sU komos enone and he siecleThe Sling and The Stone ON WAR IN THE 21st CENTURY | ers srgondsore fl agai Goi i tr om Fos ngs ight J ops caaon fotos Vine fe Grotto Dae [DCD corns > inndchgpict sowcon iy lovin wrecgorl es staan Colas Inougens how ape conde pote sbngnsoerm bw, theron eve 0} Thom A wars ey wet pole esis ern ere efseftiet highoch weap. ‘Clr! Thoman Sars USMC, prs he echn ond cure proce | oh ASW" "ODT foam on nghnc dines dcr, erganzato, Hang, ond Sunoten ach ele one advomage of aeneegy ne Hk Sot wie wore ay Hares Jeo he weld ho vod mn dui sci oan ormotenboned sos soar soem cllten aga oo vats ates geo | tent a humor ale cology by tl bat he enw The US. ease ‘Sachmen lle to eens fe ingame of ar blade ov eto ‘Sieiogy les» prepa de woh hed of wor we oe hig doy (a bee re mom as let ue ourtaion wo Tha Sing and The Soro cngans why 4G de nt or we by deleting tenors try ejay. 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Arges, SW hasbeen Sire esi re at oye Fs ed oe 45 Sicoch pessoa learned fom he predecsa o coconbsars ord ‘ned his pees Faced wih cronies hay cod obo sing convert wa, AGW won| sau aileron poh, Twomicoaion aces reg eho cr te Gand term ar snp esa ie eckson cqus hathavo been deep ome “ia ered rw pha” 22 Hones “Th otha ony scone or AGW harap perso abe ay eran csr ‘ron of wor Unfenenaeyhas Boe gay cen or hw dole win US ogponen of eenAwe athe howe” af ACW nang mh recammandton caste toe ud th inal hyo he armas ord washes cf come trary poms Sure tobe conto Tw Sing ond Tee Ste shad tly oe ‘eb othe Doe Deparment and fog ha fe ane sey coo bo who bnd of mary our cur reais and wl Kindo cane Anais ‘ome fees shad propred gh Praise for The Sling and The Stone ‘ON WAR IN THE 2isr CENTURY “Bova ior and cor ovr Tem Horns xis ety, ng, boo spsctom ware hae fought a wl crt loa Pst hp cone the shart itch aan war he done depot poi fr He to howe winthe war arth ot wing al Undaring ep of mo re ighing se fs sep wing The back wh yon vt” Gere! Anthony Zim, USMC fe), for CENTCOM commander “lena! Hommes us the qui ting th cornu of cg wah ety fis cen wate, fe comoding coca et ds oncgeren ‘centomvl nds whch sbound orate boca el lyse mos “lier Gerel Brera USI ft NGC Now mir ena, “outer f Cabo ? nd The Goer Wor “Fer nel 0 quate ofa cry, TX Hames bs buen on fhe Maxine Cos! moat ugh suns on he ewan cf ware, he vr chonging rea ht Fee {ond Be odusinans ned ot ery lel fhe US ey ome he ‘halerges ht fe che. Al. tograrmard tr hs bok het cont en iit He expan fs noe af he erg sho twa and enon wy be ven naman plowing mis he anh Coles sin Goan emer ei the Meine Comps Gaze “Colonl Hames proves a grace by binging wor fhting bk rey He ships away the malodng fog ctsied by he bie! elon of the US Ieedeny tale tha ecnclegy and weaponry wa warn popl dos, By locing tthe post vconvetanel worse shows hot expan ere where ht wil bo convertoralcholarge US pony ba emt he Sholay ents wer scanty by spoonas hoo Ch Mh eta the rene ih hee US = “fob Gckicy. oma US. Sete Depriar cordat fr coun era, ‘rd bene U'Sanbanoder Saha, ean rd fare The Sling and The Stone ON WAR IN THE 21st CENTURY COLONEL THOMAS X. HAMMES, USMC 6 ZENITH PRESSDe Janet eo aby pre iporsand wolersanding trough te ‘centyenine yea of rie and i oars of dplyment tba let is boo. “And to Eri cho misad alt of days vith Dad and ner complained Contents Introduction vii 1. Foue Generton of Ware i 2.The Fist Tio Generations of Mota Was “ 4. Traston to Thil-Generation Warfare B 4. Change ia Society 2 5.Mto and the Birth of ourh-Genention War a8 sun phy da hsatnpgeaninemce 6.TheViemamese Madison % Saar ecard ee ey 1-The Sunnis Reinert 7% —, 8h Ifa: Cans versus an Army ® 9. Thea Aga Toi m cece canton oper 10. Quel: A Transnational Enemy 160 gene 1. Agana A Tal Nero 183 BUR Cony at se alm eqn 12 ay High Tech ema Fort Geneation in ‘Bape Emp tae Sy 1BTechoaogy: Noes Panes 19 ‘SS101-3685 USA 14. Characteristics of Fourth-Generation War, 207 ee 15. Where fom He 24 cee 16.Evaling the Thea 6 Seaepirpe tne 17-The Fre ls Fleiity mm Ines ss Ed Nos 22 eal j References 296 Primedia he Une Sie Index autIntroduction joined the Maine Corps in Jone 1975, only « month afc the ill of South Vietnam. Av T reported to The Basic Schoo, che war tat ad Shaped my hgh school and college years was finally ove. Although the Corps basic officer taining continued to emphasize counter-insrgency ‘tactics was clear the country as whole was ied of desing with or tink- ing about counterinsurgency. Then in 1976, Mastin Binkia and Jetfey Record published “Where Does the Marine Corps Go fm Hes” which seemed to question not only the need for counterinsugent forces but for the Comps itself In ft, the military aa whole was soving out smal to prepare to fight the Soviets in Europe, During fast yes of sve, the Corps shift focus from sll wate ‘ofighsinga huge conventional conflict However, despite the apparent f= cus on Europe, our deft in Vietnam remind anjor shadow over our ces. Most of te company commanders and all the eld grad and gen ral officers who led the Corp during tat pio had ben shaped by their ‘Vietnam experiences. All wer frusteated by our defeat and many wee sti ing to uadestand why: For my part, [100 ws trying to Figure out how the ‘ost pawefil nation inthe word ad been defeated by ny county with Conlyrwenty-t9o milion people and almost no economic power. Jn almostsii The Sing aad he Soe two handed years, America had never lost want Vietaam, What hd happened? ‘This was the beginning of my study of what as Become known 36 fourth- generation warfire Like many military professionals of my gene. tion, 1 was trying to understand ype of warfare that seemed t change all the rules In Vietnam, the side with overwhelming wealth, poe, and technology had been decsvely defeated. We had won the battles bu ost the war. One had to wonder what hat mean forall eradiionl concepts of was For the fist ten yeas of my carer it ws very ifcl find mate sialon insungency. The US armed forces were preparing fight the So vier Union in Europe and the Marine Corps ws sting tn master maneuver warfare concep. There was plenty of material on big wars but information on small wars ould be found only in used ooksons ‘Then, in 1986, Iwas fortunate enough tobe offered a fellowship at the Mershon Center for Stategic Stes, I spent the academic year of 1986-87 studying insurgency: This ear provided me the opportunity for i fist indepth study ofthe early practitioners ofthis new fot of war ‘Mao, Ho, the Sandinista, the IRA, and the Palestinians shaped my ies about the future of war ‘The result was 4 paper writen to clacify my ‘thoughts oninsurgeney and how ademoeray could respond tt [condensed itto.an ace for publication in the March 1988 sue ofthe Mrine Coys Gxt led "Tnsugeney: The Forgotten’ Dea.” From 1987 to 1990, 1 gota small taste ofthe practical aspects on surgency.Ispen hove years raining insurgents in various focaions ofthe word. This was the ail end of dhe Cold War and the United States stil had vested interests inthe outome of number of nsurgencies, The most intiguing part of that tour was the vpportuntyt tall co these men. Twas particularly impressed with ewo aspects of the men T met. Fest was their utter determination to continue the struggle despite the od. They were not deterred by fear of death In each case they were engage in struggle with a government force that posesed many tes thee military power, Tn each case, they knew th odds and were ot deere, They believe in ther eause and were sure that belie was powerful enough to defes the Invstacton iy government. The idea they fought for was central to thei resistance. In fat, they were counting on political power generated by thus to neutralize the overwhelning military power of the goverment. As T worked with ‘hese men, realized his ict should be obvious to Americans. Am idea kept ‘our American revolution alive during sven long yeu of war ‘The second outstanding tai was the rematkableingenity they dis played for overcoming problems. Whether the problems were ttc l= istical, octal, or politica, chey often attacked thes from agirection ‘hat simply would not occur toa Western-trined sl. [found insu sents are not impressed with conventional power, They respect it but seck ways around it—and have consis ‘They ofen used tactics ad techies that were outside the training and ‘experience of the government forces. Despite years of wat they consistently suprised goverment frees with their ingenuity and detetination, In surgents are ving proof why man sat dhe topo the fod chain, We are the most creative, treacherous, los, aggressive an determined ie form to yet evolve. Any nation that assumes itis inherently serie to another Isseting itself up for disaster “This period of practical interaction with insurgents provided a strong iy succeeded in finding those ways verification of much of what had learned during my year of tudyat Mer son. The experience also convinced me enone than ever hat the real threat roms Conventional enemies esposed themselves to our military steagths I surgnts found ways around ther. The danger layin ou thinking in com ‘ventional terms and seeking to dominate tht batild a the expense of being prepared to fight on other ils Upon completion of this assignment, 1 went to the Marine Comps ‘Command and Staff College Just as Laseived, Saddam Hussein invaded Kevwait The forces we had built to confront the Soviets on the pins of Europe were superbly suited fr a high-intensity war inthe desert. The snazing sees of our forces aguns he Iraqi itary confirmed the US. ‘sith in high-technology weapons. Thowsands of gun camera clips show jig precision weapons fying into the doors and windows of target vin «ated years of research and development. The mos highly touted “Tesoa interests wer not conventional fares bat unconventional oesofthat wat waste domination posi it you had the sight igh- tcc nology equipment, Berween trumpeting the lessons of ou victory inthe Gulf and straggling withthe major reduction tht followed the wa the services simply ceased o pay any attention to unconventional wacfre, Une fortunately unconventional warfare was aot inished with US. force, ‘This led dnevyto my next encouoer with 4GW. In January 1992, ‘deployed with Marine Fores Somali to Mogadishu, After thee years of ‘tuning and Learing fom insurgents, this wis an oppoctnity to see in- sugeney frm the government side. When I ws a Somali from January to May 1993, allied forces were under US. command and suceeded in bringing modicum of oederto whit wasan esepionlly fagmented tribal society The level of fragmentation was remasiabe, and sadly, mated by the savagery characteristic of confit between closely relited ens. The ‘wo main warlords, Aideed and Ai Mahal, were not of dtferent tribes or ‘even diferent clans. They were members of diferent sub-lan ofthe same lan, Despite thi close association, they were deadly enemies bent on d= stroying Mogadishu in an atempeto conto it Bsentilly Soul society nad descended into chaos. (Operations in Somalia revealed both the complesigy inherent i such collet and in the techniques that could be used cont. During the fis five months, the US ted UN. forces took fm conta of the coun ty The key wat a uified command where the poi, military and hu _mnitarian organiations coordinated closely and understood the att of ‘the conflict they were involved in. On the security side, the extensive use ‘of human inteligence sources and aggresive, ound the-lock saturation patrolling allowed us eo gun contol of Mogadinhn, These tactics mae use ‘of the strengths of our Marines They did wel abet cops geting to hous the aeighboshooss they patoled. They lene who should and should not be there. Their constant presence allowed a semblance of normalcy to re= turn to the streets of Mogacnh and the outlying cite, Unfortunately exactly 8 most had predicted would happen, when the UN. tok over, aggressive patlling and eonmtant conc with the people ‘hat had been the ley to U.S. success ceared t he the noe, UN. forces withdrew ato cantonments and counted on thei superior conventional Inacio power to protect them tom she iba insrgents. hey ceded the ground ouside che UN. camps othe Somali, The automne was ineitable—de- feat and withdrawal. And even with the withdrawal of UN. forces, the con ice continues today. Somalis yet another example ofthe long ine ines involved in fouth-generation war Upos completion of my tour in Somalia, attended the National De- fence Collegeof Canada. Tis was an eye-opening experince. Because (Canada forces are small, the Defence College fos on how ntemationa society and Canadian society interact, What makes each work? How can ach be influenced for the good? Although this may seem an odd coarse of instruction fora “war” college, the fact that Canada, a country with only ‘hiay milion peopl, ia significant player in any international forums speak highly of thisstategic approach, Les han 10 percent of the course ‘was spent on purely military matters, As 3 ret, Iwas provided a much ‘roude edcaton than normally given in US. wa calles. The college also required a yearlong research effore on a subject ofthe student’ choosing and allowed significant blacks af time for esearch and writing Based on extensive rating and professional discussions was convinced ‘hat another generation of war as cling. Further hough we cou ac tually race that evolution, During tt yearin Canad, US. forces were an- ‘ushed in Mogadishu and ie hecane clear the United Stites ws leaving Somalia, Once agin, 2 mitay weak orc ad sed fourth generation wat are to defen significantly more poweel conventional forces A the ac eric yearn Canada progresed, expanded onthe research Thad done at ‘Mershon and developed my eae conceringfourth- generation warfre a my cequied course pape Subsequent I shortened the pape for publica= son in the September 1994 Marine Corps Gazete4s*The Evolution of Wat Ino the Forth Genesation."That paper and the subsequent aie ad out ‘he basic thesis this book—warfre evolves fom generation to gener ion Further tis gerne evolution. The “evolutions in military afi 20 ‘prominent in our discussion of defense today wexe not revolutions at al Rather they were the culmination of practic nen seeking practical sli- ‘tions to rctical and operational problensof thr day. As these sctions a= ‘cumulated hey evolved into the “revoationary” techniques we dics 50impress. Further nvestigition showed thatthe evolution ot each gene sion of war required a preceding evolution i the poi economics alan technical seracture ofthe society that wes tht typeof war, War coves in consonance with society asa whe (Over the las rn yeas, continued read about and sty the eel tion of war, Conlits around the world seemed t confi that wari indeed evolving. Unforeunaey despite the fit that some of thee confit involved direct stacks on the United States, oar defense establishment ‘hose to ignore them. We pefered to fous on outst suscee in the ‘wars with rag andthe amazing high-technology weapons we were devel ‘oping. We did not want eo dcal with the manpower intensive, lo-tech nology confit that were actully taking place around the world. It wis nich more comforibe to theorize about itu high-technology confit ith “ner peer competi.” ‘Then hese low-tech conflicts moved from overcast the heat of America I ike most Americans fl the fs visceral impact of GAV on Seprember 11,2001. That momnng, Las ina staf meeting a the US, Ma: Fine Corps! Cheaeal Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRE. The briefing as just geting stated when, at 8:45 am, one of the Marines in ‘he inelgence section stepped into inform us CNN wat reporting an air «raft ha struck the World Trace Center. We imetintely shifted our a= tention tothe drama unfolding ive on TV. Ie was pricy poignard because during August CBIRF had conde a msjor ining eerie with the fre department of New York—which ad includ a disussion oftheir response tothe 1993 World rae Center atch, We knew many of out ‘ind would be responding agai, While we monitored ee situation, weslso let th unit The Chem- ‘eal Biological Incident Response Force had bee freed in 1996 specif lenges. Although tactialchllenges clearly had an impact, ateibuting the gen- ‘rational changes in watlce primarily to itary factors onesies the problem. Infact, the forces involved could execute those tactics only be- “aus ofthe majo politica, economic, sca, and technical changes that receded them, ‘Theft generation of war spew nts frm the intention of gunpowder Duta from the politcal, economic, and soil straceures that developed as Burope transitioned fom a feudal tem to a system of nation-states ule 6 f | teymonarcs. the transton rom techy” dal ight to the armies cof Napoleon required ceatues. This ime was roquized noe only to develop reliable firearms bur, more important, to develop the politcal system, the wealth generating national conomies, the scial structure, and che tech nologies capable of sestaining the mass amis of dhe Napoleonic era, Dur ings time, heist generation of moder war ev soln consonance ‘with the societies of western Europ, It peaked with che mative aries of the Napoleonic Wars ofthe ely 19th century. Plt, warfare ofthe size and complexity of Napoleonic war r= _gie the evolution of he nation-state, Only the resources of nation -tire could ase, erin equip, and sustain che masive ames of the French Rev ‘lion. The consoldation of the maion tat’ power and he nation tran sition fom the pate domain of a monarch allowed forthe mobilization ofits wealth, ingenuity and manpower in support af a wae ‘The colonization of America provide major economiestimalus tht allowed countries to fil larger, more echnical advanced armies—the arrival of gol and silver fom the New Wold. Although his ed to temen- ‘dou inflaton, it also vsly increased the coinage in civultion, which stimulated economic growth. Both the population and the gross domes: lic produ (GDP) per person” were increasing sgaificandly faster than prior to 1500, Ezonoaiall; major advances in agriculture and ransporation were ‘seat to generating te wealth and resources required t field ad sus ‘ain lange armies. Improvedagriculrure and higher yield crops acing rom Ameria increased firmer productivity and reduced the shor necessary to achieve thse level of prt. combination increased che overall wealth ofthe nation provided addtional fod foe major amis andy re ing manpower from eriulture, provided an incresein the avilable man ower fr mobilization. ‘As the wealth and tade of European society increased, so di the teansportation network. Although the speod and displacement of ships at sca increased rapidly daring this perio, the dramatic increases cami in ‘the road an inland barge eansporation networks arose western Europ, Although ehese changes tok place over centuries, they were essential 1building ehe economic base that could both sustain ane move much anger eves aesoss Europe. In 1415 at Agineout, about 31,000 men fought £6,000 British and 25,000 French In contest, hy 1815, ¢ Waterloo, more than 200,000 men were present. Socal the development ofa genaine fet of patriot in the muse ‘ofmen making up the armed forces was esentilo cable Napoleonic wat- fare The French Reeoition broaght this fcng tothe Eugopesn cont ent, and dhe impact vas obvious. Suddenly, warfare di not involve only royalya small profesional anny. andthe resireof a country—it involved the ene population, Fe was only this sense of pasos that allowed the poorly rained Freas infantry wo pees home conly attacks against oppo ‘ng armies. J was this erthasiasn that could provide continuous supply lof manpower to support the famous coum attacks With the early success ofthe French, the ether Busopean powers had ‘o widen the base of thee forces, ad the concep of nationals began its teanstion tothe other nations of Europe. This social change cari for ‘ward into succeeding generations of wat ‘echnical, mass poduction ofthe reliable, smoohbore musket, de ‘velopaent of ightightariller and the advent of dimen ist long stance commiuniction via visual tslegrph ll conrbuted to he evan ofthe frst generstion of modern wr. Mass anpuwer ad been the re Jn ancient Greace and Rome and hd cven een & major pat af war dr Jing the Middle Ages. However, the combination of changes across society pivided the mach Inger armies and massed dvec-fze weapons that marked the culmination of the fist generation of war at Waterloo, CCealyevoluton fm medieval warfare tothe fst generation of mod- ‘erm war sequired significant change inthe polit, economic, social and rechoolegieal trustees of the time: Second Generation ar ike de Se generation fr the second generation did not rome jst fom immprovernents in weaponry I too, reguired changes aro the spec- ‘eum of human activity: Although che political structure ofthe nation-state ‘rar esetily in plce athe end of the Napoleonic Wass the stat power to ti and enforce taxes creased dramatically daring the hundred years between Waterloo and the Miracle ofthe Marne. [Bren ore important than an increase in the abiy eo levy and ole taxes was much vaster Wealth 8 The GDP per penonin western Entope lisse ile om 1800+ 1915, while the population intense sbout ty escent’ The combination of increased GDP per person, major population increas, and sical better government conto masiveynceased the wealth avalible to the national govemments of Europ Agreat deal ofthis increase im wealth an be atibuted othe rapid in rminated in the German suendes Although the new tacts filed to win Weed War they introduced an entre generation of German offers tothe det of mison-type ones, reconnaissance pul, penetrating a ron, and expanding from the penetra ion. Thus, the ineleetal foundation of SGW was Firlyin place 198, In ation to the intellectual bass, Workd War sae the introduction of tanks, aircraft long-range ater, and, on the estan Font, get bates of manewer, [Not content with superficial understanding of what had happenin ‘Word War I the Geran amy undertook an intensive historical study of what ell happened. They focasedon sewer major issues: the reasons the Schlefie pln led, solving che problem of the trenches to restore mo bility to the battlefield the Brith use of tanks at Somme andi Camb, the tactical success of the German 1918 offensive and why it filed opera tionally and the use of airpower hy the Allies aginst the Gna 1918 of- Fenn Ieisinteresting to note that their staies explored che key components of what would become Miasieg During the interwar period, he Getmans ‘continued to study these ideas and to inogrte the parte sus 4 ‘ical and technical innovations into a coherent operational weapon, So if bltaleg was in face evolutionary, why didsit dhe British and French militaries lean rom World War I and apply thse lessons inthe interwar period? ‘The Brvshacoalyatemped ro ear but wafer fom he its and starts of chief of talfwho exhibited varying ates for learing. At the end Trae Tew Ri ‘of Weald War the Ish ara aid sussestlly condi combined-arms tmschanized warlue. As Millet and Murray pao canbe seen, therefor, thatthe BEF (British Expetionary Force) salycondacted two kinds of warfare in the second half of 1918: fin, mechanical waa in July and August; and secondly, radional or semi-teaditonal open wale roan the end of v= st 1 the Armistice Yer the fic that he lange sale mechanical tas d po take lace in he last oaths while the war was won Lbymeansthat were familia ro most officers did stg infaence sheway in the 1920 and 1990s Iris important, however, to note chat this debate didnot actualy tart fer the Way, but in at commenced in ae 1917 and carly 1918? ‘mechanization and mechanics ware were debated 1918, the British were cqua othe Gerrans in atic thinking and headin he application of tecnologia the form of armor Unfors, they id no undertake a dete study ofthe lessons ofthe war ani 1932. en then they did so only because Lond Milne, progressive thinker be ‘ame chief ofthe lapel Genera Staff (CIGS). Hosmer, the report was ot finshed uni the new CIGS, Field Marshal Montgomeny-Masing bed, took ote. “Montgomery Massngberd was adamantly against discussing the tuys problems in publi, o he severly restricrd dsibuton of he re- port. Unfortanately he se trend, Until the outbreak of World Wr ll «het ofthe Imperial General Saffafter Lond Mine eine to study the lessons of World War They ed all armor developments to support of n= Santry and exalry, squandering numerous opportunities for Britin to de ‘elop true combined-arm ites, Further educing any chance for change was the asi-inllectal bent ofthe British army. Simply pa unlkethe Geran, who sswewarasa pro fesion requiring intense study by the best minds in the amy, dhe Beith seemed 10 consider the army a pleasine occupation for second sos. The losed-mindednes ofthe Bish regimental messi ggering Thus. thefe innenators who di appear inthe interwar pete were kept fly place by the CIGS, regimental tations and thes Flow aces ‘The French, in contrast to he Bish, condasted an intensive study of World War I seking doctrinal and organizational lesons. Unfortunately, ‘he instil bins toward methodical battens that the stay was limited to battles that "proved" that aight controlled centrally dteted bate, emphasizing repower, was the key to victory: Reinforcing the in- sttonal bias was the requirement thae"il aces, enue, and buoks by serving officers had to rceve approval bythe high command before pub: cation” The inspite intervar army leadership, the sling of issue Sion, 2nd emphasis onthe "methods ba” ensuced thatthe French army completely missed che evolution th drove Blake, Teisinteresting to noe the silts inthe French interwar “iscus- sion" and our eurtent DOD “dicusion of fture war. The Freach general staff fined the discussion and then ensued that "experiments" and"de- ‘elopments" adhered to the deisiton. Currents; DOD has dine the fa ture as technology ands desing al experiments and developments in that slirection. Mach ike the Fench, DOD has nor seen the evoation of war taking place in ou ie but instead iit wars eolving aconding to it preconceived vision Although moze compresed than the evolution oft and second gen= eration warfare, IGW also evoied overtime. The time fame was shoet- ‘ened for numerous reasons, aot he last of which ie chat the ato change across society, which had heen accelerating dosing the ast few centuries, increased even more inthe twentieth century. Further, innovation always accelerates during modern wale, becnise the ene soiey devotes isl to waz With therise of Hider, Germany essentially went ona wari foot jing not fll mhiieation but defintely level of efor well beyond the peacetime efforts oftheir pst and future enemies Swommany of Birt Those Generations Tn these fest capers, we trace the evolution ofthe fst thee genee- tions of war A coupe het ep out ist stat none of them consisted. Feats He atin Ke ofasudden tansormation each wolves over ine, bach could be see de ‘elopng ovr the cont ha proceed Second, each new generation requized developments aro the spes- eum of soe Technological change sone has never ben sufcient to pro: dace 4 mor change in how man wages wa. it equies complete socetat tunge-—poltcal, economic, soca and tecisological—ta creat the co Aitions necessary for major changes in wae Finally we can see the logical pogresion ofthe three generations Fis generation war focused on the direct destruction ofthe enemys close Fre Second-enetation war eid on Feepower bu sil focused onthe destruc tion ofthe enemy fighting forces. Bath were ested by the waiting apblies of the societies rom which they sprang As society progress and wasablewo projet power oer much ong ranges thinl-genertion wir took advantage ofthe changes to Fosison destruction ofthe ene cork ‘mand and contol and logistics ste istst way to destroy his wal Fight. ‘Bach succeeding generation ceached deeper into the enemys teriory in an efor to defet him. IT 4GW is logical progression, it must reach sch deeper into the enemy's forces inseking vetor. In subsequent chap ‘es, we will ce that 4GW basin fst ewe to focus deeply inthe en ty’ ear I focuses onthe direct destruction of che enemy's politcal wil ro ightChanges in Society Weinert 36W er mane varie aly sen 198 ¥ in 1940, The previous chapters have also ‘shown cha major changes warfre were always preeded by changes in the poltia, economic socal and technical segments of socey Given that sgesin warn, ve bane sid came to mati changes in thee areas an apparent purse toch to ak ifthe changes in society since the evolution of he third yeneration ae scent wo indiat that it sti foe he fourth generation We kaow i took about a hundred years to move fom the height of| GW confit, as epresented by the Napoleonic Wars, to 2GW conc, 1s represented by Wor War Required that long for society to develop the indosta, societal, and echnical base to support the huge armies t= ing a four-year strug. We also know tat although al the tactical ele- ments of 3GW war weze presen in World War itreuired the nveny-one years berseen World War I and World Wr I for society to develop the bse required to generat ful edged maneuver war (SGW), Therefore, plore the posit that 4GW is evolving, the logical period to examine for political, economic, soil, and technical changes the vime between (he start of Woeld War IL and today, (Obvious) a single chapter cannot bey to provide a definitive fs of the enormous seit changes since that tne. Homer, this chapter pro= vides an abbreviated ling of some ofthe key changes eis designe 10 stimulate thought conceming the breath and typeof changes in acer since the 1940s—an lead the reader co consider how those changes have fected warfre during the sme prin, Politically there have been estensive changes since the end of World Wr TlThe mort obviousisthe exponential inceae nthe name of play~ «son the international stage. Prior to the was, the nation-state was the only sigticantplayeon the inceratinal cen. Imbel ae the wath ‘he politi and economic spheres heya change rapidly and cach added ‘numerous and varied players to dhe politcal sage ‘The most abvious change i the politcal scone was the eeation and growth of aterationl organizations. Te fist was the United Nations, at had Been licking and wasthe pre ‘cursor for numerous other international onguniations, White ad it Teprovided an international fours tle real power, che United Nations ws immediatly a part of any International political strugele Titi; one oft prime fnctions was to provide an app fense of both national and international interests, primarily of Western ance of ntemational approval for action taken in de~ powers. Howewc as che United Nations expanded to inclede an erer= increasing number of'Thied World nations, became an effective place fr those nations to expres their disapproval of the ations of Western powers in particular the United Stites. Fuse, the United Nation was ‘only the first ofa series of international ganizations that now hase sig- sificant impact on the negotiations and relations between nations, The United Nations alone har given birth to the International Bank For Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the International Monetary Fund, , and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Each ofthese international agencies infringes on national wvezeignty in one ‘ay or another, Nations are no longer fee to set thei cae tril their ‘wn interest rates, ther own safety standards, ther oven constructions standards, and so on. These basic element of national sovereignty were ‘considered integral toa nation-states power peor to World Wat IMo The Sig an he Sone Although the enfocement power of dese bodes sharply hited by the nature ofthe United Nations, we should not underestimate the inf ence they ave tough thee member nations, Although the United Na- tons asa whole may noe use military fore to punish those who transgres, individual sates certaily express tei dsapproval—in the poli eco nomic, soca and even technical realms A parish tate suffers um reduced sloped world Although «generation ago the mos they could hope to ee was the nev village, now they can see Park Avene. Thi reates 2 much eater sense of lative deprivation and unrestin thos nations. Along with ‘he Internet it alo liminates the government monopely on information. [No longer ca any state astume'ts tizens wl believe only what the gor ramen el them, "This unrest combined withthe aetficial natu of the boundaries of ‘many tates, has cesulted i the severe breakown of order within many of these postcolonial "uations." Often this edt the efectve, i ot the of ficial dissolution of many of these creations ofthe colonial powers, The the government resolt has been the reversion to mach elie soca ongunizations-—tibal clan oF gang. The result isa major change in whom we might fight and haw they se fight In the lasthusdeed years oro, Wester satons have become accustomed fighting disciplined, ustormed soliers of anther tation, Now we are faced with fighting watrior or clan societies. The di ference between 3 soldier and a wartioe is esentil Soldiers are disciplined members of speificprofesion. As such, they sre under the cotrl of political entiy and do not have spect final ‘orsocial benefits fom continuing cfg. Although theres increased res fig and opportunity for promotion during war, most professional oles lla east pay ip servic oa preference or pace, In contrasty a warrior society ehrives on and eit for war, Often, the young warrior has eveything to lone (excep his ite if he stops fighting Consider the young clans in Somalis. As a meraber of fighting clan, the has prestige and income. They combine to give him aces 40 money, food, propertand women. Ihe pus hisseepons dow lses hat pres tige and theincome—and with them everything els. Although the rk of death rom ighingisaways resent, its ata ess than the rk of death fiom starvation ihe sop ign, Unfortunately, most of these wari societies’ sechanisns for keeping tinlence toa manageable eel are sed on tational tems, Pornstars, in Somalia, clan elders would meet and determine ines imposed on an indi ‘dua oe uly who killed another during camel raid. Hower the advent ‘of power new weapons has escilated the ki heyond the contol ofthe od soil stems, The young warriors have lard new techniques to emh= oy the new weapons. Like al hsman onganietions they hive adapted, ‘This creates a major problem for Wester soldiers facing sich a wat or scity. These societies have lesen shat pushing women and citdeen ' the font, even in close combat, wl often neutralize the soperir fire Power of Western oldies. Sometimes the women snd children ae armed, fometimes not: Further, women and children atthe font shows that the ‘tie society has mobilized aginst a perceived threat ts livelihood, ter tory or customs. Even when the coaFonttion docs not include weapons, ‘astioe societies ave learned that Western soldiers have rouble dealingTe Stng andthe Sane with argenmbers ot women nd cideen-—and haves ther 2623 teal tool when i creates an aeartags Tn sum, there hasbeen an enormous social change fom what Wester fines faced at the hening if Word War I. The cites of ich mations have fragmented and are begining to align by interests rather than ma~ ‘ional: Many pour nations have filed completely with theie populations ‘breaking up into the vibes or clans that preceded he nation-xtae imposed by the colonial powers, Unfortunately, che eibl ongaizatons were never designed o dea with the challenges inherentina filed nation, Thus, many ‘of the por fc ice hope In shot, social changes singe World War IT have been extensive and wide-ranging ‘The curative changes in political, economic, and social arenas since World War Il ae clear and distinc. The changes in the echnical aca ae overwhelming. Panky, theyare much too extensive, and to familia tthe reader, t explore in depth hee. Stil consider the following examples, Ia 1940, the fist computer had ot even besa developed. The fist satelite vas almost rwenty yeas away. Teleison il not exist. Commercial ava ‘on was ints nfngy—transpacfe Hights ook days. The tral capacity of lleansoceaic cable and phone ines wa es than neo tay’ be op- Siccables, artes, as eehnology continues to evel itis just py reorder ing every spect of our ives The entirely new fis of smplexty and et- work theory ae changing how we see the world. Our understanding of ology is increasngat an ever faster pace In each of these areas the word tas eap ahead since World War I Tes inmutvely obvious to any observer that alent unimaginable change has occurred inthe ast sity years. Although ntall sector of 450 ciety evel a dhe same rate all are moving in the same direction. As We ‘vole int the industrial er governments, business, and seca organi tions moved roa hicrarchial structure that was often national in scale 10 the same way, as we move into the Information Age, al rectors of soiey ae bsomingvetworked onan intematonal cle. Whats es obvious thatthe rte of changehas been aceeating—and not just over the let sity deur but over corded history, ‘Consider world population aon: Ietook fm year nl 1800 0 0m fom three hundred million to one billion Yer the population doubled in only the nex 150 years, reaching two billion by 1950, Then it tsipled in a mere ily years, reaching sx ilion by 2000. Te took more than 3,700 years fr the first derncracy to eve alee Rome became an empire, yet the next 200 years saw democracy spread around the wold Te took anos a hundked years fom rosie for itt become a cental element of national esonontis. eto Jes than ewenty-sive yeas forthe personal compute tod the sae, It took Jes than fv yeas for instant messaging to panetate mot sais, nent ofthe steam fas In warfire, change is also accelerating. 