questionable conduct and rulings in RMC 11 TR 26800 on 2/27/12, 2/28/12, and 3/12/12
(resumption oI Trial in spite oI NRS 178.405 and NRS 5.010 and Holmes' own assessment oI Coughlin's
"mental health" issues in both her 2/28/12 Order and here 3/12/12 ruminations rendered and subsequent
contradictory Order signed, in addition to the), 3/13/12 (various other orders by Judge Nash HOlmes, and
3/14/12 (grievance letter to SBN), and 10/4/12 (again, Judge Nash Holmes reIuses to Iollow NRS 189.010-
050 in striking another attempt by Coughlin to have the Iact that a summary contempt order is a Iinal
appealable order, and thereIore the RMC and Judge Nash Holmes, once again, are permitted to skirt the law
with respect to the Court, under NRS 189.030 being required to order the preparation oI the criminal
appellant's transcript (and certainly, iI Judge Nash Holmes wishes to issue a "misdemeanor oI criminal
contempt" conviction in a summary Iashion (based upon unattributed hearsay by "some Marshal" whom,
contrary to the dictates oI NRS 22.030 did not have to sign an aIIidavit to have a contempt Iinding Ior
conduct allegedly occurring outside the presence oI the court be consiered (good thing Ior Marshal Joel
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Harley...because either he is lying or Judge Nash Holmes is lying some more, speciIically with respect to
this categorically Ialse non-sense about Coughlin "disassembling a smart phone" or recording device in the
restroom and leaving part oI it there (the implication being, given Judge Nash Holmes lies about the order oI
her sua sponte interrogation oI Coughlin regarding recording issues and Coughlin needing to use the
restroom-ie, Judge Nash Holmes lied, under oath, on 11/14/12 when she said Coughlin's request to use the
restroom came only AFTER she began her interrogation about recording or recording device...which, iI
Chair Echeverria would have allowed Coughlin to enter the certiIied copy he had to have his mother buy Ior
him (becuase the RMC thrice rejected Coughlin's attempts to buy one himselI, and in Iact, Judge Nash
Holmes attempted to levy some unIathomable sanction or sua sponte disbarment about some piddly
nonsense related to Coughlin's Iiling oI an in Iorma pauperis application (truly a low, even here...especially
where Judge Nash Holmes alternately writes bar counsel on 3/14/12 a greivance directed to Coughlin where
she mentions, via some unattributed hearsay (which seems to be a common theme running through Judge
Nash Holmes work) that ) using an AIIidavit that was Irom November 22, 2011 in a March 2012 Iiling (IFP
Orders typically last 6 months, so....? And to whatever extent Judge Nash Holmes seeks to make Coughlin's
interlineating a diIIerent case number on that notarized IFP or Coughlin's adding "Request Ior Audio
Recording oI Trial in 11 TR 26800" onto that IFP as tantamount to conduct supporting her desire to sua
sponte disbar Coughlin...welll...Coughlin wonders why that Hug-a-Thug program was not given more oI a
chance beIore Judge Nash Holmes went all "six months in County Ior jaywalking" on him. Coughlin's
Iriend GeoI Giles, Esq. (big ups to the Masjid here in Reno, including RaIik Beekun, a member oI the
Muslim center`s board oI directors and everyone there who was so kind in giving Coughlin a place to go Ior
Iood and pleasant company, during their celebration oI Ramadan, no less, incident to Coughlin attempting to
recover Irom the Leviathan wrath oI the Reno Municipal Court and the McGeorge MaIia's, some might say,
"approach") may have said it best when he mentioned something about "the community college proIessors oI
the legal landscape..."
Also Panel Chair Echeverria is running the Panel like a thug, basically. See WLS's attorney Joe
Garin's argument respecting Coughlin's right to insist on technical compliance with service rules....NOw
what that mean? It mean that the SBN and King and Peters do not get to put on testimony by Judge Beesley
and Elcano (even though lots oI stuII was said by both that damages the SBN's case and only Iurther drives
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home the McGeorge MaIia meme, and the extent to which King and Echeverria cheerIuly deIile any
conception oI due process that might attache to a Dsiciplinary Hearing (to which they seem to drag along
Clerk Peters...what is she supposed to do? Get Iired like Coughlin at WLS? See Caryn Sternlicht's approach
at the hearing on the Objection to Master Linda Gardner's Recommendations in the the Santiago v.
Vaxevanis TPO deal FV08-03380, where she Iilled in Ior Coughlin, whom took issue with then Master
Linda Gardner making Orders in TPO's where opposing counsel was Richard Molezzo, Esq., that purported
to rule on the title to vehicles...despite NRS 33.018 seeming to clearly lack any jurisdictional basis Ior her to
do so, particularly where the vehicle was being given to the accused abuser, and Iurther where that Order
was seemingly later recharacterized as an "agreement"....uh, no. See a similar "this ORder is an agreement
so no appeals will be allowed Irom it, even the 12/26/12 one you Iiled, Coughlin" this summary eviction
"Trial" appeal (Irom which this 61383 atty Iees oI $42, 050 appeals stems...) incident to the 12/20/11
Hearing (six weeks late because Hill (but what about Casey Baker, Esq., who has absconded to Kentucky
and leIt Rich to Iace the music?) had to go on a six week vacation, a Iact about which he claimed to be able
to control the RJC into not complying with NRS 40.253(7)-(8). Coughlin hereby asks this court to stop the
trial oI 11/19/12 in rcr2011-063341 (the iphone case presided over by judge sIerrazza, whom managed to
conIiscate all oI Coughlin's subpoenas on the auspices that Skau's Iraudulently noticed ex part motion
provided suIIicient grounds too...but then Iailed to return any oI them to Coughlin in time to have them
served Ior the 11/19/12 hearing...and entered an Order that purports to take away Irom Coughlin the right to
have served subpoenas issued propertly under a reading that doesn't include the rendered order by Judge
SFerrazza oI 10-/22/12 in 063341)...So, while Coughlin likes and respects Judge SIerrazza, he must recuse
himselI Irom that continuation oI Trial in 063341 on 11/19/12.
Also, both Echeverria and Pat King are seeking to take a page out oI the Judge Nash Holmes
"Contempt Statute Pastiche Cookbook" to accomplish their neIarious aims, includign disobeying the
Iollowing authority by trying to "preserve Ior the record" and "admitting Ior the limited purpose oI establish
Coughlin's "altering" a previously Iiled document, where Coughlin, in complete exasperation at Echeverria
demonstrating the highest possible level oI evident impartiality in ruling irrelevant or not properly
authenticated every single thing Coughlin oIIered into evidence
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As Ior Coughlin's inability to get Echeverria to admit anything into evidence Ior any purpose other than in
support oI some Summary Disciplinary Hearing violation oI the RPC that Echeverria sought to enter in an
Order in violation oI SchaeIIer (when Echeverria was not grimacing noticeably and telegraphing displeasure
to Coughlin at Coughlin mere mention oI the mitigating quality oI local law enIorcement misconduct or that
oI members oI the judiciary or prosecution team...much less Echeverrias verbally suggest that Coughlin
Iorget about the permission to do so Iound in Laub and instead cease comparing his case to Stephen R.
Harris, Esq.'s (despite the ripe ground to consiering Judge Beesley's improprly notice (no signed green car
certiIie dmailin in compliance with the requirements oI SCR 109 considering Laura Peter's announcing oI
the rules on September 11th, 2012 and subsequent indications oI assent to electronic service by the nndb,
sbn, and panel, and declaration oI the rules attendnat to the running oI time vis a vis materials required
served under scr 109, incident to a certiIied mailing (ie, Peters announced the SBN and Panel would only
begin the running oI such time periods upon the date on which Coughlin's signature was made on one oI the
green certiIied mailin return receipt requested cards...and given the SBN can't show as much Ior the
Supplemental notice announcing the Designation Io Witnesses oI Judge Beesley or WLS's Elcano
(Echeverria seemed to indicate he did not understand what Coughlin was reIerring to when Coughlin
suggested that given he was suing wls and elcano in 60302, and garin was elcano and wls's attorney oI
record there, that questioning elcano may be tantamount to communications with represented parties (dollars
to donuts elcano has not told garin about this, and Coughlin didn't have the time to given the "jUdge
sIerrazza auhtorize me to serve you notice oI the ex parte emergency hearing to quash your subpoenas on
basis that judge sIerrazzas himselI seemed to approve your using in connection with utilizing such
subpoenas on 10/22/12 in rcr2011-063341" by Reno City Attorney Creig Skau (who, ironically sought to ex
part quash Coughlin's subpoenas based upon insuIIiciency oI procedural rules compliance grounds even
where he was apparently lying about Jduge SFerrazza granting him the authority to serve Coughlin notice oI
the hearing by email....and or oI the 11/7/12 order by Judge sIerazzaa. Local government really doesn't like
complying with subpoenas...just ask the SEcond Judicial District Court and WCDA's OIIice, whom
waitinged until 11/13/12 at 4:46 to even Iax Coughlin notice oI its intent to Iail to appear at the 11/14/12
Disciplinary Hearing (despite the Iact that the basis Ior such objections by Watts-Vial (and thats another
thing...is that the Watts-Vial whom is a 2nd Judicial judges staII member? Is the Judicial Assistant
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Townsend in the RMC connected to the Marshal Townshend? Is Sargent AVansino oI the RSIC connected
to Dena Avansino? We know ecomm 911 dispatcher jessica duralde is married to rpd Nick Duralde, the
oIIicer who eIIected the wrongIul, admittedly retaliating "how's that?" arrest on 8/20/11 in rcr2011-063341
that started all this oII....and that jessica duralde was on duty that day and that wcda jim leslie Iailed to
provide the materials or response Irom kelley odom and ecomm incident to the 10/3/12 subpoena he sent her
(Judge SIerrazzaoIIering the scant time Coughlin's case in chieI was accorded, which amount to 1/8th oI the
total running time oI the on the record portion oI the proceedings (and the stoagie breaks "Boss Hog"
Echeverria (and his med mal background provides yet another specious connection to Elcano via the
"panopay" case Elcano constantly reminsces about...) grew more and more Irequent once the Hearing turned
to the time allotted to Coughlin's case in chieI...), a couple people name Cummings in the WCSO/WCDC,
ec., etc.
But as to King and Echeverria's attempt to make the Discipinary Hearing one where some summary
proIssional conduct ORder may be issued (an allegation that coughlin "altered a previously Iiled document"
is so laughable Irom Echeverria where Coughlin is alleged to have scratch out and or notated his doing so a
Iile stamp on the 10/31/12 Pre Hearing Memorandum oI Law, and interlineated that the document was now
being titled a "Declaration" or something similar in an exasperated attemtp to get somethign, anything, into
the record in that ng12-0204 case...Violations oI proIessional conduct rules not charged in attorney
disciplinary complaint could not be considered by Supreme Court. In re Discipline oI SchaeIer, 2001, 25
P.3d 191, 117 Nev. 496, modiIied on denial oI rehearing 31 P.3d 365, certiorari denied 122 S.Ct. 1072, 534
U.S. 1131, 151 L.Ed.2d 974. So, iI the SBN and Echeverria want to charge coughlin with some violation
there, it will require due process, and they must reIrain Irom a Nash Holmsian transmogriIication oI one type
oI proceeding into another type wholly unsupportable under the law (judge Nash Holmes sought to make a
traIIic citation trial a Iull blown "Summary Disciplinary Proceeding" in 11 tr 26800, whereas Echeverria and
King seek to turn a Disciplinary Proceeding that they have rigged to cheat Coughlin out oI every single due
process protection possible into a "Summary Disciplinary Proceeding"...which doesn't even exist in Nevada
law. a SCR 102(5)? maybe....but not a Summary Disciplinary Proceeding Order Finding Coughlin to have
"Altered" a Previously Filed Document just because Chair Echeverria was Ilummoxed by the ingenuity oI
Coughlin in getting into the record all that stuII on the cd/dvd's and in the two diIIerent "Declarations" or
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similarly titled submissions into evidence that had those cd/dvd's attached to them....(and the panel and nndb
and sbn's assent to electronic service makes required that the materials in the SkyDrive and via email
attachments, as well as the cd/dvd's Coughlin provided be included in the record on appeal).
Plus, it was wrong Ior Chair Echeverria to deny Coughlin the right to record the
11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing and Couglin HEREBY PLACES THE STATE BAR OF
NEVADA, SUNSHINE REPORTING SERVICES, CAROL HUMMEL, LINDA SHAW,
PAT KING, LAURA PETERS, THE NORTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD
AND ITS PANEL ON NG12-0205 ET AL ON A LITIGATION HOLD NOTICE.
Also, kind oI odd that NVB Judge Beesley didn't mention the 3/30/12 (hey, thats the same date Judge
Flanagan dismissed Coughlin's appeal oI the summary eviction /"Trial" Irom his Iormer home law oIIice...."
Iiling by Couglin in Cadle Company v. Keller wherein Coughlin attached as exhibits that pesky Iiling oI a
notice oI appeal by coughlin against the RMC and City ATtorney and Judge Nash HOlmes Iollowing his
release Irom 5 ays summary incarceration, no stay (though Judge Nash HOolmes sure does care about those
clients, to be sure, right? she wouldn't, nor would Jduge Howard, be seeking to get back at Coughlin more by
attempting to arrange greater damage theml;kjasdIl;
/It is categorically false for 1udge Nash Holmes to assert, in the audio record on
3/12/12 the order of events and when she asked Coughlin her questions about
recording, considering when a restroom break took place an exactly what it is she
asked Couglin and when, and what his responses were, and when some allegations by
"the Marshal" were made, what they consisted of, etc.. on 3/12/12 in 11 tr 26800 the
audio transcript reads 7 minutes into the audio record the RMC provided the SBN:
1udge Nash Holmes (Nash): It appears to me in this case that the defendant is suffering from
some extreme form of mental illness. during the trial I asked the defendant attorney
repeatedly if he was recording the proceedings he denied that vehemently a few times and
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then he quote took the fifth a few other times and then he requested to be excused to go to the
bathroom and the Marshal later reported to me that while the gentleman was in the
bathroom he disassembled a recording device in his pocket and took the memory out of it
and it was later found in that, uh, by the Marshal no one else had gone into the bathroom
and that was retrieved and it was put into his possession at the Sheriff's office and when they
booked him into jail for the contempt charge that was booked into evidence and I asked the
Sheriff's office to hold that into evidence. I believe he has violated Supreme Court Rule
229(2)(B) which was amended by ADKT 440, August 1st, 2011...."
One Coughlin did not do anything oI the sort indicated by Judge Nash Holmes (by way oI
unattributed hearsay, like her car sleeping allegations in her 3/14/12 letter re Coughlin to the SBN)
above.
NRS 178.405 should have prevented anything said or done by Judge Nash Holmes Iollowing her
statement at the 7 minute mark that "It appears to me in this case that the deIendant is suIIering
Irom some extreme Iorm oI mental illness." Further, that which Judge Nash Holmes had
communicated to her prior to the start oI Trial on 2/27/12 in 11 tr 26800 needs to be testiIied to
under oath, rather than have Bar Counsel assert to halI baked "can't ask the judge about her mental
processes" loophole, as he has done.
whether the citation or report in 11 tr 26800 contained any mention oI retaliation, given she was
looking right at it and given what she said in court. Also, the whispering with Marshal Harley, and
the bits about Coughlin reporting to Ormaas what RPD OFIicer Carter said to Coughlin in 61901,
and Ormaas's responses thereto on 2/27/12, and Dan Wong, ditto at an earlier hearing on that
matter...
Simply put, there was no questioning by Judge Nash Holmes oI Coughlin as to whether he was recording
anything or whether he possessed a "recording device" until AFTER the one and only restroom break Judge
Nash Holmes mentions on the audio record. And that sua sponte interrogation oI Couglin occured
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RESTROOM BREAK, A BREAK IN WHICH JUDGE NASH HOLMES
REFUSED TO ALLOW COUGHLIN TO TAKE HIS YELLOW LEGAL PAD WITH HIM AND WHICH
OCCURED AFTER COUGHLIN MADE A VERBAL PRESERVATION ON THE RECORD OF THE
WHISPERING IN EACH OTHER'S EARS BY CITY ATTORNEY ALLISON ORMAAS AND
MARSHAL HARLEY (WHO SEEMED A BIT UPSET ABOUT SOME OF THE QUESTIONS
COUGHLIN ASKED THEM IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE TRIAL (DURING THAT PERIOD OF
TIME WHERE JUDGE NASH HOLME'S ASSISTANT INDICATED, ON THE RECORD IN ONE OF
THE OTHER CASES ON THAT STACKED DOCKET, THAT Judge Nash Holmes just couldn't be Iound,
and how odd that was...which is odd, considering what was going on in 11 cr 22176, 11 cr 26405 12 cr
00696 and 11 tr 26800, and rcr2012-065630 and rcr2011-063341 at the time (lots oI reasons Ior and
indications that local law enIorcement and prosecutors and public deIenders were non too happy with
Coughlin...and consider the 2/24/12 email vacating the 2/27/12 status conIerence between young and dogan
that neither YOung nor Dogan wish to testiIy about...but which seems to have been held anyways aIter a
written communication oI its being reset was transmitted to Coughlin by Dogan, wherein, during the time
Judge Nash Holmes couldn't be Iound (maybe she was at one oI the group meetings amongst Judges about
Coughlin that RMC Administrative Judge William Gardner reIerenced on the record in 11 CR 26405?
Interesting the Notice oI Appeal in 60302 was Iiled that same day too, 2/27/12) Dogan got his ORder Ior
Competency Evaluation oI Coughlin in rcr2012-065630 (apparently in retaliation Ior Coughlin's Iiling oI
2/21/12, and DDA Zach Young was still smarting Irom a Iiling by Coughlin oI approximately 11/28/12,
which resultd in Young promptly amending his complaint in rcr2011-063341 to add a charge that was
duplicative, even where YOung Iailure to allege theIt or possessing/receiving "Irom another' under Staab
makes his so charging Coughlin in that iPhone case a RPC 3.8 violation, which is YOung's specialty,
apparently. That, and violating NRs 178.405, which YOung did by Iiling in rcr2011-063341 with a stamp oI
2:55pm a Iugitive document oI his own, an Opposition to Coughlin's or the WCPD Motion to Appear as
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CoCounsel on 2/27/12...nevermind YOung tried to hold a TRIAL on 5/7/12 in that case despite the Order
Iinding Coughlin competent in cr12-0376 didn't even get signed and entered until 5/9/12...ditto the Trial
seeting oI 5/8/12 in RMC 11 cr 26405, the criminal trespass case. NOt much respect Ior nrs 178.405
(including within NRs 5.010) here in Northern nevada..
Coughlin didn't received the 2/28/12 Contempt ORder in 11 tr 26800 until July 2012...but did Iile a Notice oI
Appeal 3/7/12...despite "summary criminal contempt" being a Iinal appealable order, Judge Nash HOlmes
continues to reIuse to Iollow NRS 189.010-050 (so Coughlin has to type the transcript, yay....
It is true that contempt committed in a trial courtroom can under some circumstances be punished summarily
by the trial judge. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 . But adjudication by a trial judge oI a
contempt committed in his immediate presence in open court cannot be likened to the proceedings here. For
we held in the Oliver case that a person charged with contempt beIore a "one-man grand jury" could not be
summarily tried. |349 U.S. 133, 138| The power oI a trial judge to punish Ior a contempt committed in his
immediate presence in open ... In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel oI Coughlin
violated in both 11 cr 22176 and 11 tr 26800, also orders no suIIiciently detailed or capable oI being known
how to comply with, not suIIicient warning, violat Houston v Eighth Judicial District (Nev.).
See, this is why In Re Oliver and Cooke require all elements oI "summary criminal contempt" occur " in the
"immediate presence" oI the Court. Maybe Marshal Harley and some other Marshal have misled Judge
Nash HOlmes, or maybe something worse is going on here....but what Judge Nash HOlmes said on the
recording is entirely misleading an inaccurate, iI not an outright lie (again, maybe not a lie by Judge Nash
Holmes, maybe she is repeating a lie, but regardless her reliance on unattributed hearsay is distrubing an
inappropriate, particulary where she not only purports to issue a "summary criminal contempt" conviction
against an attorney, but also where Judge Nash Holmes appears to try to transmogriIy what she sees as "a
simple traIIic citation trial" into a Iull blown SCR 105 disciplinary hearing where she is both Bar Counsel
and the Panel...That Marshal needs to sign an aIIidavit, under NRS 22.020 and Judge Nash HOlmes ought to
have to put something on the record, under oath, in response to Coughlin's recent subpoena (and SBN Pat
King wishes to let Judge Nash HOlmes phone in her testimony, and it probably won't even be sworn
testimony, but rather just some musings by Judge Nash Holmes purporting to make "rulings" Iinding "by
clear and convincing evidence" all sorts oI things outside her jurisdiction) on 11/14/12, on, Partick O. King,
SBN Bar Counsel has also Iiled Motion to Quash the Subpoenas Coughlin attempted to have served on
Marshal Joel Harley, Marshal Deighton, Judge Nash HOlmes, Judge William Gardner, Judge Gardners
Administrative Assistant Lisa Wagner, who can't quite Iind the NOtice oI Appeal Coughlin Iaxed to her
(allowable under the RMC Rules) on June 28th, 2012 in 11 CR 26405 (the appeal was dismissed under an
NRS 189.010 analysis by Judge Elliot, whom also got Coughlin appeal oI the 11 cr 22176 conviction
resulting in this Court's 6/7/12 temporary suspension Order in cr11-2064, which was denied based upon a
civil preparation oI transcript down payment rule, in that criminal appeal, where the RMC has a thing in
place with this Pam Longoni that violates Nevada law in that it reIused to give Coughlin the audio cd oI the
trial Ior some time, insisting only Longoni would be allowed to transcribe it, and that the transcript's
preparation would absolutely not start until a down payment was made. Plus, even where Coughlin caved to
the payment demands..Longoni repeatedly hung up the phone on him and otherwise ignored his
communications (there may be an issue oI the email Longoni holding out to the public issuing a
"bounceback"...but she needs to sign an aIIidavit as to whether she put Coughlin on a blocked list, and upon
inIormation and belieI, Coughlin Iaxed his request to the number the RMC held out Ior her on her behalI
too...
In her March 14th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin to the SBN (now NG12-0434, and perhaps,
NG12-0435, depending upon whom you ask and what King means by "Clerk oI Court"...because in King's
3/23/12 email to Coughlin he apparently identiIies Ms. Marilyn Tognoni as "Clerk oI Court oI Department
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3"...whoever, wouldn't it be Second Judicial District Court Clerk oI Court Joey Orduna Hastings that would
need to send Family Court Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin to the SBN's King
Ior King now apparent contention that the NG12-0435 "ghost grievance" consisting oI Judge L. Gardner's
April 2009 Order was not Iiled by the RMC Judges? Oh, Clerk oI Court Orduna Hastings? Do you have
anything to say about this? Judge Nash Holme's 3/14/12 grievance to bar counsel reads:
"
Dear Mr. Clark:
This letter constitutes a Iormal complaint oI attorney misconduct and/or disability against
Zachary Barker Coughlin. The accompanying box oI materials demonstrates some oI the problems
with the practice oI this attorney being experienced by myselI and the other three judges in Reno
Municipal Court. My two most recent Orders in what should be a simple traIIic citation case are
selI-explanatory and are included, together with copies oI massive documents Me. Coughlin has
IaxIiled to our court in this case. Audio recordings oI two oI my hearings in this matter are also
included. He Iailed to appear Ior the second one this past Monday.
I have another traIIic case pending trial with him that was re-assigned to me based on our
Department I judge being out Ior surgery. We have multiple addresses Ior Mr. Coughlin and can't
seem to locate him between cases very easily. We are setting that case Ior trial and attempting to
serve him at the most recent address we have (1422 E. 9
th
St. #2 Reno NY 89512), although I
heard today he may be living in his vehicle somewhere. We do have an address Ior his mother,
however, as she recently posted part oI a Iine Ior him.
Judge Ken Howard, Department 4, had a case on Mr. Coughlin late last year that is now
on appeal to the Second Judicial District Court. Judge Bill Gardner, Department 2, also has a
matter currently pending in his court with Mr. Coughlin as the deIendant. I have enclosed some
copies oI documents Irom those matters, in chronological order, simply because they appear to
demonstrate that he is quickly decompensating in his mental status. Our staII also made you some
audio tapes oI Coughlin in the him and him and him and him and him and him and him him and I
will him and him and him and him and him in Departments 2 and 4 so you can hear Ior yourselI
how this attorney acts in court. You can see his behavior in my traIIic citation case does not
appear to be an isolated incident.
It is my understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a matter pending on this attorney.
My Judicial Assistant was contacted by the Washoe Public DeIender in February when I had Mr.
Coughlin jailed Ior Contempt oI Court and they stated that they represent him in a Gross
Misdemeanor matter in RJC. I have no other inIormation on that.
You will have the Iull cooperation oI myselI, the other judges, and the staII oI Reno
Municipal Court in your pursuit oI this matter. Mr. Coughlin has positioned himselI as a vexatious
litigant in our court, antagonizing the staII and even our pro temp judges on the most simple
traIIic and misdemeanor matters. I do think this is a case oI some urgency, and I apologize Ior
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taking two days to get this package to you; our IT person was ill and could not make the copies oI
the audios oI Mr. Coughlin's hearings until today, and I Ielt it was important that the audios be
included in the materials to be considered by the State Bar. On February 27, Coughlin
told me he was actively practicing law and had appointments with clients. | do not know iI that
was true, but iI so, he could be causing serious harm to the practice oI law in Northern Nevada
and could be jeopardizing someone's Ireedom or property interests. "
/Rule 120. Costs; bar counsel conflict or disqualification.
1.
An attorney subjected to discipline or seeking reinstatement under these rules may be assessed the costs, in
Iull or in part, oI the proceeding, including, but not limited to, reporter's Iees, investigation Iees, bar counsel
and staII's salaries, witness expenses, service costs, publication costs, and any other Iees or costs deemed
reasonable by the panel and allocable to the proceeding.
2.
If, for any reason, bar counsel is disqualified or has a conflict of interest, the board of
governors shall appoint an attorney, ad hoc, to act in the place of bar counsel.
Coughlin is truly severly indigent at this point and requests, to whatever
extent and IFP has not already been granted herein, and Order allowing him to
proceed In Forma Pauperis
Docket entry Ior the trial court matter this case was appealed Iorm shows the impropriety oI the Clerk oI
Court dismissing the appeal Ior lack oI paying a Iiling Iee:
06-SEP-2012 04:55 PM $Notice/Appeal Supreme Court COUGHLIN, ZACHARY
Entry: APPEAL FEE PAID FOR THE 7-30-12 NOTICE OF APPEAL - IMAGE ATTACHED TO JULY
FILING
http://www.ccwashoe.com/public/ckpublicqrydoct.cpdktrptIrames?
backtoP&caseidCV11-03628&begindate&enddate
06-SEP-
2012
04:55 PM
$Notice/Appeal Supreme Court COUGHLIN, ZACHARY
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Entry:
APPEAL FEE PAID FOR THE 7-30-12 NOTICE OF APPEAL - IMAGE ATTACHED TO
JULY FILING
06-SEP-2012
04:56 PM
**Payment Receipted
Entry: A Payment oI -$34.00 was made on receipt DCDC375290.
conclusion
please reinstate the appeal and or grant ifp status or provide time to submit a proper ifp as
bar counsel clearly is gunning for a Panel Order that entails Coughlin paying back this unconcionable
attorney fee award prior to reinstatement, and that is if Bar Counsel Pat King doesn't get his stated
wish to have Coughlin disbarred. Further, the District Court's 3/30/12 Order should be added to this
appeal given the circumstances, to whatever extent Coughlin failed to file a timely notice of appeal
thereto, as should the notice of appeal of the justice court's 12/21/11 Order Resolving Coughlin's
November 17th, 2011 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien consdiering the R1C failed to file
stamp in Coughlin's timely 12/26/11 notice of appeal thereto in rjc rev2011-001708, as the rjc did in
another summary eviction from a commercial lease involving coughlin's former home law office in rjc
rev2012-000374...further RMC 1udge Nash Holmes has similarly refused to follow the rules on
transmitting appeals in 11 TR 26800 ( a case whee Richard Hill had RMC Marshal 1oel Harley violate
courthouse sanctuary doctrine where Harley personally served Coughlin notice of the 3/23/12 order to
show cause hearing in the district court appeal of this matter (and really, on October 19th, 2011,
Coughlin alreaqdy had a District court appeal in this matter in cv11-03126 or cv11-03051...thus
making void the entire appeal in cv11-03628, perhaps).
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The undersigned does hereby aIIirm that the preceding document does not contain the
social security number oI any person. The assertions herein are made, pursuant to NRS
53.045 under penalty oI perjry and based upon my Iirst hand knowledge oI these matters,
except to perhaps a very, very Iew aspects oI a a very Iew assertions which are made upon
inIormation and belieI.
Dated this November 17th, 2012,
/s/ Zach Coughlin, signed
electronically
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Appellant
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Proof of Service:
On this date, I, Zach Coughlin electronically served a true and correct copy oI the
Ioregoing document to all registered eIilers, and to those whom are not I placed a true and
correct copy oI the Ioregoing document in the usps mail on this date:
Richard G. Hill, Esq.
Casey Baker, Esq.
Richard G. Hill, CHTD.
Attorneys Ior Respondent Merliss
652 Forrest St.
Reno, NV 89509
DATED THIS: Dated this November 17th, 2012
/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Appellant
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INDEX TO EXHIBITS:
1. Exhibit 1: various relevant materials.
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Close Print
Chief Marshal Roper and Marshal Harley on setting the record straight
in NG12-0435
Sent: Fri 11/23/12 4:09 PM
To: roperj@reno.gov (roperj@reno.gov); harleyj@reno.gov (harleyj@reno.gov); je@eloreno.com
(je@eloreno.com); skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com); cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com);
eifert.nta@att.net (eifert.nta@att.net); nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net (nevtelassn@sbcglobal.net);
patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); christensend@reno.gov (christensend@reno.gov);
mike@tahoelawyer.com (mike@tahoelawyer.com); davidc@nvbar.org (davidc@nvbar.org);
fflaherty@dlpfd.com (fflaherty@dlpfd.com); fflaherty@dyerlawrence.com
(fflaherty@dyerlawrence.com); stuttle@washoecounty.us (stuttle@washoecounty.us); wongd@reno.gov
(wongd@reno.gov); ormaasa@reno.gov (ormaasa@reno.gov); mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us
(mkandaras@da.washoecounty.us); zyoung@da.washoecounty.us (zyoung@da.washoecounty.us);
bdogan@washoecounty.us (bdogan@washoecounty.us); jleslie@washoecounty.us
(jleslie@washoecounty.us); holmesd@reno.gov (holmesd@reno.gov)
Dear Panel, Judge Nash Holmes, Chief Roper, Marshal Harley, Bar Counsel, et al,
I apologize for using email to communicate here, but my current indigency and time
constraints so require it. Further, I in no way wish to violate any Orders by any of the
RMC Judges respecting emailing or contacting the RMC in connection with specific
cases, and submit this limited correspondence in the hopes that my interpretation of any
such Orders is in line with reality and will forgive at least this limited use of email
outside of any attempt to file anything in any of the matters in which I am a party
before the RMC. The exigency involved here relates primarily to the enormous
deference that will be given to the Panel's decision in the SBN v. Coughlin disciplinary
matter, and my desire to have the Panel afforded every opportunity to have all essential
information necessary to arrive at a just decision at its disposal. What follows is in part
a request and in part a recognition of the extent to which Judge Nash Holmes's action
during the 2/27/12 Trial in 11 TR 26800 may likely have been the best thing to have
had done, owing to her vast experience in these and a great deal many other matters,
and, hopefully, will have an upbeat result stemming therefrom.
At the Double R Blvd. Northern Office of the State Bar of Nevada, RMC Judge Nash
Holmes, on 11/14/12, testified under oath and indicated something along the lines of
the following:
001655
During the 11 TR 26800 "simple traffic citation Trial" on 2/27/12, starting at about 3
pm, Judge Holmes interrogated Coughlin as various points throughout the Trial as to
whether he was recording the proceedings (without permission), and or whether he had
a "recording device" (whether every laptop anyone brings to Court would be
considered a "recording device" to Judge Holmes is not exactly clear).
Judge Holmes then testified that after an initial round of interrogation of Coughlin as to
whether he was recording the proceedings and or had a "recording device" that
Coughlin got "all sneakity" and said he was not, but then "quote, 'took the Fifth' then
immediately asked to be allowed to use the restroom...and I ordered Marshal Joel
Harley to accompany him there...and it was reported to me that while in the restroom
Coughlin disassembled a recording device and hid some part of it in the restroom..."
(Coughlin recounts this testimony from memory, and admittedly, it is far from
verbatim).
It is categorically false (though not necessarily maliciously so) for Judge Nash Holmes to
assert, in the audio record on 3/12/12 the order of events and when she asked Coughlin her
questions about recording, considering when a restroom break took place and exactly what it
is she asked Coughlin and when, and what his responses were, and when some allegations by
"the Marshal" were made, what they consisted of, etc.. on 3/12/12 in 11 tr 26800 the audio
transcript reads 7 minutes into the audio record the RMC provided the SBN:
Judge Nash Holmes (Nash): It appears to me in this case that the defendant is suffering
from some extreme form of mental illness. during the trial I asked the defendant attorney
repeatedly if he was recording the proceedings he denied that vehemently a few times and
then he quote took the fifth a few other times and then he requested to be excused to go
to the bathroom and the Marshal later reported to me that while the gentleman was in the
bathroom he disassembled a recording device in his pocket and took the memory out of it
and it was later found in that, uh, by the Marshal no one else had gone into the bathroom
and that was retrieved and it was put into his possession at the Sheriff's office and when
they booked him into jail for the contempt charge that was booked into evidence and I
asked the Sheriff's office to hold that into evidence. I believe he has violated Supreme
Court Rule 229(2)(B) which was amended by ADKT 440, August 1st, 2011...."
001656
One Coughlin did not do anything of the sort indicated by Judge Nash Holmes (by way of unattributed
hearsay, like her car sleeping allegations in her 3/14/12 letter re Coughlin to the SBN) above.
Perhaps NRS 178.405 in the context of NRS 5.073 should have some baring on anything said or done
or Ordered by Judge Nash Holmes following her statement at the 7 minute mark that "It appears to me
in this case that the defendant is suffering from some extreme form of mental illness." To the extent
any question of Coughlin's competency was communicated to or brought to Judge Nash Holmes
attention prior to the 2/27/12 3:00pm start of the Trial in 11 TR 26800, that proceeding should have
been stayed or suspended, especially if the WCPD's Office made such communnications in close
temporal proximity to the 1:31 pm 2/27/12 Order for Competency Evaluation by Judge Clifton in
RCR2011-065630. And arguably, given the same office (in a broad sense) in which DDA Z. Young and
DDA Kandaras work, it is arguably a basis for conflicting out the WCDA's Office from any one of the
three prosecutions is has maintained against Coughlin this year (especially considering the issues related
to whether the WCSO's timely effected the lockout of 11/1/11 in the eviction from Coughlin's former
home law office, which, given the recent admissions by the locksmith there that day, and the Reno
Carson Messenger receipt from the day prior, and Casey Baker, Esq's testimony related to his
interactions with the WCSO on October 28th, 2012 during his sworn testimony at the criminal trespass
trial before RMC Judge Garder on 6/18/12, and the RJC's failure to even move to Quash Coughlin's
subpoenaing records related to the fax logs and confrimation of transmission or receipt incident to the
RJC's "usual custom and practice" of faxing eviction Orders to the WCSO for service (like those in the
Richard Hill/Casey Baker Summary Eviction "Trial" involving Coughlin's former home law office, and the
"within 24 hours of receipt" language found within NRS 40.253 (the Order is void or invalid after that
point, in which case, it would mean Hill and or Baker were the trespassers, not Coughlin, regardless, its
inappropriate for RMC court appointed defender Loomis to categorically refuse to assert any claim of
right defense that such a criminal trespass defendant may wish to assert for, say, Richard Hill admits to
charging the same rent under a "storage of personal property" that was previously charged for "full use
and occupancy". Nonetheless, posting an Eviction Order that does not contain stay away language
(much less the fact that is does not have the required "within 24 hours" language called for by the
statute) is not tantamount to posting a no trespassing sign, further, Hazlett-Stevens making arguments
in his closing as to matters not in evidence (allegations of living in the residence) is reversible error, and
for Judge Gardner to do as Judge Howard did, an prevent the City Attorney from even having to Oppose
Coughlin's Motion for New Trial, is further indication of the extent to which Coughlin's reactions during
the 2/27/12 Trial, however offputting, are not totally unfounded. Further, that which Judge Nash
Holmes had communicated to her prior to the start of Trial on 2/27/12 in 11 tr 26800 needs to be
testified to under oath, rather than have Bar Counsel assert to half baked "can't ask the judge about her
mental processes" loophole, as he has done. But, actually, a review of the Hardesty/Mirch dynamic
may dictate that Coughlin would have been fairly limited in that regard anyways, nonetheless, Judge
Nash Holmes appeared, to her credit, and answered some questions. The answers revealed an
opportunity put forward now to clear some things up, though the constraints of the Disciplinary Hearing
format, some disagreements over what the SBN communicated to Coughlin with respect to the rules
that would be applied to him vis a vis NRCP 45 subpoenas (whether, he, as a suspended attorney could
issues a subpoena (Coughlin maintains the Bar/Panel/Board did give him such authority) and whether
001657
any witness fee or subpoena decus tecum fee must be paid by Coughlin (Coughlin maintains he was
provided indications upon which he reasonably relied that he would not be so required in additions to
the rules or practicies attached to the service thereof), and other factors severely limited the extent to
which the opportunity created by Judge Nash Holmes testimony was realized to its full potential. That
necessitated this correspondence. Coughlin recalls the first time he saw opposing counsel allege he
was lying in a filing, it was one of the early one's by Richard Hill's former associate Casey Baker, alleging
"outright lies". It was upsetting, especially considering how unfair and baseless the allegations
seemed...and Coughlin nows wishes he would have done and said some things differently incident to
his testimony relative to RPD Sargent Tarter and Judge Nash Holmes's own testimony, and intends to
address the extent to which objectionable conduct by opposing counsel can often times become a sort
of learned characteristic perpetuating a race to, if not the ethical gutter, at least a preponderance of
Rambo litigating. To some extent the incidents with Marshal Harley and RCA Ormaas may be fallout
from that. Important too, however, is to consider whether the "courthouse sanctuary" doctrine has
some application, however confusing it may be, where the WCSO may be hired by private parties to
conduct service, and the Marshals are only extending intra-governmental courtesies in assisting in the
manner in which Marshal Harley did on 2/27/12. Richard Hill gets the "oopsies" a lot. Oppsie, I
asked for $20K in attorney's fee incident to a summary eviction at the trial court level, despite that not
being supportable under NRS 69.020, Hill says. Oopsie, I left the window unit air conditioner in the
exposed to the street by the Lakemill lodge window at your former home law office, which was then
robbed, but for which I still managed to charge you full rental value at full use and occupancy rates,
though I had you subject to an arrest for custodial trespass anyways, Hill and Baker say.
(at the 9 minute 48 second mark of the first audio file attached from 2/27/12)
"Judge: Sir, I would like you to raise your hand to be sworn, because its my experience that people who
represent themselves tend to testify a whole lot when they are asking other people questions, so let's
just start that way and then we won't have to do it later, so swear him in and then we'll get going
Marshal: Testimony (inaudible)...you are about to (inaudible) understand (inaudible) truth, whole truth,
nothing but truth, solemnly?
Coughlin: Yes, Sir?"
However, from there, throughout the Trial Judge Nash Holmes interrupts Coughlin during his
questioning of Tarter to indicate to Coughlin that he is asking questions and not testifying, or that he
will have an opportunity to make some point when its his turn to testify, if he chooses to testify, etc.,
etc, and eventually Judge Nash Holmes asks Coughlin, after the restroom break, if he intends to testify
on his own behalf..."Nor does the trial judge's speculation that Appellant might use his closing
argument to present unsworn testimony." Soto, 139 S.W.3d at 857.
001658
The transcript from the 2/27/12 certified audio recording of the traffic citation Trial
at the 1 hour and 6 minute 18 second mark of the running time (yes the certified audio transcript is
provided in a FTR format that necessitates installing TheRecord Player, but for the ease of the
receipients of this correspondnece, Coughlin convereted the audio therein exactly as it was into a more
workable format, .mp3 files, split into two files for 2/27/12 (before and after the one restroom break)
and one file for the continuation fo the trial on 3/12/12) of file one:
Judge Nash Holmes (Judge): Sir, Mr. Coughln, sit down, I am done with you.
Coughlin: Just to preserve for the record, Your Honor.
Judge: Sit down, sit down, your're done. For the record the defendant is looking in his pockets and
behind his back and turning around and clowning around and showing utter disprespect for this court
and if you say another word or do another little antic like that you are going out of this Court in
handcuffs. Do you have any other witnesses? Prosecutor?
Prosecutor Ormaas: No, Your Honor, the City rests.
Judge: Sir, do you wish to testify?
Coughlin: Can I call Officer Tarter as my own witness?
Judge: you can call anyone you wish to testify.
Coughlin: I am sorry, Your Honor, but I really need to use the restroom.
Judge: You have two minutes. Marshal (Harley), you will escort him to the restroom, don't take
anything with you, Sir...
Coughlin: Can I take my notes with me?
Judge:No, turn them upside down.
Coughlin: Can I take the one page?
Judge: No, turn them upside down.
Coughlin: Really?
Judge: Turn them upside down. Marshal you will go with him to the restroom.
Coughlin: Will I be able to go into the stall alone? Just checking.
Judge: You have two minutes. You have two minutes.
Coughlin: Okay.
001659
(that ends the first audio file attached for 2/27/12, which represents the entirety of the proceeding
prior to the ONLY restroom break during that Trial)
(Start of the second audio file of 2/27/12, which represents the entirety of the proceedings of that day
following the ONLY restroom break of the day).
Coughlin: (re-enters courtroom): Thank you, Your Honor.
Judge: Okay, we are back on the record in 11 TR 26800. Mr. Coughlin, are you recording these
proceedings?
Coughlin: No, Your Honor.
Judge: Do you have any sort of devices in your pocket?
Coughlin: I believe what is in my pocket is private, Your Honor.
Judge: I want to know if you have any sort of recording devices in your pocket!
Coughlin: I believe that is a Fourth Amendment issue, Your Honor.
Judge: I am asking you, are you are recording anything from these proceedings in your pocket without
Court permission?
Coughlin: I believe that is a Fourth Amendment issue.
Judge: Sir?
Coughlin: And, no, I'm not.
Judge: Okay, proceed, do you have any questions for this witness (RPD Sargent John Tarter) that are
different from the area that we gave gone over already.
Coughlin: Well, I would like to ask a follow up on the rolling stop citation..." (thereafter Judge Nash
Holmes does not ask any other questions of Coughlin in any way related to recording or recording
devices, nor did Judge Nash Holmes ask any questions of anyone related to recording or recording
devices besides. Judge Nash Holmes did ask, before the restroom break, of Coughlin, if Coughlin had
any evidence or proof to support his contention that he attempted to provide to either Reno City
Attorney Wong or Ormaas discovery or information related to the statement to Coughlin, incident to
the November 13th, 2011 custodial criminal trespass arrest of Coughlin at his former law office incident
to an impermissible summary eviction of a commercial tenant not based on the non-payment of rent
(ie, a No Cause Eviction Notice was posted and a Landlord's Affidavit alleged a No Cause basis for
proceeding).
001660
On the second audio file from 2/27/12, at the 5 minute mark, the follow occurs on the record:
"Coughlin: was I there? Do I remember the name of the other officer who was there with him who
went into Richard Hill's law office for twenty minutes with him and hung out?
Judge: If you mention the name Richard Hill again I am going to hold you in contempt because I have
told you repeatedly to stick to the relevant issues about the boulevard stop."
(At the 11:17 minute mark of the second audio from 2/27/12 the following occurs on the record):
Judge: Officer (RPD Sargent Tarter), you are excused. Sir, do you intend to testify?
Coughlin: Yes, Your Honor.
Judge: Then testify, you don't need to take the stand, you can testify right there, you don't have to ask
yourself questions, just give me a short narrative version of what happened, and don't refer to yourself
in the third person, he was sworn in at the beginning of the case, don't refer to yourself in the third
person, just tell me what happened.
Coughlin: Yes, your honor, I reported a bribe to Sargent Tarter, then he retaliated against me.
Judge: Sir! Sir! Keep it relevant!
Reno City Attorney Ormaas: Objection, move to strike!
Judge: Keep it relevant about whether or not the boulevard stop occurred and what happened:
Coughlin: Sargent Tarter perjured his testimony today
Judge: Sir, Sir, answer about the boulevard stop.
Coughlin: Yes, Your Honor, this incident occurred when I went over to Richard Hill's office.
Judge: Sir.
Coughlin: I can't get into that? Okay.
Judge: Sir, boulevard stop.
Coughlin: Sargent Tarter lied today when he...
Judge: All right, Sir!
Coughlin: about the boulevard stop, I am saying...I disagree
Judge: take him into custody, you are in contempt of court, you will spend the next five days in jail, this
court is finished, this matter is continued
001661
Coughlin: Your Honor I move for a stay, I have a trial..and I have clients who need me
Judge: that is your problem, Sir. For the record you are in contempt of court because you have been
insubordinate, you have disregarded all of my requests, directions, orders, cajoling, my efforts to get
you to follow the instructions of the court, to act like a lawyer, or even to act like a defendant
representing himself in this court, you have made faces, belittled, you have argued, you have played,
you have been ridiculous in this courtroom and brought up issues that are irrelevant and immaterial
and to disrupt this proceeding, and there are only five or six people here that you could disrupt, you
have done everything you can to divert from the matter at question and to keep us from resolving the
issue of whether or not you have committed the traffic violation of the boulevard stop, and you are in
utter contempt of this court and have done nothing to deal with the facts of this case...you are being an
obstinate jackass, I am having a hard time believing you are a lawyer, you obviously missed the class on
on evidence, courtroom decorum and on criminal law..."
Coughlin was taken into custody whereupon a search incident to arrest was performed in the holding
area/back room of the RMC by Marshal Joel Harley with Marshal Scott Coppa assisting, and Marshal
Coppa was one of two Marshals transporting Coughlin to the Washoe County Detention Facility where
he served the 5 days in jail Judge Nash Holmes ordered (and the RMC refused to return the $100 that
Coughlin's mother paid into the RMC when counter clerk "Tom" promised her the Court would issue an
Order resulting in Coughlin being released from jail one day early...however, aside from the WCDC
walking Coughlin down in handcuffs from his cell to the booking desk and back, there was no release
from custody and Coughlin's mother was not returned her $100 payment in exchange for an early
release by either the RMC or the WCDC.
While conducting the search incident to arrest, RMC Marshal Harley went through Coughlin's pockets
and took out a simple flip style cell phone, a smart phone, a micro sd card, and an electronic shaver.
Upon taking possession of the micro sd card Marshal Harley immediately began interrogating
Coughlin as to whether it would work with the smartphone, then directed another Marshal to "go tell
the Judge that Coughlin was recording!" without any other support for such an accusation. None of
this occurred in the restroom and Chief Marshal Roper has indicated to Coughlin that Marshal Harley, in
carrying out Judge Nash Holmes Order to escort Coughlin to the restroom, did not actually go in the
restroom, but rather waited outside its door.
I ask that Chief Marshal Roper, Marshal Harley, and Marshal Coppa correct the misrepresentations
made by Judge Nash Holmes (whether or not they were purposeful or where something was lost in
translation and the affidavit requirement of NRS 22.030 for "contempt not in the immediate presence
of the Court" was not followed by Judge Nash Holmes incident to her 2/28/12 Order, wherein Judge
Nash Holmes writes, on page 2 of her 2/28/12 Order Finding the Defendnat in Contempt of Court and
Imposing Sanctions: "The matter was called at apprxoimately 3:00p.m. and concluded withoua verdict
about 4:30 p.m. after the court held the defendnat in criminal contempt of court for his behavior and
001662
activites committed in the direct presence of this court during the trial. The court finds that
defendant's contemptuous conduct conside of his ....deceitful...behavior during trial, all of which
appeard to be done to vex an annoy the court, the witness, and the opposing party, and to disrupt the
trial process. The court finds that the following occurred, and constitute contempt...."9) defendant's
lying to the court in response to direct questions posed by the court with regard to his recording the
proceedings...(page 3)...The court finds that the defendnat's actions were intentional and done in utter
disregard and contempt for the court, an in the presence of the cour, for purposes of disrupting and
delaying the proceedins and dishonoring the rule of law and this court, and constitute the misdemeanor
of criminal contempt, a violation of NRS 22.010. Good cause appearing therefore, the following
sanctions are imposed: IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to NRS 22.100, that the defendant be incarcerated at
the Wahoe County Regional Detnetion Facility for the term of five (5) days, from the time he was taken
into custody on this court's order on February 27, 2012, and that sentence shall not be reduced for any
reason..." The time stamping on that 2/28/12 Order Finding the Defendant in Contempt of Court
and Imposing Sanctions indicate "3:47". Washoe County Sheriff's Office personnel Deputy Hodge,
Patricia Beckman, RMC
Somehow, in her 2/28/12 Order (and during the Trial) Judge Nash Holmes found it relevant that,
allegedly, the RPD "gave Coughlin a break" over his driver's license being expired (actually, Coughlin's
then valid, current, driver's license was being withheld by Richard G. Hill, Esq., as Coughlin reported to
Sargent Tarter...and it was likely an old DL that the RPD is referring to as "expired" when mentioning
the "break", which, again, was somehow relevant enough to find its way into the Order, but the
withholding of Coughlin's then current, valid DL by Hill was sustained as irrelevant during the Trial (and
in fact seems to have been one of a myriad of vague basis for issuing a summary criminal contempt
Order requiring then licensed attorney with client's depending upon him, Coughlin, immediately being
taken to the WCDC for 5 days in jail...).
Coughlin hereby requests the RMC, WCDA, and WCDC to indicate the extent to which his property was
booked into his personal property at the WCDC, only to have the WCDC and or WCDA release the
property to the City of Reno Marshals the following day, well after any timeframe to conduct a search
incident to arrest (NNDB Member Mary Kandaras was involved in this matter, and in fact, despite Judge
Nash Holmes ordering the property released on 3/30/12, it took until 4/7/12 and approval by Mary
Kandaras before the property was so released. wcso12-1805 c-47951.
With local attorney Pam Wilmore standing, watching, and or hearing/participating in the conversations,
on or about March 21st, 2012 WCSO's P. Beckman handed Coughlin a note that read "Per Judges
Orders, call Marshal Deighton" and provided a phone number for Coughlin to seek further explanation
as to the admission that the City of Reno Marshals had returned to the jail on 2/28/12 and retrieved
items of Coughlin's personal property, including his "flip" phone, his smart phone, and his micro sd
card. Deputy Hodge's admission that, contrary to the indications by WCSO Cummings and Campbell
that the micro sd card was released to Coughlin's agent on 2/29/12, but rather, was not so release,
001663
combined with his statement that the smartphone, micro sd card, etc. were released to the Marshals
because it would be easier for Coughlin to get his property back through them, reveal that a search not
incident to arrest occurred here by the RMC on 2/28/12 and or the City of Reno Marshals, or, to be fair,
at least some sort of "seizure" did (especially considering that upon the smartphone and micro sd card
finally being returned to Coughlin on or about 4/7/12 by WCSO Deputy Iver, Brandi Berriman, and
Patricia Beckman (and only after "Maddy" got approval from DDA Kandaras, and after Coughlin was
threatened with abuse of process by Deputy Beatson). The RMC's Marilyn Tognoni also made some
indications respecting the smartphone and micro sd card to Coughlin. Perhaps, the allusion
to wcso12-1805 c-47951 in Judge Nash Holmes 3/30/12 Order Releasing Coughlin's property indicates
whether a warrant or some other lawful Order allowed for the Marshals to retrieve those items a day
after they were booked into Coughlin's personal property at the jail...but Coughlin has not been
provided any such Warrant or Order and hereby requests that he be so provided a copy of it now, and
that, given important data was lost to Coughlin upon his discovery the micro sd card and smartphone
had been wiped, that any copies of the data then stored therein be provided to Coughlin (the Diaz case
in the Ninth Circuit seems to provided a great deal of latitude to law enforcement to search digital data
within the reach of one whom is subject to a custodial arrest, and perhaps even copy it...in which
case....is would be appreciate if a copy thereof could be provided to Coughlin, and some compensation
for the extent to which his 32 GB micro sd card was rendered useless upon its return, as was his HTC
G2 cell phone (which never quite worked the same from then on and was rendered totally inoperative
a short time thereafter...the 32 GB micro sd card having an approximate value of $85 and the HTC G2
smartphone a used value of around $175.00).
I know I write in the third person sometimes (its tough representing yourself, especially when time
requires lots of copying and pasting, etc., etc) and that it can appear awkward.
I would appreciate the parties receiving this correspondence who have any knowledge of the events
detailed herein (especially with respect to the false accusations related to recordings, disassembling,
and hiding component parts of devices in the RMC restroom as detailed on the record on 3/12/12 in 11
TR 26800 and again in Judge Nash Holmes testimony at the 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing for NG12-
0434 (and NG12-0204, and NG12-0435) to set the record straight.
For a verbatim or close to it transcription of what Judge Nash Holmes testified to at the Disciplinary
Hearing on 11/14/12 (including those matters she purported to repeat details related to what variosu
RMC Marshals told her regarding Coughlin, on would likely need get the transcript or any recordings
from the CCR assigned to that Hearing, Carol Hummel, and given Coughlin's current indigency, any
requirement that Coughlin pay up front for the transcript would make review prohibitive, and Coughlin
hereby requests of the Panel a fee waiver or deferment of such costs in that regard):
001664
Linda Shaw, Owner, Sunshine Reporting Services - Reno
1895 Plumas St,
Reno, NV 89509,
(775) 323-3411
Sunshine Reporting Services
Eric Nelson
CCR Longoni
(775) 323-3411
fax (775) 323-2749
151 Country Estates Circle
Reno, Nevada 89511
Carol Hummel
(775) 827-9120/
fax (775) 827-9120
chummel@charter.net
In her 3/12/12 Order in 11 TR 26800, a transmogrification of sorts appears to occur, turning a "simple
traffic citation trial" into a Disciplinary Hearing, albeit one of a summary nature, with an absent
Respondent. That Order read, in relevant part:
"Based upon the total circumstances of this case, the in-court performance of the
defendant, as observed by this court, the written documents faxed to the court for filing by
001665
this defendant, the statements and behavior of this defendant and his overall conduct herein,
this court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that Zachary Barker Coughlin, an attorney
licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada, has committed numerous acts of attorney
misconduct, including, but not limited to, violating the following Rules of Professional
Conduct:
8.4(c}-engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
8.4 (d)-engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
3.3 (a)-lack of candor to the court by knowingly making false statements to a tribunal;
3 .l-defending in a proceeding by asserting or controverting an issue without a basis in
fact and with matters that are known to be frivolous;
3.2-failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation. and, in fact, taking
extreme measures to delay litigation;
3.4(c)-being unfair to opposing counsel by continually alluding to matters the lawyer
does not reasonably believe are relevant or supported by admissible evidence;
1.3-failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness; and
1. I-lack of competence in his practice and appearances before this court.
In addition, Zachary Barker Coughlin, likely also violated Nevada Supreme Court Rule
229, section 2(b), as amended by ADKT 449 on August 1, 2011, by surreptitiously recording
the traffic citation trial of February 27,2012 without the advance permission of this court and
then lying to this court when questioned about it and denying that he had done so.
Whether or not there are medical reasons to explain Mr. Coughlin's actions is not for
this court to decide. He has become nothing less than a vexatious litigant to Reno Municipal
Court due to his unorthodox, disruptive, bizarre and irrational methods and practices that go
beyond the pale of anything that is civil, ethical. professional or competent. Good cause
appearing therefore, the court orders as follows:
001666
IT IS ORDERED that this matter is continued, and all proceedings relating thereto are
tolled, until further order of this court, while the matter of attorney Zachary Barker Coughlin
is referred to the State Bar of Nevada;
IT IS ORDERED that no further action shall be taken by the Reno City Attorney's
Office, or the clerks or staff of Reno Municipal Court, in the above-entitled case, pending
further order of this court;
IT IS ORDERED that Zachary Barker Coughlin is barred and forbidden from faxing,
emailing, delivering. having delivered, serving. presenting for filing. personally or otherwise,
any motion or document to Reno Municipal Court, in the above-entitled case, pending further
order of this court."
One, Coughlin is not emailing this correspondence in that "above titled case (11 TR 26800) but in
connection with matters outside that case. Three, it is really not at all clear how Judge Nash Holmes
could make all those rulings, and only after having done that, decide to suspend the proceedings for a
Competency Evaluation, given the import of NRS 178.405:
NRS 178.405 Suspension of trial or pronouncement of judgment when doubt arises as to competence of
defendant; notice of suspension to be provided to other departments.
NRS 178.405 Suspension of trial or pronouncement of judgment when doubt arises as to competence of
defendant; notice of suspension to be provided to other departments.
1. Any time after the arrest of a defendant, including, without limitation, proceedings before trial, during trial,
when upon conviction the defendant is brought up for judgment or when a defendant who has been placed on
probation or whose sentence has been suspended is brought before the court, if doubt arises as to the
competence of the defendant, the court shall suspend the proceedings, the trial or the pronouncing of the
judgment, as the case may be, until the question of competence is determined.
001667
2. If the proceedings, the trial or the pronouncing of the judgment are suspended, the court must notify any
other departments of the court of the suspension in writing. Upon receiving such notice, the other departments
of the court shall suspend any other proceedings relating to the defendant until the defendant is determined to
be competent.
NRS 189.030 Transmission of transcript, other papers, sound recording and copy of docket to district court.
1. The justice shall, within 10 days after the notice of appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk of the district court
the transcript of the case, all other papers relating to the case and a certified copy of the docket.
2. The justice shall give notice to the appellant or the appellants attorney that the transcript and all other
papers relating to the case have been filed with the clerk of the district court.
3. If the district judge so requests, before or after receiving the record, the justice of the peace shall transmit
to the district judge the sound recording of the case.
NRS 5.073 Conformity of practice and proceedings to those of justice courts; exception; imposition and
collection of fees.
1.The practice and proceedings in the municipal court must conform, as nearly as practicable, to the
practice and proceedings of justice courts in similar cases. An appeal perfected transfers the action to the
district court for trial anew, unless the municipal court is designated as a court of record as provided in NRS
5.010. The municipal court must be treated and considered as a justice court whenever the proceedings
thereof are called into question.
2.Each municipal judge shall charge and collect such fees prescribed in NRS 4.060 that are within the
jurisdictional limits of the municipal court.
(Added to NRS by 1989, 903; A 1991, 455; 1997, 115)
NRS 5.075 Form of docket and records. The Court Administrator shall prescribe the form of the
docket and of any other appropriate records to be kept by the municipal court, which form may vary from
court to court according to the number and kind of cases customarily heard and whether the court is
designated as a court of record pursuant to NRS 5.010.
001668
City Attorney Ormaas sure could be made to explain her statements on the record regarding whether
the citation or report in 11 tr 26800 contained any mention of retaliation, given she was looking right
at it and given what she said in court. Also, the whispering with Marshal Harley, and the bits about
Coughlin reporting to Ormaas what RPD OFficer Carter said to Coughlin in 61901, and Ormaas's
responses thereto on 2/27/12, and Dan Wong, ditto at an earlier hearing on that matter...
Simply put, there was no questioning by Judge Nash Holmes of Coughlin as to whether he was recording
anything or whether he possessed a "recording device" until AFTER the one and only restroom break Judge
Nash Holmes mentions on the audio record. Judge Nash Holmes did ask Coughlin if he had any proof that City
Attorney's Wong and Ormaas failed, in some way, to received or follow up on some offer by Coughlin to
provide materials related to Coughlin's contentions respecting the statement madAnd that sua sponte
interrogation of Couglin occured IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RESTROOM BREAK, A BREAK IN WHICH JUDGE NASH
HOLMES REFUSED TO ALLOW COUGHLIN TO TAKE HIS YELLOW LEGAL PAD WITH HIM AND WHICH OCCURED
AFTER COUGHLIN MADE A VERBAL PRESERVATION ON THE RECORD OF THE WHISPERING IN EACH OTHER'S
EARS BY CITY ATTORNEY ALLISON ORMAAS AND MARSHAL HARLEY (WHO SEEMED A BIT UPSET ABOUT SOME
OF THE QUESTIONS COUGHLIN ASKED THEM IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE TRIAL (DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME
WHERE JUDGE NASH HOLME'S ASSISTANT INDICATED, ON THE RECORD IN ONE OF THE OTHER CASES ON THAT
STACKED DOCKET, THAT Judge Nash Holmes just couldn't be found, and how odd that was...which is odd,
considering what was going on in 11 cr 22176, 11 cr 26405 12 cr 00696 and 11 tr 26800, and rcr2012-065630
and rcr2011-063341 at the time (lots of reasons for and indications that local law enforcement and prosecutors
and public defenders were non too happy with Coughlin...and consider the 2/24/12 email vacating the 2/27/12
status conference between young and dogan that neither YOung nor Dogan wish to testify about...but which
seems to have been held anyways after a written communication of its being reset was transmitted to Coughlin
by Dogan, wherein, during the time Judge Nash Holmes couldn't be found (maybe she was at one of the group
meetings amongst Judges about Coughlin that RMC Administrative Judge William Gardner referenced on the
record in 11 CR 26405? Interesting the Notice of Appeal in 60302 was filed that same day too, 2/27/12) Dogan
got his ORder for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin in rcr2012-065630 (apparently in retaliation for
Coughlin's filing of 2/21/12, and DDA Zach Young was still smarting from a filing by Coughlin of approximately
11/28/12, which resultd in Young promptly amending his complaint in rcr2011-063341 to add a charge that was
duplicative, even where YOung failure to allege theft or possessing/receiving "from another' under Staab makes
his so charging Coughlin in that iPhone case a RPC 3.8 violation, which is YOung's specialty, apparently. That,
and violating NRs 178.405, which YOung did by filing in rcr2011-063341 with a stamp of 2:55pm a fugitive
document of his own, an Opposition to Coughlin's or the WCPD Motion to Appear as CoCounsel on
2/27/12...never mind Young tried to hold a TRIAL on 5/7/12 in that case despite the Order finding Coughlin
competent in cr12-0376 didn't even get signed and entered until 5/9/12...ditto the Trial seeting of 5/8/12 in
RMC 11 cr 26405, the criminal trespass case. NOt much respect for nrs 178.405 (including within NRs 5.010)
here in Northern nevada..
Coughlin didn't received the 2/28/12 Contempt Order in 11 tr 26800 until July 2012...but did file a Notice of 001669
Appeal 3/7/12...despite "summary criminal contempt" being a final appealable order, Judge Nash Holmes
continues to refuse to follow NRS 189.010-050
It is true that contempt committed in a trial courtroom can under some circumstances be punished summarily
by the trial judge. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 . But adjudication by a trial judge of a
contempt committed in his immediate presence in open court cannot be likened to the proceedings here. For
we held in the Oliver case that a person charged with contempt before a "one-man grand jury" could not be
summarily tried. [349 U.S. 133, 138] The power of a trial judge to punish for a contempt committed in his
immediate presence in open ... In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Coughlin
violated in both 11 cr 22176 and 11 tr 26800, also orders no sufficiently detailed or capable of being known
how to comply with, not sufficient warning, violat Houston v Eighth Judicial District (Nev.).
See, this is why In Re Oliver and Cooke require all elements of "summary criminal contempt" occur " in the
"immediate presence" of the Court. Maybe Marshal Harley and some other Marshal have misled Judge Nash
HOlmes, or maybe something worse is going on here....but what Judge Nash HOlmes said on the recording is
entirely misleading an inaccurate, if not an outright lie (again, maybe not a lie by Judge Nash Holmes, maybe
she is repeating a lie, but regardless her reliance on unattributed hearsay is distrubing an inappropriate,
particulary where she not only purports to issue a "summary criminal contempt" conviction against an
attorney, but also where Judge Nash Holmes appears to try to transmogrify what she sees as "a simple traffic
citation trial" into a full blown SCR 105 disciplinary hearing where she is both Bar Counsel and the Panel...That
Marshal needs to sign an affidavit, under NRS 22.020 and Judge Nash HOlmes ought to have to put something
on the record, under oath, in response to Coughlin's recent subpoena (and SBN Pat King wishes to let Judge
Nash HOlmes phone in her testimony, and it probably won't even be sworn testimony, but rather just some
musings by Judge Nash Holmes purporting to make "rulings" finding "by clear and convincing evidence" all sorts
of things outside her jurisdiction) on 11/14/12, on, Partick O. King, SBN Bar Counsel has also filed Motion to
Quash the Subpoenas Coughlin attempted to have served on Marshal Joel Harley, Marshal Deighton, Judge
Nash HOlmes, Judge William Gardner, Judge Gardners Administrative Assistant Lisa Wagner, who can't quite
find the NOtice of Appeal Coughlin faxed to her (allowable under the RMC Rules) on June 28th, 2012 in 11 CR
26405 (the appeal was dismissed under an NRS 189.010 analysis by Judge Elliot, whom also got Coughlin appeal
of the 11 cr 22176 conviction resulting in this Court's 6/7/12 temporary suspension Order in cr11-2064, which
was denied based upon a civil preparation of transcript down payment rule, in that criminal appeal, where the
RMC has a thing in place with this Pam Longoni that violates Nevada law in that it refused to give Coughlin the
audio cd of the trial for some time, insisting only Longoni would be allowed to transcribe it, and that the
transcript's preparation would absolutely not start until a down payment was made. Plus, even where Coughlin
caved to the payment demands..Longoni repeatedly hung up the phone on him and otherwise ignored his
communications (there may be an issue of the email Longoni holding out to the public issuing a
"bounceback"...but she needs to sign an affidavit as to whether she put Coughlin on a blocked list, and upon
information and belief, Coughlin faxed his request to the number the RMC held out for her on her behalf too...
001670
In her March 14th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin to the SBN Judge Nash Holmes details some concerns she
has with Coughlin's work as a self representing attorney defending a traffic citation (now NG12-0434, and
perhaps, NG12-0435, depending upon whom you ask and what King means by "Clerk of Court"...because in
King's 3/23/12 email to Coughlin he apparently identifies Ms. Marilyn Tognoni as "Clerk of Court of Department
3"...whoever, wouldn't it be Second Judicial District Court Clerk of Court Joey Orduna Hastings that would need
to send Family Court Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin to the SBN's King for King
now apparent contention that the NG12-0435 "ghost grievance" consisting of Judge L. Gardner's April 2009
Order was not filed by the RMC Judges?
AS to the application of the "courthouse sanctuary" doctrine to RMC Marshal Harley serving the Order to Show
Cause upon Coughlin at approximately 1:25 pm in one of the conference rooms right outside the interior of
Courtroom B at the RMC:
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-district-court/1372465.html
"THE LAW
(COURTHOUSE SANCTUARY)
Despite antagonistic dicta to the contrary; most modern era precedent dealing with the issue of
Courthouse Sanctuary from service of process have held that New York State residents receive no such
immunity protections. Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, 273 A.D. 411, 77 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1st Dept.1948);
Department of Housing Preservation, City of New York v. Koenigsberg, 133 Misc.2d 893, 509 N.Y.S.2d 270
(N.Y. Civ.Ct.1986); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Bobo, N.Y.L.J., 1 Misc.3d 901(A), 2003 WL 22928513 (Dec. 17,
2003, J. Miller, Nassau Co. Dist. Ct.) These cases hold that the Courthouse Sanctuary is only available to
foreign state residents who come into New York's Courts to contest jurisdiction. This doctrine has been
slightly expanded to include New York residents who enter the jurisdiction of a New York Court of limited
territorial jurisdiction to contest jurisdiction. See Palazzo v. Conforti, 50 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Civ.Ct.1944);
Singer v. Reising, 154 Misc. 239, 276 N.Y.S. 714 (Queens County 1935).
The Baumgartner Appellate Division panel also acknowledges a limited Courthouse Sanctuary rule for
New York residents if such service would constitute a disturbance directly tending to interrupt the
proceedings of the Court or to impair the respect due its authority. This rule by itself would not be
applicable to the instant case as service of process was effected in the Courtroom but outside the Court's
presence and in between calendar calls.
STATE RESIDENCY IMMUNITY DISTINCTION?
The English Common Law made no New York State residency distinction. The doctrine of immunity from
arrest of a litigant attending a trial of an action to which he is a party found early recognition and dates back to
the book of 13 Henry IV, J.B. Sampson v. Graves, 208 A.D. 522, 203 N.Y.S. 729 (1st Dept.1924). This is for
the obvious reason that England had no sovereign states. The privilege is not a creature of statute, but was
created and deemed necessary for the due administration of justice. See Matthews v. Tufts, 87 N.Y. 568
(1882); citing to Van Lien v. Johnson (N.Y. Ct. Appeals, unreported 1871).
The logical question now arises, exactly when did New York's Appellate Court's recognize a residency distinction
for application of the Courthouse Sanctuary? The answer is that the Court of Appeals never
established such a rule. In contra point of fact, the Court of Appeals has opined that:
It is the policy of the law to protect suitors and witnesses from arrests upon civil process while coming to
and attending the court and while returning home. Upon principle as well as upon authority their
001671
immunity from the service of process for the commencement of civil actions against them is absolute eundo,
morando et redeundo. Person v. Grier, 66 N.Y. 124 (1876). Emphasis Added.
In this unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals expressly addressed the New York State resident immunity
distinction and established in its dicta that whether any distinction should or does in fact exist, is at least
doubtful. This immunity is one of the necessities of the Administration of Justice, and Court's would often
be embarrassed if suitors or witnesses, while attending Court, could be molested with process. It is noted
that Person involved a foreign state resident. In establishing the sanctuary doctrine, the Court stated that

