FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

G.R. No. 150758

February 18, 2004

VERONICO
vs.
THE
HONORABLE
APPEALS, respondent.

TENEBRO, petitioner
COURT

OF

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning
the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of
psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal
liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an
individual who contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the
subsequent declaration that the second marriage is
void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted
marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on
April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B.
Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City.
Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and
without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a
photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared
with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet
another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified
from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married
to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was
indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy

against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapulapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having
been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda
Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent
marriage of the accused has all the essential
requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first
marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not
guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited
with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired
two children. However, he denied that he and
Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming
that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize
their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage
contract merely to enable her to get the allotment
from his office in connection with his work as a
seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his
brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila
whether there was any marriage at all between him
and Villareyes, but there was no record of said
marriage.9

CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT

AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR
(sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NONEXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY
DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN
THE ACCUSED AND
PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE
AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we
find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed
judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity.12

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of

Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered

defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his
first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an
alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks
the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the
date on which the second marriage was
celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of
the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and
prays for his acquittal.14

Hence, the instant petition for review on the following

assignment of errors:

Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence,

both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of
the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes.

Documentary evidence presented was in the form of:

(1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro
and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as
seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila
City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the
Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from
Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing
Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally
married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract,
petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the
National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and
(2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of
Manila, dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these
documents attest that the respective issuing offices
have no record of a marriage celebrated between
Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense
cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which
in itself would already have been sufficient to
establish the existence of a marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of
public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions
relevant to public documents are applicable to all.
Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document
is a public record. When the original of a document
is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office, its contents may be proved by a certified
copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof
(Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage
contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof,
was admissible as the best evidence of its contents.
The marriage contract plainly indicates that a
marriage was celebrated between petitioner and
Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be
accorded the full faith and credence given to public
documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the
certification issued by the National Statistics Office on

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil
Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly
show that neither document attests as a positive fact
that there was no marriage celebrated between
Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely
attest that the respective issuing offices have no
record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as
to the absence of a record is quite different from
documentary evidence as to the absence of a
marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to
the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution
serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which
should be given greater credence than documents
testifying merely as to absence of any record of the
marriage, especially considering that there is
absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage
contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as
a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage.
The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no
evidence presented by the defense that would
indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from
the self-serving testimony of the accused himself.
Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter,
Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of the
existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners
own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the
first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took
steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage
to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such
purported non-existence, it is significant to note that
the certifications issued by the National Statistics
Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated
October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively.
Both documents, therefore, are dated after the
accuseds marriage to his second wife, private
respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient
evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the
first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.

The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the

effects of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial
declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of
the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that,
since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently
declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not
committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the
Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely
no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted
during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be
null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioners
psychological
capacity
or
incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore,
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere
act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was
celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence
of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated. To our mind, there is no
cogent reason for distinguishing between a
subsequent marriage that is null and void purely
because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a

subsequent marriage that is null and void on the

ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as
criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States
penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in
recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special
contract between spouses, and punish an individuals
deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the
special bond between spouses, which petitioner has
undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is
not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas
lacks the essential requisites for validity. The
requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified
by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of
the contracting parties and their consent freely given
in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and
formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage
license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties
personally declare their agreement to marry before
the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any
male or female of the age of eighteen years or
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned
in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for
the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner
and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age,
and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage
with the required license before Judge Alfredo B.
Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in
the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage
is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that
children conceived or born before the judgment of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written
into the law itself that such a marriage, although void
ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the
States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory,
and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each

marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to

thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for
the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence
on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time,
while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were
both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the
determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes of
this particular case, the act of the accused displays a
deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and
the State does not look kindly on such activities.
Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic
of which is its permanence. When an individual
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the
foundation of the States basic social institution, the
States criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is
prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the
same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be
entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional
which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which
sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant
petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636,
convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of
Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

SO ORDERED.

TORING VS. TORING

DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Ricardo P.
Toring from the May 31, 2004 decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. The CA
reversed the August 10, 2001 judgment of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-99-36662,[2] nullifying
Ricardo's marriage with respondent Teresita M. Toring
on the ground of psychological incapacity.

THE FACTS
Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his
aunts house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousins
teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting
lessons at his aunts house. Despite their slight
difference in age (of five years), the younger Ricardo
found the dance teacher attractive and fell in love with
her. He pursued Teresita and they became
sweethearts after three months of courtship. They
eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of another
girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry
her.

Albaran, and his and Dr. Albarans respective

testimonies. Teresita did not file any answer or
opposition to the petition, nor did she testify to refute
the allegations against her.[3]
Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at
the trial that Teresita was an adulteress and a
squanderer. He was an overseas seaman, and he
regularly sent money to his wife to cover the familys
living expenses and their childrens tuition. Teresita,
however, was not adept in managing the funds he
sent and their finances. Many times, Ricardo would
come home and be welcomed by debts incurred by
his wife; he had to settle these to avoid
embarrassment.
Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from
other people, Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts
she collected as sales agent of a plasticware and
cosmetics company. She left the familys utility bills
and their childrens tuition fees unpaid. She also
missed paying the rent and the amortization for the
house that Ricardo acquired for the family, so their
children had to live in a small rented room and
eventually had to be taken in by Ricardos parents.
When confronted by Ricardo, Teresita would simply
offer the excuse that she spent the funds Ricardo sent
to buy things for the house and for their children.

On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after

their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment
before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time
of, and subsequent to the celebration of their
marriage. He asked the court to declare his marriage
to Teresita null and void.

Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and

suspected that she was pregnant with another mans
child. During one of his visits to the country, he
noticed that Teresitas stomach was slightly bigger. He
tried to convince her to have a medical examination
but she refused. Her miscarriage five months into her
pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo
alleged that the child could not have been his, as his
three instances of sexual contact with Teresita were
characterized by withdrawals; other than these, no
other sexual contacts with his wife transpired, as he
transferred and lived with his relatives after a month
of living with Teresita inCebu. Ricardo reported, too, of
rumors that his wife represented herself to others as
single, and went out on dates with other men when he
was not around.

At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage

contract; the psychological evaluation and signature
of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R.

Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant,

materialistic, controlling and demanding person, who
mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for the

Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4,

1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the City Court of
Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson,
Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.

nightlife and was very averse to the duties of a

housewife; was stubborn and independent, also most
unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was
unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their
family; and was most painfully unmindful of him. [4] He
believed that their marriage had broken down beyond
repair and that they both have lost their mutual trust
and love for one another.[5]
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that
contributed to the demise of the marriage was
Teresitas Narcissistic Personality Disorder that
rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
her essential marital obligations. To quote Dr. Albaran:
Teresita, the respondent[,] has [sic] shown to manifest
the following pervasive pattern of behaviors: a sense
of entitlement as she expected favorable treatment
and automatic compliance to her wishes, being
interpersonally exploitative as on several occasions
she took advantage of him to achieve her own ends,
lack of empathy as she was unwilling to recognize her
partners [sic] feelings and needs[,] taking into
consideration her own feelings and needs only, her
haughty and arrogant behavior and attitude and her
proneness to blame others for her failures and
shortcomings. These patterns of behavior speaks [sic]
of a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which started to
manifest in early adulthood. The disorder is
considered to be grave and incurable based on the
fact that individuals do not recognize the symptoms
as it is ego syntonic and they feel there is nothing
wrong in them. Because of that[,] they remain
unmotivated for treatment and impervious to recovery.
[6]

She based her diagnosis on the information she

gathered from her psychological evaluation on
Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresitas eldest
son). She admitted, though, that she did not
personally observe and examine Teresita; she sent
Teresita a personally-delivered notice for the conduct
of a psychiatric evaluation, but the notice remained
unanswered.
In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that there was
no basis to declare Teresita psychologically
incapacitated. It asserted that the psychological
evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son

Richardson) only revealed a vague and general

conclusion on these parties personality traits but not
on Teresitas psychological makeup. The OSG also
argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically
identify and sufficiently prove the medical cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity. Neither did the
evidence indicate that the alleged psychological
incapacity existed prior to or at the time of marriage,
nor that the incapacity was grave and incurable.
The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his
marriage to Teresita. In short, the RTC believed Dr.
Albarans psychological evaluation and testimony and,
on the totality of Ricardos evidence, found Teresita to
be psychologically incapacitated to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. The OSG appealed
the decision to the CA.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the
trial courts findings did not satisfy the rules and
guidelines set by this Court in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina.[7] The RTC failed to specifically
point out the root illness or defect that caused
Teresitas psychological incapacity, and likewise failed
to show that the incapacity already existed at the time
of celebration of marriage.
The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albarans
psychological evaluation do not appear to have been
drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt
mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise,
the CA found that Ricardos allegations on Teresitas
overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate
grounds for declaring the marriage null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code. These
allegations, even if true, could only effectively serve
as grounds for legal separation or a criminal charge
for adultery.
THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS
Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual
findings of the trial court, particularly the expert
testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial
court in declaring the nullity of the marriage fully
complied with Molina.
In its Comment,[8] the OSG argued that the CA
correctly reversed the RTCs decision, particularly in

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

its conclusion that Ricardo failed to comply with this
Courts guidelines for the proper interpretation and
application
of
Article
36
of
the
Family
Code. Reiterating its earlier arguments below, the
OSG asserts that the evidence adduced before the
trial court failed to show the gravity, juridical
antecedence, or incurability of the psychological
incapacity of Teresita, and failed as well to identify
and discuss its root cause. The psychiatrist, likewise,
failed to show that Teresita was completely unable to
discharge her marital obligations due to her alleged
Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Ricardos Reply[9] reiterated that the RTC decision
thoroughly discussed the root cause of Teresitas
psychological incapacity and identified it as
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. He claimed that
sufficient proof had been adduced by the psychiatrist
whose expertise on the subject cannot be doubted.
Interestingly, Ricardo further argued that alleging the
root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36
of the Family Code is no longer necessary,
citing Barcelona v. Court of Appeals.[10]
These positions were collated and reiterated in the
memoranda the parties filed.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA
committed no reversible error when it set aside the
RTCs decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et
al.,[11] we held that psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage.
The psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.[12]
We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family
Code in Molina and laid down definitive guidelines in
the interpretation and application of this article. These
guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of

gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability

established in the Santos case, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence,
inviolability
and
solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity

must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
"the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be

medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession
or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those

embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.[13]

