PRESENTATION ON

SAFETY IN PROCESS PLANTS

IN REFINERY SECTOR
Organized by:

PetroFed

By
Dhananjoy Ghosh
GM (Operations), NRL

CONTENT

Unsafe Incidents in Indian Oil & Gas Industries

Commitment to Process Safety

Understand & Manage Risk

Safety Steps in Process Plant

Failure in Process Plants- Experiences

Conclusion

UNSAFE INCIDENTS IN OIL & GAS INDUSTRIES

(2004-05 to 2008-09)
FATALITY:
TOTAL: 164 NOS.
E&P-72, REFINER & GP-58, PIPELINES-10, MRKT-24.
FIRE INCIDIENTS:
TOTAL: 101 NOS.
E&P-51, REFINERY &GP-22, PIPELINES-13, MRKT-15
IT IS SAID THAT TREND WAS SAME IN 09-10, RATHER ONE
MAJOR FIRE & FATALITY OCCURRED IN JOYPUR KNOWN TO
ALL.

(Ref: Analysis of major incidents in Oil & Gas Industries 2004-09 by OISD )

UNSAFE INCIDENTS IN OIL & GAS INDUSTRIES

(2004-05 to 2008-09)
TYPES OF FATALITIES IN REFINERY & GP SECTOR:
-14 NOS DURING MAINTENANCE/PROJECT EXCUTION.
-21 NOS. DURING WORKING IN HEIGHT.
-7 NOS. DUE TO EXPOSURE OF TOXIC GAS.
-16 NOS. DUE TO FIRE & OTHER INCIDENTS

EQUIP FAILURE & MISCREANT ACTS CAUSED 45% & HUMAN

ERROR- 50% OF WHICH 67% WAS ON NON ADHERENCE TO SOP.

COMMITMENT TO PROCESS SAFETY

TO CREATE GOOD RECORD OF LESS/NO UNSAFE
INSIDENT, WE NEED COMMITMENT AS FOLLOWS:
1.

PROCESS SAFETY CULTURE:

COMBINED ALL LEVELS IN THE ORGANIZATION CONTRIBUTE
TO A CULTURE OF SAFETY.

2.

COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS:

OISD STANDARDS ON DESIGN & LAYOUT, OPERATING
PRACTICES, MAINTENANCE & INSPECTION, ENVIRONMENT
PROTECTION, SAFETY & FIRE PROTECTION, ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENTS & FACILITIES, E&P ACTIVITIES, TRAINING &
DEVELOPMENTS, AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS.

3.

WORKFORCE INVOLVEMENT:
SECTION GIVES GUIDANCE TO USE KNOWLEDGE OF PEOPLE
CLOSE TO PROCESS.

COMMITMENT TO PROCESS SAFETY

4.

STAKEHOLDER OUTREACH:
DEVELOP RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMUNITY AND OTHER
STAKEHOLDERS.

5.

PROCESS SAFETY COMPETENCY:

MANAGE CHANGES PROPERLY & SEE RESOURCES &
KNOWLEDGE ARE NOT LOST.

WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE RISK OF A PROCESS PLANT

AND MANAGE THE RISK IN COMENSURATE OUR COMMITMENT
TO PROCESS SAFETY AS MENTIONED ABOVE.

UNDERSTAND AND MANAGE RISK

UNDERSTAND RISK:

PROCESS KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT.

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION & RISK ANALYSIS.

MANAGE RISK:

STRICT ADHERENCE TO OPERATING PROCESURE.

SAFE WORKING PRACTICES.
ASSET INTEGRITY & RELIABILITY.
CONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT.
TRAINING & PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE.
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE.
OPERATIONAL READINESS.
DAY TO DAY OPERATION.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT.

SAFETY STEPS IN PROCESS PLANT

TECHNOLOGY SELECTION:

- PROVEN TRACK RECORD OF SAFETY TO BE ENSURED.

RISK ASSESMENT STUDY:

-

TO BE CARRIED OUT BY AUTHORISED AGENCY.

DESIGN & ENGINEERING STAGE:

-

MAKE A CHECK LIST FOR HAZOP STUDY IN P&ID REVIEW.

(INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM REFINING, JULY09 MAY BE
REFFERED AS A CAPSULE/READY RECKONER)

Contd-

SAFETY STEPS IN PROCESS PLANT

-

REFER OISD STDS

106, 109, 111, 118, 163, 178 FOR PROCESS & INSTALLATION.
RESPECTIVE ASME, NACE, API, ASTM, BIS, IBR
GUIDELINES TO BE FOLLOWED FOR MECH. ENGG. POINT
OF VIEW.
110, 113, 149, 173, 180 FOR ELECTRICAL POINT OF VIEW.
152 FOR INSTRUMENT POINT OF VIEW; PRESENTLY FOR
MAXIMUM SAFETY, IEC 61511 WITH SIL RECOMMENDATION,
IEC 60079, ANSI/ ISA-91.00.01-2001, ANSI/ ISA-TR99.00.012007, ANSI/ ISA-18.2-2007, ANSI/ ISA-61010-1 (82.02.01)-2004,
ISA-TR84.00.07-2010, ISA-TR98.00.02-2007 SHOULD BE
REFERRED MOST OF WHICH ARE ADVISED TO FOLLOW AS
PER OISD 152.
166, 200, 196, 197 FOR ENVIRONMENT POINT OF VIEW.

SAFETY STEPS IN PROCESS PLANT

PROJECT EXECUTION:
-

OISD STD 105, SP 70 (BIS) & NFPA CODES TO FOLLOW.

CERTIFIED OHSA AND QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN,

PROVEN SAFETY TRACK RECORD TO BE ENSURED.

EXECUTION IN 5 FORMAT STAGES IS MUST.

SAFETY ORGANOGRAM TO BE ENSURED.

DAILY SAFETY PLAN TO BE FOCUSSED.

MANAGEMENT SAFETY REVIEW TO BE DONE.

SAFETY STEPS IN PROCESS PLANT

PLANT OPERATION:
-

OPERATING & POCKET MANNUALS TO BE FOLLOWED.

CHECK LIST FOR START UP, SHUTDOWN, KNOWN

EMERGENCY HANDLING TO BE AVAILABLE.

APPROVAL SYSTEM TO BE IN PLACE FOR BYPASSING

INTERLOCK.
-

ADEQUACY OF COMMUNICATION, ILLUMINATION.

ADHERENCE TO WORK PERMIT SYSTEM.

CHECK LIST & OBSERVE CRITICAL EQUIPMENTS.

SAFETY TOUR OF UNITS AT COMBINED LEVELS.

MANAGEMENT SAFETY REVIEW TO BE IN PLACE.

PPE COMPLIANCE.

ANY SAFETY

SAFETY STEPS IN PROCESS PLANT

PLANT MAINTENANCE & INSPECTION:

-

OISD STANDARDS FOR ROTARY & STATIONARY

EQUIPMENTS TO BE FOLLOWED.

OISD STANDARD 153 TO BE FOLLOWED FOR INSTRUMENTS.

OISD STANDARDS 137, 147, 148 FOR ELECTRICAL TO BE

FOLLOWED.

OISD STANDARS 164 FOR FIREPROOFING, AND 170 FOR

PIPE RACKS & TRACKS TO BE FOLLWOED BY CIVIL
MAINTENANCE.

MAKE SMALL CKECK LISTS FOR DAILY MONITORING OF

CRITICAL EQUIPMENTS.

ADHERENCE TO WORK PERMIT SYSTEM.

PPE COMPLIANCE.

REFER MSDS TO HANDLE CHEMICALS.

FAILURE IN PROCESS PLANT-EXPERIENCES

FURNACE TUBE LEAK:
IF ONLY SMOKY LEAKAGE, COIL PURGING STEAM CAN BE
USED; FOR LQUID FIRE LEAK, NEVER USE COIL PURGING
STEAM TILL BOX COOLED DOWN AFTER SHUTTING.
FURNACE TUBE COKE UP:
IGNORING HIGHER SKIN TEMP, AS PASS FLOW SHOWED HIGHER.
WHEN BOTH SHOW HIGH VALUE, DOUBT FLOW
NOT TEMP, WHEN
BOTH SHOW LOW VALUE DOUBT TEMP
NOT FLOW IN FURNACES.
-

OIL INGRESS INTO COIL PURGING STEAM PASSING CHECK

VALVE RESULTING IN OIL INGRESS INTO BURNER
ATOMISING, PURGING STEAM AND BOX FIRING WITHOUT
CONTROL.

BEFORE OPENING COIL PURGING STEAM ENSURE ITS

PRESSURE IS HIGHER THAN COIL PRESSURE.

