SEALED 0°51 (Rey 1/1) Canal Complaint BY COURT ORDER UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SRISINAL for the Northern Distiet oF California aR 25 2015 United States of America ) RICHARD W. WIEKING . NORTHERN DiSTR'Gr OF CALIFORNIA CARL MARK FORCE 1V, et al } Case No, ) ) B-15-70370 Defendants) — ~ ME] CRIMINAL COMPLAINT the complainant in his case, stat that the fllowig is ret thebestof my knowledge and belie On oraboutihe dat(sjof ___2012through 2013 inthecounty of ___SanFrancisco inthe Norte _Distictof _Calforia —_, he defendant) volte Cade Section Offense Description 18USC Secton 6 Tot of Government Property TBUSC Secton 1349 Wire Secs 1SUSC. Secon 1956) Honey Uaundeing 18USC secten 208 Conner at cr This criminal complaint is based on these facts: ‘See Affidavit of Special Agent Tigran Gambaryan (attached) Approved as to form: AUSA Kathryn Haun ® Continued on the attached sheet. “Complainant's signanure S/A Tigran Gambaryan, IRS-Criminal Investigations _ Printed name and le ‘Sworn to before me and signed in my presence. Date: 03/28/2015 Judge signature City and state: San Francisco, CA _ Hon, Maria-Elena James, U.S. Magistrate Judge _ Printed name andl tleMELINDA HAAG (CABN 132612) United States Attorney DAVID R. CALLAWAY (CABN 121782) Chief. Criminal Division KATHRYN HAUN (DCBN 484131), WILLIAM FRENTZEN (LABN 24421) Assistant United States Attorneys 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36053 San Francisco, California 94102-3495 Telephone: (415) 436-7200 FAX: (415) 436-7234 Kathryn.haun@usdoj.gov William. frentzen@usdoj.gov RAYMOND N. HULSER (MABN 551350) Acting Chief, Public Integrity Section RICHARD B. EVANS (DCBN 441494) Trial Attorney 1400 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 Telephone: (202) 353-7760 Richard.B.Evans@usdoj.gov Attomeys for United States of America UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AFFIDAVIT OF SPECIAL AGENT TIGRAN GAMBARYAN IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL v. COMPLAINT CARL M. FORCE IV and SHAUN W. BRIDGES, FILED UNDER SEAL Defendants. 1, Tigran Gambaryan, being first duly swom, hereby depose and state as follows: AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINTI L INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND The following affidavit is made in support of a criminal complaint and arrest warrant tor Carl 3 || Mark FORCE IV (“FORCE”) for violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 1343 (Wire Fraud); 18 U.S.C, Section 4 |]641 (Theft of Government Property); 18 U.S.C. Section 1956 (Money Laundering); and 18 U.S.C. Section 208 (Conflict of Interest) and also in support of a criminal complaint and arrest warrant for 6 |] Shaun W. BRIDGE: (“BRIDGES”) for violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 1343 (Wire Fraud) and 18 7\Iu C. Section 1956 (Money Laundering). 8 ‘4am a Special Agent with the Criminal Investigation Division of the Intemal Revenue Service 9 || (RS), in the Northern District of California and have been since 2011. 1 am currently the group's Cyber 10 || Crimes Jnit Liaison, Prior to that, my background was as an auditor for California's Franchise Tax 11 || Board where | investigated abusive tax shelters. My training and experience includes, but is not limited 12 |}, investigations involving money laundering, white collar fraud, public corruption, organized crime, 13 |Jand violations of the Bank Secrecy Act and tax code. I have developed a specialty in cyber and digital 14 |] currency crimes. 15 [am involved in an investigation into members of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force to include 16 |} former Drug Enforcement Administration Agent Carl Mark FORCE IV (FORCE) and former Secret 17 |] Service Agent Shaun BRIDGES (BRIDGES). This is a bicoastal investigation that is based in San 18 |] Francisco, being handled by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northem District of California and the 19 || Public Integrity Section in Washington D.C. 20 In this investigation, | am joined by several co-case agents, to include Special Agents and a Staff 21 |] Operations Specialist trom the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) San Francisco Division's Public 22 || Corruption Squad, which investigates abuse of public office in violation of criminal law to include 23 | fraud, bribery, extortion, conflicts of interest, and embezzlement. I am also joined in this investigation 24 || by the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) and the Department of 25 || Homeland Security’s Office of the Inspector General (DHS OIG), both of which investigate and 26 | prosecute fraud and abuse by federal officials 27 ‘The facts in this affidavit come from my personal observations, my training and experience, and 28 || information cbtained from other agents and witnesses. ‘This affidavit is intended to show merely that AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT1 || there is sufficient probable cause for the requested complaint and warrants and does not set forth all of 2 || my knowledge about this matter. 3 IL. SUMMARY 4 The government had multiple investigations into the Silk Road marketplace, an underground 5 |} black market that allowed vendors and buyers to conduct illegal transact ns over the internet, One of 6 || these investigations was conducted in the Southern District of New York, and the other was conducted 7 |J out of Baltimore in the District of Maryland. Both FORCE and BRIDGES were assigned to the 8 || Baltimore investigation and not the New York investigation. The two investigations were conducted | 9 || independently of each other. 10 ‘Throughout 2012 and 2013, both FORCE and BRIDGES had significant responsibilities related 11 || to Baltimore's investigation. In this capacity, FORCE was the lead undercover agent in communication 12 || with DPR, the owner, administrator and operator of the Silk Road website.' BRIDGES was the 13 |] computer forensics expert on the Baltimore investigation. In their capacity as members of the Baltimore 14] Silk Road Task Force, both FORCE and BRIDGES had significant exposure to and developed expertise 15 |] in the digital currency known as Bitcoin, 16 | As will be described further herein, FORCE and BRIDGES abused their positions as federal 17 [agents and engaged in a scheme to defraud a variety of third-parties, the public, and the government, all 18 || for their own financial enrichment. With respect to former Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 19 |] Special Agent FORCE, the investigation has revealed among other things that: 20 a. FORCE created certain fictitious personas -- that were not officially sanctioned -- to 21 communicate with DPR, the target of FORCE’s investigation. Using one of these 2 personas, FORCE sought to extort DPR by seeking monetary payment, offering in 2B exchange not to provide the government with certain information if DPR paid $250,000; 24 b. FORCE acted outside the scope of his official role on the Baltimore Silk Road Task 25 Force and created a fictitious persona named “French Maid.” Operating as “French 26 7 "Until October 1, 2013, DPR was known to FORCE and the rest of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force only by his online moniker “Dread Pirate Roberts” or “DPR.” Ulbricht was known on the 2g |] Silk Road site by the moniker “Dread Pirate Roberts” (DPR) and is referred to hereafter interchangeably as “DPR and “Ulbricht.” AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINTi Maid.” FORCE fraudulently represented to DPR certain information concerning “French 2 Maid’s” true identity and offered to sell DPR information about the government's 3 investigation into Silk Road in exchange for approximately $100.000 worth of bitcoin, 4 which DPR paid and FORCE deposited into his own personal accounts; c. FORCE stole and converted to his own personal use a sizeable amount of biteoins that 6 DPR sent to FORCE in FORCE’s official undercover capacity and rather than turning 7 those bite over to the government, FORCE deposited them into his own personal 8 accounts; 9 d. FORCE engaged in a series of complex transactions between various Bitcoin accounts 10 (known as Bitcoin addresses), his personal digital currency accounts, and his personal u bank accounts, including a $235,000 wire to an overseas account in Panama, all in an 12 effort to launder and conceal the true source of the ill-gotten proceeds; 13, e. FORCE used his of l position as a DEA agent to illegally run criminal history checks 14 on individuals for the benefit of a third-party digital currency exchange company, 15 CoinMKT, in which FORCE had personally invested approximately $110,000 worth of 16 bitcoin; 7 FORCE functioned as the de facto Chief Compliance Officer for CoinMKT all the while 18 employed as a DEA agent, even allowing himself to be featured in CoinMKT’s “pitch 19 decks” to venture capital investors and allowing himself to be listed as CoinMKT"s anti- 20 money laundering and/or compliance officer in order to benefit CoinMKT (a company in 21 which FORCE had invested); 2 g FORCE improperly directed CoinMKT to freeze one of its individual customer's 2B accounts containing a large amount of digital currency, worth approximately $297,000, 4 even though he lacked @ sufficient legal basis on which to do so, and FORCE then 25 illegally seized those funds and transferred them into his own personal account; and 26 h. FORCE used his supervisor's signature stamp, without authorization, on an official U.S 27 Department of Justice subpoena and sent the subpoena to a payments company, Venmo, 28 directing the company to unfreeze his own personal account, which had been previously AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINTfrozen due to certain suspicious activity. FORCE then sought to conceal evidence of his improper use of an official subpoena by directing the company not to contact the DEA and attempting to destroy copies of the subpoena. When the company did not comply, FORCE asked another agent on the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force. an IRS agent, to collaborate with him on seizing that company’s bank accounts. With respect to former U.S. Secret Service (USSS) Special Agent BRIDGES, the investigation has revealed among other things that: a, In late January 2013, members of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force, to include BRIDGES and FORCE, gained access to a Silk Road website administrator account as a result of the arrest of a former Silk Road employee, On January 25, 2013, the Silk Road website suffered a sizeable theft of bitcoins, bitcoins which were moved into Mt. Gox, a digital curreney exchange based in Japan; On February 12, 2013, BRIDGES formed and registered a personal limited liability company called “Quantum Intemational Investments, LLC,” (Quantum), and on February 22, 2013, BRIDGES opened an account at Fidelity Investments (Fidelity) in the name of Quantum; According to records obtained from Fidelity, BRIDGES funded his Quantum Fidelity account exclusively with wire deposits from Mt. Gox in Japan, Specifically, between March 6, 2013 through May 7, 2013, BRIDGES’ Quantum Fidelity account in the United States received nine wire transfers from Mt. Gox totaling approximately $820,000; Despite having personally benefitted in the amount of $820,000 from a Mt. Gox account and receiving a large wire on May 7, 2013 from Mt. Gox, just two days later on May 9, 2013, BRIDGES served as the affiant on a multi-million dollar seizure warrant for Mt. Gox and its owner's bank accounts; and Upon learning of the government's criminal investigation into the Baltimore Silk Road ‘Task Force based in the Northem District of California, and following an interview by the FBI as part of the criminal investigation, BRIDGES transferred over $250,000 out of AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 5Quantum Fidelity account via wire transfers into another bank account held by himself and a third-party. Because this affidavit is for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause for the crimes proposed to be charged at the present time. it does not include certain additional facts known to me and the government’ investigation continues, IIL, RELEVANT STATUTES Based on my training and experience and the facts as set forth in this affidavit, there is probable cause to believe that FORCE has committed violations of law to include Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 (Wire Fraud), Title 18, United States Code, Section 641 (Theft of Government Property), Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (Money Laundering), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 208 (Conflict of Interest). There is also probable cause to believe that BRIDGES has committed violations of law to include Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 (Wire Fraud) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (Money Laundering) Title 18 U.S.C. § 641 prohibits embezzling, stealing, or converting any property belonging to the United States worth more than $1,000. The essential elements of this offense are: (1) the defendant knowingly embezzled, stole, or converted to the defendant's use or the use of another the money or property of value with the intention of depriving the owner of the use or benefit of the money or property; (2) the money or property belonged to the United States; and (3) the value of the money or property was more than $1,000. See Ninth Circuit Instruction 8.39, Title 18 U.S.C. § 1343 prohibits wire fraud. The essential elements of this offense are: (1) the defendant knowingly participated in, devised or intended to devise a scheme or plan to deffaud, or a scheme or plan for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises; (2) the statements made or facts omitted as part of the scheme were ‘material, that is they had a natural tendency to influence, or were capable of influencing, a person to part with money or property; (3) the defendant acted with the intent to defraud, that is, the intent to deceive or cheat; and (4) the defendant used, or caused to be used, a wire communication to carry out or attempt to carry out an essential part of the scheme. See Ninth Circuit Instruction 8.124, AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. 6Title 18 U.S. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) prohibits the laundering of proceeds from “specified unlawful activity” (SUA), The essential elements are: (1) the defendant conducted or intended to conduct a financial transaction involving property that represented the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; (2) the defendant knew that the property represented the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; (3) the defendant knew the transaction was designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity; and (4) the defendant did something that was a substantial step toward committing the crime. See Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 8.147. The money laundering statute specifically identifies both § 1343 wire fraud and § 641 theft of government property as “specified unlawtul activity.” Title 18 U.S.C. § 208 prohibits federal employees from taking certain acts affecting a personal financial interest, Although there is no Ninth Circuit model instruction for this statute, caselaw establishes that the essential elements are: (1) the defendant was an officer or employee of the Executive Branch of the United States; (2) the defendant participated personally and substantially as a government employee through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, rendering of advice, investigation or otherwise in a matter; and (3) the defendant knew that he had a financial interest in the particular ‘matter in which he was participating. IV. BACKGROUND FORCE was employed as a DEA Special Agent for approximately 15 years. He began his career with the DEA in September 1999 and served in Denver, Puerto Rico, and Baltimore. FORCE resigned on May 4, 2014, shortly after law enforcement began the current investigation. FORCE received approximately $150,000 in annual salary from the DEA. Based on my investigation, during the relevant timeframe of 2012 into 2014, his wife was a homemaker and the houschold had no significant outside income. FORCE used one of hi personal bank accounts to receive several large international and domestic wire and Automated Clearing House (ACH) transfers throughout the latter half of 2013 and. first half of 2014. I have reviewed FORCE’s bank records, and two personal checking accounts in FORCE's name reveal incoming deposits totaling at least approximately $757,000 for the roughly year AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINTlong period beginning April 2013 through May 20142 This does not include amounts deposited from May 2014 onward. I have also leamed through my investigation that during this timeframe FORCE. paid off his mortgage, a government thrift savings plan loan, and wrote several very large checks for tens of thousands of dollars. In 2014, FORCE made investments in real properties, in businesses, and wired hundreds of thousands of dollars into an overseas account. From 2013 through the present, FORCE has held numerous accounts in his own name and with his own personal identifiers’ at a variety of digital currency exchanges around the world, including in the Northem District of California. Moreover, in April 2014, FORCE established a company called Engedi, LLC. According to documents filed with the Maryland Secretary of State, Engedi, LLC’s purpose is to speculate and invest in Bitcoin. Like FOR BRIDGES was a member of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force. Until abrupt resignation on March 18, 2015, after learning he was a subject of this investigation, BRIDGES was employed as a U.S. Secret Service (USSS) Special Agent for approximately six years. He began his career with USSS in October 2009 and served in its Baltimore Field Office. After the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force ended, BRIDGES remained part of the USSS Electronic Crimes Task Force in Maryland. In this role, he served as the affiant on numerous seizure warrants. On January 25, 2013, the Silk Road website suffered a sizeable theft of Bitcoin, a theft with which BRIDGES was associated. For reasons discussed below, I believe the proceeds of this theft were transferred to the Mt. Gox exchange in Japan. On February 12, 2013, not long after the Silk Road thefts occurred, BRIDGES formed a company called Quantum International Investments, LLC (Quantum). On February 22, 2013, BRIDGES established a personal investment account at Fidelity Investments (Fidelity) in the name of Quantum. BRIDGES used that Fidelity account to receive several large international wire transfers from Japan, specifically from Mt. Gox, throughout the March through May 2013 timeframe. There were nine Approximately $330,000 was deposited in 2013 and approximately $427,000 was deposited in 2014. This does not include the deposits made after this period that are discussed further below. * These personal accounts use FORCE’s home address, and link to his personal bank and email account information. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINTwire transfers from Mt. Gox to BRIDGES’ Quantum Fidelity account, and each was just under $100,000. This account was funded exclusively with deposits trom Mt. Gox. Just two days after receiving his last Mt. Gox wire on May 7, 2013, BRIDGES served in his official capacity as the affiant on a May 9, 2013 seizure warrant where he seized over $2.1 million from Mt. Gox, under the theory Mt. Gox was operating in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1960, which prohibits the operation of an unregistered money service business. After leaming of this investigation into the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force and after being interviewed by federal law enforcement in the summer of 2014, BRIDGES transferred via two separate interstate wires over $250,000 from his Quantum Fidelity account into an account at another bank that was held in his own name and in the name of a third-party (with whom BRIDGES has a personal relationship). V. BITCOIN BACKGROUND Bitcoin* a form of decentralized, convertible virtual currency that exists through the use of an online, decentralized ledger system. While Bitcoin mainly exists as an internet-based form of currency, it is possible to “print out” the necessary information and exchange Biteoin via physical medium. The currency is not issued by any government, bank, or company, but rather is generated and controlled through computer software operating via a decentralized network. To acquire bitcoins, a typical user will purchase them from a Bitcoin seller or * hanger.” It is also possible to “mine” bitcoin by verifying other users’ transactions. Bitcoin is just one form of digital currency, and there are a significant number of other varieties of digital currency. Bitcoin exchangers typically accept payments of fiat currency (currency which derives its value from government regulation or law), or other convertible virtual currencies in order to obtain biteoins, When a user wishes to purchase bitcoins from an exchanger, the user will typically send payment in the form of fiat or other convertible virtual currency to an exchanger, usually via wire or ACH, for the corresponding number of bitcoins based on a fluctuating exchange rate. The exchanger, often for a ince Biteoin is both a currency and a protocol, capitalization differs. Accepted practice is to use “Bitcoin” (singular with an upper case letter B) to label the protocol, software, and community, and “biteoin” or “bitcoins” (with a lower case b) to label units of the currency and that practice is adopted here. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. 9|] commission, will then typically attempt to broker the purchase with another user of the exchange that is trying to sell bitcoins, of, in some instances, will act as the seller itself. If the exchanger can place a buyer with a seller, then the transaction can be completed, When a user acquires bitcoins, they are sent to the user's Bitcoin address. This is somewhat analogous to a bank account number, which is comprised of a case-sensitive string of letters and numbers amounting (0 a total of 26 to 35 characters. ‘The user can then conduct transactions with other Bitcoin users, by transferring biteoins to their Bitcoin addresses, via the internet. Little to no personally identifiable information about the payer or payee is transmitted in a Bitcoin transaction. Bitcoin transactions occur using a public key and a private key. A public key is used to receive bitcoins and a private key is used to allow withdrawals from a Biteoin address, Only the Bitcoin address of the recei ing party and the sender's private key are needed to complete the transaction, which by themselves rarely reflect any identifying information, All Bitcoin transactions are recorded on what is known as the block chain, This is essentially a distributed public ledger that keeps track of all Bitcoin transactions, incoming and outgoing, and updates approximately six times per hour. ‘The block chain records every Bitcoin address that has ever received abitcoin and maintains records of every transaction and all the known balances for each Bitcoin address. tal currencies, including Bitcoin, have many known legitimate uses. However, much like cash, biteoins can be used to facilitate illicit transactions and to launder criminal proceeds, given the ‘ease with which they can be used to move money anonymously. As is demonstrated herein, however, in some circumstances bitcoin payments may be traced to accounts at traditional financial institutions using the block chain. VI. SILK ROAD BACKGROUND The Ik Road website was established in early 201 and operated until on or about October 2, 2013, when it was seized by law enforcement. The illegal nature of the commerce hosted on Silk Road was readily apparent to anyone visiting the site. The vast majority of the goods for sale consisted of illegal drugs of nearly every variety, openly advertised on the site as such and prominently visible on the home page. The only form of payment accepted on Silk Road was Bitcoin. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. 10Silk Road was only accessible through the TOR network, a special network on the internet designed to conceal the true IP addresses of the computers on the network, and, thereby. the identities of the network’s users. TOR stands for “The Onion Router.” Every Silk Road user had at least one Bitcoin address associated with the user's Silk Road account, where deposits to the account could be sent, To make purchases on the site, the user first had to obtain Bitcoin (for example, from an exchanger) and have them sent to the biteoin deposit address associated with the user's Silk Road account. After thus funding the account, the user could make purchases from Silk Road vendors. A federal grand jury sitting in the Southem District of New York indicted Ross William Ulbricht, also known as “DPR,” as being the creator of Silk Road and engaging in a drug conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C, Section 846, among other charges. The matter proceeded to a multi-week trial in January 2015 before U.S. District Judge Katherine B. Forrest. Evidence at that trial, and other evidence of which 1 am aware, establishes that from late 2012 through his arrest on October |, 2013, Ulbricht (DPR) was residing in and ran the Silk Road from San Francisco. On or about February 4, 2015, a federal jury sitting in the Southem District of New York convicted Ulbricht of all counts with which he was charged. Sentencing is set for May 15, 2015. ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH PROVIDED TO COURT IN SEPARATE UNDER SEAL FILING IS REDACTED HERE. Aside from the New York case, on October 1, 2013, the District of Maryland charged Ulbricht with murder-for-hire and related drug-conspiracy charges.* It is the District of Maryland’s investigation and case in which FORCE and BRIDGI were involved. VII. FORCE PROBABLE CAUSE FORC ’s Official Undercover Role On Baltimore's 1k Road Task Force As described above, FORCE, BRIDGES, and other law enfor ement agents from the Department of Homeland Security, Internal Revenue Service, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service,* worked on a The District of Maryland had previously charged “John Doe a/k/a Dread Pirate Roberts” with these charges on or about May 1, 2013, at which time the District of Maryland was unsure of the true identity of DPR. The District of Maryland subsequently charged Ulbricht with these offenses after an IRS Special Agent on the Souther District of New York's investigation identified DPR as Ulbricht. ° The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (ATF) was part of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force early on, but their involvement did not last long, AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. ntask force out of Baltimore dedicated to identifying and apprehending DPR, later determined to be Ross Ulbricke. As part of his official role in the Baltimore Silk Road investigation, FORCE communicated with DPR using an undercover identity, hereafter referred to as “Nob.” Nob (FORCE) and DPR communicated throughout 2012 and 2013 using a variety of methods of communication, including on a private messaging system on the Silk Road website and on chat programs that operated over the TOR network, Their communications reveal that DPR believed Nob to be a drug smuggler operating in the United States with connections to criminal organizations throughout the world. In reality, of course, Nob was FORCE, an undercover DEA agent, Many but not all of their communications were encrypted, as discussed further below. Some portion of the communications between DPR and Nob (FORCE) are memorialized in FORCE’s official case file, preserved in what are known as DEA 6s, which are official reports of the DEA’s investigation. Some of the communications are also preserved on FORCE’s official computers, However, not all of the communications between DPR and Nob (FORCE) were memorialized. At the time of Ulbricht’s arrest, law enforcement seized a laptop computer from Ulbricht’s person. This computer has been forensically analyzed. It, too, contained evidence of communications between DPR and Nob (FORCE). It also contained certain communications between DPR and FORCE that FORCE did not memorialize in his official reports or as part of his official case file. Ulbricht’s computer also contained a handful of files that appear to be Ulbricht’s notes to himself. One such file is named “LE counterintel” which your affiant believes stands for “Law Enforcement Counterintelligence” and contains information that DPR was receiving from purported “inside” law enforcement sources. I have reviewed these files and believe that they contain information that came from a person or persons inside law enforcement, in part because of their substance and in part because of their use of certain terminology and acronyms that are not widely known by the public. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINTPrior to his arrest, DPR was known to have been hiding his true identity and location from law enforcement, so information concerning the government's investigation was material and valuable to him. I have reviewed many of the communications between DPR and Nob (FORCE) that are available. At some point, Nob (FORCE) and DPR began encrypting certain of these communications using what is known as PGP encryption, PGP stands for “pretty good privacy” and is an encryption algorithm that allows its users to send encrypted conversations through messaging or chat services. ‘Much like the way bitcoins are controlled, PGP too uses a system of public keys and private keys. With PGP. a public key is used to encrypt a message for a specific user to read, and a private key is used by ‘he recipient to decrypt the message. In addition to needing a private key to decrypt a message, a user must also possess a unique password that was established at the time of creation to decrypt or sign a message. A review of FORC official case file does not contain any of the private PGP keys or passwords needed to decrypt FORCE’s encrypted communications with DPR. Nor did FORCE provide these private PGP keys to the prosecutor on the Baltimore case or to those in his chain-of-command. Instead, FORCE appears to have been the only individual to have possessed the private PGP keys and passwords needed to unlock his communication with DPR. This is notable, because as a law enforcement agent, | know that one of the chief concerns in working an investigation and building evidence is the ability to obtai decipherable, admissible evidence for use in later proceedings. Despite his involvement in the Baltimore Silk Road investigation, and knowledge that other law enforement would be unable to read encrypted communications without the private PGP keys, FORCE, acting as Nob, specifically instructed DPR to use PGP to encrypt messages relating to the investigation. While this request may have enhanced Nob’s (FORCE’s) credibility to DPR as a “criminal,” thereby furthering his cover, it would have made it difficult for FORC! E to document the communications, communications that would be of use to law enforcement making a case against DPR at a later date Even if encrypting messages to DPR would make Nob more credible, the communications should have been documented, in deciphered form, and memorialized in the case file. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. B3s Ihave conferred with other law enforcement agents who conduct online undercover operations and believe the failure to preserve the private PGP keys while simultaneously directing a target to use PGP to encrypt messages makes little sense in the context of a law enforcement investigation, particularly taking into account that this task force involved multiple law enforcement officers, all of whom might require access to the evidence FORCE gathered in his dealings with DPR: In the event FORCE were to lose the PGP private keys, or that something were to happen to FORCE, any evi lence contained in the encrypted PGP format would effectively be lost and unusable without the private key. FORCE's apparent failure to document the private PGP keys for his communications with DPR anywhere in his case file, or to provide them to others at the DEA or to the prosecutor, leads me to believe he did not want anyone other than himself (FORCE) to be able to decrypt certain of those communications, and that, as a result, he sought deliberately to undermine the integrity of the ongoing Baltimore Silk Road Task Force investigation. Although in the beginning of his time communicating with DPR, FORCE (as Nob) occasionally provided certain decrypted communications to others on the Task Force, including the prosecutor with whom he was working, FORCE did not provide all communications in decrypted form. ‘This was despite the fact that the prosecutor with whom FORCE was working repeatedly emphasized the need for FORCE to provide all encrypted communications. In fact, toward the end of the timeframe in which Nob (FORCE) was in relatively heavy communication with DPR, FORCE increasingly was not providing the decrypted versions of their communication. FORCE?s Theft of 525 Bitcoins Coming from Ulbricht, a/k/a “DPR” In his communications with DPR, Nob (FORCE) created the fiction that Nob had sens information that he would provide to DPR, ofien in exchange for payment, including law enforcement sensitive information. One of the cover stories that Nob (FORCE) created with DPR was that Nob had access to a corrupt government employee, fictionally named “Kevin.” Ironically, “Kevin” was supposed to be a corrupt Department of Justice case agent on the government’s Silk Road investigation and simultaneously on Nob's payroll, who would feed Nob information about law enforcement’s AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 41 |] investigation into the Silk Road, FORCE memorialized this cover story concerning “Ke dated August 1, 2013 (the “August DEA 6") DPR subsequently paid Nob (FORCE) in bitcoins on at least two occasions, One payment was 4 {in June 2013 for 400 biteoins’ for fraudulent identification documents that Nob was supposed to provide 5|]to DPR. A second payment was in August 2013 for 525 bitcoins for “Kevin’ inside law enforcement 6 || information. At the time of the payments, 400 bitcoins would have been worth approximately $40,000 7] and 525 bitcoins would have been worth approximately $50,000." Both the June 400 bitcoin payment $jJand the August 525 bitcoin payment became official government property once DPR made the 9 || payments: they were received as part of FORCE’s official undercover role trom the target of a federal 10 |] investigation and therefore became undercover proceeds. M1 As is described further below, rather than properly documenting these payments, and 12 |] safeguarding them in a government account, FORCE took custody of the payments and deposited the 13 || bulk of the 400 bitcoin payment and ail of the 525 bitcoin payment into his own personal account. 14 |] Records received from a digital currency exchange, CampBX, reveal that FORCE maintained a personal 15 || account there that was linked directly to two additional personal accounts belonging to FORC 2 (1) 16 | FORCE’s account at another digital currency exchange, Bitstamp, and (2) FORCE’s account at a 17 |] payments processing account, Dwolla, neither of which were government or official accounts.’ 18 In the August DEA 6, FORCE memorialized the fact that he, acting as Nob, sent a PGP- 19 |} encrypted communication to DPR. According to the August DEA 6, Nob (FORCE) “advised DPR that 1 The 400 bitcoin payment was actually an 800 bitcoin payment but Nob (FORCE) refunded DPR 400 bitcoins because the dea! for the fraudulent identification documents allegedly fell through. 22 * These are very conservative estimates and the actual loss amount is likely greater than these amounts: FORCE himself valued the 400 bitcoin payment as being equal to $76,800 on October 22, 23 }] 2013, and not $40,000 as described here. The reason for the difference concerns the fluctuating value of bitcoin during this timeframe. ‘The value of bitcoin at the time of the June 2013 payment was 24 || approximately $100 per bitcoin, yielding the $40,000 approximation provided here. However, the value at the time of FORCE’s own valuation of the 400 bitcoin payment in October 2013 was approximately 25118192 per bitcoin. It should also be noted that during the time that FORCE was liquidating biteoins through his own personal accounts, the value of bitcoin fluctuated dramatically ranging from less than 26 | $300 per bitcoin to over $1100 per bitcoin 7 ° FORCE maintained a separate account at Dwolla in the name of his official undercover identity. In contrast, FORCE’s personal account at Dwolla was in his own name and established using 2g || his own personal identifiers such as Social Security number, home address, personal email and date of ~~ | birth. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 15*Kevin’ wanted a ‘donation’ of bitcoins from DPR, the inference being that the information on the Silk Road investigation is valuable.” The August DEA 6 further specifies that “Special Agent FORC provided a Biteoin wallet address” for DPR to deposit the Bitcoin payment for “Kevin's” information. However, FORCE made an “Agent's Note” at the bottom of the August DEA 6 explicitly stating that DPR never made the payment, writing “AGENT'S NOTE: DPR made no such payment.” (emphasis added). The August DEA 6 is also notable for what information it does not contain, It does not include the actual Bitcoin public address that Nob (FORCE) provided to DPR to receive payment for “Kevin' information. Including this information would have allowed other law enforcement agents to trace any payment if made, Nor does the August DEA 6 list or document the PGP encryption password that would be subsequently needed to decipher the encrypted communication between DPR and Nob (FORCE) conceming “Kevin's” information or the information surrounding the payment for that information. However, certain communications between Nob (FORCE) and DPR were maintained on the server that hosted the Silk Road website, which the FBI imaged as part of the Southern District of New York investigation. I have obtained and reviewed a copy of that server and it contains the ‘communications between Nob (FORCE) and DPR, including certain communications that FORCE does not appear to have memorialized in the official case file, The server contains a chain of messages between DPR and Nob (FORCE) from July 31, 2013 through August 4, 2013. With the exception of one message DPR authored, the messages in the chain are completely encrypted. ‘That sole unencrypted message in this chain is from DPR to Nob (FORCE). It is dated August 4, 2013, and concerns a payment DPR made for * evin’s” information. Specifically, DPR wrote: “I could not decrypt your second message, got an error. I could decrypt the first, and have sent the 525 bic as requested. Please keep me posted and you have my word that no one else knows anything about this. I'm sorry I didn’t know how much to send before. I was afraid of offending if I sent too little and looking foolish if | sent too much, I hope I didn’t make things too difficult for you.” (emphasis added) Within approximately two hours of DPR sending the message described above, Nob (FORCE! AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 16responded to DPR with an encrypted message but containing the unencrypted subject line, “use PGP!” As noted, PGP stands for “Pretty Good Privac: ." an eneryption mechanism. In other words. FORCE, was directing DPR to encrypt his messages. Following the message containing the unencrypted subject line were a series of additional back and forth encrypted PGP messages between Nob (FORCE) and DPR. | know from other law enforcement agents who conduct undercover operations on TOR and black market sites that there is little reason to direct a target who is using clear communication to instead use encrypted communication, and no reason to fail to document a decryption mechanism in the case file or share it with other agents, management, or the prosecutor. Again, FORCE did not memorialize the PGP private encryption key that could be used to decipher the July 31-August 4, 2013, encrypted communication chain between himself and DPR anywhere in his ease file or provide it to anyone else at the DEA or to the prosecutor with whom he was working. Furthermore, the last mention of DPR's payment for “Kevin's” information in FORCE’s official DEA case file is the August DEA 6, in whi h FORCE specifically stated that no payment was ever received. Nor are there any subsequent DEA 6s correcting or amending this. In fact, a review of FORCE's official case file reveals that FORCE never documented having received a 525 Bitcoin payment from DPR, as DPR’s August 4, 2013, communication to Nob (FORCE) states had occurred. | believe that FORCE, acting as Nob, instructed DPR to use PGP encryption in part to conceal the fact that DPR actually had made a 525 bitcoin payment to Nob (FORCE) that FORCE was not detailing in his official law enforcement reports. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that in the August DEA 6 FORCE took care to explicitly note the fact in the “AGENT’S NOTE: DPR made no such payment,” and there is no subsequent DEA 6 in which FORCE states that DPR did transmit a $25 bitcoin payment. It is further bolstered by the fact that FORCE does not appear to have memorialized the PGP encryption keys for his communications with DPR anywhere in the official case file. Finally, when DPR mentioned the 525 bitcoin payment in the August 4 communication, the first response FORCE acting as Nob gave was “use PGP!” Notably, by late July 2013, the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force had been made aware that the FBI was seeking to obtain an image of the Silk Road server, and therefore FORCE may have had reason AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT "7to fear that any communications between himself and DPR would be accessible to the FBI in the event the FBI was successfiil in imaging the server. Records obtained from FORCE’s personal digital currency account at a digital currency exchange company, CampBX, reveal that on September 27, 2013, FORCE deposited the precise amount of 525 bitcoins into his own personal account at CampBX.'” T have performed an analysis of the block chain as it concems the 525 bitcoin deposit to FORCE’s personal CampBX account. The analysis reveals that the 525 biteoins FORCE received into his own personal CampBX account was directly linked, through a series of transactions, to the 525 bitcoin payment that DPR made on August 4, 2013, ie. the same day DPR communicated to Nob (FORCE) that he had “sent the 525 BTC as requested.” Records trom the Silk Road servers establish that this 525 bitcoin payment originated from DPR’s Silk Road account on August 4, 2013. Specifically, the 525 biteoin payment was split into four smaller payments and made in the following manner: a, On August 4, 2013 at 22:05 UTC a payment of 203 biteoins b. On August 4, 2013 at 22:05 UTC a payment of 134 biteoins On August 4, 2013 at 22:05 UTC a payment of 61 biteoins d. On August 4, 2013 at 22:01 UTC a payment of 127 bitcoins The 525 bitcoin payment went from four addresses and ultimately landed in a single pass- through account on September 1, 2013. The 525 bitcoin remained in the pass-through account from September 1, 2013 until September 27, 2013, when they were transferred into FORCE’s personal account at CampBX. These transactions are depicted on “Trace of $25 Biteoin Payment,” attached as Exhibit B. Notably, FORCE treated DPR’s June 400 bitcoin payment differently from the way he treated the August 525 bitcoin payment. To be sure, FORCE wrongfully deposited substantial portions of both '° The September 27, 2013 date has significance because email records | have reviewed indicate that, at the latest on September 27, 2013, FORCE learned that DPR was about to be apprehended as part of the separate New" York investigation into the Silk Road. In response to learning this information, FORCE wrote to the prosecutor with whom he was working inquiring as to the true name and identifying information of DPR. To my knowledge, FORCE was not provided with that information on September 27, 2013 in response to his inquiry AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 18payments into his own personal account at CampBX, and later transferred them to another of his personal accounts at Bitstamp, another digital currency exchange where FORCE maintained a personal account. However. FORCE memorialized the 400 bitcoin payment in a DEA 6 (albeit many months after the June 400 bitcoin payment was made) and in January 2014 attempted to put together a seizure ‘warrant for that 400 bitcoin payment. He did not do any of this for the 525 bitcoin payment. ‘And as part of the process of putting together a seizure warrant for the 400 biteoin payment, the federal prosecutor with whom FORCE was working emailed FORCE on January 16, 2014, and asked him a series of questions, including where the 400 bitcoins physically were. FORCE replied in an email later that day that the 400 bitcoins were “at the DEA.” Based on my review of records and an analysis of the ‘slock chain, this was not true. And, with respect to the 525 bitcoins, FORCE never made any attempt to memorialize the payment or to prepare a seizure warrant, ‘The federal prosecutor with whom FORCE was working was unaware of any 525 biteoin payment ever having been made, as were FORCE'’s superiors at the DEA. As part of this investigation, a federal search warrant was issued to search various personal email facilities belonging to FORCE. One such email account contained what appears to be a note to himself saved in a dratis folder. ‘This note references two transfers of bitcoin payments from DPR, one made it “June/July 2013 for the fraudulent UK identification” and one made on August 4, 2013, the same date that DPR transferred 525 bitcoins to Nob (FORCE). See Exhibit C attached (“Draft Note”). In other words, FORCE’s own saved email note indicates there was a payment from DPR on August 4, 2013." The note also appears to attempt to justify FORCE’s conduct, noting that the government actually made money during the time FORCE retained the payments (presumably given the fluctuating value of Bitcoin). At the time of the 525 bitcoin payment and during the time of the communications between Nob (FORCE) and DPR, I have confirmed via internet service provider records and a variety of other means that DPR (Ross Ulbricht) was physically located in San Francisco, in the Northern District of California. "| For reasons that are currently unknown to me, FORCE characterized the August 4, 2013 payment as being for 200 bitcoins. However, as demonstrated above, the August 4, 2013 payment was for 525 bitcoins. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 9Based on the fact that DPR paid 525 bitcoins to Nob (FORCE) in FORCE’s official government capacity as an undercover agent on Baltimore's Silk Road case. and based on the fact that the 525 bitcoins ultimately ended up in FORCE’s personal account with CampBX, there is probable cause to believe that FORCE embezzled, converted, or stole government property in violation of 18 U. Section 641. Given that these bitcoins went through several different accounts, often for short periods of time, as depicted in Exhibit B, and sat idle in a pass-through account from September 1, 2013 through September 27, 2013, before making their way to FORCE’s personal account with CampBX on ‘September 27, 2013, there is also probable cause to believe that FORCE was attempting to conceal the source of the true source of the proceeds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1956. FORCE’s Fraud as “French Maid” ‘The only officiaily-sanctioned undercover jemtity for FORCE to communicate with DPR was as Nob. Nob was the persona that was discussed in FORCE’s official reports, “Nob” was also the persona of which others in FORCE’s chain-of-command and the federal prosecutor on the Baltimore Silk Road case were aware. When DPR was arrested in San Francisco, he was caught literally in the act of running the Silk Road on a laptop computer. The FBI seized and forensically examined that laptop and its contents were part of the government's proof at trial against Ulbricht. As discussed above, Ulbricht’s laptop contained a text document entitled “LE counterintel,” a record of sorts that he maintained about information he was receiving from apparent law enforcement “insiders” purporting to have knowledge about the governments investigation into the Silk Road. The file appears to contain cut and pasted sections of what the insiders were relaying to him through online chats or private messages One such insider used the moniker “French Maid.” Notes in a file from Ulbricht’s computer indicate that he paid “French Maid” approximately $100,000 worth of bitcoi exchange for a name hat he was told Mark Karpeles had provided to law enforcement, Mark Karpeles was at the time the CEO of the now-defunct Mt. Gox digital currency exchange. The Baltimore ilk Road Task Force was attempting to arrange an interview of Karpeles during the July to August 2013 timeframe, in order to obtain any information Karpeles might have had concerning the operator of Silk Road. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 20Specifically, in a text document recovered from Ulbricht’s computer titled “log,” there is an entry dated September 13, 2013, in which Ulbricht wrote: “French Maid claims that mark karpeles has given my name to DHLS [sic]. | offered him $100K for the name.” Days later," Ulbricht wrote “I paid French Maid $100K for the name given to DHLS by karpeles.” Our investigation has revealed that there is probable cause to believe that FORCE was “French Maid,” a source that Ulbricht paid for inside information. I have reviewed private messages between “French Maid” (FORCE) and DPR obtained from the Silk Road server imaged by the FBI, The messages span from August 26, 2013 through September 14, 2013. The bulk of the messages are encrypted with PGP keys, but some early messages are not encrypted. In the first message in this thread, dated August 26, 2013, “French Maid” wrote to DPR: “I have received important information that you need to know asap. Please provide me with your public key for PGP, Carl.” (Emphasis added). Just four hours later, “French Maid” sent a follow-up message to DPR with the subject line “Whoops!” and a message stating “I am sorry about that, My name is Carla Sophia and I have many boyfriends and girlfriends on the market place. DPR will want to hear what [ have to say ;) xoxoxo.” (Emphasis added). What follow are a series of back and forth encrypted messages between DPR and “French Maid.” Of particular note, there are several encrypted messages between DPR and “French Maid” on September 13, 2013, with “French Maid” including the subject line “Hope you like.” It is unclear whether “French Maid” ever provided DPR with any name. In the “log” file recovered from Ulbricht’s computer, after the entry stating that he had “paid French maid $100k for the name given to DHLS by karpeles,” there is an entry stating: “He hasn’t replied for 4 days.” There is no further entry in the “log” file regarding “French Maid.” The fact that the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force was attempting to arrange an interview with Karpeles was not widely known in law enforcement circles. In other words, “French Maid” could not have been just anyone out of the universe of law enforcement, It had to have been someone who knew The entry gives only the date range of “September 11-September 18” and does not provide an exact date. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 2about Baltimore's attempt to arrange an interview with Karpeles.'? Based on emails I have reviewed, FORCE was one of a small group of individuals that knew of those discussions Additional pieces of circumstantial evidence prove that FORCE is “French Maid.” Both “French Maid” and FORCE (operating as “Nob”) used the exact same brand of PGP software, a free brand called GnuPG, ‘There are different brands of PGP software so it is noteworthy that both FORCE (operating as Nob") and “French Maid” used the same brand. Not only did FORCE and “French Maid” both use the same brand of PGP software, they also both used the same outdated version of that software, 1.4.12, Version 1.4.12 was released on January 2012, and was replaced with a new version by December 2012, and was one of several versions of GnuPG software." As such, both “French Maid” and FORCE (as Nob) were using a specific, older version of the GnuPG software, and neither of them replaced it with the other (free) versions of GnuPG that came out thereafter. | know based on conversations with another federal agent who is involved in undercover investigations that among TOR users and consumers of PGP sofiware, v1.4.2 version was somewhat outdated by late August 2013 when “French Maid” appeared in communication with DPR for the first time, This is not akin, for example, to two people using the same model of mobile phone but both having software that is out of date. Rather, the outdated version that both * nich Maid” and FORCE (as Nob) used is more of a “signature” given the greater number of versions available. There are also additional simifarities between FORC! (Nob’s) and “French Maid’s” PGP patterns. Both “Nob” and “French Maid” left certain default settings on their PGP software, For one thing, both “French Maid” and FORCE (Nob) left a “tag” that appeared on every message authored from their PGP key revealing the brand and version of PGP software they were using. This is akin to, for example, leaving the phrase “sent from my iPhone” on the bottom of one’s emails but with greater detail: it would be akin to leaving a phrase like “sent from my iPhone 6 IOS 8.0.1.” Leaving this “tag” on typically reveals that one is dealing with a fairly inexperienced user of PGP, because someone that regularly uses PGP to communicate would normally have changed their settings to omit this tag. After ‘ My understanding is that that the interview with Karpeles never materialized. 'S FORCE’s investigation into Silk Road began in approximately February 2012 and he began using PGP as “Nob” sometime by approximately April 2012. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT2 all, the entire point behind PGP software is anonymity, so if a user leaves the brand, version, bit, and release date of software on a message this is revealing something about the sender and undermines the goal of remaining 100% anonymous. One of the first things many PGP forums or regular users of PGP. software instruct is that a user disable this feature. Moreover, PGP offers choices of 102 2048, 3072 or 4096 bit encryption keys, with the higher keys giving greater protection. Many of the regular PGP users that were active on the Silk Road chose the 4096 bit keys because of the additional protection the larger key provided. Here both FORCE (as Nob) and “French Maid” used the 2048 bit default encryption key. In addition to the PGP similarities, additional evidence that FORCE is “French Maid” is that the 710 bites payment DPR made to “French Maid,” worth approximately $98,000 at the time, ended up in FORC 's own personal digit | currency account at CampBX. Specifically, Silk Road server data reveals that DPR made a payment on September 15, 2013, for 770 bitcoins. As noted, this is the same time frame when Ulbricht wrote in his journal that he had “paid French Maid $100K for the name that [KJarpeles provided to DHLS.” An analysis of the block chain reveals that the 770 bitcoin payment was broken up into four separate bitcoin addresses and funneled through a series of pass-through accounts in September 2013. Between September 23, 2013 and September 29, 2013, those four addresses all came together to deposit 770 bitcoins in FORCE’s personal account at CampBX. For a detailed analysis of these complex transactions, see attached Exhibit E (“Trace and Analysis of DPR September 2013 Payment to French Maid”). Records obi ed from CampBX demonstrate that this was an account held in FORCE’s personal capacity. Moreover, throughout November 2013, a substantial portion (at least 600 bitcoins) of the biteoins in FORCE’s CampBX account moved to FORCI 's personal account at Bitstamp, a global digital currency exchange. Again here, records obtained from Bitstamp demonstrate that FORCE used his personal identifiers, home address, date of birth, personal bank account, and personal email address in connection with his Bitstamp account. As is discussed further below, FORCE subsequently liquidated hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of bitcoin from this Bitstamp account by having the proceeds wired into his personal checking account. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. 2B1 From having reviewed the entries from the “log” file on Ulbricht’s computer and the unencrypted portion of the “French Maid” and DPR messages, | believe that FORCE’s statement to DPR that he was "Carla Sophia,” a user on the “market place” with “many girlfriends and boyitiends,” 4 [and FORCE’s omission of his true identity, was a material misrepresentation. | believe this information influenced or was capable of influencing DPR whether to part with property, in this case 770 bitcoins, had DPR known that he was not communicating with a female named “Carla Sophia” but instead a male 7 || named Carl FORCE who was in fact a federal agent. 8 When DPR made the 770 bitcoin payment and when the communications between “French 9 Me * (FORCE) and DPR occurred, I have confirmed via internet service provider records and a variety 10 |] of other means that DPR (Ulbricht) was physically located in San Francisco, in the Northem District of 11 || California. Based on the ct FORCE fraudulently told DPR via the use of interstate wires that he was 12 |] “Carla Sophia,” and that this fact was material, and given that on that basis DPR paid 770 bitcoins to 13 || “French Maid” for information, and that FORCE’s personal accounts received 770 bitcoins from DPR 14]|during the same September 2013 timeframe, there is probable cause to believe that FORCE 15 || committed wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1343. ven that, for example 194 bitcoins of 16 || this 770 payment went through several different accounts, as depicted in Exhibit E, from September 15, 17 |] 2013 through September 22, 2013, before making its way to FORCE’s personal account with CampBX 18 |]on September 23, 2013, there is also probable cause to believe that FORCE was attempting to 19 || conceal the true source of the proceeds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1956, “Death From Above” 21 From reviewing one of FORCE’s official reports dated November 12, 2012, I know that around 22 ||that time FORCE obtained information from Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) about an 23 || individual then being considered as a possible suspect for DPR. The individual was named “AA.” 24 | [actual name omitted here for confidentiality.) Due to its law-enforcement sensitive nature, FORCE was 25 || not permitted to share this information with individuals outside the government. 26 On or about April 1, 2013, FORCE created a fictitious persona on the Silk Road website named 27/|"Death from Above.” FORCE, using the “Death from Above,” moniker, solicited a $250,000 payment 28 || from DPR and provided DPR the AA name and personal identifying details. Specifically, on April 1, AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 24201 Death from Above” wrote DPR a message on the Silk Road server stating, “I know that you had something to do with [C.G.'s] disappearance and death. Just wanted to let you know that I'm coming er." for you. Tuque. You are a dead man, Don’t think you can elude me. De Oppresso Li On April 6, 2013, DPR replied: “I don’t know who you are or what your problem is but let me tell you one thing: I've been busting my ass every god damn day for over two years to make this place what it is. [ keep my head down, I don’t get involved with the drama . . . somehow psychotic people still turn up at my doorstep . . . I've been hacked, I've had threats made against the site and now, thanks to you, I've had threats made against my life. I know [ am doing a good thing running this site. Your threats and all of the other psychos aren't going to deter me . . . stop messaging me and go find something else to do.” Later that day “Death From Above” (FORCE) replied to DPR, this time dropping a reference to AA's name, stating “It’s not that easy [AA]. I'm legit. Green Be Friend of [C.G.]. have access to TS/SCI files that FBI, DEA, AFP, SOCA would kill for. In fact, that is what I do . . . kill. The only thing that I do... Don’t worry DoD has no interest in you and your little website. North Korea and Iran are a lot more important. In fact, as far as the Army and Navy are concerned you are a nobod; Petty drug dealer. But, [C.G.] was somebody. So tell me where he is and we will be done with this.” On April 10, 2013, “Death from Above” (FORCE) wrote to DPR again, this time giving DPR details concerning AA including full name, date of birth, citizenship, address, and other personal identifying details. DPR stated, “Is that enough to get your attention? After watching you, there is no way you could have killed [C.G.]. But I think you had something to do with it. So, $250,000 in U.S. cash/bank transfer and I won't give your identity to law enforcement, Consider it punitive damages. Death From Above.” This payment appears to have never materialized, apparently because DPR did not believe “Death From Above's” information: in April 2013 Ulbricht wrote in the “log” file found on his laptop 'S The entire series of messages that “Death From Above” sent to DPR is not included here for brevity. The reference to C.G. [N.B. actual name omitted here for confidentiality] was a reference to an employee of DPR whom DPR had sought to have murdered in January 2013, as explained further below. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. 251 Jf that he was ing blackmailed again. Someone says they have my ID, but hasn’t proven it.” Then, on 2] April 11. 2013, Ulbricht wrote “guy blackmailing me who says he has my ID is bogus.” 