Subsequent
jurisprudence
on
psychological
incapacity applied these basic guidelines to varying
factual situations, thus confirming the continuing

doctrinal validity of Santos. In so far as the present

factual situation is concerned, what should not be lost
in reading and applying our established rulings is the
intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36
of the Family Code to the most serious cases of
personality disorders; these are the disorders that
result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the
afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the
marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the
psychological illness and its root cause must have
been there from the inception of the marriage. From
these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of
the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage;
it simply recognizes that there never was any
marriage in the first place because the affliction
already then existing was so grave and permanent as
to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he
or she was to assume or had assumed.[14]
In the present case and guided by these standards,
we find the totality of the petitioners evidence to be
insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. As
already mentioned, the evidence presented consisted
of the testimonies of Ricardo and Dr. Albaran, and the
latters psychological evaluation of Ricardo and
Richardson from where she derived a psychological
evaluation of Teresita.
a. Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation and
testimony
Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation
that Teresita suffers from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder
that
rendered
her
psychologically
incapacitated to assume essential marital obligations.
To support her findings and conclusion, she banked
on the statements told to her by Ricardo and
Richardson,
which
she
narrated
in
her
evaluation. Apparently relying on the same basis, Dr.
Albaran added that Teresitas disorder manifested
during her early adulthood and is grave and incurable.
To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind
of testimony and evaluation that, in this case, became
the basis for the conclusion that no marriage really
took place because of the psychological incapacity of
one of the parties at the time of marriage.

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of
the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled
with
the
results
of
the
psychological
tests administered only on Ricardo, without more,
already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion
that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. This Court has long been negatively critical
in considering psychological evaluations, presented in
evidence, derived solely from one-sided sources,
particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the
marriage.
In So v. Valera,[15] the Court considered the
psychologists testimony and conclusions to be
insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant
the finding of respondents psychological incapacity
because the facts, on which the conclusions were
based, were all derived from the petitioners
statements whose bias in favor of his cause cannot
be discounted. In another case, Padilla-Rumbaua v.
Rumbaua,[16] the Court declared that while the various
tests administered on the petitioner-wife could have
been used as a fair gauge to assess her own
psychological condition, this same statement could
not be made with respect to the respondent-husbands
psychological condition. To our mind, conclusions and
generalizations
about
Teresitas
psychological
condition, based solely on information fed by Ricardo,
are not any different in kind from admitting hearsay
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence.[17]
To be sure, we have recognized that the law does not
require that the allegedly incapacitated spouse be
personally examined by a physician or by a
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.[18] This recognition, however, does
not signify that the evidence, we shall favorably
appreciate, should be any less than the evidence that
an Article 36 case, by its nature, requires.
Our recognition simply means that the requirements
for nullity outlined in Santos and Molina need not
necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated
spouse. In other words, it is still essential although
from sources other than the respondent spouse to
show his or her personality profile, or its

approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause

of the inability to appreciate the essential obligations
of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and
incurability of the condition.

how the recited incidents, made by one who was not

even born at the time of the spouses marriage,
showed a debilitating psychological incapacity already
existing at that time.

Other than from the spouses, such evidence can

come from persons intimately related to them, such
as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or
lawyers who could testify on the allegedly
incapacitated spouses condition at or about the time
of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that
trace their roots to the incapacity already present at
the time of marriage.

Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardos

cause, is the failure of Dr. Albarans psychological
evaluation to fully explain the details i.e., the what,
how, when, where and since when of Teresitas
alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. It seems to
us that, with hardly any supporting evidence to fall
back on, Dr. Albaran simply stated out of the blue that
Teresitas personality disorder manifested itself in
early adulthood, presuming thereby that the
incapacity should have been there when the marriage
was celebrated. Dr. Albaran never explained, too, the
incapacitating nature of Teresitas alleged personality
disorder, and how it related to the essential marital
obligations that she failed to assume. Neither did the
good doctor adequately explain in her psychological
evaluation how grave and incurable was Teresitas
psychological disorder.

In the present case, the only other party outside of the

spouses who was ever asked to give statements for
purposes of Teresitas psychological evaluation was
Richardson, the spouses eldest son who would not
have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36
case because he could not have been there when the
spouses were married and could not have been
expected to know what was happening between his
parents until long after his birth.
We confirm the validity of this observation from a
reading of the summary of Richardsons interview with
the pyschologist: Richardsons statement occupied a
mere one paragraph (comprising eleven sentences) in
the psychological evaluation and merely recited
isolated instances of his parents fighting over the
foreclosure of their house, his fathers alleged
womanizing, and their differences in religion (Ricardo
is a Catholic, while Teresita is a Mormon).[19]
We find nothing unusual in these recited marital
incidents to indicate that Teresita suffered from some
psychological disorder as far back as the time of her
marriage to Ricardo, nor do we find these fights to be
indicative of problems traceable to any basic
psychological disorder existing at the time of
marriage. For one, these points of dispute are not
uncommon in a marriage and relate essentially to the
usual roots of marital problems finances, fidelity and
religion. The psychologist, too, never delved into the
relationship between mother and son except to
observe their estranged relationship due to a previous
argument a money problem involving Ricardos
financial remittances to the family. To state the
obvious, the psychologists evaluation never explained

Dr. Albarans testimony at the trial did not improve the

evidentiary situation for Ricardo, as it still failed to
provide the required insights that would have
remedied the evidentiary gaps in her written
psychological evaluation. In fact, Dr. Albarans crossexamination only made the evidentiary situation
worse when she admitted that she had difficulty
pinpointing the root cause of Teresitas personality
disorder, due to the limited information she gathered
from Ricardo and Richardson regarding Teresitas
personal and family history. To directly quote from the
records, Dr. Albaran confessed this limitation when
she said that [t]he only data that I have is that, the
respondent seem [sic] to have grown from a
tumultuous family and this could be perhaps the
[sic] contributory to the development of the
personality
disorder.[20] Dr.
Albarans
obvious
uncertainty in her assessment only proves our point
that a complete personality profile of the spouse,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, could not
be determined from meager information coming only
from a biased source.
b.

Ricardos testimony

Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a

squanderer and an adulteress. We do not, however,
find Ricardos characterizations of his wife sufficient to
constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume basic marital obligations. Mere difficulty,
refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is
different from incapacity rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness.[21]
Ricardos testimony merely established that Teresita
was irresponsible in managing the familys finances by
not paying their rent, utility bills and other financial
obligations. Teresitas spendthrift attitude, according to
Ricardo, even resulted in the loss of the house and lot
intended to be their family residence. This kind of
irresponsibility, however, does not rise to the level of a
psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of
the Family Code. At most, Teresitas mismanagement
of the familys finances merely constituted difficulty,
refusal or neglect, during the marriage, in the handling
of funds intended for the familys financial support.
Teresitas alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does
not constitute psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code. In order for sexual infidelity to
constitute
as
psychological
incapacity,
the
respondents unfaithfulness must be established as a
manifestation of a disordered personality, completely
preventing the respondent from discharging the
essential obligations of the marital state;[22] there must
be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that
effectively incapacitated her from complying with the
obligation to be faithful to her spouse.[23]
In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimony to
prove that Teresita suffered from a disordered
personality of this kind. Even Ricardos added
testimony, relating to rumors of Teresitas dates with
other men and her pregnancy by another man, would
not fill in the deficiencies we have observed, given the
absence of an adverse integral element and link to
Teresitas allegedly disordered personality.
Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresitas
alleged character traits already existed at the
inception of their marriage. Article 36 of the Family

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

Code requires that the psychological incapacity must
exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.[24]In the absence of this element, a
marriage cannot be annulled under Article 36.
Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs
to be alleged in a petition for annulment under
Article 36 of the Family Code
Citing Barcelona,[25] Ricardo defended the RTC
decision, alleging that the root cause in a petition for
annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no
longer necessary. We find this argument completely at
variance with Ricardos main argument against the
assailed CA decision i.e., that the RTC, in its decision,
discussed thoroughly the root cause of Teresitas
psychological incapacity as Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. These conflicting positions, notwithstanding,
we see the need to address this issue to further clarify
our statement in Barcelona, which Ricardo misquoted
and misinterpreted to support his present petition
that since the new Rules do not require the petition to
allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity,
it follows that there is also no need to allege in the
petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
[26]

In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for

annulment for its failure to state the root cause of the
respondents alleged psychological incapacity. The
Court resolved this issue, ruling that the petition
sufficiently stated a cause of action because the
petitioner instead of stating a specific root cause
clearly described thephysical manifestations
indicative of the psychological incapacity. This,
the Court found to be sufficiently compliant with the
first requirement in the Molina casethat the root cause
of the psychological incapacity be alleged in an Article
36 petition.
Thus, contrary to Ricardos position, Barcelona does
not do away with the root cause requirement. The
ruling simply means that the statement of the root
cause does not need to be in medical terms or be
technical in nature, as the root causes of many
psychological disorders are still unknown to science.
It is enough to merely allege the physical
manifestations constituting the root cause of the

psychological incapacity. Section 2, paragraph (d) of

the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(Rules)[27] in fact provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages.
xxxx
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the
Family Code shall specially allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriages at the time
of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.
As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement
alleging the root cause in a petition for annulment
under Article 36 of the Family Code was not
dispensed with by the adoption of the Rules. What the
Rules really eliminated was the need for an expert
opinion to prove the root cause of the psychological
incapacity. The Court further held that the Rules,
being procedural in nature, apply only to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.
To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of
proof to show that Teresita suffered from
psychological incapacity; thus, his petition for
annulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo merely
established that Teresita had been remiss in her
duties as a wife for being irresponsible in taking care
of their familys finances a fault or deficiency that does
not amount to the psychological incapacity that Article
36 of the Family Code requires. We reiterate that
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity, as the same may only be
due to a persons difficulty, refusal or neglect to
undertake the obligations of marriage that is not
rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of
the Family Code addresses.[28]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the
petition and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. Costs against the

petitioner.

Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the

Cathedral of San Jose.

SO ORDERED.

Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the

marriage
celebration,
he
obtained
another
employment contract as a seaman and left his wife
with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in
January 1983, while working overseas, respondent
received a letter from his mother informing him that
Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same
letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.
Respondent claimed he then immediately asked
permission to leave his ship to return home. He
arrived in Antique in November 1983.

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10,
a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of
his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of
the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or,
in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null
and void. 1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition
through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had
been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the
instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco
did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead," 2 and second, Nolasco's
attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same
proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the
law on marriage. 3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was
a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica
Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during
one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting
onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent
Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they
returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose,
Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's
contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent
married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for

her himself whenever his ship docked in England
proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he
had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena
Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the
bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all
returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from
among friends but they too had no news of Janet
Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had
lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker
despite his lack of knowledge as to her family
background. He insisted that his wife continued to
refuse to give him such information even after they
were married. He also testified that he did not report
the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the
Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia
Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her
daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire
to return to England even before she had given birth
to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked
why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave
Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet
Monica never got used to the rural way of life in San
Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had
tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she
had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but
when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet
Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left
on 22 December 1982 for England. She further
claimed that she had no information as to the missing
person's present whereabouts.

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a
Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No.
209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order
No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as
presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker Nolasco,
without prejudice to her reappearance. 4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals
contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead because
respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there
existed a well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently
established a basis to form a belief that his absent
spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now
before this Court on a Petition for Review where the
following allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court's finding that there existed a well-founded belief
on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was
already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
Court's declaration that the petition was a proper case
of the declaration of presumptive death under Article
41, Family Code. 5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by
petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a wellfounded belief that his wife is already dead." 6
The present case was filed before the trial court
pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which
provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during
the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance

where there is danger of death under the

circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of
the Civil Code, which it superseded, 7 the following
crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time
required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for
a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable
the spouse present to remarry. 8 Also, Article 41 of the
Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil
Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires
either that there be no news that such absentee is still
alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be
dead andbelieved to be so by the spouse present, or
is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code. 9 The Family Code, upon the other hand,
prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee
is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four
(4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief
that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee. 10

Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied

with all these requirements. 11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils
down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he
had complied with the third requirement, i.e., the
existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent
spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to
conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that
she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree
of diligence required in searching for a missing
spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was
charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the
defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had
already died. The Court held that defendant had not
exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts
of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made
inquiries concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he
fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did
not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived
in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of
securing information concerning her whereabouts. He
admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife
was dead. He admits that the only basis of his
suspicion was the fact that she had been
absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the
investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his
attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique
after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of
seeking the help of local authorities or of the British
Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's contract
and went to London, a vast city of many millions of
inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you
exert efforts to inquire the whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.

Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had
a trip to London and I went to London to look for her I
could not find her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he
confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt
on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England.
The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to
wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily
know the geographical difference between London
and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the
two places could mean one place in England, the
port where his ship docked and where he found
Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave
home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or
Paraaque, would announce to friends and relatives,
"We're going to Manila." This apparent error in naming
of places of destination does not appear to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila
and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London
and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by
the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty
(350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that
walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with
a simple hope of somehow bumping into one
particular person there which is in effect what
Nolasco says he did can be regarded as a
reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet
Monica declined to give any information as to her
personal background even after she had married
respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his
failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss
of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife
which respondent claims were all returned to him.
Respondent said he had lost these returned letters,
under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to
respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from
their friends of her whereabouts, considering that
respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it
is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by
its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is
not synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before,
there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility.
Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said
testimony merely tended to show that the missing
spouse had chosen not to communicate with their
common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving
his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut
short his employment contract to return to San Jose,
Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine
(9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly
asked leave from his captain, to November 1983
when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent,
moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker
without inquiring about her parents and their place of
residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why he
did not even try to get the help of the police or other
authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find
his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's
departure and respondent's subsequent behavior
make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that
Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is
a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate
it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they
make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be
allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one
of them leave the conjugal abode and never to return
again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on
marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried
to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in
the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such
collusion between the parties when they find it
impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through
existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's
young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the
requirements of the law must prevail. Since

respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of

the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death must be denied. The law does not
view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of
the Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the familyand
an inviolable
social
institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
stressed strongly the need to protect.

23

the Court

. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the

family in the preservation of which the State bas the
strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of
the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution there is set forth the following basic
state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the
Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a
basic social institution which public policy cherishes
and protects. Consequently, family relations are
governed by law and no custom, practice or
agreement destructive of the family shall be
recognized or given effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the
well-founded belief required by law that his absent
wife was already dead that would sustain the
issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial court's
decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively
dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are

hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against

respondent.
Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN
NICDAO
CARIO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on
the validity of the two marriages contracted by the
deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death
benefits is now the subject of the controversy
between
the
two
Susans
whom
he
married. 1wphi1.nt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in
toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-9318632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S.
Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was on
June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario
(hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom
he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee
Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992,
with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred
to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in
their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in
1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and
bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23,
1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and
respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from
MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and]

Pag-ibig, 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a

total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and
burial (SSS). 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed
the instant case for collection of sum of money
against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia,
that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least onehalf of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos
(P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death
benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.
Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file
her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in
default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to
the deceased took place during the subsistence of,
and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of
nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no
knowledge of the previous marriage and that she
became aware of it only at the funeral of the
deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced
herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her
action for collection of sum of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license. In
support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the
marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner
which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of
marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO
(sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this
municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot
issue as requested a true copy or transcription of
Marriage License number from the records of this
archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs.
Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it may
serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of
respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to
pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the
amount which was paid to her in the form of death
benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S.
Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of
P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the
latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS.
GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT
CASE
INSTEAD
OF
THE
CLEAR
AND
UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED,
AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE
ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or
a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass

upon the validity of marriage even after the death of

the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with
sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two
marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the
subject death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force
when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the
marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall
within the marriages exempt from the license
requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no
marriage license number and, as certified by the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that
such a certification is adequate to prove the nonissuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that
they secured the required marriage license. Although
she was declared in default before the trial court,
petitioner could have squarely met the issue and

explained the absence of a marriage license in her

pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court.
But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and
chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will
put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed
validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage
between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition,
however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is declared void ab initio, the death
benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to
respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40
of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there
must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of
a previous marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of
nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second
marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan
Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage is the separation of the property of the
spouses according to the applicable property
regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void
ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute community or conjugal partnership of
property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property
Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to
the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubine, relationships where both man and woman

are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the

same married man, 17 ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective
contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution shall
belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries
earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.
Then too, contributions in the form of care of the
home, children and household, or spiritual or moral
inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan
Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage,
having been solemnized during the subsistence of a
previous marriage then presumed to be valid
(between petitioner and the deceased), the
application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual
Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation,
Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations,
incentives and benefits from governmental agencies
earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless
respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary,
it could not be said that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these
monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in
common by respondent and the deceased, but belong
to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate
succession, the said death benefits of the deceased
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not
being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of
them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code
governs. This article applies to unions of parties who
are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the
absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the
Family Code reads -

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly
in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in
good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article,
wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal
shares and will be divided equally between them,
even if only one party earned the wages and the other
did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the
disputed death benefits were earned by the
deceased alone as a government employee, Article
147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As
there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case,
both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be
in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death
benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as
her share in the property regime, and the other half
pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate

succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children

with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the
Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of
the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the
second wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been
dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership
established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has
the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative
heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled
to share in his estate upon his death should she
survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal
partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such
putative heir she has an interest in the husbands
share in the property here in dispute.... And with
respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observed that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there
is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And
inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved before judicial
declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable
solution in this case would be to recognize the right of
the second wife to her share of one-half in the
property acquired by her and her husband, and
consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage. 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited
decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior
and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage.
This is the reason why in the said case, the Court
determined the rights of the parties in accordance
with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court,
construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that
a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a
marriage is an all important condition precedent only
for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is
previously married wishes to contract a second
marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial
decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or
she could contract said second marriage, otherwise

the second marriage would be void. The same rule

applies even if the first marriage is patently void
because the parties are not free to determine for
themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage.
However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for
filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored
on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All
that a party has to do is to present evidence,
testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the
marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact
valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the
determination of the issues before it, will rule on the
status of the marriage involved and proceed to
determine the rights of the parties in accordance with
the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial
v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that
may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if
the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
connoted that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay
respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys
fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-9318632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as
to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo,
JJ., concur.
Puno J., on official leave.
G.R. No. 171713
ESTATE
vs.

OF

December 17, 2007

ROGELIO

G.

ONG, petitioner,

Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her

Mother and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing
(1) the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 23
November 2005 and (2) the Resolution2 of the same
court dated 1 March 2006 denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 70125.
A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer
for support pending litigation was filed by minor
Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her
mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against
Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. In her Complaint, Jinky
prayed that judgment be rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne
Rodjin Diaz as his daughter.
(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly
support of P20,000.00 pendente lite and thereafter to
fix monthly support.
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys
fees in the sum of P100,000.00.
(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as
maybe just and equitable in the premises.4
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November
1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted.
This developed into friendship and later blossomed
into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a
Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil
wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by
Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.5
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and
Rogelio cohabited and lived together at Fairlane
Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin
Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998 was
born at the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital, Tarlac
City.

10

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor
Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all
the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and
provided for all of minor Joannes needs recognizing
the child as his.

trial de novo pursuant to the provisions of Section 6,

Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.8

within the first 120 days of the 300 days following the
birth of the child because of

On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting

Rogelios Motion for New Trial:

a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual

intercourse with his wife;

In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor

Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor
Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the
child.

