LTD

Case Digests
2015-2016
FEU JD Block JD4202

Cruz vs Sec of the DENR

347
12/6/2000
Aguilar, Charles Tito R.

SCRA

128

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus
as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail
certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the Regalian
Doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
RULING:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA,
there is nothing in the law that grants to the Indigenous Cultural Communities
(ICC)/Indigenous Peoples (IP) ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains
remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and
occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.

Sec of DENR vs Yap

568 SCRA 164
Aguilar, Charles Tito R.

10/8/2008

FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the
petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al,
and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay
Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded

them from filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey
of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory
relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition
countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not
available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code.
ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed
agricultural land, therefore making these lands alienable.
RULING:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or
statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with
the presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that
there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from
the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.

3
Republic vs Lao
Charles Tito R.

405 SCRA 291

Aguilar,

FACTS:
Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application for registration of a parcel of
land. She allegedly acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo
Noguera and Ma. Victoria Valenzuela who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The
latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the
same from Edilberto Perido by transfer. She prayed that the land be registered in
her name under Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act) based on her and her
predecessor-in-interests open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and
adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more

than thirty (30) years. She presented witnesses and evidence constituting of deed
of sale, survey plan, the technical description of property and tax declarations in her
and her predecessors names. The court approved the application. The petitioner
represented by the Solicitor General appealed the decision before the CA which reaffirmed the lower court decision, hence this petition for review before the SC. The
petitioner contends that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant the issuance of
the title to the respondent as she fails to comply with the required periods and acts
of possession mandated by law and her failure to prove that the land is alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent sufficiently complied with the required period and acts of
possession?
Whether the respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application
was alienable and disposable land of the public domain?
RULING:
The court held that Commonwealth Act 141 requires that before one can register
ones title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that he, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; in adverse possession over the land for at
least 30 years and the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain. Petitioner was right to contend that the respondent did
not prove by incontrovertible evidence that she possessed the property in the
manner and time required by law. She did not provide the exact period when her
predecessors-in-interest started occupying the property. No extrajudicial settlement
of the property from its previous owners was shown and she did not show any
relationship between the parties where she obtained her deed of sale. She further
did not present any certification from appropriate government agency to show that
the property is re-classified as disposable and alienable land of the public domain. It
is incumbent for an applicant of a land registration to provide these incontrovertible
evidences to support her claim for her application. In the absence of these
evidences, her application shall fail. Hence the petition was granted and her
application was denied.

La Bugal B'laan vs Ramos

Albay, Miami Frianz F.

127882 12/2/2006

Facts:
Jul. 25, 1987: Pres. Aquino issued EO 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept,
consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations for contracts
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals. The President may execute with the foreign
proponent, upon recommendation of the Secretary.

Mar. 3, 1995: Pres. Ramos approved RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act 1995) to govern
the exploration, development, utilization, and processing of all mining resources. It
took effect on Apr. 9, 1995.
Mar. 30, 1995: Pres. Ramos entered into a Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in S. Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and N. Cotabato.
WMCP sold all its shares to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (Sagittarius), a corporation
organized under Philippine Laws with at least 60% of its equity owned by Filipinos
and/or Filipino owned corporations.
By virtue of such sale and transfer, the DENR Secretary approved the transfer and
registration of the FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius.
Petitioners allege that RA 7942 allows fully foreign owned corporations to explore,
develop, utilize and exploit mineral resources contrary to Sec. 2, Par. 4, Art. 12.
It allows foreign-owned companies to extend more than mere financial or
technical assistance. It permits foreign owned companies to OPERATE AND MANAGE
mining activities.
It allows foreign-owned companies to extend BOTH financial AND technical
assistance instead of financial OR technical assistance.
Issue:
W/N RA 7942, the Philippine Mining Act is constitutional.

Held:
NO. It is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes service contracts. Although the
statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with
the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts.
It follows that the WMCP FTAA entered into under such Act is also unconstitutional.
All provisions of the DENR AO 96-40 not in conformity with the Decision are also
invalidated.
Following the literal text of the Constitution, assistance accorded by foreignowned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
petroleum, minerals and mineral oils should be limited to technical or financial
assistance only. Contrary to this, the WMCP FTAA allows WMCP, a fully-foreignowned mining corporation, to extend more than mere financial or technical
assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and operate every aspect of
the mining activity.
In Section 33, Chapter VI the underlying assumption is that the foreign
contractor manages the mineral resources, just like the foreign contractor in a
service contract.

Chapter XII grants foreign contractors in FTAAs the same auxiliary mining
rights that it grants contractors in mineral agreements.
An FTAA contractor has or has access to all the financing, managing, and
technical expertise, suggesting that some management assistance is prescribed.
Section 1.3 of the WMCP FTAA grants WMCP the exclusive right to explore,
exploit, utilize, process and dispose of all Minerals products and by-products thereof
that may be produced from the Contract Area.
Under Section 1.2, WMCP shall provide all financing,
management and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.

technology,

All in all, WMCP is granted beneficial ownership over natural resources that
properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of the citizens.
Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est. The phrase management or other
forms of assistance in the 1973 Constitution was deleted in the 1987 Constitution,
which allows only technical or financial assistance. The omission was intentional
and purposeful.
The phrase service contracts has likewise been deleted in the 1987
Constitution. This omission is indicative of a difference in purpose. The concept of
technical or financial assistance agreements is not identical to that of service
contracts. The drafters, as evidenced from their deliberations, intended to do away
with service contracts which were used to circumvent the capitalization (60%-40%)
requirement. It was intended to be a safeguard to prevent abuses. Service contracts
are not allowed.
The CONCOM took into consideration the Draft of the 1986 UP Law
Constitutional Project when it adopted the concept of agreementsinvolving
either technical or financial assistance.
The UP Law draft proponents viewed service contracts under the 1973
Constitution as grants of beneficial ownership of the countrys natural resources to
foreign owned corporations. While in theory, the State owns these natural resources
and Filipino citizens, their beneficiaries service contracts actually vested
foreigners with the right to dispose, explore for, develop, exploit, and utilize the
same. This is clearly incompatible with the constitutional ideal of nationalization of
natural resources, with the Regalian doctrine, and with Philippine sovereignty.
But the proponents still recognized the need for capital and technical knowhow in the large-scale exploitation, development and utilization of natural
resources. Thus, they proposed a compromise: agreementsinvolving either
technical or financial assistance. This compromise is deemed to be more consistent
with the States ownership of and its full control and supervision over such
resources.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs with
foreign-owned corporations is an exception to the general rule that participation in

the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Such provision

must be construed strictly against non-Filipinos.

5
Sotto vs Sotto
Frianz F.

43 Phil. 688

9/1/2022 Albay, Miami

Facts:
The petitioner alleges that he is the owner of said lot No. 7510 that in or about the
year 1907 he absented himself from the city of Cebu, leaving the respondent in
charge of the lot that on or about the 16th of April, 1921, upon visiting the office of
the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Cebu he discovered that the respondent
had fraudulently obtained the registration of said lot in his own name and that a
certificate of title for said lot had been issued to said respondent. Due to his long
absence from Cebu, he was unable to appear in court in the land registration
proceedings and to defend his rights and that this action is his only remedy to
recover the property in question.
Issue:
Whether the final decree of confirmation and registration be reopened and the term
judgment is within the meaning of section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Held:
Yes, the final decree of confirmation and registration can be reopened. The final
"decree of confirmation and registration" cannot be reopened except for the reasons
and in the manner stated in section 38 of the Land Registration Act. The final
"decree of confirmation and registration" provided for in the Land Registration Act is
not a judgment within the meaning of section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
that section is not applicable to decisions covered or confirmed by such final
decrees. The remedy provided for in section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure may,
in land registration matters, be applied to judgments not confirmed by final decrees.

Legarda vs Saleeby
31 Phil. 590
Albay, Miami Frianz F.

10/2/1985

Facts:
Legarda obtained a decree of registration of a parcel of land on the 25th of
October, 1906. Saleeby, on the 25th of March, 1912, obtained a certificate of
registration for his land which joined the land theretofore registered by Legarda. The
certificate of title issued to Saleeby included a narrow strip of the land theretofore
registered in the name of Legarda. On the 13th of December, 1912, Legarda
presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the adjustment and
correction of the error committed in the certificate issued to Saleeby, which
included said narrow strip of land.
Issue:

Whether the petitioner has a better title over the wall and the land occupied
by it.

Held:
Yes, the petitioner has a better title over the property. In a case where two
certificates of title include or cover the same land, the earlier in date must prevail
as between the original parties, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate
be wholly or only in part comprised in the earlier certificate. In successive
registrations where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular
interest in land, the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land
as against the person who obtained the second certificate. The decree of
registration is conclusive upon and against all persons.
The real purpose of the torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to
land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted, at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once the
title was registered, the owner might rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. The proceeding for the registration of land under the
torrens system is a judicial proceeding, but it involves more in its consequences
than does an ordinary action.
The registration under the torrens system and the issuance of a certificate of
title do not give the owner any better title than he had. He does not obtain title by
virtue of the certificate. He secures his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a
fee simple title. If he obtains a certificate of title, by mistake, to more land than he
really and in fact owns, the certificate should be corrected. If he does not already
have a perfect title, he can not secure his certificate. Having a fee simple title, and
presenting sufficient proof of that fact, he is entitled to a certificate of registration.
The certificate of registration simply accumulates, in one document, a precise and
correct statement of the exact status of the fee simple title, which the owner, in
fact, has. The certificate, once issued, is the evidence of the title which the owner
has. The certificate should not be altered, changed, modified, enlarged or
diminished, except to correct errors, in some direct proceedings permitted by law.
The title represented by the certificate can not be changed, altered, modified,
enlarged or diminished in a collateral proceeding.

Capitol Subdivision vs Province of Negros Occidental

7 SCRA 60
1963
Aonuevo, Jon-jon

FACTS:
Lot 378, which is the subject matter of this case, is part of Hacienda
Madalagan, registered under the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 issued in the name of the
aforementioned in 1916. Sometime in 1920, the Amenabars sold the

aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares for the purchase price of P300,000,

payable in instalments. In 1924, the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name
of the Amenabars was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Benares obtained a Transfer
Certificate of Title under his name.
Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda including Lot 378 to
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. And then later in 1926, he again mortgaged the
Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first
mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.
In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to the son of Jose Benares,
Carlos Benares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual installments, subject to
the condition that the title will remain with the Bank until full payment.The Bank
executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff and a transfer
certificate of title covering Lot 378 was issued. It should be noted that, despite the
acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take possession
of the property for Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right
of lease.
When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale 1949, plaintiff took
steps to take possession the Hacienda and it was discovered that Lot 378 was the
land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental. Immediately
thereafter, plaintiff made representations with or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made
representations with the proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation. Not
being satisfied with the explanations given by said officials, it brought the present
action on June 10, 1950.
In its answer, defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot in question in
the year 1924-1925 through expropriation proceedings and that it took possession
of the lost and began the construction of the provincial hospital thereon. They
further claimed that for some reason beyond their comprehension, title was never
transferred in its name and it was placed in its name only for assessment purposes.
And that defendant acted in bad faith in purchasing the lot knowing that the
provincial hospital was situated there and that he did not declare such property for
assessment purposes only until 1950.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not defendant herein had acquired the lot in question in the
aforementioned expropriation proceedings.
HELD/RATIO:
The Court held that defendant was not able to sufficiently prove that they
have acquired the legal title over Lot 378. Several circumstances indicate that the
expropriation had not been consummated.
First, there, the entries in the docket pertaining to the expropriation case
refer only to its filing and the publication in the newspaper of the notices. Second,
there was an absence of a deed of assignment and of a TCT in favour of the

Province as regards Lot 378. Third, the property was mortgaged to Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co. Lot 378 could not have been expropriated without the intervention of the
Milling Co. And yet, the latter was not made a party in the expropriation
proceedings. And fourth, a second mortgage was constituted in favour of the Back,
which would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged to the
mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated without the Banks
knowledge and participation.
Furthermore, in the deed executed by the Bank promising to sell the
Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was explicitly stated that some
particular lots had been expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not been
expropriated.

Director of Lands vs Santiago 160

4/15/1988
Aonuevo, Jon-jon

SCRA

186

FACTS:
On Sept. 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent
Garcia in the CFI of Bataan. A copy of the application was forwarded to the SolGen
thru the director of Lands. On Feb. 19, 1974, the Director of lands filed an opposition
to this application, and at the same time the SolGen entered his appearance and
authorized the Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearing of the same.
Subsequently, respondent IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., with the conformity of
the respondent Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute Party Applicant from Maria
Garcia to Imperial Corp without amending the boundaries of the area stated in the
original application. Said motion was granted by the respondent Judge Santiago.
A notice of initial hearing was sent by respondent Judge to all parties
concerned, with the warning that a party who failed to appear would be declared in
default. The same notice was likewise published in the Official Gazette and posted
by the sheriff as required by law.On Jan. 23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing,
neither petitioner nor his counsel was present; an order of general default was
issued by the respondent Judge on the same date. After the reception of the
evidence for the applicant before the clerk of court, the respondent Judge rendered
the questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in favor of the respondent
corporation.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the
failure of his counsel to appear at the initial hearing was excusable,a nd that the
decision was contrary to facts and to law. The motion was however denied.
ISSUE/S
WON respondent Judge Santiago erred in decreeing the following orders and
decisions:
1. Admitting the Amended Application for Registration and adjudicating the parcels
of land in favor of respondent corporation,

2. Declaring the Director of Lands in default,

HELD/RATIO:
The petition is Granted. The Supreme Court is not convinced with the
conclusion of the respondent Judge and with the arguments of the respondent
corporation that the latter, through its predecessors-in- interest, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years.
The pertinent provision of law which states: If no person appears and
answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the
applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be
recorded , cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the
answer before it, which has long been filed, for such an interpretation would be
nothing less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust.
Especially in this case where the greater public interest is involved as the
land sought to be registered is alleged to be public land, the respondent Judge
should have received the applicants evidence and set another date for the
reception of the oppositors evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and
petitioner herein should have been accorded ample opportunity to establish the
governments claim. In view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever
classification belong to the State, courts must scrutinize with care applications to
private ownership of real estate.
Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public Land Act, to wit:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims,
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to
wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.

Barroga vs Albano
Aonuevo, Jon-jon

FACTS:

157 SCRA 131

1/20/1986

CFI of Ilocos Norte adjudicated a parcel of land in favour of Delfina Aquino.

One of the oppositors was Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in default. For
unrecorded reasons, the decree of registration did not issue except until after lapse
of 14 years or so (October 14, 1955). It was only after 24 years (November 17,
1979) that OCT was issued in Delfina Aquinos name.
1970 after the decree of registration had been handed down but before the
title issued in Delfina Aquinos favour, the children and heirs of Ruperto Pascual,
appellants Eufemia Barroga and Saturnina Padaca, brought suit against the children
and heirs of Delfina Aquino, appellees Angel Albano et al.
Barroga had been in possession of the land since 1941 and real owners thereof
prayed that Aquinos title be cancelled and new title be made out in their names.
Aquinos title encroached upon a 4sqm portion of an adjoining lot belonging to
Cesar Castro who filed a complaint in intervention.
CFI dismissed Barrogas and Padacas complaint and declared the intervenor
Castro the owner of 4sqm portion overlapped by Aquino.their action was barred by
prior judgement. Res adjudicata, the judgement of the cadastral court was one
against a specific thing and therefore conclusive upon the title of the thing. As
possessor of the lot in question, they could not be ejected therefrom by mere writ of
possession.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not they can be ejected.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes. The Writ of possession could properly issue despite the not
inconsiderable period of time that had elapsed from the date of the registration
decree, since the right to the same does not prescribe. The appellees must be
declared to be entitled to the writ over the subject lot, despite the lapse of many
years, their rights thereto being imprescriptible, in enforcement of the decree of
registration and vindication of the title issued in favour of the predecessor-ininterest. The writ may be correctly enforced against the appellants. The appellants,
it must be said, have succeeded in prolonging the controversy long enough. They
should not be allowed to continue doing so.

10

Republic vs Malabanan
587
4/29/2009
Batulan, Kervin

SCRA

172

Facts:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for registration of his land situated in
Silang, Cavite, with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, on February 20, 1998, which
he purchased from Eduardo Velasco. He assailed that his predecessors-in-interests
were in an open, notorious, continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land
for more than 30 years. Malabanan alleged that the subject property is an alienable
and disposable patrimonial property of the State, as evidenced by the certificate
issued by CENRO-DENR, hence the Regional Trial Court granted the petition. The

OSG appealed with the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in granting the petition filed
by Malabanan because the petitioner failed to prove that the subject land is a
patrimonial property of the State. During the pendency of the case with the CA,
Malabanan died hence his interest is represented by his heirs.
Issue:
In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and
disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any
time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established
that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
Ruling:
In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945
have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length
and quality of their possession.
Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his
title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

11 Averia vs Caguioa 146 SCRA 459

Kervin

Batulan,

Facts:
The petitioner herein, refused to participate in the hearing of the registration
proceedings below, claiming the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had
no competence to act upon the said case under Section 112 of Act 496, otherwise
known as the "Land Registration Act." It is argued that the lower court had no
competence to act on the registration sought because of the absence of unanimity
among the parties as required under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act.
Issue:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed of sale
Ruling:

With reference to Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (now Section 108 of P.D.
No. 1529), the court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which
enabled it to grant relief only in cases where there was "unanimity among the
parties" or none of them raised any "adverse claim or serious objection." Under the
amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not only such
noncontroversial cases but even the contentious and substantial issues, such as the
question at bar, which were beyond its competence before.

12 Arceo vs CA
Kervin

185 SCRA 489

5/8/1990 Batulan,

Facts:
Spouses Arceos owned unregistered parcels of land, they had a son named
Esteban who has five children. One of Estebans children named Jose who was then
married to Virginia Franco. Jose and Virginia had then six children. Before the
spouses Arceo passed away, they executed a deed of donation in favor of Jose
covering the subject disputed land.
Sometime in 1972, Virgina together with her children filed an application for
registration of the subject land with the cadastral court. The same was contested by
the other heirs, hence the court denied the petition and distributed the land
according to the law. Soon thereafter, the decision was appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, the petitioners now
argue with the Supreme Court that the cadastral court was bereft of the power to
determine conflicting claims of ownership, and that its authority was solely to
confirm an existing title, and that anyway, all the lots should have been awarded to
them by virtue of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since 1941
(1942, when Jose took possession of the parcels) or otherwise, by acquisitive
prescription.
Issue:
Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the matter
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that under Section 2 of the Property Registration
Decree, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration
court, is no longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land
registration law. The Supreme Court said that the Decree has eliminated the
distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a
cadastral court. The amendment was aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the
change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the required trial
courts the authority to act not only on applications for registration but also over all
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising from such applications or petitions.

13

SM Prime Holdings vs Madayag 578

2/12/2009
Borja, Mark Joseph

14

Delos Angeles vs Santos

Borja, Mark Joseph

12 SCRA 622 12/24/1964

15

Bureau of Forestry vs CA
Borja, Mark Joseph

153 SCRA 351

16 Martinez vs CA
Reyville

56 SCRA 647

SCRA

552

Caratiquit,

FACTS:
Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez are the registered owner of a fishpond in Lubao,
Pampanga. The fishpond was originally owned by Montemayor who secured titulo
real over it. After Montemayors death, the property was passed to his successorsin-interest, who in turn, sold it to Garcia. Because Garcia was prevented by then
municipal president of Lubao, Beltran, from restoring the dikes on the constructed
property, Garcia filed a case to retrain Beltran in his official capacity from molesting
him in possession of the parcel and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. The
writ was issued against the municipal president and was declared permanent by the
Court and was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Garcia applied for the registration of
the land in his name and the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, sitting as land
registration court, granted the registration. Pursuant to this decision, OCT was
granted to Garcia. Ownership of the property changed hands until eventually
acquired by Martinez by virtue of TCT. To avoid any untoward incident, the
disputants agreed to refer the matter to the Committee on Rivers and Streams
which appointed a sub-committee. The sub-committee submitted a report that the
parcel was not a public river but a private fishpond own by Martinez. The committee
rendered a decision that Martinez should be restored to the exclusive possession,
use and enjoyment of the parcel. The municipal official of Lubao refused to
recognize the decision. Martinez filed a case against the mayor praying that the
latter be enjoined from molesting them in their possession of the property and in
the construction of the dikes therein. While the case was still pending, then Sec.
Moreno of Public Works and Communications ordered another investigation,
directing Martinez to remove the dikes they had constructed, on the strength of the
authority vested in him by RA 2056 entitled An Act to Prohibit, Remove and/or
Demolish the Construction of Dams, Dikes, or Any Other Walls in Public Navigable
Waters, or Waterways and in Communal Fishing Grounds, To Regulate Works in such
Water or Waterways and in Communal Fishing Grounds, and to Provide Penalties for
its Violation, and for other Purposes. The order embodied a threat that the dikes
would be demolished should the Martinez fail to comply in 30 days. Martinez filed a

case in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga which ruled in his favor. The lower
court declared that the decision rendered by the Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communications null and void. The officials of the Department of Public Works and
Communications appealed contending that Martinez have no cause of action
because the property in dispute is a public river. The CA reversed the ruling of the
lower court and declared parcel covered by TCT of Martinez is a public stream and
that said title should be cancelled and the river covered reverted to public domain.
Martinez assails this decision being a collateral attack on the indefeasibility of the
torrens title originally issued in 1925 in favor of their predecessor-in-interest.
ISSUE:
Whether the Land Registration Court can adjudge the registration of a land of the
public domain.
HELD:
No. The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registerable properties,
such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot
validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of a private applicant. Hence, the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of
Certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked at any
time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any
prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations. The right of reversion
or reconveyance to the State of the public properties fraudulently registered and
which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not
prescribe.

17 Republic vs CA
Reyville

299 SCRA 199

Caratiquit,

FACTS:
RA 1899 authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities. Invoking
the provision of RA 1899, Pasay City Council passed an ordinance for the
reclamation of 300 hectares of foreshore lands, empowering the City Mayor to
award and enter into reclamation contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions
therefor. The ordinance was amended authorizing the Republic Real Estate
Corporation (RREC) to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms
and conditions. The Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages
with Writ of Preliminary Preventive Injunction and Mandatory Injunction before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. The complaint was amended questioning subject
Agreement between Pasay City and RREC on the grounds that the subject matter of
such Agreement is outside the commerce of man, that its terms and conditions are
violative of RA 1899, and that the said Agreement was executed without any public
bidding. CFIC issue an order that the defendants, their agents, and all persons
claiming under them, to refrain from further reclaiming or committing acts of
dispossession or despoliation over any area within the Manila Bay or the

Manila Bay Beach Resort. It also issued a writ of preliminary injunction which
enjoined the defendants, RREC and Pasay City, their agents, and all persons
claiming under them from further reclaiming or committing acts of dispossession.
The CFIC ruled in favor of Pasay City and RREC. Republic appealed to CA. Before
appeal could be resolved, PD 3-A was issued, thus: The provisions of any law to the
contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore
or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it
under a proper contract. All reclamations made in violation of this provision shall be
forfeited to the State without need of judicial action. Contracts for reclamation still
legally existing or whose validity has been accepted by the National Government
shall be taken over by the National Government on the basis of quantum meruit, for
proper prosecution of the project involved by administration. Republic and the
Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) signed a
Contract for the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project (Phases I and II) which contract
included the reclamation and development of areas covered by the Agreement
between Pasay City and RREC. Then, there was issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
which transferred to the Public Estate Authority (PEA) the rights and obligations of
the Republic of the Philippines under the contract between the Republic and CDCP.
CA Affirmed the Decision of the CFIC and RREC has the option to buy 60% of 21
hectares of land already reclaimed. Pasay City and RREC filed a motion that 55
hectares had been reclaimed. CA modified its decision and ordered the turn-over to
Pasay City of the ownership and possession of 9 lots titled in the name of CCP.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA is correct in deciding that the ownership and possession of the 9
titled lots be turned-over Pasay City.
HELD:
No. A notice of lis pendens is necessary when the action is for recovery of
possession or ownership of a parcel of land. In the present litigation, RREC and
Pasay City, as defendants in the main case, did not counterclaim for the turnover to
Pasay City of the titled lots aforementioned. What is more, a torrens title cannot be
collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens title, whether fraudulently
issued or not, may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or annul it.
Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the germane provision of Section 48 of P.D.
1529, that a certificate of title can never be the subject of a collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding instituted in
accordance with law.

18

Alvarez vs PICOP 606 SCRA 444

Caratiquit, Reyville

12/3/2009

FACTS:
PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an
application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an
IFMA. In the middle of the processing of PICOPs application, however, PICOP refused

to attend further meetings with the DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus
against then DENR Secretary Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a privileged writ
of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to
PICOP.
While PICOP did not seek any certification from the NCIP that the formers
concession area did not overlap with any ancestral domain, PICOP initially sought to
comply with the requirement under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government
Code to procure prior approval of the Sanggunians concerned. However, only one of
the many provinces affected approved the issuance of an IFMA to PICOP.
Undaunted, PICOP nevertheless submitted to the DENR the purported resolution of
the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of PICOPs application for
IFMA conversion, apparently hoping either that the disapproval of the other
provinces would go unnoticed, or that the Surigao del Sur approval would be treated
as sufficient compliance.
The cause of action of PICOP in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is that
the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then Pres.
Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with
PICOP.
ISSUES:
a)
Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the nonimpairment clause by which the government may be bound for the issuance of the
IFMA.
b)
Whether PICOP complied with the LGC requirement of obtaining prior
approval of the Sanggunian concerned by submitting a purported resolution of the
Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of PICOPs application for IFMA
conversion.
HELD:
a)
No. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause it is only a license or a privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. A license is merely a
permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to
whom it is granted neither is it a property or a property right, nor does it create a
vested right nor is it taxation. Thus, this Court held that the granting of license
does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights. Since
timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
b)
No. The approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required by law, not
because the local government has control over such project, but because the local
government has the duty to protect its constituents and their stake in the

implementation of the project. Again, Section 26 states that it applies to projects

that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of nonrenewable resources,
loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant
species. The local government should thus represent the communities in such
area, the very people who will be affected by flooding, landslides or even climatic
change if the project is not properly regulated, and who likewise have a stake in the
resources in the area, and deserve to be adequately compensated when these
resources are exploited. Indeed, it would be absurd to claim that the project must
first be devolved to the local government before the requirement of the national
government seeking approval from the local government can be applied. If a project
has been devolved to the local government, the local government itself would be
implementing the project. That the local government would need its own approval
before implementing its own project is patently silly.

