Mark Clemente y Martinez v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 194367 15 June 2011 VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which denied petitioners appeal. The petitioner, Martinez, was charged with violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner gave a fake P 500.00 bill to Francis de la Cruz to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail bakery but was refused because it was found out that it was fake. So, Francis de la Cruz reported the matter to jail officers. Consequently, the jail guards conducted a surprise inspection and found out 23 more fake 500 bills in the wallet of the accused. The defense of the accused was the defense of frame up. After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The RTC gave credence to the prosecution's witnesses in finding that the counterfeit money were discovered in petitioner's possession during a surprise inspection, and that the possibility that the counterfeit money were planted to incriminate petitioner was almost nil considering the number of pieces involved. As to the elements of the crime, the RTC held that the fact that the P500.00 bills found in petitioners possession were forgeries was confirmed by the certification issued by the Cash Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. On appeal before the CA, petitioner argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article 168 of the RPC. Petitioner contended that one of the elements of the crime which is intent to use the counterfeit bills was not established because the informant Francis dela Cruz did not take the witness stand. Whether all the elements of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank note in this case are present?

Issue:

Resolution: Petitioner Mark Clemente y Martinez alias Emmanuel Dino is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false bank notes defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments. In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill. Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge. In this case, the non-presentation of the informant as witness weakens the prosecution's evidence since he was the only one who had knowledge of the act which manifested petitioner's intent to use a counterfeit bill. The prosecution had every opportunity to present Francis dela Cruz as its witness, if in fact such person existed, but it did not present him. Hence, the trial court did not have before it evidence of an essential element of the crime.

People of the Philippines v. Urban Salcedo, et al G.R No. 186523 22 June 2011 PERALTA, J.:

Facts:

This is a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals about kidnapping case of Abu Sayyaf Group of Shiela Tabunag, Reina Malonzo, Ediborah Yap and Joel Guillo. In Criminal Case No. 3537-1129, for the kidnapping of Joel Guillo, accused-appellants were sentenced to reclusion perpetua; in Criminal Case No. 3608-1164, for the kidnapping of Reina Malonzo, they were sentenced to Death; in Criminal Case No. 3611-1165, for the kidnapping of Sheila Tabuag, they were sentenced to Death; and in Criminal Case No. 3674-1187, for the kidnapping of Ediborah Yap, they were also sentenced to Death. In the Brief for Accused-Appellants filed with the CA, it was argued that the prosecutions evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It was further averred that some of the accused-appellants were merely forced to join the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) for fear for their lives and those of their relatives, while four (4) of them, namely, Wahid Salcedo, Magarni Hapilon Iblong, Nadzmer Mandangan and Kamar Jaafar, were supposedly minors at the time the alleged kidnapping took place; hence, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344 (otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006), should apply to said accused-appellants. It was then prayed that accused-appellants Nadzmer Isnani Madangan, Magarni Hapilon Iblong, Wahid Salcedo, Kamar Jaafar, Abdulajid Ngaya, Lidjalon Sakandal and Sonny Asali be acquitted, while the sentence for the rest of the accused-appellants be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:

Whether to change the penalty imposed because the State had not been able to prove accused-appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the defense failed to adduce proof of minority of the four accused-appellants.

Resolution: The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Records reveal that the prosecution witnesses were unwavering in their account of how accused-appellants worked together to abduct and guard their kidnapped victims, fight-off military forces who were searching and trying to rescue said victims, and how ransom was demanded and paid. The prosecution likewise presented two former members of the ASG who testified that they were part of the group that reinforced the kidnappers and helped guard the hostages. They both identified accused-appellants as their former comrades. In the face of all that evidence, the only defense accused-appellants could muster are denial and alibi, and for accused-appellants Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar, their alleged minority. Accused-appellants' proffered defense are sorely wanting when pitted against the prosecutions evidence. It is established jurisprudence that denial and alibi cannot prevail over the witnesses' positive identification of the accused-appellants. The detention of the hostages lasted for several months and they were transferred from one place to another, being always on the move for several days. Thus, in this case, for accused-appellants' alibi to prosper, they are required to prove their whereabouts for all those months. This they were not able to do, making the defense of alibi absolutely unavailing.

