Persons and family relation Civil code Case digest NICANOR T. SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELAO T.

SANTOSGUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO CECILIO MENDOZA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA DE LA ROSA MENDOZA JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs. DANILO PANGILINAN JOSE MODEQUILLO vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, ALBINO JOSEF vs. OTELIO SANTOS SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY vs. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO vs. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INES FLORANTE F. MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC. PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T. MORING and HUSBAND vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA FORTALEZA vs. SPOUSES RAUL LAPITAN and RONA LAPITAN

NICANOR T. SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELAO T. SANTOSGUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO G.R. No. 134787 Facts: Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are brother and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased. Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a "Basic Agreement of Partition" covering properties they inherited from their parents. Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero (collectively, the "Guerreros"), filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal against petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance. Issue: Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court has no application Ruling: A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. Thus, the provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance of an action between members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil actions involving members of the same family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family Code. Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case contains no such allegation. But a complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by the introduction of evidence effectively supplying the necessary averments of a defective complaint. November 15, 2005

CECILIO MENDOZA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA DE LA ROSA MENDOZA G.R. No. L-23102 Facts: April 24, 1967

In the complaint, private respondent, Luisa De La Rosa Mendoza averred that she was married to Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953, that they lived together as husband and wife until 14 July 1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his studies and practice his profession. Since then, defendant Mendoza, without justifiable cause or reason deliberately abandoned and neglected plaintiff and despite repeated demands by plaintiff, defendant has failed and refused, and still fails and refuses, to provide for the maintenance and support of plaintiff, who is allegedly to be pregnant, sickly and without any source of revenue, while defendant (now petitioner) is employed in a hospital in the United States. Issue: Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition, and invoking Article 222 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines. Ruling: Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that before a suit between members of the same family (in this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it must appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, and the only way to make it so appear when the suit is filed is by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being initiated filed or maintained unless such efforts at compromise appear, the showing that efforts in question were made is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows that the failure of the complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be so attacked at any stage of the case even on appeal. While the Supreme Court agree that petitioner's position represents a correct statement of the general rule on the matter, we are nevertheless constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance committed no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its face, the same involved a claim for future support that under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines can not be subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of application of Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies. This appears from the last proviso of said Article 222, future support.

JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs. DANILO PANGILINAN G.R. No. 185920 Facts: Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the company to pay the respondents back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos name situated in Pandacan. Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually the business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC. Issue: Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid. Ruling: Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242 governs extrajudicial constitution. On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually reside therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved. In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid. July 20, 2010

JOSE MODEQUILLO vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, G.R. No. 86355 Facts: The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur also registered in the latters name. A motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153. Issue: Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home. Ruling: The petitioners contention that petitioner and his family should consider it a family home from the time it was occupied in 1969 is not well taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The debt and liability, which was the basis of the judgment, was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code. May 31, 1990

ALBINO JOSEF vs. OTELIO SANTOS G.R. No. 165060 Facts: In Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant, which is a case for collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that petitioner failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent on various dates in 1994. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City found petitioner liable to respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts decision in Toto. Petitioner filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, but it was dismissed in a Resolution dated February 18, 2002. The Judgment became final and executory on May 21, 2002. A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003 and enforced on August 21, 2003. On August 29, 2003, certain personal properties subjects of the writ of execution were auctioned off. Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City was sold by way of public auction to fully satisfy the judgment credit. On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, questioning the sheriffs levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and real properties. Petitioner claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his children; and that the real property was his family home thus exempt from execution. Issue: Whether or not the levy and sale of the personal belongings of the petitioners children as well as the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the judgment award in favor of respondent is legal. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect, the trial courts failure to observe the proper procedures to determine the veracity of petitioners allegations, is unjustified. The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite petitioners allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the nature of the same, whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they belonged to petitioner or to someone else. November 27, 2008

SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY vs. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA G.R. No. 172263 Facts: July 9, 2008

Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Authers failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution. After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A. Kelley filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on the ground that the subject property was their family home which was exempt from execution. Issue: Whether or not the subject property is the family home of the petitioners. Ruling: Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code. The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO vs. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INES G.R. No. 132537 Facts: October 14, 2005

Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines. Josephine and Socorro demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice lands while under the management of Marietta and for the return of the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of the property. Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owners copy of the TCT and pay damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue of which, a parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Mariettas name was sold at a public auction wherein Josephine was the highest bidder. Mariettas husband, Hinahon together with their children, filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya on the ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence and is thus exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the time they occupied it in 1972 Issue: Whether or not the property can be sold. Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. While the respondent contends that the house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is not deemed constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her debts. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as the family home only upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta was instituted in 1986 to for acts committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied property was constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta falls within the exception provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home.

FLORANTE F. MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC. G.R. No. 97898 Facts: Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00. On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent, the salient portion of which provides: That defendants will undertake to pay the amount of P2,000,000.00 as and when their means permit, but expeditiously as possible as their collectibles will be collected. On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff. On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory. They alleged that the compromise agreement had not yet matured, as there was no showing that they had the means to pay the indebtedness or that their receivables had in fact been collected. Issue: Whether or not the final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the provisions of the said Code. Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows: Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborer, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. The exemption provided, as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by August 11, 1997

operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).

PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T. MORING and HUSBAND vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG G.R. No. 108532 Facts: March 9, 1999

As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (for recovery of property) in favor of private respondent, two (2) of petitioners' properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental with an area of about five (5) hectares, and the other was the family home also located at Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to the private respondent. To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 (docketed as Civil Case No. 10407) to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their death, they left the subject property covered by OCT No. P-12820 and Free Patent No. 548906. Considering that said property has been acquired through free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Petitioners further alleged that they were in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land and that on February 9, 1968. Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance in favor of the private respondent over the subject property including their family home that was extra judicially constituted in accordance with law. As a result of the alleged illegal deed of conveyance, private respondent was able to obtain in his name Tax Declaration No. 851920 over the land, thus casting a cloud of doubt over the title and ownership of petitioners over said property. Issue:

Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment. The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the "debt" was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243 (2).

SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA FORTALEZA vs. SPOUSES RAUL LAPITAN and RONA LAPITAN G.R. No. 178288 Facts: August 15, 2012

Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan (creditors). As security, spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baos, Laguna (subject property). When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests and penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. The public auction sale was set on May 9, 2001. At the sale, the creditors son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona emerged as the highest bidders. Then, they were issued a Certificate of Sale that was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba City. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership on November 20, 2003 and the registration of the subject property in their names on February 4, 2004. Despite the foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitans formal demand to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property. Issue: Whether or not the Honorable court of appeals gravely erred in not holding that the petitioners were prevented by the respondent from exercising their right of redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a redemption price of a highly equitable and more than double the amount of the foreclosed property, especially that the foreclosed mortgaged property is the family home of petitioners and their children. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property, which was even notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was sold at the public auction.