Consti 1-A

LECTURE PRESENTATION FOR LAW STUDENTS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
BASED ON PHIL. POLITICAL LAW 2002 EDITION BY ISAGANI A. CRUZ RETIRED ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES
CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION:
SEC. 1, ART. VI THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH SHALL CONSISTS OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY THE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM.

B.
THE SENATE
1. COMPOSITION:
SEC. 2, ART. VI THE SENATE SHALL BE COMPOSED OF TWENTY FOUR SENATORS WHO SHALL BE ELECTED AT LARGE BY THE QUALIFIED VOTERS OF THE PHIL, AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.
2. QUALIFICATIONS:
SEC. 3, ART. VI NO PERSONS SHALL BE A SENATOR UNLESS HE IS A 1) NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHIL, 2) ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION, MUST BE AT LEAST 35 YEARS OF AGE, 3) MUST BE ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, 4) A REGISTERED VOTER, AND 5) A RESIDENT OF THE PHIL FOR NOT LESS THAN 2 YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION.
2. QUALIFICATIONS:
2.1 NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN ARE THOSE WHO ARE CITIZENS OF THE PHIL FROM BIRTH WITHOUT HAVING TO PERFORM ANY ACT TO ACQUIRE OR PERFECT THEIR PHIL CITIZENSHIP. THOSE WHO ELECT PHIL CITIZENSHIP IN ACCORDANCE WITH PAR. (3), SEC. 1 HEREOF SHALL BE DEEMED NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN. (SEC. 2, ART. IV, CONSTITUTION)
2. QUALIFICATIONS:
2.2 AGE QUALIFICATION THE AGE IS FIXED AT 35 AND MUST BE POSSESSED ON THE DAY OF ELECTION, THAT IS, WHEN THE POLLS ARE OPENED AND THE VOTES ARE CAST, AND NOT ON THE DAY OF THE PROCLAMATION OF THE WINNERS BY THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS. THIS NULLIFIES THE RULING IN THE CASE OF ESPINOSA V. AQUINO (ELECTORAL CASE NO. 9, SET), WHICH UPHELD THE LATE SEN. BENIGNO AQUINO JR WHO WAS LESS THAN THE REQUIRED AGE ON THE DAY OF ELECTION BUT CELEBRATED HIS 35TH BIRTHDAY BEFORE HIS PROCLAMATION AS ONE OF THE SENATORIAL WINNERS.
2. QUALIFICATIONS:
2.3 RESIDENCE IS DEFINED AS THE PLACE WHERE ONE HABITUALLY RESIDES AND TO WHICH, WHEN HE IS ABSENT, HE HAS THE INTENTION OF RETURNING (LIM V. PELAEZ, ELECTORAL CASE NO. 36, HET & BRILLIANTE V. REYES, HET CASE NO. 31, 1988). A PERSON CANNOT HAVE TWO RESIDENCES AT THE SAME TIME; ACQUISITION OF NEW RESIDENCE RESULTS IN FORFEITURE OF THE OLD. HOWEVER, AN INTENTION TO ABANDON HIS OLD RESIDENCE CANNOT LEGALLY BE INFERRED FROM HIS ACT IN ESTABLISHING A HOME ELSEWHERE OR OTHERWISE CONDUCTING HIS ACTIVITIES THEREIN, IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR SHOWING THAT HE HAS DECIDED TO ADOPT A NEW RESIDENCE.
2. QUALIFICATIONS:
2.3 RESIDENCE: THUS, A LEGISLATOR WHO BUILT A HOUSE ESTABLISHED A LAW PRACTICE IN MANILA OCCASIONALLY VISITED HIS RELATIVES AND PROPERTIES IN HIS HOME PROVINCE WAS DEEMED TO HAVE FORFEITED HIS LEGAL RESIDENCE IN LATTER PLACE (Ibid). AND BUT HIS NOT THE
RESIDENCE IS IN ANY PART OF THE PHIL, UNLIKE IN THE CASE OF MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP WHO MUST RESIDE IN THE DISTRICT WHERE HE IS RUNNING.
2. QUALIFICATIONS:
2.4 CONTINUITY OF QUALIFICATIONS THE QUALIFICATIONS PRESCRIBED ARE CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS, THAT IS, THEY MUST BE POSSESSED FOR THE ENTIRE DURATION OF THE MEMBERS INCUMBENCY. 2.5 EXCLUSIVITY OF QUALIFACTIONS - THEY ARE ALSO EXCLUSIVE UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS; HENCE, CONGRESS IS NOT COMPETENT TO ENACT LAW FOR ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATIONS, LIKE, MUST BE A COLLEGE GRADUATE.
3. TERM OF OFFICE:
THE TERM OF THE SENATORS SHALL BE 6 YEARS AND SHALL COMMENCE , UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, AT NOON ON THE 30TH DAY OF JUNE NEXT FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION. NO SENATOR SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN 2 CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED (SEC. 4, ART. VI, CONSTITUTION).

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 1. COMPOSITION SEC. 5 (1), ART. VI THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL BE COMPOSED OF NOT MORE THAN 250 MEMBERS, UNLESS OTHERWISE FIXED BY LAW, WHO SHALL BE ELECTED FROM (a) LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES, CITIES, AND THE METRO MANILA AREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUMBER OF THEIR RESPECTIVE INHABITANTS, AND ON THE BASIS OF A UNIFORM AND PROGRESSIVE RATIO, AND THOSE WHO, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, SHALL BE ELECTED THROUGH A (b) PARTY-LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL,AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 1. COMPOSITION SEC. 5(2), ART. VI THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE 20% OF THE TOTAL MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE OF REP. FOR 3 CONSECUTIVE TERMS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 1. COMPOSITION SEC. 5(2), ART. VI THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES: 1. ENABLING LAW RA 7941 (THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT; 2. LANDMARK CASES: 2.a) ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY V. ANG BAONG BAYANI-OFW GO! Go! Phils., et. Al. (GR No. 147589, June 26, 2001); and 2.b) ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. V. COMELEC (GR NO. 203766, April 2, 2013) NOTE: FOR REPORT

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 1. COMPOSITION SEC. 5(3), ART. VI EACH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT SHALL COMPRISE, AS FAR AS PRACTICABLE, CONTIGOUS, COMPACT AND ADJACENT TERRITORY. EACH CITY WITH A POPULATION OF AT LEAST 250,000 OR EACH PROVINCE, SHALL HAVE AT LEAST ONE REPRESENTATIVE.

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 1. COMPOSITION SEC. 5(4), ART. VI WITHIN 3 YEARS FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF EVERY CENSUS, THE CONGRESS SHALL MAKE A REAPPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS BASED ON THE STANDARDS PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION.

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 1.1) THE DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES: GERRYMANDERING IS THE ARRANGEMENT OF DISTRICTS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO FAVOR THE ELECTION OF PREFERRED CANDIDATE (USUALLY RE-ELECTIONISTS) THROUGH THE INCLUSION THEREIN ONLY OF THOSE AREAS WHERE THEY EXPECT TO WIN, REGARDLESS OF THE RESULTANT SHAPE OF SUCH DISTRICTS. (*****)

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 1.1) THE DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES: GERRYMANDERING (CONT): THIS PRACTICE WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN INITIATED BY ELDRIDGE GERRY, FORMER GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTES AND 5TH VP OF USA. COMPACT MEANS SOLID, CONTIGOUS, IN PHYSICAL CONTACT; AND ADJACENT, CLOSE BY OR NEAR.

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 1.1) THE DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES: MACIAS V. COMELEC (3 SCRA 1)IS THE AUTHORITY FOR THE VIEW THAT THE VALIDITY OF A LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT MEASURE IS A JUSTICIABLE QUESTION, INVOLVING AS IT DOES CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS THE INTERPRETATION OF WHICH DOES NOT CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION. THE SC IN FACT ANNULLED THE CHALLENGED LAW IN THAT CASE WHEN IT WAS SHOWN THAT THE APPORTIONMENT WAS NOT BASED ON THE NUMBER OF INHABITANTS IN THE VARIOUS REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICTS. THE SC NOTED THAT SOME BIG PROVINCES WERE GIVEN LESS REP THAN CERTAIN RELATIVELY SMALLER ONES, E.G., CEBU GOT 7 WHILE RIZAL WITH A BIGGER POPULATIONS THEN GOT ONLY 4.

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 2. QUALIFICATIONS (*****) SEC. 6, ART. VI NO PERSON SHALL BE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP UNLESS HE 1) IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHIL, 2) ON THE DAY OF ELECTION, IS AT LEAST 25 YEARS OLD, 3) IS ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, AND 4) EXCEPT THE PARTY-LIST REP, MUST BE A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE DISTRICT IN WHICH HE SHALL BE ELECTED, AND 5) A RESIDENT THEREOF FOR A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN ONE YEAR IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION.

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 3. TERM ***** SEC. 7, ART. VI THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL BE ELECTED FOR A TERM OF 3 YEARS WHICH SHALL BEGIN, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, AT NOON ON THE 30TH DAY OF JUNE FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION. NO MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN 3 CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 3. TERM 3.1) BORJA V. COMELEC (GR NO. 133495, SEPT. 3, 1998) : FACTS: JUAN WAS ELECTED IN A SPECIAL ELECTION TO FILL UP THE VACANCY CREATED BY THE DEATH OF PEDRO IN CONGRESS. HE RAN AGAIN, AND WON TWICE THEREAFTER. ISSUE: CAN JUAN STILL RUN FOR THE SAME POSITION AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE THIRD TERM?

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 3. TERM 3.1) BORJA V. COMELEC (GR NO. 133495, SEPT. 3, 1998) : HELD: NO. AS HELD IN THE BORJA CASE, THE CONSTITUTION BARS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REP FROM SERVING FOR MORE THAN 3 CONSECUTIVE TERMS. IT WAS SAID THAT IF ONE IS ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE TO SERVE THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF A DECEASED MEMBER, NO MATTER HOW SHORT, IT WILL BE CONSIDERED ONE TERM FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPUTING THE NUMBER OF SUCCESSIVE TERMS ALLOWED. (Political Law Reviewer, p. 470, 2008 ed., Albano, Albano, Jr., Albano-Pua, & Albano III)

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 3. TERM 3.2 BORJA V. COMELEC (GR NO. 133495, SEPT. 3, 1998) QUESTION: WHERE LIES THE DIFFERENCE IF A VICE-MAYOR SUCCEEDS THE MAYOR IF THE LATTER DIES AND IF A PERSON IS ELECTED TO THE UNEXPIRED PORTION OF THE TERM OF A MEMBER OF CONGRESS?

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 3. TERM 3.2 ANSWER: THE DIFFERENCE IS THAT THE VICE-MAYOR SUCCEEDS TO THE MAYORSHIP BY OPERATION OF LAW, WHILE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE IS ELECTED TO FILL THE VACANCY. IN THAT REAL SENSE THEREFORE, SUCH REPRESENTATIVE SERVES A TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. AS THE PURPOSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION IS TO LIMIT THE RIGHT TO BE ELECTED AND SERVE IN CONGRESS, HIS SERVICE OF THE UNEXPIRED TERM IS RIGHTLY COUNTED AS HIS FIRST TERM. (Political Law Reviewer, p. 471, 2008 ed., Albano, Albano, Jr., Albano-Pua, & Albano III)

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 4. ELECTION SEC. 9, ART. VI IN CASE OF VACANCY IN THE SENATE OR IN THE HOUSE OF REP, A SPECIAL ELECTION MAY BE CALLED TO FILL SUCH VACANCY IN THE MANNER PRESCRIBED BY LAW, BUT THE SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP THUS ELECTED SHALL SERVE ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM.

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 5. SALARIES SEC. 10, ART. VI THE SALARIES OF SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL BE DETERMINED BY LAW. NO INCREASE IN SAID COMPENSATION SHALL TAKE EFFECT UNTIL AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE FULL TERM OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REP APPROVING SUCH INCREASE.

C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 5. SALARIES SEC. 20, ART. VI THE RECORDS AND BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF THE CONGRESS SHALL BE PRESERVED AND BE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW, AND SUCH BOOKS SHALL BE AUDITED BY THE COA* WHICH SHALL PUBLISH ANNUALLY AN ITEMIZED LIST OF AMOUNTS PAID TO AND EXPENSES INCURRED FOR EACH MEMBER. *NOTE BENE: NOT THROUGH CERTIFICATIONS ISSUED BY LEADERS OF BOTH HOUSES.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: (*****) SEC. 11, ART. VI A SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL, IN ALL OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY NOT MORE THAN 6 YEARS IMPRISONMENT, BE PRIVILEGED FROM ARREST WHILE THE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION. NO MEMBER SHALL BE QUESTIONED NOR BE HELD LIABLE IN ANY OTHER PLACE FOR ANY SPEECH OR DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS OR IN ANY COMMITTEE THEREOF.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 1. PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST (*****) THE 1935 CONSTITUTION ON PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY FROM ARREST EXCEPTED ALL CRIMINAL OFFENSES REGARDLESS OF DEGREE, WITH THE RESULT THAT THE LEGISLATOR COULD CLAIM SAME ONLY AGAINST CIVIL ARRESTS. FOR ANY CRIMINAL OFFENSE, HE WAS SUBJECTED TO ARREST AT ANY TIME, EVEN DURING THE SESSIONS.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 1. PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST (CONT): UNDER THE 1973 AND 1987 CONSTITUTION, THE SCOPE OF THIS IMMUNITY HAS BEEN EXPANDED TO COVER NOT ONLY CIVIL ARRESTS BUT ALSO ARRESTS FOR CRIMINAL OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY NOT MORE THAN SIX YEARS IMPRISONMENT. ACCORDINGLY, THE IMMUNITY MAY NOT BE INVOKED IF THE CRIME IS MURDER BUT IS AVAILABLE IN CASE OF, SAY, SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES. THE IMMUNITY NOW APPLIES ONLY WHILE THE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION. SESSION DOES NOT REFER TO THE DAY-TO-DAY MEETINGS OF THE LEGISLATURE BUT TO THE ENTIRE PERIOD FROM ITS INITIAL CONVENING UNTIL ITS FINAL ADJOURNMENT.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 2. PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE THERE ARE TWO REQUIREMENTS THAT MUST CONCUR IN ORDER THAT THE PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE CAN BE AVAILED OF BY THE MEMBER OF THE CONGRESS: 1) THAT THE REMARKS MUST BE MADE WHILE LEGISLATURE OR THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE IS FUNCTIONING, THAT IS IN SESSION; AND 2) IS THAT THEY MUST BE MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISCHARGE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 2. PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE (*****) 2.1 COFFIN V. COFFIN (A MASS. 1) THESE CONDITIONS WERE FIRST LAID DOWN IN THIS LEADING CASE WHERE THE PRIVILEGE WAS DENIED A LEGISLATOR WHO UTTERED SLANDEROUS REMARKS IN THE COURSE OF A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH A CONSTITUENT DURING A LULL IN THE SESSION.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 2. PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE (CONT): 2.2 JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG (17 SCRA 876) APPLYING THE RULE ANNOUNCED IN COFFIN V. COFFIN, OUR OWN SC DECLARED IN JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG THAT THE PRIVILEGE COULD NOT BE INVOKED BY A LEGISLATOR WHO HAD ALLEGEDLY MALIGNED THE PLAINTIFF IN AN OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHIL COURSED THROUGH AND PUBLISHED IN NEWSPAPERS. THE FINDING WAS THAT HE HAD WRITTEN THE LETTER AT A TIME WHEN CONGRESS WAS IN RECESS AND IN HIS PRIVATE CAPACITY ONLY.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 2. PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE (CONT): 2.3 OSMENA V.PENDATUN (L-17144, OCT. 28, 1960) - IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE PRIVILEGE IS NOT ABSOLUTE ALTHOUGH IT IS USALLY SO CALLED. THE RULE PROVIDES THAT THE LEGISLATOR MAY NOT BE QUESTIONED IN ANY OTHER PLACE, WHICH MEANS THAT HE MAY BE CALLED TO ACCOUNT FOR HIS REMARKS BY HIS OWN COLLEAGUES IN THE CONGRESS ITSELF AND, WHEN WARRANTED, PUNISHED FOR DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 2. PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE (CONT): 2.3 OSMENA V.PENDATUN (L-17144, OCT. 28, 1960) THUS, IN THE CASE OF OSMENA V. PENDATUN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHIL HIMSLEF WHO HAD BEEN VILIFIED BY THE PETITIONER COULD NOT FILE ANY CIVIL OR CRIMINAL ACTION AGAINST HIM BECAUSE OF THIS IMMUNITY.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 2. PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE (CONT): 2.3 OSMENA V.PENDATUN (L-17144, OCT. 28, 1960) NONETHELESS, THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REP IN WHICH THE QUESTIONED SPEECH WAS DELIVERED WERE NOT PRECLUDED FROM DEMONSTRATING THEIR LOYALTY TO THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE BY DECLARING OSMENA GUILTY OF DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR AND SUSPENDING HIM IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR DISCIPLINARY POWER UNDER WHAT IS NOW ART. VI, SEC. 16(3) OF THE CONSTITUTION.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 3. CONFLICT OF INTEREST SEC. 12, ART. VI ALL MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL UPON ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE, MAKE A FULL DISCLOSURE OF THEIR FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS INTERESTS*. THEY SHALL NOTIFY THE HOUSE CONCERNED OF A POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST THAT MAY ARISE FROM THE FILING OF A PROPOSED LEGISLATION OF WHICH THEY ARE AUTHORS. *NOTE: WHY DISCLOSE ONLY? WHY NOT REQUIRE THEM TO UNLOAD THEIR STOCKHOLDINGS, LIKE IN SOME COUNTRIES.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 4. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES (*****) SEC. 13, ART. VI NO SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP MAY HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVT, OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING GOCC OR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES, DURING HIS TERM WITHOUT FORFEITING HIS SEAT. NEITHER SHALL HE BE APPOINTED TO ANY OFFICE WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN CREATED OR THE EMOLUMENTS THEREOF INCREASED DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. THE FIRST PART IS CALLED INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE; WHILE THE SECOND PART IS CALLED FORBIDDEN OFFICE.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 4. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES (*****) 4.1 ADAZA V. PACANA (135 SCRA 431) - IN THIS CASE, THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT WERE ELECTED GOVERNOR AND VICE-GOVERNOR, RESPECTIVELY, OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL. BOTH SUBSEQUENTLY RAN FOR THE BATASAN PAMBANSA, BUT ONLY THE PETITIONER WON. ADAZA THEN QUALIFIED AS MEMBER OF THE LAWMAKING BODY, WHEREUPON, PACANA ASSUMED THE GOVERNORSHIP AS STATUTORY SUCCESSOR. ADAZA CHALLENGED PACANAS TAKEOVER, CONTENDING THAT UNDER THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM A LEGISLATOR COULD CONCURRENTLY SERVE AS GOVERNOR; HENCE,

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 4. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES (*****) 4.1 ADAZA V. PACANA (135 SCRA 431) (CONT): THERE WAS NO VACANCY IN THE GOVERNORSHIP THAT PACANA COULD FILL. THE SC UNANIMOUSLY REJECTED THIS ARGUMENT AND HELD THAT ADAZA AUTOMATICALLY FORFEITED THE GOVERNORSHIP THE MOMENT HE TOOK HIS OATH AS A MEMBER OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 4. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES (*****) 4.2 CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION NOT EVERY OTHER OFFICE IS TO BE REGARDED AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE LEGISLATIVE POSITION. FOR EXAMPLE, MEMBERSHIP IN THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS IS PERMITTED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 4. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES (*****) 4.3 EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS MOREOVER, IF IT BE SHOWN THAT THE SECOND OFFICE IS AN EXTENSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POSITION OR IS IN AID OF LEGISLATIVE DUTIES, THE HOLDING THEREOF WILL NOT RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE LEGISLATORS SEAT IN CONGRESS.
ACCORDINGLY, THE CHAIRMEN OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REP ON EDUCATION RETAIN THEIR SEATS IN CONGRESS WHILE SITTING CONCURRENTLY AS EXOFFICIO MEMBERS IN THE UP BOARD OF REGENTS.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 4. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES (*****) 4.4 FORBIDDEN OFFICE EVEN IF THE MEMBER OF CONGRESS IS WILLING TO FORFEIT HIS LEGISLATIVE SEAT THEREIN, HE MAY NOT BE APPOINTED TO ANY OFFICE IN THE GOVERNMENT THAT HAS BEEN: 1) CREATED, OR 2) EMOLUMENTS THEREOF HAVE BEEN INCREASED, DURING HIS TERM.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS: SEC. 14, ART. VI NO SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP MAY PERSONALLY APPEAR AS COUNSEL BEFORE ANY COURT OF JUSTICE OR BEFORE THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS, OR QUASI-JUDICIAL AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES. NEITHER SHALL HE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BE INTERESTED FINANCIALLY* IN ANY CONTRACT WITH, * NOTA BENE IS THIS NOT A MANDATE TO DIVEST THEIR BUSINESS HOLDINGS?

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS: SEC. 14, ART. VI (CONT): OR IN ANY FRANCHISE OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGE GRANTED BY THE GOVERNMENT, OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, OR ITS SUBSIDIARY, DURING HIS TERM OF OFFICE. HE SHALL NOT INTERVENE IN ANY MATTER BEFORE ANY OFFICE OF THE GOVT FOR HIS PECUNIARY BENEFIT OR WHERE HE MAY BE CALLED UPON TO ACT ON ACCOUNT OF HIS OFFICE.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS: APPEARANCE OF THE LEGISLATOR IS NOW BARRED BEFORE ALL COURTS OF JUSTICE, ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS, AND TO ALL ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES, LIKE THE SEC, NLRC, COURT MARTIALS AND MILTARY TRIBUNALS. THE PURPOSE OF DISQUALIFICATION IS TO PREVENT THE LEGISLATOR FROM EXERTING UNDUE INFLUENCE, DELIBERATELY OR NOT, UPON THE BODY WHERE HE IS

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS: APPEARING. THE PRESSURE MAY NOT BE INTENDED; NORMALLY, THE APPEARANCE IS ENOUGH, CONSIDERING THE POWERS AVAILABLE TO THE LEGISLATOR WHICH HE CAN EXERCISE TO REWARD OR PUNISH A JUDGE DECIDING HIS CASE OR, IN THE CASE OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS, HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH ITS MEMBERS.

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS: THIS IS THE REASON WHY THE PROHIBITED APPEARANCE MUST BE PERSONAL. THE LAWYER-LEGISLATOR MAY STILL ENGAGE IN THE PRACTICE OF HIS PROFESSION EXCEPT THAT WHEN IT COMES TO TRIALS AND HEARINGS BEFORE THE BODIES ABOVE-MENTIONED, APPEARANCE MAY BE MADE NOT BY HIM* BUT BY SOME OTHER MEMBER OF HIS LAW OFFICE. * NOTA BENE: COME AGAIN? THIS IS A MYIOPIC VIEW (WRR).

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS: 5.1 PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN (113 SCRA 33)- ON PERSONAL APPEARANCE A LEGISLATOR ENTERED HIS APPERANCE AS COUNSEL FOR ONE OF THE PARTIES TO AN INTRACORPORATE DISPUTE BEFORE THE SEC. HE DESISTED WHEN HIS REPRESENTATION WAS CHALLENGED UNDER THE ABOVE-MENTIONED SECTION. THEREAFTER, HE PURCHASED P200.00 WORTH OF STOCKS IN THE CORPORATION FROM THE FACTION HE WAS REPRESENTING AND SOUGHT TO INTERVENE IN THE SAID

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS: 5.1 PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN (113 SCRA 33)- ON PERSONAL APPEARANCE (CONT) - SAID DISPUTE, THIS TIME AS A STOCKHOLDER. THE SC DID NOT ALLOW HIM TO DO SO AS HIS EVIDENT PURPOSE WAS TO CIRCUMBENT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION. THE SC DECLARED: UNDER THOSE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, WE ARE CONSTRAINED TO HOLD THAT

D. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES: 5. INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS: 5.1 PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN (113 SCRA 33)- ON PERSONAL APPEARANCE (CONT) - THERE HAS BEEN AN INDIRECT APPEARANCE* AS COUNSEL BEFORE . . . AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY AND, IN OUR OPINION, THAT IS A CIRCUMVENTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION.
* NOTA BENE: IS IT NOT THAT THE APPEARANCE OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THEIR LAW OFFICES CONSIDERED AS AN INDIRECT APPERANCE ALSO? IF SO, IT SHOULD BE PROHIBITED (MY COMMENT-WRR).