19 Heirs of Clemente vs Heirs of Vicente Ermac 403

SCRA 291
Castillo, Frinz Lemwel
Facts:
At Lot No. 666 was originally owned by Claudio Ermac and, after his death, was
inherited by his children Esteban, Balbina and Pedro. Clemente Ermac registered the
said Lot to his name alone without regards to the other predecessors-in-interests.
The respondents were able to prove consistently and corroboratively that they as
well as their predecessors-in-interests had been in open, continuous and
undisturbed possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners.
According to the appellate court, [t]he fact that [petitioners] have in their
possession certificates of title which apparently bear out that it [was] Clemente
Ermac alone who claimed the entire property described therein [has] no discrediting
effect upon plaintiffs claim, it appearing that such titles were acquired in
derogation of the existing valid and adverse interests of the plaintiffs whose title by
succession were effectively disregarded.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the alleged tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to
defeat the title over the property in the names of petitioners predecessors-ininterest [Spouses] Clemente Ermac and Anunciacion Suyco
2. Whether or not laches has set in on the claims by the respondents on portions of
Lot No. 666
The Courts Ruling
First Issue:
Ownership of the Disputed Lot
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and unsubstantiated
testimony of respondents, as well as on tax declarations and realty tax receipts, in
order to support its ruling that the land was owned by Claudio Ermac.

We are not persuaded. The credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for
respondents is a factual issue already passed upon and resolved by the trial and the
appellate courts. It is a hornbook doctrine that only questions of law are entertained
in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial courts findings
of fact, which the CA affirmed, are generally conclusive and binding upon this
Court.19
Moreover, while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove
ownership, they may constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied
by possession for a period sufficient for prescription.20 Considering that
respondents have been in possession of the property for a long period of time, there
is legal basis for their use of tax declarations and realty tax receipts as additional
evidence to support their claim of ownership.
Second Issue:
Prescription and Laches
Petitioners assert that the ownership claimed by respondents is barred by
prescription and laches, because it took the latter 57 years to bring the present
action. We disagree.
When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to property, a
constructive trust is created in favor of the defrauded party. Since Claudio Ermac
has already been established in the present case as the original owner of the land,
the registration in the name of Clemente Ermac meant that the latter held the land
in trust for all the heirs of the former. Since respondents were in actual possession
of the property, the action to enforce the trust, and recover the property, and
thereby quiet title thereto, does not prescribe.
Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations.23 It cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and
injustice.24 Its application should not prevent the rightful owners of a property to
recover what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

20

Republic vs Iglesia ni Cristo

591
6/30/2009
Castillo, Frinz Lemwel

SCRA

438

Facts:
Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre.
On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Erao G. Manalo, as
corporate sole, filed its Application for Registration of Title before the MCTC in
Paoay-Currimao. Appended to the application were the sepia or tracing cloth of plan
Swo-1-001047, the technical description of subject lot,[3] the Geodetic Engineers
Certificate,[4] Tax Declaration No. (TD) 508026[5] covering the subject lot, and the

September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale[6] executed by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of

INC.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), entered its
appearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Laoag City to appear on its
behalf. It also filed an Opposition to INCs application.
Issue:
WON THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
[MCTC] DECISION GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION
Held:
INC entitled to registrable right over subject lot
With the resolution of the core issue, we find no error in the findings of the courts a
quo that INC had indeed sufficiently established its possession and occupation of
the subject lot in accordance with the Public Land Act and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529,
and had duly proved its right to judicial confirmation of imperfect title over subject
lot.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are final
and conclusive on, and cannot be reviewed on appeal by, this Court as long as they
are borne out by the record or are based on substantial evidence. The Court is not a
trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may
have been committed by the lower courts.[24] This is applicable to the instant case.
The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and 1959 when it
purchased the respective halves of the subject lot, but is also tacked on to the
possession of its predecessors-in-interest, Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter
possessing the subject lot way before June 12, 1945, as he inherited the bigger lot,
of which the subject lot is a portion, from his parents. These possessions and
occupationfrom Sabuco, including those of his parents, to INC; and from Sabuco to
Badanguio to INC had been in the concept of owners: open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
property. These had not been disturbed as attested to by respondents witnesses.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the October 11, 2007 CA
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85348 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

21

Chavez vs PEA
384 SCRA 152
Castillo, Frinz Lemwel

12/9/2002

FACTS:
President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was tasked
with the development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all
kinds of lands. The then president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and
offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project.

Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then,
years later, PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the development of the Freedom
Islands. These two entered into a joint venture in the absence of any public
bidding.
Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda
denouncing the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. An investigation was
conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI
were lands of the public domain; the certificates of title over the
Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to
form an investigatory committee on the legality of the JVA.
Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose
billions by the conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also
asked for the full disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the parties.
ISSUE:
W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
HELD:
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in
the Regalian doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the
public domain.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all natural
resources are owned by the State and except for alienable agricultural lands
of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated.
The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares
of the 750 hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the
area are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Further, it is provided
that AMARI will reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the areas of land and it
will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be incurred.
The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the
public domain, waters and other natural resources and consequently owned by
the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienable unless
they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesnt convert these inalienable natural
resources of the State into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and
disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.

22

Oh Cho vs Director of Lands

75
8/31/1946
Castillo, Kaycelle

Phil.

890

Facts:
Oh Cho is a citizen of the Republic of China who purchased a residential parcel of
land in Guinayangan, Tayabas in 1938. The subject land has been in the continuous,
public, and adverse possession of the predecessors in interest since 1880. In June
1940, Oh Cho applied for the registration of the subject land, which was opposed by
the Director of Lands following the Constitutional prohibition against aliens
acquiring private or public agricultural lands. The CFI however overruled the
opposition and decreed the registration applied for. Hence, the present appeal by
the Director of Lands. The Director of Lands maintained its opposition on the ground
of lack of title to the lot and of disqualification as alien from acquiring lands of the
public domain.
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the
Land Registration Act. He also failed to show that he and ay of his predecessors in
interest had acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant.
Issue:
Whether Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration he was applying for,
considering that he failed to show title to the lot and that he is an alien disqualified
from acquiring lands of public domain.
Held/Ratio:
NO, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration because the earliest
possession of the subject land by Oh Chos first predecessor in interest began in
1880 and because his immediate predecessors failed to apply for registration.
All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain, unless the land has been in the possession of an
occupant and predecessors in interest since time immemorial since such possession
would justify the presumption that the land had never been a private property even
before the Spanish conquest. As such, the applicant does not qualify under the
exception.
Oh Cho is neither entitled to a decree of registration under the provisions of the
Public Land Act since he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of public
domain.
Arguably, Oh Chos immediate predecessors in interest could have been entitled to
a decree of registration had they applied for registration; consequently, the right of
the immediate predecessors in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed
to also have been acquired. However, Oh Chos immediate predecessors failed to
apply for registration. As such, they did not have any vested right in the lot
amounting to title, which was transmissible to the applicant.
Judgment was reversed and the application for registration was dismissed.

23

Diaz vs Republic

181502 2/2/2010 Castillo, Kaycelle

Facts:
Flora Garcia filed an application for registration of a vast tract of land in Laur, Nueva
Ecija and Palayan City in 1976, alleging that she possessed the land as owner and
worked, developed, and harvested the agricultural products and benefits from the
land continuously, publicly, and adversely for more or less 26 years. The Republic of
the Philippines opposed such application because the subject land was inalienable
as part of public domain for being within Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation
established in 1955.
In an earlier case (Reyes case) involving the same land, the Supreme Court already
ruled that such property was inalienable as it formed part of the military
reservation. Also, the existence of the possessory information title to which the
applicant in the Reyes case anchored its claim, was not proven. In said case
therefore, the decree of registration issued was declared null and void.
Despite the Reyes case, the CFI ruled in favor of Garcia in the present case. The
Republic appealed the decision to the CA, who reversed the CFI decision, ruling that
the Reyes case shall apply in Garcias case since both cases involve the same
property. The CA concluded that Garcia did not validly acquire title to the land since
her ownership to the land traces to the same possessory information title, the
probative value of which was already passed upon by the SC and because the land
was situated inside military reservation.
Meanwhile, the CA approved a compromise agreement between the Republic and
petitioner Diaz, who substituted applicant Garcia, excluding from the claim a portion
of the land supposedly not within the military reservation. The OSG however moved
for reconsideration informing the CA that the land subject of the amicable
settlement was still within the military reservation. The CA annulled the compromise
agreement. The SC denied the petition for review filed by Diaz, as well as the first
two MR filed. Hence, the present letter of petitioner deemed by the SC as a third
MR.
Issue:
Whether the registration of land subject of the compromise agreement between
Diaz and Republic should be granted, considering that in a previous case involving
the same property, the Supreme Court ruled that the subject land is inalienable for
being part of a military reservation, and the existence of the possessory information
title, to which applicant Garcias claim of title can also be traced, was not proven.
Held/Ratio:
NO, the decree of registration could not be granted since the SC Order in Reyes
case dismissing the application for registration and declaring the land as part of
public domain bars the claim of applicant Garcia and present petitioner Diaz.
Petitioners contended private rights over the land could not be respected because
the SC had already recognized the same land to be public forest even before the
FMMR was established.

In registration cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial
confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an
application for registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain
constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also against all
persons. It was incumbent upon the lower court to respect the SC ruling in Reyes
case.
Before the military reservation was established, evidence showed that the subject
land is largely forested and mountainous. It was ruled in Reyes case that forest
lands are not registrable under the Public Land Act. The inclusion of a forest land in
a title, whether issued using Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens
system of registration, nullifies the title. Forest lands may only be registered when
they have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical
manner (upon the recommendation of the proper department head who has the
authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable,
timber and mineral lands) coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of
her predecessorsininterest. Since petitioner did not produce such evidence, her
occupation thereof, and that of her predecessorsin interest, could not have ripened
into ownership of the subject land because prior to the conversion of forest land as
alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be counted in
reckoning compliance with the thirtyyear possession requirement under the Public
Land Act.
Moreover, the fact that the possessory information title on which Diaz bases their
claim of ownership was found to be inexistent in Reyes case, thus rendering its
probative value questionable, further works against granting the decree of
registration applied for.

24

Carino vs Insular Government

Castillo, Kaycelle

212 US 449

Facts:
Mateo Carino applied for registration of a certain land. Initially it was granted by the
court, but the Government of the Philippines and the government of the United
States appealed to the Court of First Instance of Benguet, because they were taking
the property for public and military purposes. The CFI dismissed the application for
registration. On appeal, the CFI decision was affirmed by the Philippine Supreme
Court. The case was brought to the US Supreme Court via writ of error.
Carino is an Igorot, and possessed the subject land for more than 30 years before
the Treaty of Paris. He and his ancestors had held the land for years. The local
community recognizes them as the owners of the said land. His grandfather lived
upon it and maintained fences around the property. His father raised cattle on the
property and he had inherited the land according to Igorot custom. However, no title
was issued to them from the Spanish Crown. He tried twice to have it registered
during the Spanish occupation but was not successful. In 1901 he filed a petition
alleging ownership of the land but he was only granted a possessory title.

Relevant Laws:

Philippine Commissions Act No. 496

Philippine Commissions Act No. 926 (An Act Prescribing Rules and
Regulations Governing the Homesteading, Selling, and Leasing of Portions of the
Public Domain of the Philippine Islands) this law dealt with acquisition of new titles
and perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law. Benguet was one of the
excluded provinces under this Act.
Carinos contention: he could register the land under Philippine Commissions Act no.
496 which covered the entire Philippine archipelago.
Governments contention: Spain had title to all the lands in the Philippines except
those it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired. There was a decree issued by
Spain that required registration within a limited time but Carinos land wasnt
registered, hence, such land became public land.
Issue:
Primary: Whether Carino could register title to the land albeit Benguet was excluded
from Phil Com Act No. 926.
Based on the issue: Whether Carino owns the land.
Held/Ratio:
YES, Carino could register the land if ownership could be maintained.
Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks and
should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he
lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law
of Spain.
Whatever the position of Spain was on the issue, it does not follow that the US
would view Carino to have lost all his rights to the land this would amount to a
denial of native titles throughout Benguet just because Spain would not have
granted to anyone in the province the registration of their lands.
The Organic Act of July 1, 1902 provides that all the property and rights acquired
there by the US would be for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof. This same
statute made a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and it
provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the laws. It would be hard to believe that any
person didnt include the inhabitants of Benguet, nor it meant property to refer
only to those lands which had become such under a ceremony (of registration)
many of the people of the land may have not even heard of.
Although in Sec. 14 of the Organic Act, it is said that the Philippine Commission may
prescribe rules and regulations for perfecting titles to public lands, it should be
noted that this section refers to those cases where the land was admitted to be

public land. The US SC hesitates to suppose that it was intended to declare every
native who had not a paper title, a trespasser. The question still remains: what
property and rights did the US acquire?
In cases such as the instant case, the presumption would and should be against the
government. As far back as memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership; it was never public land. It would not be proper
to just let the conqueror to dictate how to deal with the Philippine tribes if it really
meant to use the rights acquired by them for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof.
The natives were recognized by the Spanish laws to own some lands, irrespective of
any royal grant. They didnt intend to turn all the inhabitants into trespassers.
Principle of prescription was admitted: that if they werent able to produce title
deeds, it is sufficient if they show ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription.
Although there was a decree in June 25, 1880 that required everyone to get a
document of title or else lose his land, it does not appear that it meant to apply to
all but only those who wrongfully occupied royal lands. It doesnt appear that the
land of Carino was considered as Royal land nor was it considered to have been
wrongfully occupied. Two articles of the same decree provided that titles would be
attributed to those who may prove possession for the necessary time. There were
indications that registration was expected but it didnt mean that ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof was not to confer title to them but to
establish it.

25

Baguio City vs Masweng

Castillo, Rio Star

578 SCRA 88 2/4/2009

Facts:
City Mayor of Baguio Yaranon issued three 3 orders for the demolition of the
illegal structures constructed on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation
without the required building permits and in violation of Section 69 of Presidential
Decree No. 705, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 1096 and Republic Act No.
7279.
Private repondents Gumangan et al filed a petition for injunction with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction and claimed that the lands where their residential houses stand are their
ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing openly and
continuously since time immemorial; that their ownership thereof have been
expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15. Thus, demolition of their residential
houses is a violation of their right of possession and ownership of ancestral lands
accorded by the Constitution and the law.
NCIP granted private respondents application and was affirmed by the CA.
Issues:

1.
Whether or not NCIP has jurisdiction or authority to issue temporary
restraining orders and writs of injunction
2.

Whether or not private respondents Gumangan et al are entitled of relief

Ruling:
1.
Yes, NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of
injunction.
Under Sec. 5, Rule III of the NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03:
The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the
implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371.
The allegations in the petition prove the nature of the action and the
jurisdiction of a particular tribunal, squarely qualify it as a dispute(s) or
controversy(s) over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO.
Sec. 69 of IPRA & Section 82, Rule XV of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03
says NCIP may issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without
any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main action is for
injunction. The power to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of injunction
allows parties to a dispute over which the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against
any action which may cause them grave or irreparable damage or injury. In this
case, the Regional Hearing Officer issued the injunctive writ because its jurisdiction
was called upon to protect and preserve the rights of private respondents who are
undoubtedly members of ICCs/IPs.
1.
No, private respondents are not entitled to the relief granted by the
Commission.
Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition
of private respondents ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the
Molintas and Gumangan families, the predecessors-in-interest of private
respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not
acknowledge vested rights over the same. Proclamation No. 15 explicitly withdraws
the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or settlement. The fact remains, too, that the
Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as inalienable in Heirs of
Gumangan v. Court of Appeals. The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as
such precludes its conversion into private property. The courts are not endowed with
jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.
The petition is granted.

26
Facts:

City Mayor of Paranaque vs Ebio

6/23/2010
Castillo, Rio Star

621

SCRA

555

Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land
which was an accretion of Cut-cut creek, originally occupied by their great
grandfather Vitalez. The city government later advised all the residents to vacate
the said area for the proposed road construction, however respondents immediately
registered their opposition which caused the suspension of construction. Later, City
Administrator Aldip sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the
area within the next thirty (30) days. The respondents then applied for a writ of
preliminary injunction against Petitioners in the RTC.
RTC denied while the CA reversed the decision and ruled in favor of the
respondents.
Issue:
Whether the character of respondents possession and occupation of the
subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.
Ruling:
Yes, the character of possession and ownership by the respondents over the
contested land entitles them to the avails of the action. A right in esse means a
clear and unmistakable right. A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must
prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing. It
should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never arise.
From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
only one conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither
Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Paraaque in its corporate or
private capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Respondents are deemed
to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription.
Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register
their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land
registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the
applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a
means of acquiring ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but does
not confer, ownership.
Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either
through judicial proceedings or through administrative process. Respondents
application for sales patent, however, should not be used to prejudice or derogate
what may be deemed as their vested right over the subject property. The sales
patent application should instead be considered as a mere superfluity particularly
since ownership over the land, which they seek to buy from the State, is already
vested upon them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the State does not
have any authority to convey a property through the issuance of a grant or a patent
if the land is no longer a public land. Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give
what he does not have. Such principle is equally applicable even against a
sovereign entity that is the State.

27 PNB vs Garcia, et. al. 182839 6/2/2014 Castillo,

Star

Rio

Facts:
Jose Sr is indebted to Garcia spouses. To secure payment, he issued special
power of attorney in favor of the Garcia spouses for purposes of their loan
application with PNB. Jose Sr. also executed an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage
in favor of PNB. The transactions were without the knowledge and consent of Jose
Sr.s children.
Garcia failed to pay their loan. Respondents then filed before the RTC a
Complaint for Nullity of the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage, Damages with
Preliminary Injunction against the spouses Garcia and PNB claiming they acquired
subject property during their marriage and became owners with his children upon
death of his wife Ligaya and that consent of his children were not obtained.
RTC dismissed the complaint CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issues:
1.

Whether or not the subject property is conjugal

2.
Whether the registration of the subject property in the name of one spouse
destroy the presumption that the property is conjugal
Ruling:
1.

Yes, all property acquired during marriage is presumed conjugal.

Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. PNB failed to rebut the allegation that the
subject property was acquired during the formers marriage to Ligaya, the legal
presumption of the conjugal nature of the property, in line with Article 160 of the
Civil Code.
2.
No, registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not
destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the property was
acquired.
The registration of the property is not conclusive evidence of the exclusive
ownership of the husband or the wife. Although the property appears to be
registered in the name of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal
property if it was acquired for valuable consideration during marriage. It retains its
conjugal nature. To rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the property, the
petitioner must present strong, clear and convincing evidence of exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses.
In the present case, the petitioner bank failed to overcome the legal
presumption that the disputed property was conjugal.

28

Director of Lands vs Reyes 68 SCRA 177 11/28/1975

Castro, Floricel

FACTS:
Applicant Alinsunurin claiming ownership in fee simple by inheritance of a vast tract
of land admittedly inside the boundary of military reservation of Fort Magsaysay
sought the registration of title under Act 496. Petitioners opposed the application
claiming that the applicant was w/o sufficient title, not in possession in the concept
of an owner for atleast 30 years preceding the filing of application.
Applicant filed a motion for substitution of parties, requestion P.I.D Corporation be
considered as applicant having acquired all his rights over the property. The court
granted the motion and ordered that the parcel of land applied for be registered in
favor of P.I.D Corporation 2/3 portion and the other 1/3 in favor of certain Tamayo.
Petitioners filed Notice of Appeal from the said decision to Supreme Court. PEnding
Approval of Record
On Appeal applicant PID Corporation and Tamayo filed a motion for issuance of
decree of registration and despite opposition of the petitionert, Lower Court granted
the motion and issued a decree of registration.
ISSUE:
WON the issuance of a decree of registration to PID Corporation and Tamayo is valid
despite the Appeal filed by the Petitioner.
HELD:
No. Execution pending appeal is not applicable in a Land Registration proceeding. It
is fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into
purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgement w/c may be reversed on
appeal.
A torrens title issued on the basis of a judgement that is not final is a NULLITY, as it
is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act which requires that
a decree shall be issued only after decision adjudicating the title becomes final and
executory.

29 Benin vs Tuazon
Floricel

57 SCRA 531 6/28/1974

Castro,

FACTS:
Plaintiffs filed three separate complaints alleging that they were the owners and
possessors of three parcels of agricultural land and while enjoying the peaceful
possession of their lands, defendants illegally entered and started destroying the
dwellings and improvements.
Plaintiffs prayed that they be declared owners as well as to declare null and void all
transfers certificate of title issued by Register of Deeds because they were based on

the Original Certificate of title which was allegedly null and void. According to the
petitioner, when the registered owners mentioned in Original Certificate of title
applied for the registration, the original application was published in the Official
Gazette but they alleged that the amendment and alteration made on the area
boundaries and technical description of the parcel prior to the decision was NOT
published. Despite the failure of said publication, the decision rendered in Land
Registration Case was based on the amended plan.
Now the plaintiffs are questioning the jurisdiction of Land Registration Court to
render the decision for lack of publication.
ISSUE:
WON LRC has jurisdiction to issue the decree based on the amended plan despite its
failure to be published.
HELD:
LRC lacks jurisdiction to the area and parcel added on the amended plan. Under
Sec. 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow or order an amendment of the
application for registration when it apperas to the court that the amendment is
necessary and proper. Under Sec 24 of same act, the court may at anytime order an
application to be amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of
the application. The rule is, if the amendment is consist of an inclusion of area or
parcel of land not previously included in the original application for registration a
new publication of the amended plan must be made. The purpose of the new
publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended
application. WIthout the new publication the registration court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the
original application, and the decision of the registration court would be nullity in so
far as the decision concerns the newly included land.

30

SM Prime Holdings vs Madayag 578

2/12/2009

31 Mendoza vs CA
Floricel

84 SCRA 67

SCRA

7/14/1978

552

Castro,

FACTS:
In 1964, it was proven that a parcel of land is owned by Mendoza. Mendoza applied
for a title. During pendency of the application before the land registration court,
Mendoza sold the land to Daniel Cruz. The contract of sale was admitted in court in
lieu of the pending application for land title. The registration court rendered a
decision in July 1965, ordering the registration of the two parcels of land in the
name of Cruz subject to the usufructuary rights of Mendoza.
The decision became final and executory. In 1968, however, upon failure of Cruz to
pay Mendoza, Mendoza petitioned that the title issued in the name of Cruz be

cancelled. The land registration court ruled in favor of Mendoza on the ground that
the court erred in its earlier decision in issuing the land title to Cruz who was not a
party to the application of title initiated by Mendoza. Cruz appealed. The Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of Cruz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the title can be dealt with in the name of a third party.
HELD:
Yes. First of all, it was proven that Mendoza caused the registration in the name of
Cruz pursuant to their contract of sale. Second, Mendoza overlooks Section 29 of
the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the registration of the land
subject matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the buyer (Cruz) or of the
person to whom the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the
interval of time between the filing of the application for registration and the
issuance of the decree of title. A stranger or a third party may be dealt with in the
land registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the
instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion
that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior
notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances
obtaining in this case show that these requirements have been complied with in this
case.

32

Director of Lands vs CA
276
SCRA
7/28/1997
Chua, Christian Edmund

276

Facts:
Private respondent filed a petition for original registration of his title under PD No.
1529. The Land Registration Court dismissed the petition for non-compliance with
the mandatory publication of notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling. The CA held that the
publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing and posting at the site
were sufficient to comply with the requirements under PD No. 1529.
Issue:
Whether the publication in general circulation of the notice of hearing is a
mandatory requirement for land registration
Held:
Yes. Although the law only requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette,
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is still required. The reason is due
process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not widely read and circulated as
newspaper and is oftentimes delayed.

33

Adviento vs Alvarez
562 SCRA 434
Chua, Christian Edmund

8/20/2008

Facts:
Adviento allegedly acquired the property against the interest of Alvarez. He traced
his title to a person, who bought the property from Gaya. Alvarez allegedly
constructed a building in the subject property. Adviento filed a case for damages
against Alvarez. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Alvarez. Among other faults of the
Adviento, Adviento failed to give notice to the respondents for the registration of the
property.
Issue:
Whether publication of the notice is enough to inform the respondents about the
registration of the property
Held:
No. The applicable law for the case was Act No. 496. Under Act No. 496, applicants,
who wants to register an imperfect title, must provide notice to the contiguous
owners, occupants and those known to have interests in the property, among other
requirements. In this case, the respondents have interests in the property and
Adviento admitted that notice was not provided to the respondents. Hence, notice
of publication was not enough to fulfill the requirements of land registration.

34 Garcia vs Bello
Edmund

13 SCRA 769

Chua,

Christian

Facts:
A writ of possession over the subject property was issued in favor of Guzman.
Garcia (Benjamin, Anatalia, Fabian and Vicente) filed for an action of prohibition to
restrain the Court of First Instance from enforcing the writ of execution. Garcia
argued that the decision on the writ of possession is not binding upon them,
because they were not parties in the decision.
Issue:
Whether the decision is not binding to the respondents because they were not
parties in the case
Held:
No. A land registration case is a proceeding in rem. The decision rendered is binding
upon the whole world.

35 De Castro vs Marcos
Vera, Queenie

26 SCRA 644 1/27/1969

De

Respondent Akia filed a petition before the CFI, acting as a cadastral court, for the
reopening of cadastral proceedings, pursuant to R.A. No. 931. Respondent there

sought the registration in his name a 15,922 sqm of land. Petitioner De Castro then
moved to intervene. Her interest is in the 1000 sqm allegedly included in the 15,922
sqm of land specified in the respondents petition. According to the petitioner, the
land was awarded in her favor since she was the highest bidder in a public auction.
Petitioner fully paid the purchase price with interests and she also claimed that she
had been paying taxes on the lot. Petitioners motion for intervention was granted.
Petitioner presented documentary and testimonial evidence in support of her
opposition to the inclusion of said 1000 sqm of land. Respondent judge ruled out
petitioners intervention and dismissed her opposition to the reopening of the
cadastral proceedings. Petitioner filed two Motions for Reconsideration and both
motions were denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the reopening of the cadastral case is jurisdictionally tainted by lack of
publication.
HELD:
NO. Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 931 establishes the procedure for reopening cadastral
proceedings. Such procedure does not include publication. Neither publication is
mentioned in any of the provisions of the said law. Sec. 1 of the said law merely
states that, the competent Court of First Instance, upon receiving such petition,
shall notify the Government, through the Solicitor General.
If a prospective intervenor claims a piece of land by an alleged right that has
occurred prior to the institution of the original cadastral case, a proceeding in rem,
he is to be deemed to have received notice through publication therein made. If his
rights are derived from government after the land has been declared part of the
public domain by the cadastral court, the notice to the government of a reopening
petition as provided by law, should suffice. For, the government is supposed to take
up the cudgels for a public land grantee, or, at the very least, notify the latter.
In sum, the subject matter of the petition for reopening a parcel of land claimed by
the respondent was already embraced in the cadastral proceedings filed by the
Director of lands. Consequently, the Baguio cadastral already acquired jurisdiction
over the said property. The petition need not be published. the authority of the
cadastral court over the reopening proceedings below is not impaired by failure of
publication.