People of the Philippines v. Alberto Anticamara y Cabillo, et al. G.R No. 178771 8 June 2011 PERALTA, J.:

Facts: This is an appeal of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's judgment finding appellants Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando) and Alberto Cabillo Anticamara (Al) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. About the early morning of May 7, 2002, in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, Lando and Al, being then armed with a hand gun, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take Sulpacio Abad, driver of the Estrellas, hog tied him, brought to a secluded place, shoot and bury in a shallow grave. In his defense, Lando denied having committed the crimes charged and interposed alibi as a defense. He claims that at the time of the incident on May 7, 2002, he was in Barangay Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac, with his family. He denied ever going to the Estrella farm in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan. Al claimed that he acted as a lookout and was tasked to report to his companions if any person or vehicle would approach the house of the Estrellas. He said that he was forced to follow what was ordered of him and did not report the matter to the police because he was threatened to be killed, including the members of his family who were in Cebu. Issue: Are the appellants guilty of murder and kidnapping and serious illegal detention?

Resolution: The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00556 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. For Murder: The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio in the early morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime. Moreover, there was a conspiracy between the perpetrators and the defense of denial was not given weight since there was a positive identification of the accused by the witness, AAA. As to the defense of alibi, aside from the testimony of appellant Lando that he was in Tarlac at the time of the incident, the defense was unable to show that it was physically impossible for Lando to be at the scene of the crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. For Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention: The Court finds appellant Lando guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape. The crime of kidnapping was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Appellants Lando and Al, both private individuals, forcibly took AAA, a female, away from the house of the Estrellas and held her captive against her will. Thereafter, appellant Lando brought AAA to his house in San Miguel Tarlac, whereby she was deprived of her liberty for almost one month. It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. The crime of rape was also established by the prosecution. Appellant Lando succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of threat and intimidation. AAA testified that on May 9, 2002, appellant Lando brought her to a hotel to hide her from Fred and Bert, who intended to kill her. Appellant Lando told her to follow his orders, otherwise, he will give her to Fred and Bert. While in the hotel, appellant Lando raped her.

People of the Philippines v. Efren Patelan Lambarte et al G.R No. 182918 6 June 2011 BRION, J.:

Facts:

At about 6:00 p.m. of September 22, 2004, Eulalia Garcia was tending her sari-sari store along the National Highway in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union when the appellant and Lamberte came to borrow her gas lamp. She noticed that both were drunk and armed. They said they were looking for a bullet that fell on the ground. After finding the bullet, she asked them where they were going and they answered, We are going to kill the doctor. The two then waited under a mango tree. Shortly thereafter, the victim, on board a truck, passed by Garcias store on the way to his poultry farm. The appellant and Lamberte followed on foot. Ten minutes later, Garcia heard two gunshots coming from the direction of the poultry farm. It appears that the victim arrived at his poultry farm at around 7:00 p.m. to deliver medicines and bread to his workers, Alvin Manolong, Crispino Yaranon and Ferrer Anasario. After the delivery, the victim instructed the workers to resume their work. The workers then proceeded to Building 1 and left the victim standing beside his truck near Building 5. Subsequently, the workers heard gunfire coming from the victims direction. Manolong went down to investigate. On hearing a second shot, Manolong ran towards the parked truck and saw the victim lying on the ground with a gunshot wound in his stomach. Manolong called his companions, yelling that the victim had been shot. Both the Regional trial Court and the Court of Appeals found the perpetrators guilty. Whether the qualifying, aggravating and mitigating circumstances were properly appreciated or not?

Issue:

Resolution: The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses clearly prove that a conspiracy existed in the commission of the crime. Garcia testified that the appellant and Lamberte had the common design of killing the victim. The fact that each one was armed with a firearm shows that they acted with the singular purpose of killing the victim. Both accused threatened workers Manolong, Yaranon and Anasario with harm should they tell anyone that they (accused) killed the victim. Under these facts, it does not matter who actually shot the victim because of the conspiracy that existed. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all; each of the accused is equally guilty of the crime committed. The CA correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery as the victim was shot at the back. However, the CA misappreciated the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. Moreover, the CA erred in crediting the appellant with the mitigating circumstance of intoxication simply because Garcia testified that the accused were both drunk. In this case, there is no convincing proof of the nature and effect of the appellants intoxication. The mitigating circumstance of intoxication cannot be appreciated in the appellants favor merely on the testimony of a prosecution witness that he was drunk during the incident. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Since neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the felony, the proper imposable penalty on the appellant is reclusion perpetua.