FAILURE IN PROCESS PLANT-EXPERIENCES

FURNACE BOX EXPLOSION WHILE IGNITING BURNER:
ENSURE PILOT GAS BURNER LIGHTING BEFORE MAIN
INSTALL BLOCK AND BLEED IN FUEL GAS
HEADER.

BURNER.

FIRE IN CLOUMN BOTTOM HEAVY FLIUD PUMP:

USE SPRINKLER SYSTEM AS PER OISD GUIDELINES;
INSTALL
SHUTDOWN C/V AT PUMP SUCTION BUT AT A LONG DISTANCE FROM
PUMP SUCTION. DONT
EXTINGUISH FROM CLOSE DISTANCE.
FIRE IN LIGHT FLUID PUMP BY VAPOR CLOUD IGNITION:
IN ANY FIRE , ISOLATING SOURCE IS MUST. ENSURE
SAFETY SYSTEM IN MECH SEAL OF PUMP.
OIL INGRESS IN STEAM CKT, AIR/OIL IN N2 CKT:
DUE TO HOSE/TEMPORARY CONNECTION.
ESTABLISH APPROVAL FOR THIS KIND OF ROUTINE

API PLAN

JOBS.

FAILURE IN PROCESS PLANT-EXPERIENCES

RUPTURE IN VACUUM HEATER OUTLET THERMOWELL:
INSTALL INCLINED INSTEAD OF 90 DEGREE WITH FLOW AND WITH
RIGHT METULLARGY.
AVOID AIR INGRESS THRO VAC. COLUMN BOTTOM LT:
IF INSTALLED OUTSIDE, AVOID CORROSION THROUGH
SCHEDULED INSPECTION. USE STEAM FLUSHING OF
INSTRUMENT, IF NECESSARY.
EXPLOSION IN HYDROGEN COMPRESSOR OR PIPELINE:
DONT TRY TO TIGHT THE LEAK; PURGE OUT WITH
NITROGEN, THEN TIGHT.
-

FOR UNIT COMMISSIONING, TO SAVE TIME,

PRESSURISE
SYSTEM IN MIX WITH 50% NITROGEN; IN SUCH CASE, FOR MINOR
LEAK, TIGHTENING MAY BE CONSIDERED FOR APPROVAL.

FAILURE IN PROCESS PLANT-EXPERIENCES

TEMP EXCURSION IN HYDROCRACKER:

ONLY ONE TEMP INDICATION WAS HIGH WHILE &
DUBTED TO
CHECK BY MAINTENANCE AS ALL OTHER
INDICATIONS WERE OK.
DELAY IN OPENING EMMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION VALVE DUE TO
THIS CAUSED DAMAGE TO CATALYST AND REACTOR
INTERNALS.
REPLACING MANUAL OPERATED EMMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION
VALVE BY AUTOMATIC
EMMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION VALVE
(ADC). BUT ADC FAILED IN TWO REFINERIES IN INDIA.
CHECK PROVEN TRACK RECORD BEFORE CHANGING
TO ADC.

FAILURE IN PROCESS PLANT-EXPERIENCES

DAMAGE OF GRID PLATE IN CCR:
DUE TO AIR INGRESS INTO NITROGEN CIRCUIT DUE TO NON
AVAILABILITY OF BLOCK & BLEED ARRANGEMENT
IN NITROGEN
HEADER WITH OXYGEN ANALYSER
FAILURE IN FCC PLANT:
VARIOUS UNSAFE INCIDENCE/FIRE TOOK PLACE DUE
TO NON
ADEQUACY OF EMMERGENCY INTERLOCK
SYSTEM.
ESTABLISH UPDATED INTERLOCK SYSTEM
COMMENSURATE
WITH ASSIGNED SIL AS PER ISA.

CONCLUSION
FROM THE FAILURE ANALYSIS DISCUSSED SO FAR, IT IS
ESTABLISHED THAT MAJORITY INCIDENTS OCCURRED
MOSTLY DUE TO HUMAN ERROR WHICH IS SUPPORTED
BY OISD DATA ALSO AS DISCUSSED EARLIER.
LET US BE DECIPLINED TO AVOID HUMAN ERROR AND
LET SYSTEM IN PLACE.
LET US LEARN FROM EVERY INVESTIGATION.
WHEN WE LEAVE HOME FOR GOING TO PLANT, LET US
THINK THAT OUR BELOVED ARE WAITING FOR US TO
RETURN.

THANK YOU