E. SESSIONS: SEC. 15, ART. VI THE CONGRESS SHALL CONVENE ONCE EVERY YEAR ON THE 4TH MONDAY OF JULY FOR ITS REGULAR SESSION, UNLESS A DIFFERENT DATE IS FIXED BY LAW, AND SHALL CONTINUE TO BE IN SESSION FOR SUCH NUMBER OF DAYS AS IT MAY DETERMINE UNTIL 30 DAYS BEFORE THE OPENING OF ITS NEXT REGULAR SESSION, EXCLUSIVE OF SATURDAYS, SUNDAYS, AND LEGAL HOLIDAYS. THE PRESIDENT MAY CALL A SPECIAL SESSION AT ANY TIME.

E. SESSIONS: SEC. 15, ART. VI (CONT) WHEN THE PRESIDENT CALLS FOR SPECIAL SESSION, CONGRESS IS MANDATED TO COMPLY WITH IT. HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT CALL IS NOT NECESSARY IN SOME INSTANCES, AS WHEN THE CONGRESS MEETS TO CANVASS THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (SEC. 4, ART. VII), OR TO CALL A SPECIAL ELECTION WHEN BOTH THE PRESIDENCY AND THE VICEPRESIDENCY ARE VACATED (SEC. 10, ART. VII), OR WHEN IT DECIDES TO EXERCISE THE POWER OF IMPEACHMENT (ART. XI), PARTICULARLY WHERE THE RESPONDENT IS THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF.

E. SESSIONS: 1. KIND OF SESSIONS: 1.1) REGULAR SESSION GENERAL LEGISLATION 1.2) SPECIAL SESSION SPECIFIC LEGISLATION 1.3 SINE DIE SESSION IT IS ONE HELD WITHOUT DAY, BY STAYING THE HANDS OF THE CLOCK DEFINITELY AT A CERTAIN TIME AND CONTINUING THE SESSION INDEFINITELY (U.S. VS. PONS, 34 PHIL. 729).

F.
QUORUM: SEC. 16(2), ART. VI A MAJORITY OF EACH SHALL CONSTITUTE A QUORUM TO DO BUSINESS, BUT A SMALLER NUMBER MAY ADJOURN FROM DAY TO DAY AND MAY COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF ABSENT MEMBERS IN SUCH MANNER, AND UNDER SUCH PENALTIES, AS SUCH HOUSE MAY PROVIDE.

F.
QUORUM:
1.
QUORUM - IS DEFINED AS ANY NU8MBER SUFFICIENT TO TRANSACT BUSINESS (JAVELLANA V. TAYO, 6 SCRA 1048), WHICH MAY BE LESS THAN THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERSHIP. IN OUR CONSTITUTION, IT IS REQUIRED THAT THE QUORUM BE A MAJORITY OF EACH HOUSE.
2. AVE;INO V. CUENCO (83 PHIL 17) - IN THIS CASE, THE PETITIONER, WHO WAS THEN SENATE PRESIDENT, MOTU PROPIO, ADJOURNED A SESSION OF THE SENATE AND WALKED OUT WITH THIS FOLLOWERS, LEAVING TWELVE

F.
QUORUM:
1.
QUORUM - IS DEFINED AS ANY NU8MBER SUFFICIENT TO TRANSACT BUSINESS (JAVELLANA V. TAYO, 6 SCRA 1048), WHICH MAY BE LESS THAN THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERSHIP. IN OUR CONSTITUTION, IT IS REQUIRED THAT THE QUORUM BE A MAJORITY OF EACH HOUSE.
2. AVELINO V. CUENCO (83 PHIL 17) (CONT) - OTHER MEMBERS WHO CONTINUED MEETING AND REPLACED HIM WITH THE RESPONDENT AS ACTING PRESIDENT. AVELINO, THEREUPON, FILED A QUO WARRANTO

F.
QUORUM: 2. AVELINO V. CUENCO (83 PHIL 17) (CONT) PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CUENCO, CONTENDING THAT THE LATTER HAD NOT BEEN VALIDLY ELECTED BECAUSE 12 MEMBERS DID NOT CONSTITUTE A QUORUM, THAT IS MAJORITY OF THE 24-MEMBER SENATE. THE SC FINALLY RULED THAT THE 12 MEMBERS IS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A QUORUM, BEING A MAJORITY OF THE 23, NOT 24.

G.
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS: SEC. 16(3), ART. VI EACH HOUSE MAY DETERMINE THE RULES OF ITS PROCEEDINGS, PUNISH ITS MEMBERS FOR DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR, AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF 2/3 OF ALL ITS MEMBERS, SUSPEND OR EXPEL A MEMBER. A PENALTY OF SUSPENSION, WHEN IMPOSED, SHALL NOT EXCEED 60 DAYS.

G.
RULES OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS: 1. RULES OF PROCEEDINGS - RULES OF PROCEEDINGS ARE NEEDED FOR THE ORDERLY CONDUCT OF THE SESSIONS OF THE CONGRESS. UNLESS SUCH RULES VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL OR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, THEY ARE WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE DISCRETION OF EACH HOUSE TO FORMULATE AND INTERPRET, AND MAY NOT BE JUDICIALLY REVERSED.

G.
RULES OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS:

2.
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS - EVEN WITHOUT THE ABOVE PROVISION, THE AUTHORITY TO DISCIPLINE ITS MEMBERS CAN STILL BE EXERCISED BY EACH HOUSE AS AN INHERENT POWER, WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF ONLY A MAJORITY VOTE, CONFORMABLY TO THE GENERAL RULE ON THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY. WITH THIS PROVISION, THE DISCIPLINARY POWER IS NOT SO MUCH EXPRESSLY CONFERRED AS LIMITED BECAUSE OF THE SPECIFIC CONDITIONS LAID DOWN FOR ITS PROPER EXERCISE.

G.
RULES OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS: 2. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS (CONT) -THUS, THE COURTS MAY ANNUL ANY EXPULSION OR SUSPENSION OF A MEMBER THAT IS NOT CONCURRED IN BY AT LEAST 2/3 OF THE ENTIRE BODY OR ANY SUSPENSION METED OUT BY THE LEGISLATURE, EVEN WITH THE REQUIRED 2/3 VOTE, AS TO ANY PERIOD IN EXCESS OF THE 60-DAY MAXIMUM DURATION. THESE ARE PROCEDURAL MATTERS AND THEREFORE JUSTICIABLE.

RULES OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS: 2. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS (CONT) BUT THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR IS THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CONGRESS AND CANNOT AS A RULE BE JUDICIALLY REVIEWED. THE MATTER COMES IN THE CATEGORY OF A POLITICAL QUESTION. ACCORDINGLY, THE SC DID NOT INTERFERE WHEN THE LEGISLATURE DECLARED THAT THE PHYSICAL ASSAULT BY ONE MEMBER AGAINST ANOTHER (ALEJANDRO V. QUEZON, 46 PHIL 83), OR THE DELIVERY OF A DEROGATORY SPEECH WHICH THE MEMBER WAS UNABLE TO SUBSTANTIATE (OSMENA V. PENDATUN, 109 PHIL 863), CONSTITUTED DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR AND JUSTIFIED THE ADOPTION OF DISCIPLINARY MEASURES.
G.

H.
ADJOURNMENT: SEC. 16(5), ART. VI NEITHER HOUSE DURING THE SESSIONS OF THE CONGRESS SHALL, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER, ADJOURN FOR MORE THAN 3 DAYS, NOR TO ANY OTHER PLACE THAN THAT IN WHICH THE TWO HOUSES SHALL BE SITTING. THE PLACE AS USED HERE REFERS NOT TO THE BUILDING BUT TO THE POLITICAL UNIT WHERE THE TWO MAY BE SITTING (JEFFERSON MANUAL).

H.
ADJOURNMENT: 1. KIND OF ADJOURNMENTS: 1.1) SINE DIE OR FINAL ADJOURNMENT MEANS ADJOURNMENT MADE WITHOUT ASSIGNING A DAY FOR A FURTHER MEETING OR HEARING. ONE MADE UNTIL THE OPENING OF THE NEXT CONGRESS.
1.2) TEMPORARY ADJOURNMENT ADJOURNMENT MADE DAY TO DAY OR WITH A DAY FOR THE NEXT MEETING. THIS IS ADJOURNMENT MADE DURING THE DURATION OF THE SESSION OF THE CONGRESS.

I. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS: SEC. 17, ART. VI THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL EACH HAVE AN ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL WHICH SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MEMBERS. EACH ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SHALL BE COMPOSED OF 9 MEMBERS, 3 OF WHOM SHALL BE JUSTICES OF THE SC TO BE DESIGNATED BY THE SC, AND THE REMAINING 6 SHALL BE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF REP, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO SHALL BE CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PARTIES OR ORGANIZATION REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE SENIOR JUSTICE IN THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SHALL BE ITS CHAIRMAN.

I. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS: 1.1) POSITION OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL ALTHOUGH THE ETS ARE PREDOMINANTLY LEGISLATIVE IN MEMBERSHIP AND THE PROVISION CREATING THEM IS FOUND IN ARTICLE VI ON THE LEGISLATIVE DEPT, IT IS NOT CORRECT TO SAY THAT THEY ARE MERE ADJUNCTS OF CONGRESS. IN FACT, IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES, THEY ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE LEGISLATURE, AND ALSO OF THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS FOR THAT MATTER.

I. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS: 1.2) ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (63 PHIL 139) AS AFFIRMED IN LAZATIN V. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (168 SCRA 391): IN THIS CASE, IT WAS HELD THAT THE RESPONDENT BODY (PREDECESSOR OF ELETORAL TRIBUNALS) HAD THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO PRESCRIBE ITS OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE, AS AGAINST THOSE EARLIER ADOPTED BY THE LEGISLATURE ITSELF, IN CONNECTION WITH THE ELECTION CONTESTS UNDER ITS JURISDICTION.

I. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS: 1.3) SUANES V. DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE SENATE (L-2480, OCT. 26, 1948): IN THIS CASE, THE SC FURTHER BOLSTERED THE INDEPENDENCE OF THESE BODIES BY HOLDING THAT THE EMPLOYEES OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS ARE ITS OWN, AND NOT OF THE SENATE NOR THE HOUSE OF REP NOR OF ANY OTHER ENTITY, AND IT STANDS TO REASON THAT THE APPOINTMENT, THE SUPERVISION, AND THE CONTROL OVER THE SAID EMPLOYEES ARE WHOLLY WITHIN THE TRIBUNAL ITSELF.

I. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS: 1.4) MORRERO V. BOCAR (66 PHIL 429); AZNAR V HRET (GR NO. 65000, JAN. 9, 1990)l: THE DECISIONS RENDERED BY THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS IN THE CONTESTS MENTIONED IN THIS SECTION, OF WHICH THEY ARE THE SOLE JUDGE, ARE NOT APPEALABLE TO THE SC, EXCEPT IN CASES WHERE THERE IS A CLEAR SHOWING OF A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ETS AS THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WAS AFFIRMED IN ROBLES V. HRET (181 SCRA 780).

I. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS: 1.5) BONDOC V. PINEDA (201 SCRA 792) - IN THIS CASE A DIFFERENT QUESTION WAS RAISED TO WIT, WHETHER THE HOUSE OF REP COULD, AT THE REQUEST OF THE DOMINANT PARTY THEREIN, CHANGE ITS REPRESENTATIVE IN THE HET, PRESUMABLY TO THWART THE PROMULGATION OF A DECISION FREELY REACHED BY THE TRIBUNAL. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE TRIBUNAL AS THE SOLE JUDGE OF ELECTION CONTESTS INVOLVING THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REP, THE SC ASSUMED JURISDICTION, PRECISELY TO PROTECT THAT INDEPENDENCE.

I. THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS: 1.5) BONDOC V. PINEDA (201 SCRA 792) (CONT): THE SC DECLARED: THE RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REP REMOVING CONG. CAMASURA FROM THE HET FOR DISLOYALTY TO THE LDP, BECAUSE HE CAST HIS VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE NACIONALISTA PARTYS CANDIDATE, BONDOC, IS A CLEAR IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE OF THE HET TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE ELECTION CONTEST BETWEEN PINEDA AND BONDOC. . . ITS RESOLUTION OF EXPULSION AGAINST CONG. CAMASURA IS, THEREFORE, NULL AND VOID.

J.
THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
SEC. 18, ART. VI THERE SHALL BE A COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT CONSISTING OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, AS EX-OFFICIO CHAIRMAN, TWELVE SENATORS AND TWELVE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REP, ELECTED BY EACH HOUSE ON THE BAIS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATIONS FROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COA SHALL NOT VOTE, EXCEPT IN CASE OF A TIE.

J.
THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
SEC. 18, ART. VI (CONT): THE COMMISSION SHALL ACT ON ALL APPOINTMENTS SUBMITTED TO IT WITHIN 30 SESSION DAYS OF THE CONGRESS FROM THEIR SUBMISSION. THE COMMSISSION SHALL RULE BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL THE MEMBERS.
LANDMARK CASES: 1. DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496 2. CUNANAN V. TAN, 5 SCRA 1

ORGANIZATION OF ETS AND COA: SEC. 19, ART. VI - THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS AND THE COA SHALL BE CONSTITUTED WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REP SHALL HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED WITH THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SPEAKER. THE COA SHALL MEET ONLY WHILE THE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION, AT THE CALL OF ITS CHAIRMAN OR A MAJORITY OF ALL ITS MEMBERS, TO DISCHARGE SUCH POWERS AND FUNCTIONS AS ARE HEREIN CONFERRED UPON IT.
K.
THE RULE THAT THE COA CAN MEET ONLY DURING SESSIONS OF CONGRESS IS THE REASON WHY AD INTERIM APPOINMENTS ARE PERMITTED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
QUESTIONAIRES:
1. WHAT COMPOSES THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES?
2. SHOULD MANNY PACQUIAO DECIDES TO RUN FOR THE SENATE AS SUGGESTED BY SOME PEOPLE, WHAT QUALIFICATIONS MUST HE POSSESS?
3. SHOULD JINKY PACQUIAO DECIDES TO RUN FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO REPRESENT THE PROVINCE OF SARANGANI, WHAT QUALIFICATIONS MUST HE POSSESS?
4.
WHO ARE CONSIDERED NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS?
5.
ARE PERSONS BORN OF FOREIGN MOTHERS WHO ELECTED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW, CONSIDERED NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS?
6. WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND BY THE TERM RESIDENCE? o ANIMUS MANENDI o ANIMUS REVERTENDI o ANIMUS NON-REVERTENDI
NOTA BENE: MUST READ CASES: A. LIM v. PELAEZ, ELECTORAL CASE NO. 36, HET. B. BRILLANTE v. REYES, ELECTORAL CASE NO. 31, HET (1988)
7. WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND BY THE TERM THE DAY OF THE ELECTION? NOTA BENE: MUST READ CASE: ESPINOSA v. AQUINO, ELECTORAL CASE NO. 9, SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUTANL.
8. WHAT IS GERRYMANDERING?
9. WHAT IS THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THIS TERM?
10. WHAT ARE THE TERMS OF OFFICE OF:
A. B.
MEMBERS OF THE SENATE? MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES?
CHAPETER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
11. CAN A MEMBER OF CONGRESS BE ARRESTED FOR THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME WHILE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION? 12. WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AVAILMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST?
13. CAN A MEMBER OF CONGRESS BE QUESTIONED OR HELD LIABLE IN ANY OTHER PLACE FOR ANY SPEECH OR DEBATE IN CONGRESS OR IN ANY COMMITTEE HEARING THEREOF?
14. WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AVAILMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE? MUST READ CASE: OSMENA v. PENDATUN, GR L-17144, OCTOBER 28, 1960.
CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT. 15. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY LEGISLATURE OR LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE IS FUNCTIONING OR IN SESSION? 16. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY FINAL ADJOURNMENT?
NOTA BENE: MUST READ CASE: A. LOPEZ v. DELOS REYES, 55 PHIL. 205 B. JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG, 17 SCRA 876
17. CAN A MEMBER OF CONGRESS HOLD OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS AGENCY DURING HIS TERM OF OFFICE?
18. CONGRESS CREATED AN OFFICE NAMED NATIONAL ARTISTS DEVELOPMENT AGENCY. CAN A MEMBER OF SUCH CONGRESS WHO CREATED THIS OFFICE QUALIFY TO HEAD IT AFTER THE TERM OF HIS OFFICE?
19. CAN A MEMBER OF CONGRESS APPEAR PERSONALLY AS COUNSEL BEFORE ANY COURT, ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, QUASIJUDICIAL OR ANY OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES?
MUST READ CASE: PUYAT v. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 23
20. MANNY POQUIAO WAS ELECTED CONGRESSMAN FOR THE IST DISTRICT OF KIG. BEFORE HIS ELECTION HE TRANSFERRED HIS SHARES IN THE FAMILY CORPORATION TO HIS SON.
QUESTION: CAN HIS SON ENTER INTO A GOVT CONTRACT DURING HIS TERM OF OFFICE?
21. WHAT IS ELECTORAL
THE COMPOSITION OF THE TRIBUNAL? WHAT IS ITS
FUNCTION?
22. WHAT IS THE COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS? WHAT IS ITS FUNCTION? GOOD LUCK
THE
CHAPTER 9 POWERS OF CONGRESS
CLASSIFICATION OF POWERS OF CONGRESS: (*****)

1. LEGISLATIVE POWER;
2.
3. 4.
NON-LEGISLATIVE POWER;
IMPLIED POWER; INHERENT POWER.
CHAPTER 9 POWERS OF CONGRESS

CLASSIFICATION OF POWERS OF CONGRESS. (*****) 1. LEGISLATIVE POWER. - IS THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE LAWS AND TO ALTER AND REPEAL THEM. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION: THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH WILL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY THE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM (Section 1, Article VI, Constitution). a. NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER: (*****)
POWERS OF CONGRESS
a.1) DERIVATIVE AND DELEGATED POWER: (*****)
AS VESTED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, IT IS DERIVATIVE AND DELEGATED POWER. THE CONSTITUTION IS THE WORK OR WILL OF THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, IN THEIR ORIGINAL, SOVEREIGN, AND UNLIMITED CAPACITY. LAW IS THE WORK OR WILL OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THEIR DERIVATIVE AND SUBORDINATE CAPACITY. THE ONE (FORMER) IS THE WORK OF THE CREATOR, AND THE OTHER (LATTER) OF THE CREATURE. THE CONSTITUTION FIXES LIMITS TO THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY, AND PRESCRIBES THE ORBIT WITHIN WHICH IT MUST MOVE (Vanhornes Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall, 304, 308 [U.S.1795]).
SIMPLY PUT, LEGISLATIVE POWER IS ONE DERIVED FROM, AND DELEGATED BY, THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE TO CONGRESS THROUGH THE CONSTITUTION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
a.2) PLENARY LEGISLATIVE POWER: (*****) UNLIKE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH CONTAINS ONLY A GRANT OF ENUMERATED LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE FEDERAL CONGRESS (ALL LEGISLATIVE POWERS HEREIN GRANTED . . . Sec. 1, Art. 1, US Constitution), THE 1987, LIKE THE 1973 AND 1935 CONSTITUTIONS, EMBODIES A GRANT OF PLENARY LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE PHIL. LEGISLATURE. THUS, ANY POWER, DEEMED TO BE LEGISLATIVE BY USAGE AND TRADITION, IS NECESSARILY POSSESSED BY CONGRESS, UNLESS THE ORGANIC ACT HAS LODGED IT ELSEWHERE (Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]). AND IN FACT, SEC. 1, ART. VI OF THE 1987 ORGANIC LAW HAS ALSO GIVEN LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE ELECTORATE THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS SET DOWN IN SEC. 32, ART. VI.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
AS COROLLARY TO THIS PLENARY GRANT OF LEGISLATIVE POWER, IT FOLLOWS: a. THAT THE CONGRESS ALONE CAN MAKE LAWS AND CONGRESS MAY NOT DELEGATE ITS LAW MAKING POWER. THIS IS THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. THAT CONGRESS CANNOT PASS IRREPEALABLE LAWS.
b.
SIMPLY PUT, A PLENARY LEGISLATIVE POWER IS THE POWER TO ENACT LAWS COVERING ANY MATTER SUBJECT ONLY TO THE PROHIBITIONS AND LIMITATIONS EMBODIED IN THE CONSTITUTION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
b. LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE POWER: (*****) SPEAKING OF THE POWERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPT. OF GOVERNMENT UNDER THE AMERICAN FLAG, AN EARLY CASE DECIDED BY THE PHIL. SUPREME COURT SAID: SOMEONE HAS SAID THAT THE POWERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT, LIKE THE BOUNDARIES OF THE OCEAN, ARE UNLIMITED. IN CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, AS WELL AS GOVERNMENTS ACTING UNDER DELEGATED AUTHORITY, THE POWERS OF EACH OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE SAME ARE LIMITED AND CONFINED WITHIN THE FOUR WALLS OF THE CONSTITUTION OR THE CHARTER, AND EACH DEPT. CAN ONLY EXERCISE SUCH POWERS AS ARE EXPRESSLY GIVEN AND SUCH OTHER POWERS AS ARE NECESSARILY
POWERS OF CONGRESS
IMPLIED FROM THE GIVEN (OR EXPRESS) POWERS. THE CONSTITUTION IS THE SHORE OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AGAINST WHICH THE WAVES OF LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT MAY DASH, BUT OVER WHICH IT CANNOT LEAP (Govt. v. Springer, 50Phil. 529, 309 [1927]).
ALTHOUGH THE ORIGINAL 1973 CONSTITUTION ADOPTED A PARLIAMENTARY FORM OF GOVERRNMENT, IT DID NOT ADOPT THE ENGLISH PRINCIPLE OF PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY UNDER WHICH PARLIAMENT CAN DO EVERTHING BUT MAKE A WOMAN A MAN, AND A MAN A WOMAN (De Lolme, The Constitution of England 102 [1853]. NEITHER DID THE REVISION OF 1981 NOR THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. THUS, LEGISLATIVE POWER REMAINS A LIMITED POWER AFTER THE MANNER OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM EMBODIED IN THE 1935 CONSTITUTION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
IT IS SUBJECT TO: b.1) SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS WHICH CIRCUMSCRIBE BOTH THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER ITSELF AND THE ALLOWABLE SUBJECTS OF LEGISLATION. THE SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS ARE FOUND IN:
b.1.a) ARTICLE III, THE BILL OF RIGHTS; b.1.b) ARTICLE VI, THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; b.1.c) OTHER PORTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
b.2) FORMAL AND PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF PASSING BILLS AND THE FORM THEY SHOULD TAKE. THESE ARE FOUND, AMONG OTHERS, IN: b.2a) SEC. 24, ART. VII, THE PASSAGE OF APPROPRIATION, REVENUE, AND TARIFF AND OTHER BILLS; b.2.b) SEC. 26(1), ART. VII, SINGULARITY OF SUBJECT OF BILLS;
b.2.c) SEC. 26(2), ART. VII, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS;

