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IRENEO G.

GERONIMO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO ESMAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 105540 July 5, 1993
Facts:
Graciana Geronimo and private respondent were married. Graciana died
without a will leaving no descendants nor ascendants. She was survived by her two
brothers Tomas and petitioner, her nephew Salvador and her husband. The husband
was appointed as the administrator of the estate of the deceased.
However, the husband's capacity to inherit and administer the property of the
decedent is now being questioned in view of the discovery by the petitioner that the
marriage between oppositor and the decedent was celebrated without a marriage
license. Petitioner contends that there was no marriage license obtained by the
spouses Esman because the copies of the marriage contract he presented did not
state the marriage license number
Issue:
Can there be a valid marriage where one of the essential requisites license
is absent?
Ruling:
Yes. The non-indication of the license number in the certified copies
presented by the petitioner-appellant could not be deemed as fatal vis-a-vis the
issue of the validity of the marriage in question because there is nothing in the law
which requires that the marriage license number would be indicated in the marriage
contract itself.

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE and
FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 119398 July 2, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses
which he entered in the sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the races on
various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively.
When petitioner demanded to the private respondents for the collection of
the prizes due him, private respondents, however, denied and replied that the
demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of the Commissioner of PCGG.
Thereafter, petitioner, sued for damages private respondent.
Issue:
Whether private respondent acted in bad faith and could be liable for
damages.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that: to hold public officers personally liable for
moral and exemplary damages and for attorney's fees for acts done in the
performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these officers
exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But
even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for
nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud.

However, private respondent may still be held liable under Article 32 of the
Civil Code, under the article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with
malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the
constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good
faith in the performance of one's duties. Petitioner's right to the use of his property
was unduly impeded.

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner,


vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA
NICOLAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 107125

January 29, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless
imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of
the judgment in the Criminal Case, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan
civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents.
Petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither
criminally negligent nor recklessly imprudent. He concludes that his acquittal bars
any civil action.
Issue:
Does the acquittal bars any civil action?
Ruling:
No. It is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil
liability for the same act or omission lies.
Petitioner was acquitted on reasonable doubt, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is
"for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes,
the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal

case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence
in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions
involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not
the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable.
Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in
determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the
question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC., petitioner,


vs.
MERLIN J. ARGOS and JAJA C. PINEDA, respondents.
G.R. No. 130362

September 10, 2001

Facts:
Respondents are the general manager and commercial director, respectively,
of the Fragrances Division of petitioner IFFI. Hernan H. Costa, was appointed
managing director of IFFI. Consequently the general managers reported directly to
Costa.
Costa and respondents had serious differences which resulted in respondents
filing a criminal complaint for libel against Costa, for allegedly describing
respondents as "persona non grata" . Subsequently, respondents filed a civil case
for damages against petitioner, in its subsidiary capacity as employer. Herein
petitioner IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint.
Issue:
Could private respondents sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary
liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the
pendency of the criminal libel cases against petitioner's employee?
Ruling:
No. Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability
before the conviction of its employee is premature. Article 33 of the Civil Code
provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.

Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires
only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil
liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary
civil liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in
the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a
criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties.

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