Notes

(1) M. Heidegger, Interview in Der Spiegel, 1976, no. 23, 214.

(2) M. Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, trans. F.D. Wieck and J.G. Gray (New
York: Harper & Row, 1968), 144. References are made to the English translation,
but my reason for sticking with the ambiguous German title is given below.
(3) Ibid., 6.
(4) R. Mugerauer identifies four variations of the question, but a discussion of
the two other senses is not necessary for the purposes of this essay. R. Mugera
uer, Heidegger's Language and Thinking (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1988), 66.
(5) Op. cit., What is Called Thinking?, 4-5.
(6) Ibid., 3.
(7) What does the fact that adults will kick, scratch, jostle, and outmaneuver e
ach other in order to buy a Cabbage doll or Jordan gym shoes as a Christmas pres
ent tell us?
(8) Ibid., 4-5.
(9) Hilary Putnam seems to be close to this idea when he claims that "...arguing
about the nature of rationality [is] the task of the philosopher par excellence
". H. Putnam, Reason, Truth, History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 198
1), 113.
(10) Op. cit., What is Called Thinking?, 168.
(11) This is one reason why Heidegger calls Socrates "the purest thinker of the
West". Ibid., 17.
(12) Ibid., 239.
(13) Ibid., 66.
(14) Ibid., 42.
(15) David Kolb writes,
Heidegger insists that the most proper action of thinking is not asking question
s about grounds and foundations, but "listening" to what addresses us, where wha
t addresses us is not a set of doctrines or a system of propositions ("Raising A
tlantis: Later Heidegger and Contemporary Philosophy", Abstract, APA Proceedings
and Addresses, 67:2, October 1993, 65).
(16) The quarrel about ratio and logos, Latin and Greek, is ancient. Heidegger,
as a former seminarian, is aware of an anti-Latinate element in church tradition
. Erasmus, in his sixteenth century translation of the New Testament, translates
logos as sermo, a departure from Anselm's vulgate ("In the beginning was the wo
rd [logos]").
(17) The obvious example is the "instrumental" or "tool" metaphor of reason. See
R. Nozick, The Nature of Rationality, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Pres
s, 1993), 133, 134, and 176.
(18) M. Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. J.M. Anderson and E.H. Freund (

New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 53. John Sallis, in his The Gathering of Reason (
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1980), 12, makes similar points:
Logos means originally: gathering.... Logos, as the gathering of opposed element
s, composes them all into one, yet without suppressing their mutual opposition.
(19) W. Sellars, Science, Perception, and Reality, (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul), 1.
(20) M. Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. P. Hertz and J. Stambaugh (New
York: Harper & Row, 1959), 70.
(21) Op. cit., What is Called Thinking?, 31.