b.2.d) SEC. 27(1), ART. VII, APPROVAL OF BILLS INTO LAW.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
c. CLASSIFICATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER: (*****) c.1) GENERAL LEGISLATIVE POWER CONSISTS IN THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS INTENDED AS RULES OF CONDUCT TO GOVERN THE RELATIONS AMONG INDIVIDUALS OR BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUALS AND THE STATE. c.2)SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE POWER - CONSISTS IN THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS EXPRESSLY MANDATED IN THE CONSTITUTION, SUCH AS TO PASS A GENERAL APPROPRIATION LAW. NOTE: HOW ABOUT THE ANTI-DYNASTY LAW?
POWERS OF CONGRESS
CLASSIFICATION OF POWERS OF CONGRESS: 2. NON-LEGISLATIVE POWER, SUCH AS: 2.a) POWER TO IMPEACH; 2.b) POWER TO CONCUR IN TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT EXECUTED BY THE PRESIDENT; 2.c) POWER TO DECLARE THE EXISTENCE OF WAR; 2.d) POWER TO ACT AS CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY; 2.e) POWER TO CONCUR IN AMNESTY GRANTED BY THE PRESIDENT; 2.f) POWER TO ACT AS BOARD OF CANVASSER FOR PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL VOTES.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
CLASSIFICATION OF POWERS OF CONGRESS: 3. IMPLIED POWERS THOSE THAT ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE EFFECTIVE EXECUTION OF OTHER POWERS EXPRESSLY GRANTED. EXAMPLE POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION. 4. INHERENT POWERS THESE ARE POWERS WHICH THOUGH NOT EXPRESSLY GIVEN ARE NEVERTHELESS EXERCISED BY CONGRESS AS THEY ARE NECESSARY FOR ITS EXISTENCE. EXAMPLES (EXAMPLES GIVEN ARE ALSO EXPRESS POWERS): a. TO DETERMINE THE RULES OF ITS PROCEEDINGS (Sec. 16 [3] & 21, Art. VII); b. TO DISCIPLINE ITS MEMBERS (Sec. 16[3], Art. VII); c. TO KEEP JOURNALS OF ITS PROCEEDINGS (Sec. 16[4], Art. VII).
POWERS OF CONGRESS
REPORT ON THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: 1. JOURNALS 1.1 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS 1.2 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 2. FLOW CHART OF PROCEDURE 3. ORIGIN OF BILLS 4. PROHIBITED MEASURES 5. TITLE OF BILLS 6. ENROLLED BILL 7. ENGROSSED BILL 8. FORMALITIES 9. APPROVAL OF BILLS
POWERS OF CONGRESS
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES: SEC. 21, ART. VI: THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OR ANY OF ITS RESPECTIVE COMMITTEES MAY CONDUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS DULY PUBLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE. THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS APPEARING IN OR AFFECTED BY SUCH INQUIRIES SHALL BE RESPECTED.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES: SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT): 1. IN AID OF LEGISLATION ( BENGZON V. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, 203 SCRA 767) IN THIS CASE, PETITIONERS SOUGHT TO RESTRAIN THE RESPONDENT FROM INVESTIGATING THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE ALLEGED MISUSE OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS AND THE ILLICIT ACQUISITION OF PROPERTIES BEING CLAIMED BY THE PCGG FOR THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHL.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES: SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT): 1. IN AID OF LEGISLATION ( BENGZON V. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, 203 SCRA 767) (CONT): THE SC GRANTED THE PETITION, HOLDING, INTER ALIA, THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE PRESENTLY IMPLEADED AS DEFENDANT IN A CASE BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN, WHICH INVOLVES ISSUES INTIMATELY RELATED TO THE SUBJECT OF CONTEMPLETED INQUIRY BEFORE THE RESPONDENT COMMITTEE, AND THAT NO LEGISLATION WAS APPARENTLY BEING CONTEMPLETED IN CONNECTION WITH THE SAID INVESTIGATION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES: SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT): 1. IN AID OF LEGISLATION ( BENGZON V. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, 203 SCRA 767) (CONT): THE DECISION, HOWEVER, FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN WAS CRIMINAL IN NATURE AND THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION WAS TO ASCERTAIN THE DISPOSITION OF FUNDS AND PROPERTIES CLAIMED TO BE PUBLIC IN NATURE. ITS FINDINGS ON THIS MATTER COULD BE THE SUBJECT OF LEGISLATION ALTHOUGH IT
POWERS OF CONGRESS
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES: SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT): 1. IN AID OF LEGISLATION ( BENGZON V. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, 203 SCRA 767) (CONT): MAY NOT HAVE BEEN EXPRESSLY STATED THAT SUCH WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE INQUIRY. AS OBSERVED IN THE EARLIER CASE OF ARNAULT V. NAZARENO (87 PHIL 29), THE SC SAID WE ARE BOUND TO PRESUME THAT THE ACTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY WAS WITH A LEGITIMATE OBJECT IF IT WAS CAPABLE OF BEING SO CONSTRUED, AND WE HAVE NO RIGHT TO ASSUME THAT THE CONTRARY WAS INTENDED.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES: SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT): 2. PUNISHMENT FOR FAILURE OR REFUSAL OR CONTUMACY OF WITNESS (ARNAULT V. NAZARENO (87 PHIL 29) - FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO ATTEND A LEGITIMATE INVESTIGATION OR CONTUMACY OF THE WITNESS MAY BE PUNISHED AS LEGISLATIVE CONTEMPT. THUS IN THIS CASE, THE PETITIONER WAS ORDERED INCARCERATED BY THE SENATE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS HE DECIDED TO ANSWER CERTAIN RELEVANT QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF A GOVERNMENT TRANSACTION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES: SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT): 2. PUNISHMENT FOR FAILURE OR REFUSAL OR CONTUMACY OF WITNESS (ARNAULT V. NAZARENO (87 PHIL 29) (CONT): IT WAS HELD IN THIS CASE THAT THE QUESTIONS THAT MAY BE RAISED IN A LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION DO NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE RELEVANT TO ANY PENDING LEGISLATION, PROVIDED ONLY THAT THEY ARE RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED. SUCH INVESTIGATION MAY RESULT IN THE SUBMISSION OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION BASED UPON THE FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES: SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT):
3.
DURATION OF PUNISHMENT (LOPEZ V. DE LOS REYES, 55 PHIL. 170) AND (ARNAULT V. NAZARENO): IN THE OLD RULE ANNOUNCED IN LOPEZ V. DE LOS REYES, WAS THAT THE PUNISHMENT COULD LAST ONLY FOR THE DURATION OF THE SESSION WHEN THE CONTEMPT WAS COMMITTED.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES: SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT): 3.1 DURATION OF PUNISHMENT (LOPEZ V. DE LOS REYES, 55 PHIL. 170) AND (ARNAULT V. NAZARENO): IN ARNAULT CASE, HOWEVER, THE SC HELD THAT THE OFFENDER COULD BE IMPRISONED INDEFINITELY BY THE SENATE, IT BEING A CONTINUING BODY, PROVIDED THAT THE PUNISHMENT DID NOT BECOME SO LONG AS TO VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES: SEC. 21, ART. VI (CONT): 3.2 DURATION OF PUNISHMENT (LOPEZ V. DE LOS REYES, 55 PHIL. 170) AND (ARNAULT V. NAZARENO) (CONT): AS FOR THE HOUSE OF REP, THE SAME DECISION DECLARED THAT THE IMPRISONMENT COULD LAST NOT ONLY DURING THE SESSION WHEN THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED BUT UNTIL THE FINAL ADJOURNMENT (ADJOURNMENT SINE DIE) OF THE BODY. THIS RULE IS PRESUMABLY STILL VALID AND MAY BE APPLIED, UNLESS CHANGED, TO THE PRESENT CONGRESS.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
APPEARANCE OF DEPARTMENT HEADS THE INFORMING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT MAY BE EXERCISED BY HIM INDIRECTLY THROUGH THE MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET, WHO MAY APPEAR BEFORE EITHER HOUSE OF THE CONGRESS UNDER CONDITIONS LAID DOWN AS FOLLOWS: SEC. 22, ART. VI THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS MAY UPON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE PRESIDENT, OR UPON THE REQUEST OF EITHER HOUSE, AS THE RULES OF EACH HOUSE SHALL PROVIDE,
POWERS OF CONGRESS
APPEARANCE OF DEPARTMENT HEADS SEC. 22, ART. VI (CONT): APPEAR BEFORE AND BE HEARD BY SUCH HOUSE ON ANY MATTER PERTAINING TO THEIR DEPARTMENTS. WRITTEN QUESTIONS SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OR THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP AT LEAST 3 DAYS BEFORE THEIR SCHEDULED APPEARANCE. INTERPELLATIONS SHALL NOT BE LIMITED TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS, BUT MAY COVER MATTERS RELATED THERETO. WHEN THE SECURITY OF THE STATE OR THE PUBLIC INTEREST SO REQUIRES AND THE PRESIDENT SO STATES IN WRITING, THE APPEARANCE SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN EXECUTIVE SESSION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION ***** SEC. 29(1), ART. VI NO MONEY SHALL BE PAID OUT OF THE TREASURY EXCEPT IN PURUSUANCE OF AN APPROPRIATION MADE BY LAW.
1.
APPROPRIATION DEFINED AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE MAY BE DEFINED AS A STATUTE THE PRIMARY AND SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO AUTHORIZE THE RELEASE OF PUBLIC FUNDS FROM THE TREASURY. EXAMPLE: THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION
1.
APPROPRIATION DEFINED (CONT): A LAW CREATING AN OFFICE AND PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR IS NOT AN APPROPRIATION LAW SINCE THE MAIN PURPOSE IS NOT TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS BUT TO CREATE THE OFFICE.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
1.
APPROPRIATION DEFINED (CONT): APPROPRIATION MEASURES MAY BE CLASSIFIED INTO GENERAL AND SPECIAL. THE GA LAW IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE FOR THE FINANCIAL OPERATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT DURING A FISCAL PERIOD; WHEREAS, A SPECIAL APPROPRIATION IS DESIGNED FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE, SUCH AS THE CREATION OF A FUND FOR THE RELIEF OF TYPHOON VICTIMS.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 2. IMPLIED LIMITATIONS 2.1 FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE IT IS ESSENTIAL TO THE VALIDITY OF AN APPROPRIATION THAT IT BE DEVOTED TO A PUBLIC PURPOSE. 2.1a) PASCUAL v. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATION (110 PHIL. 331) THUS, IN THIS CASE, AN ITEM IN THE APPROPRIATION MEASURE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF ROADS IN A PRIVATE SUBDIVISION WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY WERE TURNED OVER TO THE PHL GOVT WAS ANNULLED BY THE SUPREME COURT.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 2. IMPLIED LIMITATIONS 2.1a) PASCUAL V. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATION (110 PHIL. 331) (CONT): ***** THE SUPREME COURT OBSERVED THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE IMPROVED WITH PUBLIC FUNDS WAS PRIVATE IN NATURE AT THE TIME THE APPROPRIATION WAS MADE. THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE ROADS WERE LATER DONATED TO THE GOVT DID NOT CURE THE BASIC DEFECT OF THE APPROPRIATION AS IT WAS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
2.
IMPLIED LIMITATION 2.1b) AMOUNT MUST BE DETERMINATE OR AT LEAST DETERMINABLE - THIS IS ANOTHER REQUIREMENT FOR A VALID APPROPRIATION; OTHERWISE, THE NATIONAL TREASURER WILL HAVE NO GUIDE OR, WORSE, WILL HAVE UNLIMITED DISCRETION IN THE RELEASE OF PUBLIC FUNDS.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 2. IMPLIED LIMITATION 2.1b) AMOUNT MUST BE DETERMINATE OR AT LEAST DETERMINABLE (CONT): IDEALLY, THE LAW MUST APPROPRIATE A FIXED AMOUNT, BUT IT IS SUFFICIENT IF ONLY THE MAXIMUM IS INDICATED. BUT WHERE THE MINIMUM RATHER THAN THE MAXIMUM IS SPECIFICED, AS WHERE THERE IS AN APPROPRIATION OF NOT LESS THAN P1-MILLION, THE MEASURE IS INVALID FOR LACK OF CERTAINTY. HERE THE NATIONAL TREASURER IS IN EFFECT AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE FROM THE TREASURY ANY AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF P1-MILLION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS IN ADDITION TO THESE EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS, THE CONSTITUTION LISTS DOWN SEVERAL SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION OF THE CONGRESS: 3.1) SEC. 24, ART. VI: *****
ALL APPROPRIATION BILLS SHOULD ORIGINATE EXCLUSIVELY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, BUT THE SENATE MAY PROPOSE OR CONCUR WITH AMENDMENTS.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT):
3.2) SEC. 25 (6), ART. VI DISCRETIONARY FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR PARTICULAR OFFICIALS SHALL BE DISBURSED ONLY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES TO BE SUPPORTED BY APPROPRIATE VOUCHERS AND SUBJECT TO SUCH GUIDELINES AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
3.3) SEC. 25 (4), ART. VI A SPECIAL APPROPRIATION BILL SHALL SPECIFY THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS INTENDED, AND SHALL BE SUPPORTED BY FUNDS ACTUALLY AVAILABLE AS CERTIFIED TO BY THE NATIONAL TREASURER, OR TO BE RAISED BY A CORRESPONDING REVENUE PROPOSAL INCLUDED THEREIN.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
3.4) SEC. 25 (1), ART. VI THE CONGRESS MAY NOT INCREASE THE APPROPRIATIONS RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT AS SPECIFIED IN THE BUDGET. THE FORM, CONTENT, AND MANNER OF PREPARATION OF THE BUDGET SHALL BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.4) SEC. 25 (1), ART. VI (CONT):
THE REASON FOR THE ABOVE RULE IS THE THEORY THAT THE PRESDIENT KNOWS MORE ABOUT THE NEEDED APPROPRIATIONS THAN THE LEGISLATURE. UNDER THE 1935 CONSTITUTION, IT WAS ONLY THE APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT THAT COULD NOT BE INCREASED. ONE OTHER REASON BEING TO PREVENT THE CONGRESS FROM UNDULY INFLUENCING HIM.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.4) SEC. 25 (1), ART. VI (CONT): BUT WHILE THE CONGRESS MAY NOT INCREASE THE PRESIDENTS BUDGETARY RECOMMENDATION, THERE IS NO PROHIBITION AGAINST ITS REDUCING SUCH RECOMMENDATIONS, WHICH IS IN FACT WHAT IT USUALLY DOES, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATING TO THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. HOWEVER, REDUCTION IS NOT PERMITTED WHEN IT COMES TO THE APPROPRIATION FOR THE JUDICIARY (SEC. 3, ART. VIII, CONSTITUTION).
POWERS OF CONGRESS
3.5) SEC. 25 (2), ART. VI NO PROVISION OR ENACTMENT SHALL BE EMBRACED IN THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL UNLESS IT RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO SOME PARTICULAR APPROPRIATION THEREIN. ANY SUCH PROVISION OR ENACTMENT SHALL BE LIMITED IN ITS OPERATION TO THE APPROPRIATION TO WHICH IT RELATES.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. 3.5) CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): SEC. 25 (2), ART. VI (CONT):
THE BUDGET IS ONLY A PROPOSAL, A SET OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE APPROPRIATIONS TO BE MADE FOR THE OPERATIONS OF THE GOVT. IT IS USED AS A BASIS FOR THE ENACTMENT OF THE GAA LAW, WHICH IS THE MEASURE THAT AUTHORIZES THE RELASE OF PUBLIC FUNDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ARTICLE JUST MENTIONED.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. 3.5) CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): SEC. 25 (2), ART. VI (CONT):
THIS IS A VERBATIM REPRODUCTION OF ART. VI, SEC. 19(2) OF THE 1935 CONSTITUTION. THE PURPOSE IS TO PREVENT RIDERS OR IRRELEVANT PROVISIONS THAT ARE INCLUDED IN THE GAA BILL TO ENSURE THEIR APPROVAL.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.5) SEC. 25 (2), ART. VI (CONT): 3.5.a) GARCIA V. MATA (65 SCRA 520) IN THIS CASE, CERTAIN PROVISIONS DEALING WITH THE ACTIVATION AND RETIREMENT OF RESERVE OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES WERE INCORPORATED IN THE GAA FOR 1956. THE SC, IN ANNULLING THESE PROVISIONS, DECLARED: A PERUSAL OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION OF RA 1600 FAILS TO DISCLOSE ITS RELEVANCE OR RELATION TO ANY APPROPRIATION ITEM THEREIN, OR TO THE APPROPRIATION ACT AS A WHOLE.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.5) SEC. 25 (2), ART. VI (CONT): 3.5.a) GARCIA V. MATA (65 SCRA 520) (CONT): FROM THE VERY FIRST CLAUSE OF PAR. 11 ITSELF, WHICH READS: AFTER THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT, AND THERE IS NO EMERGENCY, NO RESERVE OFFICER OF THE AFP MAY BE CALLED TO A TOUR OF ACTIVE DUTY FOR MORE THAN TWO YEARS DURING ANY PERIOD OF THE CONSECUTIVE YEARS. THE INCONGRUITY AND IRRELEVANCY ARE ALREADY EVIDENT. WHILE RA NO. 1600 APPROPRIATED MONEY FOR THE
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.5) SEC. 25 (2), ART. VI (CONT): 3.5.a) GARCIA V. MATA (65 SCRA 520) (CONT): OPERATION OF THE GOVT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1956-57, THE SAID PAR. 11 REFERS TO THE FUNDAMENTAL GOVT POLICY MATTERS OF THE CALLING TO ACTIVE DUTY AND THE REVERSION TO INACTIVE STATUS OF RESERVE OFFICERS IN THE AFP. THE INCONGRUITY AND IRRELEVANCY CONTINUE THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE PARAGRAPH.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.5) 3.5.a) SEC. 25 (2), ART. VI (CONT): GARCIA V. MATA (65 SCRA 520) (CONT):
IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE RESPONDENT-APPELLEES, IT WAS A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL INHIBITION AGAINST RIDERS TO THE GAA. IT WAS INDEED A NEW AND COMPLETELY UNRELATED PROVISION ATTACHED TO THE APPROPRIATION ACT.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.5) SEC. 25 (2), ART. VI (CONT): 3.5.b) RIDER PROHIBITION APPLIES ONLY TO GAA IT WILL BE NOTED THAT THE ABOVE PROHIBITION APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE RIDER IS INCORPORATED IN THE GA BILL. SUPPOSE, HOWEVER, THAT THE RIDER IS INCLUDED IN AN ORDINARY BILL ONLY? THE ANOMALY MAY STILL BE ATTACKED BUT NOT ON THE BASIS OF ART.VI, SEC. 25(2). THE APPLICABLE PROVISION WILL BE SEC. 26(1), WHICH REQUIRES EVERY BILL TO EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT, TO BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
3.6) SEC. 25(3), ART. VI THE PROCEDURE IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS SHALL STRICTLY FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE FOR APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS FOR OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
3.6) SEC. 25(3), ART. VI (CONT): THE REASON FOR THIS NEW RULE IS TO PREVENT THE ADOPTION OF APPROPRIATION SUB ROSA (SECRET APPROPRIATION) BY CONGRESS. IN THE PAST, THE PUBLIC WAS UNABLE TO ASCERTAIN THE PURPOSES AND EXACT AMOUNTS OF THE OUTLAY FOR THE OPERATIONS OF THE CONGRESS AND THE ALLOWANCE S OF ITS MEMBERS .
POWERS OF CONGRESS
3.7) SEC. 25(5), ART. VI NOW LAW SHALL BE PASSED AUTHORIZING ANY TRANSFER OF APPROPRIATIONS; HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REP, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SC, AND THE HEADS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS MAY, BY LAW, BE AUTHORIZED TO AUGMENT ANY ITEM IN THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES FROM SAVINGS IN OTHER ITEMS OF THEIR RFESEPCTIVE APPROPRIATIONS.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. 3.7) CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): SEC. 25(5), ART. VI (CONT):
THIS PROVISION PROHIBITS ONE DEPARTMENT FROM TRANSFERRING SOME OF ITS FUNDS TO ANOTHER DEPARTMENT AND THEREBY MAKE IT BEHOLDEN TO THE FORMER TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.7.a) DEMETRIA V. ALBA (148 SCRA 208) APPLYING THE ABOVE PROVISION, THE SC DECLARED IN THIS CASE:
PAR. 1 OF SEC. 44 OF PD NO. 1177 (LAW ON BUDGET PROCESS DURING MARTIAL LAW) UNDULY EXTENDS THE PRIVILEGE GRANTED UNDER SAID SEC. 16(5), ART. VIII, 1973 CONSTITUTION. IT EMPOWERS THE PRESIDENT TO INDISCRIMINATELY TRANSFER FUNDS FROM ONE DEPT, BUREAU, OFFICE OR AGENCY OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPT TO ANY PROGRAM, PROJECT OR ACTIVITY OF ANY DEPT, BUREAU OR OFFICE INCLUDED IN THE GAA OR APPROVED AFTER ITS
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.7.a) DEMETRIA V. ALBA (148 SCRA 208) (CONT):
3.
ENACTMENT WITHOUT REGARD AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE FUNDS TO BE *TRANSFERRED ARE ACTUALLY SAVINGS IN THE ITEM FROM WHICH THE SAME ARE TO BE TAKEN, OR WHETHER OR NOT THE TRANSFER IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF AUGMENTING THE ITEM TO WHICH SAID TRANSFER IS MADE. NOTE: *ART. VIII, SEC. 16(5), 1973 CONSTITUTION
POWERS OF CONGRESS
3.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): DEMETRIA V. ALBA (148 SCRA 208) (CONT):
3.7.a)
IT DOES NOT ONLY COMPLETELY DISREGARD THE STANDARDS SET IN THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW, THEREBY AMOUNTING TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS, BUT LIKEWISE GOES BEYOND THE TENOR THEREOF. INDEED SUCH CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES RENDER THE PROVISION IN QUESTION NULL AND VOID.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.7.b) TRANSFER OF SAVINGS IN INTEREST OF EXPEDIENCY AND EFFICIENCY:
TRANSFERS OF SAVINGS IN ONE DEPT FROM ONE ITEM TO ANOTHER IN THE GAA MAY BE ALLOWED BY LAW IN THE INTEREST OF EXPEDIENCY AND EFFICIENCY. IN THIS CASE, THERE IS NO DANGER TO THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BECAUSE THE TRANSFER IS MADE WITHIN A DEPT AND NOT FROM ONE DEPT TO ANOTHER.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.8) SEC. 29(2), ART. VI (APPROPRIATIONS FOR SECTRARIAN PURPOSES) - NO PUBLIC MONEY OR PROPERTY SHALL EVER BE APPROPRIATED, APPLIED, PAID, OR USED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, FOR THE USE, BENEFIT, OR SUPPORT OF ANY SECT, CHURCH, DENOMINATION, SECTARIAN INSTITUTION, OR SYSTEM OF RELIGION, OR FOR THE USE, BENEFIT, OR SUPPORT OF ANY PRIEST, PREACHER, MINISTER, OR OTHER RELIGIOUS TEACHER OR DIGNITARY AS SUCH, EXCEPT WHEN SUCH PRIEST, PREACHER, MINISTER OR DIGNITARY IS ASSIGNED TO THE ARMED FORCES, OR TO ANY PENAL INSTITUTION, OR GOVT ORPHANAGE OR LEPROSARIUM.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.8.a) AGLIPAY V. RUIZ (64 PHIL. 201): THE ABOVE PROHIBITION IS APPLICABLE ONLY WHERE THE APPROPRIATION IS INTENDED PURPOSELY TO BENEFIT A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION. IN THIS CASE, THE PHIL GOVT AUTHORIZED A SPECIAL STAMP ISSUE ON THE OCCASION OF THE OBSERVANCE IN MANILA OF THE 33RD INTERNATIONAL EUCHARISTIC CONGRESS UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. THE PETITIONER, AS HEAD OF THE PHIL INDEPENDENT CHURCH, ASSAILED THE MEASURE AND CONTENDED THAT IT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTION
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.8.a) AGLIPAY V. RUIZ (64 PHIL. 201) (CONT):
INASMUCH AS IT BENEFITED A PARTICULAR RELIGION. THE SC, ON EXAMINING THE FACTS, DISCOVERED THAT THE ORIGINAL DESIGN OF THE STAMP FEATURED A PICTURE OF A CATHOLIC CHALICE, BUT THIS WAS LATER REJECTED IN FAVOR OF A MAP OF THE PHIL UNDER WHICH APPEARED THE CAPTION, SEAT, 33RD INTERNATIONAL EUCHARISTIC CONGRESS, FEB. 3-7, 1937.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.8.a) AGLIPAY V. RUIZ (64 PHIL. 201) (CONT):
AS THE PURPOSE OF THE STAMP ISSUE WAS EVIDENTLY TO FOCUS ATTENTION NOT ON THE EUCHARISTIC CONGRESS BUT ON ITS SITE, THE IDEA BEING TO ATTRACT TOURISTS TO OUR COUNTRY AND NOT PRIMARILY TO PUBLICIZE THE RELIGIOUS EVENT, IT WAS HELD THAT THE STAMP ISSUE WAS NOT INVALID.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.8.b) GARCES V. ESTENZO (105 SCRA 510):
IN THIS CASE, THE SC RULED THAT THE PURCHASE OF A RELIGIOUS IMAGE BY THE BARANGAY COUNCIL WITH PRIVATE FUNDS RAISED FROM VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS DID NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.8.c) PEOPLE V. FERNANDEZ (CA, GR NO. L-1128, 1945):
IN THIS CASE, IT HAS ALSO BEEN HELD THAT THE ABOVE PROVISION DOES NOT INHIBIT THE USE OF PUBLIC PROPERTY FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES WHEN THE RELIGIOUS CHARACTER OF SUCH USE IS MERELY INCIDENTAL TO A TEMPORARY USE WHICH IS AVAILABLE INDISCRIMINATELY TO THE PUBLIC IN GENERAL.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (CONT): 3.8.c) PEOPLE V. FERNANDEZ (CA, GR NO. L-1128, 1945) (CONT): HENCE, A PUBLIC STREET MAY BE USED FOR A RELIGIOUS PROCESSION EVEN AS IT IS AVAILABLE FOR A CIVIC PARADE, IN THE SAME WAY THAT A PUBLIC PLAZA IS NOT BARRED TO A RELIGIOUS RALLY IF IT MAY ALSO BE USED FOR A POLITICAL ASSEMBLAGE.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
3.8.1) SEC. 5, ART. III (ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE) NO LAW SHALL BE MADE RESPECTING AN ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION, OR PROHIBITING THE FREE EXERCISE THEREOF. THE FREE EXERCISE AND ENJOYMENT OF RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP, WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION. OR PREFERENCE, SHALL FOREVER BE ALLOWED. NO RELIGIOUS TEST SHALL BE REQUIRED FOR THE EXERCISE OF CIVIL OR POLITICAL RIGHTS.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
3.8.2) SEC. 6, ART. II (DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE): THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
3.8.3) SEC. 3(3), ART. XIV - AT THE OPTION EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY THE PARENTS OR GUARDIANS, RELIGION SHALL BE ALLOWED TO BE TAUGHT TO THEIR CHILDREN OR WARDS IN PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND HIGH SCHOOL WITHIN THE REGULAR CLASS HOURS BY INSTRUCTORS DESIGNATED OR APPROVED BY THE RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES OF THE RELIGION TO WHICH THE CHILDREN OR WARDS BELONG, WITHOUT ADDITIONAL COST TO THE GOVERNMENT.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 4. AUTOMATIC RE-APPROPRIATION SEC. 25(7), ART. VI - IF, BY THE END OF ANY FISCAL YEAR, THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE FAILED TO PASS THE GENERAL APPROPRIATION BILL FOR THE ENSUING FISCAL YEAR, THE GENERAL APPROPRIATION LAW FOR THE PRECEDING FISCAL YEAR SHALL BE DEEMED RE-ENACTED AND SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE AND EFFECT UNTIL THE GENERAL APPROPRIATION BILL IS PASSED BY THE CONGRESS. NOTE: THIS IS THE SAME AS SEC. 16 (6), ART. VIII OF 1973 CONSTITUTION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 4. AUTOMATIC RE-APPROPRIATION SEC. 25(7), ART. VI (CONT) UNDER THE 1935 CONSTITUTION, THE GAA HAD A DURATION OF ONLY ONE FISCAL YEAR. HENCE, IF CONGRESS FAILED TO ENACT A NEW GAA FOR THE INCOMING FISCAL YEAR, THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT WAS THEORITICALLY PARALYZED SINCE NO MONEY COULD BE PAID OUT OF THE TREASURY EXCEPT IN PURSUANCE OF AN APPROPRIATION MADE BY LAW. THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHIL THEREFORE HAD TO CALL BACK CONGRESS IN SPECIAL SESSION AND KEEP IT IN SESSION UNTIL IT WAS ABLE TO APPROVE A NEW GAA.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 4. AUTOMATIC RE-APPROPRIATION SEC. 25(7), ART. VI (CONT) THE OLD PROCEDURE ENTAILED A GREAT DEAL OF INCONVENIENCE, NOT TO MENTION CIRCUMVENTION OF THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE OF FUNDS THAT WERE MADE IN ADVANCE OF THE EXPECTED NEW GAA. TO CORRECT THIS, THE ABOVE RULE REVERTS TO THE OLD SYSTEM OBSERVED UNDER THE JONES LAW WHERE THE OLD GAA IS DEEMED CONTINUED IN OPERATION DESPITE LAPSE OF THE FISCAL YEAR FOR WHICH IT WAS ORIGINALLY INTENDED UNTIL CONGRESS ENACTS A NEW GAA.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 5. SPECIAL FUNDS SEC. 29(3), ART. VI ALL MONEY COLLECTED ON ANY TAX LEVIED FOR A SPECIAL PURPOSE SHALL BE TREATED AS A SPECIAL FUND AND PAID OUT FOR SUCH PURPOSE ONLY. IF THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH A SPECIAL FUND WAS CREATED HAS BEEN FULFILLED OR ABANDONED, THE BALANCE, IF ANY, SHALL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE GENERAL FUNDS OF THE GOVERNMENT. NOTE: RESTORED FROM THE 1935 CONSTITUTION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION 5. SPECIAL FUNDS SEC. 29(3), ART. VI (CONT) IF, FOR EXAMPLE, A SPECIAL TAX IS LEVIED UPON SUGAR MILLERS FOR THE REHABILITATION OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY, THE REVENUE COLLECTED SHALL BE USED ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE INDICATED AND SHOULD NOT BE CHANNELED TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE COCONUT INDUSTRY. WHATEVER REMAINS AFTER THE REHABILITATION OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY, SHALL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE GENERAL FUNDS OF THE GOVT FOR GENERAL APPROPRIATION IN THE DISCRETION OF THE LEGISLATURE.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF TAXATION THE POWER OF TAXATION IS INHERENT IN THE STATE AND IS GENERALLY VESTED IN THE LEGISLATURE. ITS EXERCISE IS, HOWEVER, RESTRICTED BY THE FOLLOWING RULES: SEC. 28(1), ART. VI (UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE TAXATION) THE RULE OF TAXATION SHALL BE UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE. THE CONGRESS SHALL EVOLVE A PROGRESSIVE SYSTEM OF TAXATION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF TAXATION SEC. 28(1), ART. VI (UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE TAXATION) UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION MEANS THAT THE PERSONS OR THINGS BELONGING TO THE SAME CLASS SHALL BE TAXED AT THE SAME RATE. EQUALITY IN TAXATION REQUIRES THE TAX IMPOSED TO BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF THE VALUE OF PROPERTY. EQUITABLE TAXATION- MEANS THAT THE TAX BURDEN MUST BE IMPOSED ACCORDING TO THE TAXPAYERS CAPACITY TO PAY.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF TAXATION SEC. 28(3), ART. VI (CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS) : ***** CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, CHURCHES, PARSONAGES OR CONVENTS APPURTENANT THERETO, MOSQUES, NONPROFIT CEMETERIES, AND ALL LANDS, BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY, AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE, OR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF TAXATION SEC. 28(3), ART. VI (CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS) : LLADOC V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE (14 SCRA 292) ***** IN THIS CASE, A DONATION OF P10,000 WAS ACCEPTED BY A PARISH PRIEST FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A CHURCH. THE BIR SOUGHT TO IMPOSE A DONEES TAX UPON HIS SUCCESSOR, WHO PROTESTED, INVOKING THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF TAXATION SEC. 28(3), ART. VI (CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS) : LLADOC V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE (14 SCRA 292) *****
THE SC SUSTAINED THE BIR, HOLDING THAT THE TAX IMPOSED WAS AN EXCISE TAX, A TAX LEVIED NOT UPON THE CHURCH ITSELF BUT UPON THE PARISH PRIEST FOR THE EXERCISE BY HIM OF THE PRIVILEGE OF RECEIVING THE DONATION. THE TAXES COVERED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION ARE REAL ESTATE TAXES OR AD VALOREN TAXES IMPOSED ON THE PROPERTY ITSELF.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF TAXATION SEC. 29(4), ART. VI: NO LAW GRANTING ANY TAX EXEMPTION SHALL BE PASSED WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF TAXATION SEC. 29(4), ART. VI (CONT): BILLS ARE ORDINARILY PASSED WITH THE SUPPORT OF ONLY A SIMPLY MAJORITY, OR A MAJORITY OF THOSE PRESENT AND VOTING. THE ABOVE PROVISION REQUIRES AN ABSOUTE MAJORITY OF THE ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP OF THE CONGRESS BECAUSE A TAX EXEMPTION REPRESENTS A WITHHOLDING OF THE POWER TO TAX AND CONSEQUENT LOSS OF REVENUE TO THE GOVERNMENT.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF CONCURRENCE SEC. 19 (PAR. 2), ART. VII (CONCURRENCE WITH AMNESTY) HE (THE PRESIDENT) SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO GRANT AMNESTY WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS. THE CONSSTITUTION REQUIRES THE CONCURRENCE OF CONGRESS TO AN AMNESTY. NOTE THAT THE BASIS OF THE MAJORITY IS NOT THE MEMBERSHIP OF EACH HOUSE. IT WOULD APPEAR, ITS THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF LEGISLATURE AS A WHOLE.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE POWER OF CONCURRENCE SEC. 21, ART. VII (CONCURRENCE WITH TREATY): NO TREATY OR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT SHALL BE VALID AND EFFECTIVE UNLESS CONCURRED IN BY AT LEAST 2/3 OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE WAR POWERS SEC. 23 (1), VI THE CONGRESS, BY A VOTE OF 2/3 OF BOTH HOUSES IN JOINT SESSION ASSEMBLED, VOTING SEPARATELY, SHALL HAVE THE SOLE POWER TO DECLARE THE EXISTENCE OF A STATE OF WAR. NOTE THAT THE AUTHORITY TO DECLARE REFERS NOT TO WAR BUT ONLY OF THE EXISTENCE OF A STATE OF WAR IN LINE WITH OUR RENUNCIATION OF WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY UNDER SEC.2 ART. VI.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE WAR POWERS SEC. 23 (1), VI (CONT): THE ABOVE PROVISION SUGGESTS A WAR ALREADY BEGUN OR PROVOKED BY THE ENEMY AND THE EXISTENCE OF WHICH WE ARE ONLY AFFIRMING. IN OTHER WORDS, WE ARE NOT THE AGGRESSOR BUT MERELY REACTING TO AN AGGRESSION. THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF A STATE OF WAR IS THE SOLE ACT OF CONGRESS AND MAY BE EFFECTED ONLY BY 2/3 OF BOTH HOUSES IN JOINT ASSEMBLED, VOTING SEPARATELY.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE WAR POWERS SEC. 23 (1), VI (CONT): AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND DIPLOMATIC HEAD, HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT MAY SO PRECIPITATE OR ACTUALLY BEGIN HOSTILITIES THAT THE LEGISLATURE WILL HAVE NO CHOICE EXCEPT, IN THE WORDS OF CORWIN, TO BAPTIZE THE HOSTILITIES WITH THE NAME OF WAR. IT WILL NOT BE CORRECT, OF COURSE, TO SAY THAT CONGRESS BECOMES FUNCTUS OFFICIO ONCE IT DECLARES THE EXISTENCE OF A STATE OF WAR AND THAT THEREAFTER THE WAR EFFORT BECOMES THE
POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE WAR POWERS SEC. 23 (1), VI (CONT): SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES. THE ARMED FORCES MUST, TO BEGIN WITH, BE RAISED BY CONGRESS. THEREAFTER, THE TROOPS MUST BE REGULATED, FED, CLOTHED, ARMED, BILLETED, PAID AND OTHERWISE MAINTAINED, ALL OF WHICH WILL NEED THE PASSAGE OF LAWS AND THE ENACTMENT OF APPROPRIATIONS. THIS MEANS THAT THE PRESIDENT MUST DEPEND HEAVILY ON CONGRESS FOR THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF HIS MILITARY POWER. THE POWER OF THE SWORD AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE MUST BE EXERCISED TOGETHER.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE SEC. 32, ART. VI THE CONGRESS SHALL, AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE, PROVIDE FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM, AND THE EXCEPTIONS THEREFROM, WHEREBY THE PEOPLE CAN DIRECTLY PROPOSE AND ENACT LAWS OR APPROVE OR REJECT ANY ACT OR LAW OR PART THEREOF PASSED BY THE CONGRESS OR LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODY AFTER REGISTRATION OF A PETITION THEREFOR SIGNED BY AT LEAST 10% OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST 3% OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE SEC. 32, ART. VI: THE ABOVE PROVISION IS THE CONFERMENT LEGISLATIVE POWER DIRECTLY ON THE PEOPLE.
OF
INITIATIVE IS THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE TO PROPOSE BILLS AND LAWS, AND TO ENACT OR REJECT THEM AT THE POLLS, INDEPENDENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (BLACK, P. 923). IT IS THE RIGHT OF A GROUP OF CITIZENS TO INTRODUCE A MATTER OF LEGISLATION EITHER TO THE LEGISLATURE OR DIRECTLY TO THE VOTERS (WEBSTER, Col. Ed, 752).
POWERS OF CONGRESS
REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE SEC. 32, ART. VI: REFERENDUM IS THE RIGHT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE TO ADOPT OR REJECT ANY ACT OR MEASURE WHICH HAS BEEN PASSED BY A LEGISLATIVE BODY AND WHICH IN MOST CASES WOULD WITHOUT ACTION ON THE PART OF THE ELECTORS BECOME A LAW (BLACK, 1446). IT IS DEFINED AS A METHOD OF SUBMITTING AN IMPORTANT LEGISLATIVE MEASURE TO A DIRECT VOTE OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE, THE SUBMISSION OF A LAW PASSED BY THE LEGISLATURE FOR THEIR APPROVAL OR REJECTION (SIBAL, Phil. Legal Encyclopedia, p.845).
POWERS OF CONGRESS
REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE SEC. 32, ART. VI (ENABLING LAW RA NO. 6735): IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE, CONGRESS PASSED RA NO. 6735, APPROVED AUG. 4, 1989, ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM: a) INITIATIVE IS THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OR TO PROPOSE AND ENACT LEGISLATION THROUGH AN ELECTION CALLED FOR THE PURPOSE.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE SEC. 32, ART. VI (ENABLING LAW RA NO. 6735): a) INITIATIVE (CONT) THERE ARE 3 SYTEMS OF INITIATIVE, NAMELY: a.1) INITIATIVE ON THE CONSITUTION WHICH REFERS TO A PETITION PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION (THIS PORTION WAS DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN SANTIAGO, ET. AL VS. COMELEC, GR NO.127325, MARCH 19, 1997) BECAUSE ITS INCOMPLETE AND INADEQUATE SYSTEM/PROCEDURE) a.2) INITIATIVE ON STATUTES WHICH REFERS TO A PETITION PROPOSING TO ENACT A NATIONAL LEGISLATION; AND
POWERS OF CONGRESS
REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE SEC. 32, ART. VI (ENABLING LAW RA NO. 6735): a) INITIATIVE (CONT) THERE ARE 3 SYTEMS OF INITIATIVE, NAMELY:
a.3 INITIATIVE ON LOCAL LEGISLATION WHICH REFERS TO A PETITION PROPOSING TO ENACT A REGIONAL, PROVINCIAL, CITY, MUNICIPAL, OR BARANGAY LAW, RESOLUTION, OR ORDINANCE.
b) INDIRECT INITIATIVE IS THE EXERCISE OF INITIATIVE BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH A PROPOSITION SENT TO CONGRESS OR LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODY (SEC. 2, RA 6735).
POWERS OF CONGRESS
REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE SEC. 32, ART. VI (ENABLING LAW RA NO. 6735): c. REFERENDUM IS THE POWER OF THE ELECTORATE TO APPROVE OR REJECT LEGISLATION THROUGH AN ELECTION CALLED FOR THE PURPOSE . IT MAY BE OF TWO CLASSES, NAMELY: c.1) REFERENDUM ON STATUTES WHICH REFERS TO A PETITION TO APPROVE OR REJECT AN ACT OR LAW, OR PART THEREOF, PASSED BY CONGRESS; AND
POWERS OF CONGRESS
REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE SEC. 32, ART. VI (ENABLING LAW RA NO. 6735): c. REFERENDUM (CONT):
c.2) REFERENDUM ON LOCAL LAWS WHICH REFERS TO A PETITION TO APPROVE OR REJECT A LAW, RESOLUTION OR ORDINACE ENACTED BY REGIONAL ASSEMBLIES AND LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODIES (SEC. 2(C), RA NO. 6735).
POWERS OF CONGRESS
REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE SEC. 32, ART. VI (ENABLING LAW RA NO. 6735): d. PROHIBITED MEASURES: THE FOLLOWING CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF AN INITIATIVE OR REFERNDUM PETITION: 1) NO PETITION EMBRACING MORE THAN ONE SUBJECT SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE ELECTORATE; AND 2) STATUTES INVOLVING EMERGENCY MEASURES, THE ENACTMENT OF WHICH IS SPECIALLY VESTED IN CONGRESS BY THE CONSTITUTION, CANNOT BE SUBJECT TO REFERENDUM UNTIL 90 DAYS AFTER THEIR EFFECTIVITY (SEC. 10, RA 6735).
POWERS OF CONGRESS
REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE SEC. 32, ART. VI (ENABLING LAW RA NO. 6735): e. LOCAL INITIATIVE:
NOT LESS THAN 2000 REGISTERED VOTERS IN CASE OF AUTONOMOUS REGIONS, 1000 IN CASE OF PROVINCES AND CITIES, 100 IN CASE OF MUNICIPALITIES, AND 50 IN CASE OF BARANGAYS, MAY FILE A PETITION WITH THE REGIONAL ASSEMBLY OR LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODY, RESPECTIVELY, PROPOSING THE ADOPTION, ENACTMENT, REPEAL, AMENDMENT, OF ANY LAW, ORDINANCE, OR RESOLUTION (SEC. 13, RA NO. 6735).
POWERS OF CONGRESS
REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE SEC. 32, ART. VI (ENABLING LAW RA NO. 6735): f. LIMITATIONS ON LOCAL INITIATIVE: (a) THE POWER OF LOCAL INITIATIVE SHALL NOT BE EXERCISED MORE THAN ONCE A YEAR; (b) INITIATIVE SHALL EXTEND ONLY TO SUBJECTS OR MATTERS WHICH ARE WITHIN THE LEGAL POWERS OF THE LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODIES TO ENACT; AND (c) IF AT THE TIME BEFORE THE INITIATIVE IS HELD, THE LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODY SHALL ADOPT IN TOTO THE PROPOSITION PRESENTED, THE INITIATIVE SHALL BE CANCELLED. HOWEVER, THOSE AGAINST SUCH ACTION MAY, IF THEY SO DESIRE, APPLY FOR INITIATIVE.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
AUTHORITIES: 1) THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY, VOLUME II, FIRST EDITION, 1988, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.
2)
PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, REVISED EDITION, 1970, RUPERTO G. MARTIN. MOSTLY FROM THE PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, 2002 EDITION, ISAGANI A. CRUZ.
3)
QUESTIONAIRES FOR RECITATION:

