2 _ A Perfect Failure. The Bay of Pigs pe Kenedy viniraions Bay of Tig Sea ranks amore the worst The Kenny petal y 8 OR rt Planted by 39 ise Peer gap of AMET eo had ite reams pence in many PALE ‘lace smal Deke neato secreonnbeae a sth the ultimate ai of overtone vedo bea erie faire?” The BOND fneladed some of te On ‘overnment etallthe ma exigent eas eta 0 te anes. mage mene nag ins supporting ne Dia Wee der tthe outset ane aed nis fared adventure” vay hie fre ivan wa HESS John F. Ken: ety nan plea opponent Richard Mt Rs VieePreident dure na ein, NICE he United Sats the Ee resend ane BoD OC eet Coa Fh en ech 1960, atin 08 NOS President gti eahower directed the Cet Sees) 1 organi Sea Semone a re Cac areata eran Cast eran i engaein weer waa ereciaputalaree nue 1 gine PN veda serge fr aay svasion, APPA abate ln (Ot pecnveanto sues re ae Cob exes a asa bang of eee infor vee to cary out fulleae invasion. rout inoring re they could landA Peet Pare & ‘Two daysafter the inauguratonin January 196, President John .Ken- rndy and several lading members of his new administration were given 2 dealed briefing sbout the proposed invasion by Allen Dulles, head of the (CIA, and Geoeral Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Saft. During the next eighty dys, a core group of presidental advisers repeater dscussed this inherited plan Informally and in the mesings of an advisory committe that included thre Joint Chiefs of Staff. In early Apri 196, st ‘near the meetings with he Presisent, alte ey avers gave ther sper, to the CLA‘ invasion plan. Their deliberations led to afew modifiation of teal, such asthe choice ofthe invasion ste ‘On April 7, 1961 the brigade of about fourten hundred Cuban exes, sled th United Sates Navy, Air Force, and theCA, invaded heswampy oat of Cuba a the Bay of Pigs. Nothing went as planned. On the Fist, ‘ote ofthe four ships contaling reserve armmunitionand supplesartived; | there two were sunk bys fw planes in Castro's ore, and the other Wo ‘prompaly led. By the second day, the brigade was completely surrounded by twenty thousand troops of Castro's welhequipped army. By the third day, boutwelve hundred membersothe brigade, comprising almostallwhobad rot been Kile, were captured and ignominiusly ld off to prison camps, tn giving thelr ull approval, Presiden Kenedy, Dean Rusk, Rober ‘MeNamara, and othe igh Level policy-makers inthe United Stats govern~ ‘menthad asiumedthat “use of the exile brigade would make possible the t9p- pling of Casio without actual aggression by the United States." The Presi- ‘eats main advises ceraialy dd nt expec such an overwhelming wlan tdaster- Nor dd they antieipate thatthe United States government sate to disclaim responsibility forthe iil alr assault Would be thoroughly ‘asrelted, that fend Latin American counties would be otraged, th Dproertmectngt would beheld inthe United States and throughout the werld “tDdenounce the Unite Stats for its egal acts of aggression against ay ‘eihbor, that intellectuals who had regarded the new admiration with Inopes woul express disaffection in sarcastic telegrams ("Nixon oF Dotsitmake any diference?”),or that Europeanalesand Unted Bs statesmen would join in condemaation. None of them guessed that tive invasion would encourage a miltary rapprochement betwen andthe Soviet ade, culminating ina deal tose upinstllations aly files from United States shores equipped with nuclear bombs and Jes and manned by morethan five hovsand Soveroops, ansorany thin eighteen months toa powerful military base asastelit ofthe Union Had the President and bis policy advisers imagined that his sh snaro would materiale (or had the even considered uct an tobe a calculated sk, they undoubtedly would have rejected the asco plan. are given a vivid picture ofthe Presidents reactions in Sorensen’s scescibed bya New York Times teviewer a "he nearest thing we othe memoirs Kenedy intended to write.” When the fstEEE we repon revel HOW WOE NSD TS na been, President KER neue Permaned, ASB DEM ES xpath es he a5 ED” ney