36 Valisno vs Plan
Queenie

143 SCRA 502

De

Vera,

FACTS:
Petitioners purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blancos and
subsequently declared ownership over the land for taxation purposes and took
possession thereof by assigning a caretaker over the property who built his house
thereon. Respondent Cayaba claims to be the owner of the property by virtue of a
deed of sale executed in his and Bienvenido Noriegas favor from the heirs of

Verano and ousted the caretaker from the property and constructed an apartment
thereon. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession of the land. The court
decided in favor of the petitioner but on appeal, the CA reversed the decision and
dismissed the complaint of the petitioner on grounds that the description of the
property in the complaint is different from the subdivision plan provided by the
respondents with their respective area and boundaries appearing to be completely
different. The court did not find any compliance to the requirement of the law that
the property in dispute must be clearly identified. Under the Civil Code, Articles 433
and 541, the actual possessor of the property has the presumption of a just title and
he need not be compelled to show or prove why he possesses the same. It was clear
that the respondent is the current possessor of the property having constructed the
apartment on the property in dispute. Contrasting the evidence of the respondent
and petitioner, the court choose the respondents evidence as they were able to
provide a vicinity plan that shows the land position in relation to the adjoining
properties with known boundaries and landmarks. Petitioner merely presented a
sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as mere guess works. Subsequently, the
respondents filed a petition for registration of the property before the CFI which was
opposed by the petitioner. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the opposition
that the same is barred by a prior judgment of the court.
ISSUE:
Whether res judicata can be set up in a land registration case.
HELD:
YES. Res judicata operates in the case at bar with its requisites present in the case:
[a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court
having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a
judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. The inclusion of private
respondent Cayaba's coowner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for
registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One
right of a coowner is to defend in court the interests of the coownership. Although
the first action was captioned for the recovery of possession, possession is sought
based on ownership, thus the action was one in the nature of accion reinvidicatoria.
The second action is for registration of title where the registration is sought based
on ones ownership over the property. The difference between the two is that the
plaintiff seeks to exclude other persons from ownership over the property in the first
action while it seeks to exclude the whole world in the second action. The cause of
action however remains the same. The employment of two different actions does
not allow one to escape against the principle of res judicata where one and the
same cause of action cannot be litigated twice. Although the first action was
litigated before a competent court of general jurisdiction and the other over a
registration court is of no significance since that both courts should be of equal
jurisdiction is not a requisite for res judicata to apply. For convenience, the SC
should decide whether to dismiss the application for registration or the opposition
thereto. Because the conflicting claims of both parties have been settled and

decided by the court previously, it upheld the finality of its decision and dismissed
the petition.

37 Republic vs Lee
Queenie

197 SCRA 13 1991

De

Vera,

FACTS:
Respondent filed before the RTC a registration of a parcel of land in her favor which
was opposed by the Dir. Of Lands on grounds that respondent or her predecessorin
interest acquired the land under any recognized mode for acquisition of title; they
have not been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of the land in
the concept of an owner for at least 30 years prior to the filing of application and
the land in dispute is a public domain belonging to Republic of the Philippines. The
court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Upon appeal by RP, it affirmed the
lower court decision thus this appeal to the Supreme Court.
Republic of the Phil. contends that respondent failed to prove by conclusive
evidence that she has ownership of the land by fee simple title and her testimony
as to the ownership of her predecessorininterest is self serving after claiming that
she obtained her Deed of Sale of the property from Mataban and Espiritu who
obtained their title from the previous owners of the land, Diaz and Vinluan. From the
time of filing the application of registration, the respondent was in possession of the
land for 13 years but she sought to tack her possession on the said land from her
predecessorininterests who were in possession of the land for 20 years. Conditions
provided by Sec. 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 where one is under a
bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership through their predecessorininterest or
by themselves have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the agricultural land in public domain for 30 years shall be
entitled to a certificate of title.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent is able to provide sufficient and substantial evidence as
complying with the requirement of law for confirmation of her ownership of the land
in dispute.
HELD:
NO. The most basic rule in land registration cases is that no person is entitled to
have land registered under the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the owner
in fee simple of the same, even though there is no opposition presented against
such registration by third persons. In order that the petitioner for the registration of
his land shall be permitted to have the same registered, and to have the benefit
resulting from the certificate of title the burden is upon him to show that he is the
real and absolute owner, in fee simple. Equally basic is the rule that no public land
can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from
government. A grant is conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by himself
or through his predecessorsininterest, has occupied the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and under a claim of title since 26 July 1894 or prior thereto. The

doctrine upon which these rules are based is that all lands were not acquired from
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.
It is incumbent upon the private respondent to prove that the alleged 20 year or
more possession of Diaz and Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the 30 year
period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private respondent failed to
discharge to the satisfaction of the court. The bare assertion that Diaz and Vinluan
had been in the possession of the property for more than 20 years found in private
respondents declaration is hardly the wellnigh incontrovertible evidence required
in cases of this nature. Private respondent should have presented specific facts that
would have shown the nature of such possession. The phrase adverse, continuous,
open, public and peaceful and in concept of owner by which she described her own
possession in relation to that of her predecessorsininterest are mere conclusions of
law which require factual support and substantiation.
Private respondent having failed to prove by convincing, positive proof that she has
complied with the requirements of the law for confirmation of her title to the land
applied for, it ws error on the part of the lower court to have granted her
application.

38 Republic vs Sayo 191 SCRA 71 1990

Sittee Junaira

Dimao,

DOCTRINE: Under the regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the state. Hence, it is
that all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming
the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to
substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusion
of law other than factual evidence of possession and title.
FACTS
In a compromise agreement entered into between different parties in an application
for registration of lot 7454 situated in the Municipality of Santiago, province of
Isabela now transferred to Nueva Vizcaya, Judge Sofronio G. Sayo (respondent)
approved and confirmed such and the title and ownership of the parties in
accordance with its terms on March 5, 1981.
The Solicitor General has taken the present recourse in a bid to have the decision on
March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and rendered in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion contending that:
1)

No evidence was adduced by the parties to support their registration

2)
Some of the parties in the compromise agreement has no authority to enter
into the compromise agreement
3)
The counsel of the Republic of the Philippines was not given notice of the
agreement to take part therein nor the decision approving the same.

The respondents argued that the proposition of the Solicitor General are premised
on the proposition that the lot is public land.According to them, the private
character of the land is demonstrated by the following circumstances:
a)
The possessory information title of the applicants and their predecessors-ininterest
b)
The fact that the lot 7454 was never claimed to be public land by the Director
of Lands in the proper cadastral proceedings
c)
The prewar certification of the National Library appearing in the Bureau of
Archives that the property in question was registered under the Spanish system of
land registration as private property owned by Don Liberato Bayaua, applicants
predecessors-in-interest.
d)
The proceedings for registration brought under Act 496 (Torrents Act)
presupposes that there is already a title to be confirmed by teh court, distinguishing
it from proceedings under the Public Land Act where the presumption is always that
the land involved belongs to the State.
ISSUE
Whether or not the subject land belongs to the respondents as part of their private
property.
HELD/RATIO
No. The respondents failed in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the
property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title
from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other
means for the proper acquisition of public lands. The applicant must present
competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on
general statements, or mere conclusion of law other than factual evidence of
possession and title. Hence, the property must be held to be part of the public
domain.
Th principal document relied upon and presented by the applicant to prove the
private character of the land was a photocopy of a certification of the National
Library to the effect that the property in question was registered under the Spanish
System of land registration as private property of Don Liberato Bayaua. But the
court ruled that Spanish document cannot be considered a title to property, it not
being one of the grants made during the Spanish regime and obviously not
constituting primary evidence of ownership.
The argument that the initiation of an application for registration of land under the
Torrens Act is proof that the land is of private ownership cannot be given merit. It is
precisely the character of the land as private which the applicant has the obligation
of establishing. In the absence of any adverse claim to show a proper title for
registration, the applicant is not assured of a favorable decree by the Land
Registration Act 496.

Further, the decision of the Registration Court is based solely on the compromise
agreement of the parties.The compromise agreement included private persons who
had not adduced any competent evidence of their ownership over the land subject
of the registration proceeding. What was done was to consider the compromise
agreement as proof of title of the parties taking part therein, a totally unacceptable
proposition.
As to the Informacion posesoria invoked by the respondents, it requires condition
such as inscription in the Registry of Property and actual, public, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of the land for 20 years to be considered a mode to
acquire public lands. The proof of fulfillment of these conditions are absent, hence,
cannot be considered as anything more than prima facie evidence of possession.
Under the regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the state. Hence, it is that all
applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain.
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it
must be, as they are hereby, declared null and void and set aside.

39

Ong vs Republic 548 SCRA 160

Dimao, Sittee Junaira

3/12/2008

DOCTRINE/S:
*

Applicants for registration of title must prove the following:

1)
That the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain
2)
That they have been in an open, continuous , exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945.
*
The law requires possession and occupation to acquire title to alienable lands
of public domain. Occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to
qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exrcise over hiw own property.
FACTS
Petitioner Charles L. Ong in his behalf and as duly representative of the brothers
Roberto, Alberto, and Cesar files and Application for Registration of Title over a lot
situated in Brgy. Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. They alleged that they are the coowners of the lot and an exclusive property purchased from spouses Tony Bautista
and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998. That they and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in an open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the
concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.

The Office of the Solicitor general opposed the application contending that the
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in an open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot as required by
the Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1073. Also the applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title to
prove their claims; that the tax declaration appended to the application does not
appear genuine and merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage; that the
application was filed beyond the period allowed under PD No. 892 and that the
subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of private
appropriation.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner and his brothers. In an
appeal to the supreme court , the decision was reversed and set aside. The CA
ruleed that despite the land being of public domain, it is part of those disposable
and alienable lands and is incumbent upon the applicant to prove that they
possessed the lot in the nature and for the duration required by law. However,
petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in
adverse possession of the lot in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945. It was
also noted that the earliest tax declaration presented is dated 1971. Hence, could
not fairly claim posession of the land prior to 1971. Neither they can prove that they
actually occupied the lot prior to the filing of the application.
ISSUE
Whether or not Ong and his brothers and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
an open, continuous and notorious and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the
concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.
HELD/RATIO
No. Petitioner failed to prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
an open, continuous and notorious and peaceful possession of the subject lot since
June 12, 1945. The records shows that petitioners bought the lot from spouses Tony
Bautista abd Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998 who in turn purchased the same
from spouses Teofilo Abellera on Jnauary 16, 1997. The latter bought the subject lot
from Cynthia cacho et al on July 10, 1979. The earliest tax declaration submitted
was issued in 1971 in the name of of spouses Cacho. If to tack the petitioners claim
of ownership with his predecessors in 1971, still it would fall short of the required
possession from June 12, 1945.
Moreover, petitioners evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed and
occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required by law. Petitioners
admitted that none of them occupied the subject lot. No improvements were made
thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on several occasions. Tony
Bautista, petitioners predecessor-in-interest also testified that they also never
actually occupied the lot.
As held in Republic vs Alconaba: the law speaks of possession and occupation.
Since these words are separated by the conjunction and the clear intention of the

law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law
adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant
to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own property.

40

Republic vs Guinto Aldana 175578 8/11/2010

Dimao, Sittee Junaira

DOCTRINE:
*
While the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is
teh original tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of Lands (now the land
Management services of DEBR), blueprint copies and other evidence could also
provide sufficient identification.
*
Application for registration requires teh establishment of evidence taht teh
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over the
lot under the bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. He must
prove that for at least 30 years he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in an
open, continuous , exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land.
*
Tax declarations and realty tax payments constitute at least prof that a holder
has a claim of title over the property, for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. It
announces his adverse claim against all other parties who may have conflict with
his interest.
FACTS
Respondents Guinto-Aldana filed with the RTC of Las Pinas City an application for
registration of title over teo pieces of land in talango Pamplona Uno. Las Pinas City.
They professed themselves to be co-owners of these lots having acquired them by
successsion from their predecessors (parents of the respondents) who in turn had
acquired the property under a 1969 documents denominated as Kasulatan sa
Paghahari ng Lupa na Labas sa Hukuman na may Pagpaparaya at Bilihan. Under
this document, the parents of the respondent acquired such in for a consideration in
his respective share from Romualdo Guinto. They also alleged that until the time of
the application, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in an actual,
open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in the
concept of owner and that they had consistently declared the property in their
name for purposes of real estate taxation.
In support of their application, respondents submitted the blueprint of plans well as
copies of the Technical descriptions of each lot, certification from the geodetic
engineer and the pertinent tax declarations together with the receipts of payment
therefor. They averred that the propertys original tracing cloth plan had previously

been submitted to the RTC of Las Pinas on a previous registration case in an LRC
case No. LP -125.
Opposing the application. Petitioner through the Office of the City Prosecutor,
advanced that the land sought to be registered were inalienable lands of the public
domain; that neither of the respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest had been
in prior possession thereof; and that the muniment of title and the tax declaration
submitted to the court did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
fide acquisition or of a prior possession in the concept of owner.
Petitioner Zenaida Guinto-Aldana,in her testimony declared that the subject land
was owned by her family since she was 5 years of age and her grandparents had
lived in the lots until teh death of her grandmother in 1961. That aside from her
grandparents, there are caretakers who had tilled the land and who had lived until
sometime between 1980-1990. She remembered that her grandmother constructed
a house on the property. That sometime on 1970, her family built an adobe fence
around the perimeter and on 1990s they reinforced it with hollow blocks and
concrete after an inundation caused by the flood. She claimed that she and her
father had been religiously paying real estate taxes shown in the tax declarations
and tax receipts submitted to the court. Zenaidas claim or prior open, exclusive
and continuous possession of the land was corroborated by Josefina Luna, one of the
adjoining lot owner, who strongly declared that Zenaidas parents are the owner of
the land had not of her knowledge that she came to know of any other claim.
The Regional Trial Court on July 10, 2003 rendered a decision denying the
application for registration. It found that respondents failed to establish with
certainty the identity of the lots applied for registration because of failure to submit
to the court the original tracing cloth plan s mandated by the Presidential Decree
no. 1529.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. In the petition to the SC,
Petitioner avers that the CA committed an error as Section 17 of PD No. 1529 states
that the submission in court of the original tracing cloth plan of the property sought
to be registered is a mandatory requirement in registration proceedings in order to
establish the exact identity of the property. Invoking Del Rosario vs Republic of the
Philippines, petitioner believes that respondents are not relieved of their procedural
obligation to adduce in evidence the original copy of the plan, because they could
have easily retrieved it from the LRA and presented it in court. It suggests that the
blueprint submitted cannot be an approximate substantial compliance of the
Section 17 of PD no. 1529 and is illegible ad unreadable for it does not even bear
the certification of the lands Management Bureau. Further, it also attacks claim of
the respondents prior possession as there was no clear and convincing evidence to
show proof.
ISSUE
1)
Whether or not blue print, technical specifications and tax declaration and
real estate payments are sufficient evidence to provide identification of the subject
land claimed of ownership in compliance of the Section 17 of PD 1529.

2)
Whether or not the respondents has exercised acts of dominions over the
land under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
HELD/RATIO
1)
Yes. If the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original
tracing cloth plan is merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to afford
certainty as to the exact identity of the property applied for registration and to
ensure that the same does not overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining lots,
there stands to be no reason why a registration application must be denied for
failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, especially when it is accompanied
by pieces of evidence- such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and a
duly executed technical description of the property which may likewise substantially
and with as much certainty prove the limits and extent of the property sought to be
registered.
As laid down in the doctrinal precept laid down in the republic of the Philippines V
CA and in the later cases of spouses Recto vs Republic of the Philippines and
Republic of the Philippines vs Hubilla, that while the best evidence to identify
a
piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan,
blueprint
copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification.
Therewith, the
submission of the respondents of the blueprint plan together
with the technical description of the property operates as substantial compliance
with the legal
requirements of the law. It was noted that the blueprint
submitted proceeded
officially from the Land Management services and
bears the approval of Surveys
division Chief and was endorsed by the
Community Environment and Natural
resources Office of the DENR. This
accompanied by the technical descriptions of the lot executed and verified also
by the Geodetic Engineer.
2)
Yes. Respondents had established evidence that she and her predecessorsin-interest have exercised acts of dominion over the land complying the number of
more than 30 years in an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land.
From the records, possession of the respondents of the said land dates back to
1937 and had been declared for taxation by Zenaidas father. Such declaration for
tax purposes continues up to 1979, 1985 then to 1994. The respondents could have
served further proof of declarations if not for the filed being burned as certified by
the Office of the Rizal Provincial Assessor when a fire broke out in that certain office.
Also, respondents receipt for tax expenditures between 1977 and 2001 are likewise
fleshed out in the records and in these documents the herein respondents are the
name owners of the property with Zenaida being identified as the one who delivered
the payment in 1994 receipts.
These unbroken chain of positive acts exercised by respondents predecessors as
demonstrated by these pieces of evidence, yield no other conclusion than that as
early as1937, they had already demonstrated an unmistakable claim to the
property.

No. Petitioner failed to prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
an open, continuous and notorious and peaceful possession of the subject lot since
June 12, 1945. The records shows that petitioners bought the lot from spouses Tony
Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998 who in turn purchased the same
from spouses Teofilo Abellera on January 16, 1997. The latter bought the subject lot
from Cynthia cacho et al on July 10, 1979. The earliest tax declaration submitted
was issued in 1971 in the name of of spouses Cacho. If to tack the petitioners claim
of ownership with his predecessors in 1971, still it would fall short of the required
possession from June 12, 1945.
Moreover, petitioners evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed and
occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required by law. Petitioners
admitted that none of them occupied the subject lot. No improvements were made
thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on several occasions. Tony
Bautista, petitioners predecessor-in-interest also testified that they also never
actually occupied the lot.
As held in Republic vs Alconaba: the law speaks of possession and occupation.
Since these words are separated by the conjunction and the clear intention of the
law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law
adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant
to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own property.
Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while tax declarations
and tax realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are a
good indication of possession in the concept of owner these documents such as tax
declarations and realty tax payments constitute at least proof that a holder has a
claim of title over the property, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes
for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. It
announces his adverse claim against all other parties who may have conflict with
his interest.
Indeed the respondents have been in possession of the land in the concept of an
owner which makes the right thereto unquestionably settled and hence, deserving
protection under the law.

41

Republic vs Cuaves
Fadera, Juna Carlo

167 SCRA 150

11/9/1988

Facts:
Romerico Chavez, the alleged owner of the subject property which consists of
181.4776 hectares, applied for its registration with the Court of First Instance of

Iloilo. He claimed that the land was originally owned by his grandfather who had
been in peaceful, exclusive, continuous and open possession of the land since time
immemorial and he acwuired the land by virtue of a Deed of Definite Sale. He also
claimed that he had been paying taxes on the property and had planted coconut
and mango trees thereon. The Director of Lands opposed with such application but
this was granted by the CFI after due hearing relying on Chavezs lone testimony.
Herein Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the said decision
but reduced the area to 144 hectares. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner
contends that: first, the land was not sufficiently identified with indubitable
evidence because what was submitted was only a blueprint copy of the survey plan
contrary to the statutory requirement of mandatory character thst the original
tracing cloth plan of the land applied for which must be approved by the Director of
Lands should be submitted; and second, the nature and length of possession
required by law had not been adequately established.
Issue/s:
1. WON the land was not sufficiently identified by presenting a blueprint copy of the
survey plan?
2. WON the nature and length of possession required by law had not been
adequately established
Held/Ratio:
1. NO.
As a rule, the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes was
the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, however, blueprint copies
and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification.
Here, there was a considerable compliance with the requirement of the law as the
subject property was sufficiently identified with the presentation of the blueprint
copy which was certified by the Bureau of Lands including the technical description
that goes with it. Hence, the subject land was sufficiently identified by the blueprint
copy of the survey plan.
2. YES.
As a rule, the applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the
claim and cannot offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law that
factual evidence of possession.
Here there is not enough evidence to support his claim except his own unsupported
declarations.
Hence, private respondent failed to prove his claim of ownership.
The petition was GRANTED. Although the subject property was sufficiently identified,
the applicant has failed to prove the peaceful, exclusive, continuous and open
possession necessary to support his claim of ownership. Hence, the registration was
denied.

42 Serra vs CA
Juna Carlo

195 SCRA 482

3/22/1991

Fadera,

Facts:
The Hernaezes (Primitivo, Rogaciana, and Luisa), herein private respondents, filed
with the CFI of Bacolod City a petition for reconstitution of allegedly lost original
certificates of title covering 3 lots which was supported by a certification from the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental that no certificates of titles had been issued
covering the properties. The petition was granted and the ROD of Negros Occidental
reconstituted original certificates of title to the subject lots and a transfer
certificates were issued in their names. Upon learning of the existence of the TCTs,
Serra Serra, herein petitioner filed with the ROD an adverse claim against
reconstituted certificates of title. They filed a motion for cancellation of said
certificates of title, claiming that they are holders of valid existing certificates of
title and that they are in actual possession of the properties covered by the
reconstituted certificates of titles since before the war. The CFI denied the motion
for cancellation without conducting a formal hearing. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but this was denied. The Hernaezes filed a motion for execution of
the order granting the petition for reconstitution and prayed that they be placed in
possession of the subject properties. The trial court granted the motion and issued a
writ of possession. This was challenged by the petitioner before the Court of
Appeals which issued a writ of preliminary injunction and thereafter lifted the same.
Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
WON the issuance of a writ of possession was proper. (procedure and reconstitution
of original certificate of title)
Held/Ratio:
NO. As a rule, writ of possession may be issued only in the following cases; 1)land
registration proceeding; 2)extra-judicial foreclosure of REM; 3)judicial foreclosure of
mortgage, a quasi in rem proceeding, provided that the mortgagor is in possession
of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had
intervened; 4)execution sales. In land registration case, a writ of possession may be
issued only pursuant to a decree of registration in an original land registration
proceedings not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration
case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof
during the proceedings up to the issuance of the decree. However, it cannot be
issued in a petition for reconstitution of an allegedly lost or destroyed certificate of
title. Reconstitution does not confirm or adjudicate ownership over the property
covered by the reconstituted title as in original land registration proceedings where,
in the latter, a writ of possession may be issued to place the applicant-owner in
possession. The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to
have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law in the
same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. A person who seeks a
reconstitution of a certificate of title over a property he does not actually possess

cannot, by a mere motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which is summary
in nature, deprive the actual occupants of possession thereof. Possession and/or
ownership of the property should be threshed out in a separate proceeding. Here,
petitioners were not mere possessors of the properties covered by the reconbsituted
titles, they are possessors under claim of ownership. Actual possession under claim
of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Hence, the writ of
possession was not proper.
Petition GRANTED.

43

Republic vs Nilas 512 SCRA 286

Fadera, Juna Carlo

1/23/2007

Facts:
In 1941 The trial court adjudicated the subject property to the Calingacions and
ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration, upon finality of the decision, to
issue the corresponding decree of registration. Spouses Abiera, Respondent Nillas
parents, acquired the subject lot through Deed of Absolute Sale and thereon
Respondent Nillas acquired it from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim. No
decree of registration has ever been issued over the subject lot ever since the
decision was made by the trial court. Nillas now (1997, 56 years after the 1941
decision) sought the revival of the 1941 decision and the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration for the said lot with the RTC which granted the
petition and directed the Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority to issue
the corresponding decree of confirmation and registration. Office of the Solicitor
General appealed the RTC decision, arguing that the right of action to revive
judgment had already prescribed and Nillas should have established that a request
for issuance of a decree of registration before the Admonistrator of the LRA. The
appeal was denied by CA which reiterated that the provisions of Sec.6 Rule 39 of the
ROC, which imposes a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgment by motion,
refer to ordinary civil actions and NOT to special proceedings such as land
registration cases. Hence this petition. The OSG contends that the principles of
prscription and laches do apply to land registration cases, that under Sec 6 of Rule
39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of
its entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by statute
of limitations.
Issue/s:
1. WON the principles of prescription and laches applies to the decision in a land
registration cases.
2. WON the judgment in Land Registration cases may be executed on mition or
enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39.
Held/Ratio:

1. NO. In the case of Sta. Ana v. Menla (Sta. Ana Doctrine), the court extensively
explained that the provision of Sec. 6 Rule 39 refers to civil actions and is not
applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so
because a party in a civilaction must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same
within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable
against the losing party. In special proceedings, the purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a
parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and
confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the
land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom. Further, There is nothing
in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree.
The reason is xxx that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not
need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the
issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land
Registration Commission failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for
the reason that no motion therefor has been filed cannot prejudice the owner, or the
person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.
2. NO. Sec. 39 of PD 1529, lays down the procedure that interposes between the
rendition of judgment and the issuance of certificate of title. No obligation
whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even
as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the Section
are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration
Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of
court (that is to transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the
Commissioner), and the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the
preparation of the decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register
of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their
performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review. The
failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance
of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the
land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can.
Petition DENIED

44

Manotok Realty vs LLT Realty

540
12/17/2007 Aguilar, Charles Tito R.

SCRA

304

FACTS:
The Petition involved properties covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
994 which in turn encompasses 1,342 hectares of the Maysilo Estate. The vast tract
of land stretches over three (3) cities within Metropolitan Manila. CLT Realty
Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and
Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo
Estate. CLTs claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate of Title derived from

Estelita Hipolito. Hipolitos title emanated from Jose Dimson whose title appears to
have been sourced from OCT No. 994.
For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT,
claiming that Dimsons title, the proximate source of CLTs title, was irregularly
issued and, hence, the same and subsequent titles flowing therefrom are likewise
void. The Manotoks asserted their ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they
derived it from several awardees and/or vendees of the National Housing Authority.
The Manotok title likewise traced as its primary source OCT No. 994. The trial court
ruled for CLT. Manotoks appeal to the CA was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the title issued in the name of CLT is valid.
HELD:
It is evident from all three titlesCLTs, Hipolitos and Dimsonsthat the properties
they purport to cover were originally registered on 19 April 1917 in the
Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. These titles could
be affirmed only if it can be proven that OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917
had actually existed. CLT were given the opportunity to submit such proof but it did
not. The established legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title
is that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of
evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be
reconveyed is his. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant's claim.
Considering that CLT clearly failed to meet the burden of proof reposed in them as
plaintiffs in the action for annulment of title and recovery of possession, there is a
case to be made for ordering the dismissal of their original complaints before the
trial court.
As it appears on the record, OCT No. 994, the mother title was received for
transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 based from the issuance of
the decree of registration on 17 April 1917. Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date
of inscription or the date of transcription of the decree into the Original Certificate
of Title. Thus, such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date
when the title took effect. It appears that the transcription of the decree was done
on the date it was received by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917.
There is a marked distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the
certificate of title; the entry of the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land
registration and the entry of the certificate of title is made by the register of deeds.
The certificate of title is issued in pursuance of the decree of registration. It was
stressed that what stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree
of registration made by the registrar of deeds in the registry.
Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that
the certificate of title is to take effect.

Hence, any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is void,
for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that CLT titles made specific reference to
an OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since
they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the
CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on the
dates appearing on their respective titles.
The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the
case on remand. In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should
prevail, the Special Division is directed to make further determinations based on the
evidence already on record and such other evidence as may be presented at the
proceedings before it.
WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special Division of the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

45

Manotok Realty vs LLT Realty

582
3/31/2009
Albay, Miami Frianz F.