1.
HOW DOES A BILL BECOMES A LAW? WHERE SHOULD APPROPRIATION, REVENUE OR TARIFF BILLS, BILLS OF LOCAL APPLICATION, AND PRIVATE BILLS ORIGINATE? WHAT IS AN APPROPRIATION BILL? REVENUE BILL? TARIFF BILL? BILL OF LOCAL APPLICATION? PRIVATE BILL? GIVE EXAMPLE OF EACH.
2.
3.
4.
IN THE ENACTMENT OF A TAX LAW, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE THAT THE SENATE VERSION OF THE TAX BILL BE ADOPTED AND APPROVED AS THE TAX LAW?
QUESTIONAIRES
5.
IF THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT WANT A BILL TO BE PASSED INTO LAW, WHAT SHALL HE DO? IF CONGRESS WANTS IT PASSED INTO LAW, WHAT SHALL IT DO? (Bar Flunkers Act of 1953; In re Cunanan, et al., 94 Phil. 534). CONGRESS PASSED A LAW, RA 4790, ENTITLED AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICAPLITY OF DIANATON IN THE PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR WHEN IN FACT THE SAID MUNICIPALITY COMPRISED NOT ONLY BARRIOS IN LANAO DEL SUR BUT ALSO TWO MUNICIPALITIES TO BE DISMEMBERED IN THE ADJACENT PROVINCE OF COTABATO (Lidasan v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 496) . AS A STUDENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, WHAT IS YOUR OBSERVATION OF THIS LAW?
6.
QUESTIONAIRES
7.
THE PRESENT 14TH CONGRESS OF THE 5TH PHIL. REPUBLIC HAS A LIFE OF 3 YEARS EFFECTIVE JUNE 30, 2007 UP TO JUNE 30, 2010. IT HOLDS REGULAR SESSION STARTING 4TH MONDAY OF EVERY JULY AND ADJOURNS FOR RECESS 30 DAYS PRIOR TO THE OPENING OF THE NEXT REGULAR SESSION. IN MAY, 2008, THE HOUSE OF REP HELD A LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY IN RELATIONS WITH ITS PROPOSED BILL REGULATING THE CTPL INSURANCE INDUSTRY. MR. CONFESSOR, CEO OF ABC INSURANCE CO., WAS SUMMONED TO APPEAR BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE TO SHED LIGHT ON CERTAIN ANOMALOUS PRACTICES IN THE CONDUCT OF THE CTPL BUSINESS. DURING THE HEARING HE REFUSED TO ANSWER IMPORTANT RELEVANT QUESTION ON THE GROUND THAT HE MAY INCRIMINATE CERTAIN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL. THEREAFTER, HE WAS CITED IN DIRECT CONTEMPT AND WAS DETAINED AT THE HOUSE EVEN BEYOND ITS ADJOURNMENT FOR RECESS ON JUNE 13, 2008 UNTIL TODAY, AUG. 1, 2008 DUE TO HIS CONTINUED REFUSAL TO ANSWER. QUESTION: IS HIS CONTINUED DETENTION AT THE HOUSE LEGAL? EXPLAIN. (Lopez v. De Los Reyes, 55 Phil.170; Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29).
PROPOSED ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 7

YES, THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF MR. CONFESSOR IS LEGAL. IT IS WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE HOUSE TO CONDUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION WHICH INCLUDES THE POWER TO PUNISH CONTUMACIOUS WITNESS WITH DETENTION FOR CONTINUED REFUSAL TO ANSWER RELEVANT QUESTION. IN THE CASE AT BAR, MR. CONFESSOR CONTINUOUS LY REFUSED TO ANSWER QUESTION WHICH IS RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT OF LEGISLATION UNDER CONSIDERATION. AS SETLLED IN THE CASE OF ARNAULT V. NAZARENO, HIS DETENTION COULD LAST NOT ONLY DURING THE 2007-2008 SESSION, WHEN THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED, BUT COULD LAST UNTIL THE FINAL ADJOURNMENT OF THE 14TH CONGRESS IN THE YEAR 2010. THIS IS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE LEGISLATURE AS AN INSTITUTION.
QUESTIONAIRES
8.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MANILA HAS VARIOUS REAL PROPERTIES AMONG WHICH IS A PARKING LOT NEAR ONE OF ITS CHURCHES. THE PARKING LOT COLLECTS P20.00 PER VEHICLE PER 3-HOUR USAGE AS RENTAL AND HAS A TOTAL OF P60,000.00 RENTAL COLLECTION A MONTH. UPON A THIRD PARTY INFORMATION, BIR DISCOVERED THIS AND ASSESSED THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MANILA THE PRESUMPTIVE VAT LIABILITY FOR THE YEAR 2007 AMOUNTING TO P86,400.00. THE CHURCH QUESTIONED THE VALIDITY OF THE ASSESSMENT AND INVOKE ITS EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION UNDER SECTION 28(3), ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION. QUESTION: IS THE CHURCHS ARGUMENT CORRECT? (Lladoc v. Commisioner of Internal Revenue, 14 SCRA 292)

CONSIDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION: CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, CHURCHES AND PARSONAGES OR CONVENTS APPURTENANT THERETO, MOSQUES, NONPROFIT CEMETERIES, AND ALL LANDS, BUILDINGS, AND IMPROVEMENTS, ACTUALLY , DIRECTLY, AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE, OR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION (Sec. 28 [3], Art. VI).