ean eat ea: HES tg sane tought he kad 3D ea common WA EO fat approved. “HOW rove Ba eens upc te SON hank Sorensen WTO; utara etter ESE the same gues a 8S Ba se ofthe Kennedy 08+ nininratn, recaleg hat on sameness TaN the Bayo! Pies 2 a fehgojre wet aharci opto cre ine serait ine way, iF 08 WOE, we ee vera days! Aen rege net TI CN ee Defense McNamara a pt the gerne SED Fs sal sate that etl ft the Garg whic, SOT havea ne Sein aking TO Quatcations of the core mbes of the ‘advisory sr0UP eran etn TE oes suited «eWay 05 Ug Pet Sodaments The core tek of Kenedy eam wHOWETEDTLCE cet Nanvesion plan uted thre cabinet see meno We chute ve wel guaiied to make SOI yea of te prosandicons of a or anni Te mae or of Se ha roa Sonn F- Kennedy Gh Scene nnn gonna ease ea ni eiepood ideas andsound ABE” i ecred in policy TARDE Loh eae Deparment unde Dest ANSE Sratesbead of eo woe etc te ee ation. Daring the Truman on Run became ean Pee sation. Pere aronginvenee O82 A St imporant deiionseoo- seg ed anes foreign OBE! 8 ing Uni mr, he Seceayof DEN snexper sais ion worked bis way upto tbe Preise Yrenjoyed atoweringrepaion| spree aiance ancl He ete wh personal incenssy- Ear tees he had been ontheA Pej Fine » uty ofthe Harvard Busnes School Later he develope his experts inthe ‘atisialcontolunt ofthe Unite Sates Air Force, where helped to work ‘ut sucessful stem for surveillance and contol to facltate decision ‘making about below of materials and production. During his yearsat Ford Motor Company, MeNamarahad also devised new techniques for improving rational methods of decision-making. “Ten, to, thre was Rober Kennedy, the Attorney General, one ofthe ‘mos influential members of the Presidents team. According fo his lose ‘Booval theyovernnent the President's other wana righ Youngman ‘those strengths far outweighed his weaknesses. The Attorney General had ‘eon briefed on the invasion plan from the begining. He did ot attend the ‘ne seriesof formal meetings o the advisory commit: but was brought it Asan active participant abou four o ive days before the President madehis final deiton, Dung that week, according to his memorandum dictated sik seeks lee," alendedsomemestinge at the Wbite House. Afterwards sai ‘that thoapht that. -basedon theinformation hat had been given thererealy wasnt any alternative to aceepting it." On on ccs on durngthat sme racial week, he wed his personal influence to suppres ‘opposition to theCIA plan ‘Aso on handvas McGeorge Bundy, the Presidents Specs Assisan for ‘Natioal Security Affair, who hadtherank ofacabinet member. Akey man ‘bn Kennedy's White House team, Bundy was one ofthe leading intellectuals Imported to Washingion from Harvard Universi, where head been Dean Gf sand Scieees, His background in decision making was not lite {he problems of ea nivrsty earlier in his earect, asa scholar, he had ade aclore dy of Secretary of Stale Acheson's decisions. “The White House al leo included Arthur Schlesinger, Je. an out standig Harvarohisorian whom the President asked toaitendall he Whit ewings onthe invasion plan, and Rickard Goodwin, anoter Har man of uncommon inelignce.” Goodwin didnot attend the policy. ‘making mectingsbut was informed about the invasion pan, discussed it fe- erly mith Schlesinger, and conferred with Rusk and others during the preceding the final decison “The Presiden esked five of thst membersofhiscoreproup toon White House meetings of the ad hoc advisory commitecon the Cuban onplan. Athesemectings, Keane's advisers fund themselves face ee With thee Joint Chiels of Sal, in fal, medaled regalia. These men vere carry-overs from the Ekeshower admintration: the dlbeations, they remained quite decached (rom the Ken: Also present tthe mestng ofthe advisory commie were five bad iy close esto he President andismain advisers. Trot ace pricipans were the director and depuy decor ofthe CIA, ad Richard Bisel, They, oo, were carry-overs fom the aiinistration, bot President Kennedy and hs iner cre {member ofthe new aminsration’s eam According (0ree Kenedy meine a EO