Appeals is also applying the protective rule to New York residents.
The basis of the Courthouse Sanctuary rule is that parties should be allowed to contest jurisdiction
Z
essentially allows the plaintiff to use a defective default judgment as a weapon to compel the defendant to
submit to the service of process. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Bobo; cite supra. The location of an
individual's residence does little to legitimize such a mockery. Absent the compulsion of clear controlling
precedent; this Court will not condone such a situation..."
NRS 266.595 Appeals. Appeals to the district court may be taken from any final judgment of the municipal
court in accordance with the provisions of NRS 5.073.
NRS 5.073 Conformity of practice and proceedings to those of justice courts; exception; imposition and
collection of fees.
1.The practice and proceedings in the municipal court must conform, as nearly as practicable, to the
practice and proceedings of justice courts in similar cases. An appeal perfected transfers the action to the
district court for trial anew, unless the municipal court is designated as a court of record as provided in NRS
5.010. The municipal court must be treated and considered as a justice court whenever the proceedings
thereof are called into question.
2.Each municipal judge shall charge and collect such fees prescribed in NRS 4.060 that are within the
jurisdictional limits of the municipal court.
(Added to NRS by 1989, 903; A 1991, 455; 1997, 115)
NRS 5.075 Form of docket and records. The Court Administrator shall prescribe the form of the
docket and of any other appropriate records to be kept by the municipal court, which form may vary from
court to court according to the number and kind of cases customarily heard and whether the court is
designated as a court of record pursuant to NRS 5.010.
NRS 5.010 General requirements for court; designation as court of record. There must be in each
001672
city a municipal court presided over by a municipal judge. The municipal court:
1.Must be held at such place in the city within which it is established as the governing body of that city
may by ordinance direct.
2.May by ordinance be designated as a court of record.
The personal service by Marshal Harley of the Order to Show Cause in the appeal of the summary eviction
matter from Coughlin's former home law office at 121 River Rock St, with Richard G. Hill, Esq. as opposing
counsel in CV11-03628, occurred while Coughlin was speaking to RCA Ormaas in attempts to resolve the matter
(11 TR 26800 a traffic citation matter wherein RPD Sargent Tarter and other officers responded to Richard G.
Hill, Esq.'s office on 11/15/12 (its possible both Hill and Coughlin called the police and or 911...can't remember)
when Coughlin appeared there after being released from 3 days in jail incident to the 11/13/12 criminal
trespass arrest (now a conviction and discussed in that attached materials, some of which appear on the
Nevada Supreme Court's site under case 61901, the conviction stemming from 11 CR 26405 before RMC
Administrative Judge W. Gardner, the brother of District Court Judge Linda Gardner whose April 2009 Order
sanctioning Coughlin was cited by Washoe Legal Services at the cause for his firing, and led to 60302, now on
appeal...
I would really just like to move on from all of this, but this is a time of exigent circumstances, and if the RMC
and the City of Reno Marshals do not take affirmative steps to disavow the unsworn hearsay Judge Nash
Holmes attributed in her supposedly sworn testimony at Coughlin's 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing, it may be
that a negligent hiring, training, or supervision cause of action may acrue against various Marshals, even
personally (and its not so clear Mr. Christensen and the City of Reno would extend any purported
representation to such personal liability, for, say, slander or libel).
NRS 22.010 Acts or omissions constituting contempts. The following acts or omissions shall be deemed contempts:
1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while the judge is holding court, or engaged in judicial duties
at chambers, or toward masters or arbitrators while sitting on a reference or arbitration, or other judicial proceeding.
2. A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance in the presence of the court, or in its immediate vicinity,
tending to interrupt the due course of the trial or other judicial proceeding.
3. Disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, order, rule or process issued by the court or judge at chambers.
4. Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn or answer as a witness.
5. Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of such court or judge at
chambers.
6. Disobedience of the order or direction of the court made pending the trial of an action, in speaking to or in the presence of a
juror concerning an action in which the juror has been impaneled to determine, or in any manner approaching or interfering with such juror
with the intent to influence the verdict.
7. Abusing the process or proceedings of the court or falsely pretending to act under the authority of an order or process of the
court.
001673
[1911 CPA 452; RL 5394; NCL 8941](NRS A 1983, 843)

NRS 22.030 Summary punishment of contempt committed in immediate view and presence of court; affidavit or
statement to be filed when contempt committed outside immediate view and presence of court; disqualification of judge.
1. If a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court or judge at chambers, the contempt may be
punished summarily. If the court or judge summarily punishes a person for a contempt pursuant to this subsection, the court or judge shall
enter an order that:
(a) Recites the facts constituting the contempt in the immediate view and presence of the court or judge;
(b) Finds the person guilty of the contempt; and
(c) Prescribes the punishment for the contempt.
2. If a contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court or judge at chambers, an affidavit must be
presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a statement of the facts by the masters or arbitrators.
3. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, if a contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the
court, the judge of the court in whose contempt the person is alleged to be shall not preside at the trial of the contempt over the objection of
the person. The provisions of this subsection do not apply in:
(a) Any case where a final judgment or decree of the court is drawn in question and such judgment or decree was entered in such
court by a predecessor judge thereof 10 years or more preceding the bringing of contempt proceedings for the violation of the judgment or
decree.
(b) Any proceeding described in subsection 1 of NRS 3.223, whether or not a family court has been established in the judicial
district.
NRS 22.100 Penalty for contempt.
1. Upon the answer and evidence taken, the court or judge or jury, as the case may be, shall determine whether the person
proceeded against is guilty of the contempt charged.
2. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 22.110, if a person is found guilty of contempt, a fine may be imposed on the person
not exceeding $500 or the person may be imprisoned not exceeding 25 days, or both.
3. In addition to the penalties provided in subsection 2, if a person is found guilty of contempt pursuant to subsection 3
of NRS 22.010, the court may require the person to pay to the party seeking to enforce the writ, order, rule or process the reasonable
expenses, including, without limitation, attorneys fees, incurred by the party as a result of the contempt.
NRS 199.340 Criminal contempt. Every person who shall commit a contempt of court of any one of the following kinds shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor:
1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior committed during the sitting of the court, in its immediate view and presence,
and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority;
2. Behavior of like character in the presence of a referee, while actually engaged in a trial or hearing pursuant to an order of
court, or in the presence of a jury while actually sitting in the trial of a cause or upon an inquest or other proceeding authorized by law;
3. Breach of the peace, noise or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of a court, jury or referee;
4. Willful disobedience to the lawful process or mandate of a court;
5. Resistance, willfully offered, to its lawful process or mandate;
6. Contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness or, after being sworn, to answer any legal and proper
interrogatory;
7. Publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of its proceedings; or
001674
8. Assuming to be an attorney or officer of a court or acting as such without authority.
ARTICLE IV - Judicial Department
Sec.4.010Municipal Court. The Municipal Court must include one department and may include
additional departments in the discretion of the City Council. If the City Council determines to create additional
departments, it shall do so by resolution and may appoint additional municipal judges to serve until the next
election.
(Ch. 662, Stats. 1971 p. 1976; ACh. 553, Stats. 1973 p. 881; Ch. 373, Stats. 1979 p. 645; Ch. 208, Stats. 1985
p. 675; Ch. 9, Stats. 1993 p. 21)
Sec.4.020Municipal Court: Qualifications of Municipal Judge; salary.
1.A Municipal Judge must be:
(a)An attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada.
(b)A qualified elector within the City.
2.A Municipal Judge shall not engage in the private practice of law.
3.The salary of a Municipal Judge must be:
(a)Fixed by resolution of the City Council.
(b)Uniform for all judges in the Municipal Court.
(Ch. 662, Stats. 1971 p. 1976; ACh. 343, Stats. 1973 p. 422; Ch. 553, Stats. 1973 p. 881; Ch. 98, Stats. 1977
p. 211; Ch. 561, Stats. 1977 p. 1395; Ch. 208, Stats. 1985 p. 675; Ch. 599, Stats. 1993 p. 2501; Ch. 327, Stats.
1999 p. 1369)
Sec.4.030Disposition of fines. All fines and forfeitures for the violation of ordinances shall be
paid to the City Clerk in the manner to be prescribed by ordinance.
(Ch. 662, Stats. 1971 p. 1977)
Sec.4.040Procedure, additional judges. The practice and proceedings in the Court must conform
as nearly as practicable to that of justices courts in similar cases. Upon the written request of the City
Manager an additional temporary Municipal Judge may be provided for so long as the City Council authorizes
additional compensation for such a Judge. Whenever a person is sentenced to pay a fine, the Court may
adjudge and enter upon the docket a supplemental order that the offender may, if he or she desires, work on
the streets or public works of the City at the rate of $25 for each day. The money so earned must be applied
against the fine until it is satisfied.
CONTEMPT
001675
Acts or omissions constituting, generally, 22.010
Affidavit of facts constituting, 22.030
Affidavits presented in bad faith, NRCP 56(g), JCRCP 56(g)
Appearance, failure of defendant to make, 22.130
Arrest
Bond, 22.070
Excuses for not bringing arrested person before court, 22.140
Illness of defendant, effect, 22.140
Attorneys at law
Bar examination, early release of results, SCR 68
Discharged, failure to deliver certain materials to client, 7.055
Bail
Violation of conditions deemed contempt, 178.484
Commercial premises, violations of writ of restitution, 118C.210
Commission in presence of court or judge, 22.030
Compelling performance, imprisonment, 22.110
Court order, violation, 1.250, 22.010
Court reporters, 656.240
Criminal, 193.110, 193.300, 199.340
Custodial parent, failure to comply with visitation orders, 125C.030, 125C.040
Discharge from arrest, 22.070
Disqualification of judge or justice, making of charge not punished as contempt, 1.225, 1.230
Documents, refusal to permit inspection, NRCP 37(b)(2), JCRCP 37(b)(2)
Failure to perform specific acts directed by judgment, 22.010, NRCP 70, JCRCP 70
Imprisonment, 22.100, 22.110
001676
Indictment for contemptuous conduct, 22.120
Justice courts, civil proceedings, 74.040
Material witness granted immunity, failure to testify, 178.576
Misconduct by defendant during criminal trial, 175.387
Municipal court may punish for, 266.570
Punishment, 22.030, 22.100, 22.120
Reentry on real property after ejectment, 22.020
Refusal to answer or be sworn, 22.010, 50.195, NRCP 37(b)(1), JCRCP 37(b)(1)
Sheriffs duties, 22.060, 50.205
Subpoenas, failure to obey
Deemed contempt, 22.010, 174.385
Witnesses, forfeitures and damages, 50.195
Summary punishment, 22.030
Trials for contempt
By court or jury, 22.100
Disqualification of judge, 22.030
Investigating charge, 22.090
The RSIC Victoria Oldenburg wants to talk to the Panel about how the RSIC and Wal-
Mart are in a long term business partnership where the 2nd St. Wal-Mart is on tribal
land rented out by the RSIC and patrolled by its tribal officers, who admit to routinely
making misdemeanor petty theft/shoplifting custodial arrest (Officer Kameron
Crawford and Donnie Braunworth have been trained in all the neato "he didn't give me
all the information necessary to issue a citation" explanations (including Crawfords
lying under oath that Coughlin didn't provide his driver's license to him on September
9th, 2011, especially where Wal-Mart's Frontino admits he did not make a citizen's
arrest, nor did any Wal-Mart employee) even where such misdemeanor arrests by tribal
001677
officers are forbidden under NRS 171.1255.. Reno City Attorney too would like a
chance to explain how she prosecutes cases based upon arrests by tribal officers for
misdemeanor where Nevada law expressly prevents misdemeanor arrests by tribal
officers under NRS 171.1255.
I was forced to cross examine/interact with a represented party at the 11/14/12
Disciplinary Hearing, and the SBN and Panel's violations of SCR 105 contributed
greatly to my failure to alert Mr. Garin prior to that. I think out of fairness I and Mr.
Garin/Ms. Nordstrom should be provided transcripts from the 11/14/12 Hearing.
NRS 171.1255Arrest by officer or agent of Bureau of Indian Affairs or police
officer employed by Indian tribe.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, an officer or agent of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs or a person employed as a police officer by an Indian tribe may make an
arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him or her, or may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross misdemeanor, although not
in the officer or agents presence.
(c) When a felony or gross misdemeanor has in fact been committed, and the officer or
agent has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
(d) On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony or gross
(e) When a warrant has in fact been issued in this State for the arrest of a named or
described person for a public offense, and the officer or agent has reasonable cause to
believe that the person arrested is the person so named or described.
(f) When the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed a battery upon that persons spouse and the peace officer finds
evidence of bodily harm to the spouse.
(a) Within the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony for an offense
committed on that reservation or colony; or
001678
(b) Outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony if the officer or
agent is in fresh pursuit of a person who is reasonably believed by the officer or agent
to have committed a felony within the boundaries of the reservation or colony or has
committed, or attempted to commit, any criminal offense within those boundaries in
the presence of the officer or agent.
For the purposes of this subsection, fresh pursuit has the meaning ascribed to
it in NRS 171.156.
Please see the photograph in the attached materials of the RSIC Officer taking
Coughlin's driver's license from him, thereby vitiating his assertion that an arrest was
an available option due to Couglin not providing his driver's license to the Officers.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
11 22 12 final collection for Chief Marshal Roper's review 0204 26800 part 1 of 2.pdf
11 22 12 final collection for Chief Marshal Roper's review 0204 26800 part 2 of 2.pdf
11TR26800 031412 RMC continuation of trial Nash Ormaas Hill traffic citation 031412_20120312-
1033_01cd003b8f0851d0.mp3
11TR26800 RMC 022712 part 2 of 2 from 2 27 12 031412_20120227-1621_01ccf56bce224540.mp3
11TR26800 RMC 022712 part 1 of 2 from 2 27 12 031412_20120227-1507_01ccf5618f76c460 (2).mp3
CV11-03628 ENTIRE EFLEX COMBINED FOR APPENDIX IN 60331 AND 61383 COUGHLIN V MERLISS 26406 1708 26800
NG12-0204.pdf
CR12-1262 appeal.pdf
11 2 12 file stamped complete notice of errata and revised supplemental 26405 1708 0204.pdf
11 15 11 rpd tarter redacted 0204 0434 26800 police report ormaas retaliation.pdf
001679
Elcano's testimony at Disciplinary Hearing FW: Opposition
Download all

Sent: Fri 11/23/12 7:22 AM
To: skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com); je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com); patrickk@nvbar.org
(patrickk@nvbar.org); eifert.nta@att.net (eifert.nta@att.net); cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com);
jgarin@lipsonneilson.com (jgarin@lipsonneilson.com); pelcano@washoelegalservices.org
(pelcano@washoelegalservices.org); linda.gardner@washoecounty.us (linda.gardner@washoecounty.us)
10 attachments
emergency motion filed october 17 2011 merliss.pdf (127.4 KB) , 10 27 12 Order Denying Legal
Defender RMC Judge Howard 11 cr 22176 60838 despite Aigersinger mandatory authority.pdf (558.7
KB) , 10 26 12 Coughlin's Motion for Continuance in 22176 60838 denied though RMC grants one to
RCA for Hill to go on vacation.pdf (1145.7 KB) , 03018 to 03041 Judge Linda Gardner listed by SBN
King as greivant in ng12-0435 fyi prosecutorial misconduct blog smaller size b.pdf (2.5 MB) , 10 27
12 Order Denying Legal Defender RMC Judge Howard 11 cr 22176 60838 despite Aigersinger
mandatory authority.pdf (558.7 KB) , 10 17 12 Coughlin's Emergenc Motion commercial tenant no
cause forbidden 0204 1708 60331 61383 0204-3.pdf (620.6 KB) , 10 17 11 email and attached
Emergency Motion to Stay, Set Aside, Vacate Eviction Hearing Order to Baker 1708 0204.pdf (146.3
KB) , wls gardner emails siragusa and non profit property tax email collection 0204 60302.pdf (4.4
MB) , 8 16 11 Judge Linda Gardner Order of Recusal from Coughlin case FV11-02864-2379391 so
why didn't her brother in 26405 1708 60331.pdf (51.9 KB) , fv08-03380 shortened TPO Santiago v
Vaxevanis Master Linda Gardner Coughlin WLS 26405 54844 60302 sjpr.pdf (542.4 KB)
Dear Panel,
Despite Mr. Hill's repeated assertions that I never raised the issue of being a commercial tenant (law office and or
mattress business) in the "Trial" court (or "lower court") in Hill's sworn testimony at the 6/18/12 criminal trespass
Trial at which I was convicted of trespassing in 11 CR 26405 (due to Richard's false police report, which is a
crime itself), and again at the Disciplinary Hearing on 11/14/12 wherein Hill again made the allegations that I did
not raise the issue of it being impermissible to utilize the summary eviction proceedings incident to NRS 40.253
against a commercial tenant unless pursued under a non-payment of rent basis. At the time of Hill's
serving/posting the 30 Day No Cause Notice of Unlawful Detainer, I was clearly practicing law out of my former
home law office at 121 River Rock St., Reno, NV (consider the double helpful Recusal Order by Judge Linda
Gardner (and Bar Counsel's bate stamped "Formal Hearing File SBN v. Zachary B. Coughlin", at 03018 contains a
page purporting to identify Judge Linda Gardner as the grievant in NG12-0434, though the SBN King's has
previously been rather, typically, coy about just whom provided him that April 2009 Order and under what
circumstances it became a "grievance", and how it was run through the Screening Panel. What is more
curious is that, according to King's bate stamping, the only thing in that file that indicates G: Judge Gardner A:
Zachary Coughlin, Esq. is a printout of a blog page that concerns "prosecutorial misconduct"...and "someone"
stampe "FYI" on it...and there is a bate stamping separate from King and the SBN's (which is at the bottom of the
page) given the "Page 1 of 1094" atop the page on 03019 (according to King's bate stamping). Sure seems like
lifelong prosecutor's like Linda Gardner and her brother William Gardner, now both Judges, and the SBN's King
are awfully keen to snuff out anyone who even thinks a prosecutor might be held to the same rules of professional
conduct as nearly all other lawyers (King isn't much for taking public defender's to task either....ironically, Judge
Linda Gardner takes a particularly punitive tact with legal aid domestic violence attorneys like....well, like myself,
whom she got fired by Washoe Legal Services Paul Elcano in May 2009 incident to her April 13th, 2009 Order
sanctioning Coughlin, which WLS's Elcano testified to. What Elcano did not mention, and which is proven
001680
and detailed in the attachments herein, is that when he moved WLS to a bigger more expensive building, right
before the economy crashed for a period of time that is still ongoing, he entered a lease with a private landlord
which attempted to shift the burden of paying property taxes onto the non-profit legal aid organization, Washoe
Legal Services. With all that legal talent at his disposal, Elcano asked Coughlin to research and write the
Memorandum of Law addressing the issue of whether WLS would be able to avoid such tax liability. The
attachments show that Coughlin was pressed to prepare as completely for the April 12th, and April 17th, 2009
Trial dates in the Joshi divorce case that became a Petition for Mandamaus and a wrongful termination suit in
54844 and 60302...but the attached materials also clearly disprove Judge Gardner's contention that Coughlin had
done no research and or lacked any basis to support the positions he took at trial in that matter. Further,
Coughlin's paralegal, Deb Pringle (who normally did good work) is indicated therein, as she was unable to retrieve
the ALR article that Coughlin mentioned to Judge Gardner at the Trial (contrary to Judge L. Gardner's written
Order's contentions), and Coughlin, upon retrieving it himself inbetween addressing the non-profit property tax
burden scenario for Elcano and WLS, sent Pringle an email demonstrating to her what it was he was asking her to
collect. And ED Elcano was at least somewhat accurate in his testimony at the 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing
when he indicated the he "stood by his employee" following a late January 2012 incident with Rhonda Harrison
or whatever it was...though that and the CAAW/TWS matters added up, and whether they contributed to what
transpired at the April 12th and 17th Joshi Trial or not (very possibly, though I got a bit too involved in the non-
profit property tax issue because I had and have gratitude towards Paul Elcano for hiring me in September 2007
when no one else would and wanted to do a good job on it...and didn't give myself enough time to pull together
the research that I did, in fact do, for the Joshi Trial...but it is relevant to note that I followed ED Elcano's
directions to bounce ideas off of Todd Torvinen, and I did call Mr. Torvinen and also ran into him in the
courthouse prior to the Trial, and distinctly recall his approving, at least in theory, of the position I took at Trial.
I would bet it would have been better received with more specific citations to authority and a more polished
presentation of exhibits to Judge L. Gardner...but I was a very inexperienced attorney at that point and, frankly,
take issue with the extent to which all these prosecutors get all this "in court" experience...then become judges,
then want to fire anyone whom they are "hard pressed to explain to how to put on your case" which is a direct
quote from Judge Linda Gardner to me during that Trial...and I did mention the ALR articles that I researched to
her on the record...and I object to the extent to which Judge Gardner's Order on m Motion for Reconsideration
seeks to characterize the position I set out as somehow "devious". Mr. Joshi, to borrow from the domestic
violene literature, wanted the "power and control" (a la the Duluth Model) associated with having the credit cards
in his own name, and apparently largely used for his sisters to come over for trips and other expenses fairly
attenuated from those expended for the community. But, that is the funny thing...I was working hard on a a
Memorandum of Law to help ED Elcano and WLS's in an attempt to retain the freedom from property taxes often
enjoyed by non-profits...perhaps if Judge Linda Gardner was aware of that or the fact that I did do a fair amount of
preparation and research prior to that Joshi Trial, should would have a different view of the work I did
therein. But, I would do it again, because Paul's time was better spent out with the movers and shakers he had
developed relationships with in the community throughout a career spanning over thirty years, and that moves
along with interests of WLS a more significant way than I imagine only a very few others could approach.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
001681
Formal request for names of those on my Screening Panel`
To: cdbaker@richardhillaw.com
Subject: RE: Opposition
Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2011 10:42:25 -0700
Just go ahead and review the laws directed to when and how often the property tax
information must be provided to renters.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
121 River Rock St.
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Licensed in Nevada
review, dissemination, copying, or the taking of any action based on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.
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IRS Circular 230 Disclosure: To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the Internal Revenue Service, we inform you
that any U.S. federal tax advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) was not intended or written to
be used, and cannot be used, by any person for the purpose of (i) avoiding tax-related penalties or (ii) promoting, marketing
or recommending to another person any transaction or matter addressed in this communication.
Sent: Thu 11/22/12 12:39 PM
To: tsusich@nvdetr.org (tsusich@nvdetr.org); schornsby@nvdetr.org (schornsby@nvdetr.org);
patrickk@nvbar.org (patrickk@nvbar.org); je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com
(cvellis@bhfs.com); mike@tahoelawyer.com (mike@tahoelawyer.com); eifert.nta@att.net
(eifert.nta@att.net); skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com); davidc@nvbar.org
(davidc@nvbar.org); fflaherty@dlpfd.com (fflaherty@dlpfd.com); fflaherty@dyerlawrence.com
(fflaherty@dyerlawrence.com)
I am writing to formally request the names of those who were on the Screening Panel
incident to the current SCR 105 SBN v. Coughlin Complaint in ng12-0204, etc.
001682
Rule 105. Procedure on receipt of complaint.
1. Investigation.
(a)
Investigation and screening panel review. Investigations shall be initiated and conducted by bar counsel or
bar counsel's staff or other investigative personnel at bar counsel's direction prior or pursuant to the
opening of a grievance file. At the conclusion of an investigation of a grievance file, bar counselshall
recommend in writing dismissal with or without prejudice, referral to diversion or mentoring pursuant to
Rule 105.5, a letter of caution, a private reprimand, or the filing of a written complaint for formal hearing.
The recommendation shall be promptly reviewed by a screening panel. A screening panel shall consist of
three members of the disciplinary board, appointed by the chair in accordance with Rule 103(6). Two of the
three reviewers must be members of the bar. By majority vote they shall approve, reject, or modify the
recommendation, or continue the matter for review by another screening panel
Given the Board's inclusion of numerous individuals with patent conflicts (DDA Kandaras (intimately
involved in the opposition's causes in a number of matters, including the apparent search and seizure of my
smart phone and micro sd card incident to summary "misdemeanor of criminal contempt" Order (that
cited to a non summary civil contempt statue in NRS 22.010, yet attempted to utilized the summary nature
of NRS 22.030 (only without complying with the Affidavit requirement for conduct not in the "immediate
presence" of Judge Nash Holmes, all while purporting to be a criminal misdemeanor charge a la NRS
199.340 (very creative, and very, very duplicitous to boot coming from a Judge...and add to that an attempt
to further Bar Counsels SCR 111(5) aims by including the "find by clear and convincing evidence" burden
of proof standard necessary to prove an ethical violations of the RPD in a disciplinary hearing setting....
Then there is Richard Hill's best friend, David Hamilton being on the Board (and SBN King has curiously
redacted nearly any mention of Hill in his 8/23/12 Complaint (for which there remains no return of service
filed in the Disciplinary File (and any attempt by the SBN to assert that the certified mailing of 8/23/12 is
sufficient is fraudulent, see Coughlin's recent sworn Affidavit or Declaration under penalty of perjury as to
the SBN, Panel, and NNDB's representations in that regard, especially in light of SCR 105(4). Further is
is fraudulent and displays a lack of candor to assert that SCR 106 provides insulation from subpoena where
it speaks merely to causes of action, and any immunity therein surely has its limits, otherwise Pat King
would probably go biting Respondent's in their jugular's like the vampire he is.
Also, please formally provide me a copy of any rules of procedure or other applicable policies, practices,
rules, procedures, or dictates adopted by the Panel and or the NNDB or SBN that attach to these
disciplinary proceedings, such as the one of 11/14/12 (and the 45 days from the Panel's designation will run
real soon, so to get a non-void for lack of jurisdiction Disciplinary Hearing set and noticed, the SBN, Panel,
and NNDB is hereby advised to take note of that fact and proceed accordingly. Further, Coughlin objects
to the SBN, Panel, and Board's depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser in this
quasi-criminal setting, particularly where the SBN still refuses to divulge the complainant in the NG12-0435
grievance, or which Clerk of Court or whoever it was that forwarded that April 2009 Order to the SBN.

And to the extent the Complaint has been curiously disinfected to redact mention of Richard G. Hill, Esq.,
allegations in Hill's 1/14/12 unsigned grievance letter to the SBN (while they waited to hear back on their
001683
Judge Howard and Cassandra Jackson want to explain
Milsner v Carstarphen case from the Nevada Supreme Court) attached to the SBN's 2/14/12 letter to
Coughlin (which King fraudulently attempted to assert at the 11/14/12 Hearing that Coughlin somehow
failed to respond to, or to respond timely, particularly where the bate stamped Disciplinary File as late
provided by King on 11/8/12 (in violation of SCR 105(2)(c)) is a textbook case of fraudulent ommission and
obfuscation....see the "Folders" for each grievance (the folder listing Linda Gardner as the grievance filer is
particularly interesting considering is consists only of a online blog entry about prosecutorial misconduct,
and given that Linda Gardner and her brother, the one who refused to recuse himself from the criminal
trespass matter where Richard G. Hill signed the Complaint and the RPD has admitted to fraud incident
thereto on tape, 11 CR 26405, are both lifelong prosecutors.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
Sent: Thu 11/22/12 12:56 AM
To: je@eloreno.com (je@eloreno.com); cvellis@bhfs.com (cvellis@bhfs.com); davidc@nvbar.org
(davidc@nvbar.org); complaints@nvbar.org (complaints@nvbar.org); eifert.nta@att.net
(eifert.nta@att.net); mike@tahoelawyer.com (mike@tahoelawyer.com); patrickk@nvbar.org
(patrickk@nvbar.org); skent@skentlaw.com (skent@skentlaw.com); skauc@reno.gov (skauc@reno.gov);
robertsp@reno.gov (robertsp@reno.gov); hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov (hazlett-stevensc@reno.gov);
wongd@reno.gov (wongd@reno.gov)
6 attachments
DistCtOrder_REDACTED cr12-1018 longoni transcript defective.pdf (141.4 KB) , 12 16 11 email to
plongoni@charter.net longoni and 12 21 11 email to ballardd@reno.gov regarding longoni 22176
26800 0204 0435.pdf (22.7 KB) , 10 9 12 Affidavit of Laura Peters 0204 never sent to Coughlin no
proof of service, yet file stamped.pdf (1516.8 KB) , 12 15 11 22176 2064 Order by Howard on
transcript costs.pdf (92.8 KB) , 12 15 11 22176 ROBERTS NOTICE OF DENIAL OF SERVICE.pdf
(110.8 KB) , 11 16 12 skau grievance materials combined 0204 063341.pdf (1943.8 KB)
How RMC handouts and agreements with Pam Longoni are not violating NRS 189.030
and NRS 4.14(a)
RCA Skau wants to explain his lies about the judge authorize service by email for an
unnoticed hearing where Skau sought to argue email service was insufficient when it
came to his people...Then RCA Hazlett-Stevens want to explain his mysterious claims 001684
to have not received the Notice of Appeal in cr12-1262 or why he puts on perjured
testimony by Richard G. Hill, Esq., RCA Pam Roberts would like to explain the same
for 11 cr 22176. RCA Allison Ormaas wants to explain what she was whispering in
RMC Marshal Harley's ears on 2/27/12 and whether it was about the same failure to
chart follow up on, or report RPD Chris Carter's admission that "Richard Hill pays me a
lot of money, so I arrest who he says to and do what he says to do...", just like Reno
City Attorney Chief Criminal Deputy Dan Wong explained he was surely not going to
do to when Coughlin made the same report to him on 1/19/12....
SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters wants to explain how she approved fax filing for
Coughlin on 9/11/12, and how her Affidavit of 10/9/12 wound up in the Disciplinary
file only made available to Coughlin 5 days before the hearing (with thousands of pages
of filler and duplicates to hide the little it contained...which in the case of Linda
Gardner's grievance, was a mysterious printout from a blog and no more...no cover
letter, no nothing...and Kings email where he purports that the "Clerk of Court" sent
him the Order still has not been clarified, though Joey Orduna Hastings, Clerk of Court
of the Second Judicial District Court wants to indicate whether she sent it to the SBN,
or, more likely, the Clerk of Court of one of the Muni Court Departments (probably
Judge Nash Holmes' in D3, considering her 3/23/12 email to the SBN about Coughlin's
clothing choices to check on a traffic citation at a munic court filing office window...)
who got ahold of District Court Judge Linda Gardners April 2009 Order when Judge
L. Gardner passed it to her brother, RMC William Gardner, who refused to recuse
himself from Coughlin's criminal trespass case based upon Richard Hill's Complaint,
but did manage to pass his sister's Order around to his fellow Judges and hold meetings
with them about how to get back at Coughlin for pointing out things they do that violate
due process rights and other laws. Like those requiring a stay of proceedings when a
defendants competency is brought into question. DDA Young is great at violating
those laws, and bossing Judge Sferrazza around in court, demanding he take into
custody anyone who doesn't do just exactly what DDA Young wants and or give just
exactly the answer he is looking for....
Pat King, Laura Peters and David Clark want to explain how their statements and
corresponence with Coughlin respecting his right to issue subpoenas and waiver of
witness fees of fees for subpoena duces tecums departed remarkably from the sudden
about face on that issue when the Motions to Quash started coming in, though the
Disciplinary Hearing of 11/14/12 went on just they same, right....
001685
Dear Panel, SBN, and Mr. Garin, and Ms. Nordstrom and RMC Chief Marshal Roper,
and Marshal Joel Harley,
Bailiff John Reyes wants to explain his views on how "its not a Fourth Amendment
violation if the person was guilty of the crime you suspected him of committing when
you did the search" and how its acceptable "subterfuge" for Reyes to help ol Jimmy
Sleazy, WCPD Jim Leslie by muscling over indigent criminal defendants for him when
Leslie can't be bothered upholding the Sixth Amendment, whereupon Reyes comes to
Jimmy's rescue and tells Coughlin, Leslie at his side, that "I'm going to put my foot up
your ass..." Reyes watches defendants get put in jail for months day in day out for doing
less than that....
Steve Tuttle wants to explain why the RJC didn't respond to Coughlin's requests for
information on the transmission of the Eviction Order in rjc 2011-001708 to the
Washoe County Sheriff's Office.
Liz Stuchell and Deputy Machen, and Roxy Silva want to explain all the false affidavits
of service he files, and Maureen and Roxy's assertions that the "receipt" of the eviction
Order in NRS 40.253 was at 8:05 am on 11/1/11 in rjc Rev2011-001708 (Sheriff must
effect the lockout "within 24 hours of receipt of the Order"...and Casey Baker, Esq.
wants to explain his testimony of 6/18/12 when he explained what he did with the
Sheriff's Office on October 28th, 2011...and Reno Carson Messenger service want to
explain why their receipt shows they delivered the lockout order to the WCSO at 4:45
pm on 10/31/12, while the locksmith swears the lockout was not effected until a couple
minutes to 5 pm, and definitely not sooner than 4:48 pm, despite Machens 11/1/11
Affidavit of Service (that his supervisor Stuchell had to admit was false in that it alleged
"personal service" where the WCSO admits no one was home (and the locksmith totally
refutes Hill's testimony of 6/18/12 "they tried to serve it to you but you ran away..."
(really, Rich, becaue Casey didn't testify to that, but he did say that you weren't even
there that day, so what do you base that sworn allegations on Rich, besides your desire
to mitigate your liability for all your misdeeds there?).
Chief Marshal Roper and Joel Harley wanted to explain some of the things Judge Nash
Holmes got "confused" on in her "sworn testimony"...which is shaping up to look at lot
like the unsworn hearsay testimony of a Judge in the In Re Mirch case that resulted in a
disbarment, which in Nevada, are irrevocable as of 2008. To be clear, Judge Nash
Holmes testified falsely at the 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing in a number of ways. The
attached audio from the Hearing and Judges Nash Holmes various Orders (which reveal
001686
a disturbing attempt to mix and match various civil and criminal contempt statutes,
some plenary, some summary, and add the transmogrification of a "simple traffic
citation Trial" into some sort of Summary Disciplinary Hearing...which SBN Bar
Counsel Pat King is only too happy to sign on to, eager to kick back and rely on SCR
111(5) after having fed Judge Nash Holmes the instruction to make sure to copy and
paste as many sections of the Rules of Professional Conduct into an "Order" that is sure
to point out the burden of proof necessary for a "ethical violation" finding in a
Disciplinary Hearing setting. The only thing less transparent than this awkward attempt
by Bar Counsel and Judge Nash Holmes to get 'r done was the brother and sister act by
Judge William Gardner and his sister Judge Linda Gardner, complimented, of course,
by that oh so suspicious looking "5" in the SBN's "received" stamp of Judge L.
Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin, which Washoe Legal Services's Paul
Elcano cited as the sole reason for Coughlin's firing (and which begat the Mandamus
Petition against L. Gardner in 54844, the wrongful termination suit against WLS in
60302, the criminal trespass conviction in 11 CR 26405 that Judge W. Gardner refused
to recuse himself from, etc., etc.
WCPD Biray Dogan and DDA Zach Young wanted to explain their violations of NRS
178.405 and the communications with RMC Judge Nash Holmes regarding the 2/27/12
Order for Competency Evaluation that should have prevented her from even holding the
Trial (the one that occurred right after RMC Marshal Harley served a civil eviction
appeal document on behalf of the process server Richard G. Hill, Esq. hired to serve
Coughlin the Order to Show Cause in cv11-03628 that Coughlin had already received
in connection with his being the attorney of record and an e-filer on that matter...see
Caplow).
RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez and Officer Chris Carter wish to address the panel about
their misconduct in 11 CR 26405 and the extent to which Richard Hill and his client,
Dr. Matt Merliss misled them, especially vis a vis the attached filings in 11 CR 26405
and 61901.
Sargent Paul Sifre had some thoughts on the custodial jaywalking arrest and Sifre v.
Wells Fargo, LLC. Officers Wesley and Look wanted to weigh in on that too..
RPD Officer Nick Duralde and his wife, ECOMM/911 dispatcher Jessica Duralde (who
was working that night of the 8/20/11 arrest that started a year in which Coughlin was
arrest 10 times, including a custodial arrest for jaywalking on 1/12/12 then another one 001687
for "misuse of 911" even though Coughlin received two protection orders in FV12-
00187, and -00188), with Officer Duralde pulling Couglin over in the middle of the
night upon his walking to his car after being released from jail on a 15 degree night on
1/13/12, where five other RPD Officers helped Officer Duralde with the pressing matter
of the sudden disappearance of Coughlin's license plate...), (all suspiciously close in
time to Coughlin filing a complaint against Duralde and the RPD on 1/7/12 with the
RPD) wanted to weigh in on the misconduct attendant to Duralde's testifying that
dispatch reported to himself and RPD Officer's Alaksa and Rosa that night about "a
possible fight" thus supporting their reponse and the associated Terry Stop weapons
check frisk pat down and custodial arrest for a misdemeanor allegedly occuring outside
their presence after 7 pm:
(c) When the person is found and the arrest is made in a public place or a place that is open to the public and:
(2) The misdemeanor is discovered because there was probable cause for the arresting officer to stop, detain or arrest the person for another
alleged violation or offense;
(d) When the offense is committed in the presence of a private person and the person makes an arrest immediately after the offense is
committed;
(e) When the offense charged is battery that constitutes domestic violence pursuant toNRS 33.018 and the arrest is made in the manner
provided in NRS 171.137;
(f) When the offense charged is a violation of a temporary or extended order for protection against domestic violence issued pursuant to NRS
33.017 to 33.100, inclusive;
(h) When the person voluntarily surrenders himself or herself in response to an outstanding warrant of arrest.
The RSIC Victoria Oldenburg wants to talk to the Panel about how the RSIC and Wal-
Mart are in a long term business partnership where the 2nd St. Wal-Mart is on tribal
land rented out by the RSIC and patrolled by its tribal officers, who admit to routinely
making misdemeanor petty theft/shoplifting custodial arrest (Officer Kameron
Crawford and Donnie Braunworth have been trained in all the neato "he didn't give me
all the information necessary to issue a citation" explanations (including Crawfords
lying under oath that Coughlin didn't provide his driver's license to him on September
9th, 2011, especially where Wal-Mart's Frontino admits he did not make a citizen's
arrest, nor did any Wal-Mart employee) even where such misdemeanor arrests by tribal
001688
officers are forbidden under NRS 171.1255.. Reno City Attorney too would like a
chance to explain how she prosecutes cases based upon arrests by tribal officers for
misdemeanor where Nevada law expressly prevents misdemeanor arrests by tribal
officers under NRS 171.1255.
I was forced to cross examine/interact with a represented party at the 11/14/12
Disciplinary Hearing, and the SBN and Panel's violations of SCR 105 contributed
greatly to my failure to alert Mr. Garin prior to that. I think out of fairness I and Mr.
Garin/Ms. Nordstrom should be provided transcripts from the 11/14/12 Hearing.
NRS 171.1255Arrest by officer or agent of Bureau of Indian Affairs or police
officer employed by Indian tribe.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, an officer or agent of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs or a person employed as a police officer by an Indian tribe may make an
arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him or her, or may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(b) When a person arrested has committed a felony or gross misdemeanor, although not
in the officer or agents presence.
(c) When a felony or gross misdemeanor has in fact been committed, and the officer or
agent has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
(d) On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony or gross
(e) When a warrant has in fact been issued in this State for the arrest of a named or
described person for a public offense, and the officer or agent has reasonable cause to
believe that the person arrested is the person so named or described.
(f) When the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed a battery upon that persons spouse and the peace officer finds
evidence of bodily harm to the spouse.
(a) Within the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony for an offense
committed on that reservation or colony; or
001689
(b) Outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation or Indian colony if the officer or
agent is in fresh pursuit of a person who is reasonably believed by the officer or agent
to have committed a felony within the boundaries of the reservation or colony or has
committed, or attempted to commit, any criminal offense within those boundaries in the
presence of the officer or agent.
For the purposes of this subsection, fresh pursuit has the meaning ascribed to
it in NRS 171.156.
Washoe Legal Services Paul Elcano and State Bar of Nevada's Coe Swobe's contacts
with my father, Palmer v. Pioneer, etc.
So, this is the Elcano approach...he gets an email on 4/19/12 that is a written
employment law centered complaint from an employee...and he has the employee
suspended within days thereafter...then claims to have not received the email, then
adopts some Duluth Model "Power and Control" wheel co-opting or leveraging of
"treatment" or armchair psychiatry...
Elcano, McGeorge '78. Nash Holmes, McGeorge '79. Beesley, McGeorge '79. Stephen
Kent, McGeorge '80. RMC Judge Howard (Wal-Mart conviction resulting in 6/7/12
temporary suspension in 60838), McGeorge '81. Loomis, McGeorge '82 (twice
Coughlin's RMC court appointed counsel, allowed to withdraw with pay both times,
refused to advocate in any way). Gammick, McGeorge '82. Springgate, McGeorge '85
(opposing consel in ng12-0435 asking for sanctions in divorce case closing argument).
Kandaras, McGeorge '91 (Deputy District Attorney involved in warrantless seizure of
Coughlin's smart phone. DDA Z. Young, McGeorge '04. Hazlett-Stevens, McGeorge,
'06.
What do you call it when Judge Nash Holmes testifies, on 11/14/12 that she questioned
Coughlin about "recording devices" and or whether he was recording BEFORE the one
restroom break, purposefully changing the order of the questioning and the restroom
break to suggest some furtive activity on Coughlin's part, which Judge Nash Holmes
then further attempted to amplify in her assertion that Marshal Joel Harley was ordered
to follow Coughlin into the restroom and that a Marshal asserted to her that Coughlin
"disassembled a recording device" in the restroom and "hid a part or portion of it in the
restroom"
001690
Fraud on the court Conduct of counsel in omitting portion of deposition when
deposition is read into record, and giving impression that entire document is being
proffered, resulting in buttressing of his party's position is fraud on the court warranting
the imposition of sanctions. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rules 172, 172, subd. 1(a, d). Sierra Glass &
Mirror v. Viking Industries, Inc., 1991, 808 P.2d 512, 107 Nev. 119, rehearing denied.
It is categorically false for Judge Nash Holmes to assert, in the audio record on 3/12/12 the order of events
and when she asked Coughlin her questions about recording, considering when a restroom break took place
an exactly what it is she asked Couglin and when, and what his responses were, and when some allegations
by "the Marshal" were made, what they consisted of, etc.. on 3/12/12 in 11 tr 26800 the audio transcript
reads 7 minutes into the audio record the RMC provided the SBN:
Judge Nash Holmes (Nash): It appears to me in this case that the defendant is suffering
from some extreme form of mental illness. during the trial I asked the defendant
attorney repeatedly if he was recording the proceedings he denied that vehemently a few
times and then he quote took the fifth a few other times and then he requested to be
excused to go to the bathroom and the Marshal later reported to me that while the
gentleman was in the bathroom he disassembled a recording device in his pocket and
took the memory out of it and it was later found in that, uh, by the Marshal no one else
had gone into the bathroom and that was retrieved and it was put into his possession at
the Sheriff's office and when they booked him into jail for the contempt charge that was
booked into evidence and I asked the Sheriff's office to hold that into evidence. I believe
he has violated Supreme Court Rule 229(2)(B) which was amended by ADKT 440,
August 1st, 2011...."
One Coughlin did not do anything of the sort indicated by Judge Nash Holmes (by way of
unattributed hearsay, like her car sleeping allegations in her 3/14/12 letter re Coughlin to the
SBN) above.
NRS 178.405 should have prevented anything said or done by Judge Nash Holmes following
her statement at the 7 minute mark that "It appears to me in this case that the defendant is
suffering from some extreme form of mental illness." Further, that which Judge Nash Holmes
had communicated to her prior to the start of Trial on 2/27/12 in 11 tr 26800 needs to be
testified to under oath, rather than have Bar Counsel assert to half baked "can't ask the judge
about her mental processes" loophole, as he has done.
001691
Here is the actual statements made, verbatim, from the certified audio transcript of the 2/27/12
"simple traffic citation Trial" stemming from Coughlin going to Richard G. Hill, Esq.'s office
to get his driver's license, wallet, keys, and client's files following a custodial arrest for
trespass (see RPD Sargent Lopez and Officer Carter's explanations thereof in 11 CR 26405
and 61901) and three days spent in jail, upon being released therefrom on 11/15/12...and at the
Trial on that traffic citation issued by RPD Sargent John Tarter, RMC Marshal Joel Harley,
just before Trial (when Judge Nash Holmes couldn't be found and WCPD Biray Dogan and
DDA Zach Young were getting an Order for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin in rcr2012-
065630 at 1:31 pm...and the 11 TR 26800 Trial starting late, not at 1 pm as noticed, but at 3
pm....with RMC W. Gardner admitting to meetings being held amongst the RMC Judges
wherein they brainstormed ways of combating Coughlin's championing of due process rights
for the disenfranchised...
whether the citation or report in 11 tr 26800 contained any mention of retaliation, given she
was looking right at it and given what she said in court. Also, the whispering with Marshal
Harley, and the bits about Coughlin reporting to Ormaas what RPD OFficer Carter said to
Coughlin in 61901, and Ormaas's responses thereto on 2/27/12, and Dan Wong, ditto at an
earlier hearing on that matter...
Simply put, there was no questioning by Judge Nash Holmes of Coughlin as to whether he was
recording anything or whether he possessed a "recording device" until AFTER the one and only
restroom break Judge Nash Holmes mentions on the audio record. And that sua sponte interrogation
of Couglin occured IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RESTROOM BREAK, A BREAK IN WHICH
JUDGE NASH HOLMES REFUSED TO ALLOW COUGHLIN TO TAKE HIS YELLOW LEGAL
PAD WITH HIM AND WHICH OCCURED AFTER COUGHLIN MADE A VERBAL
PRESERVATION ON THE RECORD OF THE WHISPERING IN EACH OTHER'S EARS BY
CITY ATTORNEY ALLISON ORMAAS AND MARSHAL HARLEY (WHO SEEMED A BIT
UPSET ABOUT SOME OF THE QUESTIONS COUGHLIN ASKED THEM IMMEDIATELY
BEFORE THE TRIAL (DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME WHERE JUDGE NASH HOLME'S
ASSISTANT INDICATED, ON THE RECORD IN ONE OF THE OTHER CASES ON THAT
STACKED DOCKET, THAT Judge Nash Holmes just couldn't be found, and how odd that
was...which is odd, considering what was going on in 11 cr 22176, 11 cr 26405 12 cr 00696 and 11 tr
26800, and rcr2012-065630 and rcr2011-063341 at the time (lots of reasons for and indications that
local law enforcement and prosecutors and public defenders were non too happy with Coughlin...and
consider the 2/24/12 email vacating the 2/27/12 status conference between young and dogan that
neither YOung nor Dogan wish to testify about...but which seems to have been held anyways after a
written communication of its being reset was transmitted to Coughlin by Dogan, wherein, during the
time Judge Nash Holmes couldn't be found (maybe she was at one of the group meetings amongst
Judges about Coughlin that RMC Administrative Judge William Gardner referenced on the record in
001692
11 CR 26405? Interesting the Notice of Appeal in 60302 was filed that same day too, 2/27/12) Dogan
got his ORder for Competency Evaluation of Coughlin in rcr2012-065630 (apparently in retaliation
for Coughlin's filing of 2/21/12, and DDA Zach Young was still smarting from a filing by Coughlin
of approximately 11/28/12, which resultd in Young promptly amending his complaint in rcr2011-
063341 to add a charge that was duplicative, even where YOung failure to allege theft or
possessing/receiving "from another' under Staab makes his so charging Coughlin in that iPhone case
a RPC 3.8 violation, which is YOung's specialty, apparently. That, and violating NRs 178.405, which
YOung did by filing in rcr2011-063341 with a stamp of 2:55pm a fugitive document of his own, an
Opposition to Coughlin's or the WCPD Motion to Appear as CoCounsel on 2/27/12...nevermind
YOung tried to hold a TRIAL on 5/7/12 in that case despite the Order finding Coughlin competent in
cr12-0376 didn't even get signed and entered until 5/9/12...ditto the Trial seeting of 5/8/12 in RMC
11 cr 26405, the criminal trespass case. NOt much respect for nrs 178.405 (including within NRs
5.010) here in Northern nevada..
Coughlin didn't received the 2/28/12 Contempt ORder in 11 tr 26800 until July 2012...but did file a
Notice of Appeal 3/7/12...despite "summary criminal contempt" being a final appealable order, Judge
Nash HOlmes continues to refuse to follow NRS 189.010-050 (so Coughlin has to type the transcript,
yay....
It is true that contempt committed in a trial courtroom can under some circumstances be punished
summarily by the trial judge. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 . But adjudication by a
trial judge of a contempt committed in his immediate presence in open court cannot be likened to the
proceedings here. For we held in the Oliver case that a person charged with contempt before a "one-
man grand jury" could not be summarily tried. [349 U.S. 133, 138] The power of a trial judge to
punish for a contempt committed in his immediate presence in open ... In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257.
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Coughlin violated in both 11 cr 22176 and 11 tr 26800, also
orders no sufficiently detailed or capable of being known how to comply with, not sufficient warning,
violate Houston v Eighth Judicial District (Nev.).
See, this is why In Re Oliver and Cooke require all elements of "summary criminal contempt" occur
" in the "immediate presence" of the Court. Maybe Marshal Harley and some other Marshal have
misled Judge Nash HOlmes, or maybe something worse is going on here....but what Judge Nash
HOlmes said on the recording is entirely misleading an inaccurate, if not an outright lie (again,
maybe not a lie by Judge Nash Holmes, maybe she is repeating a lie, but regardless her reliance on
unattributed hearsay is distrubing an inappropriate, particulary where she not only purports to issue a
"summary criminal contempt" conviction against an attorney, but also where Judge Nash Holmes
appears to try to transmogrify what she sees as "a simple traffic citation trial" into a full blown SCR
105 disciplinary hearing where she is both Bar Counsel and the Panel...That Marshal needs to sign an
affidavit, under NRS 22.020 and Judge Nash HOlmes ought to have to put something on the record,
under oath, in response to Coughlin's recent subpoena (and SBN Pat King wishes to let Judge Nash
001693
HOlmes phone in her testimony, and it probably won't even be sworn testimony, but rather just some
musings by Judge Nash Holmes purporting to make "rulings" finding "by clear and convincing
evidence" all sorts of things outside her jurisdiction) on 11/14/12, on, Partick O. King, SBN Bar
Counsel has also filed Motion to Quash the Subpoenas Coughlin attempted to have served on
Marshal Joel Harley, Marshal Deighton, Judge Nash HOlmes, Judge William Gardner, Judge
Gardners Administrative Assistant Lisa Wagner, who can't quite find the NOtice of Appeal Coughlin
faxed to her (allowable under the RMC Rules) on June 28th, 2012 in 11 CR 26405 (the appeal was
dismissed under an NRS 189.010 analysis by Judge Elliot, whom also got Coughlin appeal of the 11
cr 22176 conviction resulting in this Court's 6/7/12 temporary suspension Order in cr11-2064, which
was denied based upon a civilpreparation of transcript down payment rule, in that criminal appeal,
where the RMC has a thing in place with this Pam Longoni that violates Nevada law in that it
refused to give Coughlin the audio cd of the trial for some time, insisting only Longoni would be
allowed to transcribe it, and that the transcript's preparation would absolutely not start until a down
payment was made. Plus, even where Coughlin caved to the payment demands..Longoni repeatedly
hung up the phone on him and otherwise ignored his communications (there may be an issue of the
email Longoni holding out to the public issuing a "bounceback"...but she needs to sign an affidavit as
to whether she put Coughlin on a blocked list, and upon information and belief, Coughlin faxed his
request to the number the RMC held out for her on her behalf too...
In her March 14th, 2012 grievance against Coughlin to the SBN (now NG12-0434, and perhaps,
NG12-0435 (stamped as "received" by the SBN from the "Clerk of Court" of some still unnamed
Court (I'd bet its from the RMC Clerk of Court, whom King purported to have certified documents
from a Court she doesn't even work for at the 11/14/12 Disciplinary Hearing...but then again, Panel
Chair Echeverria allow WLS's Elcano to certify documents just because he claimed to have watched
a tape of a hearing, where Elcano is neither a licensed attorney, nor does he work for any Court....),
depending upon whom you ask and what King means by "Clerk of Court"...because in King's 3/23/12
email to Coughlin he apparently identifies Ms. Marilyn Tognoni as "Clerk of Court of Department
3"...whoever, wouldn't it be Second Judicial District Court Clerk of Court Joey Orduna Hastings that
would need to send Family Court Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 Order sanctioning Coughlin to
the SBN's King for King now apparent contention that the NG12-0435 "ghost grievance" consisting
of Judge L. Gardner's April 2009 Order was not filed by the RMC Judges? Oh, Clerk of Court
Orduna Hastings? Do you have anything to say about this? Judge Nash Holme's 3/14/12 grievance to
bar counsel reads:
"
Dear Mr. Clark:
001694
This letter constitutes a formal complaint of attorney misconduct and/or disability against Zachary Barker
Coughlin. The accompanying box of materials demonstrates some of the problems with the practice of this attorney being
experienced by myself and the other three judges in Reno Municipal Court. My two most recent Orders in what should be
a simple traffic citation case are self-explanatory and are included, together with copies of massive documents Me.
Coughlin has faxfiled to our court in this case. Audio recordings of two of my hearings in this matter are also included.
He failed to appear for the second one this past Monday.
I have another traffic case pending trial with him that was re-assigned to me based on our Department I judge
being out for surgery. We have multiple addresses for Mr. Coughlin and can't seem to locate him between cases very
easily. We are setting that case for trial and attempting to serve him at the most recent address we have (1422 E. 9
th
St. #2
Reno NY 89512), although I heard today he may be living in his vehicle somewhere. We do have an address for his
mother, however, as she recently posted part of a fine for him.
Judge Ken Howard, Department 4, had a case on Mr.Coughlin late last year that is now on appeal to the Second
Judicial District Court. Judge Bill Gardner, Department 2, also has a matter currently pending in his court with Mr.
Coughlin as the defendant. I have enclosed some copies of documents from those matters, in chronological order, simply
because they appear to demonstrate that he is quickly decompensating in his mental status. Our staff also made you
some audio tapes of Coughlin in the him and him and him and him and him and him and him him and I will him and
him and him and him and him in Departments 2 and 4 so you can hear for yourself how this attorney acts in court. You
can see his behavior in my traffic citation case does not appear to bean isolated incident.
It is my understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a matter pending on this attorney. My Judicial Assistant
was contacted by the Washoe Public Defender in February when I had Mr. Coughlin jailed for Contempt of Court and
they stated that they represent him in a Gross Misdemeanor matter in RJC. I have no other information on that.
You will have the full cooperation of myself, the other judges, and the staff of Reno Municipal Court in your
pursuit of this matter. Mr.Coughlin has positioned himself as a vexatious litigant in our court, antagonizing the staff and
even our pro temp judges on the most simple traffic and misdemeanor matters. I do think this is a caseof some urgency,
and I apologize for taking two days to get this package to you; our IT person was ill and could not make the copies of
the audios of Mr.Coughlin's hearings until today, and I felt it was important that the audios be included in the materials
to be considered by the State Bar. On February 27, 2012, Mr. Coughlin told me he was actively practicing law and had
appointments with clients. [ do not know if that was true, but if so, he could be causing serious harm to the practice of
law in Northern Nevada and could be jeopardizing someone's freedom or property interests. "
Maybe it would be best if the RMC focused less on offering unsworn hearsay testimony that is
easily proven to be patently false at Disciplinary Hearings (to the extent one is allowed to offer
such proof, which Panel Chair Echeverria invariably rules is "not relevent" and King smugly
basks in his SCR 111(5) vacation with his "Clerk of Court" Laura Peters...whose lies about
SCR 105(4) resulted in Panel Chair Echeverria quashing all subpoenas Coughlin issued, 001695
Report Selection Criteria
Case ID: DV08-01168
Docket Start Date:
Docket Ending Date:
Case Description
Case ID: DV08-01168 - ASHWIN JOSHI VS. BHARTI JOSHI (D14)
Filing Date: Tuesday , July 01st, 2008
Type: DO - DIVORCE - NO CHILDREN
Status: CLOSED - Case Closed
Related Cases
FV08-01910
Case Event Schedule
Case Parties
6 3,10 Plaintiff/Counter-Deft @1144868 JOSHI, ASHWIN

7 11,12 Defendant
Counterclaimant
@1144866 JOSHI, BHARTI

9 Judge D14 GARDNER, HONORABLE
LINDA
Address: P. O. BOX 30083
RENO NV 89520
Aliases: none

R.
SERVICES
001696
299 South Arlington
Avenue
Reno NV 89501

R.
SERVICES
299 South Arlington
Avenue
Reno NV 89501

14 Real Party in Interest 9473 Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Address: P. O. Box 3961
Reno NV 89505
Aliases: none

Docket Entries
Filing Date Description Name Monetary
01-JUL-2008
08:50 AM
**Civil Cover Sheet
Entry: none.

01-JUL-2008
08:51 AM
$Complaint-Divorce No Children
Entry: none.