WHEREFORE, finding defendants motion for new

trial to be impressed with merit, the same is hereby
granted.

b) husband and wife were living separately in such a

way that sexual intercourse was not possible;

Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and

refused and continued failing and refusing to give
support for the child and to acknowledge her as his
daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore
adverted complaint.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio,
the latter failed to file any responsive pleading despite
repeated motions for extension, prompting the trial
court to declare him in default in its Order dated 7
April 1999. Rogelios Answer with Counterclaim and
Special and Affirmative Defenses was received by the
trial court only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to
present her evidence ex parte on the basis of which
the trial court on 23 April 1999 rendered a decision
granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint.
In its Decision6 dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his
natural child;
2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a
monthly support of P10,000.00 and further
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorneys
fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and the cost of the
suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the
order of default and a motion for reconsideration
seeking the courts understanding, as he was then in
a quandary on what to do to find a solution to a very
difficult problem of his life.7
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial
with prayer that the decision of the trial court dated 23
April 1999 be vacated and the case be considered for

The Order of this court declaring defendant in default

and the decision is this court dated April 23, 1999 are
hereby set aside but the evidence adduced shall
remain in record, subject to cross-examination by
defendant at the appropriate stage of the
proceedings.
In the meantime defendants answer is hereby
admitted, subject to the right of plaintiff to file a reply
and/or answer to defendants counterclaim within the
period fixed by the Rules of Court.
Acting on plaintiffs application for support pendente
lite which this court finds to be warranted, defendant
is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff immediately the
sum of P2,000.00 a month from January 15, 1999 to
May 1999 as support pendente lite in arrears and the
amount of P4,000.00 every month thereafter as
regular support pendente lite during the pendency of
this case.9
The RTC finally held:
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the
defendant is the father of the plaintiff Joanne Rodjin
Diaz.
Since it was duly established that plaintiffs mother
Jinky Diaz was married at the time of the birth of
Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is
a legitimate child of the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo
and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code). The child is
still presumed legitimate even if the mother may have
declared against her legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on
the following grounds provided for in Article 166 of the
same Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides
that there must be physical impossibility for the
husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife

c) serious illness of the husband which prevented

sexual intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a
Japanese national and that he was living outside of
the country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he
comes home only once a year. Both evidence of the
parties proved that the husband was outside the
country and no evidence was shown that he ever
arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the
birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a
relationship with another man before she met the
defendant, there is no evidence that she also had
sexual relations with other men on or about the
conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her
second child (see Exh. "A"), so her first child, a
certain Nicole (according to defendant) must have a
different father or may be the son of Hasegawa
K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who
shouldered the hospital bills representing the
expenses in connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is
an evidence of admission that he is the real father of
plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that even when he
stopped going out with Jinky, he and Jinky used to go
to motels even after 1996. Defendant also admitted
that on some instances, he still used to see Jinky after
the birth of Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was even the
one who fetched Jinky after she gave birth to Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that
Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky and defendant
Rogelio Ong and it is but just that the latter should
support plaintiff.10
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision
and disposed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate
child of defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky
Diaz. The Order of this Court awarding support
pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed
and that the support should continue until Joanne
Rodjin Diaz shall have reached majority age.11
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied for lack of merit in an Order of the trial court
dated 19 January 2001.12 From the denial of his
Motion for Reconsideration, Rogelio appealed to the
Court of Appeals. After all the responsive pleadings
had been filed, the case was submitted for decision
and ordered re-raffled to another Justice for study and
report as early as 12 July 2002.13
During the pendency of the case with the Court of
Appeals, Rogelios counsel filed a manifestation
informing the Court that Rogelio died on 21 February
2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution was filed by said
counsel praying that Rogelio be substituted in the
case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong,14 which motion
was accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals.15
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of
Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present
appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision
dated December 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court
of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is
hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED
to the court a quo for the issuance of an order
directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA
analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity
of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon
consultation and in coordination with laboratories and
experts on the field of DNA analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.16
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated 1 March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its
Decision as follows:
In this case, records showed that the late defendantappellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the early stage of the

11

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

proceedings volunteered and suggested that he and
plaintiffs mother submit themselves to a DNA or
blood testing to settle the issue of paternity, as a sign
of good faith. However, the trial court did not consider
resorting to this modern scientific procedure
notwithstanding the repeated denials of defendant
that he is the biological father of the plaintiff even as
he admitted having actual sexual relations with
plaintiffs mother. We believe that DNA paternity
testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the
most reliable and effective method of settling the
present paternity dispute. Considering, however, the
untimely demise of defendant-appellant during the
pendency of this appeal, the trial court, in consultation
with out laboratories and experts on the field of DNA
analysis, can possibly avail of such procedure with
whatever remaining DNA samples from the deceased
defendant alleged to be the putative father of plaintiff
minor whose illegitimate filiations is the subject of this
action for support.17
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues
for resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED
WHEN
IT
DID
NOT
DISMISS
RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE THAT
ROGELIO G. ONG WAS HER FATHER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED
WHEN
IT
DID
NOT
DECLARE
RESPONDENT AS THE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF
JINKY C. DIAZ AND HER JAPANESE HUSBAND,
CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO
REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF HER LEGITIMACY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE
COURT A QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE
FACT THAT IT IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO
THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG.18

Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due

course and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 23, 2005 be modified, by setting aside the
judgment remanding the case to the trial court for
DNA testing analysis, by dismissing the complaint of
minor Joanne for compulsory recognition, and by
declaring the minor as the legitimate child of Jinky
and Hasegawa Katsuo.19
From among the issues presented for our disposition,
this Court finds it prudent to concentrate its attention
on the third one, the propriety of the appellate courts
decision remanding the case to the trial court for the
conduct of DNA testing. Considering that a definitive
result of the DNA testing will decisively lay to rest the
issue of the filiation of minor Joanne, we see no
reason to resolve the first two issues raised by the
petitioner as they will be rendered moot by the result
of the DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the
determination of filiation of minor Joanne for purposes
of support in favor of the said minor.

The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out

of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on
the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy.

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court

and special laws.

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however,

is not conclusive and consequently, may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article
255 of the New Civil Code23 provides:

There had been divergent and incongruent

statements and assertions bandied about by the
parties to the present petition. But with the
advancement in the field of genetics, and the
availability of new technology, it can now be
determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio
is the biological father of the minor, through DNA
testing.

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and

eighty days following the celebration of the marriage,
and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be
admitted other than that of the physical impossibility
of the husbands having access to his wife within the
first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to

adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support
(as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden of
proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child.
There are four significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action which parties have to face:
a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption
of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and child.20

This physical impossibility may be caused:

A child born to a husband and wife during a valid

marriage is presumed legitimate.21 As a guaranty in
favor of the child and to protect his status of
legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is

established by any of the following:

Article 167. The children shall be considered

legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress.

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public

document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption

be made in favor of legitimacy. We explained the
rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v.
Court of Appeals22:

1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living
separately in such a way that access was not
possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.24
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as
follows:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or

a final judgment; or

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the

legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child; or

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their

illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

DNA is the fundamental building block of

entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in
cells and is the same in every cell of
person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence,
DNA profile can determine his identity.25

a persons
all human
the same
a persons

DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted

from a biological sample obtained from an individual
is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a
pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom
the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for
each person, except for identical twins.
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint
called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to
an individual (except in the rare occurrence of
identical twins that share a single, fertilized egg), and
DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a
component of every cell in the human body, the DNA
of an individuals blood is the very DNA in his or her
skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples
from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They
are known as A (Adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine)
and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases
appear in an individuals DNA determines his or her
physical make up. And since DNA is a double
stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific
paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are
called "genes."
Every gene has a certain number of the above base
pairs distributed in a particular sequence. This gives a
person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the

12

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ.
They are known as "polymorphic loci," which are the
areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests,
fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing simply
means determining the "polymorphic loci."
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample
obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may
proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five
(5) techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are: the
RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism);
"reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was
used in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence by
37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; DNA
process; VNTR (variable number tandem repeats);
and the most recent which is known as the PCR([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short
tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was
availed of by most forensic laboratories in the world.
PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in
an evidence sample a million times through repeated
cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA
polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes
measurements in 13 separate places and can match
two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error rate
of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing,
"matches" are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or
fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a
criminal case, the evidence collected from the crime
scene is compared with the "known" print. If a
substantial amount of the identifying features are the
same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a
match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA
or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have
come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show
variations between people. In each of these regions, a
person possesses two genetic types called "allele,"
one inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test,
the forensic scientist looks at a number of these
variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA
profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the
mother and child, it is possible to determine which half
of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The
other half must have been inherited from the
biological father. The alleged fathers profile is then
examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types

in his profile, which match the paternal types in the

child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the
child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA
types match, then he is not excluded as the father.26
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is
provided:
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. For purposes of this
Rule, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxxx
(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA
profiles, results and other genetic information directly
generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
(d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived
from DNA testing of a biological sample obtained from
a person, which biological sample is clearly
identifiable as originating from that person;
(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible
scientific methods which include the extraction of DNA
from biological samples, the generation of DNA
profiles and the comparison of the information
obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples
for the purpose of determining, with reasonable
certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two
or more distinct biological samples originates from the
same person (direct identification) or if the biological
samples originate from related persons (kinship
analysis); and
(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical
estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a putative
parent compared with the probability of a random
match of two unrelated individuals in a given
population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA
analysis, the resolution thereof may provide the
definitive key to the resolution of the issue of support
for minor Joanne. Our articulation in Agustin v. Court
of Appeals27 is particularly relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so
steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court
of Appeals (336 Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated
in 1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA
because "DNA, being a relatively new science, (had)

not as yet been accorded official recognition by our

courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by
such conventional evidence as the relevant
incriminating acts,verbal and written, by the putative
father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of
admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as
enunciated inTijing v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No.
125901, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA 17]:
x x x Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern
and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have
now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The University of
the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute
(UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem
repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the
fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies,
one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father
and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of
DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the
results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said results is to
deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and
authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence
came in 2002 with out en banc decision in People v.
Vallejo [G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA
192] where the rape and murder victims DNA
samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused
were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the
purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an
association exist(ed) between the evidence sample
and the reference sample. The samples collected
(were) subjected to various chemical processes to
establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4
April 2003, 400 SCRA 584], we acquitted the accused
charged with rape for lack of evidence because
"doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the

real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been

perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we
wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still
our doubts."
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos.
161434, 161634 and 161824, 3 March 2004, 424
SCRA 277], where the Court en banc was faced with
the issue of filiation of then presidential candidate
Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely
to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and
any physical residue of the long dead parent could be
resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing...
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v.
Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA
504], we affirmed the conviction of the accused for
rape with homicide, the principal evidence for which
included DNA test results. x x x.
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the
trial court, petitioner questions the appropriateness of
the order by the Court of Appeals directing the
remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing given
that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that
a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is
no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our
mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the
order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more
ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without
basis especially as the New Rules on DNA
Evidence28 allows the conduct of DNA testing,
either motu proprio or upon application of any person
who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and
notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the
case;