Opa ren Kennel ue oe Ho ete ero ae De MNA Poss Fas » Roger Hilsman lirctor ofthe ntligence branch ofthe State Department), ‘Bisel asa brillant economist and yoverament executive whom President ‘Kennedy nad known for ears and so mired and respected that be would ‘very probably hive made him Director of the CIA whes Dulles eventually {etre Bil was the most active advocate ofthe CIA plan is eloquent prestnitions di the mai ob of convincing the conferees accep it “Thre other: who participated nthe White House metings 3s members ofthe advisory comminee were exceptionally well qualified to appraise the pola conseqcences ofthe invasin: Thomas C. Mann assist secretary ‘of sate for Inte-Amerian afalrs; Adolph A. Bere, J chairman ofthe Latin American ask fore; and Paul Nite, assant secretary of defense, tnho ad formety bees the director of the policy planning sa athe State Department "The eroup that deliberated on the Bay of Pigs decison included men of consderablentalecalalent Like the President all he rain advisers were Sheva thinkers, capable of objeive, rational analysis, and accustomed 0 peaking thet minds. Dt cllectively they filed to detec the serious lawsin, fhe invasion pl ‘Six major miscalculations “ThePresiden and hiskey advsersapprovedthe Bay of Pigs invasion lan ‘onthe bai of six asiumplions, each of which was wrong, Inretrosped, the President's advisers coud st that even when they fst began to dius the ‘pln, sufficient information was avalableoindiete that ther assumption treme oo say. They could have obeaned and used thecrcial informa: ‘they had been more real and probing in uiiling heir advisory ros. “Assumption number I; No one wil know tht the United States was responsible orth invasion of Cuba. Most people wll believe te CIA over sory, ad skeptics can easly be refuted. President Kennedy was first old abou the plan by the CIA repesen- te lad down one frm stipulation: The United Sates armed forces not overt partiipatein an invasion of Cuba. He repeated this eten~ ton each ime the matter was dieused, He would not consid ac- the CIA's plan toute the armed Cuban brigade vnless cold be Assumed tha the United States government would not beheld respons lary attack agains its small neighbor. On the assimp it equirement could beet the plan was seen sa plden oppor byErhrow Casio, TheCasiroresinchad ben asurceofiration led States government, ven tg the Prevent and his adisers ide ita cet threat vo American secur.tn responseto spout the plan, Alen Dulles and ny Bae sued Kenney 208 a at all the word aha eth Coban sets were Yiaorsandexeut0r6 oF oul eer eyo tal Wal TE Pe vould ask com whe ip fact ta the Une SLE Prsieering the invasion. THE iy landed inthe gly Or cana eles woul be oe” 0N8 finspecactl i ip peliinary av aac sas. rend The only nos) part wot nord te wold en story. THE yal compiy whe bombing Of 0 2 a cs would be Bass of World Wart a merings Tey woudlonk ke ples se Presidents gestions Siorage, without any Un ee an cold sy ces BAST Cuban dee receding ie invasion rbecoreinresing aT ete ‘During the werk nat he cover sion) woul Sanger has eae the pla Sa before the invasion, Aselone what Tm reading cei eg The President's pres sects teen cover iar) OPE resent Kennedy compl Prshen otnee agentsove bere AI NG cane about apes Wsalidou oF Reeicannewsmentad Matte a re can aexas about ete min Umea eas mia a in Guatemala, what ae Bere agreed or MALT aeserbing Tos eae im co est emake CoO Yes, acorn 1° Setesines, Mo ok ol aroun a a soil pum “amet gt Une See i ok ak FS ‘he aetual Gehl: eal EN eget nani py mabe se old adage hate expect any sete FBO Pay mber of people ak inte hey never duced se OPN Thar secret at of ‘ary agarsion cscs poring country mi berevenel OF 08° nay arr hen Bean PN re se reg eared ane a it rer bn ey pacar whom RSvehAd Me te he Can exes poi owe ag Le our at sould) BONE casa pe CIA 03 upcaes 0a ‘Gin ad agreed vo aiow termsgnch air tacks esis members of raionin bison.” ned heated reasons for reveai {eachot nomad (iat in Guatemala whe bn fei ene), an onic i Nia