The biggest reason for rejecting materialism is the notion that mental states are multiply realisable.

If a silicon painmaker could both function and feel like ordinary pain, which is realised, not by silicon states, but by a certain kind of brain state, then pain can't be identified with that brain state. Ah, but I beg to differ. Artificial hearts function like ordinary hearts, and may even feel the same to those who have them. For an amputee, a prosthesis functions, in important respects, like the missing limb. Otherwise it wouldn't be a prosthesis. Now some prostheses are better than others. A perfect prosthesis would function just as well as an ordinary limb, if not better, and feel just the same. Likewise for the function and feel of the painmaker. Indeed, if the function were performed perfectly, it would determine an identical feel. What's the point of these analogies? Simply this. Artificial hearts aren't hearts and prostheses aren't limbs. They're synthetic versions of natural things. By analogy, painmaker pain feels just like the real thing. But it's not natural. So it's not pain. It's artificial pain. Because it's "pain", not pain, that the painmaker makes, there may yet be a single, physical, neural type that pain maps onto. In other words, the prospect of artificial mental states, in natural minds or otherwise, doesn't rule out the natural identity of mind and brain.