01-JUL-2008
08:51 AM
** Summons Issued
Entry: none.

01-JUL-2008
08:53 AM
Financial Declaration ...
Entry: SHORT FORM FINANCIAL DECLARATION ASHWIN JOSHI

01-JUL-2008
08:55 AM
**Payment Receipted
001697

03-OCT-2008
03:53 PM
Heard-Not Settled
Entry: JTAYLOR, CLERK; CD

10-OCT-2008
09:32 AM
***Minutes
Entry:
10/3/08: Case Management Conference - Transaction 405010 - Approved By: NOREVIEW
: 10-10-2008:09:33:20

10-OCT-2008
09:38 AM
** Notes ...
Entry: FILE RETURNED TO FILING OFFICE; JT

15-OCT-2008
10:10 AM
** Notes ...
Entry: CMC NOT ON RECORD CALLED ADVICE ZACHARY B. COUGHLIN JA

17-DEC-2008
04:18 PM
Notice to Set
Entry: NOTICE TO SET TRIAL: JANUARY 7, 2009 @ 10:30

07-JAN-2009
09:36 AM
Application for Setting
Entry: 1/2 DAY TRIAL

25-FEB-2009
02:50 PM
Pre-Trial Order
Entry: none.

05-MAR-2009
09:26 AM
Trial Statement - Defendant Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry: none.

11-MAR-2009
04:56 PM
Trial Statement - Plaintiff Springgate, Esq., John P.
001698
Entry:
TRIAL STATEMENT OF PLAINTIFF - Transaction 644213 - Approved By: TPRINCE : 03-
12-2009:07:20:23

12-MAR-2009
05:00 PM
Heard ...
Entry:
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE NOT ON RECORD; TRIAL COMMENCED ON THE
RECORD-JAVS, NOT CONCLUDED, CONTINUED TO 3/17/09. PLAINTIFF PRESENT
WITH COUNSEL. DEFENDANT PRESENT WITH COUNSEL. RM 4; MCA

17-MAR-2009
11:11 AM
Under Advisement
Entry:
PLAINTIFF WAS PRESENT WITH COUNSEL; DEFENDANT WAS PRESENT WITH
COUNSEL; JAVS RM 4; MCA

09-APR-2009
10:41 AM
** Notes ...
Entry:
CD BURNED HEARING DATE 03-12-2009 & 03-17-2009 REQUESTED BY ZACHARY B.
COUGHLIN CALLED FOR PICK UP 03-17-2009/JA

13-APR-2009
09:23 AM
Order ...
Entry: AFTER TRIAL - Transaction 706269 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 04-13-2009:09:24:06

13-APR-2009
03:21 PM
Notice of Entry of Ord Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER AFTER TRIAL - Transaction 708197 - Approved By:
ASMITH : 04-13-2009:15:37:59

23-APR-2009
04:13 PM
** Notes ...
Entry:
CD BURNED HEARING DATE 03-12-2009 & 03-17-2009 REQUESTED BY MARC
ASHELEY AND TODD TORVINEN CALLED FOR PICK UP 04-23-2009/JA

29-APR-2009
09:53 AM
Request for Submission Sternlicht, Esq., Caryn R.
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: STIPULATION AND ORDER TO ENLARGE TIME PERIOD FOR
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PARTY SUBMITTING: CARYN STERNLICHT, ESQ
DATE SUBMITTED: 04/29/09 SUBMITTED BY: JN DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
001699
INTERESTING TO NOTE WLS DOESN'T REQUEST CD UNTIL AFTER 4/19/09
WRITTEN COMPLAINT BY COUGHLIN-NOTE BY ZC

29-APR-2009
04:48 PM
Request for Hearing Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
REQUEST FOR ADJUSTMENT OF FILING DATE OR EXTENSION OF TIME -
Transaction 741585 - Approved By: MPURDY : 04-29-2009:17:02:19

30-APR-2009
03:35 PM
Mtn for Reconsideration Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION ; REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO
RESPOND - Transaction 744344 - Approved By: ASMITH : 04-30-2009:16:09:49

30-APR-2009
04:31 PM
Request for Submission Complet
Entry: none.

30-APR-2009
04:39 PM
Stip and Order...
Entry: TO ENLARGE TIME PERIOD FOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

12-MAY-2009
12:03 AM
Notice of Appeal Supreme Court Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
ORDER AFTER TRIAL - Transaction 765327 - Approved By: MPURDY : 05-12-
2009:09:36:43

12-MAY-2009
12:15 AM
Notice of Appeal Supreme Court Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
ORDER AFTER TRIAL - Transaction 765328 - Approved By: MPURDY : 05-12-
2009:09:38:37

13-MAY-2009
01:13 PM
Opposition to ... Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
OPPOSITION TO REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION - Transaction 769905 - Approved
By: MPURDY : 05-13-2009:13:33:42

13-MAY-2009
01:13 PM
Mtn to Strike... Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry: Transaction 769905 - Approved By: MPURDY : 05-13-2009:13:33:42
001700

13-MAY-2009
04:10 PM
** Case Reopened
Entry: none.

13-MAY-2009
04:11 PM
Ex-Parte Mtn... Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
DEFENDANT'S EMERGENCY MOITON FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME AND ORDER
GRANTING EMERGENCY REQUEST TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA
PAUPERIS

13-MAY-2009
04:11 PM
Request for Submission Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: DEFENDANTS EMERGENCY MOTION ORDER SHORTENING
TIME PARTY SUBMITTING: ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ DATE SUBMITTED: 05/13/09
SUBMITTED BY: JN DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:

13-MAY-2009
04:23 PM
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PARTY SUBMITTING:
ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ DATE SUBMITTED: 05/13/09 SUBMITTED BY: JN DATE
RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:

13-MAY-2009
04:27 PM
Motion ... Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN
FORMA PAUPERIS

13-MAY-2009
04:27 PM
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PARTY SUBMITTING: ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ DATE SUBMITTED: 05/13/09
SUBMITTED BY: JN DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:

13-MAY-2009
04:28 PM
Amended Notice of Appeal Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry: none.

001701
13-MAY-2009
04:28 PM
Case Appeal Statement Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry: FOR AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL ONLY

14-MAY-2009
03:33 PM
Notice ... Ashley, Esq., Marc
Entry: OF SUBSTITUTION OF STAFF COUNSEL

14-MAY-2009
04:48 PM
Supreme Ct Deficiency Notice
Entry: FOR NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED 5/12/09 TRANSACTION #765328

14-MAY-2009
04:49 PM
Entry: FOR NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED 5/12/09 TRANSACTION #765327

14-MAY-2009
04:49 PM
Entry:
FOR AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED 5/13/09. NO FEES PAID, ZACHARY
COUGHLIN, ESQ., FILED FOR IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS FOR HIMSELF IN THIS
CASE.

15-MAY-2009
12:10 AM
Amended ... Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
AMENDED CASE APPEAL STATEMENT OR PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR
OTHER EXTRAORDINARY WRIT - Transaction 774264 - Approved By: MPURDY : 05-15-
2009:07:52:03

15-MAY-2009
12:11 AM
Amended ... Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL; OR ALTERNATIVELY PETITION FOR WRIT
OF MANDAMUS OR OTHER EXTRAORDINARY WRIT - Transaction 774265 - Approved
By: MPURDY : 05-15-2009:07:53:39

15-MAY-2009
09:19 AM
Entry: none.
001702

15-MAY-2009
09:37 AM
Certificate of Clerk
Entry: FOR 1ST 5/12/09 APPEAL, NO CASE APPEAL STATEMENT OR FEES

15-MAY-2009
09:38 AM
Certificate of Transmittal
Entry: FOR 1ST 5/12/09 APPEAL, NO CASE APPEAL STATEMENT OR FEES

15-MAY-2009
09:39 AM
Entry: FOR 2ND 5/12/09 APPEAL, NO CASE APPEAL STATEMENT OR FEES

15-MAY-2009
09:39 AM
Entry: FOR 2ND 5/12/09 APPEAL, NO CASE APPEAL STATEMENT OR FEES

15-MAY-2009
09:40 AM
Entry: FOR 5/13/09 JOINT AMENDED APPEAL, NO FEES

15-MAY-2009
09:41 AM
Entry: FOR 5/13/09 JOINT AMENDED APPEAL

15-MAY-2009
09:41 AM
Entry: FOR 5/15/09 SECOND AMENDED APPEAL & AMENDED CASE APPEAL STATEMENT

15-MAY-2009
09:51 AM
Entry: FOR 5/15/09 SECOND AMENDED APPEAL & AMENDED CASE APPEAL STATEMENT

19-MAY-2009
12:00 PM
Ord Deny in Forma Pauperis
Entry: ON BEHALF OF ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ.
001703

20-MAY-2009
11:40 PM
Reply... Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry: REPLY TO OPPOSITION

21-MAY-2009
11:27 AM
Ord Denying ...
Entry:
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION - Transaction 785777 - Approved By: NOREVIEW :
05-21-2009:11:35:08

21-MAY-2009
11:27 AM
Entry: none.

21-MAY-2009
11:27 AM
Entry: none.

21-MAY-2009
11:27 AM
Entry: none.

21-MAY-2009
03:03 PM
Supreme Court Receipt for Doc
Entry:
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 53833 RECEIPT FOR DOCUMENTS (INCLUDES ALL 4
NOTICE OF APPEALS)

21-MAY-2009
03:04 PM
**Supreme Court Case No. ...
Entry: SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 53833

21-MAY-2009
04:06 PM
Request for Submission Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, & DECREE OF
DIVORCE PARTY SUBMITTING: JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ. DATE SUBMITTED:
5/22/09 SUBMITTED BY: CPARSLEY DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:
001704

26-MAY-2009
02:03 PM
Request for Submission
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: REPLY TO OPPOSITION PARTY SUBMITTING: ZACHARY
COUGHLIN, ESQ DATE SUBMITTED: 05/26/09 SUBMITTED BY: JN DATE RECEIVED
JUDGE OFFICE:

26-MAY-2009
03:09 PM
Supreme Court Notice
Entry: SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 53833 NOTICE TO PAY SUPREME COURT FILING FEE

27-MAY-2009
09:58 AM
Motion ... Ashley, Esq., Marc
Entry: TO CORRECT PROPOSED DECREE

27-MAY-2009
01:28 PM
Entry: none.

27-MAY-2009
01:45 PM
Entry:
MOTION TO STRIKE THE NOTICE(S) OF APPEAL - Transaction 795498 - Approved By:
MPURDY : 05-27-2009:15:13:37 DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION TO STRIKE THE
NOTICE(S) OF APPEAL PARTY SUBMITTING: JOHN SPRINGGATE, ESQ DATE
SUBMITTED: 05/27/09 SUBMITTED BY: JN DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:

01-JUN-2009
04:41 PM
Supreme Court Receipt for Doc

03-JUN-2009
04:35 PM
$Notice/Appeal Supreme Court
Entry:
ZACHARY COUGHLIN ESQ. ( FOR AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED MAY 13,
2009 )

04-JUN-2009
09:29 AM
**Payment Receipted
Entry:
001705
A Payment of -$34.00 was made on receipt DCDC237460.

08-JUN-2009
08:55 AM
Opposition to Mtn ... Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CORRECT PROPOSED DECREE - Transaction 818528 -
Approved By: MPURDY : 06-08-2009:09:24:39

08-JUN-2009
10:29 AM
**Supreme Court Appeal Bond
Entry: none.

08-JUN-2009
10:52 AM
$Def 1st Appearance - DV
Entry:
MOTION TO TREAT SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL OR PLED IN THE
ALTERNATIVE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AS A PETITION FOR WRIT OF
MANDAMUS ONLY AND NOT A NOTICE OF APPEAL

08-JUN-2009
10:57 AM
Mtn to Strike...
Entry: none.

08-JUN-2009
11:01 AM
Opposition to Mtn ... Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry: OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE

08-JUN-2009
11:06 AM
**Payment Receipted
Entry: A Payment of -$88.00 was made on receipt DCDC237754.

08-JUN-2009
11:53 AM
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
STRIKE PARTY SUBMITTING: ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ. DATE SUBMITTED: 06/08/09
SUBMITTED BY: MRYBKA DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:

08-JUN-2009
12:18 PM
Request for Submission
001706
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION TO STRIKE PARTY SUBMITTING: ZACH COUGHLIN,
ESQ. DATE SUBMITTED: 06/08/09 SUBMITTED BY: MRYBKA DATE RECEIVED JUDGE
OFFICE:

08-JUN-2009
03:45 PM
***Minutes
Entry: RE: 3 12 09 - Transaction 820893 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 06-08-2009:15:47:27

08-JUN-2009
04:16 PM
Request for Submission Ashley, Esq., Marc
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION TO CORRECT PROPOSED DECREE PARTY
SUBMITTING: MARC ASHLEY, ESQ. DATE SUBMITTED: 6/9/09 SUBMITTED BY:
ASIMPSON DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:

09-JUN-2009
02:59 PM
Reply... Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
REPLY ON MOTION TO STRIKE - Transaction 824177 - Approved By: MPURDY : 06-09-
2009:15:33:59

09-JUN-2009
02:59 PM
Entry:
DOCUMENT TITLE: MOTION TO STRIKE - Transaction 824177 - Approved By: MPURDY
: 06-09-2009:15:33:59 PARTY SUBMITTING: JOHN SPRINGGATE, ESQ. DATE
SUBMITTED: 6/9/09 SUBMITTED BY: ASIMPSON DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:

09-JUN-2009
02:59 PM
Opposition to Mtn ... Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE - Transaction 824177 - Approved By: MPURDY :
06-09-2009:15:33:59

10-JUN-2009
03:04 PM
***Minutes
Entry: re: 3 17 09 - Transaction 827393 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 06-10-2009:15:14:02

17-JUN-2009
04:23 PM
Affidavit of Resident Witness Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry: Transaction 842514 - Approved By: MPURDY : 06-17-2009:16:31:09

001707
19-JUN-2009
09:57 AM
Decree of Divorce

19-JUN-2009
10:02 AM
Entry: none.

19-JUN-2009
10:04 AM
Entry: none.

19-JUN-2009
10:23 AM
** Notes ...
Entry:
E-FILED DECREE OF DIVORCE; NOTIFIED JOHN SPRINGGATE'S OFFICE OF SAME
BY TELEPHONE

19-JUN-2009
11:51 AM
Decision With Hearing
Entry: none.

19-JUN-2009
11:52 AM
** Case Reopened
Entry: none.

22-JUN-2009
08:48 AM
Entry: none.

22-JUN-2009
02:12 PM
Notice of Entry of Decree Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE
OF DIVORCE - Transaction 851165 - Approved By: ASMITH : 06-22-2009:14:47:32

15-JUL-2009
02:34 PM
Ord Denying Motion
001708
Entry:
TO STRIKE IN PART; ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART - Transaction
899705 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 07-15-2009:14:37:24

15-JUL-2009
02:35 PM
Entry: none.

15-JUL-2009
02:36 PM
Entry: none.

15-JUL-2009
02:37 PM
** Case Closed
Entry: none.

20-JUL-2009
02:51 PM
Entry:
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART; ORDER
GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART - Transaction 909119 - Approved By: ASMITH
: 07-20-2009:15:10:12

22-JUL-2009
09:32 AM
Stipulation ... Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry: STIPULATION TO AMEND DECREE OF DIVORCE

23-JUL-2009
04:17 PM
Order ...
Entry:
TO AMEND DECREE OF DIVORCE - Transaction 920637 - Approved By: NOREVIEW :
07-23-2009:16:19:47

23-JUL-2009
04:23 PM
** Notes ...
Entry:
ORDER TO AMEND DECREE OF DIVORCE EFILED; COUNSEL TO RECEIVE
ELECTRONIC NOTIFICATION

24-JUL-2009
02:13 PM
001709
Entry: Transaction 922926 - Approved By: AZION : 07-24-2009:14:19:03

04-AUG-2009
03:02 PM
Mtn Ord to Show Cause Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: CONTEMPT - Transaction 945045 -
Approved By: ASMITH : 08-04-2009:15:22:54

28-SEP-2009
02:39 PM
Supreme Ct Ord Dismis Appeal
Entry:
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 53833 - Transaction 689 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 09-
28-2009:14:40:14

28-SEP-2009
02:41 PM
Proof of Electronic Service

01-OCT-2009
04:23 PM
Withdrawal of Counsel Ashley, Esq., Marc
Entry: none.

14-OCT-2009
11:54 AM
Withdrawal of Counsel Springgate, Esq., John P.
Entry:
JOHN P SPRINGGATE, ESQ/ASHWIN JOSHI - Transaction 1099490 - Approved By:
ASMITH : 10-14-2009:12:06:21

14-OCT-2009
12:15 PM

07-DEC-2009
02:27 PM
**Supreme Court Case No. ...

07-DEC-2009
02:58 PM
Supreme Court Order Denying
Entry:
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS; SUPREME COURT CASE
NO. 54844 - Transaction 1192001 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 12-07-2009:14:58:18
001710

07-DEC-2009
02:58 PM

08-DEC-2009
11:53 AM
Supreme Ct Accept - eFile Doc

08-DEC-2009
12:07 PM

28-DEC-2009
12:30 PM
Motion ... Coughlin, Esq., Zachary
Entry:
MOTION FOR RETURN OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND - Transaction 1230075 - Approved
By: AZION : 12-28-2009:12:33:01

28-DEC-2009
12:33 PM

30-DEC-2009
04:45 PM
Supreme Ct Not/Lieu/Remittitur
Entry:
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 54844 - Transaction 1235784 - Approved By: NOREVIEW
: 12-30-2009:16:46:19

30-DEC-2009
04:47 PM

12-JAN-2011
11:01 AM
Family Court Info Sheet

12-JAN-2011 Proof of Electronic Service
001711
11:05 AM

05-JUL-2011
12:15 PM
** Case Reopened
Entry: none.

05-JUL-2011
12:17 PM
Entry:
MOTION FOR RETURN OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND (NO PAPER ORDER PROVIDED) -
Transaction 2325502 - Approved By: MCHOLICO : 07-05-2011:12:28:59 PARTY
SUBMITTING: ZACH COUGHLIN DATE SUBMITTED: 7/5/11 SUBMITTED BY:
MCHOLICO DATE RECEIVED JUDGE OFFICE:

05-JUL-2011
12:29 PM

23-AUG-2011
11:59 AM
Order ...
Entry:
TO RETURN BOND - Transaction 2424815 - Approved By: NOREVIEW : 08-23-
2011:12:00:24

23-AUG-2011
11:59 AM
Entry: none.

23-AUG-2011
12:00 PM
** Case Closed
Entry: none.

23-AUG-2011
12:01 PM

30-AUG-2011
12:30 PM
**Trust Disbursement SITE DEFINED TRUST DEPOSIT,
001712
Entry: A Disbursement of $250.00 on Check Number 19067

31-AUG-2011
12:51 PM
** Notes ...
Entry:
4 CD'S BURNED FOR HEARINGS 03/12/09 & 03/17/09 REQUESTED BY DEBORAH
PRINGLE / PAUL ELCANO CALLED FOR PU - ME