People of the Philippines v. Joseph Mostrales y Abad G.R No.184925 15 June 2011 MENDOZA, J.:

Facts:

On April 18, 2002, the accused Joseph Mostrales, Diosdado Santos, Ronnie Tan conspiring and confederating together with @ JOHN-JOHN, @ KUMANDER AGUILA, @ KUMANDER KIDLAT AND TEN (10) JOHN DOES, kidnapped MA. ANGELA VINA DEE PINEDA and threatening to kill her if the ransom amounting to eleven million pesos will not be given to them. Upon arraignment on July 30, 2002, Joseph Mostrales (Mostrales) pleaded not guilty to the charge. Both his co-accused, Diosdado Santos (Santos) and Ronnie Tan (Tan), remained at-large as of the date of promulgation of the CA Decision.The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty and was sentenced to suffer Death. Moreover, he was ordered to pay eleven million pesos for the unrecovered ransom money, two million pesos for moral damages, and P268,093.37 as compensatory damages. On the other hand, the decision of the Court of Appeals is they affirmed with the Regional Trial Courts decision with modifications of lowering the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Whether all the elements of kidnapping are present in this case?

Issue:

Resolution: The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals with the sole MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages to private complainant and her parents is increased to P200,000.00. In this case, the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of kidnapping: (1) The offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim or a public officer who has a duty under the law to detain a person; (2) He kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) The act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) In the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official. Moreover, as the CA emphatically stated, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identity of the assailant has been established by the witnesses. The accused failed to sufficiently prove that it was physically impossible for him to have been present at the place where the crime was committed. The accused himself testified that if traffic was light, it would only take three to four hours to commute from Umingan, Pangasinan to Manila. Travel time may even be reduced significantly to less than three hours if one would travel using a private vehicle. Thus, as the CA concluded, it was physically possible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime in Mandaluyong City in the early hours of November 12, 2001, and in Umingan, Pangasinan on the same day before noon.

People of the Philippines v. Angelito Esquibel y Jesus G.R No. 192465 8 June 2011 CARPIO, J.:

Facts:

On February 7, 2003 in Manila, Angelito Esquibel y Jesus stabbed and hit CLARK BALOLOY y TACSAGON thereby inflicting upon the latter a stab wound on the abdomen which was the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter. The accused pleaded not guilty and asserted self defense. The prosecution and the defense presented two different versions of the facts and witnesses. In its Decision dated 24 October 2007, the RTC found Esquibel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. The RTC accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of Gaboy and disregarded Esquibels claim of self-defense. The RTC stated that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was duly established by direct and positive evidence. Gaboy, the eyewitness, convincingly narrated the details and circumstances of how Baloloy was killed, showing that Esquibel knowingly chose the mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of the crime without risk to himself. The RTC further stated that Esquibels version of self-defense was self-serving and cannot be given credence over the positive and credible testimony of Gaboy. The accused filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, affimed the decision of the Regional Trial Court stating that they found no cogent reason to depart from the rule that matters concerning the credibility of the witnesses in criminal cases are left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Since the trial court is in the best position to assess and observe the witness demeanor, conduct and attitude under a grueling examination, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. The CA stated that Gaboys testimony was consistent, unwavering and straightforward. Esquibels defense that there were alleged inconsistencies in Gaboys testimony are trivial and insignificant and do not contravene Gaboys testimony that she directly witnessed Esquibel stabbing Baloloy. Whether treachery as a qualifying circumstance is present in the case?

Issue:

Resolution: The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the crime, depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or repel the aggression, thus, insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the victim. The sudden attack by Esquibel with a bladed weapon, with Baloloys back against him, was undoubtedly treacherous. Baloloy was washing his hands outside his house when Esquibel appeared out of nowhere and stabbed him. Baloloy was unprepared and had no means to put up a defense. Such aggression insured the commission of the crime without risk on Esquibel. The Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the lower courts with modifications on the amounts of civil indemnity, temperate damages, and exemplary damages are increased to P75,000, P25,000, and P30,000, respectively.