3 There appears to be no mention of “Death From Above” anywhere in FORCE’s official DEA 6 4|| reports. However, FORC case file contains several DVDs of video taken with FORCE’s official 5 |] DEA laptop with a screen-recording program that shows certain communications with DPR, At some 6 || point in that several hours’ worth of video footage there is a clip of a message being typed on the Silk 7|| Road using the “Death From Above” account, A screenshot from that video is attached as Exhibit A. 8 || Therefore, I believe FORCE was “Death From Above.” Death From Above was not known to 9 |] FORCE’s superiors at the DEA, or the prosecutor assigned to the investigation, and FORCE was not 10 || authorized to disclose information concerning persons under investigation to anyone outside the 11 || investigative team, including, of course, disclosing information to the target himself as part of an 12 || unsanctioned extortion effort. 13 FORCI 's acting as “Death From Above” demonstrates that FORCE had a history of: (1) creating 14 | fictitious personas that he did not memorialize in his of | reports or apprise his superiors at the DEA 15 | or the prosecutor of; (2) soliciting payments from DPR; and (3) providing law-enforcement sensitive 16 | information to outside individuals when the disclosure of such information was not authorized and not 17 |] memorialized in any official report. 18 FORCE’s Conflict of Interest with CoinMKT 19 CoinMKT is a California-based digital currency exchange company that supports trading 20 |] between Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. | have reviewed a number of emails between FORCE and 21] CoinMKT personnel, including its CEO and Co-Founder. These communications demonstrate that 22 | FORCE had a two-fold relationship with CoinMKT: he we both a major investor as well as its de facto 23 |] compliance officer ~ all while he was employed as a full-time DEA agent who was investigating digital 24 || currency users and providers. 2s | According to the email in November 2013 FORCE invested approximately $110,000 worth of 26 | bite in in CoinMKT in two installments. First, on or about November 8, 2013, FORCE invested 27 approximately $10,000 worth of bitcoin in CoinMKT. Second, on or about November 25, 2013, 28 | FORCE invested approximately $100,000 more worth of bitcoin in CoinMKT. According to CoinMKT, AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. 26the amount of FORCE's investment made him one of the top four investors in its first seed round of fundraising In addition to his investor status, FORCE was engaged in negotiations with CoinMKT to become its Chief Compliance Officer. Early on in their communications. CoinMKT's CEO flagged the possibility of a conilict with FORCE simultaneously being a DEA agent and serving as CoinMKT’s compliance officer, noting in a November 1, 2013 email, “Just FYI if there's a work conflict ~ I'm not interested in doing anything illegal, so if we have to wait until you're not officially an employee [with DEA] or whatever, then let me know, you're the best judge of that... On November 16, 2013, CoinMKT’s CEO wrote to FORCE asking a few questions. For example: CoinMKT: Where would you work? Would you retain your old job? FORCE: I would work here in Baltimore. I'm not sure how much longer I will be staying here at DEA. CoinMKTT: What connections can you bring to the table to help us with compliance? FORCE: I have numerous contacts with IRS-Criminal Investigations, and my Intel Analyst (among others have direct access to FinCEN [Financial Crimes Enforcement Network}) . . . plus I can run queries in criminal databases [database name omitted] for suspect members of CoinMKT. I know from my training and experience as a law enforcement officer that running checks in government databases such as the one FORCE referred to by name in the email above is strictly forbidden if not for an official law enforcement purpose. In fact, misuse of a government database may violate federal law and expose the offender to potential criminal liability. Nor does it appear that FORCE was speaking in the future tense about what he could do for CoinMKT down the road in the event he left the DEA and had full-time employment with CoinMKT, because his offer to run checks in criminal databases such as the one he mentioned by name would have been contingent upon his remaining an agent in order to have access to such databases. Moreover, FORCE explicitly indicated that he would remain at DEA and simultaneously perform compliance work for CoinMKT, In a November 23, 2013, email FORCE stated “you know for right now, | think it would be better if you just pay me in stock options, I will stay on with DEA until AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT ca[CoinMKT] hits it “big time’ I have a lot of down time at DEA so I am contident that I can handle all that needs to be done regarding Legal and Compliance on a daily basis.” CoinMKT has advised that it needed a bank account in order to be successfull in the digital currency field. On November 25, 2013, CoinMKT"s CEO wrote to FORCE stating that a primary anti- money laundering (AML) contact was needed and asking if CoinMKT could list FORCE as its AML point of contact. Subsequently, on January 13, 2014, CoinMKT advised FORCE it was listing FORCE as its Compliance Officer for purposes of contact with a bank. FORCE responded the next day, “All right...let’s hope this goes.” Again, this was while FORCE was still employed as a DEA agent. During the latter part of 2013, FORCE and CoinMKT continued to discuss FORCE’s role as a Compliance Officer. By January 2014, email correspondence indicates that CoinMKT thought of and included FORCE as part of '$ core team, including him on internal emails. For example, in a January 20, 2014, email CoinMKT’s CEO sent to about 11 employees describing each employee's job description, FORCE was listed as the third person after the two founders as “compliance extraordinaire.” Although CoinMKT authored this email, other communications demonstrate that FORCE thought of himself as one of the CoinMKT team and encouraged CoinMKTT te use his status, his name, bio, and || photo in their company materials. For example, on February 19, 2014, FORCE provided CoinMKT a headshot and bio to include in pitch decks for investors." And on January 25, 2014, FORCE wrote inquiring if CoinMKT was registered with appropriate authorities and offering guidance about money transmission laws. In his email inquiry, FORCE used phrasing that suggested he was part of the company: “this will keep us from having the Feds seize any monies from us under 18 U.S.C. Section 1960... . eventually when we hit the big time, we are going to have to get a license from each state that ‘we have customers in...” (emphasis added), CoinMKT has provided numerous emails between CoinMKT and FORCE’s personal email account. A search warrant was also obtained and served on Microsoft (which hosts Outlook email) for FORCE’s personal emails. Some of the emails between FORCE and CoinMKT were included in the Microsoft production, However, several other of the emails that CoinMKT provided were not included ‘© CoinMKT has confirmes that they used FORCE’s bio and profile, and solicited venture fundraising in the San Francisco Bay Area, within the Northern District of California. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 28in the production that Microsoft made, including many of the emails excerpted above, The FBI has conferred with Microsoft about this issue, and was advised that all emails from FORCE’s personal email were provided and that any emails that were missing likely meant that the user had deleted those emaits, In other words, it appears to me that FORCE may have selectively deleted certain inculpatory emails between himself and CoinMKT. FORCE’s Unlawful Seizure of R.P.'s Funds R.P. was a California resident who held an account at CoinMKT during at least 2013 and 2014. R.P. maintained cash in his account with CoinMKT as well as various brands of digital currency to include bitcoin, litecoin, feathercoin, and worldcoin. On February 5, 2014, CoinMKT emailed FORCE regarding what it initially believed to be suspicious activity by R.P, noting chat R.P. had withdrawn “$10,000 three times instead of once for $30,000.” CoinMKT sought direction from FORCE on how to proceed, noting R.P. had approximately 128 biteoin (approximately $109,000 at the time) in his account with CoinMKT. On February 8, 2014, FORCE emaited CoinMKT directing them to suspend R.P,"s account and to “tell (R.P.] that the federal government is investigating him for federal violations of 18 USC 1956 (money laundering) and 18 USC 1960 (unlicensed money transmitter) and 32 USC 5324 (structuring)... will s the 128 btc federally end do all the paperwork...” ‘On or about February 7, 2014, FORCE instructed a DEA intelligence analyst to run a criminal history check on R.P., noting that the purpose was to uncover illegal activity on R.P. According (0 a subsequent report FORCE authored, the only information found on R.P, was that he had previously withdrawn $17,000, had a felony conviction for vandalism, and was a self-employed actor, Nonetheless, on February 8, 2014, at FORCE’s direction, CoinMKT froze R.P.’s account, On February 10, 2014, FORCE, now using his official DOJ account instead of the personal email account he had storically used to communicate with CoinMKT, served an administrative subpoena on CoinMKT requesting that they provide all information regarding R.P. FORCE also sent the subpoena to CoinMKT by facsimile later that day, CoinMKT’s facsimile services are hosted by “Hello Fax,” a company based in San Francisco within the Northem District of California. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 2»On ‘ebruary 1), 2014, CoinMKT’s CEO emailed FORCE to relay that “some feedback from other users... may throw off our thesis about this user's [R.P.’s] activity. Let s talk when you can, I'm glad { caught this * CoinMKT “EO has explained that he learned that a glitch in CoinMKT’s system was not permitting users to withdraw more than $10,000 worth of currency at a time, thereby din inishing the earlier suspicion that R.P, was structuring transactions or doing anything criminal. FORCE replied to this email, inquiring whether CoinMKT had frozen R.P.’s account and seeking information conceming R.P.’s digital currency balances, noting that R.P. may have a memtal condition. On March 1, 2014, R.P. wrote to CoinMKT advising that he had not been able to log in to his account. CoinMKT replied to R.P. that his account had been “suspended due to suspicious activity. Under government subpoena, we have been instructed to forward your communication to authorities. We have ce’d Mr. Carl FORCE who will be your point of contact, please send further communication to him to resolve this issue.” A Report of Investigation FORCE authored states that on February 26, 2014 and March 6, 2014, FORCE attempted to contact R.P. stating “I have attempted to contact you numerous times via telephone and emails, yet have re jus ved no response. I am trying to ascertain if your suspi financial transactions at CoinMKT have a legitimate explanation, The facts show that you are structuring deposits and withdrawals. In addition, virtual currencies have been linked to illicit activities such as illegal narcotics transactions, money laundering, child pomography, ete. As such, | am starting the legal process to seize your Real Money Balances at CoinMKT. A negative response to this email will be evidence that you are abandoning your assets at CoinMKT.” ‘Over the coming weeks, FORCE directed CoinMKT to seize R.P.’s account, CoinMKT has expressed it was hes tant to do so, but did not want to draw the ire of federa! law enforcement, especially given that the digital currency field was already subject to fairly intense law enforcement scrutiny. CoinMKT also felt it prudent to defer to the direction of a federal law enforcement agent, and trusted that if FORCE was telling CoinMKT that R.P. was using their company as a platform for illegal activi ', it was not in a position to second guess that conclusion. Nonetheless, CoinMKT requested something in writing from FORCE before seizing R.P.’s account. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 30During this March 2014 timeframe, R.P.’s account with CoinMKT contained two forms of currency. First, it contained approximately $37,000 in cash, Second, it contained approximately $297,000 in four forms of ‘ent digital currencies (bitcoin, litecoin, feathercoin, and worldcoin). FORCE instructed CoinMKT to seize R-P.’s balances. CoinMKTT effectuated this seizure by creating an entirely new account with the name “R_ seized.” On March 12, 2014, CoinMKT emailed FORCE, carbon copying others at the DEA, stating that it had created the “ _seized” account, providing the login and password information and asking FORCE to “please advise when you would like us to move the funds” from the R.P. account into the R_seized account, Later that same day FORCE replied to CoinMKT, including none of the other recipients on the original message ia his reply, “Transfer them now please.” On March 23, 2014, using his official DEA email account with no one carbon copied, FORCE emailed CoinMKT noting that “we checked the balances this moming [in the R_seized account} and the coins are still not there. Is everything okay?” CoinMKT replied later that same day that they had experienced some logistical issues in effectuating the transfer of digital currency from R.P.’s account to the R_seized account On March 26, 2014, CoinMKT emailed FORCE stating “the [R.P.] funds should be in your account. We made the move 2 days ago but please confirm on your end that you have received them.” FORCE replied, from his official DEA email account with no one carbon copied, “Yes they are in DEA’s account now. Thank you very muck!” [ have confirmed that no such digital currency funds were received in any official DEA account, but instead went into FORCE’s own personal account with Bitstamp, as described further below, On April 3, 2014, FORCE emailed CoinMKT from his official DEA account, this time carbon copying three other DEA employees including his supervisor, directing CoinMKTT to “please convert the 537,051.08 that has been seized from R.P. into a certified check and forward it to DEA ... please make the certified check payable to the U.S. Marshals Service.” CoinMKT did so and sent the government certified check for $37,051.08, representing that portion of R.P.’s account that had been in cash. In a Report of Investigation dated March 11, 2014, FORCE wrote that “on March 13, 2014, DEA seized the following: 179.7977 bitcoin; 3,417.565 Litecoin; 366,511.2876 feathercoin; and AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 3116 621,439,7182 worldcoin from [R.P.] for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act statutes, more specifically structuring financial transactions and money laundering. [R.P.] was exploiting CoinMKT to launder his illicit proceeds.” FORCE did not attempt to translate these various digital currency balances to any approximate dollar values as he had done in other instances. In a Report of Investigation dated April 3, 2014, FORCE made reference to the earlier March 11 Report of Investigation and noted that “on April . 2014, DEA seized $37,206.30 from [R.P]. . . FORCE directed CoinMKTT to forward a certified check || for $37,206.30 to the U.S. Marshal’s Service.” A Standard Seizure Form (SSF) is a government form that is typically completed by the DE. when funds are seized. FORCE prepared two SSFs relative to R.P.: (1) an SSF dated April 3, 2014, for the approximately $37,000 in cash that was seized from R.P.’s account; and (2) an SSF dated March 12, 2014, for the approximately $297,000 worth of digital currency that was seized from R.P.’s account. However, FORCE instructed the DEA Asset Forfeiture Specialist not to input the digital currency SSF into the government's computer tracking system for seized funds, the Consolidated Asset Tracking System (CATS), but rather to “hold” it for “a few months” or until further notice. The DEA Asset Forfeiture Specialist made a handwritten note on the digital currency SSF noting that FORCE had expressly directed it not be input at that time. FORCE included a copy of the F relating to the cash in the official case file of the Silk Road investigation.” However, he did not include a copy of the relating to the digital currency in that same case file. It appears that FORCE “papered up” the seizure of the digital currency portion of R.P.’s account in such a way that he may have thought he would be covered in the event anyone ever asked any questions about it being documented, but at the same time in a way that made it appear as if the approximately $37,000 in cash was the sum total of all that was seized from R.P. Telling in this regard is that (1) when FORCE emailed from his official DEA account about the approximately $37,000 in cash he carbon copied numerous individuals; the same was not true when he emailed about the approximately $297,000 worth of digital currency; (2) FORCE’s co-case agent has advised that she was ‘7 My investigation confirmed with FORCE’s then-supervisor that the R.P. “case” had no known connection to the Silk Road. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 26 of the belief that only approximately $37,000 total was seized from R.P.’s account, and was unaware of the remaining approximately $297,000 in digital currency that had been seized from R.P."s account: (3) FORCE completed SSFs tor both the cash and digital currency seizures but did not include the SSF for the digital currency in the case tile; and (4) FORCE directed that the digital currency SSF be held, In sum, I believe the way in which FORCE documented the R.P. seizure was FORCE’s attempt to give himself plausible deniability by memorializing the digital currency seizure in both a Report of Investigation and SSF, albeit in a fashion that did not draw attention to the fact that it was worth approximately $297,000. ‘The documentation is particularly oblique for someone unfamiliar with digital currency, as many in FORCE’s chain of command were. The approximately $297,000 worth of digital currency funds" from R.P."s CoinMKT account did not make it to any cfficial DEA or goverment account. Instead, that amount ultimately went into FORCE’s personal Bitstamp account and was subsequently liquidated into U.S, dollars into FORCE’s personal checking account. Specifically, on April 14, 2014, the funds moved from the R_Seized |] account that CoinMK'T had set up into a pass-through account. ‘Then, on April 16, 2014, those funds moved from the pass-through account to FORCE’s personal Bitstamp account. In late April 2014, FORCE made a withdrawal request of approximately $201,000 from his Bitstamp account to his personal checking account. I have also confirmed with DEA that no case was ever opened against R.P. Jam aware of no legal basis on which FORCE seized R.P.’s balances. Within days of the seizure of the approximately $297,000 in digital currency funds from R.P., FORCE launched his own personal limited liability company dedicated to the investment in and speculation of digital curreney, Engedi, LLC. FORCE 's Use of Official Subpoena for His Own Fi Gain Venmo is a payments platform company that enables person-to-person and merchant payment transactions using an application on mobile phones or other internet connected devices. Venmo is a subsidiary of PayPal, based in San Jose, California, and as discussed, relevant personnel from Venmo’s compliance division are based in San Francisco, California, both within the Northem District of 'S The precise deposit amount was 222.9989 bitcains. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 31 || California. On or about February 12, 2012, FORCE opened a Venmo account with the user name 2||*cforce.” That same day. a user by the name of “R.R.” also opened a Venmo account. 3 Also on or about February 12, 2014, R.” initiated a payment to FORCE using Venmo's 4 || platform, The note on the transaction to FORCE stated: “Reversing payment #7163719 for $2500.00 5 || from user (R.R.] to user better bitcoin.” Venmo’s fraud controls identified high risk payment activity 6 || and blocked both FORCE’s and R.R.’s accounts. 7 On February 13, 2014, FORCE contacted Venmo by email from one of his personal email 8 || addresses to request, among other things, that his account with Venmo be unlocked so he could 9 || withdraw $2,500. FORCE informed Venmo that RR. was the target of a federal undercover 10 |) investigation for which FORCE was the assigned case agent and the payment was for an undercover 11 || Bitcoin transaction, FORCE attached a copy of his badge and credentials in this email, and also 12 || mentioned in a post-script that he was interested in partnering with Venmo for employment 13 |] opportunities. 14 On or about February 17, 2014, with his account at Venmo still blocked, FORCE served an 15 || administrative subpoena on Venmo from his official DOJ email account, Carl.M.Foree@usdoj.gov, with 16 |] carbon copy to one of his personal email addresses. In this email, FORCE stated: “Please comply to 17 ||the attached subpoena! If you should have any questions, please call me at 443.324.