001713
Close Print
amjur
Sent: Tue 3/10/09 10:26 AM
To: zcoughlin@washoelegalservices.org; dpringle@washoelegalservices.org
71 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation 300
American Jurisprudence, Second Edition
Database updated September 2008
State and Local Taxation
Laura Hunter Dietz, J.D., and Jane E. Lehman, J.D., of the National Legal Research Group, Inc.
Part Four. Exemptions from Taxation
XV. Persons, Property, and Organizations Exempt from Taxation
D. Eleemosynary, Educational, Religious, and Other Like Associations, Institutions, and Organizations
2. Character, Ownership, or Use of Property
Topic Summary Correlation Table References
300. Generally
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 241.1(3), 241.1(4)
A.L.R. Library
Property tax: exemption of property leased by and used for purposes of otherwise tax-exempt body, 55
A.L.R. 3d 430.
There are basically three types of charitable exemption schemes:
1. based solely on the ownership of the property;[FN1]
2. based solely on the use of the property;[FN2]
3. a combination of ownership and use, so that the property must both be owned by a charitable
organization and used for an exempt purpose.[FN3]
Thus, ordinarily, property belonging to an institution which has been granted tax exemption is not
exempt from taxation unless such property is used for the purposes for which that institution was
established.[FN4] If use is the test, ownership alone is not sufficient.[FN5]
When use alone is the test, the character of the owner may illuminate the purposes for which the
property is used and should not be excluded from consideration.[FN6] Under the use test, when an
owner derives no income or benefit from his property, but allows another to use it for a charitable
purpose, the property is exempt.[FN7]
When both ownership and use are required, although there is authority to the contrary,[FN8] the
same entity need not be the owner and user provided that a tax exempt entity owns the property and
another entity operates it for an exempt use.[FN9] However, a private owner is not exempt merely
because he leases his property to a non-profit entity for charitable use.[FN10] 001714
[FN1] Town of Morristown v. Woman's Club of Morristown, 124 N.J. 605, 592 A.2d 216
(1991) (for property owned by historical society).
[FN2] Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of State of Ala. v. Norred,
603 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1992); Connolly v. County of Orange, 1 Cal. 4th 1105, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
857, 824 P.2d 663, 72 Ed. Law Rep. 1089 (1992), as modified, (Mar. 26, 1992); West
Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper, 652 P.2d 564 (Colo. 1982); Highland Park Owners, Inc. v.
Tracy, 71 Ohio St. 3d 405, 644 N.E.2d 284 (1994) (Ohio has two statutes, with more
rigorous use restrictions when the property is not owned by a charity).
[FN3] Kunes v. Samaritan Health Service, 121 Ariz. 413, 590 P.2d 1359 (1979); United
Church of Christ v. Town of West Hartford, 206 Conn. 711, 539 A.2d 573 (1988); York Rite
Bodies of Freemasonry of Savannah v. Board of Equalization of Chatham County, 261 Ga.
558, 408 S.E.2d 699 (1991); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410, 849 P.2d 83 (1993); Chicago Patrolmen's
Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, 171 Ill. 2d 263, 215 Ill. Dec. 655, 664 N.E.2d 52 (1996);
Carroll Area Child Care Center, Inc. v. Carroll County Bd. of Review, 613 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa
2000); In re University of Kansas School of Medicine-Wichita Medical Practice Ass'n from a
Decision of Dist. Court of Shawnee County, Kansas, 266 Kan. 737, 973 P.2d 176 (1999);
Banahan v. Presbyterian Housing Corp., 553 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1977); City of Lewiston v.
Marcotte Congregate Housing, Inc., 673 A.2d 209 (Me. 1996); Supervisor of Assessments of
Baltimore County v. Keeler, 362 Md. 198, 764 A.2d 821 (2001); Ladies Literary Club v. City
of Grand Rapids, 409 Mich. 748, 298 N.W.2d 422 (1980); Hattiesburg Area Senior Services,
Inc. v. Lamar County, 633 So. 2d 440 (Miss. 1994); United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n of Greater
Kansas City v. Ross, 789 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1990); Pittman v. Sarpy County Bd. of
Equalization, 258 Neb. 390, 603 N.W.2d 447 (1999); Housing Partnership v. Town of
Rollinsford, 141 N.H. 239, 683 A.2d 189 (1996); Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millburn Tp., 95 N.J.
503, 472 A.2d 517, 42 A.L.R.4th 591 (1984) (for general charitable exemption); Hapletah v.
Assessor of Town of Fallsburg, 79 N.Y.2d 244, 582 N.Y.S.2d 54, 590 N.E.2d 1182 (1992);
Riverview Place, Inc. v. Cass County By and Through Cass County Bd. of Com'rs, 448
N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1989); True Christianity Evangelism v. Zaino, 91 Ohio St. 3d 117, 742
N.E.2d 638 (2001); Alpha Gamma Zeta House Ass'n v. Clay County Bd. of Equalization, 1998
SD 101, 583 N.W.2d 167 (S.D. 1998); Methodist Hospitals of Memphis v. Assessment
Appeals Com'n, 669 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. 1984); Twin Valley Community Services, Inc. v.
Town of Randolph, 756 A.2d 1233 (Vt. 2000); Wellsburg Unity Apartments, Inc. v. County
Com'n of Brooke County, 202 W. Va. 283, 503 S.E.2d 851 (1998); Deutsches Land, Inc. v.
City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999).
[FN4] McHenry v. Alford, 168 U.S. 651, 18 S. Ct. 242, 42 L. Ed. 614 (1898); People ex rel.
Nelson v. Rockford Masonic Temple Bldg. Ass'n, 348 Ill. 567, 181 N.E. 428, 83 A.L.R. 768
(1932); Salvation Army v. Town of Standish, 1998 ME 75, 709 A.2d 727 (Me. 1998); St.
James Educational Institute v. City of Salem, 153 Mass. 185, 26 N.E. 636 (1891); Ancient
and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry v. Board of County Com'rs, 122 Neb. 586, 241
N.W. 93, 81 A.L.R. 1166 (1932).
[FN5] Board of Directors of Chicago Theological Seminary v. People of State of Illinois ex rel.
Raymond, 188 U.S. 662, 23 S. Ct. 386, 47 L. Ed. 641 (1903); People ex rel. Goodman v.
University of Illinois Foundation, 388 Ill. 363, 58 N.E.2d 33, 157 A.L.R. 851 (1944); State v.
Ritschel, 220 Minn. 578, 20 N.W.2d 673, 168 A.L.R. 274 (1945); Riverview Place, Inc. v.
Cass County By and Through Cass County Bd. of Com'rs, 448 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1989);001715
Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999).
[FN6] West Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper, 652 P.2d 564 (Colo. 1982).
603 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1992).
[FN8] Immaculate Heart of Mary High School Inc. v. Anderson, 96 Idaho 226, 526 P.2d 831
(1974).
[FN9] Christ the Good Shepherd Lutheran Church v. Mathiesen, 81 Cal. App. 3d 355, 146
Cal. Rptr. 321 (1st Dist. 1978); Sisters of Good Shepherd of City of Washington, D.C. v.
District of Columbia, 746 A.2d 310 (D.C. 2000); In re University of Kansas School of
Medicine-Wichita Medical Practice Ass'n from a Decision of Dist. Court of Shawnee County,
Kansas, 266 Kan. 737, 973 P.2d 176 (1999); St. Joseph's Health Center Properties, Inc. v.
Srogi, 51 N.Y.2d 127, 432 N.Y.S.2d 865, 412 N.E.2d 921 (1980); Case W. Res. Univ. v.
Tracy, 84 Ohio St. 3d 316, 703 N.E.2d 1240, 131 Ed. Law Rep. 491 (1999) (by statute);
Twin Valley Community Services, Inc. v. Town of Randolph, 756 A.2d 1233 (Vt. 2000).
[FN10] Lincoln Street, Inc. v. Town of Springfield, 159 Vt. 181, 615 A.2d 1028 (1992).
Computer equipment that was owned by a credit corporation, leased to a nonprofit taxpayer,
and used for educational purposes was not exempt from property taxes. Fleet Credit Corp. v.
Frazier, 726 A.2d 452 (R.I. 1999).
2008 Thomson Reuters/West. Volumes 33-34B 2008 Thomson Reuters/RIA. No Claim to Orig. U.S.
Govt. Works. All rights reserved.
AMJUR STATELOCL 300
END OF DOCUMENT
84 C.J.S. Taxation 334
Corpus Juris Secundum
Database updated June 2008
Taxation
Francis C. Amendola, J.D., Elizabeth M. Bosek, J.D., John Bourdeau, J.D., Paul Coltoff, J.D., Nicole Fox,
J.D., Heidi J. Henle, J.D., John Kimpflen, J.D., Anne Knickerbocker, J.D., Sonja Larsen, J.D., Stephen
Lease, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D., Daniel O'Brien, J.D., Kevin Schroder, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D.
IV. Exemptions
C. Particular Exemptions
4. Charitable, Educational, and Religious Institutions
b. Charitable and Benevolent Institutions
(3) Use of Property
Topic Summary References
334. Generally
001716
West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 2337
Under constitutional or statutory provisions requiring, in various terms, charitable use of property in
order for it to be exempt, such use is a prerequisite to exemption. The dominant use of property is
controlling on the question of exemption.
Under a statute broadly exempting from taxation all property belonging to charitable or benevolent
institutions, such property is entitled to exemption regardless of the purposes for which it is used.[FN1]
Where, however, the constitution or statute in some form refers to charitable use of the property in the
grant of exemption, such use is a prerequisite to exemption from taxation.[FN2] The original purpose
will not control, nor does property need not be irrevocably committed to a particular exempt purpose to
qualify for an exemption;[FN3] it is the use of the property during the current tax year for which the
assessment is made which determines the right to exemption.[FN4] Where a corporation was chartered
for charitable or benevolent purposes, a general exemption applies only to property used for the
purpose for which it was created.[FN5]
Under laws exempting property used for charitable purposes, the use made of the property is the
sole test of exemption.[FN6] Where property is not used for such purposes, it will not be exempt
although intended for future use of a charitable character,[FN7] or owned by a charitable
institution.[FN8] Under constitutional or statutory provisions for exemption of property used exclusively
for charitable purposes, the test of whether property is so used is the use to which it is in fact
dedicated,[FN9] or the significance of the questionable activity compared to the total activity on the
property.[FN10] "Use" is a question of fact,[FN11] and must be made on a case by case basis.[FN12]
Under such a provision it must appear that the property is so held as to be dedicated to public, instead
of private, advantage or gain, and that it is devoted to the public use.[FN13] The determination that a
religious institution owns real property does not foreclose the possibility that the property is being used
exclusively for charitable purposes.[FN14]
Under constitutional or statutory provisions for exemption from taxation of property "used exclusively
for charitable purposes," the use to which property is put is the criterion by which to determine
whether it is exempt from taxation,[FN15] and any institution, whether charitable or noncharitable, may
receive the tax exemption if it uses the property exclusively for charitable purposes.[FN16] Where the
use of property is wholly for the promotion and advancement of learning, science, and the useful arts,
that use is deemed charitable.[FN17]
Under laws exempting property owned by charitable institutions and used for charitable purposes,
ownership is not the sole test of exemption,[FN18] but use is the dominant factor[FN19] or
criterion[FN20] on which exemption is based, and property held by such institutions is not exempt
unless used for charitable purposes.[FN21] In such case, it is the dominant,[FN22] or immediate and
primary[FN23] use which is controlling. So, the fact that a corporation performs many charitable
functions does not render its realty exempt where the dominant use thereof is noncharitable.[FN24]
Under statutes exempting from taxation real property of a corporation organized exclusively for
charitable or benevolent purposes and used exclusively for carrying out thereon one or more of such
purposes, the test of exemption is whether the property is used exclusively for carrying out thereon one
or more of the purposes of the institution's incorporation,[FN25] and in order to be exempt it is
essential that the property be in use[FN26] and be used for such purposes.[FN27]
Rental housing.
In some jurisdictions, the use of lands for private homes for individuals,[FN28] or for low-rent
housing of persons of limited income,[FN29] do not entitle the owner of the property to exemption from
the payment of real estate taxes, but in other jurisdictions housing authorities may be exempt as
charitable organizations.[FN30] The renting of property for commercial use or for the purposes of a
private dwelling is not a charitable use.[FN31]
Cases:
001717
To qualify for tax exemption under statute exempting land used for public, pious or charitable
purposes from property taxation, a property must be dedicated unconditionally to public use, the
primary use of the property must directly benefit an indefinite class of persons who are part of the
public, and must also confer a benefit on society as a result of the benefit conferred on the persons
directly served, and the property must be owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis. MacDonough-
Webster Lodge No. 26 v. Wells, 834 A.2d 25 (Vt. 2003).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] S.D.In re Dakota Wesleyan University, 48 S.D. 84, 202 N.W. 284 (1925).
A.L.R. Library
Tax exemption of property used by fraternal or benevolent association for clubhouse or
similar purposes, 39 A.L.R. 3d 640.
[FN2] Wis.Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583
(1999).
Actual use
N.C.Appeal of North Carolina Forestry Foundation, Inc., 35 N.C. App. 414, 242 S.E.2d 492
(1978), review allowed, 295 N.C. 260, 245 S.E.2d 778 (1978) and judgment aff'd, 296 N.C.
330, 250 S.E.2d 236 (1979).
Declaration of purpose
The use to which an institution's property is put, rather than the declaration of purpose
found in its charter or articles of incorporation, determines whether its property is exempt.
Ga.Camp v. Fulton County Medical Soc., 219 Ga. 602, 135 S.E.2d 277 (1964).
[FN3] UtahCorporation of Episcopal Church in Utah v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 919 P.2d 556
(Utah 1996).
[FN4] N.M.United Veterans Organization v. New Mexico Property Appraisal Dept., 84 N.M.
114, 500 P.2d 199 (Ct. App. 1972).
[FN5] N.Y.North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc. v. City of Rye, 48 N.Y.2d 135, 422
N.Y.S.2d 1, 397 N.E.2d 693 (1979).
[FN6] Ga.Thomas v. Northeast Georgia Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America, 241 Ga. 291,
244 S.E.2d 842 (1978).
Under construction
IowaSouth Iowa Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Board of Review of Cass County, 257 Iowa
1302, 136 N.W.2d 488 (1965).
Use for declared purpose of institution
S.D.South Dakota State Medical Ass'n v. Jones, 82 S.D. 374, 146 N.W.2d 725 (1966). 001718
[FN7] OhioZindorf v. Otterbein Press, 19 Ohio Op. 105, 6 Ohio Supp. 65, 1940 WL 316
(B.T.A. 1940), aff'd, 138 Ohio St. 287, 20 Ohio Op. 366, 34 N.E.2d 748 (1941).
A.L.R. Library
Prospective use for tax-exempt purposes as entitling property to tax exemption, 54 A.L.R. 3d
9.
[FN8] Tex.Baptist Memorials Geriatric Center v. Tom Green County Appraisal Dist, 851
S.W.2d 938 (Tex. App. Austin 1993), reh'g overruled, (May 19, 1993) and writ denied, (Nov.
3, 1993).
[FN9] Minn.Concordia College Corp. v. State, 265 Minn. 136, 120 N.W.2d 601 (1963).
(1999).
(1999).
[FN12] Colo.Board of Assessment Appeals v. AM/FM Intern., 940 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1997) ,
as modified on denial of reh'g, (July 28, 1997).
[FN13] S.D.Loyal Order of Moose Lodge No. 1137 v. Pennington County, 1997 SD 80, 566
N.W.2d 132 (S.D. 1997).
Essential government use test rejected
Vt.American Museum of Fly Fishing, Inc. v. Town of Manchester, 151 Vt. 103, 557 A.2d
900 (1989).
[FN14] OhioTrue Christianity Evangelism v. Tracy, 87 Ohio St. 3d 48, 716 N.E.2d 1154
(1999).
[FN15] Neb.Pittman v. Sarpy County Bd. of Equalization, 258 Neb. 390, 603 N.W.2d 447
(1999).
[FN16] OhioOlmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. v. Tracy, 77 Ohio St. 3d 393, 674 N.E.2d 690
(1997).
[FN17] OhioBattelle Memorial Institute v. Dunn, 148 Ohio St. 53, 35 Ohio Op. 9, 73 N.E.2d
88 (1947).
[FN18] Ind.Indianapolis Elks Bldg. Corp. v. State Bd. of Tax Com'rs, 145 Ind. App. 522,
251 N.E.2d 673, 39 A.L.R.3d 624 (Div. 2 1969).
001719
[FN19] Mo.Franciscan Tertiary Province of Missouri, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 566
S.W.2d 213 (Mo. 1978).
Purpose of use
S.D.South Dakota State Medical Ass'n v. Jones, 82 S.D. 374, 146 N.W.2d 725 (1966).
[FN20] UtahFriendship Manor Corp. v. Tax Commission, 26 Utah 2d 227, 487 P.2d 1272
(1971).
[FN21] Ill.North Shore Post No. 21 of Am. Legion v. Korzen, 38 Ill. 2d 231, 230 N.E.2d
833 (1967).
Seasonal use sufficient
Me.Green Acre Baha'I Institute v. Town of Eliot, 150 Me. 350, 110 A.2d 581 (1954).
(1999).
Substantial and primary use
N.M.United Veterans Organization v. New Mexico Property Appraisal Dept., 84 N.M. 114,
500 P.2d 199 (Ct. App. 1972).
[FN23] W.Va.Wellsburg Unity Apartments, Inc. v. County Com'n of Brooke County, 202 W.
Va. 283, 503 S.E.2d 851 (1998).
251 N.E.2d 673, 39 A.L.R.3d 624 (Div. 2 1969).
[FN25] N.Y.Wantagh-Levittown Community Ambulance Corps. v. Board of Assessors of
Nassau County, 56 Misc. 2d 545, 289 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Sup 1968).
[FN26] N.Y.Young Women's Christian Ass'n of City of New York v. City of New York, 217
A.D. 406, 216 N.Y.S. 248 (1st Dep't 1926), aff'd, 245 N.Y. 562, 157 N.E. 858 (1927).
[FN27] N.D.Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society v. Board of County Com'rs,
Ramsey County, 219 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1974).
[FN28] OhioGoldman v. Friars Club, Inc., 158 Ohio St. 185, 48 Ohio Op. 147, 107 N.E.2d
518 (1952).
(1999).
[FN30] N.H.Housing Partnership v. Town of Rollinsford, 141 N.H. 239, 683 A.2d 189
(1996).
001720
(1971).
2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
CJS TAXATION 334
END OF DOCUMENT71 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation 280
B. Public Bodies and Property
2. Character and Purpose of Use
280. Requisite that property be devoted to public use
West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 213, 217
Forms
AnswerDefenseProperty owned by public body not devoted to public use. 22B Am. Jur. Pleading
and Practice Forms, State and Local Taxation 105.
AnswerDefenseProperty owned by private corporation but devoted to public use not exempt. 22B
Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, State and Local Taxation 106.
In many jurisdictions, statutory or constitutional provisions are in force exempting from taxation
property held by public bodies and devoted to public use.[FN1] In these jurisdictions, while there is
apparent authority otherwise,[FN2] the question of the exemption of property ordinarily depends upon
the use to which the property is put, rather than upon its ownership,[FN3] and property of a
municipality which is held for purely private purposes and used for profit and gain may be taxed in the
same manner as the property of individuals or private corporations.[FN4] Of course, public property is
exempt from taxation if used for a predominantly public purpose and only incidentally for a private
purpose.[FN5]
Under some authority, the property must be devoted to a governmental function.[FN6] When a state
agency acts outside its authorized governmental purposes, then its immunity from taxation is not
automatic.[FN7] Thus, where a city owned property which it leased to the United States Postal Service,
the use was not exempt as the delivery of mail laid outside the obligations of the city.[FN8]
Property owned by a municipality but devoted to a use which is entirely proprietary in its nature, or
leased to private individuals, is not public property devoted exclusively to a public purpose and may not
be exempted from taxation.[FN9] Whenever public property is used by a private citizen for a private
purpose that use prevents exemption, unless the use is incidental and de minimis.[FN10] However,
when the lease is determined to serve a public purpose, the property may remain exempt. Use of
exempt property by a private party under a lease agreement does not defeat the exemption if the
001721
private party's use is the public use underlying the exemption.[FN11] Thus property leased to a private
venture to establish an airport,[FN12] to provide airport parking,[FN13] to provide traveler services in
an airport,[FN14] to provide parking at a sports and entertainment complex,[FN15] for electrical
generation,[FN16] and a lease of public property pursuant to an industrial bond act[FN17] have all
been held exempt because a public purpose was served thereby.
Practice Guide: Where public property is leased to a private party for a profit making
enterprise, the test of whether the property should be taxable turns not on who the legal
owner is, but on who has the most significant incidents of legal ownership.[FN18]
Although public use does not necessarily require public access,[FN19] it is frequently observed that
a use which excludes the general public does not serve a public purpose.[FN20] This is particularly so
when use is restricted to a limited group of members.[FN21] Thus a parking lot providing free parking
only to the agency's employees did not constitute a public use.[FN22]
Cases:
City-owned ice skating rink did not qualify for tax exemption under statute exempting from taxation
any public property used exclusively for a public purpose, where ice rink was leased to ice facilities
development and management firm, which hoped to profit from its operation of ice rink, firm made
more than 57% of its income from operation of rink by private rental of rink, city agreed that
employees at rink would not be treated as public employees while lease was in effect, and under lease
firm was entitled to any tax rebates. R.C. 5709.08. Parma Hts. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St. 3d 463, 2005-
Ohio-2818, 828 N.E.2d 998 (2005).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] Slay v. Louisiana Energy and Power Authority, 473 So. 2d 51 (La. 1985); Columbus
City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 90 Ohio St. 3d 496, 739 N.E.2d 783 (2001).
[FN2] Town of Warrenton v. Warren County, 215 N.C. 342, 2 S.E.2d 463 (1939).
[FN3] Crittenden Hosp. Ass'n v. Board of Equalization of Crittenden County, 330 Ark. 767,
958 S.W.2d 512 (1997); Sachem's Head Ass'n v. Board of Tax Review of Town of Guilford,
190 Conn. 627, 461 A.2d 995 (1983); Chadwick v. City of Crawfordsville, 216 Ind. 399, 24
N.E.2d 937, 129 A.L.R. 469 (1940); City of Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County,
490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992); Application of City of Wichita, 255 Kan. 838, 877 P.2d 437
(1994); Howard D. Johnson Co. v. King, 351 A.2d 524 (Me. 1976); Metropolitan Sports
Facilities Com'n v. County of Hennepin, 561 N.W.2d 513 (Minn. 1997); City of Harrisburg v.
School Dist. of City of Harrisburg, 551 Pa. 295, 710 A.2d 49, 126 Ed. Law Rep. 252 (1998);
Quirk v. Campbell, 302 S.C. 148, 394 S.E.2d 320 (1990); International Water Co. v. Town of
Holland, 161 Vt. 584, 641 A.2d 347 (1993); State Bd. of Equalization v. City of Lander, 882
P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1994).
[FN4] Robinson v. Indiana & Arkansas Lumber & Mfg. Co., 128 Ark. 550, 194 S.W. 870, 3
A.L.R. 1426 (1917); Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 642 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994);
Application of City of Wichita, 255 Kan. 838, 877 P.2d 437 (1994); Interwest Aviation v.
County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987).
[FN5] Dade County v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973); City of
001722
Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County, 490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992); Whitehouse v.
Tracy, 72 Ohio St. 3d 178, 648 N.E.2d 503 (1995); International Water Co. v. Town of
P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1994).
[FN6] City of Providence v. Killoran, 447 A.2d 369 (R.I. 1982) (does not include a recreation
area).
[FN7] Delaware County Solid Waste Authority v. Berks County Bd. of Assessment Appeals,
534 Pa. 81, 626 A.2d 528 (1993).
[FN8] City of Oskaloosa v. Board of Review of City of Oskaloosa, 490 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa
1992).
958 S.W.2d 512 (1997); Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 642 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994);
Walden v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 375 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1979) (traveler
services at airport); Tri-County Public Airport Authority v. Board of County Com'rs of Morris
County, 245 Kan. 301, 777 P.2d 843 (1989); Anoka County v. City of St. Paul, 194 Minn.
554, 261 N.W. 588, 99 A.L.R. 1137 (1935); Interwest Aviation v. County Bd. of Equalization
of Salt Lake County, 743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987).
[FN10] Whitehouse v. Tracy, 72 Ohio St. 3d 178, 648 N.E.2d 503 (1995).
[FN11] Howard D. Johnson Co. v. King, 351 A.2d 524 (Me. 1976).
Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County, 490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992) (including on-
site living quarters for airport manager).
[FN13] Matter of Fasi, 63 Haw. 624, 634 P.2d 98 (1981).
[FN14] Charleston County Aviation Authority v. Wasson, 277 S.C. 480, 289 S.E.2d 416
(1982).
[FN15] Metropolitan Sports Facilities Com'n v. County of Hennepin, 561 N.W.2d 513 (Minn.
1997).
[FN16] Taylor v. Davenport, 281 S.C. 497, 316 S.E.2d 389 (1984).
[FN17] Quirk v. Campbell, 302 S.C. 148, 394 S.E.2d 320 (1990).
[FN18] Interwest Aviation v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 743 P.2d 1222
(Utah 1987). 001723
[FN19] City of Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County, 490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992).
[FN20] City of Fayetteville v. Phillips, 320 Ark. 540, 899 S.W.2d 57, 100 Ed. Law Rep. 1185
(1995).
[FN21] Holiday Island Suburban Imp. Dist. No. 1 of Carroll County v. Williams, 295 Ark. 442,
749 S.W.2d 314 (1988) (use restricted to property owners in district); Sachem's Head Ass'n
v. Board of Tax Review of Town of Guilford, 190 Conn. 627, 461 A.2d 995 (1983)
(recreational area).
[FN22] State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Kinney, 68 Ohio St. 2d 195, 22 Ohio Op. 3d 434,
429 N.E.2d 1069, 1 Ed. Law Rep. 1265 (1981).
AMJUR STATELOCL 280
END OF DOCUMENT
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71 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation 300
D. Eleemosynary, Educational, Religious, and Other Like Associations, Institutions, and Organizations
2. Character, Ownership, or Use of Property
300. Generally
West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 241.1(3), 241.1(4)
A.L.R. Library
Property tax: exemption of property leased by and used for purposes of otherwise tax-exempt body, 55
A.L.R. 3d 430.
There are basically three types of charitable exemption schemes:
1. based solely on the ownership of the property;[FN1]
2. based solely on the use of the property;[FN2]
3. a combination of ownership and use, so that the property must both be owned by a charitable
organization and used for an exempt purpose.[FN3]
Thus, ordinarily, property belonging to an institution which has been granted tax exemption is not
exempt from taxation unless such property is used for the purposes for which that institution was
established.[FN4] If use is the test, ownership alone is not sufficient.[FN5]
When use alone is the test, the character of the owner may illuminate the purposes for which the
property is used and should not be excluded from consideration.[FN6] Under the use test, when an
owner derives no income or benefit from his property, but allows another to use it for a charitable
purpose, the property is exempt.[FN7]
When both ownership and use are required, although there is authority to the contrary,[FN8] the
same entity need not be the owner and user provided that a tax exempt entity owns the property and
another entity operates it for an exempt use.[FN9] However, a private owner is not exempt merely
because he leases his property to a non-profit entity for charitable use.[FN10] 001725
[FN1] Town of Morristown v. Woman's Club of Morristown, 124 N.J. 605, 592 A.2d 216
(1991) (for property owned by historical society).
603 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1992); Connolly v. County of Orange, 1 Cal. 4th 1105, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
857, 824 P.2d 663, 72 Ed. Law Rep. 1089 (1992), as modified, (Mar. 26, 1992); West
Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper, 652 P.2d 564 (Colo. 1982); Highland Park Owners, Inc. v.
Tracy, 71 Ohio St. 3d 405, 644 N.E.2d 284 (1994) (Ohio has two statutes, with more
rigorous use restrictions when the property is not owned by a charity).
[FN3] Kunes v. Samaritan Health Service, 121 Ariz. 413, 590 P.2d 1359 (1979); United
Church of Christ v. Town of West Hartford, 206 Conn. 711, 539 A.2d 573 (1988); York Rite
Bodies of Freemasonry of Savannah v. Board of Equalization of Chatham County, 261 Ga.
558, 408 S.E.2d 699 (1991); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410, 849 P.2d 83 (1993); Chicago Patrolmen's
Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, 171 Ill. 2d 263, 215 Ill. Dec. 655, 664 N.E.2d 52 (1996);
Carroll Area Child Care Center, Inc. v. Carroll County Bd. of Review, 613 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa
2000); In re University of Kansas School of Medicine-Wichita Medical Practice Ass'n from a
Decision of Dist. Court of Shawnee County, Kansas, 266 Kan. 737, 973 P.2d 176 (1999);
Banahan v. Presbyterian Housing Corp., 553 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1977); City of Lewiston v.
Marcotte Congregate Housing, Inc., 673 A.2d 209 (Me. 1996); Supervisor of Assessments of
Baltimore County v. Keeler, 362 Md. 198, 764 A.2d 821 (2001); Ladies Literary Club v. City
of Grand Rapids, 409 Mich. 748, 298 N.W.2d 422 (1980); Hattiesburg Area Senior Services,
Inc. v. Lamar County, 633 So. 2d 440 (Miss. 1994); United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n of Greater
Kansas City v. Ross, 789 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1990); Pittman v. Sarpy County Bd. of
Equalization, 258 Neb. 390, 603 N.W.2d 447 (1999); Housing Partnership v. Town of
Rollinsford, 141 N.H. 239, 683 A.2d 189 (1996); Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millburn Tp., 95 N.J.
503, 472 A.2d 517, 42 A.L.R.4th 591 (1984) (for general charitable exemption); Hapletah v.
Assessor of Town of Fallsburg, 79 N.Y.2d 244, 582 N.Y.S.2d 54, 590 N.E.2d 1182 (1992);
Riverview Place, Inc. v. Cass County By and Through Cass County Bd. of Com'rs, 448
N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1989); True Christianity Evangelism v. Zaino, 91 Ohio St. 3d 117, 742
N.E.2d 638 (2001); Alpha Gamma Zeta House Ass'n v. Clay County Bd. of Equalization, 1998
SD 101, 583 N.W.2d 167 (S.D. 1998); Methodist Hospitals of Memphis v. Assessment
Appeals Com'n, 669 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. 1984); Twin Valley Community Services, Inc. v.
Town of Randolph, 756 A.2d 1233 (Vt. 2000); Wellsburg Unity Apartments, Inc. v. County
Com'n of Brooke County, 202 W. Va. 283, 503 S.E.2d 851 (1998); Deutsches Land, Inc. v.
City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999).
[FN4] McHenry v. Alford, 168 U.S. 651, 18 S. Ct. 242, 42 L. Ed. 614 (1898); People ex rel.
Nelson v. Rockford Masonic Temple Bldg. Ass'n, 348 Ill. 567, 181 N.E. 428, 83 A.L.R. 768
(1932); Salvation Army v. Town of Standish, 1998 ME 75, 709 A.2d 727 (Me. 1998); St.
James Educational Institute v. City of Salem, 153 Mass. 185, 26 N.E. 636 (1891); Ancient
and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry v. Board of County Com'rs, 122 Neb. 586, 241
N.W. 93, 81 A.L.R. 1166 (1932).
[FN5] Board of Directors of Chicago Theological Seminary v. People of State of Illinois ex rel.
Raymond, 188 U.S. 662, 23 S. Ct. 386, 47 L. Ed. 641 (1903); People ex rel. Goodman v.
University of Illinois Foundation, 388 Ill. 363, 58 N.E.2d 33, 157 A.L.R. 851 (1944); State v.
Ritschel, 220 Minn. 578, 20 N.W.2d 673, 168 A.L.R. 274 (1945); Riverview Place, Inc. v.
Cass County By and Through Cass County Bd. of Com'rs, 448 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1989);001726
Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999).
[FN6] West Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper, 652 P.2d 564 (Colo. 1982).
603 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1992).
[FN8] Immaculate Heart of Mary High School Inc. v. Anderson, 96 Idaho 226, 526 P.2d 831
(1974).
[FN9] Christ the Good Shepherd Lutheran Church v. Mathiesen, 81 Cal. App. 3d 355, 146
Cal. Rptr. 321 (1st Dist. 1978); Sisters of Good Shepherd of City of Washington, D.C. v.
District of Columbia, 746 A.2d 310 (D.C. 2000); In re University of Kansas School of
Medicine-Wichita Medical Practice Ass'n from a Decision of Dist. Court of Shawnee County,
Kansas, 266 Kan. 737, 973 P.2d 176 (1999); St. Joseph's Health Center Properties, Inc. v.
Srogi, 51 N.Y.2d 127, 432 N.Y.S.2d 865, 412 N.E.2d 921 (1980); Case W. Res. Univ. v.
Tracy, 84 Ohio St. 3d 316, 703 N.E.2d 1240, 131 Ed. Law Rep. 491 (1999) (by statute);
Twin Valley Community Services, Inc. v. Town of Randolph, 756 A.2d 1233 (Vt. 2000).
[FN10] Lincoln Street, Inc. v. Town of Springfield, 159 Vt. 181, 615 A.2d 1028 (1992).
Computer equipment that was owned by a credit corporation, leased to a nonprofit taxpayer,
and used for educational purposes was not exempt from property taxes. Fleet Credit Corp. v.
Frazier, 726 A.2d 452 (R.I. 1999).
AMJUR STATELOCL 300
END OF DOCUMENT
84 C.J.S. Taxation 334
Corpus Juris Secundum
Database updated June 2008
Taxation
Francis C. Amendola, J.D., Elizabeth M. Bosek, J.D., John Bourdeau, J.D., Paul Coltoff, J.D., Nicole Fox,
J.D., Heidi J. Henle, J.D., John Kimpflen, J.D., Anne Knickerbocker, J.D., Sonja Larsen, J.D., Stephen
Lease, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D., Daniel O'Brien, J.D., Kevin Schroder, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D.
IV. Exemptions
C. Particular Exemptions
4. Charitable, Educational, and Religious Institutions
b. Charitable and Benevolent Institutions
(3) Use of Property
Topic Summary References
334. Generally
001727
Under constitutional or statutory provisions requiring, in various terms, charitable use of property in
order for it to be exempt, such use is a prerequisite to exemption. The dominant use of property is
controlling on the question of exemption.
Under a statute broadly exempting from taxation all property belonging to charitable or benevolent
institutions, such property is entitled to exemption regardless of the purposes for which it is used.[FN1]
Where, however, the constitution or statute in some form refers to charitable use of the property in the
grant of exemption, such use is a prerequisite to exemption from taxation.[FN2] The original purpose
will not control, nor does property need not be irrevocably committed to a particular exempt purpose to
qualify for an exemption;[FN3] it is the use of the property during the current tax year for which the
assessment is made which determines the right to exemption.[FN4] Where a corporation was chartered
for charitable or benevolent purposes, a general exemption applies only to property used for the
purpose for which it was created.[FN5]
Under laws exempting property used for charitable purposes, the use made of the property is the
sole test of exemption.[FN6] Where property is not used for such purposes, it will not be exempt
although intended for future use of a charitable character,[FN7] or owned by a charitable
institution.[FN8] Under constitutional or statutory provisions for exemption of property used exclusively
for charitable purposes, the test of whether property is so used is the use to which it is in fact
dedicated,[FN9] or the significance of the questionable activity compared to the total activity on the
property.[FN10] "Use" is a question of fact,[FN11] and must be made on a case by case basis.[FN12]
Under such a provision it must appear that the property is so held as to be dedicated to public, instead
of private, advantage or gain, and that it is devoted to the public use.[FN13] The determination that a
religious institution owns real property does not foreclose the possibility that the property is being used
exclusively for charitable purposes.[FN14]
Under constitutional or statutory provisions for exemption from taxation of property "used exclusively
for charitable purposes," the use to which property is put is the criterion by which to determine
whether it is exempt from taxation,[FN15] and any institution, whether charitable or noncharitable, may
receive the tax exemption if it uses the property exclusively for charitable purposes.[FN16] Where the
use of property is wholly for the promotion and advancement of learning, science, and the useful arts,
that use is deemed charitable.[FN17]
Under laws exempting property owned by charitable institutions and used for charitable purposes,
ownership is not the sole test of exemption,[FN18] but use is the dominant factor[FN19] or
criterion[FN20] on which exemption is based, and property held by such institutions is not exempt
unless used for charitable purposes.[FN21] In such case, it is the dominant,[FN22] or immediate and
primary[FN23] use which is controlling. So, the fact that a corporation performs many charitable
functions does not render its realty exempt where the dominant use thereof is noncharitable.[FN24]
Under statutes exempting from taxation real property of a corporation organized exclusively for
charitable or benevolent purposes and used exclusively for carrying out thereon one or more of such
purposes, the test of exemption is whether the property is used exclusively for carrying out thereon one
or more of the purposes of the institution's incorporation,[FN25] and in order to be exempt it is
essential that the property be in use[FN26] and be used for such purposes.[FN27]
Rental housing.
In some jurisdictions, the use of lands for private homes for individuals,[FN28] or for low-rent
housing of persons of limited income,[FN29] do not entitle the owner of the property to exemption from
the payment of real estate taxes, but in other jurisdictions housing authorities may be exempt as
charitable organizations.[FN30] The renting of property for commercial use or for the purposes of a
private dwelling is not a charitable use.[FN31]
Cases:
001728
To qualify for tax exemption under statute exempting land used for public, pious or charitable
purposes from property taxation, a property must be dedicated unconditionally to public use, the
primary use of the property must directly benefit an indefinite class of persons who are part of the
public, and must also confer a benefit on society as a result of the benefit conferred on the persons
directly served, and the property must be owned and operated on a not-for-profit basis. MacDonough-
Webster Lodge No. 26 v. Wells, 834 A.2d 25 (Vt. 2003).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] S.D.In re Dakota Wesleyan University, 48 S.D. 84, 202 N.W. 284 (1925).
A.L.R. Library
Tax exemption of property used by fraternal or benevolent association for clubhouse or
similar purposes, 39 A.L.R. 3d 640.
(1999).
Actual use
N.C.Appeal of North Carolina Forestry Foundation, Inc., 35 N.C. App. 414, 242 S.E.2d 492
(1978), review allowed, 295 N.C. 260, 245 S.E.2d 778 (1978) and judgment aff'd, 296 N.C.
330, 250 S.E.2d 236 (1979).
Declaration of purpose
The use to which an institution's property is put, rather than the declaration of purpose
found in its charter or articles of incorporation, determines whether its property is exempt.
Ga.Camp v. Fulton County Medical Soc., 219 Ga. 602, 135 S.E.2d 277 (1964).
[FN3] UtahCorporation of Episcopal Church in Utah v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 919 P.2d 556
(Utah 1996).
[FN4] N.M.United Veterans Organization v. New Mexico Property Appraisal Dept., 84 N.M.
114, 500 P.2d 199 (Ct. App. 1972).
[FN5] N.Y.North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc. v. City of Rye, 48 N.Y.2d 135, 422
N.Y.S.2d 1, 397 N.E.2d 693 (1979).
[FN6] Ga.Thomas v. Northeast Georgia Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America, 241 Ga. 291,
244 S.E.2d 842 (1978).
Under construction
IowaSouth Iowa Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Board of Review of Cass County, 257 Iowa
1302, 136 N.W.2d 488 (1965).
Use for declared purpose of institution
S.D.South Dakota State Medical Ass'n v. Jones, 82 S.D. 374, 146 N.W.2d 725 (1966). 001729
[FN7] OhioZindorf v. Otterbein Press, 19 Ohio Op. 105, 6 Ohio Supp. 65, 1940 WL 316
(B.T.A. 1940), aff'd, 138 Ohio St. 287, 20 Ohio Op. 366, 34 N.E.2d 748 (1941).
A.L.R. Library
Prospective use for tax-exempt purposes as entitling property to tax exemption, 54 A.L.R. 3d
9.
[FN8] Tex.Baptist Memorials Geriatric Center v. Tom Green County Appraisal Dist, 851
S.W.2d 938 (Tex. App. Austin 1993), reh'g overruled, (May 19, 1993) and writ denied, (Nov.
3, 1993).
[FN9] Minn.Concordia College Corp. v. State, 265 Minn. 136, 120 N.W.2d 601 (1963).
(1999).
(1999).
[FN12] Colo.Board of Assessment Appeals v. AM/FM Intern., 940 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1997) ,
as modified on denial of reh'g, (July 28, 1997).
[FN13] S.D.Loyal Order of Moose Lodge No. 1137 v. Pennington County, 1997 SD 80, 566
N.W.2d 132 (S.D. 1997).
Essential government use test rejected
Vt.American Museum of Fly Fishing, Inc. v. Town of Manchester, 151 Vt. 103, 557 A.2d
900 (1989).
[FN14] OhioTrue Christianity Evangelism v. Tracy, 87 Ohio St. 3d 48, 716 N.E.2d 1154
(1999).
(1999).
[FN16] OhioOlmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. v. Tracy, 77 Ohio St. 3d 393, 674 N.E.2d 690
(1997).
[FN17] OhioBattelle Memorial Institute v. Dunn, 148 Ohio St. 53, 35 Ohio Op. 9, 73 N.E.2d
88 (1947).
251 N.E.2d 673, 39 A.L.R.3d 624 (Div. 2 1969).
001730
[FN19] Mo.Franciscan Tertiary Province of Missouri, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 566
S.W.2d 213 (Mo. 1978).
Purpose of use
S.D.South Dakota State Medical Ass'n v. Jones, 82 S.D. 374, 146 N.W.2d 725 (1966).
(1971).
[FN21] Ill.North Shore Post No. 21 of Am. Legion v. Korzen, 38 Ill. 2d 231, 230 N.E.2d
833 (1967).
Seasonal use sufficient
Me.Green Acre Baha'I Institute v. Town of Eliot, 150 Me. 350, 110 A.2d 581 (1954).
(1999).
Substantial and primary use
N.M.United Veterans Organization v. New Mexico Property Appraisal Dept., 84 N.M. 114,
500 P.2d 199 (Ct. App. 1972).
[FN23] W.Va.Wellsburg Unity Apartments, Inc. v. County Com'n of Brooke County, 202 W.
Va. 283, 503 S.E.2d 851 (1998).
251 N.E.2d 673, 39 A.L.R.3d 624 (Div. 2 1969).
[FN25] N.Y.Wantagh-Levittown Community Ambulance Corps. v. Board of Assessors of
Nassau County, 56 Misc. 2d 545, 289 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Sup 1968).
[FN26] N.Y.Young Women's Christian Ass'n of City of New York v. City of New York, 217
A.D. 406, 216 N.Y.S. 248 (1st Dep't 1926), aff'd, 245 N.Y. 562, 157 N.E. 858 (1927).
[FN27] N.D.Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society v. Board of County Com'rs,
Ramsey County, 219 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1974).
[FN28] OhioGoldman v. Friars Club, Inc., 158 Ohio St. 185, 48 Ohio Op. 147, 107 N.E.2d
518 (1952).
(1999).
[FN30] N.H.Housing Partnership v. Town of Rollinsford, 141 N.H. 239, 683 A.2d 189
(1996).
001731
(1971).
CJS TAXATION 334
END OF DOCUMENT71 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation 280
B. Public Bodies and Property
2. Character and Purpose of Use
280. Requisite that property be devoted to public use
West's Key Number Digest, Taxation 213, 217
Forms
AnswerDefenseProperty owned by public body not devoted to public use. 22B Am. Jur. Pleading
and Practice Forms, State and Local Taxation 105.
AnswerDefenseProperty owned by private corporation but devoted to public use not exempt. 22B
Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, State and Local Taxation 106.
In many jurisdictions, statutory or constitutional provisions are in force exempting from taxation
property held by public bodies and devoted to public use.[FN1] In these jurisdictions, while there is
apparent authority otherwise,[FN2] the question of the exemption of property ordinarily depends upon
the use to which the property is put, rather than upon its ownership,[FN3] and property of a
municipality which is held for purely private purposes and used for profit and gain may be taxed in the
same manner as the property of individuals or private corporations.[FN4] Of course, public property is
exempt from taxation if used for a predominantly public purpose and only incidentally for a private
purpose.[FN5]
Under some authority, the property must be devoted to a governmental function.[FN6] When a state
agency acts outside its authorized governmental purposes, then its immunity from taxation is not
automatic.[FN7] Thus, where a city owned property which it leased to the United States Postal Service,
the use was not exempt as the delivery of mail laid outside the obligations of the city.[FN8]
Property owned by a municipality but devoted to a use which is entirely proprietary in its nature, or
leased to private individuals, is not public property devoted exclusively to a public purpose and may not
be exempted from taxation.[FN9] Whenever public property is used by a private citizen for a private
purpose that use prevents exemption, unless the use is incidental and de minimis.[FN10] However,
when the lease is determined to serve a public purpose, the property may remain exempt. Use of
exempt property by a private party under a lease agreement does not defeat the exemption if the
001732
private party's use is the public use underlying the exemption.[FN11] Thus property leased to a private
venture to establish an airport,[FN12] to provide airport parking,[FN13] to provide traveler services in
an airport,[FN14] to provide parking at a sports and entertainment complex,[FN15] for electrical
generation,[FN16] and a lease of public property pursuant to an industrial bond act[FN17] have all
been held exempt because a public purpose was served thereby.
Practice Guide: Where public property is leased to a private party for a profit making
enterprise, the test of whether the property should be taxable turns not on who the legal
owner is, but on who has the most significant incidents of legal ownership.[FN18]
Although public use does not necessarily require public access,[FN19] it is frequently observed that
a use which excludes the general public does not serve a public purpose.[FN20] This is particularly so
when use is restricted to a limited group of members.[FN21] Thus a parking lot providing free parking
only to the agency's employees did not constitute a public use.[FN22]
Cases:
City-owned ice skating rink did not qualify for tax exemption under statute exempting from taxation
any public property used exclusively for a public purpose, where ice rink was leased to ice facilities
development and management firm, which hoped to profit from its operation of ice rink, firm made
more than 57% of its income from operation of rink by private rental of rink, city agreed that
employees at rink would not be treated as public employees while lease was in effect, and under lease
firm was entitled to any tax rebates. R.C. 5709.08. Parma Hts. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St. 3d 463, 2005-
Ohio-2818, 828 N.E.2d 998 (2005).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[FN1] Slay v. Louisiana Energy and Power Authority, 473 So. 2d 51 (La. 1985); Columbus
City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 90 Ohio St. 3d 496, 739 N.E.2d 783 (2001).
[FN2] Town of Warrenton v. Warren County, 215 N.C. 342, 2 S.E.2d 463 (1939).
958 S.W.2d 512 (1997); Sachem's Head Ass'n v. Board of Tax Review of Town of Guilford,
190 Conn. 627, 461 A.2d 995 (1983); Chadwick v. City of Crawfordsville, 216 Ind. 399, 24
N.E.2d 937, 129 A.L.R. 469 (1940); City of Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County,
490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992); Application of City of Wichita, 255 Kan. 838, 877 P.2d 437
(1994); Howard D. Johnson Co. v. King, 351 A.2d 524 (Me. 1976); Metropolitan Sports
Facilities Com'n v. County of Hennepin, 561 N.W.2d 513 (Minn. 1997); City of Harrisburg v.
School Dist. of City of Harrisburg, 551 Pa. 295, 710 A.2d 49, 126 Ed. Law Rep. 252 (1998);
Quirk v. Campbell, 302 S.C. 148, 394 S.E.2d 320 (1990); International Water Co. v. Town of
P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1994).
[FN4] Robinson v. Indiana & Arkansas Lumber & Mfg. Co., 128 Ark. 550, 194 S.W. 870, 3
A.L.R. 1426 (1917); Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 642 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994);
Application of City of Wichita, 255 Kan. 838, 877 P.2d 437 (1994); Interwest Aviation v.
County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987).
001733
Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County, 490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992); Whitehouse v.
Tracy, 72 Ohio St. 3d 178, 648 N.E.2d 503 (1995); International Water Co. v. Town of
P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1994).
[FN6] City of Providence v. Killoran, 447 A.2d 369 (R.I. 1982) (does not include a recreation
area).
[FN7] Delaware County Solid Waste Authority v. Berks County Bd. of Assessment Appeals,
534 Pa. 81, 626 A.2d 528 (1993).
[FN8] City of Oskaloosa v. Board of Review of City of Oskaloosa, 490 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa
1992).
958 S.W.2d 512 (1997); Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 642 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994);
Walden v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 375 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1979) (traveler
services at airport); Tri-County Public Airport Authority v. Board of County Com'rs of Morris
County, 245 Kan. 301, 777 P.2d 843 (1989); Anoka County v. City of St. Paul, 194 Minn.
554, 261 N.W. 588, 99 A.L.R. 1137 (1935); Interwest Aviation v. County Bd. of Equalization
of Salt Lake County, 743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987).
[FN10] Whitehouse v. Tracy, 72 Ohio St. 3d 178, 648 N.E.2d 503 (1995).
[FN11] Howard D. Johnson Co. v. King, 351 A.2d 524 (Me. 1976).
Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County, 490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992) (including on-
site living quarters for airport manager).
[FN13] Matter of Fasi, 63 Haw. 624, 634 P.2d 98 (1981).
[FN14] Charleston County Aviation Authority v. Wasson, 277 S.C. 480, 289 S.E.2d 416
(1982).
[FN15] Metropolitan Sports Facilities Com'n v. County of Hennepin, 561 N.W.2d 513 (Minn.
1997).
[FN16] Taylor v. Davenport, 281 S.C. 497, 316 S.E.2d 389 (1984).
[FN17] Quirk v. Campbell, 302 S.C. 148, 394 S.E.2d 320 (1990).
[FN18] Interwest Aviation v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 743 P.2d 1222
(Utah 1987). 001734
[FN19] City of Osceola v. Board of Review of Clarke County, 490 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1992).
[FN20] City of Fayetteville v. Phillips, 320 Ark. 540, 899 S.W.2d 57, 100 Ed. Law Rep. 1185
(1995).
[FN21] Holiday Island Suburban Imp. Dist. No. 1 of Carroll County v. Williams, 295 Ark. 442,
749 S.W.2d 314 (1988) (use restricted to property owners in district); Sachem's Head Ass'n
v. Board of Tax Review of Town of Guilford, 190 Conn. 627, 461 A.2d 995 (1983)
(recreational area).
[FN22] State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Kinney, 68 Ohio St. 2d 195, 22 Ohio Op. 3d 434,
429 N.E.2d 1069, 1 Ed. Law Rep. 1265 (1981).
AMJUR STATELOCL 280
END OF DOCUMENT
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55 A.L.R.3d 430 (Originally published in 1974)
American Law Reports
ALR3d
The ALR databases are made current by the weekly addition of relevant new cases.
Property tax: exemption of property leased by and used for purposes of otherwise tax-
exempt body
Maurice T. Brunner, LL.B.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Article Outline
Index
Table of Cases, Laws, and Rules
Research References
ARTICLE OUTLINE
I Preliminary Matters
1[a] IntroductionScope
1[b] IntroductionRelated matters
1[c] IntroductionClassification of exemption provisions
2 Summary and comment
II General considerations
3 Generally
4 Strict or liberal construction
5[a] Effect of lease provisionsGenerally
5[b] Effect of lease provisionsProvisions as to obligation for taxes
III Ownership as test of exemption
6 Generally; 99-year lease
7 Provisions exempting property "owned" by tax-exempt body
8 Provisions exempting property "belonging to" tax-exempt body
9 Provisions exempting property "of" tax-exempt body
10 Provisions exempting property "held" by tax-exempt body
11 Provisions exempting property "set apart for" tax-exempt purposes
12 Provisions exempting property "founded and endowed by" tax-exempt body
13 Provisions exempting "public property," "church property," etc
IV Use as test of exemption
14[a] Provisions exempting property "used for" tax-exempt purposesGenerally
14[b] Provisions exempting property "used for" tax-exempt purposesView that payment of rent
requires denial of exemption 001736
14[c] Provisions exempting property "used for" tax-exempt purposesProvision exempting
property gratuitously occupied
15[a] Provisions exempting property but excepting therefrom property leased or used for profit
Generally
15[b] Provisions exempting property but excepting therefrom property leased or used for profit
Property not leased for profit
16 Provisions exempting property which is leased
INDEX
Ad valorem taxation property 8, 15[a]
"Belonging to" tax-exempt body 8
Business corporation 10
Charitable purposes 13, 14[a], 16
Charter exemption 6
Chattel real 6
Church property, provisions exempting 13
Classification of exemption provisions 1[c]
Comment 2
Commercial transaction 5[a], 10
Economic advantage from lease 14[b]
Educational institution 6, 11, 14[a]
Fee simple owner 6
"Founded and endowed by" tax exempt body 12
Fraternal holding corporation 14[a]
General considerations 3- 5
Good faith, release transaction entered in 3
Government, exemption of land leased to 8
Gratuitously occupied property 14
"Held by" tax-exempt body 10
Improvements 5[a], 9
Individual owners, property in name of 9
Increase in profit or benefit by owner from leased property 5[b]
Introduction 1
Lease, specific provisions of 3, 5, 16
Liberal construction 4
License fee 7
Limiting use of property 5[a]
Municipality, property leased to 4, 14
Ninety-nine year lease 6
Nominal rent 7, 10, 14[b]
Nonprofit corporation 8, 14[b], 15[b]
Obligation for taxes, provisions as to 5[b]
"Owned by" tax-exempt body 7
Ownership as test of exemption 6- 14
Particular type of exempt institution 3
Practical ownership under long term lease 9
Preliminary matters 1, 2
Private property used for public purposes 13, 14[a]
Profitable transactionm 5[a], 9, 14- 16
"Property of" tax-exempt body 9
Public corporation 9
Public property, provisions exempting 13, 14
Public service corporations 9
Real property tax paid by tenant as part of rent 5[b]
Related matters 1[b]
Religious organization 7, 14
Reserved land by Federal Government 8
001737
Tex
Dallas v Cochran (1914, Tex Civ App) 166 SW 32, error ref.
Wyo
Commissioners of Cambria Park v Board of County Com'rs (1946) 62 Wyo 446, 174 P2d 402.
[FN23] Havens v Alameda County (1916) 30 Cal App 206, 157 P 821; State v Chamberlain
(1893) 55 NJL 292, 26 A 913.
[FN24] Ill
People ex rel. Goodman v University of Illinois Foundation (1944) 388 Ill 363, 58 NE2d 33,
157 ALR 851
La
State ex rel. Cunningham v Board of Assessors (1898) 52 La Ann 223, 26 So 872
Minn
State v Bell (1890) 43 Minn 344, 45 NW 615
Ohio
Humphries v Little Sisters of Poor (1876) 29 Ohio St 201, supra 8 (denying exemption for
want of ownership)
Tex
Dallas v Cochran (1914, Tex Civ App) 166 SW 32, error ref.
Va
Board of Supervisors v Medical Group Foundation, Inc. (1964) 204 Va 807, 134 SE2d 258.
[FN25] Cleveland State University v Perk (1971) 26 Ohio St 2d 1, 55 Ohio Ops 2d 1, 268
NE2d 577, 55 ALR3d 422.
[FN26] Commissioners of Cambria Park v Board of County Com'rs (1946) 62 Wyo 446, 174
P2d 402.
[FN27] State v North Star Research & Development Institute (1972) 294 Minn 56, 200 NW2d
410, holding that a nonprofit corporation operating a research center, and intended to
stimulate the economy of a region by enabling small businesses to have access to a center
for research, and supported by contributions from profitmaking businesses, was not a
"corporation in connection with a business conducted for profit" so as to be liable for tax on
real estate occupied and leased by it from a public school district.
410, holding that a corporation which successively leased school land for terms of 2 years
and 11 months and 2 years and 9 months without option to renew took a risk in signing
short leases and legitimately "avoided" and did not "evade" the tax imposed.
[FN29] Havens v Alameda County (1916) 30 Cal App 206, 157 P 821.
001738
[FN30] People ex rel. Carr v Chicago (1926) 323 Ill 68, 153 NE 725; People ex rel. Harding v
Chicago (1929) 335 Ill 450, 167 NE 79; Dallas v Cochran (1914, Tex Civ App) 166 SW 32,
error ref.
In Church of Epiphany v Raine (1889) 10 Ohio Dec Reprint 449, 21 WL Bull 180, exemption
was allowed for a house used exclusively for public worship under a perpetual lease, the
court not discussing the proviso "if not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit."
[FN31] State v Bell (1890) 43 Minn 344, 45 NW 615, supra 13.
See also State ex rel. Cunningham v Board of Assessors (1898) 52 La Ann 223, 26 So 872,
stating that there was no feature of a lease in this case.
[FN32] See Cleveland State University v Perk (1971) 26 Ohio St 2d 1, 55 Ohio Ops 2d 1, 268
NE2d 577, 55 ALR3d 422.
[FN33] Riverside Military Academy, Inc. v Watkins (1944) 155 Fla 283, 19 So 2d 870, later
app 156 Fla 398, 23 So 2d 386.
P2d 402.
P2d 402.
410, stating that such a nebulous definition would result in the conclusion that for all
practical purposes, the legislature intended no exemption for such corporations.
Section 15[b] Footnotes:
[FN37] State v Chamberlain (1893) 55 NJL 292, 26 A 913 (stating that the test of exemption
is not ownership of the property, but is use and the payment of rent); Bancroft v Magill
(1903) 69 NJL 589, 55 A 103.
[FN38] People ex rel. Goodman v University of Illinois Foundation (1944) 388 Ill 363, 58
NE2d 33, 157 ALR 851 (declaring that the phrase "with a view to profit" modifies both the
word "leased" and the word "used" in the statute); Board of Supervisors v Medical Group
Foundation, Inc. (1964) 204 Va 807, 134 SE2d 258.
Section 16 Footnotes:
[FN39] Galvin v Masonic Toledo Trust (1973) 34 Ohio St 2d 157, 63 Ohio Ops 2d 242, 296
NE2d 542; Yates v Milwaukee (1896) 92 Wis 352, 66 NW 248; Milwaukee v Shoup Voting
Machine Corp. (1972) 54 Wis 2d 549, 196 NW2d 694 (charter exemption of property leased
for convenience of inhabitants of city extended to voting machines leased with option to
purchase, applying the rental payment to purchase price).
[FN40] Morgan v Watts (1970) 255 SC 212, 178 SE2d 147 (exemption of property leased to
001739
and operated by the state Public Service Authority apparently intended to continue
exemption formerly enjoyed by property of privately owned electric cooperatives).
[FN41] Yates v Milwaukee (1896) 92 Wis 352, 66 NW 248, recognizing that for some
purposes, such as enforcement of the assessment, an assessment may be regarded as a
tax; and also holding that an amendment of the statute so as to exempt the premises from
"taxation and from any and all special taxes and assessments for the year 1891" did not
exempt the property from an assessment for an improvement constructed in the previous
year, certificate for which was issued in January of 1891, before the amendment became
effective.
55 A.L.R.3d 430
END OF DOCUMENT
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ALR
1. Comment Note: Availability of Tax Exemption to Property Held on Lease from Exempt Owner
2. Construction of Exemption of Religious Body or Society from Taxation or Special Assessment
3. Prospective Use for Tax-Exempt Purposes as Entitling Property to Tax Exemption
4. When is Property Owned by State or Local Governmental Body Put to Public Use So as to be
Eligible for Property Tax Exemption
Am.Jur.2d
5. State and Local Taxation, Public Bodies and Property, Character and Purpose of Use,
Requisite That Property be Devoted to Public Use
6. State and Local Taxation, Eleemosynary, Educational, Religious, and Other Like Associations,
Institutions, and Organizations, Character, Ownership, or Use of Property, Generally
Am.Jur. Proof of Facts
7. Violation of Restrictive Covenant
Bogerts Trusts & Trustee
8. The Administration of Charitable Trusts, Liabilities Arising from Contract or Property
Ownership
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1
1. In re Marriage of Nigorizawa,
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d, 2009 WL 596736,
Nonpublished/Noncitable (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and
8.1110, 8.1115), Cal.App. 2 Dist., March 10, 2009 (NO. B204900)
...re Siragusa (9th Cir.1994) 27 F.3d 406 Siragusa involved a
dissolution action that resulted in an award of alimony and a
property settlement that were reduced to a money judgment
before the husband's bankruptcy discharged his property
settlement obligations to the wife. Siragusa held that the money
judgment that resulted from the property settlement was a debt
discharged in bankruptcy (under a former version of the statute),
but alimony was not discharged under bankruptcy law and could
subsequently be modified...
...re Marriage of Lynn (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 120 arose in the same
posture as Siragusa, in that the husband's property settlement
obligation was discharged in a bankruptcy action five years after
the settlement was entered. After discharge of the property
settlement debt, the wife obtained an order for a modification of
spousal support, and the husband appealed. The Court of Appeal
held that the family law court could not simply substitute spousal
support......
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2. Murphy v. Murphy,
17 Neb.App. 279, 759 N.W.2d 710, Neb.App., December 02, 2008
(NO. A-08-007)
...k. State Court Proceedings. A postbankruptcy alimony modification
violates the discharge injunction of the Bankruptcy Code when the
spouse seeking modification of alimony is merely attempting to
reinstate a discharged property settlement obligation, rather than
seeking a modification based on changed circumstances. [12] 51
Bankruptcy 51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and Liabilities
Discharged 51X(C)2 Debts Arising from Divorce or Separation 51k
3367 Nondischargeability of Property Distributions 51k 3367(3) k.
Benefit/Detriment Analysis. Nonspousal support...
...Modification of Decree: Alimony. A postbankruptcy alimony
modification violates the discharge injunction of the Bankruptcy Code
when the spouse seeking modification of alimony is merely
attempting to reinstate a discharged property settlement obligation
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rather than being a modification based on changed circumstances. 8.
Bankruptcy: Debtors and Creditors: Divorce. Nonspousal support
obligations or debts incurred in the course of a marital dissolution
proceeding are not dischargeable in bankruptcy unless
discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that
outweighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse...
...debt that Christi was ordered to pay in the approximate amount of
$7,800. However, after the decree, Christi filed for bankruptcy and
the Citibank debt was discharged by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.
Consequently, that creditor pursued Matthew, and he ultimately
settled such debt by a payment of $4,300, for which he sought
credit against child support via this modification proceeding.
Matthew had a 14-year career with the Douglas County sheriff's
office, but in February 2006, an investigation concerning......
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3
3. Wilson v. Wilson,
Slip Copy, 2008 WL 2580931, 2008 -Ohio- 3195, Ohio App. 9 Dist.,
June 30, 2008 (NO. 05CA0078)
...indebtedness on the first and second mortgage * * * [t]he court
further orders that the balance assumed is in the nature of support
or maintenance but is not modifiable absent the agreement of
the parties. The marital obligations to pay the balances [sic] is an
integral part of the support obligations imposed hereunder and
therefore these debts are not dischargable [sic] in bankruptcy
under sections 523(a)(5) and 523(a)(15) of the U .S. Bankruptcy
Code. The trial court adopted the......
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4
4. Yager v. Fox,
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2008 WL 2246041, Minn.App., June 03,
2008 (NO. A07-691)
...not required. See, e.g., Marden v. Marden, 546 N.W.2d 25, 27, 29
(Minn.App.1996) (stating, in the context of modifying child
support to account for a support obligor's discharge of debt in
bankruptcy which made the support recipient liable for the debt,
that [u]nder these circumstances, substantially undisputed by [the
obligor], separate findings of the children's needs appear to be
unnecessary to support the support modification); Abbott v.
Abbott, 481 N.W.2d 864, 867-68 (Minn.App.1992) (stating, in the
context of reversing the denial, without......
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5
5. Philopena v. Philopena,
Not Reported in A.2d, 2008 WL 2252547, Conn.Super., May 13, 2008
(NO. FA074105715S)
...20, 2007 is incorporated herein and shall continue to be an
obligation of the defendant until such time as the debts involved
therein are paid in full or discharged by operation of bankruptcy
001743
or operation of law. 5. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff $1.00
per year alimony for eight years, modifiable as to amount only
when the defendant is no longer under any support obligation for
said child and/or the......
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6
6. In re Erlich,
384 B.R. 123, Bkrtcy.W.D.Pa., March 25, 2008 (NO. BK.05-37026
BM, ADV. 06-2172 BM)
...11, 2006, reducing debtor's child support obligation to $711 per
month due to the emancipation of his older daughter. The reduced
payment was for the support of his younger daughter only. The
adversary action has been tried and is now ready for decision. -
ANALYSIS - When debtors filed their bankruptcy petition, 523 of
the Bankruptcy Code provided in part as follows: (a) A discharge
under section 727 does not discharge an individual debtor from any
debt- (15) not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is
incurred by the debtor in the course of a......
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7
7. In re Marriage of Rathbun,
752 N.W.2d 32, 2008 WL 375447, (Table, Text in WESTLAW),
Unpublished Disposition, Iowa App., February 13, 2008 (NO. 07-
1225)
...reduced her work hours, citing health reasons. Sue's IPERS
retirement account was valued at $43,197. In 2006 Sue filed for
bankruptcy and discharged approximately $36,000 in debts. She
also sold her home and moved into an apartment. She claimed
monthly expenses of $2200. The district court's June 21, 2007
modification order denied James's petition but modified the
alimony so it would terminate at James's death. On June 28, 2007,
James filed a motion for enlarged or amended findings......
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8
8. Rogers v. Rogers,
51 Va.App. 261, 656 S.E.2d 436, Va.App., February 12, 2008 (NO.
0608-07-1)
...business expenses from prior year with current types of business
expenses in determining whether there was change in circumstance
warranting modification of spousal support; (2) trial court could
consider former husband's pending bankruptcy discharge that
would shift debt to wife in determining whether there was change
of circumstances warranting modification; (3) trial court could not
assume that...
...order endorsed by counsel or the parties. [3] 134 Divorce 134V
Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134k 230
Permanent Alimony 134k 245 Modification of Judgment or Decree
134k 245(2) k. Grounds and Rights of Parties. Trial court could
consider former husband's pending bankruptcy discharge that
would shift debt to wife in determining whether there was change
001744
of circumstances warranting modification of husband's spousal
support obligation. [4] 51 Bankruptcy 51IV Effect of Bankruptcy
Relief; Injunction and Stay 51IV(A) In General 51k 2363 Protection
Against...
...court may not order a lump sum spousal support award to
compensate a non-debtor spouse for the other spouse's discharge
of marital obligations in bankruptcy; this would re-create a debt
discharged under federal bankruptcy laws and impermissibly
intrude upon federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. [5] 134 Divorce 134V
Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134k 230
134k 245(2) k. Grounds and Rights of Parties. Where a material
change in circumstances due to bankruptcy occurs, a court may
modify a spousal support order. [6] 51 Bankruptcy 51X
Discharge 51X(C) Debts and Liabilities Discharged 51X(C)2
Debts Arising from Divorce or Separation 51k 3365 Property
Distribution and Alimony, Maintenance, or Support 51k 3365(2)
Property Distribution or......
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9. In re Munck,
Not Reported in B.R., 2007 WL 4354418, Bkrtcy.D.Kan., December
07, 2007 (NO. 02-41690)
...Child Support Services to Reopen Case to Determine
Dischargeability,FN 1 and Debtors' Motion for Show Cause Order.FN
2 YoungWilliams Child Support Services is seeking to reopen this
case, which was closed on January 27, 2006, for the purposes of
determining whether a debt owed to JoAnn McGuire FN 3 was
discharged in this bankruptcy. Debtors are seeking an order to
show cause why the West Virginia Department of Health & Human
Resources, Bureau of Child...
...the Secretary of Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation
Services (Kansas SRS), by and through Carl G. Wheeler,
YoungWilliams Child Support Services (YoungWilliams) Staff
Attorney, moved to reopen this bankruptcy case to determine the
dischargeability of the debt owed to Ms. McGuire.FN 20 [ FN20.]
Although YoungWilliams' role and standing in this proceeding is
contested by Debtors, at a......
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10
10. In re Chiappone,
Not Reported in B.R., 2007 WL 4178510, Bkrtcy.D.Conn., November
21, 2007 (NO. 05-34871LMW, ADV.PRO. 05-3181LMW)
...account in modifying these obligations. see also Siragusa v.
Siragusa (In re Siragusa), 27 F.3d 406 (9th Cir.1994) (Alimony
modification based on debtor's discharge in bankruptcy of
approximately a $1.2 million property settlement obligation did not
violate the discharge injunction, where nothing in the record
suggested that the divorce court was attempting......
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11. Meeks v. Meeks,
964 So.2d 185, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D1972, Fla.App. 2 Dist., August 17,
2007 (NO. 2D06-4505)
...Fla. 2d DCA 1981) Bankruptcy law concerning the dischargeability
of obligations created in dissolution of marriage judgments is
complex. The bankruptcy code allows certain debts to be
excepted from bankruptcy discharge, including some domestic
support obligations. 11 U.S.C. 523(a) (2000 & Supp. V. 2005).
Prior to the 2005 amendments to the bankruptcy code, true
support obligations owing to a spouse or family member were
generally not dischargeable, but obligations relating to equitable
distribution were dischargeable......
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12
12. In re Zeitchik,
369 B.R. 900, 57 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 324, Bkrtcy.E.D.N.C., June
15, 2007 (NO. 05-09769-8-RDD, 06-00169-8-RDD-AP)
...death or remarriage, whether payments were in lump sum or
periodic, direct or indirect nature of payee, any waiver of
maintenance, whether obligations were modifiable, location of
paragraphs containing these obligations within marital settlement
agreement, and tax treatment of obligations. 11 U.S.C.(2000 Ed.)
523(a)(5) [4] 51 Bankruptcy 51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and
Liabilities Discharged 51X(C)2 Debts Arising from Divorce or
Separation 51k 3365 Property Distribution and Alimony,
Maintenance, or Support 51k 3365(2......
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13
13. In re Aprea,
368 B.R. 558, Bkrtcy.E.D.Tex., April 25, 2007 (NO. 06-40493)
...441, 448 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2006) [7] In this case, the debtor used
unsecured credit to finance his living expenses prior to bankruptcy
and now seeks to discharge those debts. The debtor provides
complete or nearly complete financial support for his fiance, and
his amended Schedule J shows that he anticipates spending more
than $700 a month on food and recreation. The debtor leases a......
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14
14. In re Cavaluzzi,
364 B.R. 363, Bkrtcy.E.D.Mo., March 19, 2007 (NO. 06 4037 659, 05
60826 705)
001746
...Adversary No. 06-4037-659. March 19, 2007. Background Attorney
who represented Chapter 7 debtor's former wife in prepetition
child-support modification proceedings initiated by debtor, as well
as on appeal, filed adversary complaint to determine the
dischargeability of her debt for attorneys fees. Holdings The
Bankruptcy Court, Kathy A. Surratt-States , J., held that: (1)
plaintiff's attorneys fees were in the nature of maintenance and......
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15
15. Corder v. Corder,
231 S.W.3d 346, Tenn.Ct.App., November 30, 2006 (NO. W2005-
01711-COA-R3CV)
...on the advice of his attorney at the time. The parties ultimately
agreed that, if Father were not permitted to reduce his child
support payments, he owed $4,172 plus 12% statutory interest,
which Mother calculated to be $7,657.69.FN 4 [ FN4.] Father
acknowledged that he had filed bankruptcy. He said that he received
an order of discharge from bankruptcy on January 9, 2002, from
an Oregon bankruptcy court. His debts related to child support
were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Father sought to
introduce into evidence a letter from his former attorney to Mother's
attorney, dated July 9, 2001, which related to Father's reduction in
child support payments and the reasons therefor. The trial court
found that the letter constituted inadmissible hearsay and disallowed
it. Father then......
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16
16. In re Voepel,
Not Reported in B.R., 2006 WL 2686894, Bkrtcy.D.Ariz., September
18, 2006 (NO. 02:04 19548 GBN, 02:05 00133)
...any alimony or child support obligations. He does wish to
discharge non-alimony and non-support obligations created by the
amended decree. Accordingly, the alimony and child support
obligations established in the decree will not be discharged in the
bankruptcy case. Defendant's closing brief at 1. 5. Section
523(a)(15) of the bankruptcy code provides that a Chapter 7
discharge does not discharge a debt that does not constitute
alimony or support, but is incurred in the course of a divorce, unless
(A) debtor does......
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17
17. Robison v. Robison,
Not Reported in S.E.2d, 2006 WL 2251632, Va.App., August 08,
2006 (NO. 0551-06-4)
...1990) On February 14, 2005, the trial court entered an amended
decree of divorce ratifying, affirming and incorporating the parties'
amended property, custody, and support settlement agreement
001747
(APCSSA). The APCSSA set forth husband's obligation to repay wife
for any future settlement paid to Monarch Homes, Inc. (Monarch)
for a debt that was found non-dischargeable in a bankruptcy
petition filed by husband. Paragraph 56(G) of the APCSSA provided,
in pertinent part: In the event that Former Wife......
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18
18. House v. House,
Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2006 WL 1519656, 2006 -Ohio- 2776, Ohio
App. 11 Dist., June 02, 2006 (NO. 2005-L-075)
...portion of the parties' mortgage payments during the pendency of
the divorce case was an order to pay a marital debt that should
have been discharged in bankruptcy. She also questions why the
temporary support order was not modified when she moved back
into the marital home, also during the pendency of the divorce case.
We find no abuse......
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19
19. Taylor v. Taylor,
Not Reported in A.2d, 2006 WL 1391293, Conn.Super., May 02, 2006
(NO. FA000436771S)
...on marital home was intended by the parties to be in the nature of
support and maintenance, rather than a property distribution, and
thus, it was not dischargeable in bankruptcy, where the
dissolution judgment tied ex-husband's obligation to pay mortgages
to alimony by including a provision that alimony could be modified
if he failed to meet obligation, and the parties later decided that ex-
husband would make direct payments to ex...
...on the arrearage, and consider counsel fees. In view of this
conclusion, the court defers decision on the motion for
modification of alimony. [ FN1.] The defendant filed for
bankruptcy on October 11, 2005. Although recent revisions to the
bankruptcy code have changed the language of the exemption to
dischargeability for debts owed to former spouses, those
provisions of the new law apply only to cases filed on or after
October 17......
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20
20. In re Andrus,
338 B.R. 746, 55 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 1266, Bkrtcy.E.D.Mich., March
14, 2006 (NO. 05-86582, 05-5863)
...Law. Bankruptcy acknowledgement in judgment of divorce, which
purported to recognize that husband, in event that he later filed for
bankruptcy relief, would not be able to discharge his alleged
non-modifiable support debt to make series of payments to his
former wife in amount that was precisely equal to net amount owed
001748
by......
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21
21. Collett v. Collett,
270 Neb. 722, 707 N.W.2d 769, Neb., December 09, 2005 (NO. S-
04-850)
...Divorce or Separation 51k 3365 Property Distribution and Alimony,
Maintenance, or Support 51k 3365(1) k. In General. Generally, a
bankruptcy discharge does not discharge the debtor from any
debt for a domestic support obligation. Syllabus by the Court 1.
Modification of Decree: Alimony: Appeal and Error. An appellate
court entrusts the modification of an alimony award to the
discretion of the trial court and reviews the trial court's decision de
novo on the record for...
...time of the decree, or that were accomplished by the mere
passage of time, do not justify a change or modification of an
alimony award. Pope v. Pope, supra; Desjardins v. Desjardins, 239
Neb. 878, 479 N.W.2d 451 (1992) Shan characterizes the change in
circumstances upon which the modification order was based as the
bankruptcy discharge of the First National Bank debt and the
impact of that discharge on Kimberly. Brief for appellant at 12.
Shan argues that these circumstances were within...
...distinguishable from In re Fluke, 305 B.R. 635 (Bkrtcy.D.Del.2004)
, in that the original decree did include an award of alimony and
the postbankruptcy modification of that award was sought on the
basis of a material change in circumstances. Other courts addressing
this scenario have rejected arguments that modification of
alimony is merely a repackaging of debts discharged in
bankruptcy and thus prohibited by federal law, if the party seeking
modification is able to demonstrate an actual change in financial......
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22
22. Casey v. Casey,
Not Reported in A.2d, 2005 WL 1971887, Conn.Super., July 27, 2005
(NO. FA010342634S)
...of the property orders entered in subparagraphs N, O, and P. It is
the intent of this order that a discharge in bankruptcy by the
plaintiff does not constitute payment of the property orders and
that such a discharge would constitute a substantial change in
circumstances for which the defendant would have the right to seek
a modification of the alimony order. This order terminates upon
the death of the plaintiff or the defendant or upon the remarriage of
the defendant......
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23. Reineke v. Reineke,
699 N.W.2d 859, 2005 ND 132, N.D., July 13, 2005 (NO. 20050006)
001749
23
...Background: In proceedings for divorce, the District Court Burleigh
County South Central Judicial District Bruce A. Romanick , J.,
entered second amended judgment increasing wife's spousal
support award. Wife appealed. Holdings: The Supreme Court
VandeWalle , C.J., held that: (1) remand was required to permit
reconsideration of amount and duration of modification of spousal
support incident to husband's discharge of mortgage debt in
bankruptcy, and (2) trial court was not required, on remand, to
reconsider case law guidelines applicable to awards and
modifications of spousal support. Reversed and remanded.
Sandstrom , J., concurred in result. West Headnotes [1] 134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134k 230
134k 245(1) k. Power and Authority. District court has continuing
jurisdiction to modify a spousal support arrangement. N.D.C.C. 14-
05-24.1 [2] 51 Bankruptcy 51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and
Separation 51k 3365 Property Distribution and Alimony,
Maintenance, or Support 51k 3365(1) k. In General...
...wife's appeal from trial court's amendment of judgment in action
for divorce, to permit reconsideration of amount and duration of
modification of former husband's spousal support obligation
incident to his discharge of mortgage debt in bankruptcy, as well
as explanation of court's rationale, where increase in payments
ordered in amended judgment exceeded former husband's monthly
obligation...
...payments ultimately left former wife with deficit. [5] 134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134k 230
134k 245(2) k. Grounds and Rights of Parties. Trial court was not
required, in modifying spousal support by reason of former
husband's discharge in bankruptcy of mortgage debt with readily
ascertainable value, to reconsider case law guidelines applicable to
awards and modifications of spousal support. Brenda A.
Neubauer Neubauer & Oster , Bismarck, N.D., for plaintiff and
appellant. Ronald K. Reineke, pro se, Mandan, N.D., defendant and
appellee. VANDE WALLE , Chief Justice. [ 1] Frances Michels
appealed a second amended judgment that increased her
spousal-support award. Michels argues the increase is insufficient
to fulfill her enhanced burden to satisfy debt discharged in
bankruptcy by her ex-husband, Ronald Reineke. We reverse the
second amended judgment and remand for further proceedings to
reconsider the......
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24. In re Henderson,
324 B.R. 302, Bkrtcy.W.D.Ky., April 11, 2005 (NO. 04-1016, 03-
11535)
001750
...254(2) k. Modification or Vacation. Kentucky domestic relations law
limits the circumstances under which a divorce decree provision on
maintenance and property dispositions may be modified. KRS
403.250 [2] 51 Bankruptcy 51I In General 51I(C) Jurisdiction 51k
2060 Exclusive, Conflicting, or Concurrent Jurisdiction 51k 2060 1 k.
In General. While the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine issues of dischargeability under the discharge exception
for nonsupport divorce debt, including a determination of what is in
the nature of a property settlement or in the nature of maintenance,
alimony......
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25. Casey v. Casey,
Not Reported in A.2d, 2004 WL 2595842, Conn.Super., October 18,
2004 (NO. FA01-0342634S)
...of the property orders entered in subparagraphs N, O, and P. It is
plaintiff does not constitute payment of the property orders and
that such a discharge would constitute a substantial change in
circumstances for which the defendant would have the right to seek
a modification of the alimony order. This order terminates upon
the death of the plaintiff or the defendant or upon the remarriage of
the defendant......
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26
26. Koropatkin v. Koropatkin,
Not Reported in A.2d, 2004 WL 2442408, Conn.Super., October 06,
2004 (NO. FA990720780)
...an alimony order. Soon after the defendant's Motion to Modify was
denied, he took the extraordinary step of filing for bankruptcy and
attempting to discharge that debt by naming the defendant as a
creditor.FN 1 The defendant's failure to meet the payments ordered
in the original dissolution judgment has caused a substantial change
in the parties' circumstances warranting a modification of the
$1.00 per year alimony. This the parties have stipulated to. The
defendant has continued to pay the plaintiff's health and automobile
insurance. He has......
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27. Mijango v. Mijango,
Not Reported in A.2d, 2004 WL 2361789, Conn.Super., September
28, 2004 (NO. FA030349577S)
...the event the plaintiff does not pay the $25,000 as ordered. It is
plaintiff does not constitute the payment of the $25,000 property
order and that such a discharge would constitute a substantial
change in circumstances for which the defendant would have the
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right to seek a modification of the alimony order. D. BY WAY OF
CUSTODY AND SUPPORT 1. The court enters an order of joint
physical custody of the......
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28. Mijango v. Mijango,
Not Reported in A.2d, 2004 WL 2439722, Conn.Super., September
28, 2004 (NO. FA030349577S)
...the event the plaintiff does not pay the $25,000 as ordered. It is
plaintiff does not constitute the payment of the $25,000 property
order and that such a discharge would constitute a substantial
change in circumstances for which the defendant would have the
right to seek a modification of the alimony order. D. BY WAY OF
CUSTODY AND SUPPORT 1. The court enters an order of joint
physical custody of the......
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29
29. Braswell v. Braswell,
881 So.2d 1193, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D2070, Fla.App. 3 Dist.,
September 15, 2004 (NO. 3D02-2993, 3D02-2853, 3D03-1615)
...$23 million to be in the nature of support for purposes of an
injunction, it would not deem the payments support for purposes
of modification. [9] [10] Another characteristic to consider is that
support is not dischargeable in bankruptcy, while obligations
under a property settlement agreement may be dischargeable.
See De Lapouyade v. De Lapouyade, 711 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA
1998) Here, paragraph 13 of the parties......
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30
30. In re Skaja,
313 B.R. 198, W.D.Tex., August 16, 2004 (NO. SA-03-CA-1221-XR)
...was suffering from no physical ailments, and ex-wife's need to
have debtor make such payments in order to avoid reduction in
assets available for her support. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A.
523(a)(5) [12] 51 Bankruptcy 51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and
Separation 51k 3367 Nondischargeability of Property Distributions
51k 3367(1) k. In General. (Formerly 51k3348.5 Statutory......
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31
31. Birt v. Birt,
208 Ariz. 546, 96 P.3d 544, Ariz.App. Div. 1, August 12, 2004 (NO.
1CA-CV 03-0258)
001752
...change in circumstances sufficient to warrant an increase in
alimony). 28 State and federal courts have held that a
bankruptcy discharge of debts allocated in part to one of the
parties to the divorce can constitute a change of circumstances to
permit a modification of the property allocation, alimony and child
support. Alyson F. Finkelstein, A Tug of War: State Divorce Courts
Versus Federal Bankruptcy Courts Regarding Debts Resulting from
Divorce, 18...
...v. Coakley, 400 N.W.2d 436, 440-41 (Minn.App.1987) (discharge
amounted to change of circumstances permitting state court to
modify maintenance and child support awards); In re Marriage
of Beardslee, 922 P.2d at 1131-33 (court could modify property
allocation after bankruptcy discharge). 29 Consistent with this
view, the Ninth Circuit held that when an ex-husband obtained a
bankruptcy discharge of......
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32
32. Riebe v. Riebe,
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2004 WL 1095024, Minn.App., May 18,
2004 (NO. A03-1388)
...marriage dissolution judgment proceeding, pro se appellant
appears to seek relief from the district court's order denying his
motion for modification of his maintenance obligation because he
claims he is unable to pay and because the bankruptcy court
discharged his debts. Appellant also alleges unspecified procedural
irregularities in the district court proceedings. Because the district
court did not commit procedural errors...
...incarcerated during that time. While incarcerated, he injured his
shoulder and knee. Since his release, appellant has made only one
maintenance payment, and he moved to modify the
maintenance order on the grounds that his debts to respondent
had been discharged in bankruptcy and that his physical disability
prevented him from paying maintenance. He submitted a report from
an orthopedic surgeon indicating that......
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33
33. In re Marriage of Koedam,
680 N.W.2d 377, 2004 WL 242908, (Table, Text in WESTLAW),
Unpublished Disposition, Iowa App., February 11, 2004 (NO. 03-
0084)
...Vault Company and now owns and operates it. Following
dissolution of the parties' marriage each party separately sought and
secured discharge in bankruptcy of their extensive personal
debts, largely credit card debts. Their pre-trial stipulation in this
modification action, relied on by the trial court in modifying child
support, shows that Christine's net monthly income is about $2,115
and Scott's is about $1,806. Christine is engaged to marry Jason......
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34
34. In re Fluke,
305 B.R. 635, 51 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 1042, Bkrtcy.D.Del., February
10, 2004 (NO. 00-01364 PJW)
...obligation was discharged. Id. He paid the alimony judgment but
she filed a motion in divorce court to have the property settlement
modified, citing the discharge of the property settlement in
bankruptcy as a changed circumstance. Id. The alimony
modification was granted and the husband was required to pay
$7,500 per month until the wife remarried or the death of...
...made by the bankruptcy court in In re Ladak: We caution against
reading our holding as a case where the discharge of debts in
bankruptcy may prohibit a state court from modifying a divorce
decree concerning spousal maintenance or child support because
of a material change in circumstances. There is no ongoing
maintenance obligation flowing from Debtor to Respondent to
modify here. 205 B.R. at 712 ORDER For the reasons set forth in
the Court's Memorandum Opinion of this date, Charles......
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35
35. In re Whitnall,
305 B.R. 854, 93 A.F.T.R.2d 2004-1381, Bkrtcy.E.D.Wis., January
16, 2004 (NO. 02-31285-JES, 02-2430)
...Internal Revenue Code has elements of maintenance in[sic] a
property division, but avoids some of the pitfalls of both.
Maintenance is amendable based upon a change of
circumstances. Property divisions are dischargeable in
bankruptcy. This is allowed by the Internal Revenue Code and is a
combination of maintenance and property division which eliminates
both......
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36
36. Shiever v. Allen,
60 Mass.App.Ct. 1104, 799 N.E.2d 158, (Table, Text in WESTLAW),
Unpublished Disposition, 2003 WL 22801588, Mass.App.Ct.,
November 25, 2003 (NO. 01-P-1777)
...because the husband's income and the children's needs had
increased, there was no material change in circumstances which
warranted a reduction in the husband's child support obligation
(A.I-6). The husband did not appeal from that judgment (see docket
entries). On August 25, 1999, the wife filed a Chapter 7
bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of
Massachusetts, and discharged $62,999.80 in personal debt (A.I-
29, 31), including the wife's October 2, 1998, obligations with
respect to the marital debt. On August 8, 2000...
...alleging, as changes in circumstances, the wife's remarriage and
the benefit she receives from her new spouse's income, and the
001754
discharge in bankruptcy of the wife's personal debt (A.I-23-
25).FN 1 The husband requested that his support obligation be
reduced from $600 a week to $232.56 a week due to [the wife's]
decreased debt and subsequent significant increase in...
...the husband framed in his notice of appeal the issue to be
considered by this court with respect to the modification action:
Reduction in child support for the plaintiff Alan Shiever on the
basis of: (1.) Uvonne (Shiever) Allen's marriage to Ronald Allen;
(2.) Uvonne (Shiever) Allen's discharge in bankruptcy including
elimination of $26,353.68 representing her 50% marital debt liability
per the Judgment of October 2, 1998 and the $62,999.80 of total
debt; (3.) Uvonne (Shiever) Allen's current......
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37
37. In re Brown,
302 B.R. 637, Bkrtcy.N.D.Iowa, November 24, 2003 (NO. 01-9181-C,
01-02347-C)
...51k3348.5 Inability to pay exists, of kind sufficient to permit the
discharge of divorce-related debt not in nature of support, if
excepting debt from discharge would reduce debtor's income to
below a level necessary for support of debtor and debtor's
dependents. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(15)(A) [8] 51
Ability to......
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38
38. In re Retort,
300 B.R. 411, Bkrtcy.W.D.Pa., October 23, 2003 (NO. 01-23056 BM)
...not sign agreement until months after attorney had begun
providing such services; and (2) debtor's obligation to attorney was
postpetition debt, of kind that was not discharged. Vacated West
Headnotes [1] 51 Bankruptcy 51VII Claims 51VII(E) Determination
51k 2921 k. In General. Attorney who had represented Chapter 7
debtor at child support modification hearing had valid claim
against debtor for legal fees owing under terms of attorney fee
contract between them, though debtor......
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39
39. Atwater v. Delaine,
155 Ohio App.3d 93, 799 N.E.2d 216, 2003 -Ohio- 5501, Ohio App. 8
Dist., October 16, 2003 (NO. 82191)
...the trial court erred in issuing its order clarifying an earlier order
because the clarifying order had the effect of modifying the
001755
spousal support provision of the divorce decree, a provision that
the parties had agreed, and the court ordered, unmodifiable. { 13}
Our conclusion today does not jeopardize the authority of the
bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability of Danny's
debt to Michele under Section 523(a)(5), Title 11, U.S.Code. Under
that provision, support obligations owed to a former spouse......
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40
40. Hendricks v. Hendricks,
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2003 WL 21911163, Minn.App., August 12,
2003 (NO. C2-02-2101, C2-02-2132)
...$2,424.88. The decree also provided that [n]either party shall
discharge in bankruptcy his or her obligation to * * * pay joint
debts. * * * Should either party discharge in bankruptcy * * *
any joint debt of the parties assumed by one of the parties, such
discharge shall constitute a basis upon which the other party may
move the court to modify the maintenance provision (if any)
and/or seek an additional property award if that party is held liable
for the discharged debt......
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41
41. In re Marriage of Knopff,
Not Reported in P.3d, 118 Wash.App. 1002, 2003 WL 21907639,
Wash.App. Div. 1, August 11, 2003 (NO. 51093-2-I)
...expenses paid by the father. The automatic stay in bankruptcy
does not apply, however, to proceedings for the establishment or
modification of an order for alimony, maintenance or support.
11 U.S.C. sec. 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) And bankruptcy does not
discharge debts to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such
spouse......
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42
42. In re Ingalls,
297 B.R. 543, Bkrtcy.C.D.Ill., August 04, 2003 (NO. 02-72357, 02-
7186)
...that is not in nature of support will be dischargeable, on inability-
to-pay theory, if payment of debt would reduce debtor's income
below that necessary for support of debtor and debtor's
Ability to Pay. (Formerly 51k3348.5......
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43
43. In re Cunningham,
294 B.R. 724, Bkrtcy.C.D.Ill., May 29, 2003 (NO. 02-92319, 02-9077)
...Bankruptcy No. 02-92319. Adversary No. 02-9077. May 29, 2003.
Chapter 7 debtor brought adversary proceeding for determination of
dischargeability of his obligation to former spouse. The
Bankruptcy Court, Gerald D. Fines , Chief Judge, held that portion
of judgment debt which represented Chapter 7 debtor's arrearage
under child support order entered by divorce court, as modified by
later state court order, was nondischargeable in bankruptcy as being
in nature of support, notwithstanding that, at time judgment......
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44
44. In re Blair,
291 B.R. 514, 175 Ed. Law Rep. 270, 03 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3101,
2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3958, 9th Cir.BAP (Ariz.), March 27, 2003
(NO. 01-02315-PHX-GBN, AZ-02-1168-RYPB, 01-00147-PHX)
...Because we are reversing the Order on other grounds, we need
not reach this issue. Further, ECMC contends that the bankruptcy
court's partial discharge was improper because it arbitrarily
reduced the Debts. While we do not reach that issue here, we
agree that the Record does not show sufficient analysis to support
the 50% reduction of the Debts. See Hornsby, 144 F.3d at 438 The
undue hardship exception in 523(a)(8) requires the bankruptcy
court to discharge only that portion of the debt that would
otherwise impose undue hardship. We recognize that by accepting a
bankruptcy court's equitable power to grant a partial......
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45
45. Loveday v. Loveday,
Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2003 WL 1465770, 2003 -Ohio- 1431, Ohio
App. 7 Dist., March 24, 2003 (NO. 02 BA 13)
...The Common Pleas Court, Belmont County, overruled her
objections and denied her motions to hold husband in contempt and
to modify spousal support. Wife appealed. The Court of Appeals
DeGenaro , J., held that wife's failure to appear at husband's
bankruptcy proceedings did not waive her ability to challenge
dischargeability of husband's marital debts in subsequent
proceeding in domestic court. Reversed and remanded. West
Headnotes 134 Divorce 134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of
Property...
...her objections to a magistrate's decision and denied her motions
to hold Defendant-Appellee, Gary Loveday, in contempt and to
modify the award of spousal support. That decision also overruled
Gary's motion to hold Vicki in contempt. The trial court found Vicki's
failure to challenge the dischargeability of certain marital debts in
Gary's bankruptcy proceedings prevented her from challenging the
dischargeability of those debts in a later proceeding in state court.
001757
The issue before......
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46
46. Benjamin v. Benjamin,
858 So.2d 270, Ala.Civ.App., March 21, 2003 (NO. 2010892)
...all of her expenses and repay the loan. The wife correctly notes
that this court has held that a husband's discharge in bankruptcy
of an alimony-in-gross award and the marital debts he was required
to assume pursuant to the divorce judgment can be a material
change of circumstances warranting a modification of periodic
alimony. See Thornburg v. Thornburg, 628 So.2d 885, 887
(Ala.Civ.App.1993) see also Smith v. Smith, 741 So.2d 420......
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47
47. In re Bucher,
289 B.R. 699, Bkrtcy.C.D.Ill., February 12, 2003 (NO. 02-7221, 02-
73165)
...show an inability to pay divorce-related debt not in nature of
support, by demonstrating that payment of debt would reduce
debtor's income below that necessary for support of debtor and
his/her dependents, then court's inquiry is at an end, and debt is
discharged. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(15)(A) [3] 51
3367 Nondischargeability of Property Distributions 51k 3367(3......
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48
48. In re Marriage of Sprague & Spiegel-Sprague,
105 Cal.App.4th 215, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 261, 03 Cal. Daily Op. Serv.
285, 2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 323, Cal.App. 4 Dist., January 09,
2003 (NO. G030108)
...added.) In In re Siragusa, supra, 27 F.3d 406, the wife filed a
motion in state court to have alimony modified based upon her
ex-husband's prior bankruptcy discharge of a property
settlement obligation. Id. at p. 407.) The husband's bankruptcy
had been discharged and no bankruptcy proceeding was pending
when the wife filed the state court motion. After the state court
modified alimony, the husband filed a new complaint in
bankruptcy court alleging the modification violated the standing
injunction of title 11 United States Code section 524 , which prohibits
creditors from attempting to collect debts that were discharged in
bankruptcy. Ibid. The bankruptcy court dismissed the husband's
complaint, deferring, in the interest of comity, to the state court's
determination on......
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49
49. In re Gilpin,
287 B.R. 921, Bkrtcy.C.D.Ill., December 26, 2002 (NO. 02-72247, 02-
7160)
...Marital debt not in nature of support will be dischargeable on
inability to pay theory, if paying the debt would reduce debtor's
income below that necessary for support of debtor and debtor's
Ability to Pay. (Formerly 51k3348.5......
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50
50. In re McKinnis,
287 B.R. 245, Bkrtcy.E.D.Mo., December 06, 2002 (NO. 01-4375-
293, 01-49642-293)
...of necessities, where debtor-husband had significantly greater
earning capacity at time of parties' divorce, and wife had agreed to
reduction in debtor's maintenance and child support payments
in exchange for his assuming responsibility for marital debts.
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5) [11] 51 Bankruptcy 51X
Debts Arising from Divorce or Separation 51k 3366 k. Effect of State
Law. (Formerly 51k3349 Determination of whether obligation
contained in......
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001759
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1
1. N.R.S. 125.150
West's Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated Title 11. Domestic
Relations Chapter 125. Dissolution of Marriage Divorce 125.150.
Alimony and adjudication of property rights; award of attorney's fee;
subsequent modification by court
...denied. Divorce 247 District court may consider spouse's
discharged property settlement obligation as changed circumstance
in ruling on motion for modification of alimony; modification of
alimony award based on discharged property settlement obligation
does not recreate debt discharged under federal bankruptcy
laws. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5) Siragusa v. Siragusa,
1992, 843 P.2d 807, 108 Nev. 987 rehearing...
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2
2. In re Siragusa,
27 F.3d 406, 31 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 890, Bankr. L. Rep. P 75,965,
C.A.9 (Nev.), June 20, 1994 (NO. 92-16788)
...No. 92-16788. Argued and Submitted March 18, 1994. Decided
June 20, 1994. Debtor brought action claiming that state court's
modification of alimony based on Bankruptcy Court's discharge
of property settlement violated discharge injunction. The United
States District Court for the District of Nevada Lloyd D. George ,
Chief Judge, affirmed the bankruptcy court's...
...In General 51 k 2363 Protection Against Discrimination or
Collection Efforts in General; Fresh Start. 51 k 2364 k. Discharge
as Injunction. Alimony modification based on debtor's discharge
in bankruptcy of approximately $1.2 million property settlement
obligation did not violate discharge injunction, where nothing in
record suggested that divorce court was attempting to reinstate
property...
...court stayed enforcement of the judgment for one week, and in
the interim, Dr. Siragusa filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition for the primary purpose of obtaining a discharge of the
approximately $1.2 million still owed on the property settlement.
Under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(5) , alimony debts are not
dischargeable. Therefore, the bankruptcy court required Dr.
Siragusa to pay Ms. Siragusa $7,500 a month until the alimony
arrearages that had been reduced to judgment in state court were
paid. However, because debts stemming from property
settlements are dischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C.
001760
727 , on May 4, 1988, the bankruptcy court discharged Dr.
Siragusa's property settlement obligation. Dr. Siragusa paid off the
alimony arrearages as scheduled and one day prior to the final
payment date, on August 31, 1990, Ms. Siragusa filed a motion in
divorce court to have the alimony modified, citing the discharge
of the property settlement in bankruptcy as a changed
circumstance. A Nevada divorce court referee granted the alimony
modification, ordering Dr. Siragusa to pay his ex-wife $7,500 per
month until the earlier of Ms. Siragusa's remarriage or the...
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3
3. In re Marriage of Nigorizawa,
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d, 2009 WL 596736,
Nonpublished/Noncitable (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and
8.1110, 8.1115), Cal.App. 2 Dist., March 10, 2009 (NO. B204900)
...re Siragusa (9th Cir.1994) 27 F.3d 406 Siragusa involved a
dissolution action that resulted in an award of alimony and a
property settlement that were reduced to a money judgment
before the husband's bankruptcy discharged his property
settlement obligations to the wife. Siragusa held that the money
judgment that resulted from the property settlement was a debt
discharged in bankruptcy (under a former version of the statute),
but alimony was not discharged under bankruptcy law and could
subsequently be modified...
...re Marriage of Lynn (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 120 arose in the same
posture as Siragusa, in that the husband's property settlement
obligation was discharged in a bankruptcy action five years after
the settlement was entered. After discharge of the property
settlement debt, the wife obtained an order for a modification of
spousal support, and the husband appealed. The Court of Appeal
held that the family law court could not simply substitute spousal
support...
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4
4. In re Voepel,
Not Reported in B.R., 2006 WL 2686894, Bkrtcy.D.Ariz., September
18, 2006 (NO. 02:04 19548 GBN, 02:05 00133)
...any alimony or child support obligations. He does wish to
discharge non-alimony and non-support obligations created by the
amended decree. Accordingly, the alimony and child support
obligations established in the decree will not be discharged in the
bankruptcy case. Defendant's closing brief at 1. 5. Section
523(a)(15) of the bankruptcy code provides that a Chapter 7
discharge does not discharge a debt that does not constitute
alimony or support, but is incurred in the course of a divorce, unless
(A) debtor does...
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5
5. Birt v. Birt,
208 Ariz. 546, 96 P.3d 544, Ariz.App. Div. 1, August 12, 2004 (NO.
1CA-CV 03-0258)
001761
...change in circumstances sufficient to warrant an increase in
alimony). 28 State and federal courts have held that a
bankruptcy discharge of debts allocated in part to one of the
parties to the divorce can constitute a change of circumstances to
permit a modification of the property allocation, alimony and child
support. Alyson F. Finkelstein, A Tug of War: State Divorce Courts
Versus Federal Bankruptcy Courts Regarding Debts Resulting from
Divorce, 18...
...v. Coakley, 400 N.W.2d 436, 440-41 (Minn.App.1987) (discharge
amounted to change of circumstances permitting state court to
modify maintenance and child support awards); In re Marriage
of Beardslee, 922 P.2d at 1131-33 (court could modify property
allocation after bankruptcy discharge). 29 Consistent with this
view, the Ninth Circuit held that when an ex-husband obtained a
bankruptcy discharge of...
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6
6. In re Marriage of Knopff,
Not Reported in P.3d, 118 Wash.App. 1002, 2003 WL 21907639,
Wash.App. Div. 1, August 11, 2003 (NO. 51093-2-I)
...expenses paid by the father. The automatic stay in bankruptcy
does not apply, however, to proceedings for the establishment or
modification of an order for alimony, maintenance or support.
11 U.S.C. sec. 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) And bankruptcy does not
discharge debts to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse...
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7
7. In re Blair,
291 B.R. 514, 175 Ed. Law Rep. 270, 03 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3101,
2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3958, 9th Cir.BAP (Ariz.), March 27, 2003
(NO. 01-02315-PHX-GBN, AZ-02-1168-RYPB, 01-00147-PHX)
...Because we are reversing the Order on other grounds, we need
not reach this issue. Further, ECMC contends that the bankruptcy
court's partial discharge was improper because it arbitrarily
reduced the Debts. While we do not reach that issue here, we
agree that the Record does not show sufficient analysis to support
the 50% reduction of the Debts. See Hornsby, 144 F.3d at 438 The
undue hardship exception in 523(a)(8) requires the bankruptcy
court to discharge only that portion of the debt that would
otherwise impose undue hardship. We recognize that by accepting a
bankruptcy court's equitable power to grant a partial...
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8
8. In re Marriage of Sprague & Spiegel-Sprague,
285, 2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 323, Cal.App. 4 Dist., January 09,
