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5
VOLUME
VIOLENCE
POLITICAL
IN MINDANAO:
THE STATE OF
PLAY IN 2016
OCCASIONAL
PAPER
MAY 2016
02
POLITICAL VIOLENCE
IN MINDANAO:
THE STATE OF
PLAY IN 2016
ARMED GROUPS IN MINDANAO
The study of adaptation as a phenomenon among armed groups
within Mindanao has been largely overlooked in the academic literature,
despite occasional references in policy analyses of Southeast Asia
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* The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.
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Nevertheless, the majority of attacks (102 incidents or roughly 58% of attacks) recorded were committed by unknown perpetrators on
typically unidentified civilians. There are many possible explanations for the predominance of unknown perpetrators, including: the
clandestine intent of certain violent incidents, specifically those related to political assassination; the fleeting nature of armed
skirmishes where shooters are simply labeled as militants or gunmen in the press; as well as gaps in reporting.
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The New Peoples Army is regularly underestimated as simply another rentextracting group that terrorizes local businesses. Yet, of the 15 attacks they
initiated, 3 involved the destruction of farm equipment and 3 others involved
violence against local notables, specifically several town councilors, a barangay
chief, and a vice mayor. The remaining incidents involved abductions and
clashes with local police and militia members. While acts of sabotage are not
particularly sophisticated or worrisome on their own, in the context of other
attacks on persons conducted by the NPA that notably only lead to 5 fatalities,
these acts are indicative of an organization that uses violence selectively.
To wit, when the NPA abducted 2 AFP soldiers and 3 cops at several
checkpoints in Northern Mindanao on April 3, one retired officer was released
to the public because he was in poor health. On April 17, the NPA captured 5
cops in a raid in Davao City, who were released on April 25 with the negotiating
assistance of Rodrigo Duterte.33 Although the details of the negotiation were not
disclosed to the press, NPA propaganda benefits from showing clemency to the
enemy after successfully executing the abduction of armed officers in a major
city. Using this classic propaganda by the deed in conjunction with a
relatively active media arm, the NPA has succeeded at garnering
national attention and perhaps radicalizing new groups.
To the NPAs advantage is the lack of a unified voice from the business
community estimating how much is lost by taxation to their activities. Their
racketeering, though well known in the abstract, is seldom publicized with
any specificity, which allows them to remain a semi-legitimized arm of
the CPP. Severing the CPP-NPA connection by fully discrediting
NPA behavior would be a further good step at getting the
CPP to come to the table on governments terms.
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Conclusion
The medias coverage of Philippine attacks has become routine: Mindanao fatigue
is often complained about by academics and journalists alike, who wonder why there has become
disinterest in following stories about Mindanao despite the gravity of the violence that ensues.
Small-scale incidents are frequent, and where they do not exist, it is difficult to tell whether it is
because they are underreported either by the victims or the media owing to lack of broad interest;
or because families and businesses have capitulated to paying revolutionary taxes or other
forms of protection money. In this way, even Filipino audiences in the capital
have become inured to the notion of Mindanao violence.
Although there is no understating insurgency and sub-state violence as a perennial
feature of the Philippine domestic security landscape, hope remains that violence can abate.
There are clearly areas of accommodation, if not cooperation, among different political groups,
including those that take up arms. Members of the Moro National Liberation Front, a group
behind the 2013 Siege of Zamboanga that resulted in the deaths of hundreds and the
displacement of thousands, for example, was permitted to parade Davao City two years
later in 2015.42 In tending to domestic insecurity, there must be a balance. The authors
hope that this balance can be found in the incoming Duterte administration.
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endnotes
Millar, Paul, Does Abu Sayyaf pose a major
terror threat to Southeast Asia?, Southeast Asia
Globe, June 1, 2016: http://sea-globe.com/194302-abu-sayyaf-isis/?fb_ref=FsVMvAf6rr-Twitter
For more information on the Global Terrorism
Database, please see the website at https://www.
start.umd.edu/gtd/
For more information on the Bangsamoro
Conflict Monitoring System, please see the website
at http://bcms-philippines.info/vers1/
In the interests of saving space, definitions
for each individual category have not been reproduced here. For a complete set of definitions for
these attacks, the reader is requested to refer to
pp. 22-24 of the Global Terrorism Databases Codebook, which can be accessed through this link:
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf
See: Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers
and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
Cesar Adib Majul, The Moro Struggle in the
Philippines, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2,
Islam & Politics (Apr., 1988), pp. 897-922
Tom McKenna, Saints, scholars and the idealized past in Philippine Muslim separatism, The
Pacific Review, Vol. 15 No. 4 2002: 544-545
McKenna, Thomas M. Muslim Rulers and
Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism
in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1998, 200-210
Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University, August 24,
2015 https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/309?highlight=MILF
Marites Daguilan Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria. The
MILF Story, Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion
in Mindanao, Quezon City, Philippines : Ateneo
Center for Social Policy & Public Affairs : Institute
for Popular Democracy, 2000.
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10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
Zachary Abuza, The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28:4, 2005, 53479,
Alpaslan zerdem and Sukanya Podder, Grassroots and Rebellion: A Study on the Future of the
Moro Struggle in Mindanao, Philippines, Civil
Wars, Vol. 14, Iss. 4, 2012, 521-527
12
13
Zachary Abuza, Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2005, 2-20
14
15
Ibid.