46

Rosales vs Burgos577 SCRA 264

Aonuevo, Jon-jon

SCRA

583

1/30/2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Adoracion Rufloe is the wife of Angel Rufloe, now deceased, while
co-petitioners Alfredo and Rodrigo are their children. During the marriage of
Adoracion and Angel, they acquired a 371-square meter parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 406851 which is the subject of the present controversy. Sometime in 1978,
respondent Elvira Delos Reyes forged the signatures of Adoracion and Angel in a
Deed of Sale dated September 8, 1978 to make it appear that the disputed property
was sold to her by the spouses Rufloe. On the basis of the said deed of sale, Delos
Reyes succeeded in obtaining a title in her name, TCT No. S-74933.Thus, in
November 1979, the Rufloes filed a complaint for damages against Delos Reyes
alleging that the Deed of Salewas falsified as the signatures appearing thereon were
forged because Angel Rufloe died in 1974, which was four (4)years before the
alleged sale in favor of Delos Reyes.During the pendency of the case, Delos Reyes
sold the subject property to respondent siblings Anita, Angelina, Angelitoand Amy
(Burgos siblings). A new title, TCT No. 135860, was then issued in their names.The
Burgos siblings, in turn, sold the same property to their aunt, Leonarda Burgos.
However, the sale in favor of Leonarda was not registered. Thus, no title was
issued in her name. The subject property remained in the name of the Burgos
siblings who also continued paying the real estate taxes thereon.The RTC rendered
its decision declaring that the Deed of Sale in favor of Delos Reyes was falsified as
the signatures of the spouses Rufloe had been forged. The trial court ruled that
Delos Reyes did not acquire ownership over the subject property. Such was the state
of things when the Rufloes filed their complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Contract

and Cancellationof Transfer Certificate of Titles against respondents Leonarda and

the Burgos siblings, and Delos Reyes.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring that Leonarda and the Burgos
siblings were not innocent purchasers for value and did not have a better right to
the property in question than the true and legal owners, the Rufloes. The trial court
also held that the subsequent conveyance of the disputed property to Leonarda by
the Burgos siblings was simulated to make it appear that Leonarda was a buyer in
good faith. The CA reversed and set aside that of the trial court, declaring in the
process that respondents were purchasers in goodfaith and for value. Thus, this
petition.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether the sale of the subject property by Delos Reyes to the Burgos siblings
and the subsequent sale by thesiblings to Leonarda were valid and binding; and
(2) Whether respondents were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value
despite the forged deed of sale of their transferor Delos Reyes
HELD/RATIO:
Petition Granted. The issue concerning the validity of the deed of sale
between the Rufloes and Delos Reyes had already been resolved with finality which
declared that the signatures of the alleged vendors, Angel and Adoracion Rufloe,
had been forged. It is undisputed that the forged deed of sale was null and void and
conveyed no title. It is a well-settled principle that no one can give what one does
not have, nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what one owns or is
authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller can
transfer legally. Due to the forged deed of sale, Delos Reyes acquired no right over
the subject property which she could convey to the Burgos siblings. All the
transactions subsequent to the falsified sale between the spouses Rufloe and Delos
Reyes are likewise void, including the sale made by the Burgos siblings to their
aunt, Leonarda.
As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land, as in this case,
may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and will
in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
property. However, this rule admits of an unchallenged exception: . . . a person
dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and
to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man
to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack
of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to
inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation.
This simulated sale is the handiwork of Amado who apparently acted
advisedly to make it appear that his sister Leonarda as the second transferee of the
property is an innocent purchaser for value. Since he or his children could not

plausibly assume the stamp of a buyer in good faith from the forger Elvira Delos
Reyes.

47

Pajomayo vs Manipon 39 SCRA 676 6/30/1971

Fernando, Niezel

Facts:
On June 5, 1963 the plaintiffs (Pajomayo) filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Branch IX, at Urdaneta, Pangasinan) a complaint alleging that they are
co-owners pro-indiviso of the parcel of land described in the complaint which is
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1089 in the name of Diego Pajomayo,
issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan; that they had acquired
the land as an inheritance from their late father Diego Pajomayo; that they and their
predecessor-in-interest had been in actual, peaceful and uninterrupted possession
of said property in the concept of owners for a period of more than 70 years until
the early part of the year 1956 when the defendants dispossessed them of said
property.
The defendants (Manipon), after denying some of the allegations of the complaint,
alleged that they are the exclusive owners of a parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 14043 issued by the office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan, the said land having been adjudicated to them in the cadastral
proceedings of the Malasique cadastre, and that apparently the plaintiffs are
claiming the same parcel of land. The defendants claim they had acquired the land
mentioned in their answer by inheritance from their deceased father Pioquinto
Manipon, and that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual,
peaceful, and adverse possession of said land for more than 70 years, to the
exclusion of plaintiffs.
Issue:
Whether the Title No. 1089 held by the plaintiffs-appellees (Pajomayo) which
was issued in virtue of the homestead patent should prevail over the Title No. 14034
held by the defendants-appellants (Manipon) which was issued in connection with
the cadastral proceedings.
Held:
Yes, Title No. 1089 should prevail. The Court held the trial court correctly
ruled that plaintiff's O.C.T. No. 1089 prevails over defendants' O.C.T. No. 14034, the
former having been issued on 27 November 1931, or prior to the issuance of the
latter on 1 April1957.
The plaintiffs base their claim of title to the land in question, on Original Certificate
of Title No. 1089 issued to their father, Diego Pajomayo, on November 27, 1931 in
virtue of a free patent that was granted to him. Once a homestead patent granted
in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act
496, as amended, the Certificate of Title issued in virtue of said patent has the force
and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration Act.

When one of the two titles is held to be superior over the other, one should be
declared null and void and should be ordered cancelled. And if a party is declared to
be the owner of a parcel of land pursuant to a valid certificate of title said party is
entitled to the possession of the land covered by said valid title. The decree of
registration issued in the cadastral proceedings does not have the effect of
annulling the title that had previously been issued in accordance with the provisions
of the land Registration Law (Act 496).

48

Wee vs Mardo

202414 6/4/2014 Fernando, Niezel

Facts:
Respondent (Mardo) was granted a registered Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284, dated
April 26, 1979, covering the Lot No. 8348, situated in Putting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite.
On February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly conveyed to petitioner Josephine Wee,
through a Deed of Absolute Sale a portion of the said lot known as Lot No. 8348-B,
for a consideration of P250,000.00 which was fully paid. Respondent however
refused to vacate and turnover the subject property claiming that the alleged sale
was falsified.
Petitioner (Wee) file an Application for Original Registration of a parcel of land
claiming that she is the owner of said unregistered land by virtue of a deed of
absolute sale.
Respondent filed a Motion to dismiss the application alleging that the land described
in the application was different from the land being claimed for titling. The motion
was however, denied. A motion for reconsideration and second urgent motion for
reconsideration were subsequently filed by respondent, but both were denied by the
RTC.
Upon presentation of evidence by the parties, the RTC granted the application of the
petitioner. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
RTC, hence, respondent appealed to the CA.
The CA held, among others, that petitioner was not able to comply with the
requirement of possession and occupation under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.
Her admission that the subject lot was not physically turned over to her due to
some objections and oppositions to her title suggested that she was not exercising
any acts of dominion over the subject property, an essential element in the
requirement and occupation contemplated under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to the subject property as evidenced by the
alleged deed of absolute sale and despite respondents possession of the subject
property.
Held:
No, the petitioner is not entitled to the subject property. The Court held that the
subject land is already registered under OCT No. OP-1840 (Patent No. 042118-03-

6111) of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite, under the name of respondent Felicidad
Mardo.
In addition, the Court held that the applicants for registration of title under Section
14(1) must sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. (Republic v. Manimtim, G.R. No. 169599,
March 16, 2011)
The CA denied the application on the issue of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land. It was of the view that she
could not have complied with the requirement of possession and occupation under
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 considering that she admitted that it was not
physically turned over to her.

49

Campit vs Gripa, et al. 195443 9/17/2014

Fernando, Niezel

Facts:
Subject of this case is a 2.7360 hectare agricultural land situated in Umangan,
Mangatarem, Pangasinan, presently occupied by respondents Isidra B. Gripa, Pedro
Bardiaga, and Severino Bardiaga, represented by his son Rolando Bardiaga, but
covered by TCT No. 122237 issued in the petitioners name. The petitioner (Campit)
claimed to have purchased the property from his father Jose Campit in 1977.
On the other hand, respondents (Gripa) claimed to be the rightful owners of the
subject property, as earlier adjudged by the court in Civil Case No. 11858 decided
on June 12, 1961, and in Civil Case No. 15357 decided on August 8, 1978. The
Court, in these cases, cancelled the titles of the petitioner and his father Jose
because they were obtained through the misrepresentation of the petitioners
grandfather, Isidro Campit.
Issue:
Whether that the title of the petitioner to the subject property shall prevail
because the August 8, 1978 decision in Civil Case No. 15357, which declared his
title null and void, was never executed and under the Torrens system of registration,
a certificate of title is an indefeasible and incontrovertible proof of ownership of the
person, in whose favor it was issued.
Held:
No, the title of the petitioner will not prevail. The Court held the validity of
petitioners title, having been settled with finality in Civil Case No. 15357, could no
longer be reviewed. Because the doctrine of res judicata provides that a final
judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive
as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes as an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.

The Court also held that it cannot allow the petitioner to maintain his title and
benefit from the fruit of his and his predecessors fraudulent acts at the expense of
the respondents who are the rightful owners of the subject property. The Torrens
system of registration cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor
can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or to permit one to enrich
oneself at the expense of others.
Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner can still
be compelled under the law to re-convey the property registered to the rightful
owner under the principle that the property registered is deemed to be held in trust
for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered.
An action for re-conveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in
ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. There is,
however, an exception to this rule where the filing of such action does not prescribe,
i.e., when the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the action, being in
effect that of quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe.

50

Republic vs Vera 120 SCRA 210

Frias, Helen May

1/27/1983

Facts:
Private respondents filed with the lower court an application for registration of title
under Act 496 over parcels of land located in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan.
The Court of First Instance of Bataan confirmed the titles to subject parcels of land
and adjudicated them in favor of the private respondents. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines filed with the lower court an opposition to the application stating that the
parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic, not subject to private appropriation. Petitioner stressed that the lands in
question can no longer be subject to registration by voluntary proceedings, for they
have already been subjected to compulsory registration proceedings under the
Cadastral Act.
Issue:
Whether the lands in question being a subject of a cadastral proceeding may be a
subject of private appropriation in favor of the private respondents.
Held/Ratio:
No.
In cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands
object of the petition is required by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or
before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. In
the absence of successful claimants, the property is declared public land.
In this case, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the
aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the
portions they were then occupying, otherwise, titles over the portions subject of

their respective claims would have been issued to them. The Cadastral Court must
have declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision had already
become final and conclusive.

51

Pamintuan vs San Agustin 43 Phil. 558

Frias, Helen May

6/22/2022

Facts:
The lot in question was decreed in favor of petitioner Florentino Pamintuan by the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga and that certificate of said lot was thereupon
issued to him by virtue of the decision in a land registration case. In the meantime,
a cadastral case was instituted. Due to the petitioners failure to claim the lot at the
trial of the Cadastral case, the said lot was awarded to the private respondents.
Petitioner then presented a motion to the Court of First Instance, asking that the
decision of the court in regard to the lot in the Cadastral case be set aside and that
the writ of possession issued by virtue of said decision be recalled.
Issue:
Whether a final decree in an ordinary land registration case can be set aside by a
subsequent decree of the Court in a cadastral case.
Held/Ratio:
No.
The title to the land is fully as well settled and adjudicated, within the meaning of
the Cadastral Act, by a final decree in an ordinary land registration case as it would
be by a similar decree in a Cadastral case. Obviously, it cannot have been the
intention of the Legislature to provide a special proceeding for the settlement and
adjudication of titles already settled and adjudicated. In this case, the subsequent
filing of a cadastral case does not give the court the jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second
decree for the same land is null and void. The jurisdiction of the court in cadastral
cases over lands already registered is limited to the necessary correction of
technical errors in the description of the lands.

52

Director of Lands vs Pastor 106

7/31/1988
Frias, Helen May

SCRA

426

Facts:
Respondent Manuela Pastor filed with the Court of First Instance of Batangas an
application for confirmation of imperfect title over thirteen (13) lots situated in
Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas City. In her application, the respondent claims that
she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous, uninterrupted, open,
public, adverse and notorious possession of the lots under claim of ownership for
more than thirty (30) years. The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the
application on the ground that said lots were declared public land in a previous
cadastral proceeding.

Issue:
Whether lands declared as public land in a cadastral proceeding may still be a
subject of a judicial confirmation of title.
Held/Ratio:
Yes.
A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the
same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the
same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains
alienable and disposable (now sections 3 and 4, P.D. No. 1073).

53

Navarro vs Director of Lands

5
7/31/1962
Gaffud, Marvela Angela

SCRA

834

Facts:

This is an appeal by Anacleto P. Navarro from the order of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, dismissing his application for registration of 2 residential lots in Malate.
The Director of Lands interposed an opposition claiming that both lands belong to
the State. Navarro submitted an evidence wherein the Director of Lands filed a
motion to dismiss on 2 grounds: 1) that the application was barred by prior
judgment and 2) that the same was improper as an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land law which is only applicable to
public agricultural lands and not to those which are residential in character.

It appears that sometime in 1950 the Director of Lands filed a cadastral proceeding
in the Court of First Instance of Manila to settle and adjudicate title to the same lots
in question. The State claimed it as part of the public domain.
Issue/s:
Whether the lots applied for are part of the public domain or have so far been
possessed by appellant that he must be deemed to have acquired title thereto
which is sufficient for registration in his name?
Held/Ratio:
The lots applied for are part of the public domain.
The declaration by final judgment in the cadastral proceeding that they are public
lands settled this issue.
It is a rule long familiar in this jurisdiction that all lands are presumed to be a part of
the public domain that to overcome this presumption, evidence must be more than

a mere preponderance and that vague and indecisive proofs are insufficient even in
the absence of opposition on the part of the government.
Appellant Navarro admits that neither Caridad Guillen Cortez nor her predecessors
ever declared the land in question for taxation purposes And that none of them
paid taxes on said land. In spite of the averment that the two lots in controversy
constitute privately owned property, the evidence is unanimous to the effect that
none of the alleged owners ever declared the land for taxation purposes. None of
them ever paid taxes on the property. It has been truthfully said that tax
declarations and tax receipts constitute evidence of great weight in support of
possession or ownership. Any owner, the most ignorant included, knows his
obligation of seeing to it that his real property is declared for taxation purposes and
that he regularly pay the taxes thereon.

54

Lahora vs Dayanghirang
Gaffud, Marvela Angela

37 SCRA 346 1/30/1971

FACTS:
Spouses Francisco lahora and Toribia Moralizon brought this appeal to this court
from the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dismissing their petition with
the lot in issue (Lot No. 2228) on the ground of previous registration.
The records show that appellants petitioned the Court of First Instance of Davao for
registration of 9 parcel of lands located in Manay, Davao, of which was acquired
by Toribia Moralizon by inheritance and the other half by purchase and by
continuous, open, public and adverse possession in the concept of owner. One of
the said parcels of land was identified as lot no. 2228. Such petition was opposed
by Emilio Dayanghirang Jr. claiming that the lot no. 2228 belonged to him in his wife
covered by OCT P-6055 in his wifes name. The Director of Lands also alleged that
the applicants never had a sufficient title over the lands, nor have they been open,
continuous and notorious possession for at least 30 years.
ISSUE/S:
(1)
Whether the patent issued to the wife of Emilio Dayanghirang Jr. as well as
the original certificate of title obtained by her were null and void?
(2)

Whether the same lot can be the subject of two registration proceedings?

RATIO/S:
(1)
No, the patent and original certificate of title issued to Dayanghirang Jr.s wife
is valid.
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the
certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted
by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is,
recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee Thereafter, the land is
automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title
issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38

of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the
certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued
in a registration proceeding.
(2)

No, the same lot cannot be the subject of 2 registration proceedings.

In the present case, Lot No. 2228 was registered and titled in the name of
oppositors wife as of 21 June 1956, nine (9) years earlier. Clearly, appellants
petition for registration of the same parcel of land on 26 November 1965, on the
ground that the first certificate of title (OCT No. P6053) covering the said property is
a nullity, can no longer prosper. Orderly administration of justice precludes that Lot
2228, of the Manay Cadastre, should be the subject of two registration proceedings.
Having become registered land under Act 496, for all legal purposes, by the
issuance of the public land patent and the recording thereof, further registration of
the same would lead to the obviously undesirable result of two certificates of title
being issued for the same piece of land, even if both certificates should be in the
name of the same person. And if they were to be issued to different persons, the
indefeasibility of the first title, which is the most valued characteristics of Torrens
Titles, would be torn away.
For this reason, the Supreme Court has ruled in Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil.
558, that in a cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an earlier case and that a second decree for
the same land would be null and void.

55

Republic vs Aquino
120 SCRA 186
Gaffud, Marvela Angela

1/27/1983

Facts
Vivencio p. Angeles filed an application of registration of title over a parcel of land in
San Mateo, Rizal with the Court of First Instance of Rizal wherein an opposition was
filed jointly by Victorino Perez and Dionisio, Conrado, Jose, Nicanor, Lourdes and
Trinidad, all surnamed Sta. Maria, and individually by Felix Lorenzo, as
representative of the heirs of Victor Lorenzo. Unfortunately, their opposition was
dismissed. One of the grounds of the opposition was that the said lot was declared a
public land by the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The same lot was also a subject of
a homestead application filed by Gonzalo Lorenzo wherein he sold such property to
Vivencio P. Angeles who was also granted with his homestead application and
withdrew such for the application of the registration on the said property.
Issue
Whether the lower court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the application for
registration of title and in ruling that the applicant-respondent Vivencio P. Angeles
has a registrable title over the lot in question?
Ratio

Yes, the lower court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the applicatition for
registration f title and in ruling that Vivencio Angels has a registrable title over the
lot.
In the first place, in Land Registration Case No. 1196, GLRO Rec. 50288, entitled
Isabelo Lorenzo et al. vs. The Director of Lands, et al. the Court of First Instance of
Rizal had already declared subject property as a public land. That the decision had
long become final and, therefore, cannot be disturbed anymore on the ground of res
judicata. And, Republic Act 931 does not apply to persons claiming title to land
which has been declared public land in an ordinary registration proceeding.
The fact that he had filed a homestead application over the property is an
admission that their possession was not in the concept of an owner.

56

Republic vs T.A.N. Properties Inc

555
6/26/2008
Galicia, Monico King A.

SCRA

477

FACTS:
Case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. covering Lot located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.on 11
November 1999, the trial court called the case for initial hearing, there was an
Opposition of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands
(petitioner). During the hearings, respondent presented three witnesses: Torres,
respondents Operations Manager Evangelista, a 72year old resident of San
Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth and the Records Officer II of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.
The testimonies of respondents witnesses showed that Kabesang Puroy had
peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an
owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son
Antonio. The land was adjudicated to one of Antonios children, Prospero Dimayuga
(Porting). Then on 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent.
Respondent submitted two certifications issued by the DENR. First certification by
the CENRO, that the lot falls within the alienable and disposable zone. Second
certification by Regional Technical Director of DENR, stating that the subject area
falls within an alienable and disposable land.
RTC adjudicated the land in favor of respondent, that a juridical person or a
corporation could apply for registration of land provided such entity and its
predecessors-in-interest
have possessed the land for 30 years or more. Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
trial courts Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent, a private corporation, is qualified to apply for registration of
the land under the Public Land Act.
HELD/RATIO:

No, respondent TAN Properties is not qualified.

The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private
dominion presumably belong to the State. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible
evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.
It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because
the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public domain. Under the
1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private corporations from
acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of
the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Under the
1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens,
were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present
1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the
corporate applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the land,
the same was already private land by operation of law because the statutory
acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of
possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the
statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of
such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit
corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain.
In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher
than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right.Under RA 9176, the
application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only
acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land.

57 Nieto vs Quines
Monico King A.
FACTS:

1 SCRA 227

1/28/1961

Galicia,

Sometime in 1917, Quines filed with the Bureau of Lands a homestead application
covering a tract of land. Upon the approval, homestead by Quines was designated
as Lot No. 3044, and he began clearing and cultivating the land.
In the years 1923 to 1925, cadastral surveys were made by the Bureau of Lands. On
1927, cadastral proceedings were initiated by the Director of Lands, and Quines did
not file any answer therein.
Maria Florentino filed an answer claiming several lots including Lot No. 3044.
On August 16, 1930, the cadastral court awarded Maria Florentino Lot No. 3044.
On August 29, 1930, pending the issuance of the final decree of registration and the
original certificate of title to Maria Florentino, a homestead patent covering Lot No.
3044 was granted to Bartolome Quines, and issued Original Certificate of Title in his
name.
Six months thereafter, or on March 12, 1931, the same Register of Deeds issued
Original Certificate of Title No. 11982 in the name of Maria Florentino covering the
lots awarded to her, including Lot No. 3044.
Sometime in 1952, Maria Florentino sold all the lots to Arturo Nieto, who
subsequently secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title in his name. On
the other hand, Quines executed a deed of sale on 1953 transferring Lot No. 3044 to
Atty. Miguel P. Pio.
Nieto filed a complaint against Quines that the homestead patent and Original
Certificate of Title No. 623 were obtained through fraud and misrepresentations,
prayed that the patent and title be cancelled and that the title issued in plaintiff's
name be declared as the true and valid title over the lot in dispute.
Lower court rendered judgment in defendants' (Quines and Pio) favor dismissing the
complaint. Nieto appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the title issued to a homestead applicant prevail over a subsequent
registration of an awardee in cadastral court proceedings.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes. As a homestead applicant, the defendant religiously complied with all the
requirements of the Public Land Act and, on August 29, 1930, a homestead patent
was issued in his favor.
Also, the defendant having complied with all the terms and conditions which would
entitle him to a patent, Bartolome Quines, even without a patent actually issued,
has unquestionably acquired a vested right on the land and is to be regarded as the
equitable owner thereof. (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). Under these
circumstances and applying by analogy the principles governing sales of immovable
property to two different persons by the same vendor, Bartolome Quines' title must
prevail over that of Maria Florentino not only because he had always been in

possession of the land but also because he obtained title to the land prior to that of
Maria Florentino.

58 Del Prado vs Caballero 148225 3/3/2010 Sevilla,

Victor Emmanuel
59

DBT Mar Bay vs Panes 594 SCRA 578

Ganchero, Kevin Ken

7/31/2009

Facts:
The subject land was conveyed by B. C Regalado to DBT through a dacion en pago
for services rendered. On June 24, 1992, the respondents Ricaredo Panes and his
sons filed a complaint for quieting of title with damages and petition for injunction
against Regalado and DBT because the transferred land covered the Panes' lot
which they alleged was exclusively theirs. In the complaint, Ricaredo alleged that he
is the lawful owner of the covered portion which he had declared for taxation
purposes in his name. Respondents claimed that Ricaredo and his immediate family
had been and still are in actual possession of the subject property, and their
possession preceded the 2nd world war. For its part, DBT, alleged that it is the
legitimate owner and occupant of the subject property after they registered the
same among other defenses. Ricaredo Panes insists that despite DBTs registration
of the TCT, he has acquired the land through acquisitive prescription.
Issues:
Whether title to registered land may be acquired through prescription.
Held:
No. Respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is
baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, acquisitive prescription of ownership
of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special
laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496, as amended by PD No. 1529, provides that no title
to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
adverse possession. In the instant case, proof of possession by the respondents is
immaterial and inconsequential.

60 Lonoy vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

185 11/27/2008 Ganchero, Kevin Ken

572

SCRA

Facts:
After her husband Gregorio died, Hilaria Tabuclin sold their conjugal land to Deleste.
Hilaria died soon after and her brother-in-law, Juan was appointed as special
administrator of the estate together with Noel as regular administrator. However,
Noel could not take possession of the subject property as it was with Deleste
already hence he filed an action for reversion of title. The case reached the
Supreme Court which ruled in favor of Noel and held that Deleste is only entitled to

 of the subject property as Hilaria is only entitled to the same since the property is
conjugal. They were adjudged as co-owners as was their heirs who failed to partition
the land.
Portions of the subject property was expropriated and awarded to farmerbeneficiaries under Operation Land Transfer. But since Deleste has long since
passed away, with the land remaining unpartitioned among his heirs, the just
compensation cannot be awarded. The heirs of co-owners then filed an action for
the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents given to farmer-beneficiaries as the
awarding was done without sufficient notice to them.
Issue:
Whether the certificates of title may be cancelled because of DARs failure to issue
sufficient notice.
Held:
No. A certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of
the patent as in the present case. Land covered by such title may no longer be the
subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person.
After the expiration of the one year period, a person whose property has been
wrongly or erroneously registered in anothers name may bring an ordinary action
for reconveyance, or if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree gives petitioners
only one other remedy, i.e., to file an action for damages against those responsible
for the fraudulent registration

61

Ybanez vs IAC
194 SCRA 743
Ganchero, Kevin Ken

3/6/1991

Facts:
Respondent Ouano was able to secure homestead patents over the subject land.
After complying with all the requirements he was issued an original certificate of
title. He occupied the land and harvested its fruits for 19 years until petitioner,
together with his sons, contested his ownership and forcefully took possession of
the said land effectively evicting Ouano. Petitioners alleged that the Director of
lands had issued a ruling favorable to them as the true owners and that Ouano
wasnt in actual possession of the land as he did not have a house built on it.
Issue:
Whether Ouanos title may be revoked on the basis of the Director of lands
decision.
Held:
No. It was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original Certificate of
Title issued to private respondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671, an ordinary
civil action for recovery of possession filed by the registered owner of the said lot,

by invoking as affirmative defense in their answer the Order of the Bureau of Lands,
dated July 19, 1978, issued pursuant to the investigatory power of the Director of
Lands under Section 91 of Public Land Law (C.A. 141 as amended). Such a defense
partakes of the nature of a collateral attack against a certificate of title brought
under the operation of the Torrens system of registration pursuant to Section 122 of
the Land Registration Act, now Section 103 of P.D. 1259. The case law on the matter
does not allow a collateral attack on the Torrens certificate of title on the ground of
actual fraud. The rule now finds expression in Section 48 of P.D. 1529 otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree. In the instant case, the public land
certificate of title issued to private respondent attained the status of indefeasibility
one (1) year after the issuance of patent on April 15, 1963, hence, it is no longer
open to review on the ground of actual fraud. Consequently, the filing of the protest
before the Bureau of Lands against the Homestead Application of private
respondent on January 3, 1975, or 12 years after, can no longer reopen or revise the
public land certificate of title on the ground of actual fraud. No reasonable and
plausible excuse has been shown for such an unusual delay. The law serves those
who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them
to act.

