A.M. No.

MTJ-93-813 September 15, 1993

FERNANDO CAYAO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JUSTINIANO A. DEL MUNDO, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Fernando R. Cayao with the Office of the Court
Administrator charging respondent Judge Justiniano A. Del Mundo, MTC, Indang Cavite
with abuse of authority.
Acting on said complaint, the Office of the Court Administrator directed Judge Enrique M.
Almario, Regional trial Court Branch XV, Naic, Cavite, to conduct an investigation and to
submit his report and recommendation thereon.
Based on the records as well as the report submitted by the investigating Judge, it appears
that on or about October 22, 1992 at 9:25 a.m., while traversing the stretch of Mataas na
Lupa, Alulod, Indang, Cavite, complainant, as driver of Donny's Transit Bus with Plate No.
DWB 315, overtook a Sto. Nio Liner with Body No. 5282 driven by one Arnel Ranes
Muloy. As a consequence thereof, the bus driven by complainant almost collided head-on
with an oncoming owner-type jeepney with Plate No. PJT 752. It turned out later that the
jeepney was registered in the name of respondent Judge Del Mundo who, at the time of the
incident, was one of the passengers therein along with his sons Rommel and June and one
Edward Rommen. Respondent's son Rommel was behind the wheel.
At 3:30 p.m. of the same day, even before complainant could properly park his bus, he was
picked up by policemen of the Philippine National Police Station of Indang, Cavite at the
Indang Public Plaza and was immediately brought before the sala of respondent judge.
There, complainant was confronted by respondent judge and accused by the latter of
nearly causing an accident that morning. Without giving complainant any opportunity to
explain, respondent judge insisted that complainant be punished for the incident.
Whereupon, complainant was compelled by respondent judge to choose from three (3)
alternative punishments none of which is pleasant, to wit: (a) to face a charge of multiple
attempted homicide; (b) revocation of his driver's license; or (c) to be put in jail for three (3)
days. Of the three choices, complainant chose the third, i.e., confinement for three (3) days,
as a consequence of which he was forced to sign a "waiver of detention" by respondent
judge. Thereafter, complainant was immediately escorted by policemen to the municipal
jail. Though not actually incarcerated complainant remained in the premises of the
municipal jail for three (3) days, from October 22 up to October 25, 1992, by way of serving
his "sentence". On the third day, complainant was released by SPO1 Manolo Dilig to the
custody of Geronimo Cayao, complainant's co-driver and cousin.

The fact of detention of complainant in the premises of the municipal jail for three (3) days
was confirmed and corroborated by the testimony of the jail warden of Indang, Cavite,
SP04 Adelaida Nova. The fact of complainant's release therefrom after three (3) days
detention was testified to by SPO1 Manolo Dilig who prepared the corresponding document
of release. For his defense, respondent judge merely made general denials.
The actuations of respondent judge herein complained of, constitute abuse of authority. To
begin with, respondent's verbal order for the arrest of complainant at the Indang Public
Plaza without the requisite complaint having been filed and the corresponding warrant of
arrest having been issued in order that complainant may be brought to his sala is
characteristic of personal vengeance and the abusive attitude of respondent. Being a
judge, respondent above all, should be the first to abide by the law and weave an example
for others to follow (Ompoc vs. Torres, 178 SCRA 14 [1989]). Instead, respondent judge
opted to avail of his judicial authority in excess of what is allowed by law to gratify his
vindictive purposes.
If respondent honestly believes that complainant committed violations of traffic rules and
regulations which nearly caused the accident involving their respective vehicles,
respondent judge should have caused the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against
complainant and left it at that. On the contrary, respondent is not one to let the law run its
own course. This is a classic case where respondent took it upon himself to be the accuser,
prosecutor, judge and executioner at the same time to condemn complainant for his alleged
wrongdoing without the benefit of due process. Without even an opportunity to air his side,
complainant was unceremoniously made to choose his own penalty. Left with no other
choice but to face his predicament and overpowered by the imposing authority of
respondent, complainant picked the lesser evil of the three alternatives given to him.
Complainant can hardly be blamed for so doing. A perusal of the two (2) other choices
presented to him will illustrate why.
The first choice given to complainant was to face a charge of multiple attempted homicide.
To threaten complainant with a criminal case for multiple attempted homicide is indicative of
respondent's gross ignorance of the law. As a judge, he should know very well that such at
charge will not hold water in any court of law considering that no accident per se ever
occurred and hence, no life threatening injury was even sustained. To a mere bus driver
who is not at all familiar with the intricacies of the law, such a threat spelled not only the
possibility of long-term imprisonment and all the hardship it entails but also the onus and
shame that will forever attach to his name. Surely, to his mind, a threat of prosecution
coming from a municipal trial court judge is alarming enough.
The second alternative punishment offered to complainant to choose from involves his very
means of livelihood revocation of his driver's license. This is tantamount to economic
death penalty and just as repulsive as the first alternative.
Faced with these grim prospects complainant voluntarily submitted himself to the jail
warden of the Indang Municipal Jail for detention after executing his "waiver of detention,"

