Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Second edition
To Emma
Blast effects on
buildings
Second edition
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN: 978-0-7277-3521-8
# Thomas Telford Limited 2009 and # Arup for chapter 8, # Crown Copyright for chapter 11
All rights, including translation, reserved. Except as permitted by the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise,
without the prior written permission of the Publisher, Thomas Telford Limited, 40 Marsh Wall,
London E14 9TP.
This book is published on the understanding that the authors are solely responsible for the
statements made and opinions expressed in it and that its publication does not necessarily imply
that such statements and/or opinions are or reflect the views or opinions of the publishers.
While every effort has been made to ensure that the statements made and the opinions
expressed in this publication provide a safe and accurate guide, no liability or responsibility can
be accepted in this respect by the authors or publishers.
Contents
Foreword to the second edition
Acknowledgements
About the editors
List of authors
1
xi
xiii
xiv
xvi
Introduction
Major General Christopher Elliott CB MBE, Arup Security
Consulting
Objective
Scope
Modern terrorism
Risk
The special effect of catastrophic loss
Partial factors in blast design
A design philosophy: planning for protection
Blast loading
Peter Smith, Cranfield University at the Defence Academy
David Cormie, Arup Security Consulting
Notation
1
3
5
5
6
6
7
8
9
12
17
25
29
30
30
v
vi
Introduction
Explosions
Explosion classification
Explosives classification
Blast waves in air from high explosives
Blast waves in air from vapour cloud explosions
Blast wave interactions
Basic blast wavefront parameters
Blast wave parameters for loading on structures
Blast wave scaling laws
Reflection coefficients
Regular and Mach reflection
External blast loading of structures
Internal blast loading of structures
Conclusions
References
32
32
33
33
34
36
37
37
39
41
44
45
48
53
56
58
59
80
59
59
60
61
65
66
77
80
81
82
85
86
92
94
97
99
Discussion
References
101
102
103
103
104
104
105
105
107
108
111
114
115
115
117
118
118
viii
136
139
139
142
146
147
148
150
152
154
154
156
156
156
157
157
158
164
164
165
165
166
168
174
175
176
177
177
Introduction
Types of glazing and behaviour under blast loading
Levels of blast enhancement
Framing systems
Design of laminated glass for blast loads
Derivation of the resistance function for a laminated
glass pane
Design example 1: single-glazed laminated glass pane
subject to blast load
Design example 2: single-glazed laminated glass pane
subject to increased blast load
Iso-damage analysis
Calculation of edge reaction forces
Glazing hazard classification
References
10 Whole-building response to blast damage
David Cormie, Arup Security Consulting
Notation
Introduction
Disproportionate versus progressive collapse
Protection and disproportionate collapse
Development of robustness requirements in national standards
Tolerability of risk
Methods of design for structural robustness
Tie-force-based design methods
Alternate loadpath methods
Alternate loadpath analysis procedures
Key element design methods
Discussion
References
11 Vehicle-borne threats and the principles of hostile
vehicle mitigation
Paul Forman, Centre for the Protection of National
Infrastructure (CPNI)
Dorian Evans, Ministry of Defence
Gary Heward, MFD International
Introduction
Types of vehicle-borne threat
Site assessment for vehicle-borne threats
177
180
184
187
190
194
202
208
208
210
211
214
216
216
216
217
218
218
223
226
228
230
237
245
246
247
250
250
253
255
ix
257
269
271
273
274
290
274
274
275
277
282
283
284
285
289
290
292
292
292
295
295
297
Appendices
A Equivalent SDOF properties for beams and slabs
B Maximum deflection and response time for elasto-plastic
SDOF systems
C Design flowchart
D Conversion factors
309
319
323
Index
325
299
xi
Acknowledgements
I am indebted to my co-editors, Professor Geoff Mays and Dr Peter Smith,
editors of the first edition for being receptive to my original proposal to
prepare a second edition of this book, and for their unwavering support
during its writing. I hope this edition does justice to its predecessor and
manages to retain its accessible style and content. I am enormously
grateful to the chapter authors for their invaluable contributions.
The preparation of the second edition was supported financially by
Arups Design and Technology Fund. I am grateful to Arup for this
support, and to Cranfield University at the Defence Academy and to
the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure. I also wish to
extend my thanks to my colleagues in Arup Security Consulting and
elsewhere in Arup, notably Arup Advanced Technology & Research.
Eduardo Aja of Arup Security Consulting has prepared the examples in
Chapter 4, for which Tim Rose of the Atomic Weapons Establishment
has permitted us to use Air3d and has undertaken a valuable review of
the chapter. Corus has generously made available their design methods
for Corus Bi-Steel in Chapter 8. John Colvin of John Colvin Glass
Consultant kindly assisted with material relating to the forthcoming EN
Standards for glass. Bassam Izzuddin of Imperial College has reviewed
Chapter 10 in detail and has provided many valuable suggestions for its
improvement. Tom Ward has helped me with a number of the figures
and Simon Blakeney with some of the photographs. Vivianne Kollevris
of Arup Security Consulting has reviewed large parts of the text in
meticulous detail with an unassailable and seemingly inexhaustible
enthusiasm. I am enormously grateful for her meticulous eye for detail,
without which a number of errors would have made it into print. Any
that remain are mine alone.
Without the support and encouragement of my wife Emma, none of
this would have been possible. Thank you.