[XXXX]." The 18 || attached subpoena commanded the production of documents related to R.R. and directing Venmo’s 19 || administrator to it the ‘freeze’ on the account of Carl Force, eff ive immediately.” The subpoena 20 |) itself contained a specific case matter number and grand jury number. FORCE sent this subpoena to 21 |] Venmo’s law enforcement contact within its compliance division, who was based in San Francisco, 22 || within the Northem District of Californi 2B Given Venmo’s belief that FORCE’s request to unfreeze a personal account was not a proper use 24 |/of an official government administrative subpoena, and given FORCE’s repeated contact with Venmo 25 | from his personal email address, Venmo did not lift the freeze on FORCE”s account and instead notified 26 || FORCE’s superiors in the DEA. On February 24, 2014, FORCE emailed Venmo’s compliance team in 27 || San Francisco and instructed them to disregard the subpoena. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 34stamp on the si On March 4. 2014, FORCE asked one of his co-case agents on the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force to run a query in a law enforcement database for Venmo, stating that he wanted to collaborate “on a suspicious money remitter, Venmo, Ine. Venmo has since registered with FinCEN, but | want to know if they have state money license remitting licenses in California and New York. Can you check? If not, I want to seize their bank accounts (need to identify them) 4 la BRIDGES and [M.M.’s] seizure warrants for Mt. Gox.” In other words, FORCE appears to have been targeting Venmo for seizure after the company rebuffed his attempts to use a subpoena for his own personal matter On Mareh 13, 2014, FORCE again used his personal email a -ount to email Venmo’s support division, In that email, FORCE advised Venmo that if they refused to unfreeze his account, he would retain an attomey and file a civil lawsuit. In another email FORCE sent to Venmo later that same day, FORCE explained the funds in his Venmo account were personal and stolen by R.R., and “As such, this 82, 500 has nothing to do with DEA. it was my personal assets that were stofen by [R.R.].” On March 14, 2014, FORCE, again using his personal email address, directed Venmo not to contact the DEA again, The administrative subpoena addressed to Venmo contains DEA Special Agent A.P.’s signature mature line. A.P. was FORCE’s acting supervisor during the rel ant timeframe of the subpoena, A.P. stated he did not review or sign the subpoena and believes that FORCE, without A.P.’s knowledge, used A.P.’s signature stamp to execute the subpoena. Following FORCE’s submission of his letter of resignation on May 4, 2014, described above, another DEA employee witnessed FORCE taking boxes into a room where documents are taken to be permanently burned or destroyed. The contents of FORCE’s burn boxes have since been seized and analyzed. Among other documents, these burn boxes contained copies of the administrative subpoena to Venmo. However, FORCE’s superior reported that there are no copies of this subpoena in the Baltimore Silk Road case file, Based on the forego FORCE issued and used an official government subpoena for his own personal financial gain and transmitted it to a third party. By doing so, there is probable cause to believe that FORCE committed a lation of the conflict of interest statute, in violation 18 U. c Section 208. I also believe FORCE was trying to cover up evidence of his use of the subpoena by AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. 3516 placing the copies in his burn box instead of the official case file. Furthermore, | believe that by directing Venmo to ignore the subpoena and not to contact the DEA, FORCE was attempting to obstruct justice by concealing his wrongful use of an official government subpoena for a personal matter. Additional Evidence Concerning Bitstamp Bitstamp is a global digital currency exchange headquartered in Europe with a limited U.S. presence in Sun Francisco, within the Northern District of California, On October 12, 2013, FORCE attempted to create an account with Bitstamp using identification documents in the name of his DEA- issued undercover identity. Bitstamp’s verification process rejected these documents as not genuine. FORCE thereafier provided Bitstamp with his own personal ident tion documents and his true and correct name, and Bitstamp created an account in FORCE’s name. FORCE’ Bitstamp account is associated with a single bank account and with two email personal addresses. One of the personal email addresses contains the moniker “fiat broker.” which refers to someone who trades in currency. The account is associ ted with FORCE’ personal checking account at M&T Bank. On approximately November 9, 2013, FORCE made his first withdrawal request from Bitstamp for approximately $34,000 worth of bitcoins.” I have reviewed FORCI personal bank records and see an incoming international wire transfer to FORCE’s bank account in the amount of approximately $34,000 on November 13, 2013. Thereafter, FORCE made a second withdrawal request of Bitstamp for approximately $96,000 worth of bitcoins. This withdrawal request triggered Bitstamp to conduct a Know Your Customer (KYC) check, also referred to as enhanced due \ce, on approximately November 20, 2013. This check essentially involved Bitstamp asking for more information from FORCE, ‘Throughout the latter part of November 2013, FORCE had a series of back and forth exchanges || with Bitstamp using his personal email account. FORCE responded to Bitstamp’s know-your-customer queries stating, among other things, the following: “I am a Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration . .. and learned about Bitcoin through my investigation of SILK ROAD. I have attached a copy of my resume and a scanned copy of my badge and credentials.” '° All of these amounts represented in dollars from Bitstamp were in bitcoin based on their value at the time of the transfers. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 36It appears that FORCE’s account with Bitstamp remained active after these initial know-your- customer checks, as his personal M&T bank records reveal two incoming deposits from his account with Bitstamp in January 2014 for approximately $57,000 and $50,000, On April 18, 2014, FORCE requested a withdrawal trom his account with Bitstamp of approximately $80,000 to be deposited into his M&T bank account, Bitstamp flagged this request and conducted additional know-your-customer checks. Bitstamp’s review showed that FORCE's account had been accessed using TOR. Given this, Bitstamp blocked FORCE’s account. ‘To unblock his account, FORCE made the following statements via an online support ticket with Bitstamp: Tam a U.S. Department of Justice ~ Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Special Agent who worked the original SILK ROAD website and corresponding investigation. [ leamed about Bitcoin through my investigation of DREAD PIRATE ROBERTS ai SILK ROAD. I am attaching a scanned copy of my DEA credentials and badge to ve my status as Law Enforcement. Again I obtained my bitcoin from investing a couple thousand dollars in the virtual currency in the beginning of 2012 when they were selling at $4 a coin from exchanges such as GetBitcoin LLC (small “mom and pop” exchanges). Also, | have increased my holding of bitcoin through trading, the buying and selling, of the eryptocurrency. I trade in Bitcoin. As such, I am constantly buying, shorting, selling, transferring, purchasing other assets such as real estate through RealtyShares and gold through goldsilverbiteoin, plan to continue to utilize Bitstamp to purchase and sell Bitcoin at a profit On April 24, 2014, as part of Bitstamp's fraud and theft prevention procedures, Bitstamp |] inquired why FORCE accessed his account through TOR and FORCE responded via the support ticket: °° Within a day after Bitstamp froze FORCE’s account on April 18, 2014, FORCE sent an e-mail on April 19, 2014 to another DEA Special Agent whose primary responsibility was to account for undercover funds DEA had expended. FORCE’s e-mail indicated that the Baltimore Silk Road ‘Task Force had hundreds of bitcoin that they want to put into “service” and requested the ereation of a DEA account with an exchange to liquidate bitcoin into U.S. dollars. ‘That Special Agent advises that FORCE’s April 19 e-mail was unusual because it was sent on a Saturday evening and there was a significant delay in time from when FORCE had acquired the biteoin to when he sent the e-mail, I believe, based on my investigation, that the timing of FORCE’s April 19 email was not coincidental given that Bitstamp had frozen his account earlier that day and he may have suspected that law enforcement had discovered that the bitcoins in his personal account were not his property. By sending such an e-mail, FORCE would be able to later maintain that he had tried to return the bitcoin to the government. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 37“Lutilize TOR for privacy. Don't particularly want NSA looking over my shoulder :)” ‘The following day, a member of Bitstamp's management learned of FORCE’s comments and thought it was strange that a government official would make such a statement, FORCE’s account was blocked again. On April 28, 2014, FORCE made another withdrawal request trom his account at Bitstamp of approximately $201,000 worth of bitcoin to his personal bank account. It is clear that FORCE’s account with Bitstamp was frozen and untrozen numerous times during the April timeframe after FORCE verified his identity. After speaking with another then-member of federal law enforcement, BRIDGES, Bitstamp subsequently processed the withdrawal request, and FORCE’s bank records reveal that he received approximately $201,000 to his M&T bank account on May 6, 2014. Based on my investigation described above, | believe that some if not all of the bitcoins that went into FORCE's account with Bitstamp was property that belonged to the government and/or third parties and that FORCE had come into possession of in his capacity as a DEA Special Agent, and not his own personally-acquired bitcoins, as he told Bitstamp. On or about May 2, 2014 FORCE emailed Bitstamp to request that they delete all transaction history associated with his account. I believe, based on my investigation and the timing of FORCE’s request, that this was an attempt by FORCE to conceal his activity. Evidence of FORCE’s Improved Financial Picture Thave reviewed many but not all of FORCE’s bank records from 2009 ta present. I have also reviewed a financial analysis the FBI prepared of FORCE’s financial history. Based on these sources, FORCE's financial situation and spending increased dramatically during 2013 and 2014, Le, the timeframe of the wrongdoing described herein. In summary, for the nearly two year period before FORCE worked the Silk Road case, FORCE deposited a total of approximately $250,000 into his bank accounts, an amount consistent with his federal salary. In contrast to that, the bank records show that in the just over two-year timeframe from FORCE’s joining the Silk Road case to his May 2014 resignation, FORCE deposited approximately $776,000 into his bank accounts, an amount that represented solely his liquidation of bitcoins. On or about February 17, 2012, FORCE began working on the Silk Road investigation, Thereafter, his financial situation improved markedly. In 2013 and 2014, FORCE had total deposits that AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 38eww I have traced as bitcoin liquidation proceeds worth over approximately $776,000. This includes, tor example, six sizeable deposits into FORCE’s checking accounts from his Bitstamp account totaling approximately $518,000. There were also approximately $118,000 worth of deposits from Coinbase, another San Francisco-based digital currency exchange company where FORCE had a personal account FORCE'’s spending also increased after his involvement on the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force. Aside trom his approximately $110,000 bitcoin investment into CoinMKT, FORCE paid off a $22,000 government loan on November 19, 2013. On December 2, 2013, he paid off his mortgage in full, which was approximately $130,000 outstanding. On February 18, 2014, FORCE signed a “Purchaser Agreement” with RealtyShares, Inc., listing his net worth in excess of $1 million, and providing a $15,000 investment in three real properties. On or about May 8, 2014, presumably after learning of the government's investigation and after he had resigned, FORCE wired $235,000 to an offshore account in Panama. Records that I have recovered reveal that this wire was ultimately destined for BTC-e, a digital currency exchange outside the U.S. and that is not registered with the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (*FinCEN”). Based on evidence discussed further below, I believe that the vast majority ~ if not all ~ of this wire represented proceeds of illegal activities. Other ways that FORCE appears to have spent some of the proceeds of his ultra vires activities inefude payments in the tens of thousands of dollars for the Following: * A June 2014 payment for the purchase of a company franchise; © An August 2014 payment to a “Scottrade” account; + A September 2014 transfer to an E*Trade account; * A September 2014 check payable to “Cash” These are illustrative examples and not all of the financial outlays known to the government. Moreover, FORCE appears to have funded the business he opened on the side for speculating in Biteoin, Engedi, LLC, with money from his personal checking accounts into which he had transfered ill-gotten proceeds. On May 7, 2014, FORCE opened a new bank account with Gardner Bank in the Engedi, LLC name, funding it 20 days later with an $8,000 check from FORCE’s personal M&T checking account. And on AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 392014, FORC| transferred $93.000 from his personal M&T checking account to the Engedi ‘ount at Gardner Bank. FORCE’s False Statements and Obstructive Conduct Upon learning he was the subject of this investigation, FORCE, through counsel, approached the government about meeting for a voluntary interview. FORCE signed the Northern District of California and Public Integrity Section’s standard form Proffer Agreement, sometimes known as a “Queen for a Day” letter. This Agreement is standard in criminal investigations and provided, among other things, that if FORCE was truthful, the goverment could not make direct use of the information FORCE provided against him in a future case-in-chief. An important exception to the protections of the Proffer Agr ment was that FORCE could be prosecuted for perjury, obstruction of justice, or false statements in the event he was untruthful during the session, Pursuant to the Proffer Agreement, FORCE met with representatives from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California, the Public Integ Section, the FBI, IRS, and DOJ OIG, on May 30, 2014. During that proffer session, FORCE was specifically asked whether he had ever used. the moniker “French Maid.” FORCE denied that he had, As demonstrated above, this was not truthful as FORCE had operated as “French Maid” in communications with DPR, among other personas. Additionally, FORCE’s conduct throughout the investigation obstructed the real proper purpose of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force which was to identify, locate and arrest DPR and other Silk Road users, At numerous points, FORCE corruptly obstructed the lawful investigation into DPR and Silk Road by pursuing his own personal and unlawful goals. VIII BRIDGES PROBABLE CAUSE Bridges’ Background Former Secret Service Special Agent BRIDGES was also on the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force and worked alongside FORCE. Until March 18, 2015, before he abruptly resigned, BRIDGES had been assigned to the Secret Service’s Electronic Crimes Task Force. His specialty was in computer forensics and anonymity sofiware derived from TOR. Another member of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force that has been interviewed confirmed that BRIDGES was the Task Force’s subject matter expert in Bitcoin. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. 4016 In these roles, BRIDGES had access to and used digital currency and was the affiant on various seizure warrants pertaining to digital currency. In fact, on May 9, 2013, BRIDGES was the affiant on one of the largest-ever seizures trom a digital currency exchange. This was an approximately $2.1 million seizure pertaining to the digital currency exchange Mt. Gox, purportedly because Mt. Gox had violated 18 U.S.C. Section 1960 by failing to register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and thus was engaged in operating an unlicensed monk ervice business. This is not the only matter on which BRIDGES served as the affiant. he Sil Road Theft and BRING! C.G. was one of DPR’s employees and functioned as a Silk Road customer support representative, under the username “Flush.” In this role, C.G. had administrator access to the Silk Road website,”! meaning C.G. had certain administrative privileges on the Silk Road website, including the ability to access vendor accounts and reset Silk Road user and vendor passwords and pins. On or about January 17, 2013, FORCE and BRIDGES were part of a team that apprehended C.G. ina controlled delivery for a kilogram of cocaine. C.G. was arrested and soon thereafter began to cooperate with law enforcement, turning over his Silk Road login credentials in the process to members of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force. During this same timeframe C.G. also turned over access to his account and passwords to other di ital currency accounts to include his Mt. Gox and Dwolla accounts. As a result of this controlled delivery, C.G, was charged with federal criminal narcotics charges.” One of the accounts that C.G. provided access to was a Silk Road administrator account named “Flush.” C.G. acted as a Customer Service representative on the Silk Road site using the account name “Flush.” But on January 17, 2013, C.G. tumed over access to the “Flush” account to members of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force. C.G. also executed several consent forms authorizing law enforcement to use and assume the “Flush” identity.> 7! This should not be construed as someone who had root access to the server. It should be noted that C.G. is cooperating with law enforcement and is hoping for leniency in sentencing as a part of his cooperation. C.G.’s criminal history includes convictions for filing a fraudulent insurance claim and acquiring a controlled substance by prescription alter * Because of concems about C.G.'s whereabouts, DPR at some point cut off the “Flust account's access, but through communications with DPR, C.G. was able to regain access to the account on January 20, 2013, and pass that information onto the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 411 On January 25, 2013, C.G. debriefed with FORCE, BRIDGE and other members of the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force. According to BRIDGES’ report of the interview, C.G. showed them 3 || how to log ito Silk Road vendor accounts and reset passwords, how to change the status of a seller to a 4 || vendor, how to reset pins, and information about how the Silk Road administrative functions worked. 5 || BRIDGES’ text messages indicate that he left the proffer session after one day, and a Silk Road Task 6 || Force member stated that BRIDGES told him that he left the latter part of the January 25, 2013 7 | protte 8 On January 25, 2013, during the altemoon and into the night, the Silk Road website suffered a 9 || series of sizeable thefis. These thetis affected certain Silk Road vendors and overlapped with the time of 10 } the C.G. protter session. ‘The thefts were accomplished through a series of vendor password and pin 11 || resets, something that could be accomplished with the administrator access that C.G. had given to the 12 || Baltimore Silk Road Task Force. 