Abu Sayyaf Group, Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University, August 24, 2015
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/
cgi-bin/groups/view/152
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Peter Chalk, The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters: The Newest Obstacles to Peace in
the Southern Philippines?, CTC Sentinel, November 2013
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22
The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks, Crisis Group Asia Report
N202, 14 February 2011, 3-4
23
Ibid, 5-10 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, Revolutionary Taxation and the Logistical and Strategic
Dilemmas of the Maoist Insurgency in the Philippines. Journal of Asian Security and International
Affairs 1, no. 3 (2014): 266-267
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Editha Z. Caduaya, Peoples burial: Thousands march for NPAs Kumander Parago, Rappler, July 10, 2015 http://www.rappler.com/
nation/98884-kumander-parago-pitao-funeraldavao Glenda M. Gloria, Benito Tiamzon: Writer,
organizer, party man, Rappler, March 23, 2014
http://www.rappler.com/nation/53686-benitotiamzon-cpp-leader
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The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks, Crisis Group Asia Report
N202, 14 February 2011, 10-22 Nathan Gilbert
Quimpo, Revolutionary Taxation and the Logistical and Strategic Dilemmas of the Maoist Insurgency in the Philippines. Journal of Asian Security
and International Affairs 1, no. 3 (2014): 282-287
Francis Domingo, Explaining the Sustainability
of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New
Peoples Army, Small Wars Journal, October 4,
2013 Edwin Espejo, Pay for permit to campaign,
Reds tell candidates, Rappler, December 26,
2015:
http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/
elections/2016/117159-cpp-npa-2016-elections
Alexis Romero, AFP insists NPA strength down
to 3,900, PhilStar, January 12, 2016 http://www.
philstar.com/headlines/2016/01/12/1541823/afpinsists-npa-strength-down-3900 Mart D. Sambalud, NPA at 47: We become large and strong,
Davao Today, March 29, 2016 http://davaotoday.
com/main/politics/npa-at-47-we-become-largeand-strong/
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endnotes
Julie M. Aurelio, 13 Abu Sayyaf men killed
in new firefight, says AFP, Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 12 2016: http://newsinfo.inquirer.
net/779107/13-abu-sayyaf-men-killed-in-newfirefight-says-afp#ixzz4ANjivwNc
Desk Man,
Notorious Sayyaf leader killed in Basilan clash,
Mindanao Examiner, April 12, 2016: http://mindanaoexaminer.com/notorious-sayyaf-leaderkilled-in-basilan-clash/ Gerg Cahiles, AFP
downplays ISIS hand in Basilan clash. CNN Philippines, April 13, 2016: http://cnnphilippines.com/
news/2016/04/12/afp-isis-abu-sayyaf-basilanclash.html Kaye Imson, Analyst: PHL govt should
reinforce troops in Mindanao, InterAksyon, April
12, 2016: http://interaksyon.com/article/126365/
video--analyst-phl-govt-should-reinforce-troopsin-mindanao
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28
Ibid.
29
http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/
malaysian-police-nab-14-isis-suspects-in-4-dayoperation
30
Joseph Franco, Mindanao after the Philippines presidential elections, New Mandala, March
9 2016: http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2016/03/09/mindanao-after-the-philippinespresidential-elections/
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32
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training-camp-in-lanao-del-sur#sthash.fFu3rRKh.
dpuf PH troops regain control of town attacked
by terrorists, Rappler, March 1, 2016: http://www.
rappler.com/nation/124287-military-control-butiglanao Richel V. Umel, IS-linked group beheads 2
captive sawmill workers, SunStar, April 15, 2016
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/cagayan-de-oro/
local-news/2016/04/14/linked-group-beheads2-captive-sawmill-workers-467848 JC Ansis,
Butig clashes: What we know so far, CNN Philippines, March 3, 2016: http://cnnphilippines.
com/regional/2016/03/02/Butig-Lanao-del-Surclashes-Maute-group.html
ABS-CBN
News,
Military finds evidence linking Maute Group to
MILF, May 31, 2016: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=OiZ0HHqv3fY
Dennis J. Santos, Communist rebels free
5 cops captured in Davao City, Inquirer Mindanao, April 25, 2016: http://newsinfo.inquirer.
net/781550/communist-rebels-free-5-cops-captured-in-davao-city
33
www.policyforum.net/all-conflict-is-local/
James Fearon, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and
Civil War, The American Political Science Review.
97.1 (Feb 2003): 75-90. Simeon Djankov and Marta Reynal Querol, Poverty and Civil War: Revisiting
the Evidence, Review of Economics and Statistics, 92:4, 2010, 1035-1041
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41
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/davao/localnews/2015/04/20/mnlf-belittles-bangsamoro-basic-law-403456
42
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35
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International Alert, Rebellion, Political Violence and Shadow Crimes in the Bangsamoro: The
Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System (BCMS),
August 2014, 20112013
37
38
Joseph Franco, All conflict is local: Mindanao after the Philippine Presidential Elections, Asia
& Pacific Policy Society, March 10, 2016: http://
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9.5
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ABOUT
Luke Lischin
Angelica Mangahas
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