62 Ponce de Leon vs RFC 36 SCRA 289 1976

Anne Sherina Bianca

Garcia,

FACTS:
Jose L. Ponce de Leon filed with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) Manila,
his loan application, in the amount of P800,000.00 offering as security certain
parcels of land, among which, was the parcel which Ponce de Leon and Soriano
mortgaged to the PNB. The application stated that the properties offered for
security for the RFC loan are encumbered to the PNB, Bacolod, and to Cu Unjieng
Bros. The application was approved for P495,000.00 and the mortgage contract was
executed by Jose L. Ponce de Leon, his wife, and Francisco Soriano. The same
parties signed a promissory note for P495,000.00, with interest at 6% per annum,
payable on installments every month for P28,831.64 in connection with the
mortgage deed. The mortgage deed specifically stipulated that the proceeds thereof
shall be used exclusively for the purchase of machinery and equipment,
construction of buildings and the payment of obligations and that the release of the
amounts loaned shall be at the discretion of the RFC. Subsequently, none of the
amortization and interests which had become due was paid and, for this reason, the
RFC took steps for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties
consisting of real estates and the sawmill and its equipments of Ponce de Leon
situated in two places in Samar. Previous to the expiration of the one-year period of
redemption, Francisco Soriano, through Teofila Soriano del Rosario offered to
repurchase the Soriano lot the last day for the redemption of the lot but the offer
was rejected and they were told to participate in the public sale of the land to be
conducted by the RFC. Jose L. Ponce de Leon did not offer to redeem the mortgaged
properties sold at anytime before the expiration of the period of redemption.
Subsequently, Ponce de Leon instituted the present action alleging that there was
delay in the releases of the amount of the loan and the sheriffs sales were null and

void because the properties were sold in an inadequate prices and that the it was
not in accordance with law. These allegations were denied by RFC sustaining the
legality of the mortgage and Sheriff's sales. On the other hand, Francisco Soriano
wrote a letter, to the President asking the latter's intervention so that the projected
sale on the same date to be conducted by the RFC may be suspended insofar as the
lot in his name is concerned and that he be allowed to redeem it which was granted
under the conditions that the property could be redeem in its appraised value of
P59,647.05, payable 20% down and the balance in ten years, with 6% interest.
Soriano did not redeem the lot under the conditions of the RFC. In due course, the
lower court ruled in favor of RFC. The Sorianos appealed this decision pointing out
that the selling price of the said properties were ridiculously inadequate.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sheriffs foreclosure is valid.
HELD:
Yes. Mere inadequacy of the price obtained at the sheriff's sale unless shocking to
the conscience will not be sufficient to set aside the sale if there is no showing that,
in the event of a regular sale, a better price can be obtained. The reason is that,
generally, and, in forced sales, low prices are usually offered. The records further
show that two (2) days after the execution of the deed of mortgage for P10,000 in
favor of the PNB Francisco Soriano received P2,000 from plaintiff, Francisco
Soriano received a letter informing him that the PNB mortgage on the Paraaque
property would be foreclosed, unless the debt guaranteed therewith were settled;
that, accordingly, his children came to know of the mortgage in favor of the PNB;
that said mortgage was transferred to the RFC. Under these circumstances, it is
difficult to believe that Sorianos did not know then of the mortgage constituted by
Francisco Soriano in favor of the RFC. Their aforementioned failure to contest the
legality of the mortgage for over five (5) years and these attempts to redeem the
property constitute further indicia that the same belonged exclusively to Francisco
Soriano, not to the conjugal partnership with his deceased wife, Tomasa Rodriguez.
Apart from the fact that said attempts to redeem the property constitute an implied
admission of the validity of its sale and, hence, of its mortgage to the RFC
there are authorities to the effect that they bar the Sorianos from assailing the
same.

63

Mercado vs Liwanag 115 Phil. 469 6/30/1976

Garcia, Anne Sherina Bianca

FACTS:
Ramon Mercado and Pio D. Liwanag executed a Deed of Sale of a parcel of land
situated in Quezon City. The said sale was issued in the name of the Ramon
Mercado and Basilia Mercado as co-owners PRO-INDIVISO, and the sale was without
the knowledge and consent of plaintiff Basilia Mercado. The said land was thereafter
expropriated by NPC at a price of P10,000.
ISSUE:

Whether the Deed of Sale was vaild.

HELD:
Yes. A co-owner may dispose of under Article 493 is only his undivided aliquot
share, which shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him upon the
termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to divide the property into parts
and then convey one part by metes and bounds. The title is the final and conclusive
repository of the rights of the new co-owners. The question of whether or not the
deed of sale should be annulled must be considered in conjunction with the title
issued pursuant thereto. Since, according to this title, what appellee acquired by
virtue of the sale is only an undivided half-share of the property, which under the
law the vendor Ramon Mercado had the absolute right to dispose of, the trial court
committed no error in dismissing the action.

64

Guaranteed Homes Inc vs Valdez

577
SCRA
1/30/2009
Garcia, Anne Sherina Bianca

441

FACTS:
Respondents, who are the descendants of Pablo Pascua (Pablo), filed a complaint
seeking reconveyance of a parcel of land situated in Cabitaugan, Subic, Zambales.
The property had already been sold by Pablo during his lifetime to Alejandria
Marquinez and Restituto Morales. They alleged that Pablo died intestate and was
survived by his four children, one of whom was the deceased Cipriano who declared
himself as the only heir of Pablo and confirmed the sales made by the decedent
during his lifetime, including the alleged sale of the disputed property to spouses
Rodolfo. Subsequently, the spouses Rodolfo sold the disputed property to petitioner
by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. On the other hand, Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the action is barred by the
Statute of Limitations. The RTC granted petitioners motion to dismiss. Noting that
respondents had never claimed nor established that they have been in possession
of the property and that they did not present any evidence to show that petitioner
has not been in possession of the property either, the RTC applied the doctrine that
an action to quiet title prescribes where the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property. The trial court found that the complaint per its allegations presented a
case of implied or constructive trust on the part of Cipriano who had inaccurately
claimed to be the sole heir of Pablo in the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate
which led to the issuance of TCT No. T- 8241 in his favor. Upon appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale of the property was valid.
HELD:
YES. It is basic that a person dealing with registered property need not go beyond,
but only has to rely on, the title of his predecessor-in-interest. Since "the act of
registration is the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons

are concerned," it follows that where there is nothing in the certificate of title to
indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance
thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title
upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto. It is enough that petitioner had examined the
latest certificate of title which in this case was issued in the name of the immediate
transferor, the spouses Rodolfo. The purchaser is not bound by the original
certificate but only by the certificate of title of the person from whom he had
purchased the property. Registration in the public registry is notice to the whole
world. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land shall be, if registered, filed or entered
in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land to which
it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering,
filing or entering.

65

Panganiban vs Dayrit 464 SCRA 370

Gonzales, Liezel

7/28/2005

FACTS:
The petitioners alleged that they are the possessors and owners of Lot 1436 which
they inherited from the late Juan and Ines Panganiban, father and daughter
respectively. The owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 covering Lot 1436 had
been lost but upon petition with the trial court by Erlinda Pacursa (one of the heirs
and petitioner herein) the trial court granted the petition. The Register of Deeds of
Misamis Oriental issued an owners duplicate copy to Erlinda.
Petitioners further alleged that unknown to them, a certain Cristobal Salcedo
asserted ownership over Lot 1436 and believing it was unregistered, sold a portion
of it to respondent. The latter discovered that what she had bought was registered
land. Unable to annotate the deed of sale at the back of the OCT, respondent
fraudulently filed a petition for issuance of the owners copy of said title. This
petition alleged that the copy issued to Erlinda was lost in the fire. It was granted
and the Register of Deeds issued an owners duplicate certificate to respondent
which contained the annotation of a Notice of Adverse Claim filed by Erlinda
wherein it is alleged in part that Erlinda is one of the lawful heirs of Juan and Ines,
the registered owners of the property and she has legitimate claim thereto.
Moreover, petitioners alleged that the newly issued owners duplicate certificate to
respondent was prejudicial to their previously issued title which is still in existence.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that Lot 1436 was sold by the petitioners
and their father which was covered by a Deed of Definite Sale and Salcedo came
into ownership. Salcedo sold the property to respondent.
ISSUE:
(1)
Whether or not the petitioners duplicate certificate of title is valid and
subsisting
(2)

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the possession of the property

HELD:
(1) The CA correctly ruled that the duplicate certificate of title on petitioners
possession is valid and subsisting. The Court had already ruled in Serra Serra v CA
that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of
another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision
has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of a new title. Since the
owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 earlier issued to Erlinda is still in existence,
the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over respondents petition for
reconstitution of title. The duplicate certificate of title subsequently issued to
respondent is therefore void and of no effect.
(2) The Court rules in the negative. Petitioners are no longer entitled to recover
possession of the property by virtue of the equitable defenses of laches. In our
jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may be
barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.
The petitioners inaction for 45 years reduced their right to recover the subject
property into a stale demand.

66

Mejia de Lucas vs Gamponia

10/31/1956 Gonzales, Liezel

100

Phil.

277

FACTS:
Free patent No. 3699 was issued over the land subject of the action in the name of
Domingo Mejia which was transcribed in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Nueva Vizcaya and certificate of title No. 380 issued in the name of Domingo Mejia.
After the issuance of the patent but before the registration of the same, Mejia
deeded the land to Zacarias Ciscar. Upon his death the property was included in the
distribution of his estate and adjudicated to Roque Sanchez. Sanchez sold the land
to Andres Gamponia.
Domingo Mejia, upon his death, left his brother Pedro Mejia who is survived by his
daughter Concordia Mejia de Lucas.
The court a quo held that the sale by the patentee to Zacarias Ciscar is null and
void, as the sale was made only 11 days after the issuance of a patent in violation
of the provisions of section 35 of Act No. 926. It further held that since the land is
registered land no title in derogation to that of the registered owner could have
been acquired either by Zacarias Ciscar or Sanchez and Gamponia.
The main defense is plaintiffs right of action has already prescribed by virtue of the
possession of the land by the defendant and his predecessors in interest for a
period of 37 years. This defense was overruled by the court a quo on the ground
that as the land is registered, with a certificate of title in the name of patentee
Domingo Mejia, title thereto may not be acquired by the defendant and his
predecessors in interest against said registered owner. This ruling is evidently based
on Section 46 of the Land Registration Act, which provides that no title to

registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by

prescription or adverse possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mejia de Lucas is entitled to the property
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative.
While no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the
defendant and that is, the equitable defense of laches. No hold that the defense of
prescription or adverse possession in derogation of the title of the registered owner
Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of laches. Otherwise,
stated, we hold that while defendant may not be considered as having acquired title
by virtue of his and his predecessors long continued possession for 37 years, the
original owners right to recover back the possession of the property and the title
thereto from the defendant has, by the long period of 37 years and by patentees
inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.
It is to be noted that all the complications would never had been occasioned had the
original patentee and his successors in interest not slept on their rights for more
than a generation. Add to this the fact that the original conveyance made by the
patentee is not absolutely null and void. The prohibition against the sale of free
patents is for a period of seven years (Section 35, Act No. 926) after that period of
time a patentee would be free to dispose of the land. Within seven years from the
conveyance the original patentee could have brought an action to recover back his
property. Since nothing of this sort was done by him, it was certainly natural for the
purchase to have assumed that the original patentee gave up his right to recover
back the property and acquiesced in vendees right and title. The successor in
interest of the original purchaser must also have believed in good faith that the
patentee and his successors in interest were reconciled to the idea of allowing the
property to stay in the hands of the successors in interest.

67 Manotok vs Borque (or Manotok vs CLT Realty?)

SCRA 583
12/18/2008 Sevilla, Victor Emmanuel
68

Gregorio Araneta vs RTC

Gonzales, Liezel

580 SCRA 532

582

3/4/2009

FACTS:
The Gonzales or Maysilo estate in Malabon, Rizal was expropriated by the Republic
of the Philippines, with the understanding that the Government would resell the
property to its occupants. However, due to its failure and its instrumentality, PHHC,
the occupants and tenants of the estate filed a complaint to compel PHHC to sell to
the tenants their respective occupied portions of the Gonzales estate.

The Gregorio Araneta University Foundation (GAUF) sought to intervene in the case
on the ground that 52 tenants of the property and Araneta Institute of Agriculture
entered into a Kasunduan whereby the former conveyed to the latter priority
rights to purchase portion of the estate.
In the basis of this Kasunduan, a compromise agreement was duly approved by
the court. Included in this compromise agreement are Lots 75 and 54 awarded to
Gregorio Bajamonde. Incidentally, it appears that on the basis of the Kasunduan
and the forged compromise, Araneta University was able to register in its name with
the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City TCT No. C-24153 for Lots 75 and 54 which
had been awarded to Gregorio Bajamonde.
On the other hand, the compromise agreement between Araneta University and the
tenants was declared null and void for being a forgery and the partial decision
rendered in accordance therewith was likewise declared null and void and of no
force and effect.
The lower court ordered the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City to cancel the title of
GAUF and to issue a new TCT over Lots 75 and 54 in the name Gregorio Bajamonde
or heirs and ordered the Clerk of Court to issue writ of possession in favor of
Gregorio Bajamonde or heirs.
GAUF filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the Joint Order alleging that the
twin orders in question were issued by the trial court without jurisdiction. The CA
denied the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to issue the Joint Order which directed
the cancellation of the petitioners title over Lot 54 and 75
HELD:
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action
is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title
was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set
aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, it is indirect or
collateral when, in an action or proceeding to obtain a different relief, an attack on
the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
Here, while it may be true that Civil Case No. C760 was originally an action for
specific performance and damages, nonetheless the case cannot constitute a
collateral attack on the petitioners title which, to begin with, was irregularly and
illegally issued. It bears stressing that the source of GAUFs title was the
Compromise Agreement purportedly executed by Gregorio Bajamonde, et al. which
were declared null and void. Well settled is the rule that the indefeasibility of a title
does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. In view of these
circumstances, it was as if no title at all was ever issued in this case to the

petitioner and therefore this is hardly the occasion to talk of collateral attack
against a title.
The Court agree with the CA that the trial court had jurisdiction to annul petitioners
title. It must be emphasized that, notwithstanding the original denomination of the
said action as one for specific performance and damages, it was petitioner GAUF no
less which sought to intervene in Civil Case No. C760 and claimed that it has rights
or interests in the subject matter being litigated therein. It is undeniable that
petitioners TCT was issued in enforcement of a partial decision in Civil Case No.
C760. As it were, the validity of petitioners title was an issue litigated in Civil Case
No. C760 on account of the presentation therein of the Compromise Agreement
which, to stress, was the springboard of petitioners title. Hence, when that same
Compromise Agreement and the Partial Decision in connection therewith were
eventually nullified, the trial court acted very much within its jurisdiction in ordering
the cancellation of petitioners title in the same Civil Case No. C760.

69 Ono vs Lim
Ma.Victoria

614 SCRA 514

3/9/2010 Julo,

Facts:
Vicente Lim filed an action in the RTC a petition for the reconstitution of the owners
duplicate copy of the OCT alleging it has been lost during the World War II by his
mother, Luisa. The land was sold to Luisa by the spouses Diego Ono and Estefania
Apas. The deed evidencing the sale had been lost without being registered. Antonio
Ono, the only legitimate heir of the spouses, executed a notarized confirmation of
sale in favor of Luisa. Zosimo Ono and Teofisto Ono opposed Lims petition
contending that they had the certificate of title in their possession as the
successors-in-interest of the Spouses Ono. Lim converted the petition for
reconstitution into a complaint for quieting of title, stating that he had been in the
actual possession of the property since 1937, cultivating and developing it, enjoying
its fruits, and paying the taxes of the land.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Lim. RTC ordered the Register of Deeds of Cebu
to register the land in favor of Luisa Lim. The lower court found that Lim had been in
peaceful possession of the land since 1937; that the possession had never been
disturbed by Ono; that Lim declared the lot in their name for taxation purposes; that
Lim paid the tax related to it; and that the signature of Antonio Ono on confirmation
of sale document was genuine.
On the appeal, CA affirmed the decision of RTC. CA ruled that the action for quieting
of title was not a collateral, but a direct attack on the title; and that Lims
undisturbed possession had given them a continuing right to seek the aid of the
courts to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on
their own title. The CA corrected the RTC, by ordering that the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Cebu City issue a new duplicate certificate of title in the name of Luisa,
considering that the owners duplicate was still intact in the possession of the Ono.
Issues:

1.
Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be collaterally attacked through
an ordinary civil action to quiet title;
2.
Whether or not the ownership over registered land could be lost by
prescription, laches, or adverse possession;
3.
Whether or not there was a deed of sale executed by Spouses Ono in favor of
Luisa and whether or not said deed was lost during World War II;
4.
Whether or not the confirmation of sale executed by Antonio in favor of Luisa
existed; and
Ruling:
The Court ruled in favor of Lim and declared that the petition has no merit.
Action for cancellation of title is not an attack on the title. The attack is direct when
the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On
the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident
thereof. Lim was asserting only that the existing title registered in the name of the
petitioners predecessors had become inoperative due to the conveyance in favor of
Lims mother, and resultantly should be cancelled. Lim did not thereby assail the
validity of OCT or challenge the judgment by which the title of the lot involved had
been decreed.
Prescription was not relevant. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or
losing ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and
under the conditions laid down by law. However, prescription was not relevant to
the determination of the dispute herein, considering that Lim did not base his right
of ownership on an adverse possession over a certain period. He insisted herein,
instead, that title to the land had been voluntarily transferred by the registered
owners themselves to Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest. Lim showed that his mother
had derived a just title to the property by virtue of sale; that from the time Luisa
had acquired the property in 1937, she had taken over its possession in the concept
of an owner, and had performed her obligation by paying real property taxes on the
property, as evidenced by tax declarations issued in her name; and that in view of
the delivery of the property, coupled with Luisas actual occupation of it, all that
remained to be done was the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in her
name.

70

Radiowealth Finance vs Palileo 197 SCRA 245

Julo, Ma.Victoria

Facts:
The defendant spouses Enrique Castro and Herminia R. Castro sold to plaintiffappellee Manuelito Palileo (private respondent herein), a parcel of unregistered
coconut land. The sale is evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. The deed
was not registered in the Registry of Property for unregistered lands. Since the
execution of the deed of sale, appellee Manuelito Palileo exercised acts of ownership

over the land through his mother Rafaela Palileo, as administratrix or overseer.
Appellee has continuously paid the real estate taxes on said land from 1971 until
the present.
In another civil case, a judgment was rendered against Enrique Castro and was
directed by the RCT to pay Radiowealth Finance Company. A writ of execution was
issued. The Provincial Sheriff sold at public auction the subject land that defendant
Enrique Castro had sold to appellee Manuelito Palileo. A certificate of sale was
executed by the Provincial Sheriff in favor of defendant- appellant Radiowealth
Finance Company, being the only bidder. After the period of redemption has expired,
a deed of final sale was also executed by the same Provincial Sheriff. Both the
certificate of sale and the deed of final sale were registered with the Registry of
Deeds.
The Private respondent Manuelito Palileo filed an action for quieting of title over the
same. After a trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision in his favor. On
appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.
Issue:
As between the two buyers of unregistered land, who is the rightful owner (the first
buyer in a prior sale that was unrecorded, or the second buyer who purchased the
land in an execution sale whose transfer was registered in the Registry of Deeds)?
Ruling:
Palileo has the better right over the land.
There is no doubt that had the property in question been a registered land, this case
would have been decided in favor of petitioner since it was petitioner that had its
claim first recorded in the Registry of Deeds. It must be stressed however that this
case deals with a parcel of unregistered land and a different set of rules applies. The
Court affirm the decision of the CA. Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments
affecting unregistered lands is without prejudice to a third party with a better
right. The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere
registration of a sale in ones favor does not give him any right over the land if the
vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to
somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. It was held therein that
Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered under Act No.
496. Section 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court held that Article
1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution
sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was
registered. It was explained that this is because the purchaser of unregistered land
at a sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and
merely acquires the latter's interest in the property sold as of the time the property
was levied upon. Applying this principle, the CA correctly held that the execution
sale of the unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect because the land
no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of the said execution sale.
Findings of fact of the CA are conclusive on this Court and will not be disturbed
unless there is grave abuse of discretion. The finding of the CA that the property in

question was already sold to private respondent by its previous owner before the
execution sale is evidenced by a deed of sale. Said deed of sale is notarized and is
presumed authentic. There is no substantive proof to support petitioners allegation
that the document is fictitious or simulated. There is no reason to reject the
conclusion of the CA that private respondent was not a mere administrator of the
property. That he exercised acts of ownership through his mother also remains
undisputed.

71

Bernabe vs Court of Appeals

7/21/2008
Julo, Ma.Victoria

559

SCRA

53

Facts:
Titan Construction Corporation filed a case before the RTC against petitioners
predecessor-in-interest, Antonio F. Bernabe, and his siblings Patricio F. Bernabe, Jose
F. Bernabe and Cecilia Bernabe Perez who are co-owners of an undivided one-half
share in two parcels of land located in Paranaque. The Deed of Sale of Real Estate is
entered into by Titan and the defendants.
A compromise agreement was subsequently entered into by Titan and the
remaining defendants, whereby the latter agreed to the sale of their one-half share
in the properties to Titan and waived whatever cause of action for damages they
might have against each other. By virtue of the compromise agreement, similar
Deeds of Conditional Sale were separately entered into by respondent Titan as
vendee, and defendants Patricio, Cecilia, and Antonio, as vendors of their undivided
shares in the two properties. The three deeds were similarly worded and contained
the same terms and conditions and differed only as to the amount of the purchase
price.
Defendant Jose and Antonio died. Titan subsequently filed a supplemental complaint
alleging that Antonio had already received a substantial portion of the down
payment for the sale of his share in the properties; that prior to his death, Antonio
executed a SPA in favor of his two children, Jose III and Shirley Ann, empowering
them to execute in his favor the Deed of Conditional Sale involving his share in the
properties; that on the basis of the deed, it made additional substantial advances on
the purchase price and even expended certain amounts to satisfy the judgment
debt of Antonio in Civil Case No. 92-2328; that the heirs of Antonio refused to
execute the formal deed of sale; and that through its exclusive efforts, the one-half
share of the original defendants in both properties was segregated and TCT No.
86793 covering the same was subsequently issued.
The trial court upheld the validity of both the Deed of Sale of Real Estate and the
Deed of Conditional Sale. It held that there was no basis to rescind the contracts
since petitioners had not proven that Titan had failed to comply with its undertaking
under them. The RTC modified the decision, specifying that in view of the
compromise agreements entered into by Titan and defendants Patricio and Cecilia,
the decision should be rendered against the heirs of Antonio. Accordingly, said heirs
were ordered to execute a registrable Deed of Absolute Sale over the one-third (1/3)
share of Antonio in the property covered by TCT No. 86793 of the Register of Deeds

of Paranaque, pursuant to the Deed of Conditional Sale, upon Titans payment to

them of the amount of P3,431,058.42 representing the balance of the purchase
price.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was
dismissed in the Decision dated 22 January 2002, and the RTC decision was affirmed
in toto.
Petitioners, contending that the Deed of Sale of Real Estate and Deed of Conditional
Sale are contracts to sell and not contracts of sale, allege that Titan has no cause of
action to file the complaint for specific performance since it failed to pay the
purchase price in full as agreed upon in the contracts. The Deed of Conditional Sale,
which necessarily superseded and nullified the Deed of Sale of Real Estate,
expressed this intent more clearly when it stated that upon full payment of the
purchase price, Vendor shall execute the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of Vendee transferring and conveying all his undivided shares in the properties.
Titan dismisses petitioners claim. Instead, it relies on the declaration of the Court of
Appeals that there was a perfected contract of sale of real estate evidenced by the
Deed of Sale of Real Estate. However, Titan expounds, said contract was not in the
form required for registration under the law and so the courts below, in affirming it
and requiring petitioners to execute a registerable deed, simply followed the
provisions of the Civil Code governing the form of contracts, particularly Articles
1356, 1357 and 1358. Titan adds that it is only upon the execution of a registerable
deed of sale that full payment of the consideration should be made, and that since
the contract still has to be put in a registerable form as required by law, there is
nothing yet to rescind.
Issues:
(1)
Under a deed of conditional sale of a parcel of land, may the vendee compel
the vendors to execute a registerable deed of sale based on the allegation that it
had paid a substantial portion of the P1 million down payment of the total
consideration of P17,700,000.00, where it was expressly stipulated that the vendors
would execute the necessary deed of absolute sale in favor of the vendee only upon
full payment?
(2)
May the vendors in a deed of conditional sale ask for rescission of contract for
failure of the vendee to pay in full the agreed consideration?
Ruling:
The petition is denied. Respondent Titan Construction Corporation is ORDERED to
PAY petitioners Heirs of Antonio F. Bernabe and petitioners are ORDERED to ACCEPT
the payment and thereupon EXECUTE the proper deed of absolute sale. Both parties
are ORDERED to COMPLY with the other stipulations in the Deed of Conditional Sale.
Ratio:
No. Petitioners cannot ask for rescission of the Deed of Conditional Sale since it has
been proven that far from violating the conditions of the deed, Titan was ready and

willing to perform its contractual obligations. That the balance had not yet become
due and demandable is a result of the appeal from the RTC and CA decisions, and is
not due to Titans alleged refusal to comply with the contract. Accordingly, the Deed
of Conditional Sale remains valid, but petitioners cannot be compelled by specific
performance to execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of Titan until and unless
Titan settles the balance of the purchase price as agreed upon.
The whole essence of a compromise is that by making reciprocal concessions, the
parties avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. A compromise
agreement can be entered into without novating or supplanting existing contracts,
but in this case, the irreconcilable incompatibility between the Deed of Sale of Real
Estate and the Deed of Conditional Sale inevitably resulted in extinctive novation.
The difference between contracts of sale and contracts to sell is relevant. In a
contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of
the thing sold; in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the
vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price.
Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the
property and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or
rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until full
payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment of the price is a positive
suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective.
Titan has a cause of action since it has already partially performed the contract by
making down and other payments on the purchase price, as well as effecting and
spending for the segregation and titling of the shares of petitioners and their coowners in the properties. Titan seeks only to enforce the contract. The first
condition, i.e., that Eriberta Development Corporation must agree to make the
vendors share pertain to the northern half of the properties, was deemed fulfilled
with the segregation and titling of the interests of Antonio, Patricio and Cecilia under
TCT No. 86793. The separation of the property was registered on 12 October 1994,
just a few months after the parties executed the Deed of Conditional Sale. With the
segregation of the property and the issuance of TCT No. 86793, the fourth condition,
i.e., that the titles to the properties be surrendered to Titan, was also satisfied since
the segregation would not have transpired had the old titles not been surrendered.
The second condition involving the co-owners waiver of their right of first refusal
was also complied with, as evidenced by similar declarations in the deeds of
conditional sale executed by Patricio and Cecilia. It is only the third condition the
acquisition of a right of way over the northern part of the propertythat had not yet
been fulfilled at the time of the filing of the supplemental complaint. It was on the
basis of the fulfillment of all the conditions that the RTC ordered the execution of the
registerable deed of sale but only upon Titans payment of the balance. But since the
trial courts decision was appealed all the way to this Court, it could not attain
finality and execution could not be ordered. In short, the pendency of the appeal put
resolution of the controversy on hold.

