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What were the key factors which greatly dramatised Japanese

militarism between 1931 and 1945?

IB History HL
Internal Assessment
Candidate name: Cheng Nicholas Gin Foon
Candidate number:
School: Li Po Chun United World College
Exam session: May 2016
Word count: 1,921

Nicholas Cheng Gin Foon

Section A: Plan of Investigation


This paper will evaluate the question: What were the key factors which greatly
dramatized Japanese militarism from 1931? To explore this fervor for militarism, the
economic, social and political state of Japan must be accounted. The scope of this
investigation thus encompasses and explores the Nationalist and Militarist Principles of the
Japanese public, Japanese response to Western powers, the rise of ultra-nationalism, and the
independence of the military evidenced from 1931 to 1945. For the purpose of this paper, this
paper will reference the Manchurian Incident of 1931 as the first major product of militarism
in Japan. Hence, events which occur after this incident fall outside the scope of the
investigation.
This investigation addresses the research question by first exploring secondary sources
from 1937. The source is valuable for its ability to capture the perspective many scholars held
while Japanese militarism was at its pinnacle. The investigation then focuses on consolidating
an understanding of how the topic is currently perceived among historians. The two most
applicable and definitive sources are In a Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times
to the Present by prominent Harvard historian Andrew Gordon and A Social Basis for
Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community by Richard J. Smethurst of
Oxford. By analyzing these sources in combination with journal articles, a comprehensive
perspective can be drawn.

Nicholas Cheng Gin Foon

Section B: Summary of Evidence


Nationalist and Militarist Principles of the Japanese Public
The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) stressed loyalty to the state and the notion
that education served the state and society.1
Government-run Shintoism emphasized military glorification and authoritarian rule.2
The military class of daimyo and samurai held dominance in the state for centuries
prior.3
The daimyo, or feudal lords who supported the shogun, ruled by the sword, and their
adherents, the samurai, could kill at will.4
The Japanese public were Fervently patriotic and nationalistic, and developed deep
emotional feelings towards the emperor.5
The Japanese public held Soldierly and nationalistic values.6
The slogan of the nation since the Meiji Era was: Enrich the Nation and strengthen its
arms (fukoku kyohei).7
Japanese Response to Western Powers
The aim of the parliament was to raise military strength to stand equal to the West.8
The United States recognized Japans interests in Manchuria with the Ishii-Lansing
Agreement of 1917.9
1

Andrew Gordon, In A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 105.
2
Kenneth Colegrove, Militarism in Japans Foreign Policy, Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Vol. 2015, America and Japan (1941): 8.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Richard Smethurst. A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community.
(Califronia: University of California Press, 1974), xviii.
6
Ibid., xvi
7
Martin Bernd, Japan and Germany in the Modern World (New York: Bergahn Books, 1995), 81.
8
Colegrove, Japans Foreign Policy, 8.
9
Shinichi Kitaoka, Diplomacy and the Military in Showa Japan (1990), Daedalus No. 3, Showa: The Japan of
Hirohito (Summer, 1990), Vol. 119: 155.

Nicholas Cheng Gin Foon

There was rapid increase in military expenditures after the Triple Intervention (23 April
1895) which signified Japans inability to hold its position against Western powers.10
Formation of national military organizations such as young mens associations.11
Yamagata Aritomo, considered the father of the modern Japanese army, believed
Manchuria was within Japans line of sovereignty (shukensen).12
After the Manchurian Incident (1931), Japans imperial elite convinced the public that
war was inevitable and set about building a political-economic system that would
prepare Japan for war.13
The war office initiated a series of army pamphlets outlining a) Japans lack of
resources, b) Japans divine destiny to expel Western intervention c) the army and
navy must be augmented.14
The rise of ultra-nationalism
During the Great Depression, western countries enacted trade barriers between them
and Japan.15
The United States Immigration Law (1924) prohibited Japanese from immigrating to
the country.16
The Great Depression (1929) caused social uncertainty and rural discontent, which
rallied Japanese opinion behind the militarys acts of aggression in Manchuria.17
The Washington Naval Conference (1921-22) restricted the amount of battleships
between the US, the UK, and Japan to a ratio of 5:5:3.18
10