1 tok hung of yeas fom the development ofthe musket and cannon fr first-generation warfre to ‘rave Second generstion warfire evolved and peed nthe hundred years, Detween Waterloo and Verdun. Thind-generation wari came to matty Jn ess than renry-ive years. Cleat think genertion waste cannot be the leading edge af war more than sity year ate. The next few chapters vil outine how fourth-geneaton ware bas evolved and has dominated warsince World We IMao and the Birth of Fourth-Generation War “Frostproof ape oe Word ‘Warll, However nh ike the fighting in che US, Civil Was he Boer Warn the Russo-Japanese War tok place far om the European cen ter of power and was therefore largely gored Just the pre-World War 1 profesional miitaies mised dhe obvious precinors to the disasters of ‘World War I, Wester profesional militares completely ased the evo Jution of SGW. And like their predecesos,chey were doomed to suler tic own disasters in Asia and Affic, Iss fist practitioner to hath write shout and uccesslly execute con cept of AGW, Mao TseTung, ws a product ofthe intense turmoil that sharsctriaed Chinain the erly rwenteth century. Mao was nineteen when the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty abdicate in 1912.Thus he grew up under the collpsing imperil system, He had seen China hare bythe West, ape by its warlords and filed by its emperor and his court. Du ing Mao youth, China ws «peripheral player at best—more a source of confit among other nations than a enter of power in its own right ‘The abdication of dhe emperor ended 290 years of Manchu rile Even more emtkably tended 2,000 year tradition of ae by an emperor Fis “s Made i Fhe 6 sbiation was not voluntary. He nad been fore by revolationans who hopes bring Chia inc the rwenteth century: In is place, Yean Shika, a leading Qing genera in alliance with the revolutionaries, became prei~ dent ofthe new republic ‘Unfortunately for Chin, he rapidly assumed the cole of dictator gor ing ofr as to declare cat he would make himself emperoe on January 1, 1916, Notsnexpecedly hi declaration rested i widespread protest the lingmentation ofthe revolutionaries ito competing factions, and contia- ed fighting as Yuan Shika ated ro consolidate power His attempt to scize power ended then he died suddenly in Jone 1916, ‘The nea elie years saw China toen by i wat a he various ware donde each tied to achieve dominance took until 1928 fo the Nain alist Party to seize contol of Chin and declare itelf the legitimate government, with Generalissimo Jang Jesh (Chiang Kai-She at is hed Tnilly alld with the Communists, de Nationalists turned on the Com mist Party once Jiang fel he was winning Jang knew tha the biggest single threat ro his ule was the Comiunises, From 1927 to 1983, his Na- ‘onaliss dd thee best to estoy the Communists, to consolidate his hold 09 power, Teswar aginst this backysbund that Mao came to power inthe Com smunist Pury. Mao had been member ofthe party snc ifs meeting in Shanghai in 1921, By she time ofthe Nationalist Ant Bandit Carypigns (4927-33), he was 4 seasoned organizer an planner More important, he > things done. One of che most impressive and important things Mao Achieved was to completly rewrite the Communist strategie approach fist, guns the Nationalists, then aginst the lpnese an finally gait the Nationalists gui, His vison would guide the party oitscompletevc~ cozyin 1949, Tnunderstanding che evolson of GW, its essential wo remember that te Communist insurgency in China did ot use the srategy of People’s ‘Warat the begining. Att founding in 1921, the Chinese Communist, Pry subscribed tothe Soviet concept ofan invungency based on the w= ‘ban workers af dhe nation. The party leadership, advze by Soviet ison ‘fiers cng tothe Maras Leninis view that sevlution must be based46 The Sing athe Sone ‘nthe urban proletariat This was matter of dogma an thereto not sa jest to discusio, despite the huge dileences benscea the politcal socal ‘comomic nd eigioas systems ofthe rwo mations Unlike nos of the Marsist leaders, Mao, a the son of a prosperous pasa, Bad spent most of his life inthe countryside. He dd not Blive thatthe urban proletariat had suffceot power to conquer the warlords and contol ll of Chins, During 1926 and 1927, Mao, is his continuing ody of what worked snd what didn, developed a now revolutionary concept, He stated dha theeevluton in China must be based om the strenath wf the pessnts” He ecognied that in Chin social structure, the indus workers simply didnot represent a ore strong enough tense success In contest, the hundseds of millions of peasants, if propedy organized, ould be tht force ‘Mao di not develo these theories nam academic setting, He lived bis theory: During this period, he wasan ative army commander who con- stant sought ways to increase the lleciveness of his for. He under ood the key fics: Fst he mast avid direst carontation with superior varlord and yorernment forces. Second, he needed the peasants onside towin, He developed a srtege appetch around those tw prep: “This was summed up in a pithy folk shyme, which conveyed the sence of the Red Ary’ fine tategy a it final for, drawn up by ‘Mao and Zh," an popslried thevaghous the ary May. contained sixtoun characters Dijin, wo tui [ When the] enemy advances we witha, Di uso oa, [When the] enemy res, we has, Dip, wo da, [When the] enemy tres, we attack, Di ui wo ju [When the] enemy withdeaws we pursue * Zhu De—co-commands of the Zi-Ma Anny’ 1928. Thin ey onsite faba ihe thousand men, r | i Maral i fo inna War ‘Meanie the gundebnes forthe army's eaten of ans, which ‘Mao ad first issued at Sane in September 1927, were expanded into what beste known asthe “Sie Main Points for Attention.” Solders were urged to replace srwbedng and wooden bed-bouds afte staying at pease nt ones overnight return whatever they bored to py or anything they damaged; ro be courteous; be far in busines dealings and to teat prisoners humanely “Macs thoughtson revolution were ceri evolving edd aot see se lio ava spasm eae by aura proletariat everthnos the gow ernment. He snr ta. plical stage where he must pay aterion 10 maintaining the good ofthe people Farther, he wnderstood that main ‘taining the god of the peasants was aot simply «propaganda sagan tbat essential to his army's survival. He knew that only the peasants could provide an unbeatable intligence network constant source of manpower, nd resources in the fos of food an labor. This ws the entire thrust of the sc main points. ‘Mao was taking ative step tokeepthe peasants on his side. Tn Chin, simply bag the lesser of two evils helped, Showing conscious, easisteat concern forthe welfie of the peasants was a powesfl weapon aginst the warlords and. government: The poople responded by supporting Mao's aries, They not only provided manpower and itelignce foe the annie ‘trained and manned loa sistance yeoups that took their iectin from the Communists. the Frch and Americans were to discover in Viet= ram, thee lal forces ted down major government Forces and ensured that ‘he lol population rmine loyal wo the Commins. Ate sre me, ‘the lea forces provided esc intelligence logins, and even combat. supporc to the egular guerilla ormatirs ‘Although Mao stressed go behavior toward the peasants this did not mean he was above tking whit he needed fom the merchants. Yer even ‘when deatng with these enemies ofthe peopl,” heensred that hiss ers couche his demands as requests and ether pid cash or gave credit slip tothe penton om whom the supplies were taken, As Mao thought evolved he put tem forward othe Cental Com iste withthe itenton of shi ing the strategie approach of che entire4s The Sig and be So revolution: Through asenes of political maneuvers which i heiebh and Now, matched his stated strategic approach, Mao convinced the Cental ‘Commitee to at least acknowledge che power ofthe peasants, Akbough the commusigué om the Cental Committe dd not give unqualified support to Mao position, itd recognive asthe comes path we ea ing other options open, Hloweves, the issue was not sted. As with any group theatened by anatack on its core bei, the Mars, tho ail belived the reoliion mst based on he arban proletarian, fought bck, In fsimess grat de ofthe diffrence in opinion was based on aciference inexperience, The proletariat banch ofthe party had survived by fghtinga mobile wr ken ing their ay together and meving from place to place. They were co vinced they could act as a catalyst forthe urban updsing. Based on their ‘comb experience they disputed Mao heretical deviation foan Maraist- Lennie thought and resisted its implementation, “This fiction of the parry worked constantly to overcome the shift 0 Mao strategy Yer on December 8, 129, they slleedanothersethuck The ‘Cental Comite sued directive to combine the wtban and peasant roaches much more closely. They direst the Red Ary to expand rn ‘mobile fore by listing peasant self-defense nit ‘The previous tactics of avoiding the caprue of majorities must be changed. So long as there isa possibilty of vitor and w long 2s the masses can be aroused, attacks shouldbe launched against them and they should he ccypied. Rapidly taking posession of | rmsjr cites would have the greatest political significance, This -textegy if coordinated with the worken’, peasant and older! teugale doughout the entire counts wil promote the greatest revolutionary tide Although the continued emphasis on the cites shows thatthe di restive was not an unguaifid shift so Maoist eactics, Mao was plese to sec his thoughts woven into the Central Commitee’ssteateyic ap proach. In dhe highly conservative slque that was the Communist Party, ST Macatee toh ane in 49 Jt was a major victory to have his “heretical” thoughts included as part ofthe official strategy. More telling than the incusion of his thoughts in Communist doctrine was the great fice he gained when he was pro- rmotedl to army group commander an placed in change of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sisth ans, Although anathema to the Marist-Lennisetaitonalits, Mao's views were decisively reinforced bythe abject flue ofthe Sovit-ondered 1930 offensive agains the cts. All ements that adhered to the shan proletariat fine of urban upeisings aod anackswere defeated with heay ca ‘uals. This offensive expose the urban cades to Nationalist firepower angled to heay casualties among those who enthsistially executed the offensive agus the cites. In camtast;Mao proceeded mach more cautiously with his armies. He chose ro enicle his target city rather than occupy it Thun when the other Communist aries were defeated, he withdrew in good onde. Although technically defeated, because het, had filed to sie his target city the minor losses sffesed by forces using his tactics tod in sharp contrast c0 the catastrophic easualies suffered by the Marist Lenina faction Infact ‘Mao could pine wo some Hinitd suces fom hi ort. While Mac prestige grew markedly the flue of dhe ofensive against ‘he cits greatly weakened the Communists a « who. The Nationalists ‘wan opportunity and stepped up eeirefforts to nish the job an estoy ‘he Communists completely Generalsimo Jang ish inated a series of Ans- Ban Canpuigns (Like all countesinsuagets ing wanted oedice the legitimacy ofthe insurgents by lbelng them bandits) Mao, sing his ‘acti and basing his foresin Hhe countryside, easly defeated the fist 140 ‘campaigns, The acts ot his"Siateen Characters” posed more than the ny ‘conventional Nationalist forces ould handle He drew the Nationalist deep into Red Army ests then attacked ‘The contrast of is sucess andthe urban proetara’s defeats ily setled the doctrinal argument in Mao’ vor and greatly insese his pres ‘ge in che Communist arg: He was becoming the ist among equals Mao used this new prestige to radically ater the Marxist-Leninist theory of v= ‘lution. He abandoned the Soviet theory, bated on a scken revolution of50 The Sig and te the urban, industria! proletariat and adopted his own theory, based on protracted war conducted hy rural peasants Although this decision tlienated the eraitonalist and spl the Communist Pry, history proves "Tins 4GW began evolving in the same way ts predeeseors had. Faced with spect racial and operational problems, practical ighters developed tfletve solutions. The development of AGW pales Mao's growing un derstanding the capabilities and limitations inhecent in his static, oP rational, and tactical cicumstances. Given warfaes Darwinian nature, those who clung to the impractical Marxist-Leninist approach were em inated, The deaths served as pointed lessons for the survivors smart enough to understand, As Mao was reorganizing the Communist Put based on his new pine ciples, Generalissimo Jang Jes decided that despite the Japanese inva sion of Manchuria, hie most dangerous enemy continued co be the (Communists, Minimiving hiseRorts against the Japanese, he expanded his ‘Au- Bandit Campaign with dhe spesfc goal of wiping out the Reds Although initially repulsed by the Communists, the Nationalists achieved sucess when they adopted he rl wine and blocouse echaiqes the Britis sed guns he Boers in South Afica By building alos, the [Nationalists cut the countryside upinto more manageable pieces. Te i= road lines were protested by blockhowses that alowed the Nationalists greatly reduce the Communists ably ta move From one sector wo another Tid, he uiloads allowed fr rapid reinforcement of any blockhouse under signticant aac, Slowly but surely the Nationalist were steanging ‘the Communistshy cutting them of from theirsoureaf stengh, the peas ants, The Comumunist were bing bse ‘Recognizing that they were dealing with an entirely new situation, the (Communists made she tough and fatctl dessin 1 abandon their ome area inthe south and commence the Long March to establish tei forces, Jn Yenan. The Long March selfs one ofthe epi tales of human endurance snd determination, In litle more than year, the Communists marched ealy 5,00 les while fghting more than 200 bates. Despite constant combat, hunger, and deprivation, the Communist averaged fieen miles a Malte af ohio Bar day over ail terrain across mountain ranges, over swoien iver, ad ‘hough desolate plains. OF the 86,000 who started the march, fewer than 5000 coapleed it “The Long March had the immediate effect of consolidating Mao's au- ‘thority inthe Communist Pacyand providing an incredibly tough and in tenstly loyal eadee he came to draw on in the future, From this point forwatd, Mao hid frm grip on paver within the Comumnist Paty A= though he fought off several subsequent challenges to his authority, using ‘arous and often brutal tactics, he neve again gave up conta ofthe pasty Im addition to providing 2 safe place to consolidate his power, Yenan {ve Mao timer fle on what he had learned When Yenan,he wrote his mows Yai Cbi Chan (Guerils Warfare. semarkable this sen dervolume is, Mao newer claimed to have created anew form of warfire— he knew that guerillas had been asousd for centuries. le was simply a Practitioner of wa laying out whst he thought woud be a war-wiing, serategy Although his book ostensibly discusses the ant-apancie wi Mao was ooking beyond the war with Japan tothe inevitable strug withthe Na Sonalsts.Athougi noe claiming to have eeated x new method of wa he ‘id provide a strategie concepe that mowed guerilla warfte Fern a subor- inate effort co suppor conventional amy 0 4 war-winning approach, As the firs practitioner o define nsusgeney, Man like Clavsewiteun- derstood that wars fundamentally a politica undertaking, However he went ‘eh ures than Clase is definition, sting, The problem of po- Tal mobtization ofthe army and the people sine ofthe utmost in Pottance... poltial mobilization i the most fundamental condition for wining the war Hie further emphasized the primacy of politcal efforts hen he stated “Our jos not merely to recite our pail program to the People... [We must] wansirm the plc! mobilization forthe war ito ‘regular movement. his sx mater ofthe fist magnitude on which the victory primarily depends” Altes fim establishing the overriding palit nature of insurgency, ‘Mao outlined his famous cre phases forthe successful conduct of ins geno Boiled down to ther eence the thre phases aeshe Sigg and he Sa Phase The insingcnts concentrate prmaniyon ling po lial suength, Miltary action is limite to selected, politically rotated assassinations. Any other military action must have ropagands purpose to cement he poplatons support of tein sages ‘Phase I: The insurgents gain strength and consolidate son tral of base aes, They begin to actively ante some portions ofthe contested area, And, because Mao had no ouside sponsor providing weapons, they conducted military operations both capture arms and vo wea dawn ovement foes, Phase Il: The insurgents commit rule Frees (which have boon careflly husbanded up to this point) in a final offensive ‘sina the government. This phase ean steceed onli the "cote- lation of ores has een shifted to the insurgents dng the carly phases, Although apparently simple, these thre phases show «sophisticated understanding of the power poical,economic and social elements that, onsite the“base of military powes Mao knew that insurgents could nt ‘match the government’ conventional litany forces inital Therefore he ‘eonecived the earefl build of polit, social and economic power d= ing phases and 11, His goal was nothing es than to change the corel Hon of forces" benseen dhe goverment and the insurgents. Only after shat, sbife would the insurgents be ready to mone to phase IL final destin ofthe government by conventional forces “Thus Mao developed, ested, and used two cities concepts in his i= torious elle to overtheow the Nationals Chinese government. The Best, ‘was tha politcal power ws the eset forse in an armed confit The second was that political power could be wa! o change th corelaton of forces that insurgent conventional forces could conduct the Gna offer sive to overthrow the gover ‘Mao practical soltions to the prublems the Chinese Revotion faced resulted in the evoltion of new form of wt, which became known "People’s Wa” His emphasis on bilgi poll base among the Maeadte Rhl oeawnn 8S ‘masses people aa using ha politcal power to slowly wear down an en- ‘my’ superior military power was an innovation ofthe fist onde. Ie ws ot the fist time this approach had bees used, However, it was ee fist. ‘ume it had been clearly articulated and then disseminated asa form of wa fae capable of defeating much more poses enemis ‘Mao as thought beyond the boundaries of Chins. He expnded his das to state that to manimize political power, insurgents must projec it beyond ther borders. Through propuginda, they must attack thei enemy by undermining the political wil of that enemy’s people lls, and spon sors. The insurgents most Further ebilize nesta poli opinion topes sure the enemy's major alls into withdrawing support. The find ask of th insurgent propazanis was to generate materi and econoanic support forthe movement from findly and neural counties ‘Mao understood the intreaional pect of is srugele, Although he Aid not receive major weapons shipments or direct support tons outside sources, he was erenly aware that international epinion could significantly reduce support to his Nationalist foes Indcusing is plan to defeat the Japanese (and later the Nationalist Chess, whom Mao always new he ‘would have to fight), he stared, "Is not enough fr Chia to rely on er strength alone andshe cannot win without ulzing the aid of international forces and the change within the enemy county ber iterations peop ‘nda an diplomacy wil become more important ‘Mao counted heal o political maneuvering to change the “ore tion of frees” both internal and external t China. He had aio developed don ‘hat shit in frees. Generations before Westerners began to discuss the Power of networks, Mao strove to develop bath intemal and external et works to support his sevolution, Intesnally the newark provided a wayto mone information to his ol lowers and a way to keep those flower under lose observation forse sity seasons. The party edt crue that each party member was embe of one of numerous party groups, such asthe Young Communist League, Young Workers, and Young Students, each party member was ember ‘of veveral groups he was caught in hick web ofboth suppor and contol terete strategie, operational and tactic apprches to achieveHA The sand he See “Thus, Jong before acrworks became esential elements of the wider world, “Mao was employing ther in his politi and security organizations Inermationlly, Mao built networks to neutralize, a5 much as feasible, support forthe Nationalists, Although these networks could no stop sup por, hey’ ad a inpuct—and Mao ays took advantage of any ede i his serugee "Although Mao employed every technique e could devise to si the destruction ofthe Nationalist oneation of farce, he knew thatthe fin goverment wold depend on a mancusercspaign by contention forces "The concept that gverilla warfire ean en in itself and that use ac= tivities can be divorce from those of the regula foes since ‘Mao’ Poop’ War asa major evolaton aay frm the Western con- ‘cept of campaigns fought purely by regular forces However, he dd nt move completely aay rom the concep chat only regular foes, by destroying the eneay’s amis, can win a war: While reversing Chasewite' relative Value conceming politi as opposed to military power, Mao sl sw the application of military power asthe ial tp in the revolution Even wit this caveat, Maps te futher ofa new stategie approach 0 war His dee phases served ax an outline for succes insigcnsis, whether urban or rurally based He recognized that war i essentially un- predictable and he therefore bil great feb into the model. Based on his own suceses and flues, stretching over decades aa commander he knew that the phases ould nt be rigidly separated but merge inc cach ‘other. An insurgency may bein late phase Tin some parts ofthe country ‘while stilln early phase nother Conversely if government connterinsurgency astons become ssces=| fa, ee inargents may revert to phase I In faci the insurgents re oF nizing properly the cover organizations essential in phase [remainintact and underground, ready to revume functioning unt the nal victory of phase I Peoples War was corey ile asa new form of war Map wat the fist envision politic! poe athe ky to insurgency. He swt as long= ‘erm srl tha would ebb and flow before lang to Final vitory. He ko understood that networked iterlocked, mass organizations were the Mabie i ohne Bar 58, ey to political power. Long before we conceived of our“inodern” wired, ‘nterconnected society. Mao had established an entire insurgency based on ‘hat principle. Using mission-typearers or most day-to-day operations, he reserved all major statege decisions thimself—and abo wed the net™ work 10 ensue that aone of hi subordinates could accumulate enough poster to depose bie ‘Mao rea penios lay i earing from his mistakes, then taking those lessons and organizing them into a coberens, articulate strategy for seizing power His was the fundamental work upon which dhe fourth genesaion of wae would be bulThe Vietnamese Modification Nigriz sneer sfimenion Hoch Misha Yo Neen iap developed and employed the next major modification wf Com= ‘nis asurgeney doctrine. The irst Communist insungens fae with e- {eating powerful ouside government, they developed an intresting twist. on the concepe of Peoples War. While maintaining the Macist move of three-phase insurgency based onthe peasant they refined the mde! ti ‘clude an aggresive atackon the national will f their einipa enemy firs Fane, then the United States. Ho and Giap develope the ability 20 take the politcal waro thee distant enemy's homeland and destroy his will to continue the steugele For purposes of hi study i's vital to understand how nations a phinicated and powerfal e France and the United States could completely ‘misunderstand the typeof conflict in which they were engaged Ris lest ‘that muchas the generals of Word War lid not understand thar warfare tua changed frst he French and then the US. politcal and military lead es mise the changes, “illustrate how completely the United States mised she type of war wwe were fighting, consider Col. Harry Summer’ Ox Steg’ A Critical We temance Maas 97 Analysts of the Vstnam War Publi in 192, it was widely alam in Poical mia, and academic cles a clear, asurate strategic asses rmentofhe US-Vietnamese War In it Summers sed Clusewitacanlogic tw ague ha he proper oe forthe United States in Viet was to act as ‘a secen berneen the North Vietnamese regular and South Viemam, He ‘ied that the ee ett South Vietnam was not fom insugency but from a conventional invasion. The insurgent activity simply served 1 dis- tract our attention fom ehe veal tneat—the North Vietnamese Arm Colonel Summers backs this argument by pointing out hat tas, in fat, the North Vietnamese Army hat finaly invaded and destroyed che South, He state: Ieisindicativ of our strategic flr in Vietnam that almost. a decade fterour involvement the tue nature ofthe Vietnam War ie sill in question. There ae stil hose who would attempt iit ingot revolutionary war mold and who blame our defeat on our failure to implerene counterinaugency doctrine: This pint of vew equiresan aceptance ofthe North Vietnamese contention thatthe [North Vietnamese regu forces were an extension ofthe ger rill fort, point of view not borne out by the fics! Colonel Summers ws joined in this viewpoint by a amber of other senior US. officers. Admiral U.S. Sharp, CINPACELT 196468, « tended that the Vietnam Wis was essentially a conventional war and was subject to sation by application of conventional military force. Sharp stated, “We could have forced Hanoi to give up is ellorts to take over South Vietnam. Bur authority to wee power to thisend was simply not forthcoming.” Aqreting with thi conclusion, General RG, Davis stated, “pom the beginning, i war known thatthe real enemy would be thove 14 [NVA segula divisions plus the Viet Cong main force eegiments snd buataions.”” Tn hisotherwise oustanding article comparing Vietnam to Fl Salvador, Lieutenant Cole! Hayden also subscribe to this theory. He wrote[ijn Viewarn in 1968, ollowing thet oftensve «a com bined cis-miitary campaign plan for ration building ultimately feted the insurgents hy 1570 and forced the Novth Vietnamese to conventional military cts in 1972, as not aban ‘ills who ksked inthe Stigon Presidential Palace gate in April 1975, but a North Vietnamese T-S8 tank I took a major North ‘Viewamese conventional eiitay offensive to do what» revels tionary insurgency cou aot doin South Vietnam, “The common theme that comes oti al these writings and that as ‘any proponents even ray, South Viena as nat defeated by a as gene tre by Although the statement that we had destoyed mos of the insorgents conventional feof Pry? maton in South Vietnam is accurate, the interpretation that South Vietnam fll tot conveotonal, foreign invision isnot. Even more significant, the idea that concent Sig on the North Vietnamese camsentional power would have won the war is «gross oersimplificition of the conlct—a and ‘mental misunderstanding ofthe nature of the war ‘Yer the idea tha Vitnum fll 9 an invasion has great appa, ciel because simplifies the sittin, I moves us out ofthe complex elon of insurgeneyan-AGW into theraatiey orderly and eaxytr-understara el ‘of comenional war Unfoetnatelyifwe ate vee hy this ies, we Flt see the ature ofthe war we fought and therefore cannot hen fom i, We ‘sll note the significant sontibutio the Vietnamese mide to AGW, Realty Athoohthe conventional arcigainvsion theory sound sonvincing ‘oan American readers fundamental Mawis that lets an American pint of view. Viewing these events from an American pont of view help Uusunderstand wha we did batt obscutes what the Vietnamese Comms ists were doing an therefore what ws relly hopping onthe ground, Tn contrat the study ofthe war from s Viet point of i ang Mao model ofa hzee-phased insurgency, cleanly shows thatthe Second In- dochina War was an invurgeney brought t is plaaned conclusion In the noe Wawro last chapees, we billy explored how Mao devclaped Peoples War. Wecan row exploe how Ho Chi Minh and his fllers maid thatthe Phased approach to succeed in Vietnam, In his address to the Second National Congress of the Viet Nast Worker's Paty Panty andG In the first stage. all we did was to preserve al increase our main sommarized the Viet Minh revolution to date:"Our Jovetnment foresaw that our Resistance War as thre stages, Forces. Inthe second rage, we have actively contended with the enemy and prepared forthe general counrerffensiv. The tied stage isthe gen= cal counterafensve." Cleary Housing Man’ thro phased me! Not only did he openly rmered home Ho's ecutng heme: ‘The tut s resident Johnson wants neither peace nor peace egotations. Asa mater of facta the very moment when be talks «lo about peace discussion, the US. imperialists ae farther ex panding their ar of agresson io South Viet-Nam, massively send ingther tens of thousands of US tmopsandestendingesaation” in North Vier-Nam. The people the world have eal ea this ‘Thats precisely the reson why the progressive American people are actively opposing the US, war of aggression in ViewName Given insurgency’ poi nature Ho undsitood thatthe U.S. cen "ee f grvity as our politica wll Hews the impact of Ter wattack that center of eats He tured ‘ory i his effort to change the correlation of forces n preparation forthe ‘conventional battles of phase IL In contrat, the U.S, govemmene did not seem to understand thatthe perception of what happened ia Tex ese Jmportant than what really happened. Esen worse, dhe gorernment had squandered its credibility with the press and, trough them, with the US, Public, Aconting to Joho Laurens, a young CBS reporter atthe sme bathed defen into ajo strategic ve- Bad information was in the miltary reporting system... Bach seg ofthe reporting sstem was wna onaccracy. Ate, lis were deliberate. Bok counts were exaggerate Civian dead, ‘wounded and caprared became enemy dead, wourded an cap- tuced. The numbers of weapons and supplics caprued and de= staoyed were inte. Territory swept wat miseported. Detail of combat were adjusted to ook more favorable to the US sie. Suc ‘essfilnemy ambushes were not reported, Casals rom reny fire were listed ss combat dead and injured. Mistakes ofall kinds ‘were unreported. Cover-upe were commonpace™2 The Saga te stare LLaurencets not talking bout the ate sites an eal seventies Viet sam, Fe stalking about his pesception as young reporter in 1965 and 1966. By ch end of his fis tourin Vieenam, he had completely lost faith in oficial government statements. By 1966, the oficial Military Assistance ‘Command Vietnam (MACV) news conference ws deisively ered 12 asthe"Five Clock Follies." Thegoverament’credblirycoornue to de- cline fom that point, Farther eroding the government's reiility was the fact that General ‘Westmoreland flew home just before Tet to reassure the American people thie we were winning, thit"thereisaligh atthe end ofthe nnd." Heco- pleted this ehereading tour ofthe United States only 2 month anda half before Tet “The embarrassment ofbeing surprised nd the disastrous erosion of the oveenment’ credibility prevented i fom convincing the American peo- le that Terwas relly US. victory. Further the government was never able to recover its cody withthe people or the mea. rely the press. Aid nor ru the tactical succes of Tet ato a stag defeat. The imabiiey oF US. decision makes to nderstand its political ramifications and deal sith those ramiiations di ‘Understanding how Ho made such good ase of te highly inaccurate ress reports on Tet is eral wo understanding one of the most power tools of AGW, We kaow the media will continue play etic ole ia ial pes reports ll forms of wa and, just swith nal mitacy repo are apt nt tobe accurate Even more problematic the hnge insreae inthe number and ypes of reporters who will cover any even. Much of thut coverage will be "unedited ive forage, wit saeation peovded by an anchor who probably hasnomiltary experienceand, tina domestic rs wil simply keep alle Ingo fil atime Because 4GW i essentially polticaland we wil aly se the meas- re ofcontml we had in Desert Storm—the apd dseminacion of acute, cree informaton can make o break the eountensurgens® eff. We must 0 beyond “disgust” with inaccuracy ofthe past ander to understand how the pres lates othe tue conde of wa ie Low Matin Summary ‘The tras ofthis entive discussion has ben to iustete tat key US. ecnon makers never lly understood ce ature of the Vietnam War Like Colonel Summers, hey sa the strugele in Clausewtzean terns and ft they could wer down the Vietnamese though shee attion. Because they ‘ould not conceive ofthe dea that we col ose until mach too ate, we ‘ever even focused the goverament on dhe wt. Te ft that we had no ‘one above the eel of cole in Washington working on Vietnam fl ime shows shat we considered thie a less tha serio war. Unfortunately the pase “limited wat” summed up ous level of commiaent Incontast the Communists understood he nature ofthe wa they were conducting. They knew tc key to victory waste wll ote American peo- ple. Knowing this, they developed a strategy to atack shat will They di tated the tempo, timing, umber of engagement, tens of engagement, areas f operations and inal outcome. The question reins, how did this come about? Given the enormous gulf between th culture, histories, and polit ‘eal oxganizations ofthe an side began witha good understanding ofthe other Yet des igoniss, iis understandable that neither tehaving started with major misconceptions about the United States and its r= Iationship with its South ‘ble enough to analyze the situation in light of new information, lara fom thei mistakes, and reorient their efforts twaed our weak pont ‘our national wil Like dhe Communists, the United States and South Vietnam started without a clear pict of what was necessity for vetry: However neve ‘hanged. We cleaely misunderstood the Connunists and ruck atthe pe riphery oftheir suengeh: dei egular combat forces Not understanding Mao's insurgeney, despite the wide aiabilty of books that articulated it and Ho's public endorsement of it, we focused on the North Vietnamese conventional forces. We consistently sought "big battles” against those forces. Asa ssl we virally ignored che ey battle for polialexebl- ityand strength essential inthis neve form of warfare, We were fighting an cote diferent war than the Vietnamese etmamese ally the Communists proved flex-TA The Sang se oe Despite the inital groping hy both ies the Commniss had a ceae understanding ofthe nature ofthe wa they were fighting. They hada guide snd stuck oie Even when they misntespreted the situation andattempted to moweto phase I prematrely not once tice, they maintained heir strategic fo andl dropped back o phase H.The esl was an insurgency ‘hac developed mostlyas described by Mao, Making use of theisecure base anexin North Vietnam, protrcted wa the Communists changed the “oreiton of forsee” between the wating factions and destoyed the politi wll ofthe United States, [Against both the Pench andthe Americans the Vietnamese success fly expleited the natu divisiveness of democracy to erode support for and continual pala propaganda, the war The effectiveness ofthe North Vietnamese attacks was enforced by the flue of Western leader o comprehend what was happesing In both cases, Ho successful eampaign against ouside "agresioe cleared the ‘vay forthe iar victory that constitutes phase II ofthe Maoismndel, Incontras, ur strategic decision makers could nt escape thes ner ent prides in their views of war As Shy and Collier pa i,"“American strategy’severely challenged Ho and Gap, but in the en led o defeat them in lage pare Because i never grasped the kind of war being fought nor the particular Vietnamese conditions that gave the wart reoluion= any characte "Been today many Americans point to the apparent sucden willingness ‘of the Vietnamese to negotiate after the Christin bombing ofensive as roof that we could have won the war with pruper application of conven- tional ices. This makes sense only you view negotiation ina Western European sense as way to end conflict, Ia contest, Mao and the North Vietnamese sa negotiation a simply another tol in the cont, Mao stated openly that: Rewations rately compromise compromises ae made only 0 farther the strategic design. Negoition, then, undertaken forthe «ual purpose of gaining time to butes position (military, polit= ical, social, economic) and to wear down, fastate and harss the ‘opponent. Few any exsendal concesions are tobe expected fom He tiamee Mobfosim 75 the revolutionary side, whose si sony eo crate cnt that will preserve che unity of the strategic ine ad qurantce the de velopment of a"vctoris situation," First France, then the United States saw superior litary power neu- tlie by th superior political agility ofthe Vietnamese. The result was a succes execution ofa classi insurgency right dor to the final cn Ventional bales—~and the entinied eolion of the fourth generation Alehough the Vietnamese strategy wis developed oly aie alongs ses of mistakes and at great cost, Ho’ determined adherence to Peoples ‘Wir an his eventual understanding ofthe stratesituaton allowed him to cus hiseffrts onthe rea ene In dang so, he provided yet another step forwan in ns pola will of outside sponsor sates and refined the cnept of “chang= Ing the creation of force.” rt theo, He showed insngent how to defeat the Although this entre chapter may seem an exerci seman it pur pe so stimulate the reader to consider the nature ofthe wae Like most Westerner, we ae more comfortable with che European concept of war, with ts clearly define us of fore and relatively clear delineation of ‘he responsibilities of dhe military: Unforeenately politi, demographic tnd religious tends since World War Il indicate that tore wars will be complex, confusing. and nasty 4GW stages athe than the ipl com Ais of ear generations During the hey years of cont the Vietnamese Commis refined and improved on Mao's doctrine. They showed insurgents how to use wide ‘arity of information chanselso directly attack the wl of external pow ers These great powers, the United States and France, thought they were Protected by oceans from direct enemy action and fond out ate tit "ey had misunderstood the nau of the wa they were fightingThe Sandinista Refinement ith the success of the Vietnamese insgents worldwide tok ear ‘fa small Third World nation Uke Vietnam could defeat the United States, anything was posible. This edt increased efortsby insurgents in widely separated aeas ofthe world And Tike ll efrtsto adopt new ors ‘of ware some were sucess others ere not In Nicragun, the Sandinists, through evolutionary step, frter i «rest the emphasis on political development driving te battlefield out come. They refined the Maoist doctrine by making poltical strategy self the endgame. In the Sandniss strategy, politcal maneuvering would not bbe the precursor toa conventional invasion it would serve asthe invasion ielf by destoying external suppor forthe Nicaraguan National Guard rower ik previous innovations it took tm, mistakes, and numerous fase paths before dhe Sandinista found the slution to seizing power “The movernent started 1961, when Thomas Borge snd Carlos Fors seca founded the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN). Al ‘hough hiss the accepead date fr de start oF dhe movement, they did not publish clear manifesto concerning thee doctrine t tha time —mort kay ‘because they had not yet developed one. However, hey did tate that they ie Sa Rane were Marxist-Leninist who subscribed to the"Yoceheory of nsungen With Casto sucess in Cab and Che Guevers popularity hin wis og ical choice fora Latin American insurgent at In June 196, they felt ready co aeemp an aed evolution based on that theory In keeping wih he "Yoo" thor, Borge led approximately sity sverillas nso Nicragua, in am attempt o start the evolution. By Octo ber, the effort had fale, Thesimplstic"foc" approach never had chance ‘ofbuilding the ongnization nesessary to overcome the Somoza sect ap paras The few survivors remeated actos the border into Honduni and were arrested, Not peresved t bea genuine threat, they served vying times in Honduran prisons and were released Upon ries, the Sundinstas spent the next ew years struggling i= lv 0 seve while they figured our anew approach. Leaning from the Imstakes they made and fom the flue of iia movements thoughout Latin America, they abandoned the “foo” theory. In its pce the FSLLN cxperimented with diferent approaches to establishing a popular uprising gins Somers, Firs, they flied unsuceesilly wth an arban revoltion This, on Fled—in the same way it ied in hee nations, Teenie theory a or ‘ng gue orcs in the cites played othe srengths ofthe dictator's se cyfoes Af filing direct arterpts a urban wae, they attempted 1 0 sania urban labor but could not organize the labue sions na Cons ist fonts. Refising to ge up the Sandinista agreed to ty « Maoist. *The"fco theory afinsutpnces sates tht by eating a sl Fs ao toed an nsugen rp willbe abet stimulate x spomtunein ‘singof thems he people and rapidly the yverment Che ve ‘era props this thon; based hi xperenes with Cast in the Cuban ‘Revoton. He i nat updentand ht thst ccs was bse on thea ios of Cb, which includ pending clap ofthe Batata reste Che yd foc his mistaken theory whe he eed apy tin very ile onion a atv snd wa ley government fre in Octber 1987TB TheShng unde So People's Wa. After two yeas of preparation the selected the area around Pancasan movintsin to build the base aca fr their insurgeny. In keeping with Mao’ concep, hey planned ro foeus on plitel or nization of the pesant population and avoid fighting the Nationat Guard. Led by Borge and Fonsec, the FSLN rerurmed to the mouatains jn 1966 to establish a peasant support network, However, they were un succes generating peasunt support. As middle-class college-eduated, urban Comnmnists the ile to inspire Catholic peasnts, They were sake ing ieleor no progress—ad frankly dd not seem wo understand the peas nts iheront distrust of outsiders, In May 1967, he Nicaraguan National Guard discovered thei pres- ‘ence and rapidly moved to estoy them. Twenty-five of the thirey-five Sandinisea cadres were killed during the National Guaes campaign. The surviving Sandinstas were fread to ee, fis to the cites and the 0 ‘Cub. Finally they fled to Costa Ric, where they were reduced tof rancing thei onguizaton by rbbing banks. After the National Guards campuigo, Anastasio Somoza announced tha the Sandinista had bees destroyed ‘One expected benefit accred fom this a elfen the moun tains the Sandinistscaprured the admivation os number of Latin Amer- ican students attending Patice Lumumba Friendship of che Peoples Univerityin the Soviee Union. Nikita Khrushchev bad established thei versity in an attempe to caprce and influence the next generation ofead> ‘chip inthe Third Woe To areace utr ender tothe Communist case, Khrushchev presided scholarships to promising young Socialis o¢ Cm renin fro al te the wold “Throughout this period, sgetiant number of Latin American st dents were envlled. Because the purpose ofthe university ws encour ge revolution, the icky naturally provide fll eportig on the“heroic™ activities ofthe Sandinista. As the Latin American students either grad uated oe dropped out, they returned home an gravitated to dhe Sandin= either lmited success anderen more linied pital nganization, ‘the Sandinisa leadership resolved to continue «People’s War, Unforunaely eS Rion for ther, they aked de arity of Mao ot Ho, The one “intelectual” Sar Aint, Fonseca, produced concep based on Marais, However other than promsing to reistribure lage and hollngs o peasant dl no provide a coerent mesg fr arr insugency. ‘This sa maje deviation fom both Mao and Ho. Each of them had ‘aeflly thought-out politcal agendas that were cent other plans 1 unify the peasants Behind them. Although acither intended to Kee the political promises he made, both had a extensive agenda to present othe peopl as put of phase I political rganization—and they would repeat hat theme throughout their struggle. A coherent, applicable message is cen tral 0 4OW. However, ther this lack of a mesage nor the lick of organization ‘ep the SaninistasFiom attempting yet again to establish a peasant-based Uupesing inthe northern mountains, In a variation of tes, they a be gn to organize an urban insurgency’ a he same time. Although the main ‘adres retumed to the mountains, urban ongizations would be formed mobilize stents, zo banks, instigate labor dspotes, and 30 on Like all sucesfl insurgents, the Sandinista kept trying new approaches until hey found something that worked. Although they did have Timited success inthe cites, the Sandisistas ‘once again led tery to gun the suppor of the peasants, la addition to bing coltge-educited ousidess, most