complainant felt that he had no other choice but to serve out the "penalty" forcibly and
arbitrarily imposed upon him by respondent.
While it is true that complainant was not put behind bare as respondent had intended,
however, complainant was not allowed to leave the premises of the jail house. The idea of
confinement is not synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to
qualify as confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or physically, of his personal
liberty (Black's Law Dictionary, 270 [1979]). Under the circumstances, respondent judge
was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention when he, as a public officer, ordered the arrest and
detention of complainant without legal grounds (Article 124, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs.
Battallones 23 Phil. 46 [1912]). In overtaking another vehicle, complainant-driver was not
committing or had not actually committed a crime in the presence of respondent judge
(Section 6, Rule 113, Rules of Court). Such being the case, the warrantless arrest and
subsequent detention of complainant were illegal. In the case at bar, no less than the
testimony of the jail warden herself confirmed that complainant was indeed deprived of his
liberty for three (3) days:
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q Alright, did you or did you not in fact detain Fernando Cayao on
that premises? On the ground of that premises?
WITNESS (jail warden):
A I did not put him inside the jail, your Honor, but he was inside the
police station.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q Alright, as a police officer, I ask you again, did you or did you not
detain Fernando Cayao based on the premises that you said under
oath before this Court?
A Yes, your Honor, inside the police station.
Q Does it mean that he could not have gone freely of his own
volition outside the police station without your authority or
permission?
A He can move freely.
COURT:

Q When you said that, you meant he could have gone home, he
could have gone eating in restaurant, he could have gone to a
theatre or in any public place. Is that what you mean?
WITNESS:
A No, your Honor. Only inside the police station.
Q Why only in the police station? Inside? What is your order? What
did you tell him?
A Because he voluntarily went to the police station to be detained.
Q Alright, so, had he told you that he would have gone to other
places, you will have no objection? You will have no interpolation or
you would not feel that you have a right to have him under your
custody. Is that correct?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A I will still prevent him.
(TSN, November 19, 1992, pp. 9-10)
Of equal importance is the perception of complainant himself as to whether his liberty, was
actually restricted or not:
xxx xxx xxx
Q So, summarily speaking, you feel that you were detained in the
municipal jail of the station of Indang, Cavite?
A Yes, your Honor, because I was not able to get out from the police
station from the time that I was detained.
(TSN, November 19, 1992, p. 16)
It would be well to emphasize at this point that the gravity of the misconduct of respondent
is not alone centered on his order for the detention of complainant. Rather, it is ingrained in
the fact that complainant was so detained without affording him his constitutional rights.
As previously mentioned, complainant was condemned by his own accuser without the
benefit of due process. Complainant was not even accorded any of the basic rights to
which an accused is entitled. When respondent insisted on punishing hire without a chance
to air his side, complainant was deprived of the presumption of innocence, the right to be