2003 (NO. G030108)
...added.) In In re Siragusa, supra, 27 F.3d 406, the wife filed a
motion in state court to have alimony modified based upon her
001762
ex-husband's prior bankruptcy discharge of a property
settlement obligation. Id. at p. 407.) The husband's bankruptcy
had been discharged and no bankruptcy proceeding was pending
when the wife filed the state court motion. After the state court
modified alimony, the husband filed a new complaint in
bankruptcy court alleging the modification violated the standing
injunction of title 11 United States Code section 524 , which prohibits
creditors from attempting to collect debts that were discharged in
bankruptcy. Ibid. The bankruptcy court dismissed the husband's
complaint, deferring, in the interest of comity, to the state court's
determination on...
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9
9. In re Marriage of Lynn,
7408, 2002 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9320, Cal.App. 5 Dist., August 13,
2002 (NO. F038161)
...marital settlement agreements (MSAs) upon discharge of
obligations thereunder in bankruptcy was inapplicable; (2) trial court
abused its discretion in modifying support without considering all
relevant factors; and (3) trial court abused its discretion in directing
former husband to pay former wife's attorney fees without
considering statutory factors. Reversed
West Headnotes [1] 51 Bankruptcy 51X
Discharge 51X(C) Debts and Liabilities Discharged 51X(C)2 Debts
Arising from Divorce or Separation 51 k 3365 Property Distribution
and Alimony, Maintenance, or Support...
...to her. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 524 [4] 134 Divorce 134V
Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134 k 230
Permanent Alimony 134 k 245 Modification of Judgment or
Decree 134 k 245(2) k. Grounds and Rights of Parties. Court in a
dissolution action may consider the discharge in bankruptcy of
one spouse's property settlement debt as a factor in determining
whether to modify that spouse's support obligation. [5] 134
Divorce 134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134 k
255 k. Conclusiveness of Adjudication. (Formerly 134k11.5 205...
...of marital settlement agreements (MSAs) upon discharge of
obligations thereunder in bankruptcy did not apply to former wife's
request for modification of spousal support to recover amount of
property settlement discharged in former husband's bankruptcy,
where parties' MSA did not include spousal support provision. West's
Ann.Cal.Fam.Code 3592 [12] 134 Divorce 134V Alimony,
Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134 k 230 Permanent
Alimony 134 k 245 Modification of Judgment or Decree 134 k
245(2) k. Grounds and Rights of Parties. Trial court was not required
to disregard discharge in bankruptcy of former husband's
property settlement debt to former wife in determining former
husband's obligation to pay spousal support merely because statute
governing modification of marital settlement agreement (MSA)
upon discharge of obligation thereunder in bankruptcy did not apply
to spousal support under facts...
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10
10. Lee v. Lee,
996 P.2d 389, 2000 MT 67, Mont., March 16, 2000 (NO. 98-716)
...former wife for marital property she sold after it had been
awarded to husband in dissolution decree did not retroactively
modify former husband's accrued maintenance obligation; (5)
district court could require former wife to reimburse former husband
for joint credit card debts, even though those debts had been
discharged as to former wife in bankruptcy proceeding; (6)
former wife was not entitled to offset against amount she owed
husband $5,000 received by husband in settlement...
...the maintenance awarded to her under the 1996 decree, and is
not precluded from bringing a timely action to upwardly modify this
maintenance as expressly provided in the 1996 decree. 51
Further, the District Court offset Lee's obligation to pay joint credit
card debts, which resulted from the discharge of these debts in
Johnson's bankruptcy proceedings. The court added $3,055 to the
judgment in Lee's favor. Lee contends this offset was proper, due to
the...
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11
11. In re Cervantes,
229 B.R. 19, Bankr. L. Rep. P 77,907, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 748,
98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 993, 3 Cal. Bankr. Ct. Rep. 62, 9th Cir.BAP
(Cal.), December 31, 1998 (NO. 97-5046, NC-97-1822-RYKME, 96-
56831-JRG)
...that had accrued at time assignment was executed; assigned
support rights became obligation owed to state by individual
responsible for support. Social Security Act, 456(a), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 656(a) ; 402(a)(26), as amended, 42
U.S.C.(1994 Ed.) 602(a) (26). [5] 51 Bankruptcy 51X
Debts Arising from Divorce or Separation 51 k 3365 Property
Distribution and Alimony, Maintenance, or Support 51 k 3365(2)
Property Distribution or...
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12
12. Boutte v. Nears,
7802, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,923, Cal.App. 3 Dist., October 23,
1996 (NO. C020606)
...attorney's fees were ordered as supplemental child support based
on the fact that the issue before the Court was child support
modification. DISCUSSION I Nears raises three arguments for
reversal of the court's supplemental child support order: (1) the
order, which was intended to convert a debt dischargeable in
bankruptcy (attorney fees) into a nondischargeable debt (child
support), was an impermissible attempt by a state court to
circumvent federal bankruptcy law (see In re Marriage of...
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13
13. Siragusa v. Siragusa,
108 Nev. 987, 843 P.2d 807, Bankr. L. Rep. P 75,035, Nev.,
December 03, 1992 (NO. 22043)
...Court held that: (1) district court's order adopting domestic
relations referee's recommendation is appealable; (2) district court
had jurisdiction to modify alimony award; and (3) husband's
property settlement obligation that had been discharged in
bankruptcy could be considered as changed circumstance in
ruling on motion for modification of alimony. Affirmed
West Headnotes [1] 134 Divorce 134IV
Proceedings 134IV(O) Appeal 134 k 179 k. Presentation and
Reservation in Lower Court...
...247 k. Commencement and Termination. Judgment for alimony
arrearages extends supporting spouse's alimony obligations for
period of judgment, and these alimony obligations are modifiable
until expiration of term specified in judgment. [6] 51 Bankruptcy
51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and Liabilities Discharged 51X(C)1
In General 51 k 3342 k. Effect of State Law in General.
Determination of whether obligation is dischargeable in...
...Rights of Parties. District court may consider spouse's discharged
property settlement obligation as changed circumstance in ruling
on motion for modification of alimony; modification of alimony
award based on discharged property settlement obligation does not
recreate debt discharged under federal bankruptcy laws.
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5) Graziadei & Cantor , Las Vegas,
for appellant. Shinehouse & Duesing Joshua Landish , Las Vegas...
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14
14. In re Hutchins,
113 B.R. 1, Bkrtcy.C.D.Cal., April 10, 1990 (NO. SB 89-06418 DN,
SB 89-0419 DN)
...discharged as to the supporting spouse and Debtor David M.
Hutchins. However, she has at least two alternatives: (1) declare
bankruptcy herself to discharge the debts; and/or (2) seek a
modification of the periodic support obligations for the future so
that the state court can rectify any disadvantages she has suffered
because of the changes...
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15
15. In re Marriage of Jones,
242 Mont. 119, 788 P.2d 1351, Mont., March 19, 1990 (NO. 89-429)
...and Cross-Appellant. No. 89-429. Submitted on Briefs Dec. 21,
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1989. Decided March 19, 1990. Action was brought to modify
former husband's maintenance obligation. The Fourth Judicial
District Court, Missoula County John Henson , J., awarded spousal
maintenance, and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, Barz , J.,
held that award of maintenance to former wife, following
bankruptcy discharge of former husband's property settlement
obligation, was not abuse of discretion, notwithstanding fact that
husband had acquired new obligations since divorce. Affirmed and
remanded...
...See also 97 B.R. 36 West Headnotes [1] 134 Divorce
134V Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property 134 k 230
Permanent Alimony 134 k 245 Modification of Judgment or
Decree 134 k 245(3) k. Application, Bill, or Petition, and Hearing
Thereof. Award of maintenance to former wife, following
bankruptcy discharge of former husband's property settlement
obligation, was not abuse of discretion, notwithstanding fact that
husband had acquired new obligations since divorce. [2] 134
230 Permanent Alimony 134 k 245 Modification of Judgment or
Decree 134 k 245(3) k. Application, Bill, or Petition, and Hearing
Thereof. District court was entitled to...
...failing to pay the court ordered maintenance and child support
payments. On May 22, 1989, Kenneth filed a motion for
modification of spousal maintenance after the bankruptcy court
discharged Rita's $43,594 property judgment. The District Court
entered an order dated June 13, 1989, finding in pertinent part that
Kenneth owed $8,000 in...
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16
16. In re Kullgren,
109 B.R. 949, Bkrtcy.C.D.Cal., January 05, 1990 (NO. SA 88-02244
JR, SA 88-0489 JR)
...Courts; Proceedings in General 51II(C) Costs and Fees 51 k 2182
Grounds and Circumstances 51 k 2185 k. Dischargeability
Determinations; Consumer Debt Issues. Award of fees and costs to
debtors under Bankruptcy Code provision justifying such award
when unsuccessful dischargeability complaint is brought in
connection with consumer debt was warranted, where neither
original nor amended complaint showed any factual support for
filing. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 523(d) [6] 170A Federal Civil
Procedure 170AXX Sanctions 170AXX(B) Grounds for Imposition...
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to
Print
17
17. In re Marriage of Myers,
54 Wash.App. 233, 773 P.2d 118, 58 USLW 2026, Wash.App. Div. 3,
May 23, 1989 (NO. 9097-3-III)
...230 Permanent Alimony 134 k 245 Modification of Judgment or
Decree 134 k 245(2) k. Grounds and Rights of Parties. Upward
001766
modification of ex-wife's spousal maintenance was supported by
the facts; although there was a dispute over ex-husband's earning
ability at time of dissolution, his actual income later increased and
his financial condition was also considerably improved by
bankruptcy which resulted in a discharge of many of his debts.
Jerry Sorlien, Atty. at Law, Moses Lake, for appellant. Ronald
McAdams, McAdams, Ponti & Junke, Walla Walla, for respondent.
SHIELDS, Judge. Edward R. Myers appeals a modification of
spousal maintenance in the decree of dissolution of his marriage to
Mary Jean Myers. The primary question presented is whether the
court...
...failing to comply with it. That motion was denied by the court
because Mr. Myers' obligation to pay the parties' debts was part of
the property division. Mr. Myers was discharged of the debts in
bankruptcy. Mrs. Myers then brought this motion to modify
spousal maintenance, introducing evidence of collection efforts and
lawsuits filed against her over the discharged debts. She also
introduced evidence the Buick...
...five year period for which maintenance was awarded. Mr. Myers
contends the court erred in considering any evidence relating to
debts he discharged in bankruptcy as a basis for modifying
spousal maintenance. He summarizes his argument as follows: The
ex-husband was granted relief from liability on the debts of the
parties...
Tag
to
Print
18
18. In re Edwards,
91 B.R. 95, Bkrtcy.C.D.Cal., April 15, 1988 (NO. LA 86-22518-NCA,
LA 88-00139-NCA)
...violation of the supremacy clause of the constitution. It is possible
to readjust the relative position of the spouses by modification of a
spousal support order, taking into consideration the amount of
property obligations discharged by one spouse in bankruptcy.
There is nothing in the provisions of Civil Code 4812 nor in the
legislative history behind it to suggest...
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to
Print
19
19. In re Marriage of Williams,
157 Cal.App.3d 1215, 203 Cal.Rptr. 909, Cal.App. 5 Dist., June 29,
1984 (NO. CIV. 7116, F000447)
...of creditor to offset mutual debt make it clear that offset cannot
be used to revive in state court proceeding debt which is already
discharged in bankruptcy; setoff provisions are applicable only in
bankruptcy court. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 524 553 [8] 134
230 Permanent Alimony 134 k 245 Modification of Judgment or
Decree 134 k 245(1) k. Power and Authority. 134 Divorce 134V
Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property...
001767
...for support of spouse in event that obligations for property
settlement to spouse or support of spouse were discharged in
bankruptcy, intended to redress inequities which could result from
bankruptcy discharge of community debts assigned to one
spouse to extent it was possible to do so within limitations imposed
by supremacy of bankruptcy law, by, e.g., permitting modification
of spousal support order, but legislature did not intend to go
beyond scope of bankruptcy law to reach and modify final property
settlements...
...wife pursuant to property division of marital dissolution decree
were made periodically did not convert property division into
provision for alimony, support, or maintenance which could be
modified following wife's discharge in bankruptcy of her
corresponding debt to husband and increase in his liabilities by
discharging debts which decree ordered her to pay. Bankr.Code, 11
U.S.C.A. ...
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to
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20
20. In re Shaver,
40 B.R. 964, D.Nev., September 30, 1983 (NO. 82-157, CV-R-83-
135-ECR, 82-192)
...In General. (Formerly 51k3348.5 51k421(5) Payments to be made
by debtor to his former wife pursuant to agreement incorporated in
amended divorce decree constituted alimony which was not
dischargeable in bankruptcy, where debt was payable in
installments over substantial period of time, obligation was to
terminate at wife's death, division of property and...
Tag
to
Print
21
21. In re Marriage of Clements,
134 Cal.App.3d 737, 184 Cal.Rptr. 756, Cal.App. 1 Dist., July 09,
1982 (NO. CIV. 48201)
...appellant. Merrill, Thiessen & Gagen, P.C., Danville, for
respondent. MILLER, Associate Justice. In this case we examine the
discharge of a debt by the federal bankruptcy court when the
bankrupt spouse was required to make payments on the
discharged obligation as part of a property settlement agreement
ordered by a state family law court. The precise question presented
by this appeal is whether the court below erred in reducing the
bankrupt spouse's monthly support to reflect payments ultimately
made on the discharged obligation by the non-bankrupt spouse
who remained personally liable on the community debt. We
conclude that no error was made. William and Marlene Clements
were married in 1955. Their marriage was dissolved by...
...William. Civ.Code, 4358.) Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Act
provides that the liability of a codebtor of the bankrupt is not
discharged by the bankrupt's discharge. 11 U.S.C. 524(e).
001768
Because this debt had been assigned to Marlene as part of the
equal division of community property, on February 9, 1978, William
obtained an order from the trial court allowing him to reduce
Marlene's spousal support in direct proportion to the payments he
was making to C.I.T. Financial. Marlene's spousal support payments
of $1,000 per month...
...court thereupon reinstated the trial court's order allowing William
to deduct any payments made on the C.I.T. obligation from
Marlene's support. [2] [3] The Bankruptcy Act as amended in
1978 ( 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(5)) and its predecessor ( 11 U.S.C.
35(a)(7))
4
provide that a discharge in bankruptcy shall release a
bankrupt from all provable debts except debts due to a spouse,
former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance
for, or support of such...
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to
Print
22
22. Myhers v. Myhers,
6 Cal.App.3d 855, 86 Cal.Rptr. 356, Cal.App. 2 Dist., April 23, 1970
(NO. CIV. 35012)
...effective 1 January 1970.) Appellant argues that since the weekly
payments were non-modifiable they amounted to a division of
property and hence became a liability dischargeable in
bankruptcy. However, we see no necessary connection between
modifiability and dischargeability. Prior to entering the separation
agreement, Freda, like any wife, had a potential right to an
allowance for support and maintenance, an allowance which would
be (1) modifiable by the courts, and (2) non-dischargeable in
bankruptcy. Under the separation agreement she gave up her right
to a...
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to
Print
23
23. Roberts v. Roberts,
261 Cal.App.2d 424, 68 Cal.Rptr. 59, Cal.App. 1 Dist., April 23, 1968
(NO. CIV.24417)
...Authority. With respect to property settlement agreements which
contain pure or severable provisions for periodic payments in the
nature of alimony, such payments may be modified by subsequent
court order and may not be discharged in bankruptcy. West's
Ann.Civ.Code, 139 ; Bankr.Act, 17, sub. a(2), 11 U.S.C.A.
35(a) (2) [2] 51 Bankruptcy 51X Discharge 51X(C) Debts and
Separation 51 k 3365 Property Distribution and Alimony,
Maintenance, or Support...
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to
Print
24
24. Fernandes v. Pitta,
47 Cal.App.2d 248, 117 P.2d 728, Cal.App. 3 Dist., October 09, 1941
(NO. CIV 6567)
001769
...Bankruptcy Act, section 35 found on pages 177 and 178 of Title
11 U.S.C.A . That section provides in part: A discharge in
bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable
debts, except * * * for alimony due or to become due, or for
maintenance or support of wife or child. [2] In the Dunbar case,
supra, it was held that liability for the support and maintenance
of children, even though reduced to judgment, is not provable in a
bankrupt proceeding so as to release the debtor therefrom. This
exception to the...
Tag
to
Print
25
25. Lewis v. Roberts,
267 U.S. 467, 45 S.Ct. 357, 37 A.L.R. 1440, 69 L.Ed. 739, U.S.Ala.,
March 16, 1925 (NO. 284)
...for the support of herself and their minor children under a final
decree of absolute divorce was not a provable debt which was
released by the bankrupt's discharge. The ground of the decision
was that the court could look into the proceedings to determine the
nature of the liability which had been reduced to judgment; that a
decree awarding alimony was not in any just sense a debt which
had been put into the form of a judgment, but rather...
Tag
to
Print
26
26. Egbers v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.,
98 Wash. 531, 167 P. 1073, Wash., October 17, 1917 (NO. 13949)
...law gives them as against the husband and father. The foregoing
decisions hold that no allowances in the way of alimony, whether
they be subject to modification or not so subject, are barred by a
bankrupt's discharge, since they are not provable debts under
the act of 1898. The Bankruptcy Act of 1903 (Act Feb. 5, 1903, c.
487, 32 Stat. 797), which...
001770
Close Print
what i wanted
Sent: Mon 3/16/09 3:58 PM
To: dpringle@washoelegalservices.org
87 A.L.R.4th 353 (Originally published in 1991)
ALR4th
Divorce: court's authority to institute or increase spousal support award after discharge of
prior property award in bankruptcy
Gavin L. Phillips, J.D.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Article Outline
Research References
ARTICLE OUTLINE
II Institution of Support Award
III Increase in Support Award
2[a] Summary and commentGenerally
2[b] Summary and commentPractice pointers
II Institution of Support Award
3 In absence of reservation of jurisdiction by trial court
III Increase in Support Award
4 Discharge of property settlement debt to dependent spouse
5 Discharge of joint debt to third party
6 Apportionment of debt as condition for waiver of support award by dependent spouse
Research References
United States
11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5). See 2[b]
11 U.S.C.A. 524. See 4
001771
Ninth Circuit
Emelity, In re, 251 B.R. 151 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2000) 4
Tenth Circuit
Danley, In re, 14 B.R. 493 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1981) 2[b], 5
Alabama
Smith v. Smith, 741 So. 2d 420 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) 4
California
Clements, In re Marriage of, 134 Cal. App. 3d 737, 184 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1st Dist. 1982) 5
Williams, In re Marriage of, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1215, 203 Cal. Rptr. 909 (5th Dist. 1984) 5
Indiana
Kruse v. Kruse, 464 N.E.2d 934 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) 2[b], 5
Minnesota
Coakley v. Coakley, 400 N.W.2d 436, 87 A.L.R.4th 339 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) 2[b], 4
Stolp v. Stolp, 383 N.W.2d 409 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) 3
Nevada
Siragusa v. Siragusa, 108 Nev. 987, 843 P.2d 807 (1992) 4
Rhode Island
Hopkins v. Hopkins, 487 A.2d 500 (R.I. 1985) 2[b], 3, 6
Utah
Beckstead v. Beckstead, 663 P.2d 47 (Utah 1983) 4
Washington
Myers, In re Marriage of, 54 Wash. App. 233, 773 P.2d 118 (Div. 3 1989) 5
Wisconsin
Eckert v. Eckert, 144 Wis. 2d 770, 424 N.W.2d 759 (Ct. App. 1988) 4
Wyoming
Macy v. Macy, 714 P.2d 774 (Wyo. 1986) 2[b]
Richardson v. Richardson, 868 P.2d 259 (Wyo. 1994) 4
I. Preliminary Matters
This annotation collects and discusses the reported cases in which the courts have addressed the
issue of whether a court granting a judgment, decree, or order of absolute divorce[FN1] has the power
subsequently to institute a spousal support[FN2] award or to increase a spousal support award[FN3]
001772
where the property award[FN4] obligation of the payor spouse is discharged in a subsequent
bankruptcy proceeding.
A number of jurisdictions may have rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or legislative
enactments bearing upon this subject. Since these are discussed herein only to the extent that they are
reflected in the reported cases within the scope of this annotation, the reader is advised to consult the
appropriate statutory or regulatory compilations.
Related Annotations are located under the Research References heading of this Annotation.
2[a] Summary and commentGenerally
Although the concepts of equitable division of marital property and alimony or support are related in
that equitable distribution statutes seek to replace the concept of postmarital support through alimony
with one of postmarital stability through a just distribution of marital property and assets,[FN5] debts
owed to a former spouse of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such former
spouse are excepted from discharge in bankruptcy while a liability of the debtor to the former spouse
which is pursuant to an award of property and not in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support is
dischargeable.[FN6] Thus, where an obligation to a former spouse pursuant to a property award of the
divorce court has been discharged in the bankruptcy of the payor spouse, the divorce court may be
requested to institute a support award or to modify an existing support award to the dependent former
spouse on the grounds that the discharge of the obligation resulted in a substantial change in the
financial circumstances of the dependent former spouse, raising the issue of the authority of the court
to initiate or to modify such an award after the court has handed down the final divorce decree.
A divorce may be rendered that permanently relieves a spouse from liability to pay alimony in any
sum. Such, of course, is the effect of a divorce decree that expressly provides against alimony. There is
authority, moreover, for the view that the same relief from alimony is obtained where a decree could
have awarded, but did not award, alimony and does not contain a reservation of a right to award
alimony subsequently.[FN7]
On the other hand, a trial court that does not make any award of alimony when granting a divorce
has the power to reserve to the dependent spouse the right to apply for alimony at a future date.[FN8]
In a case in which the court has power or authority to award permanent alimony, whether it should be
allowed in the particular case is a matter of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised with reference to
established principles and in view of all the circumstances of that particular case,[FN9] including the
needs of the dependent spouse and the financial ability of the payor spouse.[FN10] But it has been
held that, in the absence of an initial award of support or the reservation of jurisdiction by the court
with regard to the issue of support in a divorce case, the divorce court did not have jurisdiction to
institute an award of support to the dependent spouse where a property settlement award to the
dependent spouse was subsequently discharged in the bankruptcy of the payor spouse ( 3).
A decree granting permanent alimony payable periodically is a final judgment to which the doctrine
of res judicata applies, and although the statute may authorize a modification of the decree, the
petitioner, in the absence of fraud or concealment in or at the time of the procurement of the decree
and to avoid the res judicata effect of the decree must show a substantial change in the material
circumstances since the decree was entered.[FN11] One of the chief grounds for modification of an
allowance of alimony is a material change in the financial circumstances of the parties.[FN12] For
example, some courts have held that the discharge, in a bankruptcy proceeding, of a property
settlement debt of the payor spouse to the dependent spouse constituted such a material change in the
financial circumstances of the parties so as to permit the divorce court to make an upward modification
of the support award to the dependent spouse ( 4).
Where a joint debt of the parties to a marital dissolution was apportioned to the payor spouse as
part of the division of marital property and the debt was subsequently discharged in the payor's
bankruptcy, leaving the dependent spouse liable to the third-party creditor, the authority of the divorce
court to award an upward modification in the support to the dependent spouse has been upheld ( 5).
Furthermore, the authority of the court to order the payor spouse to indemnify the dependent spouse
for liability to third-party creditors for joint debts which were discharged in the payor's bankruptcy
proceeding has been upheld as a modification of an alimony award where the dependent spouse had
001773
waived the right to alimony in the divorce on condition that the debt be apportioned to the payor
spouse ( 6).
2[b] Summary and commentPractice pointers
There is authority to the effect that a state court has concurrent jurisdiction with a bankruptcy court
to determine whether a debt is exempt from discharge as a debt owed to a spouse or former spouse
for alimony, maintenance, or support under 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5), and thus, the dependent spouse
may bring a contest to dischargeability of a debt in either an appropriate state court or in the
bankruptcy court. Where an evidentiary hearing has been held in the bankruptcy court with both parties
represented, counsel for the payor spouse could argue that it is inappropriate for the state court to re-
examine the dischargeability of the listed debts. But counsel for the dependent spouse could argue that
the state court in such a case is not precluded from re-examining the award of support made to the
dependent spouse in the initial divorce decree to determine if the discharge of a debt owed to the
dependent spouse in the bankruptcy of the payor spouse constitutes such a change in the financial
circumstances of the parties so as to justify an upward modification of the support award.[FN13]
Where there has been no formal decree of support to a dependent spouse in a marital dissolution
case but the payor spouse has been ordered by the trial court to make a payment to a third-party
creditor, counsel for the dependent spouse could argue that the ordering of payment in such a manner
is the equivalent of a decree for support when petitioning the court for a modification of support after
the payor spouse has obtained a discharge of the debt in a bankruptcy proceeding.[FN14]
Where a dependent spouse files a petition in state court to modify an award of support subsequent
to the grant of a judgment of dissolution of marriage, counsel for the dependent spouse can request in
the petition that the modification, if granted, be made retroactive to the date of the filing of the
petition.[FN15] Furthermore, where the dependent spouse files a petition for modification of a divorce
decree with respect to support, counsel for the payor spouse can file an answer and counterclaim for
modification to the petition rather than make an oral motion for modification on the date of hearing of
the petition.[FN16]
Where the dependent spouse has made a petition for a modification of a support award to the court
on the ground that the discharge of a property award in bankruptcy of the payor spouse constitutes
changed circumstances and the modification is denied without an opinion, counsel for the dependent
spouse can argue on appeal that the lower court should have made detailed findings as to the changed
circumstances, such as the increase in the income of the obligor spouse as a result of the discharge in
bankruptcy and the corresponding reduction in assets and income of the obligee spouse.[FN17]
In the event that a state court grants a modification of a support award as a means of redressing a
change in the circumstances of the parties as the result of a bankruptcy discharge of a property
settlement of the payor spouse, if, in the payor spouse's perception, the balance is not properly struck,
or if some penalty for noncompliance is imposed which seems inappropriate to the payor spouse, it may
be appropriate for counsel for the payor spouse to appeal the decision in the state court system and
not attempt a lateral shift to the federal bankruptcy court system, because the bankruptcy court will not
reopen a closed case in order to afford relief from a state court order entered after the bankruptcy has
closed.[FN18]
II. Institution of Support Award
3. In absence of reservation of jurisdiction by trial court
It was held by the court in the following case that, in the absence of an initial award of support or
the reservation of jurisdiction by the court with regard to the issue of support in a marital dissolution
case, the court did not have jurisdiction to institute an award of support to the dependent spouse
where a property settlement debt of the payor spouse to the dependent spouse was subsequently
discharged in bankruptcy.
In Stolp v Stolp (1986, Minn App) 383 NW2d 409, the court held that a trial court, which, in its
original judgment of divorce, did not award spousal maintenance nor reserve jurisdiction to award it in
the future, had no jurisdiction to make an award of maintenance subsequent to the divorce where a
spouse had discharged a property settlement debt in bankruptcy. Thus, the court reversed the trial
court, noting that the statutes authorize a divorce court to grant maintenance if the spouse seeking it
001774
lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him or her, to provide for his or her
reasonable needs and to reserve the issue of maintenance for future determination. The court observed
that, if alimony is granted in accordance with the terms of the statutory requirements, a divorce court
retains jurisdiction to modify the decree at a later time, but where, as in this case, the decree did not
specifically reserve jurisdiction of the issue of alimony for determination at a later date, no such
jurisdiction can later be claimed.
See Hopkins v Hopkins (1985, RI) 487 A2d 500, 6, in which the waiver of alimony by the
dependent spouse in return for the allocation of a joint debt to the payor spouse is treated by the court
as an award in the nature of alimony.
III. Increase in Support Award
4. Discharge of property settlement debt to dependent spouse
In the following cases, the courts held that the discharge of a property settlement obligation of the
payor spouse in a bankruptcy proceeding constituted such a change in the financial circumstances of
the parties to a divorce as to permit the divorce court to make an upward modification in the support
award to the dependent spouse.
The court in Coakley v Coakley (1987, Minn App) 400 NW2d 436, 87 ALR4th 339, upheld the
authority of the trial court to review maintenance and support awards and adjust them accordingly
where a property award to the dependent spouse was discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding of the
payor spouse, because, according to the court, the payor spouse had been released from his debt
obligations and had thereby done damage to the financial circumstances of the dependent spouse. The
court observed that a trial court retains its jurisdiction to amend maintenance and child support awards
as the circumstances might require; that an obligation to pay maintenance or child support may be
modified upon a showing that a substantial change of circumstances has occurred that makes the
original order unreasonable and unfair; and that the trial court's determination must be supported by
findings that reveal its consideration of the factors listed in the statute. The court found that the trial
court made detailed findings including the fact that the property settlement payment awarded by the
divorce court to the dependent spouse and the liability of the payor spouse on nonhomestead debts
that were to be satisfied from the sale of the marital homestead were discharged in the bankruptcy
relief afforded to the payor spouse.
See Beckstead v Beckstead (1983, Utah) 663 P2d 47, in which the court affirmed a trial court's
authority to modify a decree for alimony in a divorce case where the former wife's share of the
proceeds from the sale of the marital home was reduced by the amount of a mortgage, the proceeds of
which had been loaned to the parties' daughter; the wife received in return the daughter's obligation to
the parties for the loan they had made to her; and the daughter's debt was subsequently discharged in
bankruptcy. The court found that the bankruptcy discharge had denied the wife a portion of the
proceeds which it was contemplated she would receive from the home and that the property settlement
was inextricably involved with the alimony award.
In Eckert v Eckert (1988, App) 144 Wis 2d 770, 424 NW2d 759, CCH Bankr L Rptr 72334, the court
held that the payor spouse's discharge in bankruptcy of his property division obligation to the
dependent spouse in a marital dissolution constituted a change in financial circumstances of the parties
which justified the divorce court's exercise of its discretion under the statute to make an upward
modification of the dependent spouse's maintenance award where the court found that, following a
bankruptcy discharge, the payor spouse no longer had a legal obligation to pay a property division
equalization payment, a predivorce debt, or court-ordered contribution to the dependent spouse's
attorney's fees. The court stated that a revision of a divorce judgment to alter maintenance payments
could be made only upon a showing of a substantial change in the financial circumstances of the
parties; that the first step in a substantial change analysis is a factual inquiry, and the second step
requires a conclusion of law as to whether the changed circumstances are substantial; and that, when
modifying maintenance and its duration, a court could consider everything having a legitimate bearing
on the present and prospective matters relating to the lives of the divorcing parties.
001775
Cases:
Ex-husband's Chapter 7 discharge, which relieved him of any obligations upon property settlement
award entered by state divorce court, did not preclude divorce court from modifying its alimony award
based upon "changed circumstances," such as discharge of property settlement debt. Bankr. Code, 11
U.S.C.A. 524. In re Emelity, 251 B.R. 151 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2000).
Increase in former wife's debt as result of former husband's bankruptcy was sufficient change in
circumstances to warrant upward modification of former husband's alimony obligation, and did not
violate Bankruptcy Code even though former wife's financial problems resulted from discharge of former
husband's alimony in gross obligation in bankruptcy proceeding. Smith v. Smith, 741 So. 2d 420 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1999).
In post-divorce proceeding, court did not err in modifying husband's alimony obligation by
continuing it beyond term called for in decree where original decree called for husband to make alimony
payments to wife of $3,000 per month for sixty months, where decree also required husband to pay
wife $1.250 million over fifteen years for her share of community property interest in husband's medical
practice, where husband fell behind in his payments and his property settlement obligation was later
discharged in bankruptcy although his alimony obligation was not, where court properly considered
discharged obligation as "changed circumstance" justifying modification in that discharge of obligation
had changed both husband's and wife's financial circumstances, and where modification of alimony
award based upon discharged property settlement obligation did not re-create debt discharged under
federal bankruptcy laws. Siragusa v Siragusa (1992) 108 Nev 987, 843 P2d 807, CCH Bankr L Rptr
75035.
Significant body of law consistently supports treatment of post-divorce bankruptcy discharge of
obligation under divorce decree as change of circumstances justifying modification of maintenance.
Richardson v Richardson (1994, Wyo) 868 P2d 259 (citing annotation).
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
5. Discharge of joint debt to third party
The courts in the following cases held or recognized that the trial court had the authority to modify
a support award to the dependent spouse where a joint debt of the parties, which was apportioned to
the payor spouse, was subsequently discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding of the payor spouse
leaving the dependent spouse liable to the third-party creditor.
The court in In re Marriage of Clements (1982, 1st Dist) 134 Cal App 3d 737, 184 Cal Rptr 756, a
case which involved the discharge in bankruptcy of joint debt obligations apportioned to one spouse,
stated in dictum that the statute had been amended to specifically provide that the divorce court might
consider a discharged property settlement as a change that might justify modification of spousal
support. The court observed that proper grounds might always be presented for the purpose of
modifying or revoking an award of spousal support under the statute; but the applicant must show the
economic situation of the parties had changed, since it is the economic relation which is to be affected
by a proposed modification.
To the same effect see In re Marriage of Williams (1984, 5th Dist) 157 Cal App 3d 1215, 203 Cal
Rptr 909, in which the court reviewed the legislative history of the statute and determined that it was
designed specifically to redress the type of inequity which arises in a case where one spouse, having
accepted assignment of certain of the community debts, subsequently discharges those debts in
bankruptcy and leaves the other spouse exposed to individual liability in derogation of an equal division
of the community property. However, the court rejected the suggestion that the legislature intended to
or believed it could reach and modify final property settlements, notwithstanding the inequities which
result from discharges in bankruptcy of community debts or other property settlement obligations.
See Kruse v Kruse (1984, Ind App) 464 NE2d 934, in which the court held that the trial court did not
commit error when it found that the discharge in bankruptcy of the payor spouse resulted in a
substantial and continuing change of circumstances that justified an upward modification in the child
001776
support award made when the parties were divorced, where the trial court had found that the payor
spouse's weekly paycheck deductions were reduced due to his bankruptcy; that the bankruptcy
proceeding discharged the payor spouse from the court-ordered payment of the second mortgage on
the family home and from payment of the loan on the van used by the dependent spouse as
transportation for herself and the children; that the second mortgagee sued to foreclose on the family
home and had received judgment; and that the resulting increased costs for suitable housing and the
loss of the van which the dependent spouse needed to maintain her employment were a substantial
change in circumstances affecting the children's needs.
In Re Danley (1981, F BC DC NM) 14 BR 493, 5 CBC2d 296, CCH Bankr L Rptr 68361 (applying
New Mexico law), the bankruptcy court held that the discharge in bankruptcy of community debts
assigned to the payor spouse was such a changed circumstance as to permit state court action to
modify the support award; the court found that it was clear from the decision of the divorce court that
payment by the payor spouse of the community debts was a significant factor in the initial spousal
support award and that jurisdiction was reserved by the divorce court to deal with any changed
circumstance. Furthermore, the court found that the use of the sum of the discharged debts as a
measure of the change in support, while it frustrated to some extent the federal policy of a fresh start
for debtors discharged in bankruptcy, was properly understood as an exception to discharge for a
support obligation.
The court in Re Marriage of Myers (1989) 54 Wash App 233, 773 P2d 118, upheld the trial court's
consideration of the bankruptcy discharge of debts, which became the sole obligation of the dependent
spouse under a marital dissolution decree, in an upward modification of the spousal maintenance
awarded under the decree. The creditors had pursued the dependent spouse for satisfaction of the
debts after the discharge of the payor spouse. The court noted that the ultimate decision to modify
maintenance must be based upon a substantial change in the needs of the spouse receiving
maintenance and the ability of the other spouse to pay. The court cited In re Marriage of Clements
(1982, 1st Dist) 134 Cal App 3d 737, 184 Cal Rptr 756, this section, as authority for the proposition
that bankruptcy is one of many facts to consider in a modification of spousal maintenance.
6. Apportionment of debt as condition for waiver of support award by dependent spouse
In the following case, the court upheld the authority of the trial court to order the payor spouse to
indemnify the dependent spouse, as a support award, for liability to third-party creditors whose debts
were discharged in the payor spouse's bankruptcy proceeding where the dependent spouse had waived
the right to support in the divorce case in return for the apportionment of the debts to the payor
spouse.
The court in Hopkins v Hopkins (1985, RI) 487 A2d 500, affirmed a trial court judgment that the
payor spouse indemnify the dependent spouse as to certain joint debts incurred during the course of
their marriage, where the judgment was based upon a finding by the trial court that the dependent
spouse's waiver of alimony was conditioned upon the payor spouse's agreement to assume the debts.
The court stated that the trial court was entitled to modify the previous alimony decree where it had
found that (1) the initial indemnification was in the nature of alimony, and (2) there had been a change
in circumstances since the original decree by the discharge of the debts in bankruptcy; and that, while
the discharge in bankruptcy of the debts was final as to the relationship between the payor spouse and
third-party creditors, it was not as to the relationship between the payor spouse and the dependent
spouse.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
West's Key Number Digest, Divorce 234
West's Key Number Digest, Divorce 245(1)
001777
A.L.R. Library
Index to Annotations, Alimony
Index to Annotations, Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Index to Annotations, Divorce and Separation
Index to Annotations, Property Settlements
Index to Annotations, Separate Property
Retirement of Husband as Change of Circumstances Warranting Modification of Divorce DecreeEarly
Retirement, 36 A.L.R.6th 1
Retirement of Husband as Change of Circumstances Warranting Modification of Divorce Decree
Prospective Retirement, 110 A.L.R.5th 237
Excessiveness or inadequacy of lump-sum alimony award, 49 A.L.R.5th 441
Spouse's right to set off debt owed by other spouse against accrued spousal or child support payments,
11 A.L.R.5th 259
Power to modify spousal support award for a limited term, issued in conjunction with divorce, so as to
extend the term or make the award permanent, 62 A.L.R.4th 180
Divorce: excessiveness or adequacy of trial court's property awardmodern cases, 56 A.L.R.4th 12
Divorce: excessiveness or adequacy of combined property division and spousal support awards
modern cases, 55 A.L.R.4th 14
Enforceability of premarital agreements governing support or property rights upon divorce or separation
as affected by fairness or adequacy of those termsmodern status, 53 A.L.R.4th 161
Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded as permanent alimony following divorce, 28
A.L.R.4th 786
Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded for alimony and child support combined, 27
A.L.R.4th 1038
Excessiveness or adequacy of money awarded as temporary alimony, 26 A.L.R.4th 1218
Validity and enforceability of escalation clause in divorce decree relating to alimony and child support,
19 A.L.R.4th 830
Divorce: power of court to modify decree for alimony or support of spouse which was based on
agreement of parties, 61 A.L.R.3d 520
Retrospective increase in allowance for alimony, separate maintenance, or support, 52 A.L.R.3d 156
Obligation under property settlement agreement between spouses as dischargeable in bankruptcy, 74
A.L.R.2d 758
Domestic divorce decree without adjudication as to alimony, rendered on personal service or equivalent,
as precluding later alimony award, 43 A.L.R.2d 1387
Trial court's jurisdiction as to alimony or maintenance pending appeal of matrimonial action, 19 A.L.R.2d
001778
703
Change in financial condition or needs of husband or wife as ground for modification of decree for
alimony or maintenance, 18 A.L.R.2d 10
Retrospective modification of, or refusal to enforce, decree for alimony, separate maintenance, or
support, 6 A.L.R.2d 1277
Creditor's right to have bankruptcy discharge of individual debtor revoked, vacated, and set aside, 138
A.L.R. Fed. 253
Debts for alimony, maintenance, and support as exceptions to bankruptcy discharge, under 523(a)(5)
of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5)), 69 A.L.R. Fed. 403
Legal Encyclopedias
Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation 685, 689, 690, 692, 696, 699, 702-703, 710-713, 715-717
Treatises and Practice Aids
Bankruptcy Service, L. Ed. 7:118-7:120
Bankruptcy Service, L. Ed. 22:75
Trial Strategy
Modification of Spousal Support Award, 32 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 491
Spousal Support on Termination of Marriage, 32 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 439
Forensic EconomicsUse of Economists in Cases of Dissolution of Marriage, 17 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts
2d 345
Wife's Ability to Support Herself, 2 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 99
Alimony, 1 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 452
Defense Against Wife's Action for Support, 17 Am. Jur. Trials 721 48-49
Separate Maintenance Proceedings, 7 Am. Jur. Trials 121 91-92
Forms
1 Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Alimony Agreements 17:21-17:26, 17:71-17:86, 17:88
8A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Divorce and Separation, Forms 386, 474, 513-515, 517, 671,
792-793, 811-813, 816-817, 821-825
001779
Additional References
Boolean Search Query: property or debt w/12 discharg! w/10 bankrupt! w/35 (modif! or amend! or
reopen! or reduc!) w/8 (alimony or support or maintenance)
Section 1[a] Footnotes:
[FN1] Temporary alimony or support during periods of separation or divorce a mensa et
thoro are beyond the scope of this annotation.
[FN2] This annotation includes cases which deal with an award of spousal support, whether
described as support, alimony, or maintenance.
[FN3] Awards of "alimony in gross" or "lump-sum alimony," insofar as these represent
property distributions even though payable in installments, are excluded from the annotation,
which is concerned solely with spousal support awards not representing a property
distribution.
[FN4] This annotation includes cases in which the court allocates to one spouse as part of
the property division a joint debt of the parties to a third-party creditor.
Section 2[a] Footnotes:
[FN5] Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation 872.
[FN6] Am. Jur. 2d, Bankruptcy 801, 802.
Section 2[b] Footnotes:
[FN13] Hopkins v Hopkins (1985, RI) 487 A2d 500.
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[FN14] Hopkins v Hopkins (1985, RI) 487 A2d 500.
[FN15] Kruse v Kruse (1984, Ind App) 464 NE2d 934.
[FN16] Macy v Macy (1986, Wyo) 714 P2d 774.
[FN17] Coakley v Coakley (1987, Minn App) 400 NW2d 436, 87 ALR4th 339.
[FN18] Re Danley (1981, F BC DC NM) 14 BR 493, 5 CBC2d 296, CCH Bankr L Rptr 68361
(applying New Mexico law).
Westlaw. 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
87 A.L.R.4th 353
END OF DOCUMENT
001781
Close Print
motion for reconsideration and appeal in Joshi
Sent: Sun 4/19/09 8:11 PM
To: dpringle@washoelegalservices.org; zcoughlin@washoelegalservices.org
Hi Deb,
please calendar the motion for reconsideration and the appeal in Joshi. Get Bharti a copy of this ALR
section I pasted below. Judge Gardner wanted more discovery sent out.
Basically, I believe Judge Gardners decision is quite wrong. I have the ALR's to prove it. There is case
law that says that say, if we had won on the alimony but lost on the property settlement in the sense
that Bharti was stuck with half the community debt, Ashwin could not use Bharti's failure to pay those
credit cards as a reason to set off his alimony payments less that amount. Basically courts protect
support obligations at the expense of contractual obligations.
26[b] Payments made by supporting spouse for other purposesSetoff not allowed
The court in each of the following cases determined that an offset against an arrearage of alimony for payments to
various third parties on behalf of a former spouse, including tuition and sums spent in satisfaction of a bank loan
or credit card charges, would not be permitted.
The court in Morel v Morel (1982, La App 5th Cir) 425 So 2d 1289, cert den (La) 430 So 2d 99, refused to allow
as an offset against delinquent alimony pendente lite and child support several noncomplying expenditures by the
husband, including the payment of the children's tuition, a community debt, when the amount expended could be
recovered by him at the time of the settlement of the marital community, and the payment was not made pursuant
to the spouses' agreement. A request by the wife that the husband make such payments during a later time period
was found irrelevant to the instant indirect payments.
Where the wife testified that she used the credit card to "balance out" household expenses for herself and the
children while the couple was separated, the court in Youngberg v Youngberg (1986, La App 4th Cir) 499 So 2d
329, would not permit an offset against postdivorce permanent alimony and child support arrearages for one-half
of the credit card charges. The husband had been ordered to pay alimony pendente lite and child support during
the period in which the charges were made, but was current in his payments at that time, and asserted that the wife
made the charges without the his permission. The wife maintained that the credit card charges were for expenses
for which the husband was responsible. The court concluded that neither spouse intended such a credit when the
husband paid the credit card account balance, denying the offset apparently based on the lack of evidence of an
agreement between the parties.
In Gottsegen v Gottsegen (1987, La App 4th Cir) 508 So 2d 162, the facts of which are more fully stated in
22[a], the court disallowed credit against past-due permanent alimony for pre-award payments made on
veterinarian and cable television bills when those items could not be considered necessary for the wife's support,
pursuant to La.R.S. 9:310, which provided for the retroactive effect of such awards subject to credit for any
support provided.
Credit card charges for the purchase of luggage and an airline ticket by the wife immediately prior to separation,
which apparently fell to the husband to pay, were not offset against arrears in alimony pendente lite by the court in
001782
Rauch v Rauch (1988, La App 5th Cir) 535 So 2d 1317, the facts of which are more fully discussed in 24[b],
when the husband's claim was not "liquidated" within the meaning of LSA-C.C. art. 1893, the statutory setoff
provision.
Although affirming the lower court's postponement of a decision respecting the husband's right to credit until the
divorce trial because this aspect of the decision was not appealed, the court in Keff v Keff (1983, 3d Dept) 95 App
Div 2d 888, 464 NYS2d 29, remarked that a judgment requiring the husband to pay the full amount of the claimed
arrears in temporary maintenance and child support would have been appropriate, notwithstanding a claimed setoff
for amounts paid by him for attorney's fees owed by the wife. The court noted that the husband neither moved for
relief of the support order, nor proffered any reason for his neglect, and his unilateral reduction of support was
improper.
The court in Gluck v Gluck (1987, 2d Dept) 134 App Div 2d 237, 520 NYS2d 581, concluded that a husband's
payment of the spouses' credit card bills, apparently prior to divorce, could not be offset against arrears in
(temporary) maintenance and child support owed to his wife.
And, in Kerpen v Kerpen (1991, 2d Dept) 172 App Div 2d 496, 567 NYS2d 849, the court refused to credit a
husband with voluntary payments made on behalf of his wife for "club and other items" toward the sum of money
owed by him for maintenance and child support under a pendente lite order.
In Locke v Locke (1893, NY) 71 Hun 363, 24 NYS 1129, it was decided that a husband could not subtract the sum
paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment entered against both spouses as cosigners of a promissory note on behalf
of their son from a delinquent installment of alimony. It appeared that the wife recovered a decree against her
husband awarding alimony, and thereafter, at the request of the couple's adopted son, made a promissory note
payable to the order of the son, which was endorsed by the son and by the husband, and discounted by a bank with
the son realizing all of the proceeds. The son, as well as the wife, defaulted on the payment of the note, and the
bank recovered a judgment against all of the parties for the amount of the note. The judgment was paid in full by,
and assigned to, the husband, but he could not collect anything from the wife or the son because they were both
insolvent. The husband subsequently defaulted on a semiannual payment of alimony and the wife applied for leave
to issue execution against the husband for alimony due. In response, the husband contended that the amount of the
judgment should be set off against the wife's claim. The court held that the husband was not entitled to set off the
judgment against the decree of alimony under the circumstances, saying that alimony, the object of which was to
continue the husband's duty to support his wife after the divorce, might be held liable only to satisfy a debt
contracted for her support with a creditor who had naturally relied upon it as a means of payment. In this context,
the court pointed out that had no divorce decree been granted against the husband, he would not, as husband, have
been liable to pay the note which his wife signed for their son and, hence, such note was not a debt that could be
collected from her alimony by either the bank or the husband, its assignee.
11 A.L.R.5th 259 (Originally published in 1993)
ALR5th
Spouse's right to set off debt owed by other spouse against accrued spousal or child support payments
Claudia Catalano, J.D. 001783
When faced with the issue of the propriety of reducing the amount of support available for the needs of a divorced
spouse in order to set off her indebtedness to her former spouse, many courts have looked to the particular
circumstances involved and attempted a resolution which avoided an injustice to either party. The power of the
court to order an offset of a spouse's debt against accrued installments of support owed to her, in some
jurisdictions, however, has been questioned. One recent case to consider whether a prohibition against the
retroactive modification of the support order limited the court's authority to offset a debt against accumulated
support is Taylor v Ellenbecker (1991, SD) 471 NW2d 587, 11 ALR5th 1002in which the court found that the
statutory provision at issue curtailed such modification, and refused to eliminate a husband's child support
arrearage by allowing a setoff of the value of services he performed in remodeling and repairing his former wife's
residence. This annotation gathers those cases which discuss whether a spouse obligated to pay alimony or child
support is entitled to offset a debt owed to him by his former spouse or credit payments made to others on her
behalf against accrued support payments.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Article Outline
Index
Research References
ARTICLE OUTLINE
1[b] IntroductionRelated annotations
2[a] Background and summaryGenerally
2[b] Background and summaryPractice pointers
II General Principles
3[a] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetGenerally
3[b] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetEffect of determination that support
obligation is not ordinary "debt"
3[c] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetEffect of determination that debt of parent
and child support obligation are not cross demands
3[d] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetEffect of determination that offset against
child support must provide support to child, generally
3[e] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetDetermination that offset must provide
support to child alone
3[f] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetEffect of determination that spouses' offset
agreement impairing child's right to support is unenforceableimpairment found
3[g] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetImpairment not found
4 View that supporting spouse should strictly comply with court order
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5[a] View that support recipient's control of support funds is consideration in determining other spouse's right to
setoffControl found or supported permitting setoff
5[b] View that support recipient's control of support funds is consideration in determining other spouse's right to
setoffControl not found which would permit setoff
6 View that court has no authority to permit setoff of supported spouse's debt against accrued support payments
7 View that court has no authority to permit setoff of supported spouse's debt which was discharged in
bankruptcy
8 View that offset allowed against support obligation where equity demands
III Particular Factors Affecting Offset
9 Compulsion of circumstances
10[a] Spouses' agreement to offset, generallyAgreement found or supported permitting setoff
10[b] Spouses' agreement to offset, generallyAgreement not found which would permit setoff
11 Together with substantial compliance with child support decree
12[a] Supported spouse's conductConduct found permitting setoff
12[b] Supported spouse's conductConduct not found which permitted setoff
13 Retroactive application of support award
14 Liquidity of supporting spouse's claim
15 Time at which supporting spouse's claim arose
IV Particular Determinations
A Alimony
16 Claim arising from supported spouse's noncompliance with divorce decree, or debt owed directly to
supporting spouse under terms of decree
17 Contract claim by supporting spouse for funds or value of services or property advanced to supported spouse
18[a] Claim arising from supported spouse's appropriation of supporting spouse's funds or property not allocated
by decreeSetoff allowed
18[b] Claim arising from supported spouse's appropriation of supporting spouse's funds or property not allocated
by decreeSetoff not allowed
19[a] Payments made by supporting spouse relating to automobileSetoff allowed
19[b] Payments made by supporting spouse relating to automobileSetoff not allowed
20[a] On obligation incurred prior to divorceSetoff allowed
20[b] On obligation incurred prior to divorceSetoff not allowed
21[a] Payments made by supporting spouse relating to residence of supported spouseSetoff allowed
21[b] Payments made by supporting spouse relating to residence of supported spouseSetoff not allowed 001785
22[a] On obligation incurred prior to divorceSetoff allowed
22[b] On obligation incurred prior to divorceSetoff not allowed
23 Payments made by supporting spouse relating to other real property
24[a] Payments made by supporting spouse for medical care, clothing, or the likeSetoff allowed or supported
24[b] Payments made by supporting spouse for medical care, clothing, or the likeSetoff not allowed
25 Payments made by supporting spouse on joint income tax deficiency
26[a] Payments made by supporting spouse for other purposesSetoff allowed
26[b] Payments made by supporting spouse for other purposesSetoff not allowed
27[a] Undisclosed types of debt or indirect paymentsSetoff allowed
27[b] Undisclosed types of debt or indirect paymentsSetoff not allowed
B Child Support
28[a] Claim arising from supported spouse's noncompliance with divorce decree, or debt owed directly to
supporting spouse under terms of decreeSetoff allowed
28[b] Claim arising from supported spouse's noncompliance with divorce decree, or debt owed directly to
supporting spouse under terms of decreeSetoff not allowed
29[a] Contract claim by supporting spouse for funds or the value of services or property advanced to the
supported spouseSetoff allowed
29[b] Contract claim by supporting spouse for funds or the value of services or property advanced to the
supported spouseSetoff not allowed or supported
30[a] Claim arising from supported spouse's appropriation of supporting spouse's funds or property not allocated
by decreeSetoff allowed
30[b] Claim arising from supported spouse's appropriation of supporting spouse's funds or property not allocated
by decreeSetoff not allowed
I. Preliminary Matters
This annotation[FN1] collects and discusses cases in which a court considered whether a spouse obligated to pay
alimony[FN2] or child support may be permitted[FN3] to set off against a delinquency in support a debt owed to
him by the supported spouse,[FN4] or offset indirect payments made to a third party on behalf of the supported
spouse.[FN5] This annotation deals with cases discussing the request for an offset brought pursuant to or arising
from a matrimonial action instituted by either spouse.[FN6] The discussion is limited to cases in which support
was alleged to be in arrears or owing from the spouse obligated to pay it, but the accrued sum may have resulted
from the retroactive application of the support award.
A number of jurisdictions have rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or legislative enactments directly
bearing upon this subject. These provisions are discussed herein only to the extent and in the form that they are
reflected in the court opinions that fall within the scope of this annotation. The reader is consequently advised to
consult the appropriate statutory or regulatory compilations to ascertain the current status of all statutes discussed
001786
herein, including those listed in the Jurisdictional Table of Cited Statutes and Cases.
1[b] IntroductionRelated annotations
Related Annotations are located under the Research References heading of this Annotation.
2[a] Background and summaryGenerally
It can be generally said that the determination of whether an offset should be allowed against accumulated support
depends upon the facts and circumstances in each case, the courts of many jurisdictions balancing certain general
principles against the particular factors that might lead to an injustice for the spouse obligated to pay support if the
offset were denied. Several basic principles have been espoused which argue against the allowance of an offset,
most of which can be attributed to the promotion of consistency in enforcement orders, the unique nature and
purpose of the support obligation (and the avoidance of an injustice to the spouse to whom support is owed), or the
concept of finality as to accrued payments. It has been contended that these principles are merely expressions of a
more general rule that the spouse obligated to pay support is not entitled to a setoff as a matter of law, and are not
necessarily in conflict with the position that a situation might arise in which equitable considerations would permit
a setoff.[FN7] Such appears to be the case in most, but not all, jurisdictions.
At least one jurisdiction seems to demand "strict" compliance with the support order, since the single court to
address the issue of a credit against delinquent support for noncomplying payments on behalf of a wife expressed
this opinion, and did not limit its decision to the circumstances of the case ( 4). The special nature and purpose of
the support obligation owed by a divorced spouse to her former spouse and child will be a consideration affecting
the court's determination of the propriety of an offset in most instances ( 3[a]). For example, in several
jurisdictions in which the courts have determined that the support obligation is a "duty" and not a "debt," it has
been held that a setoff of an ordinary debt should not permitted as a matter of right against the support obligation
( 3[b]). The determination that any debt owed to the noncustodial parent and the obligation owed by him to the
child were not cross demands has precluded the setoff of that debt against a child support obligation ( 3[c]). In
other instances in which an offset against a child support obligation was sought, several jurisdictions have ruled
that the offset was impermissible based on the determination that it did not provide support to the child ( 3[d]) or,
occasionally, that it did not benefit the child alone ( 3[e]), which opinion apparently would prohibit a setoff in
any situation included within the scope of this annotation. In those cases in which the supporting spouse
contended that the spouses agreed to an offset against child support, a determination that the agreement, which not
in the best interest of the child, was unenforceable, has precluded the requested offset ( 3[f]), although some
courts, finding no impairment to the child's right to support, have permitted such a setoff ( 3[g]). Certain courts,
embracing the principle that the spouse to whom support is paid is entitled to disburse support monies as she sees
fit, have allowed ( 5[a]) or denied ( 5[b]) an offset based upon whether the supported spouse controlled the
funds at issue, or whether the supporting spouse usurped this right. A view also expressed is that the allowance of
an offset against accrued support installments amounts to a retroactive modification of past-due judgments beyond
the power of the court ( 6). And, one court has maintained that it had no authority to enter a judgment offsetting
against accrued support a spouse's payment of debts avoided in bankruptcy by the other spouse ( 7).
There appears to be no general rule as to when circumstances may require that a spouse be given an offset against
his support obligation, despite these general principles. And, it should be noted that in a few jurisdictions, there is
no indication that an offset considered by the court to retroactively modify the decree will be permitted under any,
or at least most, circumstances. Some courts, however, have expressed the view that an exception may be made to
allow a setoff or "credit" when equitable considerations demand ( 8). Courts have held that setoff was allowed
where a compulsion of circumstances necessitated an indirect payment of support to the wife's creditors ( 9).
Setoff has been permitted by courts when the spouse obligated to pay support was in arrears merely as the result
of the retroactive effect of the decree ( 13). In many cases, the existence of an agreement by the spouses to a
mode of payment other than that called for in the support decree ( 10[a]), together with proof of substantial
compliance with the spirit and intent of the decree in cases involving an offset against delinquent child support (
11), are factors considered by the courts to permit setoff. Consequently, where no agreement between the spouses
was found concerning the offset against support, setoff has been denied ( 10[b]). In deciding whether an offset
against accrued support payments was appropriate, a few courts have found certain other behavior by the
001787
supported spouse which justified ( 12[a]) or did not justify ( 12[b]) the grant of the setoff. And, factors which
have influenced the courts to deny an offset against accrued support payments were the unliquidated nature of the
claim to be setoff, in one jurisdiction ( 14), and the time that the claim underlying the requested setoff arose (
15), in many instances, the courts objecting to the setoff of a claim which pre-existed the support decree.
Courts have been faced with a determination of whether particular types of debts owed to the spouse obligated to
pay support, or indirect payments made by him on behalf of the spouse to whom support is owed, may be offset
against a support arrearage. Again, no general rules can be formulated as to whether the offset will be permitted.
An offset against accrued support based on the allegation that the spouse to whom support was directed to be paid
was not in compliance with the divorce decree (usually a provision of the property settlement) has been allowed
against past-due alimony ( 16) and child support ( 28[a]), but in many more instances has been denied against
child support ( 28[b]), the courts usually grounding their decision in the principle that the debt of the custodial
parent was not the debt of the child, or that the child's right to the support had vested. Generally, a setoff based on
the claim that a spouse breached an agreement other than the separation agreement or property settlement
agreement, or was unjustly enriched by the value of services provided to her has not been permitted against
accrued alimony ( 17) or child support ( 29[b]), but was permitted in one instance against delinquent child
support ( 29[a]), the court finding an injustice if credit was not given. A setoff based on the claim that a spouse
appropriated funds or property not allocated by the decree, usually community property, generally has been denied
against accrued alimony ( 18[b]) and child support ( 30[b]). In a few instances, however, such a setoff has been
permitted against alimony, usually to reduce the amount found owing due to the retroactive effect of the award (
18[a]), and one court has suggested that an offset against back child support might be permissible on equitable
grounds if it were shown that the custodial spouse used the funds misappropriated by her for the support of the
children ( 30[a]).
Whether or not a spouse is entitled to credit against arrearages for indirect payments made to others on behalf of
his former spouse also depends to a large extent upon the particular circumstances surrounding the case. The
request for an offset against accrued support for payments relating to jointly held property, which was not the
residence of the spouse or child, has not yet met with success ( 23, 34), nor has the request for an offset against
an arrearage in alimony for payments toward a joint income tax liability ( 25). Courts have shown some
reluctance in permitting expenditures associated with the provision of a car for the spouse's use to reduce a child
support arrearage ( 31[b]), but a credit for such payments has been granted ( 31[a]). An offset against arrears in
alimony or both alimony and child support usually will be permitted ( 19[a], 20[a], 31[a]) or denied ( 19[b],
20[b]) based on whether an agreement existed between the spouses as to the offset of the automobile-related
payments and a benefit was received by the spouse. The same circumstances have generally influenced the court to
grant ( 21[a], 22[a]) or deny ( 21[b], 22[b]) an offset for payments associated with the spouse's and child's
residence against past-due alimony, or child support ( 32[a], 32[b], 33[a], 33[b]), or other necessities, such as
medical care, against arrears in alimony ( 24[a], 24[b]) or child support ( 35[a], 35[b]). Some courts have
refused an offset when the obligation associated with an automobile ( 20[b]) or residence ( 22[b], 33[b]) was
incurred prior to the divorce and, thus, the payment benefited the spouse obligated to pay support as well. Courts
have also determined the propriety of an offset against accrued alimony ( 26[a], 26[b]) or child support ( 36[a],
36[b]) for payments made by the supporting spouse to others for miscellaneous purposes, such as to satisfy the
supported spouse's credit card debt, or for debts or payments the nature of which was undisclosed by the court (
27[a], 27[b], 37), again the results depending to a great extent on the individual circumstances. It should be noted,
however, that in only one instance a claim for money owed by the supported spouse, the nature of which was
unclear, was set off against alimony, under circumstances in which the supporting spouse also owed a separate
equity award to his former spouse which might have been reduced as an alternative ( 27[a]).
2[b] Background and summaryPractice pointers
Possibly because many of the exceptions found to justify a setoff against an accrued support obligation are more
clearly applicable to an offset of this nature, counsel should be aware that a court may be more sympathetic to an
offset which can be categorized as one for the indirect payment of support to others on behalf of the support
recipient, rather than merely as a "debt" owed from that spouse to the one obligated to pay support. Note that in
some instances the same request for a setoff may be classified as either. For example, the request to offset the
001788
husband's payment of a mortgage on the marital home against a support obligation was permitted when seen as a
request to "credit" an indirect payment to a third party to provide shelter for the wife and child,[FN8] and denied,
in part, when categorized by the court as a request by the husband for contribution of the wife's share of a pre-
existing joint obligation.[FN9]
Counsel also should be alerted to the fact that an early determination of whether the spouse's underlying claim,
upon which the defense of setoff is based, is related to the issues raised in the matrimonial action brought by his
former spouse, alleging nonpayment of support, may avoid later difficulty. A claim of offset arising from the
separation or property settlement agreement is certainly a related claim, and at least one court has ruled that such a
claim, in a controversy which concerned a husband's subsequent request for the setoff of one-half of the proceeds
from the sale of the marital home pursuant to a separation agreement, was a compulsory counterclaim the assertion
of which was limited to the time and forum of the wife's action for alimony arrearages.[FN10] Some claims are
more obviously unrelated to the issues raised in an action to enforce a support decree. It has held that an action to
show cause is not the proper forum in which to bring a counterclaim against the supported spouse based on an
unrelated tort action. For example, where a husband sought to offset damages for the alienation of the affections
of his son in response to his wife's action for delinquent child support, a court held that the proper subject matter in
an action to enforce a prior judgment is limited to the subject of that judgment, dismissing the counterclaim
without prejudice to the husband.[FN11]
In a case involving a finer distinction, it was also held that a court erred in broadening the issues raised in a
contempt proceeding to include whether a constructive trust arose from the predivorce sale of the supporting
spouse's property not mentioned in the divorce decree, upon his request for a credit for the proceeds of that sale
against accrued alimony and child support payments.[FN12]
The spouse obligated to pay support may opt to bring a subsequent suit upon the denial of the requested offset in
the matrimonial action. Several courts have suggested this as an alternate avenue of recovery.[FN13] The viability
of the husband's claim, should the domestic relations court express an opinion on its merits or fail to state that its
determination is without prejudice to the supporting spouse's independent action, is unclear. It should be noted that
in one instance, a court has held that a husband could not maintain a later action in tort and contract against his
wife, the proceeds of which he admittedly intended to use to set off an alimony judgment, under the rule of res
judicata, based on an earlier action in which the court held that it was without statutory authority to modify an
alimony judgment by setting aside the past-due installments.[FN14]
Another court, however, has held that a lower court's order denying a setoff for a promissory note payable by the
wife to the husband as a defense to the wife's action to recover a child support arrearage could not act as a bar to
the husband's subsequent action for recovery on the note, when it was clear to the court that the validity of the note
was not, nor could it possibly have been, directly in issue and fully litigated in the original action.[FN15]
Should the spouse ordered to pay support be denied the requested offset against accrued installments, he might
consider moving for a modification of his current obligation. Counsel should be aware that several courts have
been inclined to the view that, while the requested setoff against accrued and past-due support payments was
impermissible, the circumstance of the supported spouse's indebtedness to the supporting spouse might warrant
such a modification.[FN16]
At least one court has viewed a spouse's "obstinate disobedience" of the divorce decree in refusing to pay marital
debts assigned to her under that decree, forcing the spouse obligated to pay her support also to assume those debts,
to constitute a change in conditions such as would justify modification of the maintenance award.[FN17]
Moreover, where the supporting spouse, as a co-debtor, has been required to pay even a single community
obligation due to his former spouse's discharge of that debt in bankruptcy, such a factor has been considered by
some courts to be a change of circumstances sufficient to support modification. It has been held that the material
change in the economic status of the parties, when the spouse to whom the support had been awarded significantly
reduced her indebtedness through bankruptcy, and the nonbankrupt spouse had increased obligations to be met,
may indicate a change in the ability to pay support so as to authorize the reduction in the amount of support
payments.[FN18].
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Of course, there is no express duty imposed upon a court to set off an outstanding debt against a future support
obligation. One court found no abuse of discretion in the determination that a husband, who wished to set off
funds expended by him to satisfy a deficiency judgment against both spouses which arose upon the foreclosure
sale of the marital residence, failed to establish a substantial change in circumstances, when the record did not
reveal a substantial reduction in the husband's earnings.[FN19]
And, a modification of a child support obligation will require a determination of whether the requested offset is in
the best interest of the children. It has been pointed out that the court's paramount concern is to protect the
economic welfare of the child, within the confines of the parents' financial capability, not to balance through setoff
a creditor-debtor relationship between the parents.[FN20]
Other restrictions may apply. It has been pointed out a spouse, who was denied the statutory right to set off
payments he made on an alleged joint federal income tax liability against past-due alimony installments, might not
move for a modification of his future support obligation unless he were not in contempt for failing to make past-
due payments, despite the suggestion that modification might otherwise be justified.[FN21]
Moreover, it has been suggested by one court that the concept of a "setoff" against a future child support
obligation, due to the variability of the amount of the payments and the court's continued involvement, was
inappropriate when a statutory offset provision contemplated a single judgment in which conflicting claims are
offset and only the difference between the two judgments paid.[FN22]
II. General Principles
3[a] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetGenerally
Courts universally have embraced the position that the unique nature or purpose of the support obligation owed to
the former spouse or child must be considered in any determination as to whether a setoff would be permitted
against that obligation.[FN23]Ala
Ryan v Ryan (1960) 271 Ala 243, 123 So 2d 102, 100 ALR2d 919
Anonymous v Anonymous (1983, Ala App) 428 So 2d 109
Dodd v Dodd (1991, Ala App) 588 So 2d 476
Cal
Keck v Keck (1933) 219 Cal 316, 26 P2d 300
Avila v Leonardo (1942) 53 Cal App 2d 602, 128 P2d 43
Williams v Williams (1970, 1st Dist) 8 Cal App 3d 636, 87 Cal Rptr 754
Parsons v Parsons (1990, 4th Dist) 220 Cal App 3d 79, 269 Cal Rptr 356, op withdrawn by order of ct (Cal) 1990
Cal LEXIS 3278
Colo
Hall v Hall-Stradley (1989, Colo App) 776 P2d 1166
Fla
Chappell v Chappell (1971, Fla App D4) 253 So 2d 281
Rankin v Rankin (1972, Fla App D3) 268 So 2d 573
Hinton v Reynolds (1983, Fla App D4) 442 So 2d 1111
Ga
Attaway v Attaway (1941) 193 Ga 51, 17 SE2d 72
Farmer v Farmer (1978) 147 Ga App 387, 249 SE2d 106
Ill
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Schmitt v Woods (1979, 5th Dist) 73 Ill App 3d 498, 29 Ill Dec 498, 392 NE2d 55
Ind
Re Marriage of Honkomp (1978) 178 Ind App 68, 381 NE2d 881
Iowa
Picht v Henry (1961) 252 Iowa 559, 107 NW2d 441
Re Marriage of Mills (1989, Iowa App) 441 NW2d 416
La
Re Andras (1982, La App 4th Cir) 410 So 2d 328
Hamilton v Hamilton (1982, La App 1st Cir) 421 So 2d 291
Feazell v Feazell (1984, La App 3d Cir) 445 So 2d 143
Gottsegen v Gottsegen (1987, La App 4th Cir) 508 So 2d 162 (Pursuant to La.R.S. 9:310)
Hawkins v Hawkins (1991, La App 3d Cir) 592 So 2d 843, companion case (La App 3d Cir) 592 So 2d 852
Mont
Haaby v Haaby (1974) 165 Mont 475, 529 P2d 1387
Hadford v Hadford (1981) 194 Mont 518, 633 P2d 1181
Re Marriage of Good (1984) 213 Mont 269, 691 P2d 1337
NY
Haubrich v Haubrich (1944) 267 App Div 872, 46 NYS2d 506
Dorfman v Dorfman (1947) 191 Misc 227, 77 NYS2d 267
Lefkowitz v Lefkowitz (1959) 7 Misc 2d 958, 186 NYS2d 925
Vought v Vought (1959) 22 Misc 2d 356, 195 NYS2d 521
Palmer v Palmer (1966) 52 Misc 2d 610, 275 NYS2d 978
Locke v Locke (1893, NY) 71 Hun 363, 24 NYS 1129
ND
Bosch v Bosch (1972, ND) 197 NW2d 673
Tenn
Oliver v Oczkowicz (1990, Tenn App) 1990 Tenn App LEXIS 354
Tex
Re McLemore (1974, Tex Civ App Dallas) 515 SW2d 356
Medrano v Medrano (1991, Tex App San Antonio) 810 SW2d 426
Smith v Rabago (1984, Tex App Houston (14th Dist)) 672 SW2d 38
Wyo
Broyles v Broyles (1985, Wyo) 711 P2d 1119
Macy v Macy (1986, Wyo) 714 P2d 774
It was held in Attaway v Attaway (1941) 193 Ga 51, 17 SE2d 72, that a judgment for alimony, being based upon
the obligation imposed by law upon a husband to support his wife, could not be extinguished or satisfied by setting
off a judgment in the husband's favor and against his wife for the value and hire of an automobile, when "the set
off would mean nothing in the way of such support." Restating its position, the court maintained the principles of
setoff were not applicable to a case involving alimony.
Because the paramount importance of protecting the rights of children upon divorce dictated that amounts payable
as child support take precedence over any personal obligation between those parents, the court in Schmitt v Woods
(1979, 5th Dist) 73 Ill App 3d 498, 29 Ill Dec 498, 392 NE2d 55, remarked that child support payments are exempt
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from a setoff resulting from the personal debt of one of the parents.
And, it was decided in Locke v Locke (1893,NY) 71 Hun 363, 24 NYS 1129, that a husband, who had satisfied a
judgment entered against both spouses as cosigners of a bank note procured for their son, could not subtract the
sum paid from past-due alimony, the court saying that alimony, the object of which was to continue the husband's
duty to support his wife after the divorce, might be held liable only to satisfy a debt contracted for her support
with a creditor who had naturally relied upon it as a means of payment. The court apparently concluded that the
bank was not such a creditor, nor was the husband, as its assignee.
3[b] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetEffect of determination that
support obligation is not ordinary "debt"
The courts in the following cases, recognizing the view that the nature of the support obligation must affect a
determination of the propriety of the setoff requested, held that the setoff was precluded because the "duty" to
support is not an ordinary "debt."
Deciding, in an equity action, that a decree for alimony in favor of a wife against her former husband was not a
"debt" due from the husband to her, within the scope of a statutory provision for setoff, but an obligation imposed
on him by law to support or maintain her, the court in Ryan v Ryan (1960) 271 Ala 243, 123 So 2d 102, 100
ALR2d 919, held that the wife's alleged indebtedness to him was not available to satisfy or extinguish the decree
for alimony. In reaching its determination, the court examined Statute 350, Title 7, Code of 1940, which
provided that mutual debts, liquidated or unliquidated, demands not sounding in damages merely, subsisting
between parties at the commencement of a suit may be set off one against the other, concluding that alimony was
not a debt within the meaning of the statute, but a duty. The court stressed that alimony was not to be considered a
property settlement upon the dissolution of a marriage, but had as its sole object the support and maintenance of
the wife, and that the offset of a pre-existing debt, owed either to the husband or another creditor, would deprive
the wife of such support contrary to public policy. The court added that the mere existence of mutual demands did
not authorize an equity court to set them off against each other, absent allegations showing an intervening equity
which rendered it necessary to protect the demand to be set off, but did not consider whether allegations of the
wife's insolvency and her nonresidence showed such an intervening equity.
The court in Keck v Keck (1933) 219 Cal 316, 26 P2d 300, reversed an order which in effect allowed a husband to
offset a pre-existing judgment debt in his favor against accrued alimony owed his former wife, saying that alimony
was founded on the marital duty of a husband to support his wife and not an ordinary debt, and the two demands
did not by operation of law compensate and discharge one another under California Code of Civil Procedure
440. Consequently, the court decided that the husband could not, in the manner of an ordinary judgment debtor, as
a matter of right, and by motion, avail himself of the remedy provided for by the statute. The judgment against the
wife, who had been appointed as guardian of her husband for a period of years during the marriage, arose as the
result of a settlement of guardianship accounts.
Upon the wife's order to show cause, the court in Williams v Williams (1970, 1st Dist) 8 Cal App 3d 636, 87 Cal
Rptr 754, ruled that a husband could not automatically setoff, under California Code of Civil Procedure 440, his
former wife's portion of a net deficit resulting from the operation of a community property apartment house
against either alimony or child support arrearages for the reason that a support obligation was not an ordinary debt
but rather was a court-imposed marital duty. The husband had made none of the support payments provided for in
a divorce decree, but managed, by agreement, the apartment house, discharging the loss incurred in its operation
by paying taxes, trust deed payments, and for repairs and improvements, subsequently arguing that the past-due
support obligations and the apartment house deficit were "cross demands" within the purview of the Code which
should be deemed satisfied so far that they were equal.
And, although the award of attorney's fees on behalf of the husband was found to be an error and, thus, the wife
did not owe the amount of the award, the court in Parsons v Parsons (1990, 4th Dist) 220 Cal App 3d 79, 269 Cal
Rptr 356, op withdrawn by order of ct (Cal) 1990 Cal LEXIS 3278 (without explanation), held that the very nature
of child support, an obligation due to the child and paid to the custodial parent only as a conduit for the
disbursement of that support, did not permit a setoff against accrued child support for amounts owed for other
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things, such as the fees.
In Rankin v Rankin (1972, Fla App D3) 268 So 2d 573, the court thought that the holding in Chappell v Chappell
(1971, Fla App D4) 253 So 2d 281, 25, together with the general law that alimony is "something more" than an
ordinary debt required a reversal of the trial court's order allowing the husband to set off against delinquent
alimony payments possible business debts incurred in maintaining properties that the spouses held in
common.[FN24]
According to the court in Bosch v Bosch (1972, ND) 197 NW2d 673, it was proper to refuse a husband the
statutory right to set off against past-due alimony installments payments he made on an alleged joint obligation for
federal income tax liability, reduced to judgment subsequent to the parties' divorce, when alimony was not a
"debt" within the meaning of the statute. The husband contended that his request for a setoff was permitted under
Section 28-20-33 N.D.C.C., which allowed the setoff of "mutual final judgments," and Section 09-01-08
N.D.C.C., which entitled a party to a joint obligation to contribution from the other parties for sums paid in excess
of his share of the debt. Upon finding that the parties' stipulations and divorce judgment provided for the payment
of alimony, and did not merely concern a property settlement, the court stressed that a setoff would deprive the
wife of the purpose of the judgment, that is, support, and that a support obligation, imposed by law, might not be
extinguished by a claim in the husband's favor because it was not a debt within the meaning of the statutes.
In Smith v Rabago (1984, Tex App Houston (14th Dist)) 672 SW2d 38, the court refused to offset arrearages in
child support by imputed rentals due the husband for the time the wife was in wrongful possession of his separate
real property, stating that child support payments are a unique obligation and, consequently, the two demands were
not due in the same capacity or right, or "mutual."
Persuaded by decisions from other jurisdictions which were compatible with the court's longstanding position that
the welfare of the child is the primary concern in cases involving child support, the court in Broyles v Broyles
(1985, Wyo) 711 P2d 1119, refused to offset past-due child support payments by the amount of a damages award
in favor of the husband, in part, for the reason that the support obligation was not an ordinary debt, but a court-
imposed parental duty. The decisions cited by the court included Smith v Rabago (1984, Tex App Houston (14th
Dist)) 672 SW2d 38, this subsection, and Gaines v Gaines (1978, Ky App) 566 SW2d 814, a decision in which the
court found that the "offset," or suspension of payment, of the amount awarded as child support in the divorce
decree by the amount a father was ordered to pay to reduce the mother's portion of a marital debt, until the debt
was satisfied, was improper.
3[c] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetEffect of determination that debt of
parent and child support obligation are not cross demands
Recognizing the principle that the specific purpose of the child support obligation must be considered, the courts in
the cases reported below held that a debt owed by the custodial parent to her former spouse and that spouse's
obligation to support their child were not demands between the same parties such as might be offset against one
another.
In Avila v Leonardo (1942) 53 Cal App 2d 602, 128 P2d 43, where a husband sought to set off a claim against his
former wife for breach of her agreement to hold him harmless from liability for child support against accrued child
support, the court ruled that such an action would not be permitted, in part, because the claims were not cross
demands by the same parties.
And, in Williams v Williams (1970, 1st Dist) 8 Cal App 3d 636, 87 Cal Rptr 754, the court held that a husband
could not set off, by operation of law, his former wife's portion of a net deficit resulting from the operation of
community property apartment house against overdue child support payments, influenced in significant part, by the
view that child support is not the type of cross demand "by one party against the other" contemplated by California
Code of Civil Procedure 440, which deemed such demands compensated so far as they were equal. The court
pointed out that the obligation resulting from the deficit was that of the wife only and not the child, and the child
support obligation, even if considered a debt, was due to the child rather than the wife, a mere conduit for the
disbursement of the funds. The court added that to allow the offset and, thus, the use of child support funds to
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maintain property held in common by the husband and wife, would frustrate both public policy and the support
order.
In response to a husband's attempt to set off a judgment he obtained against his former wife as the result of her
violation of his visitation rights against child support arrearages which he owed, the court in Hall v Hall-Stradley
(1989, Colo App) 776 P2d 1166, concluded that a parent who owes a duty of child support may not offset his
obligation against a personal judgment against the custodial parent based on the public policy concept that the
beneficial interest in the support belongs to the child.
It was contrary to law to allow credit against support payments for amounts that had been garnished from the
husband's wages for the payment of a marital debt for which the wife was made responsible under the dissolution
decree, according to the court in Re Marriage of Honkomp (1978) 178 Ind App 68, 381 NE2d 881, when support
allowances for the benefit of minor children are received by the custodial parent in a fiduciary-like capacity which
does not permit the setoff against support payments of a debt owed to the husband by the wife in her individual
capacity.
See also, in this context, Jenkins v Jenkins (1991, Ind App) 567 NE2d 136, in which the court, in denying the
setoff, recognized that, because a custodial parent acts as a conduit only and in a fiduciary capacity when receiving
child support payments on behalf of the child, the payor cannot withhold support payments to offset a debt owed
by the custodial parent to the payor, although the primary issue before the court, whether a property settlement
debt owed to the wife by the husband might be satisfied from a surplus in child support paid by him, is not
addressed by this annotation.
Although the credit claimed by the husband against back child support, arising from his former wife's failure to
return the husband's portion of a joint income tax return, was denied primarily because it did not substantially
comply with the child support requirement of the divorce decree, the court in Hadford v Hadford (1981) 194 Mont
518, 633 P2d 1181, also expressed the opinion that the wife's retention of the husband's one-half of the refund was
purely a property settlement dispute between the husband and wife which should not affect a separate child
support obligation imposed on the husband.
It was not error to deny a credit against accrued child support payments owed by the husband for a personal loan
allegedly owed to him by the wife (the custodial parent) which was unrelated to the support order, according to the
court in Oliver v Oczkowicz (1990, Tenn App) 1990 Tenn App LEXIS 354, when to do so would amount to
requiring the children to pay the debts of the custodial parent.
Pointing out that the two demands were not owing between the same parties, nor in the same capacity or right,
and, consequently not "mutual," the court in Smith v Rabago (1984, Tex App Houston (14th Dist)) 672 SW2d 38,
would not offset arrearages in child support by imputed rentals due the husband for the time the wife was in
wrongful possession of his separate real property.
Finding the reasoning in Smith v Rabago (1984, Tex App Houston (14th Dist)) 672 SW2d 38, this subsection,
persuasive, the court in Broyles v Broyles (1985, Wyo) 711 P2d 1119, ruled that a setoff was not permitted against
a child support deficiency in the amount of a damages award in favor of the husband as a consequence of the
wife's failure to pay certain obligations as required by the terms of the property settlement agreement, when the
award arose from the husband's payment of the wife's debts, and not those of the child. The primary concern of the
court was the welfare of the child, whose independent right to support was not to be impaired by equitable
adjustments between his parents. The court apparently embraced the position that there was no conceivable reason
why a portion of a parent's debt should be allowed as a setoff against child support.
But, on the other hand, the courts in the following cases ruled that under certain circumstances an obligation owed
by the supported spouse might be set off against the support obligation owed to the child.
The court in Picht v Henry (1961) 252 Iowa 559, 107 NW2d 441, apparently rejected a wife's position that child
support due to be paid by her former husband was not her property and not subject to her individual obligation,
arising under the terms of the property settlement, to pay her husband a certain sum of money from the proceeds
of the sale of the marital home. The court stated that such an argument overlooked the fact that the husband was
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not a stranger from whom the children's right to support must be protected, as was an ordinary creditor. Where
both spouses had an equal duty to support the children, the court seemed to view the request for setoff as similar
to a controversy between spouses as to how, or from which assets, the expense should be apportioned between
them, the resolution of which depended upon equity and the welfare of the children. In allowing the requested
setoff, the court found no jeopardy to that welfare in the case before it.[FN25]
And see Krause v Krause (1987, Butler Co) 35 Ohio App 3d 18, 518 NE2d 1221, in which the court held that it
was permissible to set off the wife's current child support obligation, ordered upon a change of the child's custody,
against the husband's arrearages, when the payments involved the same parties and arose out of the same right to
child support. The court added that equity dictated that before the husband received any child support payments
from the wife, he must satisfy the arrearage incurred from his violation of a court order by refusing to pay the
support.
3[d] View that nature or purpose of support obligation affects offsetEffect of determination that offset
against child support must provide support to child, generally
The courts in the cases found below, expressing or recognizing the view that the special nature or purpose of the
child support obligation was relevant to whether an offset should be permitted, denied an offset against child
support when it was not shown that the amount in question actually provided support to the child.
The court indicated in Anonymous v Anonymous (1983, Ala App) 428 So 2d 109, a case in which the request for
credit for several expenditures made by a husband on behalf of his former wife and children against both alimony
and child support arrearages was denied, that the key factor in its determination as to the propriety of a credit
against child support was whether the sum contributed to the actual support of the child. The court was influenced,
in refusing to credit against alimony the payments on a car provided to the wife, that the sums gave the appearance
of being in the nature of gifts rather than payment for necessities.
However, on the other hand, in Haygood v Haygood (1991, Ala App) 581 So 2d 870, reh overr (Ala App) 1991
Ala Civ App LEXIS 241 and cert den, without op (Ala) 1991 Ala LEXIS 742, mortgage payments made on the
residence of the husband, in which the former wife and children resided during a period of reconciliation were
found to be properly credited against delinquent child support, when the court viewed the payments as rental
payments on behalf of the children.
And, upon the wife's appeal of the reduction of a child support arrearage owed by her former husband, in Dodd v
Dodd (1991, Ala App) 588 So 2d 476, the court concluded that it was error to allow the husband credit for
payment of the wife's expense in moving the family to another state after the couple's divorce, when the children's
ongoing basic needs were not met by the expenditure. Although there was some evidence that the spouses had
agreed to the credit, the focus of the court's inquiry was whether the expenses clearly could be categorized as
essential to basic child support. According to the court, however, it was not error to approve even gratuitously
expenses if this test was met.
And, although the court did not demand that the funds at issue be used to support the children, see, Hinton v
Reynolds (1983, Fla App D4) 442 So 2d 1111, in which the court expressed the opinion that an equitable basis for
some setoff or credit for the husband on his child support obligation might well be demonstrated if shown that his
former wife actually used all or part of the funds misappropriated from him for support of the children.
See also Oliver v Oczkowicz (1990, Tenn App) 1990 Tenn App LEXIS 354, in which the court would not permit
credit against accrued child support payments for a personal loan owed by the custodial parent to the noncustodial
parent which was "unrelated to the support order." It should be noted, however, that it is unclear from the decision
whether the court meant by this language a debt unrelated to the provision of necessaries to the children, or a debt
not arising under the terms of the court order.
Upon the husband's petition for habeas corpus arising from his confinement pursuant to an order finding him in
contempt for failure to pay child support, the court in Re McLemore (1974, Tex Civ App Dallas) 515 SW2d 356,
rejecting the husband's challenge to the validity of the commitment order based on the court's failure to give him 001795
credit for money expended by him for the benefit of his former wife, stated that the support order in question had
directed payments to be made monthly for the benefit of the children and, consequently, expenditure solely for the
benefit of the wife would not exonerate him from his liability to pay child support.
Construing Tex. Fam.Code 14.41(a),(c) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991), the court in Medrano v Medrano (1991,
Tex App San Antonio) 810 SW2d 426, held it was error to grant an offset to reduce a child support arrearage owed
by a husband for expenditures other than those for "actual support to the child." The wife had brought a suit
against the husband for failure to make child support payments, and challenged credits given against the amount
allegedly owed for sums paid by the husband toward a note payable by the wife, for the purchase of her car, or the
value of her use of the husband's car. The statute stated in pertinent part that a judgment for unpaid child support
may be subject to a counterclaim or offset for reimbursement for actual support provided to the child by the spouse
obligated to pay support. It was clear to the court that the offset allowed was outside the quoted language of the
provision, although noting that the wife's statement that the offset was based on expenses other than those
necessary for the child's support was not challenged by the husband.
24[b] Payments made by supporting spouse for medical care, clothing, or the likeSetoff not allowed
In the following cases, it was determined that a spouse would not be allowed to offset against delinquent alimony
payments expenditures made to others for the benefit of his former spouse to provide medical care, clothing, or
other necessities.
The court in Viser v Viser (1962) 243 La 706, 146 So 2d 409ovrld on other grounds by Miller v Miller (La) 321 So
2d 318, rejected the husband's claim for a credit against accrued alimony pendente lite for payments on
merchandise, including clothing and furniture, purchased and charged to him by his wife prior to the alimony
decree, perceiving no legal basis for deducting these costs from the alimony fixed by the court. The wife had
purchased the items the day before her departure from the marital home. The husband had paid or agreed to pay to
satisfy the accounts for the merchandise, and two of the accounts had been reduced to judgment against him.
While the court agreed that the availability of the merchandise was relevant to the alimony rate insofar as it
reduced the wife's needs, this issue was not before it, but only the amount due under the previous alimony
judgment.[FN65]
Credit card charges for the purchase of clothes by the wife immediately prior to leaving the couple's home, which
the husband was seemingly obliged to pay, were not allowed as a credit against arrears in alimony pendente lite by
the court in Rauch v Rauch (1988, La App 5th Cir) 535 So 2d 1317. The claim for reimbursement of the charges
was treated in the same manner as that for funds allegedly withdrawn from a community bank account by the wife,
the court saying that an offset based on a disputed and "unliquidated" community claim should be resolved upon
partition and settlement of the community property regime, rather than as a defense to a claim for unpaid alimony,
relying upon Hartley v Hartley (1977, La) 349 So 2d 1258, 18, and citing LSA-C.C. art. 1893, the statutory
setoff provision.
In Taplinger v Taplinger (1967, 1st Dept) 29 App Div 2d 530, 285 NYS2d 888, more fully discussed in 20[a],
the court disallowed a credit against delinquent temporary alimony for amounts paid by the husband, prior to the
rendition of any support order, to maintain health insurance for the wife's benefit.
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To go out Monday April 20th
Sent: Sun 4/19/09 8:03 PM
To: ldavenport@washoelegalservices.org; dpringle@washoelegalservices.org
1 attachment
Alien vs Sponsor immigration research.docx (367.5 KB)
Hi Deb and Lidia,
At the last hearing in Davenport I believe Judge Hardy said (and this is not in the minutes but could still
be held against us) that our discovery requests (including the subpoena duces tecum to the lender's
involved in Richard's residential purchases--we seek a copy of the loan applications to establish he is
lying about his income to the court) need to go out by Monday, April 20th, 2009, or else we will be
stopped from seeking these materials or even introducing them into evidence. Nik Palmer was told to
be cooperative in helping us ascertain who to send these subpoenas to (see if you can figure out just
based on the discovery already provided or the recorders website). I hope you have gotten a check
from Robin to do this. We don't always have a lot of time to send these out and that is why we need
to speed up the process for getting a check from Robin. Lidia, if a check from Robin is not ready, I
suggest you go get a money order for $25 for each subpoena that needs to go out and we can get you
reimbursed.
I am attachign some very, very informative law review articles I uncovered recently and I suggest you
get very familar with these, Lidia. Also, see the minutes the court posted on the 15th...they direct Lidia
to provide something like the last four months of bank statements related to the rents she receives on
her parents condo (which is in her name). Lidia, I suggest you try to figure out what it is Judge Hardy
wanted from you and give it him to the best of your ability and if that's not possible, then just write a
short affidavit explaining why (Deb can help format it). Deb, call me tomorrow when these subpoena
are ready to go out and I can come in and sign them.
PS- Deb, the sub duces tecum's need to go out in Kearns as well.
Lidia, as I wrote you before, you need to get a copy of the last hearing before Hardy and meticulously
right down every direction he gave to either party and make sure they get done. You need to do this.
Deb, check her work. Deadlines were mentioned that did not make it into the minutes and we will still
be held to them nonetheless.
Thank You,
Zach
001797
Close Print
RE: WLS receipt of my complaint April 19th, 2009
location.
Sent: Mon 4/27/09 9:32 AM
Zach,