13

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested;
or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the
results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to
produce new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the
court may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of
the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist
appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term "biological sample" means
any organic material originating from a persons body,
even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible
to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other
body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.29
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the
biological samples as enumerated above as may be
available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case,
petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining
an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized
for the conduct of DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct
of DNA testing. In People v. Umanito,30 citing Tecson
v. Commission on Elections,31 this Court held:

may be accomplished through DNA testing, is

material to the fair and correct adjudication of the
instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the
courts are authorized, after due hearing and
notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However,
while this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at
bar, capacitated as it is to receive and act on the
matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts and does not, in the course of daily routine,
conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more
appropriate that the case be remanded to the RTC for
reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with
due notice to the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v.
Court of Appeals32:
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been
marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their
existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing
technology finally provides a much needed equalizer
for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have
long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have
repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case
comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally
evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of
evidence gathering. We therefore take this
opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA
testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
23 November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March
2006 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on

Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424
SCRA 277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA
testing in our jurisdiction in this wise: "[i]n case proof
of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain,
DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained
from body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical residue of the long dead parent could be
resorted to."

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson,
Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.

It is obvious to the Court that the determination of

whether appellant is the father of AAAs child, which

DECISION

G.R. No. 141528

Austria-Martinez,,

October 31, 2006

OSCAR
P.
MALLION, petitioner,
vs.
EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also

denied in an order9 dated January 21, 2000.
AZCUNA, J.:

Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court raising a question of law: Does a
previous final judgment denying a petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of
nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?

A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR

THE DECLARATION OF HIS MARRIAGE AS NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE
REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF
(THE) DISMISSAL OF AN EARLIER PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME
MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF HIS WIFES
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE
36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH
HAS PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN
DETERMINED SQUARELY AND DEFINITIVELY BY
THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT
IN ACCORD WITH LAW.

The facts are not disputed:

On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed
a petition1 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity
of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under
Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended,
otherwise known as the Family Code, citing
respondents alleged psychological incapacity. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in
a decision2 dated November 11, 1997 upon the
finding that petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant
evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is
seeking."3 The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals
was likewise dismissed in a resolution 4 dated June 11,
1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and
other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95
attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999
another petition5for declaration of nullity of marriage
with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that
his marriage with respondent was null and void due to
the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with
a motion to dismiss6 dated August 13, 1999, praying
for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res
judicata and forum shopping.
In an order7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted
respondents motion to dismiss, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of
Suits, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This case
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.8

B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR

THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE
MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD
CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND MISAPPLIED THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND CONCEPTS ON RES
JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
AND FORUM SHOPPING.10
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the
two cases was the same, that is, the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of
action in the earlier case was distinct and separate
from the cause of action in the present case because
the operative facts upon which they were based as
well as the evidence required to sustain either were
different. Because there is no identity as to the cause
of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not
lie to bar the second petition. In this connection,
petitioner maintains that there was no violation of the
rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes
the splitting of a cause of action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated
May 26, 2000, counters that while the present suit is
anchored on a different ground, it still involves the
same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that
is, the validity of petitioner and respondents marriage,
and prays for the same remedy, that is, the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent

14

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

thus contends that petitioner violated the rule on
forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that
petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as
the ground he cites in this petition could have been
raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
The petition lacks merit.
The issue before this Court is one of first impression.
Should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due
to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by
Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same
proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on
the ground of a partys psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code?
Petitioner insists that because the action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity and the action for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of
marriage license constitute separate causes of action,
the present case would not fall under the prohibition
against splitting a single cause of action nor would it
be barred by the principle of res judicata.
The contention is untenable.
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a
final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits on points and
matters determined in the former suit."11
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every wellregulated system of jurisprudence and is founded
upon the following precepts of common law, namely:
(1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the
interest of the State that there should be an end to
litigation, and (2) the hardship on the individual that
he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A
contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and
quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer
the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part
of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility
and happiness.12
In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is
embodied in Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, thus:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The

effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court
of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a
specific thing or in respect to the probate of a will, or
the administration of the estate of a deceased person,
or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or status of a particular person or his
relationship to another, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or
administration, or the condition, status or relationship
of the person; however, the probate of a will or
granting of letters of administration shall only
be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is,
with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as
to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties
and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action
or special proceeding, litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and,
(c) In any other litigation between the same
parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res
judicata.13 Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its concept
as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict,"
which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,
demand or cause of action. On the other hand,
Section 47 (c) pertains tores judicata in its concept as
"conclusiveness of judgment" or otherwise known as
the rule of auter action pendantwhich ordains that
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case between
the same parties involving a different cause of
action.14 Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior
judgment obtains in the present case.

Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of

the following requisites: (1) the former judgment
is final;
(2)
it
is
rendered
by a
court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it is a judgment or an orderon the merits;
and (4) there is -- between the first and the second
actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action.15
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first
three requisites. What is in issue is the presence of
the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to
determine whether the causes of action are identical
is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain
both actions, or whether there is an identity in the
facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions.
If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the
two actions are considered the same, and a judgment
in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.16
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the
two petitions brought by him seeking the declaration
of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate
causes of action for the evidence necessary to
sustain the first petition which was anchored on the
alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is
different from the evidence necessary to sustain the
present petition which is anchored on the purported
absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking
different grounds for the same cause of action. By
definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another.17 In both
petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent.
What differs is the ground upon which the cause of
action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner
essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal
issue that holds the key to the resolution of this
controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and
respondents marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the
claim that the marriage is null and void because no
valid celebration of the same took place due to the
alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No.
SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded
that the marriage had been solemnized and
celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now

bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a

marriage license which petitioner raises now could
have been presented and heard in the earlier case.
Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as
regards every matter offered and received to sustain
or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for
that purpose and of all other matters that could have
been adjudged in that case.18
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or
avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying
the form of his action or adopting a different method
of presenting his case. 19 As this Court stated in Perez
v. Court of Appeals:20
x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not
a different cause of action, provided it grows out of
the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the
wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different
causes of action simply because the theory of the
second would not have been open under the
pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the right
to bring a second action after the loss of the first
merely by having circumscribed and limited theories
of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.
It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the
grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to
place in issue in his pleading, all the issues
existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be
tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth
in his first action every ground for relief which he
claims to exist and upon which he relied, and
cannot be permitted to rely upon them by
piecemeal in successive action to recover for the
same wrong or injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or
equitable, must present to the court, either by the
pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon
which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not
at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it
by piecemeal or present only a portion of the
grounds upon which a special relief is sought and
leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit
if the first fails. There would be no end to litigation
if
such
piecemeal
presentation
is
allowed. (Citations omitted.)

15

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the
course of action to take in order to obtain judicial
relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is
filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and
relevant issues therein. The losing party who files
another action regarding the same controversy will be
needlessly squandering time, effort and financial
resources because he is barred by law from litigating
the same controversy all over again.21
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded
the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is
now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For
this reason, the Court finds that the present action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack
of marriage license is barred by the decision dated
November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San
Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

HALILI VS. HALILI

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of
the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying
petitioners petition for review on certiorari (under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set
aside the January 26, 2004 decision[1] and September
24, 2004 resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to
declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. SantosHalili null and void on the basis of his psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage
in
the
Regional
Trial
Court
(RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites
thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they
never lived together as husband and wife, but
maintained the relationship. However, they started
fighting constantly a year later, at which point
petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and

started dating other women. Immediately thereafter,

he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other
women as he was already a married man. It was only
upon making an inquiry that he found out that the
marriage was not fake.
Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering
from a mixed personality disorder, particularly
dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as
diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan.
The court a quo held that petitioners personality
disorder was serious and incurable and directly
affected his capacity to comply with his essential
marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the
marriage null and void.[3]
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the trial court on the ground that the
totality of the evidence presented failed to establish
petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration. It was denied.
The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for
review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs decision
and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.
Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration
reiterating his argument that his marriage to
respondent ought to be declared null and void on the
basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that
the evidence he presented, especially the testimony
of his expert witness, was more than enough to
sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court
that he was and still is psychologically incapable of
complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

and burden of decision-making, must consider as

essential the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental disposition of the parties.[5]
In this case, the testimony[6] of petitioners expert
witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from
dependent personality disorder. Thus:
Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and
interviews which you conducted, can you briefly tell
this court your findings [and] conclusions?
A.
Well, the petitioner
is
suffering
from a
personality disorder. It is a mixed personality disorder
from
self-defeating
personality
disorder
to [dependent] personality disorderand this is
brought about by [a] dysfunctional family that
petitioner had. He also suffered from partner relational
problem during his marriage with Chona. There were
lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage, sir.
Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is
suffering from psychological incapacity to handle the
essential obligations of marriage?
A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage
was very questionable. It was a very impulsive
decision. I dont think he understood what it meant to
really be married and after the marriage, there was no
consummation, there was no sexual intercourse, he
never lived with the respondent. And after three
months he refused to see or talk with the respondent
and afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural
death, and he never thought it was a really serious
matter at all.

Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage

were you able to conclude xx xx that petitioner and
respondent are suffering from psychological
incapacity?
A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had
a residence, they never consummated the marriage.
During the very short relationship they had, there
were frequent quarrels and so there might be a
problem also of lack of respect [for] each other and
afterwards there was abandonment.