ofthe Saris were ao" skinned” urban dvellers who stood oat among the much darker mouerain Prasants. Unable so convert he peasans to theircaus,the Sandia were ‘wily tracked through the National Guan network of peasant informants, ‘As a reslt, the National Guard was abl to ill many Sandinista leaders and eal defeat thee second attempr to urginire the peasant. And once again, defeat brought unexpected benefits or the Sansa Daring 1971, small group of university students fon alent Nicaraguan failes beyan to week aeratives to Somat’ cen. They went to + spiritual reeat un by a Catholic priest. though suppoedly discussing ‘eigows sues they ured the discussion to political iss, Over the courte ‘ofthe nex yea, they applied Marxist hought tothe politi sation in Niearagusso The Shingo e ring 1972, they were joined by a Sandinista commandant for sex «ral days of intense discussion. Then nearly 1973, they abandoned the re= sweat and went usderpround withthe Sandinista mosement They provided ‘new blood, poical camouflage and extensive new contacts fr the badly bartered Sundnistas. This was che Sandinista’ st expansion of the per sonal networks 40 vital to an inaurgeey. ‘The Sandiistas got a second major break on December 28, 1972. Nicaragua’ capital cry, Managua, was vitually destroyed by 4 massive ‘euthquake, More than eighty percent ofthe buildings were damaged or de staoyed, and about ten thousand people were killed, International id poured into the country—and was prompaly siphoned affinto the personal account of corrupt meabes of the Somora government The sya l= use ofthe government to help the people purely because they were enrich: ing themaelves created anise te Saninisas could ue ‘The combivation of anoher setback inthe montune and the rising anger among the people at Somes corruption created a sense of urgency among the Sandinits The PSEN debated whether o apt the rr stag seorusea mass urban evolution. The unzency ofthe debate was enhanced bythe cling chat a people's revolt was coming, Coniions in Somozas Nicaragua were raid approaching thos of Biss Cab i 1988 In he afermath ofthe earthquake, Somoaa cronies were squeezing into areas of dhe economy that had traditionally belonged to aristocratic Fails not associated with Somors, These ew incursions alienated those poweefal segments of Nicnguan soiery: The Sandinista fle thatthe ‘combination of the corruption and the competition among the elite would Inevitably lead ro revoe, Yer as fir ax most of the countey was concerned, ‘he Sandnists ad been destroyed, They clearly had a huge challenge to overcome. They ha to peove thei continued existence and take the lead in {he bling resistance to Somos (On December 27, 1974 the Sannin exected a daring sd ona hol- day pare and took horages. Although they naromly missed capturing the American ambassads, they di got Somorals foreign minister and many members of his cabinet. Thee suecenfl escape to Coa with 1 milion i ‘ransom spectacularly announced that they weee not destroyed an esulted in mera new cra talbo rigs an iteralstraggein the SN among the who sought a Macs protacted-war strategy those who sought a Marsisepoetaran approach and the fcr of thint-way aca, The Maoists wentbick tthe northern sountansand were again es ily defeaed by the National Guard. Thee leader, the intellectual Fonseca, vs killed in an ambush on November §, 1976. Once again, Somoza was ‘convinced he had destroyed the Sundinisas. The urban movement aio filed. Hlowover,the errs survived, largely because hit key leaders = rained oursde the country theoughowr the stugele, Fuom this vantage point they had te benef of earning fom the stakes the other fictions ofthe party made while nor sfering the casas that ae an inevitable part of sich mists. In January 1977, the Sundinsts got another major break, Jimmy Carter was sworn in ae president ofthe United States Although the Carter aloinistation made no immediate major changes in potcy in Central Ameria, the Nicaraguans perceived that Samoa had lost one ofthe jor pillars of his fry stength—the unqualified suppor of the Unie States. As Shisey Christian points out "In many counts evem some oth= sin Latin America, Washington tine would hare meant litle but in Nicaragua the key to power over public policy was to gve the appest ance of having the support of the United Stats, whether the US. govee- ment was consciously giving this support or not." Like ll asurgnts, an all wuts for tht mater, the Sundinisas learned by tial and error and series of pin dees, But finaly, they ‘were developing an approch, the “thin way” that woud ead to victory, At this critical juncture, Humberto Ortega tusk stock of what ther fl ‘res had tught them. He recognized tar hs college-edcated urban cole leagues coud never eam the wus of the peasants, The Maoist concxpt of "peasant revolution” could not work, given the current ongunizaton and personne ofthe Sandinistas. IFhe planned to se a Macist approach, it would requirea great deal of ime remit and rn pople who could win the confidence ofthe peasants “Then, examining the exer Sandinista atemps to use the “oss” the ‘ory aod incite urban insugences, he ndestod that the prime weakness52 The Sang a te sone ofboth was their lure to develop polite base. Unlike thei problem with the peasants, che Sandinista inability to crete 2 poiial base in the ‘ites probably had more 1 do with their lack of a clear political agenda. His people were city dwells, they could lend in andbe easily accepted in the cites. Otega also recgized thatthe tremendous popaltion shift to the cites made an effort the urban areas essential to success. Furs, The understood that things were happening quickly in Nicaragua. IF the ‘movement went back tothe mountains 1 develop Maoist insurgency, it ‘would be irelevant to the coming revolution, ‘Ortega understood one othe key aspect ofthe stay stuation. The eatet thea to dhe Sainintas wes the democratic reform movement If ‘succeeded while the Saninistas were sill getting established inthe mone tains, the ease ofthe insurgency woul he netrazed. The frmation of 1 moderate, reformist goverment would present the Sandinits with a ‘much greater problem than the represive Somos rei (Oreegasbod solution was to create third way. He farmed bros front, urban-based coalition whose suength rested in the middle-class businessmen, enrepreneurs, unemployed suds, and urban poor ofthe shansytowns. On May 4, 1977, he published a new PSLN strategy paper called the "General Political Miltary Platform of Stuggle fr the San- linista Front for National Liberation.” Writen primanly by Humberto (Ortega, it contained the basic insurectional strate, inching (1) devel- ‘opment of progratn without fist sears (2) creation of a broad anti= Somoda font with noa-Marsst opposition groups (3) creation of mass ‘ongunizations to support the FSLN; (4) agitation to bring abou the ad icaizaton ofthe moderate opposition; (5) action to undermine the tegvty of the National Guard; and (6) unification of the three FSLN factions unde joint leadership” is emphasis on concealing the PSL leis doctrine sommined with setive propaganda fora moderate coalition alowed hsm to convince awide ange of Somoras opponents o jon the coalition. Even without these ef forts, Somora opponents were driven toward the calton simply because they no longer had any ther outlet for thes opposition o his ee. So mora ha driven even legitimate opposition iat the shadows, a ean Rema $8 “Taking advamage of the alienation of the busines elas, the Sunidin= ists used their extensive nerwork of contats—ofien even faily mem ‘bento encourage key busines lesdets o jon this appara moderate ‘oppoiton, "This wae where he recruitment of the upper-class students ‘om the religious reat proved erica. Given the mall sie of Niccuguas litebusiness community manyof these young alts knew and were even related 20 key members ofthe elite. The Sandinista exploited those won ‘seatnns to push ther sgenda forward, They were so succes hit aoup of weve prominent citizens actully sigoed a proclamation of cpponiion, to the reyme and published i. They became known a Ler Dave (The wel) ‘Ortega sees informing this coalon co-opted most ofthe oppo sition fictions. By Forming che coalition Font, the Sandinists positioned. ‘thomslves to block any compromise brokered by outside agence such as ‘he United States, The lst thing they wanted was a compromise hat could dfs the coming revolution, The Sandinista el inovation wasthatyde= spite the appearance of abroad fion, Ortega ensured thatthe key elersents of power namely all ofthe coalition’ ary and security elements, re ‘mained firmly inthe hands of ehe Communist een, ‘Thus, his hind way created a broad ase of support with a wide range flies while maintaining ft contol of the revolution. Once the eo tion rok power, the oer members ofthe coition and that Sandinista hel all he ey postions in the new police and atary organizations The ‘moderates cealized to Ite that this arrangement give the Sannin cf festive contol of the county, ‘With this broad font au power bas, the Sandinists continued work: Ing forthe uprising the ee sure was coming, Dung his pie the SEN ‘conducted number of atacks on the National Gund, to keep the move ‘ment inthe eyes of the people while sotuthing the parts cate! of the front silty arm. At the same tims, they moved gic bt effectively to take overall the Key secur billets ‘Much more important tothe revolton was the work the Sandinista Aid to further undermine support forthe Somoza tee in the interne ‘ional community: They showed wae srategic sion an operational Sessin exes is arp whe Shannon Si Scar on th ppl ot that as opposing te ee "hoary teach carat a the Ngan pena ser man ig se Oi han ‘enifng ta cht adnan emote of puting fete cere seep comeing Neng The Nears tcc hn Sas poe sna nate stn (te pt lost te sition to wrk hough she inert nme Somer kann on ison ec ewe fim an ch opoon Somozs ms ine ‘tanh Sata woth es hone ‘osm ach nego “Pe Sdn ackagun US port as ut on Sowing he Sands emoxcandppopostion te om nb tl Sonos eine The present te mode mee a te oa ton wes esl t tht dein. Oe the ha the te ad reper eles inthe cin he Sansa ued thse we theky pera wh meters str Thera 0 of | Nostra rtespeal Communism Theses ese to he thea modchip ying ener hed {Kear without msion no hoe sea hs eg thy ds umber a pats Te mos ce vere Wes med the press who spore iba hel and pene up nthe United Scrum Pesan ches ‘The Wen na wer invited o Banu i ith he Sar Aineaand pnt ais comity Nab Ge Sinn col couton se Gud commatig ats ily ery Sine thy pete ain the i natn, the met ee Scenes members ton oer heels the anna ert Cant a ing der wh gt trent ovement afer hover ef Some The mea wer enrrged peak the yang pts who wee leaner holy monet Lien hhh el Spal nse ancl he ms af te Seer eine. Tse Py San Renn rests fle they could no long fallow the bishops, because che oficial church save supporto che Somoza regime. Given the tremendous pre ‘ge focal priests held the very religious Nicaraguan soviet, hey were hey ‘lemnents inthe wvltoisffosin the counted. They also proved high’ saci, the Palestsians wou buycort their busineses and probably rc, wore hey sided withthe Palestinians, dhe Irals would shu their shops oven o conver fore them eo sty pen, ta provoke reaction fom he Plestinians. Mos of these businessien made the logical choice and sided with he Palestinians, Itey had to go Bankrupt, they were beter off ha jing rend in the community when it happened. By this time, ie was clear tw-everyone tthe authorities that twas genuine popular upg. Every: ‘one had 0 chore side ‘Thve obvious questions arineat his point, What was the cause ofthis tremendous burst of resistance on the part ofthe Palestinians? How did the Isat and PLO leadership iss 0 completely? How did it ongan- rainy ‘the Israelis? " Hees the doshas hy matte Pin te sey ‘ofthe soon-to-be"victorious” Amb armies. These governments assured the fident they would soon return, a spines ‘Thus, fiom 1948 to 1967, dhe Paletiians wore scattered ro various An nations. They could not omunize as «body simply because se wos ‘against se interests of those Arab nitions tallow them to down fche Mangan he the Ara nations prctere to kop ther i a ekuge tats al made al ‘eof thee extensive police powers o ep them inthe camps The Arab ational leaders wanted exploit she refige sues gaint the Lacs not help the Palestinians tre new ie Inaction attention eo che plight ofthe Palestinians pro a cre way todfr isis from throm peopl shot the cruption ofthe rab egies. as to the benefit othe Arab dictators to ensue thatthe Pales- tinuns remained refiges. Further, the destabilizing eet ofange ubers of refugees on Jordan did not ecap che notice of ther Arab dictators ‘The few Palestinians left in Ivel were agrarian, isolated, and fage mented along religions lines (Msti/Christan. Their society was pootiy suited fr resistane, Morcover, they did nt fice a clase, fkng cola power buts sal. ightly knit homogenous Jewish society thahad the p= pont and synpathy of rch ofthe est of the word Given ei situation, the Palestinians could no develop casi insor _geo popular ongunizatons. The Palestinians inside Iel were too few to ‘eate mass ongazaton sential for a popular upeising The Palestinians Tsing outside Israel wore not even nthe estoy they wanted to win back and ere being hewily suppressed by the host” Arsh governments cause the Arab governance feared unrest in there counties they limite Patestsian activites to conducting nino nis in laa The Aca governments were adamanty opposed ro letting the Palestinians organize Irs or until 1965, when Yasir Artit fund che Path, thatthe Pes ‘inns had an audible voice. Even this wie was external to Ina Under ‘hese cicumstnees, the Plstinans could ot develop a eaerene AGW sate ‘The lsat siumph inthe 1967 war actuallyimproved the poi st ation ofthe Palestinians, oral became, in essen chic colonial power inthe Wes Banks and Sini Peninsula (particularly the Gaaa Step). While Arafat sil contelled the PLO fom outside the tersitvies a sigaticant interalresstnce movement began to ake shape inthe territories. "The Ire oscuption gave bith toto separate entes Fist the ‘well-known armed underground sought olen action, andsome elements took orders frm the PLO. This was the mos isle face of the Palestinian Fhe ate reste andthe une the Taacis wore most success in countering Ie wis not gente insurgeney but simply terrorists operating without Political mobilization Although they kiled many Ica and kept the pop lation on edge, these armed activists could not bea decisive force in a AGW serge ‘The second group though much les vse, would in the long erm ‘bea much greater pablem forthe Iracis, These were the local serie in stitutions that gre to fil the gaps inthe serves provided by th Iris 2 the ocupying per. ‘Upon oeeupatin, the Isis had 0 set up a guveenment of sorts fr the oesupied territories, Untomunately they made no conscions fr _geuinely inooporate the lage Palestinian population ino their sey, Instead they provided a minimalist government keep the terior quiet, ‘This eft the Palestinians wiehout many ofthe services normally provided by government. Asa rest, they organized to roid abo, educational, medic and socal services, The lselsllowed these service organizations ant alnited degre, even encouraged them, ecause they reduced the Ista cos of ning he occupied territories, What the Iselin didnot reco was that thse ‘ngniztins provided both a base for mass onganzation and 2 esining ‘round for Palestinian leaders. Gaining experience through runing thee onganization.a generation ofloal leaders emerged within the occupied er Ascacy ss 1982 the new Palestinian leadership exerted itsinsoenein ‘the Shabiha efgee carp. Inside the cari, the Youth Council far Socal Activity organized the carp residents to clean up the camp They’ peoided ‘tush and sewer services, established sports gue, provided medical cae, Arowe out the pimps and thieves, and expelled suspected Ise eolahori ‘ors. In esence, they formed Teal goverment and bean to take cae of thei people ‘They took contol tothe point of kexping Ital patrols out of the amp. In 1987, when the Isl amy seat a bataion into the camp to make arests, the batalion was stpped cold by miss protest and seta ally driven out of the camp. The Ieaelisecutty services didnot seem toThe Sting ate Stone undead thesis othe ation norte por x wider saedience By xy 197 oly the asian smal snes nd dow ingite siding Paani serosa nse hy cooper with th ct roe sr propery Ye hyo ond soon ecco jing he aesnian ean ‘est uy na of capi th eosin 967 dee msc pon he Paes pital psi They mo had ae tambo Peis ine Tal eritoy wish he ise provided xin poplin nas een. Send, he a fad ere ctl oi or ying we Ti vee Pas tis feo oni pit he sina et ses po Sonne jes ofthe wo : 3 th hela Pasian sens oo wer ine ong el an were ea ply re wen te nasa ved noe lt nse Theses ions once a at dint, cui the ney The si et i fy ic tryst ey beso the gms oF ‘(he a goenment and vasa line Than eae he on nr ced with AGW wen pT pi a cmon ey heya ane Coron they ad as ongeition and hy hat ee bal nd hip. Fonte for ete peo este we hare sen te bepioing msn eer ie igh "he normal confusion hy young men who become ions of resistance ane th oF an occupying amy hat ind itself heustfrom the deceptively simple ppessng ik of occupation to the ecky and volatile risk of pacification. According to Schiff and Yaar. Soitwasthat the raw materials of anger and festation but up toa ctitcal mass. The litany of Palestinian fears and griev= acer that had festered fran entize generation went os and o. “The diference atthe end of 1987 was anew sense of self con {idence nourished by the lates round of ios, the single handed stack on the army camp, the derring-do of the Islamic shad and the clout ofthe youngsters of Bulata—all mde even more pao ‘nounced by the signs of confusion and capitulation om the part of the IDE Together with the latest moves suggesting Israel’ intent to strip the Palestiaian of the lst oftheir sets and re sources, these evens seed to confirm the belie that having reached a nai the residents of the territories hid ao other choice but co take thee fit into their own hands They had new ‘models of heroism they had begun to congue cei fear ofthe szimy;and most important they had very few ilosions about the farae awaiting them ithe didnot cast off the chains oftheir ‘own ansicty and act. If they continged to hope that «solution ‘would come from without, soon it woul be to late, And the mass demonstrations of October aad November hid proven at least one ching; hse who took to the strect enjoyed the support ‘of countless others who were convinced af the Koran diturn thatthe had had runed into battle xy-“Alah help only shone ‘sho help herselves, ‘The cauldron had been coming ta bil over a prin of years. How Aid the Isat and external Palestinian leadership mis the signs so come pletely? Apparently the Isai had become complacent. They hal sustined the oxsupation for twenty yeas without majo eruptions of Palestinian anger ‘They seem to have deluded themselves int eleving that the Palestinians fete themscives better off under eal rle than under Arable. Jus sin Portant, the Isactis ad become used to the henelits of cing colonial power: cheap labor, reduced costs of peoviding services to second-class ‘tae, and the confidence that came from defeating every mafoe Arb amy in tase major wars Unfortunately ths confidence seemed allow them to completly ‘overtook ther pending defeat in southern Lebanon, Despite a twenty-year ‘eugee in southern Lebanon, they had not been able ro deeat the guer- ila resistance. Even withthe asitaace of the Lebanese Chita malin,they cd not cush ths HGW enemy, However expt ne continue surbances they had convince themselis they had defeated te Palestini= ans wuth Lebanon sig dei conventional forces. In 1987, the Israelis could nots that df wis loenng for their Fores thers (On theater side, the exteral PLO leadership in Tunisia missed the Palestinian feusteaion that erupted ito the Tota simply becase they ve fom elements inside the estvis that, were extemal. All reporting were supported by payment rm the PLO an Fatah rather than by their worc among the people, Afi of losing thie jobs they were careful to report what Araiae wanted to heae rather tha elit. The combination ‘of phyieal distance, institional bias, personal prjuices, and distorted reporting ensured that the PLO cd noc grasp what was going on inthe ‘The local Palestinian leadership quickly understood that this uprising ‘was diferent from any that had preceded i, Because they undewtod the Ailfeenc, shy could take advantaye ofthe spontancous eruption af age (Galvanized by the widespread popular uprising the local Palestinian lead= cers wer the fit eo understand and rect to what was realy happening in ‘the occupied rerio. This is a suspising, gen that the lal eader- ship was jus that lca They ied among the peopl. They met with them every day a they went aboot thir legitimate busines of prosding een ‘il scrvicesin the ocupied territories, Ao ulike bth the Isl leaders and the oserscas Palestinians, he local Palestinian leaders were genuinely concerned fr the wellite of the people “The fst step they tole wast simply contin providing the medical and social services they had before the lita started. These series sas tained the civil disobedience in the see. The medial organizations pro vided mil care to wounded Palestinians, who were aid to go 1 the hospitals Because the In security ones were aresting those involved in ‘he diurhancesThe women’ group oleted donations, distribute food and money, helped organize blood dives, and geal enlarged dhe oe of| Palestinian women inthe resistance. The agricultural unions, which previ ‘wry had focused on improving the lot of de day Ibor employed by the Is- _acis, now worked hart improve the food supply the osupid esitores by providing encouragement, advice, and supplies fr local Palestinians cultivate any emp plots Because they already had a Iading tle in the day-to-day ives of the Paestnian people, the local leaders could easily rastion to providing uc ‘cal guidance inthe fm of simple dretives uch as no toute weapons and to abandon the Molotov cocktail, These were both highly praca Fis, they knew they could not match the Isracis ina confit based ‘on the we of weapons. tt singly gave the sais ens wo ae lethal farce, Second, the use of weapons would eltinate the stongest wesposs the Palestinians had the image of young Palestinians armed only with rks and ort facing bevy aed Isl toops ‘The decision to not use Molotov cocktails was even more pectic ‘Through their medical services, hey determined that the highly volae ‘weapons were ling and injuring Far mone Palestinians than leis Ina «tion to this practical reason fo dropping the Molotov cack fom the anenal, the loa eaership quickly undentood that they undermined he international image of teenagers with rocks ightnga well-equipped, pow ‘fl Ince ary. The visceral human fat offre made any ace of ‘ree aginst people throwing ire bombs seem mich mare reasonable than firing on teenagers armed only with rocks, Ath beginning ofthe Ini, 1 in most chaotic situations, local leaders cose fist on uiderstanding and getting some degree of contol in their own are. They then reached ‘ut to adjacent ares and red to cooedinate their activities forthe benefit. Fal, nally they eed to organize some fem of crsis-wide leadership. ‘The Pasian support organizations displayed ll the characterises ‘of self onganiving network inaction, While the lsat and exteralPles- Sinan leadership struggle to move formation through biracial con mand channels t try to figure aut what was going on the leas were ‘teanizing: By the end of December they put together the sified National Command (UNC), which was composed of relatively unknowe but ety samy lva leaders, Iwas actualy started by Mohammed Labadia book. shop owned his driver‘ The goal ofthe UNC was to stn the teri= tory-wide evelheii step was to produce handbils, Although these ands were later to become Fimous aerial part ofthe eval ae ast few issues wore pt together quickly bya few dea ‘en. They managed to drat prin, and dstibute ens sands hand bills, with dstsibuion of ea taking place on de same night throughout the teritries. They may not have undertone est hei fst hand bill would have, but they immedtely recognized their imiut. These Dandi arvcuated dhe Palestisian anges, pu orth eee demands forces- sation ofthe hosiiis, nd provided dvetion om how they shoul resist wads cls the spt ies To snl see omen eis camps i Ine poplin covery tras nding eS ts and on the eal of he eying sole an he ho Calabro, Palen Base wo be Rowe om ines chuhes rtp and ly ples vere We ms se che nnd uring het tthe cao Lethe le word om th the wean rng ath rite he Flexi pepe wil cee ul he chien OF inky in Pasian ete wn pliers Aesough niall wing almost asia lt prose, the handills pro vided a source of information and a series of ideas for the Palestina to rly around, Of pariulaimportance, the handbills focused on AGW rch ques and tactics They eshorted the Palestinians tows rocks instead of "les ato ene that their symbols the Figs) tere present everwhere Furshes they emphasized what theyived to be achievable political goal ‘Oneof the critical eal decisions the UNC made was o nt revel thet emis This served wo purposes. Fs, it nance the mystique of the UNC. Because the leaders were ot prominent people but mid-level oa, ‘hey wore conser ha the Palestinians would ot respond onve they Fund ut char they were in nence, being ll by thee neighbors. The ict thatthe UNC leadership was “unknown? enhanced their prestige. Inthe minds of ‘the people they were hidden hand yuidng the sevolutio. They povided focus and reassurance thatthe sufering and disuprion of the Intifada ‘woul ead to some concrete improvements inthe lies of the Palestinians, Anonyeit aso gave the leadership seeming invulnerability the F- rac security ores. They knew that the Fails would imprsa any end stheydested and in ict the Leal ido, Repeatedly they caprred the ene UNC. But becanse the UNC naam had never been published, now leaders simply stepped forward and hep pricing the handbils, Ae longa the handhills were praduced, the Palestinian people dd not know shat the leaenhip bal ben captured With this simple deception, the Pestinian adersip neutralized the police poner of Ireland witrined the UNC much fonger than would have been possible with any other method In aditon to providing ational leadership i the fem of the bind bills the Palestinians continued oengize tthe local evel Like de UNC, local lenders eine mostly anonymous, Ther are no lear eds on how ‘many loa emits existe, but it must have bee in the hundreds, By the spring of 1988, they ha organized local Palestinian leadership every village in the cupid trios. Like the UNC leaership, he lal ad, ‘sere often arrested and contined—only tobe replaced bother low-level actvists determined eo see the Inia contin. In effet, they created a sch ike organization, a network that wasnt subject decapitation, as « hicrarchicalonunizaton would be. The networked nature ofthe adeship ‘made i vitally impossible o destroy. This iva definitive characteristic AGW organization, ‘The abltyofthe UNC and lea comates ro continual econstruct, ‘hemselves after Ire rouradups was essential to the effctivenese ofthe Inada. The frst UNC handhils were produce in early January By ate January the UNC was producing ie sath andl and wa tackeniy ‘ounded up The Israelis woul cond Five roundups bu ever nerupted the ow oF the handils which continued abe produce 3 seven-to-ten- ay interals. Clearly command of the Inifada developed fom the bottom up. Fist ‘he local leadership simply continued to provide service, although uneThe Seagun th Mene uch sore dtcult conditions, Nea, hey matured and neoworked, po ving tatcl guidance. Thea the UNC evolved foe these oa ements Finally betatedly, the PLO began to understand what was happening, and ‘Yassir Arafar began to influence the action In fac, the UNC would fell lose influence. The combination of peated sweeps by dhe Irae security ores and Aran’ determination 9 re= tun power by neutralizing the UNC leaderip finally relegated UNC toa minor ole. Yet ven the combined efforts of Arafitad the sls coud not Fusing estes cutie the leadership before ceed viru Like previous new tactical uppmiches, this wriaton of GW devel oped out of the efforts of practic leaders to sue practical tcl po lems in real ition, (One of de interesting apects ofthe Intifada is the way Frc Yas ‘ir Aral to mosh is long-held postions in onder to appear to be kad ing the movernent, Fist he accepted UN, Security Council relations 242" and 338." “Then, on November 15, 1988, the PLO released the Palestinian Dec: larson of Independence. Finally on December 14,1988, Acfit declared The hey eames of UN, reslatin 22 [pase in 1967} at thar he ON, "airs tha the faliment of Charter niles rors the cable of ura sing peace inthe Mt En which should inci the plication of both he flowing pip "a Withraal oercarme Sine fom terre acapdin the cen cons “Termination ofall or sts of licens resp fr and a bnowledgeent of dhe nergy tein and poitiaiependence ‘ofevey Staten the are adh tive peace within seat and 08 rized bound fre fro thet or acs of face.” "The ey lament in IN. reson 38 (used in 1973) “1, Cath upon lps to he peeing cen al ing ane eae econ Army 1S that aha it it~ fant shft ahi pvos po sim. Ara consummate cn a sition on eng oe banging stl station gh y she Inia Aight no expanntachnoniemesofeplyng SOW watt sto aoe Fats she ound kt he hangs inher of warfare. * " * Another inseing apt fhe Tia ithe way the ener 2p rune Ansty feet apn i Hh oryoevtngement ste he hte wend hee ingle teibeerinstegthand men” Atha i 1967 0 ean the major Ach pr inhi get ena. Nr the ln ofthe Inia we ng itn nae Aas a ovzrzatcn in insa stge ithhe e Imation w the open vel echoing Fash, Sleep thee guy aloe al hos ne tlie the raed igh of inl Renting the of ces ad by rages the Peis en need women ancl een telat cuss nthe mente witha art Thtseign ‘asf onl wisconsin mrp, bet ri non wa slr fie oto in ‘The pon of camer often gered Paeinan sont they unde ticinpuct te aes hon inertia secs sa spp forthe sc res Dey sry te lo ictus of usin senses in Firs pet ig ch aion ae all ay avy imei; mtr than wae hours ae he momen ‘fhe adoption of his cision the pts they now op °2.Cals up al he pris cncemed ta stat immediately air the come free in pementation of Seca Con elation 242 (1947) nal "3. Desies shit, rms an surely wih the enti, nein tons stat betwen the aes concerned ner ppopriate apn sed at er ‘ashing ju and dbl peace the Male Fae”Oe Toy Ngan th Stn pe beng tied wn oh Te sherpa hae ao With eas diy bro Paesnnn hee complete wh wee ing rs ts changell ge ah wer ‘Theiss hala sophisti bein psn toe hed Thy pie ive, tah tice censors concn enperatnin ade ft oe Cae titre coninton of te opted a he pow ao pningy he Pies th dese mp ee te we es win th wien, pet un einpt eet es hgonbothe and ach abl opin, Ya aan ayn lol poe hy wee inp in tel Gaathand te Worm eda aay mone “gmpaec oan Te usin ve gck paler he "Thesis anne ne to mses The fs was snail cons ssp te pra Peis an rpg be eel tng ama iy The kd enya hoping owe me a allo the isis to becnc a ew county ‘hes hen a tmnt 9s The Prenat chat as og the ees ceed eit fest wl bono pee Reta a Kalas thee ey At vc pcs ci sos wa ie etna ae to lg hs nee pel th sn dies fh rere Ic ey wer hot can hey wand em wt {lima tombe wiht and ina uesonble temp oldon these rier "Te sine an oer ses err i i cae, ‘The most abu were the international media. But the Pal astute crnugh reinforce that message through a number oF eter channels. ‘Onc ofthe moss powerfl was the international academic and prof sional comnts, Highly espcte Palestinians in each community pxe= seed ther message vs nterational forums, esting, cra conferences, sad television interviews. They made articulate, symputheti, rational spokespesons. Used tossing acl with checkered headees g, ‘gaint sal, Westerners wer now seeing highly educated people West, er dress providing coherent, calm, ational agement forthe Palestinian prsition Another channel was the olersof the rl tm. Steeped inthe ea isons oF a mural army tha fights nly to protect its nation, these young solr rouble econeling that image with consul fing mer bl esa tenagess and ssteatialyharsing women and hlden tying ' x0 about thir dit busines. They sae this image fe hack to them bp. the international and even left-wing Iricli media. Adding to tht fans ‘ation was the most cent ad ony fire ofthe Tack Defense Fence IDE: Operation Peace fr Gaile, teil fed invasion of Lebanon, Given ‘the smal siz ofthe country, these solders communicated ely with fam ityand fiends and cou rintoee the feelings af eastation, The intial fee of the ude ntfs uprising was to pane che [seal respons. In contrast the Palestinians fl a surge of confidence and bride at their open defiance ofthe Ira forces They moved quick toe Plt the weakneses inherent in an occupying free ofa demnratic mation attempting to suppress civil population Theiniial eel response was confised sid disjointed, They were bal Ale withthe problems of dang with mass demonsteatons ed by waves ‘of women and children, They simply had no training o contingency plans fo suc an event. The previons easy" wenty years of occupation dey did not prepare che for what they now confonted Complicating the problem fir the soir or policeman on the sret ww the complete file ofthe plitcl and altar leadership to under nd what was yong on. By the end of December, it was cle that helo ‘aepoiey for the occu teritories was bankrupt—bat they hed nothing to putin its place Although he Inaclis could not dev a coherent strategic approach, {hey did respond tacticlly—alshough somewhat sky Their stems to ‘conduct door-to-door searches and enforce cnfews were two examples Ye they both showed the impotence ofthe Irae ores, Often the searcheswere ned back by mas demonstatons, Ken when they sce seatchos were hasty and destractive—drivng the occupants he searched houses more firmly nto the arms oF che Int, Because they could not fence their way int sone neighborhoods, the curfew was simply impos ble to enfrce—and therefore a sane of derision forte Arabs Suidenly the Isl security forces were ot insneble. They were no longer universally feared. As wit ll occupying amis, the psychologial aspect ofthe occupation weee as important as the phasic aspects The Ie rac had lv thee prychologial exe. "The Israelis were so sot espn that twas the sumer 1988— Fly sc months into the Iatifads—beore she nach pt ut thirst ins teligence analysis ofthe oot of the revolt, Unirtanaclseven then it ci rthavea major impacton the way dhe Ts government conducted Busi ness inthe nscupid etre, Although slow to understand an eat, the Isls dl develop some igh efetve rol against this new kind of waar, One the most mt portant was the creation of the IDF Field lotelligence Coops. They eae ‘othereaization that aleseach evel of eomsnand has its on tlie lemeat all ntligence simply flows up the chain, with itl owing dow, They alo realized that une inelgence for conventional ight in the desert, almost all inellgence in the Iida snust come fy Busan intelligence (HUMINT) and signals ineligence (SIGINT). assist ber acta forces, the nals invested hein increased HUMINT and SIG- INT forall evel of command. They aso added unoanned aerial vehicles UAV) balloons, thermal sights, language capa al even beg ex periment with vin intelligence, sich as face recgition technolo ‘They understood tha this was a contest oF human sill at the tatial level—technology could hel, but it was not the solution, Although both sides adaped atc the Palestinians did a bene jo oFadjusting onthe teategieand operational levels Teirabgyto ep the Palestinian youth in she strct, combined with dhieabity to heep de story alive nthe Wester mei, slowly hut suey ground down external up poet for zal Even the seemingly unbeatable Ina loblyin the United Sites wis unable to maintain unequivocal support foe Lal, The AFL {10.19 no uncertain terms, rotted the eeutment of Palestinians bythe beak secu oe, Another carly, and unexpected, blow cane from Jordan when King ussein renounce all ims o sovereignty over the West Bank on July 531, 1988, This completely eliminated the “Jordanian option”—which ‘many vara Israelis saw us the preferted solution, They planned tn ve ‘the West Bank adits ractious Palestinian population back to Jordan his renunciation, King Hussei foreclosed that option-—and showed ‘understanding ofthe changing nature ofthe Palestinian demands, He une employ aginst the Palestinians. The result was the election of « Labor gov ‘ernment, which then agreed to and conducted the Oso negotiations ‘Ths the Initia boughs togeter the ey elements of GW to allow 2 people without a state, an ay, or a government to take on and defext the most powerful amy nthe Middle Ease Jn the words of Schl and Yai, wo of dhe most astute observes of the Irci-Aca saga “The Invifada was an assertion of defi that bubbled up from below statement bythe legions of Palestinian youth who fete bereft ofa future; the high school and university students doomed ta choose between indignity and exile; he ten of hone sands of laborers who made their lig sae but were expected to remain inssble; the vetransof Tsai prisons who were mote ‘convinced than ever ofthe justice oftheir cause but saw their peo- ple sinking deeper and deeper into hopelessmes. In short twas ‘the work of che Palestinian masses, ad hat is why i surprised everyone the complacent Israel authorities, the over-onfident Jordanians, che selF-satisied PLO feadetshp, and even local Palestinians regarded as influential figures inthe ttitores, A popular tevolt with all the hallmarks of a gensne revlon, it ‘rupted suddenly and crete a ew strategy for che Palestinian struggle that confounded both the PLO establishent,seram= Ding willy keep up wit ceship whose cn evens fom afar, and the ative lead sents were suddealy spinning out of onto Aboue all however, it delivered sharp reminder to the Irelis that chey simply could nor go on blithely ignoring the naenty-yeurold Palestinian publem fstenng ightsn the middleof ther colletve lap? ‘With the signing of the Oslo axons 1993, che Palestinians, using GW, achieved what she combined armies ofthe Arb nations had filed to acm: they had force the Trelis oye rerstory. Athowgh the Palestinians’ subsequent inability to enact the forma agreement has greatly limited the intended zest the fet remains that dhe Insta forced the Ineals othe negotiating table and won concessions How the Tsalis re ‘versed his SGW Palestinian vstory isthe subject ofthe next chapter The al-Aqsa Intifada Witte st Sper 13,198 eh Poss a spparenly started down the path to satchond. Afier decals of conte it appeared that the Palestinians woul aly hare a lad to call theiconn. The six-year tis et the intemal an external colons nee ‘su for oth sides o accepe she unthinkable: ecogition of che blonde ‘my, Vera the time ofthis writing, that drat has fied to dust, Since Sepcmber 2000 the Palestinians snd Isis hive been focked inthe Blondiest conic oftheir histoy—the al-Aqsa Intifac,Alhgh ‘exact numbers ae difficul co come by, and unbiased bers even more slat, scaly as August 2003, che Hiington Pot estimated the dead at more than 2,80 Palestinians and shout 9UD Israelis, ‘These estimates align closely with she Ammesty Intemational figure of 2,300 Palestinians Gincdng 400 chien) and 900 Its including 100 chilaren lle ‘hugh the endl of 203. Ii diicult o comprehend what hnses a those ‘magnitudes an mean to small populations. However, wecan ase the Hs ington Pst figures to provide sense of the sce of the sonflit and the suring ofeach side,Toanderstand the smpact these umbers have om the Irak popu tion, consider how America would react if we had wstched! more than 40,500 people killed on our strets by eros. That may sound like an suey high number huts proportionate to our population. Irae has 3 population of bout sx millon The US. popltion is 270 millon’ or forey~ five times the sizeof rac, The Isls sustaining 900 dea isthe ste 25 the United States having 40,500 killed Pesan loses are even more devastating. Although their popu tion is more than about 28 millon,’ es chan half hat of sal the Plee- tinians have sustuined over thee Hines as many casuals. Compartive figures for the United States wold be more than 225,000 Americans killed by an acupying force, I wil be extraordinarily dificue to oner= ‘come dhe hate and distrust tha so many deaths have generates ‘The obvious question is, What happened? How di the Palestinians squander thee AGW victory over he Isacln? Hose dd the Ili aie sta point where they have essentially no security in theirenr hares? ctequted majo effores by peacemakers on both siesta achieve the level of confidence necessity to sgn the accords. Itasoroquited major ef Fortsby handlers on bth sides to reverse conditions to what unffonts us today. a fact, it took almost seven years to go fiom Oso toal-Agss. Over that ime, hurline Palestinians took conta ofthe Inada and restated ‘heir goal of destroying Isl. For their prt, harsine leis tok, and con- tine to take aggesive, blondy action again the Palestinians. Essentially, Israel hardliners, in conjunction wih hardline, centralized entrenched, and ‘out-of touch Palestinian leadership, ed thee peoples to this place. They swore actively assisted by radical fundamentalists on both sides ‘On the Isak side, hardliners led by Ariel Sharon and Binyanin Ne- tanyahu onsistrtly opposed the Oslo accords nd worked agressive undermine ther. Thee postion from the beginning was thatthe accords were the it step in the Palestinians ultimate goa!