heard by himself and counsel, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him as well as the right to an impartial and public trial. Moreover,
complainant was made to execute a waiver of detention without the assistance of counsel.
Worse, the aforesaid waiver was even subscribed by complainant before the very same
judge who was his accuser. Certainly, such intentional and blatant violations of one's
constitutional rights committed by respondent cannot be tolerated by this Court.
As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the visible
representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. From them, the people draw
their will and awareness to obey the law (De la Paz vs. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540 (1975)). If
judges, who swore to obey and uphold the constitution, would conduct themselves in the
way that respondent did in wanton disregard and violation of the rights of complainant, then
the people, especially those with whom they come in direct contact, would lose all their
respect and high regard for the institution of the judiciary itself, not to mention, cause the
breakdown of the moral fiber on which the judiciary is founded.
Undoubtedly, the actuations of respondent judge represent the kind of gross and flaunting
misconduct on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the
law and rendering justice that so quickly and severely corrodes the respect for law and the
courts without which the government cannot continue and that tears apart the very bonds of
our polity (Ompoc vs. Judge Torres, 178 SCRA 14 [1989]).
Furthermore, the reprehensible conduct exhibited by respondent judge in the case at bar
exposed his total disregard of, or indifference to, or even ignorance of the procedure
prescribed by law. His act of intentionally violating the law and disregarding well-known
legal procedures can be characterized as gross misconduct, nay a criminal misconduct on
his part (Babatio vs. Tan, 157 SCRA 277 [1988]). He used and abused his position of
authority in intimidating the complainant as well as the members of the Indang police force
into submitting to his excesses. Likewise, he closed his eyes to the mandates of the Code
of Judicial Conduct to always conduct himself as to be beyond reproach and suspicion not
only in the performance of his duties but also outside his sala and as a private individual.
(Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr. 199 SCRA 75 [1991]).
Clearly, there is not, an iota of doubt that respondent, through his oppressive and vindictive
actuations, has committed a disservice to the cause of justice. He has unequivocably
demonstrated his unfitness to continue as a member of the judiciary and should accordingly
be removed from the service.
WHEREFORE, respondent judge Justiniano A. Del Mundo of the Municipal Trial Court of
Indang, Cavite is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except
accrued leave credits with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Feliciano and Grio-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

G.R. No. 126252

August 30, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JESUS GARCIA y MANABAT, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
For review is the conviction of accused-appellant JESUS GARCIA y MANABAT for illegal
possession of five (5) kilos of marijuana for which he was initially sentenced to death. The
Information1 against him reads:
That on or about the 28th day of November, 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control five (5) kilos of compressed marijuana dried leaves, without the authority
of law to do so, in violation of the abovecited provision of the law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pled not guilty.