Call Coe

Sent: Friday, April 24, 2009 11:12 PM
To: kathy@kbreckenridgelaw.com; toddtorvinen@sbcglobal.net; Paul Elcano
Subject: WLS receipt of my complaint April 19th, 2009
Please see my complaint below, sent last Sunday and received according the the electronic receipt of delivery
provided by my electronic mail carrier.
To: pelcano@washoelegalservices.org; mashley@washoelegalservices.org
Subject: The email you were sent last Sunday
Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2009 23:02:20 -0700
Dear Paul,
Here is the email you were sent last Sunday. My account shows that it was received by you.
Please place a copy of this in my employment file.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin
To: pelcano@washoelegalservices.org; zcoughlin@washoelegalservices.org
Subject: PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2009 19:52:41 -0700
THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED FOR PAUL ELCANO ONLY, PLEASE DO NOT READ UNLESS YOU ARE THE INTENDED
RECIPIENT.
001798
Paul Elcano, Executive Director
Washoe Legal Services
299 S. Arlington Ave.
Reno, NV 89501
April 15
th
, 2009
Dear Paul,
I wish to make another formal complaint alleging a hostile work environment that includes harassment, sexual harassment, workplace
bullying, discrimination and other prohibited conduct directed towards due to my race, gender, religion, national origin, political affiliation,
sexual orientation, and age.
I have been harassed, sexually harassed, and discriminated against by employees of Washoe Legal Services on many occasions. This is
ongoing. I have informed you and others at our workplace of this harassment many times. Some, but not all, of the prohibited behavior
directed towards me includes inappropriate sexually charged comments, racially charged comments, gender discrimination, screaming, the
use of disparaging and foul language, bullying, and intimidation. Much of this conduct has focused on my gender, sexual orientation, national
origin, political affiliation or viewpoint, race and other immutable characteristics. This conduct has continued to occur and is presently
ongoing. Marc Ashley, Karen Sabo, and John Sasser were definitely made aware of this by me in one of our sit down meetings and I
informed them of my wish to file a formal complaint at that time, though I do not believe my request was followed up on. I recently filed a
formal complaint approximately two months ago but have yet to hear back from anyone with Washoe Legal Services regarding that
complaint.
I am in no way going to detail every single inappropriate or prohibited act by a Washoe Legal Services employee directed at me in this
communication. It is my firm desire that we all just get along, serve our clients well, and make efficient use of the grants bestowed upon us,
and I would hate to see anyone lose their job without a real opportunity to address these issues. This inappropriate conduct has included a
variety of activities, not all of which I will be able to fully detail in this complaint but will be able to provide details at an appropriate time.
I would like a copy of this and my other complaints placed in my employment file. I request that the formal complaint and grievance process
begin soon.
Sincerely,
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Subject:
Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2009 08:58:08 -0700
From: pelcano@washoelegalservices.org
CC: kathy@kbreckenridgelaw.com; toddtorvinen@sbcglobal.net
Dear Zach,

For some reason your e-mail did not come through on my computer so I just received it yesterday from a board
member. This matter was referred to the Board independently, not by me, and as a result they are handling it. Because of this
situation I am not to be communicating directly with you. The purpose of this communication is to clarify my status and
address a misunderstanding about your personal belongings. You are free to pick up any personal affects you want. We only
request that you do so outside of business hours and with me and a board member present. Arrangements to do so, and all
001799
further communication about this matter should be made to our Board President Kathy Breckenridge at
Kathy@kbreckenridgelaw.comwith a copy to Todd Torvinen at toddtorvinen@sbcglobal.net. If they instruct you differently then
you should follow their instructions.

Sincerely,

Paul Elcano
Rediscover Hotmail: Now available on your iPhone or BlackBerry Check it out.
001800
Close Print
WLS
location.
Sent: Fri 5/01/09 8:52 AM
1 attachment
Letter attached.
001801
Dear Zach,
the Joshi matter;
of this conduct;
Thursday, April 23
rd
available to you;
matters may be.
001802
Monday, May 4
th
Sincerely,
Paul Elcano
001803
PAGE 1
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
945 W. 12
th
St.
Reno, NV 89503
775 338 8118
Washoe Legal Services
Reno, NV 89501
May 4th, 2009
Dear Executive Director Elcano,
I have yet to receive a copy of my employment file. I would like such a copy to include any allegations that
have been made against me, whether by WLS employees, clients, or some other party or entity. Please
provide such a copy. I do not have a copy of my employment, contrary to what is indicated in Mr. Elcano's
recent letter, there seems to be some confusion in that regard. Regardless, it seems as though it is not that
burdensome a request to provide another copy should WLS have attempted some prior delivery of such a
copy. Please mail the copy of my employment and personnel file to me at:
945 W. 12th St.
Reno, NV 89509
Or, alternatively, if it is in a digital format, email it to me at this account. Please place a copy of this
correspondence and the attachments herein in my employment file. Please see the email from Mr. Proctor
regarding a potential meeting on Monday, May 4
th
.. After Mr. Elcano's note of May 1, 2009, I am left with the
impression that the meeting with Mr. Proctor is no longer sought. Is this the case? Nonetheless, at this late
date it is difficult to be available for any meeting today given the doubt cast by Mr. Elcano's letter upon whether
such a meeting will take place. If Mr. Proctor or Mr. Torvinen (to the extent that both are, in fact, on the
Washoe Legal Services Board of Directors- I have not been provided a list of individuals whom comprise the
Board despite repeated written requests) wish to reschedule this meeting, please let me know. Mr. Proctor
has indicated that I am not allowed to have representation with me at any such meeting.
I have received a number of conflicting messages from WLS, regarding various issues, including the
status of who is making the decision on my suspension, who instituted it in the first place and why, and who will
be handling any subsequent matters related to it. Please provide some clarification. With regard to Mr.
Elcano's instruction that I must provide any and all materials called for by his recent note, that is not possible as
WLS has impeded me from accessing many of these materials. Please take this letter as my formal
request to be provided access to my office, files, and computer for the purposes of preparing both
my response in the Joshi Bharti Request for Reconsideration (for which I have asked for additional
This watermark does not appear in the registered version - http://www.clicktoconvert.com
001804
PAGE 2
time to respond) as well as any subsequent Reply or Appeal. Further, these materials are necessary
to respond to Mr. Elcano's demands. I am available to come to WLS and make such copies today,
Monday after 7:00 p.m. , or Tuesday May 5
th
between 2-4 p.m. And 6-8 p.m. Please let me know if some
other time will work for WLS.
Additionally , I am requesting additional time to appropriately secure the correct representation to
protect my interests in these matters. Further, I must point out that I do not know what Mr. Elcano is referring
to regarding any sort of counseling that was announced with regard to the Domestic Violence staff. This is the
first I have heard of it.
Please see attached a copy of the the Motion for Reconsideration with two Exhibits attached that I
filed in the Bharti Joshi divorce matter. Also, I am attaching a correspondence I have previously sent WLS
attorneys detailing some of my concerns in other cases. Please note that the version actually filed with the
Court likely differs substantially from any rough draft you may have received a copy of. My preparation of this
Request for Reconsideration was greatly derailed by the lack of access I was afforded by WLS to the file, my
work product, records of correspondences with the client and opposing counsel, Outlook files, Tasks notes,
emails, etc. It was only by a stroke of luck that I had copies of the emails that ultimately formed Exhibits 1 and
2. There is certainly other documents that would make great exhibits but I have yet to be provided any copies
by WLS of these materials, despite my written requests for access and or copies. To simply provide a video of
the trial (provided by Mr. Ashley at 4:00 p.m. the day the Request for Reconsideration fell due) is insufficient.
I will reiterate here my request that WLS provide copies to me, or allow me to make, copies of all the
materials referenced above and any other materials that would prove useful with regard to defending myself.
May I have permission to discuss these matters with the client? feel it is necessary to adequately defend
myself, and, perhaps, in order to protect the client's interests (please see the discussion on the Santiago case
infra).
It is important to check the file for many things. For instance, did Mr. Springgate actually send out
discovery requests, as he stated at trial. There is no record of that on CourtConnect or eFile. If Mr.
Springgate merely provided documents pursuant to Rule 16.2, and included a sentence requesting I do the
same, that arguably does not rise to the level of a discovery request (such as a Request for Admission, etc.)
contemplated by the Court in its Order after Trial. It is also important to check with the staff and my emails to
them to determine whether any directions I gave them with regard to sending out discovery requests were
followed or whether either the paralegal or any person asserting that they are a paralegal were able to perform
any of the legal research or tasks that I delegated to them. I wish to expressly state here that I do not disclaim
any privacy right I have with respect to my computer, emails, or any other matter, including materials contained
within my office. My preference is to be granted access to my office for the purpose of making copies of the
appropriate documents and files. It would be most prudent, however, for WLS to assume I have such
documents (though I make no claim to here) and a system of inventorying exactly what is in my office, and on
my computer, such that any suspicious subsequent system failure, theft, or otherwise which may destroy any
such files will be looked on by any court or trier of fact that may subsequently become involved in this matter
with serious consternation.
It may also be important to note that an attorney trying this case may have sent out every discovery
001805
PAGE 3
request known to man, but if that attorney had not tracked down the authority that I did, which is set forth in
my Motion for Reconsideration and was reference in court at trial, he likely would have done no better than I
did, and arguably, would have cost Ms. Joshi her shot at forcing the Judge in this case to do something that
would have put Ms. Joshi in a much better position than that which she would have enjoyed had she accepted
the settlement.
To merely review the tape of the trial as if that is sufficient to determine how appropriate my actions
were is not supportable. Does WLS have any information as to what the Settlement Conference was like?
Have you asked Ms. Joshi? Does she feel as though she was being railroaded into accepting the settlement
without so much as a case or two in support of why it made sense? I certainly have not been asked my take on
the Settlement Conference, but, briefly, I can tell you that I found it unduly coercive. Do you think an attorney
has a right to make or respond to objections at trial to preserve issues for appeal? Is there clearly established
legal precedent in Nevada to support the assertion that evidence of domestic violence is inadmissible for any
purposes related to either alimony, community property, and or debt distributions? Is there precedent for the
position that one can or can not use a shared debt to a third party creditor as a basis for set off with regard to
alimony? This case contains an assortment of legal issues, the resolution of which is potentially precedent
making. These issues are ones that would make fine grounds for an appeal, nearly all detailed in my Motion
for Reconsideration.
I would like to point WLS to Caryn Sternlicht's work in substituting in for me as counsel in the Brenda
Santiago Objection to Master's Recommendations. Judge Gardner issued the original Master's
Recommendation. My review of the attached documents does not show any sort of agreement being entered
into, by me or my client, with regard to turning over her vehicle to her abuser. My review does show and
Objection I filed pursuant to WDCR 24 wherein I cite a measured overview of the various approaches taken
in the states with regard to the disposition of vehicles in these types of matters, particularly where the failure to
own a vehicle may have an impact on the victim's safety.
Ms. Sternlicht apparently took the stance that WLS had agreed to this deal to which we were
objecting and that, since she felt there was no Nevada law on point (which does happen from time to time in a
state without an intermediate level Court of Appeals to contribute to the body of precedent practitioners are
able to take direction from) she was refusing to argue on behalf of her client, Ms. Santiago. Ms. Sternlicht
indicated that Ms. Santiago did not wish to seek an Appeal after the denial of the Objection to Master's
Recommendation.. Imagine if the attorney in Brown v. Board of Education had taken this approach.
I must point out that I am particularly loathe to say anything that might appear critical of Ms. Sternlicht
because I have first hand knowledge and experience with regard to exactly how difficult the job she does is,
how emotionally taxing it is, how, unlike the vast majority of attorney's positions, it involves actual risk of
violence or retaliation on a daily basis in dealing with extremely volatile individuals. After one has worked in
either Ms. Sternlicht's or my position for some time, and peered around corners and darkened parking lots
wondering if some adverse party (be it one with a known violent criminal past, known psychiatric disorder,
known ability as a distance sharpshooter, known use of mind altering substances, known chemical dependency,
etc.) is out there waiting to exact revenge for some perceived slight, only then would one truly be able to make
something close to a reasoned and objective evaluation of the work done by Ms. Sternlicht and myself.
001806
PAGE 4
Indeed, given the recent NRS 7.085 tax against myself, one may be hesitant to argue with Ms. Sternlicht's
choice not to pursue the recovery in Santiago. However, a look at the authority on point is in order.
Further, "NRS 33. NRS 33.030 Contents of order; interlocutory appeal.
1. The court by a temporary order may...
(g) Order such other relief as it deems necessary in an emergency situation...
2. The court by an extended order may grant any relief enumerated in subsection 1 and:
(c) Order the adverse party to...
(3) Pay for the support of the applicant or minor child..." (Emphasis added).
A reading of NRS 33 would seem to yield some authority for letting Ms. Santiago keep the car that
was in her possession at that time, a car which had a DMV registration with her name on it along with the
adverse party's, and a car for which Ms. Santiago had entered into evidence at the Extended Protection Order
hearing a copy of the loan agreement for the car wherein both party's signatures were represented under the
heading of "buyers". What a reading of NRS 33 does not seem to support is for the Master to enter
an Order that demands Ms. Santiago turn over this car to the party against whom she was just
granted an EPO within 3 hours of the EPO being entered. At the least it would seem that an EPO is not
the appropriate forum for someone whom had just had an EPO entered against him (and where accusations of
rape and violence were broached) to be given relief from the court with regard to the ownership and
possession of a vehicle that is arguably co-owned by the parties.
How Ms. Sternlicht decided that NRS 33 and, supposedly Rule 11 did not allow her to advocate on
behalf of Ms. Santiago is not something I can entirely understand.
Even if there is no specific statutory authority for economic relief, there may still be a strong argument
for granting the use of personal property, directing to continue paying for transportation and child care
expenses, utilities/or other household expenses, or including language that prohibits defendant from transferring,
selling or encumbering property in which the survivor has an interest.
Most state statutes contain catch-all provisions that allow courts to grant other relief necessary or
appropriate to survivors in protection order proceedings. Nevada arguably has two such provisions, NRS
33.030(1)(g) and NRS 33.030(2)(c)(3).
One law review is particularly instructive in this respect. It notes that a. Rights to Use of Personal
Property: If rights to personal property are not specifically established as part of the civil protection order,
these items of property can present an arena for continuing conflict. 857 Twenty-six state statutes specifically
state that the issuance of a civil protection order does not affect title to personal property, 858 a notion upheld
in case law. 859 Seventeen state statutes stipulate that the court can grant exclusive possession of personal
property in the protection order, 860 and eighteen states and the District of Columbia provide that the order
can determine who has the right to use certain property. 861 Some statutes delineate clearly that checkbooks,
862 keys and personal effects, 863 household furniture, 864 and cars 865 are among the items of personal
property which can be disposed of in the order. Case law consistently supports this approach. 866 The court
in Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald 867 ruled that the petitioner may obtain personal property from respondent, even if a
divorce decree has already addressed property issues. 868 The majority of jurisdictions have realized that
001807
PAGE 5
enabling the courts to resolve questions about usage of personal property in a civil protection order removes
arenas of potential conflict by preventing the parties from having to contact each other in order to retrieve their
belongings, or to discuss an unresolved and controversial property matter. Reduction in contact between the
parties combined with resolution of issues that could become controversial can help prevent future violence.
21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801, 937-938.
.n857 Orloff & Klein, supra note 26, at 87; Browne, supra note 10, at 1080-81.
.n858 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, section 949 (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(9) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1992); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 173-B:4(II) (1990); N.J. Stat. Ann. section 2C:25-29b(9) (West
Supp. 1993); N.M. Stat. Ann. section 40-13-5(D) (Michie Supp. 1993); Va. Code Ann. section 16.1-253.1A
(Michie Supp. 1993); Wyo. Stat. section 35-21-105(d) (1988).
.n859 See, e.g., Jane Y. v. Joseph Y., 474 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Fam. Ct. 1984); Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d
767 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1979).
.n860 Cal. Fam. Code section 2035 (West 1994); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, section 949(a)(4) (Supp. 1993);
Ga. Code Ann. section 19-13-4 (Supp. 1993); 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); Kan. Stat.
Ann. section 60-3107(a)(9) (Supp. 1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 46:2135(A)(2), (4) (West 1982); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, section 766(1)(D) (West Supp. 1992); Minn. Stat. Ann. section 518B.01.6 (West
Supp. 1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. section 455.050.3(6) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 173-
B:4I(b)(1) (1990); N.J. Stat. Ann. section 2C:25-29(b)(9) (West 1992); N.C. Gen. Stat. section 50B-3(a)(8)
(1989); N.D. Cent. Code section 14-07.1-02.4.f (Supp. 1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section
3113.31(E)(1)(h) (Anderson Supp. 1992); S.C. Code Ann. section 20-4-60(c)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1985); Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. section71.11(a)(6) (West Supp. 1992); see also Model Code, supra note 15, sections 305,
306.
.n861 Cal. Fam. Code section 2035 (West 1994); D.C. Code Ann. section 16-1005(c) (1989), Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 19, section 766(1) (West Supp. 1992); Minn. Stat. Ann. section 518B.01.6(a) (West Supp.
1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. section 455.050 (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 173-B:4I(a)(5)
(1990); N.J. Stat. Ann. section 2C:25-29b (West Supp. 1993); N.M. Stat. Ann. section 40-13-5 (Michie
Supp. 1993); N.C. Gen. Stat. section 50B-3(a) (1989); N.D. Cent. Code section 14-07.1-02.4f (Supp.
1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section 3113.31(E) (Anderson Supp. 1992); Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
section71.11(d) (West Supp. 1993); see also Model Code, supra note 15, sections 305, 306.
.n862 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, section 949(a)(4) (Supp. 1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. section
455.050.3(6) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.J. Stat. Ann. section 2C:25-29(b) (West Supp. 1993).
.n863 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, section 949(a)(4) (Supp. 1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. section
455.050.3(6) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.J. Stat. Ann. section 2C:25-29(b) (West Supp. 1993).
.n864 See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, section 766.1.D (West Supp. 1992); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
section 173-B:4(I)(b)(1) (1990).
001808
PAGE 6
.n865 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. section 25.35.010(8) (restraining a defendant from entering plaintiff's car or
propelled vehicle); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 46:2135(A)(2) (West 1982); Md. Fam. Law Code Ann.
section 4-506(d)(9) (Supp. 1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. section 455.050.3(6) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. section 173-B:4(I)(b)(1) (1990); N.J. Stat. Ann. section 2C:2529(b)(9) (West 1992); N.D. Cent.
Code section 14-07.1-02.4.f (Supp. 1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section 3113.31(E)(1)(h) (Anderson Supp.
1992); see also Model Code, supra note 15, sections 305, 306.
.n866 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 406 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that trial court in
the domestic abuse proceeding was not precluded from addressing the request for the return of wife's
belongings, even if the divorce decree had granted relief); Parkhurst v. Parkhurst, 793 S.W.2d 634, 635 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1990) (involving protection order which divided personal property between the parties); Jane Y. v.
Joseph Y., 474 N.Y.S.2d 681, 682 (Fam. Ct. 1984) (holding that court could order the removal of family dog
where the dog was trained to attack the wife); Smart v. Smart, 297 S.E.2d 135, 136 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that temporary protection order can give wife exclusive use of marital home and order husband to
remove his personal effects from the home and turn over his key to the police); Stroschein v. Stroschein, 390
N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1986) (involving divorce action where lower court entered an order in adult abuse
proceeding which divided property). But see Cooley v. Cooley, Ohio App. LEXIS 4996 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct.
12, 1993) (stating that permanent property division is not allowed in a protection order).
.n867 406 N.W.2d at 52.
.n868 Id. at 54.
.n869 Cal. Fam. Code section 2035 (West 1994); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, section 949 (Supp. 1993); 750
ILCS 60/214(b)(10) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); Ind. Code Ann. section 34-4-5.1-5 (West Supp. 1993); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. section 403.750(6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 46:2135(A)(4)
(West 1982); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, section 766(1)(D) (West Supp. 1992); Minn. Stat. Ann. section
518B.01.6 (West Supp. 1993); Miss. Code Ann. section 93-21-13(2)(d) (Supp. 1993); Mo. Ann. Stat.
section 455-050.3(7) (Vernon Supp. 1993); Mont. Code Ann. section 40-4-121(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. section 173-B:4I(a)(5) (1990); N.M. Stat. Ann. section 40-13-5 (Michie Supp. 1992);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section 3113.31(E) (Anderson Supp. 1992); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 8, section 2.1(g)
(1992); S.C. Code Ann. section 20-4-60(c)(4),(5) (Law. Co-op. 1985); Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
section71.11(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1993); Wyo. Stat. section 35-21-105(a)(v) (1988).
Arguably, monetary relief is proper and necessary to the protection and restoration of the victim. It is
proper to hold defendant accountable. The victim of domestic violence should not be forced to choose
between her personal safety and economic survival. Additionally, venue is proper. Referral to an alternate
forum will cause unnecessary delay and deny the victim an effective remedy. Because economic dependence
and severe financial stress on abused individuals can so great an impact a survivors choice to stay or leave an
abusive relationship and because economic abuse by batterers is often an aspect of the power and control over
their lives, stronger legal advocacy for economic safety
and restitution is important to the economic empowerment of battered individuals and the goal of assuring that
people may live free of violence and oppression by their intimate partners.
001809
PAGE 7
Attorneys and advocates, together with their clients, should carefully evaluate the economic costs of
past abuse and future survival so that clients needs are assessed comprehensively and articulated to the court.
The economic relief available through a protection order may be an essential temporary mechanism to ensure
safety and promote economic justice for the survivor.
Lastly, I wish to point out that I am not ratifying or agreeing that Mr. Elcano's letter's
description of any of the events described in it are in accord with my recollection. There are a
number of things I would not be able to agree with.
WLS has asked that I provide copies of all other written complaints sent by you to me prior to the
entry of Judge Gardners order. Please make sure they are dated. I will review them and indicate to you what
the disposition of those matters may be. In that regard, I request that WLS provide me copies of any emails
received by WLS wherein I communicated these complaints. These emails should be dated, as all emails
typically are, providing electronic proof of delivery. Mr. Elcano has previously written me to indicate that he
did not receive the email for which I have electronic confirmation of receipt dated April 19
th
, 2009. I was
suspended the following day. Additionally, I am not sure how the date of entry of Judge Gardner's Order
comes into play. Please provide WLS's stance on when my suspension was communicated to me, comparing
the date of that communication to the date of WLS's receipt of my various personnel complaints. Doing so
will help me prepare the responses that have been requested.
Mr. Elcano notes that counseling for difficulties in office interaction had already been scheduled when I
received Judge Gardners order. You did not appear for the mandatory meeting at which I announced this
counseling. I only became aware of this upon reading Mr. Elcano's May 1, 2009 letter. Please provide an
indication and proof of when such a meeting was announced and to the extent the purpose of the meeting was
explained.
I need additional time to more fully indicate the various circumstances that underpin my previous
written complaints to WLS. Some, but certainly not all of my concerns, are set forth in more detail below:
Caryn Sternlicht, Esq., domestic violence attorney, WLS:
Caryn Sternlicht has indicated to me that I am not capable of working as a domestic violence
attorney due to the fact that I am a male. Ms. Sternlicht spent the first six months that I worked at
Washoe Legal Services telling me on a daily basis how very disappointed she was that I was hired, how
vehemently she was against my hiring. She indicated that I should quit my job in light of this. Additionally, Ms.
Sternlicht has announced to a domestic violence clinic that I observed, conducted by WLS, that domestic
violence is when a man harms a woman. This clinic was attended by two men, men who were seeking legal
services resulting from being victim's of domestic violence. Ms. Sternlicht went on to point out that there is no
such thing as domestic violence resulting from a woman harming a man. The two men in the clinic seemed
nonplussed, disappointed, and hurt by these statements. One of these men stated, hello? I am right here.
This is ridiculous. I had previously indicated to both Ms. Sternlicht and Ms. Zandra Lopez (as well as Karen
Sabo, Marc Ashley, John Sasser, and Melissa Mangiaracina) that I strongly objected to any statements or
literature given out by WLS that expressed the position that men could never be victim's of domestic violence.
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I feel this violates the Equal Protection Clause, amongst other laws of our state and country.
Ms. Sternlicht has sexually harassed, harassed, and discriminated against myself and others throughout
the time I have been at WLS. She has made my position one in which I am subjected to a hostile work
environment on a a repeated, systematic, and continual basis, and her actions are motivated by my race,
gender, sexual orientation, national origin, age and other immutable characteristics, as well as characteristics
such as political affiliation or viewpoint, perceived disability, and other inappropriate basis for her behavior. It
is quite normal to hear Ms. Sternlicht speaking quite loudly and repeatedly, at WLS, such comments (whether
directed to me in conversation or merely said out loud in a booming voice for all at WLS to hear) as:
all the little girls at that middle school like to give the boys bl*wj*bs in the bathroom while their friends stand
lookout for teachers, it is terrible, it is totally disgusting
I keep getting all these emails that are about penis's, making your penis larger, do this or that with your penis
(this sentiment was expressed on a weekly, and almost daily, basis, particularly when my office was located
five feet outside of Ms. Sternlicht's always open office door, and was often made at considerably more
decibels than less the more mundane statements Ms. Sternlicht made throughout the day.
Irish people are drunks and all these drug addicts and drunks are just such pathetic, awful people
(This theme was particularly articulated shortly after Mr. Elcano had asked a WLS employee if he could tell
Ms. Sternlicht about various private issues related to that employee)
Germans are evil
He (referring to an adverse party) likes to get these oriental women and marry them and or have children with
them. It is sick, he is such a disgusting little pervert, having this fetish for asian women, picking the same type
of woman over and over, all these men do this type of thing and it is completely vile and disgusting (this theme
was repeated quite often).
Ms. Sternlicht also took to the practice of calling me into her office to loudly berate and yell at me for
twenty to thirty minutes at a time over the most minor details of our jobs or our personal interaction, including
my request that she help clarify some of the issues for which she had asked me to help her do some research
on, which related to social security issues involved in a divorce matter. I was doing this research in an effort to
help Ms. Sternlicht out, as she apparently found her case load of 18 clients to be overwhelming. This included
a practice where, upon my saying anything in even the most calm voice, Ms. Sternlicht would say don't you
yell at me, how dare you raise your voice at me!,quit threatening me, or back off, hiss, get the hell away
from me, back off! It was truly a bewildering experience. Ms. Sternlicht often let me know that I had to put
up with anything she said or did because she was untouchable in light of the protected classes she was a
member of. Additionally, Ms. Sternlicht announced at an attorney's Inner Circle meeting that someone was
leaving little curly pubic hairs in the bathroom, near the toilet. The comments are particularly interesting in light
of other comments made by Ms. Sternlicht denouncing U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas.
It will take quite a bit more time and ink to detail all the inappropriate behavior Ms. Sternlicht has
directed at just me, and which was clearly motivated by my race, religion, gender, political affiliation, national
origin, and my membership in other protected classes.. I will not reveal all of it or even fully detail that which I
am revealing here, but will be available to at a later date, at an appropriate time.
Melissa Mangiaracina, child advocacy attorney, WLS:
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Ms. Mangiaracina was a member of the three person panel (for which Ms. Mangiaracina was replaced
by Karen Sabo, Esq., to bring the total of avowed, card carrying liberals on this panel to four out of four)
convened for the purposes of working with the domestic violence unit. At one of the lengthy and exhausting
interviews with this panel that I was called to (my participation in these interviews totaled approximately over
20 face to face hours with this three attorney panel and was characterized by ultra political brow beating,
coercion, intimidation, and abuse of process), Ms. Mangiaracina was in attendance with a glass of water that
bared an emblem depicting then-President George W. Bush with the inscription reading Present Dick of the
United States. I referenced this glass to Ms. Mangiaracina and mentioned that I found it offense, for a variety
of reasons, including, but not limited to, those based on gender and political beliefs and or affiliations. She
brought this same glass to a subsequent additional lengthy meeting between myself and this three attorney
panel, despite my informing her in front of Mr. Sasser and Mr. Ashley, of how troubling I found her display to
be.
WLS office manager Robin Kunce indicated to me, in a staff meeting, that no one, other than Paul
Elcano, was receiving reimbursement for their monthly personal cell phone bill. Subsequently, Ms. Kunce,
upon further questioning by myself, admitted, in front of multiple members of WLS staff, that Ms. Mangiaracina
had received reimbursement from WLS for her own personal monthly cell phone bill. Shortly before this
happened I had presented the question in a staff meeting attended by Mr. Elcano, Mrs. Kunce, and Ms.
Mangiaracina whether anyone at WLS was receiving reimbursement from WLS for using their own personal
cell phone in the course of their employment. Ms. Kunce indicated that no one was receiving such
reimbursement. Ms. Mangiaracina was silent in this regard.
WLS had a group of cell phones and lines that it apparently paid for on a monthly basis. Ms.
Mangiaracina gave me the old phone she had been provided by WLS. I asked WLS if I could instead use my
personal cell phone, thus obviating the need to carry two cell phones everywhere, and cancel the line that WLS
was currently paying for use of the cell phone given to me, and instead receive reimbursement from WLS for
approximately the same amount it was costing WLS for the line Ms. Mangiaracina gave me. My requests,
several of which were written were alternately not responded and denied.
Karen Sabo, Esq.:
Karen Sabo made a statement to me upon my leaving the restroom at WLS. The button on my pants
had accidentally come undone immediately after I had buttoned it d exited the restroom. Ms. Sabo, in a smug
and intimidating tone that also contained the usual degree of hostility in her voice that all her communications to
me have contained, told me that I better make sure I buttoned by pants before I left the restroom. On a
different date, upon leaving the restroom, Ms. Sabo, glared at me, and in front of Rhonda Harrison, called out
to me to inquire as to whether I had left the toilet seat up again (though I no of not one instance where I had
before). I went back to check to see whether I had (as was my wont in many regards, to be extremely
cautious not to offend any of the various groups so well represented at WLS), ascertained that I had indeed
put the toilet seat down, and informed Ms. Sabo of this. Ms. Sabo's conduct as part of the three attorney
panel (she replaced Ms. Mangiaracina) was continually hostile, abusive, threatening, mean spirited, racist,
sexist, extremely political, and coercive.
During one attorney's meeting (Inner Circle is the term used for it at WLS, apparently in homage to the
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television show Survivor Ms. Sabo commented on the then controversy related to Judge Schumacher's
acceptance of some large campaign contribution upon signing some document agreeing to recuse herself from
any potential eminent domain proceeding involving the firm making the campaign contribution. Ms. Sabo
expressed disbelief as to how anyone could possibly infer that Judge Schumacher's doing so might somehow
affect the Court's vote on any matter. Ms. Sabo indicated a complete lack of comprehension as to how this
could affect the total votes in favor or against an issue, or how the ratio of votes for or against an issue could
be at all influenced by such a recusal.
Melissa Mangiaracina indicated to me, at a legal services picnic and in front of our fellow WLS
attorney Karen Palmer that Karen Sabo had ordered Paul Elcano to place Ms. Mangiaracina in the large office
on the second floor near the kitchen upon WLS moving to 299 S. Arlington. This office is one of only six that
have a door in the half of the building currently occupied by WLS. Ms. Mangiaracina indicated that Ms. Sabo
told Mr. Elcano that there would be no discussion as to whether or not this was where Ms. Mangiaracina
would be placed. Ms. Mangiaracina was reportedly placed their for a variety of reasons, including the fact
that this office, with a door and windows that could be shuttered, would allow Ms. Mangiaracina to breastfeed
her newborn child on those days that she brought this child to work with her upon her return from four months
of paid pregnancy leave from an employer with less than 50 employees. Prior to this date, I had repeatedly
made my concerns known to Mr. Elcano, Robin Kunce, WLS office manager, and others at WLS that I felt
quite strongly that I needed a door on my office in order to maintain attorney client confidentiality and establish
a comfort zone for victims of domestic violence to recall to me extremely personal and painful memories of the
suffering they had experienced at the hand's of their abusers (which was necessary for a variety of reasons,
including assessing potential client's eligibility for services pursuant to the grants that fund WLS activities). I
further stated that I needed a door given the extremely hostile work environment I was subjected to on a daily
basis.
I had indicated to these individuals these concerns I had and pointed out that the child advocacy
attorneys seemed to seldom be in the office anyway, as their positions apparently required them to go outside
the office to meet with the children they represent and interact with various government agencies (a practice for
which they apparently receive reimbursement for their gas mileage every month-my requests to WLS for
information related to the amount of reimbursement they received were denied- it is unclear whether Ms.
Mangiaracina, who lives approximately 40 minutes away, each way, from WLS is reimbursed by WLS for her
commute to the office, which can occur several times a week). Given the infrequency with which the child
advocacy attorneys were actually in the office, and the fact that they never have clients or other parties visit
them at the office due to the characteristics of their jobs, I stated that I felt strongly that it made sense for me to
have an office with a door, in much the same way that Caryn Sternlicht has an office with a door. My request
was not granted.
It has been announced at WLS, by Mr. Elcano that domestic violence attorneys will not be reimbursed
for their parking expenses when they attend court. It has also be announced by WLS that the child advocacy
attorney have two paid parking passes next to the court house for their use in attending court. Ms. Sabo had
earlier made the statement that the move from 650 Tahoe St. to 299 S. Arlington Avenue was something she
was entirely in favor of given the much shorter walking distance required of her in going to court should the
move occur.
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Paul Elcano, Executive Director, WLS:
Mr. Elcano has, on numerous occasions, indicated that I am held to a much higher standard than other
employees, whether attorneys or otherwise at WLS, given that I am a white male. Mr. Elcano has expressed
to me that I am to wear a suit and tie to the office daily, establishing a dress code that was applied only to
myself. I indicated some hesitance to submitting to this direction, citing the yoga clothes and athletic wear that
Sarah Class, a child advocacy attorney who apparently still works part-time at WLS (though she may still be
enrolled on WLS health insurance and may still be credited the same number of years worked for WLS for
seniority, pay raises, and other purposes, as those attorneys who work full time and who have not left for
extended Family Medical Leave Act type absences from an employer with less than 50 employees) and
teaches yoga. I further mentioned that Sarah Class's daily wardrobe additionally consisted of clothes seemed
more in line with what a mid-career Stevie Nicks might wear as opposed to the traditional garb commonly
seen on attorneys. Mr. Elcano indicated to me that I need not concern myself with such matters, rather, that I
should do as he said and wear a suit and tie to work everyday. I have done so, save for 'casual Fridays', when
I occasionally were something less formal. However, on the very few 'casual Fridays' that I have worn
anything anywhere near as informal the clothes worn by other attorneys and staff Monday through Thursday,
Mr. Elcano has taken to glancing at me up and down in disapproval and making comments with respect to the
inappropriateness of my polo shirt or new New Balance running shoes, indicating that I am held to a higher
standard in that I am not a member of a protected class.
In this same regard, I had pointed out to Mr. Elcano that Caryn Sternlicht seemed to wear whatever
she pleased to the office, often times looking like one might expect one to look on a Sunday afternoon at
home. I further pointed out that Zandra Lopez commonly came to work, no matter what day, in extremely low
cut and cleavage revealing clothes, sequin studded jeans, ultra casual attire, and other items more commonly
associated with one's off hours. I additionally pointed out that Larry Belasco, a child advocacy attorney a
WLS whom had reportedly left the domestic violence unit after being unable to withstand the assault on his
senses caused by working with Ms. Sternlicht, often came to work on casual Fridays wearing very old and
ratty tennis shoes, an old t-shirt, and jeans to compliment his long shaggy haircut. Mr. Elcano reiterated that I
was held to a higher standard and not treated in a manner similar to my similarly situated peers. He expressed
pressures exerted on him by various individuals and entities, including the Committee to Aid Abused Women,
Tahoe Women's Services, Caryn Sternlicht, Karen Sabo, the WLS Board of Directors, and others to the
effect that I needed to be held to a higher standard and that I was essentially on a zero tolerance standard for
any behavior that did not comport sufficiently with the political correctness and specific leftist political leanings
called for in one working in my current position. Similarly, Mr. Elcano has on approximately 30 occasions
inquired with me as to whether I have paid off a consumer credit card debt that I owed (but disputed strongly),
a debt which came up in conversation pursuant to some question Mr. Elcano had asked me. I indicated to Mr.
Elcano that I did not appreciate being continually reminded of this debt, and that I found it inappropriate for
him to berate me repeatedly with regard to the existence of the debt. Mr. Elcano indicated that he would be
taking no action with respect to various debts Zandra Lopez reportedly owes to various WLS employees for
emergency personal loans after the existence of these debts was pointed out to Mr. Elcano.
I inquired with Mr. Elcano with regard to WLS trying to help in some way pay off the large student
loans attorneys, such as myself, incurred on the path to becoming an attorney. Mr. Elcano indicated that this
was a narrow and small issue that only affected a very few people and that he is more concerned with raising
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everybody's salary. I pointed out to Mr. Elcano that the price of tuition to even a state law school, such as the
one I attended, had risen, since 1975 by 350% percent in comparison the increase in the consumer price index
during that same period, and that, therefore, a much large burden was being bared by individuals such as
myself in this regard, and that any attempt to raise salaries for everyone including those individuals, such
attorneys Sasser, Sabo, Sternlicht, Elcano, Ashley, who graduated from law school prior to this steep and
exponential tuition increase of the last 30 years were disproportionately benefited by a WLS focus on securing
a pension plan for employees compared to any efforts at law loan repayment assistance. I pointed out that it
might be best to try for both. Mr. Elcano gave a confusing response that seemed to indicate it was better not
to get any help from the federal government in this regard because doing so might be done at the expense of
raising salaries in other areas.
Nonetheless, I, as a WLS attorney currently make just barely enough to not qualify for the very
ineffective law loan repayment assistance program offered by our Federal Government. Additionally, I pointed
out that there is an abundance of scholarship in the legal field for minorities and women, and a very, very few
for white males. Further, the grading system used in today's ultra-left law schools (where studies show it is
quite common for a full 85% percent of the faculty to self identify as ardent liberal democrats) are increasingly
subjected to the political motivations of the faculty given these grades (which Mr. Elcano often cites as
examples of the sterling qualifications of various attorneys at WLS, such as Ms. Class and Mrs. Mangiaracina).
Mr. Elcano notably leaves me out of such discussions with regard to the notable qualifications of WLS, made
in staff meetings and otherwise, despite my being ranked 10
th
in my class in law school, passing the bar
examination after the second year of law school (this is almost never accomplished -passage rates for
individuals taking the bar after the second year of law school indicate a 10% passage rate), being a National
Merit Finalist, a member of my school's law review, a licensed patent attorney, and a former litigation associate
a Nevada's third largest law firm Holland & Hart, ne' Hale Lane, or the fact that I passed the June 2001
Nevada bar examination and have gained a great deal of legal experience since that time, in and out of a legal
services setting, for which WLS benefits from on a daily basis).
Additionally, current federal law only allows for loan forgiveness of law student loans after one accrues
25 years of service in a legal aid setting (during the 25 years there is a reduced payment schedule offered to
those earning less than $45,000 annually, any amount still owing after 25 years would be forgiven-it is
important to note that the $45,000 or less annual requirement is difficult to qualify for in that married individuals
income is determined by combining the income of each spouse, a marriage penalty, so to speak). Congress
should enact legislation or the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education should amend existing
regulations governing the income-contingent repayment option of the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan
Program by (1) permitting forgiveness sooner than 25 years after a borrower begins repaying loans and (2)
eliminating or reducing the marriage penalty. The Federal Income-Contingent Repayment Option for Law
Student Loans, 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 733, 771-72 (2001). See also, Philip G. Schrag, Repay as You Earn: the
Government's Flawed Program to Help Students Have Public Interest Careers, (2002). However, even if
I did qualify for this program, the law is still greatly flawed, with only 1% of law students ever achieving
complete loan forgiveness upon 25 years of service, despite Congress's expectation when the law was put into
effect that approximately 30% of those with loans would take advantage of the program. The Clark County
Bar Association currently has a program that pays legal services attorneys student loans. Washoe County has
no such program.
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Additionally, at the time of my hiring at WLS and reiterated by WLS on several occasions (including at
a staff meeting) I was promised a substantial raise would be granted upon my completion of one year of
service in the domestic violence unit. To this date, I have worked at Washoe Legal Services since September
2007 and have yet to receive a raise. I have had most, if not all, of my requests for reimbursement (which
included itemized receipts and detailed reports regarding the items at issue) with regard to various items I
purchased in connection with my employment denied or ignored completely (sometimes despite numerous
written inquiries). I purchased, with my own money, a screen for my computer that reduced glare and strain on
one's eyes. My impetus for getting such a screen stemmed from noticing that approximately six secretaries and
or paralegals at WLS had recently been purchased such a screen by WLS. This screen is particularly useful
for those individuals who, like me, look directly at a computer screen for up to 8 hours a day.
Also among the items I have sought reimbursement or approval for but have yet to be granted approval
(or, in many cases, any response whatsoever) by WLS are a cell phone, a cell phone calling plan, a cell phone
Internet plan (it can be quite useful to look up precedent or other pertinent information at the court or check
email using a Blackberry), a trip to a CLE seminar (after watching Caryn Sternlicht go on trips while I have
been at WLS to legal education events in Las Vegas, Colorado, Minnesota, and elsewhere, all entailing hotel
and travel expenses on top of the tuition costs associated with these events; and watching Zandra Lopez go on
trips, that I know of, all expenses paid, to San Francisco and Las Vegas; after seeing Renee Kelly go to a
seminar, on WLS funds, to Florida; seeing Mrs. Kavitha Basavaraj go to San Diego for a seminar; seeing
Karen Palmer going on a WLS funded trip to a seminar in New Orleans just three weeks after she started
working at WLS, and on and on; after all of this I have been told by WLS that I will not be able to go on any
trips for continuing legal education, that WLS will not pay for me to go. My one and only trip while at WLS
consisted of going to the Family Law Conference in Ely-which, admittedly is a great event- and staying in a
$45 a night motel compared to the $150 hotel Zandra Lopez was reimbursed for in her recent trip to a seminar
in San Francisco, which may or may not have been or paralegals, something which Zandra Lopez may or may
not be). It is important to note that Robin Kunce, WLS's Office Manager was fronted the money to go to a
National Association of Legal Assistants (NALA) convention in New Orleans in the last year with the express
stipulation that she repay WLS the money or funds used to make these payments. No indication, that I know
of, has been given as to whether Ms. Kunce made such a payment.
What does seem clear is that Ms. Kunce may provide more benefit to WLS if she were to concentrate
more on being an Office Manager, and perhaps attending seminars related to that type of position. I provided,
in writing, Ms. Kunce with a wealth of support for my assertions that WLS should cease buying 53A HP ink
Cartridges from Office Max at a price of $90 (a special discounted price which WLS only gets because of
Ms. Kunce's industry and foresight in obtaining a contract with Office Max that yields a discount based on
purchasing a large volume annually. This special arrangement is apparently the exact same one offered to
anyone off the street who walks into an Office Max and signs up for their Frequent Buyers Club whereby,
upon paying some nominal yearly fee, such as $10, one gets a 10% discount off of Office Max's incredibly
inflated prices) when the exact same name brand cartridge could be purchase at www.Amazon.com and other
sites for $45, further mentioning that a completely usable and compatible, though non-name brand, cartridge
could be purchased at this same site for $30. Additionally, I pointed out to Ms. Kunce that one can refill these
cartridges for $9 a cartridge using an ink refill kit. Indeed, Ms. Kunce cites a rebate of $3.00 that WLS
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receive upon returning an empty 53A ink cartridge to Office Max, only to stand firm in her assertion that these
cartridges can not be refilled in any way that will not result in damage to the printers we use. One wonders
what Ms. Kunce believes Office Max is doing with the empty ink cartridge WLS receives $3.00 for (on
account of WLS's specially negotiated contract, which yields a special discount rate) upon returning these
empty cartridges to Office Max?
Ms. Kunce cited concerns related to damaging the printer with regard to using the refill kits, despite
pages of documentation provided to her indicating that this could be done without causing any damage.
Nonetheless, the compatible cartridges did not present such concerns, however, Ms. Kunce made a
completely disproven assertion that these compatible cartridges are only available from Japan and that the
shipping involved counteracted the $60 cost savings benefit, thereby contradicting her earlier statements that
the $90 price for the 53A cartridges were the determined by her, after much researching, to be the best
available on the market. This is patently not true. Ms. Kunce has shown a consistent pattern of offering one
rationale for doing something, only to change that rationale upon being shown proof that the previous rationale
she offered was untrue, inconsistent with other statements made by her, or an outright misrepresentation. This
is the case with regard to Ms. Kunce's statements concerning the rationale for why the unused half of the
building at WLS has been heated to 81 degrees around the clock for the entirety of the time for which WLS
has leased the building. Ms. Kunce has indicated, as has Renee Kelly, that there is no off switch for the
heater that heats the unused half of the building at WLS. Ms. Kunce later seemed to contradict herself in
asserting that her office would not be heated if the heater in question was just turned off completely (and
thereby yielded a savings of approximately $400 per month to WLS) because Ms. Kunce's office would likely
not get heated if this heater was just turned off. Ms. Kunce vaguely cited to Federal Law as a reason why
some alternate means of heating her office (which is arguably the only one located on the unused side of the
building at WLS), such as a space heater, using a sweater, or otherwise could not be used instead of heating
approximately 2,000 empty square feet of office building.
Ms. Kunce has also offered confusing and inconsistent rationale for why WLS, an entity with 23
employees, is apparently paying excess of $30,000 per year for phone service. WLS is apparently paying for
a 60 block of lines. It appears that every single employee at WLS has their very own seven digit, dedicated
phone line. How this can possibly be more cost effective than utilizing extensions like the majority of the rest of
workplaces in the United States do, is not clear, nor has any attempt to clarify this situation with Ms. Kunce
been met with anything other than resistance and misdirection. Additionally, phone lines are often sold in
blocks of 20 lines, as well as in blocks of 60 lines. Why it would not be less costly for WLS to be on a 20
block plan, instead of the 60 block plan it currently is on is not clear, despite attempts to discuss this with Ms.
Kunce and despite providing Ms. Kunce with pages and pages of documentation in support of these
objectives. What is clear is that Ms. Kunce is a former employee of the telephone company. Additionally, Ms.
Kunce points to issues with the new phone system for the rationale in having Jessica Garzae, part-time
receptionist at WLS (and whom is apparently, according to Caryn Sternlicht and Renee Kelly, doing so much
extra work in doing intakes for the domestic violence unit-despite the fact that this is the sole contribution made
by Zandra Lopez that I am aware ofthat she really deserves a raise and a promotion, irregardless of the
fact that Ms. Garzae is absent from her job so much that real problems have stemmed from having various
attorney's assistants/secretaries/paralegals, including oftentimes Deborah Pringle, cover for Ms. Garzae by
going up to the receptionist's desk for hours at a time, that Marc Ashley, consumer rights and landlord tenant
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attorney at WLS, has pointed out this out in Inner Circle meetings.
Ms. Garzae has taken to telling me to wash my dishes when she encounters me in WLS's kitchen,
despite the fact that I always have washed my own dishes at WKS, and despite the fact that Ms. Garzae is
also paid monthly to provide custodial services to WLS. My pointing this out has resulted in Ms. Sabo making
comments to me that are directed to my height and gender and the inappropriateness of speaking to Ms.
Garzae in a manner that results in making eye contact with Ms. Garzae; Ms. Sabo apparently would prefer that
I direct my gaze at my shoes and slump over in defeated submission whenever I make any contribution to the
discourse at WLS and that any actions by me that run counter to that will result in Ms. Sabo declaring that I
was towering over someone and being very, very intimidating, barreling down the hallways and stomping
around. Ms. Sabo apparently vehemently disagrees with my printing off any materials whatsoeverwith which
she holds an opinion or political viewpoint that runs counter to the sentiments or statistics expressed in the
printed materials, even where these materials relate to domestic violence work.
Mr. Elcano indicated that to me that the substantial raise he promised me after one year worth of
service at WLS was due in part to the substantial difficulty he had encountered in getting any attorney to remain
working in the domestic violence unit on account of the extremely hostile work environment created and
maintained by Caryn Sternlicht, in combination with the ultra demanding and emotionally wrought nature of
domestic violence work in general. Robin Kunce asked me if I had any law school loans and indicated that
WLS would make best efforts to help pay those in some way. I completed one year of service, successfully
implementing a number of changes to the structure of the domestic violence unit which arguably has brought
this unit in line with the law regulating the unauthorized practice of law in that situations of inappropriate
delegations of authority to Zandra Lopez, who may or may not be a paralegal, were eliminated. Further
evidence of my success in my time at WLS is set forth in the 300-400% increase in the case load taken on by
the attorneys in the domestic violence unit.
When I started at WLS, Caryn Sternlicht and Larry Belasco each maintained approximately 14-22
cases at any one time. Many of these case would go on for months. I have maintained a case load (after
getting myself up to speed in the area, suffering through a hostile work environment courtesy of Caryn
Sternlicht and Zandra Lopez, dealing with an exhausting and abusive in-house three attorney panel seemingly
bent on using as much face time with me as possible, while, at the same time, being as upsetting and
intimidating as possible, addressing vexatious complaints from various political entities in the community, and
constantly being subjected to an invidious double standard reminiscent of that which was imposed by various
academics throughout much of my youth) that varies between 55 and 85 cases at any one time. These current
case load statistics are in addition to providing additional services to those not taken on as clients. Whether
these statistics are being accurately inputted by someone at WLS is debatable.
And this caseload number is much lower than I would prefer, as the constant passive aggressive
complaints of Zandra Lopez (who claims to be, but may or may not be a paralegal or having any sort of
training or experience in that regard, and for whom I have documented proof in the form of emailed admissions
that she called in sick to work 30 times in a nine month period) and Deborah Pringle, my legal assistant (who
has recently become a certified paralegal and who was sent on an all expense paid trip to the Family Law
Conference in Ely, though she and Renee Kelly apparently left at noon on the conference's second day) with
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regard to being incredibly overworked. Deborah and Zandra have a well established habit and practice of
coming into my office and announcing that they were here till 8 at night three nights last week working extra
and unpaid hours, and how they came in on the weekend to work many, many extra hours or to make up for
some extended period of time during the week for which they were not able to be present at work. This is a
constant at WLS coming from Zandra and Deborah. Deborah does clearly work harder than Zandra, though
Deborah complains five times as much and takes many, many smoke breaks when she is not busy going to
Karen Sabo and alerting Ms. Sabo as to whether I showed up for court with enough time to spare or whether
I was not in the office and accounted for for an odd hour or two in some recent week. When I walked
upstairs and glanced at empty office after empty office devoid of any child advocacy attorney and asked why
Ms. Pringle does not feel the need to point this out, Rhonda Harrison asks what I am even doing upstairs
anyway, pointing out that I do not belong there and am not welcomed there. Upon my inquiring as to whether
she was the hall monitor, Ms. Harrison responds with bite me. Mr. Elcano received a written complaint from
myself in this regard, though I never was interviewed concerning Ms. Harrison's statements and was given no
indication by anyone at WLS that anything had come of my complaint.
Literally nothing one tells Ms. Pringle can be expected to be anything other than announced via
megaphone for all to hear. She and Zandra Lopez engage in constant gossip and office politicking. Ms.
Pringle seemingly does not understand that my time as an attorney is extremely limited. She does not seem to
grasp that should I engage in small talk with Ms. Pringle for over an hour a day, in the same way that she and
Ms. Sternlicht or Mr. Belasco did, I will likely not sufficiently perform my job in a manner that lives up to the
higher standard Mr. Elcano and others have communicated to me that I am to be held to.
There are other matters pertinent to the overall situation at WLS that I simply have not been afforded
enough time or access to put forth in this communication. I ask that I be provided additional time to do so.
Lastly, I have concerns with respect to how the grants that fund WLS, in general, and the domestic
violence work at WLS, in particular, are being administered. I wish to express my complaints that I have been
denied access to the text of these grants and their associated files for the purposed of determining WLS
compliance with the dictates of the grants. I am afraid grant moneys received for doing domestic violence
work may be being used for other, potentially inappropriate purposes. I will reiterate here my request to be
provided a copy of all the grants received relevant to my work in the field of domestic violence. I have made
written and verbal complaints to supervisors and attorneys at WLS with regard to my belief that some
individuals, including Zandra Lopez, may be engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. I have provided
legal authority packets for Ms. Lopez, Mr. Ashley, Mr. Sasser, Ms. Sabo, and Mrs. Mangiaracina in this
regard and made my best efforts to prevent any such unauthorized practice of law from taking place. I am
afraid this activity may still be ongoing. Further, I believe I may currently be facing some retaliatory
actions against me by WLS for my stepping forward and voicing my concerns and complaints with regard to
the grant related issues highlighted above and with regard to the unauthorized practice of law mentioned herein.
Additionally, I have made complaints, that I will reiterate here, to WLS regarding the completely spurious
accusation levied against me by Zandra Lopez. I have not received any communication from WLS related to
this inappropriate conduct of Ms. Lopez or follow up regarding my complaints. Further, I believe that some
grant applications, including those related to learning how to turn off a heating system that has been heating an
unused half of the building at WLS to 81 degrees around the clock may be inappropriate. I wish to have an
001819
PAGE 17
opportunity to comment on this more fully at some future point in time.
I feel that it may be appropriate for Mr. Elcano to recuse himself from any position of
judgment with respect to my conduct in connection with the Order levying attorney's fees against me
in the Joshi divorce matter. Mr. Elcano has previously indicated to me that he and Judge Gardner are very
close friends and that he helped her out with something very, very important at some point a long time ago. I
certainly do not mean to imply anything that might impugn the character of either Judge Gardner or Mr. Elcano,
as they are both two of the most respected figures in Nevada's legal community; however, in this situation is
might be appropriate to relieve Mr. Elcano of the decision making responsibility given this apparently close
association with an entity intimately involved in the Order assessing the sanctions which apparently underpin the
suspension involved in this matter.
Further, WLS has already indicated, and Mr. Elcano has confirmed this, that this situation is no longer
in Mr. Elcano's hands, that it has become a matter for the Board of Director's of WLS (these statements may
have been contradicted by Mr. Elcano's May 1, 2009 letter to me). Suddenly, the Board has appeared to
cease having any involvement in this situation. I request here that my various personnel/employment complaints
be provided to WLS's Board of Directors and that the Board take appropriate action to address my
personnel/employment complaints, as it appears that Mr. Elcano may be having an inappropriate level of
coercion placed upon him by various sources in regard to these matters. I request that a copy of this
correspondence and the Exhibits attached to it are provided to the Board of Directors. I further request here,
in writing, that I be provided a copy of any complaints and or statements made about me or against me by
person or entity that have been communicated or disseminated to WLS's Board of Directors or an agent
thereof. Please provide these items at your earliest convenience and in accordance with all applicable laws. I
know from past experiences that Ms. Sabo, Mr. Sasser, and Mr. Ashley are either not familiar with, or do not
believe in the Sixth Amendments Right of Confrontation, but I certainly am and do.
I request that a copy of this correspondence/complaint/personnel complaint be placed in my
personnel/employment file and that I be provided an updated copy of that file, addressed to myself, via mail,
to:
945 W. 12
th
St.
Reno, NV 89509
Lastly, I request that WLS provide the WLS Board of Directors a copy of the lengthy letter I wrote after
conducting, extensively, all the relevant research used in formulating that letter, or Appeal to the State Board of
Equalization (though the letter was signed by Mr. Elcano) as proof the work I perform for WLS and the level
of commitment I approach that work with. I request that I be provided a copy of that document as well. As I
am currently suspended, WLS will necessarily need someone other than myself to follow up with the State
Board of Equalization. If this is not the case, please communicate this to me, in writing, and I will do so.
Please see attached to this document the following items:
1.Motion for Reconsideration in Joshi divorce matter
2.Exhibits 1 and Exhibit 2 for Motion for Reconsideration in Joshi
001820
PAGE 18
3.Five (5) .pdf files in the Brenda Santiago EPO matter: EPO, Objection to Master's Recommendation,
Order Denying Objection, Master's Recommendations, Minutes
Sincerely,
/sig/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
001821
INDEX TO APPENDIX
APPENDIX A: Notice oI Filing oI Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus
APPENDIX B: Motion and AIIidavit in Support oI Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
APPENDIX C: AIIidavit oI Zach Coughlin in Support oI Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus
APPENDIX D: Petition Ior Writ oI Mandate
APPENDIX E: Order AIter Trial
APPENDIX F: Petitioner Coughlin's Request Ior Reconsideration with Exhibits 1 and 2
APPENDIX G: Petitioner Coughlin's Reply to Opposition with Exhibit 1
APPENDIX H: Order Denying Request Ior Reconsideration
APPENDIX I: Order Denying Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
APPENDIX J: Findings oI Fact Conclusions oI Law and Decree oI Divorce
001822
NOTICE OF FILING OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
When a writ petition is directed to a lower court, the writ petition to the Supreme Court must be
accompanied by a notice oI Iiling oI writ petition that is served on all parties to the proceedings oI the lower
court, and Iiled in the lower court as well (NRAP 21(a)(1)). A Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus has been Iiled
with respect to the sanctions set Iorth in the District Court's Order AIter Trial in DV08-01168.
Dated this: 26th day oI October, 2009:
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