ANSWER: NO, THE ARGUMENT OF THE CHURCH IS NOT CORRECT. UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHAT ARE EXEMPTED FROM TAXATION, AMONG OTHERS, ARE ALL LANDS, BUILDINGS, AND IMPROVEMENTS ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY, AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE, OR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES. IN THE CASE AT BAR, THE PARKING LOT IS NOT SO USED AS IT IS AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC REGARDLESS OF REASON FOR USING IT. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO , THAT IT IS SO USED, STILL THE ASSESSMENT FOR VAT IS CORRECT BECAUSE WHAT IT IS EXEMPTED, AS SETTLED IN THE LLADOC V. CIR CASE, IS FROM THE PAYMENT OF REAL ESTATE TAXES AND NOT FROM THE PAYMENT OF EXCISE TAXES, LIKE THE VAT.
CHAPTER 10 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

1.
THE EXECUTIVE POWER CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION: EXECUTIVE POWER SHALL BE OF THE PHILIPPINES. SEC. 1, ART. VII, THE VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT
THE SEAT OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW HAS UNDERGONE A SERIES OF RELOCATIONS. THE 1935 CONSTITUTION VESTED EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE PRESIDENT. UNDER THE ORIGINAL 1973 CONSTITUTION EXECUTIVE POWER WAS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO EXERCISE AND THE PRESIDENT WAS REDUCED TO A MERE SYMBOLIC HEAD OF STATE. THE IDEA OF A MERELY CEREMONIAL
PRESIDENT,
HOWEVER,
DIED EVEN
BEFORE IT
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

1.
THE EXECUTIVE POWER. COULD BE TESTED. WHEN THE ORIGINAL 1973 CONSTITUTION TOOK EFFECT, PRESDENT MARCOS, WHO WAS PRESIDENT UNDER THE 1935 CONSTITUTION, WAS ALLOWED TO RETAIN HIS 1935 CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND AT THE SAME TIME BECAME CEREMONIAL PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER. AND HE NEVER WAS MERELY CEREMONIAL HEAD. IN 1981, THE 1973 CONSTITUTION WAS REVISED AND THE PRESIDENT WAS ONCE MORE MADE HEAD OF STATE AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE, WHILE THE PRIME MINISTER WAS REDUCED TO BEING A CEREMONIAL FIGURE. WITH THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM RETURNS TO THE PRESIDENTIAL MODEL OF THE 1935 CONSTITUTION EXECUTIVE POWER IS VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT.

1.
THE EXECUTIVE POWER. IN THE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM, MOREOVER, THE PRESIDENCY INCLUDES MANY OTHER FUNCTIONS THAN JUST BEING CHIEF EXECUTIVE. WRITING ABOUT THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT, CLINTON ROSSITER SAID (The American Presidency 14-5[1962]):
HE REMAINS TODAY, AS HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN, THE CEREMONIAL HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND HE MUST TAKE PART WITH REAL OR APPARENT ENTHUSIASM IN A RANGE OF ACTIVITES THAT WOULD KEEP HIM RUNNING AND POSING FROM SUNRISE TO BEDTIME IF HE WERE NOT PROTECTED BY A COLD-BLOODED STAFF. SOME OF THESE ACTIVITIES ARE SOLEMN OR EVEN PRIESTLY IN NATURE; OTHERS, THROUGH NO FAULT OF HIS OWN, ARE FLIRTATIONS WITH VULGARITY. THE LONG CATALOGUE OF

1.
THE EXECUTIVE POWER. PUBLIC DUTIES THAT THE QUEEN DISCHARGES IN ENGLAND, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, AND THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF CANADA IS THE PRESIDENTS RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS COUNTRY, AND THE CATALOGUE IS EVEN LONGER BECAUSE HE IS NOT A KING, OR EVEN THE AGENT OF ONE, AND IS THEREFORE EXPECTED TO GO THROUGH SOME RATHER UNDIGNIFIED PACES BY A PEOPLE WHO THINK OF HIM AS A COMBINATION OF SCOUTMASTER, DELPHIC ORACLE, HERO OF THE SILVER SCREEN, AND FATHER OF MULTITUDE.
WHAT ROSSITER SAID OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT CAN BE SAID WITH EQUAL TRUTH OF THE PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT.

2.
THE CABINET. ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION MENTIONS THE CABINET A NUMBER OF TIMES (Sec. 3, 11, & 13, Art. VII), THE CABINET ITSELF AS AN INSTITUTION IS EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONALLY CREATED. IT ESSENTIALLY CONSISTS OF THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS WHO THROUGH USAGE HAVE FORMED A BODY OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS WHO MEET REGULARLY WITH THE PRESIDENT. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS THROUGH WHOM THE PRESIDENT EXECUTE THE LAW, THE PRESDIENT, THROUGH HIS POWER OF CONTROL OVER THEM AND HIS POWER TO REMOVE THEM AT WILL, REMAINS THE CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATION.

3.
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT. (*****) SEC. 2, ART. VII, PROVIDES THAT: NO PERSON MAY BE ELECTED PRESIDENT UNLESS HE IS:
a. b. c. d.
A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES; A REGISTERED VOTER; ABLE TO READ AND WRITE; AT LEAST FORTY YEARS OF AGE ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION; AND e. A RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEEDING SUCH ELECTION.

3.
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT. (*****) QUESTIONS: 1) CAN CONGRESS INCREASE OR REDUCE THE ABOVE QUALIFICATIONS? 2) WHAT IS EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS 3) WHO IS CONSIDERED A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN? 4) DEFINE RESIDENCE?

4. MEANING OF RESIDENCE. (*****) WHO IS CONSIDERED RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES? ONE IS A RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES IF HE IS DOMICILED THERE, THAT IS, THERE MUST CONCUR: (1) BODILY PRESENCE IN THE LOCALITY; (2) AN INTENTION TO REMAIN THERE ANIMUS MANENDI; AND (3) AN INTENTION TO ABANDON THE OLD DOMICILE, IF HE HAD ONE, OR ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI.

4. MEANING OF RESIDENCE. (*****) WHILE, HOWEVER, BODILY PRESENCE IN THE LOCALITY IS REQUIRED, THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT ALLOWS FOR TEMPORARY PHYSICAL ABSENCES PROVIDED THAT THE ANIMUS REVERTENDI TO THE DOMICILE IS NEVER ABANDONED. (Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 [1941]); Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]).

6.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION - TERM OF OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT. (*****) THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL BE ELECTED BY DIRECT VOTE OF THE PEOPLE FOR A TERM OF SIX YEARS WHICH SHALL BEGIN AT NOON ON THE 30TH DAY OF JUNE NEXT FOLLOWING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION AND SHALL END AT NOON OF THE SAME DATE SIX YEARS THEREAFTER. THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR ANY REELECTION. NO PERSON WHO HAS SUCCEEDED AS PRESIDENT AND HAS SERVED AS SUCH FOR MORE THAN FOUR YEARS SHALL BE QUALIFIED FOR ELECTION TO THE SAME OFFICE AT ANY TIME. (Sec. 4, Art. VII, par. 1). NOTA BENE: LONZANIDA V. COMELEC (311 SCRA 602) RE THREE-TERM LIMIT IN THE CONSTITUTION.

6.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION - TERM OF OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT. (*****) NOTE LONZANIDA V. COMELEC CASE (311 SCRA 602) REGARDING THE 3-TERM LIMIT IN THE CONSTITUTION. IN THIS CASE, THE PETITIONER WAS ELECTED 3 TIMES AS MAYOR BUT LOST IN AN ELECTION PROTEST AND WAS OUSTED DURING HIS 3RD TERM. INTERPRETING THE 3-TERM LIMIT IN THE CONSTITUTION AND LGC FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS, THE SC HELD THAT HE WAS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM RUNNING FOR THE SAME POSITION AGAIN BECAUSE HIS 3RD ELECTION WAS NULLIFIED AND HE DID NOT FULLY SERVE THE 3RD TERM. HOWEVER, THIS RULING IS NOT NECESSARILY DECISIVE OF THE QUESTION AS IT APPLIES TO THE TERM LIMITS OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT.

6.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION-TERM OF OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT. (*****) NO VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN TWO SUCCESSIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF THE SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. (Sec. 4, Art. VII, par. 2). THE SUPREME COURT, SITTING EN BANC, SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OR VICEPRESIDENT, AND MAY PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE. (Sec. 4, Art. VII, par. 7).

7.
DISCUSSION ON THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT. (***) IT WAS ARGUED THAT SIX YEARS WAS LONG ENOUGH FOR A GOOD PRESIDENT TO IMPLEMENT HIS PROGRAMS AND, RATHER OPTIMISTICALLY, THAT WITH THE CONSTRAINTS BUILT AROUND THE PRESIDENCY, A BAD ONE WOULD NOT SUCCEED IN ACCOMPLISHING HIS EVIL DESIGNS.

7.
DISCUSSION ON THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT. (***) THE FIXING OF THE EXACT TIME AND DATE FOR THE START AND ENDING OF THE TERM EXCLUDES THE RIGHT TO HOLD-OVER. AT NOON ON JUNE 30 SIX YEARS AFTER THE START OF THE TERM, EITHER THE NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENT TAKES OVER OR THE RULE ON FILLING OF VACANCIES FOUND IN SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII BECOMES OPERATIVE.

7.
DISCUSSION ON THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT. AN INNOVATION INTRODUCED BY THE 1986 CONCOM IS THE LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF TERM A PRESIDENT MAY SERVE. A PRESIDENT IS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR ANY REELECTION FOR THAT OFFICE, THAT IS, EITHER IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS TERM OR EVEN AFTER AN INTERVAL OF ONE OR MORE TERMS.

7.
DISCUSSION ON THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT. IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE ELIMINATION OF THE PROSPECT OF REELECTION WOULD MAKE FOR A MORE INDEPENDENT PRESIDENT CAPABLE OF MAKING CORRECT, EVEN IF UNPOPULAR, DECISIONS. THE PROHIBITION OF REELECTION APPLIES TO ANY PERSON WHO HAS SERVED* AS PRESIDENT FOR MORE THAN FOUR YEARS. (The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, First Edition, 1988, Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.). *EITHER BY ELECTION OR SUCCESSION

5.
CASE EXAMPLE - TERM OF OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT: IN AN ELECTION FOR THE PRESIDENCY FOR A TERM OF 6 YEARS STARTING JUNE 30, 200A TO JUNE 30, 200G, MR. MEROLCO WAS PROCLAIMED AS THE ELECTED PRESIDENT FOR A FIXED TERM OF 6 YEARS STARTING JUNE 30, 200A. HOWEVER, MR. GSAS, HIS RIVAL, FILED AN ELECTION PROTEST WITH THE PET. AFTER 4-1/2 YEARS IN OFFICE, THE ELECTION PROTEST WAS DECIDED IN FAVOR OF MR. GSAS;THEREAFTER, MR . GSAS TOOK HIS OATH OF OFFICE AS THE DULY ELECTED PRESIDENT TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY FOR THE BALANCE OF THE TERM WHICH IS 1-1/2 YEARS. QUESTIONS: CAN MR. MEROLCO RUN FOR PRESIDENT IN THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION? HOW ABOUT MR. GSAS? (Note Lonzanida v. Comelec, case 311 SCRA 602)

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (MACALINTAL SEEKS ABOLITION OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL PETITION WITH SC DATED APRIL 5, 2010): PGMA ELECTION LAWYER, R. MACALINTAL, SOUGHT THE ABOLITION OF THE PET, WHICH HE ARGUED WAS ILLEGALLY CREATED AND COULD BE UNNECESSARILY EATING UP GOVERNMENT FUNDS.
IN A 7-PAGE PETITION, MACALINTAL ASKED THE SC TO DECLARE THE CREATION OF THE PET IN VIOLATION OF TWO PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION: PAR. 7, SEC. 4,

ART. VII, AND SEC. 12, ART. VIII. MACALINTAL ARGUED THAT THE SC SITTING EN BANC SHOULD RESOLVE ELECTORAL PROTESTS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, AND NOT THE PET. THE FIRST PROVISION STATES: THE SC, SITTING EN BANC, SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT, AND MAY PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE.

THE SECOND PROVISION STATES: THE MEMBERS OF THE SC AND OTHER COURTS ESTABLISHED BY LAW SHALL NOT BE DESIGNATED TO ANY AGENCY PERFORMING QUASIJUDICIAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS. MACALINTAL ALSO SAID THE HIGH COURT WAS MISTAKEN IN CREATING THE PET BECAUSE THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT AUTHORIZE THE CREATION OF ANOTHER TRIBUNAL OPERATING ON ITS OWN BUDGET. MACALINTAL ARGUED THAT THE PET GIVES MAGISTRATES DUAL POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT. SC

TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE THAT THIS PETITION BE RESOLVED WITH DISPATCH IN VIEW OF THE FORTHCOMING PRESIDENDTIAL ELECTIONS IN MAY, 2010 WHERE CASES MAY BE FILED INVOLVING THE ELECTION, RETURNS OR QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT, HE SAID IN THE PETITION.

THE SC HELD THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PET IS AUTHORIZED BY THE LAST PAR. OF SEC. 4, ART. VII OF THE CONSTITUTION AND SUPPORTED BY THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONCOM. THE PROVISION WHICH STATES THAT THE SC SITTING EN BANC, SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTIONS, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OR VICE PRESIDENT, AND MAY PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE, MANDATES THE SC TO CREATE THE PET, THE COURT HELD.

THE COURT STRESSED THE PLENARY GRANT TO IT BY THE CONSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL POWER AND THAT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION, THE ADDITIONAL JURISDICTION BESTOWED BY THE LAST PAR. OF SEC. 4, ART. VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO DECIDE PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESDIENTIAL CONTESTS INCLUDES THE MEANS NECESSARY TO CARRY IT. THE SC RULED THAT ITS METHOD OF DECIDING PRESDIENTIAL AND VICE PRESDIENTIAL ELECTION CONTESTS THROUGH PET, IS ACTUALLY A DERIVATIVE OF THE EXERCISE OF THE PREROGATIVE CONFERRED BY THE SAID CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION (LAST PAR., SEC. 4, ARTICLE VII).

THE SC HELD THE POWER OF PET IS A DERIVATIVE OF THE PLENARY JUDICIAL POWER ALLOCATED TO COURTS OF LAW, EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONSTITUTION. (MAKALINTAL V. PET, GR NO. 191618, JUNE 7, 2011) [WRR].

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. A. THERE ARE TWO SETS OF RULES ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:
SECTION 7 ON VACANCIES OCCURING BEFORE THE PRESIDENT ASSUMED HIS TERM OF OFFICE;
SECTION 8 ON VACANCIES OCCURING PRESIDENT ASSUMED HIS TERM OF OFFICE. AFTER THE

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PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII (BEFORE ASSUMING OFFICE): THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL ASSUME OFFICE AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR TERMS. IF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT FAILS TO QUALIFY, THE VICEPRESIDENTELECT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL THE PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED.
IF THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOT HAVE BEEN CHOSEN, THE VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL A PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AND QUALIFIED.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. IF AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL HAVE DIED OR SHALL HAVE BECOME PERMANENTLY DISABLED, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL BECOME PRESIDENT. WHERE NO PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN OR SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED, OR WHERE BOTH SHALL HAVE DIED OR BECOME PERMANENTLY DISABLED, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OR, IN CASE OF HIS INABILITY, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL A PRESIDENT OR A VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AND QUALIFIED.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. THE CONGRESS SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH ONE WHO IS TO ACT AS PRESIDENT SHALL BE SELECTED UNTIL A PRESIDENT OR A VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED, IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, OR INABILITY OF THE OFFICIALS MENTIONED IN THE NEXT PRECEEDING PAPRAGRAPH. SECTION 8, ARTICLE VII (AFTER ASSUMING OFFICE): IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE, OR RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT, THE VICEPRESIDENT SHALL BECOME THE PRESIDENT TO SERVE THE

8.
THEPRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. UNEXPIRED TERM. IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE, OR RESIGNATION OF BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND VICEPRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OR, IN CASE OF HIS INABILITY, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE SHALL THEN ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL THE PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED.

8.
THEPRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. THE CONGRESS SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE, WHO SHALL SERVE AS PRESIDENT IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, OR RESIGNATION OF THE ACTING PRESIDENT. HE SHALL SERVE UNTIL THE PRESIDENT OR THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED, AND BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME RESTRICTIONS OF POWERS AND DISQUALIFICATION AS THE ACTING PRESIDENT.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. THE CASES CONTEMPLATED IN SECTION 7 ARE: a. FAILURE OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT TO QUALIFY, THAT IS, TO ASSUME HIS OFFICE BY TAKING THE OATH AND ENTERING INTO THE DISCHARGE OF HIS DUTIES; b. FAILUE TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT, AS WHERE THE CANVASS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAS NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED, OR WHERE FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION HAS NOT BEEN HELD; c. DEATH OR PERMANENT DISABILITY OF THE PRESDIENT ELECT. IN (a) AND (b), THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL MERELY ACTS AS PRESIDENT; WHILE, IN (c), HE BECOMES THE PRESIDENT.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. SECTION 8 DEALS WITH VACANCIES OCCURING IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DURING HIS INCUMBENCY AND IS LIMITED TO FOUR INSTANCES: a. b. c. d. DEATH; REMOVAL; RESIGNATION; OR PERMANENT DISABILITY, LIKE INCURABLE INSANITY.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. B. JOSEPH ESTRADA V. GMA (G.R. NO. L-146738, MARCH 2, 2001). ESTRADA QUESTIONED GMAS RIGHT TO SUCCEED HIM AS PRESDIENT, CLAIMING THAT HE HAD LEFT MALACANANG ON JAN. 20, 2001 ONLY TO DIFFUSE THE TENSION BUILDING UP AMONG THE DEMONSTRATORS AT EDSA WHO WERE DEMANDING HIS RESIGNATION. HE DENIED HE HAD RESIGNED AND SAID HE HAD EVERY INTENTION TO RETURN AFTER THE DISTURBANCES SHALL HAVE ENDED BUT WAS PREVENTED FROM DOING SO.
JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO DECLARED IN PART FOR THE COURT:

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PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. B. ESTRADA V. GMA: IN SUM, WE HOLD THAT THE RESIGNATION OF THE PETITIONER CANNOT BE DOUBTED. IT WAS CONFIRMED BY HIS LEAVING MALACANANG. IN THE PRESS RELEASE CONTAINING HIS FINAL STATEMENT, (1) HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE OATHTAKING OF THE RESPONDENT AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC ALBEIT WITH RESERVATION ABOUT ITS LEGALITY; (2) HE EMPHASIZED HE WAS LEAVING THE PALACE, THE SEAT OF THE PRESIDENCY, FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE AND IN ORDER TO BEGIN THE HEALING PROCESS OF OUR NATION. HE DID NOT SAY HE WAS LEAVING THE PALACE DUE TO ANY KIND OF INABILITY AND THAT HE WAS GOING TO RE-ASSUME THE PRESIDENCY AS SOON AS THE DISABILITY APPEARS (DIS?); (3) HE EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE TO THE PEOPLE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO SERVE THEM. WITHOUT DOUBT HE WAS REFERRING TO THE PAST

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PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. B. ESTRADA V. GMA: OPPORTUNITY GIVEN HIM TO SERVE THE PEOPLE AS THEIR PRESIDENT; (4) HE ASSURED THAT HE WILL NOT SHIRK FROM ANY FUTURE CHALLENGE THAT MAY COME AHEAD IN THE SAME SERVICE OF OUR COUNTRY. PETITIONERS REFERENCE IS TO A FUTURE CHALLENGE AFTER OCCUPYING THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT WHICH HE HAS GIVEN UP, AND (5) HE CALLED ON HIS SUPPORTERS TO JOIN HIM IN THE PROMOTION OF A NATIONAL SPIRIT OF RECONCILIATION AND SOLIDARITY. CERTAINLY, THE NATIONAL SPIRIT OF RECONCILIATION AND SOLIDARITY COULD NOT BE ATTAINED IF HE DID NOT GIVE UP THE PRESIDENCY. THE PRESS RELEASE WAS PETITIONERS VALEDICTORY, HIS FINAL ACT OF FAREWELL. HIS PRESIDENCY IS NOW IN THE PAST TENSE.

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PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. B. ESTRADA V. GMA: ESTRADA ALSO AGRUED THAT GMA COULD NOT HAVE REPLACED HIM EITHER IN AN ACTING CAPACITY BECAUSE THE DETERMINATION OF THE PRESIDENTS INABILITY TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF HIS OFFICE SHOULD BE MADE BY THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE PROCEDURE LAID DOWN IN SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII. THE COURT HELD THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN REPLACED ON THAT GROUND; AND ANYWAY, THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE HAD, BY RESOLUTION, FORMALLY RECOGNIZED GMA AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSOR OF ESTRADA BY REASON OF HIS RESIGNATION AS PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.

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PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. C. INABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO DISCHARGE HIS POWERS AND DUTIES. SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII. WHENEVER THE PRESIDENT TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HIS WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT HE IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, AND UNTIL HE TRANSMITS TO THEM A WRITTEN DECLARATION TO THE CONTRARY, SUCH POWERS AND DUTIES SHALL BE DISCHARGED BY THE VICE-PRESIDENT AS ACTING PRESIDENT.

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PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. C. INABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO DISCHARGE HIS POWERS AND DUTIES (CONT): WHENEVER A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THEIR WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE AS ACTING PRESIDENT. THEREAFTER, WHEN THE PRESIDENT TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HIS WRITTEN DECLARATION

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PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. C. INABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT . . . (CONT): THAT NO INABILITY EXISTS, HE SHALL REASSUME THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE. MEANWHILE, SHOULD A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET TRANSMIT WITHIN FIVE DAYS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THEIR WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE CONGRESS SHALL DECIDE THE ISSUE. FOR THAT PURPOSE, THE CONGRESS SHALL CONVENE, IF IT IS NOT IN SESSION, WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES AND WITHOUT NEED OF CALL.

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PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. C. INABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT . . . (CONT): IF THE CONGRESS WITHIN TEN DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE LAST WRITTEN DECLARATION, OR, IF NOT IN SESSION, WITHIN TWELVE DAYS AFTER IT IS REQUIRED TO ASSEMBLE, DETERMINES BY A TWO-THIRDS VOTE OF BOTH HOUSES, VOTING SEPARATELY, THAT THE PRESIDENTV IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT ; OTHERWISE, THE PRESIDENT SHALL CONTINUE EXERCISING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE.