Bill Gordon, Japans March Towards Militarism, last modified 2000, accessed September 19 2015,
<http://wgordon.web.wesleyan.edu/papers/jhist2.htm>
11
Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism, xiv.
12
Gordon, March Towards Militarism. 13 Matasaka Kosaka, The Showa Era (1926-1989), Daedalus, Vol.
119, No. 3, Showa: The Japan of Hirohito (1990): 35.
14
Colegrove, Japans Foreign Policy,13.
15
Dorothy Perkins, Japan Goes to War: A Chronology of Japanese Military Expansion (Pennsylvania: Diane
Pub Co, 1997), 109.
16
Kosaka, Showa Era, 35.
17
Ibid.

Nicholas Cheng Gin Foon

The London Naval Treaty (1930) restricted Japan to 12 heavy cruisers.19


Increasing national growth as a means to increase military strength.20
Independence of the military
The disparity in foreign policy between the Cabinet and the Imperial army known
widely by the Japanese as Niju-gwaiko, or dual diplomacy.21
Article XI of the 1889 Constitution allowed the military to exist outside the jurisdiction
of the Parliament.22
From 1900, the War Minister mandated to be nominated from an active-serving
General.23
The military had the ability to: terminate a cabinet, form a cabinet, alter cabinet
policies; ignore ministerial policies, and execute foreign policies independent of the
cabinet.24
The military had the privilege of advising the Emperor upon all matters pertaining to
the defense of the Japanese Empire regardless of the foreign policy of the Cabinet.25
The Manchurian Incident (1931) the first major act of aggression by the Japanese
Imperial Army was unapproved by the cabinet ,and yet, went unpunished.26
Manchurian Incident as a prelude to the military takeover of power in politics.27

19

Kosaka, Showa Era, 33.


Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism, 164.
21
Colegrove, Japans Foreign Policy,13.
22
Ibid., 11.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid., 10.
26
Marjorie Dryburgh, North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937: Regional Power and the National
Interest (London: Routledge, 2000), 105.
27
Kosaka, Showa Era, 35.
20

Nicholas Cheng Gin Foon

Section C: Evaluation of Sources


Source: A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community
Origin Book written by Richard Smethurst, a history professor and vice-chancellor
at the University of Oxford, and published in 1974 on the social causes of militarism in
Japan.
Purpose To provide insight on the social causes of Japanese militarism which are
often overlooked. The book analyzes and evaluates historical accounts to assess the impact of
military organizations in rural society.
Value Smethurst used an array of sources in his research of military organizations.
Outside the conventional references to official government documents and biographies,
Smethurst consulted rare first-hand community and local documents and interviewed former
leaders of the military organizations he describes in his book. This links to the purpose of the
source and allows him to use the subjective insight from personal accounts to assess the
impact of the organizations.
Limitation His argumentation of the importance of the social causes of militarism
fails to address and recognize the importance of other aspects. The purpose of the source does
not allow it to analyze the causes of Japanese militarism in its broader context.
Source: Militarism in Japans Foreign Policy
Origin Article written by Kenneth Colegrove who was a professor of political
science at Northwestern University, and sat on the board of Amerasia, and published in 1941
in a review of American and Asian Affairs.28

28

Northwestern University Library. Guide to the Kenneth W. Colegrove (1886-1975) Papers. Accessed 22
September 2014.
http://findingaids.library.northwestern.edu/catalog/inu-ead-nua-archon-1223

Nicholas Cheng Gin Foon

Purpose To provide analysis on various facets of Japanese militarism, combining his


own analysis with that of other scholars.
Value The value of this source lies in its wealth of first-hand sources. Written in
1941, Colegrove references numerous scholars who offer vast and vivid insights to the events
which were unfolding before them, giving a first-hand perspective on Japans foreign policy.
Limitation The limitations in this source lies in its lack of evidence. Colegrove
makes many claims which are not substantiated with reference to other sources. The source is
also written in a narrative tone, making it inappropriate for the academic rigor expected of
this investigation.