David Cormie
London, June 2009
xiii
xvi
List of authors
Mike Banfi, Arup
David Cormie, Arup Security Consulting
Neil Coyle, Corus Bi-Steel
Major General Christopher Elliott CB MBE, Arup Security Consulting
Dorian Evans, Ministry of Defence
Ian Feltham, Arup
Paul Forman, Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
David Hadden, Arup Security Consulting
Gary Heward, MFD International
Conrad Izatt, Arup
Geoff Mays, Cranfield University at the Defence Academy
David Smith, Arup Security Consulting
Peter Smith, Cranfield University at the Defence Academy
John Taylor, Castra Consulting
Chris Veale, Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
xvii
1
Introduction
Objective
The purpose of this book is to give engineers and architects a better
understanding of the opportunities (and of their own and their clients
responsibilities) to provide buildings which minimise damage to people
and property in the event of an explosion. Of course, the focus is on the
damaging effects of terrorist attacks, but the principles herein can be
applied to all explosive events. It is not a design manual, requiring
compliance, but a design handbook, giving guidance and practical advice.
Since the first edition was published in 1995, the threat of terrorism
has evolved in scope and scale, particularly with the emergence of
suicide bombers prepared to die in the act of delivery. Regrettably,
terrorism shows every sign of enduring for a long season yet. So
normal has it become that counter-terrorist measures are
now considered usual in most commercial and recreational activities;
protection is now common-place in infrastructure projects and there
is heightened curiosity about what can be achieved in this area. This
has helped the blast engineer very considerably in attracting attention
to the benefits of sensible protective design.
However, it was the deliberate flight of two fully-fuelled aircraft into
the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York in 2001 that
changed awareness most abruptly. Initial astonishment at the act was
replaced by a recognition that terrorists would explore any opportunity
presented, bounded only by what was possible within the laws of physics.
The simultaneous attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon have left a deep imprint on perceptions: the ambition of
the terrorists involved; the elegance and the novelty of their method
of attack; the complexity of their preparations; the callous and casual
murder of thousands of innocents; the initial disruption to a highly
interconnected commercial world (and also the surprising resilience
achieved through that interconnectivity); the insult delivered to
national self-esteem with consequences far beyond the attack itself.
1
Introduction
Trade Center on 9/11. The importance of ductility and rotation capacity of connections is now more generally recognised, as are the
concepts of robustness and resilience.
Facade design has moved on very significantly since the publication
of the first edition. Our understanding of the behaviour of glass, glazing
systems and facade framing systems has benefited from wide-ranging
programmes of research and development supported by full-scale testing
undertaken by the UK Government and the US Army Corps of
Engineers. Design methods have been developed for the design of
glazing systems based on fundamental theory of structural analysis,
rather than the semi-empirical methods contained in the first edition,
which are now outdated and obsolete.
Finally, the field of structural engineering continues to make
advances. With ever more demanding architectural and structural
forms being proposed, challenges present themselves apace to the
industrys structural engineers for more efficient, elegant, slender or
architecturally demanding solutions.
For all these reasons it has been appropriate to revise and expand the
original text, if it is to continue to provide authoritative and useful
guidance.
Scope
The chapters of this book have been thoroughly revised to update the
material to take account of the advances made in the field. The basic
guidelines for enhancing building resilience in Chapter 2 have been
retained and updated. Blast loading has now been split into two
chapters, with the theory of blast loading being covered in Chapter 3,
followed by a new chapter (Chapter 4) on the prediction of blast
loads. Chapter 4 describes the empirical methods available for the
prediction of blast loads and when they might be used or might indicate
that more advanced methods are necessary. A section is presented on
the use of semi-empirical methods and more advanced methods such
as computational fluid dynamics for the prediction of blast loads.
Chapter 5 describes the structural response to blast loading, and has
been revised and enhanced to include recent developments in advanced
single degree of freedom techniques for modelling structural behaviour.
The previous single chapter on the design of elements in steel and
reinforced concrete has now been split into separate chapters on each
material (Chapters 6 and 7), with a further chapter (Chapter 8) on
the design of elements in steelconcretesteel composite materials.
3
Introduction
Modern terrorism
Terrorism has been described as the deliberate use of violence to create
a sense of shock, fear and outrage in the minds of a target population.
Several factors in the way we now live make that easy to achieve.
First, terrorists are able to make use of the media as never before to carry
a sense of terror to their target population, and television, in particular,
gives terrorists a political leverage out of all proportion to their other
powers. Second, developed societies have become very dependent on
complex, brittle systems (e.g. railways, airlines, gas pipelines, large
shopping areas and business centres) which are both vulnerable and
critical to societys function, and allows the terrorist many suitable targets.
Third, terrorists hide behind the camouflage of normal daily life. This
means that almost all effective measures to combat terrorism also carry
considerable constraints on individual freedoms, which governments
are rightly reluctant to impose, and often will not.
This leads to several conclusions: terrorism today is much easier
to contain than to eliminate; there are few completely acceptable
antidotes to it; the prudent design will allow for its effects wherever it
is possible and affordable.
Risk
Protection is not an absolute concept and there is a level of protection
where the cost of protection provided with respect to the cost of the
potential loss is in balance. Protection can never offer a guarantee of
safety; conversely, too much protection is a waste of resources with
regard to what is being saved.
5