13, On January 26, 2013, the profier of C. continued, BRIDGES left early and did not participate 14 |[on this day. At some point during that day, DPR communicated to Nob (FORCE) that Silk Road had 15 || suffered thefts and that those thefts were associated with C.G."s account. Law enforcement questioned 16 || C.G. about this, and C.G. denied that he had committed the thefts. According to chats I have reviewed 17 ]| from the Silk Road servers and from Ulbricht’s laptop (as well as communications between DPR and 18 || one of his employees at the time of the January 25, 2013 thefts) it appears that DPR and the employee 19 || believed C.G. was responsible for the thefts, because they managed to associate C.G."s account, “Flush,” 20 |) with the the: 5 As a result of DPR’s belief that C. |. was responsible for the thefts, DPR communicated 21 | with Nob (FORCE) ~ whom he believed to be a major drug dealer with the ability to procure hit men — 22 || and hired Nob to have his associates kill C.G. DPR also communicated with another individual and '3 || commissioned a hit on C.G. For the hit that Nob’s associates were to perform, DPR paid Nob a total of 24 || approximately $80,000 through a bank wire transter for the murder, FORCE and C.G., together with 25 || assistance from others on the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force, then faked C.G."s death to make it look | *' This Task Force member was not present for the C.G. debrief but indicated that BRIDG 27 [told him this information. had On or about January 26, 2013, according to chats between DPR and another employee, “Flush’s” administrative account was shut down in order to prevent further theft. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 2as if Nob’s associates had killed C.G. BRIDGES was to assist with perpetrating this supposed murder- for-hire by working on “proof of death” photographs of C.G. that Nob (FORCE) was to send to DPR. Based on my review of the data trom the Silk Road servers. | believe the initial Silk Road thefis were likely committed by whoever was controlling a Silk Road account with the username umber13." Prior to January 25, 2013, “Numberl 3” had been an ordinary buyer account on Silk Road. On January 25, 2013, however, “Number13” was given vendor privileges. Also on January 25, 2013, the “Flush” account made a transter of approximately 900 bitcoins into account “Number13.” This appears to have been the first of multiple thefts that occurred that day from the Silk Road website. My analysis of both the block chain and data recovered from the Silk Road servers reveals that, also on January 25, 2013, a single Bitcoin address received no less than 20,000 bitcoins.® The first transaction into that Bitcoin address was a deposit by account “Numberl3.” These transactions are demonstrated on the attached Exhibit F (“Liquidation of Silk Road Theft Proceeds”). | believe that BRIDGES controlled and/or had access with others to “Number13,” the account that appears to have initiated the sizeable bitcoin thefts. | believe this for at least two reasons. First, ina DEA 6 that FORCE authored dated January 23, 2013, FORCE described how he had transferred 60 bitcoins into a DEA-controlled account known as “TrustUslones.” Data from the Silk Road servers demonstrates that on that January 23, 2013 date, there was a 60 bitcoin transfer from “Number13” into “TrustUsJones.” Second, in an email dated January 23, 2013, FORCE emailed BRIDGES requesting that BRIDGES deposit bitcoins to replenish the “TrustUslones” account. In other words, BRIDGES, in consultation with FORCE, appears to have been controlling “Number13” during the late January 2013 |) timetrame. On January 26, 2013, my analysis of the block chain reveals that at least 2.430 of the bitcoins stolen from the Silk Road went into another single Bitcoin wallet address. These transactions are also depicted on the attached Exhibit F. I have conferred with an individual who has a substantial °° | believe that the aggregate total of the thefts was approximately 20,000 bitcoin. The dollar value of 20,000 bitcoin would have varied dramatically depending on when the value was calculated due to the fluctuating value of bitcoin. At the time of thefis in January 2013, 20,000 biteoin would have been worth approximately $350,000. AC its peak price, however, it would have been worth far more, in excess of approximately $20 million. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 9background in block chain analysis who advised me that this wallet funded a Mt. Gox exchange account totaling 2.430 bitcoins. As noted. Mt. Gox was the world’s largest digital currency exchange based in Japan. Chats I have reviewed between DPR and one of his employees indicate that DPR and the employee launched an internal investigation into who was responsible for the January 25, 2013 theft. Those chats reveal that DPR’s own internal investigation initially led him to acount “Numberl3” as being associated with the thefts. Chats further reveal that “Number! 3” sent DPR a chat on January 27, 2013 saying “Whats [sic] going on . . .. I really need that money back. What has happened to all my BC? Within the past day someone withdrawled [sic all my be from my account without my permission. The fact they must have had a pin really confuses me and makes me think it was something on your end.” This caused DPR to reply to “Number13” stating “Your account is unde! westigation T'm affraid. What is your relationship with the user [omitted]?” During a back and forth between the two, “Number13” wrote, “I don’t know what any of that other crap in my history is. Look at my history, Jam a buyer not a seller. What is going on man?” This caused DPR to reply, “You're all set, sorry for the trouble.” DPR was physically present in San Francisco an the date of these communications with “Number13." The Silk Road thefts were completed on January 25, 2013. Within days, BRIDGES began to text FORCE asking that FORCE (as Nob) get advice from DPR about liquidating biteoins into dollars. For example, on January 30, 2013, BRIDGES texted FORCE: “Next time you chat with DPR do you think he would touch on the topic of how he moves bitcoins, meaning what exchange he uses? He should have some advise [sic] if you will be doing big drug deals on how to exchange all that back into US dollars.” FORCE replied that he had asked DPR that before and DPR would not provide an answer. BRIDGES replied, “Roger. Just curious.” Approximately two weeks after the Silk Road thefts, on February 12, 2013, BRIDGI “Quantum Intemational Investments, LLC,” (Quantum) and registered it with the Maryland Secretary of 27 The individual controlling “Number13” on this date spelled withdrawal as “withdrawled. When BRIDGES texted FORCE on February 23, 2013, as discussed herein, BRIDGES also spelled the word withdrawal incorrectly using the slightly different “withdrawlaed.” AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. 44State, On February 22, 2013, BRIDGES established a per sonal investment account at Fidelity in the Quantum name. That account was associated with BRIDGES’ Social Security number and other accounts in BRIDGES’ name. That day and the next, BRIDGES began to text with FORCE about getting C.G."s help and transferring bitcoins. Specitically, BRIDGES texted FORCE on February 22, 2013: “Whenever you are working next can we talk. [The prosecutor] said you have the gift of convincing (C.G.] to do things and we need you to convince him to do something. Whenever your (sic] availabie can we chat.” ‘Then on February 23, 2013, BRIDGES texted FORCE: “Need your help with DPR if you can. [am trying to transfer out our USSS Bitcoins and they have not shown up in over 30 hours after being withdrawlaed [sic]. Can you hit up DPR and say one of your workers or financial guys bitcoins are not showing up? Iam going to get my butt kicked if this money is missing. After 30 hours Lam getting really concerned, Our one UC account is ‘{omitted name]? Can you use your raport [sic] and help me out? I did the transfer yesterday mornin, It is clear that during this time period both BRIDGES and FORCE were actively monitoring the price of bitcoin. On February 24, 2013, BRIDGES texted FORCE, “If you got bitcoins on SR [Silk Road] get them of By the end of March, BRIDGES and FORCE were texting about the value of bitcoin. On March 20, 2013, FORCE texted BRIDGES “Bitcoin just hit $63 . .. what the slip [sie]?” to which BRIDGES replied “Ya!” and then FORCE replied, “[spleculation about big investors going in later this month. Along with the demand is exceeding supply.” ‘Then on March 21, 2013, BRIDGES texted FORCE “75 doifars now” and FORCE replied “Geez.” I have obtained and reviewed Fidelity records for BRIDGES’ Quantum account. Those records demonstrate that between March 6, 2013 and May 7, 2013, the account received nine separate wire transfers originating from Mt. Gox in Japan. The wires cotaled in excess of $820,000, and were each less than $100,000. Fidelity has confirmed that BRIDGES’ Quantum account was funded solely by deposits from Mt, Gox and no other source. The final wire from Mt. Gox to BRIDGES’ Quantum account was on May 7, 2913. Just two days later, BRIDGES served as the affiant on a seizure warrant for $2.1 million in Mt. Gox accounts, know from my training and experience as a law enforcement officer that the process of putting together an affidavit in support of a warrant is time consuming and often takes several days, if not longer, to AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. 45awe || “Plush” and * prepare, In serving as an affiant for Mt. Gox bank accounts a mere two days after he had personally received a wire from Mt. Gox (the latest in a series of wires), BRIDGES had a conflict of interest. In early 2015, by which time BRIDGES knew of the Northen District of California's investigation into the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force, BRIDGES was working on an unrelated investigation. Under the guise of that other investigation, BRIDGES contacted Coinbase, a digital currency exchange based in San Francisco. However, instead of asking only questions concerning the other investigation, Coinbase representatives report that BRIDGES engaged them in a series of questions about whether and how Mt, Gox accounts could be traced. Coinbase found this odd, given that the stated purpose of BRIDGES’ calls concerned an unrelated investigation. Based on the foregoing, | believe that BRIDGES, or someone acting on his behalf, utilized the lumberl3” accounts, but particularly the “Flush” account to fraudulently act as an administrator to reset pins and passwords on various Silk Road vendors’ accounts, and then caused biteoins to be moved from those accounts into a particular wallet and then into the Mt. Gox exchange, Moreover, | believe that BRIDGES, and/or someone working with him or acting on his behalf, used the “Number13” account to communicate with DPR and fraudulently represent that “Number13” was a buyer account on Silk Road who had nothing to do with the theft to stave off DPR’s investigation into “Number13” and its activity. I believe these communications were material. At the time of these communications, DPR was in the Northern District of California, and the Bitcoin stolen as a result of the Silk Road thefis was in a Bitcoin address and had not yet been transferred to Mt. Gox. For all of these reasons, there is probable cause to believe that BRIDGES committed wire fraud, in violation of 18 BRIDGES" Conduct During The Investigation On April 29, 2014, Bitstamp's General Counsel advised BRIDGES by telephone from the Norther District of California that Bitstamp suspected FORCE of wrongdoing and intended to formally bring it to the attention of law enforcement via a Bank Secrecy Act filing. Bitstamp did so on May 1, 2014. By May 4, 2014, FORCE submitted a letter of resignation after 15 years of service to be effective later that month, AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 461 On approximately May 2. 2014, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California opened an official investigation imo FORCE concerning his activities with his Bitstamp account and bitcoin holdings. On approximately May 4, 2014, the Public Integrity Section opened an 4 || official investigation into FORCE concerning his improper use of a subpoena to Venmo. On May 8, 2014, the Northern District of California and Public Integrity investigations were merged. 6] Between April 29. 2014 and May 5, 2014, an analyst with whom BRIDGES worked at the Secret 7 || Service, E.P., ran several queries in a government database looking for Bank Secrecy Act filings on both 8 || FORCE and BRIDGES. That analyst later ran another query on BRIDGES on or about June 27, 2014, 9 || this time using BRIDGES" Social Sec number, I know from my training and experience that access 10 ||to certain government databases is restricted and may not be used for personal matters. Based on my 11 investigation, I believe that BRIDGES may have directed the analyst to conduct these queries because 12 |] he was worried that a financial institution may have made a Bank Secrecy Act filing on him given the 13 }| multiple transfers from Japan into his Quantum Fidelity account.” 4 On May 28, 2014, BRIDGES was telephonically interviewed by a Special Agent with the FBI's 15 }] Public Corruption Squad in San Francisco, as part of the Northern District of California's investigation, 16 |] BRIDGES was joined by an attorney representing him and also by a high-level superior from the U.S. 17 || Secret Service. BRIDGES was advised of the nature of the interview and of the identity of the 18 interviewer. During that interview, BRIDGES stated that although he knew FORCE through their work 19 |]on the Baltimore Silk Road Task Force, they had minimal contact, and BRIDGES had no knowledge of 20 |J any of FORCE’s activity related to the purchase of biteoins, BRIDGES added that FORCE was 21 || unprofessional and that after learning of the Bank Secrecy Act filing of which FORCE was a subject, 22 || BRIDGES briefed the most senior manager in his office, the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the 23 || Baltimore Field Office. The SAC told BRIDGES not to discuss the matter with anyone, BRIDGES 24 || specifically denied during the May 28, 2014, interview that he ever told FORCE about the Bank Secrecy 25 ]| Act filing. He also denied having owned any Bitcoin in over a year, 1 believe that the analyst, E.P., ultimately confirmed that she ran BRIDGES in the database, 2g || but essentially stated that she could remember whether BRIDGES had specifically asked het to do © |[so. E-P. had BRIDGES” Social Security number for the second query she ran, AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. 4aOn November 13, 2014. BRIDGES was again interviewed as part of the Northern District of California's investigation, this time by representatives trom the Justice Department's Public Integrity Section and Office of the Inspector General. BRIDGES was advised of the nature of the interview and of the identity of the interviewers. BRIDGES advised he had been an alfiant on a $2.1 million seizure of accounts belonging to Mt. Gox, a digital currency exchange. He described himself as a subject matter expert on TOR, and stated that other members of the Silk Road Task Force would routinely consult him on security and undercover-type questions associated with ongoing Silk Road investigations. During this interview he reiterated what he had told the FBI Special Agent previously on May 28, 2014, namely that he and FORCE did not have a close working relationship. When questioned about Quantum International Investments, LLC, BRIDGES acknowledged that he created the LLC as a personal business venture, but stated that he had requested and obtained sper ic approval from the Secret Service Office of General Counsel (OGC} to establish the LLC and use it for investment purposes. In contrast to what BRIDGES stated during these interviews, my investigation has revealed that several of BRIDGES" statements were not accurate. These statements were capable of and did influence the government's investigation. On March 18, 2015, BRIDGES resigned after being told he was being suspended. USSS personnel advised BRIDGES to leave behind his two government ued computers in the evidence vault. Although he properly tendered one computer where directed, he placed a second Apple brand laptop computer in a cabinet directly above an area that USSS Baltimore personnel use as a “wipe” station.” [ do not believe BRIDGES would have any reason to store the laptop in this area, other than for it to be in close proximity to computers to be wiped, as USSS personnel has advised thi not a storage area for laptops. Moreover, after BRIDGES was advised of his suspension, he asked his supervisor if he could access his Dell laptop computer to copy electronic receipts of personal items he had purchased from internet merchants. However, instead of copying receipts, BRIDGES began copying a folder entitled “Bitstamp.” Upon noticing what BRIDGES was copying, his supervisor secured the laptop and did not allow BRIDGES further a ® Computers were left in the “wipe” station for the purpose of having their hard drives permanently erased AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 48BRIDGES’ Money /aundering On June 2, 2014, just days after being interviewed by the FBI Special Agent in this matter. BRIDGES wired approximately $225,000 in criminal proceeds from his Fidelity Quantum account to an account at PNC Bank. He later wired another approximately $30,000 trom the Fidelity Quantum account to the PNC account on or about July 7, 2014. The PNC account was in the name of a third- party with whom BRIDGES had a personal relationship, and BRIDGES’ name was also on the account. As described above, BRIDGES’ Quantum Fidelity only contained funds transferred from Mt. Gox, and based on the evidence described in the lk Road Theft” section above, I believe the Mt. Gox transfers represented criminal proceeds. Given that BRIDGES wired $225,000 in criminal proceeds from his Quantum Fidelity ac; unt (representing proceeds of wire fraud, a specified unlawful activity) into a different account in the name of a third-party at another financial institution just days after being, questioned in this matter, I believe that BRIDGES was attempting to conceal the source and nature of the proceeds and further impede the investigation, Given the foregoing, there is probable cause to believe that BRIDGES’ $225,000 wire constituted money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. CONCLUSION Based on my training and experience and the facts as set forth in this affidavit, there is probable cause to believe that FORCE has committed violations of law to include Title 18, United States Code, Section 641 (Theft of Government Property), Title 18, United States Code, Sec yn 1343 (Wire Fraud), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (Money Laundering), and Title 18, United States Code, || Section 208 (Conflict of Interest). There is also probable cause to believe that BRIDGES has committed violations of law to include Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 (Wire Fraud) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (Money Laundering). I therefore request that you issue the attached arrest warrants and criminal complaint. AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 49| further request that the Court order that all papers in support of this affidavit, including the 3 || atfidavit and criminal complaint, be sealed until further order of the Court or until the apprehension 4| and/or surrender of the subjects, whichever is earlier. ‘These documents discuss an ongoing criminal 5 |] investigation that is neither public nor known to all involved in the investigation, Accordingly, there is 6 |] good cause to seal these documents because their premature disclosure may jeopardize that investigation 7 || by alerting the subjects in advance of apprehension and/or surrender. In addition. for the reasons stated 8 || in the attached Paragraph meant for inclusion at Page 11 of the Affidavit, I request that that Paragraph 9 |] be sealed until further Order of this Court. ‘The government will move to unseal that Paragraph as soon 10 |as practicable, as detailed in the sealed portion of that Paragraph attached. A Proposed Order is 11 |[ attached. 