72 Egao vs CA
Maurice Victoria

174 SCRA 484

1989

Manuel,

Facts:
The private respondents filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and and/or Recovery
of Possesion and Ownership. They alleged that they are the legitimate owners and
possessors of two parcels of land Lot 662 and Lot 661 through a Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by Marfori in favor of the respondents, the Tax Declarations were
transferred to them. Marfori acquired the properties from Egao through a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated May 7, 1964, January 14 and October 6, 1965 while the Lot 661
is from Conejos to Marfori by Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 3, 1965. The private
respondents also alleged that the petitioners occupied illegally portions of the land,
hence this complaint.
The petitioners alleged that the Lot No. 662 is covered by Free Patent dated August
12, 1965 and the OCT No. P-3559 was issued March 1, 1966 in the name of Apolonio
Egao, that he and his family has been occupying the land even before the free
patent was issued. They are aware that the land cannot be a subject of the sale
since it is still under the five year prohibition period. Petitioners likewise deny the
authenticity of the Deeds of sale to Marfori.
Issue:
Whether the sale of patented lands perfected within the prohibited five (5) year
period is null and void.
Held/Ratio:
Yes.
In the Section 118 of the Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, prohibits the
alienation or encumbrance within a period of five (5) years from the date of
issuance of the patent lands acquired under free patent or homestead; In the
present case, it is clear that the deeds were executed within the prohibited period of
5 years. The free patent was issued August 12, 1965 and the Deeds of Sale were
executed May 24, 1964, January 4 and October 6, 1965, assuming the authenticity
of the said Deeds of Sale still it is considered within the prohibited period. Therefore,
no title passed from the Egaos to Marfori which could be validly transferred to
herein respondents Bontilao and Dignos.

73

Soliven vs Franciso
170 SCRA 218
Manuel, Maurice Victoria

1989

Facts:
Petitioners are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Davao as evidenced by
TCT No. T-10985. They alleged that Tompong and Ngoho obtained an agreement to
sell the property to certain Espinosa from Masbate for P60,000.00. Tompong and
Ngoho gave a partial payment of P10,000.00 and persuaded the petitioners to give
them the Certificate of Title of the property and promised that the sale will be

consummated and the balance will be paid within six months, however they never
returned to make good their promise.
A number of Deed of Sales were executed in favor of different persons, such as Atty.
Mapayo and Paulino Cagas. The Deeds were supported by a power of attorney
constituting the fact that Ngoho is appointed as an Attorney-in-fact of the Solivels.
The said power attorney was allegedly forged. Cagas, one of the buyers, obtained
the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Solivels and the
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title in his name. Upon the knowledge of the
Solivels, they procured an inscription of an adverse claim on the title.
Issue:
Whether the title to the real property is passed to an innocent purchaser by a deed
of sale in his favor executed in the name of the owners by one falsely claiming to be
said owners duly appointed and authorized attorney-in-fact.
Held/Ratio:
No.
The innocent purchaser for value protected by the law is one who purchases a titled
land by virtue of a deed of sale executed by the registered owner himself and not by
virtue of a forged deed. It is also ruled the case of Joaquin vs Madrid that, in order
that the holder of a certificate for value issued by a virtue of the registration of a
voluntary instrument may be considered a holder in good faith for value, the
instrument registered should not be forged. When the instrument presented is
forged, even if accompanied by the owners duplicate certificate of title, the
registered owner does not thereby lose his title and neither does the assignee in the
forged deed acquire any right or title to the property.
Therefore, the deed of sale of September 8, 1972 executed by Isaias Ngoho as
purported attorney-in-fact of the petitioners in favor of Cags is declared null and
void.

74

Llanto vs Alzona 450 SCRA 288

Manuel, Maurice Victoria

1/31/2005

Facts:
Bernardo and Maria Sales are spouses and they have twelve children, 11 of whom
are the petitioners while the remaining child Estela is one of the herein respondents.
Maria was the registered owner of a certain parcel of land covered with Original
Certificate of Title No. P-3225 which she acquired under a Free Patent. On January
29, 1990, a real estate mortgage contract whom Estela is a witness, was executed
in favor of herein respondent Dominador Alzona. Maria died on August 27, 1986
which shows that Maria was not the one who executed the said Real Estate
Mortgage.
The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed due to the mortgagors failure to settle
their obligation. Ernesto Alzona was the highest bidder and caused the cancellation

of the OCT in the name of Maria and acquired a Transfer Certificate of Title in his
name. Upon the knowledge of the said cancellation of OCT, the petitioners caused
the inscription of an adverse claim on the title of the property. They alleged that the
Real Estate Mortgage was not executed by the owner of the property hence it is
void, while the respondents alleged that they mortgagee in good faith.
Issue:
Whether Dominador is a mortgagee in good faith to validly transfer the title to the
highest bidder.
Held/Ratio:
Yes.
The mortgagee is considered as a mortgagee in good faith. Under this doctrine,
even if the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgage
contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of
public policy. The principle is based on the rule that all persons dealing with
property covered by a Torrents Certificate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees; are not
required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title and in the absence of
any sign that might arouse suspicion, the mortgagee has no obligation to undertake
further investigation. However, those persons who are engaged in real estate or
financing business like herein respondents Ernesto and Dominador to be considered
as mortgagees in good faith, jurisprudence requires that they should take the
necessary precaution expected of a prudent man to ascertain the status and
condition of the properties offered as a collateral and to verify the identity of the
persons they transact business with, particularly those who claim to be the
registered property owners.
In the present case, Ernesto sufficiently established that he acted in good faith in
exercising due diligence in ascertaining the status of the property by visiting the
property and he also identify the owners and occupants, it was Estela and the
persons represented themselves as Bernardo and Maria who perpetrated the fraud,
hence Ernesto and Dominador are mortgagees in good faith and are entitled to the
protection of the law.

75

LP Leviste vs Noblejas 89 SCRA 520 4/30/1979

Geologo, Noel Paolo

FACTS:
This involves property with a total area of 1.6 hectares which is situated in
Paranaque, Rizal, covered by a Transfer certificate in the name of Z. Garcia Realty,
Inc converted the property into a subdivision called the Garville subdivision. Blocks
and certain lots are the controversy specifically Lot 6, Block 4 (subsequently Lot 16,
plan (LRC) Psd-56800).
Notice of lis pendens was presented by Melecio B. Emata, noting the pendency of
Civil Case of the Court of First Instance of Rizal entitled Vivencio R. de Guzman vs.

Z. Garcia & Company referring specifically to Lot 3, redesignated as Lot 5 of the new
subdivision plan.
The lis pendens does not refer to Lot 6, Block 4.
Affidavit of Adverse Claim covering Lot 1, Block 5 presented by J. Antonio Leviste,
Executive Vice President of petitioner company, based on an assignment in his favor
by one Leticia P. Ramos, buyer of said lot from Garcia Realty.
No reference to Lot 6, Block 4.
Affidavit of Adverse covering Lot 6, Block 4 (subsequently Lot 16, plan (LRC) Psd
56800), consisting
presented by respondent Maria Villanueva based on an
agreement to sell in her favor executed by Garcia Realty. (Disputed Lot)
Attachment (Disputed Lot) was presented by Leviste & Co and participation with
Garcia Realty, Inc.
Attachment(Disputed Lot) and participation of the defendants of Z.
Garcia Realty and respondent Villanueva consummated a contract of sale over the
Disputed Lot.
Respondent Villanueva sought to have the sale registered and title issued in her
favor, free of any encumbrance, but petitioners Leviste and Berthelsen objected
alleging that they had registered adverse claims and attachments.
The Register of Deeds refused to issue a new title to Villanueva without carrying
over
(A) Two annotations registered prior to Villanueva's adverse claim,
(B) Attachments covering the entire property annotated on the title subsequent to
Villanueva's adverse claim
ISSUE:
Whether Villanueva's adverse claim is, in fact, registerable, and if so, whether it can
be preferred over the attachments.
HELD:
No, Villanueva merely filed an adverse claim based on said agreement to sell
considering that Section 62 of the Land Registration Act prescribes the procedure
for the registration of Villanueva's interest less than an estate in fee simple on the
disputed lot and there being no showing of her inability to produce the owner's
duplicate certificate, the remedy provided in Section 110 of Act 496, which was
resorted to by Villanueva, is, therefore, ineffective for the purpose of protecting her
right or interest on the disputed lot.
Adverse claim filed by Villanueva was not valid, the same did not have the effect of
a conveyance of her right or interest on the disputed lot and could not prejudice any
right that may have arisen thereafter in favor of third parties. Consequently, the
attachments of Berthelsen, Leviste, and that in Civil Case No. 2489-P of the Court of

First Instance of Rizal covering the disputed lot are superior to that acquired by
Villanueva and will have to be carried over to the new title to be issued in her favor.
Thus, Section of Act 496 provides that:
If at the time of any transfer there appear upon the registration book encumbrances
or claims adverse to the title of the registered owner, they shall be stated in the
new certificate or certificates, except so far as they may be simultaneously released
or discharged

76 LBP vs Republic
Noel Paolo

543 SCRA 453

2/4/2008 Geologo,

FACTS:
OCT No. P-2823 was issued on September 26, 1969 in favor of one Angelito C.
Bugayong. The mother title came from Sales Patent No. 4576 issued in Bugayongs
name which covers a parcel of land located in Bocana, Kabacan, Davao city. It was
originally identified and surveyed as marshy and under water during high tide, it
used to be a portion of a dry river bed near the mouth of Davao River.
The land was subdivided into 4 lots initially. Bugayong sold all the 4 lots to different
persons. 2 of the lots was sold to Spouses Du. The previous TCT under the name of
Bugayong was cancelled then registered to spouses Du.
Spouses Du sold one lot to spouses Felix and Guadalupe Dayola.
Du spouses TCT was cancelled and was replaced by another TCT registered in the
name of Lourdes Farms, Inc which is the subject of this case.
Lourdes Farms, Inc mortgaged this property to petitioner LBP.
Some residents of the land it covered, particularly along Bolton Diversion Road, filed
a formal petition before the Bureau of Lands.
Investigation and ocular inspection were conducted on the subject land.
They found that:
(1)Sales Patent No. 4576 was issued to Bugayong, the land it covered was still
within the forest zone, classified under Project No. 1, LC-47; it was released as
alienable and disposable land only on March 25, 1981
(2) the land was marshy and covered by sea water during high tide;
(3) Bugayong was never in actual possession of the land.
Bureau of Lands resolved that the sales patent in favor of Bugayong was improperly
and illegally issued and that the Director of Lands had no jurisdiction to dispose of
the subject land.
Upon recommendation of the Bureau of Lands, the Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), instituted a complaint before the RTC in Davao for the cancellation of patent

and reversion of the land covered by OCT No. P-2823 into the mass of public
domain.
The complaint, as amended, was filed against Bugayong and other present owners
and mortgagees of the land, such as Lourdes Farms, Inc. and the latters mortgagee,
petitioner LBP.
The mother Title, OCTP-2823 in the name of defendant Bugayong was issued at a
time when the area was not yet released by the Bureau of Forestry to the Bureau of
Lands.
The area covered by OCT No. P. 2823 was not yet declared by the Bureau of Lands
alienable and disposable when the said OCT was issued.
ISSUE:
Whether CA erred in not finding that petitioner Land Bank of The Philippines
mortgage right and interest as an innocent purchaser (mortgagee) for value and in
good faith over the subject land is valid and subsisting in accordance with the law
and existing jurisprudence in our country.
HELD:
No, LBP has no valid and subsisting mortgagees interest over the land
It has been established and admitted by LBP that:
(1) the subject land mortgaged to it by Lourdes Farms, Inc. is covered by TCT No. T57348; and
(2) the said TCT is derived from OCT No. P-2823 issued to Bugayong
It was ascertained the land it covered was still within the forest zone. It was
declared as alienable and disposable only on March 25, 1981.
The mortgagor, Lourdes Farms, Inc. from which LBP obtaining its alleged interest
has never been the owner of the mortgaged land. Acquisition of the subject land by
Lourdes Farms, Inc. is legally impossible as the land was released as alienable and
disposable only on March 25, 1981. Hence, LBP acquired no rights over the land.
Since Lourdes Farms, Inc. is not the owner of the land, it does not have the capacity
to mortgage it to LBP.

77

St Dominic Corporation vs IAC

Geologo, Noel Paolo

151 CRA 577 1987

FACTS:
Two decisions of the appellate court are involved in this case
1 ) Court of Appeals rendered a decision in an action for specific performance filed
by the private respondents against the St. Dominic Corporation

2) Promulgated by the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in an action to set

aside an order of the Regional Trial Court directing receipt in consignation of the
amount ordered to be paid by the Court of Appeals in its 1981 decision
Private respondents Constantino B. Acosta and Eva Acosta signed a Land Purchase
Agreement wherein herein Petitioner St. Dominic Corporation sold to the former Lot
No. 1-A, S-2, Block 8, covered by T.C.T. No. 842,00, Quezon City.
The Acostas were about 7 months in money debt of the corresponding monthly
payments due, when they sent to the St. Dominic Corp. two separate money orders
on. These payments were rejected by the St. Dominic Corporation in a letter sent to
the Acostas by its Corporate Secretary because their contract had been cancelled
said Corporate Secretary had sent to the Private Respondents herein a letter
informing the latter that their contract had been cancelled one month after their
final notice, and that postal money order sent by the Acostas were sent back to
them.
Private Respondents Acostas instituted in the then CFI of Manila an action against
the St. Dominic Corporation to compel the latter to accept payment of the lot in
question. Later a decision was rendered in said case adverse to the Acostas.
Acostas appealed the same to the then Court of Appeals. The CA rendered its
decision, setting aside the decision of the CFI of Manila.
The petitioner corporation sought reconsideration of the appellate court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether IAC erred in not finding that it is legally impossible for the petitioner,
without its fault, to transfer to the Acostas the title to land in question, it having
been transferred to a third party.
HELD:
The respondents did not have a notice of lis pendens annotated on the title of the
property during the whole time that said property was in litigation.
A notice of lis pendens in an announcement to the whole world that a particular
piece of real property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires
an interest over said property does so on his own risk or that he gambles on the
result of the litigation over said property.
Since the private respondents failed to file such notice, the subsequent purchaser
for value cannot be prejudiced by the outcome of the litigation and in the absence
of proof of any fraud on his part, such purchaser is presumed to have acquired his
title in good faith and for a valuable consideration. The rule is elementary that fraud
is not presumed. Private respondents were given by the Court of Appeals only until
December 29, 1981 to pay the remaining balance of unpaid installments. Actual
consignment was made on October 25, 1982 or almost ten (10) months late.
Innocent third party who has the title to the land and who has built a residence on it
should be respected and protected in his possession and ownership. The petitioner

should, however, pay damages to the private respondents after returning all
amounts it has received from them.

78

Maglaque vs Planters 307 SCRA 156

Ong, Gecel

5/17/1999

Facts:
A real estate mortgage was executed to secure a loan obtained by the spouses
Sabina and Egmidio Maglaque from Bulacan Development Bank now known as
Planters Development Bank. After the death of Sabina, partial payment was made
by Egmidio which the Bank accepted. However, the real estate mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed for non-payment in full of the loan. Title was consolidated
in the name of the bank as the highest bidder. The defendant-Bank contends that
the formalities provided for by law were duly observed while the plaintiff claims that
there was no such compliance. After the lapse of the redemption period, the bank
consolidated its title to the property, and became its registered owner. Thereafter,
petitioners, heirs of the spouses, filed a complaint for annulment of sale,
reconveyance of title, with damages, and injunction. The bank sold the property to
the spouses Angel S. Beltran and Erlinda C. Beltran, for thirty thousand (P30,000.00)
pesos. The plaintiff amended the complaint twice to implead the other heirs of the
spouses Maglaque, and defendant Beltran spouses, the buyers of the property in
question.
Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the bank
should have filed its claim in the settlement of estate of the deceased mortgagor.
Issue:
Whether the Bank should have filed its claim in the settlement of estate of the
deceased mortgagors
Ruling:
No. The rule is that a secured creditor holding a real estate mortgage has three
options in case of death of the debtor. These are:
(1)
to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the
mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(2)
to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary
claim; and
(3)
to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at anytime before it
is barred by prescription, without right to file a claim for any deficiency.
Obviously, respondent bank availed itself of the third option.

79
Facts:

Nagtalon vs UCPB 172504 7/31/2013

Ong, Gecel

Spouses Nagtalon entered into a credit agreement with respondent UCPB. To secure
the credit, Spouses Nagtalon executed real estate mortgage over several properties.
Upon failure to pay, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold at public
auction to UCPB as highest bidder. With the petitioners failure to exercise her right
to redeem the properties, UCPB consolidated the ownership over the properties and
TCTs in the name of UCPB were issued. Thereafter, UCPB filed an ex parte petition
for the issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC. The petitioner opposed the
petition, citing mainly the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of
foreclosure, etc. Petitioner argued that the issuance of a writ of possession was no
longer a ministerial duty on the part of the court in view of the pendency of the
case.
Issue:
Whether the pendency of a civil case challenging the validity of the credit
agreement, the promissory notes and the mortgage can bar the issuance of a writ of
possession after the foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged properties and the lapse
of the one-year redemption period.
Ruling:
No. The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a
ministerial function of the court, which cannot be enjoined or restrained, even by
the filing of a civil case for the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure and
consequent auction sale. Once title to the property has been consolidated in the
buyer's name upon failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property within the oneyear redemption period, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right belonging
to the buyer. Consequently, the buyer can demand possession of the property at
anytime. Its right to possession has then ripened into the right of a confirmed
absolute owner and the issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial function that
does not admit of the exercise of the court's discretion. The court, acting on an
application for its issuance, should issue the writ as a matter of course and without
any delay. (Sections 6 and 7 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118)
There are however exceptions to the rule that issuance of a writ of possession is a
ministerial function, as follows:
1.

Gross inadequacy of purchase price

2.

Third party claiming right adverse to debtor/mortgagor

3.

Failure to pay the surplus proceeds of the sale to mortgagor

The petitioner's case does not fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

80

Labora vs Dayanghirang

37 SCRA 346 1/30/1971

(SUPRA)

81

Republic vs Aquino

(SUPRA)

120 SCRA 186

1/27/1983

82

Republic vs TAN Properties INC 555

6/26/2008

SCRA

477

(SUPRA)

83

Nieto vs Quines

1 SCRA 227

1/28/1961

(SUPRA)

84 Register of Deeds vs RTC of Malabon

788 2/5/1990 Ong, Gecel

181

SCRA

Facts:
A Deed of Absolute Sale of a property covered by TCT No. R-3899 in the name of
Salome Castillo in favor of Jose M. Castillo, was presented to the Register of Deeds
(Atty. Francisco Romero) in Caloocan City for registration. It could not be given due
course because the original of said TCT No. R-3899 in the Registry of Deeds was
missing. As the missing title covered a parcel of land in Malabon, Atty. Gaudencio
Cena, the Register of Deeds for Malabon, filed in the RTC of Malabon, a verified
petition for reconstitution of the original of TCT No. R-3899. The court directed that a
copy of its order setting it for hearing on August 17, 1988 be published in 2
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette as provided in Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 26. However, the certificate of publication issued by the Director of the National
Printing Office stated that the order of the court was published in the May 23 and
May 30, 1988 issues of the Official Gazette and that the May 30, 1988 issue was
released for circulation on October 3, 1988 (i.e., 47 days after the date set for
hearing). The RTC of Malabon dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction because
the notice of the petition was not published in the Official Gazette "at least 30 days
prior to the date of hearing which had been set on August 17, 1988.
Issue:
a.
Whether the actual publication of the notice of the petition in the Official
Gazette 47 days after the hearing, instead of "at least 30 days prior to the date of
hearing" was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine the
petition.
b.
Whether the Register of Deeds of Malabon is the proper party to file the
petition for reconstitution
Ruling:
a.
No, it did not. The purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for
reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a
petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may
do so within 30 days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is
the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case
and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Where there is a defect in
the publication of the petition, such defect deprives the court of jurisdiction.

b.
No. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 26, which allowed the Register of Deeds to
motu proprio reconstitute a lost or destroyed certificate of title from its
corresponding owner's duplicate certificate, was expressly repealed or declared to
be "inoperative" by Section 6 of Republic Act 6732, approved on July 17, 1989. A
petition for reconstitution may now be filed only by "the registered owner, his
assigns, or any person who has an interest in the property" (Section 12, Republic
Act No. 26).

85

Tahanan Development vs CA
118
11/15/1982 Orquia, Basil Ian

SCRA

273

Facts:
The records of the case show that on October 5, 1977, private respondent
hereinafter referred to as the
Pascuals, claiming as intestate heirs of Manuela Aquial who died on January 26,
1967, filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of lost certificate of title under
Republic Act No. 26 docketed as Reconstitution Case No. 504P, Land Registration
Case No. 9368 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Manuela Aquial, the petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, was the registered owner of those contiguous lands, Lots 2
and 4 San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal now, Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal. The private
respondents said that original certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate
copies, covering said lands have been lost or destroyed in the last World War II and
diligent efforts to locate the same have been all in vain that said title was
subsisting and in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, free from liens and
encumbrances of any kind and nature up to the present that there is no record of
any sales patent, sales certificate or any land grant over said lands to any person or
entity that no Co-owner's, Mortgagee's, Lessee's or any lien holder's copy of said
Original Certificate of Title have ever been issued.
Issue:
Whether the petition for reconstitution should be granted.
Ruling:
The Court denied the petition for reconstitution. The trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution.
Rationale:
Republic Act No. 26 entitled "An act providing a special procedure for the
reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title lost or destroyed" approved on
September 25, 1946 confers jurisdiction or authority to the Court of First Instance to
hear and decide petitions for judicial reconstitution. The Act specifically provides the
special requirements and mode of procedure that must be followed before the court
can properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and
grant the reconstitution prayed for. These requirements and procedure are
mandatory. The Petition for Reconstitution must allege certain specific jurisdictional
fact and the notice of hearing must be published in the Official Gazette and posted

in particular places and the same sent or notified to specified persons. Sections 12
and 13 of the Act provide specifically the mandatory requirements and procedure to
be followed.
These sections state as follows:
Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d),
2(e), 2(f), 3(c),
3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First
Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in
the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following:
(a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed
(b) that no co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any
had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed: (c) the location, area and
boundaries of the property (d) the nature and description of the buildings or
improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names
and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements (e) the names and
addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners
of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the
property (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the
property and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the
property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration
thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated
copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for
reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in
case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in
section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan
and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General
Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a
prior certificate of the covering the same property.
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding
section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues
of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the municipality or
city in which the land is situated, at the provincial building and of the municipal
building at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise
cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the
expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known,
at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other
things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of
the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property, the owners of the adjoining properties and an other interested parties, the
location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons
having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the
petition. The petitioner shall at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting
and service of the notice as directed by the court.

As the Court have earlier quoted in fun the petition for reconstitution in
Reconstitution Case No. 504P and substantially the Notice of Hearing issued by the
court published in the Official Gazette together with the Certification of Posting by
the Deputy Sheriff, it would not be a difficult task to check and verify whether the
strict and mandatory requirements of Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26
have been faithfully complied with by therein petitioners Pascuals, now the private
respondents here.
Upon a cursory reading of both the petition for reconstitution and the notice of
hearing, it is at once apparent that Tahanan has not been named, cited or indicated
therein as the owner, occupant or possessor of property adjacent to Lot 2, title to
which is sought to be reconstituted. Neither does the petition and the notice state
nor mention that Tahanan is the occupant or possessor of a portion of said Lot 2.
The result of this omission or failure is that Tahanan was never notified of the
petition for reconstitution and the hearings or proceedings therein.
We also find that the Notice of Hearing directed that copies thereof be posted only
in the bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City and no more,
whereas the law specifically require that the notice of the petition shall be posted on
the main entrance of the municipality or city on which the land is situated, at the
provincial building and at the municipal building at least 30 days prior to the date of
hearing. In the instant case as certified to by Deputy Sheriff Arsenio C. de Guzman,
the Notice of Hearing was posted on the bulletin board of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Pasay City Branch located at the Hall of Justice, City Hall Building, Pasay
City. Evidently, the Notice of Hearing was not posted at the main entrance of the
provincial building in Pasig, Rizal. It was not posted at the main entrance of the
municipal building of Muntinlupa where the land is now comprised in Barrio Cupang,
or at least in the municipal building of Paranaque where Barrio San Dionisio was
then embraced.

86

Alabang Development vs Valenzuela 116

8/20/1982
Orquia, Basil Ian

SCRA

261

Facts:
The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed against the order of reconstitution
alleges that the petitioners are registered owners as evidenced by certain Transfer
Certificates of Title issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal covering parcels of land
located at Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa. The parcels of land surrounded by a high
perimeter wall on their boundaries were sold to innocent purchasers in good faith
for valuable consideration as part of Alabang Hills Village Subdivision, owned by
petitioner Alabang Development Corporation, many of whom were already issued in
turn the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title in their favor. These innocent
purchasers for value have been in open, actual, adverse, continuous, notorious and
uninterrupted possession of their respective lands since 1969. Petitioners alleged
that in the reconstitution case below, filed only in 1977, herein respondents as
petitioners therein sought to reconstitute a lost certificate of title, original and
owner's duplicate copy, allegedly lost or destroyed over 30 years earlier in the last
World War II. On the basis of the technical descriptions contained in petitioners'

titles and as appear in the alleged title sought to be reconstituted, the latter overlap
the parcels of land owned by petitioners and duly registered in their name. The
petitioners alleged that being actual possessors and registered owners were not
served with notice of the hearing of the petition for reconstitution in violation of
Republic Act 26 such that the court a quo acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in granting the reconstitution and that there is no appeal nor plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Issue:
Whether the petition for reconstitution should be granted. The trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over t
Ruling:
The Court denied the petition for reconstitution.
Rationale:
Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution, the Court notes that
some essential data required in section 12 and section 13 of Republic Act 26 have
been omitted: the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, which
do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners
of such buildings or improvements, and the names and addresses of the occupants
or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties
and of all persons who may have any interest in the property. Neither do these data
appear in the Notice of Hearing such that no adjoining owner, occupant or
possessor was ever served a copy thereof by registered mail or otherwise. And since
the above data do not appear in the Amended Petition, the same data do not also
appear in the Notice of Hearing of the petition published in the Official Gazette.
Patently, the provisions of Section 12 which enumerates mandatorily the contents of
the Petition for Reconstitution and Section 13 which similarly require the contents of
the Notice have not been complied with. In view of these multiple omissions which
constitute noncompliance with the above cited sections of the Act. The Court rules
that said defects have not invested the lower court with the authority or jurisdiction
to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as
prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby
rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.