The prosecutions case hinges on the testimony of Senior Inspector OLIVER ENMODIAS.
He recounted that on November 28, 1994, he and SPO3 JOSE PANGANIBAN boarded a
passenger jeepney from their office in Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, en route to
Baguio City. He took the seat behind the jeepney driver while SPO3 Panganiban sat
opposite him. They were in civilian attire. When the jeepney reached Km. 4 or 5, accused
JESUS GARCIA boarded the jeepney carrying a plastic bag. He occupied the front seat,
beside the driver and placed the plastic bag on his lap. After a couple of minutes, the
policemen smelled marijuana which seemed to emanate from accused's bag. To confirm
their suspicion, they decided to follow accused when he gets off the jeepney.2
The accused alighted at the Baguio city hall and the police officers trailed him. The accused
proceeded to Rizal Park and sat by the monument. Half a meter away, the police officers
saw the accused retrieve a green travelling bag from the back pocket of his pants. He then
transferred five (5) packages wrapped in newspaper from the plastic bag to the green bag.
As the newspaper wrapper of one of the packages was partially torn, the police officers saw
the content of the package. It appeared to be marijuana. 3 Forthwith, the policemen
approached the accused and identified themselves. The accused appeared to be nervous
and did not immediately respond. The policemen then asked the accused if they could
inspect his travelling bag. The accused surrendered his bag and the inspection revealed
that it contained five (5) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. The police
officers then arrested the accused and seized his bag. The accused was turned over to the
CIS office at the Baguio Water District Compound for further investigation. He was
appraised of his custodial rights. At about 5 p.m., the arresting officers left for the crime
laboratory at Camp Dangwa, Benguet, for chemical analysis of the items seized from the
accused. The next day, the policemen executed their joint affidavit of arrest and transferred
the accused to the Baguio city jail. Verification by the arresting officers of the records at the
Narcotics Command revealed that the accused's name was in the list of drug dealers. 4 The
result of the chemical analysis of the five (5) items seized from the accused confirmed that
they were dried marijuana fruiting tops, weighing a total of five (5) kilos. 5
For his part, the accused admitted being at the locus criminis but denied possessing
marijuana or carrying any bag on November 28, 1994. He alleged that on said day, at about
8:00 a.m., he left his residence in Angeles City to visit his brother, NICK GARCIA, whom he
had not seen for ten (10) years. He arrived in Baguio City at 12:30 p.m. Before proceeding
to his brother's house, he took a stroll at the Rizal Park. At about 2:00 p.m., two (2) men
accosted him at the park. They did not identify themselves as police officers. They held his
hands and ordered him to go with them. Despite his protestations, he was forcibly taken to
a waiting car6 and brought to a safehouse. There, he was asked about the source of his
supply of illicit drugs. When he denied knowledge of the crime imputed to him, he was
brought to a dark room where his hands were tied, his feet bound to a chair, his mouth
covered by tape and his eyes blindfolded. They started mauling him. Initially, he claimed he
was kicked and punched on the chest and thighs. When asked further whether he suffered
bruises and broken ribs, he answered in the negative. Thereafter, he explained that there
were no visible signs of physical abuse on his body as he was only punched, not kicked.
Notwithstanding the maltreatment he suffered, the accused claimed he stood firm on his
denial that he was dealing with illicit drugs. 7
To corroborate accused's testimony, the defense presented MANUEL DE GUZMAN, a
resident of Baguio City and a neighbor of accused's brother Nick Garcia. He came to know
the accused in 1994 when accused visited his brother Nick, a few months before accused

was arrested in November that same year. He recounted that in the afternoon of November
28, 1994, while he was walking along Rizal Park, he noticed two (2) men holding the
accused's hands and forcing him to a car. He was then about 8-10 meters away. He did not
see the accused or any of the two men carrying a bag. 8
In a Decision, dated January 29, 1996, RTC Judge Pastor de Guzman, Jr.9 found the
accused guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs and sentenced him to suffer the
maximum penalty of death. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Jesus Garcia y
Manabat guilty of the violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A.
7659, involving possession of marijuana weighing 5 kilograms, beyond reasonable
doubt.
The penalty for the possession of marijuana weighing 5 kilograms as provided under
R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 is Death. The Court has no recourse but to
sentence the accused Jesus Garcia y Manabat to suffer the death penalty. The law is
harsh but it must be followed and obeyed, "dura lex sed lex."
SO ORDERED.
The decision was promulgated on February 20, 1996.
On February 26, 1996, the accused moved for reconsideration. 10 He reiterated his position
that the uncorroborated testimony of prosecution witness Inspector Enmodias was
insufficient to establish his guilt. He further contended that he should only be punished
with reclusion perpetua.
On April 12, 1996, Judge de Guzman, Jr. filed an application for disability retirement. This
Court, in its en bancResolution,11 dated June 18, 1996, approved his application. The
effectivity of his retirement was made retroactive to February 16, 1996.
On August 6, 1996, Acting Presiding Judge Eulogio Juan R. Bautista issued an
Order12 granting in part accused's Motion for Reconsideration. For lack of aggravating
circumstance, the accused's penalty for illegal possession of marijuana was reduced from
death to reclusion perpetua.
In the case at bar, appellant impugns his conviction on the following grounds: (a) the
decision convicting him of the crime charged was not validly promulgated as the
promulgation was made four (4) days after the retirement of the judge who penned the
decision; (b) the uncorroborated testimony of prosecution witness Senior Inspector
Enmodias is insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
First, we shall thresh out the procedural matter raised by appellant.
In his Motion for Clarification,13 appellant contends that since the decision under review was
promulgated on February 20, 1996, four (4) days after the approved retirement of Judge de
Guzman, Jr., his decision is void and has no binding effect. 14
We reject this contention. Undisputably, a decision promulgated after the retirement of the
judge who signed it is null and void. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, 15 a decision is
valid and binding only if penned and promulgated by the judge during his incumbency. To