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PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. C. INABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO DISCHARGE HIS POWERS AND DUTIES (CONT). 1. ESTRADA V. GMA (G.R. L - 146738, March 2, 2001) JAN. 20, 2001 SIR, BY VIRTUE OF PROVISION SEC. 11, ART. VII OF THE CONSTITUTION, I AM HEREBY TRANSMITTING THIS DECLARATION THAT I AM UNABLE TO EXERCISE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF MY OFFICE. BY OPERATION OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION, THE VICEPRESIDENT SHALL BE THE ACTING PRESIDENT. PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. C. INABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO DISCHARGE HIS POWERS AND DUTIES (CONT): 2. ESTRADA V. GMA (G.R. L 146738, March 2, 2001).
ESTRADA TRIED TO TEST THIS PROVISION BY HIS MYSTERIOUS LETTER BUT THE COURT HELD THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN REPLACED ON THAT GROUND; AND ANYWAY, THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE HAD, BY RESOLUTION, FORMALLY RECOGNIZED GMA AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSOR BY REASON OF HIS RESIGNATION AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. HENCE, THIS ISSUE BECAME A POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH THE COURT, UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, HAS NO POWER TO REVIEW.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. (***) D. VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.
QUESTION: WHAT IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS REQUIRED TO REPLACE AND INSTALL A NEW VICE-PRESDIDENT IN CASE A VACANCY OCCURS IN HIS OFFICE DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED, LIKE FOR INSTANCE, WHEN THE INCUMBENT VICE-PRESIDENT SUCCEDED AS PRESIDENT?

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. D. VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. SECTION 9, ARTICLE VII: WHENEVER THERE IS A VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED, THE PRESDIENT SHALL NOMINATE A VICE-PRESIDENT FROM AMONG THE MEMBERS OF SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WHO SHALL ASSUME OFFICE UPON CONFIRMATION BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS VOTING SEPARATELY. (GMA & GUINGONA CASE)

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. E. FILLING OF THE VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT (SIMULTANEOUS): SECTION 10, ARTICLE VII: THE CONGRESS SHALL, AT TEN OCLOCK IN THE MORNING OF THE THIRD DAY AFTER VACANCY IN THE OFFICES OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OCCURS, CONVENE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES WITHOUT NEED OF A CALL AND WITHIN SEVEN DAYS ENACT A LAW CALLING FOR A SPECIAL ELECTION TO ELECT A PRESIDENT AND A VICE-PRESIDENT TO BE HELD NOT EARLIER THAN 45 DAYS NOR LATER THAN 60 DAYS FROM THE TIME OF SUCH CALL. THE BILL CALLING SUCH SPECIAL ELECTION SHAL BE DEEMED CERTIFIED UNDER PARAGRAPH 2, SECTION 26, ARTICLE VI OF THIS

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. E. FILLING OF THE VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT (SIMULTANEOUS): CONSTITUTION AND SHALL BECOME LAW UPON ITS APPROVAL ON THIRD READING BY THE CONGRESS. APPROPRIATION FOR THE SPECIAL ELECTION SHALL BE CHARGED AGAINST ANY CURRENT APPROPRIATIONS AND SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM THE REQUIRE MENTS OF PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 25, ARTICLE VI OF THIS CONSTITUTION. THE CONVENING OF THE CONGRESS CANNOT BE SUSPENDED NOR THE SPECIAL ELECTION POSTPONED. NO SPECIAL ELECTION SHALL BE CALLED IF THE VACANCY OCCURS WITHIN I8 MONTHS BEFORE THE DATE OF THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

9.
EXECUTIVE INHIBITIONS (***) QUESTION: CAN AN ENERGY SECRETARY BE QUALIFIED TO THE APPOINTMENT AS MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES? a) b) c) d) e) SECTION 13, ARTICLE VII; SECTION 7, PAR. 2, ARTICLE IX-B; SECTION I, ARTICLE XI; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284, JULY 23, 1987 CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) DECLARING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284 UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SEC. 13, ARTICLE VII: THE PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT, THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, AND THEIR DEPUTIES OR ASSISTANTS SHALL NOT, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT DURING THEIR TENURE. THEY SHALL NOT, DURING SAID TENURE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PRACTICE ANY OTHER PROFESSION, PARTICIPATE IN ANY BUSINESS, OR BE FINANCIALLY INTERESTED IN ANY CONTRACT WITH, OR IN ANY FRANCHISE, OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGE GRANTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS OR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES.

SEC. 7, 2ND PAR, ARTICLE IX-B, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION): UNLESS OTHERWISE ALLOWED BY LAW OR BY THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF HIS POSITION, NO APPOINTIVE OFFICIAL SHALL HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS OR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES.

SEC. 1, ARTICLE XI, ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS: PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST. PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES MUST AT ALL TIMES BE ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE, SERVE THEM WITH UTMOST RESPONSIBILITY, INTEGRITY, LOYALTY, AND EFFICIENCY, ACT WITH PATRIOTISM AND JUSTICE, AND LEAD MODEST LIVES.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284, JULY 23, 1987, RULE ON MULTIPLE POSITIONS FOR THE CABINET MEMBERS AND OTHER APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS: SEC. 1 EVEN IF ALLOWED BY LAW OR BY THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF HIS POSITIONS, A MEMBER OF CABINET, UNDERSECRETARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OR OTHER APPOINTIVE OFFICIAL OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT MAY, IN ADDITION TO HIS PRIMARY POSITION, HOLD NOT MORE THAN TWO POSITIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND GOCCS AND RECEIVE THE CORRESPONDING COMPENSATION THEREFOR: PROVIDED, THAT THIS LIMITATIONS SHALL NOT APPLY TO AD HOC BODIES OR COMMITTEES, OR TO BOARDS, COUNCILS, OR BODIES OF WHICH THE PRESIDENT IS THE CHAIRMAN.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284, JULY 23, 1987 (CONT): 1) CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) - IN THIS CASE, THE PETITIONER CHALLENGED EO NO. 284, JULY 23, 1987, WHICH IN EFFECT ALLOWED CABINET MEMBERS, THEIR UNDERSECRETARIES AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES AND OTHER APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPT TO HOLD OTHER POSITIONS IN THE GOVT ALBIET SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED THEREIN. THE RESPONDENTS, IN REFUTING THE PETITIONEDRS ARGUMENT THAT THE MEASURE WAS VIOLATIVE OF ART. VII, SEC. 13 OF THE

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284, JULY 23, 1987 (CONT): 1) CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) (CONT): CONSTITUTION, INVOKED ART. IX-B, SEC. 7, ALLOWING THE HOLDING OF MULTIPLE POSITIONS BY THE APPOINTIVE OFFICIAL IF ALLOWED BY LAW OR BY THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF HIS POSITION. IN DECLARING THE EO UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THE SC DECLARED: IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONSTRUCTION GIVEN TO SEC. 13, ART. VII IN RELATION TO SEC. 7, PAR. 2, ART. IX-B OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284 DATED JULY 23, 1987 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284, JULY 23, 1987 (CONT): 1) CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) (CONT): OSTENSIBLY RESTRICTING THE NUMBER OF POSTIONS THAT CABINET MEMBERS, UNDERSECRETARIES OR ASSISTANT SECRETARIES MAY HOLD IN ADDITION TO THEIR PRIMARY POSITION TO NOT MORE THAN 2 POSITIONS IN THE GOVT AND GOCCS, EO 284 ACTUALLY ALLOWS THEM TO HOLD MULTIPLE OFFICES OR EMPLOYMENT IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THE EXPRESS MANDATE OF SEC.13, ART. VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITING THEM FROM DOING SO, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION ITSELF.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284, JULY 23, 1987 (CONT): 1) CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) (CONT): THE COURT IS ALERTED BY REPONSDENTS TO THE IMPRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES THAT WILL RESULT FROM A STRICT APPLICATION OF THE PROHIBITION MANDATED UNDER SEC. 13, ART. VII (CONSTITUTION) ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE GOVT, CONSIDERING THAT CABINET MEMBERS WOULD BE STRIPPED OF THEIR OFFICES HELD IN AN EXOFFICIO CAPACITY, BY REASON OF THEIR PRIMARY POSTIONS OR BY VIRTUE OF LEGISLATION.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284, JULY 23, 1987 (CONT): 1) CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) (CONT): AS EARLIER CLARIFIED IN THIS DECISION, EX-OFFICIO POSTS OR THOSE REQUIRED BY THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICIAL CONCERNED DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF ANY OTHER OFFICE WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION. WITH RESPECT TO OTHER OFFICES OR EMPLOYMENT HELD BY VIRTUE OF LEGISLATION, INCLUDING CHAIRMANSHIPS OR DIRECTORSHIPS IN GOCCS AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES, SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT THE FEARED IMPRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES ARE MORE APPARENT THAN REAL. BEING HEAD OF AN

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284, JULY 23, 1987 (CONT): 1) CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) (CONT): EXECUTIVE DEPT IS NO MEAN JOB. IT IS MORE THAN A FULL-TIME JOB, REQUIRING FULL ATTENTION, SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND EXPERTISE. IF MAXIMUM BENEFITS ARE TO BE DERIVED FROM A DEPT HEADS ABILITY AND EXPERTISE, HE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO ATTEND TO HIS DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITHOUT THE DISTRACTION OF OTHER GOVT OFFICES OR EMPLOYMENT.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284, JULY 23, 1987 (CONT): 1) CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317) (CONT): HE SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM DISSIPATING HIS EFFORTS, ATTENTION AND ENERGY AMONG TOO MANY POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY, WHICH MAY RESULT IN HAPZARDNESS AND INEFFICIENCY. SURELY THE ADVANTAGES TO BE DERIVED FROM THIS CONCENTRATION OF ATTENTION, KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE, PARTICULARLY AT THIS STATE OF OUR NATIONAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPEMNT, FAR OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS, IF ANY, THAT MAY BE GAINED FROM A DEPARTMENT HEAD SPREADING HIMSELF TOO THIN AND TAKING IN MORE THAN WHAT HE CAN HANDLE.

10.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. (*****)

QUESTION:
IS THE PRESIDENT IMMUNE FROM SUIT?

10.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. A. LEGAL BASIS: 1) THE 1935 CONSTITUTION 2) ORIGINAL 1973 CONSTITUION SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII: THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT DURING HIS TENURE. 3) 1973 CONSTITUTION, AS AMENDED IN 1981: SECTION 17, ARTICLE VII: THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT DURING HIS TENURE. THEREAFTER, NO SUIT WHATSOEVER SHALL LIE FOR THE OFFICIAL ACTS DONE BY HIM OR BY OTHERS PURSUANT TO HIS SPECIFIC ORDERS DURING HIS TENURE. 4) 1987 CONSTITUTION 5) FORBES, ETC. V. CHUOCO TIACO AND CROSSFIELD (16 PHIL. 534 [1910]).

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PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. B. 1987 CONSTITUTION. WHEN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION WAS CRAFTED, ITS FRAMERS DID NOT REENACT THE EXECUTIVE UMMUNITY PROVISION OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION. THE FOLLOWING EXPLANATION WAS GIVEN BY DELEGATE J. BERNAS, VIZ: MR. SUAREZ. THANK YOU. THE LAST QUESTION IS WITH REFERENCE TO THE COMMITTEES OMITTING IN THE DRAFT PROPOSAL THE IMMUNITY PROVISION FOR THE PRESIDENT. I AGREE WITH COM. NOLLEDO THAT THE COMMITTEE DID VERY WELL IN STRIKING OUT THIS SECOND SENTENCE, AT THE VERY LEAST, OF THE ORIGINAL PROVISION ON IMMUNITY FROM SUIT UNDER THE 1973 CONSTITUTION. BUT WOULD THE

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PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. COMMITTEE MEMBERS NOT AGREE TO A RESTORATION OF AT LEAST THE FIRST SENTENCE THAT THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT DURING HIS TENURE, CONSIDERING THAT IF WE DO NOT PROVIDE HIM THAT KIND OF IMMUNITY, HE MIGHT BE SPENDING ALL HIS TIME FACING LITIGATIONS, AS THE PRESIDENT-IN-EXILE IN HAWAII IS NOW FACING LITIGATIONS ALMOST DAILY? FR. BERNAS. THE REASON FOR THE OMISSION IS THAT WE CONSIDER IT UNDERSTOOD IN PRESENT JURISPRUDENCE THAT DURING HIS TENURE HE IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT. MR. SUAREZ. SO THERE IS NO NEED TO EXPRESS IT HERE.

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PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. FR. BERNAS. THERE IS NO NEED. IT WAS THAT WAY BEFORE. THE ONLY INNOVATION MADE BY THE 1973 CONSTITUTION WAS TO MAKE THAT EXPLICIT AND TO ADD OTHER THINGS. MR. SUAREZ. ON THAT UNDERSTANDING, I WILL NOT PRESS FOR ANY MORE QUERY, MADAM PRESIDENT. I THANK THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE CLARIFICATION. (CITED BY THE SC IN ESTRADA V. GMA & ESTRADA V. DESIERTO CASES).

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PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. (*****) C. FORBES,ETC., V. CHUOCO TIACO AND CROSSFIELD (16 Phil. 534 [1910]). THE COURT SAID ON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-LIABILITY: THE THING WHICH THE JUDICIARY CAN NOT DO IS MULCT THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL PERSONALLY IN DAMAGES WHICH RESULT FROM THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTY PUBLIC POLICY FORBIDS IT. WHAT IS HELD HERE IS THAT HE WILL BE PROTECTED FROM PERSONAL LIABITY FOR DAMAGES NOT ONLY WHEN HE ACTS WITHIN HIS AUTHORITY, BUT ALSO WHEN HE IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY, PROVIDED HE ACTUALLY USED DISCRETION AND JUDGMENT, THAT IS JUDICIAL FACULTY, IN

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PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. C. FORBES, ETC V. CHUOCO TIACO AND CROSSFIELD (CONT): DETERMINING WHETHER HE HAD AUTHORITY TO ACT OR NOT. IN OTHER WORDS, HE IS ENTITLED TO PROTECTION IN DETERMINING THE QUESTION OF HIS AUTHORITY. IF HE DECIDES WRONGLY, HE IS STILL PROTECTED PROVIDED THE QUESTION OF HIS AUTHORITY WAS ONE OVER WHICH TWO MEN, REASONABLY QUALIFIED FOR THAT POSITION, MIGHT HONESTLY DIFFER; BUT HE IS NOT PROTECTED IF THE LACK OF AUTHORITY TO ACT IS SO PLAIN THAT TWO SUCH MEN COULD NOT HONESTLY DIFFER OVER ITS DETERMINATION.
IN SUCH CASE, HE ACTS, NOT A GOVERNOR-GENERAL BUT AS A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL, AND, AS SUCH, MUST ANSWER FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACT.

10.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. D. THE COURT UNDERSCORED THE CONSEQUENCES IF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE WAS NOT GRANTED IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, VIZ: XXX. ACTION UPON IMPORTANT MATTERS OF STATE DELAYED; THE TIME AND SUBSTANCE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE SPENT IN WRANGLING LITIGATION; DISRESPECT ENGENDERED FOR THE PERSON OF ONE OF THE HIGHEST OFFICIALS OF THE STATE AND FOR THE OFFICE HE OCCUPIES; A TENDENCY TO UNREST AND DISORDER; RESULTING IN A WAY, IN A DISTRUST AS TO THE INTEGRITY OF GOVERNMENT ITSELF. (CITED BY THE SC IN ESTRADA V. GMA & ESTRADA V. DESIERTO CASES).

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PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. E. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO, GR NOS. 146771-15, MARCH 2, 2001 (IMMUNITY OF A NON-SITTING PRESIDENT): WHEN SEVERAL CRIMINAL CHARGES WERE FILED AGAINST HIM WITH THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FORMER PRES. ESTRADA SOUGHT TO DISMISS THEM ON THE GROUND OF HIS CLAIMED PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. IN THIS CASE, THE SC DISMISSED HIS PETITION, HOLDING IN PART AS FOLLOWS: WE NOW COME TO THE IMMUNITY THAT CAN BE CLAIMED BY PETITIONER AS A NON-STTTING PRESIDENT. THE CASES FILED AGAINST PETITIONER ESTRADA ARE CRIMINAL IN CHARACTER. THEY INVOLVE PLUNDER, BRIBERY, AND GRAFT AND CORRUPTION. BY NO STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION CAN

10.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. E. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO (GR NOS. 146771-15, MARCH 2, 2001) (CONT): THESE CRIMES, ESPECIALLY PLUNDER WHICH CARRIES THE DEATH PENALTY, BE COVERED BY THE ALLEGED MANTLE OF IMMUNITY OF A NON-SITTING PRESIDENT. PETITIONER CANNOT CITE ANY DECISION OF THIS COURT LICENSING THE PRESIDENT TO COMMIT CRIMINAL ACTS AND WRAPPING HIM WITH THE POST-TENURE IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY. IT WILL BE ANOMALOUS TO HOLD THAT IMMUNITY IS AN INOCULATION FROM LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL ACTS AND OMISSIONS. THE RULE IS THAT UNLAWFUL ACTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE NOT ACTS OF THE STATE, AND THE OFFICER WHO ACTS ILLEGALLY IS NOT ACTING AS SUCH BUT STANDS IN THE SAME FOOTING AS ANY OTHER TRESPASSER.
THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

A.
SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CONT): MENTION HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE OF THE PROFOUND INFLUENCE EXERTED BY THE PRESIDENT AS HEAD OF STATE AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. THIS INFLUENCE DERIVES FROM THE VAST POWERS CONFERRED ON HIM THAT ENABLE HIM TO ASSUME THE LEADERSHIP IN THE CONDUCT OF PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS. THIS LEADERSHIP IS DISPLAYED BY HIM NOT ONLY IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS BUT ALSO IN THEIR ENACTMENT, AS WELL AS IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE COMMAND OF THE AFP, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND EVEN THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF PUBLIC OPINION ON VITAL ISSUES.

A.
SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CONT):
SO THE QUESTION IS:

DOES THE PRESIDENT ENJOY THE TOTALITY OF EXECUTIVE POWER? IS HE AUTHORIZED TO EXERCISE ANY POWER SO LONG AS IT IS BY NATURE EXECUTIVE? IN OTHER WORDS, IS EVERY POWER RELATING TO THE ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF LAWS TO BE REGARDED AS BELONGING TO THE PRESIDENT BY VIRTUE OF HIS OFFICE?

A.
1) VILLENA V. SECRETARY OF THE (67 PHIL 451) AND PLANAS V. GIL (67 PHIL 62): THE ORIGINAL VIEW OF OUR SUPREME COURT ON THESE QUESTIONS AS THEY APPLIED TO THE PRESIDENT UNDER THE 1935 CONSTITUTION FAVORED HIS COMPLETE ASSUMPTION OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER. IN THESE CASES, THE SC DECLARED THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHIL IS THE EXECUTIVE OF THE GOVT OF THE PHIL, AND NO OTHER AND THAT ALL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY IS THUS VESTED IN HIM.

A.
2. MYERS V. US (272 US 52) - THE PRONOUCEMENTS IN VILLENA AND PLANAS WERE IN KEEPING WITH THIS U.S. CASE WHERE CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT HELD THAT THE WORDS OF SEC. 2 FOLLOWING THE GENERAL GRANT OF EXECUTIVE POWER UNDER SEC. 1 WERE EITHER AN ENUMERATION AND EMPHASIS OF SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE, NOT ALL INCLUSIVE, OR WERE LIMITATIONS UPON THE GENERAL GRANT OF EXECUTIVE POWER.

A.
SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CONT): MYERS V. US (272 US 52) (CONT):
2.
THE U.S. SC CITED WITH APPROVAL ALEXANDER HAMILTONS (ONE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS OF USA) OPINION THAT THE ENUMERATION (OF SPECIFIC POWERS) OUGHT THEREFORE TO BE CONSIDERED AS INTENDED MERELY TO SPECIFY THE PRINCIPAL ARTICLES IMPLIED IN THE DEFINITION OF POWER, LEAVING THE REST TO FLOW FROM THE GENERAL GRANT OF THAT POWER.

A.
3. LACSON V. ROQUE (92 PHIL. 456) AND MONDANO V. SILVASOA (97 PHIL. 143): THE FOREGOING VIEWS HAVE BEEN RECONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF A STRICTER INTERPRETATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER. IN THESE TWO CASES, FOR EXAMPLE, OUR SC HELD THAT THE PRESIDENTS POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS COULD BE EXERCISED BY HIM ONLY AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION.

A.
SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CONT): YOUNGSTOWN TUBE AND SHEET CO. V. SAWYER (343 U.S. 579):
4.
IN THIS FAMOUS STEEL SEIZURE CASE IN THE U.S., PRESIDENT TRUMANS TAKEOVER OF THE STEEL MILLS TO CONTINUE THEIR OPERATIONS WHILE THE STEEL WORKERS WERE ON STRIKE WAS DECLARED ILLEGAL IN THE ABSENCE OF A SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY AUTHORITY. THE ARGUMENT OFFERED WAS THAT THE CLAUSE VESTING IN THE PRESIDENT THE EXECUTIVE POWER CONSTITUTE A GRANT OF ALL EXECUTIVE POWER OF WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS CAPABLE..

A.
SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CONT): YOUNGSTOWN TUBE AND SHEET CO. V. SAWYER (343 U.S. 579) (CONT):
4.
THE U.S. SC, BY A VOTE OF 6 TO 3, DID NOT AGREE. IF THAT BE TRUE, JUSTICE BLACK COMMENTED, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHY OUR FOREFATHERS BOTHERED TO ADD SEVERAL SPECIFIC ITEMS, INCLUDING SOME TRIFLING ONES . . . I CANNOT ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT THIS CLAUSE IS A GRANT IN BULK OF ALL CONCEIVABLE EXECUTIVE POWER BUT REGARDS IT AS AN ALLOCATION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE OF THE GENERIC POWERS THEREATER STATED.

SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CONT): 5. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668):
A.
IN THIS CASE, THE SC DECLARED: X X X WE HOLD THE VIEW THAT ALTHOUGH THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IMPOSES LIMITATIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT, IT MAINTAINS INTACT WHAT IS TRADITIONALLY CONSIDERED AS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE POWER. COROLLARILY, THE POWERS OF THE PRESDIENT CANNOT BE SAID TO BE LIMITED ONLY TO THE SPECIFIC POWERS ENUMERATED IN THE CONSTITUTION. IN OTHER WORDS, EXECUTIVE POWER IS MORE THAN THE SUM OF SPECIFIC POWERS SO ENUMERATED. NOTE: THIS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE LAST WORD ON THE MATTER, CONSIDERING THE STRONG DISSENTS REGISTERED IN THIS 8-7 DECISION.

A.
SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CONT): LAUREL V. GARCIA (187 SCRA 797):
6.
IN THIS SUBSEQUENT CASE, THE SC PROHIBITED THE SALE OF THE PROPERTIES OF THE PHILIPPINES AT ROPPONGI, JAPAN, ON THE GROUND, INTER ALIA, THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES HAD NO SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO SELL THEM. NOTE: THIS TIME THE VOTE WAS 9-6

A.
7. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF 1987 (EO NO. 292, JULY 25, 1987, EFFECTIVE NOV. 24, 1989 PER RA NO. 6682) POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (BOOK III, TITLE I): a. POWER OF CONTROL (CHAPTER 1) b. ORDINANCE POWER (CHAPTER 2) c. POWER OVER ALIENS (CHAPTER 3) d. POWERS OF EMINENT DOMAIN, ESCHEAT, LAND RESERVATION AND RECOVERY OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH (CHAPTER 4) e. POWER OF APPOINTMENT (CHAPTER 5) f. GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (CHAPTER 6)

SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (CONT): 7. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF 1987 (EO NO. 292, JULY 25, 1987, EFFECTIVE NOV. 24, 1989 PER RA NO. 6682) POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (BOOK III, TITLE I) (CONT):
A.
g. OTHER POWERS (CHAPTER 7): g.1) SEC. 19. SUCH OTHER POWERS AS ARE PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. g.2) SEC. 20. RESIDUAL POWERS UNLESS CONGRESS PROVIDES OTHERWISE, THE PRESIDENT SHALL EXERCISE SUCH OTHER POWERS AND FUNCTIONS VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT WHICH ARE PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE LAWS AND WHICH ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY ENUMERATED ABOVE, OR WHICH ARE NOT DELEGATED BY THE PRESIDENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. (WRR)

B.
THE APPOINTING POWER. (*****) 1. APPOINTMENT 2. DISTINGUISH APPOINTMENT FROM COMMISSION 3. DISTINGUISH APPOINTMENT FROM DESIGNATION 4. DISTINGUISH PERMANENT FROM TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT 5. DISTINGUISH REGULAR FROM AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT 6. IF THE POWER TO APPOINT BELONGS TO THE PRESIDENT, CAN CONGRESS INTERFERS WITH IT BY PRESCRIBING THE QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC OFFICE? IF THE PRESIDENT APPOINTS ONE WHO LACKS QUALIFICATION, IS THIS ISSUE A POLITICAL QUESTION THAT CANNOT BE A SUBJECT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?