12 Respectfully submitted, 13 4 cee 15 TIGRAN GAMBARYAN Special Agent 16 Internal Revenue Service 17] Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 25" day of March, 2015 botogn 18 Whip Wi 19} a ~ — HONORA MARIA-ELENA JAMES 20 | UNITED STAT |AGISTRATE JUDGE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINTEXHIBIT AB tear Silk Road 22 eseo excoun ano0 anonymous market Searen shop by Catagory won Ferrets i hu DeathFromAbove 0 ome Sena mnsage oS Soot frond Rett read Pirate Rovers, ‘Uenow that you h link you can slude me. De Oppresso Liver something to do with Curis disappearance and death. Just wanted tole you know that m coming for you. Tuque. You are a dead man. Dont '%EXHIBIT BAll times are UTC (Coordinated Universal Time)EXHIBIT CExhibit C Cemail) txt 280.8822 times $607 = $170,495 PATNO regarding the seizure of 200 Bitcoin from DREAD PIRATE ROBERTS ‘the value of one Bitcoin on the date of transfer, August 4, 2013, was $96.877083, that value times the 200 bitcoin equals $19,735.4166 today Bitcoin is selling at $607 ... times the 200 bitcoin which is the equivalent of $121,400 here the government earned $101,665 the 400 bitcoin that was paid by DREAD PIRATE ROBERTS in June/July of 2013 for the Fraudulent Uk identification was worth approximately $44,000 today that same 400 bitcoin which is sitting out there in an on-line wallet is now worth $242,800 (400 times $607) So the U.S. Government has made, to date, in appreciation $198,800 Page 1EXHIBIT DAppendix ‘CARLM FORCE BitStamp Account Anais, USE Used S| US Fon Sls] ype pre ose Pwcmelsresos| Pura ste |“ of8to | wes out |gropme_[ree + " = 2 Tr 5 2 wse0.42 $330.00] 14.45} 2 $350.00 $330.00] — 1a [2 Si,is0.98 $330.00 6.04 z $660.00 $330.00[ 278 z 3165.00 0 2 $5,300.00 $990.00] 13.86] z zazave| S015 84 $990.00 32.07 2 49.2162] Brera, 5355.00| 620 2 = ‘S277 a s35800/ 0.9 2 ERE a] 0 ar 7760137) + a 4 ao 2. SH BRSTaEA 5 cE — 4 z 0008 SE sas7T | “00 z =Tai6} Sore Sar7[ 8.17) z 20] $5,075.40 So4577[ 2201 z “2a SI71 88 seas77| 0.59 2 20] $557oA0 $343.77 {20.89 z Zasieal $025.90 suia77 | — 2380) 2 Sues 50.60 2 $15.06 54 2 Tis05.92 3354.13 2 3357 2 $054.06 7 $5,311.05, 2 33005 z S77 z wesrase 2 520.00 2 $805.45 2 $2124 76 2 ‘$247 89 2 = sse10 | — z $3585 z ‘8852 z 550.12 z sia007 722 2 3557.22 Ta 2 ‘$227.30 ssh 2 3919.16 & 221 2 $195.74 S918] 047Appendix 8 CARL Ml FORCE BiStamp Account Anaysis ZR 5105126. $301.48 “0.01 3381 mo26 2.1701] =| esos] “05 = Soma 35 suas , 5105.74 Soo1 48 EI $252.00 S304 216580] Bi,082.88, 335148 “15063 $257.40. sustas| Oy} Zara 3068 32 savia8t 2.0] 2295100] #18527 soonas| 279 23] $05.74 ssotas| 04 EO cH $2480 $391.48] 009 2. 3105.74 sviae] 047 oN $3.90 s39188] 00 102854 a5 55 “2.03644 515.06 TUE 18 7.51407] $045 S01 suai30132 Bae = = 4.9009 = = a ae wee = Baie 415-16 zi ‘20788 is 16 anaes S1a.64 Sai5 16 22 Bas86.25 a5 16 D3 ‘S207 58, S415 16 Bai S213 $415.16 EA05) $5,000.05 $415.16 Ei 2.50812 $415.16 bea $251.37 5415 16 3.80003] Ei ssiad ~0a| $207.58 Si216.8 | Taa20%9 15:38 aa s207.88 Tuia013 15 3 azaE0R| Si2738 Tirai2013 15:38 “0.33812 si4037 51050 ‘so77-14 “ir 1335 ETAIERI = zis o04864 aaa = = 3 rao 3aa6 | 09 Sasa 253.71 $428.13 505 30.2138] $1036.22 5428.73] 28.0 ota 863.77 Se0.1 [37Appendix 8 (CARL M FORCE BiStamp Accoun! Analysis Tifis013 17-09] 35.7] $16,300.58 saa] wool F1/182013 17.06] T8068] $4,950.10, 5420.13 ud z| $556.25 $428.13 179 z Sar $2008 $428.13 z 7152019 17-1] 4.51076] 354531 $428.13 2 riso%s 1770 -5| $2,140.85 $428.13 z Boa Saaz 428.15, EIT) = is “ah Sai poBD 000, az] Si aeaT $438.00 “a 7788) EIREEEY $436.00 a. Ba a mH oT “ang I a. an04i7 = a] ECTS x = = asa TBS SHED 37.5544 $57,554.36, $4,000.00 42] ‘$4200.00, 5,000.00 2 5 $5,000.00, $1,000.00, 2 Tires 12.0 =Tro078| “11,007.48 $1,000.00 2 e801 12-10 42.7362 $42,756.16 $1,000.00 0 aaaaes| = 29996) = roa SHO OOD S000. iaioTaeA) RE $950.00 omits 1634 ‘oh ($780.00 $650.00, 2 Tans/2049 184] os} ($475.00 08030 2 zroi0%3 16:34 i ($350.00 $050.00, 2 raro1z01s 1634] 3 750.00) $050.00 z sora $950.00 3.060277 $050.00 05 $050.00 7.908 $950.00 25 $050.00 | baal EE 755823] 3950.00 3.25] 352200785 $225.00] 70.02 120172013 19:12 73.46700207] ($36,284.85 $035,00| 72.60] 121012015 23.04 7.897509 ($2796.10) $065.00] 5. Fa e0004z89 14.1559) 505,00] 78.22 740764285) $1358.38) S0es.00 272 2474267) (S238757] 5065.00] 475] e07s8017 94e4a7] — $000.00,| — 6080 ravo1m20%5 25.05 415799751 ($4012.44) $905.00 6.03 a ravonots 23:05 3.034738 ($2,826.52) ‘$065.00 [5.6] 2 ravoieots 25:05 5 20535001 (7937-47) $065.00 | 75.0) 2 12012015 25°05] 6.45031108 ($5 23324] $086.00 —i2ar} z amie0%s 2:05] 1 $965.00 | 19a) 2 aio10%s 25.08 a 135,650.00] $065 00 toshAppondx B ‘CARL M FORCE Biistamp Account Analyis 013 14.15) 2 2 478331 $4,506.55, 5096.00] a. 2 Tae, 3050.00 288 2 s950.00| 19 z 3050.00] Zo z 9.742736 "$050.00 78.62 5 3 ‘3050.00 a} 2 = ESTBD4) ‘$050.00 | #801 2 ‘02 3080.00] 0.04 2 25) 3050.00 | a7 z FESKLISTE) '$850000| 24) 2 2 05000] 3.) 2 7 $050.00 Bo 2 ‘3a 3050.00] 3.77 2 O38 $050.00 0.5] 2 Da00T76| $050.00 1.15} 2 15.0022" $950.00] 78.7 2 03687777| Sos000| 0.07 2 a 3850.00 | 004) z 3.93 ‘sus000| 0.05] 2 0] sas0.0o1 100] z 7823] $050.00] a. z Peace) $950.00] 0.89 2 a $050.00] 0.04 o a] i] 2 Sra STE var z 51,907.50 ‘175.00, — 338] 2 58,743.28 $775.00] 75.40) 2 $5590. $775.00 | F139} 2 3748.25 $776.00] 15) 2 i 508.54 $715.00 | E778] z $61,508.60 $775.00 | 123.02) z "3,258.68 $025 00] 6.52 2 31.387-60 $025 00| 2-78) z 1zi107045 005 $2467.07 3025.00] 49} 2 7215007 008 $20.75, $e2s.00 | 0.9)Appendix 8 CARL M FORCE BitStamp Account Analysis ~20) $16,500.00, $025.00] 3 Ee] 332,961.60, $025.00| 6509 ‘Sua 6e ‘sa75.00| 02] 526.00 5095.00 | 025 B4.717-50, "$028.00 | 83.4 S7B716.08, $525.00 | 780.4) a = io FL a ET) 605100 | Toa} $o05.00[ — ta. 3695.00 | 38.51 ‘3660.00 | 734.24] 3660.00] 207] 7$328.502.55) 3660.00 | 7.1 7(518.288.68) 3650.00 36.6] a5 =a sara, 3680.00 [25.89 12/1905 20:0] 0774 52,70485 3630.00] 5 Parterents 20a Sa.maa Suse ‘set0.90| #834 ertaors 20.07 0.00535) 53.68 3690.00 coi 8.15728] psa v4 $680.00 7 0.75207 $4078 $690.00 1 184.108 Biz 29455 $580.00 753605735] co aa 3640.00 Br.082587 $540.00 10,23063 65] $840.00 0.008489 "540.00 5) $540.00 2| 3640.0, SRBETE| $640.00 i 11489405 ‘3640.00 0.0280 S544] $540.00 (Sis 20287 $640,00 's1,920.00] 3540.00 51,636.40) 3840.00 ($2,560.00 3840.00 272072013 20:02 (51,020.00) 3540.00 ¥zie072048 20.02 ($6,400.00) $540.00 22072013 20-03 ($155.32) 3640.00 272072019 20:03] — $540.00 1272072015 30.03 $640.00 z0i201 20:03] $640.00 127207013 20:03 $640.00 1372072015 20:05] 2 3540.00 127207048 20-03 earrA8a7| 3540100 1a7017013 20-03 ‘ ($40.0)Appendix 8 CARL © FORCE BiStamp Account Anatsie 1473 02004006] 2620) 3640.00 aaa. “D. 36,464.00) 3640.09 aan TaToaRoRs| $1,030.43) $640.00 7a26.47 | 1272072013. 20°03 a) 3640.00, 420.24 | 127202013 20°01 ‘rase20627) 101.89 3640.00, ‘azo [iorup0'9 2009 ot 116887579] $746.80) $640.00, Tires | zar013 63 25a Ei goo. "3600.00 “foi —| raa701a 2a: 160 088) = = 70a. AE ema, 1003.35 53,155.45 "552.00 359.77 $51 30530 $632.0, 59.78 3367 632.00 a52.73 | 1220 $50.45 $632.00 62.08 | yaiant01a1 19 $410.80 3632.00 960.13_| tamu0 13 120 9471 $1230.95 $552 00 960.05 | spies0192 9 aoera ‘35520 3632.00 ‘aa 1_| sozanots 23] 143519) 007 03, $652.00 east | twes7018219 -02| 3126-40 $632.00 a6s1_| tapas 219 21 315,987.70, $652.00 92624 | iaang01s 1) “agra $4608 $092.00 go5s1_| Tagaz0ts 23) “OrR261 Sa6501 $532.00 eas | Tapaz0ts 2} 7.38! $4,300.56, 869200 aT. | 1area2015 214) 9.19202) $121.85 5832.00 21843 287201 31B,157.42 $592, 00 ata zs $128.40 ‘si2.00 aia.z2 $5540 569200 508.22 $9,782.00. 3552.00, 00.22 $1,764.00, "$652.00, a. Syme 3652.00 wg. z6_|raresB032 4 $145.35 3552.00, aes weionz019 2:1 $100.08 $62.00 Frise] v2oao 192-1 sis 00 $532.00 Trig} seps0192 1 14280 $592.00 Tai. rares0132 4 35,520.00 $632.00 Tee | wpes70132 14 $146.38 $532.00 eit | teeazots 2a] 3106.55 353200 ~7o0.88 | Yae87015 2] $196.02 $692.00 ye0.ss [173701324 ‘SES 3832.00 “eo8 | taea0is 2 $5.60 $532.00 752 | tarraa073 2:15 Si 7a8.15. 383,00 ‘Tag. | 1eren2013 2.15 Som $532.00 “raze | Yoren701375f Siaee2.e0 3532.00 Tit 421155] 32.56171 5532.00 Tat Tenge wari 3738.00 arise | 12iorania 72} 0.136867] $107.08] $738.00 arias | ¥2re72013 2.19 Dus100573 i551] ‘3736.00, Bri.ng | rererv1s2 1] 2.26170853) Bi.sti.05) $738.00 ors.60 | wwrer@019 2-3 'in¢700106] isi $738.00 bra.06 | vaora01s2 1 rLaraooai (Sas-74) $736.00 010 [ara 218 s.14954906) (525,535.94) $736.00er ‘CARL M FORCE BiIStamp Account Anas 21 i082. 72:7604952 ($52.605 09) $726.00] 10539 1088.85 5.712600] $724.00] — a5 1081.54 Z00a1 $72400| 4.0 710468 Tas 119 ($0440.05) $724.00] 18. 1110 isn (53,848.10 S720] 77 Tet al HE, a ad 108.13 $735.00 $735.00 1a 90.87 12902013 18) Si0.a80.76 $735.00] 20.97 ss.a7_| 12702013 8) $738.00 §795.00| 1.47 109a.67"| 1219072013 59h $147 00 $735.001 0. ow. a7_[ tenor sal 3735.00 $795.00] 147 rowa.67-| i220" 13a) aoaTa| $4.98 $735.00 004 osrat | 127302015 Tal 125760] 374.33 S750] 1.89 Ei Sas7s.00 ‘373500 735} = =] $5452.50, 8735.00 “Ta — 12rs02013 200 5.6539) $o0.524.79, ‘5136.00 73.5) 12190709200 2.00317 3235 $736.00] 0.01 727302013200 0.00679 3400 $735.00 0.07 273020132 22 5.5016 Bisse 82 73600] 7) r2ra020152 32 0906) $4556.06 573800] Bal 1292013 154 as azaroRa TEE 372500 | 2itas} r2isi2018 5a 04.1752012 (s76527.02|——— $725.00 181.09] DibH2014 57] 1] S700 3742.00 |— 14d oat ez [-orov2014 5) =a 308| Sid 94271 5742.00 | “249 60 ore.c2 | owawz0r + sal 4.00386) $5705.46, s7az0o0| 742 woraaz_|-o1/ow2014 tal =5200% S2sr4.a7 $742.00 479 2 | toro | ovmienrazor E4106] 347.057.35 $74.00] 38 12 Z| a8.37—[osioaa0 10-03 ~Ta0.89 $108,005.70 $7ea.00| “2160 29.16 jowoara0ia re05} 024 316128 Si68.00} 039 Z| 885.76 fovo2.9014 1605) . Sosri20 ‘3768.00 | 525) 60.63 Jovoasa014 To 05 zoe] 39,900.50, 768.00 "356.21 [0702/0014 19-0] 4.4005 53,304.52 3768.00 155.22 [010272014 18-06] 2.004 $70.54 $766.00 ‘54.1 —Loivba72014 10-0] =i.1 $860.16 $766.00 ‘44 55_[0170272014 10-06 =a 30 76 3766.0 834 58 ~[ 0170272014 10-0) 3.0854 [sr 500.36 3766.00 ‘02.15 [010272044 10.6) 2.300 $24,875.02 3766.00 706.98 5.1080) ‘$3,001.22 $766.00 Ta Tir sais] Bisarist 5768.00 TAs B.o0eea| SezmT4 $768.00 795.36 “576i S476 64 576,00 750.56 I $3240.00 5763.00 738.06 ial Sie573.40 ‘$765.00 738.72 26042] $200.00 $756.00 Tear “fl $3,072.00 3768.00 730.81 Jounarabi4 19 39 EiaTia| S354,76 $768 00, vo2/20r4 1:30 02 ‘153.80 $76.00 BIE $3302.40 $7660 Z8a66 32202 16 $786.00 oa0%6 1675 SECT] (SHES) $802.0 1Appendix ® CARL FORCE BiStamp Account Analysis eamse0.47 0 $5,505.05 $1,552.00 762.82 [awoarz0i4 16:14 1502.62 [0us:20"4 F245] Ba02 [oOsz014 2:4Appendix 8 CARL M FORCE BitStamp Account Analysis aa \witiraw [BTC Purcnass|arc Sait | Purchase TC | ofBTC | Wres Out | BTC Price 0.1 ‘$6450 3045.00] 0.7] a 5450 $248.00] 0.17 <1. $8450 $045.00 0.17 4 $53.50 04 $0450 $845.00 0.7 $8450 $845.00 0.7 8450, sea5.01 0.17 $64.50 $845.00] 0.17 $0450 $645.00 1 $84.50 $845.00[ 0.7 3230.33 3845.00| 047] $64.50 “$245.00 0.17 $55.70 ‘3585.00 | 0-1 7 $55.70 "$545.00 ‘$845 3545.00, $8.45 $645.00 06507 355.70 $645.00 2.06502] 355.70 $645.00 590.02 fovnsmr< 1239 1.0) $6.45 648,00 508.92 —|oims20%4 124 D.veed 378.08 3545.00 538.83 |ouDsra0i 1244 0.0924 $78.08 $545.00 598.74 |oios2014 124 [9.0824 $78.08 3545.00 698.08 —lowosi20%a 12d “0.0824 578.08 $645 00 “0.0824 578.08 $845.00 ‘ond $78.08 5545.00 0.0524 $78.08, 3045.00 [0-18 7 Fast saraari $245,004.29 10] '$6.480.00 ‘$245.00 | 16.9] + = a _— sea $845.00 —0.1 05 $84.50 045.00 | 0.1 03 $04.50 $245.00 0.17 ao $04.50 seag.a0| 0.17 0.4 $84.00 $248.00] 0.17] zh 38450 $945.00| 0.17 Hass $02.02 $348.00] 079 0.4 ‘SHLD 5845.00 007 = = $5450 $045.00 0.17 74.55 _[ovos/20%4 12:44] — $64.50 ‘3546.00 | 0.17 73.20 [ovos20i4 Iza) ama27| 3702 84 $845.00 130 855.82 ovos2014 12.45} 18.1684 Sigs ‘3646.00 [3074 1655.35 ovos0i4 1245} 533.80 ‘3545.00 0.07] 352.36 Jowosvania 1245} 32,535.00, 3645.00 | 5.07 549.38 |avvos/o0ta 1249 52:535.00 $648.00 [ 6.07] 649.24 [ounsenia 1245 = $99.00 3646.00 | 0.07 644.34 [ovOsa0I4 12:49 $4225.00 $648.00 [8.45] 543.82 lovnsa014 125 EI $3522 3645.00 | 074 643.51 |ovos014 1249] a9 $350.58 $48,000 -434.52_[01/0572014 12:4] 208 983] $i 597.05 i500 | 383-10Append 8 (CARL M FORCE BitStamp Account Analyle Daly] === = ‘saiance _wndraw 2 | 406.01 [ovoer0te 18:24 185) Sirsa $095.00, 2 |-a10.51[oxeraore 1:29 Te 73 3035.00 2 [43724 [otsr20%4 16-3] 2 TSO5BEBA) $24,003.19] 3035.00 2 }-455.6 —[over074 16:37 4635067325 ($17,16340) 3035.00 2 | “400 — [oroerzore 18:37 440556713 (sa 120.14] — 055.00 es. Zs. tzsatz2a| | 7820.04.00} see 00 496.11 0:98100008] $600 09 $624.00 a8 2 Bis«e.00] $624.00 460,3 —Jown7i2014 10:1] 76008226) 13979 7 3674.00 306 57 [oworE014 7a ais64a0sz Sie 20547] $524.00 2 {so 97 0.00265 152.19] $824.00 2 [coisa Baaa0a675| 5630.53) $624.00 2 e208 “42203 (5248519) | s24.00. 7 —|s2008 0.0025 (82.14 T 3624 0 S24 94 [ovar/20i4 2a 49 (i031 6) $828.00 524,05 ovr /apia 24a aze7 ($220) 3624.00 324.95 —[ovorl20342144 0.00269 ($222) $924.00 225.46 [ovarz0143 a war2.00), $824.00 2 [#255 [ovoriore 21-4 Toor $222 $0240 21226 44 fosvorote 2 —aea| sia. =I $824.00 2 [852.44 fouovizova 21 | 28 ($21 424.0) $624.00 21 soa aa_fovorora 218] ‘a ($0,888.00 $824.00 Srdea oUoTa01a 7149] i] ($8,240.00 $624 00 805.86 _[ovo7@o4 2145 waar 725,585.12) $824.00 606.85 —ovoria014 7149 i $8240 $824.00 808.05 —Jewora01421 45 72] ($088.8) $824.00 2626 ae —[ouor014 21.4] Tem ($15,510.98) 5824.00 2 [ear 01 fovoro1421-48] 10.13 ($8,347.12) 5524.0 2 [ez [ovorzore 21-46] aD 353] 7$21.27036) $2400 2] 680.48 lovo7T01421-485| 7.652440 ($1450.14) 352400 2—[es1.36[ovorizo14 2146] 0.9] ($733.36) $294.00 681-85 |ovo7a01a 7149 T9909 $924.00 6.8 [owo7o14 21-48] 0.05} $524.00 oie lown701421-45] 29 $824.00 roa [oun7i2014 21.451 Triswa00e| ‘Se24.00 7oz08~[ovori014 71.45] 0.05 | siaa.0 ‘Toa —[oin7014 7145] To4s09} ($36.3) 374.0, 705.8 [oin7E0%14 7.45] 1204] 792,640.10} 3624.00 wor. —loinzao%4 21:46) iwes07 (ea s028) $624.00 308.30 Jowor014 7149 7.48052 3526.00 808.79 73989000] $076.00 ~[so8 2 Dg $624.00 suze —SauessH| $624.00 4007 0.05 $526.00 80.77 9909 $826.00 10 —oworania 748) = 2064045] $826.00 B0—owioz0%4 13:04 a I Too owrioro%a 17-24 Eu t =Appenalc 8 ‘CARLM FORCE Biistamp Account Anahjes 549,055.00] 5 7a] (SEEKS ao Ta aDSRINST| $35,172.30) $700.00 3.55830179] ($2830.09) $700.00 0.552608] 544046 $720.00 opoTa625) ($7340 $79900 - 76.179957'5 (560,085.30) ‘$700.00, #2068 wea raaHo} 82000, 6.3865 $620.00 4.99559] $820.00 sia 24 $520.00 = $820.00 eI $620.00, $820.00 ra $0861.70 $6200 4.09805 's330041 —[se2000 200 Ea 381000 : = _ = Tas OO ‘$2400.00, $800.00 roid 17.16) 3800.00 380000 lovasraote 1-16, $5,901.05 $800.00 owzsrenig W716 $200.00 $600.00 fovasro0re 37,600.00, 600.00, $431.07 "$600.00 [0.7 319620 'se0000] — o. 310,008.00 $600.00 | — 20 Si7a1 '$e00.00| o,f 4,000.00 '$600.00|—— a] ap T35 $4,057.08, 600.00 | aa} 0.32205] 525.36 Seon] 0.52 050448] $403,56 80000] a8: $400.00 Ss0000]—— oa} $600.00 000.001 $360.80, $800.00 | “or 30,380.68, $00.00 18.07 2759.15 $800.00} 5.52 33,200.00, 390000] 6.4 ovsr0re 1778] 356,580.28, $100.00 | 778.38 oiasi0%e 1778 $7,600.35, s90000| 3.4 252014 178) $2,400.00 $900.00] 4. rasa i719 $2,156.00 $900.00 439 arash $2,080.00, 900.00 | 16 aro zi $7,600.00, $900.00] 32 areal Tas] $4,000. "3600.00 | 8.3 ar8h 0.55508 $523.58 $800.00] 17 H $800.00 ‘3s00.00 | 1.8 aiosat wise ‘ss00 00 | 723} TET HESTORD TaaTaa| $786.00 | #5148) vz rie0t4 1649 23955706) GzzTiaal $755.00] 455)Appendix CARL M FORCE Bitstamp Account Analysis (538225) "$785.00 Zosrae'a| $2,065.71 3755.00 5 Az2H0374| 1$5.047.00) $755.00 mal $57 998 $757.00 0.1702 $128.54 3757.00 zriaota 22 TZ) Sasrioa $757.00 minute 221 42 3321725 3757.00 ‘owzrianta 2222 “35 325,408.00, $757.00 jozrianta 2222 Drbas6| 3601.55 3757.00 ovarian zeal zi $2,028.00 8757.00 fouzrianis 2222 ai] 35,585.00, 5757.00 fouzranre 2222 =2| $0,084.00 $757.00 lasaragte 2222 staza 3985.49 $757.00 foariagt# 252 a rasa| eoaD Sra7.a1 ara0%4 2528] 4 Beg12.00), 3728.00, xr37720%4 23:28] esTaAaHEa| (4745.4) 312802 0.524200 re $726.00 72:30268506) $52,636.35) $728.00 5.471168 (3620081 $747.00 PETS SBSATETE FHTD 2103] = as sae| Siva 25058 30500, aise] $10,020. 5825.00 Suu 347740, 3825.00 S785 Sisto. 04 $225.00 | $4501 51 $825.00 ziave| $427.40 $525.00 ‘ae0%« 8.0] 1,875.50 $825.00 ‘202720r4 6:00] 42.40 $525.00, 9002/2014 6:0) 118051 $1702.35 5825.00" ‘oaoa0T4 055) SH STE] SOBER $800.00 ‘02,087074 0:5) 70, 38075207 $800.00 nzi042074 95) 114 76209) 60,0 Taroaz0i4 os “a $600.00 oansi2nr4 al "000 00 02] SEs S77560 0877 $5200 $771.00 0205201412 o1278 $0040) ST7176 aaneiz0'4 763 3208 36 S777t1 039,70_[ oaosia 0265 S20421 ‘STIs "oss 28 | oa asia S974 72 Spurr 0.8 | opos014 172 9.4824 S374 72 S767 32.3 o@i20%4 172 a5 $386.50 S17700 “31.68 | aposizo1a 14 Taivea! $492.10, TTT Te “weiss | oopaanre 2] =) E1720 S17720 7000.6 —[-oznsaata 112) aia! 16 304.20 sir 960.6 | oaipez014 121 50} $38.55700 S177 02 360.58 cansz014 121 Bez] $1582 $776.10 960.18 | 0262014121 = S505 $776.13Appenix 8 CARL M FORGE SiStamp Account Anasis 940.68 | Omnezo 4 172 ‘$080.12 $71623| 078) 649.05 | nav06 2014 112 45808 s77603| 0.09 320.72 oposmoie 112 .n0o.82 3776.10 2.69 a7 onne70 112 SUBzIT $778; 5 sai.72_ | opns0%4 12 $2,056.36, s77e.10] a 336.72 | oansz0% 112 =5l 33,880.05, Sreor] 777 320.80 | oamsa0i Ex $5,300.10 s77602| 702 seize | oans0i4 12 3.60508] S677 54 $776.00 | 15.39 B76 28 =i 34,9200. ‘$776.00 | 80.84 ‘87607 aaa $54 $776001 034 ‘87557 =05 $388.00 ‘$776.00 | 0-7) 84.57 = $7760 1 a6T-73 BTaG 35,306.02 716.00 [wed a7 72] oBieO4 179] 0.0) S76 776.00] 0.0) 355.04 [cameo 13} 28792! Sos005 '3776.00| 70.9] 4365 | o206014 1.13 420536 $526,196.21 3776.00 | 652.89} 034. 5—|-onba20r4-7-22 Bia} ao $766.00 — $40 o7aaifoznsa0%a 15 37 EEO Bias, 700,00 | 470s} 307.6 —[ozme2074 2:57 71.81 B11,606.89 $766.00 | —Pea.22 307.08 _|saneizora 2-69 51355) 3505.45 $766.00] 0-7 801.96 [ozme0ie 21 t 0.444] 3736.00 nea 258 $7340 Ta TTD aris] ‘3601.0 0.0)027 002373Appendix 8 (CARLM FORCE BiStamp Account Ana lat Depost BIE wri [BTC Purchase} lore sous USO Usedta Purchase BTC “USD Hom Sale| ofBTC | Wires Out BTC Pree 52.2025955 ($8,375.25 $691.00 “2 (381,720.00 ‘3681.0, ($182.85) "651.0, ($340.50) 681.00, 154.275.02) $651.00 ($1,362.00) ‘3651.00, (31.902.09) 358.00 ($204.30) ‘$651.00 405.00] $581.00 ($875.08 $551.00 $2430.00] Set.ad SE ZERTEENT| (52505440) $6500 $1406.00] $6100 4 158100) $581.00 Zasvisaa| $i,50048) 3601.00 025} i170 25] Seai.00 7 $2,045.00 $681.00 TS TSaToG (s10,73209) $58.00 4.043085 3881.00 849] 358100 Taoa0 10 $59.00 $591.00 8700] $53.00 “a $69.00 $594.00 $693.00 $681.00 fo} ffs ffs fielalshaleolslsblrolshaslslleslolats $501.00 ‘581.00, ni.00 581.00 ‘$651.00 $681.00 ia STINE, 3550.00 51,012.09 $515.00 $22.20 $615.00 $58.20 "3615.00, $61.50 $615.00 01 95 $515.00 $615.00 3515.00 4,950.75, $635.00 1476 3615.00 $2220 $615.00 $61.80 3815.00 $i 480.00, $516.00 $40.20 3615.00 $2270 $516.00 $2223 $518.00 2228 $516.00 [a ara S701 $518.00"Aopen 8 CCARL.M FORCE BitStamp Account Analysis Te USD Ueed 6] USD fom Saog pe Datetme __[8TC Deposit | windraw [TC Purchase|arc Sold] Purchase BtC | of8Tc | wees Out |BTC Price oles 2 enazor4 1205 03] $0750 $615.00 2 zi 5.0, $615.00 2 BA. $700 54 $618.00 z 358.35] $245 74875 $635.00 0 300.0909) = s 2z CET Se $5550 z 5.52506) 33,657.56 3650.00 2 E $4,634.50, $650.00 a $650.00 3650.00 2 $1,950.00 $850.00 2 Sea.s87.50, $850.00 z S24.897.52, $550.00 2 $42,770.70, $850.00 z 34288000 "$680.00 2 $6,500.00, 650.00 — 2 S71 13382 $650.00 2 $1,695.10, $650.00 z $5.256.50 3650.00 z $29,350.58, $650.00 TEE EZ. $640.0 3] 3640.00 “| $640.00 2a $640.00 5 $640.00 70.) 5640.00 mf Fxu066) $540.00 B64 3640.00 4 $540.00 = 7 $640.00 5 540,00 SEiaaTziea) $640.00, 221782613] 3540.00 302 $640.0, O5f $40.00 2] $540.00 aaa 3540.00 029 3640.00 = 322 3640.00 O23 3540.00 pnz2023| —is4.48147) $640.00 3.06554 (si.a747) $640.00 31603772 $60.50 1321787] $640.00 = H ‘$640.00 2 SATOBY $540.00 azi esa "$640.00, 88.177 785 $508.00 740613] 38.91) — $8.00 z ooviarove 21-72 L 75.05250094 ($9,766.08) 3606.00 2 aria te 2472 T 142348 (06575) $606.00Tanarov 24 Append 8 ‘CARLM FORCE BiStamp Account Analysis 224073646] $506.00 “a $808.00 a8a79 $606.00 "3608.0 $608.00 $08.00 "$606.00 3608.00 3606.00 608.00 3608.00 Teas 3608.90 60.8367 $506.00 $606.00 $508.00 08 00 $608.00 $508.00 5258826: $608.00 .paa00 182 ($2,824.10) 3608.00 7 $008.00 BE BEROSTOG 3508 00 $806.00 $608.0, $608 00 3608.00 3608.00 3608.00 STB $600.0 $25 73452 $600.0, $72,960.00, $600.00 $7758.13, $600.00 $30,000.00, $600.00 $50.00 550,00 $500.00 (S77 655] 176,370.00 3672.00] (10,500.53) ‘$672.00 | ($22 25356) 3572.00 ‘$5720 $672.00 ($5720) 672.00 SHi276.10] $2.00 $672.0 Ta seaaTE| $572.00 a $672.00 a sosEDAsG| 387200 5.56123600| $872.00 541276675 537.30] 3572.00, 3 $672.00 Taasueo2| $672.00 azsaus7 $572.00Appendix CCARLM FORCE BitStanp Account Analysis Balance: [796.67 2 $1344.00) '3512.00| 20h Br0.8 = Ti RsasE77| (5700350) 3672.00] 75.031 Bi, 0.32528667| — 9210.25) 3572.00| 0.4) 2178 7.937449 Si s40 57} 367200] tay] ‘igs [oz/iaz014 18-1 38. 