be precise, a judgment has legal effect only when it is rendered: (a) by a court legally
constituted and in the actual exercise of judicial powers, and (b) by a judge legally
appointed, duly qualified and actually acting either de jure or de facto.16 A judge de jure is
one who exercises the office of a judge as a matter of right, fully invested with all the
powers and functions conceded to him under the law. A judge de facto is one who
exercises the office of judge under some color of right. He has the reputation of the officer
he assumes to be, yet he has some defect in his right to exercise judicial functions at the
particular time.17
In the case at bar, the decision under review was validly promulgated. Although the
effectivity of Judge de Guzman, Jr.'s disability retirement was made retroactive to February
16, 1996, it cannot be denied that at the time his subject decision was promulgated on
February 20, 1996, he was still the incumbent judge of the RTC, Branch LX of Baguio City,
and has in fact continued to hold said office and act as judge thereof until his application for
retirement was approved in June 1996. Thus, as of February 20, 1996 when the decision
convicting appellant was promulgated, Judge de Guzman, Jr. was actually discharging his
duties as a de facto judge. In fact, as of that time, he has yet to file his application for
disability retirement. To be sure, as early as 1918, we laid down the principle that where the
term of the judge has terminated and he has ceased to act as judge, his subsequent acts in
attempting to dispose of business he left unfinished before the expiration of his term are
void.18 However, in the present case, as Judge de Guzman, Jr. was a de facto judge in the
actual exercise of his office at the time the decision under review was promulgated on
February 20, 1996, said decision is legal and has a valid and binding effect on appellant. 19
On the merits, we likewise affirm appellant's conviction.
In his Memorandum20 before the trial court, appellant insisted that the prosecution was
unable to discharge its onus of establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He
maintained that the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution's main witness, Senior
Inspector Enmodias, is incredible and unreliable. Firstly, appellant pointed out that if the
police officers indeed smell and the marijuana he was allegedly carrying while they were all
on board the jeepney, they should have immediately arrested him instead of waiting for him
to alight and stroll at the Rizal Park.Secondly, appellant faulted the procedure adopted by
the arresting officers who, after the arrest, took him to the CIS office at the Baguio Water
District Compound for investigation instead of bringing him to the nearest police station, as
mandated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Finally, appellant
theorized that the prosecution's omission or failure to present the other arresting officer,
SPO3 Panganiban, to corroborate the testimony of its witness Senior Inspector Enmodias
was fatal to the prosecution's case as the lone testimony of Enmodias failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt
These contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The prosecution was able to prove
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. There is nothing irregular in the manner
appellant was apprehended by the police authorities. On the contrary, we find that, without
compromising their sworn duty to enforce the law, the police officers exercised reasonable
prudence and caution in desisting to apprehend appellant inside the jeepney when they
initially suspected he was in possession of marijuana. They sought to verify further their
suspicion and decided to trail appellant when the latter alighted from the jeepney. It was
only after they saw that one of the packages with the torn wrapper contained what looked
like marijuana fruiting tops did they accost appellant and make the arrest. At that precise
time, they had obtained personal knowledge of circumstances indicating that appellant had