ANSWER TO NO. 6: SINCE THE APPOINMENT TO OFFICE IS AN EXECUTIVE FUNCTION, THE CLEAR IMPLICATION IS THAT THE LEGISLATURE MAY NOT USURP SUCH FUNCTION. THE LEGISLATURE MAY CREATE AN OFFICE AND PRESCRIBE THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PERSON WHO MAY HOLD THE OFFICE, BUT IT MAY NEITHER SPECIFY WHO SHALL BE APPOINTED TO SUCH NOR ACTUALLY APPOINT HIM. IF THE PRESIDENT APPOINTS ONE WHO LACKS THE QUALIFICATIONS, IT IS NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION; HENCE, IT CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF A JUDICIAL REVIEW.

B.
THE APPOINTING POWER. 7. THE PRESIDENT IN A PHONE CALL APPOINTED MEROLCO AS SECRETARY OF DECS. AFTER THE CALL, MEROLCO THROW OUT A LAVISH PARTY AND SPEND P200,000.00. BEFORE FORMALLY ACCEPTING THE APPOINTMENT, THE PRESIDENT APPOINTED AND ISSUED A COMMISION INSTEAD TO GSAS AS SECRETARY OF DECS. QUESTIONS: a) CAN MEROLCO SUE THE PRESIDENT FOR DAMAGES? b) IS THE APPOINTMENT OF GSAS LEGAL? 8. WHAT ARE THE CATEGORIES OF OFFICIALS WHO SUBJECT TO THE APPOINTING POWER OF PRESIDENT?***** ARE THE

C.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON THE APPOINTING POWER (SEC. 16, ART. VII): (*****) (1) THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOMINATE AND, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINMENTS, APPOINT THE HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS, OR OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM THE RANK OF COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN, AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION.

C.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON THE APPOINTING POWER (SEC. 16, ART. VII): (*****) (2) HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ALL OTHER OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THOSE WHOM HE MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINT. (3) THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, VEST THE APPOINTMENT OF OTHER OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK IN THE PRESIDENT ALONE, IN THE COURTS, OR IN THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS.

C. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON THE APPOINTING POWER (SEC. 16, ART. VII) *****
THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS DURING RECESS OF THE CONGRESS, WHETHER VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY, BUT SUCH APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVED BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR UNTIL THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS.

CATEGORIES OF OFFICIALS WHO ARE SUBJECT TO THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT:***** 1. THE HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS; 2. AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS; 3. OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM THE RANK OF COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN; 4. THOSE OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM BY THE CONSTITUTION;

CATEGORIES OF OFFICIAL WHO ARE SUBJEC TO THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT (CONT): ***** 5. ALL OTHER OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR BY LAW; AND 6. THOSE WHOM HE MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINT; 7. OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK WHOSE APPOINTMENTS THE CONGRESS MAY BY LAW VEST IN THE PRESIDENT ALONE.
THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT QUESTION: IS THE APPOINTMENT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BIR SUBJECT TO THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT?

D.
SARMIENTO III V. MISON (156 SCRA 549 [Dec. 17, 1987]). PETITION FOR PROHIBITION (12-2 Vote) (*****) 1. PETITIONERS SARMIENTO III & ARCILLA, TAXPAYERS AND MEMBERS OF IBP, CLAIMED THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF MISON AS COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS REQUIRES THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION. 2. RESPONDENTS MISON & CARAGUE MAINTAINED THAT SUCH APPOINTMENT DOES NOT NEED THE CONFIRMATION OF THE CA SINCE CONFIRMATION IS REQUIRED ONLY FOR THE OFFICERS MENTIONED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE VII, TO WIT:

a. b. c. d. THE HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS; AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS; OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM THE RANK OF COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN; OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT IN THE CONSTITUTION.
NO CONFIRMATION IS REQUIRED FOR: a. ALL OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW (Second Sentence, Constitution); b. THOSE WHOM THE PRESIDENT MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINT (Second Sentence, Constitution); AND c. THOSE OTHER OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK WHOSE APPOINTMENT IS VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT ALONE (Third Sentence, Constitution).

3. AMICUS CURIAE SENATOR NEPTALI GONZALES ARGUED THAT THE PHRASE IN THE SECOND SENTENCE HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT IMPLIES THAT THE PRESIDENT SHALL IN LIKE MANNER APPOINT THE OFFICERS MENTIONED IN THE SECOND SENTENCE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL APPOINT THE OFFICERS MENTIONED IN SAID SECOND SENTENCE IN THE SAME MANNER AS HE APPOINTS OFFICERS MENTIONED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE, THAT IS, BY NOMINATION AND WITH THE CONSENT (CONFIRMATION) OF THE CA. 4. MAJORITY OF THE COURT HELD THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IS NOT SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION, BEING OF THE RANK OF THE BUREAU DIRECTOR, WHO WAS PURPOSELY DELETED FROM THE LISTING OF THOSE WHOSE APPOINTMENTS HAD TO BE APPROVED BY THE CA. AS POINTED OUT BY THE

COURT: IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, HOWEVER, AS ALREADY POINTED OUT, THE CLEAR AND EXPRESSED INTENT OF ITS FRAMERS WAS TO EXCLUDE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS FROM CONFIRMATION BY THE CA, EXCEPT APPOINTMENTS TO OFFICES EXPRESSLY MENTIONED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE VII. 5. JUSTICE CRUZ DISSENTED: THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT BUREAU DIRECTORS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE CONFIRMED UNDER THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 16, BUT THAT IS NOT THE PROVISION WE OUGHT TO INTERPRET. IT IS THE SECOND SENTENCE WE MUST UNDERSTAND FOR A PROPER RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE NOW BEFORE US. SIGNIFICANTLY, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A LONG DISCUSSION OF THE FIRST SENTENCE IN THE CONCOM, THERE WAS NONE ON THE SECOND SENTENCE WE CAN THEREFORE SPECULATE ON THE CORRECT

INTERPRETATION OF THIS PROVISION IN THE LIGHT OF THE FIRST AND THIRD SENTENCES OF SECTION 16 OR BY BY READING THIS SECTION IN ITS TOTALITY. THE MAJORITY OPINION SAYS THAT THE SECOND SENTENCE IS THE EXCEPTION TO THE FIRST SENTENCE AND HOLDS THAT THE SETS OF OFFICERS SPECIFIED THEREIN MAY BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CA. THIS INTERPRETATION IS PREGNANT WITH MISCHIEVOUS IF NOT ALSO RIDICULOUS RESULTS THAT PRESUMABLY WERE NOT ENVISIONED BY THE FRAMERS.
ONE MAY WONDER WHY IT WAS FELT NECESSARY TO INCLUDE THE SECOND SENTENCE AT ALL, CONSIDERING THE MAJORITY OPINION THAT THE ENUMERATION IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE OFFICERS SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION IS EXCLUSIVE ON

THE BASIS OF EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS. IF THAT BE SO, THE FIRST SENTENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT BY ITSELF TO CONVEY THE IDEA THAT ALL OTHER APPOINTEES OF THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT NEED CONFIRMATION. MY OWN READING IS THAT THE SECOND SENTENCE IS BUT A CONTINUATION OF THE IDEA EXPRESSED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE AND SIMPLY MENTIONS THE OTHER OFFICERS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT WHO ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION.

IN MY VIEW, THE ONLY OFFICERS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT WHO ARE NOT SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION BY THE CA ARE: (1) THE MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS DEPUTIES, WHO ARE NOMINATED BY THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL; (2) THE VICE-PRESIDENT WHEN HE IS APPOINTED TO THE CABINET; AND (3) OTHER OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK, BUT ONLY WHEN THEIR APPOINTMENT IS VESTED BY LAW IN THE PRESIDENT ALONE.

E. QUESTION: MAY CONGRESS PASS A LAW ADDING TO THE CONSITUTIONAL LIST OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE THE APPROVAL OR CONFIRMATION BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS?

F.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE FUNCTION OF THE CA: (***) ALTHOUGH THE CA IS ASSEMBLED BY CONGRESS AND CAN MEET ONLY WHEN CONGRESS IS IN SESSION AND, THEREFORE, CAN, TO THAT EXTENT, BE IMMOBILIZED WHEN CONGRESS DECIDES TO ADJOURN (Guevara v. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379), THE CA IS A CREATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND NOT OF CONGRESS, AND IS NOT LEGISLATIVE BUT EXECUTIVE IN NATURE. AS THE SC SAID ALTHOUGH ITS MEMBERSHIP IS CONFINED TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, SAID COMMISSION IS INDEPENDENT OF CONGRESS IN FACT, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION ARE PURELY EXECUTIVE IN NATURE (Cunanan v. Tan, Jr., 5 SCRA 1). SO WHEN THE CA CHECKS THE APPOINTMENTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT, IT IS NOT STRICTLY A CASE OF THE LEGISLATIVE INTERFERRING WITH THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.

AD INTERIM VS. MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT: SEC. PAR., SEC. 16, ART. VII THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS DURING THE RECESS OF CONGRESS, WHETHER OR COMPULSORY, BUT SUCH APPOINTSMENT SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVAL BY THE CA OR UNTIL THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS. AD INTERIM OR RECESS APPOINTMENT IS ONE MADE BY THE PRESIDENT WHEN CONGRESS IS NOT IN SESSION.

AD INTERIM VS. MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT (CONT): MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT IS ONE MADE ALMOST AT THE END OF THE TERM OF AN INCUMBENT PRESIDENT TO FORESTALL THE RIGHTS AND PREROGATIVES OF HIS SUCCESSOR BY MAKING A PROSPECTIVE APPOINTMENT TO FILL AN OFFICE, THE TERM OF WHICH IS NOT TO BEGIN UNTIL HIS OWN TERM AND POWER HAVE EXPIRED. (SIGUIENTE VS. SEC. OF JUSTICE, GR NO. L-20370, NOV. 29, 1963)

AD INTERIM VS. MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT (CONT): AYTONA V. CASTILLO (4 SCRA 1) : FACTS: UPON ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE, PRES. MACAPAGAL ISSUED A0 NO. 2 RECALLING AND CANCELLING ALL ADINTERIM APPOINTMENTS MADE BY PRES. GARCIA AFTER DEC. 13, 1961. AMONG THESE APPOINTEES WAS DOMINADOR V. AYTONA AS GOV OF CENTRAL BANK. ON JAN. 1, 1962, ANDRES V. CASTILLO WAS APPOINTED, AD INTERIM, AS GOV. OF CENTRAL BANK BY MACAPAGAL. HE IMMEDIATELY QUALIFIED. BOTH CASTILLO AND AYTONA DISCHARGED THEIR DUTIES UNTIL JAN. 3, 1962 WHEN AYTONA WAS

AD INTERIM VS. MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT (CONT): AYTONA V. CASTILLO (4 SCRA 1) : PREVENTED BY A CONTIGENT OF THE AFP UPON ALLEGED INSTRUCTION OF CASTILLO, AYTONA THEN FILED THIS ACTION CONTESTING THE RIGHT OF CASTILLO TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS OF GOV. OF CENTRAL BANK.
HELD: THIS IS A CASE OF MIDNIGHT OF APPOINTMENT DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

G. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT: SECTION 14, ART. VII: APPOINTMENTS EXTENDED BY AN ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL REMAIN EFFECTIVE UNLESS REVOKED BY THE ELECTED PRESIDENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM HIS ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE. SECTION 15, ART. VII: TWO MONTHS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND UP TO THE END OF HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL NOT MAKE APPOINTMENTS EXCEPT TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE POSITIONS WHEN CONTINUED VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE PUBLIC SERVICE OR ENDANGER PUBLIC SAFETY. (NOTE: READ THE CJ CORONA CASE - DE CASTRO V. JBC & PGMA, GR NO. 191002, MAR 7 & APR 20, 2010)

G. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT: SECTION 15, ART. VII: TWO MONTHS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND UP TO THE END OF HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL NOT MAKE APPOINTMENTS EXCEPT TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE POSITIONS WHEN CONTINUED VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE PUBLIC SERVICE OR ENDANGER PUBLIC SAFETY. (NOTE: READ THE AYTONA V. CASTILLO CASE [ 4 SCRA 1] AND CJ CORONA CASE - DE CASTRO V. JBC & PGMA, GR NO. 191002, MAR 7 & APR 20, 2010)

G. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT: SECTION 15, ART. VII: THE OBVIOUS PURPOSE OF THIS PROVISION IS TO PREVENT THE USE, OR ABUSE, OF THE APPOINTING POWER FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENLISTING POLITICAL SUPPORT IN EXCHANGE FOR SOME APPOINTIVE OFFICE IN GOVT. THIS WILL ALSO PREVENT THE MID-NIGHT APPOINTMENTS THAT MAY OTHERWISE BE ISSUED BY AN OUTGOING PRESIDENT, AS HAPPENED IN THE CASE OF AYTONA V. CASTILLO (4 SCRA 1) WHERE THE FORMER WAS APPOINTED CB GOVERNOR BY GARCIA AFTER DEC. 13, 1961 AND THEN THE LATTER WAS APPOINTED TO THE SAME POSITION BY MACAPGAL ON JAN. 2, 1962. THE FORMER APPOINTMENT WAS RECALLED BY MACAPAGAL.

G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT: SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII, APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF SC: THE SUPREME COURT SHALL BE COMPOSED OF A CHIEF JUSTICE AND FOURTEEN ASSOCIATE JUSTICES. IT MAY SIT EN BANC OR IN ITS DISCRETION, IN DIVISION OF THREE, FIVE, OR SEVEN MEMBERS. ANY VACANCY SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN NINETY (90) FROM THE OCCURRENCE THEREOF.

G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT: SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII, APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF SC:
QUESTION: SUPPOSE THE 90-DAY REQUIREMENT IN SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII CONFLICTS WITH SEC. 15, ART. VII, PROHIBITING THE PRESIDENT FROM MAKING APPOINTMENTS DURING THE PERIOD OF 2 MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND UP TO THE END OF HIS TERM, IS THE INCUMBENT PRESIDENT BARRED FROM FILLING UP ANY VACANCY IN THE SUPREME COURT?

G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT: SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII: APPOINTMENTS OF MEMBERS OF SC:
IN IN RE MATEO A. VALENZUELA AND PLACIDO B. VALLARTE (298 SCRA 408), THE SC HELD THAT DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY SEC. 15, ART. VII, THE PRESIDENT IS NEITHER REQUIRED TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS TO THE COURTS NOR ALLOWED TO DO SO, AND SEC. 4(1) AND SEC. 9 OF ART. VIII SIMPLY MEAN THAT THE PRESIDENT IS REQUIRED TO FILL VACANCIES IN THE COURTS WITHIN THE TIME FRAMES PROVIDED

G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION OF THE APPOINTING POWER: SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII: APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF SC:
THEREIN UNLESS PROHIBITED BY SEC. 15, OF ART. VII. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE PROHIBITION ON APPOINTMENTS COMES INTO EFFECT ONLY ONCE EVERY SIX YEARS.

G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION OF THE APPOINTING POWER: SEC. 4 (1), ART. VIII: APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF SC:
IN THE DE CASTRO V. JBC & PGMA CASE, GR NO. 191002, MARCH 17, 2010 & APRIL 20, 2010 (THE CJ RENATO CORONA CASE), THE SC HELD THAT THE 2-MONTH RULE APPLIES ONLY TO APPOINTMENTS IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT BUT NOT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SC WHICH THE PRESIDENT IS MANDATED TO FILL UP WITHIN 90 DAYS FROM OCCURRENCE OF ANY VACANCY.

G.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT: SEC. 9, ART. VIII, APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE SC AND JUDGES OF THE LOWER COURTS:
THE MEMBERS OF THE SC AND JUDGES OF LOWER COURTS SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT FROM A LIST OF AT LEAST THREE NOMINEES PREPARED BY THE JBC FOR EVERY VACANCY. SUCH APPOINTMENTS NEED NO CONFIRMATION.
FOR THE LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENTS WITHIN 90 DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST.

H. THE REMOVAL POWER. QUESTIONS: 1. THE POWER TO APPOINT CARRIES WITH IT THE IMPLIED POWER TO REMOVE. IS THIS POWER TO REMOVE ABSOLUTE? 2. CAN AN OFFICER APPOINTED TO A 3-YEAR TERM BE LEGALLY REMOVED BY THE PRESIDENT EVEN BEFORE THE EXPIRY OF THE SAID TERM?

H. THE REMOVAL POWER. QUESTIONS: 3. CAN AN OFFICER APPOINTED TO A POSITION WITHOUT A FIXED TERM BE REMOVED BY THE PRESDENT ANYTIME? 4. CAN AN OFFICER WHOSE OFFICE WAS GIVEN A P1.00 BUDGET COMPLAIN OF CONSTRUCTIVE TERMINATION?

H.
THE REMOVAL POWER. (*****) 1. ALAJAR V. ALBA (100 Phil. 683) (VICE-MAYOR OF ROXAS CITY)
2. APARRI V. CA (127 SCRA 231) (GENERAL MANAGER OF NARRA)

AN OFFICER WHOSE OFFICE IS NOT FIXED BY LAW, HOLDS THE SAME AT THE PLEASURE OF THE APPOINTING POWER. WHEN HE IS REPLACED BY THE APPOINTING POWER OR HIS OFFICE ABOLISHED BY LAW, HE IS NOT CONSIDERED TERMINATED BUT THAT HIS TERM OF OFFICE HAS MERELY EXPIRED.

I.
THE CONTROL POWER. (*****) CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, SECTION 17, ARTICLE VII: THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE CONTROL OF ALL THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND OFFICES. HE SHALL ENSURE THAT THE LAWS BE FAITHFULLY EXECUTED. 1. THE POWER OF CONTROL
2. THE POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION

3. THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE

4. CONTROL IS DEFINED AS THE POWER OF AN OFFICER TO ALTER OR MODIFY OR NULLIFY OR SET ASIDE WHAT A SUBORDINATE OFFICER HAD DONE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AND TO SUBSTITUTE THE JUDGMENT OF THE FORMER FOR THAT OF THE LATTER (Montano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143).
5. SUPERVISION MEANS OVERSEEING OR THE POWER OR AUTHORITY OF AN OFFICER TO SEE THAT SUBORDINATE OFFICERS PERFORM THEIR DUTIES (Ibid).

5.1 POWER OF SUPERVISION SEC. 4, ART. X (LOCAL GOVT) THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHIL. SHAL L EXERCISE GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVT. PROVINCES WITH RESPECT TO COMPONENT CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES, AND CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES WITH RESPECT TO COMPONENT BARANGAYS SHALL ENSURE THAT THE ACTS OF THEIR COMPONENT UNITS ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR PRESCRIBED POWERS AND FUNCTIONS.

6. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONTROL AND SUPERVISION:
IN THE CASE OF DRILON V. LIM (235 SCRA 135), THE SC ELABORATED ON THE DISTINCTION THUS: AN OFFICER IN CONTROL LAYS DOWN THE RULES IN THE DOING OF AN ACT. IF THEY ARE NOT FOLLOWED, HE MAY, IN HIS DISCRETION, ORDER THE ACT UNDONE OR RE-DONE BY HIS SUBORDINATE OR HE MAY EVEN DECIDE TO DO IT HIMSELF. SUPERVISION DOES NOT COVER SUCH AUTHORITY. THE SUPERVISOR OR SUPERINTENDENT MERELY SEES TO IT THAT THE RULES ARE FOLLOWED, BUT HE HIMSELF DOES NOT LAY DOWN SUCH RULES, NOR DOES HE HAVE THE DISCRETION TO MODIFY OR REPLACE THEM.

6. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONTROL AND SUPERVISION:
IN THE CASE OF DRILON V. LIM (235 SCRA 135), THE SC ELABORATED ON THE DISTINCTION THUS (CONTINUED):
IF THE RULES ARE NOT OBSERVED, HE MAY ORDER THE WORK DONE OR RE-DONE BUT ONLY TO CONFORM TO THE PRESCRIBED RULES. HE MAY NOT PRESCRIBE HIS OWN MANNER FOR THE DOING OF THE ACT. HE HAS NO JUDGMENT ON THIS MATTER EXCEPT TO SEE TO IT THAT THE RULES ARE FOLLOWED. 7. TAKE CARE CLAUSE - THE POWER TO INSURE THAT ALL LAWS ARE FAITHFULLY EXECUTED.

7.1 THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE THE LAW THE PRESIDENT IS SUPPOSED TO ENFORCE INCLUDES THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF, STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS, MUNICIPAL ORDINANCIES, WAS WELL AS TREATIES ENTERED INTO BY OUR GOVERNMENT. QUESTION:
IS THE PRESIDENT EMPOWERED NOT TO ENFORCE A LAW WHICH IN HIS BELIEF IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

J.
THE MILITARY POWER (SECTION 18, ARTICLE VII). (*****) THIS SECTION BOLSTER THE PRINCIPLE ANNOUNCED IN ARTICLE II, SECTION 3, THAT: CIVILIAN AUTHORITY IS, AT ALL TIMES, SUPREME OVER THE MILITARY. BY MAKING THE PRESIDENT THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL THE ARMED FORCES, THE CONSTITUTION LESSENS THE DANGER OF A MILITARY TAKE-OVER OF THE GOVERNMENT IN VIOLATION OF ITS REPUBLICAN NATURE. THE MILITARY POWER ENABLES THE PRESIDENT TO: (*****) 1. COMMAND ALL THE ARMED FORCES; 2. SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; AND 3. DECLARE MARTIAL LAW.

1. COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES: THE POWER OF THE SWORD MAKES THE PRESIDENT THE MOST IMPORTANT FIGURE IN THE COUNTRY IN TIMES OF WAR OR OTHER SIMILAR EMRGENCY. HE CAN: a. ORGANIZE COURT MARTIAL FOR THE DISCIPLINE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES VIOLATING MILITARY LAW; RUFFY V. CHIEF OF STAFF (75 Phil. 875) COURT MARTIAL IS AN AGENCY OF EXECUTIVE IN CHARACTER WHICH MAY BE CONVENED BY THE PRESIDENT INDEPENDENTLY OF LEGISLATION AND BY VIRTUE OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTION AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. THESE ARE NOT JUDICIARY COURTS.

b. CREATE MILITARY COMMISSION FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMMINALS. KURODA V. JALANDONI (42 O.G. 4282) THE SUPREME COURT, CITING THE EARLIER CASE OF YAMASHITA V. STYER (75 Phil. 563), WHICH UPHELD THE JURISDICTION OF MILITARY COMMISSION OVER WAR CRIMMINALS, DECLARED THAT THE PROMULGATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68 ESTABLISHING WAR CRIMES OFFICE WAS AN EXERCISE BY THE PRESIDENT OF HIS POWERS AS COMMANDIER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL OUR ARMED FORCES. AQUINO V. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 2 (63 SCRA 546, [1975]) THE SUPREME COURT UPHELD THE POWER OF THE PRES. TO CREATE MILITARY TRIBUNALS AUTHORIZED TO TRY NOT ONLY MILITARY PERSONNEL BUT ALSO CIVILIANS EVEN IF AT THAT TIME CIVIL COURTS WERE OPEN AND FUNCTIONING, THUS, REJECTING THE OPEN COURT THEORY OBSERVED IN THE UNITED STATES.