18897771 7S65, 965.67 ‘3672.00 | 131.94) ‘960.39[0271420%4 70:13 40.43810579) S27. trea} 367200] — 54.5} ‘or4.r —loariaa014 10-25 4 30021344 S.876.79) $072.00] —19 2 976.08 [o2ria20%4 10-25 1.37869 ;so2047) 367200 97615 757280007] 1546.93 3672.00 9782 0.0788230; ($5189) 367200 058.5 wazraazied) SEZ 3672.00 | — 106.5] nes 78 Inorias La e-l oa ae ee04 00] — oa *fo5a.51[0zri60%4 10-1 arte $405.39 ‘04 00] 0. osse4 |oarisi20ie 19-1 0.05809 3503.52 $608.00 [1 “1052 64_[02/16720%4 10-1 a = $804.00 ‘3604.00 | 124 052.51 |oarie20r4 19-20 2.3 316.72 ‘3608.00 [0.0 “oad 71 fozriomo%4 19-20) 775000 STes5153 3504.00 33.74 norde¢ [oz/e0r4 7921 “13.775 35.5205 "3608.00 16.5] “010.88 [02/1672014 19:21 05821 S357 $504.00 — 0.08} 01083 [oz/ie0%4 79271 1.06238] 59182 3608.00 [0.07 ‘008 —oanan04 7921 “o.02576! Sis7 04.00] 0.04 oraas_ozrirz0%4 10-22 En aay Siar38 $604.00 0.8) ‘eos 419.2 30,0808 i 168.60 '$604,00 | 36.3 360.31 41022 0.087 558.50 604.00 0-121 S031 ia 192 ‘3504.00 S040 12 974.73 19 22 $700.66 sso4.00 | “5.5 ora 7s 19.2 608.00 504.0012 370.28 i. Ser a70.03, $604.00 | F745 area 41022 S175 22 [—seos.00,| — 3.36) 76.38_[oz/i9z014 19:22 $5134 3504.00|"—~o: 74.38 ozriva0ia 10:22 Siz08 00 3504.00] 2. Bra. 52275 $804.00 0.05] ara ‘i838 3593.00 | 0.0 ara $50.05 sos [0.12 ark 08 SIT $593.60 0-18 373.95 —— ‘$7708 $592.02 [0-19 2a e837] = $3500.00 $503.00 4 29a 26.5837] $i551730, $595.00 3154 2 aaa s 0.02] Sites oo a 2 ae ae 1.03 $47.36 $692.00[ 0 528.26 =0.13 S778 s50250) 09 Bas. -a.aes62| 3505 57 ‘3500.17 [1.17 a2 24 Bi480.25 ‘$502.10 | 297) 0, ;| Si77335 soui11 | 335 2p ss 14 18:2 $2,304.40, ss01 10) 73 2 [esos foziei2014 10.26] $2.085.60, Ss01-12) 594 2 [925 ai —foateo14 15:2] $2,955.00 ‘ssu00 | 60 2 {#081 oziano1e 1:26] $2.950.90 $500.18) 581 2 Twi a8 14 10:2 3430557 3502.00) 6.8) 2 [aos. 11 Poareaoe 15:26] S495170 ss1.12] 94‘CARL M FORCE BtStamp Account Anas 300.17 ane 500.7 Ea 738.96 1926} S73z7 $500.17] 0.49 709.0 —[oarera0i4 1o:26) S47z1 S607] 04 799.85 $6.02 5500, B02 790.70 3sa.02 3500.17 |p. To9.74 S20.51 ‘3690.17 | 0.06) Tos.7a $600.17 ‘500.17 1.79 708.57 Saiar ‘500-17 | 0.09) 708.57 $60.02 $500.17 | 0.1 708.07 i 10-26] $295.08 sso0-i7[— da} 703.57 _|oarig0%4 18 29 500.75 3500:17| 52) 703.54 Joari6i20%4 10:24 $18.50 500.17 “O00 "78.50 loz/i620%4 19-2) "20.1 3580-17 | 0.09] 7o3.54JoaTiga0%4 1829 saat 3500-17 | 0.06 7ai40 1419.29 $2078 3580-17 | 0.09 76.40 419.24 Szs60.55 $500.17 sa 755.30 1929 $1700.36 sear 2a 758.20 tea ‘02 $500.17 [0-2 706.26 41829 03 $2057 3590.17] 009 745.14 foarirz014 19:26} oa S002 $500.17] 0.1 735.6 [oaTi20i4 10 25] 085] 31784 5590.17] 4 TSi.8 3230058 3590.17] 473 Tre ‘32,530.82 ‘$500.17 | sar] Tris S1,770.51 "$590.17 | 3.5] 768.6 52,050.85. ‘3500.17 [sa 768.30 $240,47 $500.17 2] Tes 50051 ‘$500.17 2 Tore $500.17 500-17 Z| sre = S.00170 ss00.17 [Fas ‘2 [ear.r4|narie2ove 1027 as0a| Sis 170.02 So00.17 | 70.8] 97 88 [ozrior014 10-27 0891 554.05 $500.17 0. ‘686.63_[oz/16z0%4 70-27 1.04206] $eis 01 $500.17 | 12a) 59653_[0zr1672054 18:27 “oa $5002 spo017 [0.1 696.5 —loarigaur4 70.27) 3 $1630, ssoo.1r | oval Bo6.3lozriezo14 1027] aris] 321007 $500.17 [0-4 95.63._[ozisa0i4 70.27] 04 $295 08 s500.i7| 0 590.36 [ozrie0i4 10:27] Eri $005.12 so00.17 62) 650.36 0.02 i180 5590.17 009 689.06 =i $2607 $600.17] 049 3609 a 535.7 s600.17] 09 e685 Ziso2i Sista s500:17] 25.15) 5555 0] $6,001.70 3500.17 | —F18 5385 20) $1603.40 ‘500.17 | — 256 Bist EDI 1,026.16 3500-17 | 70.6 s19.20 0.02] ‘S180, ‘500-17 | 0.9) sis.z4 0.05] S205 $550.17 | 0.09} 01.03 [aziieo14 1827 “TTs0ea| Worse $500.17 | 13.35] 541.90 |oam20%4 1027 = $510.20, $600.17 | Tog Hie ig] $2051 $590.17 | — 019 SH0.38 =e 3007.74 $590.17 [1236.34 _|oariqani4 taz7 = $2,500.85 S007) 61 51585 siaannal 31272795, $5300] 2446 235.38 200591 176,772.05 530.00 | 35555 53536 Ea STs TOO.OD} s6r0.00| — ari 535.36] 02/202014 15} 00854848] S300] $528.50 | 001 76588 Ozonia 8:9) 23.3140817) SHEN $623.00] —2eea0 39.35 |-02720 7 75.59801829 (sar i517) "3625.00 — 94.31 = 50.14 [0220201 20-781 12079 “1512,038.06} ‘s576 00] 24.08) 69.24 [02/2000 3. 1000118| REET s570.00| 380 B0s.e4lozz0n0i: 2h ($1386.60) serasn] 279 855.69[027070% Doaaesoo1 (52610) $573 00 [v9 807.69 oz2020% 7B15500 Sova 00-239) 575.1600 20204 70604007 (5434025 57a 00 —t9} 875.23 loazoa0ie 1729 10.04853051 152599 | ssre00]—a.08 882.15 |oazoz014 1728 5.02 “4.006. $3575.00 6.09) 3824 [ozion0%4 17:25] T2STETSsE| ($146.24 3570.00 924 fozora0%4 17-28) “a 35,100.09 357500 ozs loz0r20%4 T728) opens (525.75) $570.00] 0.06) ‘6&5 jozZ072074 1728 72.30875862 TCARIEES) $575 00] 604) ‘6.56 fozeonu%a 1727 22.00619477 ($2 14274) $578.00 | 25.0] "ie, 65_fogrorzot 172 Ea] $25,350.00 5578.00 #7] 1036.0 |oaizorania i777 Ed 25.00) $570.00] 009 7038.16 "20182344 75132) 5978.01 15 04.25 054 Si768271 579.00 | a5 aDat.as 7 15.50) s573.00| D4 a8 ooaBT0208| 22.06) 367.00| 0.05 abaaze 8 Si,c8220) 3572.00] 200 049.52 Taabass| $20.18) 3578.00} 005 [-soan.35 0:05350605] $192] ‘3570.00 | v.04 “04, 5.4309 207.69] ss7a00| 654 7040.75 75223358) ($4355) sereoo| 0s 005.38 Baa) ORE 3556.00 | 8038 305.16 “7-18502) 108.25 $555.00] 0.2% or 8e iT 944 $H.708.35 $556.00 —vo.al area 0.03 S2775 $555,000.09] 71.26 ezroe2| ‘500.00, 3556.00] 7.09} [oe0.83 =1a773 $702.15 355500 159} ‘966.02 | opiat2014 047] 8107] Sz i145 3555.00 423) ‘si 72 | ozenZovs 0-47] =a 3017 S1887-43 3555.00 | 75.9] 35,1 | warziaora oar =161823] S608 12 3555.00| 1 062.1 barns 12] 7 ee mDD $540.00 | 770.10 0st75 BEET $1058 3555.00[ Ol 02067 31.079 Sir.a08.20, $579.00] — 35.84 wiser =I 99517] —— $4006.25. 3573.00] 8.02 e977 16, 5068] 5058.45 $573.00) —Ta90 3574 “o.czTsal 515.05 3573.00 | 004 595.5 0.84 $oor.20 $573.00) 0a wo 88 2.858 S375. 3573.00 [076] 366,30 BEGE Eee $573.00] 64 {ser 205] 146.50 3573.00| 235 i= 74053) ‘300721 $573.00 2150505] S28 $575.00 ETRE 3573.00 $2,124.25. $587.00 326,488.50, $597.00 312,345.78 $587.00 $507.00 - $587.00 355,909.00, $597.00 ‘SBT $507.00 sitgra72 $587.00 "3587.00, "3530.00 36.512.52 $650.00 $8,054.00 "3630.00 $126.00, ‘sex 00 Foo.s2.52 3630.00 ‘580.78 3530.00 5 SOTA ETO $610.00 4.67837205 $610.00 3.29701553] $610.00 $510.00 327242014 000) 851000 ‘a/2aro0'a 0-05 3810.00 ‘zat 0-0) 5810.00 rane 000 2500.0) $610.00 242014 0-0 1510.00) $610.00 Gor242014 0-09] $610.0, Garza2014 0:0] $610.00 tzrearova 22 Ton AanE $577.00 ozreaz0i4 2 234 71.30016176 357700 aziauzoi4 2 24) ZATTO8sa| (431420) $577.00 ‘arzarani4 2:45 4.035665 $2574.78 $577.00 7a. 10206879 sib. $577.00 38.02426'72 ($35,450.04 $67.00 0] S680 7h "$575.00, RET $485.00 $2,048.30 $485.00 $506.32 $485.00 32,425.00 $485.00 $1,708.85 $485.00 Bazis4| $485.00 58.1287 $20,102.41 $435.00 225704 409) 0065 ‘$6401.25 $800.00i Appenclx 8 CARLM FORCE Bi p Account Analysis rk amr $1000.50 $600.00 896.3 0069 ‘S315 $500.00 021.57 8.7548 $agr7 30, $500.00 2 eas =5| S2:500.00, $500.00 2 sore? oarzsz0ta 4 1 2.011 310,480.56, $500.00 2] 995.19 oars a0] 810 $4,240.06 $500.00 2 | -aozoa | oora20 =O 3125.00 $500.00 aot ozs 50006] S75153 $500.00 ao0.a4 | ozs 1 3500.00 $500.00 aso.t4—| 0770 =a] $5,000.00, $500.00 s76.02 | 0720 aie $2.208.40 $500.00 2975.95 | oar2520 oT $3550 $500.00 2 [805.6 | o2ro820 =o] 35,000.00 $500.00 2 es0.15 | oerasoie 1] a $3,401.87 "$500.00, 2 [seo a7_[ oars «2 inasaTaiT| siazs77 $470.00 ess.65 | 07600 0.750183} 1788) $470.00 505.45 | ozo 453 Bi raareat Tt 129.53) $470.00 24.08 | 02520 10.5341 (60-161. $470.00, bea.72 | oviesmoia a3 18,74069 ($0278.12) ‘470.00 0225/2014 45] Te u2000042| ($7,956.63 "$470.00 2 [ote 15 foaiasan 4 1608] TEs SOREN $520.00 2 [wos foara5074 5.05 2.085 55452 "$520.00 — 2955 94 |narzer20%4 1:05] urs 33.101 52 $520.00 2 [sts —foobernra 1512 947] Sipser $521.00 ari.7_lozesiao14 15:15] 20578) ‘S672 TT 3520.00 trad [ozs014 15.15 a2 $109.77 $520.00 ‘9a 7 [0z57014 15-15 35.50.44 3520.00 125.64 [0z520%4 15.18 Ser Tea $520.00 2 [25 66 [nares 4 15:75 soz $520.00 2 [128 65 foasroie 155) =o.00612] 33.18 $520.00 2 [935 97 [oasr014 16 ~1-007a 5305 3520.00 2 {e512 [nares is 6:47 Sas87 | Hess $520.00 76186 5.4737] $08 2 3520.00 308.08 2156 52] $00,510.04 3576.00 B05 zi $578 00 $578.00 8021 EZ $500.87 $576.00 30827 i $576.00 $576.00 2 sera $576.00, $578.00 2 [sar 14 [026720141508 =aaTia| $5,521.50 $578.00 2 |se5'9%foaerota 16:0] 0.23226 $136.25 $578.00 2596 48 aa207| $2550 $578.00 505.45 $576.00 $578.00 4.46 fozes014 16.05 575.00 $578.00 354.16 lonen0i4 To9 S74 57 3578.00 575.16 _|oz262014 18.5 $5,205.65, $578.00 2 | s74-16 foz67014 16.5] $575 00 $578.00 2 [87403 ozs 156] S7z25 $578.00 2 [87353 fonmerore 1as| 320000 $578.00 2 [sets 026014 16.6 35,1705 $570.00 2565168 [ozger014 16-05 $576.00 587.00Appendix B ‘CARL M FORCE BitSlamp Account Analysis (cena eae aeres20 4 4 OR a Ti.s4036] S07 ai 5620 cE) (SH12.34550) = Sagoo 2 asia $36,205.30, 2 Sarai $3,238.52 2 “B44! S41547 2 2 18518 $1,065, 2 18,069 312.5770, z =o] 36,880.00, 2 aaa 33,728.45, z Taasa0nns| 2 D6 2 si20%8 20,00 wivea 8] 2 agmavzors 20:01 24 9067052 z i 2 i z 5 2 3.01 z “7 z ‘asi6s2 z aa.asT5628 z ostsa0ta 200 x 2 fosts201¢200 2.084 z 77096604 2 0.495) z ‘O.05f (52275) 2 BUTTS] 5.580.10} z EOUEIS| Saw 2 27837 Sisar 73 2 0.08 $53.08 2 ains28) 35,108.39, 2 eT Sirs] 2 ‘2.02800 ($2,005.03 2 asia 7$58.428.55 2 4.45247080 (30,784.73) 2 2.9776878i ($51.64) z Sas z osins/2014 23:19 335,465.08 Zz, siosrania 2520 S25146 z ossre0r4 23:20 $1,758.50 z oosvente 25:20 $062.75 2 35730555 2 3132056. 2 $5.55 zl 385.00 z $770.17 2 31,342.00 2 nio320%4 232 $1,342.00,Append CCARLM FORCE SiStamp Account Ana}ysis BT Saas USO Used is | USD fom Sales Deposit | witharaw Purchase ore | of rc z S118 28 z Tiss z SI7.83 z 320130 z $1387.25. z $489.30 2 $ia.901 5 2 | 558-20 |oaesa0rs 23:23] s1021232 2 | 55 36 [osms0r4 2523 352403 z Zr aar6] — ($18,107.76) = ‘3555.00 2 wa4573704 265. 3558.00 z 6.703085 '54487-19 3853.00 2 736.5540035] $90,608.80) $885.00 Zz 1.82662526] 51,286.09) $656.00 z iorssr472| sri709 $598.00 : 3 PAE $875.00 z 3140482 3875.00 2 = = $1,404.02 | 3875.00 z 30.508] $20,647.22, $875.00 2 58.8174] 7 $99,70177 ‘3675.0, z saa $2492.26 $575.00 2 PELE "3655.00, 2 0.35087] $555.00, 2 7120084 "$655.0, 2 3.034530 ~ 3585.00 2 Snes] 3655.00 2 L 78.86 165840 3555.00 2 163 {$107,250.00 ‘3650.00 z Saar $620.00 z $438.58 ‘3620.00 z 405 62, 3620.00 Zz ~ [ss $620.00 2 5355 08 $620.00 z $i,006-20, $620.00 2 $2746.98 $520.00 2 $598.30 $620.00 2 $aoe8.22 $520.00 z Siz "3620.00 2 36.20 $20.00 2 $49.60 3520.00 2 518.60 "$620.00 z “} $5705.29, 3620.00 2 $1200.24 3620.00 z $70,784.63, $635.00 2 "2248297 $695.00 2 [sie28 os7i20%4 20°08) = $5.198005 3535.00Apponaic 8 (CARLM FORCE BitSiamp Account Analyse Daly aT =] USD Used Tye | Boiance | _Datotme [src Depost | winraw |aTC Pur Purchase BTC Notes. 2 | 506.05 [0370712014 208] 2} 51 [os077204 20:08 2 z z — 2 7 $1,252.66 2 $2,505.26 z Sia.86e.37 z 35 z 7 S191731 2 EXIA Baa — z ‘0.85347809) z = wa.0ns27018 = z =] SEZ z ToaTaseaag z 3452141519 2 eal Soa. z 373560) $2346.10, z Taso z 34. 40540772 q z 31.90636735 3900.00 38.4 z 73.00361264 ($43,002.17 $500.00] 67 z L SADE 3553,00 | 68.1 z $5,162.69 $583.00[ 634 z Sio,t3e.20 3583.00 | 2027 $202.08 3583.00 0.59 $352.31 $593.00 | 0.7 $202 06 $593.00 0.50 [si 748 00 | ss83.00— 3a] 2 $2267.87 3593.00 | a. z $202.08 5683.00.| 1.80 2 7 $292.08 $583,000.50 z 328.50 $583.00 [039 2 = $292.08 $583.00 | 0.0 z $200 88 $583.00 [0-2 2 Ei707.40 $583.00 3. z 323,248.05, $593.00 28.5 2 $202.08 $583.00] 00 z 3406.79 '3553.00 | 6.04 z 520208 $583.00] 00 z Ba7e4.48 $583.00| 533 z 8 7 = 320208 $683.00] 0.0 2 ‘Ou21014 641 $553.00 $553.00 1.17Appendix 8 ‘CARL M FORCE BitStamp Account Analys 2 2 $76 17005) 2 755297804 z 408704259 2 = 2.00578507| z ao.34196407] 2 : siaDeas $580.00 2 31,948.13 5509 2 $e. 240.52 $500.0 z ‘SL850.27 580.00 2 2 $eaz01.22 = ss80.00 z 204 eis za) $570.00 f 300] ($188,000.00 3550.00 ase] — SaaS $563.00 “25.608 $48,241.45, 356300 “130817 574,585.55, $570.00 | = 8.81635] SBT $570.00 ] 162.5671 — 302,583.14 $570.00 i Taree (SERA $480.00 ‘zal 580,00 PRL 3580.00, 012500004] $590.00 “70a EONS $500.00 52.0316] $96,598.55, $500.00 oral S12288.76 $690.00 aT oOS50R| 3575.00 Be 59846007 3575.00 2.45 782652| Si41325] $575.00 032572074 1535] 52763062| ($578.39 [$575.00Appendix 8 CARL M FORCE Bistamp Account Analysis oats [USD Rom Sales] 0807 Ts) Purchase STC | of BTC | Wires Out 4864 —oa7igo1e 14:40) = a aa a al a za a aa c zm z = a 2 aa 2 arzrianv4 1440 2 a0 2 a z aa a 2 asari0%4 1450 $515.10 2 =] 3.0884 53525 2 si 0.974 $501.76 z 22 =r87574| $3.053.01 2 5a) 310-7654 $5,546.00 2 22 “347101 51,787.57 53 2.00764 54,538.95, z za) 0.92208] 7487 z 3 351.50 z os a Bra2.88 $515.00 2 | aaz 95 [os77014 14:5 551.50 3515.00 2 | 490.53_10927/2014 23 02 ($51,510.00 $505.00] 103.02) 2 [490.45 lowarizo%4 23:5] nae saat $475.00 008 2 {490 06 osavizoia 29:50 9.36808] 375.32 $475.00 | 0.39] 21-495 93 losevzovs 23:50 2.1450) Saves $475.00 2.0}7 bat [To _ ge | alnce 6 post | wha Purchase es out gave azn 25 =Dazeed S135 S750 sre —[oatsrania 350 =r2trig| San $475.00 a7 o2.0 $475.00 ayaa Sane 547500 a8 S7E0 $475.90 rez $2575 $475.00 at 355700 $475.00 2 asa e003] $475.00 ara Sse $475.00 aGE7 $1350 $475.00 45775 $45.08 $475.00 e573] oazaaa¥e ba $9500 ‘475.00 45723 oazazore 00 3409537 $75.00 E #565-—[ oazEao14 090 = Saasz[ 3475.00 — 1 $475.00 37500 547500 Seren z #0626 37500 z 75.10 547500 z $404.00 z $5400 z $54.99 z Sen800 z = a S440 z 40851 $4540 2 STSNDT S540 z 527261990 E $440.00 Z ISTE (S105 19 = $440.00 z 2 ‘Srt.oor co] 4.00 3 FGETS T2003 $40.0 z O54 $2078 S400 z SERRE Bi,69199 $440.00 5 2am a $0520 Z "a Ferra $5200 “E5007 32,9062 $5200 = zr $358.10 $8200 “B53 Sag s0452 $452.00 50071 23,708.08 $452.00 405 s2at7ah S520 cas Sri00 Sas20 “nat 35023 26 345200 2 : TezraBbs3 sara 5500] — 0:8) 3 31645 eer e7505] 45500 — 22 z 3a 183800) Sissoo| —“sa z 2 $5100) $45500| 122 2 aaaniasie| ——_| “157787 $455.00] — 05 z ma SRE sa5050[ We 2 “24 $1575 $059.50] — 028Appendix 8 (CARL FORCE BiStamp Account Analyeie Datetme lar peposit ae windraw sTC Purchase} Purchase BTC USD Used [USD fom Sale bamsi0v4 23:70 ‘papsrani4 2528 ‘owosra014 2520] fowosr2ni4 93:28 owaonra 23:25 oansi2ni4 2525 oaosranta 2325 fowosonva 2329 oaosianta 252] loapsreota 2327] hss} ffabalstlmbelelelaalshalasalslelball fh} fol sia97378 ‘$450.50 | 70.95 sioa0aT) $446.00 [2081 ‘$446.00 | — 5:3 ‘446.00 [024 589} suse 00 — ia ‘$446.00 6.05] ‘as 00 | 0.05} ‘$446 00] 1.35) ‘446.00 2.14 “sae 00 | 28) '46,00} 0.04 ‘sade 00 [02 ‘$445 00 0.05) $446.00 0.05} =| $445.00 | 0.051 449.00 001 1 $446.00 0.0) $248.00 0.79) 324.9911 $45.00] T1144 5.150836] 3245.00] asa 3.572044 $46.00 6.6 = 7454305668] = $446.00 13.07 2e.00073285 $729.00 25.0 15109332 $429.00] — 12d 4.074 $429.00 7209 0002 x $429.00] — 0.08 73 $3217.50) $420.00 6.4 amma 7s, 39748) $429.00) 2321oariao14 325 Appendic 8 ‘CARL M FORCE BitStamp Account Analy O38 (S347 49] $423.00, oari02014 3.25] TasazODA Biz831) 475.00 parioraora 6:32 7H EERO 392.00 Dariorota 2 0 BF oaDsTE (SaseA OA $507,00 narioraore 2204 150 (s5.718.80) $39.00 pariareore 22.04 a755544) (s60.7] "$361.00, artoraore 22:01 Daze] 16130] ‘381.00 ariarors 2701 772550772) 55 574.18 5361.00 oart12014 0.27] 324807606] ($1,196.89 3360.00, oariuZov4 027] ‘ (S250, $350.00, Dariaoi4 0-2 ara ($565 3850.00, Darr2014 0-2 2.157058 ($754 3350000 arti2014 0:28 3.46957 (64 $350.00 art 12014 0:30 Bimnrer | — (38.3675) 3320.00 art 2014 0-30 7 $25,200.00] 35000 ari20%4 0:90 3| 750.0) 3350.00 4/1204 0-9} Bel 7519.27100] $350.00 Dari20%4 0:4 423 $1,400.50 $350.00 a 9.325.00) $350.00 | $420) 3350.00 G09 TiA03-52 $350.00 error 60670 ($7975.55) $350.00 aT SEE $368.0 10-287 $40,504.75, 3368.00 arora 1237 580116] $1,387.20, 5430.00 oaeri20ta 12:37 ~D.00864| 53.57 $490.00 arriizora 1237 “o.c08e4] S307 $430.00 2 “o.008e4| S357 $430.00 z 5.007 ETE $430.00 2 =.266ie| $544.45 $490.00 z 05h “sata 315,789.58 $438.00 04 Sisane] 31,387.06. $438.00 509 3.34041 5i.468.44 $429.00 09 0.1742 ‘S767 $430.00 ‘00 7.4762 3i6i6.26 $499.00 3.00 | =ea0777| = $2,110.81 430.00, 2 S00 212.79 35,508.25, "$450.00 2 ariz2014 3.10) “9.30351 $2108 $430.00, 2 ‘ariz2014 31) #3558] $5667.22 430.00 z ‘ariz2014 3.10) 0.76968] $0048 ‘430.00 Dalizaore 3:14 =. 32.607 66 $458.00 =z $5276.80 430.00 ECRETIELE (SORE. ‘$420.00 49.0405 105 ($00,077.01 20.00 39 (12,600.00 $420.00 Tazrss| ($4314.04) $420.00 artaranta 1429 72 (S20.400.00 $420.00 artvanta 129 EAST (Sa.151.95) $420.00 TS Sere $434.00 Ei [sera 343400|_ wires Out S187 | Sisg5210 $4400] 2737 02 $66.80 S340] 0.19 ari] $485.53 §494.00| 0.09 158502] $eowst $494.00] 72.09 575.73_| owiae0ia ad 13.2562] $5,788.20, e434.00| 11.54 57o.s4 | ow/az0id aaa} 88550] $2,12034 s49400| — 429 559.78 | oa/arabia 480] T0645] $4,302.00, sasaal os 500.88 | ov/aZ014 #60} 02 $06.80 $404.00 | 2. 554.45 Sim001 $708.47 e434.00| 449] — 420 | oaviaioora 450 125.45) $54,443.20, $434.00 106.69 52 —[oa2120%4 10-10 00] $400.00) 490.00, 152 [oaroazora 12: D 380.3 | carsizoia 5:30] 75 20535067 SEH ‘5a 00 5n87_|-oasor4 3:30] 2.56880) (Ga. 39] ‘$454.00 Toao7 | 0057014 531 8.10025 (0202.44) ‘454.00 71.15] wasi7014 534 7.08807] ($3430.63) 488.00 72 | oanen'4331 354842035) $17,834.68) $454.00 Tosa _| bapsiors 3.2 3.68888733] ($1,752.08) $475.00 7re.53 | oarsa0i4 342 22. 85435055 S0.846-22) $475.00 ea z2| barpszora 3:2} 70.60830172| ($5,081.74) [75.00 793.8 | oargsz014 3:2) #2768241 $475.00 7o5.51_|-oaraszor4 3.2) Ga $475.00 aoazi | oaraszo14 3.21 TO70557268| $475.00 asi.e2 | pareszo14 3:42] a7. 70527558 $475.00 eso | barasz014 3.42] 0.88] $475.00 75.16 | varasz014 420) FAREXKZITZ $485.00 a.16|-barasz014 4201 “i $485.00 6 16-_|-oarasz0r4 420) 4 $495.90 iao1.t8- | oasz0%d 4 01 Zt 7,300.82 $465 00 9.25 | 04572014 4:20) Ti ts04 s47.24] $40.00 303.25 12:02] $5,380.53 $405.00 907.33 aorTT 979 (Si.a06.14 $485.00 aorar 008 $455.00 8.75 ZaBi6a $485.00 ar9.00 waaero47s| $485.00 22.06 3.35785622 $485.00 2.75 | owrsiznia «20h 9.78] 5495.00 isac2 | owres0i4 «20 Zaria $485.00 36.02 | owrsra0i «20 0 $405.00 338.2 | ovres04 «20 a838 $485.00 sp0.02 | wasanta«20 435) $2252.00] $405.00 oa0.s2 | oarascnya4 20 “0 ($4,660.00) $465.00 54 | oarzsr20r4 «20 78762 ($1,208.40 ‘$455.00, a6.24oazs2014 11 342365074 715 405.08) $450.00 030.24 _[ouzsaore 0 ($22,500.00) $450.00 7038.33 [oarsizore 17 a8] ($35.60) 450.00 7s0_—[oarasizo1e 11-1 Tareas 7$5.254.42) ‘$450.00 “sa [oarasiz014 1111 a ($1,800.00) $450.00Append 8 CARL M FORCE BiStamp Account Anais 72.9086 28 ($32,443.00 3445.00] 04.0 “Ha 720634 $6,640.47 $445.00] 13. 12.15 189088| ($5,407.50 344,00 —T0.2 a2 sama ‘3462.00 27.25 952.05 [oaeei2014 20-1 162.503] $15,078.58 $462.00 | 130-16 ‘964 — [oarasra0ia 20:14 E0537] ‘S370. $402.00) 7.49 W574] oarerania aah 028] Siz, $428.04 | 0.29 size = aia] Si070.10 $426 00 2-16] 050.55 0275} Sur 70 $420,000.24 0a.26 S| ¥2Bs7.80 574 Saa.o5 Fr 365.80 Da 963.75 3014 $70.00 28 aa.86 07 ‘S580 3:8 240.08 | oaroeror4 435} = 2] Sijs5860} $420.00] 2.32 ~ 887.00 | ovsiz0i4 35] EEE S31. 365.45, $426.00 | 85-4 53.18 | owzeiz0i4 435) 0719] sisie25 5420.00] 3.35 355 [ oaaarora a9 30.1828] S12 976-26 s#08.00| 25a asa oazaz0%e 1 y owe Tam] 435 loanaaoie 13 =a = = a Ending Balance 432 2776.38081% 120.498 _14496.66189 107191 _(39\t44,792.90) _$6.404,504.7EXHIBIT ELUISE Pee ele 9/22/2013 00:52 9/29/2013 18:10 9/17/2013 20:08 ASQCSMtTDZ2et1ydWE 17p1DgXbvbDm50Q32u9 ‘14rE7iqy4a6P274WCCs {652)STOXpCAMALZL Seeonnonee ‘ngkufaxtev2hPHB senate Bre sends 189 BTC to sends 154 BTC to 17 1DgXbvbbms003z {HEumWkybo1ZXaVvTT AsgcsMeTOZZeC4ydW65 \ovezameOnSc BYFISVQNEat468 fesroocia ace ea CampBX address 10tal of 388.9985 BTC 770 BTC (worth ofespoa 77 approximately 9/17/2013 20:09 9/22/2013 00:56 17p1D9Xbvb0m5DQ32u9 $97,000 on 14rE7igyda6P27qWCCs ve2q9Tele9unSct 9/15/2013) “ngkUfBxtevZhPHB 2Rs9Sku9bBxWt3- sends 154 BTC to Per records obtained one ae 00s Lhd Surtteasaemeras AHDv¥vhcFUV3HxNRYZN- ‘ Bacrsjevava - miseinbeltat fem tek on peer ‘autor rig canrk Fore’ Ross Ulbricht's CampBX address laptop, the 770 bitcoins transaction into bitcoins address 9/20/2013, 23:29 4g BTC deposited into onahquewedrsthcs “SsunCanumsiny ae. ‘These GC were sso 9/23/2013, 18:13 1drE7Iqy4a6P27qWC 9/17/2013 2011) erdtositonvaes 9/22/2013 1:08 {156RBPQUCWEdsSHHCSIS IMmnaBibaiyuTedtnsk KsuACésUmShiy2 CsngkUfextev2nPHB LarE7iqyasP27qWecs ‘pokUBevznP HB UyDEeisy 76 sends 194.9995 BTC to appears to the ighUenteZnPh sends 146.8895 BTC to 1eyBTBVaerbDINGZE}sA/ payment to nena 347 BTC to 156RBPaUCWESXHCS ‘SaTAGfFCBS% "Frenchmaid”. This * ‘SkSuACEsUMSRy2C This is Carl Mark Force's UybEeisey7<1P6p transaction was a withdrawal made by Ross Ulbricht from Silk Road. CampBX address 9/29/2013, 23:14 9/17/2013 2022 9/22/2013 1:17 U9hxpQdokGzQT4o1mT 1MrE7igyAa6P27qWCCS ANANAD22ZnwB74gVRed ZBAQUVEK2SMEXS ‘The sum of these ‘ngkUfBxtev2nPHB WiMINEFKjtyy509 9/15/2013, 2:10 ‘sends 154.0005 BTC to sends 154 BTC to UTC, payments to INGNADZzZni¥B74gVRed U9HxpQdakGzQTa0tmT WiHINPERjtyySt9 XZBAQUVE R965 ‘This is Carl Mark Force's 4ré7iqy4a6P27qWC CampBX address CsngkUfextevZnPHE is 520 BTC. Total BTC deposited into 4rE7sqy4a6P27qWC 9/29/2013, 23:13 9/17/2013 20:13 9/22/2013 1:17 ‘1CxBuSVCZfCekkzQfMis- Congkuncev2nPH8 adapta argues srussrusyergaainevo Ncoyisowrn . ak nevenons ieReustohanr sends 10 988 BT to sens 160889 BTC sends 1603565 Bret ‘Rovner YN sruusrUsgevgaanacvo ICrausvegteettean perro IFR6U3BOpharV2I SNCQSfLéGweNAN ‘This is Carl Mark Force's (CampBX address Alltimes ate UTC (Coordinated Universal Time)EXHIBIT FSilk Road anonymous marketplace January 25, 2013 20,073 bitcoins are stolen from Silk Road and Silk Road vendors and deposited into bitcoins address 12 783qwztPyA67uq63LG8GSizwhFCl7}4A January 26, 2013 1,475 bitcoins are sent from 12783qw2tPyA67uq63LG8G51 2whFcI7}4A into MtGox bitcoins address 1Bn¥oj218dcGhhgGcQBmbsi mrh6GzijrtB January 26, 2013 another 955 btc are sent from 127B3qw2tPyA67uqg63LG8G5i zWhFcI7}4A Into MtGox bitcoins address 1BnYoj218deGhhgGeQambsi mrh6Gzs/rtB As of January 26, 2013, MtGOX account 1Bn¥oj218dcGhhgGcaBmbsimrh6GzijrtB controls at least 2,430 stolen bitcoins Between March and May of 2013, MtGOX account 1Bn¥oj218deGhhgGcQBmbsimrh6GzijrtB makes 9 wires to Quantum International LLC, into Shaun Bridges’ Fidelity Account Liquidation of Silk Road Theft Proceeds mvs oa bse tulad Bitcoins f 3/8/2013, aaa sone eo me 3/18/2013 aa 45/2013 4/16/2013 4/26/2013, 5/7/2013 98,968.00 2249.27 $ 99,968.74 51.00 1960.17 ane BPE | $ 99,968.08 $ 142.00 704.00 $ 9996834 $ 68.00 1470.14 $ 99,969.32 $ 136.00 735.07 “$ 2555937 $ 109.00 234.49 13289.15 | “if sold on the day it was wired out May 9, 2013 BRIDGES served as the affiant on a m seizure warrant for Mt. Gox and its owner's bank accounts