—the destruction ofthe state of Tel ‘Ascari as 1991, even bere the Oslo asconds were signed, the Likud Party (led by Netanyahu and Sharon) worked to defeat any posible com promise with he Palestinians in the occupied territories. One of thes key took was eneuraging the immigration of «milion Soviet Jews. With the filo the Berlin Wall the Soviet Jews were cg coat othe West ‘The Isa government dis bes to encourage these people comet Te rack. In dings, they achieved tw gas. Fis, they reversed the pope ‘son ed that say Palestinian and Sephardic on- European) Jews growing "py in proportion to the Ashkensyin~Jns of European descent. Se ‘ond, hey provided the people need o populate the West Bank elements the Likud Party is apy building Arthistme, Ariel Sharon was housing inser an architect of the pro sco sete als inthe accede, Fle had alas en no cal proponent of Greater Israel an sa the setdemens as beeing Ys on the groan hy enabling mens song al tenn Wes Banke pnd peasy Ste ee cme ths - dren, He sated that if innocent casualties cant be avoided in an attack on encny ores, they were acceptable. However, chien and no-ight- ing women could not be deliberately targeted. Azzam belcee this to be the corect interpretation ofthe teachings of the Prophet Mohamed, Bin Laden leary diay ‘The macau hn hen pin je wait sto condact attacks in ofthe camps in Afghanistan for rinng terrorist ype Bin Laden supported theieplan. Azzam ese hecaus he fle that the Egyptians would target women ad chien a part oftheir atacks. Shordy therefrom November 24,1989, Azzam and his two sons were killed by «remote control bomb, The stk has boon raced to members ‘oF the Eayptin action of th ais but has never been concTasively ed to bin Laden, However from this point forward, bin Laden was ie 20 shape a= ‘Queda into the much more aarenivs, worldwide terrors onganization it ‘has become. About this me, no longer welcome in Pakistan, bin Laden ny ‘stared to Saud Arabia, The demise of Azzam ensued that even fom a Aitanc, he coll key positions in al- Queda with is people From Saudi Arabia, bin Lader remained active inthe airs ofa (Qaeds, Although the Soviets had withdrawn fom Afghanistan, Najib la, the last Afghan presidente Soviets put in power, continued fight ‘the mujahideen, In turn, bin Laden continued to supp the Islamic ‘stance, In 190, besides continuing is involvement with -Oeda, bin Laden spoke our fequenty in mosques, wiring that Saddam Hussein vould involve himself inthe Gulf sates. He even waned the Sal yet Fanly tat Hussin was abou to invade Kuwait, When they di nothing and Saddam invaded in Laden proposed hat the Saud armed fore, sported by his al-Qaeda, wee suficent to pro, ‘ect Saudi Arabia, The Sao government didnot share his optim and invited the United Stats to send woeps to protect Saad Arabia and evict the Frais from Kuwait The royal fly assured in Lan that when the Ings were ever out of Kus, the Americans would go ome. Bia dens anges and sense of betrayal hy the Sau al Sami nly incensed hen the Americans did not go home after the war bustin or along term sty. ven toda Bin Lan leafs that the opal fale ili in ‘cligiows duties to protect the hoy sites. le refses to eer Sali Arabia byrname, because it includes the family ate of the rv fil, He now ‘fr tit only iil wth rerms such the Land ofthe Two Monques ‘Phe presence of nidel-both maleandFele—in the Lando the To Holy Mosques (Mecea and Medina infuriated bin Laden. Once the legis ‘were scted from Kavi n Febuary 1991, he became veal ppunen the presence of Americ oops Sacre sil Bin Lad gitsted age {bei presence and, by impation, the Lng sion o permit IS. bees in Saudi Aria. I esenc, be joined forces with the ant-reyals oppeniton He became wea enough thatthe Saudis esertaly placed him under honey (Chafing under the restrictions, bin Laden used his inluence withthe rey family to get permission to leave the country ona "busines ei." Hle sed ito fee eo Sudan in 1991 and contin his work in suppor of his ‘ion ofan Islamic caliphate. Sudan was dea for is purpose to 1989, DeHacanal-Turabi ad the National lami Hout ro powerin Sudan hestated goal eo etablish an sane republic euled purely by Ilamiclav. He nite bin Laden to establish a hase in Sedan nd bring dhe 1,000 to 1,500 Aeab Afghan veterans from Pakistan to Sadan. Ther he would be fe to con tine his mission to spread Islam to the world Tn Suen bin aden pursued dal tack. Fist he woskel at expanl- ing his busines nrerestsworkwide. This not only generated income but lke established a worldwide network of banks, resources, and contacts for fate ation Second he confined t sapportacts af terror whenever posible, with 4 putea emphasis on Aavesican ages. With busineses in Europe, Asia, ‘Alica, and the Middle Eas, he was in postion 0 provide funds, safe ses, commnications, contacts transportation and experts his ex panding network of asocates, He was realy to pt that network to use in conducting atacks against Americans wherever he found thea With the entrance US. forces into Somalia in Deverber 1992, bin Laden stated that i ws part oF continuing American ort to ake con- tool of the Middle East and desrny Ilan Ten years alter the fact, he ‘Jsimed that he focused his orton this opporsniy to attack and defeat USS forces an Islamic country “The fst step wis a Decesnber 1992 ack ona hotel in Yemen that sees the bllting location of American Farce in tart to Somalia. No American wer ill inthe hom blast, but one Astrlisn tourist Was. Bin Laden chins that hi support to the Soma clans continued and thar his oops wor iwived in the defeat ofthe Rangers in Mogadishu in October 1993. At the time bin Laden, asa matter of pole, id not ebm responsi Fr theatack However ter the Somalis drove US and UN, forces out ofthat county in 1994 he could not resist bragging, He told [CNN that he was very proud ofthe le his Arabs had played in the day- long Fight gaint the Rangers and Special Forces, [At che sme ime, al-Queda was providing suppor for che fist attack ‘on the World Trade Center On Pebruary 26,1993, tuck bomb was det- ‘nated inthe underground parking garage, Kling six Americans injuring more than 1,000, nd eaused $500 milion damage Bin Laden war elated enn wh theses of hs tak bons sin a Qe dnt im sna Cy Qaeda was an oiization ou mane milo. ‘tins simaeoty—cenompe ont lngermlginy ssriintan pear in aden dtu selene hgh econo Henares Picked sto eed borne Heappimed i hadepy De he san lZawaian Egan hoe than yer epee tet alion ing Ladd Dan ce he nary iflcveni gns ndeece Bn Laer ao fred craton sun e Nin elder Toe 1 ine ab sharpening ce heading te ons come al psig mar sacks. highly eae snes bint oie his erie nin hoe of tac many and ance He med mnie tgs SQycistiin ech oe The lim uy cmt ple te ping fost dane the vet nd i foe os oe nich har Outs meat mp ae ng Balsa sil The anism comin deans Me nth sf iment steer tpi egos 204 pops ndings ra Ques anes Bese etn Sere once pres sien napa Fpazinda mesg hones Inmach two Kame trv anor wasn bn nea pl ei Moe thes of wl: pce nme aniseed ge ‘Sons for a huge mumber of Muslims. “ The Manic ondyommier cond kisser ese ‘etn of ri schoh they ural in parton te lips Canina Osea ent ah Ma nthe sane ay Ma cee Bhinsplyainne et stu eae ae Aton ont poe scaly ed wenon ote tach of Men anntostegten he real ft mn Te spe shook a sepal Guth won in tarcge“The finance committe supervises the enest complex aspect of Queda, Ty handle al financial anes nclding legtinate businesses, front businesses, non-government organiations, chars, and criminal activities The legtimate Businesses ae worldwide as ae the other enter- prises) and inchade pharmaceuca companies, uit companies, ivetock Finns ishing oats, onstruction companies an dozens ther encerprises hvoughout Aiea, Asa, and Europe, "The finance committee ilk reponse for the diseibuion of funds based on dietions fom the operators. Distribution includesseting upac> counts moving ast and ensuring that personne have acess to thse 2c- counts, Ta asst in this work, the nance comonttee has a section responsible for dosuents—both egal and Forged This ommitte canes tablish an identity fora member, complete with passport, addsesses, hacks ound, ere cas, bank cards ank accounts, and so. “The itary commie is responsible fv linia and une eine ingThe one major uni ey Formed the O55 Brigudsspazealy ook heary casualties in Afghanistan and so longer an fei force. Homeves, dur ing its existent served not ony asa jor combat element for the Tale iban (the embodiment ofthe rapid-deplowment force in Laden and Azzam ‘nvisioned) but lo ting unit to pcpare musidecn o Sigh nother oot sich as Chechnya. Despite the major damage inte by the US. ‘umpaign in Alghasntan, te itary commitce ppazetycomtinuest un terrors ining amps thu take hie eras throug basic, advanced and spesiired training “The niltary commie also seeks to be a source of training for ter rorists ron the word. To achicve that, they have produced an eleven ‘olume, 7,000-page taining manval. ARhougs most of the manual is Copied for Western itary source, particularly US. Acmy fel man- ash, practical lessons the mujahideen tls i includes many of te learned fighting the Russians To ensue eas of distribution and use, hey have placed the firs ten volumes—whih coverall conventional and ever rilla military operation CD-ROMs. A final volume, chemical and biological wart, they reserve for estited distribution to key elements ofthe fore. Clay they take seriously thee roleas trainers fr the worlds Islamic terrorists. ses 4 twat Emmy 180 (ce in Lae pt hopin in le Chet aston rch ite ene cai. Thy aee he mold rane eu toatack Areca Wem mercy Therboed see Galaton teat pln Qjehctemined he lot port thy nul pve Faraone mt nh ches sts Qud might pron wine fnngand ads Porting ‘ith posites, hy pve gc ing ge tn pero seri prona Tsk venir ip Ste kn te muito hirer esi sce Howe thy ele cal wae them tae her ote Aly le entree fase exec set iy fm the cori ume There seri hepsi manana Thy © fan peptone ras apa hele they lin, repr and ce nn sven capital yproch ve -Qleda a mambo ja vans in hit he Unie Ses Per te ets her igh et ih poate Cura nea ep ing majoras can ak iy decom Type bent Ilva capbie we maiming neste Srinath Thess eto th widen ofc poe an pers Far ath ith py fc ow pal Qt raininsa dant ales che tack wine ae lane wi, Frter he poets of oe non el ss Wee inetigence and pl acts eal te toa Thy binge mhunter phe eng +h lng penal ges Ths th poco sk dea ports recap cnt opens Bese iting ll stacks ne Aman nership owed al-Qaeda tegen hs wih overs a ei a 2am wore ike mination ooo aes ed thes al nono etion ay esate oe ens ‘They ato we nwo fcr o mone prance ed1S The Sig ad he ou svemp i bin Laden in uty 199 le tr Med ad dards and enforcement were based on the arbiteary decisions of a self: appt, elgious sit, In short, the Talibun had bul the vacety bia Laden wished to impose oe te entite Isle world pon arrival in Afghanistan bin Laden allied himsel'with the Tal- iban and along with che Pakistan ater Serves Inelgence (SI), up ported them during their final deve to seize Kabul The Pakistani ISI bad supported the Taliban al along in an effort to ensure hata friendly ‘overnment was installed in Kabul. The Taliban captured Kabul in Sep. ‘ember 1996 and established their ealphite. Akhough they had not bees ble to conquer che north ofthe nation, the Taliban helé Kaba und one ofthe county south of the Sala Tunnel. They clined tobe the Ie s5timae government of Afghanistan—and were recognized by Pakistan assuch, ‘The Taltban-contoled area waseasly lage enough ir a-Qaed toes tsbsh and run full-edged training camp a religious schools, This a lowed for the rapid expansion of both the schools wf the Mlamic study ‘committee and the training camps ofthe miliary committee, In addition, t- Queda supported the Taliban's continuing campaign agsns the North tm Alliance (mostly Tjkand Uzbek tribesmen fom mortem Afghanistan, {el by Abmad Shah Mason By doings, bah the school and ining asp gine favor withthe Tilia and hdl acess to a superb nisin schoo or thei warrior, Bin Laden quickly mate Afghanistan the center of his worldwide net work Inside Afghanistan, protected by the alban, he increased the tans lingo terrorists a wells planning nd supporting attacks by his persed andy afte tear groups, Heal can the agressive lions ogee. that were an esentia pare of raining members of al-Qaeda, Despite the appicent security provided by his location inthis remote austere ad dane ‘serous part ofthe wold, bin Laden contsue his plcy of ant claiming ‘rei for attacks aginst American target: In keeping with che guidelines lid down by ts Emi-Cencral ‘Osama, Al Qaeda code forbade its mebership fam publicly densivng its onganitation o elsiming credit for its atte: "ByThe Sang a claiming eet, we wore told that he groupe will een the wath ofthe target tte. Everyone kos that we were behind and e sponsible forthe attack. Why claim ced and become identified and huated down?” Assuch, Al Qgoda dd nor esi ered for is bombing othe National Gund Builng in Riyadh on Noveaber 13,1995 that killed seven people, ofthe Khobar Tower i= ‘ary filtyn Dhahran tha killed nineteen Americans andinjured several hundied more, However e added" have great respect for the people wh di this action, What thoy di isa big honour hat T mised participating” “Tofurtherconfusehis enemies bin Laden had his operative cei. forthe attacks to varios ft ongaizations sich ase Word Ime Font ‘orth Jihad Against Jews and Crssades His acti of ot claiming credit ran contrary ote policy of vitally all previous terri groups, where even non-particpants were eager to cai cei fr any ters action, His policy worked. Despite developing a worldwide neework, being be- hind numerous sucesfl stacks and being implicated in wnsaccessfil a= tacks and asasinaton tept,al-Qued was ot hensily targeted by US, and Wester ineligence agencies. Ben afer the fist World Trade Center artck, both the FBI andthe CIA concluded thatthe teworsts who con dated the stack were not part of any major organization but were sa - lated cell operating on thes own, Not uti ater the simultane bombing wo US, embassies in Afra in 1998 were US. inegence an lw n= Fancemen agencies wiling o believe al-Qgeda was a woeldwide organiza ‘on withthe capability to coordinate complex tacks. Ttisas important to note dat al-Queda i trly a modern organi tion Ileus fom nistakes incorporates the lessons learned nt is rin ing and future operations, and lier re-attacks the poblem, Condes the antacks we have uccessfilyiemtfed a supported by l-Queda: 1991: Arcachon a tourist hota in Yemen, ‘The eager was Anrican servicemen, but only one Australian tourist was ile 1993: February 26 tuck bomb tack on World Trade Center, ies eat Ty ‘New York‘This was highly succes stick that targeted one of ‘the smo of Western capitals, Thera even indications hat '-Queda attempted to chemically contaminate the rubble but was unsuecesfil They aso filed to collapse the structure. Capeued documents indicat that they have continu o study the employ- ‘ment of chemicals fir potential tacks. Obviously they continued to study how to atack the World Tiade Cente. 1998: Al-Queda claims to have supported the October 3-4 Somali attack on U.S forces ia Mogasht, If the las are wu, ‘this ws highly succes. No key al-Qaeda personnel wete hurt in the atack nor in the Amesican opertinsafcrwand, but the stack resulted in American oop withdrawal that led tothe Fle re ofthe UN. effort. Although this was adsaster for the aer= ‘ge Somali it id remove any chance of Western influence in this amie county 1994 On December 11, al- Queda operatives bombed Philp Pine Ainines Flight 434, en route from Cebs 0 Japan. This bombing ws no atsbuted ro al-Qgeda uni fri the Philips pines led authorities co cprure Abdul Hamid Mara aa is ap top. The interogution and the laptop files showed that the Domibing was a dry run fora muck bigger operation; Opn Bor jinka. Under tht plan, five terorits were to board a series of Aight checkiuggaye through, then get of aan ineermediate son. ‘They were to target eleven lines on the same day, Each suitease ‘would contain a bomb set vo explode ower the Pate asthe ai Tins headed to America Wit had suceeded, approximately Sour thowand people could have did. Murad alo claimed that a: Queda was planing suicide atacks using tiers asthe weapons. Even with ths nformatin ints hun the United Seiten dl not take aguresive action to lminate al-Queds options, Again, bin Ladi approach af no taking cred for attacks pi off Although ‘Oplan Bojinks was nor executed, the planing snd thought that wont into sinaltaneowsly bombing eleven airliners was useful in ‘he preparation for 9/11,et the Sig a th So 1994; A-Queda filed in wsisination atts against Pres ‘Ment Clinton and President Ramos in the Philipines. 1995: Al-Qaeda filed ia an assassination attempt against President Mubarak of Exype, Hoover, in spare operation by an eniely dierent cell, they sucesflly bombed the National (Guard Aemony in Riyadh, Saud Arabia 1996: Al-Qaeda supported a succes attack on the Khobar ‘Towers ia Dhahran kiling nineteen US servicemen. Again, they Aid ota cen, 1998:On Aust 7-Qaca sce bombers neaelysimaltas newusy detonated track bombs athe US. embasies ia Dares Salam, Tanzania, and Naebi, Kenya, ling more than 200. 2000: On Jasary 14, -Queda filed execute a seall-boat suicide stackon the USS Suliown in Yemen. Theirboae was ver= toad an sank before it could attack They obviously learned fon ‘he experienc anon Octo 12,2000, they succeded ina seal- oat suicide stack om the USS Calrin Yemen, 2001: Oa September 9, wo al-Qaeda members assassinated Ahmad Shah Mssond, leader of the Norther Aliance in ‘Afghanistan "This ws a eomplex operation that nvoed rcreit- ing assassins in North Africa, moving them through Brin to es- lublsh credentials, then onto Patan, and lly convincing the Northern Alliance they were genuine journals, 2001: On Sepeember 11, a-Qgeds conducted a secon re amtack on the World Teade Center and the Pentagon They ied tw compete another sicdeatack when te passenger of Fight 177 fought ro retake the srr En the stage it casein west= xn Pennseia Since 2001, a-Qgeda cls have succeded with bombings a asym jue in Tuva andthe US, consulatein Karahi Cells have ben nested Jn Singapore fr ploting ra blow upthe U.S embassy in Morocco fr plan sing sal-boat suiide attackon U.S ship, and inthe i when chant Reid the incompetent shoe bomber filed to detonate his bomb. They sue> cwaean a masivebombing ina nightlubin Indonesis killing hundreds mostly Austalian touiss—as well a¢ a setrsimultaneius attack om five tens in Madi, king more than 200 ‘They cae the fight nto Saud Arabia with three near-sinultaneous truck bombing against honsng complexes ring May 2003 and multiple stsination atacks against government officals ‘Through one oftheir associated organizations they changed she out ‘ome ofthe election in Spin, withthe nee smltancos detonation of ren bombs on tains, Actin glance, here ds not seem tke seem tobe astateyc vision behind these aneacks, Rates, they seem tobe the violent ishing ot of disparate rertor ist groups. In fictwhen one reviews the develop 7 redevelopment of the gels an techniques ‘of -Queda i becomes apparent that tis isa genine 4GW stategc sp proach, AL-Qgeasteate goal are elected in bin Laden's statements and ‘writing: When he formed l-Queda in conjunsion with Azzany he was fo ‘sed on driving the Soviets ou of Afghanistan and buiMing “api Action force" toot che ad of Muslims anywhere in the world they were threatened by ities. Althongh ls Ques wis nly conceived as uct tila combat fore in Laden began to belive he needed oad terror to his anenal—even though it meant he had to murder ze his mentor and partner, 10 move the ganization in that direction. Up to this pin is focus had been primarily agains the Soviets. With their dete and his return to Saud Arabia, his strategie goals began vo expand s began to expand significantly Bin Lacon was angered bythe Saud funy’ rejecting his oe of hep, ‘wviting the Americans into defend Saudi Arabia seizing his asst, de feming his charactes and attempting ta asssinate hin. He decided they were uni tobe epers af the Two Holy Mosques anal mut be remove fom power, Although this was primary goat was mot she only goal In keeping with running truly ansatonal eror organization, in Laden lo sought the overthow of Arab regimes he did ‘sence all Ar feol were Islmic enough. In regimes became targets,Oe the other l= “Throw the ate 1990s, bin Laden campaigned Jamic groups expand the war toinchude America. He argued stony that, “American were the only crsaders ver to have accuped the holy places, that dey had! massacred thousands of eagi Muslims an were bent on tiling more, and finaly that alchough meh oftheir interest in che Gulf seas economic, they wer sil he tls of the Jews and were working with hem to destoy Ila, "This ermpaign to expand dhe war include America would serve two purposes for bin Laden, First be would achieve his personal goal of skit ing the aac to America ss both the stongest supporter ofthe Sau gow ‘enment an the defilers of the Holy Land. Second he wou shift the atacks out ofthe Mile Eas, where the sotaltarian governments wee {racking down on the failes and supporters of terms ‘Given the brutality nd virtually unrestited power ofthe ple agen- ies inthe Mle ast, the Arab governments were crippling al-Qaeda “operations inside their nations. A-Queda was getting fewer and fewer re tulsa gveater ae greter cost both in casualties and money. As more al (Qaeda meets were rounded up al-Qaeda was ligated ro support heir families. Bin Lae ke that only when he shifted the attacks oat of he ‘Mile East would he Ara governments eax the ecaiy measures that ‘vere costing a-Qgoda so much eeasure and talent. In February 1998, bin Laden anounced the formation of the World Jani Front for fihad aginst Jews and the Crusaders. At tht time, he published che fatwa calling for war against Americas, Feel on all Mus Tims to conduct personal had againse Americans anki them wherever they might be [Phcooghl an Arabic newspaper [he] announced dhe fea tion of the “Workt Islamic Front fr Jshad against Jews and the Crusaders” a new organization with Al Queda a its core, Tis statement mains the central cll emsand the best document for undeestanding it ideology. I describes che presence of US. ‘mops in the Holy Land (Saud Arabia) the suffering indited Iraq by sanctions and the occupation of Jerusalem, as 2clear de 1 (hed Pons ny 1S laration of warby the Americans against Godshis prophet and the “Mastims."It invokes its awn interpretation of slam a t eon clade tht “oll Americans and thei ais san invidual duty ‘ofevery Mest who sable in any country where tics posible” Faced with the overwhelming mitary might ofthe United Stats, the only option they belived would work was team ‘Any doubts about bin Ladess anger over the continued presence of American toops in Saudi Arabia were erased by the boring of the to US. embassies in Africa oo the eighth anniversary ofthe acl of US. ‘woops in Saudi Arabia: August 7, 1998, American inelgence finally agreed tain Laden was major test nd ules eliminated, would en tinue to plan, sponsor, and exeate tacks against American target word wide. On August 20, President Cliton ordered crise mise strikes aginst bin Laden’s hase a Afghanistan and a phanmaccurial plan inthe Sudan, Unfortunately the cruise missiles led tol in Laden, Instead the fied assssination atempe enhanced his prestige throughout Islami Jands.The cunsensus inthe Arabic press and street was that he ha stood upto the United States and succeeded. The trike on the pharmaceutical plant just made the United Sues look foolish, Als, the face that bath attack were conducted immediatly before Monica Lewinsky was due testy tothe special prosecutor made it lok lke a attempt co distract, the US. publi, ‘This fcr, combined with » complet lore to fellow up, indicated ‘that the United States would nor strike back hard even when directly ar tacked, Despite hin Laden being declared the nusher 1 enemy ofthe United States, our public response was limited toa single night of erine missile attacks. Ahough President Clinton did sign an executive onlet suthorzing bis ssssination, our inability ta tack bin Laden made that 4 purely academic exerci Incontiniinghis pater of escalating agunst enemies that tack hm, bin Laden iitisted the planing and positioning office forthe 9/11 at, ‘ack. In keping with hs past decltions of nent, he informed he world,165 The ing an be So ‘tough the media of hs plans to stack America.” On Dever 22,1998, hhesummoned Rabsmlah Yost, aeepoter fr both Pakistanis The Neer and Time, to Afghanistan for an interview: In chat interview, he restated bis dindan for Sah Arabi, sued clear al for evolution against the ‘Sau Family restated his reasons for ating Americ, bs plans to attack us, and his plans use weapons of mass destruction “Time: How do you react tthe December atacs on rag by US. and Beiish forces? (Osama bin Laden: There xo doubt cat the tresherous at tack has confirmed hat Britain and America are ating on behalf of Teal and the Jes, paving the way forthe Jews dive the ‘Muslim world once gain, enslave it and for the rest ofits wealth, A grea purt the fe that cared out he ata came fom oe tain gulf countries that have Tost thelr sovereignty. Now infidels valk everywhere on the land where Muhammad wa born and where the Koran was vale to im The situation s serious. The ules have become powerless. Muslin should carey out tei b= ligatons since the rales ofthe regan have acepeed the ivssion of ther countries. These countries belong to Islam and no the rulers. ‘Time: What can the US. expect fom you now? ‘Osamabin Laden: Any thie oe xzinal or robber who enters another country in ender so tal should expect be exposed to murder at any time, Fr the American foes to expect anything fiom me personally reflsts avery narrow perception. Thousands of millions of Musins are angry: The Americans should expect = Tinie eal aspos fa Que image among Masi. He cae a+ fit he requrreat to decane ie nent Aire taking. After the ata ee though e dies not opcly li espns beaks i known that ie ort heath, Howeves the ata cnnot be onadered justin, bee eto openly warn is eee that hey wee ging be aad ‘tions fom the Masi world dat are proportionate tothe in- justice they ine, Tine: The U.S.sys you ae tying to asuice cera and clear weapons ‘Osama bin Laden: Acquis weapons forthe defenseof Mus ims isa religious duty. HT have indeed acid these weapons, "hen I hank God for enabling mew do so, Andi seck to acqite thse weapons, am carrying uta diy. woul bea in for Mase Fims not o try wo possess the weyponsthit woul! prevent the in fils fom ifitng harmon Muslin ‘Once again, bin Laden skill applied AGW techniques wo war. He sed open medi to broadcast his messge not only tothe US. goverment ‘buraho tall Westen governments and thse people, More important, his followers workwide received the message. He emphasized that this was @ mass movement against America ialingement on the hay places, He «alle on Gulf Arabs, particularly Sau ro rove against thee rales He intimated that he had, and was willing tose, weapons of mass destruction Howes fhe kept icambiguousy making afer Wester response uch les ikl ba foeig us to conser the posi ue Finally he sil did oe take respi for the atacks on US. em basis, Although US. agencies have proved i tothe satisfaction of West- tem eaders,the ambiguity in hisstatementallos the Arb word osee him sanding up 10 Americ.” This allows Arabs to claim tha the attacks were orchestrated by Joes to discret Arabs “To understand in Laden’ sete, consid it rom the viewpoint of| cin any ation agaist AGW conflict The key publem st destny suppor forthe yoverament you ae trying to overthrow In tis cae he seeks to overthrow the go ‘tomentof Sud Arabia. Apparently he hopes toes the caliph ofthe Indy places and then using that prestige and his existing organization, be in absorbing all Islamic ares ito worldwide Islamic caliphate Fortunately for us, Islamic fandamestalis is smply noe a try that sells well with voters of the Wester democracy If the voters wont buy{ghey wll not fore their governments eu of aid tthe get mation, Because he cannot sell Americans on the ie tha an even more Fae rmentalist Saudi Arabi would be the most just option avilable, he must, take action to convince ust is simply too expensive ro contin tn support them (Given thacbin Lace’ tage was the government of Saudi Arabia, be had the addtional problem ofthe temendous US. reliance on imported ‘i Uni the invasion of fag sucesive US, goveraments proved more in terested in governmental stability nthe Middle East dan inthe evolution of democracies, Fen worse fr in Laden is chat Iran proves diy re minder ofthe problems inherent in dealing with an Islamic republic "Thus any 4GWW campuiga to deve Americans out of Saud Aribia would be slong one Feast wear down American soe to he pont where the American people decide ole the Howse of Saud stand or fillon ts wn, With hsearyrarget-—US. military personne] overcns, US. embassies,in= ternational ight, US. sarships—he was constantly reining America of the price we wes paying to prop yp a comet and despodic regime "Tos serategy seemed to be working, After the embassy bombings in Aiea public opinion in the United States was eginning to shit. Our it~ iacns were tne of what appar to bean endless commierent in sapport ‘one despetic stat ans anther For the Fst, public discourse be gn tosnsider the possibilty of US. forces leaving Saudi Arabia. [A this i, bin Laden made a fundamental eror. He seems to have concluded that if king afew Americans a embassies overseas stimulited clscusson of withdraws, killing thousands in New York would certainly Tea to tha witha Tn this analysis fil to understand the American payee. In at temping to send 2 Fina expensive message to fonce che Unite Sates 0 thr from che Mile East, he eoductedasneakatack’ inthe United States Perhaps his misunderstanding came fom our ratvely mil eac~ tion toatticks on US. citizens and US. embassies overseas, or perhaps his ‘tre Blinded him to oarcltaal suength in mes of adversity. ‘Whatever the reson, he commited «fundamental strategic enor in| AGW, Rather than sending the message e intended-—that maintaining Que wotidéamy forces in Saud Arabia means the United States wil contin ta sul ee saline ent the message "Tan attacking you in yous Homeland"This isa message Americans do not reac well o,Pechaps he should have xe amine more closely aur response wo the last ration eo conduct a sneak at- tack on or hor land: Japan, He might have noticed ue ie unified ou people and drove them through four yeas of high: itensty warfare nd ‘rafed in the naclea attack on tw Japanese iis, AL-Queda has suffered 4 major setback, The Ald offensive in Afghanistan has hurt them badly: Akhough they contin operate nt ofthe tral areas of northwest Pakistan, they cans hea effcetive a they see wth gett sponsor In abn te ated li atackon "ir network, Finances and contacts worldwide hus alo damaged them ret deal However, like true networis, hey ate well designed to abso lange -AV-Ques prestige inthe Islami terme network increase with each steac, from the hotel in Aden igh ehough the 9/11 araks. Wid in retsing prestige, bin Laden became the witying voice for the fundamen tlt Blamie movement. Much hike dhe CEO ofa snoern multinational -omporation, he was focused atthe macro level. His most important fun ‘tion wast provide clear, coberent ext vision of where hes he smoverent going. Tn ation, he sppeaed greatly co the masses of Muslin who were uadled and fused that the yreat Isami civilization shoul hve fallen ‘ofa behind the West. He provided some answer, seve sapegoats, and "posible, frist, solution tothe Wests domination a the Middle Fast. (Cleat 4 man wio understood the necessity of providing ingpeation ‘ois followers bin Laden waote and disseminated poety at eval jue ‘ures in his campaigns. 1Te was also areal to selestauspicons esi hi Pond fifo release poetry AL he wedding af his eldest son, in Janay 2001, bin Laden narrate the flowing poem, ping the sce bombers who anacked the USS Cafe A. dentroyes even the brave might fee, ‘She inpites horror inthe harbour andthe open seas,‘She goes at the waves aed by arrogance aughtness and Fike ih, “Toher doom she prngresses slowly; clothed in a huge lsin, Aavstng hei dinghy, boing in the waves” Inthissimple poem, he ste how the course the suicide brabers can defea the arrogance and fake might of the United States. Ke sent ser= foc the terest, sontempe for the United States, and illton ral message: pa acing that the might of ee United ty Despite a masve effort that has eliminated many cell wore, al (Qed coated operitions and che atest of newly revealed cell indi- cae that we do ot have a lee ide of the extent of te organization nor tw resent telly Een two yeas after the United States finally commence» serious, ‘workride attack on al-Oreds, we cannot pvt the future of the coaliet, ‘Our invision nf rag ha allowed al-Qaeda personnel to getin lose to US, personne, while they emi essentially invisible to us in ase of Arabs ‘The result has hoon ssigifcan ie in ULS. casualties with an unknown amount of damage to s-Qzeda For conventional powers ths sone of the frustrating and cautonazy aspects of AGW. The massive conventional victory ver Saddam’ orcesa= svallyexposed US. forces to much greater risk. In aditon, he occupation offers etialy important bated eo sl-Qyeda. ithe latercanprevet Iraqis fons forming unfie gosernmen ad drive colton Forces out will ot only destabilize Taq bu wll serve as a huge psycologal victory over the United States. Asie fom cresting pool of rece, his would provide the ungowered regions essential or establishing aiing alities und bass. Conversely if secure, democratic government canbe established in Iraq. it could well serve a an example for other Ara nations, The emer gence of rue democracy if prosperity followed, would vastly undercut the Suppor al-Queda reeves fom the masses. in shor, rag has moved fom being peripheral to che US~al-Qaeda stragele to. sentral hated chat wil rx the endurance ofthe rwosides |Al-Quedas mang the ost ofthis opportunity to atack US. forces. De loping and executing an attack in che West suites high degre of sill ad sigitcanasety no the fea of which is operatives capable of mow= ing about without atacting undue atention, The US, presence in Taq, means that the Arabs supportingl-Ceds even non-Iragi Arabs, ean mene hour the country much mor easily han can the Western security forces hunting them. The invasion of aq places strategically significant Amer ican efor in the Arab heartand with lth isk that implies Although we cannot predict the outcome of his decaes-engear with -Qued, we are undoubkedly witnessing 4 major sage between 4 nae ‘on a transntional organization, Clery we are fighting fourth-gen- ‘cation war. Knowing that, what lessons ca we lea fom the strug up vo thispoine| ‘The first and most important lesson that prior 9/11 al-Qgeda sc ‘seeded by staying un message for both chi interal Islamic ard externa US. audiences. The key was maintaining alow profil while slay ine easing the cost tothe United States of supporting the Saudi government Inaddiion to the cost in Blood a easu, they were exacting a oa in "he perception of Amerie in the Islamic word Bin Laden was succesflly panting the Satis corrupt regime that ‘he Americans supported purely frases to cheapo He tate that the United States supported the Saudis and ether corept Arab regimes only ‘o ensure stability in oil prices. He hammered atthe theme that America id not suppor democracy and would never support the Ara people gins. their qranmeal masters. The Arab people could only turn ro al-Qaeda Achieve their dreams ofa just society ‘The combination of messages wax paying to aS, cultural weakness Patience. Americans were ted of bearing the fiscal and emotional ost of ‘Supporting stabty in the Middle ast—and bing hated for it. Bin aden’ dogged persistence an low-level ticks in the area (most Amer ‘cansconsidcred the African embassies tbe close enough tobe considered 'n the area) mirored che Palestinian approach during the Ina. Like the Paesinine Inifids I messge tothe Ich public, bin Laden was make ing the poine ro the US. public and aur decision makers thatthe peleee was the presence of U.S troop ina aea where they were not wanted, “Therefor, the only solution wo being hated and attacked was to simply go home and let the Arabs realve among themselves who would ul in the Middle East. “The second mafor lesson we can draw from al-Qaeda campaign isthe sheer uration of GW, Despite hey casuals in Afghanistan, the losses tofdozens fells worldwide, the eiaue of sigifican funds, andthe rex Qaeds networked nature allowed i 0 absorb the ing of other aes, lame ad remain athe. The 2004 attacks in Spain av open support for innungent in Iraq show that they remain cough opponent. Like all AGW wars, tis one wl he long, ard we are ony two years nto re pe final esn is that AGW opponent ts ily to make nor snistakes as we ae, With che 91 asks, al-Qued showed he danger in ‘ot understanding the culture ofthe mation you are ightng.Pourth-gen- Craton warlae is based on getting a clear mesaye through to the target tuience. hough the message may be sent by any numberof channels, iewil aways be filtered through a perio or nations cultural eference. Bin Laden filed ro understand Americ ural abhorrence nd anger o- ward sneakattasks directed at American si, He completely failed to un derstand the visceral action a diet attack would provoke from the people ofthe United Stats Hise has shown tara direct artackon the minds ‘of decison makers equtesan undestning ofthe history culture, and t= tides of che people involved Afghanistan: A Tribal Network O27 2018 tnd out sin ‘Perpetrators of 9/11, After unsuccessfully negntiati Ne ‘Taliban to tur over al-Qgeda terrorists, eee Buh stmt Boldly steiking into Afghanistan, i th oan US i campai cugh the a Queda ad alibi by spe Tyee ee “unending tocol son, Power and directly assist the Afghans wl ‘ ome a ely ise Ahn nb sad hes ah Despite he pisos of ire both esha Sone A ini emeing de eon Qin SGW nag Tretia he id St dictable fashion, with conventional far voice are res nea the US, campagne ‘cused on unconventic mane eS oa ics oingallins with Aigan ose eum suponed iy neuhelning US Rees tee ‘Taliban from Kabul In ess than ewo months the NorthersAllanee went sed the dire reminders ofthe fire of ait, the inital campaign suceeded iba government and aicted signin dam ‘The US. actions proved that a nation can sill supine1ST Shaan the ne fiom contlfing less shan one-sinth ofthe county inthe extreme north to contig ll bu Sagment of the monn Although che enemy seemed to ave withdrawn, we could them nor contr their desrvton, Thy had recovered fom thei spre and reverted to cansial Afghan tribal tactics, The US ontinaed to hus ‘buts with ack of contac, assumed the enemy ad been dispersed and was oe ineectve ‘With the teat ofthe Tlban apparetly gone the US. government shifted ite fous eaewhere, We perceived tha the bullc ofthe fighting was ‘over. Inkoepng with the president's ft- stated poy tha the United States cst“ nation building, we esensily left the Mghans to ebuild their ‘own eountey. The intrest we did maintain in dhe county was focus on pursing the remnants ofthe Tala in the woth, We asc mont of the 10,000 eros we kept in the county or that purpose alone, Now it was cour tur fora suprise suddenly oue progres seemed w stop. Inet the confaed tribal pois of Afghanistan east them selves. The od ethnic sonfsts moved to the Fregron. Some Afghan took advantage four pursuit ofa Queda tose old scores heirs, ous sth and eset nd combined withthe lack of US. feces and poor interagency eordinaion, resulted in very odd ations on the ground, Within sx months, US. ar- craft were contig bombing missions supporting one Pashtun taba clement agunst another. Father south, US. Special Fores, focused on ‘honing he remnants fa- Queda, were employing tribal cements tha were ofcally enemies ofthe US-supported government in Kabul We lacked ‘he regional knowlege to anticipate when one eal group was sing ws against another U.S. ad Aighan goverment efforts were ery pod ordinate, Inn efor to improve tht coordination at lea! eve, he small IS, ‘ment working with the Afghan government begun planing nation- nid operations in other sections ofthe country. Despite the fst that President Bush had repeatedly stated hat he United Sats ddr" na tion building, people onthe ground understood thir if we ile toesblsh soe Kn of nation, Afghanistan would vert he wees hat ge ric tothe Taliban idaion Doh ean ‘Thc obvi questions ow did we find ourselves such range cir ‘umstance? How did we get embroiled in a 4GW struggle without any apparent long-term national strategy or unified US. efor? Why are we simulrancously chasing an elusive asargent enemy and engaging in eaton bing when we have