AIIidavit Supporting Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus
Page 1
Zach Coughlin,
Petitioner,
vs.
The SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT oI the State oI Nevada, In and
For the COUNTY OF WASHOE and
the Honorable Linda Gardner, District
Judge,
Respondent
NV Supreme Ct. No.:
District Ct. No.: DV08-01168
001823
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certiIy that on the 26
th
day oI October, 2009 I served Notice oI Filing oI
Petition For Writ OI Mandate on the above-captioned matter upon the Iollowing
party by electronic Iiling a true and correct copy to, as Iollows:
John Springgate, Esq.
Attorney Ior Ashwin Bharti
Reno, NV 89501
Hon. Judge Linda Gardner
Second Judicial Dist. Ct. Dept. 14
Reno, NV 89501
1 S Sierra St
Page 2
001824
AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby aIIirm that the preceding document does not contain
the social security number oI any person.
Dated this 26
th
day oI October, 2009.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Page 3
001825
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROCEED
WITH MANDAMUS PETITION IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Pursuant to NRS 12.015 and NRAP 21, and based on the Iollowing AIIidavit, I
request permission Iorm this Court to proceed without paying courts costs or other
costs and Iees as provided in NRS 12.015 because I lack suIIicient Iinancial ability.
Dated this 26
th
day oI October, 2009:

Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar. No. 9473
931 Forest St., Reno, NV 89509
Tel: 775 338 8118
Fax: 801 760 6207
Motion and AIIidavit Supporting Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus
Page 1
Zach Coughlin,
Petitioner,
vs.
Judge,
Respondent
NV Supreme Ct. No.:
001826
AFFIDAVIT
I, Zach Coughlin, being an oIIicer oI the Court and swearing under penalty oI
perjury depose and say that I am the
Petitioner in the above-entitled case; that in support oI my motion to proceed on
Mandamus without being required to prepay Iees, cost or give security thereIor, I
state that because oI my poverty I am unable to pay the costs oI said proceeding or to
give security thereIor; that I believe I am entitled to redress; and that the issues which
I desire to present on appeal are the Iollowing:
Petioner previously Iiled a Notice oI Appeal/Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus in
Case No.: 53833. Petioner's Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis was denied in that
case by the District Court. Petitioner provided the District Court with a $250
supersedeas bond (that has yet to be returned), paid a $38 Iiling Iee with the District
Court in addition to an $88 Iee to appear in DV08-01168 as a real party in interest, a
$250 Iiling Iee with the Nevada Supreme Court (it is unclear whether the $250 Iiling
Iee Ior Case No 53833 will be applied to this Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus or
reIunded, or neither). Case No. 53833 was dismissed by the Nevada Supreme Court
without prejudice with respect to Petitioner's ability to Iile Ior Mandamus. Petitioner
requests that this Court reIund the $250 Iiling Iee in case 53833 and waive the Iiling
Iee Ior this Mandamus Petition, or, alternatively, apply the Iee provided in 53833 to
the instant Mandamus Petition. I attest that the responses which I have made to the
questions and instructions below relating to my ability to pay the cost oI prosecuting
the appeal are true.
1. Are you presently employed? I am not currently employed.
a. II the answer is yes, state the amount oI your salary or wages per month and
give the name and address oI your employer. n/a
Page 2
001827
b. II the answer is no, state the date oI your last employment and the amount oI
the salary and wages per month which you received. Mr. Coughlin was employed,
through May 11, 2009 at Washoe Legal Services and received a yearly gross sum oI
approximately $54,000.
2. Have you received within the past twelve months any income Irom a business,
proIession or other Iorm oI selI-employment, or in the Iorm oI rent payments,
interest, dividends, or other source? I have received unemployment beneIits.
a. II the answer is yes, describe each source oI income, and state the amount
received Irom each during the past twelve months. n/a
3. Do you own any cash or checking or savings account? Yes.
a. II the answer is yes, state the total value oI the items owned. Mr. Coughlin has
approximately $1,500 in a checking account.
4. Do you own any real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles, or other
valuable property (excluding ordinary household Iurnishings and clothing)? No.
a. II the answer is yes, describe the property and state its approximate value: Mr.
Coughlin owns a 1996 Honda Accord worth approximately $2,000.
5. List the persons who are dependent upon you Ior support and state your
relationship to those persons. n/a.
6. I have total monthly expenses oI approximately $2,000.
I understand that a Ialse statement or answer to any question in this aIIidavit will
subject me to penalties Ior perjury.
Dated this 26
th
day oI October, 2009

Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Page 3
001828
ORDER
Let the applicant proceed without prepayment oI costs or Iees or the necessity oI
giving security thereIor.
DATED this ................ day oI .............. 2009
................
Nevada Supreme Court Justice
Page 4
001829
AFFIDAVIT OF ZACH COUGHLIN IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT
OF MANDATE
Zach Coughlin, under penalty oI perjury, deposes and says: That AIIiant has
personal knowledge oI the Iacts set Iorth herein and am competent to testiIy thereto.
1. That Zach Coughlin an attorney licensed to practice law in the State oI Nevada
and practicing law in the State oI Nevada. His State Bar number is 9473.
2. That attached hereto is a copy oI an Order AIter Trial Iinding Zach Coughlin in
contempt oI court. That Zach Coughlin seeks a writ oI mandate pursuant to the
petition Iiled herewith and regards to said order.
3. That the statements contained in the Petition For Writ OI Mandate are true and
Page 1
Zach Coughlin,
Petitioner,
vs.
Judge,
Respondent
NV Supreme Ct. No.:
001830
correct.
4. That the Petition sets Iorth Nevada statutory grounds and case law grounds as
to why said Order is not valid and not in compliance with Nevada law in that the
Order directly violates NRS 18.010(2)(b), and NRS 7.085, and NRCP 11 as it does
not contain the Iacts constituting the conduct in the immediate view and presence oI
the court or judge and contains only conclusory, ad hominem, statements; Iurther,
the Order sanction the attorney Ior arguing Ior a ruling on alimony which the same
court later entered in the court's Final Order.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Petitioner
Page 2
001831
th
day oI October, 2009 I served the AIIidavit OI Zach
Coughlin In Support OI Petition For Writ OI Mandate on the above-captioned matter
upon the Iollowing party by personal delivery by placing a true and correct at their
place oI business, as Iollows:
Reno, NV 89501
Reno, NV 89501
1 S Sierra St

Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Page 3
001832
The undersigned does hereby aIIirm that the preceding document does not contain the
social security number oI any person.
Dated this 26
th
day oI October, 2009.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Page 4
001833
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE
Petitioner Zach Coughlin submits this PETITION FOR WRIT OF
MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION with the Iollowing Points and Authorities. This
Petition is brought pursuant to NRAP 21(a) Ior issuance oI a writ oI mandate
directing the district court to withdraw any sanctions against Petitioner. The issues
presented are whether the lower court's Order AIter Trial was appropriate with regard
to sanctioning Petitioner and whether it was suIIiciently detailed in describing the
conduct sanctioned. The Iorm oI this Petition is summary in nature, with attachments
but without transcripts (though video oI the entire trial does exist and may present a
more useIul and economical approach Ior review). The relieI sought is this Court`s
Petition Ior Writ oI Mandamus Page 1
Zach Coughlin,
Petitioner,
vs.
Judge,
Respondent
NV Supreme Ct. No.:
001834
intervention by way oI extraordinary writ, nulliIying any sanctions issued against
Petitioner.
DATED this 26th day oI October 2009.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

931 Forest St.
Reno, NV 89509
Tel: 775 338 8118
Fax: 801 760 6207
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. STANDARD FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
A writ oI mandamus will issue to compel the perIormance oI an act which the
law requires as a duty resulting Irom an oIIice, trust, or station, and where there is no
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course oI law. Hickey v. District
Court, 105 Nev. 729, 782 P.2d 1336 (1989); NRS 34.160. A writ oI mandamus is
available when the respondent has a clear, present legal duty to act, or to control an
arbitrary or capricious exercise oI discretion. Rouna Hill Gen. Imp. Dist. v. Newman,
97 Nev. 601, 637 P.2d 534 (1981). The writ is the appropriate remedy to compel
perIormance oI a judicial act. Solis-Ramire: v. Eighth Juaicial Dist. Court ex rel.
County of Clark, 112 Nev. 344, 913 P.2d 1293 (1996). Similarly, the purpose oI a
writ oI prohibition is not to correct errors, but to prevent courts Irom transcending
their jurisdiction, and they are issued to arrest the proceedings oI a district court
exercising its judicial Iunctions when those proceedings are in excess oI the
001835
jurisdiction oI that court; it also is to issue where there is no plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy at law. Guerin v. Guerin, 114 Nev. 127, 953 P.2d 716 (1998);
Glaays Baker Olsen Family Trust v. District Court, 110 Nev. 548, 874 P.2d 778
(1994); NRS 34.320. The writ is the correct mechanism Ior prohibiting the use oI
enIorcement orders eIIectuating an underlying order that was issued without
jurisdiction. Golaen v. Averill, 31 Nev. 250, 101 P. 1021 (1909). As to both varieties
oI writs, they are intended to resolve legal, not Iactual disputes. Rouna Hill Gen. Imp.
Dist., supra. The Court may in its discretion treat a petition Ior writ oI mandamus as
one Ior prohibition, or vice versa, or treat a notice oI appeal interchangeably as a
Petition Ior a Writ. Messner v. District Court, 104 Nev. 759, 766 P.2d 1320 (1988);
In re Temporary Custoay of Five Minors, 105 Nev. 441, 777 P.2d 901 (1989). In this
case, the essential Iacts are somewhat in disupte (although, as noted below, that some
oI the lower court`s commentary in dicta is arguably unsupportable), and the main
disputes are as to matters oI law, going both to a duty to act, and a duty to reIrain
Irom acting, both oI which duties arguably have been violated by the lower court,
requiring an order by way oI an extraordinary writ Irom this Court.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A Complaint Ior Divorce was Iiled by ASHWIN JOSHI (hereinaIter Mr. Joshi),
by and through his attorney, JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ., on July 8, 2008. An
Answer and Counterclaim was Iiled by BHARTI JOSHI (hereinaIter 'Ms. Joshi'), by
and through her attorney oI record, ZACHARY B.COUGHLIN, ESQ., on July 18,
2008. Argument was heard on March 12, 2009 and March 17,2009. Mr. Joshi was
present and represented by John P. Springgate, Esq.; and Ms. Joshi, was present and
001836
represented by Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq., Ior Washoe Legal Services.
The District Court entered and Order AIter Trial on April 13
th
, 2009 sanctioning
attorney Coughlin. Mr. Coughlin ceased representing Ms. Joshi. Mr. Coughlin
Iiled a Motion Ior Reconsideration Iollowed by an Opposition Iollowed by a
Reply Iollowed by a denial oI Mr. Coughlin Motion Ior Reconsideration. The
District Court subsequently entered a Final Order (aIter Mr. Coughlin had ceased
representing Ms. Joshi) that awarded alimony. The District Court's Order AIter
Trial sanctioned Mr. Coughlin, at least in part, Ior seeking alimony.
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER AFTER TRIAL ISSUING
SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT STAND
Pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b), the court has authority to order attorney's Iees
"when the court Iinds that the... deIense oI the opposing party was brought or
maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party." Further,
pursuant to NRS 7.085, iI a court Iinds that an attorney has: (a) Iiled, maintained or
deIended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State and such action or
deIense is not well-grounded in Iact or is not warranted by existing law or by an
argument Ior changing the existing law that is made in good Iaith; or (b)
unreasonably and vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding beIore any court
in this State, the court shall require the attorney personally to pay the additional
costs, expenses and attorney's Iees reasonably incurred because oI such conduct.
NRS 7.085 reIerences NRCP 11.
Pursuant to Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Association, 116 Nev.
646, 5 P.3d 569 (2000), the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate manner
001837
in which to review a District Court Iinding oI contempt as to an attorney was by writ
oI mandate. The District Court's Order AIter Trial is not valid and is not in
compliance with Nevada law in that the Order directly violates NRS 18.010(2)(b),
and NRS 7.085, and NRCP 11 as it misstates the law and does not contain the Iacts
constituting the conduct in the immediate view and presence oI the court or judge and
contains only conclusory, ad hominem, statements, and allowed no advance notice or
hearing. Further, the Order sanctioned the attorney Ior arguing Ior an award oI
alimony, despite the Iact that the same court awarded alimony in the court's Final
Order. Arguments set Iorth in Mr. Coughlin's Motion Ior Reconsideration and Reply
to Mr. Springgate's Opposition to Motion Ior Reconsideration are incorporated herein
by reIerence iI its please the Court and in the interest oI judicial economy and
reducing the volume oI paper involved in this Petition Ior Writ oI Mandate.
The District Court's Order AIter trial gives an explication oI the basis Ior the
sanctions. Rather than try to summarize that basis Ior the District Court, this Petition
will merely respond, line by line, to the rationale and basis oIIered by the District
Court. The District Court's Order AIter Trial is set Iorth in bold, infra, in its entirety
with respect to the basis Ior the sanctions Iollowed by Petitioner's own precedent and
analysis addressing the propriety oI so sanctioning counsel.
-At trial, Mr. Springgate stated that Mr. Coughlin had conducted no discovery
in this case. In addition, Mr. Coughlin failed to present one documentary piece
of evidence at trial on behalf of Ms. 1oshi's claims.
In adversary bankruptcy proceeding to have debt, which was incurred as result
oI motor vehicle accident, declared nondischargeable, debtor woula not be entitlea
to attorneys fees where, although attorney for plaintiffs failea to present sufficient
001838
eviaence to support finaing that aebtor was operating motor vehicle while legally
intoxicatea, he aia present eviaence of at least colorable claim, in that claim haa
some legal ana factual support since aebtor testified that he aia consume alcohol
auring evening preceaing acciaent, ana where attorney for plaintiffs was somewhat
limited as to evidence by prior order of court prohibiting plaintiffs from calling
any expert or other witnesses at trial, ana from introaucing at trial any
aocumentary eviaence other than judgment oI state court due to attorney's Iailure to
comply with pretrial order setting discovery deadlines, so that attorney Ior plaintiIIs
did not act in bad Iaith, vexatiously, wantonly or Ior oppressive reasons in bringing
adversary proceeding. Re Coupe, (1985, BC ND Ohio) 51 BR 939.
Mr. Coughlin was seriously limited in what evidence he could produce by the
District Courts ruling, in response to a misstatement oI Nevada law by Mr.
Springgate, that Ms. Joshi would not be allowed to admit any evidence whatsover
oI domestic violence, Ior purposes oI either a distribution oI property/debt or
alimony calculation, despite the Iact that Nevada law allows Ior such evidence to be
introduced (not Ior the purposes oI a Iault analysis but Ior earning capacity issues as
well as intimidation and control oI Iinances arguments, amongst other reasons).
Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d 200 (1997);and 'repetitive
acts oI physical or mental abuse by one spouse 'causing a condition in the injured
spouse which generates expense or aIIects that person`s ability to work. Roarigue:
v. Roarigue:, 116 Nev. 993, 998-99, 13 P.3d 415 (2000).
Further, Mr. Coughlin did put on a multitude oI evidence in support oI Ms.
Joshi's claims. Ms. Joshi testiIied as to the Iactors in an alimony and or property
001839
distribution analysis so well that the District Court was moved to award her alimony
and a lesser portion oI the community debt...aIter the the District Court had
sanctioned Mr. Coughlin Ior not putting on a colorable claim in either regard... The
District Court made the seemingly incongruous ruling in its Final Order awarding
Ms. Joshi alimony and a lesser debt apportionment aIter Mr. Coughlin had ceased
representing Ms. Joshi.
-Mr. Coughlin argued incessantly with the Court throughout trial
The District Court ruled on several oI Mr. Springgate's objections prior to
providing Mr. Coughlin any opportunity to respond. Responding to objections Ior
the record is is necessary Ior is one Iails to state an argument Ior the record, the
issue is not preserved Ior appeal. Mr. Springgate introduced exhibit aIter exhibit
that did not comply with the District Court's own Pre-Trial Order and various court
rules (examined in detail in the Motion Ior Reconsideration). Counsel heeded the
common rule oI thumb that continuing objections are generally not the best practice,
especially in light oI the Iact that many courts now require that objections be made
stating the speciIic ground oI objection. Dickerson v. Com., 174 S.W.3d 451
(Ky.2005), Davis v. Com., 147 S.W.3d 709 (Ky.2004); Elwell v. State, 954 So. 2d
104, (Fla. 2nd DCA 2007) review granted, 963 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 2007). This was
especially diIIicult terrain to navigate in this case (balancing preserving issues Ior
appeal with attempting to avoid upsetting the District Court's pursuit oI the orderly
administration oI justice) given that some situations brought up issues oI
Ioundation, hearsay, and procedure all at the same time.
Finding, among other things, that the eviaence was insufficient to establish that
001840
a aefense attorney haa committea ana intenaea to commit a wilful contempt, the
court in Connell v State (1907) 80 Neb 296, 114 NW 294 (ovrld on other grounds
State ex rel. Wright v Barlow, 132 Neb 166, 271 NW 282), reversed a lower court
judgment oI contempt on two counts oI addressing the court in what was variously
described as disrespectIul, humiliating, and insulting language. The first count was
preaicatea upon the attorneys comments after the trial fuage haa flatly overrulea
an obfection to a question propounaea by the prosecutor to a witness. In taking an
exception to this ruling, the attorney statea that the point was one that he wantea to
present, but that iI the court had made up its mind he would not go into it...With
reIerence to the charge oI contempt based on this language, the court on appeal Iirst
noted that the transcript oI this and other incidents revealed that the judge had been
led into controversy and argument when nothing was required but a prompt
decision...Stating that such a remark as the attorney's initial reIerence to the judge's
having made up his mind would, when made in open court, ordinarily be regarded
as more or less oIIensive, the court reasoned that the implication plainly was that
the point was an important one which merited discussion, and the insinuation was
that the court had made an important ruling with a closed mind and without proper
consideration oI the matter... the court pointed out that the judge, instead oI taking
measures to prevent such discussion, had continued it by a remark which could only
be calculated to produce the reply which Iollowed.
Asking to please be allowed to state an objection Ior the record is not quite the
same thing as where an attorney used contumacious, contemptuous language and
court was justiIied in Iinding in contempt attorney who, aIter motion to vacate
001841
client's conviction was denied, told judge "You have exhibited what your
partisanship is. You shouldn't be sitting in court. You are a disgrace to the bench"
and continued arguing aIter being held in contempt. Kunstler v Galligan, (1991, 1st
Dept) 168 App Div 2d 146, 571 NYS2d 930, aIId 79 NY2d 775, 579 NYS2d 648,
587 NE2d 286.
-and made sarcastic, derogatory remarks to the Court, Mr. Springgate, and
Mr. 1oshi throughout trial. ..~to refrain from making degrading remarks to
both Mr. 1oshi and Mr. Springgate.
A deIense attorney was held in contempt oI court in Re Cohen (1973, DC NY)
370 F. Supp 1166, upon 13 incidents oI misbehavior, including the use oI sarcastic
and disrespectIul language in addressing the court... the speciIications oI
misconduct were (1) expressions oI dis-pleasure with the trial court's rulings in
language such as "this is ridiculous," "I have never seen anything like this circus,"
"this is a travesty," and "this is a Iarce"; (2) the attorney's use oI a scatological term,
to wit, "a pile oI sh*t," when the trial judge requested him to sit down; and (3) the
statement, made in what was characterized as a sarcastic and mocking response to
the judge's request that the attorney keep within the bounds in his summation,
"Would your Honor like me to discuss a burlesque show or a rodeo." In Iinding the
attorney in contempt, the court observed that what was presented was neither a case
oI an isolated instance oI contemptuous conduct which at times occurs under the
pressure oI a trial where an attorney is carried away by misguided zeal in his client's
behalI, nor was it a case in which the attorney could plausibly claim that his acts or
conduct were triggered by or in response to the acts or attitude oI the judge.
001842
Mr. Coughlin made no statements whatsoever that bear any resemblance to
those cited in the precedents set Iorth above. Further, the District Court makes
mention that Mr. Coughlin was 'admonished approximately 15 times by the
Court to quit arguing, to ask specific questions, to discontinue asking questions
calling for a legal conclusion, and to refrain from making degrading remarks
to both Mr. 1oshi and Mr. Springgate... A common thread amongst all these 15
alleged instances (that number estimate is believed to be high) is that they are either
not required by law (one is allowed to ask an open ended or general question, in
Iact, it is a Iairly useIul tactic with some witnesses; Iurther, it is pretty hard to garner
a statement against interest or admission iI one is not allowed to ask a witness iI
they were careless or iI some item was bought to beneIit to community, particularly
where consel has made clear he is not seeking a legal conclusion Irom the witness)
or not supported by anything other than the comparatively milqeutoast 'like I am
opposing counsel's assistant. It is quite telling that the District Court could not
manage to quote a single derogatory, insulting, or sacrcastic remark made during the
Trial. II something was said worth sanctioning it should not be that burdensome to
remember it or print it and the importance to the legal proIession that decisions be
made in the sunshine oI transparency call Ior such detail.
Comments made by deIense attorney in criminal trial aIter trial court had
sustained prosecution's objections to attorneys' questions on cross examination and
in which attorney had stated "nobody seems to want to get to the truth here," and,
upon being asked by trial court whether he was accusing court oI suppressing truth,
included "I may just have to do that later," did not tend to interIere with the court's
001843
business, and thereIore did not constitute contempt. I (1978, La) 355 So 2d 1288. II
suggesting that there is a reason to anticipate needing to impugn the court's
credibility at a later point in a trial is not sanctionable, no statements in the District
Courts opinion is.
In re Mettler, (1915), 50 Mont. 299, 146 P. 747 an attorney's contempt
conviction Ior reIusing to sit down at trial was overturned when the contempt order
was Iound Iatally deIective Ior Iailing to recite the complete Iactual basis oI the
contempt, stating that mere general allegations oI insolence will not suIIice. In
addition to the statutory requirement oI an order setting Iorth the Iacts oI the
contempt, the contemnor must be granted an opportunity to explain or excuse
himselI. Such opportunity allows the individual to potentially purge himselI or
show no contempt was intended; again, general allegations oI insolence, insulting or
contemptuous behavior, unsuported by any details in the lower court's sanction
order, would not provide a proper order oI sanctions. Rankin v. District Court, 58
Mont. at 291, 191 P. at 776. See, also, Palmieri v. Marean, 83 N.Y.S. 843, 843-44
(App. Div. 1903) (vacating a IiIty dollar contempt Iine against Palmieri in a
Manhattan civil trial Ior reIusing to sit down);
At one point in the Trial, the District Court reIerred to Ms. Joshi's counsel as
'Mr. Zach. Such Iamiliarity may strike some as untoward and dismissive,
however, it is entirely likely the Court was not guilty oI some Freudian slip, but
rather made a simple linguistic inversion oI counsel's Iirst and last names. Further
Mr. Springgate surely meant no disrespect when arguing against admitting evidence
oI domestic abuse when he stated that 'while Mr. Coughlin was not practicing in
001844
those unIortunate days when Iault was included in the calculation oI alimony, I was
and let me tell you... Whether or not opposing counsel had received a license to
practice law at the time a particular precedent was passed down is oI dubious utility
in explaining this particular evidentiary issue.
-The Court notes that there were well over 40 objections during four (4) hours
of trial. Mr. Springgate's objections were well-founded and continuously
sustained except in one instance. Mr. Coughlin was overruled on every
objection except one and argued with the Court over most rulings.
Again it would seem the nothing in the Iollowing ALR suggests that making an
objection once every ten minutes or so is sanctionable. Conduct oI attorney in
connection with making objections or taking exceptions as contempt oI court, 68
A.L.R.3d 314. Further, the District Court's statement regarding Iactual issues (such
as a rate oI success arguing objections) is exaggerated.
-The Court notes that at one point, after an exhibit had been admitted, Mr.
Coughlin could not find the copy provided by Mr. Springgate in discovery.
Mr. Coughlin demanded a copy be provided at trial, stating"am I supposed to
be rifling through my papers? My understanding is that you are supposed to
provide a copy." When asked if he had the copy of the document, Mr.
Coughlin stated, "I do not know. I could spend my time and mental energy
looking around for Mr. Springgate's document like I am his assistant, or we
could ask Mr. Springgate to provide a copy at the time he is seeking admission
like I believe the rule states." Mr. Coughlin cited no rule and then proceeded
to interrupt the proceedings twice approximately five (5) minutes and twelve
001845
(12) minutes post ruling to re-argue the point. Mr. Springgate replied to the
arguments by referencing when exactly the copy had been provided to Mr.
Coughlin during discovery and where the copy could be located. The Court
had to admonish Mr. Coughlin to quit arguing the point and reiterate that the
exhibit had been admitted.
Opposing counsel should not be required to let Mr. Springgate lead in the
dance that is litigation. Petitioner's Motion Ior Reconsideration and Reply to
Opposition do thoroughly explicate exactly why Mr. Springgate's trial practice
violated several rules, partiuclarly with regard to attempting to admit exhibits that
had not been identiIied, marked, indexed, or propounded in violation oI court rules
and the District Court's own Pre-Trial Order. Further, this situation relates to the
dangers oI relying on continuing objections, as mentioned supra, particularly where
Mr. Springgate is seeking admission oI hearsay in the Iorm oI a $5,000 community
debt to Mr. Joshi's Iriend in Tanzania supported by an email. Ms. Joshi repeatedly
and passionately implored counsel to Iight to get her alimony, citing the diIIiculties
oI supporting two twenty year olds trying to gain an education.
-Mr. Coughlin filed an Answer and Counterclaim on Ms. 1oshi's behalf that
included allegations unsupported by law;
Counsel's Motion Ior Reconsideration and Opposition provided pages oI
support Ior the positions taken. Mr. Springgate has yet to provide any such support,
particularly Ior asking the court to award sanctions against opposing counsel taking
the mafority position in American jurisprudence on a particular point oI law.
Although an order granting or denying a motion Ior reconsideration is not itselI
001846
appealable, the Supreme Court can consider arguments raised in the motion Ior
reconsideration so long as the District Court considers the motion on the merits, the
notice oI appeal is Iiled aIter the order disposing oI the motion, and the motion and
order are included in the record on appeal. Arnola v. Kip, 168 P.3d 1050 (Nev.
2007).
-and filed an Opposition to the request for return of Mr. 1oshi's passport
without any factual or legal basis. Further, at trial, Mr. Coughlin presented
almost no evidence to support Ms. 1oshi's requests and claims. The most
troubling aspect of this case was Mr. Coughlin's rude, sarcastic and
disrespectful presentation at trial; Mr. Coughlin's inability to understand a
balance sheet; his failure to conduct discovery; and his lack of knowledge with
regard to the rules of evidence and trial procedure. All of this was
compounded with a continuously antagonistic presentation of the case that
resulted in a shift from a fairly simple divorce case to a contentious divorce
trial lasting an excessive amount of time. For all these reasons, the Court finds
that Mr. Coughlin's presentation of the case and arguments in support thereof
to be unfounded in fact, unwarranted by existing law, unreasonable, and
vexatious throughout this entire proceeding.
Judge Schumacher already made a Pre-Trial ruling with regard to the passport
issues, several months beIore the Trial in this case. No sanctions were issued, and
law oI the case doctrine prevent the District Court Irom exhuming that issue to
autopsy the propriety oI Mr. Joshi demanding the courts rush in and have all his
things delivered to him while he Iails to make a single phone call Ior months and
001847
months (he was still promising to do so at the Trial) to help Ms. Joshi get that to
which their culture dictates is aIIorded her upon divorce, her ceremonial gold
'woman's wealth, traditionally held by the groom's Iamily. How the District Court
is aware oI exactly what discovery was conducted by either side's counsel is
unclear, but certainly Mr. Springgate did not present any more discovery request to
Ms. Joshi than her counsel did to Mr. Joshi. For some reason the District Court
provided no indication oI how Mr. Springgate's violating the Pre-Trial Order and
various court rules results in sanctioning opposing counsel Ior not immediately
identiIying the court rules pertaining to those transgressions. Further, this arguably
was not such a simple divorce case considering all the authority and precedent that
Iorms the Motion Ior Reconsideration. The Iact that Petitioner was sanctioned Ior
arguing the mafority view on an issue that is arguably without precedent in Nevada
(and which may present an opportunity Ior the Nevada Supreme Court to issue
some precedent that may curb the need to return to District Courts Ior additional
hearings to enIorce property distribution rulings or modiIy alimony terms) is
inappropriate.
ABA Criminal Justice Standards, Special Functions oI the Trial Judge,
Standard 6-4.3 (2d ed.1980) requires a clear warning iI the conduct was not
'willIully contemptuous. Id. Standard 6-4.2(a) The District Court's Order AIter
Trial does not seem to contemplate any intent requirement, much less Iind counsel's
conduct willIully contemptuous. Thus, the Standards would require a warning in
this case and the Order AIter Trial makes no mention oI such a warning.
VI. CONCLUSION
001848
A Writ oI Mandate should be issued Iorthwith, directing the lower court to do
that which is required by law, and to cease doing that which is prohibited by law.
Further, Mr. Coughlin should be reimbursed Ior costs ($250 Iiling Iee, $88 real party
in interest appearance Iee, $250 supersedeas bond, $38 District Court Iiling Iee, $150
copying costs) and time spent on this action (45.5 hours at $225 per hour).
DATED this 26th day oI October, 2009.
_______________________
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

931 Forest St.
Reno, NV 89509
Tel: 775 338 81118
Fax: 801 760 6207

001849

th
day oI October, 2009 I served the Petition Ior Writ oI
Mandamus and AIIidavit OI Zach Coughlin In Support OI Petition For Writ OI Mandate on
the above-captioned matter upon the Iollowing party by personal delivery by placing a true
and correct at their place oI business, as Iollows:
Reno, NV 89501
Reno, NV 89501
1 S Sierra St
Zach Coughlin, Esq.

001850
The undersigned does hereby aIIirm that the preceding document
does not contain the social security number oI any person.
Dated this 26th day oI October, 2009.