87

Serra vs CA

195 SCRA 482

3/22/1991

(SUPRA)

88 Republic vs Ramos
Basil Ian

169481 2/22/2010

Orquia,

Facts:
On February 23, 2001, respondents filed a Petition for Reconstitution before the RTC.
The late Julio Ramos, grandfather of herein respondents, is the original claimant of
Lot No. 54 of the Cadastral Survey of Orani, Bataan, as evidenced by a Relocation

Plan of said lot duly approved by the Chief, Regional Surveys Division, Ruperto P.
Sawal, and the Regional Technical Director Eriberto V. Almazan.The Acting Registrar
of Deeds of Bataan likewise issued a Certification to the effect that OCT No. 3613
covering Lot No. 54 of Orani Cadastre is not among the salvaged records of the said
Registry. The owners copy of OCT No. 3613 was lost and all efforts exerted to locate
the same are in vain. The said Lot No. 54 is declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Julio Ramos and taxes due thereon are fully paid up to the current year.
There is no document pending registration with the Registry of Deeds of Bataan
affecting said Lot 54. Respondents prayed for the issuance of an order directing the
Registrar of Deeds to reconstitute OCT No. 3613 on the basis of the approved plan
and technical description. Respondent Reynaldo Ramos Medina, a 62year old watch
technician, testified on the material allegations of the petition. He likewise declared
on the witness stand that his mother used to keep the owners copy of OCT No.
3613. During the Japanese occupation, however, it was buried in a foxhole and since
then it could no longer be found. Reynaldo further testified that he and his coheirs
are the present occupants of Lot 54.
Issue:
Whether the petition for reconstitution should be granted.
Ruling:
The Court denied the petition for reconstitution. The trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution.
Rationale:
RA 26 lays down the specific procedure for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed
Torrens certificates of title. It confers jurisdiction upon trial courts to hear and decide
petitions for judicial reconstitution. However, before said courts can assume
jurisdiction over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for, the petitioner
must observe certain special requirements and mode of procedure prescribed by
law.
Perusal of respondents Petition for Reconstitution, for the purpose of verifying
whether the strict and mandatory requirements of RA 26, particularly Section 12 (b)
and (e) thereof, have been faithfully complied with, would reveal that it did not
contain an allegation that no co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate had
been issued or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed. The
petition also failed to state the names and addresses of the present occupants of
Lot 54. Correspondingly, the Notice of Hearing issued by the court a quo did not also
indicate the names of the occupants or persons in possession of Lot 54, in gross
violation of Section 13 of RA 26. Because of these fatal omissions, the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over respondents petition. Consequently, the
proceedings it conducted, as well as those of the CA, are null and void.

89 Ragua vs CA 88521
Emmanuel
90

1/21/1991

Sevilla,

Manotok vs Barque
574 SCRA 468
Sevilla, Victor Emmanuel

Victor

12/18/2008

91 Alipon vs CA 305 SCRA 118

Joseph

Borja,

92 OCA vs Matas
Tatiana

Ramirez,

247 SCRA 9

Mark

Karen

FACTS:
Private respondent Judgw Matas took cognizance of the petition for issuance of new
duplicate copies of OCT Nos. P-12658, P-12659, P-12661 and T-9857 filed before his
Sala, notwithstanding the fact that his court has no jurisdiction over Kapalong and
Sto. Tomas Davao where the subject properties covered by the aforesaid titles
where located.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Matas acted
Miscellaneous Case No. 1626.

without

jurisdiction

in

taking

cognizance

of

HELD:
Administrative order No. 7 defines the territorial jurisdiction of RTC in Regions 1 to
12 of RTC Davao Del Norte. Br. 1 and 2 has jurisdiction over Kapalong and Br. 4 has
jurisdiction over Sto. Tomas. Branch 1 of RTC of Davao del Norte the presided by
Judge Matas has jurisdiction ocer Mis. 1626. Sec. 2 of Pd 1529 states that CFI shall
have jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands
including and interest therein and over all petitions filed after original registration of
title. Also, Sec. 17 of PD 1529 provides that the application for land registration shall
be filed with CFI, now RTC. Of the province or municipality where the land lies.
Petition for replacement of lost certificates as in Mis. 1626 was properly taken
cognizance by Br. 1 of RTC Davao del Norte since the petition stated that lots
covered by the lost duplicate are situated in Kapalong and Sto. Tomas which are
both in the province of Davao del Norte. If at all, there was an unwitting violatiom of
Adm. Order 7 which places Kapalong within either Br. 1 or 2 and Sto. Tomas with Br.
4. He exceeds the territorial area of his branch for at the time Mis. 1626 was filed,
Sto. Tomas which was composed of the barrios of Kapalong was not yet declared as
non existent. The error consisted merely of the impropriety of the venue of the
petition.

93

New Durawood vs CA 253 SCRA 740

Ramirez, Karen Tatiana

2/20/1996

FACTS:
Petitioner-corporation filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of the lost owner's
duplicate certificates of TCT Nos. 140486, 156454, 140485. attached thereto was an
afgidavit of loss. subsequently, petitioner discovered that the original TCTs on file
with the RD were cancelled and in lieu thereof,TCTs in the name of Durawood Corp.
& Lumber Supply Inc. Were issued. Petitioner found out about the reconstitution and
filed a suit before the CA praying for the annulment of the assailed order and for the
cancellation of TCTs in the name of Durawood. CA dismissed the suit and in effect
affirmed RTC order declaring TCTs 140486, 156454, 140485 null and void.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a court has jurisdiction to issue a new owner's duplicate of Torrens
Certificate of Title, when in fact, the existing owner's copy has not been lost or
destroyed.
2. which law governs the issuance of new owner's duplicate certificate of title in lieu
of lost ones?
HELD:
Petition was granted. The owner's duplicate of certificates of title were in the
possession of the petitioner's chairman of the board and the certificates were not in
fact lost or destroyed, hence, there was no necessity for the petition filed in the trial
court for the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy of certificate of title. The court
never acquired jurisdiction to order the issuance of new certificates. Thus, the newly
issued duplicates are null and void. The remedy in case of refusal or failure of the
holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificates of title is a petition in court to
compel surrender of the duplicate certificate to the RD and not a petition for
reconstitution.
Section 109 of PD 1529 is the law applicable in petitions for issuance of a new
owner's duplicate certificate of title which was lost or stolen or destroyed. RA 26
applies only in cases of reconstitution of lost or destroyed original certificates on file
with the RD.

94

Gocheco vs CA (Republic vs. CA?)

Ramirez, Karen Tatiana

317

SCRA

504

FACTS:
Vicente Yupangco, owner of a unit in a condiminium building in Makati, filed a
petition for the issuance of a new duplicate certificate of title in lieu of his lost copy
pursuant to Sec. 109 Pd 1529. Register of Deeds of Makati posted no objection. RTC
granted the petition and the Solicitor General was furnished with a copy of the
decision. The Solicitor General moved for revonsideration on the ground that no

copy of the petition or notice had been given to him. RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration. The Courtb of Appeals affirmed RTC order.
ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the solicitor General is required to be notified and be heard in
a proceeding for issuance of an owner's duplicate certificate of title.
HELD:
CA decision was affirmed. The request for representation should have come from
the Register of Deeds of Makati who was the proper party to this case; who was
notified and manifested no objection to the petition. The petition is anchored on Sec
109 Pd 1529 does not impose a notification requirement in proceedings for the
issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title. The lack of notice to the
Solicitor General as counsel for the Register of Deeds, was at most, only a formal
and not a jurisdictional defect.

95

Spouses Alcazar vs Arante 177042 12/10/2012

Rementina, Mary Grace

Facts:
Petitioner Crisanto Alcazar filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost Owners
Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title. He alleged that the original owners
were his deceased parents and he is the sole heir. Being unknowledgeable about
the procedures for transferring the title of the property in his name, he entrusted to
a group of individuals (who identified themselves as connected with the Land
Registration Authority) the owners duplicate of title for the transfer. However, the
said group never contacted the petitioner. The fact of its loss was reported to the
Register of Deeds of Pasig by way of Affidavit of Loss.
The RTC of Pasig ruled in favor of Alcazar, declaring the owners duplicate copy of
title null and void and ordering the Registry of Deeds of Pasig to issue a new
Owners Duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title based on the original thereof on file
in its office. The RTC Decision has become final and executory.
Respondent Arante filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Final
Decision contending that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain Alcazars petition
because the subject owners duplicate title was not in fact lost but actually exists.
She alleged that the petitioners obtained a loan from her and as a security, they
executed a real estate mortgage over the subject property. She added that the
petitioners personally delivered and turned over the original owners duplicate copy
of title. Due to the failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, respondent decided to
register the mortgage with the Register of Deeds of Pasig but she was informed that
the petitioners had caused to be annotated to the copy of TCT on file, an affidavit
stating the owners duplicate copy thereof was lost.
Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for reconstitution filed by the
petitioners.

Held/Ratio:
NO, the RTC has no jurisdiction. When the owners duplicate certificate of title has
not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the
reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision had
no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the original
certificate. Thus, with proof and with the admission of petitioners that the owners
duplicate copy of the TCT was actually in the possession of respondent, the RTC
Decision was properly annulled for lack of jurisdiction.

96

Selph vs Aguilar 107 Phil. 443 3/29/1960

Rementina, Mary Grace

Facts:
The subject property was first acquired by Spouses Capule. Valentin Devilles
obtained a judgment against Spouses Capule and the latters right and interest to
the property were levied upon which culminated in the sale to Devilles of the land at
an auction. The sale was noted on TCT No. 4610.
Capule filed Civil Case No. 2614 against Devilles wherein Capule won and,
thereafter, reacquired the land at the Sheriff's sale. Capule mortgaged the property
to Manila Trading & Supply Co. to secure the payment of 16 promissory notes.
Devilles filed Civil Case No. 3145 to annul the execution of the judgment in favor of
Capule and to cancel the Sheriff's sale. He also caused a Notice of Lis Pendens to be
inscribed in Capule's certificate of title and in the land records.
The Capules failed to pay Manila Trading and judgment having been rendered in
favor of the latter, the Sheriff sold the property at foreclosure sale. Capule's TCT was
cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 8578, was issued to Manila Trading. The notice of
Lis Pendens was annotated in this new TCT.
A judgment was rendered in Civil Case No. 3145 in favor of Devilles, declaring the
sale in Case No. 2614 null and void and ordering the issuance of a new certificate of
title in favor of Devilles. Devilles sold the property to Spouses Aguilar and Gliceria
Vda. de Aguilar, herein respondent.
Instead of surrendering the owners duplicate of TCT No. 8578 to the Register of
Deeds, as required, Manila Trading sold the property, subject to the Lis Pendens, to
Julius Reese. Reese presented to the court a petition under Act 496 for cancellation
of the annotation of lis pendens. According to him, the lis pendens may not
adversely affect him because the Supreme Court decision in Case No. 3145 was not
shown to the Register of Deeds until after 21 years, contrary to Sec. 79 of the Land
Registration Law.
Issue:
Whether Reese may invoke the ground of non-enforcement and prescription of the
Supreme Court decision in Civil Case No. 3145 to bar the issuance of a new TCT in
favor of respondent.

Held/Ratio:
NO. Sec. 79 does not say that if the judgment is not registered within 60 days, the
notice will not be binding. And even if it said so, the judgment will not be binding
only as against persons other than the parties to the suit. It is still binding on the
parties (the Capules) and their successors (Manila Trading and Reese), particularly
because the titles of these successors bear the annotation relating to the lis
pendens.
Although action on a judgment prescribes after ten years, the period begins from
the time such judgment becomes final and no proof exists as to the date when the
judgment in Case No. 3145 became final. And then, in so far as Reese's attempt to
get possession, the decision may be invoked in defense as res judicata which does
not prescribe.
Reese may not object on the ground of nonenforcement and prescription of the SC
decision, because if any one could object thereto, it was the Register of Deeds who
was called upon to implement the order of cancellation and issuance; and yet he
has shown willingness to comply. It is true that in complying, the Register is now
requiring Reese in turn to surrender his title. But the latter may not properly refuse,
because he received such title from the Register upon his undertaking to respect
the outcome of the litigation, the title being expressly subject thereto, by the
annotation of lis pendens.
Manila Tradings refusal or failure to surrender the title, upon the request of the
Register of Deeds, gave Devilles successors the right to petition the court for
appropriate orders.

97 Ligon vs CA
Mary Grace

244 SCRA 693

6/1/1995 Rementina,

Facts:
Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed a complaint for specific performance with damages
against the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP), alleging that by virtue of an
Absolute Deed of Sale, IDP sold to it two parcels of land, both of which IDP is the
registered owner. They stipulated in the Deed that IDP shall undertake to evict all
squatters and illegal occupants in the property within 45 days from the execution of
the contract. IDP failed to fulfill its obligation hence INK prays that the trial court
order IDP to comply and to pay damages.
IDP contended that it was INK which violated the contract by delaying the payment
of the purchase price and prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and
revoked.
The trial court rendered a partial judgment, granting the reliefs prayed for by INK
except damages. INK filed a motion praying that petitioner Ligon, who was in
possession of the certificates of title over the properties, be directed to surrender
the certificates to the Register of Deeds for the registration of the Absolute Deed of
Sale in its name. INK alleged that the document could not be registered because of

the refusal and/or failure of petitioner to deliver the certificates of title despite
requests.
The trial court granted the motion of INK and ordered petitioner to surrender to INK
the owners copy of the certificates of title for the registration of the Absolute Deed
of Sale in INKs name and the annotation of the new mortgage executed in favor of
petitioner on the new transfer certificates of title to be issued to INK.
Issue:
Whether INK has a superior right to the possession of the owners copies of the
certificates of title.
Held/Ratio:
YES. Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by
the Register of Deeds unless the owners duplicate certificate is presented together
with such instrument, except in some cases or upon order of the court for cause
shown. In case the person in possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or fails
to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds so that a voluntary document may
be registered and a new certificate issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529
states:
Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates.Where it is necessary to issue a new
certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of
the registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be
registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owners
duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to
compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing,
may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate
to surrender the same and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum
upon such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not
amenable to the process of the court, or if for any reason the outstanding owners
duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the
same as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new
certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment
of the outstanding duplicate.
Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction
vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the
former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity
of suits the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the
regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for original
registration but also over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with
power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions.
Even while Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529 speaks of a petition which can be filed by one who
wants to compel another to surrender the certificates of title to the Registry of
Deeds, this does not preclude a party to a pending case to include as incident

therein the relief stated under said section, especially if the subject certificates of
title to be surrendered are intimately connected with the subject matter of the
principal action.
The principal action filed by INK was for specific performance with damages based
on a document of sale. Such action was well within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. When IDP did not question the genuineness and validity of said
deed of sale and its obligations thereunder, the summary judgment issued by the
court granting the reliefs sought by INK was also an exercise of its general
jurisdiction. Hence, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from the
same court to compel the holder of the duplicate certificates of title to surrender the
same to the Register of Deeds for the registration of the deed of sale subject of the
principal action, the motion was a necessary incident to the main case.

98

PNB vs Fernandez 61 Phil. 448

Sanchez, Antonio

99

Avesta vs Caguion

100 Cuyugan vs Sy Quia

Sanchez, Antonio

5/13/1935

146 SCRA 459

24 Phil. 567

12/29/1986

3/27/2013

101 Del Prado vs Caballero 148225 3/3/2010

102 Concepcion vs Concepcion 448 SCRA 31 1/11/2005
Sanchez, Antonio
103 Sajonas vs CA
Chrislyn Faith

258 SCRA 79 7/5/1996 Taguiling,

Facts:
Domingo Pilares filed for collection of sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On
June 25, 1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties in the said
case under which Uychocde acknowledged his monetary obligation to Pilares
amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay the same in two years from June 25,
1980.However, Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking in the compromise
agreement so Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the
decision based on the compromise agreement. The court granted it so Sheriff Garcia
presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina
and the same was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073.

Meanwhile, spouses Uychocde agreed to sell a parcel of residential land to spouses

Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell. On August 27,
1984, the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on the
said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property.Upon full payment of the
purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in
question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984. Hence TCT No.
N79073 was cancelled and TCT No. N109417 was issued in the name of the Sajonas
couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried
over to the new title. The Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice
of levy on execution upon Pilares but Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of
said annotation.
Issue:
Whether the adverse claim inscribed in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N190417
still in force when Sheriff Garcia caused the notice of levy on execution to be
registered and annotated in the said title
Held:
Yes. In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we
must read the law in its entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D.
1529 provides: The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty daysfrom
the date of registration.
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the
adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be
treated separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence following, which
reads: After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be
cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest.
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and
effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to
include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse
claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of
time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act.
It should be noted that the law employs the phrasemay be cancelled, which
obviously indicates, as inherent in its decision making power, that the court may or
may not order the cancellation of an adverse claim, notwithstanding such provision
limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty days from the date of
registration. The court cannot be bound by such period as it would be inconsistent
with the very authority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the period of
effectivity is immaterial in determining the validity or invalidity of an adverse claim
which is the principal issue to be decided in the court hearing. It will therefore
depend upon the evidence at a proper hearing for the court to determine whether it
will order the cancellation of the adverse claim or not. To interpret the effectivity
period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty
days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an
inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure

designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the
registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land
Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and
serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is
claiming an interest on the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.
Hence, the disputed inscriptions of adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of Title
No. N79073 was still in effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff
Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on execution thereto.

104 Register of Deeds vs Nicandro 111

4/29/1961
Taguiling, Chrislyn Faith

Phil.

989

Facts:
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) sold to the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation, now the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), 159 lots
which were included in a larger parcel of land covered by TCT No. 1356.
Subsequently, without the knowledge of the DBP:
1)
the 159 lots were segregated and a new transfer certificate of title No. 36533
covering the same was issued;
2)
that the subdivision plan segregating them was not annotated on the bigger
title No. 1356; 3) the fact that title No. 1356 was pro tanto cancelled by the new
title No. 36533.
4) PHHC sold 2 parcel of lands which were among the 159 lots already sold to the
appellant DBP
A month later, Honesto C. Nicandro and Elisa F. Nicandro presented to the Register
of Deeds for registration two deeds of sale executed by the PHHC in their favor yet
were denied registration. Hence, Nicandros filed affidavits of adverse claim over the
two lots, which were annotated on TCT No. 3653 to protect their right.
DBP on the other hand, discovering that the lots it had purchased are already
covered by TCT No. 36533, caused the annotation thereon of its deed of sale of
October 20, 1955.
Issue:
Whether adverse claim is the right remedy for the Nicandros
Held:
No. "SEC. 110 provides that Whoever claims any right or interest in registered land
adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for registering the same,
make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how
or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate
of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed. x x x."

In this case, Although admittedly we have here a case of double sale, actually this is
not an instance of double registration. Only the deed of sale in favor of appellant
was inscribed on the certificate of title covering the lots in question. The Nicandros
were not able to register their deeds of sale; Instead, informed of the prior
registration by the DBP, they sought to protect their right by filing adverse claims
based on the said deeds of sale under Section 110 of Act496.
It is clear from the above quotation that for this special remedy (adverse claim) to
be availed of, it must be shown that there is no other provision in the law for
registration of the claimant's alleged right or interest in the property. The herein
claim of the Nicandros is based on a perfected contract of sale executed in their
favor by the lawful owner of the land.
Considering that the Land Registration Act specifically prescribes the procedure for
registration of a vendee's right on a registered property, the remedy provided in
Section 110. Which was resorted to and invoked by appellees, would be ineffective
for the purpose of protecting their said right or interest on the two lots.
Furthermore, the adverse claim of the Nicandros was annotated on TCT No. 35633
only on February 17, 1959 and the sale to the DBP was registered as of January 15,
1959, the certificate of title on the two lots in controversy should be issued in favor
of the first registrant, the DBP.

105 Villaflor vs Juezan 184 SCRA 315

Taguiling, Chrislyn Faith

4/17/1990

Facts:
On February 22, 1961 Juezan registered his affidavit of adverse claim in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T1217 (formerly a part of Original Certificate of Title 806)
under primary entry No. 26083 of the Register of Deeds of Davao. On March 1,
1961, Juezan filed Civil Case 3496 seeking from Villaflor the surrender of owners
duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title T1217 in order that the deed of sale in his
favor will be registered or annotated in the certificate of title. Juezan further
questioned the validity of the deed of sale in favor of Villaflor.
More than four (4) years after Juezans adverse claim was annotated that is, on
October 15, 1965 and while case No. 3496 is pending, Villaflor presented for
registration two (2) deeds of sale affecting the land subject of the action, the first
dated March 21, 1963 conveying 8.6186 hectares and the second dated September
6, 1986 conveying the remaining 3.0219 hectares and as a consequence, Transfer
Certificate of Title T1217 was cancelled so Transfer Certificate of Title T7601 was
issued to Villaflor wherein the adverse claim annotated was carried on.
Issue:
Whether the adverse claim of Juarez should be cancelled
Held:

Yes. The basis of Civil Case No. 3496 is a deed of absolute sale dated July 7, 1956,
allegedly executed by Simon Maghanay in favor of Juezan. This document is also the
basis of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim ordered cancelled by the trial court. The
purpose of said adverse claim is to protect the interest of the appellant pending this
litigation. Thus, considering that a notice of lis pendens had been annotated on
T.C.T. No. T7601 Vi, the Court finds no basis for maintaining the adverse claim. This
Court sees no reason for disturbing the questioned order of the trial court dated
August 25, 1967 directing the cancellation of the Juezans adverse claim at the back
of transfer certificate of Title No. T7601. The notice of lis pendens filed by Juezan
affecting the same property in connection with Civil Case No. 3496 is sufficient.

106 Ching vs Enrile

565 SCRA 402
Trinidad, Nathaniel

9/17/2008

FACTS:
On September 5, 1985, petitioners purchased from a certain Raymunda La Fuente a
370-square meter lot covered by TCT No. 83618.
_____________________________________________________________________________
La Fuente delivered to petitioners a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale with the
Owners Duplicate Certificate of Title and thereafter, petitioners took physical
possession
of
the
subject
property.
_____________________________________________________________________________
The conveyance was not registered in the Register of Deeds as prescribed by
Section 51 of PD 1529. Instead, on November 20, 1986, petitioners executed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim which was recorded and annotated at the back of TCT No.
83618 reflected in the Memorandum of Encumbrances under Entry No. 86 62262.
_____________________________________________________________________________
On August 19, 1988three years after they purchased the disputed property,
petitioners received a Notice of Levy on Attachment and Writ of Execution issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig in favor of respondents, in Civil Case No.
54617 entitled Sps. Adolfo Enrile and Arsenia Enrile v. Raymunda La Fuente.
The Notice of Levy on Attachment was recorded at the dorsal portion of TCT No.
83618 under Entry No. 34332 while the Writ of Execution was inscribed under
Entry No. 34342. Also inscribed in the TCT is the Certificate of Sale dated January
26, 1989 covering the disputed property in favor of respondents.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Petitioners filed a Petition to Remove Cloud on or Quiet Title to Real Property
asserting
ownership
of
the
disputed
property.
_____________________________________________________________________________
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners upholding the latters superior
right over the disputed property in view of the registration of the Affidavit of
Adverse Claim prior to the Certificate of Sale annotated in favor of respondents.
_____________________________________________________________________________

Respondents appealed to the CA, principally arguing that the RTC committed
reversible error in ruling that petitioners had a better right over the disputed
property. Respondents theorized that the prior conveyance of the disputed property
made by La Fuente to petitioners being a voluntary dealing with a registered land,
mere registration of their adverse claim was insufficient. To respondents, in order to
have petitioners interest protected, they should have registered the Deed of
Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds pursuant to Section 51 of PD 1529 and not
merely register an adverse claim under Section 70 of the same law. Citing the
second paragraph of Section 70 which provides that an adverse claim shall be
effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration, respondents
insisted that the annotated Adverse Claim of petitioners had already expired, hence,
it offered no protection when respondents acquired the disputed property through
execution sale.
_____________________________________________________________________________
The CA rendered the herein challenged decision reversing that of the RTC. Even as
the CA viewed the prior sale of the disputed lot in favor of petitioners as perfected
and consummated, it nonetheless upheld respondents preferential right over the
disputed
property.
_____________________________________________________________________________
The CA declared that respondents, as attaching creditors who registered the order
of attachment and the sale of the property to them as the highest bidders, acquired
a valid title to the disputed property as against petitioners who had previously
bought the same property from the registered owner but failed to register their
deed
of
sale.
_____________________________________________________________________________
The CA further declared respondents as purchasers in good faith. On the premise
that petitioners filing of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim was procedurally flawed and
that the annotated adverse claim had already prescribed on December 20, 1986
after the lapse of 30 days from its registration which was November 20, 1986, the
CA ruled that it cannot be considered sufficient notice to third person like the
respondents who were not aware of the sale of the disputed lot to petitioners prior
to the levy on attachment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adverse claim is still valid
RULING:
The adverse claim is still valid.
The Court finds that the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the
annotated adverse claim had already prescribed by the mere lapse of 30 days from
its registration. The issue is no longer of first impression. In the 1996 case of
Sajonas v. Court of Appeals,we explained that a notice of adverse claim remains
valid even after the lapse of the 30 day period provided by Section 70 of PD 1529.
Section 70 provides:

Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the

registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if
no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same, make a
statement in writing, setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or
under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse
claimants residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of
title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be
cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest. Provided,
however that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same
ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
In the same case, we held that for as long as there is yet no petition for its
cancellation, the notice of adverse claim remains subsisting: Thus:
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity
of the adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not
be treated separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence following,
which reads:
After the lapse of said period, the annotation of the adverse claim may be
cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest.
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force
and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to
include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse
claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of
time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act.
In a petition for cancellation of adverse claim, a hearing must first be conducted.
The hearing will afford the parties an opportunity to prove the propriety or
impropriety of the adverse claim

107 Lozano vs Ballesteros 195 SCRA 681

Trinidad, Nathaniel

4/8/1991

FACTS:
Maria Nieves Nunez Tuazon, deceased mother of the plaintiffs, was the original
registered exclusive owner of the land in question comprising Lots Q, B and O as
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 46076. However only Lot Q is the
subject of this present action. By virtue of a deed of absolute sale, Tuazon sold the
land in question to Marciana de Dios.
________________________________________________________________________________

Augusto, Dario, Jaime, Cresencia, Lourdes and Alicia, all surnamed Lozano, together
with Marciana de Dios filed a verified petition before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan seeking the approval of the consolidationsubdivision plan and for the
annotation of several documents at the back of the Original Certificate of Title No.
46076.
The court approved the consolidation subdivision plan and directed the inscription,
among others, of said deed of sale at the back of the title. Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 26537 was issued in the name of Marciana de Dios.
________________________________________________________________________________
Plaintiffs caused the annotation of their adverse claim at the back of the title of the
said lot. Thereafter, a petition for the settlement of the estate of Augusto Lozano
was filed by the plaintiffs.
________________________________________________________________________________
De Dios sold lot Q to defendant Ignacio Ballesteros and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 63171 was later transferred in his name.
________________________________________________________________________________
Plaintiffs filed an action for reconveyance against De Dio alleging that the estate of
Augusto Lozano is the absolute owner of Lots Q, O and B.
________________________________________________________________________________
The court rendered a default decision in favor of the plaintiffs. However, the
judgment was not satisfied on the ground that De Dios was insolvent and did not
have any registered property.
Having failed to effect the recovery and/or reconveyance of the lots, plaintiffs filed
several complaints before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for
reconveyance
and
recovery
of
possession
________________________________________________________________________________
The trial court rendered a decision declaring defendant Ignacio Ballesteros the
absolute owner of the land in question; ordering the cancellation of plaintiffs
adverse claim at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 63171 at the expense of
the plaintiffs;
Hence, plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. However, the Court
of Appeals in its resolution ruled that the matter submitted for determination is
purely a question of law that is beyond the jurisdiction of this court." Thus, the
records of the case were elevated to this Court.
The appellants insist that the said adverse claim has been carried along in the
subsequent titles of the defendants. Thus, they conclude that the consequence of
this cautionary notice is that whatever would be the result of their claim against
Marciana de Dios is binding on subsequent purchasers or successors ininterest.
They contend that the defendants-appellees should have waited for the decision

of the court on the question of the validity of the adverse claim or should have first
moved for the removal or cancellation of the adverse claim. Hence, appellants
conclude that defendants-appellees are purchasers in bad faith as they have
knowledge of the claims against De Dios.
However, the appellee stresses that a cursory examination of the adverse claim
filed by the plaintiffs appellants readily reveals that the same has failed to comply
with the formal requirements of Section 110 of Act 496 with respect to adverse
claims. And for which, and for all legal purposes, the adverse claim under comment
is not valid and effective. Appellee argues that there was a fatal non-joinder of
necessary or indispensable parties. Thus, the position of the appellants is
untenable because the non-joinder of necessary and indispensable parties
renders null and void as against them any decision in a case in which they were not
made parties -litigants. Furthermore, appellee submits that the protection given
by the law to adverse claimants in regard to the property subject to an adverse
claim is available only to the party whose registered adverse claim meets all the
formal requisites of law, and not when the same is a nullity.
Hence, appellee concludes that an invalid and ineffective adverse claim cannot
validly serve as a notice or warning to third parties who may deal with the
properties subject thereto because such adverse claim by reason of its nullity is
deemed not existent and unregistered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adverse claim is valid
RULING:
NO. The applicable law in the case at bar is still Section 110 of Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act despite the modification introduced
by Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
The said section particularly deals with adverse claim, to wit:
Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered
owner, arising subsequent to date of the original registration, may, if no other
provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing
setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired,
and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the registered
owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants
residence, and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon
a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of
the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice and
equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be
cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a claim
thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double
or treble costs in its discretion.