In Te, this Court defined dependent personality

disorder[7] as
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of
dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others comments. At times they actually bring about
dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in
early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder
may be unable to make everyday decisions without
advice or reassurance from others, may allow others
to make most of their important decisions (such as
where to live), tend to agree with people even when
they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting
projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do
things that are demeaning in order to get approval
from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of
being abandoned.

xx xx xx
We grant the motion for reconsideration.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of
the Philippines,[4] this Court reiterated that courts
should interpret the provision on psychological
incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of
a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines and by decisions of church
tribunals.
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature
of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task

Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that

Lester Halili and respondent suffered from a grave
lack of discretionary judgment. Can you expound on
this?
A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil
[rites which] they had undergone. [It was] just a spur
of the moment decision that they should get married
xx xx I dont think they truly considered themselves
married.
xx xx xx

In her psychological report,[8] Dr. Dayan stated that

petitioners dependent personality disorder was
evident in the fact that petitioner was very much
attached to his parents and depended on them for
decisions.[9] Petitioners mother even had to be the
one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt
confused on what action to take upon learning that his
marriage to respondent was for real.[10]
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of
persons suffering from a dependent personality
disorder, petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating
manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This

16

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

submissive attitude encouraged other people to take
advantage of him.[11] This could be seen in the way
petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by
his father who treated his family like robots[12] and,
later, by respondent who was as domineering as his
father.[13] When petitioner could no longer take
respondents domineering ways, he preferred to hide
from her rather than confront her and tell her outright
that he wanted to end their marriage.[14]
Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to
his dysfunctional family life, to wit:[15]
Q. And what might be the root cause of such
psychological incapacity?

effectively renders him unable to perform the

essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is
declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 resolution of
this Court and the January 26, 2004 decision
andSeptember 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City,
Branch
158
dated April
17,
1998 is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lesters family is

dysfunctional. The father was very abusive, very
domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and
the children never had affirmation. They might [have
been] x x x given financial support because the father
was [a] very affluent person but it was never an intact
family. x x x The wife and the children were practically
robots. And so, I would say Lester grew up, not
having self-confidence, very immature and somehow
not truly understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a
husband, what [it] meant to have a real family life.

Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners

personality disorder was grave and incurable and
already existent at the time of the celebration of his
marriage to respondent.[16]
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had
a psychological condition that was grave and
incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court,
in the same Te case, recognized that individuals with
diagnosable personality disorders usually have longterm concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.
[17]
Particularly, personality disorders are long-standing,
inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much
severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of
living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning
and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create
problems for those who display them and for others.[18]
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner
is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that

TE vs. TE GR No. 161793

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this
petition. Psychological
incapacity,
since
its
incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd subject
of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats
this case, however, with much ado, it having realized
that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily
imposed a perspective by which psychological
incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with
the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and
devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition
further
assails
the
January
19,
2004
Resolution[2] denying
the
motion
for
the
reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse
of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a

gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese

association in their college. Edward was then initially
attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter
already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to
court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when
petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent,
a freshman.[3]

family then hid him from Rowena and her family

whenever they telephoned to ask for him.[9]
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to
Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they
should live with his parents, she said that it was better
for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.
[10]

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two

understood one another and developed a certain
degree of closeness towards each other. In March
1996, or around three months after their first meeting,
Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he
refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her
persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they
left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he,
providing their travel money and she, purchasing the
boat ticket.[4]
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a
month. Their pension house accommodation and
daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not
find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back
to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house
and Edward to his parents home. As his family was
abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him,
threatening him that she would commit suicide,
Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles
place.[5]
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to
a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and
she, 20.[6] The two then continued to stay at her
uncles place where Edward was treated like a
prisonerhe
was
not
allowed
to
go
out
unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his
guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena. [7] At
one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to
his brother who suggested that they should stay at
their parents home and live with them.Edward relayed
this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he
should get his inheritance so that they could live on
their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but
the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be
disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.
[8]

After a month, Edward escaped from the house of

Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His

After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000,

Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment
of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters
psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-00-39720.[11]
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on
July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate
whether there was collusion between the parties.[12] In
the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and
deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist
it in the scheduled hearings.[13]
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an
investigation report stating that it could not determine
if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it
recommended trial on the merits.[14]
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner
found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and
made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old]
Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again
Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college
at AMA ComputerCollege last 1994 and is currently
unemployed. He is married to and separated from
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself
at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation
to his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the
latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He
is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in
business and one deceased sister. Both his parents

17

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

are also in the business world by whom he [considers]
as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues
are said to be handed to each of the family
member. He generally considers himself to be quiet
and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid
of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in
being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as
well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in
the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full
servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is]
said to isolate himself from his friends even during his
childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and
hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite
having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is
said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and
shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend
prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness
to petitioner and this became the foundation of their
intimate relationship. After a month of dating,
petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having
problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly
retorted that she also hates her family and that she
actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that
[time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that
they should elope and live together. Petitioner
hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both
young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they
would somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In
the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously
brought the idea of eloping and she already bought
tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner
reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped
to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the
house of a friend of respondent, but they were not
able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent
an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but
could not find any so it was suggested by respondent
that they should go back and seek help from
petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the
house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out
of the country so respondent decided to go back to
her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed
behind at their home. After a few days of separation,
respondent called petitioner by phone and said she

wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded

immediately and when he arrived at their house,
respondent confronted petitioner as to why he
appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and
even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got
scared so he went home again. Respondent would
call by phone every now and then and became angry
as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent
went to the extent of threatening to file a case against
petitioner and scandalize his family in the
newspaper.Petitioner asked her how he would be able
to make amends and at this point in time[,]
respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,]
out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify
her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle
brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very
same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage
Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never
applied for any Marriage License.

the petitioner already settled his differences with his

own family. When respondent refused to live with
petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner
decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his
parents. He told her already that he was disinherited
and since he also does not have a job, he would not
be able to support her.After knowing that petitioner
does not have any money anymore, respondent
stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner
that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is
said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weaklyfounded. The break-up was caused by both parties[]
unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He
was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting
boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved
with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their

house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived,
respondent refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways
with
her
uncle
showing
to
him
many
guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should
persist in going home, they will commission their
military friends to harm his family. Respondent even
made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should
perish, the authorities should look for him at his
parents[ ]and relatives[ ]houses. Sometime in June
of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went
home. He told his parents about his predicament and
they forgave him and supported him by giving him
military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform
them that he signed a marriage contract with
respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was
referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner
offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of
petitioners
parents
while
they
are
still
studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed
that she would only live with him if they will have a
separate home of their own and be away from his
parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he
should already get his share of whatever he would
inherit from his parents so they can start a new
life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that]

Revised Beta Examination

Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be
emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon
swearing to their marital vows as each of them was
motivated by different notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,]
is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit
himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the
search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as
an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a
lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with
other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of
lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to
commit himself to a relationship especially to that of
respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously
aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and
timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously
attached and spend a solemn time alone.

ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is

said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of
woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in
her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is
seen to take move on marriage as she thought that
her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune
because he is part of a rich family. In order to have
her dreams realized, she used force and threats
knowing that [her] husband is somehow weakwilled. Upon the realization that there is really no
chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the
relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to
know himself and marry himself before submitting to
marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of
intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution
solemnized by religious and law. In the case
presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is
evidently clear that both parties have impulsively
taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of
their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point
of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral
disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely
exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful,
insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides
toward convenience. It is apparent that she is
suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of
Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that
started since childhood and only manifested during
marriage. Both parties display psychological
incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for
them to take.[15]

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its

Decision[16] declaring the marriage of the parties null
and void on the ground that both parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential
marital
obligations.[17] The
Republic,
represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of
appeal.[18]
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August
5, 2003 Decision[19] in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867,
reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.[20] It ruled
that petitioner failed to prove the psychological

18

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did
not personally examine respondent, and relied only
on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the
psychological incapacity was not shown to be
attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of
the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina[21] needed for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.[22] The CA faulted the lower court for rendering
the decision without the required certification of the
OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its
agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be,
the petition.[23] The CA later denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration in the likewise assailed January
19, 2004 Resolution.[24]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the
instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15,
2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.[25]
In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA
erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the
marriage void, not only because of respondents
psychological incapacity, but rather due to both
parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points
out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to
personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that
the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because
the latter represented it during the trial; and it had
been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial
court orders and notices.[27]
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,
[28]
that the annulment petition filed before the RTC
contains no statement of the essential marital
obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The
root cause of the psychological incapacity was
likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it
medically or clinically identified. The purported
incapacity of both parties was not shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the
clinical psychologist did not personally examine the
respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the
requirements in Molina[29] were not satisfied.[30]

The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether,

based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage
between the parties is null and void.[31]
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin
and charting the development of jurisprudence
interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code

Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code,
Article 36 was based on grounds available in the
Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero
elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court
of Appeals:[33]
However, as a member of both the Family Law
Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and
the
Civil
Code
Revision
Commission of the UP LawCenter, I wish to add some
observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then
Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to
then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
traced the background of the inclusion of the present
Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee
had thought of including a chapter on absolute
divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of
the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and
the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault
divorce between the spouses after a number of years
of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous
years of separation between the spouses, with or

without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)

whenever a married person would have obtained a
decree of absolute divorce in another country.
Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce
but called by another name. Later, even the Civil
Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision
Committee and Family Law Committee started
holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft
of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated
the definition of marriage as

marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The

result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void
marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the
present Civil Code, to wit:
(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:

a special contract of permanent partnership between

a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It
is an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by law.
With the above definition, and considering the
Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino
people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social
institution upon which the family and society are
founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that
any provision on absolute divorce would encounter
from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of
our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people
belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did
not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead,
opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon
Law. It was thought that such an action would not
only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would
also solve the nagging problem of church annulments
of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil
law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested
to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action
for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to
avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages
as found in the present Civil Code and those
proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon
Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code
decided to consolidate the present provisions on void

Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be

invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34.
Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages
in our country today may already be dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute
divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as
well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz
of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee
was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has been declaring marriages null and void on
the ground of lack of due discretion for causes that, in
other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce,
like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a
man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise
perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who
refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to
have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the
Committee that they have found out in tribunal work
that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their

19

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.
[34]

In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft
provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion
took finally produced the following revised provision
even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation
above has dropped any reference to wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage and to mentally
incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases
refer to defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation. There being a
defect in consent, it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity
is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer
to mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
My own position as a member of the Committee then
was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense,
insanity of a lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term

psychological or mental impotence, Archbishop Oscar
Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session
that this term is an invention of some churchmen who
are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as psychological
or mental incapacity to discharge . . . Justice Ricardo
C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with
another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority
opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36
is: Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera,
considered the inclusion of the phrase and is
incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented
that this would give rise to the question of how they
will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed
that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility
that one may be cured after the psychological
incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was
not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice
Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the
remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for
determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of
marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was
subsumed under special cases and special situations,
hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family
Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is
there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages
that even comes close to being psychological in
nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances

existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage
which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack
of essential requisites, some marriages are void from
the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code,
particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters,
now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with
the more permissive mores and practices of the time,
took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of
Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following
persons are incapable of contracting marriage: 3.
(those) who, because of causes of a psychological
nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage provided the model for what is now Art. 36
of the Family Code: A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law
recognizes only two types of marriages with respect
to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however,
recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or
annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical
Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually declares the
marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in
the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can
never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman
Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal
procedure with a Court selection and a formal
hearing.
Such so-called church annulments are not recognized
by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to
capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another
marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not
being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law,

the former being more strict, quite a number of

married couples have found themselves in limbofreed
from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic
Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or
enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to
such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision
Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept
of psychological incapacity into the Family Codeand
classified the same as a ground for declaring
marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the
beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917).
This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for
psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the
same indirectly from a combination of three old
canons: Canon #1081 required persons to be capable
according to law in order to give valid consent; Canon
#1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant
of the major elements required in marriage; and
Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required
that internal and external freedom be present in order
for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
produced two distinct but related grounds for
annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of
due competence. Lack of due discretion means
that the person did not have the ability to give valid
consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the
union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that
the person was incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made during the
wedding ceremony.
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in
the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such
as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the
foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof
necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.
The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several
cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the
time of marriage was probably not present in persons
who had displayed such problems shortly after the
marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short
of
revolutionary.
Once
the Rota itself
had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind

20

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after
1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of
serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.[36]

Interestingly, the Committee did not give any

examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by
so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. The
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.[37] The
law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in
its application.[38]
Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase psychological
incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible
cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by
Article 68[40] of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment
of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.[41] This interpretation is,
in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A
sharp conceptual distinction must be made between
the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely
between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and
the
incapacity
to
assume
the
essential
obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains
the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal,
example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and
on the assumption that they are capable according to
positive law to enter such contract, there remains the
object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is

located in a different locality, and prior to the

conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted
down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the
hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the
canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the
psychological process of giving consent because it
has been established a priori that both have such a
capacity to give consent, and they both know well the
object of their consent [the house and its
particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of
the consent/contract which does not exist. The
contract is invalid because it lacks its formal
object. The consent as a psychological act is both
valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is
directed towards an object which is not
available. Urbano
Navarrete
summarizes
this
distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the
positing of consent but with positing the object of
consent. The person may be capable of positing a
free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling
the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the
consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the
Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity
with respect to marriage arising from pathological
conditions, there has been an increasing trend to
understand as ground of nullity different from others,
the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from
sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which
ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this
rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do
sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a
grave psychopathological condition which affects the
higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom;
or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so that
is to say, they arise from certain physiological
dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect
the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties
however, so that these persons are still capable of
free human acts. The evidence from the empirical
sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies
of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards
sexual activities which are not normal, either with
respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or
to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism,

homosexuality]. However,
these
anomalies
notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the
higher faculties remain intact such that a person so
afflicted
continues
to
have
an
adequate
understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity
of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage
freely. The question though is whether such a person
can assume those responsibilities which he cannot
fulfill, although he may be able to understand them.In
this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage issues from the
incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than
the incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not
actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps
taken by church courts were not too clear whether this
incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity
to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for
example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect,
under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from
properly deliberating and its judgment lacks
freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the
intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the
influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the
inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it
was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary
freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision
made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse,
would not be a free act. But this is precisely the
question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect
is always and continuously under such an irresistible
compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and
certainly more reasonable, to think that there are
certain cases in which one who is sexually
hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate
quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies;
his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one
reason that he cannot posit the object of consent, the
exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal
way and with usually regularity. It would seem more
correct to say that the consent may indeed be free,
but is juridically ineffective because the party is
consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The
house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity
as
an
Autonomous
Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more
clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did

a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to

give consent on the one hand, and the inability to
fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his
opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the
meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to
evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty
with positing a free and intelligent consent. However,
such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an
intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in
another sphere: delivering the object of the
consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise
treated the difference between the act of consenting
and the act of positing the object of consent from the
point of view of a person afflicted with
nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction
usually leaves the process of knowing and
understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is
the object of consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object
of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence
cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress
towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is
to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the
same person with the ability to make a free decision,
an intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and
weighing
of
things. The
decision coram
Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that
such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard
to the moment of consent but also, and especially,
with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The
decision concludes that a person in such a condition
is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of
fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in
understanding what the obligations of marriage are,
nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same
obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in
1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as
moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar
expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in
some
anomalies
and
disorders
in
the
personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties
of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or
psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence
that constitutes the impediment dealt with by
C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the

21

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

subject incapable of binding himself in a valid
matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly
renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential
obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the
long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile
tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity
when either or both of the contractants are not
capable
of
initiating
or
maintaining
this
consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases
where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a
narcissistic personality] that he does not even know
how to begin a union with the other, let alone how to
maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second
incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses
are incapable of beginning or maintaining a
heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very
substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could
arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good
of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not
of thebonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A
spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing
to the good of the other party qua persona rather
than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of
contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a
person who may be quite capable of procuring the
economic good and the financial security of the other,
but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of
the other. These are general strokes and this is not
the place for detained and individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the
concrete circumstances of the case concerns a
person diagnosed to be suffering from serious
sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent
may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the
essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable
of assuming them because of his constitutional
immorality.
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of
the person as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities
is determined not only at the moment of decision but
also and especially during the moment of execution of
decision. And when this is applied to constitution of
the marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment

of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent

consideration that must be factored into the question
of whether a person was in a position to assume the
obligations of marriage in the first place. When one
speaks of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill
the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in
fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto
esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz
collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume
the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic
constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of
his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy
as regards the rights of others that he had
violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably
disturbed in the presence of this personality
disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and
experience how others feel) is common. A sense of
entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially
favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise
common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which
others are taken advantage of in order to achieve
ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered
as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is
the right to the communio vitae. This and their
corresponding obligations are basically centered
around the good of the spouses and of the
children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not
have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the
incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of
these rights. There are some cases in which
interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some
characteristic features of inability for interpersonal
relationships in marriage include affective immaturity,
narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not
very clear under what rubric homosexuality was
understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to
say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the
inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or
because
of
the
inability
to
fulfill
its
obligations. Progressively,
however,
rotal
jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to
assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978,
Parisella was able to consider, with charity,
homosexuality as an autonomous ground of
nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said

to be unable to assume the essential obligations of

marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of
matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to
the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius
vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage]
certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical
structure to account for the complex phenomenon that
homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily
impotent because, except in very few exceptional
cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual
relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental
infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not
necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion
because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect
the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather,
the homosexual person is unable to assume the
responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to
fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other
words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of
consent, as in the defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs
to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified
by the canon: causes of a psychological
nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause
is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In
other words, there must be a reference to the psychic
part of the person. It is only when there is something
in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the
person which impedes his capacity that one can then
affirm that the person is incapable according to the
hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is
judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the
extent that he is found to have something rooted in
his psychic constitution which impedes the
assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply
engrained in ones consciousness would not seem to
qualify to be a source of this invalidating
incapacity. The difference being that there seems to
be some freedom, however remote, in the
development of the habit, while one accepts as given
ones psychic constitution. It would seem then that the
law insists that the source of the incapacity must be
one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.
[42]

Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on

a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether

a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated,

the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,[43] ruled that
the findings of the trial court are final and binding on
the appellate courts.[44]
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and
declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the
pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
[45]
explained that when private respondent testified
under oath before the lower court and was crossexamined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented
evidence
in
the
form
of
testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties
to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be
applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its
framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by
the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,
[46]
thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own
deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
(1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation
of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable,
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

22

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need
be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession
or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or

inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less

ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our
Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident
source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and
apart from each othershall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable
base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney

or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[47]

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the

Courts membership concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V.
Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result and
another threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice
Romerotook pains to compose their individual
separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
even emphasized that each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or
generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the
field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is
on all fours with another case.The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
[48]

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,

[49]
the Court has applied the aforesaid standards,
without too much regard for the laws clear intention
thateach case is to be treated differently, as courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the
Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one
in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity.Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution

of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs

exaggeration of Article 36 as the most liberal divorce
procedure
in
the
world.[50] The
unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll
on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very
foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions. Far from what was intended by the
Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all
sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina,
has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled
marriages on account of the personality disorders of
the said individuals.[51]
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of
the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is
the intervention by the State, through the public
prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the
parties and/or fabrication of evidence.[52] The Court
should rather be alarmed by the rising number of
cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic
violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys
psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing
the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting
the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a
person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who
cannot comply with or assume the essential marital
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It
may be stressed that the infliction of physical
violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly
are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly.[53] Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is
no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same
is void from the very beginning. [54] To indulge in
imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will
simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed
spouses should not pose too much of a concern for
the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its