illicit drugs in his possession. They had reasonable ground upon which to base a lawful
arrest without a warrant.1wphi1.nt
Neither do we find anything irregular with the turn over of appellant to the CIS Office. At the
trial, it was sufficiently clarified that this has been the practice of the arresting officers as
their office had previously arranged with the CIS for assistance with respect to
investigations of suspected criminals, the CIS office being more specialized in the area of
investigation.21 Neither can the police officers be held liable for arbitrarily detaining
appellant at the CIS office. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes
a public officer who shall detain another for some legal ground and fail to deliver him to the
proper authorities for 36 hours for crimes punishable by afflictive or capital penalties. In the
present case, the record bears that appellant was arrested for possession of five (5) kilos of
marijuana on November 28, 1994 at 2 p.m., a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to
death. He was detained for further investigation and delivered by the arresting officers to
the court in the afternoon of the next day. Clearly, the detention of appellant for purposes of
investigation did not exceed the duration allowed by law,i.e., 36 hours from the time of his
arrest.
Coming now to appellant's defense, we find that his simplistic version of what transpired
that fateful day utterly failed to rebut the overwhelming evidence presented by the
prosecution. His testimony is not worthy of credence.Firstly, appellant insists he did not
bring any travelling bag or personal items with him. 22 However, we find it baffling that one
would visit a relative in a distant province and fail to bring clothes and other personal
belongings for the duration of his stay. Secondly, while appellant repeatedly emphasized
that he went to Baguio City to visit his brother whom he had not seen for ten years, 23 his
corroborating witness, de Guzman, adamantly insisted that the first time he met appellant
was only months before the arrest.24 Thirdly, we find it altogether disturbing that appellant,
without compunction, acknowledged in open court that he lied when he initially claimed he
was kicked by the police officers while under their custody. After testifying that he was
kicked and punched on the chest and thighs, appellant unwittingly declared that he suffered
no broken ribs or internal injury as a result of the alleged mauling. Realizing the
improbability of his claim of maltreatment, he promptly altered his previous testimony. He
sought to explain the lack of visible signs of physical abuse on his body by clarifying that he
was only punched, not kicked, by the police authorities. 25 Lastly, it runs counter to common
experience that an innocent person, wrongly accused of a crime and subjected to alleged
physical abuse by the authorities would keep mum about his plight. Yet, appellant, through
all the sufferings he supposedly underwent, would have us believe that he has not confided
to anyone, not even to his brother, his version of the incident, not to mention the
maltreatment he supposedly endured in the hands of the police authorities. 26 In sum,
appellant's defense lacks the ring of truth.
Neither did the testimony of appellant's corroborating witness aid the defense as it is
equally flawed. De Guzman testified that he saw appellant being held by two men and
being forced into a car, yet he never revealed what he saw to appellant's brother Nick. No
explanation was offered for this omission. Although De Guzman thought that the two men
harbored ill intentions in abducting appellant, he never reported the incident to the police
nor told Nick, appellant's brother, about what he witnessed. In fact, it was when Nick told
him that appellant was in jail that de Guzman allegedly mentioned to Nick what he saw
days earlier.27

Treated separately, the incongruent details in the defense theory may appear innocuous at
first blush. However, the inconsistencies eventually add up, striking at the very core of
appellant's defense the real purpose of his presence at the crime scene. The
contradictions become disturbing as they remain unsatisfactorily explained by the defense
and unrebutted on record.
In sum, we find the testimony of Senior Inspector Enmodias credible to sustain a judgment
of conviction. We reiterate the familiar rule that the testimony of a single witness, if positive
and credible, is enough to convict an accused. For indeed, criminals are convicted not on
the number of witnesses presented against them, but on the credibility of the testimony of
even one witness.28 It bears stress that it is the quality, not the quantity, of testimony that
counts.29 To be sure, a corroborative testimony is not necessary where the details of the
crime have been testified to with sufficient clarity.30 As there was nothing to indicate in this
case that police officer Enmodias was inspired by ill-motive to testify mendaciously against
appellant, the trial court had every reason to accord full faith and credit to his testimony.31
On a final note: The death sentence originally imposed on appellant was correctly modified
by the trial court and reduced to reclusion perpetua as there was no aggravating
circumstance present in the commission of the crime. However, both the Decision and
Order of the trial court omitted to impose the penalty of fine. 32
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Order, dated August 6, 1996, affirming the conviction of appellant
JESUS GARCIA y MANABAT for violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. 6425, as amended
by R.A. 7659, but reducing his penalty toreclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, subject to the
modification that the additional penalty of fine in the amount of ten million (P10,000,000.00)
pesos is likewise imposed on him. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

Rollo, p. 5.