Nicholas Cheng Gin Foon

Section D: Analysis
The Manchurian Incident of 1931 was referred to as a prelude to the military
takeover of power in politics by historian Matasaka Kosaka.29 Was Japans entrance into
the military state solely a result of one event? No, Japans passage into militarism was
set long before this first act of aggression.
Japans entrance into militarism was to a large extent due to the role and
independence of its army. A number of legislative decrees enacted by the Meiji
government allowed for the independence and freedom of its military to act as it pleased.
Article XI of the 1889 Constitution allowed the military to exist outside the jurisdiction of the
Parliament.30 The military simultaneously gained the privilege of advising the Emperor
upon all matters pertaining to the defense of the Japanese Empire regardless of the foreign
policy of the Cabinet as a result of Article XI.31 In 1900, it was further stipulated that the
serving War Minister on the Cabinet was to be a elected from the military.32 This resulted in
the military gaining vast political influence over the parliament and Emperor. The military
gained vast control of the cabinet system, able to establish and dismantle cabinets at will as
well as act independently of the cabinets foreign policy.33 This disparity between the cabinet
and military (known as niju-gwaiko), resulted in the Manchurian Incident (1931) which
cemented the militarys place in foreign affairs.34 The Incident represented the Cabinets
failures to control the reckless urges of the Japanese military and exemplified its
independence and role in instigating Japanese militarism in the 1930s.

29

Kosaka, Showa Era, 35.


Ibid., 41.
31
Colegrove, Japans Foreign Policy, 10.
32
Ibid., 11.
33
Ibid.
34
Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism, 164; Marjorie Dryburgh, North China and
Japanese Expansion 1933-1937, 105
30

Nicholas Cheng Gin Foon

The values held by the Japanese public from the Meiji Restoration (1868) was a major
factor in causing Japanese militarism. The historian Richard Smethurst argued that the
Japanese public was fervently patriotic and nationalistic, and developed deep emotional
feelings towards the emperor36 and held soldierly and nationalistic values.37 These
principles of the Japanese public were caused by the traditional belief of the importance of
the military class in Japanese society, along with religious and educational reforms. Social
Science Professor Kenneth Colegrove argued that the daimyo, or feudal lords who supported
the shogun, ruled by the sword, and their adherents, the samurai, could kill at will.38 From
this quote, one can see the violent militaristic tendencies of the Japanese feudal military caste
and its shift into the modern era. This is substantiated as prior to the Meiji era, the military
class of daimyo held supremacy in the centuries prior.39 The culmination of these factors
created a tradition of military admiration and a sense of loyalty to the state and emperor,
which played a major social role in dramatically increasing Japans militarism in the 1930s.
Educational and religious reforms emphasized traditional values of patriotism and
military reverence which molded a Japanese public which would not oppose the actions of an
. In terms of these reforms, The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) stressed loyalty to the
state and the notion that education served the state and society.40 State-enforced Shintoism
emphasized military glorification and authoritarian rule.41 In tandem, these factors sowed the
seeds for a patriotic Japanese public.

36

Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism, xvii.