state we dont do citer “To understand how we got here, we have to understand the ce is tory of Afghanistan, The fist thing wo understand is hat all Mghan poli- tis are tral Also, because the borders ate artificially imposed by the the res are not contained within Afghanistan burstradde he border with surrounding nations mst af Which mead seat stake Afghaistn. Thus, Afghan polis are silaneousy iba and inerational Father compiating the stuation ar internal enigeations, 90 ‘ve inside Afghanistan the tribes are mised. be may he a majority in ‘one atea anda minority in aprber: Finally, numer international and Busia andthe Br "eansnational players, such as elsious movements and drug dears, have vested interests Afghanistan, We haves stare withthe tribal structure ofthe mtn, The Pashtun ae the lingest bean live primi in the south and southeast pasts of Alghanistan, UnareunatelytheAfjhas- Pakistani border divides thee tae ional cibal lands, Infact, more Pashtun live in Pakistan than in Afjhaisen ‘The Taj are the secon largest tribe The ive prnaiiyin the north and northeast ofthe couney, with the lads coming fern the Panjishi v= ey: Thus, he Tals are often etered to asthe Panjshiis, They obviously have efits 0 Tajikisean, With only ten percent athe population, the Haar ate just barely the ‘hind lige group—and the most wolated, They tea Mongol people and Jn contrast most Agha te Shit rather than Sui The'lve in the ‘enter ofthe country in he mountainous region northwest of Kabul. They Imaitain a stong relationship with Tran an conto he trade cous be ‘ween Tran and Kabul “The Usbeks are the fourth largest tribe but makeup only eight percent ‘ofthe population, However, they have strong tiesto Urbekistan, 50 they -eecve nippore om both Ustcks and Rus16 Phe Sang the one The balance othe county’ mito very’ small groups With ths hase understanding ofthe riba nate ofthe country and ‘ough makeup and locaton ofeach ibe, we can conduct a quick review of secon Afgan histony “Modern Afghanistan was established by Ahmad Shah, a Pasta tbl leader In 1747, he completed the conquest ofthe lands between Persia and the Indus Rivet. From then unt 1978, che Durrani tbe (o named for Ah mad Shab propensity for wearing pearls or urea?) provided the kings of ghana. This kingship was based om the power fhe Pashnun ies, of which the Durrani wee one bach, ‘Continua alan interatonal wars ele in eequent changin rower Now kings came to power based on temporary alliances with both internal and external alles. Further complicating the power-saring arrangements was that outs powers fl ie ta interfere in Afghan pl iis i an effort to put"theie” man onthe tone. In parila, the Bris and the Russians thought of Afghanistan simply as a pawn in the Great Game. Despite all these complications, the Pashtun ssitsined an un broken hold on the crown. Although the king change the tise he came fiom never did ‘The isc blatant attempt by 2 moder oeign power to rl direct oe cuted in 1859. To cur ofa perceived Russian move south, the British in vaded Afghanistn and established themselves as the ruling power, However combination of Afghan agresveness and British ineptitude led tothe newetoal destruction ofthat Beh invasion forse in 1842. Defeated i Afghan proper but detrined to protest the joe of thee “empire the British incorporated the Baluchistan region of Afghanistan ino British India in 1859. By eiing this area, now southwest Pakistan, the Bish cut Afghanistan of from the sea The Afghans did not have the power to ress the British move, Baluchistan isa long ey from Kabul nd ie populated bythe Baluch who didnot owe any logy tothe Pash- ‘ons. Therefore, the Pashtuns could not resort to cheir normal ib eae ‘ics to dees he British, Baluchistan remained under British contol until {was incorporated into modern-day Pakistan upon he laters inde- dendence eT Evenafie the annexation of Baluchistan, the Ahan boundaries, both orth and south, emai vague, Iwas util 1875 thatthe Rssians uni larenly fixed the northern boundary. Inthe souh, the Bets unceaguin invaded in 1878, to start the Sec= ‘ond Anglo-Afghan War They quickly seize the cites and remained i Aighanistan antl 1880) when anew slr took the Afghan tone, Suis fed with cis ue, dhe Betis withdrew from most of Afghanistan, They id keep some kay teen onthe Afshin India bard, and they vetined the right ro comtol Ahan foreign policy Just because they saw the new ing 2t operative didnt mean they woalIn takeout insane aginst yt another change in eine, Although the Russians did nor attempt to change the regime, in 1885, they suddenly seid Afghan tetory north uf the Oxus River This was despite the fc hat ehey had wnilatrly drawn the previous borer, The Russians hon declared ths toe the sew bone. A decade later, he Bris ye another riltera ation, established the Durand linea the boundary berwsen British Inia and. Afghanistan, Unfortunately the Durand ine was devised solely bythe British forthe se ‘arty and pection of Bish Indie resale ina souteen hor that Ave the rational teritony of the Pashnan ies between Afghanistan sand British Inia later Pakis)-To his; the actual order n the south mains source of contention between Pakistan and Afihanistan—e is largely ignored by dhe Pasha in daily business, Finally in 1895, che Russians sain unter ert reestablished the bor sme, they stack to it That in s nom the border with the Republic of Turkmenistan, Urbekistn, and Tajikistan, Hse, 80, thei ‘esnatonal boundary divided trations tba aes In short, Afghaistnbath north an south, was atic carve fom ‘rational bal areas. The ariicat boundaries impose in 1895 insane that Afghanistan could be ony Tore confedertion of tribal chess Pledging various levels of loyalty tothe Duran’ king in Kabul In fact he king remained in power only dhnoagh a delicate balancing ‘ofthe needs of the various wiber and never trying to rule wth oo hess ‘hand. The sjtem, although not modern, worked. The ltt King, Zahir‘Shan, ruled from 1933-73. In 1973, Prince Daud Khan his cousin seized power while the king was on vacation in Tl Daud was backed by the Peoples Demacraic Party of Afghanistan (PPA, 4 Communist organization, As Daud consolidated his power he desided fe did not need the support of the Comaunises and began moving then frm hey govesnmene post. In 1978, the PDPA strok back din in a Sovet-backed cop, overthrew Daud, Nar Mohamed Tarski a self proclaimed Marist, sired power. To keeping with hisadopeed partys philosophy Tarai attempted tain ‘roduc relorms aeons the eon: In patios, he ates to change tba traditions concerning mariage, weddings, womens sights, womens education, land ownership and the power structure in ural Afghanistan, Inthe conservative Afghan elt, these reforms were seen as striking at ‘he very coe af Afghan soit: Compounding the problem, the PDPA per- Sonne! were ineompetent. The combination led toa countrywide rebellion against che PDPA government later the same year The Commins re sponded with ieteainglyvoket forts so coerce the poplation. “Thus even before the atcival of the Soviets, the pte was established for stony ial resistnce to efor hy the cent government expand its coated, and reforms, ino the countryside, Simultaneous; the Com- ‘munis ternal power struggles continued, leading to another coup ia September 1979. Hatz prcsident Unfortunately he proved a incapable of ubliving Afghanis as his predeceson. Fearing that Afghan insabiy would speead to the adjacent, heaify Inlanic areas the Soviet Union, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. On De ccmber 27,1979, the Soviet Forties Army invaded and rapidly seized evesy :najor population center, executed Amin, and installed poppet regime, “They wereconfident they could estore stably tothe country and thus pre~ ent any spcad of stabil to ther stairs ‘Ati, itsemed af the Soviets had achieved an easy victory. Their conventional faces uiely ok contol fall major population centers. ‘Amin, the prime minister, named hime tial esitance was sporadic and not particu intense. Howeve, just ke French, British, Portuguese, Belgians, and Americans in other parts of the | | | worl he Sines completely ied osc that they had embarkadon ath generation war These wars have dfn timelines. The abe of initial resistance unl sea phase ‘The Soviets had selected an even move challenging enemy than those that defeated Western powers The Ahan ave along tain of inter= rupting ther eonstant intramural stages only omg enough t combine against an nternationat ner In keeping with that ation, the Ahan resistance, ongunied aro wobaly based mili clled mujahideen be the AGW enemy ein his pitial-oganization gan attacking Soviet Forces shortly alter the invasion For the next ten years the Sones tid to pacy Aghanistn, They lke their Western counterparts, se pearly conventional ares and acs tics agsins a completely unconventional enemy. They controled the cites but ever controled mae sections ofthe cnuntyside, Tey attempted destroy anid with Firepower, ‘The Afghans fll huck on dhe traisonal rib utc gaint invades, Using ambushes. assassination, and setae onli casalties on the So ets, Bu for Afghans se to resolving their own fight, they added new twit They took their message to the world and sought acstance bot rom Islamic ations and the Wet. In keeping with AGW, they found ales with similar interests and made what were clearly ‘temporary alice. Even fundamentalist lari parties were happy to ake US. funds and weapons jest the Suits fom Afghanistan, The basic ature of the eal coalitions and history f shifting alances meant that ‘the Afghans were naturals at 4GAV. Further, the mujahideen were deter- ‘mined to thr out che foreign iaders on ater what the cst. ‘The Soviets respnded with one of the inst vciows, corchd-ert, 1 nenworked nature of ‘ted thatthe United States faced an insurgency in Tag. He was the Fist scior U.S offal ro categorically sate the obsious “Tclieve there are mid-level Batis, Fag intlligence ere ice people, Special Security Organization people, Spesial Repub Yiean Gud people that have ongunized atthe regional level in cellular stractre and are condacting what Tull deve as « classical gurl type campaign against us.” Gen John Abin, Jy 15,2003 Even afer this statement bythe man responsible for fighting the n= urgent, the Pentagon would not refer oi asa insurgeny and instead noid defining the typeof conic on which we had entered ~Thedincusion about wha type af confi this is. almost beside the point... I'S wont emeberig that awe kind of have {his anos nd of you know, sade iscason, i i this os ie that.” Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita, July 16, 2008 "The Pantago forts to avoid discussing the ype of ware ae ight ing coal not be more diametrically opposed to Cnusewits canon that the single act of determining the ype of war one isto engage in tthe supreme act ofthe statesman and coatmander. Rather than iemiving the wea they were lly the Bush administration consnued to denigrate the resistance in Irq as merely the aftermath ofthe short, deisive war ehey had panned, Unfortunately events ding the fll and winter of 2008-04 confiemed ‘General Abia’ judgment. The insungens in Iraq ate cea a itelli= gent, adept, and adaptable enemy ‘During the month of August and September 2003, they attacked a police academy graduation; the UN. headquarters (evie); the Jordanian fy Hg bes obtain 78 embassy: che Turkish embassy; Ayatollah Mobammal Buyer, Baghdad chief of police ansucesfly; Res Cross ilies (vie) numerous po lice stations an intllgence center in Ibi he mayors of Fallujah, Haditha, sd Khalidi; thedepary workers; Korean contractors hotels where elif workers andl Wester of fcials stay; and numerous US. miltiry positions and convoys, Their ‘choice of tayets showed the clear steatgic concep of deseoying Ameti- ‘an willy attacking US. forces, any government of NGO spporting the United State, and any lagi working fr or believed tobe eolaborting, withthe United States. ‘Buoyed hy thee succes in driving the United Nations and many’ id agencies out ofthe country, che insurgents stopped up operations aginst US. forces. Their atcks increased in both sophisticatiun and deals ‘They sucesfily shot down US. craft lying out uf Bughdad Fnteroational Aipory, and continved to kill Tragi who cooperated with the United States, Hiwever a US, fnces be came more efetive at countering insurgent ects, the insurgents ean yor of Haglan soir apanese aid eopters damaged a commenal sr fies went up, In respons, the ant-coition forces (ACP) shifted their campaign fom international agencies to dhe lea security services and individuals Siting the colton, During December, thee bombing and assassination ‘campaign began to focus on police pertonnel and Iraqi civiians working With the Couiton Provisional Authority By Maw, they weee king 3 ‘minimus of oe policeman per da. Throughout this pti, they contin ued tous improvised explosive devices (IED) against caltion forcs,bat heir focus had shied the Lagi security forces Expanding on dhs ampiga, they began an ative effort to create die trast and suspicion among the waits elements of Fag socety The nest= ‘simultaneous bonibing of the poiia headquarter ofthe PUK and KPP uring al-Adha, Kurds away oa ag, Sinise multiple bombings and mortar attacks ‘on the Shia community daring tir oly day of Ashoura was intended deepen the divisions between Shia and Suni “The ACF contnved is elenles attacks with the asssination of Shia lei Ineesing the tension, the ACF personnel began conducting atacks blame oli, was clearly intended 9 dive thewhile wearing Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) and lag pic unites, creating distrust both of and among the ckements of Tag scwurty forex, Asa direct esl of thee actions, neither coalition nor lags can assume tha a uniform means cn ‘The subsequent cifclis in signing the Transitional Administrative {aw (TAL) Jag nterim consiuion, indicate he increasing tensions and mistrust among the elements of Iragi society The Shia eprsentatves de= layed the ceremony and signed only after traveling ro visi Grand Ayat [ah Ali Sistan in is home. Aehough the signing of dhe TAL was pnsiive step, twas aly the Best step preparing ray to govern il Tn fic, the nationwide surge of atacks in April 2004 bs home che fice chat the coalition ices a competent, networksdy and de termined fourth- generation enemy. Atte tm the US. leadership was emphasizing the tasition to sovereignty. Ahough adnitely unable to explain what that meant or exact what isan increasingly fic path to ered ‘whom they wold atm the coun uy over 1, US. leaders were suprised hy the extent and power of the resistance in Apri ‘They should not have Been. The natu of the vary tergets and rsa indicate thar the ACF wascondacting a well-thought-out operational cam- puign Each tactical act was minor intel But orchestrated a a contin ing campaig, they were moving toward the strate goal uf diving US. ancl international reoastuction elements out of Taq while simultaneously sextng the conditions Fir ciel wat By forcing ost internationals organizations ad intimidating age willing to work with us the ACR intended to seduce she support ofthese ‘onpanizatons key functional roles and drastically eeduce US. capaci to ‘ceabish ug. With the upsunge in olence, the weminginabiiey of the United States o prove security wll aggravate the Irgk people and con sinue to provide an arena for Islamists to drety stack Americans Decides of living under dittor have raugh the Iraqis the danger of| bucking the wrong side, Until the situation clarifies, the majority of Tags wil remain neutral And the fat thatthe Unie States has sid itis ea ings aways pat ofthe equation. Why opt to support force that hae an nounced its intention to leave soon? Thus, US. policy sinfonces the ACF gq ea i esr lishing the no zone "The unintended result oF ating safe haven fr Kurvishrefgeeshas been the flourishing of Kurdishraled region. Under the protection of a> lied arpowerit developed self goverament alin Decerabe2003 was the aot stable region of occupied Tag. Back by alarge, well-equipped il tia the peshanerga, the Kurdish leader have put aside ther differences and are runing an eetive government in their ection of Tag "The Kurdish experience ander the British and she the various Arab dominated Iai governments ensures that they wll ot surrender their ur rent autonomy ighly En fic ther insistence on dictating elements of he “Transitional Adminitrative Las to protect their interest almost derailed the UL. ors ro have the le signed Inthe south, the Shia Arabs have long simmered as an oppressed mar jority. Denied equal representation under the mandate, the monarchy, othe republic, hey were brutally sures by Saddam. In 199, they, 00, an= were the ehler President Bus cll o rel flowing the liberation of Iraq. The to, were abandoned bythe United Staes and pia heay prise pethape as many a ity thousand Shis were killed in Sadan suppres sion af thee revo Beyond the immedte Kling, Sadar drsine the marshes that pro= vided a way of Fife othe half-ilon Marsh Ars. Tn his efforts to de= rive Shia insurgents of hiding place, Saddam nearly destroyed a marsh ‘lure shousands of yeas old, When colton forces defeated Saddanis forces ony a few thousand Marsh Arabs were left. Since then, efforts 10 restore the marshes have begun, and Mash Arabs are seruringr their ol ‘homes a apy a he marshes rel "This ste station in which the coabtion found ise at the end of April 2004, Without any previous history of uses, tad ro oma go" ‘ernment chat would represent fry the wises of thee distinct groups. ‘Compounding the problem was the active insurgency outlined at he ‘ginning ofthis chapter Givea that one ofthe central characteristics of eg hf eben Femi 183 -4GW ists long duration, the immediate sutton is not a important a the long-term strengths and weaknesses ofthe combatants So the key qe Sion is, Wha are the rave renga weaknesses ofeach side? ACE Serengths 1. The greatest stength of ny insurgents theft hate doesn't have to win. He simply has to stayin the Fight uni the coalition ives up and pes ome, As long a the insurgents can sty ‘Thos forces are not going home. By simply not losing, they compel their Fight is nok over ‘opponent to choose—either contin to fight, perhaps indefinitely quit and go home. In rag, withdrawal of coalition forces will not rel in po rca setcement. I il simply se the stage fo the strode among the vat- ious elements of the ACE, 2+ each tries to atin its specific, and offen mutually exclusive goa 2.Theiesurgentsavea loose ecork Networks are exeptonlly resent andiivlt tw dest. Asstt prove the opposition appears to inclide element of Suda loyalists, dsofested lds, aq cima lems, Ansar al-In,hued, shure woluntes fom vos counties and pos ‘hy clement of the S ‘they have diferent wols an erent consisencie is oth strength ant anand Tania inteligensewgenies. The fat that aweaines Irs astrength because the coalition cannorforsona singlecause ‘or group in its couaterinsargency efforts Ie a weakness hei, ltough Indications are that they can coordinate thir itary actions they cannot efleaively coondinte their poicl agendas. 3. The high unemployment rae Teaves large umber a Fra young sen unemployed and angry Angry young men with time on their hands and acess to weapons are an deal source of ecru 4. Iaq serves asa magne for tani damental eho wish to strike backat America Religions extents those who we che United States asthe ‘Great Satan, hose who trained inthe Afghan camps of Osum bin Laden, and volunteers who have served inthe Algerian ci wr, Boss and Ceh- yall se raga a new baeground. Beses providing experi acqued Jn decades of fighting around the world, they provide a significant poo of suicide bomber for che cause. Suicide buinbing x nota tcte commonNt The Shan Stone Teagis bur iti sgnanite of elgious extents, H Fequen occurrence in leu ie a lear ndicatr ofthe presence of extremist. '5. legis ash in weapons—in particlarocket- propelled grenades, rockets mortars ad SA-T mises which acide forthe suicide and hi arvdran attacks the ACF favor. Just as imporzant, x hoge quantity of ex plosives, mers, and detonators avaiable Zr ether improvised explosive devices orca bombs. 6. Although there have been atacks on slated road the ACF pric marily operat in dense urhan ates that, duet lack of significant police co ltary presence, provide an ideal evizonment for thei survival. The urban areas provide the necestes of inelgence, and eoncealent. iy climinating and threatening flea agi leaders at the local level he ACF ensue compliance fom the local coma The urban terrain aso restricts the use of US, repo. 7.The Taga a proud people and want ro ee the “ctpien” gone asquickiyas posible, the ACF ean convince dhe pengle hat the only way to gat the United States ot of ri through armed esstance, this an bbe a powerfl act. 4. Every significant tacks immediately broadcast othe word. Ina ion to the primary goal of weakening US. wil aso impacts potential allies polite decison making concerning sitions ad and forces for Ia ACE Weakness 1. The ACP lacs any untpng poical ered. Phe only unifhing ele- rent is wish to Kill Americans and anyone who asst them. Akhough this can motivate «network itcannot unify them. 2. Bach insurgent relives hat the Fight will noc be over ifthe coalition leases. They kw that arises departre ofthe calton wil ikely lead to civil wan Therefore, cach insurgent sist consider whether he ensuing chaos isa goal he wishes to fight or, Some wil be in aor of such chaos, particularly fi spreads eo Saud Arabia; others wl fear 3. The sea" the insurgents operat in is latvely all and, Timi primar to she largely Suni-populated central part ofthe country Further because the ACF ist united, they have no uniting political ene yas tory the resto rays people. Unttunately the attacks in both the out and the north over the winter of 2003-04 indicate that the ACF can at least operat in other sections ofthe country. Tis may alo indice that he siuation is changing and that more of the Iraqi people ate toning gust she enalition, 4. Although the Tags are a proud people and want to se the acs pies” gone us quickly as possible ifthe coalition can contince the people that the fistest way o get the United States out is the defeat ofthe ACE, Teag national pide could be a powerful asc othe calito. Ie will mot sare common lags asst the coalion in defeating the ACE tecroand is criminal elements, 5-The majority of lags donot want Sada ary to return to power ‘Thiscan pride basis for cooperation particularly among those who have sutfered badly at Saddam’ hands Coalition Strengths |The coalition possesses the resources and technical capabilites to we store the Tragieconomy. Mose important, the Tags avean educate pp= lation that can absorb the resources put then to wurk, ad un x modem soxiery Given the long-term nature of counteinsuggencyit is escent Fs rags to ucestand that the best prospeets for improving thei economy ‘sa continued US. presence, until the new ea government and military tne capable wf posing fo thee own stability a secs. 2. The dilly improvement in power, sanitation, water, and tade ae having postive impacts, even i Ube Bathist triangle. They provide exi- enc thar fe can be heter if Iraqis cooperate with the caition In con= trast repeated ACP tacks onthe infastsctre show thatthe ACF snot interested inthe economic well-being oF Tags 3. The log-tern relationship with Kunde particular strength for the coufition, due 1 its protection of the Kurdish enclave during the lst fen years. In che short term this has gestly fitted the oan’ abil= ity to work with the Kurds in establishing and minting ar in the north, However, the Kur’ stengeh and desie fe sl-rle may greatly complicate establishing a stable government in Iraq,4The Sun and Shia have long history of eommunity ts, inl ing excnsve intermarriage. Mary faiies have both Suni and Shia branches, Improving teliions between the ten communities can greatly ‘ssa coalition efforts to bul fee Fag Coalition Weaknesses 1 Offs US, seatements focus more onthe withdrawal oF US farses ‘than on Tong-rerm support fora new democrai kay ading some sug- gest that the United Seite x more interested n pursuing ts own domer the agenda than in stabiizing a volatile region inthe war on teror. Any seemingly precipitous departure of US forces would hand vctoy to the ‘nsungents In patclardacosion of eri US. withdrawal tengthensthe ACF’ bility to insite Tags tense that ther dont cooperate 2.The ato of colton forces to civilian populition in Tag isa frac tion ofthat for forces intially employed in Boss anal Kosovo. During the firs year of operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, there were ronghly nineteen ‘eoops per thousind inhabitants, In Iria the eat is ewer than even pet ‘ome thousind inhabitants. Clearly, we have too few to0ps to provide secu rity and nation-building asstance 3. One response ro the shortage of temps appears to he a rsh to count tas rained Iraqis qualified security personnel, There iil eidence that a couple of wes raining makes an Tag a fle gent, yo hat s essentially what the ple and Iragi Civil Defense Corps ‘roops are getting, The poenial for abuse by poorly tained and wasuper- vised police and ICDC is high. A patera of such abuse will ea signiti- cant sethack forthe cnliton 4 Taq leer are hesitant tbe too cosy aligned with the coalition, ‘They fear not ust reprisals but also loss of tus ad ifluence if they are perceived as American puppets. Tey alo fear thatthe Amercane wil de- pur before Functioning government i frmly installed. 5. The colton: apparent lack of understanding ofthe ACF com- poniton harper efforts to effectively combat them. During Ramadan, ‘bombings conducted by the ACF had key personae at various command levels, fom division othe Pencagon giving varied and eve contradistory statement about who was behing the bombings. I we do not understand ‘wa the enemy is and what motivates him, other than killing Americans, ‘ew be difcalew figh him, (6 Taetcl responses to ACE attacks saggest a een between ta tics and opeatonal-leve aims. he US. response to che shotdoven of the Blackhawk ilcapern the north closely esembled Teach actions against. the Palestinians. US. frees conducted a show of force, including aval bombing, movement of amor and the destruction of empty houses in the vicinity of the shootdown, Te tactic of destroying homes has been sed and hs filed in Krael for almost eo decades, Even worse, the perception ‘thar the United States as chosen oot Iraqis asthe Isai et les tinans isa major seback for our hearts and sind campaign 17. The lack ofeulturl awareness and language capabilities in coalition forces adversely pst os abiltyto pacify aq, Repeated hunsiiation of Iraqis their nn homes and at checkpoints is tenng many neutral to the ACE The lisk of lngage sls means coalition personnel ar isolated fiom the lags even when they are serounded hy them 8. The iefctive carspagn to keep the people ofthe Unie States in- formed sto thecrtcal nate wf aur gus and she steateyyt achieve them threes popular spor forthe wa Ifthe US. meme nt ane adepcatepinng or say and posing longterm lan fr se the Ameren people wl imoeaingy objec th ntl. Ti lo taps he Colin vs Ahoy eltihp with he ag veep 9, Coalitions an alianss poss inherent weakness, bea hey can be ict The ACF inter te he United Ses by vig ‘veyall penal suppor ereingincertional a nanan an lags calaborte ith shecoalton With be dew of UN ad NGO persone andthe pening wth of Spain oes, the ACE campuge opens tov Bon es ply sce 10. Coumerongeny lly Darwinian US. souninagency operations il hep or unacly ACF ghtersan nding sosmprove ‘heguaiy thoi fighting Those who uve ae snare orca Filan mote sve. They hae leaned fom te makes of ote Ax188 Fhe Sigal he the cements ofthe insurgent reswork observe the acton-eacton-coun tention el, they ae leaming what works and what docs when it comes to fighting the US-led coalition Ti contrast othe steady Darwinian proces dhe insurgent side the United States egualy rotates personel out ofthe theater The curser po icy of tnit otation rater than individual rotation ea huge imprenersent cover the truly devasating init rotation policies of Vietnam. However, tie ottion does no soe the fact that our Iaders usualy rotate ou of rer each rourThesefore, cach unit returns with a ifezent wet ‘heir ait: oF nexperienced leaders, who will always be bend the earning curve when compared t their adverse, Atthe time ofthis wring, tis imposible to predic with certinty the ‘outcome in Iraq, However, the wa has lealy become AGW struggle Re ‘cent history shows that this rype of srg Ise decade we move. Fare ther tke the othe complex struggles in Palestine and Afghanistan, there are no just to sides but muses intensely inwoved comnmunites: Shi, ‘Suni, Arab, Kurd, US, and other colton members. This mul-sded + pain effos contest requis patience, long-tem view and sow to build rest among the comune. Ps eype of effort does no end self well timelines. (Cafoetnatly, a of ate Apri 2004, the US. ffore has focused on a single date—Jaly Il the transition of contol to an rag government "The administration steadily pared back ts prewar goals. Despite a nil postion thatthe United States would not lave uns the ragis ad a work ing constitution ad fice-arket economy the administration has quiethy albandoned both those gous as unachievable by July 1. Wore, they have not yet atculated a pan for after the transition of authority Hw will he United States, with che new Iasi government as a partner, defeat the in ssgents? How will shy sustain che wll and focus ofthe American people ‘over the long ineline necessary to create a stable, ee Iraq? “This chapter stated with Causewitrs caution abour understanding the awe ofthe war one efighting Unfortanatly he US. focus on high ea nology and the power af precision weapons convinced our dession makers ‘hat we cou preva quickly and chegply is ag, We cole make tarp, high-te, tied generation war of maneuver rather than the lng-e, low-tech, fourth -geseaton war that sits underlying nature. Much to the surprise of the Jong Vision 2020 proponents, dhe insurgent have proven largely immune ro ou technology Howeser, the flue of information technology to give conventional forces an edge aginse AGW opponents should sot have been surprise. 1b hasbeen clear fra decade oe more that as always he emerging technol ‘ogy fivors the new generation of war rather than the ok, We are gesting 4 lesson in that cto “Tonderstand the danger inherent ia the Department of Defense lance on the technological aspects of war rather than its human specs, we need to takea clase look t how these new technologies fir the AGW pretitoncr who dss them t esnforce the hurna sls his gana ‘ion rater than to seplace the humans, That is exactly the subject of he next chapter,Technology Not a Panacea (Toit entriedin 46 Win ng inn aswell a worldwide stage against a-Quesa These are long-term struggles tht will he won or lost primarily with human sill and knowl «cig. Unforeumately for Americ, in is rush to embrace technol 3 the soliton to all our problems, much oes defense establishment has ignowed the importance of earl and Mistral understanding. As discussed in CChaprer 1, they ate convinced tht high technology il pode vewally all the answers fr Fate warts, regandes ofthe vetting “The cuerentemphasison transformation within the Department of De= fense contin expand this theme, detain how the infomation re lion can be harnesed to vastly improve military and political decison making allossng technologically advanced nations to dominate all arenas ‘of conflict. Aiepower proponents and defense industry spokesmen in pat= til pie the capabilitics of our sensors, computerized information pro- ‘cesing systems, worldwide secure communications stems, and pression ‘wesjons. Mey ini that these sts wilallowe us toes” the bat= Hef with near-pefece earn undeestnd it and strike with vet m= iy, Proponents ofthe high-tech sts assre oat pic leadership 1 shat our etn this ate is commanding ad translates diet a in herent advantage sgsinst any potential enemy hey state, "Network conic warfare, where bale time plays critical rol, s analogous to the Tn fit, these proponents ace so confident that ew economie model, with potentially increasing returns on investment, Very high ing rates of change ave profound impact on the outcome; ocking ot alternative enemy strategie and Tocking in suc. “Truc bekeversin technology se warfare asbeing duce 1 aone-ided contest where the technology superior side dictates all action, They never discuss what happens ifthe enemy sects a strategy where Hime is not esental. How can hate sme be cil in a war that hts decade? ‘Or what do we do ifthe enemy works hard not to produse any collectible signal" Tn other words the tue believers ignore what happening to US. forces around the world rod. Rather than del with the complex politcal, economi, and sovial a pects ofthe confit we are curently fighting hey Foca on technologies solutions co problems at the tactical level of war IF thee is onc thing we should have Fern from watching the Germans execute 3GW, is that strategic itor is nor the sum ofncsedie tail vetores Both Germany nd Japa ied © understand the seat context ofthe war—and despite ‘exceptional tctial-and opeatonal level victories, Filed abysmal srate= ays the United Sates nitrors his misunderstanding today. We continu to oss on techno ialy They could win bates ut not was. a ‘al slutions a the tactical and operational levels without «serous discus- son of the state imperatives or the nature of the war We ate Fighting, Acindicated Chapter 1 suongly disagree wih thea that ech nology peovides an inherent advantage to the United States this chap ‘ex Twill poi out how de explosive growth of information technology Al-Qaeda has ed this approach sin the desrtion f the Tb govern= ‘cot i Afghanistan The ACF in ag have aia US ces acpi Baghdad Inf, eas HUMINT, not chology that ed oe ap ofa Al sd the lig OF 006 Uday and Qohha actualy eroded ur aT information revuktion allows wir poten tial AGW enemies to noe only match our capabilites in many ares but sctualycxced them in some tprovides those enemies wit distinct ad- antes onthe uti! evel othe strato. aconflicr with the Unie Seater or other Western powers This shoul notcome as asurprist- As ong {8 we insist on using 3GWV tactics, we should nor believe that AGWY teh- ology gives us an advantage, Neve technology fivorsa new generation of ‘war—not simply updating the ol generation with new equipment, You may be thinking that my view overstates the ease-—hat I fil 16 tndestand the incredible clleston diseminatin,collai ‘capabilities the Department of Defense and other national agencies po and analysis sess You may fel that our potential 4GWY enemies could not have acess to beter information than out comibatant commanders. After ll, hey are snl, geographical separated entities that have no major bas or faci- ‘ies t provide the kindof sspport our eombutat conumanders woutinely 1 acknowledge char our systems are the mos powerful, most capable, ‘most technically advanced i the world. They cealy cam eallect more i= formation across the 47 ean peat next toa phon of Osama bin Laden fing one dretion ‘one das and another drston the next. Colors aficonscan change swell Message ane hidden on pages inside sites with no inks ‘0 them, placed openly in chatrooms... oe more dec com~ munications, AL Qaeda wes commercially availble eneryption Feb, St software or hides messages inside graphics by process knowa as steganography: They are giving strate direction to thee sup Porters by using the Web and] using [enyptographic software] 0 transmit eral messages,” says a British intelligence source." Yer, because wa, regis of generation, remains a contest between ‘wo wil, Wester teigence agencies are ylang sie information fom the wes Some ofthe most valuable intligence gleaned fom the si thas been the connection besween Ile charities and Queda fundraising operations. Analysts found the same bask-ascount numbers sted in Islamic humanitarian appeals om sites raising fads for jad against ee enemies Ila, Several LS. based Is lume “charities” have heen shut doen thanks to she analyst’ dis: covery ofthis Fund-rising scam We also know chat once this inellgence method was revealed inthe medi, the ter bers. War wil continue to be the action-raction-counterstion cycle in 1 ceased the practice of ting the same account nam herent in all human straggles. However, meth technology fivors the ‘ongaization buile s a nerwork zather than a hierarchy. “The Imeret aso provides asuperhryster to squire and move Finds, ‘We now know al-Qaeda has used Islamic charities an ely moved money ‘wound the world via formal, informal (ala), o even tba nerwors Given the billions of dollars that move through these channel every year and the Byzantine ratureo the system, it provides vitally invisible path for the funds, Further, these funds do noe wave ust wa Ilmic route, All migrant groups have informa ste to send money bac hose, Given the workd wide, eanseatinal multi-ethnic nat ofthe al-Qaeda network, ‘we must assure they ae sing mille pats, Osa bin Laden was aot ‘the fist tous charities to cole Funds The Ih Republican Army use {eseotlly the same system fr years to collec funds inthe United States, “The Inert simply makes i easier and ster,Finally, the workiwide etormation system enables stv’ to ‘se the information revolution to directly tack the US. center of geav= ity:our political wil Once again, the Somalis showed us how. They r= ognized the power of a message sent via mass media, Based on this knowledge, they were eady to exploit any success they might have against US. foresin Mogadishu. Althos dice the exact date or me they would succeed against American forces, they had planed to mamediately exploit the media when it dl happen, “The speed with which they ecorted jour tober 3, 1993, battle indicates this In aditon, che escor was hesily semed and had enough authority to peotect those white, Western jour pals from mobs of angry Somalis. Further, they seemed to know the Aeadlines forthe images oe uplnked ta make che evening news cycle inthe Unied States. All this ould not have been acinidence The aetons reveal a care fly developed plan to project specific image 10S. deciion makers As ‘ resulof ths careful prepartion, the Somalis delivered an explosive mes sage adead American being draggel h-nugh de steers) ta taryeted a> Aience (US. decision makers) within minutes ofthe vent ongefore the olfcal Department of Defense version of evens could wend its way tothe top and be released t the pi Boh al-Qseds and the ant-csliton forces in Iq andertand the power ofthe medi and often include coverage i thee tetical plans. The individual events are pat of the ell operational approx of dred n= fueing devon abet who view or real the reports, And by posting fn rectly tothe Internet, they climinate even the balering efces of the mainstream media editors, Recent events om Somalia ro Beiut ta the West Bank to New York ‘Ciyand Washington make it clea thar commercially available systems a= low slow-ech opponent get inside ou decision-making cle. Althovgh ‘the commeril product may not beaszeined a our potssonally produced moze rapidly allowing our opponents J the Somalis could not pre= ints to the seene ofthe Oc- inteligence prodets ie moves mu to set the topo of operations. ‘iat Des Vat Make Them a Real Threat? A the statgi lel the combination of our perceived technological soperioiy and our bureaiertic onganivation seus up fora major Blue against a more agile, inclecmally prepared enemy. [e manifested ivelt and hid yencration warie. Asa rest, we have eovineed our selves tha applying our technology to these older generations of wa gives sa unique and virally snaslale lead, through our ability to con- to igh. cial documents state tha we have the sensors, processing 595- luce precision attacks that surgically cemove a enemy's bi Our of tems, secure communications and precision weapons that will allow us to dominate the battlespce via precision strike, In fac, small, eneratly well funded onganizations have the same tcondict precision ares Teie open-source eporting, terse. abi eo perform al dhe steps neces Sseasors ate huian intelligence contac ining, and commercially svilale imagery. They process infortationthrough the most subtle, sophisticated, an eae spten in existence the human mind. They have secute, worldwide communications through the se ofthe Inesnet and basic tradecraft, Finally, hey have pression weapons, the Form of humans willing to side the nance ro the target “They have repeatedly desnonstrited all hese capabilites in diverse lo cations, yet somchovr aur Department of Defense still routs the "superior ity’ of our high-tsnology systems, Unfortunately, DOD publications never addresshow our pesision weapons can attack atanget that bers it isan society. In both Afghanistan and rag, the end of ee canventional warfare phase essellyerminated our ability to conduct peision sees, Although we oceasinully launch a missile o &presion bomb against a ange hese tacks have minor elects. In contrast the insurgent use of precision weapons i che oom of ar bombs drove the United Naions out of rag, The ws hand-plaved back packs on Spanish rans resulted na charge to the Spanish government and the impending withdnwal