People of the Philippines v. Jonie Dominguez G.R No. 191065 13 June 2011 SERENO, J.:

Facts:

Jonie Dominguez, the accused, molested his grandnieces AAA and BBB, by means of force, violence and intimidation, while armed with a knife. AAA and BBB chose to stay silent about the instances of rape, until their mother accidentally discovered the commission of the crimes from the accused himself. Overhearing Dominguez in one of his drinking sessions, boasting that the children's vaginas were already wide, she confronted her daughters and asked them about the remark. The children reluctantly confided to her what had happened. As a result, the girls were brought to a doctor for examination and found AAAs hymen intact, but did not discount the fact that the child could have been molested. In contrast, BBB was found to have old hymenal lacerations. According to their testimonies, the accused had employed trickery so that either AAA or BBB would be left alone with him and thereafter raped, with threats of harm to her person or her family. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecutors evidence was doubtful.The charges against him, he says, were just fabricated, since the parents of the victims had an axe to grind against him. He claims that he had loaned an amount to the victims aunt, who is the sister of the victims father. When he demanded the return of the money, the victims parents got mad at him. He insinuates that these ill feelings were the reason why he was falsely charged by AAA and BBB. Another point being raised by the accused-appellant concerns the consistency of AAA's testimony. He argues that the inconsistencies in her testimony taint her credibility. In effect, he claims that since rape is a traumatic event for the victim, there was no way AAA could have forgotten or been mistaken about it, including its place of occurrence, had rape really happened. Specifically, the accused is arguing that since AAA mentioned two places -- their house and the back of the school her testimony was not credible. Whether elements of rape are present at this case?

Issue:

Resolution: The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Rape is committed: 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d)When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. 2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Before and after the violations, the intimidation took the form of th reats that the victims family would be killed by the accused. The accused also employed trickery and took advantage of his authority over his grandnieces. Under these circumstances, the accused was able to have carnal knowledge of BBB and commit a series of sexual assaults against both her and AAA. The two incidents of rape against AAA happened before she reached 12 years of age, she being 9 and 10 then. For those incidents, proof of threats, force or intimidation, is not necessary. Contrary to the claim of the prosecution, the accuseds relationship to the victims cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance. For relationship to aggravate or qualify the crime of rape committed against a minor, the accused must be a relative of the victim within the third civil degree. As a brother of the victim's paternal grandmother, he is but a relative within the fourth civil degree. This relationship cannot qualify the crime as to merit the punishment of reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended. Thus, the rape of BBB by means of carnal knowledge was simple rape, and the amount of civil indemnity should be decreased from P75,000 to P50,000. With respect to the manner of rape committed against AAA twice and against BBB six times, which was rape by digital insertion, jurisprudence from 2001 up to the present yields the information that the prevailing amount awarded as civil indemnity to victims of simple rape committed by means other than penile insertion is P30,000.

People of the Philippines v. Feliciano Saysot Cias G.R No.194379 1 June 2011 VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts:

On April , 2000 the accused Feliciano Cias forced and intimidated by holding a scythe AAA and removed her underwear while resting inside the house with her child and while AAAs husband was away. Cias, with the assistance of his counsel, was arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. During the trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of the private complainant; Dr. Stephen S. Estacion (Dr. Estacion), who conducted the medico-legal examination on AAA; and Senior Police Officer 3 Georgen Barot Sefe (SPO3 Sefe). On the other hand, the defense presented as witnesses accused Cias and his wife, Felina Cias. Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals is correct or not?

Issue:

Resolution: In determining the guilt or innocence of the accused in rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse. Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with. Thus, if the victims testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis of this testimony; otherwise, the accused should be acquitted of the crime. More importantly, appellate courts do not disturb the findings of the trial courts with regard to the assessment of the credibility of witnesses. The reason for this is that trial courts have the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. The exceptions to this rule are when the trial courts findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or when certain facts of substance and value, likely to change the outcome of the case, have been overlooked by the trial court, or when the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. However, the Supreme Court finds none of these exceptions present in the instant case.