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

001851
F I L E D
Electronically
04-13-2009:09:23:48 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
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-Exhibit 1-
F I L E D
Electronically
04-30-2009:03:35:14 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
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-Exhibit 2-
F I L E D
Electronically
04-30-2009:03:35:14 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
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Request for Reconsideration - 1
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Code 2490
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
299 S. Arlington Ave
Bar No.: 9473
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Attorney for Zach Coughlin
Attorney of Record for Joshi Bharti*
IN THE FAMILY DIVISION
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIVISION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Bharti Joshi,
Defendant
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Case No.: DV08-01168
Dept. 14
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION; REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO
RESPOND
COMES NOW, Zach Coughlin, Esq., on behalf of himself with respect to the personally
liability for attorneys fees pursuant to NRS 7.085, and commenting to the Court in regard to his
representation of the Defendant, Joshi Bharti, and moves the Court to Reconsider the Order After
Trial it entered and served electronically on April 13
th
, 2009. This motion is made and based
upon the attached memorandum of points and authorities and all the papers and pleadings on file
in this action.
F I L E D
Electronically
04-30-2009:03:35:14 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
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(Please Note: Mr. Coughlin attempted a to timely file this Request on eFile, however, a technical
deficiency regarding the signature line resulted in a rejection of the filing, communicated to Mr.
Coughlin on April 29
th
, 2009, and required a refilling after being informed of the problem by
Annie at the filing office (775 328 3112 is Annie contact number).
Dated this 27
th
day of April, 2009
/sig/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
The Order Requiring Attorney to Personally Pay Opposing Counsels Legal Fees Should be
Reconsidered and Set Aside.
Mr. Coughlin wishes to express his sincere and profound respect for this Court and for
opposing counsel John Springgate, Esq. He recognizes the valuable opportunity presented by
the criticisms set forth and is resolved to redouble his efforts in developing along the path of
becoming a consummate professional of the ilk to which Judge Gardner and Mr. Springgate
belong. Mr. Coughlin feels is fair to point out that subsequent to this Trial Mr. Springgate
reached out to Mr. Coughlin and a very productive communiqu resulted which has led to Mr.
Coughlin being fortunate enough to be provided much useful instruction in aid of Mr. Coughlins
journey to, hopefully, one day becoming anywhere near as accomplished and respected a
professional as Mr. Springgate.
*It is important to note at the outset that Mr. Coughlin does not believe he is currently
representing Ms. Joshi. It is Mr. Coughlins understanding that Washoe Legal Services
substituted a different attorney to represent Ms. Joshi henceforth in this case. Mr. Coughlin has
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and intends to continue to make every appropriate attempt to accomplish this transition in a
manner that attends to all matters of concern to Ms. Joshi.
This Court enjoys discretion to award attorney's fees in a divorce action. (See NRS
125.150(3); Love v. Love, 114 Nev. 572, 959 P.2d 523 (1998)). Also, pursuant to NRS
18.010(2)(b), the court has authority to order attorney's fees "when the court finds that
the...defense of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to
harass the prevailing party." Finally, pursuant to NRS 7.085, if a court finds that an attorney has:
(a) filed, maintained or defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State and such
action or defense is not well- grounded in fact or is not warranted by existing law or by an
argument for changing the existing law that is made in good faith; or (b) unreasonably and
vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State, the court shall
require the attorney personally to pay the additional costs, expenses and attorney's fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
Whether counsel defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State where such
action or defense is not warranted by existing law or by an argument for changing the
existing law that is made in good faith?
Should Ms. Joshi have been ordered to pay half the community credit card debt (for
which her personal property probably could not be used to satisfy as she was not a cosigner on
nearly all of the accounts), any subsequent failure on her part to do so could likely not be
used as a proper basis to set off any alimony award received. However, the Courts Order
After Trial points out that Mr. Joshi requested the Court consider his net income after deducting
taxes, factoring in the present $600 per month he is presently paying for community debt, and
set off any alimony responsibility by his assumption of an unequal distribution of
community debt. (Emphasis added). The Courts Order seems to endorse this arrangement as
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fair and acceptable and the Courts statements to Mr. Coughlin and Ms. Joshi at the Settlement
Conference explicitly indicated how well grounded in legal custom this scenario was thought to
be. However, the majority rule in the various states and overwhelming balance of recorded case
law suggests otherwise, sometimes very strongly. Nevada may not have authority directly on
point, though In Re Anders (a bankruptcy case from Nevada) may be.
The court in each of the following cases determined that an offset against an arrearage of
alimony for payments to various third parties on behalf of a former spouse, including tuition and
sums spent in satisfaction of a bank loan or credit card charges, would not be permitted. The
special nature and purpose of the support obligation owed by a divorced spouse to her former
spouse will be a consideration affecting the court's determination of the propriety of an offset in
most instances. For example, in several jurisdictions in which the courts have determined that
the support obligation is a "duty" and not a "debt," it has been held that a setoff of an ordinary
debt should not permitted as a matter of right against the support obligation. It should be noted
that in a few jurisdictions, there is no indication that an offset considered by the court to
retroactively modify the decree will be permitted under any, or at least most, circumstances.
Nevada does not appear to have any reported case law on this issue, as can sometimes be the
case.
Remanding the case for a new trial to determine whether the wife consented to certain
payments to third parties in lieu of alimony arrearages due under a separation agreement, the
court in Lopez v Lopez (1980, App) 125 Ariz. 309, 609 P2d 579, observed that support
payments, whether for the wife's or child's support, are to be disbursed by the supported spouse
as she sees fit, and the supporting spouse ordinarily is not entitled to credits against past-due
support for monies that he paid to third parties on his own accord and without her consent.
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The court in Morel v Morel (1982, La App 5th Cir) 425 So 2d 1289, cert den (La) 430 So
2d 99, refused to allow as an offset against delinquent alimony pendente lite and child support
several non-complying expenditures by the husband, including the payment of the children's
tuition, a community debt, when the amount expended could be recovered by him at the time of
the settlement of the marital community, and the payment was not made pursuant to the spouses'
agreement. A request by the wife that the husband make such payments during a later time
period was found irrelevant to the instant indirect payments.
Although apparently agreeing with jurisprudence to the effect that the supported spouse is
entitled to spend support funds as she chooses, and the supporting spouse may not usurp this
right by making payments to others on his own accord, the court in Feazell v Feazell (1984, La
App 3d Cir) 445 So 2d 143, held that the husband's payments to third parties on behalf of his
former wife were not unilateral, but in accordance with the wife's direction and, consequently,
permissible.
Where the wife testified that she used the credit card to "balance out" household expenses
for herself and the children while the couple was separated, the court in Youngberg v Youngberg
(1986, La App 4th Cir) 499 So 2d 329, would not permit an offset against post-divorce
permanent alimony and child support arrearages for one-half of the credit card charges. The
husband had been ordered to pay alimony pendente lite and child support during the period in
which the charges were made, but was current in his payments at that time, and asserted that the
wife made the charges without his permission. The wife maintained that the credit card charges
were for expenses for which the husband was responsible. The court concluded that neither
spouse intended such a credit when the husband paid the credit card account balance, denying the
offset apparently based on the lack of evidence of an agreement between the parties.
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In Gottsegen v Gottsegen (1987, La App 4th Cir) 508 So 2d 162, the court disallowed
credit against past-due permanent alimony for pre-award payments made on veterinarian and
cable television bills when those items could not be considered necessary for the wife's support,
pursuant to La.R.S. 9:310, which provided for the retroactive effect of such awards subject to
credit for any support provided.
Credit card charges for the purchase of luggage and an airline ticket by the wife
immediately prior to separation, which apparently fell to the husband to pay, were not offset
against arrears in alimony pendente lite by the court in Rauch v Rauch (1988, La App 5th Cir)
535 So 2d 1317, when the husband's claim was not "liquidated" within the meaning of LSA-C.C.
art. 1893, the statutory setoff provision.
Although affirming the lower court's postponement of a decision respecting the husband's
right to credit until the divorce trial because this aspect of the decision was not appealed, the
court in Keff v Keff (1983, 3d Dept) 95 App Div 2d 888, 464 NYS2d 29, remarked that a
judgment requiring the husband to pay the full amount of the claimed arrears in temporary
maintenance and child support would have been appropriate, notwithstanding a claimed setoff
for amounts paid by him for attorney's fees owed by the wife (Ms. Joshi should receive a similar
set off for the fees paid to Mr. Springgate). The court noted that the husband neither moved for
relief of the support order, nor proffered any reason for his neglect, and his unilateral reduction
of support was improper.
The court in Gluck v Gluck (1987, 2d Dept) 134 App Div 2d 237, 520 NYS2d 581,
concluded that a husband's payment of the spouses' credit card bills, apparently prior to divorce,
could not be offset against arrears in (temporary) maintenance and child support owed to his
wife.
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In Bruner v Bruner (1978, La App 2d Cir) 356 So 2d 1101, cert. gr. (La) 358 So 2d 641,
it was held that the trial court erred in allowing a husband credit or an offset against a claimed
arrearage of alimony pendente lite for payments made by him to third parties on his wife's behalf
where the evidence did not show that the payments were made at the request of, or with the
consent of, his wife.
A husband was not entitled to credit against arrears in pendente lite maintenance and
child support for voluntary payments he made to third parties for his wife's and children's
benefit, according to the court in Krantz v Krantz (1991, 2d Dept) 175 App Div 2d 865, 573
NYS 2d 738, on the ground that several of the payments also satisfied the husband's
contractual obligations.
And, in Kerpen v Kerpen (1991, 2d Dept) 172 App Div 2d 496, 567 NYS2d 849, the
court refused to credit a husband with voluntary payments made on behalf of his wife for "club
and other items" toward the sum of money owed by him for maintenance and child support under
a pendente lite order.
Mr. Springgate presented no case law or other legal authority beyond his own
professional opinion as to the legal basis for including such a set off for payments owed to third
party creditors in satisfying a domestic support obligation. Courts universally have embraced
the position that the unique nature or purpose of the support obligation owed to the former
spouse must be considered in any determination as to whether a setoff would be permitted
against that obligation. Mr. Springgate, who provided a thorough exposition in court (that
astutely referenced the Hein and Rodriguez cases) regarding the precedential history of
excluding evidence of the respective fault of the parties in property distribution and also in,
perhaps, an alimony determination, seemingly was unaware of the reasonableness and firm
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grounding in multitudinous precedent for sticking to the position that a debt to a third party
creditor might not be used to properly offset an alimony obligation.
This, so much so that Mr. Springgate felt it reasonable to move for Mr. Coughlin to
personally pay Mr. Joshis legal fees, at least in part, for Mr. Coughlins part in Ms. Joshis
declining to accept the offered settlement. One might wonder whether Mr. Springgates request
for sanctions in that regard was well- grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or by an
argument for changing the existing law that is made in good faith, or whether it unreasonably
and vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State.
The court in Palmer v Palmer (1966) 52 Misc 2d 610, 275 NYS2d 978, recognized the
principle that a husband may not set off against unpaid alimony and child support payable to his
wife debts or claims owed to him by her, nor payments made by the husband to third parties for
the benefit of his wife or child without the wife's prior consent that they be instead of the amount
fixed by the matrimonial judgment or order, although in the controversy before the court,
concerning summer camp expenses paid by the husband on behalf of a daughter, the wife waived
the rule. The court added that without consent, indirect payments must be regarded in addition to,
not in lieu of, the support fixed by the court, that is a gift.
The court in Compton v Compton (1987, Tenn. App. Middle Section) No. 86-258-II,
held that a husband could not offset against alimony arrearages bills paid on behalf of his wife
without her request or agreement that the payments were in lieu of alimony, but in making the
payments had conferred to her an "officious benefit." The husband paid less alimony per month
than the amount ordered by the court, but contended that he also paid bills for his wife which
more than offset the deficiency for that period. Refusing to permit the offset against the
deficiency in alimony, the court pointed out that to vary the terms and allow a set off for the
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payment of other bills not included in the decree would subject the courts to a plethora of
such claims, making enforcement of the simplest divorce decree a quagmire for the trial
judge.
The language emphasized immediately above brings up an interesting point. The
Settlement, and ultimately the Order After Trial call for a situation where Ms. Joshi may well
(and it is very likely according to Mr. Springgate) need to ask this Court to have another hearing
in the future should Mr. Joshi discharge any of the debts he has been ordered to pay (or perhaps
even where Ms. Joshi has done so). However, the resolution urged by Ms. Joshis counsel would
arguably be more in line with judicial economy were courts in this State to adopt the majority
rule forbidding the offset of alimony due through payment to third party creditors. To the extent
the case loads in Family Court are so overburdening, having such a clear statement of the law
would obviate the need to have more and more contempt hearings following the discharge of a
supporting spouses obligations in bankruptcy.
Can it be said, considering NRS 7.085, that Mr. Coughlin filed, maintained or defended
a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State and such action or defense [was] not well-
grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or by an argument for changing the existing law
that is made in good faith in the instant case? Mr. Coughlin respectfully urges this Court to
consider the arguments set forth herein for reasons why the sanctions entered could be
reconsidered.
Seemingly, the award of attorneys fees relates, in part, to Mr. Coughlins failing to
counsel his client to accept a settlement offer whereby Ms. Joshi would agree to take $1.00 of
alimony for five years in exchange for Mr. Joshi agreeing to be responsible for about $20,000 of
consumer debt. This is the arrangement contemplated by Siragusa, and it makes sense when
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courts are adjudicating the marital dissolutions of extremely wealthy parties. This is not one of
those situations. This consumer debt was largely incurred on the Mr. Joshis credit cards, to
which Ms. Joshi was not a co-signer or authorized user and was never allowed to examine any
sort of itemized statement of the charges incurred (despite Mr. Coughlins written requests to
opposing counsel and indication that allowing her to do so would further settlement
negotiations). Exhibits A and B (please note that not all such correspondences are immediately
available to Mr. Coughlin given the situation referenced elsewhere in this Motion). Whether the
large balance transfers Mr. Joshi testified to making were made to transfer debt from an account
for which he was the only signatory to one where Ms. Joshi was a co-signatory (and thus could
see her separate property used to satisfy the debt) is certainly a valid point of inquiry.
Mr. Coughlin argued against accepting such a settlement (though he certainly informed
Ms. Joshi that the decision to go to trial was largely hers, but an attempt will be made to veer
away from considering the divergent interests of attorney and client in situations such as these, as
well as the lack of notice constitutional problems associated with NRS 7.085 awards). Mr.
Coughlin anticipated the trial may well result in an alimony award to Ms. Joshi of roughly $500
per month, potentially for over 10 years, when considering that equalizing payments for a
$12,000 yearly income disparity was a good yardstick for a 21 year marriage that produced two
children. This seems particularly true where it would take 12-20 years of payments to get Ms.
Joshi to social security age.
Should Ms. Joshi have been ordered to pay half the community credit card debt (for
which her personal property probably could not be used to satisfy as she was not a cosigner on
nearly all of the accounts), any subsequent failure on her part to do so could likely not be
used as a proper basis to set off any alimony award received. However, the Courts Order
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After Trial points out that Mr. Joshi requested the Court consider his net income after deducting
taxes, factor in the present $600 per month he is presently paying for community debt, and set
off any alimony responsibility by his assumption of an unequal distribution of community
debt. (Emphasis added). Additionally, the Court noted that to protect Ms. Joshi in the event
Mr. Joshi filed for bankruptcy, Mr. Joshi suggested that the court maintain jurisdiction over the
issue of spousal support for five years.
Indeed at the Settlement Conference (which was conducted the same day as the Trial,
something Mr. Coughlin agreed to in an effort to appease Mr. Joshis counsel stated desire to
encourage judicial economy) the Court seemed to indicated the reasonableness of this settlement
proposal and the jurisdictional $1.00 payment. It was unclear whether any subsequently
increased support obligation over and above the $1.00 set forth in the decree would enjoy
priority over third party creditors should Mr. Joshi file bankruptcy. It is clear that support
obligations enjoy priority in bankruptcy proceedings, it is not as clear whether this priority is
with respect to the original $1.00 per year award, or to any subsequently modified amount.
Like many domestic violence cases, the Settlement offered essentially exerted a good
deal of inappropriate power and control (a la the Duluth model) over Ms. Joshi and her rights
and Mr. Coughlin objected to that and is hopeful others can see why he felt strongly that doing
so was the right thing to do.
The Courts Order after Trial is not sufficiently detailed and specific to support an award
personally requiring counsel to pay opposing sides attorneys fees.
-Requirements of specific findings
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In the following cases, the courts held or recognized that specific findings by the trial
court were required before an attorney could be assessed with his opponent's fees. Major v First
Va. Bank, 97 Md. App 520, 631 A2d 127 (1993). (RICO claim; $25,000 for counsel fees).
In O'Brien v Cseh, (1983, 2d Dist) 148 Cal App 3d 957, 196 Cal Rptr 409 ( 12[b]), the court
found that an order by the trial court assessing attorney fees against counsel and giving only
"good cause appearing" as a reason for the sanction failed to meet the statutory requirement of a
detailed recital of the circumstances justifying the imposition of sanctions.
The court reversed an award of fees against an attorney that was imposed by the trial
court without any finding as to the actual costs incurred by the opposing parties, in City of El
Monte v Takei, (1984, 2d Dist) 158 Cal App 3d 244, 204 Cal Rptr 559 ( 9[a]). The case was
remanded for a hearing to determine reasonable expenses and counsel fees, since under the
applicable court rules the sanctions were limited to that amount.
If Mr. Joshis bare and inconsistent assertions in court regarding the various debts he
sought this Court to divide constitutes sufficient evidence for the court a question arises. Why
is this proof deemed sufficient with regard to the evidence presented where, when Ms. Joshis
points of contention are backed by similar evidence (testimony and financial declarations), the
court takes issue with the lack of evidence presented? Mr. Coughlin recognizes the level of skill
Mr. Springgate displays in court, when combined with the far superior reputation amongst his
peers in legal circles that Mr. Springgate enjoys arguably entitles Mr. Springgate the benefit of
the doubt.
Trial court abused its discretion in imposing a monetary sanction on the ground of failure
to perform a reasonable investigation before filing claims; no evidence was presented at the
sanctions hearing, and the sanctions order did not state that the trial court considered evidence.
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Russell v. McBride Elec., Inc., 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2022 (Tex. App. Dallas Mar. 16 2006).
Administrative findings and decision were not supported by substantial evidence and the record
did not demonstrate a reasonable basis for the ALJ's refusal to set aside the default order;
however, the record did not demonstrate that the department's motion for new trial was a
pleading frivolously presented for an improper purpose, unwarranted by existing law, and
without evidentiary support, and there was no showing that the motion was filed in bad faith to
support an award of attorney's fees. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Frieda, 112 S.W.3d 768, 2003
Tex. App. LEXIS 6604 (Tex. App. Beaumont 2003). In a lawyer's action to impose sanctions
against another lawyer, the sanctions were reversed as the stated bases for the sanction were
violations of Tex. Civ. Pac. & Rem. Code Ann. chs. 9, 10 and Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; both the lack of
evidence for the amount of necessary attorney's fees and the failure of the trial court to
demonstrate either the rationale for the sanction imposed or that a lesser sanction would have
sufficed, required a remand. Hemphill v. Hummel, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5799 (Tex. App.
Corpus Christi July 31 2008). In a case where a mother was trying to recover real property from
her daughter, sanctions were properly not awarded because there was some evidence supporting
the daughter's counterclaims for breach of contract and fraud; the mother did not disprove
allegations made by the daughter that she and her husband had paid part of the cost of a septic
system, as well as the taxes on the property. Delahoussaye v. Kana, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS
8561 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. Nov. 13 2008).
In Charles v Charles, (1986, Dist Col App) 505 A2d 462 ( 4[a]), the court reversed an
assessment of attorney fees against an attorney, where the trial court had failed to make a
specific finding of bad faith. The court stated that it is within the inherent authority of trial
courts to assess attorney fees against an attorney who has acted in bad faith, if the sanction is
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imposed after fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record. But although counsel's
conduct in this case made an assessment of fees appropriate, and there had been fair notice
and a hearing on the plaintiff's motion for attorney fees, the court decided that the absence of
a specific finding of bad faith required reversal and remand for a new hearing directed to that
issue.
The Courts Order after Trial in the Joshi divorce matter did not contain any language
related to this intent question. This Order failed to specify whether the court found counsels
actions to exhibit bad faith. As such the sanction should not be upheld as it is not sufficiently
detailed and specific.
Before a proper finding of a Frivolous claim may be made under a statute authorizing fee
awards against attorneys on that basis, it is necessary for the trial court to find that the
attorney knew that the action was without any reasonable basis in law and could not be
supported by a good- faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
held the court, in Radlein v Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., (1984) 117 Wis. 2d 605, 345
NW2d 874. The court stated a two-pronged test for determining an attorney's responsibility in
sanctions for commencing a Frivolous action: first, is the law ready for an extension,
modification, or reversal; and if not, then second, was the argument for such change made in
good faith even though not successful. Frivolous action claims are an especially delicate area,
said the court, since the ingenuity, foresightedness, and competency of the bar should be
encouraged and not stifled.
The Courts Order After Trial in the case at bar should reconsider any finding that
counsel put forth an action that was without basis in law (it is not entirely clear what NRS 7.085
contemplates necessary with respect to the intent issue). Mr. Coughlin mentioned the Siragusa
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and Allen opinions in court and referenced the American Law Reports covering the pertinent
issues underlying the dispute with regard to the appropriateness of the settlement discussed. The
ALRs counsel was referring to are Debts for alimony, maintenance, and support as
exceptions to bankruptcy discharge, under 523(a)(5) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11
U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5)), 69 A.L.R. Fed. 403; Spouse's right to set off debt owed by other
spouse against accrued spousal or child support payments, 11 A.L.R.5th 259 (Originally
published in 1993); Change in financial condition or needs of husband or wife as ground for
modification of decree for alimony or maintenance, 18 A.L.R.2d 10 (Originally published in
1951) .
In a post-divorce proceeding, the court did not err in modifying husband's alimony
obligation by continuing it beyond term called for in decree where original decree called for
husband to make alimony payments to wife of $3,000 per month for sixty months, where decree
also required husband to pay wife $1.250 million over fifteen years for her share of community
property interest in husband's medical practice, where husband fell behind in his payments and
his property settlement obligation was later discharged in bankruptcy although his alimony
obligation was not, where court properly considered discharged obligation as "changed
circumstance" justifying modification in that discharge of obligation had changed both husband's
and wife's financial circumstances, and where modification of alimony award based upon
discharged property settlement obligation did not re-create debt discharged under federal
bankruptcy laws. Siragusa v Siragusa, 108 Nev 987, 843 P2d 807, CCH Bankr L Rptr 75035
(1992); In re Siragusa, 27 F.3d 406, 31 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 890, Bankr. L. Rep. P 75,965,
C.A.9 (Nev.), June 20, 1994 (NO. 92-16788).
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There is no explicit relation of debt allocation and community property distributions to
the spouses. The Nevada statutes do not mandate any particular order of decision among child
support, spousal support, property division, or debt allocation. This has led to a certain amount of
confusion as judges attempt to achieve equity through a holistic approach to deciding all issues
in the case. (Marshall Willick, Esq. article at http://www.willicklawgroup.com/get_file/id=283).
The Nevada Supreme Court has opined that where a party does not pay the debts that
were supposed to be paid, that party is not entitled to the property share that was awarded based
on anticipation of such payment. Allen v. Allen, 112 Nev. ___, ___ P.2d ___ (Adv. Opn. No.
149, Oct. 22, 1996). The Nevada Supreme Court has likewise allowed the reopening of alimony
to the party to whom a debt fell because the other party was supposed to pay that debt but failed
to do so. Martin v. Martin, 108 Nev. 384, 832 P.2d 390 (1992). What is still lacking, however,
is any clear guideposts as to which party should have been allocated what debt to begin with.
The Nevada case law, however, appears to presume that the debt terms set out in the decree are
absolute, and that other terms, such as alimony (See Martin v. Martin, 108 Nev. 384, 832 P.2d
390 (1992)), or property division (See Allen v. Allen, 112 Nev. ___, ___ P.2d ___ (Adv. Opn.
No. 149, Oct. 22, 1996)), will be amended to enforce the debt division. In the interests of
judicial economy it is important to note that, while there is no significant appellate authority on
these subjects, costly proceedings in the lower courts to enforce debt payment terms by less
drastic means (primarily, contempt sanctions) are common.
To the extent that the Courts sanctions in the case at bar were motivated by a concern for
judicial economy, fashioning a decree that will potentially see these parties returning to court to
litigate costly contempt proceedings should Mr. Joshi (or perhaps Ms. Joshi, though much case
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law is presented here that would argue against it) discharge his various debts in bankruptcy
seems ill advised.
In Nevada, except for real estate and jointly- managed businesses, it appears that both
spouses have free reign to incur debt for which the community is responsible. It also seems
rather clear that the creditors of such community debt are unaffected by anything in a divorce
decree from pursuing either of the parties for repayment. See Marine Midland Bank v.
Monroe, 104 Nev. 307, 756 P.2d 1193 (1988) (bank is free to pursue wife for delinquent joint
credit card debt despite divorce courts order for husband to pay such debt). It is typically very
difficult to pursue a spouse who is not a cosigner with respect to using that spouses separate
property covers any community debt.
In Martin v. Martin, 108 Nev. 384, 832 P.2d 390 (1992), an August 1988 divorce decree
ordered child support and for the husband to pay two Visa accounts. He filed bankruptcy in
September, and had them discharged in April of 1989. The wife filed a motion for spousal
support; after an evidentiary hearing, the lower court found that the debt payment terms were
characterized as being in the nature of alimony, maintenance and support and so ordered
support in an amount sufficient to repay wife for credit debts now falling to her. On appeal, the
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed that in this case the hold harmless provisions qualified as
maintenance or support, since court found that without it the spouse would be inadequately
supported. The husbands assumption of debt was tied to an agreement for lower child support,
and when he breached the agreement, he left her inadequately supported. While discharge was
proper, he could not discharge obligations arising out of the decree. The appellate court
apparently did not address timeliness question of how wife could file a motion for alimony
nearly a year after the divorce was final (local rules permit only six months to modify a decree
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under NRCP60(b)), but there may have been additional procedural facts not recited in the
opinion.
In Allen v. Allen, the husband and wife entered into an oral property settlement; the wife
waived child support, and the husband agreed to pay certain debts and pay $16,250.00 to the
wife to equalize the division of community property. 112 Nev. ___, ___ P.2d ___ (Adv. Opn.
No. 149, Oct. 22, 1996). The agreement was made during a settlement conference held by the
district court judge, but was not reduced to writing for a year, when the court entered a divorce
decree nunc pro tunc adopting the agreement. In the interim, the husband filed bankruptcy, and
was released from most of the financial obligations. The wife claimed that the husband used
the bankruptcy to defraud her out of her share of the community property and that because of the
bankruptcy there was a failure to equalize the division of community property as intended. The
wife moved to set aside the decree, which was denied by the district court as barred by federal
law.
The Supreme Court, noting that the district court knew all these facts, expressed no
understanding of why the district court would enter the decree in the first place, but held that in
any event, it was error to refuse to set it aside. Noting its holding in Siragusa v. Siragusa (108
Nev. 987, 843 P.2d 807 (1992)), the Court again held that the lower court could consider the
effect of the husbands bankruptcy upon the community and the rights of the parties, but this is
not to say the state court would be interfering in any way with the bankruptcy courts decree.
The Court expressly rejected the husbands assertion that the wifes fraud claim was waived
under 11 U.S.C. 524 because she failed to file a complaint in the bankruptcy action. Finally,
the Court concluded that even aside from the question of fraud, the decree entered was inherently
unfair and should be set aside: Under no circumstances, bankruptcy or no bankruptcy, should
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one party to a divorce be allowed to take all of the benefits of the divorce settlement and leave
the other party at the disadvantage suffered by the wife in the present case. Although some of
these comments may be dicta, Allen provides authority for the proposition that whenever a
bankruptcy has an effect upon the community and the rights of the parties, a motion can be
entertained to ameliorate that effect.
However, it appears that an intervening bankruptcy has no effect on the liability of
the non-custodian for child support arrears, or the ability of the custodian to collect them.
In In Re Anders, No. BK-S-91-24783-LBR (Bk. Ct., D. Nev., Mar. 10, 1993), the court held that
a former wife who declares chapter seven bankruptcy could retain a child support arrears
judgment (granted after she filed bankruptcy) despite the bankruptcy. The court held that child
support is a property interest belonging to the child and the custodian merely has a right to
enforce the childs property interest. The 11 U.S.C. 541(b) exception from the property of the
bankruptcy estate for powers which are exercisable solely for the benefit of another apply to
child support by analogy. This argument should arguably be expanded to include the duty
associated with other support obligations, such as alimony, ahead of the debt to monolithic third
party multi- national credit card and insurance companies being rewarded with trillions of dollars
in bailouts whilst throwing luxury executive getaways weekend bashes.
The proposition supported by In Re Anders speaks to a situation addressed at trial in the
case at bar. What should or would happen if Ms. Joshi was granted alimony and subsequently
moved to discharge her share of the community debt in bankruptcy or simply just failed to pay
these debts (or, as Mr. Springgate suggested, if she was forced into bankruptcy)? In Re Anders
and the large number of cases representing persuasive authority (all non-Nevada and non-U.S.
Supreme Court cases are cited herein merely as persuasive authority, of course) cited
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elsewhere in this motion support the position that a support obligation (alimony too, not just
child support) should be upheld even where the supported party has failed to live up to the debt
distribution terms of a Courts divorce decree. Following this rule would cut down on the costly
contempt proceedings that Mr. Springgate suggested he may bring should Ms. Joshi be granted
alimony and fail to pay her share of the debt distribution (something that case law from Nevada,
In re Anders arguably bars).
Indeed, the very existence of this majority rule would seem to vitiate Mr. Springgates
argument that counsels actions were vexatious in regard to the position counsel argued on behalf
of Ms. Joshi at trial. Mr. Coughlin stated in court at trial that the public policy underlying
alimony and other support obligations did not warrant placing the interests of behemoth multi-
national credit card conglomerates ahead of those of the citizens of Nevada who have been
granted an alimony award by the courts of this state. Perhaps it is for that reason that, at one
point during trial, Mr. Springgate announced to the Court that he could basically see the logic in
the position opposing counsel was taking and could understand why one would make the
argument. Mr. Springgates Trial Statement mentions that this probably would seem like an
alimony case to most people. Mr. Springgate moved for attorneys fees to be personally assessed
against opposing counsel at the conclusion of trial, a point at which Mr. Springgate for the first
time broached the subject of moving for such personally liability for fees against opposing
counsel. Clearly the lack of notice in this regard is troubling from a constitutional law
perspective.
One might ask how Mr. Springgate, in making such a motion (never mind presenting a
divergence of interests between opposing counsel and opposing counsels client) has not himself
violated NRS 7.085. Can one really seek personally liability for fees, alleging that opposing
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counsel has filed, maintained or defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State
and such action or defense is not well- grounded in fact or is not warranted by existing law or by
an argument for changing the existing law that is made in good faith; or unreasonably and
vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State when one has
plainly announced in open court that they actually see the validity of opposing counsels
position?
This brings up the question of a legal services attorney who is not charging the client for
his services asking the court to award attorneys fees to his client. This Courts Order After Trial
perhaps takes issue with such a request, noting that Ms. Joshi requests reasonable attorney's fees
be paid to Washoe Legal Services for the services of Mr. CoughlinThe Court notes the
following information has been provided and has been taken into consideration on this issue: On
July 18, 2008, Mr. Coughlin filed a Statement of Legal Aid Representation which states
Defendant is receiving "free legal assistance" from Washoe Legal Services pursuant to NRS
12.015. However, Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 61 (September 22, 2005) the
Nevada Supreme Court concluded that a party is not precluded from recovering attorney fees
solely because his or her counsel served in a pro bono capacity. While Nevada law has been
silent on this issue, many courts have concluded that an award of attorney fees is proper, even
when a party is represented without fee by a nonprofit legal services organization. There exist
many decisions to support such a ruling: Martin v. Tate, 492 A.2d 270, 274 (D.C. 1985); In re
Marriage of Brockett, 474 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Butler v. Butler, 376 So. 2d 287,
287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); In re Marriage of Gaddis, 632 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Ferrigno v. Ferrigno, 279 A.2d 141, 142 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971); Sellers v.
Wollman, 510 F.2d 119, 123 (5thCir. 1975) (holding that it is proper to award attorney fees to
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legal aid society in Truth- in-Lending Act action); Folsom v. Butte County Assn of
Governments, 652 P.2d 437, 447 n.26 (Cal. 1982) (concluding that an attorney fee award is
proper to a legal service organization in a suit to enforce a public transportation law).
In addition to the various state courts, the United States Supreme Court has concluded
that an award of attorney fees to a nonprofit legal services organization is to be calculated
according to the prevailing market rate, stating that Congress did not intend the calculation of fee
awards to vary depending on whether plaintiff was represented by private counsel or by a
nonprofit legal services organization. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894 (1984).
The Courts Order in Joshi arguably does not comply with the dictates set forth in Miller
v. Wilfong, and thus should not stand. Second, while it is within the trial courts discretion to
determine the reasonable amount of attorney fees under a statute or rule, in exercising that
discretion, the court must evaluate the factors set forth in Brunzell v. Golden Gate National
Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969). The Nevada Supreme Court noted that under
Brunzell, when courts determine the appropriate fee to award in civil cases, they must consider
various factors, including the qualities of the advocate, the character and difficulty of the work
performed, the work actually performed by the attorney, and the result obtained. We take this
opportunity to clarify our jurisprudence in family law cases to require trial courts to evaluate the
Brunzell factors when deciding attorney fee awards. Id. at 349. (Emphasis added).
Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled in Wright v. Osburn, that family law trial
courts must also consider the disparity in income of the parties when awarding fees. 114 Nev.
1367, 1370, 970 P.2d 1071, 1073 (1998). The Court in Miller v. Wilfong clarifies the Wright
language, noting that parties seeking attorney fees in family law cases must support their fee
request with affidavits or other evidence that meets the factors in Brunzell and Wright. Miller
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v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 61 (September 22, 2005). Ms. Joshis counsel submitted
such in affidavit, seeking a fee waiver. The Courts Order notes that Mr. Coughlin filed a
Statement of Legal Aid Representation which states Defendant is receiving "free legal
assistance" from Washoe Legal Services pursuant to NRS 12.015.
Mr. Joshi seemingly did not produce the required materials pursuant to the language in
the cases cited above, nor did the Courts Order set forth an application of specific elements
required in an award of attorneys fees. The result obtained in this case would not seem to argue
on favor of an award of attorneys fees. Mr. Joshi would not seem to be able to argue that he
was the prevailing party where he has been ordered solely responsible for the vast majority of
community debt. Pursuant to NRS 125.150(1)(b) and Putterman v. Putterman, 113 Nev. 606,
939 P.2d 1047 (1997), in granting a divorce, the Court shall ensure an equal disposition of the
community estate, absent compelling reasons justifying an unequal distribution. The Court must
make written findings as to why such a division is appropriate. The Courts Order here notes
that Mr. Joshi has likely incurred an unequal distribution of the community debt in this case.
The Court finds his testimonial acquiescence at trial to take on this debt is a compelling reason to
make an unequal distribution of the community debt.
It is not clear to Ms. Joshis counsel that any such testimonial acquiescence on Mr.
Joshis part took place at trial. Mr. Joshis counsel may have broached a suggested disposition,
though it is not clear to Mr. Coughlin how this differs from discussing settlement negotiations at
trial. Typically statements against interest made during settlement negotiations are not
admissible. If such acquiescence did take place at trial, then why would Mr. Springgate devote
the majority of the Trials four and a quarter hours running time to entering credit card balance
statements (devoid of itemization and only representing very recent balances), one after another?
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Mr. Springgates case took over three hours to conclude. By that time, Mr. Coughlin felt forced
to present a much shorter case on Ms. Joshis behalf, resulting on only approximately forty
minutes being devoted to Ms. Joshis presentation. This was a particular disadvantage with
respect to the presentation of evidence in support of an alimony award. The Court found a lack
of factual support for an award of alimony to be one of these reasons supporting awarding
sanctions. Perhaps, Mr. Springgate could have sent some discovery of his own to speed up that
part of the Trial in the form of Requests for Admissions. Mr. Coughlin does not recall Mr.
Springgate sending any discovery requests, though access to the file would certainly enable Mr.
Coughlin to verify this to be the case. Mr. Springgate did not do this. Indeed, there was a real
paucity of discovery requests sent out by Mr. Springgate, though the Court spent much of its
opinion on the sparseness of discovery sent out by the nonmoving party. Additionally, though
no formal Offers of Judgment appears to have been exchanged between these parties, NRCP
68(e) and NRS 17.115(3) makes offers during settlement negotiations inadmissible.
No evidence was presented at trial or cited in the Courts Order as to the qualities of the
advocate, the character and difficulty of the work performed, or the work actually performed by
the attorney. The Courts Order did make one mention of the difficulty of the work performed
here, pointing out that issues the Court took with Mr. Coughlins counsel were compounded
with a continuously antagonistic presentation of the case that resulted in a shift from a fairly
simple divorce case to a contentious divorce trial lasting an excessive amount of time.
(Emphasis added). The Court viewed this as a simple divorce case in its bare essence. The court
viewed a trial that lasted 4.15 hours to have taken an excessive amount of time.
Ms. Joshi has paid taxes during her adult life, taxes which fund the administration of
justice. If, where, as here, there are genuine disputes with regard to how the law should be
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applied, and Ms. Joshis position is supported by a vast body of reported case law (though,
admittedly, Mr. Coughlins Trial Statement was wholly insufficient in setting out the authority in
support of the position taken at trial and it is inappropriate to essentially put the Court in the
position at trial of knowing every arcane point of law that might come up), and the opposing side
has refused to honor requests (See Exhibit A and Exhibit B) to produce proof in support of
various points of contention (i.e., support for whether Mr. Joshi had made efforts to track down
the womans wealth, sufficient documentation to prove two personal loans totaling over $11,000,
proof that his surgery was necessary, itemized statements proving that his incongruously high
amount of credit card debt was all incurred for community purposes in a marriage where
expenses were essentially shared and paid for out of each spouses respective personal credit
accounts), the trial length in the present case does not appear excessive. 4.15 hours for a
Divorce Trial stemming from a 21 year marriage that produced two children, where a short
Settlement Conference was conducted the same day and immediately preceding the beginning of
the Trial, would not seem to be so excessive, especially in an age where some partys divorce
trials last several days or weeks.
Indeed, some parties Divorce Settlement Conferences, whether singular or multiple, last
longer than this combined Settlement Conference/Trial did. Ms. Joshis counsel chose not to
penalize Ms. Joshi by accepting a settlement where the only legal precedent offered in support of
the positions it contained was the esteemed opinion of opposing counsel as to the imminent
reasonableness of the offer on the table, along with Mr. Joshis counsel mentioning perhaps one
case where jurisdiction was reserved to increase alimony where a millionaire physician had
offered to cover some debts along with agreeing to a very, very large cash payout (in the
millions) to the spouse he was pledging to support. Mr. Coughlin recognizes the deficiencies in
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his own presentation and admits that a thoroughly briefed Trial Statement or Settlement
Conference Statement by Mr. Coughlin likely would have gone a long way towards determining
whether the Court believed the issues related to using third party debts as a set off for alimony
where a worthy use of the Courts limited resources and in line with the concerns for judicial
economy that all competent practitioners need to keep foremost in their minds. Regarding
Siragusa, such a case simply does not resonate with someone in Ms. Joshis set of circumstances.
Regardless, such a case says one could proceed with such a settlement arrangement (dependent
upon the chance to come back to court to litigate contempt proceedings in the future and possibly
be put in a better position as a result), it does not say that one must or risk having ones attorney
face the peril of being personally responsible for opposing counsels attorneys fees.
The Courts Order did not compare the result obtained at trial to the settlement discussed,
nor was any exposition given to the relative merits of either during the Settlement Conference,
save a very strong and prolonged suggestion to accept the settlement both by the Court and
opposing counsel. The Courts Order did not set forth anything that seemed to evaluate the
Brunzell factors when deciding attorney fee awards. Miller at 349. Nor did the Court address
the proviso in Wright that family law trial courts must also consider the disparity in income of
the parties when awarding fees (Id. at 1370), and Miller that parties seeking attorney fees in
family law cases must support their fee request with affidavits or other evidence that meets the
factors in Brunzell and Wright. Mr. Joshi did not appear to submit such an affidavit, unless one
considers his Financial Declaration to suffice. The parties respective Financial Affidavits
indicate that Mr. Joshi makes approximately $12,000 more per year than Ms. Joshi. When Ms.
Joshis requests were supported only by her testimony and Financial Declaration on file the
Court took the view that the evidence was so little so as to support sanctions against Ms. Joshis
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attorney. Further, the Courts Pre-Trial Order mandates that Mr. Joshi file an updated Financial
Declaration wherein he swears, under penalty of perjury that his recent reduction in income is
based in fact.
In another case, the trial court did not satisfy requirements for exercising its inherent
authority to impose attorney fees against an attorney for bad faith conduct when it ordered
husband's counsel to remit one half of his fees received to wife's counsel, where trial court did
not permit husband's counsel to present witnesses or other Evidence in his defense, trial court did
not make an express finding of bad faith or findings justifying the relief ordered, and order did
not show how the fees awarded directly related to the fees incurred as a result of the alleged bad
faith conduct by husband's counsel. Finol v. Finol, 912 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist.
2005), related reference, 2005 WL 2373889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005) and reh'g denied,
(Nov. 7, 2005).
Another court ruled that petitioner's request for costs and expenses of litigation, including
attorney fees, did not provide notice to respondent's attorney that she could be held liable for
attorney fees under statute that awarded fees in situations where an attorney brought or defended
an action that lacked substantial justification; there was no motion requesting attorney fees from
attorney, there was no mention that the trial court was considering an award against attorney, and
the notice of the hearing contained no reference to the statute that awarded fees against attorneys
for bringing or defending an action that lacked substantial justification or to the possibility that
attorney could be assessed attorney fees for her conduct; overruling Cohen v. Feldman, 219
Ga.App. 90, 464 S.E.2d 237. West's Ga.Code Ann. 9-15-14(b). Williams v. Cooper, 625
S.E.2d 754 (Ga. 2006). See Kukui Nuts of Hawaii, Inc. v R. Baird & Co., (1990, Hawaii App)
789 P2d 501, 8[a].
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At trial, Mr. Springgate stated that Mr. Coughlin had conducted no discovery in
this case. To the extent that discovery can exist outside of asking Mr. Joshi to produce something
via a Request for Production or the like, it is not clear how Mr. Springgate is able to be certain
with regard to what Ms. Joshis counsel did or did not do with respect to conducting discovery.
Mr. Springgate did not appear to send Ms. Joshi any Interrogatories, Request for Productions, or
Request for Admissions, nor did he take anyones deposition. Mr. Coughlin would need access
to the file to determine this with surety, however eFlex and CourtConnect provide no indication
that any was sent out. Ms. Joshis counsel did send Mr. Springgate several written
correspondences suggesting documentation that Mr. Joshi could produce in an effort to speed
these parties along towards settlement.
Whether Mr. Coughlin defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State
where such action or defense is not well-grounded in fact?
The Courts Order After Trial points out that, at trial, Mr. Springgate stated that Mr.
Coughlin had conducted no discovery in this case. Apparently Mr. Springgate did not mention
the attached written correspondence wherein Mr. Coughlin suggested a multitude of documents
that Mr. Joshi could provide if he sought to expedite settlement, including a request for
documentation that would help establish that the debts Mr. Joshi claims were exclusively for the
benefit of the community and the existence of a valid medical debt incurred out of necessity.
Exhibit A. Further Mr. Coughlin requested documentation from Mr. Joshi related to three of
the car loans involving these parties and the respective title holders for each of these vehicles.
Exhibit B. Additionally, Mr. Coughlin sent Mr. Joshi written correspondence requesting that
Mr. Joshi provide some indication of what he meant on his Financial Declaration when he listed
jewelry in a Wells Fargo safe deposit box and India Locker safe deposit box. Exhibit B. This
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written request asked that Mr. Joshi provide information related to the whereabouts of this
jewelry, what a description of this jewelry would entail, and what happened to this jewelry.
The Court also notes, in explaining its decision to personally charge this legal aid
attorney with the legal fees of the accused perpetuator of domestic violence, that Mr. Coughlin
failed to present one documentary piece of evidence at trial on behalf of Ms. Joshi's claims.
This is not so, Mr. Coughlin presented Mr. Joshis own Financial Declaration, as well as that of
Ms. Joshi, both of which clearly supported the claim for alimony in establishing at the least a
$12,000 yearly disparity in the parties respective incomes. Nonetheless, there does not seem to
exist any legal precedent supporting the implication that failing to produce some specific form or
type of evidence (here documentary evidence is mentioned) plays some role in a proper
application of NRS 7.085. Were this the case, attorneys could arguably be told they violated
NRS 7.085 for failing to conduct even one deposition, or send out one request for admission, etc.
Such an arbitrary interpretation of NRS 7.085 simply should not stand when considering the
potentially devastating policy implications and chilling effect on attorneys ability to zealously
advocate for their clients. Were this application upheld it would perhaps encourage attorneys to
further over utilize the sometimes ineffective and inefficient practice documentary discovery has
become in so many instances. This is not meant to suggest that attorneys should not be gravely
concerned with discovering all items necessary to protect their clients interests to the fullest, but
rather, to merely consider what is the judicious use of discovery techniques.
Indeed, discovery is hopefully conducted to further some legitimate objective, rather than
to satisfy some perceived need to send out what may be unnecessary and overly burdensome
discovery requests in an attempt to avoid sanctions that may later arise. This situation arises, by
analogy, in modern medicine, where, in some cases, the practice of the day is to order every
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diagnostic test known to science, no matter how costly and ineffective is and without regard to
whether any intelligence was actually utilized in making the decision to order such a test,
whether or not some analysis and deduction could obviate the need to make such arrangements.
Further some people can afford more discovery than others, and many legal services attorneys
would likely attest to the need to make do with less when representing domestic violence
victims.
With respect to whether the position taken by Mr. Coughlin and Ms. Joshi was supported
by the facts, Mr. Joshis own admission at trial and the partys financial declarations prove the
income disparity necessary to support any alimony award. The undisputed length of the
marriage, 21 years (included in the Courts Findings of Fact), certainly argues in favor of an
alimony award and is, pursuant to NRS 125.150(8) (and the six Sprenger factors,), among the
eleven (11) factors the court shall consider in awarding alimony. The fact that Ms. Joshi worked
fewer hours than Mr. Joshi, largely to enable her to be the childrens primary caregiver,
particularly in the childrens younger years, similarly argues for an alimony award and is
included among these factors.
Ms. Joshis counsel feels strongly that existing law did indeed warrant the position taken
at trial. The court also took some issue with Ms. Joshis counsels repeated objections to
opposing counsel entering exhibits into evidence without providing a copy to opposing counsel
at the time they were being introduced (indicating that the documents were produced at some
earlier stage of the litigation). However, the courts own Pre- Trial Order indicated that should
more than ten exhibits be used at trial, the introducing party is to provide opposing counsel with
copies that are bound, tabbed, and indexed. It is possible more than ten exhibits were
introduced into evidence. Mr. Coughlin has not been afforded sufficient opportunity to review
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the tape of the trial to determine exactly how many exhibits were offered. Nonetheless the Court
can amend the Pre-Trial Order at any time and in any way necessary.
The Courts Order finds that the parties presently earn approximately the same amount,
Ms. Joshi earns $2,458 per month and Mr. Joshi earned approximately $3,125 per month
in 2008, but testified he is working substantially less in 2009 and has filed for unemployment
benefits the beginning of March 2009. The Court may have failed to include both jobs Mr.
Joshi worked in 2008 in assessing the income disparity of the parties. This may have been done
on purpose given Mr. Joshis testimony regarding the reduction in hours offered by his employer,
though that is not clear. Mr. Joshi violated the rules set forth in the Courts Pre-Trial Order by
failing to submit and updated Financial Declaration upon his claim of substantially changed
circumstances bearing on any potential alimony liability. Ms. Joshis counsels experience is
that an inordinately high percentage of litigants experience just such a set of circumstances
immediately prior to trial. The Courts Order After Trial states that Mr. Joshi earned
approximately $3,125 per month in 2008, but testified he is working substantially less in 2009
and has filed for unemployment benefits the beginning of March 2009.
However, dividing by 12 the amount Mr. Joshi himself reports in his own Financial
Declaration indicates that Mr. Joshi actually earned $3,458 per month in 2008. At trial, Mr.
Joshi introduced his W-2 from American Bar and Restaurant reflecting earnings of $4,157.
(Trial Exhibit "C"); and his W-2 from Sierra Sport Service in the amount of $37,504.18
(Trial Exhibit "D").If the Court finds Mr. Joshis mincing, erratic, testimonial evidence regarding
the prospects of his future unemployment (and how he kind of applied for unemployment though
he knew he would be working a few shifts in the next couple weeks except for the fact that he
also said he would not have any shifts at all in the next couple weeks) to be persuasive, one must
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wonder why Ms. Joshis testimonial evidence regarding the reduction in hours she is facing at
her employment was not similarly instructive to the Court. In 2008, Mr. Joshi earned
approximately $41,500.00 while working for two companies -American Bar and Restaurant and
Sierra Sport Service. At trial, Mr. Joshi introduced his W-2 from American Bar and Restaurant
reflecting earnings of $4,157. (Trial Exhibit "C"); and his W-2 from Sierra Sport Service in the
amount of $37,504.18 (Trial Exhibit "D").
The Court may have left out the additional $333 per month that Mr. Joshi has reported
making at Sierra Sport Service by introducing his 2008 W-2. The Court makes no mention of
the fact that Mr. Joshi failed to present any sort of evidence, save his own testimony, to support
his contention that his income will be changing substantially in 2009. It is not clear to Mr.
Coughlin that Mr. Springgate, though an officer of the court, can sufficiently corroborate such an
income reduction to an appropriate degree of certainty by merely discussing it with Mr. Joshi and
then proceeding to attest to it in court (without submitting an updated Financial Declaration). To
suggest this is in no means meant to impugn Mr. Springgates reputation. However, Mr.
Springgates reputation (that of an extremely skilled and versatile litigator who has taken on
some of the most high profile cases around) does not make something Mr. Joshi said true and in
need of no further evidentiary support simply upon Mr. Springgates repeating it to the court.
Bringing of frivolous civil claim or action as ground for discipline of attorney, 85 A.L.R.4th
544 (Originally published in 1991).
The Courts opinion chose not to describe Mr. Joshis failure to file the required updated
Financial Declaration in the terms it chooses to describe similar situations involving Ms. Joshi.
Indeed, the Courts opinion sets forth no less than thirteen instances where Ms. Joshi failed to
present any evidence relating to some specific issue. However, just going on the testimony
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referenced in the Courts opinion, one has to wonder why the Court failed to similarly point out
that Mr. Joshi failed to introduce any evidence (or documentary evidence or non-testimonial
evidence per the Courts varying descriptions of what is and is not evidence) to support his
claims that he had contacted his family to try to ascertain what they had done with the
approximately $7,000 golden jewelry bridal dowry, that all the consumer debt he alleges was
indeed incurred for the benefit of the community (realizing the presumption found in Nevada
law), that his surgery was necessary or that he was even sure it was surgery (he testified he had
no idea what kind of procedure was performed or why somebody, apparently a surgeon, took a
sharp object and cut open his body and presented him with a large billcertainly there was no
documentary evidence presented to prove that this was not an elective procedure or that it was
necessary and not a result of Mr. Joshis negligence in the same way that his failure to opt in to
the health insurance offered by his employer was, though Mr. Coughlin recognizes he was remiss
in not doing the appropriate discovery in this regard, to the extent that it was not barred by the
physician-patient privilege), that he had actually written some letter to Meena Fowler indicating
that he was pledging to pay back some $6,000 Ms. Fowler was sending to Mr. Joshis mother,
that he had taken out a loan of $5,000 from Mr. Anaby to purchase plane tickets for the familys
2001 immigration (the Courts Order did note the paucity of evidence in this regard), that he
actually does pay or has been paying $600 per month towards the community credit card debts
(though he apparently has been making these payments with community funds, in much the same
way that he has paid Mr. Springgate, though Mr. Joshi did appear to indicate that he used his
personal property, his IRS tax return, to pay Mr. Springgate, though the community is apparently
liable for such a necessary), that he actually has paid Mr. Springgate the various amounts he
inconsistently testified too, or that he has only two weeks of work scheduled for late March,
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2009; and he filed for unemployment benefits in March, 2009, or that the large balance transfers
he made in this year of divorce were actually for the purpose of obtaining a better interest rate
rather than making sure as much of the debt as possible was placed in an account where Ms.
Joshi was a co-signer, rather than in an account that Mr. Joshi was the sole signatory to.
The Court simply did not choose to comment on Mr. Joshis failure to present any
documentary evidence regarding these pertinent claims. Alternatively, the Court seemingly did
not miss any opportunity to point out an instance (on at least thirteen occasions) where Ms. Joshi
did not present the type of evidence the Court apparently wished to see (documentary evidence,
apparently, was sought, as opposed to the proffered testimonial evidence or statements against
interest under oath by the opposing party regarding the fishy payment arrangements related to the
daughters motor vehicle, the mode of payment used to purchase it, and the existence of a $6,000
cash advance taken from Ms. Joshis personal credit to fund the cash purchase). Mr. Joshi
testified that his wife had taken out a $6,000 cash advance from her personal credit card and
given the cash to Mr. Joshi who converted that cash to a money order to purchase the car the
daughter uses, but which is titled in the daughters and Mr. Joshis name.
Why Ms. Joshi would need to present documentary evidence regarding these matters
when Mr. Joshi readily admitted the case in question is unclear, particularly where Mr. Joshi has
been involved for some curious reason in transferring the monthly car payments made by the
daughter to Ms. Joshi for the car that Ms. Joshi took out a $6,000 cash advance from her credit
card account, to which she was the sole signatory, the same car that has Mr. Joshis name on the
title and does not have Ms. Joshis name on the title.
Miscellaneous Other Issues
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Given the decision in Lofgren v.Lofgren, (if community property is lost, expended or
destroyed through the intentional misconduct of one spouse, the court may consider such
misconduct as a compelling reason for making an unequal disposition of community property
and may appropriately augment the other spouses share of the remaining community property.
112 Nev. ___, 926 P.2d 296 (Adv. Opn. No. 156, Nov. 7, 1996).
Arguably, Mr. Joshi and Ms. Joshis combined testimony (together with Mr. Joshis early
Financial Declaration where he lists two separate safety deposit boxes containing gold jewelry)
support the view that the disappearance of the womans wealth ceremonial wedding jewelry at
issue here should be held against Mr. Joshi, and accordingly an unequal disposition of
community property (or community debt) may be appropriate to the extent of the approximate
value of these items. Ms. Joshi testified their value was in the $6,000 range. The womans
wealth is arguably Ms. Joshis separate property to begin with, as per Indian custom (though at
times in court Mr. Joshis grasp of the culture from which he apparently came was astoundingly
faint), however, the holding in Lofgren could arguably be extrapolated to apply in such a
situation.
Mr. Joshis own Trial Statement (line 12, page 2) comments on the case at bar, stating
that while it may seem to be an alimony case Mr. Joshis earnings are subject to the travel and
convention business fluctuations, while hers are not. Further, Mr. Springgates Trial Statement
was filed at 5 p.m. the day before Trial. Mr. Joshis Trial Statement was filed more than 5
calendar days before Trial, in accordance with Rule 5 of the Second Judicial District Court
Rules. Mr. Joshis Trial Statement notes that Mr. Joshi he is prepared to take an unfair amount
of the community debt, which he has been servicing, which equalizes their incomes. (emphasis
added). Whether it is appropriate to include the terms of a settlement negotiation in a Trial
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Statement is debatable. However, Mr. Springgate clearly wrote that the case may seem like an
alimony case and then clearly moved for opposing counsel to have personal liability for fees
under NRS 7.085 for the first time in his closing statement at Trial, seemingly asserting that
opposing counsel could not reasonably see this as an alimony case. Ironically, it would seem
Mr. Springgates moving for fees under NRS 7.085 was not reasonably grounded in fact or law.
WDCR 5(1)(c)-(d) requires that Trial statements shall be served and filed 5 calendar
days before trial, and that each party shall serve and file a trial statement which shall set forth
the following matters in the following order:
(c) A statement of issues of law supported by a memorandum of
authorities.
(d) In non-jury cases, a list of summaries of schedules referring to
attached, itemized exhibits concerning any subject matter which involves
accounting, computation, chronology, or similar data reasonably calling for
orderly itemization, e.g., wages, income, expenses, inventories, business
operations, tax computations, disability periods, property losses, itemizations
of claimed losses or injuries, and the data and reasons upon which an expert
bases his opinion (not the opinion itself), which clearly reflect the claims,
defenses, or evidence of the party, together with references to the records or
other sources upon which such summaries or schedules are based.
Mr. Springgates Trial Statement, at page 2, line 14, lists none under the heading of
Statement of Issues of Law. His Trial Statement fails to cite a single source of authority in
support of this, or any authority in support of the matters for which are apparently so well
established by precedent that there are literally no real issues worth disputing. Mr. Springgates
Trial Statement does not contain any a list of summaries of schedules referring to attached,
itemized exhibits concerning any subject matter which involves accounting, computation,
chronology, or similar data reasonably calling for orderly itemization, e.g., wages, income,
expenses, inventories, business operations, tax computations, disability periods, property losses,
itemizations of claimed losses or injuries, and the data and reasons upon which an expert bases
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his opinion (not the opinion itself), which clearly reflect the claims, defenses, or evidence of the
party, together with references to the records or other sources upon which such summaries
or schedules are based. (emphasis added). There simply is nothing attached to his Trial
Statement. There were no exhibits attached to the Trial Statement submitted at 5 p.m. the day
before Trial by Mr. Joshi. WDCR 5(d) calls for attaching exhibits to the Trial Statement. Mr.
Springgate failed to do this. Ms. Joshis counsel objected on that basis. The Court seemingly
took Mr. Springgates word that he had provided the documents forming the basis of the exhibits
he introduced at some earlier point in the litigation, likely as part of his 16.2 production, though
even if that were the case, the documents provided at that time clearly were not marked as
exhibits or organized by an index. Mr. Coughlin does believe Mr. Springgate provided these
documents in the 16.2 production and that they were bates stamped in the manner Mr. Springgate
indicated. Mr. Coughlin recognizes that, in the future, he should be prepared to utilize such
production at trial should it be offered as an exhibit without having an additional copy,
specifically marked as an exhibit provided at the time it is sought to be introduced into evidence.
In some cases, argument may be appropriate that suggests that to simply announce that one
previously included the needle they are now wishing to introduce into evidence at Trial in the
haystack that they had produced to the opposing party several months earlier is simply
insufficient. This may be a stronger argument where a partys Trial Statement is deficient in
some ways, such as note referencing with any specificity the documents a party intends to offer
as exhibits. Lastly, the Courts own Pre-Trial Order was not followed by Mr. Joshis counsel.
The Courts Order and reasoning for imposing sanctions focused in large part on Ms.
Joshis counsels objections to Mr. Joshis counsel introducing exhibits into evidence without
providing opposing counsel a copy at the time in which Mr. Joshi was seeking to introduce these
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exhibits. The Courts own Order Re Pre-Trial Procedure Orders that if a party intends to offer
more than ten trial exhibits, the proposed exhibits must be bound, tabbed and indexedeach
party shall submit two copies of the proposed exhibits to the Court and one copy to the opposing
counselfor trials which are scheduled for less than one full day, exhibits shall be marked
immediately prior to the convening for trial, and counsel shall arrive at least 15 minutes before
the scheduled time of trialeach party must file with the Court a trial statementfive days
before trialfailure to timely deliver these documents may result in sanctions against the
offending party as set forth in NRCP 37if the financial circumstances of a party have changed
substantially since the filing of the most recent financial declaration, that party is to file an
updated financial declaration at the same time as filing the trial statement.
Mr. Joshis case relied in large part upon the idea that his income had been greatly
reduced and would continue to be so hindered. There was testimony on his part that he might
have filed for unemployment, that he probably was not schedule to work anymore at one or both
of his jobs in the foreseeable future, only to be contradicted minutes later by his testimony that
he had a shift or two scheduled at his main job, the one where he earned $37,500 in 2008. How
he could still qualify to file for unemployment without yet losing his job completely is another
question. Nevadas unemployment system allows one to file if his hours have been reduced
such that he is no longer earning more than his weekly benefit amount. Mr. Joshis weekly
benefit amount, based on his Financial Declaration could be no more than the $350 maximum
cap set by law. Mr. Joshi grossed approximately $700 per week in 2008. Mr. Joshi did not file
an update Financial Declaration, as required by the Pre-Trial Order (financial circumstances of
a party have changed substantially since the filing of the most recent financial declaration, that
party is to file an updated financial declaration at the same time as filing the trial statement)
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Mr. Joshis arguments against alimony were largely based on the idea that his income had
declined significantly, yet Ms. Joshi did not have the benefit of enforcing the requirement that
Mr. Joshi file, under penalty of perjury, an updated Financial Declaration attesting to as much.
The court should not criticize Ms. Joshi for a lack of discovery in this regard while viewing Mr.
Joshis testimonial assertions (however erratic and inconsistent they may have been) at trial as
presenting sufficient evidence (though lacking in the documentary evidence required by the
Pre-Trial Order and perhaps NRS), while at the same time sanctioning Ms. Joshis counsel for
essentially not trying the case in the way the Court (which does not have the benefit of knowing
everything that goes on behind the scenes) would suggest it be tried. The Court essentially
overlooked multiple instances of divergence from the NRCP and the Pre-Trial Order by Mr.
Springgate while sanctioning what could perhaps be deemed optional litigation decisions that are
customarily left up to the parties own volition as to whether or not to proceed upon some specific
course (such as choosing to conduct a deposition). Mr. Coughlin recognizes that the direction
given by Judge Gardner during this Trial as to the type of evidence that should be offered or the
manner of presentation at trial were absolutely dictates that he should adopt immediately if he
hopes to function at all effectively as an attorney.
It appears that Mr. Joshi may have offered more than ten exhibits at Trial (especially if
the documents representing the various money transfers in regard to the Meena Fowler debt were
considered separate exhibits), though the proposed exhibits were not bound, tabbed and indexed.
They were never even proposed until the exact point in time at which Mr. Joshi sought to
introduce them. Surely they were not all being offered for impeachment purposes. For this
Trial, which was scheduled for less than one full day, the exhibits were not marked immediately
prior to the convening for trial, and Ms. Joshis counsel did indeed arrive at least 15 minutes
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before the scheduled time of trial. Mr. Joshis counsel did not submit two copies of the proposed
exhibits to the Court and one copy to the opposing counsel. See Cardenas v. Peterson Bean Co.,
180 Neb. 605, 611-612, 144N.W.2d 154, 159 (1966); Priest v. McConnell, 219 Neb 328, 330
(1985); In Re OBryan, 246 B.R. 271, 276-279 (1999).
To qualify as an exhibit a document should be marked as an exhibit or in some way
contain some indication that it is an exhibit. Though arguably the relatively slight amount of
documents produced in the instant case makes such an argument irrelevant, one should not be
able to pick several needles out of a haystack they produced in their 16.2 productions and claim
that they are exhibits previously provided to the opposing party. This places an inappropriately
high burden on the opposing party to index and organize the documents produced by Mr. Joshi.
Many litigators suggest that if one is following the other side they are not leading the litigation.
Rule 46. TrialStatements and documentary evidence.
1. Stipulating to documents. Before trial, the parties shall stipulate
which documents are admissible. Such stipulation will avoid the need for
foundational witnesses.
2. Exchanging documents. Copies of documents shall be exchanged
by counsel and marked for identification by the court clerk no later than 1
business day prior to the commencement of trial.
3. A trial statement shall be filed in accordance with Rule 5. (Local
Rules of Practice for the Second Judicial District Court).
Rule 12. Form of papers presented for filing; exhibits; documents; legal
citations.
4. All exhibits attached to pleadings or papers shall clearly show the
exhibit number at the bottom or on the right side thereof. Copies of
exhibits must be clearly legible and not unnecessarily voluminous, and
must be reduced to 8 1/2 inches by 11 inches, or conveniently folded to
that size. Original documents shall be retained by counsel for introduction
as exhibits at the time of a hearing or at the time of trial rather than
attached to pleadings. Rules of the District Courts of the State of
Nevada.
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Mr. Joshis counsel clearly did not comply with Rule 46 or Rule 12. Ms.
Joshis counsel should not be sanctioned for objecting to the introduction of Mr.
Joshis exhibits. The exhibits entered clearly were not marked for identification
by the Court one day prior to trial. Mr. Springgate had not provided any
documents prior to Trial that contained any attempt to mark them as exhibits such
that compliance with the rules could be inferred. They were only marked at the
time Mr. Joshi sought to introduce them. There is ample persuasive authority for
the position taken by Ms. Joshis counsel with regard to the introduction of Mr.
Joshis exhibits.
LR 9017. Use of Alternate Direct Testimony and Exhibits at Trials
(d) Submission of Declarations, Exhibits , and Objections. Unless
the court orders otherwise, copies of all declarations of witnesses
and exhibits that are intended to be presented at trial or at the
hearing on a contested matter must be furnished to opposing
counsel and lodged with the court as follows:
(1) The plaintiff or movant must submit to opposing counsel all
declarations and exhibits in its case in chief not less than ten (10)
business days before the trial or the hearing on the contested
matter;
(2) The defendant or respondent must submit all declarations and
exhibits in its case five (5) business days before the trial or the
hearing on the contested matter;
(3) Two (2) business days before trial or the hearing on a contested
matter each party must lodge with the courtroom deputy clerk of
the judge to whom the matter is assigned, one (1) copy of all
declarations and exhibits that the party intends to present at trial,
and an original and one (1) copy of that party's written objections
to the admission of any of the declarations or exhibits of an
opposing party. Copies of exhibits lodged with the clerk must
be premarked by counsel, and must be accompanied by a cover
sheet index containing a brief description of each exhibit ; and
U.S.Dist.Ct.Rules D.Nev., LR 9017.
3. Selecting exhibits
After all possible exhibits are identified, counsel should select those that
he himself will bring to the trial, and those that he will subpoena another
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to bring. He should have available everything that he might have to
produce at the request of his opponent, and, if he doesn't have original
documents or articles, he should be prepared with copies, and/or testimony
concerning the originals.
4. Preparing exhibit lists
Counsel should prepare a list of his witnesses with an outline of the points
to be established by each one. The outline should indicate which exhibits
the witness can identify, the number tentatively assigned to the exhibit,
and a description of it 5 Am. Jur. Trials 553.
WDCR 10: Form of Pleadings:
6. All exhibits attached to pleadings or papers must be 8 1/2 x 11 inches
in size; must be separated with bottom-tabbed divider pages; must be
labeled numerically, i.e., Exhibit 1, 2, 3, etc., rather than alphabetically,
and it will be mandatory effective January 1, 2008, that all exhibits be
identified numerically. Exhibits that are smaller must be affixed to a blank
sheet of paper 8 1/2 x 11 inches in size, with invisible adhesive tape on all
sides. Staples must not be used to affix an exhibit to a sheet of paper.
Exhibits that are larger than 8 1/2 x 11 inches must be reduced to 8 1/2 x
11 inches. Exhibits such as maps must be folded so as to appear 8 1/2 x 11
inches in size. All exhibits attached to pleadings or papers must be
separated by a bottom- tabbed divider page and clearly marked with the
exhibit number at the top and bottom of the page. All exhibits attached to
pleadings or papers must be preceded by an Index of Exhibits indicating
the exhibit number, exhibit description, and the length of each exhibit
(number of pages). Copies of exhibits must be clearly legible and not
unnecessarily voluminous. Original documents must be retained by
counsel for introduction as exhibits at the time of a hearing or at the time
of trial rather than attached to pleadings.
Ms. Joshis counsels comments were not rude or sarcastic, especially considering the
totality of the circumstances here, as more fully discussed above. Nonetheless, the Court failed
to include much at all in the way of specific examples of the rude, sarcastic, or derogatory
language or behavior that formed the basis for these sanctions. Specificity is required as set forth
in the cases cited supra. Specifics are very important in using judgments as precedent. Further,
it might be somewhat unfair to criticize Ms. Joshis counsel for a lack of knowledge with regard
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to the rules of evidence and trial procedure where Mr. Springgates presentation was counter to
the rules and Pre-Trial Order in so many ways. However, Ms. Joshis counsel certainly will
utilize the Courts Order as an important and informative guide to the areas of counsels trial
presentation and practice that need immediate improvement.
The sanctions issued in this case were improper in that they apparently relied upon the
delay in the return of Mr. Joshis Tanzanian passport early in this litigation. The Courts Order
notes that Ms. Joshis counsel filed an Opposition to the request for return of Mr. Joshi's
passport without any factual or legal basis that on August 1, 2008, Mr. Joshi filed a 'Motion
For Return Of Personal Property' requesting that Ms. Joshi return his passport, green card and
social security card. On August 7, 2008, Ms. Joshi, by and through her attorney of record,
Mr. Coughlin, filed an Opposition to the return of Mr. Joshi's passport citing case law involving
minor children and their support. Ms. Joshi filed said opposition while acknowledging the
parties' children were both over eighteen years of age at the time. On August 18, 2008, Judge
Schumacher ordered Ms. Joshi to immediately return Mr. Joshi's passport within five days.
Regardless, Judge Schumacher already ruled on Mr. Springgates request for attorneys
fees related to this issue. No Attorneys fees were granted by Judge Schumacher. Mr. Joshi did
not file a Motion for Reconsideration at that time. The issue is barred under the law of the case
doctrine. The law of the case doctrine is a species of collateral estoppel and it applies to intra-
action issues. Tien Fu Hsu v. County of Clark, 2007 WL 4532623 (Nev. 12/27/2007). Thus,
once an issue has been decided on the merits, the law of the case doctrine makes that issue
binding not only on the parties, but on the court as well: no other judge of coordinate
jurisdiction may undo the decision (Siegel, NY Prac 448, at 723 [3d ed.]).
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Mr. Springgate filed a Motion seeking the return of this passport which on a somewhat
questionable interpretation of 18 USC 1028 and 18 USC 1544, claiming Ms. Joshis failure to
immediately return it to him amounted to extortion. Ms. Joshis counsel merely asked Mr.
Springgate to provide some law that was relevant to the issue at hand or allow a reasonable
amount of time for Mr. Coughlin to determine the prudence of turning over the Tanzanian
passport. Mr. Coughlin did not suggest Mr. Joshi was committing a RICO violation by
withholding or doing nothing to aid in the return of Ms. Joshis womans wealth. Granted, a
passport may deserve a greater degree of protection, but this is the type of judgment call that can
take some time for attorneys to consistently and immediately make in an appropriate fashion.
Mr. Springgates Motion and Reply on this issue failed to cite any particular section of these
statutes or include much in the way of their statutory language. Ms. Joshis counsel has looked
up these statues and included the only parts that could seem even tangentially relevant below:
18 U.S.C. 1544Misuse of a Passport: Section 1544 of Title
18 proscribes the use or attempted use of someone else's passport,
or its use in violation of any applicable regulation or law. It also
proscribes giving one's passport to another for the other's use
18 USC 1028: Fraud and related activity in connection with
identification documents, authentication features, and information
(4) knowingly possesses an identification document (other than
one issued lawfully for the use of the possessor), authentication
feature, or a false identification document, with the intent such
document or feature be used to defraud the United States;
(7) knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person with the
intent to commit, or to aid or abet, or in connection with, any
unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that
constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law; or
To assert that Ms. Joshi was committing some form of extortion such to bring this
situation within the purview of either of these sections of the U.S.C. is not entirely fair.
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The Courts Order appears to have taken issue with the request made for ongoing child
support where the two children of the marriage were 19 and 20 years old and in college, noting
that 1. Ongoing Support for the Adult Children's Education- Pursuant to NRS 125.510(9)(b),
except where a contract providing otherwise has been executed pursuant to NRS 123.080, the
obligation for care, education, maintenance and support of any minor child created by any order
entered pursuant to this section ceases: (a) Upon the death of the person to whom the order was
directed; or (b) When the child reaches 18 years of age if he is no longer enrolled in high school,
otherwise, when he reaches 19 years of age. There has been no evidence presented by Ms. Joshi
justifying a request for continuing support of the parties' adult children. As there has been no
legal basis presented to make such a finding, the Court denies Ms. Joshi's request that Mr. Joshi
financially provide for the adult children's education.
Nevertheless, in appropriate cases, a support obligation may be imposed on the basis of
estoppel or implied contract. In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal.App.3d 848, 152 Cal.Rptr. 121
(1979); In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal.App.3d 837, 126 Cal.Rptr. 38 (1975). See, also,
Clevenger v. Clevenger, supra; V.L.P. v. J.S.S., Del., 407 A.2d 244 (1978); Fuller v. Fuller,
D.C., 247 A.2d 767 (1968); Mace v. Webb, 614 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1980); Gingery (not
reported) 1992 WL 150269; Watkins, 117 P.3d 1114; Kass, 235 A.D. 2d 150 (1997); Callahan v.
Dye, L 1667668, 8-10 (Alaska 2006); Ramsey, 23 N.E. 69, 71 (Ind. 1889). Additionally, the
demonstrable needs of the child, not the child's age, are determinative of the duty of support.
Therefore, while parents are not generally required to support a child over eighteen, his or her
enrollment in a full- time educational program has been held to require continued support.
Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543; Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 71-72 (1971); Limpert, supra, 119
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N.J. Super. at 442-43; Schumm, supra, 122 N.J. Super. 149-50. See, also, Ross v. Ross, 167
N.J. Super. 441, 444-46 (Ch. Div. 1979) (law school).
Testimonial evidence was presented by Ms. Joshi that these spouses had planned to help
their children financially during college. An implied contract to contribute to the adult childrens
educational expenses is supported by the evidence presented. Ms. Joshis testimony showed that
this family adhered to the strong cultural tradition in many families with ties to India in that the
education and furtherance of their childrens careers was of paramount importance to these
parties and that Ms. Joshi had lived and planned her life I accordance with that belief. Ms. Joshi
anticipated and believed, quite reasonably, that Mr. Joshi would contribute something to his
childrens college expenses.
There exists more attenuated support for this proposition. In Miller v. Miller, 16 Ill. 298,
where one remains with a parent, or with a person standing in the relation of a parent, after
arriving at majority, and remains in the same apparent relation as when a minor, the presumption
is that the parties do not contemplate the payment of wages for services.
Additionally, this presumption may be overthrown, and the reverse established, by proof
of an express or implied contract, and the implied contract may be proven by facts and
circumstances which show that both parties, at the time services were performed, contemplated
or intended pecuniary recompense other than such as naturally arises out of the relation of parent
and childin the absence of express proof a contract may be implied from circumstances.
Schwarz v. Schwarz, 26 Ill. 81.
Incidentally, one of the objections the Court ruled against Ms. Joshis counsel on
concerned a recently proposed bill before our States Legislature:
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Assembly Bill 125 AN ACT relating to domestic relations;
requiring the court, in certain actions for divorce, to consider any history
of domestic violence between the spouses when determining whether to
award temporary maintenance or alimony; creating a rebuttable
presumption in certain actions for divorce that an award of temporary
maintenance or alimony should not be made to a spouse who engaged in
certain acts of domestic violence against the other spouse; and providing
other matters properly relating thereto.
Legislative Counsels Digest: Existing law provides that a court
in any action for divorce may: (1) require one spouse to pay money for the
temporary maintenance of the other spouse; and (2) award alimony to
either spouse in a manner that appears just and equitable. (NRS 125.040,
125.150) This bill requires a court that is considering whether to award
temporary maintenance or alimony in certain actions for divorce to
consider evidence of any history of domestic violence between the
spouses. This bill also creates a rebuttable presumption in certain actions
for divorce that temporary maintenance or alimony should not be awarded
to a spouse who has engaged in acts of domestic violence not more than 5
years before the filing of the action for divorce or at any time after the
action is filed.) (http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Bills/AB/AB125.pdf)
(Referred to Committee on Judiciary)
The Court was not precluded from considering the abuse allegations in the instant case.
It was arguably appropriate to let the abuse allegations into evidence for purposes of the alimony
determination. Mr. Springgate gave a detailed explanation of the validity of basing property
distributions and, perhaps, alimony on such fault issues. This led to the Court ruling such abuse
allegations were inadmissible. However many courts allow such evidence. Bernard, L206411,
2-7 (Ohio 2002); Havell, 186 Misc. 2d 726; The Place of Fault in Modern Divorce Law, 28
Ariz. St. L.J. 773 (Fall 1996); Divine, 752 S.W. 2d 79 (1988). The Court at times seemed to be
object to Ms. Joshis counsel desire to respond to the various objections, or make his own
objections, seemingly out of annoyance with Ms. Joshis counsels trial presentation. Ms.
Joshis counsel has great respect for Judge Gardner and deeply regrets any trial presentation
found objectionable and is resolved to improving as an advocate with renewed vigor. Hopefully
this Motions attempt at thoroughly presenting some of the issues that arose at trial will
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demonstrate such a desire. Objections must be entered into the record to preserve issues for
appeal (particularly such potentially precedent making questions of law).
The Courts seeming annoyance is understandable. The expectations on Family Court
Judges in Nevada are enormous, the case loads crushing, and the need to enforce standards of
practice that aid in judicial economy is high. This is combined with the extreme emotional
intensity of the subject matter and the litigants very personal connections to the issues at hand.
Further, it is likely very frustrating to have attorneys who are a mere work in progress practicing
in ones courtroom, particularly where such an attorney may feel the opposing side is seeking an
advantage through intimidation, causing such an attorney to react in an overly antagonistic
manner, to the detriment of ones trial presentation.
Many of Nevadas Family Courts do allow evidence of abuse to be presented in arguing
for an award of alimony. Nevada is a no- fault state; consequently, marital fault is not an issue in
the division of property or the awards that the court makes. The Nevada Supreme Court has set
forth a series of factors in the Sprenger case [Sprenger v. Sprenger, 110 Nev. 855, 878 P.2d 284
(1994)] called the Sprenger Factors. There are six different factors that the court set forth in
determining how to award alimony. They have also addressed the fault issue in the Rodriguez
case [Rodriguez v. Rodriquez, 116 Nev. 993, 13 P.3d 415(2000), and Hein, and these two cases
may be contradictory]. There is no current factor that says the issue of domestic battery must be
considered, but many of the courts already do consider it. (see Minutes for AB 125: Assembly
Committee on Judiciary February 26, 2007, pages 4-5).
Conclusion
For the reasons cited in the various arguments contained in this Motion for
Reconsideration, the sanction assessing Ms. Joshis counsel to personally pay Mr. Joshis
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attorneys fees for 4.15 hours of Trial should not be upheld. Ms. Joshis counsel had found no
authority supporting a request under NRS 7.085 on account of a failure to accept a settlement
that proposes using consumer credit card debt as a set off for an alimony award. To ask for fees
under these circumstances may be a NRS 7.085 violation itself. Ms. Joshi should be awarded an
alimony payment of $500 per month for a period of twenty years, taking her to social security
age. Mr. Joshi should be ordered to contribute $6,000 to each of his two childrens college
expenses. The childrens contributions to the car payments should not be considered in dividing
each party half of the respective debt related to these vehicles, which the parties admitted at trial
were incurred during the marriage. The partys testimony and Mr. Joshis admissions establish
the amount owing on these vehicles. Mr. Joshi should be ordered to refinance the vehicle
awarded to him in this Courts Order. Any debt amounts that Mr. Joshi balance transferred from
an account to which he was the sole signatory to an account both spouses were signatories to
should be subtracted from the community debt apportioned to Ms. Joshi. As a side note, Mr.
Coughlin has been prevented from accessing Ms. Joshis files, contact information, and other
items necessary to prepare this Motion. Perhaps this Motion is not an appropriate place to go
into why that has occurred, but Mr. Coughlin wishes to implore this Court to preserve for Ms.
Joshi, the opportunity to seek Reconsideration, and possibly an Appeal, and to allow an
extension of time for another attorney at Washoe Legal Services to appear as counsel (though
Mr. Coughlin remains counsel of record as of this date). Alternatively, this Motion would seem
to provide support for the various issues that Ms. Joshi may seek Reconsideration of. Mr.
Coughlin also asks that he be allowed more time to more fully develop this Motion for
Reconsideration and to access the necessary materials from Washoe Legal Services to do so,
including the relevant file, work product, video of the trial, and record of correspondences
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between opposing counsel and Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Coughlin has been prevented from doing so
despite making all reasonable efforts to do so. More information related to this set of
circumstances can be provided, however, it seems prudent at this juncture not to set forth details
in this Motion at this time.
Respectfully submitted to the Court this 27
th
day of April, 2009
/sig/ Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq. and that on
the 27
th
day of April, 2009, I electronically filed at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the within
Request For Reconsideration and Motion for Extension of Time, fully addressed to:
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ
Reno, NV 89501
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social
security number of any person.
Dated this 27
th
Day of April, 2009
Melissa Ulloa /sig/
Melissa Ulloa
Agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq.
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LIST OF EXHIBITS
1. Exhibit 1- email from Zach Coughlin, Esq. to John Springgate, Esq. sent October 22
nd
,
2008. Two pages long.
2. Exhibit 2- email from Zach Coughlin, Esq. to John Springgate, Esq., sent November 10
th
,
2008. Two pages long.
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F I L E D
Electronically
05-21-2009:11:27:19 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
002010
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F I L E D
Electronically
06-19-2009:09:57:23 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
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002023
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE
Petitioner Attorney Ior Real Party in Interest
Zach Coughlin, Esq. John Springgate, Esq.
931 Forest St. Attorney Ior Ashwin Bharti
Reno, NV 89509 203 S. Arlington Ave.
Nevada Bar No.: 9473 Reno, NV 89501
Real Party in Interest
Reno, NV 89501
1 S Sierra St

Zach Coughlin,
Petitioner,
vs.
Judge,
Respondent
NV Supreme Ct. No.:
002024
including those to which SBN Bar Counsel Pat King filed on behalf of his former co-worker at
the AG's Office, Reno City Attorney Dan Wong...While the other Reno City Attorney, Creig
Skau, kept Coughlin busy with his lies about "the judge authorized me to serve you by
email"...
Sincerely
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
Zach Coughlin
1471 E. 9th St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
002025

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Officers at Spearmint Rhino Adult Cabaret

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

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