of Spank oops rom Leg. Continued prci- sow attacks on cians involved inthe recnosraction of lea has slowed ‘the resonstraston ad deamatcally ese is cos. ‘What gves our AW opponents a eve grater avatages that we continue to apply mos of our technology resources to thind- and even sec- ond- generation wane. History is replete with examples of technologically superoc forces that empluyed new techaology bused on an outmoded Un derstanding of war The British had weapons equal to or beter than the Bosss but they insisted om sing IGAV eats aginst a enemy who wat Aeveloping and employing: 2GW eat, The esl ws disaster o the bat= tefl Ta thosame wa the French tok thee superior numbers of higher-qual= it tanks and seater them among the infty forces of hei arn. The ‘numerical and techaicalsoperiosiy of their equipment could not overcome ther adherence to 2GNW tactics Instead they were decisively deere by the IGW warfie ofthe Genmans ‘Toa, the renovate themselves state that they understand and we SQW. The February 2002 edition ofthe online magazine l-drsar which ppt ts be a ic ae ged oe, padi an arte wn 4G In it, Ube al-Queashisone of bn Lads lose aids, wot as flows In 1989, some American military exper preted a fund mental change in he fature form of wari... They predic ‘hut he wars ofthe 21s¢ century would be dominate by kind oF warfare they called “the fourth genecaion of war.” Others elle ‘This new type of war presents significant dificlies for the ‘Wester war machine nditcan be sposted that [Western] armies will change fundamentally. This forecast did aot aise in 4 vac ly the cowards [among the Muslin leis new that fourth-genestion wars have areal ocurred a thatthe supe ‘rity ofthe theoretically weaker party has aay been proven in many instances, nation-states have hee defeated By stateless nae In Afghanistan, the Mujahideen tiumphed over the world’s second most qultatve power a that me... Sima a single Somali rahe humiliated Ameri and compe ito remove its forces rom Somalia. share ime ite, he Chechen Mujahideen humid and defeated the Russian eae. After thatthe Lebunese resistance (Hezbollah expelled the Zonises ary ftom southern Lebanon. “Technology di not help these great aries, even though [this ‘echnolgy] is sufficient w dest the plnet hundreds of ties over sing the arsenal of nileuchemia, and bisogical weapons. ‘The Mujahideen proved thei superiority in fourh-generition “The Westen itary expr it nll rs Wiliam Lin Keith Nigh ale Shs Jneph Ston and Gary Wikon who cold on" The Changing Fac of Wer lot the Fourth Generation’ (arn Crp Gar Oe ter 1989) a his ath fm iat "Phe Enhainn of War The Fath Generation (Marine Corps Gat Seem 1998),2M thin and te Soe tire using ony ight weaponry Tie ae par oF ee popu hide among the malades. “Thasit appears that ther ate precedents fr world powers and lange countries being defeated by [smal] units of Muishideen over the paste decade, despite the grt differences between thet sides... Al-Qaeda understands 4GW and is using it Their actions in Tray Afghanistan, and Spain demonstrate a keen understanding of how a mils tarily weaker power can attack vastly mace powerful enemy nau, nfoaton-Age technology has actly rad our postion re ative to potential ACW enemies over the ast aupl of decades. Ou posc tiom is mach weaker than che remy pictare pained by the advocates of advanced echnology Athough we have techonlogy soperiorto aro many ‘of our potential adverse continue to use ito suppor a think genera tion style of aire In contrat the mont farwaat-hinking of our opponents have sie on fourth genesntion ware. They know that the new eel ‘oy bas evolved with ands perfedy suited 4GW. Rather than applying new technology tan old tle of was, they are sing ha technology to push the nee frm of war forward ‘War snce 1945 has shown what happens to large bareaurati ores, ‘ven those of superpower: that attempt to Fons a fourth-genertion wat into the thid-genertion mod they got heten. The Chinese, Vieamese, Sandinists, Hesbolla, Palestinians, and Chechnyane all wiumphed over fences with supeioe military power, They did 9 by crippling tat power through more effective wus of AGW, from ee strategic level though the tactical The superoe technology ofthe lnsers didnot prover be a magic solution, “The hey point is that the winners fosed the new technology on the merging generation of wae rather than trying to overs the losers ead in the previous generation. To comprehend fllythe potential impact that ‘oul stl from our bureausray focusing ths perceived vecknologial ad- ‘vantage on the previous generation of war, take «ook at IBM ver the ‘home computer industry a the darn ofthe computer age I the 1970s, a 1M ini enor bs and ieredible resources, dr urinated he om pute business wordvide. The name IBM was vieuallysysoeyenows with compares. In contast, pesca computers were an ides in the vind of & few people operating out oftheir garages “Thirty years ates the survivors f those ely garages dominate he per sonal computer market andl are hunching dhe new software snd hardware ‘hat wl uthernczease their market share. They contin tonetwork these incresingly powerful machines andareactualy taking shar ofthe min Frame market. ln stark contrast, IBM has ben deiven oat of he PC ha wae and software business and i even Ising ground in its mainframe “stronghold to these ups (Quite ipl while IBM had dominant resources nd information, ts lunge, hierarchic, overconfident bareacracy rly ensue hat itu rot put those avantuges to use, Dession makers fr up in the hierarchy could not overcome their ld pejudces in vor of mainframe computers "They applied the new technology to preions-geneation concepts sed sound mainfame computers while paying only sporadic attention to the concept of personal computes Even more damaging, they asumed that he rs of she world would alo continu tobe in mainframes and buy according Unfortunately for IBM, the eet of the world was aot interested in IBM reputation oitsiliefs—onlyin resus The storie of IBM, eich seemed to confer gret advuntages, trae out tobe a major disadvantage Like IBM in the 1970s, out Departinen of Defense and ezional som bata commanders have acess ro huge seers of information, age staff processing that information, an extensive distribution spstems Ui forranately wealso have he lange buteaucacy that charicterized IBM. Like TBM, we ae busy making things more ike we think they should be, 3GW updated through Joint Vision 2020 and serving, understanding, ad reacting tothe major changes in soiey snsfrmation, rather than ob A perfect example is DOD's deve for ever-increasing centralization, is thsievision of he fi ‘re In every, rom singe-item managers fr lgitistems to the con solidted commissary stem t experimentition about the Furae of wa, “They are orig centralization simply because206 The Sng see ne DOD is centralizing. Untorsinately the politcal, soo and evanomic ys tems ofthe world are moving in a diametrically opposite direction, Suc- cessful organizations are employing information systems to improve strategie decnion making while Forcing all other dessins doverward spite this wore end accelersted by the spectacular ilar othe Soviee Union centralized planing, DOD, lke IBM inthe 197, contin eso centraline and sing any oie agli had to eve-grig bu reaerac: Frees the sume intellectual artogance and inertia that plagued TBM. If the smug tones of our profesional ourals ad “de” papers, such a J¥ 2020, *Neswork-Centris Warf," and “Trarsfrmation Planning ‘Guidance ae an accurate indication, we blieve our tems exec the ct pabiles of any opponent and will provide us with «neur-pefee under- standing ofthe baled. Thins despite the contrary evidence presented by our difialesin hunting doen al-Qaeda, she Tahar andl other insurgents in Afghanistan and rag, Unfortunatly ke all re believers, technolo ever le fs get inthe way oftheir bli he evolution fom second-xoner Fourth-Generation War on firepower to third generation Characteristics of / | maneuver matured over seventy years ago with she German oensives Jno France and Russia. Since shen, every aspect of wr vilzatin has un dergone major changes Theres, despite the Pentagon fi high-technwlogy manetverwarfire, wartize asa integral ar of cviizn- ion, has also changed Teiscleareven fom our brief stad of previous generations of moder ination with at each generation evolved or time, Further, each evolied as prac tial people developed real-world solutions to specie tatcal problems Each solution requized changes nthe politics esonom suca and tech- nical arenas before the slutons became practical, We cin se that wart is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. We can se that t evolves ine sponse to major changes in sity. eginning with Ma's concept tht political wil oud defeat superioe nilitry power and progres Aiaand inceratona nenwork to nestle Tras military power and po co nid tonal reianceon the mass ne lsc! process,warire underwent fundamental change. It sifted from 49 Indastrial-Age cus onthe destection ofthe enemy's armed forces toa208 The Sing and Anformation-Age focus on changing the minds of the enemys pote de- ‘sion makers, With the a- Age Intifada and a- Queda, we have ee that AGW can develop avaiety ofstateies, depending on the goals ofthe race titoner With Iraq and Afghanistan, we have seen that 4GWY ca hold its ‘own even aginst he most rechaologicallyadsanced and military power fil nation in the world, ‘The fourth generation hay arrive. It wes all avilable networks—po- lial economic, socal, and miliary—to convince the enemy's political de- cision makers char theirsteateys yous arc ether unahietablear too coy for she perceived benefit Iris an evolse fem of insurgency Sill red jn he fundamental prep that superior pic will when propery em ployed, can defear greater economic and mailtary power, 4GW makes use of soien’s nerworks to cacy on its ight, Unlike previous generations it Hoes an attempt co win by defeating the enemy’ military forces. Tnstea, via the nerworks, it dec attacks dhe minds of enemy decision makers to desuuy the enemy’ politcal will. Fourh-generation way ar lengthy— ‘measured in decades exter than months oF years. "The fllowing discussion loks at strate, operation, and tactical characteristic of SOW. Sratgic Lew! Strategically AGW arn to disly change the nds of enemy pol- icy makers. This change is noe to be achieved hough the eaiiona ‘method of superiority on the batik. The fist through thin-genens- tion objective of destroying the enemys armed forces and his capacity to e- generate hems nthow AGW ene wilatack ws Both the epi decisive [Napoleonic bate and the wide-canging, high-speed maneuver carapaign are ‘nla to them. Theirvictores reaccomplished through he superior use ofall avilable neeworks to directly deen the will ofthe enemy leaersbip, to convince them their war aims are cther unachievable orton coat: These networks will be employed to cary specific mestges to one policy makext sx those wh can influence the policy makers Tnsifad I showed how sophisticated opponent an tllor specific mes- sages to several audznces simuleancousy Based on strategic requirements Aug itn for vars audiences, cach message w dese 1 achieve the basi purpose of wars change an opponent’ political poston ‘om & matter of national interest. The fights i Hag and Afghanistan are showing sila charatrstics. In each, the insurgent sen one nes sage 1 his supporters, snother tothe mass of the undeided population, tnd third tothe couiton desision maker. Subsequent developments ia the al- Agu Iiads show how a central suhority suchas Arf can destroy susesfu AGW campaiga by natu ces of the Somalis and the Sandinista. They have also seen and are sbsobing che continuing Fessons of Chechnya, Bosnia, Aghnistn, and Ir Tnattempring to change the mids oFkey decision makers antagonists will sea variety ofl pasta gtthsie sage though to presents, prime ministers, members of cabinet, lato and even voters. Ime ate; high-ipat messages wl probably cone va wsul media—and the more dramatic and bloody the image the stronger the mesage. Longer term, less immediate but more thaught-prowking messages wil be passed vases, church economic academic artists and even social networks, Although the messages willbe ised on a static there, the diver wil bby tata ation, “Tacially, AGW wil sill involve a mixture of international, eas nation, national, and subnational ators, Bec the optional planer ofa AGW campaign must uel he toe valale to him, we ca assume we wil have ro dea with actors fom al thee aonas at the tactical eel a well Even moe challenging soe wilh violent ators and others wil be onion ‘The tem “noncombatan” applies mote co conventional conics be tween states shan to fourh-genceation wa involving state and non-state actors Nonvialeneactors, while hing lgily noncombatants, wil be acrie fea part ofthe tactical pli in SGW. By using protestors ae interviews, websites, and other "nonvlen” resources, the AGW warrior sin create tae ‘ia lilemmas for his opponents: These ileus tactical resoures inp lice, nteligenc, ita propaganda, and poll pheses to del with he stactons they create. Look atthe effort the United States expended to oversome thes ‘ple l-Qseda fe We were beiten while being ell prisoner” Despite the220 The Sings se Sune ft that had copies of al-Qaeda training maa that explicitly i= rect their operatives to make this statement when captured, it was stil presumed tbe ue by many inthe media. Asa sesul, it sequited an of ficial esponse, Farther, the simple act ofthe United States cresting an information organization to respond to this type of tactic action acded fuel to aleady widespread discussions in the United States about whether anything the government says could he rusted. Although the Unite States ws renal able to put tis charge b= hindus twas casi example ofan economy of force efor l-Qud, By planing this response before the conc started, they were able to en- sore that vin though thir personnel were captured the ill enesibuted tothe fight. Using 4GW technique, they tured captives into combat ante—and ted up major US. assets in responding to these charges, OF course, the actual abuse of lagi prisoners at Baghdad’ notorious Aba {Ghd prison by US. forces wll make it mich more diticule wo counter fale charges ofthis in the fur Miltary ation (terest, gurl or rarely, conventional il eed forthe message and targeted at various groups Finally tthe tactical evel the SGWV opponent wl after use mater and tools avilable in everyday socey. He will not have to minute, anspor, store, or maintain his weapons and wguipment. He will purchase hem in the target sour ijk them en coute,or simply ws them in place. Although 9/11 made it puinfly obvious, numerous truck bombings had tle shown that AGW opponents ue comercial sources for destrac= tive weapons [Aswe look at protecting ourselves from chemical, biological adiolog” ica, nuclear and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons, itis important not to oerlok the ready available commercial sources of these weapons. ‘The 1984 Bhopal chemeal plane disaster killed more people than 9/17 and left many more with serious lang tem njris. Although Bhopal was an indusil accident presents a precedent foe a devastating chemical a= tack “The necestryexstnce of chemical plants and the movement of tase industrial chemical to spportou ies ensure thatthe aw materia foe a chemical attack i arays preset. Ln ation tothe widely recognized potemial for chemical aac itis fey certain shat teroriss are today ex orig howto use liquid nut gas tankers, fel trucks radioactive waste, and other available material for fur attacks. These ae jut a fe of he esources arable to an intelligent, cetve opponent, Timeline, Organizations, Objective: “The inal rita charasersic oF AGWV is tha is tmtines, organi ons, and objectives ae diferent from those of ear generations, OF pur= ‘ula importance is understanding thatthe teins are much longee If yu Sil to understand this you fil to understand the magnitude of the chal- lenge presented by a 4GW enemy "The United Sates wants o igh eat, well-defined was, We wearinto Vietnam, Bosnia, Kexow Afghanistan a Ira comsnved wecoullean it up icky Ko cach confit, out leaders told the people we would be out in ayear ors. They fle this was important ro convince the Atnetica poo eto go tawar Fr the United State alm rain ive years. That ic how long we had msjorinvovernent in Vitnam—from 1986 to 1971 ‘We came in when the war was alteady being fight and lft before twas ‘over Fen then the US. public thought ov had been a war too Tong it ‘other words, Americans want short wt ‘Unfoetunaey,4GW wats ate lng. The Chinese Communist fought Forewenty-ight oars (1921-49).The Vietnamese Communist aught for thieyy years (1945-75), The Sandinisss fought for cighteen years (1961-79), The Palestinians have beeo resisting Isl occupation for ‘wcenty-ne years fr (1975-2004)."The Chechens have bea fighting for more than ten yeat—this me. A Queda has hoon ihn for thie Vision ofthe word Namerousotherinsurgences in the word have lasted dacs. According, when geting involved in a GW fight, we should be planning for Secadessongeommitment. Hom an American point Few his nay well be the single mos important chaeateristie of GW. Nest, we need to understand that AGW organizations ae difezent. Since Mao, 4GW organizations have focused on the movements long-term ety yor singe the founding of MAK in 1988ws short- tem tactcl tector, hey do rot sce themselves iary organizations bat as webs thi generate the pola! power central to 4GW. Thus, these organivatioas ae und by ideas. The leadership and the organizations ae networked to provide fr suriability an eatinuity when tacked. And the leadership recognizes tha thes most important funston sto sustin the idea and the organi ions not simplyto win onthe bated, Finally because of dhe long tmelines, ren the objectives are diferent. Fourth-generation-waefre opponents do no ek to sevice ore tages faster to disrupt an enemy OODA loop. They donot seek tn destroy an ‘opponent’ industrial hase axing the US. Air Force concep of ueting bey seynents ofthe opponent’ society Nor do they sek to disocate the enemy's aed Frcs so that their devsion cyl ul and she enemy cal- pola vil rater th Tapses, Infact essential wo AGW steaeysts that the opponent comt= plete his steateyie OODA Toop—ith therein decision hat the war {s too costly to continue Fourth generaton-warfre opponents focus on the poli pects ofthe conflict. Because the himat objective changing the minds of the enemy's poll leadership, the intermediate cbjectives ae all etn in shin, the opinion of he various ager audiences. They know shat ime sn tele side, Westemers in gener ad Americans in piel ae not knoe fo ‘thle paicnce. We are not «people who think in terms of tgs sting decades. Four genertion-warfate enemies wil nse immediate ojee= tives hut long-term shift inthe pola will otheircnemies The willac> ‘cep numerous tactical and operational sethacks in part of hat go (Col. Harry Summers noted in his book On Srattgy: A Cita Analy sioftheVirnam Worth after the ware told North Vistoamese colonel ‘har the United Seates ad never eon beaten oa the battlefield. The North Vietnamese replied, "Phas tue. Is alo ielevnt” Tis essential to une derstand thar 1GW opponents donot focus on swift halted victories ‘They focus a longterm strategic approach They fosuson winning wae, ot bates, Tn summary, fourth generation wr ike its predecessors, will contin © cwlve with soci asa whole As we cntine to move from a hieichisl, Hirata Industral bred soe ta network information -hised sai ou Stal, economic, scl and technical bases will evel too. With this evolution comes opportuity and hazand The key to pro ‘ing for ou security lies in recognizing these changes fr what Inunderstaning the changing nature of wa, we must noattempt 0 shape tine something iis not. We cannot force our opposentsingoacpberwar thar plays to our stenges. They wil stead wok ofght the netwar that ullenges our weakness. Clasewitr admonition to national leader :e- ey ae. mains valid as ever We must ensuse chat our leaders heed iWhere to from Here? Freeh vrei hp shar 4CWihe {0 tay, Of ever more immediate concern, the United Sete iscureniy involved in three AGW struggles—Iag, Afghanistan and ou global war ‘on teror The obvious question ix Where to from hse? Wiha ust the United Stats do to deal with fourth generation wartice? How do we pro vide security fr our people and intesests workwide—pariculry now that ‘worldwide includes our omnes? How do we win agains a GW enemy? ‘The suategc concept, operational execution, nd tactical techniques of fouth-generaton war require major changesin the way we thinkabout defense, No longer is defense only about stopping foreign enemies ove seas, Fourth: generation-warire enemies do nat ee international hound aries as an impediment, nor do they see war as primarily « mitary “Torespond, we must integsite all cements of our aaionl power some can del effestvely with 4GW enemies wherever they appa In essence swchave ro develop our defenses into a functional nenworcrther than a pure ‘rary. Although we canbe highly efletveagainsta 4GWV enemy, ie wil require ashiftin mindset shroughout the government. Allchangesina are Dureaueray are hand, Major cltral changes even harder Culeual change ars multiple hurcauceatc departments ithe hardest of al [As discussed ia Chapter 1, 1o visions of the Foture have evaled ‘The fest—high- technology eyheewas, outlined in "Transformation Planning Guidance” and Join Vii 2020 the euerent guiding phi losophy forthe Department of Defanse, Given its focus on ighting a9 overseas nation-state enemy it antiipats no real change ty DOD or- ganization wo fight 4SGW opponent, Although the concepts alk about networks, they sally mean the technology, not the oxgaaizations. They Still view warfire as taking place overseas and homeland security as 2 Aomestic mates JP 2020 seas big dense procs with conrsponding ange budge cs Is focuson technology ad nfortion superiority requires massive in ‘estment in information technology ai high-tech weapons systems. Such large has hundreds of proponents in Congress, thowands of businesses, an milions of average Anericans sonceme or ther jobs ad way of ie urterit cans hosness profits as usa forthe wast bureaeracy and industry that supports our cure proach to dsfense The Department of Defense and the dense industry have ge sunk contin espipment, ai ing, and cies designed wo fight 2GW and SGW opponents ‘ade the mri of *ransfnmation” DOD is assuring Ameren hat it isin fctchanging self wo del with the enemies ofthe ate Yee when you sgotothe offical DOD Transformation web steswndfetink ails formation ar wwwofeond mits obvious thar DOD transformation en= visions only one segnent of the spestram oF conct—high-technology conventional wa. "The Deparmentof Defense was conecned ard designed to fight mas sive contention wa by mobilizing large segments ofthe male population ad managing the massive US. industrial base. JV 2020 ad is seesor, "tansformaton, are simply high-teshaology versions ofthis concept Ex panding beyoa this ime ut expensive ole will equiea major cltral shift within DOD, Even more alarming these “new” BOD concepts are about winning bates, no winning wars They are based on the iden that iF we service226 The sing a he Stn ‘enough targets we will win the bates. IF ve wn dhe huts, the enemy will quit. As com ashe does, the wari over In facta e pin die conered in Vietnam and are rediscovering in Iq and Afghanistan, you can vin the battles an neither rn nor ever end the wa Incontrast simply maintaining and marshaling massive mets de stay enemy trgers, AGW oF neta, equines the government focus the intellecual capital of ou pple, We ave to cooainate withthe entre spec- tram of agencies tha hive role in these complex wars, Rather than just wining the ares, we must havea plan for winning the war ‘This is much Wickit. Ae we have discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan, to rebuild the enemy country as ademocracy are have tobe preped toa sistin establishing a ily fanctioning govemment, This equines experts ia every eld, oreunaay the US. goverament has such experts. Unfortunately we have no coherent ongoiraion to find and deply them, Even if wean push ‘our bureaucracy to find and deploy the ight people, they sill work in theie individual departmental tvepipes. Beyond geting the peopl othe Feld we hive to develop genie net- ‘works tie the various agencies together in the field and in Washington, ‘We ave to become oxgnizationally networked to overcome theinertiaand restriction of infection low characteristic of our 19th-century bureat- Developing those nerworks quires mj changes the way we ain rome, and exploy our people aso the govennment. Ie aequtes facut ing on human aypects of weet: guages, history, eultures, incr and international elatonships, [alo requires stcarining sequin and aid, building fewer high-tech weapons systems understanding the basics of & society a ecg the walls between bureaucracies, to make them more agile and capable of genuine interagency operations. ‘Such changes will be exrancdinarily dieu. Te means uncertaingy fr every element ofthe national security structure: mila services, civilian agencies andthe defense industry. Dozens of constuencies re threatened by the shifts in budget required by 4GW. In contrat, there sno identi thle constituency forthe major shifts in personnel and budget required © deal with this pe of war Bh a ee Yer from the bit historical suveyeale inthis book, it lear that ‘vrenemieshave eared ha only 4GW his achanceufsucceding aginst ‘the massive conventional superiority ofthe United States. Anyone who has watched modem conflict on CNN ean se that the United State easly dominates high-technology war. Athough Americans may applaud the stundofT range and videotapes of weapons showa in the news coverage of these confis, our enemies around the world see the Ftly of presenting any kind of target vo American forces They know it wil be destroyed. In ‘contrast, the dil video of ur soles stugeing eo bring onder to Taq, the dct they have with unconventional forces and tacks, and the problems in undersunding and establishing a goneroment provide living example of how to igh the United States. ‘Therefore, alehouigh major constituencies nthe United States have an imerest in pecectng high-technology war none of ur most dangeousen- ‘mics esi asa viable wayto compte agaist the United States We sim Ply have too grest ead and the weapons cost ton mich, We have to give ‘pour eyherwarfntisy and understand that our most dangerous enemies are those who ae preparing to fight a 4GW conic, is espn w AGW enemies overseas sequresa genuine effective in teragency process. Currently the United States has no formal process. Als though we created effetive interagency responses on osstion during ‘Vietnam, the ery phase of Somalis ada very few other times these sue ‘cess ane alas Been hased oa the personalities of the key people in hang ofthe agencies involved. Iehas never Been a systematic approach but ‘eather one of seer chance thar all the agencies involved were ld by peo ple who understood 4GW and the coonlination required to fight. ‘The normal US. response to AGW has heen uncoordinated and dis vine. With no uifhing strategy each agency performs ts Functions ‘within ts tovepipe a it sees it often across purposes with the others, Fourth- generation sacs ae cooainated across the specteum of hu tivity politi, miliary, economic, and security, Our respons mst he ‘coordinated across these spheres too—butwe cueenyhave no rchanien to make this happen, ‘One of the most slising cramples ofthis the short-term view ll apencis take to cheseconfics. The aed forces appt tobe the wore,by insisting on limiting tours of duty to periods as brie as these months and never Tanger thin one yea, even during a confit. In lay ian agencies have adopted the sume policies. Worse, all agencies sem tose ‘hese warsas distraction fm their main bureakrti functions. Phe un- stated poston seems tobe tht these wars cannot be allowed to intefee with noemal bureaucratic practices, patculady aot personne policy oe budgeting, Thus, we ae fighting decades-long was with personnel who spend at most a year inthe fight and a budgeting process that Laks es than a year ahead. ‘Clea; we need a majoe clea change in the US. government. De- fending agains 4GUV encinies cannot be divided nel int domestic nd foreign, mitaryand vil operations Rathex, we have to eae elfctv ine terageney structures to dea with this new thet, “Thosersiutan to change will ote that North Korea stil has huge sak ‘costs inthe hardware, ening, and organizations suitable for 2GW and must mana those fores to keep the regime in power They wil claim we must maintin the forces capable of dealing with thie lage, Industil= Age army: In fact, the minture of second hind fourth-geneatonen- ‘mies obviouly create sgniticant challenges foroar national defense. Not all furuseconfics wil be foughe primarily sing AGW. However if we can transition to AGW, we can del with the mixed reat. History has repeatedly demonstrated that nations organize and pre= pared to deal with an emerging generation of war ean defeat shoe of eur Tier generations. Ta date, 4GNW onguneations have Fired wll against previous generations, but the converses noe true, IF we do not transition ‘0 GW, we will ot do wel against those ders edhe, Although she eanstion wil be challenging, canbe done Ie wll ‘quire a major shiftin clare within the goverament—and wl ely ck «4 generation to accomplish, Given the constivencics tht support cpber= ‘war throughout the government and society, ts too big x problem to at- tack decd We must fist change the culture within the national secu ‘community to aise a generation prepared to fight 4GW. These people wil then drive the shifts necessary within their department Further cultural and organizational shift to an interagency approach | ‘ita Only uch shift can prosde the ding fc behind dhe two aspects Wwf thee 29 necessary for defense against AGW opponent defending the hotiand and Jean to win wars instead of bates, ‘These ae somewhat dtferent problems. The fst, securing the ome- lund isaconstant Iisa permanent strategic problem that wll wre con- tinually. The second, winning a war overses, is more immediate but somewhat episodic, and each challenge wil have unigue apes, Securing the Homeland ‘The challenge in wearing the homeland ist establish an interagency process tha can Fnction indefinitely against nonspecific and widely vr ied threats The formation of the Department of Hlnieland Security (DHS) was a fundamental step. Ke brngs together twenty-two the key agencies needed for this mission. Supporting this hasbeen the formation ofthe Teroist Theat laegration Center (TIC), to inegeate the in gence eflrts of the various branches of government, In the same way DOD and the servis slowly learned to work ta- gether, the civilian agencies iavolved in homeland security must do so two, However, ther coordination problems are even greater, because of s deparements involved. When the Department of Defense was formed it had to absorb only ewe depattments—the army and the nay. In addition, the wo had essentially the same mission: defending the United Stats from overseas ata. Despite the apparently simple task, it sil took more than forty-five years and multiple changes of the lav the vt to successfully integrate DOD. The tsk of integrating the weenty-two agencies with different missions Sato the Department of Homeland Se- ‘ity will he mach mote chilenging ‘Complicating the cooxnaton problem Further, many ofthe depart ‘meats tcl to eetine homeland security re outside DHS. The Justice Department, Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Departaen a all inl but independent entities, With all these complications, we need an effective, rested pres for interagency enordination Foreuately we have sh a proces, Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56), Menaging Complex Contingony Oper fom, was writen tm provide a process and organiation for soordinaing the efor oF all US. agencies in complex operations short of wat230 The Sin and he Noe PDD 56 was devetoped in response to difclies the United Statesen- ‘countered in Sori, Hou al northern Jag Signed in 1997, twas de signed co deal with "complex contingency operations overseas. Fat, the PDD states it docs not apply to “domestic disaster elif... nor to ‘counfer-terorisn an hostage-rescue operations and intemational ered conflict.” However, the disclaimer about not using it for ese in the United States was written befor 9/11 and the new understanding of he threat 0 the homeland, Once we undestund that (GW is nerwork-based ad dacs ot respect borders of any type wil se the aced to always apply a reragency approach. Given the long timelines of AGW, we know our homeland security poles wil bea constant factor of life for decades to come, Therefor, oti interagency response mst keep evlking and ime proving, to, must be constant. PDD 56 provides a supe starting pine fr processes and procedures to coordinate the wide varcty of federal, state, lca ad prvae agencies, shat muse be involved in the day-to-day defense of our homelod—and in ‘he response to any success attacks. The combination of building the 1 Iationships among and within she agencies and developing formal inver- gency proces ae both the most sential ost challenging ations we hve to take Wining the Wis [Now it's me totum tothe second half f one security problem: wine ning wars, Fortunately the primary steps for winning was instead of just butles are the same a chose for securing the homeland, We need to de- ‘velop interagency planing and execusion each time we choose to fight ‘Whither we are seeking regime change or small-scale stabilization oper sion, we mst lara eo function a practical network. History has shown ur fourch-generation opponents how to igh ws Fortunately as abo shown us how a democracy ean defeat such an en ‘my, The Brits esperences ia Malaya, Kenya, Omin, and Borneo all show ‘hat an iterate, coordinated interagency approach can win dhe war of ‘ideas rather than ost winning bates inthe Sel hart jacHees 281 “To achiev sucess, we mus be prepared to fight across the spectrum cofpltica economies, soca and military spheres, Wenot only have ta win lates, we have fill he wseusm behind them—startng with apy e- tublsing security This means just not police and security forces but abo the court system and pisoa system to suppor them, We have to establish ‘banking, cutency, customs, public heath ongnizatons, public sanitation, air tac control, business regulation, asjstem of eation, and every oer proces needed foreunninga modern eco. And all ofthese must he dont he people ofthat nation, We know that solutions im posed fom outside rzelyremaininfectonce th uscupying power eaves, Although some will cli such activites have mthing to do with wg Jing war, history indicates that to win wars, «nation his to be prepared to do exactly that, After Weck! War IL, we executed dose futons in both Germany an Japan. The British dda eave Malays unt the Malaysians were confidently eunsing ll aspects oftheir soceties, Those ate clear x= amples of winning the wars after winning the bates, ‘These requiements greatly exceed the range of knowledge and kill ‘sailble within the Department of Defense, Theceine, we need to adopt the interagency approach to planning and execution, eten ia combat, pro- posed in PDD 58, We must understand the lng mines invleed, Using PDD 68 in conjunction wit stating pint we can develop a genuine interagency system or cordinat= Jngour actions accos governmental aad non-governmental organizations ‘ver many years. Then we have to tein the people to make that interagency system function and simultaneously educate them as to why the ystems are 8 good way to govern. Like all major changes i ange bureaucracies will, take almost a generation before our eorts to reform are fly effete, However, 4GW wars last desades, so or efforts to defeat them and et lish fuetoning society wll lust that lang to. ‘The exception will be where U.S. policy makers decide our strategic position doesnot require able maton to replicethe regime we deseo Inchar ease, we can win the bates, pack up, and come home, OF course, what happened to Afghanistan after they drove che Rossans ot ils trates that we may them have te prepared to go back in and repet the‘operation periodically to prevent the ungoverned space being wsed a terrorist haven "The fice dat both domestic viglance und overseas fights sie the same organization is actualy an advantage to our government. Wecan eam fiom eachother Each department has wa culture ad must adjust in its own wayto the challenges of AGW, However, the military services ae ‘wsiquely positioned toad thar process. They ate organized to educate and train; they have lage member of young, though officers and NCOs, and they have clear charter to del wth AGW seats, They should sep ‘ut tn hep lea the transition within the government necessary to protect, "Tonite the transition, he miliary services must take tee mor tops ist we have to focus on people athe than technology: Second we have to honestly analyze the thea and ona au once and process accordingly, Finally we have to sare that no ome pists the uae with perc accuracy and we mst herefore ld eile nt or ores. ecu on Our People “The fit and by farmost important shift we mst makes» stop em hasiing technology ard start focising on people, Technology does not solve problems; people do, Ths ound credibly simple. Ie fc, tan ofe-repeated slogan in DOD. Unfortunately iis mostly lip service. Not all he emmphisis in JV 2020, "Network-Centrc Warf” andthe revli- tion in military affai” discussions om replacing 1990s weapons syste hile het isn discussion on replacing our 1890s personne system Evem the"tansformation” dscssion e primarily about technology So fi thee ths been ile discussion or study into what makes effective leaders in haote, AGW environment ‘As we have seen from out brie study ofthe development of GW, technology i lngelyirelevant to this sore of long-serm struggle: I China, Vietnam, Niciragus, Inia T, the USSR-Afghan War, and ‘Cheetnys I helsing sd had superior technology bu had no concept ‘of how to apply to this new generation of war, What relly macer are Wifi tons 288 ‘wel-uined, inelgent, creative people gue by 4 cberent long-term strategic appeosch lord to AGW. Yer, within DOD, almost all our eeources are focused on technology and hardware Although dhe serves repeat the ante that“peope are out "ther personnel policies makeit perfectly clear that poplar not consideea key pt ofthe solution. In athe services tena ‘lousy delend their antiquated personel stern, ‘To ensure that we recruit tain, educate, and seta the personel we eet fight inthe 235 century, we have tix to major problems. Fist, weave to reform our personnel syste. Second, we ned to drastically duce the sie of oar burenracy. in particule must cut the mumbe of fiek-yrade officers. Our outdated manpuwer policies, combined withthe excsiv sie ofthe service, joint and DOD bresucracies ensue that we ost precious roar cannot efletively tansion tn 4GW. These re he most important refers DOD can make—and the majority ofthis chapee willbe dedicated to per sonnel frm. Before sugysting what needs tobe done to prepare ae personnel to fight a 4GW confit, iis important to understand why the corent per- sonnel sytem does or promote the peo re-thinking, aggressive, isk taking oficer needed to lead in such a conflict. Consider the 1890s personnel sytem we curently use. This snot a typogeaphicl eror. Our eusrent miliary personnel system essentially lows from cforms insteated at the tr ofthe 19th century by Secretary ‘of War thu Root. Using the theories of Frederick Tay andl Max We ber about bureaucratic pesonnel systems and eequirements, Root fight tw replace a personne ster that ws virally unchanged since the Rev= ‘lutionary War. “Taylor and Weber's theories stove ta refine the organiation and per sonnel policies needed to run the emerging incor giants of the late 1800s. They had to devise method wo coondinat the ative of lage c= torics hased on decisions made ental. As the nition moved rnin ‘iual artisans to mass production, we needed toler howto manage these new indostrial companies. Taylor and Weber develope he personnel and ongiizatona theories guide that progres2M The Sieg and he Sone Aste WS. Anny moved into dhe Industrial Age, Secretary of Wie Root ‘se this industial node 0 zefoe ts personnel polices This was neces- sary ifthe amy were tn vole fom a Ronter constabulary 16 & modern industrial army. Secretary Root reforms were absolutely ight forthe, ‘Unfortunately; they ae ow anundeed years old but they'll foe the core of cr pervnel polices “The most damaging aspect of our manpower system sits prey tope oven evaluation stem. Tis system grooms people to fanction wll na ponders, ‘sed purely onthe evalation ofhishoss and his boss boss Thus he sys tem relies on this ingle top-down view to choose is Fru leaders, We lou proclaim we want risk-taking neewoskers. What we actu do sharply contrac that, Or day-to-day sytem sa hierarchical, risk-averse brcaucricy, For dhe majority oF his carer, an ofcer i work: ing within a bos in an organiaation chact and actively discouraged fom "getting oetsde his ane.” Somehow an oficer eho has been groomed hy ‘his tovepipe system is supposed to suddenly thrive when put into a ne ‘work in tacial station. This defies common sense. As VAdm. Herb Browne used to iy, "What you do speaks so lou, cannot heat what ierachieal bureauracy. Bach service member's promotion ie oss. Although ther sre amrous examples of officers who have succeeded in this yer and are highly effi in a network, he ode ae tacked hea gust them. Consider the problem. With oar vay inflated per= formance evaluation systems, asinge report that seit praise ater than cnthusiasti endorsement wil nish an officer carcet. Thus an innovate, fiketakng, outside-the-box officer needs to un int only one isk- aves, in-the-bor, contol rented host have his career teeninated, To ise © the top he has tn be icky enough not to su igo such an individual decades of service. Marhematiallysissysem hastoresulin never more siskeavere population that promotes people like themselves ‘A second major problem i that we still use a manpower system de- signed t select and groom people to nanan Indra-Age bureaucratic onganiraton, We snichow expect poople selected by that system t excel, ina networked word [say seem incredible chat a hunded- year-old personnel system could survive butithas. Fora denied discussion of how it volved—and bass tained il despite major flora reoroy—tead Donald Vandy!’ Tie Path Vizoy marca Army ad he Revolution in Human Afi, “The sc weaknes of oureurtent persnnel tems thatit isa unde years ad grooms people co run organizations bed on concep ian a= ‘the cennry. Unotunately thas noe the only weakness. The bureaucratic model sels a major problem. In this model, "carer development” equtes frequent moses and a wide vaso of dates The iit ens chat evry arom asthe boa range of sls nesesiy to function athe topo theo {ization Ie cuss on creating yeneralits rather than exper ‘This mode, combined with ee huge growthin stalls and headquarters, smeans that a combat arms officer wil sped less than rwseytive percent ing for combat. Thisis the inevitable outcome of our cur- rent manpower system and 2 military bureaucracy gromn way beyond the needs of the combat forces. The majority af jobs fr Bld -grade officers 2c high-level hradgarter—most of thera not par of or warighting “ongaizations. The ae of his eazer tr sy t00 few combat-reted jobs compared t0 the numberof oers on active iy urther exacerbating the problem is the tpi fice aver pattern, consists of series of shor one co Une yar) postings in aide variety of jobs. Tse alternate between service in his spesialty joint erviceand tall service. Alhongh carers wll ary somewhat, many ground comnbat-arms ofices under hissystem ative at theta billet tbattlion commander (about fifteen yeas of serge) with fower than sx years in operitional, Unis—even counting theirsime aa staffer in operational uit. Their aeruil command time in operational uit wll fen he limited tot oF three years ofthe ffcen active duty. They arn fest, amateurs y po= fession. They never spend enough time in any job to become am expert ‘Think about that. Imagine being evolved ina naj lawsuit, Would yu ‘cept lawyer who had spent nly ix of the last ite yar practising aw, tnd only wo or thee af howe inthe ster woukin. Yer our current Personnel sytem lass Amerson ad daughters unde the ombat com mand of ices with hatin me focused on leering wat Catrent carerhe Sanya he ine patterns ensure thuthey have a wie any ofamateurlev skillbutare ‘truly expert at none, Ie imperative thar we rook carcer pater 0 that ‘our oficers become professionals ther shan todayateuts: The US. Ay has tart program o increase the fn its combat arms il grade f= ‘cers spendin operational units the her veries nec to alo uit Unfortunatly current manpower policies exacerbate the problem, “They ensure tha almost ity perce ofthe ffcers in any unit eave every year With this kind of rrbulence as the noem, wits cannot develop the must needed fora networked ongaization Inefects we have combine the worst oFbureerticmanpowersystms wth rop-own reporting a pid penenaeleuoser The esl s that our people are alas crying to get to know each oer aed leara how they wil react in various situations. Thus, uit never reach tei fl ots. ‘Shor aid infequont tours ia the operating forces mean the ofies r= sponse far taining, testing, and length wits ave essentially amateurs, “This means onits tin harder, simply because the commer lacks the practical experience to tin smarter The resting high p ‘combined wit the very is fut, More damaging than even the high operations tempo i ea ogni ronnel tego, opertional tm o¥ our unity ies people ‘ations licking experience ase les confident and slfer more festatons ‘thoy dot have any fun. Thisreslts in both officers and enlisted leaving the servise—further exacerbating ur personne prahlems. “The top dovensepssing system, short tours and hig move of key petonne! are not the end ofthe duage caused by our current manpower and eaining systems Weak fil to test the uit in lini way. The key to individual and nit growth comes fom operating together ander comb Bike conditions Short of war the only way to ely erate those conditions s trough real inti erauated,oeplaytctcl exercises. Unfortunatly, ody, nsead of reat feeplay eerie, we ue owl serie exercises with no chance ‘of osing. These ae supposed to prepare our leaders to syceed inthe most ‘comple, hostile environment known tran: conflict with other men. es ‘if eam prepared for the Super Bow! by playing touch feotball aginst junior varsity team, In shor, our custent peronnel system is sntthetial ty SGW. De- signed prior w World War It encourages the type of top-down isk averse leadership that led to the disasters of 1914-18, The end result of ‘the las hndred years of our bureaurati, ‘arian personel sytem is ‘arees paths shat cripple a force fighting a AGUV enemy: Unite and nd ‘viduals ace always in turmoil. Carecr patterns emphasize exposure to broad range of skills, Vaienysather than mastery is the requirement for promotion. Today, we match our professional amateurs agains wide a ray of ever more aept eerie, The manpower polis ofall US. goverament agencies have sie problems. Al have structures policies ote inthe bureaucracies of the carly 19008. I they ae to asst in defending America aginst dhe roal= specteum threat of AGW, each mast change eo function in a networked sword Reforms To fix our pesonnel system, we ned 1 reform how we evaluate, tai, and educate our personal, We musta extend tons of day so its can learn ofnesoneetvely. Given the urgency ofthe equsement 0 change ‘ur antiquated perionnelsysters, we should start with reforms that canbe accomplished most quickly First we must replace the tnp-down fines epor system with 2360+ degree system, Second, fce-pay exersises in chaotic uncereainenviun ments must become an ineyral part of oue taining progsam. Finally we must greatly lengthen each tourof dy and make the mijority of them with ‘operating Forse rather than with headouares Evatetion ‘The St sep i achieve by adopting a 360-degre performance eval= uation. Tis designed to provide a complete view ofthe officer evaluated, We have slendy discussed how the curtent top-down enaton ater provides a comprehensive view ofthe ofier nor ewacds tats necessary tosucceed in nat. A 360-degre system would bes major step in overcoming those deficiencies in our evaluation sser,Gader tis system, cach person x ealuated byhisboss, por and sb ‘ontinaes The ver gre i compilation of input fom these sources, "Thur ityroidesatru Sl-degrcevicw ofthe ofc evalued To do wel leader no only has please his oss bu aso gun he eexpest of his pers tnd genuinely lead ater than drive, his subordinates, Tn actin trlynetwosked onganieation the reatonship will change {in a tactical situation, Sometimes a junior leader will have the knowledge and bein the hey location and become, i effet, the person sunning, the ‘operation. This requires genuine rust among superiors, subordinates and peers A 360-degree report woud evaluate those relationships essential in iin an oFetine CW combat tam. ‘Some wil objet shat his wil be a popularity contest, that we should eustanalicers carer to onc of his sergeants orjuror fiers YeriFwetust the lies of our pepe those same individuals how can we possibly not ‘ast ur ces to them? ‘Overoming 2 hundeed yeas of ingrained barcauratic hierarchy will be difca. lewil require aggresive, focused fos fm oar topiary readers Infact, given the demonstrate ability of DOD to ress changeit may take lgilaive aston similar othe Nunn-Warerleisltion However ance the desvon i mae the administrative process of eh ing toa 60 degee system should not be lengthy or expensive. Many civl- ian fers aleady use 360 degree reporting. As any search ofthe Internet ‘ll show the sofevare and processes already exis, en ese they ran. 08 ‘commercially aviluble hardware, DOD will not have to int anything. In face by rang on our sesersits, DOD wil ind many who already se ‘or manage a 340/-degrce reporting system in sheirciilan jobs, Wecan draw ‘ona wealth of experience to ese aur tansiton to this more effective and ‘equitable sem, Franky his is why performance evaluation is che challenge I would tackle itis Iecan be assomplished elatively quickly with elatvey small expense—once we accept that car 1Rh-cennury personnel system simply cannot apply in the 2st century 'A 3t-degre performance evalation il largely liminae the ofcer ‘whos focused ly on hi caver and insure that our fares are compored Whew 28 ‘of men aod women who seek whats best forthe unit andthe sun rather than themes, We all now you cannot foo your perso subordinates, "They can see when an indi is focused on his cace athe tha his rlsson.Jastas importa, they wll know shoseofiers who have genuine integrity, and tha, too, wil be reflected in the repr “The 360-degree report will ensuce that officers place the mission fire and have the moral integrity we requiee. Unfortunatly it will not ensure that chy can function effectively inthe chiotic environment of combat—partculsy the unstractured and unceriin envizonment of AGW. This leads us tothe second reform to our manpower polices: ree- ply exercises, Tining ‘This efor willbe more expensive and will tke mow time than chang ing our performance evaluation system. It wil requize major investmens in training facies, trainers, and first-class opposition face, However iti osetia Suds of tay leaders and Ft responders ‘how that the mos fective tactical decision makers rely on recognitions yuidance, then the defense ofoneinterestsin Asia 'spimarilanairand sea defense problem. Ou fore structure for this the ater should be based on denying China the ability to projost power over- seas rather than on defen China on is aid, In ft, the Chinese area yensine treat and are sucking to madeen- ize. They re moving sway’ from Maus ply defensive ence ised on ‘he mass of the People Liberation Army (PLA) to an armed force more capable of taking offensive ation in suport of external goals. They are moses thir a sea, isle nd rund Fone Starting with ground ores, they ae manning and equipping six mo- bile divisions for SGW. Departing fon thei past lance on massed ma power, thee new formations wil crv asf” divisions in whats elealy .3GW concep, This is actualy good news for us As ong as we sf Sight on the mainland, these expensive new divisions have no effect onus “They simply consume Chinese reurses purchasing snd maintsining chou sands of tanks, sillery poses, and armored personnel caries To contrast, modernizing thee navy ai, and ise Forces increases (Chinas threat to the suzounding nations. But China will ack genie ower proton capbility fr the foreeesble Future, Their current efforts sppear more targeted at anti-access and acu-deia lft to heep US. forcesata dance. Obvious power clement ofthe PLA remain we ded 0 2GW and 3GW forces Atthe sane time, other lens ofthe PLA are exploring how to eal with the United States using GW techiqes to overcome Chima’ inferiority in high-technology conventional wale254 The Sh onde For our part we shoul never plan to Bight econ dhe nanlnd, 0 we should not study China a conventional enemy but as 2 AGW enemy. We ‘student how Chin plus rouse 4GW to neutralize the power af the ‘nied States ad ensure that we are prepared to defend against sch tacks. “Thisisthe rel key wo defense against Chins, We wll examine that inthe ext section, when we consider the ei ange of potential AGW enemies afresen Enemies “The final conventional thiest we must coasde isthe rise of an un- foreseen enemy The tis ofjust such an unforescen enemy soften used justify modernizing the owes we have tsay—without changing ther ba ‘erature. However iFhistry i any guide, new powers rise by employing the new generation of war rater than by attempting to overcome the cur= rent powers huge lead inthe oles generation of war. After secing the dev= stating effect of U.S power in Desert Storm, Kosovo, Afghanistan and ‘Operation lagi Freedom, why would any new coempesitor decide to Fight the United Stats on «conventional batt? arther enforcing the hit aay fom conventional war is our excep sionally por recon! in ncomventional conic suchas Viewam, Lebanon, Somali ray and Afghanistan Although we must prepared forthe rise of anew power, we should be looking fora 4GW ener, not one that ses ‘older generations of war “This analysis ofthe 2GW and 3GW eapabilifis of our potential ene ries shows they age not serious deca to US. interests. They can ease damage but wil inevitably be defeated, Fourth- Generation Opponents Obviously more challenging ae potential 4GW enemies. Historically ‘cha been the emerging generation of war chat as hurt the dnminant power ofthe time. Afterall it became dominant by mastering the previ= ‘ous generation of wa “Today we face two types of 4GW enemies The fst isan insurgent movement wing 4GW to sive conto of a tertory. The second ss 9 tion thas using 4GW techniques an lanes to neutraze the power of the United States, ARhough the fis, in the Furs oF a-Qyeds, has dane most of nur atention and is stnce threat tothe wellbeing of Ares can citizens around the worlds nota genuine threat to the existence of our countey The second i, We will examine the threat presente by an in suger frst and then examine the moze deadly threat resented by a i= tion-state using GW. Iraurgents “This hook has desert dhe evolution of insurgency over te tothe form curently takes that ofthe transnational onginizatin. One ofthe best summaties of his type of enemy sa recent description of l-Ques, This eseripton could apply to a mamber of emerging insurgent enemies, fom naco-trlickers to eligi poups—and of «rset applies tot Al Que infeastrstore his proved very hard to detect and combat, not last ects la enforcement agencies lack the expe= rience to respond eflecielv othe thet it poses oto counter its influence among Muslim somites, Al Queda is so charac terized by a broad-based ideology, «novel suucture a robust c= act fr regeneration and very diverse membership that ats across ethnic, class aad national boundaries. It is neither single group oe 2 evalion of groups it comprise a core hase or bases in ‘Afghanisean satelite renoist als workdwid, a conglomenite of Islas poliscal partis, and other agey independent eroist groups thu it dre on for offensive ata and aber espos bites. Leaders ofall ofthe above ae co-opted as and when nec essary to serve as an integral par of Al Qed’ high command ‘which sean vs a verti Teaership structure shat provides trae sic direction and ttc support its horizontal network of com arementalzed cells and associate onions. “This sth insurgent enemy we must fight. Le will be commprd of nerwor of groups mos With legitimate grievances It will be idea based—_ = 42 4~— 256 The Sling te rathee tha terior based. The ideology wil be larly expressed as ‘ison by the senior leadership ofthe network. Tis wsion wil eve a8 the ‘Communder® intent fr subordinate clement, guide the network’ diy-to- (day operations, and prone the operatona-feve kage tothe various ooups tatcal actions. The faders wil have to communicate only when they wish to designate spec targets o eoteol speci operations. "Ava esul, the leaders wil be difficult to arget and, even when ear sted, dial co destoy. Although the destruction of -Qgeds Afghan bises ad the capture of many of hee seni eaers has hurt them badly, the organizations establishing itselFin Afghanistan, Pakistan, rag, Si thn, and hl dozen other places in ee world Te is highly only they ‘sll make the mistake of creating distinctive easly targeted mulitary bases tesin. A AGW enemy is resent and resistant wo the raion concept of pre ation Further,» AGW enemy is dificult to decapitate—pesislybecase the leadeship ita nerwork In Afghanistan, we saw it was virtually impossible dlecapitate citer the Taliban or al-Qaeda using our ac prover. Besanse the ‘emy lays lean ro each ares have 0 assume it wil be even more ‘iultin the future to we sr powers decaitate hm, stead we mst be prepared forthe long-term, close in fight necessary 10 destroy a network In ation to networking its core leadership and primary operational forces sich an enemy will make extensive use of networked mass omni zations poli, onomie, sca, and charitable, Mao set the standard for this and has been emulated by every sucestl insurgent sine, [Alchough al-Qgeda is prototype ofthe stateless insurgent enemy We wi cee soul nt thnk they wil bee ast. Many developing ations True great resentment toward Amercapatculay Ara-Tslmie states. “This content wil emin as ng as America is ereived o be support ing both oppressive Arab regimes and Ital, While we do his, we prose a perfet scapegoat forthe ihre of Islamic dreams, and wermust accep chat ated wil continae spawn an-American networks, We have aleay seen sach groups in Indonesia, the Philipines, Taian, and Pakistan This also inevitable that diverse groups around the world il be lef be hind a the world progreses to an Information-Age economy, These rps wl roid recruits or howe who claim Americas the case ther filore ard mast he punished, “Thus me can expes the ise of ether nerworked enemies, We hate seen that ch an enemy can draw on significant resources, om legit imate businesses nd charities t illegal atvtes ringing fromm petty these totheintemationa dru cartels. liven these resources nd the hatred fs «lng thes enemies, we know they will evenly obtain a weapon of mass destrction, This fstype of AGW enemy. the insurgent, wll be unpredictable and capable of causing great destruton and death even within the United Sac, Ie wil require peat esusces, fr, ad time protect ourselves from the worst of theirataks Its eentially imposible to provide com- plete proestion against thie type of enemy. However i cannot challenge Ameria existe or our ld poston inthe world hina ‘The sesnd typeof SGW enemy we wil faces dhe nation tha makes se ofa wide network of alliances and 4GW techniques ro neutralize the power ofthe United States The, tos have een studing the results ofthe laity yeas of wa They kro they cannot challenge US. conventional fons in 3GWW fight They have cen what happens to those who try. Just as cetiny they have sen the sucesen AGW opponenshave had sage he United States ad our allie, They will seek 0 apply those b= servations in any ont withthe United States. They can be dangerous to Ametia’s position in parila they can degrade our inflence and ‘conomie power in various part ofthe world, (China is clearly oar most dangerous opponent in this arena Te has shown a remarkable consistent, long-range strategy of making allies of our ‘enemies, I as provided asistance with balding long-range rockets and weapons of mass destruction to Tran ligand Nowth Korea. Beyond sup Porting ou enemies, China sso earefl to support anyone who opposes its other potential enemies, For instance, ichas supported lois priary ‘evens, Paki, ip developing both a rockst programe and a aulear ‘weapons program‘China has shown 5 prepa to protec ts interests in western China, both hy suppressing internal opposition and by helping insungents in surounding nations. Finally, Cina takes 4GW approach tthe sanc- tir of inertial boundasis, I berves them only when this helps strategically bt ignores them if they offer an impediment. “To dea with Chins, we must undentand how China ses the future of warfuc, orunately, the Chinese have published an unofficial strate a- sessment by two colonels, Qi Liang and Wang Nang which outlines hove China coud fight the United States. In hei book, Unc Har- {are they propose that China mast use all means—iilitary and non-mi- tary preva a war with the United States according tothe authors, snretited warfre wilinche such divers tactic as employing somputer hackers to atack mitary and goverment systems, Fale fears an ine «resed emphasis on urban uerila ware. Another nev tactics the we of nancial terrorism [Although thisbook snot offi Chinese py is pbliation by sen iorofficrsin a nation where individual thought snot encouraged certainly Sndiates tat dhe senor leadership at east considering such an appeach “The pattern of Chinaaliaces, combined with his book, revels ma tion dat docs noe want a dec sostiostation withthe United Stats bot seeks to have enough lies and 4GW weapons to discourage any use of US. power in what China considers its sphere of inBuence, Taleo shows that Cina does no envision a war with Ameria asa sevond= of third-genes- ation struggle They do not sek conventional suprivty: Rather, they eek vay to use «network of linces and human ingenity to overcome the USS lead in technology: They are considering not only information attacks but ao purely economic artcks. These may take a wide variety of forms, all designed to aoid the conventional strength embodied in our armed forces Tnnagine the sono impact on the United States if a serie of eon tainers Blew up in our poms, necesiating one hunded percent inspection of ativing contain fcight and the ships that caryt. We have seen that interrptions de to stevedore strikes. on our West Const can cost hundreds of milion Americas seven tlio dalla economy: Whether China conducts fe fag operation or nds terri to conduct such an atack, the rests the even ills dlls por day in economic att lost Ho same We hve ao one oretaliat against militarily, despite sting huge ssonomie damage ‘Or onside the majordsuption tour economy and estes it hook aneouth o mad-cow disease wereintetioall introduced into ourlive= Stock herds, Such am attack cauld be blamed on the Anima! Liberation Front (ALP), Alehough would invole killing many cate the statement laiing” responsibility ould rationalize that che end result woud be a collapse of the U.S, cate industry, which wil save milions of other ani nals, Given the lose network that makes up ALF even ALF itvelfmight notbe abet determine fits members conducted the attack. As Qiao and ‘Wang state in Unrated Warfare, the Chinese se thes as etimare a- ees of aac (China can use numberof GV avenues to atack the United Staes— ‘or more bly to neutralize our power in what they consider thelr sphere ‘of nflucnce by threatening such atacks Ar the same time, hey ean iit ‘ur ability o concentrate power byerauring that our enemies throughout the work! tia nore advanced weapons that requizeus to maintain forces in those regions. This move sophinicited approach than the Soviet, Unions we of proses. The Soviets attempted to contol the proves. The ‘Chinese snp provide them resources to we for whatever goals the prow ies devise, China i engaging he ales in a fasion move eeseebling that ‘of venture capitals than the verta, bureaucratic approach the Soviet Union used Finully the Chinese se the uty of attacks on our information ss- tems, They kw they dont have to destoy our Frces—they have rode stro only the links between them. They wil not eesti this ro purely siltary sticks ron software only Phe wil seekeout and atack thee ‘eal civilian infartractoe that caries a large postion of our logistic and sMdministratve data Thy are already analyzing our nenworks, to detect, critical nodes that can case the most derupionto bath military and eo omic targets(One aldonal concer is that much ofthe software that runs ttc infrassrcrure in this country is suring to be written in China Indi, and other forego count ‘These then, ae the nies we fe, Fits are the 2GW and SGV en= ‘es. Tey ae slowly learning to se SGW techniques, but they sil ely primarily on eatier-generation ores or wat: They areesentilly holders and are not serious threats to our security In shor, ou current and poten- tial 2GW and 3GWV enemies ate eminently containable—og, if ot, de- featabl [Nextar the wo varices of GW enemy: the nsurgent/eroit nove ‘ment andthe nation thats moving capil to AGW. These 4GW players ae dhe genuine threats to US. security and ae the standaed against which we must organize ou Frcs. "The key to defending agsines these enemies Isto structure our forces fr she ight we are key w face ater than the ‘oe portulted ia DOD docutnets, Paally we might have t ac the IGW and 2GW contestants insole in bral evil wars over who will lea given temitony. The forces we r= structure deal witha 4GW evenmy’caneatily defeat these enemies Reorganizing forthe Pature (Our cutent ores even wth siguitcan sedation in sizcan del with xistng and projected 2GW and 3GW enemies and the minor warlords However although we have sient Fores, they are aot eptmllycon- Figured even for sich earlier generation ener Any 2GW or 3GW fight willbe overseis, and we will want to win icky We kno hat eary-arsving U.S. forces ae the key to minimizing damage to our ales and to rapid defeat of the enemy. Unreunately, Jack he stand sili to rapidly deploy our current eat forces oversea nd there no indication furore budgets wil provide chat Bt. Both sea~ snd silt are expensive, long-lead-ime its “Therefor, enced to make changes to ou res several ares Currently the U.S. Army has ten divisions Gx hea ewo Fgh, one ai bosne ad one sr ats). The Marine Corps haste divions. The Amy "National Guard has ight divisions pls fifteen enhanced separate brigades (more than five division equivalents) and thee stati brigades. We needed only nine US. dvsons (five hea neo Marnevone airborne, and ‘one sr asa) and one anda half European diisons to smash the Iraqi aray/in 1990, We needed only heee US. divisions and one Bit Tea in 2002. One has to wonder why we need rveny-six dvb trac tured for conventional war ty Incr, we dont. We have roo many heaty ground Frcs and way too many heaey reserve forces Fr any foreseeable fight Ye we are fequently shortofthe Reb mult sion capable mediant-weight Forces we need for forward presence, quick sponse, nation blldng and peacekeeping ot rosmach peace enforcement isons In ict, fae rita shortage of ach Forces texan Frag and Aghanstan. Further, our current grou forces contribute ltl to honetnd security functions ‘Our i frees ace als sill oan fight an enemy that no longer exis. They were planned, built, 2nd organized oface a Soviet-stle creat ‘har as gone aay We now have too many ar superocny fghters and 100 few transports tankers intelligence irea bombers, and specil-mission siren, ‘Given what has happened since the collec ofthe Soviet Union and the curent enemies we fice, ome could age that ll pe i-aypesirity aircraft are esos. In essence, these force ia siti ofits succes Po tential enemies have sen the incredible qualitative lead the United States hasand soply donot Ay against ws, Yer the F-22,asingl-misson aera, remains the air fore’ highest priority and biggest procurement project “The nv has not only 20 few ships bu a distinctly unbalanced fet (Curent sd potential th mins, sobmarines an snti-ship minis. Yerthenavyhas vitally ignored the asin problem and long negksted anti-submarine warfare, The new “Transformation Planing Guidance” des DOD to specially address the ant-acees isu, but that quirement has boon ermphasized in many ts ll ernphatveaniacces weapons, ach at ‘revous documents To date, the naval services have contin t9 neglect the sue. Weave to omganize our forcer both ta fice the few emaining 2GW and SGW enemies and to more eestively ight the numerous AGW ene ‘ies we are engaged With nowFist nce to deine what 1 mean by “medium-weight forces” Al though this books too short to gt into the det, some characteristics ‘an be defined. Organizational, they mst be capable of the fllowing + engaging in not jue joint but incerageney operations. This sakes lean headquarters priory tw ensureclea coordination and prevent overwhelming the representatives fom the oer eel genes sential in AGW. The other agenies run wit sal ta {In doaestc operations, DOD simply ovrwhelas ther wih peo ple Our ure joint tate are huge—and necent We must an- aljze what sell necded w fight a neeworked, mission-orented fone and yot id ofthe exces sta overhead, + fighting 4 2GW or 3GW enemy and winning Accordingly, thoy most beable to Hight a coeotionl enemy any tein 3s ‘wllas in urban areas This des not requ age numbers of anks Ii does ruiz a balanced force capable of ihn on the mecha- rized bull + eivng in theater apd: Given the requirement for forces talfice to defeat SOW armor Faces, the rapid deployment ce- ‘quirement probably means prepositioned force. Maritime prepor stoninghas proven highly sucesfil for he naval ees and allows the Marine Conpé ro pu the equivalent oF ea division ashore within wo weeks of atving a port, However we canoe simply preposition a easy vision on ships, Our cuerent heavy visions ane pethaps the mos ersome organization ever ccated eo fight a ‘conventional fightin the open Unfortanately they areenormously expensive and prone itl apabilityin a conventional fightin c= ther urban or restrictive ean, Ina AGW Fight thee nasveFire= power is largely inclevant. Azmy pepesitioned forces must be Similar to thos ofthe Marine Coxps * poscsing the age infantry and etary police nits neces ‘cy fter the conventional ight i ove, to secure and pacify both teaily populated areas and remote areas. These units must have protected mobiity—vehicles that can survive roadside bombs and ang Ho 288 mines to ne the rom pon tually operate on foot. * deting with SGW enemies. To dos, they must be itll sgence-diven frces—with the emphasison HUMINT al ular ineelignse rather than technical intlgenc. These forces mst he networked, feibe, and able wo operate on mission ues with sound commander guidance, * including significant numbers of cil airs personne and ‘be confatble operating as part of an interagency task fre, nat vit Hower they will jase joint ome They ust be capable of operiting in hostile ev soaments and of dealing with wide variety of ealures In shor, ened to ul the frees fr ses mons. A highly esi ode an the one Lam most faiths the Maine Ai-Ground Tsk Forse (MAGTF). Sealab rom fe ce to nore than + hued thou men, the MAGTE i 4 conkinaion of, su gts, and oman an conte elements tat ony in together fr operations aos the specu of wa, “The lnget MAGTE,the Marne Expdiionay os, hs sceeded inope mp ages Desert and Op craton ag Feedm to hunaniaan operations i Soa, which t= vohed sablzing de sey orl ort the United Nations “The intermediatesined MAGTE, the Maine Expiinary Brigade, ta sages in operons as fun a hose gains the Taba in Afghanistan ohumantran operations n Bangladesh The smal, the “Marine Espsiionary Unis routinely commited to nn-sombst swell ‘combat opens. At the sine of thi writing, «MP ei aq anda [MEU isin Afghanistan ‘Writ mls these Frcs ct is smmnon ets, como doc tons svi asthe high tation, topping the hunger, sd tig tine intgested training, and flee ongnization Bor high-intensity, ‘he MEF Seldshundreds of ke arcrafhartalions fans and regiments ‘of mechanized infintry and anilery sepported by mobile, self peoecting logistics elements. For operations like Somalis, it can provide thousand ofa Se the Sto Fete 288 «lsnoured oops per regiment, to saturate the sects support by eng ‘the supesor asia sil and izepower ofthe IS advisors. though nesting and logics elements, These elements ae capable af supporting this iss primary mission for Speval Forces A Teams we canner eld the non governmental ongatizaions chat provide rele to the popeletion, sulfciene numbers of A reams to over an entire countey: Our wsever the MEF isnot complete or iea! force for 4GW. Although medinm-wcight Fras must be capable of producing the much ager inv good seating place its not the complete answer. Fourth-gencration number of aisory teams or CAPS adel to defeat 4GW enemy. swarfre ones wil ao reguite *signticantlyincressing the Special Operations Fores (Delta Force, etc) as wellas che U.S. Army Special Fores (Green + sa members tunedin interagency proces and proces Berets 8 vel as sion offices from the wide variety of federal com mercial organizations essen to runing an effective government Operationally we need to understand 4GW nerworks Thins rei ad scien a reorientation of oar Basic planing aed egeaton concepts. We need to + ruse etve intelligence units—particulriy HUMINT ‘sore ineeligence driven, Even tougher, we have to focus on the human onganizatons eat can coordinate with her federal agencies and netwarks, clr inteligence, and very long timelines characteristic of ‘he lval authors or ganizations of dhe country they ae in AGW, Rather than foeusing ou technology on finding Forces that look He ‘Those units should be tained to understand and analyze a wide 1, we fequite major inreaes in HUMINT collection and analysis capa age networks eather than build inteligense on ritary wits ili. We have the best information technology inthe wold but unfort- * numero military police units rained in the allspectrum of rately hae faust on ang conventional forces, Weneed thames pce perstions fom sommanity-tye pling full eae com- that sume creativity and sete prowess 10 understanding and defeating uta pice operations the haan aenwuks tthe cre oF 4GW. + civ ase units that can both teach and do, They mast he We must we oht-fushionad HUMINT, supported by new Information sho dal with al thei Fanetins in a maker society They Age tool and the scence of network chery’ to develop an bili t0 re hay be capable ofeablshng the functionsof ceil government nie, analy and understand the nesworks arrayed aginst ws. Only when aa then teanstion to supporting the personnel fom ather gor wwe truly undertand them can we know which nodes to attack and how ‘riment agencies who willconduct he complete reconstaction of sither destroy them or use them for oue purposes the nation we are sporting Unfortunately our HUMINT programs are curently broken, We need *inney units capable of operating ax smal itso paz out= complete renainaion of he rquirements to gow effective HUMINT ost and Silly to ve with and ave ounterpart wit of an in= operators and hove they bil elfetive HUMINT systems, We must then igens force, Ths s along che model ofthe Marine Combined ‘ensure that their personnel stems ate setup eo reward those activites Aston Platoon (CAPS) o the Aemy Miliary Advisory Teams ‘rather than remaining rooted in the bureavratic pois ofthe past. (MATS), Bor forces provided U.S. disor tothe Vietnamese lo- (Once we fs the personnel polices that are crippling our HUMINT cal security Frcs, Irv both cases the wiles, when propery ley fflots, we nee to make efforts o improve the technlogy we use this succesflly defended their lags against guerilla forces. Even field, Although not nearly ae glamorous oF expensive as space-based sys- ‘hough the vllger® equipment was after inferior co that ofthe tess and common tactical pirur systems, some imple computerized ols eri, they succeeded by combining thee local knowledge with ‘a iinprove our FIUMINTT analy by orders of mageitudeOD hasbeen employing limited mum ofthese systems various ‘operations around the world They need to become part af every optional ‘baralion that ay id self ina AGW cont. These systems are able and leadyis use both DOD foremerscas targets and cei pose aen- esto trac domestic ang activity These ae inexpensive, effete tak for analyzing and understanding the nenworks we must fig. ‘The technology emphasis must shift fom sped of targeting to sap= plementng the human sills essential n understanding the SGNV enemy: Janguage, are sts, socal nenwork analysis history.and soon. Given the inherent robustness of networked enemy; we know tha olyafter we un effectively There wil also be nodes swe donot want tn estoy but nther exploit, ‘We need eo deamatialy eink ou forces tthe operational level, We reed eo ensue tha thay ae relevant to the threat, expeditionary enough get them ther, and effective upon arial, All these atibutes a achiew= able with the cueret numberof personnel but we have to change the oF sasization equipment and axindset ofthe Forces Although we il tain some heavy frees, they ean no onger consume the mjoity. or even a a= jor portion, of our sources, “Tasca we kao tha a 4GW enemy rcs heal on network of ins. Thzough personal cots and planning they ces common view of thebatleil! and common understanding oftheir mission and dhe com- rmander’intent. Aserecution ie closes in, they gure only miieal om munication to succeed Thezefore we mst ely heavily on HUMINT and Special Operations forces for offense and ensure that our ied facies and large units are serous about force protection measuts, However, his should not mean hunkering down and sestricting ll we personnel wo pout. That contd the ight othe insurgent. Tasted hough ‘education, ning longer tours gees, and use of (GW techniques we ris moe fom cr canrent hierarchical organestion and bind ou forces, together in the same kind of mental network tht as made the insurgents succes Thee more profesional Fes, sipported by fective HUMINT, sl be ale to move out nt the saery we are “potectng”cordinate and ‘work with local pesonnd, and dominate the ares we need to cont dentand hic network can we target ‘This was the situation daring the it phase of our operations in So mala. Ageressve U.S leadership made highly fective use of HUMINT, suration patrolling tango propaginda, and fqn contact with dhe people and the sebuit Somali police Feces o otal the streets of Mo zsh. Using the same approach, the 10tst Airborne Divison and the 1st Marine Division effestvely controll their assigned sectors in Iraq, ‘The Ist Marine Division sector was so quiet that it was tnned ote to nixed division of international forces nd the division was sent home, ‘The 101st made their sector by far the quietest ofthe US. Army setors in ag At the time of this wtiting, insurgent etsy is increasing in the old Dts section, However, this may be more the inevitable impact of eating the U.S. once presence in the ae by two-thinds and ne having a clay acclated plan for Irae soveseignty rather thin a lewening effectiveness, ‘of the tactics, Nether US. nor Fag government forces hate a clear idea what wll happen after the rum of soveeighty scheduled fi July 1. Nor do theinsurgents, ue they ae steppiigup operations nan attempt 0 en- sare that whaewer trove is attempted oes a go scot ‘Simi the 1st Marine Division is facing significant challenges a it takes over Falah from dhe Rad Aichure Division, Vicious attacks om sans in Falijsh immediately after the arial ofthe division bronght pressure fra major shift in che marines approach opaifiation. Time will tell the marines have the ptience and the apertionsl antimony to con ‘tinue with theirappenach to restoring cur: For emit thee challenges, in AGW the most effective "ins protection” atics have consistently been he people ‘These ae the basic concepts for onzazstional operation, and tact ‘aruration patolling and personal contact wi cal changes o ensure that ou forces are capahle of dealing withthe ene ies we actly Fc i the word olay... and fr the foresee ure, Homeland Searity Atleast unt he Department of Homeland Security (DHS) i fll fanctioning, the Department of Defense (DOD) i going to have w ake an active role in homeland security. For she foreseeable future, DHS willi ely se apo no at med se ee Then isin amd sy wil mos elcome ‘nga inasractr earn oie and pad petting gorse seu arch non the Nato Cantera eek thane fos fora rmber ofan Fis atoughogeeog se der Tie, hey dont regi» war of Poe Comte fd sobnaton ees Sosy sno ne ee met aig takes then moreteiven. kay ualeneennteg ae th are ao afen ko the ple oir they bck up. Fly ey sends kde and we wat ley sales deal tenon Unfors, most National Guard fe ply ined aed expt er se set ions, aor aly dene alo shee ad lcs nts arm igh Kind nin ths tos Even onal fy oni por iba fowl ted ony pli Fancy he eet iti by Gen Per Schama comet atonal Gand amor and rly bras tomy pe ats wil lg ayo hin ap. Thi empath hey nis wich hate ot end noha since Word Wi I, hee, sae MP nits hata inhigh dan oes nd pode enone fenebaskpoctilathony nth The ey queion whee the shange lb permanent ren ampere et ort petioles ‘These ei whisk DOD sho prod mar spr co seen manamest—th atin en afer ths malar ty and consequence 2 succefil enemy attack, I focuses inalyon rescuing victims, mitigat= ‘og damage, and initiating restoration operations, Under oar Constitution, the lowest level of government as intl responsibility for any disaster whether 2 natural disaser or the result of weapon of mass destruction, ‘Thies both a matter of aw and a matter of praetialiy Whe focal and state authorities ae overuhelaned, they cll on eer eources. The response hasbeen a tational Nasional Git sisson, The sony