23

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

business. And second, because the judicial
declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a
warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal
spouse would have become vigilant, and never
again marry a person with a personality disorder. On
the other hand, a would-be spouse of the
psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the
latters disorder recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply
declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga
inAntonio v. Reyes,[55] there is need to emphasize
other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36.At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate
once more the principle that each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less
six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in
March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted
ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert
testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls
under the classification of dependent personality
disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and
antisocial personality disorder.[56]
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having
the primary task and burden of decisionmaking, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion
on the psychological and mental temperaments of
the parties.[57]
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional

opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the
person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they
were asked to give professional opinions about a
party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to
be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid
consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new
openness in this area did not amount to the addition
of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made
in psychology during the past decades. There was
now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole
idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of
a covenant. The result of this was that it could no
longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person
who could intellectually understand the concept of
marriage could necessarily give valid consent to
marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now
considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of
incipient psychological incapacity, not only to sexual
anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that
incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming
or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage.
For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the
right of the spouses to each other's body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the
community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a
developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since
1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or
psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the
capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each
other and to accept the other as a distinct person;
that the spouses must be other oriented since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving
love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for

interpersonal relationship because marriage is more

than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal
sharing and support is held to impair the relationship
and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. The marital capacity of one
spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference
to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six
elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to
the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of
marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the
psychological conditions that might lead to the failure
of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment
precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors
possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial
personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia,
where the individual has no real freedom of sexual
choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fall short of reasonable
expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for
anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for
an annulment on any other terms. A situation that
does not fit into any of the more traditional categories
often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are

already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to
exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage
(lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or
carry out their responsibilities and obligations as
promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to
using the ground of lack of due competence is that at
the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce
and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities
as promised at the time the marriage was entered
into.[58]

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the

importance of presenting expert testimony to establish
the precise cause of a partys psychological
incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception
of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos[60] asserts,
there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined
by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.[61] Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless
for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence
of
psychological
incapacity.
[62]
Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it
fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an option for the
trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed
psychologist/expert for an independent assessment
and evaluation of the psychological state of the
parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts
in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent
and judicious determination of the case. The rule,
however, does not dispense with the parties
prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.

24

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological
assessment, which we consider as adequate,
produced the findings that both parties are afflicted
with personality disordersto repeat, dependent
personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and
antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We
note
that The
Encyclopedia
of
Mental
Health discusses personality disorders as follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that
are characteristic of a persons recent and long-term
functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are
not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply
ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough
to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to
interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal
functioning. Personality
disorders
are
often
recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue
through adulthood and become less obvious in middle
or old age. An individual may have more than one
personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have
personality disorders, despite a variety of character
traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to
pervasive problems in social and occupational
adjustment. Some
individuals
with
personality
disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic,
paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an
awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead
to trouble getting along with other people, as well as
difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency
to blame others for their problems. Other individuals
with personality disorders are not unpleasant or
difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or
dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal
difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction
with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental
health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of
personality disorders. These include Freudian,
genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave
activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at
certain stages of development led to certain
personality types. Thus, some disorders as described
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal
and phallic character types. Demanding and

dependent behavior (dependent and passiveaggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the
oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity
and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from
fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage
was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to
engage in intimate relationships. However, later
researchers have found little evidence that early
childhood events or fixation at certain stages of
development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there
may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology of
antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there
is less evidence of inheritance of other personality
disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies
suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to
genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have
borderline personality, researchers have found that
low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of
aggression and a past history of suicide
attempts. Schizotypal
personality
has
been
associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase
(MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye
movement.
Brain
Wave
Activity Abnormalities
in
electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in
antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is
the most widely reported abnormality. A study of
borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at
least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19
percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American
Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or
DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into
three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal
personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits
and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic
narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals

and
who

have these disorders often appear overly emotional,

erratic and dramatic.
Cluster
C: Avoidant,
dependent,
obsessivecompulsive and passive-aggressive personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality
disorder not otherwise specified, that can be used for
other specific personality disorders or for mixed
conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific
personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders
usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy
may be long-term.[64]

Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the

following manner

A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of

dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others comments. At times they actually bring about
dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in
early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder
may be unable to make everyday decisions without
advice or reassurance from others, may allow others
to make most of their important decisions (such as
where to live), tend to agree with people even when
they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting
projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do
things that are demeaning in order to get approval
from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of
being abandoned.[65]

and antisocial personality disorder described, as

follows

Characteristics include a consistent pattern of

behavior that is intolerant of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an
inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through
exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical
fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse
without remorse and a tendency to blame
others. There is often a faade of charm and even
sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse
for mistreatment of others and the need to control
others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe
criminals, they also may befit some individuals who
are prominent in business or politics whose habits of
self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of
others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality
disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term
described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not
accompanied by impairments in reasoning.
According to the classification system used in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality
disorder is one of the four dramatic personality
disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and
narcissistic.[66]

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of

the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds
as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the
expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of
the parties is null and void on ground of both parties
psychological incapacity. We further consider that the
trial court, which had a first-hand view of the
witnesses deportment, arrived at the same
conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent
personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering help and support,
for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live), tends to

25

FAMILY CODE FULL TEXT CASES

agree with people even when he believes they are
wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own,
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to
get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable
or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned.[67] As clearly shown in this
case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by
the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and
gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has
no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and
clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be
said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with
antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations. This finding
takes into account her disregard for the rights of
others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others
without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and
her intolerance of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by society.[68] Moreover, as shown
in this case, respondent is impulsive and
domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and
incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is
thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for
review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003
Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision,
dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R.

No.

DELFIN
ANGELINA

L-10763.

April

29,

1961.]

YAMBAO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GONZALES, ET AL., Defendants-

Appellees.
Marcial

G.

the land is vested in a special court; and that the

present action is not the proper remedy.
Mendiola,

for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Onofre P. Guevarra for Defendants-Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. WILLS; PROVISIONS INTERPRETED; WISH OF

TESTATRIX UPHELD. The will in the case at bar
contains a clear directive to employ appellant as may
be seen from the words preceding the word
"pahihintulutan", which say: "Dapat din naman
malaman, ng dalawa kong taga-pagmana na sila ay
may dapat tungkulin o gampanan Gaya Ng Mga
sumusunod." The words "dapat tungkulin o
Gampanan" means to do or to carry out as a mandate
or directive and having reference to the word
"pahihintulutan", can convey no other meaning than to
impose a duty upon appellees. To follow the
interpretation given by the trial court would be to
devoid the wish of the testatrix of its real and true
meaning.

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is an action filed by Delfin Yambao against

Angelina Gonzales and Maria Pablo praying that the
latter be ordered to appoint and employ him as tenant
during his lifetime on the parcels of land bequeathed
to and inherited by them from Maria Gonzales, as well
as to deliver to him the value of the harvests
belonging to him as tenant of said parcels of land. In
their answer, defendants averred that the provisions
of the will relied upon by plaintiff are not mandatory;
that the determination of who should be the tenant of

After trial, the court dismissed the complaint for lack

of sufficient cause of action. It held that the provisions
of the will relied upon by plaintiff merely amount to a
suggestion to the defendants who, though morally
bound, are not legally compelled to follow said
suggestion, invoking as authority Article 797 of the old
Civil
Code.
Plaintiff
has
appealed.
The pertinent provisions of the will relied upon by
appellant read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Dapat din naman malaman, ng dalawa kong tagapagmana na sila MARIA PABLO at ANGELINA
GONZALES na sila ay may dapat TUNGKULIN O
GAMPANAN GAYA ng mga sumusunod:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
x
x
x

"(2) Pahihintulutan nila na si Delfin Yambao ang

makapagtrabaho ng bukid habang panahon, at ang
nasabing bukid ay isasailalim ng pamamahala ng
Albasea samantalang ang bukid ay nasa usapin at
may
utang
pa."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
It appears that on August 10, 1942, Maria Gonzales
executed a will bequeathing to appellees all her
properties situated in Sta Rosa, Laguna. The will was
probated in 1948. Immediately, thereafter, appellant
went to appellees to request that he be placed as
tenant of the riceland which, by an express provision
of said will, they were directed to give to him for
cultivation as tenant, and when they refused alleging
that they had already given it to another tenant he
filed
the
present
action.
In holding that the provisions of the will relied upon by
appellant imposes only a moral but not a legal
obligation, the trial court went on to consider the
import of the word "pahihintulutan" employed with
reference to appellant. In its opinion said word only

means to permit or to allow, but not to direct appellees

to appoint appellant as tenant. Rather, it opines, it
merely contains a suggestion to employ because the
testatrix did not use the words "ipinag-uutos ko" which
she used in connection with other provisions of the
will, so that there is no clear indication that it was her
intention to make such provision compulsory.
We believe, however, that the trial court has not
properly interpreted the real import of the wish of the
testatrix. Analyzing it carefully we will find that the
same contains a clear directive to employ appellant
as may be seen from the words preceding the word
"pahihintulutan" which say: "Dapat din naman
malaman, ng dalawa kong taga-pagmana na sila
MARIA PABLO at ANGELINA GONZALES na sila ay
may dapat TUNGKULIN O GAMPANAN GAYA ng
mga sumusunod." The words "dapat TUNGKULIN O
GAMPANAN" means to do or to carry out as a
mandate or directive, and having reference to the
word "pahihintulutan", can convey no other meaning
than to impose a duty upon appellees. To follow the
interpretations given by the trial court would be to
devoid the wish of the testatrix of its real and true
meaning.
Article 797 of the old Civil Code, invoked by the trial
court, is inapplicable. That refers to an institution of an
heir intended to be conditional by providing that a
statement to that effect cannot be considered as a
condition unless it appears clearly that such is the
intention of the testator. We are not faced here with
any conditional institution of heirship. What we have is
a clear-cut mandate which the heirs cannot fail to
carry
out.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
reversed. Appellees are hereby ordered to employ
appellant as tenant immediately after this decision
has become final. Costs against appellees.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

26