Hence, for the purpose of registration and as required by the above quoted
provision, as amended, the following are the formal requisites of an adverse claim:
1.

The adverse claimant must state the following in writing:

a. his alleged right or interest;
b. how and under whom such alleged right or interest is acquired;
c. the description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed, and
d. the certificate of title number

2.
the statement must be signed and sworn to before a notary public or other
officer authorized to administer oath; and
3.
The claimant should state his residence or the place to which all notices may
be served upon him.
The lower court quoted in part the adverse claim filed by the plaintiffs, to wit:
That this adverse claim is being filed prior to the filing of a court action because all
the properties above described formerly belong to my husband, the late Augusto
Lozano.
However, the lower court noted that the adverse claim filed and annotated on the
back of the title of Marciana de Dios and later to the title of the herein defendant,
did not meet the requirements provided for in Section 110 of Act 496, that is setting
forth fully how or under whom the heirs of Lozano acquired the property.
We adhere to the lower courts findings and find appellees position meritorious. A
cursory reading of the afore quoted adverse claim filed by the plaintiffs shows that
the same has failed to comply with the formal requisites of Section 110 of Act 496,
more specifically the appellants failure to state how and under whom their alleged
right or interest is acquired. Thus, the effect of such noncompliance renders the
adverse claim non-registrable and ineffective.
In a case where the adverse claim filed for registration did not fully comply with the
formal requisites of Section 110 of Act No. 496, or more specifically, there being no
description of the land in which right or interest is claimed nor the place to which all
notices may be served upon the adverse claimant given, such adverse claim could
not be registered. (LRC Consulta No. 144, Register of Deeds of Quezon City, pet.,
February 18, 1957)

108 Portes vs Arcala 468 SCRA 343

Trinidad, Nathaniel

8/30/2005

FACTS:
Respondents Segunda, Eulalia, Salustancia, Vamerco, Josefina, Felomino, Marciano,
Lydia, and Salome, all surnamed Arcala claimed that as early as 1908, their parents,
Vicente and Felisa had already occupied and developed the disputed parcels of land,
Lots 2 and 3.

______________________________________________________________________________
On 20 June 1912, the Director of Lands approved Vicentes homestead application
for Lots 2 and 3.
______________________________________________________________________________
Respondents filed the complaint against their cousins, Vicente, Jr., Perfecta, Sotera,
and Consolacion, all surnamed Arcala, the nephew and nieces of respondents
father, Vicente.
______________________________________________________________________________
Respondents alleged that on 30 November 1917, Felomina, the aunt of Luis,
registered Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in her name.
______________________________________________________________________________
The decree of registration dated 11 November 1920 was issued to Felomina by the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in GLRO Case No. 15426.
______________________________________________________________________________
However, on 26 July 1930, the cadastral court issued another decree of registration
excluding Lots 2 and 3 from the decree of registration issued to Felomina.
______________________________________________________________________________
The cadastral court amended Felominas decree of registration because Vicente and
Felisa had already obtained a homestead patent over Lots 2 and 3.
______________________________________________________________________________
Despite the amended decree of 26 July 1930, Felomina was still able to have the
title of Lot 2 reconstituted by invoking GLRO Case No. 15426.
______________________________________________________________________________
The reconstituted title of Lot 2, OCT No. RO8932, was issued to Felomina.
______________________________________________________________________________
Felomina then subdivided Lot 2 into Lots 2A and 2B.
______________________________________________________________________________
Lot 2A was issued to Luis while TCT No. T39332 covering Lot 2B was issued to
Felomina.
Luis
sold
Lot
2A
to
Napoleon
______________________________________________________________________________
Heirs of Napoleon insisted that Napoleon acquired ownership of Lot 2A in good
faith
and
for
value.
______________________________________________________________________________

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Napoleon has a right on the property
RULING:
The heirs of Napoleon has no right over the property.
______________________________________________________________________________
A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as
indefeasible
as
a
Torrens
Title.
______________________________________________________________________________
Respondents parents, Vicente and Felisa, owned Lots 2 and 3 by virtue of a
homestead patent.
Felomina
had
no
right
over
Lot
______________________________________________________________________________

2.

Reconstitution is simply the restoration of a lost or destroyed instrument or title to

its original form and condition. Felomina had nothing to reconstitute as no
certificate of title was ever issued to her over Lot 2. Luis, from whom Napoleon
purchased Lot 2A, was just as guilty as his aunt Felomina in defrauding
respondents.
______________________________________________________________________________
Luis was definitely not a buyer in good faith. Respondents were still in possession of
Lot 2 when Luis supposedly purchased the lot from Felomina and when Luis had the
lot
subdivided
and
the
subdivided
lots
titled.
______________________________________________________________________________
The only way for the heirs of Napoleon to validly claim Lot 2A is to prove that
Napoleon purchased Lot 2A in good faith.
______________________________________________________________________________
The trial and appellate courts ruled that Napoleon was not a purchaser in good faith.
We
agree
with
the
two
courts.
______________________________________________________________________________
The trial and appellate courts pointed out that as early as 1966, there was already a
brewing dispute between respondents and Luis over Lot 2.Maria, Napoleons widow,
testified that she was with Napoleon when Luis sold to them Lot 2 A. Maria
asserted that she was familiar with the history of Lot 2A and the supposed
previous owners Luis and Felomina. It was thus impossible for Napoleon and Maria
not to have known of the Bureau of Lands pending investigation at the time Luis
sold to them Lot 2A.
______________________________________________________________________________
The controversy between respondents and Luis should have prompted Napoleon to
inquire into the status of Luis title over Lot 2A. A purchaser cannot close his eyes

to facts that should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim that he acted
in good faith.
A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the
law. ______________________________________________________________________________
Assuming that Napoleon was unaware of the conflict over Lot 2A at the time of the
execution of the deed of sale, Napoleon was, however, already charged with
knowledge of the flaw in Luis title at the time of the registration of the sale.
Inscriptions of an adverse claim dated 23 November 1970 and lis pendens dated 14
September 1971 were already annotated on Luis title over Lot 2A when Napoleon
registered the Deed of Sale on 16 December 1971.
The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular
real property is in litigation. The inscription serves as a warning that one who
acquires an interest over litigated property does so at his own risk, or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over the property. By disregarding the
inscriptions and pursuing the registration of the sale, Napoleon assumed the risk of
losing Lot 2A to respondents. Napoleons heirs, being merely the juridical
continuation of his personality, hold Lot 2A in trust for respondents.

109 People vs RTC

178 SCRA 299
Caratiquit, Reyville

10/4/1989

FACTS:
Private respondents sold several parcels of land located in Dasmarias, Cavite, in
favor of Ricardo Silverio. These parcels were at that time registered in the names of
the private respondents. One of the parcels is the subject matter of a litigation
between the private respondents and Pedro Caragao and his co-owners for
reconveyance and cancellation of title and damages before Branch XVIII of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite in Tagaytay City. Pedro Caragao then caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the original of the Transfer
Certificate of Title (T.C.T.) of the parcel of land under litigation, on file in the Register
of Deeds for the province of Cavite, without the knowledge of the private
respondents. Hence,the private respondents copy of the title in question did not
bear any annotation of such notice of lis pendens. When the private respondents
sold the two parcels of land to Silverio, including the one under litigation for
reconveyance between Caragao and the private respondents, they warranted that
the properties are free from all liens and encumbrances whatsoever. On the basis
of this express warranty vis--vis the notice of lis pendens duly annotated at the
back of the original of the Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.110942) on file in the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, Assistant Fiscal Napoleon V. Dilao of the
City of Manila filed an information for Falsification of Public Document against the
private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether notice of lis pendens is a lien or encumbrance within the contemplation of
criminal law, in particular, the crime of falsification of public document.

HELD:
No. Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit or a pending
litigation while a notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a
particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires
an interest over the said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the
result of the litigation over the said property. It is but a signal to the intending buyer
or mortgagee to take care or beware and to investigate the prospect or nonprospect of the litigation succeeding before he forks down his money. Notice of lis
pendens has been conceived and, more often than not, availed of, to protect the
real rights of the registrant while the case involving such rights is pending resolution
or decision. With the notice of lis pendens duly recorded, and remains uncancelled,
he could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it during the
litigation. [T]he doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and
necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within
the power of the Court until the judgment or the decree shall have been entered
otherwise, by successive alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or decree
shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution. The lower court is
therefore correct in ruling that a notice of lis pendens being a mere cautionary
notice to a prospective buyer or mortgagee of a parcel of land under litigation, then
it imposes no obligation on the owner, but on the prospective buyer. It cannot
conceivably be the lien or encumbrance contemplated by law.

110 Villanueva vs CA 281 SCRA 298

Castillo, Frinz Lemwel

11/5/1997

Facts:
Records show that TCT Nos. 262631; 273873 and 2777938 [sic] were issued in the
name of Valiant Realty and Development Corporation and Filipinas Textile Mills, Inc.
and the same were mortgaged in favor of Equitable Banking Corp. Upon failure of
the mortgagors to comply with the terms and conditions of the mortgage, the bank
foreclosed the mortgaged properties [and] sold the same to the Equitable Banking
Corp. as the highest bidder at public auction sale. After the expiration of the
redemption period, mortgagors did not exercise the right of redemption and as a
consequence thereof, the mortgagee sold all its rights, interests and participation of
said properties to the herein oppositor, Oo Kian Tiok.
Issue:
May the Register of Deeds refuse to register an application for a notice of lis
pendens on the ground that the applicant does not have any title or right of
possession over the subject properties?
Held:
The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular
real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one who acquires an
interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result

of the litigation over said property.[13] The registration of a notice of lis pendens is
governed by Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court:[14]
Sec. 24. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of
possession of real property, the plaintiff, at the time of filing the complaint, and the
defendant, at the time of filing his answer, when affirmative relief is claimed in such
answer, or at any time afterwards, may record in the office of the registrar of deeds
of province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action,
containing the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a
description of the property in that province affected thereby. From the time only of
filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or incumbrancer of the property
affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the
action, and only of its pendency against parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order
of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
caused it to be recorded.
TO REQUIRE THAT AN APPLICANT MUST PROVE HIS OWNERSHIP OR HIS INTEREST
OVER THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE AFFECTED WITH THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS
WILL UNDULY RESTRICT THE SCOPE OF THE RULE. IN SUCH CASE, A PARTY
QUESTIONING THE OWNERSHIP OF THE REGISTERED OWNER WILL LITIGATE HIS OR
HER CASE WITHOUT AN ASSURANCE THAT THE PROPERTY WILL BE PROTECTED
FROM UNWANTED ALIENATION DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE ACTION, THEREBY
DEFEATING THE VERY PURPOSE AND RATIONALE OF THE REGISTRATION.KYLE
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED. THE ASSAILED DECISION IS
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS HEREBY
ORDERED TO ANNOTATE THE APPLICATION FOR A NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS IN TCT
NOS. 262631, 273873 AND 277938. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED

111 SLOC vs CA
Kaycelle

449 SCRA 99 1/21/2005

112 Magdalena vs CA 184 SCRA 325

Castillo, Rio Star

Castillo,

4/17/1990

Facts:
MEI donated certain part of the lot to the City Government for use as parks
and playgrounds and the donation was ratified by the City Council. An area within
this lot, was subsequently conveyed to the DBP by way of dacion en pago. The rest
were sold to third parties who thereafter constructed houses. Magdalena
Homeowners Association, Inc., believed that the act of the Quezon City Government
of authorizing the release of said as open space, after it had been so declared and

earlier dedicated as suchand its substitution by another portion of the subdivision

was beyond the City Governments authority. MHA brought suit against MEI for the
recovery of said Lot as open space for public use of the residents of the
subdivision. While the case was pending, notices of lis pendens were inscribed by
the Register of Deeds.
Trial court dismissed the case. While the case was pending adjudgment in CA,
MEI and DBP filed separate motions with the Court of Appeals praying for
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles
Issue:
Whether or not the notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles may be
cancelled
Ruling:
Yes.
According to Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and Section 76 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, a notice of lis pendens is proper in the following
cases, viz.:
(a) An action to recover possession of real estate
b) An action to quiet title thereto
c) An action to remove clouds thereon
d) An action for partition and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to the
land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon. The notice of
lis pendensi.e., that real property is involved in an actionis ordinarily
recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is pending.
The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It
does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively
advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with
it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in
any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may
well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined
and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is
therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court
having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal
like the continuance or removal of a preliminary attachment or injunctionis
not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and
ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiffs
appeal. It therefore had power to deal with and resolve any incident in connection
with the action subject of the appeal, even before final judgment. The rule that no

questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have reference only to those
affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g.,
cancellation of notices of lis pendens or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of
provisional remedies. Now, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of
the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
caused it to be recorded.

113 Lagula vs Casimiro

Castro, Floricel

98 Phil. 102

12/17/1955

FACTS:
Lagula, et al., filed a petition praying that a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 4250
be subdivided in accordance with the subdivision plan and technical description
attached to the petition and that, a new transfer certificate be issued in the name of
petitioners. The Chief of the General Land Registration Office recommended the
approval of the request. Petitioners then filed an amended petition wherein they
included the heirs of Felipe Lagula and Apolinario Casimiro. The court approved the
petition as amended and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. 4250 and
issue transfer certificates of title in the name of petitioners.
Heirs of the late Apolinario Casimiro, a co-owner of the land, filed a motion for
reconsideration praying that the order directing the cancellation of TCT No. 4250
and the issuance of new transfer certificates of titles in the name of petitioners, be
set aside on the ground that they have not agreed to the subdivision plan as
submitted to the court nor were they notified of the petition as required by law.
ISSUE:
Whether the court could acquire jurisdiction to hear the petition for the subdivision
of the land without need of a previous notice to the movants.
HELD:
YES. It is not disputed that appellants were never notified of the petition which
initiated these proceedings although they were mentioned therein as co-owners of
the land to be subdivided. The court, however, expressed the opinion that such
notice was not necessary because the purpose of the petition was merely to
subdivide a parcel of land which is already covered by a certificate of title among its
new owners and that this can be done by merely filing with the Chief of the General
Land Registratin Office a subdivision plan and that, once the plan is approved, the
Register of Deeds may issue new certificates of title in pursuance of section 44 of
Act No. 496, as amended by Republic Act No. 440. The court expressed the view
that notice of hearing is only necessary if there are streets or passageways included
in the subdivision in which case a petition shall be filed by the registered owner and
the court shall not act thereon "after notice and hearing as required by law. In the
present case, the court intimated, no such street or passageway is involved and so
notice of hearing is unnecessary.

114 Rojas vs Tagaytay 106 Phil. 512 11/24/1959

Christian Edmund

Chua,

Facts:
Rojas sold a property ("Lot No. 1") to the City of Tagaytay. The City of Tagaytay filed
for an original registration of Lot No. 1 and plan Psu-103196-Amd with the Court of
First Instance. The Court of First approved the registration. However, Rojas (same
person who sold the Lot No. 1 to the City of Tagaytay) and other respondents filed a
petition on the same proceeding to set aside the decision. They argued that Lot No.
1 was part of a bigger land already decreed in previous land registration case and
covered by an original certificate of title. In this case, there were two survey plan,
Psu-103196 which was previously registered and Psu-103196-Amd which was made
by the City of Tagaytay and shows the division of bigger property into four lots,
including Lot No. 1.
Issue:
Whether the CIty of Tagaytay can file an original registration on a property already
covered by an original certificate of title.
Held:
No. The previous decree and the certificate of title duly registered are binding upon
all, including the City of Tagaytay. The remedy for the City of Tagaytay is to secure
first the Court's approval of the subdivision plan segregating Lot No. 1. Then, have
the deed of purchase registered and secure the transfer certificate of title.

115 Republic vs Abrille

Queenie

71 SCRA 57

5/7/1976 De Vera,

FACTS: Defendant (Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille) is the owner of a parcel of land
containing an area of more or less 525,652 sqm. Deceased Abrille during her
lifetime caused the subdivision of the said parcel of land into two lots. Under the
Subdivision plan, Lot 1 contains an area of 30, 100 sqm while Lot 2 contains an area
of 577,679 sqm or a total area of 607,779 sqm, which is 82,127 sqm more than the
original area. After the approval of the Land Registration Commissioner, Abrille was
able to secure and order from the CFI directing the Register of Deeds to correct the
area and thereafter to cancel the Certificate of Title. The Register of Deeds
registered Lot 1 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrile and Lot 2 in the name of Luisa Villa
Abrille. The registration of Lot 2, which includes the excess area was not in
accordance with law for lack of the required notice and publication as prescribed in
Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration Law. The excess
area as a result of the approval of the subdivision survey was formerly a portion of
the Davao River which dried up by reason of the change of course of the said river;
hence a land belonging to the public domain. And, as a consequence thereof TCT of
Lot 2 wherein the excess area of land belonging to the public domain is null and
void ab initio.
ISSUE:

Whether the TCTs which cover the increased area in question totaling 82,125 sqm
shall be cancelled.
HELD:
YES. The increased area in question, which is not a registered land but formerly a
river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a mere mistake in area of the original
registration of the tracts of land of the defendantappellant formerly belonging to
and registered in the name of their grandfather. In order to bring this increase in
area, which the parties admitted to have been a former riverbed of the Davao River,
under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496,
proceedings in registration of land title should have been filed instead of an ordinary
approval of subdivision plan. Under Sec. 44 of Act 496, which the predecessorin
interest of the herein defendantappellant took, is good only insofar as it covers
previously registered lands. In this case, part of the tracts of the land, particularly
the area of 82,127 sqm, has not yet been brought under the operation of the
Torrens System. Worse still, the approval of the subdivision plans was without the
notice to all parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands. For an
applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally
registered Act 496 provided certain requisites to be satisfied and in this case, the
said requisites were not complied with. Thus, the judgment appealed is affirmed.

116 Ong Cung Po vs CA

Sittee Junaira

239 SCRA 341

Dimao,

DOCTRINE: The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the
capacity to acquire or hold landa of the public domain. The 1935 constitution
reserved the right to participate in the disposition, exploitation, development and
utiization of all lands of the public domain and other natural resoutces of the
Philippines for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital
of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals, corporatioon, have
been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been
disqualified from acquiring private lands.
FACTS
On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to private respondent Soledad
Parian, wife of Ong Yee. Ong Yee is the brother of petitioner Ong Ching Po.The sale
was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale and subsequently registered with the
register of Deeds of Manila of which transfer of certificate of Title was issued to the
private respondent. According to the private respondent, she entrusted the
administration of the lot and building to petitioner Ong Ching Po when she and her
husband settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded the lot be vacated
because she was going to sell it. Unfortunately, Ong Ching Po refuses to vacate the
land.
On March 19, 1981, the private respondent filed a case for unlawful detainer before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.The inferior court dismissed the case. The
dismissal was both affirmed by the Regional trial court and the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners ,on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1949, Ong Ching Po bought
the parcel of Land from Ong Joi Jong evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of Sale
conveying therewith the he is acceding to the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po to sign
another document in favor of Soledad Parian forthe purpose of facilitating the
issuance of the new title by the Register of Deeds and for the reason that he is not
yet a Filipino.
On December 12, 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po and his children filed an action for
re conveyance and damages against private respondent in the RTC of Manila.
On July 26, 1986, private respondent filed an action for quieting of title against Ong
Ching Po. Upon the motion, the case was consolidated and on May 30, 1990, the TC
rendered a decision in favor of private respondent. On appeal by the petitioners to
the CA, the court affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence the petition to the SC.
ISSUE
1)
Whether or not Ong Ching Po as a Chinese citizen can validly acquire the land
executed under the Deed of Sale.
2)

Whether or not the private respondent took possession of the property.

HELD/RATIO
1)
No. An Alien is disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines. The
Supreme Court did not go along with the claim of the petitioner that Ong Ching Po
merely used the private respondent as a dummy to have the title over the parcel of
land registered in her name because being an alien he was disqualified to own real
property in the Philippines. To sustain such contention is a violation of the
nationalization laws. Assuming that the Deed of sale is in existence and was duly
executed, still the petitioner cannot claim ownership of the land by virtue of Section
5 Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution which provides that save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations or associations qualifies to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain the Philippines, this was further reiterated in the Section 14
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution and adopted in the 1987 Constitution, Section 7,
Article XII which further states that save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain of the
Philippines.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to
acquire
or hold lands of public domain. Private land maybe transferred or
conveyed to individuals or entities qualified to acquire lands of the public
domain.The 1935 constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition,
exploitation, development and utilization of all lands of the public domain and
other natural resources of the Philippines for Filipino citizens or corporations at
least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether
individuals, corporation, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence,
they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands. Petitioner Ong Ching

Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore he was disqualified from acquiring and owning
real property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of sale
has been established, the same is null and void, it being contrary to law.
2)
Yes. The private respondent took possession of the land. Under the law,
possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of
conveyance. Under Art 1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, when the sale is
made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear
or cannot clearly be inferred. If what the petitioners meant was that the private
respondent never lived in the building constructed on said land, it was because her
family had settled in Iloilo. It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the
name of private respondent and her husband. The rental receipts were also in the
name of her husband.

117 Lee vs Republic

Carlo

360 SCRA 524

Fadera, Juna

Facts:
The Dinglasans (vendors) sold the subject property to Lee Liong (vendee), a Chinese
citizen. Later on, the vendors filed an action against the heirs of the vendee for the
annulment of sale and recovery of the land assailing the validity of the sale on the
ground of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership private or
public land. The RTC, CA and SC ruled neither for the vendors and vendee applying
the principle of pari delicto. Another case was filed against the same defendants by
the same plaintiffs but this was barred by res judicata as decided by the SC. After
the war, the widows, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu-Lee, of the heirs of Lee
Liong, both Filipino Citizens, herein petitioners filed with the RTC a petition for the
reconstitution of title of the subject property and granted the same. The Solicitor
General filed a petition for annulment of judgment of reconstitution. OSG contended
that the petitioners were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since
their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he
was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land.
CA ruled in favor of the OSG. Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
WON the successors-in-interest (petitioners) of an Aliens has the right to acquire the
subject property.
Held/Ratio:
YES. The sale of the land was consummated in 1936, under the 1935 Constituion,
aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary
succession. Here, Alien Lee Liong is disqualified to acquire the land however
ownership of the land cannot revert to the original seller because of the principle of
pari delicto. Now, the subject land is in the hands of the petitioners, both Filipinos.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private
domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non Filipinos. In

this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is
in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. If land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a
citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid. Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to
qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the
initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.
Petition GRANTED.

118 Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She

52
Galicia, Monico King A.

21 SCRA

FACTS:
Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property in Manila, as her sister died.
Then already well advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled
and an invalid, she was left with no other relative to live with. She lived in one of the
houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong
had been a longtime lessee of a portion of the property. Wong himself was the
trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping, including
rentals from her property.
In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the lessee to her, Justina
Santos executed a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the entire property,
including the portion on which the house of Justina Santos stood.
She then executed another contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased
premises. The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a
petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. It appears,
however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn when it was
discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. In 1958 she filed a petition to adopt
him and his children on the erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them
Philippine citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings were
abandoned.
Later on, she executed two other contracts, one extending the term of the lease to
99 years, and another fixing the term of the option of 50 years.
In two wills executed on, she bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had
entered into with Wong, but in a codicil of a later date she appears to have a
change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of
machinations and inducements practised by him, she now directed her executor to
secure the annulment of the contracts. Action was filed, and the court was asked to
direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration of the contracts
Both parties died during the pendency of the action. Wong was substituted by his
wife, Lui She, while Justina Santos was substituted by the Philippine Banking
Corporation.

ISSUE:
Whether an alien may validly acquire lease right and an option to buy a real
property.
HELD/RATIO:
No.
A lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien
the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.
As this Court said in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds:
[A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of
lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is
temporary they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract
which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here
forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not
impossible to acquire.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land,
by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his
property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a
virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only
of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus
abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it (jus disponendi)rights the sum total
of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred,
tomorrow, the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the
rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this is
just exactly what the parties in this case did within the space of one year, with the
result that Justina Santos ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow
concept.
As this Court said in Krivenko:
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice.
We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be.
Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude where they may build
aliens admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites their homes. But
if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to
compromise it even in the name of amity or equity, xxx
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not
acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and,
accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.