Hint 288 ant is ousinaly called out to del with Neo res, an stems: Ain ‘hr local kowledge, relationships, a physi loci i the commu rity make them effective a tht mission ovsever GW has create a much greater challenge in onc d= fense, Unfortunately an tack with weapon of mass destruction snow a Figh-proability event: The Deparment of [Tomclnd Sut and the FBI fave repeatedly provided warnings tha erorists are atterping to obin ucla, biological, or chemical weapons. We have capi al-Qaeda vileorapes oftheir experiments using some for f poison gs okill dogs, Itisalroost inevitable hata terri ill se a weapon of mas destruction ‘on US. si. The US. goverment even released sn offal surement on June 10,2003, predicting such am attack within two yer When disaster does strks, people wil call 911. They will ot call the foetal gonerament.Ths he frst responders tg WMD event wll efor local yorernment. Depending on the size of the corsmunity and the r= sources aalable theo tld they aay be able thane major dis asters without eden! help, Howeves, if a major biological, chemical, raiologia, nuclear, high-yield explosive (CBRNE) attacks conducted against Americans on ou il first responder wll nee help immediately ‘osave les and minimize propery dimage ‘Aum Shinrky binge Japanese cl, fled in their epeae ates to disseminate ge quantities of ana in Tokyo, but sey suceeded in dlvrig small quantity of sarin neve gs into the Tokyo subway sys ‘tem. Fven though the acack was not executed asonding to pl, the r= sults sill overwhelmed the Tokyo fre department—one ofthe argest and best pp in the word DOD ate recogrizes hat its esources wil be nese in wri i- ‘ster. DOD regulation 3025.1 “Miltary Sepport tv Cis Auth tte, that ay commander as suhorty to coma fdr tops atthe request of Joel authorities tn save lives and rece property damage. But unfortunately, ‘othe than the Marine Corps Chena Boing Incident Response Force (CBIRF) and she Nacional Guard Ci Suppor Teas (CST, he Depare- ment of Defense does nor have any forces tune or esp to operate in ‘he hazandvs environment WMD atack wll rateAbbough the CST tats ae ether planned or active in every state, theteamshave only veny- to members so they anno fancton as much ‘more than a sophisticated detection element. They san be on sone icky bur cannot save many vietims, In contrast, CBIRP thas four hundeed nes and sailors bat is singe, batalion-sied organization base just oath of Washington, DC Ian depay by ground in les than one hour, soiccan be a valuable actin the capital region. However, for mote di: tant locations it mast either deve Fora long perind or deploy by ai Ether way, the most cial aspect of rescue ina contaminated e ronment is time, Ths means that CBIR efectivenes is inversely po portional ot distance rom the taget.Corentss DOD has no othe nit "hat can provide downrange assistance ta ist responders, tas many nit tha prove resonnisunce, advice, and communication links (Guardian Brigid, Chemical Biolegal Rapid Response Team, Technical Escort Unit and numerous others). These however are mostly headquarters units and dupiate the capabilities of major city HAZMAT squad, "Ths, forthe two critical areas where local and state authorities will need help—armed security and sonsequence mangement the Depart= ment of Defenses porly nganized to peovide that help. Although the De- partment of Homeland Security may evenly row into those missions, ‘he teats here today With a budget of $450 billion, Americans should be able to count on DOD to lp prose them aginst GW enemies ‘his couney and i ha fils ass a mitigating the loss of hfe and prop= ery damage. As sted exer, General Schoomiaher’ iniitve to reorganize mo- reroas batlionsis positive first step In similar ein, Le. Gen, Stephen Blum, chic of the National Guard Bureau, has nite a program to de velop ten chemical, biological radiological, aucea, high-yield explosive (CBRNE) response units: These units willbe stationed around the coun” try and be avilable wo respond to CBRLNE events in suppor of local au thorie, Although curent worldwide commitments have stretched the active, sesere, and guard units the gutrd should beable to provide dedicated (CBRNE response frees out ofits eight divisions and eightun separate brigades Given the fst response times needed in CBRNE. eesponse and the inherent ransporestion delays in geting oversee it woul make more sense tome the CBRNE the primaty mission and onganize andl rain ac- ‘cordingly. Then i dhe fores are needed overseas, the transportation day wil provide sme fr the tain bere they deploy. Aer the intl mitigation an rescue efforts communities will esd massive amnuat of help in a WMD event. This tational National (Guard role and shoal emi Tn fst, given the drastically changed ture ofthe threat, perhaps security and recovery operations inside CONUS (che continental United States) should be the guar’ primary wartime le, “The hea brigidesewentil to war plans agsnst the Soviet Union haven guns he enemies we now fice. They cannot mobilize in me have an input, and fo enenny looming on the horizon wil revert to the sesond- and thid-generation waclie for which these forces are most suited. The guard news to take an honest look atts capabilities era its possible commisments and reoqganize to face AGW atacks on American teil and pride sport for AGW operations overseas, Under my propos, slsted snits would be reorganized as CBRNE response forces, The conversion of others to MP units would continue. Fi= rally the est of the guard would be organized ito the medium-weight forces described ere These elements would be capable uf augmenting regular forces conventional ght and woud be well tailored to the mach more likely missions of nation bulding, peace enforcement, and peace= becpingngtnst AGW ener Pending ‘One erial queston is howto fad the reorganization and ee-eui ing ofthe rgulag reserve and guard forces, Americans are obviously xe Tuctant to sped even more on defense in a tine of cod deficit ‘The answer is eappurtonment rather than increase. The US, Army hav aleady canceled the Ceusader ater program and the Comanche hel icoptetThese weapons had been designed to Fight the Soviets and could not be justitid aguas the new threats. Inthe same wy the P22 an enor- ously expensive program that has no justification Although the a force272 Tle Sing athe Soe and the 6 \ractor ae srambling to give i «bombing capability, this ‘elle merely ercates an extremely expensive but barely eflectve attack sireraft To the same ight, the billions we are spending on misiledense make to sense. Although missile defense is «lgial goa, pening lions on ly wntied sn poor tested sccm st. We should keep de- ‘loping the technology bur nt waste precious funds rising it ato “op eration." We ean use thee finds to support our shift to fighting AGW, Other funds will become atlible sitmply because medium-weight forces costes to purchase and est operat than hey ores. Tak bat talons in particu conrume ge bdgets‘The medium-weight units wll «ost sigoitialy les to operate. In he same way deactivating the single risson air superiority squadions wil fee upa great dea of money. Insummary our eure armed Fnces have more tha ulin budget and manpower to desl with the caren threat and 4GW threats Howes, ‘they rust be reorganized to fight the enemy ashe ie rather tha remain ing onized to ight dhe enemy of che past, DODS cyberwa iterate focses oa fighting major convention enemy becaave that is the ony en= ‘ey i proposed high-technology, very espensive systems are effective against Because DOD has so completely bought into the concept of «y= Derwaritmainains ou earent fore stricture to fight thi same mythical enemy. Even worse, DOD is shaping its farure forces to fight eh sme Digh-technology enemy ‘The Cold Warhs been oer for more than a decide, The rel war got ‘our atention dramatically on September 11—after seven decades of e¥0" Iason. es ime our forces got on with the business of organizing, ening, and equipping to fight the enemy atacking us now eathes thas the enemy wel 0 fighe The Future Is Flexibility ce we have fixe our personnel sytem, then analyzed the enemies ve Fae and engine nr Forces to deal with them he thi ill ‘oF DOD reorientation to AGW must he lesbility: We must ensure that the forces we field can dea with the unexpected Although we have «gual historical map of the vuln of SGW, his tony also shows that hy the time one generation of wae reaches mt run the net islready developing, Iecations us that wartie sales ill of suprises. Given the lng interval since the inception ofthe fourth gen- cation, we have to assume another generation is evolving and hat AGW has surprises Fors, Wess have to ascp that theres no ering bck, “The cigning powers have tried to stp change snce nobility outlawed the Jngow: Teas never worked. Wat ike af human endeavors, is constant changing tis imperative that we anticipate change by balding Mleity ino our Frcs. After challenges she acceterating ate of change Although change Isconstant, the ate of change isnot It hasbeen ascleating alm expo ental We can sce that acceleration in heat of development and adop- ‘ion of ew thoughts processes, and echnologies inal areas of humanBA The Stag and the Sone «endeavor: It took decades fr electric power to penetrate to the fa teaches fof America bu less than twenty year forthe personal computer a ess ‘than ten years forthe Internet to spread to the sme rion, Instant me saging took les than five years In warfaret tok centuries o change from micval warfare to 1GW bt only decades to reach 2GW. Each new gentition of war has devel ‘oped and been disseminated in es ime than the previous generation. We have to asume his rend will continue and prepare accordingly. We have to assume fth-generation warfare out there, Infact we may have seen the fst of SGW in the anthrax and iin ate ‘asks on Capitol Hill To date, either hasbeen solved. Appaealy a small, soup, peshaps even an indvidval, decided to take onthe power of the United States, They did so with an atack that wis nos to ate but ‘thr cased sgniticane disruptions nthe busines of governing this coune ‘1p: No one, probably noc even the perpetrators ofthe tack, could predict. it would shut down multiple post offices and huge elie bulings for ‘months, bu that hs a gone unnoticed, As stated in Chapter 15 the key to prepating for the fst so sleet and promote inteligent,innowntive people and ensure chat they are fe to ‘apesiment and fil—provded they lean from those fies, We have cea that changes in warfare are evoltionary: They ae diven by practical men seeking new ideas to solve operational and technica problems. They have never been top-down deiven by “innovation cells” Nor have they been Arven purely by techoological superiority The French proved eoncasivly ‘hat accesso next-generation technology dos no mean a nation is ready to fightin dat generation Al previous generations show tha dhe key component ro leuring to fight inthe next generation i praccl operators who ate also highly edi ‘ited in warfre (nt the same thing a technological education or simple ‘cia ting) Further, these people mustbe provided an environment that ‘encourages questioning dogma and rewards innvation, This reinforces the fact ha the number one requirement to prepare US. forces for 4GW ite {orm of our personnel sstez. Only by cresting system that educates thor- ‘oughly keeps peopl in operational billets, stimulates and rewards creativity, and rigorous tess competence can we develop the leaders needed not st to deal with theseventy-year-oldphenontenon of AGW but also wo dea with SGW ist eohes Netorking Foreunaey the peronael and orgnization needed to create and man AGW force are inherently bl. I isesentl that we build such an or taniaton in which people ar Free t explore, experiment, and understand, [Eveo more important, they must be fice to share that understanding through the nctwork rather than by passing everything thmugh a vertical breaucracy. This feedom to communicate via the Lmeret with nial conceen for ogizational lines is ese to geting the most out of @ AGW organization ‘When given slid commander guidance snd che freedom to use nt work too a cetive member oF AGNV engaiaaton can iterally cap the world for information, eas, and ecniques cat apply to is or her mis sion, He she can keep up with rapid changes—not just he technology but the ideas andthe drive that male the technology efectve. Allis canbe done at isl adiional cost Once we reform our personnel spt and consistent tanec play envionment, the mar= final costo develop a nerworked organization s insignificant, We ave ‘ready paid fr the penne, theirtesining and education, the hardware, the sofware, and the network, The only ding Keeping us from reaping the tremendous henetit i our bureaucratic requirement that all contacts pass through vertical chantels unl they reach the “approved” lve for moving -seros husearaic bounds Freedom ocotnmunicate laterally based on conymander’s intents the fancamental key to converting today’s hierarchical organization ito 19- orton’ exible networked onganization, Sach feedom is antithetical to ‘vertical ongniation ssh asthe Department of Defers (orto any other lange bureawsracy). Yer when guided by commander’ intent anda coherent ‘ison ofthe ongization goals it isan incredibly powerful force malic, “This i ota new phenomenon. Nor sa mystery bow to built ‘Many snitary unit in de past have achieved it, Certain elements are296 The Sing and he Sone ‘ssenta forward-thinking commander who provides cleat, under standable, actionable guidance; aggressive, well-raned subordinates ho have network of trust; feedom a all levle to take initiative (even to deviate from the plan) as long as it confatine with the commander ‘overall inten; hard, realistic unit esning that ensures those who ean thrive in the chaos of wae ate a leadership postions; and enough tine ‘oyether to lear how each member ofthe team will eatin acti, Units suchas the 7¢h Panzer Division in France in 1949 and the Ist, “Marine Division at Chosin in 1950 established networked organizations and di so with primitive radio systems. Often, only bie orders contd be ‘tansmitted. In 7h Panzer’ drive aeross Pans, complete changes in mie sions and objectives were transmitted in singe vetencesoner weak an bro ken radio transmissions, Simi, n Ist Marine Divisions breakout, te bataons often only tenuous communications, yet the division cone ducted 2 coordinate fective fighting withdrawal that destroyed eneiny Formations many tte its sie ‘This was possible through the mutual trust and understanding thet, ‘ame fom ting, ersining, and fighting together This closeness meant hat all understood the overall intent and worked toward that gol The result. wa that when they Faced etitly new sinattons—one an opporaniy © "eapoitan exceptional succes athe other to redeem huge fture—both ‘organizations had the inherent feiiltyof min and organization via mediately adapt to the new siuation and continue the fight. ‘The Intanet and its instantaneous, virtually fee worldwide comma ive radio ge tems ofthe 1940s and 1950s, These existing paths can allow our vertical ‘onganizations to maximize thie neeworking potenti while sil mintai ing he focus on the mission provided by commander intent "To understand how wide the each ofa networked organization i ‘consider what the Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Responte Force (CBIRF) har accomplished. CBIRF is singe baralion-sized t= asiration with no special communications equipment and no special screening required to join the unit. tas marines and sailors assigned bY ‘the same system that mans infantry battalions along with the normal nications provides a much greater opportunity than hep Te have Hohn ‘eruilconncetivity of «garrison unit, Yet by communicating with # ne ‘work of conticts using connectivity provide by the Marine Corps net= ‘work tied tothe Internet, CBIRF has progressed way beyond where it could be i restrained ta communicating only with other Marine Corps for DOD assets. Itean serve asan example of how an organization that is Sandamentally hierarchical in nature ca take advantage ofthe power of senworks co mote effetvely execute its ison It's nota coincidence that CBIRP is 2 tuly 4GW organization, Is sevess was Aum Shinrikyos 1996 attack on the Tokyo subway using nerve genta 4GW actack. After the atack, the commandant of the Marine ‘Corps, Gen Charles Kral, sw thatthe Togo fire department ws ove: ‘hele! by the casualties fron this primitive chemical atack Recogir= Ing that U.S. local emergency service organizations would also be ‘overwhelmed anid have to tart the federal goveronent, Genera Krlak formed CBIRF to provide immediare assistance to cv authorities in he vent ofa chemical or biological atackon he evan popultinn. ‘This uni sa reeagition that AGWY opponents will use weapons of| _nassdestcton aginst ur cil population and tha part defending our country includes mitigating the efRcts of such an atack. CBIRE, by the true ofits msson, i focused on a AGW enemy. tis nt designed te spon to conventional military atacks on itary targets butt the un ‘conventional, WMD attack that ae an nevtable nest tp in SGW, Further, because i the only ait n the Department of Defense with the mission of entering contaminated environment to conduct cue of personnel, CBIRF was forced ogo outside normal DOD channels ta eaen wine tactics, equipment, and techiqus it rei to succeed inthis alien environment. Military units specialize in deling with warchenicals and nuclear attacks. Yea threat analysis showed thatthe sot immediate threat. to American civilians were tai industrial chemicals and materials (TICS and"TIMs). These are agents that only sec few DOD crash fre rescue Personnel :outinely deal with. result, CBIRF personne ha o make ‘contact with a Wide range of experts outside normal DOD channels Obviows they needed otal to the Fit responders (fre, EMS, and police) who outinely deal with hazardous nates ils They also neededBS he Sng ana Sune rortlkto then qua who deal wit iaprvined explosive devices and With heay-reseue experts who dea with collapsed structures Ar the same time they had to develop and enhance their protssional skin thet core ares of detection, decontamination, and emergency medicine. inal they had to devise ently rw techniques for cheir mission such 8 con= ‘aolling rge numbers of rescuers working in small eamsand making pid entry and search ofa contaminated aa ‘They developed contacts through {quence management conferences, and military contacts. The we of email ‘nd the fatemet allowed CBIRF personne! to Pulm those contacts, “Through then, CBIRF could track a wide variety of advances the di sto sondast rescucs im 4 contaminated enstonment verse fields req Given the freedom so explore and learn as Tong a they took guidance from the commandant’s misin statement and commander’ guidance, iy theogh these net= CCBIRPs area experts could share information d works "The results, CBIRF has become a node that connects mary and ivan areas of expetse in response to chemical iological, railogical ‘cleat, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) events. The sls needed a ‘widely varie, and each tends tobe dled bya diferent part of there sponse communi, CBIRF, ingle unit integrated and mastered a vac- ery of silly incu evan response to toxic indostial chemicals, medical teatment of CHRNE casulies,heary rescue in 2 contaminated vionmen, neutizatnn of chemical and biological improvised explor sive devices itary suppor for civil authostes, and element of researc, evelopment, andl manufacturing, Al these ils ae essen in preparing torespond toa WMD attack on a clan population. CBIRF reached ost worker lear what i neded to become effective. | CBIRF’ explosives technicians had to learn about i= provsedexplisve devices, with a parscuar emphasis om those shat can be ‘sel to dseminstea chemical or biological agent. To expand on their Mar rine Corps ttining they reached out wo iin and other specialist mil ‘try organizations ro ean about improvised explosive devices the others ‘were encountering, From tht network of contacts the CBIRE explosives For insta the ote Fey 2 teat establish a quarterly stninason chemical and biological impeensed ‘explosive devices. Irdraws some ofthe top experts fram oc tae and fed- ‘eral bom squads share tir knowledge through tures and hand-on tengo Bring ranges Further because iti seminar of profesional sharing there 9 = quirement to hte instructors. The nerwork has become self-reinforcing (ace they hae rtrd the css, the sudents join dhe net of WMD ex plosives teams. They pssinformation directly to each other rather than vi ‘heir prinfly slow bureaucratic and disconnected hierarchies, Each pro fessional has access to different kaowledge by vite of his peographic lo- cation and the nization he works for “Traditionally infirnation avaiaiy as varhd, bused on a person's lovelin is ongunivation, Now the networkestabished during the seminars ses the kre tal evel simulaneouy No one has 1 wait while the meetngs/classevscssons are approved by vais ayers of ures ry. The people who have to del with the problem ae indirect contact vith each othe Yet each continues to operat within the guidelines pro ‘ed by hit sopevior By focusing on the mission and equied interac= tion rather than ehe bureaneratc proces, they have achieved more than any individual bom squad could peasy ave achieved Ii simi ison, the medical team at CBIRF ceaches out ro Both the cisdan and itary medical comniis. On the military sie, they acs of military chemical, biological and nuclear tacks. Prom thei frst-esponder cones, ‘the an lear how cvian agentes have responded and wil spond otic industrial chencals and radiological asides. The have a unique view of the gas between the military and ian onganiztions that wil hamper ‘i lear fro the expects aboat the medi rmodicl response toa WMD incident Focinstncs CBIR senior medical fice oi tempor assigned in the Porn Gul used his ice tine and email plan, evorinae, and ‘xublh a muli-nasion study into the riage ane treatment of patients in A chemically contaminated envionment. No desled study as been con ‘ducted this subject since World War I, despite the fic tha emergency media! protocols and drugs have change compere since then. The study28) The Son and he Sm ila investigate the drag interactions among common emerge oom drugs and cheovical weapons, ‘The intial contacts and planing were all conducted using the esa ‘ystems we have already paid far, The work contns in an onguing ex ‘change of information owing through network especie of verte hicruchy. Of particular importance i that uncauified treatment knowl ‘ge can he shared acoss international boundaries, sin al Internet dis cussion groups, key players ae quickly ides, sa the best people in neutral envionment to exchange infra various feds can meet i Yon on how to hese sve Tes Inadztion ro the exchanye of information in a wide vraty of elds the conacts established by allowing cross-azency omminications ele in the establishment ofswchnolegy evaluation board. This alls maa facture to meet sersand buyers oF equipment fom awe arieyoffed- ral, sae, and lal agencies, wo determine thie equipment needs and improve the manufacturer designs From this ane similar organizations, sch she Ince gensy Board and the Technical Support Working Group emerge thats deting impronerents in Fst-responder equipment Using ‘eral and ater conte they hase ue network thats bypassing mach ‘ofthe bureaucricy that delays action CBIRF acts sony oe nodeinanet- ‘work of uly expert fast respunders aa those who suppor them This aet- ‘works changing how Ameria wil espond to CBRNE attacks a fat, forthe frst ime, personal protective equipments being tested against bok rilitary and tvi nda chensicals “These simple examples show haw curen, widely aaale tools can rastialy change how anit ams and develops. Yet ont units donot we coalition of the wing has "The lnerAgency Board ws deep by leading rand emergency sevice oF nzasonsamund de county impron the uy of pon poective ie nen eile ist ssp. The Tec Sport Working Grup a ‘nna cu by the Depart of Sate and Depurtnen of Defense 0 ek Semproverentn protection agains WMD. Micha bth NL them wel due othe bureaucratic rextrstions on commenicaing catside the eommand, Unfortunately anil we fsa curen personnel lection ard promotion system, sue fedom will ein the exception rather than the norm. However, once we fx our peronnel syste ad gerinely understand the finetion of commanders intent snd guidance, we can fe the ined ‘le cretvty of our people to ata tei spi areas of expertise (Ofpurcuarimporancesthe removal oFbares between military and isan bureaucracies. Fourt- generation warfre doesnot Function within ‘ear bureaucratic boundares—i thrives on the seams bere the varios governmental security organizations Onlyby erasing those boanares us ing human ingenuity and aeeworking can we match the necworked,eeative [Each technical specialty in CBIRE is using the nenworked world to seck the best posible solutions to the re tactical problems they fae in conducting rescue operations ina sontatninated environment Lam con vinced every marin, soldi, slog and airman would love to be fre 10 ‘communicate and innovate. Image the incentive to find the best pos be solutions fal oie and NCOs knew they woul be evaluated in fee- Play exercises. Rather than waiting for information ta come to them ‘thru the stoweppes ofr curent bureaucracy, they would actively eck ‘out information on taetis, techniques, and procedures that others had Found effective in fee-phy exercises, ‘We have not begun to exploit the ably to dicone test, an disse ‘nate she new ideas and techniques we need to win in AGW, By into ing replay to simulate the inherent competitive spirit of Americans and ‘kropping artificial bureaucratic boundaries beoween cut ppl we can rap ily ind and dserinate the techriques that work! ‘We might aswel acept, encourage, and guide this activity. es going fon wither we ke it of nt. Teying to stop the adoption of cross-com partment communication sas hopeless as neawing the anghow. Instead, lees encoureit and reward it Confident competeot cnimandersfesed ‘on building ais that can win wil allow us eo exploit the technology we hve lend pid fortune for and chats curently producing only fac tion ofits potential,BD The Sing ache Sine Paton A sod it tp in manning he esi fur ito caution ofourfen oes ped encore acts Sse nd the "ha ences Ie eeing wiht aoe th putea cen mus inmene heme in bak ee ching ence at eck wunderand tip oonen ea “Ths nr ea chemo apie aioe oa, lea ing ude per hana agora ee fico Thr anetrly nr ear DOD relics wee crate eplonton of im che or peo inthe so eee ‘hse Font, DOD aay ls at ete a ‘nae cdstoniniornesipirhreouie rng he ay pure tht path ter dn pnng smn one Foerin bie onsjonesat verre isa ly an cet pr of coming an eave don iar. cmplenent dence cen ae ceasing the exerec ue evel vntat disor seg ek mon imporan pie nef locas anand Ie a es et cose a cng tly We sh vorp ‘hn peat an nace dpe “hiss ater il nao freight conbunconmandandcie stale Ourpeted tne wponaceh sero let ema = ipo eon prs at tris Bones onto many ya only fa ee Cane a he ier ich dation by edn te hetero poe spnton the igh eats The ol way drape hectare dno hve Ths vl the lyf ao pie fee wh sige it tour Tey med ha untnd hot wn Howe hoy A ut ed lip uth epee of roi second ‘eprint wring ac and cnning tech coe Peis fmm syndy "Thee den ety na halen ening sccm hat hep manne weeny beg Inte ‘way thescienae of che day suppose each nee generation of arte we mist make today’s scence sepport oer efforts to uinderstand AGWY, its networks, nis success. Two new areas of scientific explain, chaoscomplexiy ad neework theory sek to understand the complex syste and networks {hat chacterize politic, exonomis soci and techni tracts ty They can be of genie help in understanding a GW enemy: Unfortunately our cucent thrust rowaed transformation ibased on Ulferent sciences, Rather than studying complex ystems as & whole, we stress he indivicl elements of each stem, We think that hy tacking those indvidoa elements, we can build common operational picture that allows ws a godlike wow of the fight, We have stated thatthe ad ‘ances in networks and sensors mean our information willbe so perfect that we can defy history and conta centaly Is based on the concept thar we can gather information, pass tp the chan of command, proces it, decide ona course of ation, and transmit tr the forces—before the siqution changes. Althougl ome of ou ieratuce clans we ate pushing devon mak ing down, the lle to change how we evaluate and promote personnel means the systems will simply be wed to continue the centralization that San inherenr par ofthe Department of Defense. This nthe antithesis of SQW and i seventy years behind AGW. We mus jet the concept of seking certsinny and instead fous on desing with the uncersiny tats inevitable in the veal world. Rater than seeking certainty we most ele understanding of patterns and how expert Aecsion makers we those patterns in cognitions decision making. De- spite ourcurent carer pth nd ethical approaches to dekons r= faze i an aren for experts, not amateurs, We mt revie our personel systen to ensure that re devel thos experts then we nee to tum toc ences that can help dhem deal wit the uncertain, complet, and chaos ‘hey wil fie as an inherent par of human confi, chaer "The fist new science we nee to sty x chaos theory, or compli This relatively new siete concept—one tha supportsa Clausewitzean24 The Sen and the Sone swf lyre 2020 Chan hy state taconpley ‘mut mith a: et ‘oyu summed thehaercaepnie tain St apie wig Ch mim) my thanesorm in Wednytn, Dy rae ane sped ‘wether ge change pe) mens Some des ofthe hp ht evenly wil elope aerator coronas echo Cane thet necan disretihnuisnes cae a Siglo etn en Crile net hone he soir ahs a Meri angulation a ny alae hangs inonnshighalc nc menu cocy epee cof the output. - “Torey of chats come moe ‘Tope the ech wih suc onn Wate pea have tomenitr ey bites hot and at ody twin China Furth we moa have to deanine whenteene thin” oon Utrtuna hee hs cones We cannot even be certain we have picked precisely the right tine to ‘measure initial conditions. Is it any wonder nur meteorologists tl get surprises ‘Chaos theory ecogies Clausewitz view of war as an ineeibly come plexsytem and therefore basically chaotic. Miltary profesional mast on es Caso, idl, Caton, Bree, 2 Cabos, Aru, {Cena Tneligene Agency, 229 Centr Comaites of Chinese ‘Communise Paty ste peasant iefense ite on conadinatd wane segs 8 Cen Highars 62 Chamberlin, Nelle 26 ‘Chechnya, 4 136,32 Chane 09 (Chae 288-287 (Che Geers, 77 Chemical Belo ecdene Response Rone, 269.270, 277Chen Boge Ray Ck an KS Se ang shi Chinas 232 a {estan ofa emperor 4 28 2GW and 3GW crc ashast 2: GW cen 257-259 Cot Wan Gonna rertaton, 4 in Viena, 609 Mansi 448 Askcove by Naonais 45 tnkemery Youn Se 13 Chinese Comma 43 sJapance wag 3 Ciel Come, 47-48 hounding 3 fewer 33 ed Ay ery. fins gun te es $9 nga 33 hon 36 Chivas homing offense, 74 Gril Supp Teas 269 ‘Casey 51,58 leader 172,28 Chasez frm ows, 73 Giasewiseen age 37 Clint, resem, 129130 _scinaton po agit, 2 Sec onder hl Cade, 13 fale of Cap Davi al, nt enw. Coalion Povsionl Author 3 ain Comanche cope, 271 canis Party Ps) 92 Comarunce Managemen S70 onto o Foe 32 3,78 change of with US. city to Vistar (Cewsaderaztey stem, 271 (Cyberwas 225,272 ‘enti, 5 Davi, Gener R.G,57 Dayan Aske, 108 Damocati Front Paine), 92 Depart of Dt 202,208, “25,29 967-270 “H251 Seporto Ci ‘Ahories 29 colton ast 192 phasis on tanenation, bo wes entation webs 225 net of Home Sect 29,267.90 eings out WOM, 269 Desert Sor, 72,254 Diem Nge Di 63. Dien Ben Ph, 361,67 Di, Lawrences 74 Dosim, Addl Resi, 160, 168 Dope Los 171 Durnd Line, 159 Dae 156 Easter offensive, 1972,67 Eisenhower, President D. Di adsice ‘agsitst lind warin Asa, 253 Blestonic Her 36 E1Sahada, 4 Enasy bombings, 142,145 European Union, 34 Excite 196,288 F-22 (P/A22), 248,261,271 allan (Maldives) War 4 Fall, Berard, 60 64,68 Fal, 175,267 ara, 99,98,95, 105 Parva 135 Tih Genersion Wa 275,289 ‘Incision of 290-297 Fics Genestion Wr, dcusion of 163 int Gulf Was 4 Fst Indochina Wa, 59 “Vive clock allies’ 72 Faso theory of iesurgency 77,81 ris, 73 Weds ambos, 81 Fourth Gonerstion Wa, kfininon of, 2,208 Ina ramtion 9 AGW. ‘pecs eve 215219 zinirations, 21 palace 211-215 Tet eve 208-211 (be ee, 319-221 fimelines 221 US loses to SGV opponens, 3 eal, Genera ery, 73-174 Feidan, Thomas 36 Fach 24 “ny tis 1986, 19 German defeat of 24 sn tna 58 seth ate, 30 Fre preparation, 26 Shady oF WAU French Revolution, 13,1718 Fecch Union Taree 39 FSIS, 700.81 Gaede, Genel, 27 Garsta,John, ‘Gara Sip 89,90, 27 Geneva Arsorde nF 1954.59 Germany Ary 28-29 Gian. Yo Nae, 566,74 ‘Ghibal Waror Terr, Golae Heights, 115 Google, 267-258 Gree 18 Groengene, 35, 39-40 ‘Guantan Bega, 270 (Govern, Genel ans, 23 Hava 19 Horns 114,117,119 Hayden, Liestanan Gener H, 57 Hebron 124,126 Haan Cin, 10,162 Herb 120,208 Hera 135,168 fl 26 Hide Mami 162 och Ninn, 129 ‘Ades o Second Nation ‘Congres 33 Aik to Td Nariona Congress, 6 agate emis, 56 Eisen bese any fae ‘ngene 68 interatonal propaganda, 65 ‘neta pote se tony tks post Os,69 pes trmeges 8 pete 7 “lets oder Pance and tists the pes fing 9, a Hout of Sau, 148 HUMINT, 25,268 scion o 264-267 Lous King ot odan 107 Hsin Sa, 118,158, 260 TBM 3hs-2081d ALA attach, 175 Indonesia 14, 256 Information dominance, Tner-Agency Board, 280, Innereationa Atomic Energy ‘Baer 33 Inerstonsl Bank for Reconstr: ‘on and Development, 33 Inceratonal Commie Ban Landmines, 0 Insenatonal Monetary Fund, 38, Ifa, ‘stair daring, 107 fanabil, 99-100 resages 1 target audiences, 104 107-108 leadership, 10 sarc, 89 Iranian Revolution 4 Iran 168,251-252 Tran-eag Wag, esq 23,7, 15,224,227, 230, ‘Kiedish contol ate, 182 roll i scl asin Sada, 191, "2 US Fare to ecogrize ne ney 172 174 Ina Defers Core 176 Wah Reps Army, 193 Ion Trg 62 ‘imi Aton Commie, 135 ami fh 97 lean Wi sa Ist Ars, 9 Int Defense Force, 90, 105-105 Tet dine oppose Onl 14 the Bris, 1920, 185 lear rom Int, 185 setterents, increase fo, 121 sect road, 118,128 Se of 128 Subsidies to, 12b span, 253 Jerse, 90-91, 114 ‘xpunion of Jewish popubtion, tas ang Jicshi (Chiang Ki-Sheo 45, 50 Joint Vision 2010, 6 ducssion 6-7 Jone Vision 2020, 6,8, 205-206, 225,232,246 Jordasian option, 107 Justice Department 29 Karachi, 142 Khan, Pince Daud, 158 Kan, imal 268, 170 Kara government, 2170-171 hres, Hamil 163,171 Khabar Towers, 140,142 Khrshches Nita, 78 hymen 69 Koran Wr, KPb. 175 Keulah, General Chres,277 Laban, Majid, 90 aban, Mohamed, 90,99 Yahor “soverment ni to mest ‘Oslo eins, 14 Paty of rae, 107, 109 etry a Trae elections, 113 Laurence, Joh, 72 League of Nations Mandate, I, 180 Lebason,3,97, 120,284 Twin Moni 145 Liberator halogy 8485 87 Utne ‘Blue tabaon, 97 ‘am power nde? Nonny 4 setumn power ander Shar, 20 support for West Bask Tousings 1 seinen! supp ie "Arf Paty, 107, 109,12 ss oppeiin party 14 Lind, Bu 12,14 Long Math 50-5 Kon Doce The Twelve, 83 Toga ig 164 Taser tensive, 28 Maras 16 Main 18 Magn Lin, 24, 26,287 Malis ‘Maldives Wor Ser Faas War Mao Toe Tung, 3129, 05 Army commande 46 ‘Aum gros commander, 49 ih inthe pena, 46 ‘ete Commitee 47 Comes power #547 ‘Snsfiates poe. 51 fant, 4 ‘olution of eeltonsey hg? on hor toward pes ‘on compromise, 74 ‘ conentonal forces, 52,54 ‘exten ene 53,63, fo heal foes, 47 fm egmsing om phase II, 63 tn pole mobietion, 51 cee meant) ei alo 124 Nails, 160, 165 excite 162Napoleonic Ware, 17-18 Nationalist Chinese, 45 ‘An Baslt Campaigns 9,50 scan contol of China 45 the of Blckade and ion Nevrre, General 59-61 Navebeada, Zahir murder of, 170 [Netayat, Buaamin, 112, 16 Tons of 199 ection, HS postion to Palestina st, 18 eto ope in 1996, 114 fist to al Aga msque, 115 Nera 5,226 etwotk Centric Warr, 6,195, 26, 232,285 coon of 7,191 Nenworhing discon, 275 Nisan Managa eatquake, 80 [Nicaraguan National Cuz, 6, 78.79, 84 ‘sefeats Sandinists Moin, St Northern Allance (Afghanistan), 160, 1-164 [North American Fee Tae Aso- ‘duion (NAFTA), 34 [North Kore, 228, 249-251 dicen Major General Ras 173, Otis of Taner, 246 (Operation agi Fre, 4,254, 363 ‘Operation Peace for Gale, 105, 20 Oplan Boje, 1 Grego, Humber 81, 85 ‘Ses he tin iy 82 ‘oops opposition, $3 once Pee accords signing 110, 122 segosiation, olin of Onsman Erie Panes 180-182 Paka, 256-257 Thtee Seige Ineligene, 239 perations i the wal aes, 0 ‘pon to Tale, 162 ak radian confi, 162 Paetne Libertion Organization 1090 in Tons, 90,98 srsundertaning the hii neon Palestine Manat, 93, Pate, 14 ‘arial uons, 98 Bprbrate setey 23 decanton of dependence, a spor 1955+ Hanis 9-100 fardline pose Os, 112 neal cree, 98-99 ‘esas ding Iii, 10, 07108 on destuction of fel, 126 Prine Miner Mabou Ab- ts, 92,126 sec eree, 98 ere nto, 95-96 ‘erie onaniainn, (22 Stage aprench ding Taiad 107 suicide bombing 14,120 12, Poe sil of 123-124 Udenround, 34 rome groups 98 Pane Divisions, 23, Corp, 34 “ae leaders, 155 Poses teestance to Northern ‘Alliance, reno 155 veace wth bono Peoples Democratic Party of ‘fgtanistan, 158 People aeration Army; 253, ise ivions, 253 Peoples War in China, 6, 52.54 In Nira, 79. Viena, 55,59, 68,75 Peramncl peters bureucatie ‘pps 254 236, Phipps, 233,256, Phipines Atines Pgh 84 Tombing of 1 Boland, 23-24 Posh Ary 23 Ppulae Front (Palestine). 92 Popelation gee, 43 Pins Comars 208 Present! Desiion Ditetve 56 (PDS), 229-201 Prercted Wr, 74 Provincial Resoastraction Teas TeH130 pUK.US i ang, 258-259, Gig Donny Rabin, Prine Minter Vitaky 14 Rast Present ie, 2 Raala 124 Rid, Richa shoe bomen 12 Reno in Miltary Amis 7,222 Roly Capea, 27 Rome, 18 Ronde, D.S Root Sereary af War Eh, 233- 2 ozs Secretary Dona 173- irs ane Dacae Ahn bores, 157 Scie Alghan trator, 157 Ray apanee Wit, 22,44 Sundin 414 ‘efest a National Guard 86 ‘solution of Mao ste 76 fending of, 78: TSUN 76 Toki prey id 80 lacof a coherent message, 79 foun of, 76 Mains ‘Memage 1 US. Congress 85 ‘pew nd Fe nesnar, 8 fies in DC and NYC, 85 rasan based uprising, 79 peoples wi 78 vei (thinly), 81-82 tran esurgeney 77.79 Saudi Abin 2 Saudis sempet asssinat i Tren, 138 onder bin Laden home, 198 “ect bin Laden's oer 0 d= Tend kingdom, 133, 43 Schoomals, General Peter 268, 270, Ssual Generation War Tacuson of 20-22 time to vole, 22.32 Sexo Trdchina Wat 67 Seoul 250251 Serb, 196 Sha Ahmed, 136 Shan Zahir King of Afghanistan, 1si-58‘Sharon, Ase, 12 Ties 37 eon pie mites, 127 “facts on the ground’ 113 Foreign minister 115 owing mine, 13-214 King ofthe ste, parchae of home in Jerse, ny ted withdrawal fom Gans, 127 viseto al Ags mosque, 119 Sharp, Admiral 0.8, 37 ‘Shabba refage cap 95 Sissi Pena, Sieg. 24 Somali 200,263,267 se of el panes, 197 sec of mast medi, 200 Somalis 3,134, 181,197,200 Somme 28 Some, Anas, 77 ‘shnounces deacon of San- Minis, 78,81 South Afi, 22,121 South Kose, 250-251 Soviets, ‘Aighanistan invasion, 158, mp opi Ahan, 159 Maosst-Leinis view of China, 5 onderedesive aginst Chie ese cies 49 scorched eth pli “Aighaistan 159 vital fom Afghanistan, 160 ‘Al-Qaeda sacks 2 ‘export ttn bombs, 202 Special Operstions Forces, 265 Steganography 198 dete ot Home 252 “Supermarket 36-37 Sudan, 256, Summers, Colonel Hany 56,73 ‘Tai, 252,253 Tajke Teno 155 bine, 160 Taliban 2, 4,256 moves int Afghanistan, 161 songence in 2002, 165 evento ta tal ates takes Kabul, 162 texted Aghanbean, 16 “Task, Nur Mobammed, 158 “Taylor Feedesck, 235 “Teehncal Escort Uni, 270 ‘Tectia Suppor Wesking Group, 280 “Tel Aig 128 “Temple Ment, 115 “Terncst Treat Itention Cone, 2 7,58, 64,69 chang to alince offre, 65 presen Te, 70-72 “Thatand, 256 ‘Theory of entanglement, Aries, 05, ‘Thin! Generation War, 31 ‘definition of3 ‘evelopment of 24-28 time tent, 32 ‘often, 1011, 18 Tog 77 ‘Tox industrial Chemial/Matr- ths (TICTIM), 27 “Teasformation Planing ‘Guidance, 68, 206, 225,285 guidance on antaccess 261 ‘Transional Adminsrative Laws "rag 176,182 ‘Teasiioal Autry Alglunistan, 164 “Tantioal blame Sete of ‘Aighrisean, 108 ‘Treaty of Vers, 25 “Tanta? Tks? Unitod Nationa! Commands Pale fie, 92, 99-100| Sonya oF 101 Imo enes, 102 United Neon Baga Devin Beadgees armbar ofmenbers, 3 reoltion 181,95, revlon 202,102 ‘elution $38, 102-108 United States Ci Wa Unrestriced Warf", 258259 US Any Jone Reatiness Taig, ‘Gein 340 USS Cole hombing of 12, 148 USSR, 5.18 USS Sulu, attemped bombing, 1 rhc 155,168 an Creal, Mato, 12-13, “Transformation of Wa, 12 ‘Thug + Gis Day, 12 Veadun, ie Mii, 59,6 Weta, 3,227, 282,254 Vietnamese (Corman Pary $9 Easter offensive 67 Seven National Congres, 59 Spring ffmsive of 197567 ‘Third National Congeny S1 Woghctein, Colonel oa, 86,87 Wal version f am, 16 mos Wang Xiangp, 258-259 Wart 23 Wren 18,21, 43 Wiles Mas, 235 Wester, General Wiliam, 72 Wert Bal 4,107, 113-115, 126 secement 127 trate ening, 125 Wilkos, Gary. 12,14 Woltote, Dept Sertary as 173 World Bank (orernatonat Bank far Reconstruction and Deeley ne), 33-34 World ani Font, 140, 188 World Trade Center, 134, L112 Weide Onin 0 ‘esis, 25 ray 180 mer aii, 25 Wye River Conference, MS Yah, 196, 287,288 Yun Yui Chi Chin (Guerrila Waste), ‘sr huey 6The Sling and The Stone ON WAR IN THE 21st CENTURY “Bureau, chnert and “ld Cop osonay,beware—TX, Hamme! pew book on| leuth-geraton warfare hat someting oleae fo le you He mot igh vodng, bo shold gol he op ote US. 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