People of the Philippines v. Carlo Dumadag y Romio G.R No.176740 22 June 2011 DEL CASTILLO, J.: AAA, a young barrio lass, 16 years of age at the time she testified on February 21, 2000, declared that in the early morning of December 25, 1998, she was on her way home after hearing the midnight mass at BBB, CCC, DDD. She was a little bit behind Thelma, Carlos and Clarence, all surnamed Dumadag. All of a sudden, appellant approached her from behind and poked a Batangas knife on her threatening to stab her if she shouts. He pulled her towards the house of Joel Boyet Ursulum (Boyet). Once inside, she was forced to remove her pants and panty because of fear. Appellant also removed his pants and brief and pushed her on a bamboo bed. Pointing the knife at the left portion of her abdomen, appellant ordered her to hold his penis against her vagina. Appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. After appellant was through, they stayed inside the house until six oclock in the morning of December 25, 1998. All this time, appellant continued to hold the knife. Pleading that she be allowed to go home, appellant finally let her go after threatening to kill her if she reports the incident to her parents. AAA decided not to disclose what transpired because of fear. Nevertheless, AAAs uncle, EEE learned from appellant himself that the latter had sexual intercourse with her. Her uncle relayed the information to her father who confronted her about the incident. After confirming the same from AAA, they decided to report the matter to the police where she was investigated and her sworn statement taken. However, the accused claimed that it was voluntary and without the use of force since they were lovers. To support his claim that AAA was his girlfriend, appellant presented Boyet and Nieves Irish Oandasan (Nieves Irish) who both corroborated his sweetheart defense. Whether the sexual congress between appellant and the private complainant was done through force and intimidation or was voluntary and consensual.

Facts:

Issue:

Resolution: The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. On the basis of the records, the Supreme Court finds AAA candidly and categorically recounted the manner appellant threatened her and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her against her will. AAA consistently testified that while she was on her way home after hearing the midnight mass on December 24, 1998, appellant suddenly and unexpectedly grabbed her, placed his right hand around her neck and poked a knife at the left portion of her abdomen, threatening to kill her if she shouts. He made her walk towards the house of Boyet where she was forced to lie on a bed and with the knife aimed at her side succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. The failure of AAA to flee despite opportunity does not necessarily deviate from natural human conduct. It bears emphasis that human reactions vary and are unpredictable when facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual assault. There is no uniform behavior expected of victims after being raped. The fact that there is no evidence of resistance on the part of AAA does not cloud her credibility. The failure of a victim to physically resist does not negate rape when intimidation is exercised upon [her] and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapists assault because of fear for life and physical safety. In this case, AAA was dragged by appellant with a knife pointed on her neck and warned not to shout or to reveal the incident to anyone or else she would be killed. That warning was instilled in AAAs mind such that even when appellant was just holding his weapon after the intercourse, she did not attempt to flee. The intimidations made by the appellant are sufficient since it instilled fear in her mind that if she would not submit to his bestial demands, something bad would befall her. Appellants claim that they are lovers is untenable. Besides, even if it were true that appellant and AAA were sweethearts, this fact does not necessarily negate rape. Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiance and worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.

People of the Philippines v. Lucresio Espina G.R No.183564 29 June 2011 BRION, J.:

Facts:

On December 7, 1997, AAA attended a benefit dance together with her stepmother and stepsister. When she went out to find her friends, her father, the accused, called her and said that there is an errand for her. When they were in the dark place, the accused ordered AAA to remove her pants and underwear and inserted his private part on her vagina. After the said event, the accused ordered her to change clothes and went back to the benefit dance. The stepsister notice that AAA has hard time of climbing the stairs and so, she said it to her mother and the mother checked AAA and found out that her private part was bleeding. They went to the clinic for check up and medico legal. The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of rape. The appellant denied the charge against him and claimed that he had a drinking session with his friends at the house of Melanio Velasco on the day of the incident. According to him, he fell asleep on a grassy area and woke up at 8:00 a.m. of the next day. The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty. It also ordered the appellant to pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC judgment, with the following modifications: (1) the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua; (2) the amount of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00; (3) the amount of moral damages is increased to P75,000.00; and (4) the appellant is further ordered to pay the victim P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Whether the accused is guilty of rape or statutory rape?

Issue:

Resolution: For a charge of rape to prosper under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. Sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is statutory rape. In this type of rape, force and intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. In her testimony dated May 19, 1999, AAA positively identified the appellant as the one who raped her. Her testimony was clear and straightforward; she was consistent in her recollection of the details of her sexual abuse. In addition, her testimony was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Cerillo. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. As earlier stated, the parties stipulated during the pre-trial that AAA was 11 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. The parties likewise stipulated that AAA is the appellants legitimate daughter. During trial, AAA, BBB and the appellant testified to this fact. The Supreme Court however, cannot impose the death penalty in view of R.A. No. 9346, signed into law on June 24, 2006. Pursuant to this law, the Supreme Court affirm the CAs reduction of the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, with the modification, however, that the appellant shall not be eligible for parole.