March 1, 1995 TSN, pp. 4-6, 12-13.

Ibid., pp. 6-7, 14-17, 19.

Ibid., pp. 6-8, 10-12, 20-23.

The testimony of forensic officer Police Senior Inspector Alma Margarita Villasenor,
February 2, 1995 TSN, pp. 3-10; Chemistry Report No. D-064-94, Original Records,
p. 31.

April 25, 1995 TSN, pp. 2-6.

Ibid., pp. 7-9.

June 20, 1995 TSN, pp. 2-11.

Presiding Judge, Branch LX, Baguio City; Rollo, pp. 17-22.

10

Original Records, pp. 178-182.

11

A.M. No. 8868-Ret. Re: Application for disability retirement of Judge Pastor
V. de Guzman, Jr. Acting on the application for disability retirement filed by Judge
Pastor V. De Guzman, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Baguio City, under R.A.
No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 5059 and P.D. No. 1438, effective February 16,
1996 and it appearing that applicant is: (a) over 69 years of age with more than 41
years of government service and (b) suffering from Parkinson's disease, Stage IV,
Hypertension, Stage II, Organic Brain Syndrome, Mild to Moderate, a condition which
falls within the classification of permanent total disability per memorandum of Dr.
Ramon S. Armedilla, Medical Officer IV, dated April 2, 1996, concurred in by Dr.
Cecilia C. Villegas, Director III and Dr. Rosa J. Mendoza, Director I, this Court's
Clinic, the Court resolved to APPROVE the aforesaid application for disability
retirement of Judge Pastor V. de Guzman, Jr., under the above-cited law, effective
February 16, 1996, but payment of the benefits shall be subject to the availability of
funds and the usual clearance requirements.1wphi1.nt
12

Original Records, pp. 198-200.

13

Rollo, pp. 38-39.

14

In response to the Order of this Court for the filing of his Brief in this case, appellant
manifested that he adopts the contents of his Memorandum and Motion for
Reconsideration before the trial court as his Brief;See Adoption of Pleadings in Lieu
of Filing Appellant's Brief; Rollo, pp. 42-43.
15

Rule 120, Section 6.

16

Lino Luna vs. Rogdriguez and De los Angeles, 37 Phil. 186 (1917).

17

Ibid.

18

Garchitorena vs. Crescini, 37 Phil. 675 (1918).

19

It is noteworthy that a different outcome would have resulted had Judge de

Guzman, Jr. applied for optional retirement instead of disability retirement. In cases of
optional retirement, SC Circular No. 16, dated December 2, 1986, specifically
provides that the application for optional retirement should be filed at least two (2)
months prior to its specified effective date (guideline #2) and when the specified date
of retirement is reached without the applicant receiving any notice of approval or
denial of his application, he shall automatically cease working and discharging his
functions unless directed otherwise (guideline #4); See also People vs. Labao, 220
SCRA 100 (1993).

20

Original Records, pp. 161-168; This was adopted by appellant as part of his Brief.

21

March 1, 1995 TSN, pp. 20 & 25.

22

April 20, 1995 TSN, p. 12.

23

Ibid., p. 11.

24

June 20, 1995 TSN, pp. 5-6.

25

May 3, 1995 TSN, pp. 5-7.

26

April 20, 1995 TSN, p. 11.

27

June 20, 1995 TSN, pp. 6-11.

28

People vs. Matubis, 288 SCRA 210 (1998); People vs. Correa, 285 SCRA 679
(1998).
29

Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 171 (1998).

30

Peope vs. Correa, supra.

31

People vs. Arellano, 282 SCRA 500 (1997).

32

Sec. 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, provides the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos for illegal possession of prohibited drugs.