ola aes co use Nicaraguan ait BASE anwed, Furthermore i ever oeasions BYE ‘icy making Fabright, ebarman oF ranean ha an nvason ale wo re the Unteastatesand wouldse i ain Amerian countsiesand Ewroneasri yl Ayte . membersof Kennedys advisory arovp fale to quetion the sisampion tht thesetet would not be revealed President Kennedy was So confide that he bly promisedt preseonferenceon Api 2, 1961 vedaysbforethe {evasion that “there will rot be, under any condtons, any intervention in {Cuba by Unite Sates armed forss and this Government wil do everthing it posstty can. (© make sure tha tere ate no Americans involved ac= tions inside Cuba. “The word id not mediately ler that he Fit invader toad on Cuban soi were infact, United States Navy frormen (in volation of the President's orders), but the United States nevertheless was blamed fet then ‘sion from he oust. The CIA’s cover try was icy orn oes By fepreventatve othe United Nations, was aso saerficed, despite President ‘Kennedy's solemn statement oisimimats nly afew day eal that “the Integrity and credibility of Aa Seveson conic one of our sea tional acts. dont want anything tobe done {inhaling the cover sy] whic might jeopardize thal. The truth having ben careful witefom fim, Stevenson solemnly dened Usted States complisiyinthbomtingsata tein ofthe United Nations General Asem Hi stement eri mesiately sen by foreign observer as inconsistent with news repos abou, theair attacks and were son labeled ough ies when some of Ri lene {aes were diproved twenty-four hours Ite by authentic photeraphs Sievenaon ate si tat hs was the mast humialing experience oso yes of public servic. Assumption number 2: The Cubana forces 30meffecua at can be knocked out completely jus before the invasion bens. ‘Te invasion pan called fra surprise attack by American bombers, which ‘Ould deroy Cao's air orceonthe ground befor the invaders roved in. ‘he conferersat he Whice House hough tha the obsolete B-26 used todo job would be able destroy Cuba's military planes. They di ot make cent Inquires o find out that these lumbering od panes would have eapablies and would fequentl developenginetrouble. The rst at GX was a surprise, but only a smal percentage of Cuba's planes was ‘Consequently, the invasion pln went airy at the outset because Cuban airforce wa able to aera control over telanding si, Cuban nig planes which verefastand efficient, preventedthefreigherscon- Ammunition and supplies (rom reaching ther destination. THe Sup ineffective Cuban aie frce sot dawn half of the American 3-26 1 protec the invaders and repeatedly bombedhe ground woops a, 0 shore lke by United States planes was called off by Fresident it would have revealed to clearly that the panes belonged States andthat he entre invasion waza unprovakedsttack by| second se srike had been APES OW tpt, caus tere rates, But even if Be swat dspace rabeeneventesetfective been vise and the Cubana OTE a Unite utd proba Songer any ee den iris amie 3. Toe fortes naned MeN pe high Moo ad ary Can ee pre jrom Ud Se 1000s: sn ge i i ir pat of ‘erthe Und Sates, President Kennedy el no die anes i ee memes nowt United States a ies were given 8 TO tha ora re the CHA representatives shat in the brigade of ‘Assumption ! Te United states Marine wo in ne invasion. Forte: ie Ui a efor te aC ey making 2080 18 he irae mages morale Of Ne he adit and beginning 10 rr Wastes the men were ata ST ben cto baig ee perma tne army oF NE Teasionary Rais at ith ance ans ome Ny een dicontent finaly Their wingnes tha Mr in a full MEY, 2 fone hem na prison ce dee? wich morale ofthe exe blgae ations of high morale mote that sons ofthe oust oth he fathers he CIA agents are che Guaerala june ‘ech wasthe *ontaly, ane ofthe mos 9 to President Kennedy and is Teaders ofthe Cuban © wen sons ha been boat isn be ations. ale th wea ng are oes t0 ack RN 1 i ein ook ples Ne Am wasted for ate DY NS hie oficial "propegand aig be unted Stas BOVE afi amr of AMETEA TOPE and co eiafree Sere oul bing her spies he oben ended and woureman mre ressuetne essayA Pete Pare a Assumption number 4: Castro's army isso weak that the sill Cuban brigade wil beable 10 establish o well protected beachhead. ‘Another question ‘requetl discussed by President Kennedy andhis advisers ‘war whether the small exe brigade could achieve its inal goal of ‘Stablishing «fem beachhead without United Sats mltary participation ‘Aasin, without leoking ito the evidence, the conferees accepted the op- timistepctre presented by Dalles and Bissell, who described Casro'sarmy a: poorly equipped, poorly trained, ide with disension, and wnable 19 Cope with even a smal-sale invasion, Thee arurances happened to be tivecty contrary 10 reports of Castros mary ssength by experts in the State Department and i the Bish Incigence Service. The CLA planners hove olgnore the experts reports, and Kennedy's policy advisers dd not purse their querions far enough to become aware of the conradictory atm, which sould have revealed the shakiness of the CIA's assump- “Ast turned out, Castro's army responded promptly and vigorously othe invasion, eventhough the invaders fought wel Arlt patrol guarding the Coutle because of the invasion alert, was on hand o shoo athe vanguard fof the invading force the Navy frogren sent out to mark the landing site ‘Soon age numbes of well-equipped Cuban troops were shling the Beach- ‘ead with 122 mm howitzers, 37 mm cannons and rocketdhrowes. Cuban trmored tanks beran moving in within one ay afer the invaderslandd. By the following date exile brigade was surrounded by twenty thousand well. quipped Cuban roops, backed up by more than (wo hundred thousand troops and miliren who could have been brought o bear if needed. Having rosy underestimated Castro's military eapabls, President Kennedy and hisaviers bated realize tha successful beachhead could ot be establishes in Cuba without a military force a least tenes larger thanthe oe they had areed to seni. According to Sorensen: "The Pres- {ext thought he was approving a plan rushed into execution on the grounds Castro woul later acquire the miliary epabity to defeat it. Casto, already posed that eapabilly.” “Asumption number 5: The invasion by the exile brigode mil ouch off “ahoiage bythe Cuban underground and ered uprisings behind theines “ha wl effectively support the invaders and probably lead fo the fop- pling of the Castro regi. fis askedby President Kennedy appraise the CLA’sinvason plans, Chiefs StafTarertedthat the chances forsuceesfullyeablising vers fvorable bat that ‘ulimate success would depend on szeate prising inside the sland oszeable support from outside. nirervnton was led out by the Presiden vciory wouldde- f resistance and prising behind thelns. A second ap- Joist Chiefs of Sa, justone month before the invasion, made plc. Without the support ofthe Cuban resistance, theyport here would Be #8) so overcome te bunaredsof thousands of epee aso’ army and mil i pough skeptical at fir abou, eyingon massasureion smn caso regne, Present Kennedy 60 ving orp by bis advs009 FOURS doubt wie, andneendels wae ng ess. SOT ANS se Pigs debacle, Neto SOT ie ad cell tour here was the Bayes ta ihe Taine here, withou overt United 2 ied Sn woulda te CO vot and oust Cast. a sana ey Senna closes 2s: Accord ene House onside ind he tines essential © “peas the operation: 39100 sa he se Chiefs tafe and 80," thovwght, aidthe CTA cA poke ad mi conferees int irene 8 3292 orstrong reason 1 Wa eon wie SMB se CIA pla. Alek not aang ear sl canine Shmost ently 10 the ideof the 3 Ba ces the Tose pan eh ea be crgaization nv than ee etna more TE tes eas tha CA concen ta ere requesting FEE BETS Longer events snow at tneasumption ofa cuban upsinay co ken, Alen Dulles the begining the 1A ce ch I a fac, he CA sc asa he ening MOO a of widespread bad op. Te el ad not ben asked Ten a ener ecg sent ne ec a ee cn set of the Site De Oe daly survellane: of th Gears in obs, asked 5 "aapmens, Mos of the PA pole nthe Whit House metings Ber ow the and simp 3 spent ned Dalian ein fultavhorty ofthe tht ens netignc bee) Uehind NET Se oS someofibeer| oa have st imparil bel ene rn ae in Ps ee athadshor? ora et vrociming mali of Coban respond the Cao FE: tha ore ota been reed OND United Sates eee Thee wee generally weve inet owen hope of nde se a apa caste ie CS oience was ee wer ged ye oe Ne 007 tn ea gusset ul oS night av vec nese. The Pee ‘veers reed wom nent etze wow meno time reA Pa Fare » ing thatthe pee-invason alr strike would allow Casio plenty of time to ‘movesgain the underground and ronduppoicldisiens. This was tocesary sacrifice, the CTA men had decided, inorder to knock out Cao's Sieforee “The ackof detailed questioning about hese matersisremarkable when ‘we consider that President Kennedy started off with song misgivings about ‘he amount of an-Casio support tha could be mustered on the sand. His Imigivingr were shared by teat one other member ois White House staf ‘Arthur Schlesinger, 3, inthe memorandum he pave the President duringthe ‘cll week of derision, stated his doubs about uprisings behind the Hines fd argued that there was no convincing evidence that mass revolt would be touched offor that Castro's repime warsoweakbatitcouldbetoppled bythe tiles" landing. He warned that If the brigade etalihed a eee foothold {Cube the operation would at bes leadtoa protracted vil warand then Con. {ressmen and other fen policans inthe United Sates would demand that we intervene by sending in the Marines. Others, including a wel informed jouralst just retard from Cuba who was invited tothe White House, mace sill pessimistic forecasts, Appenty none of hese dissent Ing vies was taken seiouly enough by the Presiden or hs advisers to lead them oak heineligence community fran objective assessment of thee Fectivenes ofthe Cuban resistance. "Within twenty-four hours afer the fs air strikes, it became apparent that there would benosabotage or rebellion andhat Castro's regime had the tdmestisituaton firmly in hand, Jus as had been expected by the CIA (bat totbythemain body ofthe policy-making roup), the Cuan police force was ete by the lial airstrike and moved sity against intemal sources of Testane. In Havana alone, some two hundred thousand politcal suspects inee promply rounded up. Euewhere in Cuba anyone suspecied of having aserproond connections was jailed. Even organized resistance units that iaready trmed tnd waiting (or favorable opportunity 10 srke out Castro's rege wereinefeetive,initating ony sporadic incidents of| "The Revolulonsry Council composed of ele poicl leaders of the essance movement, who WereSu 1 scvts. They said tha the CLA in Cubs had failed 10 provide for organized resistance units, thus preventing them fom execuing ‘oups throughout the island, and for sending ia their own ages, who succeeded ony in confusing the ene underground Sorensen concludes that there was o cooperation between the the Cuban underground because the CIA mtrsted the eeding nes, 28 ON suppor! by the CTA Were temited by mos members of Me ving ead, Cansexuens NOS Feepenee tte acres a panne or paste” THE inertia ete bei this out emery Had wens Me the CIA epee resto presen fl ee pans (ola 08 mobi tavenance moverent in CHD iver 6: Ifthe Cuban Teaimen can retreat 10% theft unis hotdine et srigede does not suceed i it Escambray Mow ‘Assumption re inst the C2 itor objects Fs and enforce He reaime: ‘amajorrenon lan wasthedeon make TS taton tha. anew goverment it CUE oad join up withthe et ant Casr0 FOF OF iyo weealready SHO, ‘bel the Esca “seisand;soinone wa gps of es Sponde 0 ih ere casr reHime oe pat good use Dales ‘sll, when she sSOT OUP OO OE than one Fe pecans theives foul, was pe mountains. President Kennedy and eased nt SEED sao ee enna enc anced about the sion vere PLT Hevea the CUA wa 8 bane ivasion ie AP oe bious asst) i a are ne mounts. BARRED sa nave obiained. THE nin Sable the brigade of ese won mae van inormacn TN A "ad tcontadiced BET en yee of he per ales ee tobe fully ried ove, preent enn ssa TE Fresno ee GS ot diconsinnedtani ‘thes atenaing he WHE othe gon ink we CY Pies ot te from the Bay of RS