Ibid, xvi.
38
Colegrove, Japans Foreign Policy, 8.
39
Ibid.
40
Gordon, In A Modern History of Japan, 105.
41
Colegrove, Japans Foreign Policy, 8.
37

Nicholas Cheng Gin Foon

10

In response to western attempts to influence Japanese politics and foreign policy, the
Japanese parliament responded with sweeping changes made with great conviction, which
directly led to the militarization of Japan. After the Triple Intervention, the Meiji government
rapidly increased its military expenditure in an attempt to stand up to western Powers.42 The
Japanese War office initiated a series of army pamphlets outlining Japans lack of
resources, and the necessity of the army and navy to be elevated to meet its desire to expel
Western intervention.43
Yamata Arimoto, viewed as father of the modern Japanese military, believed
Manchuria fell within Japans line of sovereignty and hence must be claimed and protected
for the security of Japan.44 Directly as a result of this, the United States and Japan signed a
diplomatic note, known as the Lansing-Ishii Agreement (2 November 1917) where Japans
special interests in Manchuria were recognized by the United States.45 Japans special
interests in Manchuria in conjunction with the militarys independence were short term
causes to militarism in the 1930s.

42

Gordon, March Towards Militarism.


Colegrove, Japans Foreign Policy,13.
44
Gordon, March Towards Militarism.
45
Kitaoka, Diplomacy and the Military,155.
43

Nicholas Cheng Gin Foon

11

Ultra-nationalism was the Japanese publics response to foreign influence in Japan


and directly led to a nationalistic fervor for militarization. International pressures to
demilitarize such as the Washington Naval Conference (1921-22) and the London Naval
Treaty (1930) restricted Japans naval capacity.46 Following the Wall Street Crash (1929),
western countries enacted trade barriers with Japan.47 This caused social uncertainty, which
rallied Japanese opinion behind the militarys actions in Manchuria.48 The military
restrictions and trade barriers polarized western powers in the eyes of the Japanese public
which generated public support of the proceedings in Manchuria which signified the
emergence of Japanese militarism in the 1930s.

Section E: Conclusion
One of the main factors that magnified Japanese militarism in the 1930s was the
role and independence of the military. Legislative failures of the Meiji Constitution and
Japanese government allowed the military to garner vast amounts of influence within the
cabinet system and the ability to disregard its foreign policy. Public and parliamentary
response to foreign influences along with Japans fervor for militarization set the
foundation for the rise of ultra-nationalism in the nation. The influence the military held
over the domestic government in tandem with the patriotic and militaristic values held
by the Japanese public further created the conditions which allowed Japanese militarism
to flourish from 1931 onwards.

46

Goldstein and Maurer, The Washington Conference, 38; Kosaka, Showa Era, 33
Perkins, Japan Goes to War, 109
48
Kosaka, Showa Era, 35
47

Nicholas Cheng Gin Foon

12

Bibliography
Bernd, Martin. Japan and Germany in the Modern World (New York: Bergahn Books, 1995)
Colegrove, Kenneth. Militarism in Japans Foreign Policy, Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Vol. 2015, America and Japan (1941): 8.
Dryburgh, Marjorie. North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937: Regional Power and the National
Interest (London: Routledge, 2000).
Goldstein, Erik and John Maurer. The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability
and the Road to Pearl Harbor (London: Routledge, 2012).
Gordon, Bill. Japans March Towards Militarism. last modified 2000. Accessed September 19 2015.
<http://wgordon.web.wesleyan.edu/papers/jhist2.htm>
Kitaoka, Shinichi. Diplomacy and the Military in Showa Japan (1990). Daedalus No. 3, Showa: The Japan of
Hirohito (Summer, 1990), Vol. 119.
Kosaka, Matasaka. The Showa Era (1926-1989). Daedalus, Vol. 119, No. 3, Showa: The Japan of Hirohito
(1990).
Northwestern University Library. Guide to the Kenneth W. Colegrove (1886-1975) Papers. Accessed 22
September 2014. <http://findingaids.library.northwestern.edu/catalog/inu-ead-nua-archon-1223>
Perkins, Dorothy. Japan Goes to War: A Chronology of Japanese Military Expansion (Pennsylvania: Diane Pub
Co, 1997).
Smethurst, Richard. A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community.
(California: University of California Press, 1974).

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