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1972:AFailuretoUse
Intelligence
byW.R.Baker
Like the Battle of the Bulge, the 1972 Easter Offensive in Vietnam has often been
referred to as an "intelligence failure," mainlybecause it caught the UnitedStates and
South Vietnam completely by surprise. A look beneath the surface, however, reveals
that U.S. and South Vietnamese combat commanders were aware of significant
changes in the postureofthe North VietnameseArmy (NVA)and had accessto many
indicators of an impending NVA offensive. Colonel Allen's assessment that
commanders at The Bulge failed to embrace the intelligence available to them holds
true when evaluating why American and South Vietnamese forces failed during the
EasterOffensive,aswell.
Several factors contributed to the success enjoyed by the NVA during the Easter
Offensive. First, the U.S. and South Vietnamese commanders failed to use all of the
intelligence available tothem.Theiroverconfidence,coupledwithcommandandcontrol
2
(C
), and communications problems, violatedthe cardinal ruleof "neverunderestimate
yourenemy."
Also, Alliedcommanders relied on only two ofthe three forms ofintelligenceimagery
intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). In ignoring human intelligence
(HUMINT)data,theyoverlookedthemostaccurateforecastof enemyintentionsleading
uptotheEasterOffensive.
Background
While most areas of South Vietnam encountered NVA ground forceactivityduring the
Easter Offensiveof 1972, it wasthenorthernmost portionofthecountry,theQuangTri
Province,whichboretheinitialandmostseverebruntoftheNVA'sconventionalground
campaign. The offensive began with an extensive artillery bombardment just before
noon on Good Friday, 30 March 1972. Only the 1st ARVN (Army of the Republic of
Vietnam) (Hue) and 3d ARVN (Quang Tri) Divisions,the 147th and258thVietnamese
Marine Corps (VNMC) Brigades, and the understrength 20th ARVN Tank Battalion
stoodinthewayoftheNVAonslaughtintothenorthernprovinces.
TheNorth'splan of attack wasrelativelysimple.The324BNVADivision,supplemented
by two infantry regiments (the 5th and 6th) that had made their waysouthfromNorth
Vietnam, would engage the 1st ARVN Division, widely considered to be the ARVN's
best. Operating from its usual B4 Front staging area in theA ShauValley west ofthe
Hue, these NVA units would preempt any possibility of relief to the north by applying
pressure to the firebases west of Hue and, thereby, tothecityof Hueitself. However,
the 1stARVN hadconductedoffensiveoperationsduringMarchthatprecludedanyB4
Front operations from achievingsurprisebefore Good Friday. At the same time, the 3d
ARVNCcomprisedofthreeinfantryregiments(the2d,56thand57th),theattached20th
TankBattalion, and the two VNMC brigadeswas prepared to facethe onslaught ofthe
NVA'sB5Front,boundingdownfromthenorth.
TheEasterOffensive1972
ReluctancetoUseIntelligence
Indications of some sort of offensive wereforecastfirst duringTet, thenin March.The
NVA's 324B Division wasknown to be headedfor their usualAOin the AShauValley.
Aslight buildupacrosstheDMZwasdetected,butitwasnotenoughtocauseanygreat
alarm.
Despite the buildup, most Allied commanders were confident that the NVA could not
sustain an offensive so soon after Tet. The South Vietnamese I Corps commander,
when presented with the idea of a North Vietnamese attack across the DMZ, bluntly
stated,
"Theycannot."2
HisU.S.counterpartat theFirstRegionalAssistanceCommand
(FRAC)agreed
,"Hisappraisalappearedreasonableandwellfounded."3
Also, despite the known NVA buildup across the DMZ, the 3d ARVN commander,
Brigadier General Vu Van Giai, decided to swap the positions of the 2d and 56th
Regiments, creating a situation where his forces would be in transition. Unfortunately,
they werein theprocessof switchingpositions when the Offensivebegan.Infact,NVA
shelling beganlessthanthirtyminutesafterbothregiments' communicationsshutdown.
Coincidence?Or,rather,evidenceofgoodenemyuseofintelligence?
2
C
Problems
2
In Vietnam, C
IgnoringHUMINT
During the EasterOffensive,twoofthe threepillars ofintelligence, IMINTand SIGINT,
supplied some indicators of what was about to occur. However, it wasthe ignoring of
the third pillar, HUMINT, that ended up shaping the incorrect opinion among Allied
commanders that the NVA offensive was unlikely and, even after it began, thatitwas
doomedtofailure.
IMINT provided the first real clues of the NVA buildup north of the DMZ. U.S.
photographic intelligence missions detected a large concentration of tanks near Bat
Lake,wherethebordersofNorthandSouthVietnammettheborderofLaos.
Although no information is currently available concerning the Easter Offensive radio
SIGINT interceptspriortoMarch 30(norafterwards),itisreasonabletoassumethatthe
NVA communications security (COMSEC) measures and traffic minimization were in
effect. However, sensor activity along the Ho Chi MinhTrailwas unusuallyactivewith
"movers"duringFebruaryandMarch.
Although therehasbeenlittlewrittenonSIGINTreportingduringtheEasterOffensive,it
can be presumed that there were, in fact, few SIGINT intercepts during that period,
especially when one considerstheactions
nottakenbytheAlliedforces.IfSIGINThad
indicated the NVA buildup, the MACVcommander would probably have returnedearly
fromhisrestandrecuperationinThailandorperhapswouldnothaveleftSouthVietnam
at all.In addition,acountrywidealertgeneratedbySIGINTinterceptsofNVAoffensive
preparations would have alerted U.S. forces, thus precluding the senior U.S. Army
advisorto3dARVNfromleavingforanEastervisittoSaigon.
While IMINTand SIGINTprovided some cluesastotheNVA'sintentionsduringMarch,
HUMINT providedthemost accurateforecastofenemyintentionsbeforetheOffensive.
Conclusion
The Easter Offensive caught the Allies by complete surprise needlessly so.Whilethe
indicators of attack were numerous,U.S.andSouth Vietnamesecommanders ignored
theminfavorofamorereassuringposition:thatthe NVAcouldnotandwouldnotattack
before theend ofMarch.Their failuretouseHUMINT tothe fullestextentpossiblealso
contributed to the Alliedforces beingcaughtoff guard.The "intelligence failure" during
the Easter Offensive was less a failure to collect intelligence than it was a failure to
exploitobviousindicators.
Endnotes
1.
ColonelRobertS.Allen,
LuckyForward
(NewYork:ManorBooks,1965),157.
2.DaleAndrade,
TrialbyFire
(NewYork:HippocreneBooks,1995),p.62.
3.Andrade,62.
4. Major General Frederick J. Kroesen,
Quang Tri: The Lost Province (U.S. Army
WarCollegedocument,16Jan74).
5. Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung,
Intelligence (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of
MilitaryHistory,dateunknown),155.
6.Andrade,25.
7. Message from:Kroesen toGeneralCreighton Abrams, Subject:DailyCommander's
Evaluation,033335Z27APR72.
Mr. Bob Baker graduated with the first 96B class from Fort Huachuca in 1971. He was
assigned to the 1st Battalion, 525th MI Group, headquarteredinDaNang,Vietnam.His
further assignments included positions at Fort Bliss, Texas two tours with the
European Defense Analysis Center (EUDAC) at Vaihingen, Germany and the 513th MI
Group, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Mr. Baker has a bachelor of science degree in
Government from the University of Maryland. He iscurrently the Chief ThreatAnalyst
for Northrop Grumman Corporation. Readers may contacthim at(562)9423521 or via
EMailatbakerbo@mail.northgrum.com.