OLAQUER V. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34 (150 SCRA 144, [MAY 22, 1987]). - IN THIS CASE, HOWEVER, THE AQUINO DECISION WAS REVERSED AND IT WAS HELD IN PART: DUE PROCESS OF LAW DEMANDS THAT IN ALL CRIMMINAL PROSECUTIONS (WHERE THE ACCUSED STANDS TO LOSE EITHER HIS LIFE OR HIS LIBERTY), THE ACCUSED SHALL BE ENTITLED TO, AMONG OTHERS, A TRIAL. THE TRIAL CONTEMPLATED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN RELATION TO THE CHARTER AS A WHOLE, IS A TRIAL BY JUDICIAL PROCESS, NOT BY EXECUTIVE OR MILITARY PROCESS. A MILITARY COMMISSION OR TRIBUNAL, BY WHATEVER NAME THEY ARE CALLED, ARE NOT COURTS WITHIN THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

c. CALL OUT THE ARMED FORCES TO PREVENT OR SUPRESS LAWLESS VIOLENCE, INVASION, OR REBELLION. IBP V. ZAMORA (338 SCRA 81) - IBP QUESTIONED THE COMMAND OF PRES. ESTRADA DEPLOYING THE PHIL. MARINES TO JOIN THE PNP IN VISIBILITY PATROLS AROUND METRO MANILA FOR THE PURPOSE OF CRIME PREVENTION. THE ORDER WAS OBVIOUSLY BASED ON THE DETERIORATING PEACE AND ORDER IN THE METROPOLIS. THE IBP CONTENDED THAT THERE WAS NO EMERGENCY OR A STATE OF LAWLESS VIOLENCE TO WARRANT THE CALLING OF THE ARMED FORCES, WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF MILITARIZING THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PREJUDICE OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES AND THE SUPREMACY OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITY.

IBP V. ZAMORA (CONTINUATION) THE SUPREME COURT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION, HOLDING THAT INASMUCH AS THE IBP HAD NOT SHOWN THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING HIS COMMAND, IT WAS NOT INCLINED TO OVERRULE THE PRESIDENTS DETERMINATION OF THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE CALLING OF THE MARINES.

2. SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 1935 CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS (SEC. 14, ART. III): THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED EXCEPT IN CASES OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, IN ANY OF WHICH EVENTS THE SAME MAY BE SUSPENDED WHENEVER DURING SUCH PERIOD THE NECESSITY FOR SUCH SUSPENSION SHALL EXIST. 1973 CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS (SEC. 15, ART.1V): THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED EXCEPT IN CASES OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT .

1935 CONSTITUION, SEC. 10 (2), ART. VII: IN CASE OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 1973 CONSTITUTION, SEC. 11, ART. VII: IN CASE OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 1987 CONSTITUTION, SEC. 18, ART. VII: IN CASE OF INVASION, OR REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY, FOR A PERIOD OF NOT EXCEEDING 60 DAYS, SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF HABEAS CORPUS
QUESTION:
WHAT IS THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS?
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS A PREROGATIVE WRIT OF LIBERTY EMPLOYED TO TEST THE VALIDITY OF A PERSONS DETENTION. IF HE IS RESTRAINED OF HIS LIBERTY, HE OR SOMEONE ACTING ON HIS BEHALF MAY FILE A PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS TO SECURE HIS RELEASE.
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

THE WRIT IS DIRECTED TO THE PERSON DETAINING ANOTHER, COMMANDING HIM TO PRODUCE THE BODY OF THE PRISONER AT A DESIGNATED TIME AND PLACE, WITH THE DAY AND CAUSE OF HIS CAPTION AND DETENTION, TO DO, TO SUBMIT TO, AND RECEIVE WHATEVER THE COURT OR JUDGE AWARDING THE WRIT SHALL CONSIDER IN HIS BEHALF. IT IS A HIGH PREROGATIVE COMMON LAW WRIT OF ANCIENT ORIGIN THE GREAT OBJECT OF WHICH IS THE LIBERATION OF THOSE WHO MAY BE IN PRISON WITHOUT SUFFICIENT CAUSE. (MORAN, RULES OF COURT, VOL. II, 499).

1987 CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS (SEC. 15, ART. III): THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED EXCEPT IN CASES OF INVASION OR REBELLION, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT. (SEC. 13, ART. III) THE RIGHT TO BAIL SHALL NOT BE IMPAIRED EVEN WHEN THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS SUSPENDED MONTENEGRO V. CASTANEDA (91 Phil. 882) IN 1951, PRES. QUIRINO BASED HIS SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ON SEDITION AND IMMINENT DANGER OF INSURRECTION OR REBELLION. IF HE HAD NOT ADDED THE LATTER GROUND, WHICH WAS LISTED IN THE 1935 CHARTER, THE SC WOULD HAVE INVALIDATED HIS PROCLAMATION.

BARCELON V. BAKER (5 Phil. 87) and MONTNENGRO V. CASTANEDA (91 Phil. 882) CASES, THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE DETERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES OF THE EXISTENCE OF ANY OF THE GROUNDS PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD BE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS. THE JUSTIFICATION WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT, WITH ALL THE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AVAILABLE TO HIM AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, WAS IN A BETTER POSTION THAN THE SUPREME COURT TO ASCERTAIN THE REAL STATE OF PEACE AND ORDER IN THE COUNTRY. IN SHORT, IN THESE TWO CASES, THE DETERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE FACTUAL BASIS, WAS CONSIDERED A POLITICAL QUESTION AND BEYOND THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE JUDICIARY.

LANSANG V. GARCIA (42 SCRA 448) THE DOCTRINE IN THE BARCELON AND MONTENEGRO CASES WAS ABANDONED IN THE LANSANG CASE WHERE THE SUPREME COURT DECLARED THAT IT HAD THE POWER TO INQUIRE INTO THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BY PRES. MARCOS IN AUG. 1971 AND TO ANNUL THE SAME IF NO LEGAL GROUND COULD BE ESTABLISHED. AFTER HEARINGS, HOWEVER, A UNANIMOUS COURT, AFTER SATISFYING ITSELF THAT THERE WAS ACTUALLY A MASSIVE AND SYSTEMATIC COMMUNIST-OIRIENTED CAMPAIGN TO OVERTHROW THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. BY FORCE, AS CLAIMED BY THE PRESIDENT, DECIDED TO UPHOLD THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

GARCIA-PADILLA V. ENRILE (121 SCRA 472) IN THIS CASE, HOWEVER, THE SUPREME COURSE REVERSED THE LANSANG DECISION AND REVIVED THE BAKER AND MONTENEGRO DOCTRINES, REITERATING THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WAS A POLITICAL QUESTION TO BE RESOLVED SOLELY BY THE PRESIDENT. 1987 CONSTITUTION (PAR. 3, SEC. 18, ART. VII) THIS PROVISION, HOWEVER, HAS ABROGATED THE GARCIA-PADILLA DOCTRINE AND EXPRESSLY CONSITUTIONLIZED THE LANSANG DOCTRINE, THUS NOW, THE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT... NOTE BENE: PAR. 2, SECTION 1, ARTICLE VIII JUDICIAL POWER ON GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.

3. DECLARE MARTIAL LAW. 1935 CONSTITUTION (SEC. 10[2], ART. VII) . . . IN CASE OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY . . . PLACE THE PHILIPPINES OR ANY PART THEREOF UNDER MARTIAL LAW. 1973 CONSTITUTION (SEC. 11, ART. VII) SAME PROVISION.
1987 CONSTITUION (SEC. 18, ART. VII) IN CAS OF INVASION, REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY, FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING 60 DAYS, PLACE THE PHILIPPINES OR ANY PART THEREOF UNDER MARTIAL LAW. MORE THAN THIS, CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION AND APPROVAL IS ALREADY NECESSARY.

AQUINO V. ENRILE (59 SCRA 183). IN THIS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, BY UNANIMOUS VOTE OF ITS MEMBERS THEN, SUSTAINED THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW BY PRES. MARCOS ON SEPT. 23, 1973, BUT NO CLEAR CONSENSUS WAS REACHED ON THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE COMMON CONCLUSION. FOR THIS REASON, EACH OF THE JUSTICES SUBMITTED HIS OWN OPINION OF THE RATIONALE FOR SUCH PROCLAMATION. MARTIAL LAW UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUION CONFORMS WITH WILLOUGHBY THAT MARTIAL LAW IN ITS STRICT SENSE REFERS TO THAT LAW WHICH HAS APPLICATION WHEN THE MILITARY ARM DOES NOT SUPERSED CIVIL AUTHORITY BUT IS CALLED UPON TO AID IT IN THE EXECUTION OF ITS CIVIL FUNCTION.

4.
LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY POWERS. (*****) THE 1987 CONSTITUTION HAS PROVIDED FOR THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE ORIGINAL AUTHORITY OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: a. HE MAY CALL OUT THE ARMED FORCES WHEN IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO PREVENT OR SUPRESS LAWLESS VIOLENCE, INVASION, OR REBELLION ONLY.
b. THE GROUNDS FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PROCLMATION OF MARTIAL LAW ARE NOW LIMITED ONLY TO INVASION OR REBELLION, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT.

4.
LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY POWERS: (*****) c. THE DURATION OF SUCH SUSPENSION OR PROCLAMATION SHALL NOT EXCEED SIXTY (60) DAYS, FOLLOWING WHICH IT SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY LIFTED. d. WITHIN FORTY EIGHT HOURS AFTER SUCH SUSPENSION OR PROCLAMATION, THE PRESIDENT SHALL PERSONALLY OR IN WRITING REPORT HIS ACTION TO THE CONGRESS. IF NOT IN SESSION, CONGRESS MUST CONVENE WITHIN 24 HOURS WITHOUT NEED OF A CALL. e. CONGRESS MAY THEN, BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS MEMBERS VOTING JOINTLY, REVOKE HIS ACTION.

4.
LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY POWERS: (*****) f. THE REVOCATION MAY NOT BE SET ASIDE BY THE PRESIDENT.
g. BY THE SAME VOTE AND IN THE SAME MANNER, THE CONGRESS MAY, UPON INITIATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT, EXTEND HIS SUSPENSION OR PROCLAMATION FOR A PERIOD TO BE DETERMINED BY THE CONGRESS IF THE INVASION OR REBELLION SHALL CONTINUE AND THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES THE EXTENSION.

4.
LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY POWERS: (*****) h. THE ACTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS SHALL BE SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT WHICH SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF SUCH ACTION. THIS MATTER IS NO LONGER CONSIDERED A POLITICAL QUESTION AND MAY BE RAISED IN AN APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING BY ANY CITIZEN. MOREVER, THE SUPREME COURT MUST DECIDE THE CHALLENGE WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE TIME IT IS FILED.

4.
LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY POWERS: (*****) i. MARTIAL LAW DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OR THE OPERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. THE CIVIL COURTS AND THE LEGISLATIVE BODIES SHALL REMAIN OPEN. MILITARY COURTS AND AGENCIES ARE NOT CONFERRED JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS WHERE THE CIVIL COURTS ARE OPEN.

4.
LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY POWERS: (*****) j. THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHALL APPLY ONLY TO PERSONS FACING CHARGES OF REBELLION OR OFFENSES INHERENT IN OR DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH INVASION. k. ANY PERSON ARRESTED FOR SUCH OFFENSES MUST BE JUDICIALLY CHARGED THEREWITH WITHIN THREE (3) DAYS. OTHERWISE, HE SHALL BE RELEASED.

5. JURISPRUDENTIAL LEGACY OF MARTIAL LAW WITH THE DECISION IN SANIDAD V. COMELEC (73 SCRA 333 (OCT. 12, 1976), THE MAIN LINEAMENTS OF PHIL. MARTIAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE HAD BEEN DRAWN:
a) THE MARTIAL LAW PROCLAMATION OF 1972 WAS VALIDLY MADE ON THE BASIS OF AN EXISTING REBELLION;
b) THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW CARRIED WITH IT THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

5. JURISPRUDENTIAL LEGACY OF MARTIAL LAW c) THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR COULD LEGISLATE ON ANY MATTER RELATED TO THE WELFARE OF THE NATION; d) HE COULD CREATE MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND CONFER ON THEM JURISDICTION TO TRY CIVILIANS FOR CRIMES RELATED TO THE PURPOSE OF MARTIAL RULE; e) IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY OTHER OPERATIVE CONSTITUENT BODY HE COULD EVEN PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.

ALL OF THE ABOVE, MOREOVER, ARE CONFIRMED BY THE BROAD GRANT OF POWER FOUND IN ARTICLE XVII, SEC 3(2), OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION WHICH WAS ITSELF RATIFIED IN A MOST UNIQUE MANNER. THE SUPREME COURT WAS TO ADD LATER THAT, UNDER MARTIAL LAW, CLAIMS OF DENIAL OF SPEEDY TRIAL ARE UNAVAILING (OCAMPO V. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 25, 109 SCRA 22, Nov. 6, 1981), AND THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ALSO SUSPENDS THE RIGHT TO BAIL (BUSCAYNO V. MILITARY COMMISSION NOS. 1, 2, 6, and 25, 109 SCRA 273, Nov. 19, 1981).

ON JAN. 17, 1981, ON THE EVE OF THE VISIT OF POPE JOHN PAUL II TO THE PHILS, MARTIAL LAW WAS LIFTED BY PROC. NO. 2045. BUT NOT REALLY. IF THE HEART OF MARTIAL LAW IS THE CONCENTRATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS IN THE HANDS OF THE EXECUTIVE, THE EQUIVALENT OF MARTIAL LAW REMAINED AS PART OF NORMAL DAY TO DAY GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS THE EFFECT OF AMENDMENT NO. 6 OF 1976 WHICH GRANTED FULL LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE PRESIDENT (THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY, VOLUME II, FIRST EDITION, 1988, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

6. THE NEW MARTIAL LAW DOCTRINE IT WAS UNDER THE SHADOW OF THIS JURISPRUDENTIAL LEGACY OF THE MARCOS REGIME THAT THE 1986 CONCOM WENT ABOUT FORMULATING THE MARTIAL LAW DOCTRINE OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. IN SUM, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION: 1) NARROWED THE GROUNDS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, 2) LIMITED THE DISCRETION OF THE PRESIDENT AND PUT IT UNDER REVIEW POWERS OF CONGRESS AND OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND 3) REJECTED THE BULK OF MARTIAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE THAT HAD DEVELOP UNDER PRESIDENT MARCOS.

UNDER BOTH THE 1935 AND 1973 CONSTITUTIONS, THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS COULD BE SUSPENDED AND MARTIAL LAW COULD BE IMPOSED IN CASE OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT. THE 1987 CONSTITUTION HAS NARROWED THE GROUNDS TO [ACTUAL] INVASION OR REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT.

UNDER THE 1935 AND 1973 CONSTITUTION THE PRESIDENT COULD SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE AND IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW FOR AN INDEFINITE DURATION AND CONGRESS HAD NO POWER TO CURTAIL HIM OR REVIEW HIS DECISION. UNDER THE 1987 CONSITUTION, THE INITIAL SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE AND THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IS STILL FOR THE PRESIDENT TO DECIDE BUT THEY CAN ONLY BE FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING SIXTY (60) DAYS. (THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY, VOLUME II, FIRST EDITION, 1988, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.

K.
THE PARDONING POWER: (*****) 1. DEFINITION OF TERMS: a. b. c. d. e. f. PARDON COMMUNTATION REPRIEVE PARDON VS. PAROLE PARDON VS. PAROLE VS. PROBATION PARDON VS. AMNESTY
2. KINDS OF PARDON: a. ABSOLUTE VS. CONDITIONAL b. PLENARY VS. PARTIAL

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. (*****) 3. LIMITATIONS ON THE PARDONING POWER: a. CAN PARDON BE GRANTED IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT? b. CAN PARDON BE GRANTED FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY ELECTION LAW? c. CAN PARDON BE GRANTED EVEN BEFORE CONVICTION BY FINAL JUDGMENT? d. CAN PARDON BE EXTENDED TO A PERSON CONVICTED OF LEGISLATIVE CONTEMPT. e. CAN PARDON BE EFFECTIVE EVEN IF THE PARDONEE (CONVICTED PERSON) DOES NOT ACCEPT IT?

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 4. NATURE OF PARDON. UNITED STATES V. WILSON, (7 Pet 150 [1833]) C.J. MARSHALL SAID: A PARDON IS AN ACT OF GRACE, PROCEEDING FROM THE POWER ENTRUSTED WITH THE EXECUTION OF THE LAWS, WHICH EXEMPTS THE INDIVIDUAL ON WHOM IT IS BESTOWED, FROM THE PUNISHMENT THE LAW INFLICTS FOR A CRIME HE HAS COMMITTED. IT IS THE PRIVATE, THOUGH OFFICIAL ACT OF THE EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE, DELIVERED TO THE INDIVIDUAL FOR WHOSE BENEFIT IT IS INTENDED, AND NOT COMMUNICATED OFFICALLY TO THE COURT

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 4. NATURE OF PARDON. UNITED STATES V. WILSON, (7 Pet 150 [1833]) (CONT): A PARDON IS A DEED, TO THE VALIDITY OF WHICH DELIVERY IS ESSENTIAL, AND DELIVERY IS NOT COMPLETE WITHOUT ACCEPTANCE. IT MAY THEN BE REJECTED BY THE PERSON TO WHOM IT IS TENDERED; AND IF IT BE REJECTED, WE HAVE DISCOVERED NO POWER IN A COURT TO FORCE IT ON HIM.

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. (*****) 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. EX PARTE GARLAND (71 U.S. 333) FACTS: IN 1865, THE US CONGRESS PASSED A LAW THAT EFFECTIVELY BEBARRED FORMER MEMBERS OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT BY REQUIRING A LOYALTY OATH BE RECITED BY ANY FEDERAL COURT OFFICER AFFIRMING THAT THE OFFICER HAD NEVER SERVED IN THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT. AUGUSTUS HILL GARLAND, AN ATTORNEY AND FORMER CONFEDERATE SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS, HAD PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED A PARDON FROM PRES. ANDREW JOHNSON. GARLAND PETITIONED THE US SUPREME COURT TO DECLARE THE ACT OF CONGRESS AS A BILL OF ATTAINDER AND AN

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. EX PARTE GARLAND (CONT): EX POST FACTO LAW WHICH UNFAIRLY PUNISHED HIM FOR THE CRIME HE HAD BEEN PARDONED FOR AND WAS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. DECISION: IN A 5-4 VOTE, THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT THE LAW WAS INDEED A BILL OF ATTAINDER AND AN EX-POST FACTO LAW. THE COURT RULED THAT GARLAND WAS BEYOND THE REACH OF PUNISHMENT OF ANY KIND DUE TO HIS PRIOR PRESIDENTIAL PARDON. THE COURT ALSO STATED THAT COUNSELORS ARE OFFICERS OF THE COURT AND NOT OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT THEIR REMOVAL WAS AN EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND NOT LEGISLATIVE POWER. THE LAW WAS STRUCK DOWN, OPENING THE WAY FOR FORMER CONFEDERATE GOVERNEMNT OFFICIALS TO RETURN TO THE POSITIONS WITHIN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY.

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. EX PARTE GARLAND (CONT): JUSTICE FILED SAID A PARDON REACHES BOTH THE PUNISHMENT PRESCRIBED FOR THE OFFENSE AND THE GUILT OF THE OFFENDER; AND WHEN THE PARDON IS FULL, IT RELEASES THE PUNISHMENT AND BLOTS OUT THE EXISTENCE OF GUILT, SO THAT IN THE EYE OF THE LAW, THE OFFENDER IS AS INNOCENT AS IF HE HAD NEVER COMMITTED THE OFFENSE . . . IT MAKES HIM, AS IT WERE, A NEW MAN, AND GIVES HIM A NEW CREDIT AND CAPACITY. GARLAND WAS THEREAFTER RE-ADMITTED AND RE-INSTATED TO HIS FORMER POSITION AS ATTORNEY AND COUSELOR OF THE (FEDERAL) COURT.

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. PELOBELLO V. PALATINO (72 Phil. 441 [1941]). THE LEGAL EFFECT OF A PARDON IS TO RESTORE NOT ONLY THE OFFENDERS LIBERTY BUT ALSO HIS CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. IN THIS CASE, A MAYORS ELECTION WAS CONTESTED ON THE GROUND THAT HE WAS DISQUALIFIED FROM PUBLIC OFFICE BECAUSE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION AND IMPRISONMENT. IT WAS SHOWN, HOWEVER, THAT BEFORE ASSUMING OFFICE FOLLOWING HIS ELECTION HE WAS GRANTED AN ABSOLUTE PARDON BY PRES. QUEZON. AS A RESULT, THE SUPREME COURT HELD, HIS FORMER DISABILITIES HAD BEEN REMOVED, AND HE WAS THEREFORE ELIGIBLE FOR THE PUBLIC OFFICE IN QUESTION.

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. NOTA BENE: THE EX PARTE GARLAND DOCTRINE WAS APPLIED IN PELOBELLO V. PALATINO CASE, CRISTOBAL V. LABRADOR CASE (71 PHIL. 34 [1940]), AND SEVERAL OTHER CASES. .

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. MONSANTO V. FACTORAN (170 SCRA 190) THE EX PARTE GARLAND DOCTRINE, AS APPLIED IN THE PELOBELLO AND CRISTOBAL CASES, HOWEVER, WAS MODIFIED IN THIS CASE WHERE A WOMAN CONVICTED OF ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS WAS GRANTED AN ABSOLUTE PARDON AND THEREAFTER CLAIMED SHE WAS ENTITLED AS A CONSEQUENCE TO REINSTATEMENT AS ASSISTANT CITY TREASURER WHICH THE COURT DID NOT AGREE.

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. MONSANTO V. FACTORAN: C.J. FERNAN SAID: PARDON CANNOT MASK THE ACTS CONSTITUTING THE CRIME. THESE ARE HISTORICAL FACTS WHICH, DESPITE A PUBLIC MANIFESTATION OF MERCY AND FORGIVENESS IMPLICIT IN PARDON, ORDINARY PRUDENT MEN WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR SUBSEQUENT DEALINGS WITH THE ACTOR. PARDON GRANTED AFTER CONVICTION FREES THE INDIVIDUAL FROM ALL THE PENALTIES AND LEGAL DISABILITIES AND RESTORES HIM TO ALL HIS CIVIL RIGHTS. BUT UNLESS EXPRESSLY GROUNDED ON THE

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. MONSANTO V. FACTORAN: ERSONS INNOCENCE (WHICH IS RARE), IT CANNOT BRING BACK LOST REPUTATION FOR HONESTY, INTEGRITY AND FAIR DEALING. THIS MUST BE CONSTANTLY KEPT IN MIND LEST WE LOSE TRACK OF THE TRUE CHARACTER AND PURPOSE OF THE PRIVILEGE.

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. MONSANTO V. FACTORAN: THUS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXPANSIVE AND EFFUSIVE LANGUAGE OF THE GARLAND CASE, WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE COMMONLY-HELD OPINION THAT PARDON DOES NOT IPSO FACTO RESTORE A CONVICTED FELON TO PUBLIC OFFICE NECESSARILY RELINQUISHED OR FORFEITED BY REASON OF THE CONVICTION ALTHOUGH SUCH PARDON UNDOUBTEDLY RESTORES HIS ELIGIBILITY FOR APPOINTMENT TO THAT OFFICE.
AUTHORITIES
1.
PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, 2002 EDITION, ISAGANI A. CRUZ, RETIRED ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VOLUME II, FIRST EDITION, 1988, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.
2.

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LECTURE PRESENTATION FOR LAW STUDENTS

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

RULES OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS: