.

MADHVA

LOGIC

AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE PRAMANAi^*'"'

CANDRIKA WITH AN INTRODUCTORY OUTLINE OF
MADHVA PHILOSOPHY AND THE TEXT IN

BEING

SANSKRIT

BY

SUSIL

KUMAR MAITRA,

Lecturer

in

M.A., Ph.D.

Philosophy, University of

Author of "The Ethics of the

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PUBUSHED BY THE

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY
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1936

MUNSHI RAM MANOHAR LAL

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PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY BHTTJ'EKDRALAL BANEHJEE

AT THB CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY PBE88, SENAT8 HOUSB, CALCUTTA.

Beg. No. 686B. October,

1936B.

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PEEFACE
The

and

Jayatlrtha,

is

Pramanapaddhati,
of

"

authority

accredited

celebrated

his

Pramanacandrika

The

work and follows the

closely,

reproducing the language

many

as

its

is

Pramayapaddhati

shorter

in

work, the

the authoritative logical text

is

Madhvas.

the

on Madhva Logic

the Paddhati

of

and acknowledging the Paddhati

places

authority

at

the

end

every

of

section.

The Gandrika however has the merit of being

a clear presentation both of Madhva and other
rival views.

The

present translation,

will

give a clear

and

its

points

hoped,

Madhva

logical theory

agreement and

disagreement

idea of

of

it is

with the theories of other schools. The Introduction which gives an outline of Madhva Philosophy will also be of use in understanding and
correctly appraising the

Jayatlrtha

is

Madhva

viewpoint.

supposed to have flourised

to-

wards the middle of the fourteenth century.

According to one estimate he must be placed
Since the
between 1317 A.D. and 1380 A.D.
author

of

Jayatlrtha's

the

Gandrika

Paddhati

as

refers

his

throughout to

source-book,

always with profound respect, he

to be one of Jayatlrtha's younger

may be

and

taken

contemporaries.

MADHVA

VI

He must
latter

half

have flourished either at the

therefore

of the

LOGIC

14th or the beginning of the

15th -century.

My

sincerest

thanks are due to

my

colleague,

Dr. Satcowrie Mookerjee, for seeing the Sanskrit

He

text through the Press.

has however departed

from the original Madhva Vilasa edition (now

In the first place,
out of print) in two respects.
he has

divided

work

the

evident improvement in form.

changed the text

itself

in

chapters-^an

into

some

places.

unable to accept the correctness of

all

he has made, some of the passages as

in

the original

to

me

to

be

Madhva Vilasa

quite

in

order,

matter to the judgment of

my

he has

Secondly,

As

am

the changes

they

occur

edition appearing

I leave the whole

readers.

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CONTENTS
PAGE
Introduction

ix-xxvi

The English Transxmtion

On Liberation and the Means

On Uddeia or Statement
On Lakana or Definition
On Parikd or Examination

to Liberation

1-2
3-6

6-11

11-12

Pramana or Valid Evidence

12-14
Definition of Samiaya or Uncertain Cognition 14-20
Definition of

Definition of Viparyyaya or Error

20-21

Memory

...

21-22

by other schools

22-25

Pramana

as Valid

Knowing

as defined

Pramana as Kevalapramdw and Anupramma

25
Four kinds of Kevalapramana
...
26-36
Anupramdna as Perception, Inference and
.

Authoritative Communication

36-37

Definition of Perception

37-39

Seven Kinds of Perception

39-51

Definition of Inference

51-52

Factors of Inference

52-53

Invariable Concomitance as a

Condition of

Inference
Different Kinds of Invariable Concomitance

^7

63

57-61

Concomitance as known makes Inference

:

Possible

61-62

vm

MlDHVA
"

'

logic

PAGE

<

how known

Invariable Concomitance

63-64
64-65

Three Kinds of Inference

Nyftya View of

the

Different Kinds

65-83

Inference

83-87

Fallacies of Inference

Nyaya View

of

Authority or

Sgama

Hetu and the

Fallacies

Words and Sentences

101-109

as Costituents of

Verbal Communications
of

87-100
100-101

defined

Defects of Verbal Communications

Learning

of

103-107

Word-meanings

Primary and Secondary

107-109

Functions

of

109-111

Words
111-112
Agama as Personal and Impersonal
112-114
The Evidential Value of Sgama
Refutation of Arthupatti, Upamana, Anu- 115-122
Sambhava, Aitihya,
Independent Pramanas

palabdhi,
as

Intrinsic

Validity

and

etc.,

Extrinsic

In-

123-126

validity

" *

*.

INTRODUCTION
Madhva philosophy
tion

the idea

Bbakti and rests on

distinction

an

of

or

essential

between the devotee and the object

Vedanta teachings

metaphysics and

therefore not merely

it is

dualistic

Its

heretical.

also

but

revolutionary

interpretation

As the philosophic

of his worship.
of the

devotion

of

attitude

the religious

of

the conceptual formula-

is

conception of the Lord as

its

the efficient and not

material cause of the

the

world are a direct negation of the

monism

of the

Upanishadic teachings. It has thus been repudiated by Vedantists themselves as a gross caricature

by the

of

Vedanta

the

Sankarite

doctrines,

Advaitins

particularly

who

reject

even

qualified non-dualism as inconsistent with Vedantic

Madhvaism thus stands

Absolutism.

to

orthodox

Vedantism as Sufism does to Islamic Monotheism.

If

Sufism

pantheistic

Islamism,

no

less

interpretation of

The
physics

central
is

the

is

is

the

heresy

worst

Madhva Theism

as

of

an

Vedanta monism.
conception in the
idea

of

an

eternal

Madhva metaand

unsur^

mountable gap between the Lord and the world

The
of inanimate objects and sentient souls.
Lord is the highest reality and has independent
being..

The world and the

B

individual

souls

axs


MADHVA LOGIC

dependent on the Lord, but are not existent-

all

ially

one

efficient

Him.

with

The Lord thus

the

is

and not the material cause of the world

The world depends on the Lord,

So also have
but also has being outside Him.
the jivas or individual souls who are subservient
to the Lord and are his eternal servants.
Thus

(c/.

NyEya).

the

distinctions

between the Lord and the world

and between the Lord

and

sentient

souls

are

not merely essential but also eternal.

The main
are
of

points

summarised

in

Madhva Philosophy

the

of

a Sanskrit sloka the purport

which we give here in English

The Lord (Hari) is the highest reality (paraThe world is real. Difference is real.
tattw).
Individual souls

They

(Hareranucardh).
superior

and

the

are

servants of the Lord

are

distinguished

inferior excellences.

the experience of untainted innate

or devotion together with

means

Liberation is

Bhakti

bliss.

the Lord's

Perception,

to liberation.

by

grace

is

Inference

the

and

Verbal Testimony are the sources of knowledge.

In regard to the Lord the Vedas are the sole
evidence.
:;

The Vedas are

The above

gence of the

clearly

eternal

brings out. the wide diver-

Madhva and

For the Sankarite the world

in the Absolute

and

is

and impersonal.

the Sankarite view&f

is a false

devoid of

For the Madhvas the world has

appearance

strict

reality.

reality,

though

po$ the self-dependent reality of the Lord,

For

IM-RODUCIION

xi
r

the Sankarites, distinction

an indescribable false

undifferenced

appearance in the
Absolute.

Hence

world

an eternally

is

is

of

reality

of the

distinctive reality

the

cancelled

appearance in

For the Madhvas, distinction

Brahman.

the

is

not

Hence the five distinctions between the Lord and the inanimate
world, between the Lord and the individual souls,
only real

but

eternal.

also

between one individual soul and another, between

one inanimate object and another and between

an individual soul and an inanimate object are

both real and eternal.
This brings us to the Madhva view of the
nature and

constitution

and

world

the

of

Unlike

scheme of the padarthas or knowables.

of

who

Nyaya-Vaisesikas

the

knowables,

the

recognise seven kinds

who

Bhattas

recognise

minus

the Nyaya-vaisesikas

seven of

(the

its

five

visesa

and samavaya) and the Prabhakaras who recognise

eight

of

[five

Nyaya-vaisesikas

the

abhdva

and

s&dr&ya

(similarity)

samkhya

plus

viiesa,

substance,

stantive

(visista),

(amsi), (8)
(10)

>i

(7)

Power or

(6) the

the

Sakti,

the

of padarthas, viz.,

(3) action,

(2) quality,

(5) individuality,

rality,

(number),

Sahti (potency)],

and

Madhvas recognise ten kinds

(1)

barring

(4)

qualified

genesub-

whole

composite
(9) Similarity

and

Absence or Negation.

Of

kinds

these, substances

are

of

twenty

different

and comprise (1) The Supreme Soul or tb**

MADHVA LOGIC

Xll

Lord,

Laksmi,

(2)

dividual

Souls,

(4)

the same thing

as

the Lord's consort,

(2) In-

Unchanging Akasa which

space,

is

Primordial Nature

(5)

The Three Gums, (I) Mahat or the

Great Principle, (8) Ahamkara or The Principle
{Prakrii),

(6)

of Egoity,

Understanding

(9)

Mind, (11) The Senses,

The Elements,

(matra), (13)
(15) Nescience

Sounds,

and

(12)

Darkness,

Dispositions,

Infra-sensibles

(11)

The Universe,

The Alphabetical

(18)

(19)

Time,

are

of

Qualities

again

including the qualities

of

41

(20)

Traces

Reflection

steadfastness,

shame, strength,

magnanimity,

different

kinds

Nyaya-Vai&sikas

the

as well as such other excellences

Actions

Kesidual

(Pratibimba).

as serenity,

(10)

The

(Avidya)^ (16)

(17)

(Buddhi),

and deficiencies

gravity of mind, fear,

self-restraint,

endurance, valour,

etc.

again

are

either moral or non-moral.

Moral actions are objects of approval or disapproval.

Non-moraJ action is physical motion.
Generality

is

either eternal or non-eternal.

Individualities

bases of

By

all

are

innumerable

differentiation

by an

and are the

and distinction.

a qualified substance

specified

*c

is

meant a substantive

adjective.

Composite wholes are again either limited in

size or of unlimited extent.

Sakti or power

is

'#

of four kinds, viz., inherent

V5P

power,

adventitious

power,

the power that

is

INTRODUCTION

Xl

and a word's power of meaning or

unthinkable,

referring to an object.

Similarities are innumerable and are functions

of single objects as

determined by their relations

Thus though

to other objects.

a similarity holds

between one object and another,

it is

function

only of one and not of both.

Absence

of

is

kinds,

four

Emergent Absence,

Absence,

Absolute

Of these the

and Reciprocal Absence.

other than the locations

Antecedent

viz.,

Absence
first

they characterise.

are

Not

same as its locus,

the negation being non-different from the entities
which negate each other. Further it is either
so reciprocal negation.

It is the

eternal

or nou-eternal.

entities

it

eternal,

is

as negation

entities it is non-eternal.

negation

being

As negation

of

eternal

of non-eternal

This follows from such

from

non-different

which so negate each other.

the entities

Absolute negation

is

the negation of what never,

is

thus the negation of the unreal or the imaginary.

Though the

entity which

it

nowhere

negates

exists.

is unreal,

It

the

as the absolute absence of the unreal

negation

itself

is real.

Thus absolute negation

is

the real absence

of the absolutely unreal.

The Madhva view of

dual soul presents many

the

Lord and the

points

of

indivi-

contact with,

as well as of divergence from, the

Nyaya view.

with the Naiy&yikas, the Lord,

according to the

Madhvas,

is

Atf

the efficient and not the material cause

MADHVA LOGIC

Xiv

The Lord

of the world.
all-pervading

and

The

hand,

is

independent,

is

the subject of such qualities

is

Laksral

as omniscience, etc.

Lord.

further

the power of the

is

on the other

jiva or individual soul,

atomic (contrast Nyaya),

existentially

is

separate from, though dependent on, the Lord,

ignorant, in bondage,
to

the Lord

karmic potencies
prepares the

of the jiva

way

to

the

Lord the
wear away, and this
of the

Bhakti together

to. liberation.

with the Lord's grace

the cause of Liberation

is

consists in the experience of pure, inherent

Prakrti or primordial nature

bliss.

of

(pratibimba)

Through the knowledge

original.

which

Further the jiva stands

etc.

reflection

as

is

bondage

and

the

is

root

is

the cause

beginningless

of
*

nescience.

and

itself is

the source of the

is

viz.,

Nescience

a positive category

two kinds

ignorance as regards one's

of

ignorance,

own

nature and

ignorance as regards the nature of the Lord.

The Madhva view

substance includes,

of

be noted,

will

it

the twenty kinds

not

of

merely

the nine different kinds of the Nyaya- Vaise$ikas

but

also .those

Sankhya

the

of

Elementary Akasa
same as the ikasa

of the

unchanging Aka3a

is

latter reintroduced

under a

we have

all

Philosophers.

the M&dhvas, e.g.,

of

addition

only the space or dvik of the

the nine of the

to

these

the

Nyaya-VaiSesikas, while

name.

different
latter,

viz.,

elements, besides space, time, mind and

in

is

we have

also

the
self.

Thus
five

But

some of the

INTRODUCTION

XV

Sankhya metaphysics.

Gums,

For example, Prakrti, the

Ahamkdra, mind, the senses

Buddhi,

(indriya), the infrasensibles {maira

to tanmatra), etc., are all

these of the

corresponding

To

Sankhya padarthas.

Nyaya-Vaisesika substances and the

Sankhya padarthas, the Madhvas add some of their

own such as Avidyd (Nescience), Pratibimba (Eeflection), the Alphabetical Sounds and Darkness.
As regards gums as qualities, it will be noted
that they are

not the same as the three

The gunas

which are substances.

gunas

attributes while the three

The gunas

reals.

noted,

include

qualities but also

as

not

qualities,

only

the

many moral

gunas

as qualities are

are

substantive

it will

be further

Nyaya-VaiSeika

attributes of the soul

such as serenity, mental gravity, magnanimity, etc.

Tbl Nyaya-Vai^esikas will regard these latter as

compounds of certain primary qualities of the self
such as pleasure, pain, attraction, aversion, etc

The Madhva

classification of actions

and the morally indifferent or neutral alsj

clear departure from the Nyaya-Vais*

For the Nyaya-Vaiseikas willing

soul

and not an action

attraction or aversion as

a
its

is

quality

qi
pj

condition anl

being the object of moral judgment.

ism however willing is regarded as a kind

and therefore as a species

of the

includes physical motion as well.

*

The Nyaya-VaiSeika view

of acting

genus

which
._....:

of generality is also

msbhva logic

xvi
similarly

The Naiya-

modified by the Madhvas.

part of
yikas consider nityatm or eternality to be
'generality'
the definition of 'generality,' so that a

which

is

not nitya

reject this view

The Madhvas

no generality.

is

to the conception of

and subscribe

Thus Brahminhood,
nitya and anitya generalities.
manhood, etc., are non-eternal generalities, since

A man
are non-eternal.
their individual substrates
a Brahmin through the practice of
may become

contrariwise
penance and self-mortification just as
fio
through misdeeds,
one may lose Brahminhood
manhood may be lost in a subsequent birth,
also
it

being

possible

man

for

rebirth.

animal in a subsequent
suppose

non-eternal

generalities

(fivatva) is eternal, for

And what

is

Here

particularity.

according to

true

spirit

like

such

cases.

self-hood

jiva ever ceases to be

of generality also holds of

also

we

Madhvas, both

eternal particularities.

an eternal

no

in

individual

like that of

But a generality

an
Thus we must

to be reborn as

Thus

must

recognise,

and

eternal

non-

the particularity of

the Lord

is itself

eternal

-,

while the particularity of a non-eternal thing like

The Nyaya-Vaisesikas will
jar is non-eternal.
a

of a non-eternal thing
say that the particularity
being due to the particularities of their eternal
constituents,

no

separate

particularity

whole as a compound need be assumed.

view does not appeal to the Madhvas.

for

But

the.
tbis

In place of the samavaya relation of the Nyaya*

-'4

g-

vU

INTRODUCTION
Vaisesikas, again, the

Madhvas

XV11
will have the

two

padarthas of the viiista or qualified substantive and

These two between

the amsl or composite whole.

according to the Madhvas,

themselves comprise,

every case of the so-called constitutive relation of

samavaya.

and Sadrsya,

Sakti, power,

admitted

padarthas

distinct

as

similarity, are not

by the Nyaya-

They are however recognised as such

by the Prabhakara Mimamsakas and the Madhvas
Vai&sikas.

agree with the Prabhakaras in this respect.

however, according to Madhvas, includes,

3akti9
besides

the power in words to refer to their meanings

unthinkable power

objects, the

Lord alone in

the

which exists in

and only

completeness

its

or

and in different degrees in other beings,

the adventitious power 'which is generated in an
idol or image through the inspiring influence-^
the worshipper's devotion and the inhe^nt <>r
partially

innate

eternal or non-eternal
cularity-

Similarity

of things.

powers

like

generality

agaiji

and part^

similarity of jivas or individual

Thus the

and other eternal substances such as the Lord

souls

is eternal,

but the similarity of non-eternal things

VII

.like jars, cloths, etc., is itself

non-eternal.

As regards Abhava or Absence, the Madhvas

hold that it has reality though the pratjuogi^
cpuntei>entity of the ahpwe in some eap^gr

['-

'f.Jwfc.. or

unreal

A ibe NJ^ygyjkas
l
:: ':?

V-~

'

;;':-v:.v'-

.,~,

(e,flf.,

?Dt

absolute absence).^||g

hojsevfi* -Ahhaxa has

'
.
.'.

'

MADHVA LOGIC

XViii

Abhava
or objectivity but not saliva or reality.
presupposes reality (bhava) being adjectival to it,
but is not itself reality. Thus reality (bhavatva)
appertains to the six positives or bhava-paddrthas,

the

three (substance, quality and action) being

through the universal of being inhering in

first

real

them

second three

while the

(sattayogena sat)

and inherence) being real

that in which reality inheres
For the Madhvas however,

(generality, particularity

through relation

to

(ekartha-samavaya)

'absence' or negation
just as is 'presence.'

a form of sattva or reality

According to them, padarthas
is

and the unreal, the

latter

being a paddrtlia or knowable without reality

(e.g.,

include

both the

hare's

sky-flower,
is

real

horn,

either independent or

former being the Lord

including

(abhavah)

all

etc.).

dependent

and

other than the Lord.

is

again

reality,

Himself and the

positives (bhavah)

according to the Madhvas,

Reality

all

the

latter

negatives

Thus negation,

a form of dependent

though the entity negated in the case of

absolute negation is the unreal or the imaginary.
reality

The Madhva,

the Sankara-Vedanta and the

Vai3eika views of absence thus present

teresting points of agreement

the Sankarites
opposite

'absence'

'presence'

many

difference.

has objectivity like

in-

For
its

and as such presupposes the

reality of the consciousness in

however does not

and

Naya-

which

it

appears. It

affect the latter just as the snake-

appearance does not affect the nature of the rope

INTRODUCTION

which

XIX

Thus absence

is its substrate.

as

objective

appearance presupposes a substrate of reality but

is

For the Naiyayikas

not adjectival to the latter.

however

absence

not

objective

as

merely pre-

supposes reality but also determines or characterises

it.

Hence absence though

'

latter.
itself

both

yet

positivity

itself

and infects the

presupposes

For the Madhvas

a form of

not

however 'absence'

is

a kind of dependent reality to be distinguished

from the kinds which positively

We

shall

now

fill

experience.

our survey of the Madhva

close

Philosophy with a brief statement of the distinctive

Madhva Logic.

features of the
if

Pramam,

according to the Madhvas,

Anupmmana.

kevalapramana or

is

Kevalapramana

the knowledge which has pramanya through

as

valid

pramam

knowledge

self-validating

to

rise

Thus kevalapramana
regarded as being
(cf.

is

conditioning process or activity

as the

which gives

is

itself

Anupmmana

objects.

of

either

is
its

prama

valid

or

own pramdna

knowledge-

knowledge
or evidence

Eamanuja, Prabhakara), while Anupramdna

is

evidence through conditioning or causing the result-

ing self-evidencing knowledge.

Anupramdnas
tion, Inference

are of three kinds, viz.,

Percep-

and Verbal Testimony.

Of these, Perception

is

of

seven kinds, viz.,

the five kinds of external perception by the external

senses,

internal

perception

perception through

the

by

the

mind and

Witnessing Intelligence

<

MADHVA LOGIC

XX

which

Smrti,

the seventh kind of Perception.

is

Recollection,

a form

is

of internal perception

it

an immediate presentation of the past through

The impressions-:^
the instrumentality of the mind.
is

traces

or residual

the past experience are the- j

of

and;

connecting link between the past experience

insertion

the

The

mental function.

the present

of the

present

the

into

past

recollection

;j

is-

(c/.

:|

Bergson).

The Madhva

(gaksijridna) as a form

The knower
knowledge

and

is

of perception

acting

itself

is

peculiar.

an instrument

as

of

the Saksl or Witnessing Intelligence^

which

knowledge

the

knowledge

view of witnessing

through the

results

instrumentality of the latter

perception.

is

'Tttei
i*!

such perception include the intrinsi

objects of

nature of the

such as

self,

the self's properties or attributes

pleasure,

functions of the
the

external

the mind),

avidya or nescience, the^

etc.,

mind such

the

as

cognitions of

(which are also cognised by%

sense

Thus what other

pleasure, pain, etc.

schools will regard as objects of internal perception*!

are

here regarded

and

will

being

as

But

witnessing subject.
witnessing

cognitions

thus lack

perceptions of

as

will

the

perceptions

be

generated

timelessness

sucfc
events!

involvedui$S|

the witnessing consciousness of temporal mental

events as temporal.
that

As

the witnessing

This

is

why

Sankarites

consciousness

pra tyaka or perception

is

According to

a kind

^
INTRODUCTION

XXI

primary (anubhutirupa) but

it is

is

not a generated

cognition being nitya or timeless.

As regards

which mediates

vyapii

the

may

Madhvas bold

the

inference,

propositions)

asymmetrical
to

samavyapti

viz.,

symmetrical invariable relation

Hamilton's

reasoning

inferential

be one of four kinds,

that

corresponding to
vimnavyapti

(a

(an

corresponding

invariable

relation

propositions), of the form of mutual exclusion

or parasparaparihara (corresponding to
tions), or

proposi-

parasparasamavesa, mutual overlapping,

mutual

along with parasparaparihara,

(i)

In some case at

(it)

In some case

least

at least

propositions,

three

[answering at once to the

where

where

exclusion

is,

is,

also is,

is not,

and

In some case at least, where B is, A is not.

The relation, e.g., between 'being a male' and
{Hi)

being a cook

according

illustrates this

'

Madhvas, co-presence of the

and the probandum (sadhya) either

the

to

prolans (hetu)

temporally or spatially
inference.

Hefcce

the

is

not necessary for valid

existence of the probans

in the subject of the inference need not

insisted on.

Further,

form.]

When,

e.g., one infers

be

rain

always

on the

top of the hill from the perception of the fullness

of the rivers at the base, the mark or hetu is the

"fuHness of rivers," and that which

hj< means of this, hm#, M., the

prob(mdmn r

is

"rain.-;

But

is

inferred

sadhya

the place or

z&m m&k wfmdd^h the #afe?av i^i

MADHVA LOGIC

XX11

the

of

inference

or hetu, viz.,

on the

while the mark

hill-top,

'fullness of rivers,' is

hill-top but at the base of the

Madhvas

the

the

is

producing

what

conclude,

inference

valid

copresence of probans

is

is

observed

not

Hence

hill.

necessary for

not the

observed

and probandum, nor the

observed existence of the probans in the inferential

but

subject,

suitable place

mark

observation

the

of

mark

and time (samucitadeiadivrtti) .

in the above

time while what

inference

exists in the

belongs to the past.

Similarly the

at the base while the rain

which

is

The

present

inferred therefrom, viz.,

is

any

in

'rain'

mark is observed
inferred belongs

to the hill-top.
It

may be

pointed out however that this

is

no

Madhvas and cannot be regarded

as one of the Madhva contributions to logical
theory. The point was anticipated by the Mimaminnovation of the

sakas long before the

Madhvas.
Parthasarathi
in the " Nyayaratnamala " discussing the nature
of

vydpti rejects the view

inference

it

implies the copresence of the hetu

and the sadhya as an

Smoke,
proves

e.g.,

fire

below.

that as a condition of

which

is

indispensable condition.
rising

up

in the sky above

not in the sky above but on the ground

What

is

necessary therefore for inference

not spatial or temporal copresence of hetu and

sadhya but simply fixed relation or niyama between
is

them.
in

fixed

Thus the way

relation

to

which a thing is cognised

something else, in that way
in

INTRODUCTION
does

produce the

it

when

cognition of

cognised again

(c/.

ct

" Nyayaratnamala"
1900). The so-called

Chowkhamba edition,
Madhva contribution in this respect

p. 57,

its

is

therefore no-

thing but a re-statement of the Miraamsaka view.

The Madhva
condition

inference

of

of vyaiirekivyapti as a

rejection

no innovation

also

is

of

The same view is also taken both

by Mimamsakas and Sankarites long before the
Madhvas, and the Madhva view in this respect
The
earlier
views.
is only a reproduction of
the Madhvas.

Madhvas however may

legitimately claim

classification of inference to be

cause
to

from cause to

either

is

it

as cause or

non-causal
of

effect

from one thing

or

effect.

relation

co-essentiality

(tadatmya).

an improvement on

Thus, according to them,

earlier logic.

is

inference

or from effect to

to another not related

For the Buddhist such

nothing but the relation

between

genus

and

species

But Naiyayikas hold that there

other such relations besides co-essentiality.

Madhva view
in

itself

their

both

of

are

The

non-causal inferences combines

the Buddhist and the

Nyaya view-

points and has thus the merit of being a simplified

solution of the different issues.

As regards Agama, ct authoritative verbal testimony, the Madhvas hold that it is both personal
and impersonal. Thus the Vedas are authoritative evidence

But

so

also

though devoid
are the

of

a personal source.

personal

communications

MADHVA LOGIC

xx i v
the

recorded in

Mahabharata and other sacred

In connection with Igama, the Madhvas

common
discuss the question whether words mean
works.

Madhvas
characters or denote individuals, and the
objective
decide for the dual character ot the
however that in
primary
the case of nouns or substantives the
reference is to an individual or individuals, while
some
in the case of adjectives, verbs, etc., it is
reference with

reservation

the

or character that

attribute

The psychology

of learning

word-meanings

Madhvas

by the

discussed

primarily meant.

is

this

in

also

is

connection,

and the view which they advocate in this respect

is

word-meanings

learning

of

process

the

that

by means

consists in a course of parental guidance

of

uttered

words accompanied by gesture-indic%yi

The Madhvas reject

naming as a process o|:

tions of the objects meant.

Nyaya view
upamuna based on

of

the

and

to validity

In regard
the

the instruction of elders.

Madhvas hold

the

invalidity.

Madhvas

the

though

views

Mimamsaka

and extrinsic

of intrinsic validity
validity,

opposite invalidity!

independent

apparently agreeing with

intrinsic

its

...^

theory

Thus

argue, is intru^|

sicality in respect of utpatti (origination) or intrjag

sicality

in

recognition
origin

respect
(jnapti).

means

that

Intrinsicality

the

validity

respect

in

from

arises

as

the cognition

itself

And

intrinsicality

in

same conditions
characterises.

acceptance 1S|

subjective

of

which;*

respect
.

?ft

:tt

INTRODUCTION

means that the agency

recognition

subjective

cognises the cognition is

of

validity

cognises

the

regards

intrinsicaUty

in

the

cognition.

respect

that

agency that

the

also

XXV

Now

origin,

of

as

the

Madhvas agree with the Mimamsakas and reject

the NySya view of an additional efficiency in the
as

causal conditions

condition of the validity

As regadrs subjective recognition of the validity, the Madhvas hold however that intrinsicaUty here arises from the fact
of

the

valid cognition.

that the witnessing Intelligence that

'..cognition

is

agency that cognises the

a clear departure from the

is

Mimamsfc view, according

the

neither

(BhSfctas)

the

the

also

This

validity.

cognises

the

to

cognition nor

Mimamsakas
its

validity

by any witnessing Intelligence,

both being cognised inferentiatly by the self from
As regards
the mark of knowoness in the objectbeing cogqised

invalidity,
of

the QXfirinsicality

again,

origin consists,

addition

to

the

rejection

of

conditions,

^trittsicaUty in respect
jective

Madras, inits

according to

wising foocn the presence

of

consists in

m.y.r^spect

certain defects in

of

cpgnition,

while

invalidation or sub-

the

cognition

itself

Witnessing
being cognised by one agency, viz., the
cognised
Intelligence and its invalidity being

from the mark of

This also is an evident
practical failure,
acfrom the ordinary MimamsS view

otherwise,
its

i.e.,

inferentiaUy

departure
through
onr<\\ n to whir.h iasalidation comes either

MADHVA

XXVi

LOGIC
1

the causal conditions

in

the perception of defects

of discrepancy with

or through the consciousness

''

other experiences.

may

It

comes nearer the Buddhist than the Nyaya.

falsity

Thus the Madhvas

Sankara-Vedanta views.

or

Madhva theory of

be added here that the

>

reduce the false to the level of the imaginary and

the

what the

unreal so that

apprehends
elsewhere,

is

experience

illusory

an absolute nought and not any

elsewhen reality (as Naiyayikas say),

nor any indescribable

Sankarites

(as

solute negation

the

is

correction as ab- i

Further,

say).

without reality

positivity

cancellation or rejection of

"

Thus absolute negation

this absolute unreality.

the

is

is

something as |
Naiyayikas negation :A

elsewhen

For

Naiyayikas say.

real

the

always the exclusion of a

some

The Judgment

sheer non-sense.

not"

lent to the

is,

something from

real

negation

real locus so that a

circle is

negation of a sheer nothing and not that 7.3

of an elsewhere,

is

of

the

'*

The

unreal^
square-

according to Naiyayikas, equiva-

Judgment

"The

square

though expressed differently.

however the object

of

not a circle/*

is

For the Madhvas

absolute

negation

unreal or the imaginary so that the

is

Judgment

the g
does

not assert the exclusion of circle from square (as

|
Naiyayikas say) but expresses the absolute unreality of a square
-

which

is

a circle as well.
-

'

-.

f v-

MADHVA

logic

ENGLISH TRANSLATION
OF THE

PRAMANACANDRIKA
a

pakt

i
;

Reverence to the God with the Horse's neck,

the

God who has LaksmI

incarnated Himself in

as his consort

Rama the God

HanuGod of Bhima, and

Madhva. Om HarL v

mana, in Krsija the

in Vedavyasa the God of

Having touched the

Lakmi and also those of
,.

I. proceed

to

write

and who
of

lotus-feet of the

my Guru

Lord of

or Preceptor,

this 'Pramanacandrika

for

the easy comprehension (even) of young, immature

learners.

Everybody on this earth desires that happiness

alone shall be his lot and that not even the smallest
unhappiness shall ever mar his life. This
moksa or liberation that is sought by all.

is

the

Since

comes only from the

knowledge of the absoluteness and independence
this freedom or

liberation

MADHVA LOGIC
-**v:

the Lord and the dependence or subservience

of everything else, it behoves every seeker of this
freedom (moksa) to understand all things in this
of

way

being

as

essentially

dependent on the power of the Lord

dependent and absolute.
he

observes,

that

or

to

subservient

who

is in-

Thus the commentator

'A'

realises

all

these

that

are

dependent as being subject to the control of the

Lord becomes liberated from the bonds of the

:-u

of the dependent

and the independent however comes from valid

the
is
reason why this
cognition and this
particular treatise has been undertaken with the

'""1

empirical

The knowledge

life.

ascertaining the nature of valid cogni-

object

of

tion.

Even though the

master Jayatlrtha has

marks of
valid cognition and the rest in such works as the^l
Paddhati, etc. (Pramawpaddhati), yet, inasmuch ;|

elaborately expounded the distinguishing

works are not

as these

easily

intelligible

to

persons of feeble intelligence on account of theif

deep and thoughtful language in which they are

expressed, this treatise has been
a view to
readers

make

the doctrines intelligible

average intelligence.

of

undertaking

undertaken

not superfluous

is

to

And thus

",'

with|
thestf]

this

even though

it

most of the topics already discussed i%:

these other works and gives besides a brief account
discusses

of

some

of the objects of valid cognition as well.

Since the

and other

(scientific)

allied

things

knowledge of Praman
presupposes the tria

PRAMAtfACANDRIKA
statement

definition

(uddeia),

and

(laksana)

examination (pariksa), the definition of statement

and the rest is therefore first of all set forth.

UddeSa is the statement or verbal indication
only.
of the subject-matter by means of its name
i

In this definition the word 'udde&a' stands for

what
tion,

is

defined and the rest constitutes its defini-

viz.,

the words

subject-matter by

'

means

of

its

name

the

of

verbal indication
only.'

This

procedure (in regard to the thing defined and the

definition thereof) will also be observed in all
other cases (of definition) that will

come up

later

say that a sound as such is a verbal

will
indication, the babbling sound of the Ganges
rank as a verbal indication and thus our definition

we

on.

If

will

be too wide.

include the

verbal

alphabetical
'"

which may

To

exclude

word indication

i?

our

definition.

by

indication

implies

indication

sounds (and not by sounds as such

include non-alphabetical sounds such

as the babble of a river)

:-

in

we

such cases

But

if

and say that an alphabetical sound

we

stop here

as such

is

the alphabetical sounds 'the

verbal
of a barren woman' should pass as a
Hence to exclude such nonsensical

verbal indication,

son

indication.

combinations of alphabetical
*

subject-matter

'

(in

'

sounds the

indication of the

word

subject-

has been included in the definition.

(The words 'son of a barren woman' ar^ift^^
iT,^
f anvthitisr and therefore indicate
*

matter')

MIDHVA LOGIC

But

subject-matter.)
'

indication

verbal

caw

'

'

subject-matter

the

of

complete definition

logically
*

we stop here and accept %

if

caw

'

of the

as a

'

the

uddeso),

(of

^
|

will pass as a statement

crow

(The 'caw* 'caw' of the crow is a

combination of alphabetical sounds and it also
indicates something that really exists, viz* the
Hence the words 'by the name*
crow's voice.)
in the definition which mean * by the words of
or Uddeia.

Even

the sacred language.'

is

the definition

so,

does to a sentence like

too wide applying as it

'The earth has the character

smell' which

of

to a definition (and not to a verbal indica-

amounts

To exclude such
only has been added (in by the
cases, the word
the name which
name only '). The meaning is
tion of the subject-matter only).

'

'

subject-matter in a statement is not

"|

used with a view to bring out the distinguishing

indicates the

marks

of the

(The name

subject-matter.

used

is

-S
.11

"as

only to indicate the subject-matter and not to de-

In the case of the sentence 'The earth

fine it.)

has the quality of smell

'

though

.nition,

by means

of

language,

yet,

selected

is

the subject-matter
the

words (names)

since

or

the

define

cannot

Hence our
above)

which amounts to a

words

without reference

distinguish

sentence

'

rank

definition

not too wide.

the
as
of

to

is

of

defi-

indicated
the sacred

have not been

the marks

which
the

subject-matter,

a mere
statement

'J'u

statement.
(as

givefi|

Hence we conclude

PRAMA^ACANDRIKA

statement consists in the indication of a subjectmatter by means of such words (names) of the

marks

the

refer to

Sanskrit language as do not

which distinguish or define the subject-matter

in

question

Some

hold

that the word

has been

'only'

with a

added (in the above definition of Uddeia)

view to exclude only such definitions as

For (according

has the quality of smell.'

an Uddea

is

mon

Thus

properties.

the

quality of smell,'

effect,

indicated

property,

by

condition of

it

wanting,

is

not applying to

it)

has

earth

an

to

the

odour,

of

the

of

uncommon

subject,

uncommon
our

defi]

not too wide,

case

be said that 4 in the

uncom-

the subject-matter

and thus
is

subject-matter

The

possession

without reference to any

of

.'

since

indication

them)

sentence (which

the

reference

the

viz.,

in

definition)

in

to

specifying or

its

is,

is

the

a statement of

without reference to

The earth

of the earth

things, statements in this sense are impol

such statements will have to

respective subject-matters through the un

so far as
their

common

properties of earthiness and the rest that

distinguish them.

indication

For what

without

meant (by a verbal

is

reference

to

properties of the subject-matter)

is

the

uncommon

merely that the

statement should not contain any reference to

tinctive or

uncommon

properties other than

dis-

those

MADHVA

LOGIC

that constitute the bare property of being the subject-matter in question.

This however

is

not

interpretation

correct

as thus

of our definition, for the definition

which are in the

preted will apply to sentences

nature of definitions such as

property of earthiness

'

The

and thus

'

inter-

has the

earth

will be too wide.

of earthiness

('The earth has the property

is

'

verbal definition and not a statement of a subject-

The sentence

matter.)

of earthiness

'

the earth has the property

indicates a subject-matter (viz., the

'

uncommon

earth) without reference to any

other than

ties

(i.e.,

the property of earthiness).

we now

the

nature

Uddeia,

of

proceed to define Laksana or definition.)

defining

mark

(laksaya)

anything

else),

:i
.:'"-

>

attribute

an

is

that exists only in the thing defined

is

question

subject-matter in

(Having explained

bare

that constitute the

those

property of being the

proper-

(and not in

mark

This means that a defining

an attribute that exists in every instance of

the thing defined and does not exist

else.

sion
as

it

Thus in the case

of

of the

dewlap' serves

exists

only

cows and does not

in

as

(all)

anything

in

cow, the
a

posses- \

defining

animals

exist in animals

'

that

mark

-.-]

are

that
are

not

COWS.

.-".

we

say that an

defining mark, the

will

pass as a

attribute

as such is

possession of undivided hoofs

definition

(of the

;*
llYf,ll

If

al
*

cow) and thus

prama^tacandrikI

our definition of a defining mark will be too wide.

(Possession of undivided hoofs is an attribute,
but

not an attribute of the cow which has

is

it

Hence we

cloven hoofs.)

thing defined.

of the attribute in the

If

we

in

the thing

mixed colour

mark

is

exists

of

(Mixed colour

in

all

butes (as do not

thing defined)

the

possession

'

mark

defining

will

some cows

exists in

we

To exclude such

cow.)

say

mark) must

attri-

in every instance of the

exist

the
exist

(that

attribute

is,

every instance of

in

the thing defined.

But

of

cows and therefore cannot be a

the

of

definition

defining

an attribute that

a definition of the cow

will pass as

'

be too wide.

saying

then

defined,

and thus our definition

but not

content with

stop here and rest

that a defining

on the existence

insist

this also does not

suffice,

for 'possession

pass as a defining mark (of the

cow) as thus interpreted and thus our definition-:
(Possession of horns can*:
becomes too wide.

of

horns'

may

not be a defining
this

attribute

-of a cow,

yet

mark

may
it

such as the goat,

also

exists

dear,

such attributes (as exist

:
:

?;:

in

we

instance

every
other

animals

To

exclude

etc)

both

defined as well as other things)

in

say

the
the

thing;
attri-

a defining mark) must exist only

instances of the thing defined (and itf
^:ii<all) the

bute

in

exist

the

cow, for though

of the

(that is,
r

nothin!

|
;

mIdhva

What,

then,

is

logic

the purpose or end

(prayojana)

mark ?
subserved by the knowledge of a defining
The purpose or end subserved by the knowledge
defining

of

mark

differentiation

the

is

,|
i
-

of

thing defined from all other things of a

homogeneous or heterogeneous nature as also the
too wide or too
correct use of terms (without a
the

narrow meaning)

specified

it is

thing

with

(sajatlya)

geneous

when

is

said

be homo-

to

defined

thing

the

by the next higher

class

that

subsumes the defined thing under itself. (This

means that the homogeneous is a species coordinate with the thing defined and subsumed.
under the

thing

immediately

same

be

to

said

is

higher

heterogeneous

genus.)

\|

(vijatiya)

with the thing defined when it is not specified^

by the immediately higher genus that subsumes
the character of the thing defined.,!
Thus in the definition of the * cow,* 'the essence J
constitutes th^f|
cow-ness
or
of being a cow

under

itself

'

'

'

The immediately

character of the thing defined.

higher genus

comprehending

'cowness')

.'

is

animality.

and other animals which

this

wise,)

(sajathja)

the

jar

characterised

'animality')
the

'cow.'

character

(ofy

Therefore the horse

are

characterised by

animality

are homo-

with the 'cow.'

(Contrary-

generic character

geneous

'

this

of

and other things which are non*g

character
(o&
generic
by this

are

heterogeneous

By 'an

(vijatiya)

with

immediately higher genra^T

-i*i

i-^

PRAMA^ACANDRIKA.
a

genus which

while not including any higher class

inclusive of

or

the

'

higher genus

next

thing defined

Thus

defined.

yet

is

the

in

is

meant

thing

the

of

inclusive

example of 'animality/

since the class of animals is inclusive of the class

of

cows without including the

objects

also includes the class of cows, the

which

animal-class

must

be

mediately higher genus

These

class.

class of material

understood
in

as

the im-

to the

cow-

(concerning

the

relation

considerations

nature of the next higher genus) leave no room

for the objection that all things being included

under one all-inclusive

knowables and the

one another

like, are all

class

of

viz.,

the class of

homogeneous with

and that therefore there

heterogeneity anywhere.

under a

class,

common

(Since

all

of knowables,

they must

the same class or genus,

all

i.e.,

no

real

things come

class,

all-inclusive

is

viz.,

the

be said to be

homogeneous.

then can you sensibly talk of the heterogeneous and of one thing being heterogeneous
with another? The answer to this objection is

How

furnished by the definitions

of

the homogeneous

we have

and the

given

above

heterogeneous as

based on the concept of the next higher genus.

When a thing is included under the next higher

genus or class of the thing defined, it is said to

be homogeneous with the thing defined. SVhen
included, it is said to be
is iiot so

a thing

heterogeneous.)

In tins way in

all

other defini-

10

MADHVA LOGIC

tions

the homogeneous

and the

are to be

rest

understood.

(Having

we

logical definition,

what

the nature

explained

now

shall

valid

proceed to explain

the opposite,

constitutes

of

i.e.,

invalid

an

definition or non-definition.)

An

negation

the

Hence
existing

it

the

of

negating

it.

negation,

because

definition

which

adjectival

part,

qualified
(a)

thing

As a
negation

qualified

it

negation

is

a qualified

the

the

(&)

a'.|

qualification

and

the

quali-

definition is a qualified

and an

substantive

being

portion

it

being

'

'

and

thing defined.'

by the

a qualified negation.)

28

while existing 'k

Thus

a non-definition, as being the negation of this

is

;|

the negation of a valid %t

instance of the

qualified

..;;

nega-

qualified,

consists of a substantive

the adjective qualifying

substantive

may

thing

that which is non-existent in other things

in every

.';

qualified negation negating

(An invalid

fication of

'

thing

the

qualified

negating

negation
(c)

viz.,

the

the thing,

both

negating

be of three kinds,

of

other than

defined."

nature of

thing.

qualified

qualified

thing

thing

the

or a negation

tion

of

things

in

the

of

is

"that which,

of

instance

non-existent

is

negation,
of

negation

is

definition.

valid

logically

every

in

instances

the

the

is

it

defined,

of

non-definition

or

definition

invalid

adjectival

portion,

Thus the non-definition

11

fcRAMAtfACANDRIKA.

"The cow
qualified

an animal possessing horns " is a

negating the substantive
negation
is

'the

that

condition

negates the

(It

part of a valid logical definition.

mark must

defining

not

anything other than an instance of the

is existent
Possession of horns
thing defined.'
Again the
also in animals which are not cows.)

exist in

'

'

mixed colour

The cow

non-definition
'

(The

tion).

negation negating the

is a qualified

(that

qualification

an animal possessing

is

instance of

the thing defined

case as every

cow does not

Lastly, the non-definition

possessing undivided hoofs

negation

negating

the

in

'existing

qualification

'

is

'

every

negated in this

possess mixed
'

defini-

valid

characterises

The cow

is

colour.)

an animal

illustrates a qualified

as

substantive

well

as

('Possesthe adjectival part of a valid definition.

sion of undivided hoofs' is present in animals

Thus it
not cows and absent in cows.
'absence from other
substantive
negates the
'
things
and also the adjective existing in every
that

are

'

case of the thing defined.')

logical
(Having explained the nature of a
now proceed
definition and its opposite, we shall

examination.)
to explain the nature of pariksa or
sifting of evidence (pariksa)

Examination or

is

mentally

otherwise
adduced).
the

use of

(of

reflecting

the

on

evidence

the

cogency

that

has

or

been

Too wide use (ativyapU) consists in

exists in things
a defining mark that

12

madhVa

other than the

thing

(avyapti)

consists

mark

use of a defining

the

'.

in a part of the extent (i.e.,

instances)

consists

mark

property as a defining

the use

in

of

exist

not

does

that

v>

Ab-

thing defined.

the

of

(asambhava)

surdity

Too narrow use

defined.

in

that doe not exist

in some

LOGlO

That
any instance of the thing defined.
which is defined by the defining mark is called
in

the laksya or thing defined.

us

(Let

now

to

work,

viz.,

subject-matter of this

Pramana as such
distinguished

from

(i.e.,

any

may therefore
Pramana (we hold)

pramana)
here.

pramana

Pramana.)
general as

in

kind

particular

be

first

is

that

the

define

proceed

of

of all defined

which

'/}

agrees,
A!

This

(known).

with the nature of the object

means that the essence of pramana consists in |

making the cognitum an object (of cognition) in
There are
the form in which it actually exists.

many
is

things to be said here, but

meant

telligent

as

this

treatise 4S

young learners and as (more) in- |

people may know all these from the
for

work called the Paddhati, therefore they are not

mentioned here.* The same observations hold
* The Pramdnapaddhati observes that pramana

is

here so defined

as to apply both to tbe cognitive process and the knowledge that results

therefrom.

The cognitive process conduces to the apprehension of the

cognitum as

it

knowledge

actually exists and is called

also

Anupramapa.

apprehends the cognitum as

it

The

resulting

actually exists

and

called kevatopramana.

{Pramdpapaddhati t Madhva ViWsa Edition* p.

is,

Wk -

1L^

come up

also in respect of other matters that will

later

on

(in this treatise).

In the above definition

Pramana,

of

the property of apprehending the object

valid

to

as

Pramana merely

defined

form

abides in the

in

then our definition

abide

in the

form

in

it

actually

should

exists) .

cognitum*

narrow.

and the

Here

'

it

well (and not

apprehending

the

this

;'..+}
'*

definition

.;.;|j

processes of

,j||

knowledge

v;J

to the

cannot be said to be too

be said to be an

..

Pramam

(inasmuch as the term

illegiti-

mate extension of the meaning of the term

Pramana, for such extension is quite unexceptionable

(through the

Hence our

rest (as also

therefrom)

Nor can

:.,::

'apprehending the cognitum!

means

results

exist),

abide in the form in which

applying also to the cognitive

that

also

these

Therefore we say

help of a cognitive process).

perception

If

which

that

(since

immediately as well as mediately*

as

in

included.

as

must apprehend the cognitum as

it

form

which they actually

and thus will be too wide.

merely that

common

which it actually exists,

would apply also to the

and the cognitum

cogniser

since

erroneous

the

in

'

exists* has been

actually

it

we had

qualification

the

is

and

doubtful

as

well

cognitions,

which

is,

;\

as a

matter of fact, used in both the above two senses

of
:

the cognitive

processes

and

subject

resulting
"

knowledge)'.

The

the

who

cognises

'

"

J*

a valid cognition

''

12

MADHVA
called the cogniser or

is

by

cognised

is

cognition

it

actually exists

form

defined

as

would

be

too

is

the

called

called valid

is

of the

knowledge

knowledge were not

If valid

or valid cbgnition.

object that

Knowledge

cognitum or object known.

object as

The

knower.

valid

LOGIC

knowledge, our definition

of

wide as applying

the

to

also

which are only instrumental in the

knowledge.* Similarly, if
production of valid
processes

knowledge were not defined as apprehension

valid

the object

of

would

also

as

actually exists, our definition

it

"j

be too wide as applying to doubtful

is?

cognitions and the rest.

What,

then,

.^1

the essence of a doubtful;^!

is

cognition {saw&aya) ? It

may

be said that

it

cannak||

be said to consist merely in an indefinite appre!|

hension for this amounts to a mutual dependence
(a circular definition).

Thus

so far as a certain cognition

sion

is

(one

may

argue)

'::::{

io||j

a definite apprehe?J||

the definition of a doubtful cognition as mergg^

indefinite

apprehension

definition in

asmuch as a

amounts to a

circular^

certain cognition

is

the

other of a doubtful cognition and a doubtful cog* ~*5

distinction is

drawn betweeu

Pramana, the instrument

Pramd,

of valid knowledge.

valid

knowledge, and

Pramana

the source of the knowledge and the knowledge itself

(as

signifies

correct appre-

But Pramd means the knowledge only and

instrumental means. Thas PramS must be distinguished from

hension of the object).

its

both

processes of intellection that bring about the result of valid knowli

but Pramana

may be

used

alike for the cognitive processes

knowledge that results therefrom.

and

prama^acandrikI
as indefinite apprehension)

nitioii (defined

we

hold,

circle

by the opponent).

appears

There

clothed

no

contended

For by the term

'indefinite

here meant

is

'

is

is

involved in this definition

apprehension

the correct

reality

in

a doubtful cognition.

of

An

not a sound one.

is

indefinite apprehension is

definition

like-

This

cognition.

wise the other of a certain

argument,

is

(as

cognition

numerous

the

in

(bathed)

that

mutually incompatible forms that manifest them-

on the surface

selves in (float
If

we had

which

defined

one single thing.

cognition

doubtful

a cognition our

is

of)

definition

as

that

would be too

wide as applying also to the case of the (certain)

here.'
Therefore
cognition 'There is a jar

we say *it must be

Even so however our

clothed

in

definition

many

forms.'

would be too

wide as applying also to composite or collective

simultaneous cognition
cognitions such as the
of a

man and

a post, or of a jar, a piece of cloth,

and a

pillar

etc.

pitcher,

composite (certain) cognitions

be one single thing'

(in

forms are apprehended).

which

But

'

the

different

even

then our

remains too wide as applying to cog-

definition

nitions like

'The

jar

there

is

thing.)

To exclude such
we say there must

'

is

This tree
a

is

of the Sim^upa species,'

substance,'

etc.

(In

these also

cognition of different forms in a single

Therefore (to exclude these), we say 'the
1

different forms must be mutually incompatible.

MADHVA LOGIC

16

But even

remains too wide

our definition

so,

erroneous cognitions like "This

(In the case of the cognition

as

applying to

is

silver/

a mother

of silver in the locus of

there

pearl,

of

two incompatible forms, viz.* the form of

mother-of-pearl and the form of silver, and these
forms refer to one single thing, viz., the motherare

of-pearl,

and yet the

mother-of-pearl

the

cognition.)

doubtful

not

is

in

silver

of

illusion

To exclude such erroneous cognitions we say (not |

merely that there should be numerous incompatible forms but also) that, the numerous incomthemselves^
patible forms should also manifest
-

as

incompatible.

(In the case of the illusion*^

the form of silver manifests

mother-of-pearl

while that of

(since in the doubtful cog]

the different incompatible forms are

held also tte

present themselves as incompatible forms

(refett|f

ring to one single thing), our definition

open

the aforesaid

to

wide).

arises,

(2)

that

hold

(of

(1)

condition,
(cognition

(cognition

of)

doubtful

this

with the absence

auxiliary
viz.,

objection

is noij-

being

too^

Some

:,.

the

to

non-manifest

remains

Thus

cogniser.)

itself

of

from
of)

an

its

five

solvent

different

common
uncommon

cognition
as

cau

character,

chara

(3) (cognition of) contradictory characters

(in

and the same thing), (4) positive cognition

and
(5)
non-cognition
certain
objects)
,

an

17

PRAMAJjTACANDRIKA

forms

of

mind

'man'

result

the

as

perceived,

thing

in

'post'

desire

e.,

i.

whether the object perceived

of

is

test, viz., the

the crucial

calls

two

(of

the

ascertain

to

man* or

'a

In the absence, however,

post.')

post.

arises in the

which there

of

tall

the perceiver's

to ascertain the true nature

a desire

latter

and

the

of

recollection

the

illustrated

is

is

simultaneous

character

common to a man and a

of this common character

which

The perception
forth

from

arising

perception of a certain

the case of the

stature

doubt

common

perception of a
in

objects).

certain

'a

perception

of

curved hollow which

peculiar to the trunk of a tree or the possession

of a head, hands, etc., which is peculiar to a man,

is

there

arises

a doubt in the form of a mental

(between the two alternatives in the

'
Or, Is that a post?.', ; A
Is that a man ?

oscillation

form)

'

'

doubt arising from the cognition

mon
The

is illustrated in

character

cognition

belongs exclusively
a

doubt,

in

solvent, as to

the

to

Ether

the following case.

is

a quality

(Ikaia)

that

awakens

absence of a perception of the

whether

eternal quality.

sound

that

an uncom-

of

it is

A doubt

an

eternal

arising from

or a nonthe clash

in the fofe;,
of contradictory views is illustrated
lowing case.. The man who discovers that the
consti.yaiseikas teach that the sensibilities are

/*gted

by

the.; elements

t$:

-teaches that they are aofc -and

.,*>

that

the

8aiik%*

:&&&&

at the

'

18
cannot

thrown into doubt as to whether the

doubt arising from

cognition

positive

man who

of

The

well.

discovery

of

real source of the

want

water),

water

(as

to the

has been existent

it

made

non-existent

the

The

existence?

into

lastly, illustrates

the water which

along but remained non-

all

Or, has

water start

'Has the action

made manifest

of digging only

of

and he thus enquires,

of a solvent, as follows

manifest?

first

the

throws him into a speculative doubt

for

or

underground water in the act

discovers the

sinking a

case

the

in

illustrated

the elements

constituted by

are

sensibilities

not.

means of deciding between the

the

find

rival views is

is

MADHVA LOGIC

following,

the case of a doubt arising from

The man who

#mg

non-apprehension.

from

learns

hearsay that there lives a ghost in the banyan 1

near the tree

as

of its

'

power

demon

Is the
of

If?

thrown into a mental uncertainty

is

he does not cognise

enquires

when he comes

and yet finds none

tree yonder

making

the

solvent.

He

ft!

'-

thus

not perceived because :^

itself invisible?

Or,

is

it

unperceived because it does not exist ?

jl

Others hold that positive cognition and nonapprehension

modalities

cause
said

of

to

causes of

(as

of

the

doubt),

doubt)

'common
doubtful

character'

cognition

have three causes only

above).

as

stated

to

be regarded

as

How

is-

being

(and

-'positive-

a modality of the

only'J
(as

must be
not

five

cognition?:

'common!

PRAMAVACANDRIKA
character* that

In

this

of

a jar

a lamp

supposed to be a cause of doubt?

way.
that

There

is

in

exists

lighted

is

dispelled

is

is

and the

the

cognition

positive

dark

not exist previously

did

(The

cognition

is

thus a character that

an existent and
the
is

positive

also

is

and brought a jar into being.

raises

darkness

has operated on the lump of clay

potter

is

when

place

surrounding

There

thereby.

cognition of a jar that

till

19

positive

common

to

thing and thus

a non-existent

doubt as to the existence or non-existence of

in

object

mind

the

How

of the cogniser).

non-apprehension a modality of the 'common

In this way.

character?'

There

non-appre-

is

hension of the existent such as the non-perception

of

God

as well as of the non-existent such as

non -perception of the hair's horn.

perception as appertaining alike

and

non-existent

the

existence or

raises
of

the opposite

the

(Thus nonthe

to

existent

doubt as
the object

to

the

noa-

perccived.)

But the

common

true

character'

contradictory
of

views

'common

the

view

is that

well

as

being

character,'

cause of doubtful cognitions,

of a

common

(ti2.,

'the

doctrines,'

in the

'

the so-called 'unas

viz.,

uncommon

character,'

common

is

only one

the

cognition

there

The way

to

modalities

really

character.'

etc.) are

'the clash of

in

which these

'the clash of

be regarded as comprised

character

should be understood

MADHVA

20
*

in the

manner they

in the

work

are

LOGIC

called the 'Paddhati.'

nature of doubt we

(Having explained the

now

to be so comprised

shown

the nature of erroneous

proceed to explain

cognition.)

An

"3

(viparyaya)

error

where

just

exists

If

cognition,

our

does

error simply

as a

apply

will

is also

the

reality

tinguishes
valid

where
This

does not exist.

cognition

and thus our definition

But even thus our

too wide.

exclude the cases of

doubtful

much self-eonfidenlwe define error as

an error or invalid

cognition

Bti|

cognitions.

apprehends a thing

thing

the|

as

as invalid cognition or error,

that

certain^

excludes

This

cases of doubtful and uncertain

since valid cognition

define*

wide*

conviction.

knowledge or

to

also

Hence we
cognition which amounts to a

cognition

fact

(which are also cognitions

be too

will

as

an

definition

cognitions

and thus
error

define

thing

a
it

a matter of

as

we

not exist.

doubtful

certitude that

conscious

the

sisting in

con-

cognition

is

di

is

fi

definition fails

doubtful

cognitions,

(though lacking in certitu

cognition

or decisiveness) also apprehends a thing where

does not exist.

certain cognition.
tion remains

faulty as applying

valid

cognitions

'the

tree

is

Hence we say, an error is;-|

Even thus however our de

in

well,

e.g.,

contact

with

as

to

the case

the
the

cogni

21

pramAsacandrikI

in

some

word

an object which

of

respect

fallacious

say an error

arise

illusion of

The

a mother-of-pearl

from faulty

arising

we

from faulty perceptions,

reasonings and defects of verbal com-

munications.
of

on the

insist

thing just where the thing does not

Such errors

exist.

in

devoid of contact

is

in our definition, i.e.,

just

parts

all

asserted

is

Hence we

parts).

of its

cognises

in

exist

(Therefore contact

the tree.

of

not

does

contact

The

reasoning

the locus

an illustration of error

is

An

perception.

illustrated

is

silver in

of

error

the

in the case of

man

imagines
the influence of blinding dust
basis of the
perceives smoke and on the

who under
he

illusory

smoke

where

place

infers
fire

the existence of
not

does

in

fire

Similarly,

exist.

the lying report of an

of
strength
the
on
when
that there are ,
untrustworthy man one believes
lying on the banks of *_..,:
fruits
different

five

neighbouring river,

have a case of an

we

from a faulty verbal communication.

An objection however may be raised

errO*^
:-;.;.-,:

arising

.^

consisting in making
have defined Pramana as
cognised in the
be
to
cognition
of
object

We
the

form in which
tion

may be

it

exists (actually).

'memory'

of

a
not usually recognised as

reply is

Butthe

defini-

applying
objected to as being too wide

as it does to the case

is

here),

this is not so,

jgftf^flf that

also

(*Hjg$

Pramana)-

for scripture testifies

Our
to

'men^,f >rception,* ;iaF^^r-;

;

mIdhva

22

logic
*._

and

inference

pramanas or
to

are

'

valid sources

such things

by

as

knowledge in regard

of

showing

scripture

memory is a form of valid knowing.

Some philosophers define pramana
karana or instrumental cause of prama

An instrument

them)

is

the definition

or valid
"3

to

rank as pramana.

without

the

it

and

too wide.

'

follows from

to

and

as

>!

to non-

thus

word instrument

the

it

the

an absurdity

wide as applying

apply

cognition

without
to

also necessary

is

would

definition

Lastly,

tantamount

Hence

an instrument of

as

valid

erroneous

necessary as

*i

(and not as a mere instrument).

Similarly the epithet

that

the

as

as such (according

pramana

of

cognition

valid

that

not a pramana, otherwise any instrument

such as an axe would

valid

like,

Thus we

liberation.

desire

have the testimony of

cognition.

the 1

(dharma) merit and the

as

who

those

all

regarded

be

to

also

also!

is

would

definition

and

be

be

tofr|

the consequence or result J

the instrumentality of

valid

knowing.

We
we

however do not accept the above view

consider

applying

view

is

the definition

to the

that

result

of

the word

knowing act as

well

too
valid

narrow as
knowing.

pramana

not-|

(Our*'

signifies

as the result of

as^|

the

knowledge

that arises therefrom.)

Others define pramana as that which

pervaded by prama or valid knowledge.

is;


PRAMAtfACANDRIKl
This also

validly cognised by

is

Lord.

the

Hence every knowable such as the

like

Every

not a tenable position.

is

knowable object

&3

jar

and the

pervaded by the Lord's valid knowledge.

is

Thus every knowable answers to the above definition of pramana or valid knowing as that which
is pervaded by valid knowledge.
Thus the definition

wide as applying

too

is

not merely to

With

knowing
view

to

others

follows

Pramana

substrate

or

an

acts).

from

escape

modify the above

difficulty,
:

knowables (and

to

is

above

the

definition as

that which being either a

instrument

at the

is

same time

pervaded by valid knowledge.

Even thus however the definition is not faultless.

The mention of the word 'substrate' in
the definition is without rhyme or reason
Even
granting that the Lord is regarded as a standard
cannot be said that this in

itself

of

validity,

is

a sufficient reason for introducing the word

substrate

pramana

'

is

it

in

For

the definition.

derived

the

by means of the

word

suffix lyut,

and, according to the rules of grammar, the suffix

lyut applies only to the instrumental,

and the nominative absolute.

for

application

its

to a

the

There

subject

regarded
as

the

as

of

valid

is

no

rule

nominative as such,

(as in the present case), to the agent,

or

locative

knowing.

i.e.

nominative

(The Lord

is

the standard of valid knowing only

absolute knower,

ie.,

as

the

agent or

H
-:*\

MADHVA LOGIC

24
subject

absolute

of

knowledge and not as

its^

substrate or instrument.)

be argued that even though the

may

It

knower

as

the

is

knowledge, yet H<

of

subject

also is the substrate or locus

knowledge,

such

of

and thus may very well be the meaning of the

word pramana. But even this argument does not

The Lord

bear examination.

as

agent of the knowing act and not

locus is that

container of the agent

or

on and

acted

substrate of

at

is

He

a locus

is

which
acting

is

the adh

or

the obj

(The Lord c

itself.

the knowing act

of

the subject.)

is

im

Others (the Prabhakaras)

anubhuti,

i.e.,

By anubhuti
collection

or

apprehension of

the

as

mean

they

PramanI f

define

memory.
for

in

a.-fi

cognition other than n

According

anubhuti cannot be defined simply as

recollection/

Cji

the same time the a&raya-a

the action

be the substrate of

aO^g

is

substrate

its

For what

locus in the strict sense.

adhikarana?

knower

this

to
'

other

case the definition

apply to objects of cognition like the jar and

rest

ean

(which are other than recollection).

it

be defined

simply as

cognition/ for

this case the definition will apply to

(which

is

'

recollection^

not an independent source of knowledge

according to Prabhakaras).
v

But the Prabhakara

open to the following

definition of

,.,V.:

Pramapft

objections,; .yte^bg$
.i-'-S

".'

^i&H

25

PRAMi^ACANDRIKA
place,

wide as

too

is

it

applying to doubtful

apprehension

cognitions (which are also forms of

narrow as not applying

also too

it is

Secondly

other than recollection).

or anubhuti

memory

to

(smrti)

and the social codes derived from the

Vedas.

(Smrti means recollection as well as the

social codes

The

ings.

which
tion.

based on the Vedas and their teach-

is

latter

are

recollection

analogous to

based on an original primary presenta-

The Madhvas

accept smrti as pramana in

both these senses.).

(This closes our discussion of the definition of

We now proceed to

Pramaqa.

discuss its different

varieties.)!

Pramana

is

two kinds,

of

i.e.,

and

Anupramdna,

(2)

instrumental

the

absolute knowing.

on the order
being

of

tioned.)

viz.,

'-"'

Kevda?

(1)

self-contained, absolute knowing,

pramana,

as

of

cause

knowing

valid

i.e.,.

of

self-contained,

This enumeration is baaed!

(Kevalapramafa
importance.

superior

importance

is

first

mea*>:
,..;.^,;

".

**

Kevalapramam means knowledge that agrees

with the nature of the object known. The words
'

agrees

with the nature of the object

'

dispose

and doubtful cognitions, while the

'knowledge' disposes of percerang (and

of uncertain

word

other intervening processes). (Keratapraro^ii*^

the
the resulting knowledge as distinguished from
'

'

processes leading thereto.)

"4

<'-..&$$$&"
'
'

MADHVA

26

LOGIC

There are four kinds of Kevalapramana

kinds

four

knowledge)

Ihara,

(1)*

knowledge of the Lord or

the

knowledge of the Lord's Consort,

(2) the

Laksml,

Atfcj

self-contained

self-sufficient,

of

(i.e.>

the knowledge of

(3)

the Sage or

YoginA (4) the knowledge of the Non-Sage or

Ayogin.

The

Lord's knowledge

is

rests on, i.e., presupposes,

l

of

its

depending on

itself

the knowledge that

The

fact

distinguishes

the

only.

itself

only

'

Lord's knowledge from that of the Lord's Consort.

depending on

(The Consort's knowledge, while

also

itself,

The
it

fact of

its

being

knowledge

'

distinguishes

from the Lord Himself whose knowledge

(This
to

depends on the Lord's knowledge.)

is

it is.

aimed at the Shankarite theory according

which Brahman

revealing

is

Intelligence.

nothing but

pure

The Madhvas

distinguish

between the Lord Himself and

which the Lord has

things.)

Or,

we may

the

knowledge

Himself and

of

self-

all

other

say, the Lord's knowledge

knowledge that embraces

all

is

that appertains either

Lord Himself or to that which is other

than the Lord. The Lord's knowledge cannot be
to

the

defined simply as knowledge, for

in

definition

applying to the

Yogin's

will

knowledge

knowledge of a
definition
etc.'

be too wide as

sort).

stresses

as

To

this

(which

well

case the

is

alsp

:||

J
:

.J

exclude the latter, the;?

the words

(The Yogin's knowledge

'

that embraces attgj

is

not all-embracing

prama#ac"andria
as

is

Further, the word

the Lord's).

the

knowledge

'

'
:

a too wide application of the definition

prevents
to

2?

perception of

knowledge

invariably

is

nature of the

essence or svarupa of

Lord's

agreement with the

in

known,

object

The

Lord.

the

constitutes

Lord,

the

is

the

without

beginning and without end.

The Consort's knowledge

depends on,
only.

i.e.,

the

If

knowledge that

is

presupposes, the Lord's knowledge

knowledge

Consort's

defined simply as

'

had

been

knowledge,* the definition would

have been too wide and applicable to the Lord's

To

knowledge as well.

exclude the latter, the

words * depending on the Lord's knowledge* have

been added.
tion
it

Since dependence implies a distinc-

(between the dependent and that on which

depends), the possibility of confusion (between

the Consort's knowledge and the Lord's knowledge)

is

But mere dependence on the Lord's

precluded.

knowledge does not fully define

The

knowledge.
others

also

is

knowledge

characterised

on the Lord's knowledge.

extension

of the definition

Brahma and
added.

others),

of

by

the word

Consort's

Brahma
this

To
(to

the

dependence

preclude

such

the knowledge of
'only* has been

(The Consort's knowledge depends on the

Lord's knowledge only,

Brahma and

others

but

the

knowledge of

depends both on the Lord's

knowledge and the Consort's knowledge.)

the word

and

knowledge

Further,;

in the definition serves to

MADHVA

2&

word

non-reflective

the

knowledge' by

Hence

that of ourselves.

wide application

like

objects

have

'

definition has a too,

-1

Rju login's knowledge.

the

to

'

to distinguish

of all

Even then the

been added.

all

prevent such too

to
(

words

application, the

Here the

knowledge

knowledge from

the Consort's

wide

knowledge of

fails

itself

the

say, the Consort's

than the Lord Himself.

other

objects

we may

Or,

Consort herself.
is

from

Consort's knowledge

distinguish the

knowledge

LOGIC

(The $ju Yog in also has a

knowledge,

reflective

Hence the word 'non-reflective.*^

The Rju-Yogin has only a reflective knowledge of

of all objects).

Again

objects.

knowledge

is

say

to

Consort's

'the

that

the non-reflective knowledge of

all

from the Lord's

knowledge (and thus the definition as so worded
objects

does not distinguish

'

it

:i

Heoce the further qualifier

But the
'excepting the Lord Himself.'

remains too wide).

tion

Words

knowledge of

non-reflective

object|

all

..

and no 3uch knowledge

would be absurd and
the

words

knowledge of
Himself).

than

'other

things

all

Further,

the

which

The
in

(t. e.

leads

toA

Consort's

agreement

the

or

non-reflecti

{%. e.,

than

other

word
it

the

knowledge

iij|

from the Consort*

of

process
results

knowledge
with

Henflg

self -confuting.

the definition distinguishes

perception

Lord Himself

the

of

reality^

knowl

in,

also

is

is

percei

inv

the

esse

**J.

29

PRAMAtfACANDRIKl
Consort herself and

of the

beginningless and

is

eternal.

The Yogin' s knowledge

to

has attained

special

is

the knowledge that

perfection

or excellence

through the power born of the practice of yoga

or mental concentration.

Rju Yogin's

the

(1)

viz.,

It is of three kinds,

Yogin's knowledge,

Tattvika

knowledge,

(2) the

Atattvika

(3) the

Yogin's knowledge.

By Rju Yogin
who

soul

is

jiva or individual

meant a

capable of the spiritual excellence of

The Rju Yogin's knowledge

Brahman.
reflective

is

knowledge

is

the

than the

of all objects other

As the mere words 'the Rju

Lord Himself.
Yogin s knowledge is knowledge will not prevent,
'

a too wide application of the definition to our;

*
*
h$v
knowledge as well, the words of all objects

^application
*

As even theo them. is a

added.

"been

reflective

Lord's knowledge,
has been incorporated. As th
to

the

definition entails

the

being

reflective

an absurdity, the
knowledge

of

all

and yet not a knowledge of the Lord

Himself BS*R=^
the words 'other than the Lord
kinds
&^*$j&
been added. This knowledge is of two
'

knowledge which is the essence or nature of

which is
the Yogin himself, and (&) knowledge
Of these*
Yogin.
only a mental state of the
(o)

knowledge constituting

the

Yogin's

^begraningless and etaajfeJifcUe

fe:*
>:***'

y*"

'**

essence

jft!

knowledge ]|I

'^M&

*..

MADHVA

30

mental state

Yogin's

stream (of

only

(beginningless)

flow

as

Both these however are inH

states).

in

variably

beginningless

is

being comprised in a

LOGIC

agreement with

the nature of

thej

objects (known).

The Tattvika Yogins

are

the supernal beings

(with godly qualities) other than the Rju Yogins

and full of the conceit of true knowledge of

Merely

reality.

saying that

Tdttvika$j>

knowledge

gods with self-conscious

are the

the

of

would have involved a too wide application to the Rju Yogins (who also have sdfH
Hence the
conscious knowledge of reality).
9
Merely
Yogins.
Rju
words 'other than the
reality

'

saying

again that

Yogins

the Rju

wide application
non-Tattvikas.

the

Tattvikas are other tharf

would
to

have

involved

the gods or spirits

Hence the

words

a-

who

'with

are

self

Since there

conscious knowledge of reality.'

ungodly beings (other than Rju Yogins) wh#j

reality^
of
also have self-conscious knowledge
therefore the words ' with godly qualities * have
also

been added.

The Tattvika Yogin's knowledge $

which being beginningless does not, even

by way of reflection, embrace all things other
than the Lord. Merely saying that ' the Tdttvi
Yogin's knowledge is knowledge ' would ha
that

entailed

a too wide application to the Lord'

knowledge.
all

things.'

Hence the words does not embra

Even then there would have been

yfi.i

PRAMA^ACANDRIKA
too

31

wide application to the Consort's knowledge.

The Consort's knowledge

non-all-embracing in

is

not extend to the Lord Himself.

so far as it does

Hence the words other than the Lord.' Even

then, there would have been a too wide application
to the Rju Yogin's knowledge, for the Rju Yogin's
'

knowledge does not embrace all things other than

Hence
the Lord in the absence of reflection.
the words
then,

wide

way

'even by

would have a too

however,, the definition

application

non-Tattvika

the

to

Even

reflection/

of

Yogin's

Hence the words 'being beginningalso is of two kinds, viz., (a) knowledge

knowledge.
It

less/

which constitutes the svarupa or essence of the

Tattvika Yogin, and (b) knowledge which is
external

these, 'essential
reality,
false,

but

i.e.,

to external objects).

relates

(i.e.,

knowledge

external

not in

'

is

Of

in agreement with

knowledge

occasionally

is

agreement with the nature of

...

things.

The non-Tattvikas or 'Atdttvikas are the Gods

and Sages practising Yoga who are other than the
Rju and the Tattvika Yogin$. The non-Tattvika
Yogin's

knowledge

beginning in time,

is
is

that

which,

by slight or

characterised

partial ignorance in respect

having a

of objects other than

Merely saying that the non-Tattvika

Yogin's knowledge is knowledge would have

the Lord.

entailed a too
irT^TxriafW

wide

rrWAfnrp

application
.thii

words

to
*

the Lord's

characterised

>

MADHVA

32

LOGIC

by ignorance' have been incorporated. Even!

then there would have been a too wide applicant
Hence the word
to the non- Yogin's knowledge.
'

Even then

slight or partial/

have entailed an absurdity,

the definition would|

non-TattmW4 t

for the

knowledge in respect of the Lord

immense (and not

Words

'

Even then

Lord/

the

tainted by

Hence

ignorance.

slight)

other than

is

Yogin's knowledge.

'having a beginning

two kinds,

viz., essential

knowledge.
are the

in

The

same as

ninglessness

there
to the

would have been a too wide application

Tattvika

the;-*

Hence the words

time/

This also

is

knowledge, and exl

rules as to their truth or untrutl

The

in the previous case.

and the beginning-in4ime

begin-:

of

Tattvika and the wm-Tattvika Yogin's knowli

respectively should be understood

explained in the

the mann<

Paddhati/

The non-Yogins

or

T".

Ayogins are the

souls other than the Yogins or

*

in

Jivas or individual

souls

individi

The

sages.

wo]

differentiates

Ayogins from the Lord and the Lord's

C<

and the words 'other than the Yogins*

tinguish the Ayogins from the Yogins.

The Ayogin's knowledge is knowledge chi

tensed by immense ignorance in regard to obj<

*tfCi

other than the Lord.

Merely saying that

Ayogin's knowledge

knowledge

is

chai

by immense ignorance' would have

too wide application

to

the

Yarn's

entailed

-#**

PRAMA^ACANDRIKA

33

The Yogin's knowledge is also accompanied

by immense ignorance, viz., in regard to the
Hence the words 'other than the Lord/
Lord.

also.

The Ayogin's knowledge

previous

the

in

perishable

two kinds as
also

is

it

This

time.

in

means

cessation

or

of

also

Besides,

cases.

generated in time and

generation

is

generation

of the

cessation with respect to the manifestation

svarupa or essence.

The svarUpa

means the svarupa

or essence of the

or

or essence here

knowing

as

a cognitive process or state.

The Ayogins or non-Yogins are also of three
kinds

are

that

(1)

those

those

that

are

storm

and

stress

perpetual

'

those

'

fit

the nature of

(3) those that are

life of

inertia or

'

reality,

(partly

non-agreement

external

.e.,

in

'

fit

Tamas.

'

while the
in life*

with

knowledge,

in some cases

true

is

and partly

true

others, however, such knowledge

in

(the

in

'

perpetual participators
character

liberation, (2)

knowledge in the case of

be liberated is in agreement with

essential

to

for

participators

life,

of)

only to live the stupefied

Of these,

fit

it is

and

same

false).

As

the

Of

as being

regards

both (true and

in

mixed

of

is false

reality-

in

false,

other cases false)

the three kinds of the non-Yogins..

sense-perception,
accept
Vaisesikas
The

all

inference from

a mark, memory and the

intuitions

Sages as the four kinds of valid evidene&o:

Thio ah* Voieofiiw via} hnwe.ver is untenable

of the

'-*ii

MADHVA LOGIC

34
>

knowledge which

include the Lord's

does not

as this enumeration

and eternal as

timeless

is

also

knowledge derived from authoritative communicaFurther, recollection being the

tion (Agama).
effect

sages being

of

a variety of sense-knowledge

itself

by the power of Yoga (according to

aided

admission), there

enumeration of

is

Yogik knowledge, and Yogik

only a species of

knowledge being

mind which

intuitions

and the

sense-organ,

own

the

the action of

of

no reason for a separate

is

memory

the intuitions of sages

their

or

as

and

recollection

independent sources

of.
of;

knowledge.

[Having explained the nature

contained

direct

of

self^

(kevalapramaw), we sh

knowledge

.now discuss the nature of pramfma

Ann*

as

pramdiia or mediating processes.]

Anupramana

the

is

knowledge

'

or instrumental can

Merely saying

of valid knowledge.
is

means

Anuprama

would entail a too wide

to

knowledge

of

Anupramana) and to uncertain and doubtf

cognition

(which

applicati

itself

(which

also

is

is

tuating
to

the

Again ,

merel;

'Anupramana is an instrument or effecmeans will entail a too wide applicati

'

axe

and

other

like

merely saying 'Anupramana

will

effe

a species of knowledge

though not valid knowledge).

saying

the result or

entail

pramana

a too
(which

wide
is

is

valid

application

direct,

Ag

instruments.

knowled
to

Kevalt

self-contained

v
%i

m
*

\> V^5-^" W

PHAMA^ACANbRlKA
Simply saying again

knowledge).

pramafta
will

ment

of

wise

saying

wide application

too

(which also

perception

merely

that

too wide application to that

entail

the cause of valid

is

wide application

a too

Thus our

definition of

be necessary in

all

(What, then
or

is

Likethe

is

will entail a

'

a means

is

cognition

to

is

will

'

knower.

the

to

Anupramiina

proved to

the points.

a sadhana, instrumental cause

A Sadhana

means?)

to the instru-

Lastly saying that 'Anu-

doubtful cognition, etc.

pramana

'

'Anupramaiia

which

Anu-

valid

is

is valid).

knowledge or cognition

to

that

the instrument of that which

is

entail

means

or instrument

is

that

which being absent, the effect does not arise, even

though other conditions like the knower, etc., are

and which being present unobstructed,

present,

E.g., the axe in

the effect necessarily arises.

Hence

process of striking (the tree to be felled) .

no

wide application

there

is

every

concomitant condition,

application

marks or
presence
(to

too

cases

to

error

is

any and

no too wide

e.g.,

erroneously

of

Where

signs.

to

the

cognised

involved,

the

of defects of sensibilities, etc., is the bar

the cognition of the really effective means).

(The sadhana
i.e.,

And

the

most

is

thus the cause par excellence,

effective of

the causal conditions.

this brings us to the question

of the cause.)

The cause may

of

the.

nature

..."

be defined as the unconditional,

MADHVA

36

may

by

negation

the

which

that

the

does

cause and

material

The cause which

cause.
(into

the

effect)

it

two kinds/
instrumental

the

transformation

material

the

is

effect

before

is of

suffers

nega

is

the

that

exist

not

The cause again

caused to be.)
viz..

means

antecedent!

in

consisting

(This

non-existence.
is

which

defined as that

be

And

the effect.

antecedent of

invariable
effect

LOGIC

cause,

for

example, Prakrti or primal matter as the cause

the universe, the lump of clay as the cause of

The cause which produces

jar.

being

(Adrsta)

potter's stick

follows

conditions
(i.e.,

most

which

effective)

assemblage of

the
is

is

t.

Hence

the cause of the jar.

as

that

the inst

the cause of the universe,

as

among

that

is

example, the unseen

mental cause, for

forces

the effect witho

transformed thereinto

itself

caus;

the cause par excellen&jjp

the

sadhana,

means

'^

instrument.
.

Anupramaqa

is

of three kinds, viz., percepti

inference and authoritative

these) perception is the
of that

which

is

communication.

means

is

('

to the appreh

comparatively proximate,

mediated and present here and

perception

-A

now.

is

limited in range, being restricted

a small number of objects (i.e., objects whic|

are near and present and not separated by
barrier).
Inference however is a means i&
knowledge of the remote, the mediated

w
L

&"

37

PRAMAtfACANDRIKA
and

the past

knowledge

the

source of

number

which the

enumerative statement
the

(respectively

all

sorts of objects

The above

endless.

of

made known
knowing,

Anupramdna

means

or effective

to

therefrom

valid cognition, the cognition resulting

three kinds, viz., perceptual, inferential

is also of

and authoritative knowledge.

tual

viz. 9

There being

perception, inference and authority).

three kinds of

order of

the

objects

by the three kinds

or

an independent

based on

is

and number of

kind

is

of

is

Agama

Lastly,

future.

communication

authoritative

of

the

knowledge

Of

the cognition that

is

percep-

these,
is

produced

by the process of perceiving. This (cognition) is

what is meant by immediate knowledge, direct
knowledge or witnessing knowledge

(saksatkara) .

reached

through in-

the

Similarly,

ference

is

Lastly,

knowledge

knowledge.

called inferential or mediate

the knowledge derived from authoritati^.^

communication

called authoritative

is

knowledge

or revealed knowledge.

(What, then,
knowledge?)

perception

Perception

sense-organ that

words,

is

free

is

perception

is

is

from

the

as

a source rf-^
process

*||

(In other^S

defects.

stimulation,

the

of

by

the^

an organ of sense not subject to anjf;J>

Here the word 'sense-organ'
sensory defects.)
object,

of

inference -iriti^
prevents a too wide application to
-' -

the rest.

Rnt

it

mav be

'

-*"'?

;W'w%

said, perception is a species

M
MADHVA LOGIC

38

an instrumental cause, and an instrumental cause

only through an intervening action or

possible

is

For example, the instrument

cutting is the axe, and the axe is an

the

operation.

of

act of

instru-

,^

:i!

mental cause

of

the cutting or felling of the tree

ct

through the intervening operation of coming into

The

contact with the tree.

that

is

intervening

which being effected by the instrumental

cause serves to effect that which

the

action

the

of

(What, then,

the

is

from

results

instrumental cause, e.g., the

contact with the tree which

case of

operation

is

effected

intervening

perception as an

by the axe.
in

action

instrumental

the

cause or

agency.')

We

grant the force of the question which

And our answer

thus raised.

organ

the instrument,

is

sense-organ

this.

is

and

with the object

its effect

The consequence
the

action

(perceived)

which

eye
a

(i.e.,

view

described

is

of

to

results

from

'i

the

stress

operation inhering

(i.e.,

sense-organ

concerned)

the fact that

the

organ

with
(a*J

primary while the J

is

therein

organs are

the perceptive^

as the operation of the|

the seat of the operation)

further the

sense-; ^|

sense-organ as an instrument

Here the process or operation

operation)

the

as an instrumental cause)

or effect

the

the

is

immediate knowledge (saksatkara)

or

direct

is

of

sense-

the contact of the

intervening operation (through which

organ produces

The

is

is

said

secondary.
to

be free

Anjll
froflb

PRAMAJJACANDRIKA

39

and to be in contact with their respective

defects

with a view

objects

Hence there

of seven

is

kinds

of

in

therefrom.

our definition.

kinds,

perception

or

the truth

resulting

no discrepancy

is

Perception
different

knowledge

the

of

validity

ensure

to

viz.,

consisting

the six
the

of

operations of the senses and the perception of the

sdksi or witnessing

perception

perception

witnessing

the

of

Of

consciousness.

consisting

consciousness

the operation of

in

Witnessing Intelligence as organ

The

presentation

Atman

as

nescience

are

the

is

the

or instrument.

knowledge or

immediate

such

of

objects

these, the

essence of the

Self

or

thereof,

the

underlying absence or privation,

the

well

the

as

properties

mind, the functions of the mind such as knowledge, pleasure and the rest, time, Aka$a in its
unmodified

original

reveals its

own

condition,

of

organs of sense.)

are

olfactory

visual

and

arising

from

the

the six different organs presupposes

the six
the

also

nature.

(Sensuous perception as
operation

It

etc.

sense,

The

six sense-organs

the gustatory sense, the

sense, the tactual sense, the auditory sense

the mind.

Of

these,

the

objects

of

the

olfactory sense are odour and the different kinds of

fragrance which are the specific modes of odour;

the objects
its specific

of

the gustatory sense

are tastes

and

forms ; the objects of the visual sense

and touch are substances having magnitude and

40

MADHVA

"*'

(generated)

perceptible

kinds

different

Air

touch.

itself

is

and

from

blows

is felt as

the

rest,

the generic;J

an object

of

perceived by

(which

its feel

(The inference

Since the feel

nor cold.

the

(not directly

inferred

revealed to touch).
that

and

feel of air is also

but only)

The wind

form, certaift^

colour and

motion,

of

The

characters.

touch,

LOGIC

such as number

qualities

is

as follows.)

;:

being neither hot

_f_

is

a quality like colour

is

and cannot go wandering, there must be some substance in which the feeling in question inheres

What,

abides.

then, is the substance

substrate of the feeling

in question ?

which

is

or

the|

cannot

It

be earth, for earth, though characterised by per-3

ceptible touch, is also characterised

form and colour,

evidently

has

whereas the feeling which

the blowing wind)

the case of

experienced (in

by perceptibte|

no substrate of a perceptible fo

Nor can the substrate in question b

water or fire, for the feel which it indu

and colour.
either
is

not experienced

water)

can

it

as

cold

the

in

(as

or hot (as in the case of fire).

be the

they are

all

four ubiquitous

case

Nor

substances

again
si

devoid of the quality of such feeling.

The assumption

of

quitous substances

tactual

would

touch everywhere and at

properties in the

a perception

entail
all

Nor

times.

can the mind be the substrate in question,

the mind is atomic or infinitesimal and the
of

the infinitesimal or

atomic

is

impe

Vj* \

PBAMA^fACANDRlKl
i.e., beyond sense-perception.

41

ks
conw*-

Hence we

that which constitutes the substrate of the quail

question is
that is felt by touch in the case in

we

the (specific) substance

But
inferred

as

substrate

of

jar.
-

may be

it

said air

because

is

is

it

the

touch just as

is

the

not tenable, for air

is

the

perceptible

This objection

perceptible (and not

is

shown),

above
a

call air.

an
substrate of perceptible touch only because of
adventitious condition, viz., its association with

an object

of

perceptible form and

adventitious condition

anything that

in-

is

with the probandum but

correlated

variably

is

(An

colour.

in question,

variable correlate of the

by the
is
:

property of

condition

the

probandum

the

of

an

the

which

it

inference

is

in

in- .-

as determined

subject

(The subject

inferred.

is

In

probans.)
not an invariable correlate of the

the case

is

&

:%
,

(^

an external substance and the pro^/j||

bandum is perceptibility) . That the adventitious^
and form is proved ,;/^|
condition is perceptible colour

air

which

by the

is

invariable

stances that

are

correlation

of

and

perceptible

external

the

sob^gg

presenpgj

form together .*&*$$

between tbe;|;g|
the absence of any such correlation

of

perceptible

and

'
BpbBfe^g|
the inference, viz, being the
the adventitious condprf^
of perceptible touch ' and
perceptible colour^;;, J
tion, viz., the 'presence of

ground

colour

form.'

of

Thus we

y Substance and
.-"

an external
also char^erised

find that whatever is

is gerceived

is

v;-

MiDHVA

42

LOGIC

by perceptible colour and form, but we cannot

say that whatever

touch has

a substrate of a perceptible

is

(Hence being the substrate

is

and

colour

perceptible

also

form,

a perceptible touch

of

a valid ground for perceptibility only on the

"A

condition that the substrate has perceptible colour

and form and not otherwise.

ground

In other words, the

a ground only under conditions and

is

not unconditionally and therfore the inference in

question
affirm

is

Hence though you

not flawless.)

the presence of the ground (viz.,

being

the substrate of a perceptible touch), in the subject

of the inference (viz., air), yet perceptible

colour which
i.e.,

always accompany the probandum^fj

(and so

the presence
to

no

perceptibility, is

ground

the

form and

of

invariable

the ground

fails

probandim

the

be no invariable

correlate

correlate of
to prove

being

of

shown-l

an invariable

**

correlate

of

the probandum.)

that

is

inferred

air

from

its

Hence

it

follows^

special touch (and

not perceived as contended).

The
are

objects

by the auditory sense |

varieties in the form of

perceived

sounds and their

the alphabetical or verbal sounds.

Inadvertence of the mind (partial or complete))!

colour-blindness,

jaundice, etc.,

of the five sensibilities.

The

objects

(of

are the

defected
,.

/j

the five different senses) arfrl

mind (the sixth sense) and?

the mind makes them its objects by presiding
also objects

of

the

43

PRAMAtfACANDBIKi

and guiding and directing the operations of

over

the five external senses.

But the mind

in

such perception

of

the

external

perceives past events and

also

does not

it

The

senses.

require the aid

result of such per-

ception (of the past independently of the external

senses)

is

memory

thus said to be an
(by the

Memory

is

of internal perception

effect

mind as the

of sense

recollection.

or

sixth sense).

The

contact

this case (i.e., in the case

and object in

a direct perception of the past by means of

the mind as the sixth sense) is furnished by
of

Samshara, trace or disposition

behind by the past experience. (The mind

what we
left

the

call

past
the sixth sense has a direct vision of the
of the
and what we call the disposition or trace
as

nothing but the contact of the

would say
past with the present, or as Bergson
past

experience

the

perhaps,
past

mind

in

or

insertion

the

into

is

present).
is

recollection)

prolongation of the

The

the

thus analogous to that

of the specially gifted senses of

the

yogis

supernal powers

possess extraordinary

(of

process

which
due

to

(and thereby
practice of yogik concentration
and the present).
cross the gulf between the past

the

The
mental

defects

or

of

the

internal

predispositions, etc.

mind (which

perceptions)

vitiate the

are

desires,
,-

perceived

objects
There are also defects of the
perception) and
correct
their
with
(which interfere

#
44

MABHVA

LOGIC

these are long intervals (of time or space), closed

proximity (in time or space), subtile or potentiaJJ
condition

(media)

objects,

the

of

intervening barriers

separating the objects from the perceiver,4

non-manifestation of the objects (e.g., of the stars |

in daylight), intermixture with objects of a like|g
:

or similar nature, etc.

/ft

These defects being present, in some cases the^|

cognition itself is not generated and in some cases n
doubt or uncertainty arises (as to the evidence
the cognition that

is

generated).

ofc|

In the case of cognition due to the operation

the senses, the cause consists of the contacts of the

Thus the

four beginning with the self.

come

into contact with the mind, the

self

mind

mu
wi

the sensibilities, the sensibilities with the objects;

The
v

sensibilities

have no immediate intuition of

objects at a distance

to

the place

and must actually dart

of the objects

with them in order to

and come into contact

reveal

them.

same contacts which enable the

The

se

sensibilities

reveal their respective objects are also

diate

fo

the imine*

cause of the perception of their respecti^

absence.

No

intervening relations mediate

tween the contacts and the absence in the case

perception of absence (as Naiyayikas say).

One
":

holds

|L

tion

of

school of

that
in

six

philosophers

(the

Naiyayika

the contact which brings on

the form
different

of

immediate

kinds.

Thus

*;'-<*

cog1^'^

perception

(according^

"5>"

45

PRAMASACANDRIKA
scbool)

this

which
ence,

conjunction,

conjunction

between

effected

or

the eye and

the

these,

relation

that

substances

like

or

contact

the

is

or inher-

Of

qualifying and qualified.

that

in

inherent,

the

in

inherence

or

inner*

or

inherence

or

inherent in the conjoined,

is

relation of

is

either

conjoined,

the

ence in

is

it

jars, etc. (i.e.,

the relation which brings on the

perception

substances

of

in

relation of inherence

like jars,

the

The

etc.).

conjoined

similarly

the case of colour (which is a quality),

(These inhere in
actions and generic characters.
exists in

latter
substances like jars, dishes, etc., and these
Therefore the
are in conjunction with the eye.

of colour,

visual perception

action

and generic

of *i**'\
character takes place through the relation
the
herence in that which is in conjunction with

the
In the same way in tactual perception,
the tactual
relation which brings on perception by
eye.)

sense

sense is actual conjunction with the tactual

in

the case

as jars, etc.,

which

is in

of touch,

of

perception of

and the

such-

substances

quality

conjunction in the case of the

oTthe actions and generic characters

the

internal perception of the self' by the mind,

the

substances.

relation

is

relation of inherence in that

of

these

<U

So

conjunction

also

of

in

the case

mind and the

f;A

&&?%.

latter
substance in the case of the perception of the

while

it is

inherence in that which

is in

tion in the case of the perception of

conjun|K

the pleasure

MADHVA

46
and pain that

LOGIC

exist in the

case of perception

and

smell

of

So also in the

self.

by the

taste

and gustatory senses, respectively, the

olfactory

which

relation is inherence in that

tion, the smell

and the

substances which are

conjunc-

in

is

being inherent in|

taste

conjunction respectively

in

with the olfactory and gustatory senses.

in the perception of the generic characters of-

ly,

and actions, the relation which mediates^

qualities
is

Similar-

inherence

stances

in

in

that

which

conjunction

inherent in sub-

is

generic

(the

characters;

being inherent in the qualities and actions which^

are themselves inherent in the substances of wbic$?

they are qualities and actions).

of

sound By the auditory sense,

relation

sense

is

is

simple

Akaia

of the ear

and so

auditory sense being

the

inherence,

nothing but ether or

by the tympanum
of

In the perception^

tympanum and sound

Akaia the

relation

auditory

the

for

AkaSa as

limited^

(sound being a quality

inherent in

Kkaa

however, the]

(Th^

Akaia).

itself

as

being

limited bjr
in

inherent

which holds between sound

and the auditory sense in the case of perception

sound is a relation of pure inherence.)
But
perception of the generic characters, etc.,

sound (inherent

by the

relation

in particular

of

inherence

in

of the

is

medial

the

inhen

sounds)

<

(sounds being inherent in Akaia and tberefoi

in the limited AkUa which is the auditory sense,

and the generic characters,

etc.,

of

sounds

bein,
A"

prama^acandrika
inherent in sounds) .
of the jar

The

and

jar,'

relation

In the case of the

qualified.

perception in the form

no

perception of the absence

by the eye takes place through the

of qualification

is

47

In this place here,

the absence of the jar

there

the qualified

is

and the qualification which specifies the absence

is

the particular place or

to

which the absence

is

with reference

locality

perceived. (The localisation

thus acts as the specifying attribute of the absence

In the case again of the perception

"This place
the absence being in the form

in question.)
of
is

characterised

place

itself

by the absence

acts

as

the

of the jar/

the

substrate

and

qualified

the absence of the jar is regarded as its

tion.

Similarly in

itself

the mediating

the

of Inherence

perception

relation

is

qualifica-

that of qualified

and qualification (Inherence does not inhere. Nor

is it in conjunction with the objects between which
it

holds.

objects

Hence

between which

unique relation

and qualified.
of the objects

Thus

in

the relation of inherence to the

which

it

holds

is

that

The inherence

is

be a

a qualific3*ces

between which the inherence haesent

the case of the inherence of the yhjoga)

related to the cloth

tion

to

qualification**

of

cloth in its parts, viz., the threads,

is

said

is

of qualification

the

inhevmen-

and the threads by the

to

qualified

jition)

(and not iom a

second relation of inherence nor by conjuncti^ NonAll this however is fallacious and unteicausal
Qualities, actions* etc., being nothing

apart

MADHVA LOGIC

48

KK

being non-different from) the things qualifi

or the things acting, etc., a relation of inheren
(i.e.,

between

and their substrates J

etc.,

qualities,

impossible (for inherence presupposes a different

between the inherent and that in which t"

ground for the acceptance

Though

no

is

valifg

inherence as

of

reafcjj:

between /ftp

of

conjunction

is

required in the case of

the relation

and the mind

self

there

Besides,

inherent inheres).

"

perception of other objects,

is

it

not

t"

requi

so

in the perception of the self itself or its propert

and states, for the self and its properties beii

the objects presented to the witnessing Intellige

Ag
are not objects of perception by the mind.
alphabetical sounds being themselves substan
are, not

at

qualities

cannot be said

It

all.

they cannot be substances

generic characters they are

according to our view,

~~>, (Darkness

the

in

perceptible

For

one of our external senses.

case

sound
h th
/

of the

light

of

of those

who

hold

it

the

of

to

j 3nted to one

also

fails

*.,

has

external

sense and

<$

-r^gS

yet ugp

r">^

i,ie

to

generic character,
-

tne i\
in *ii
3
A a
and
tne

be substantive.
.

lamp

it

a subs

is

lamp according

the

'

{sounds
:

And

dar

of

is revealed

has generic character,

not a quality.)

to

this rule

>>pne of our external senses, and yet

^

ha

besides

as

to consist of nothing but

Naiyayika
J
_ <&- ;*^
_
.
f
which are substances.) Further tbo
m

Iphabetical

sounds

-y -m$
are qualities of
._-'

T"

PRAMA^ACANDRIKi

4:9

different

relation

from
of

Ahtea
of

relation

the

tion

in

itself

relation
exists.

As regards

impossible.

and

name

qualified,

it

the relation that

for

nothing but the essence of a rela(svarupasambandha), no separate

of

(Svarupsambandha
consists

that

svarupa of a relation.

qualified

and

qualification

relation

the

AMia, a

non-alphabetical

between

qualification

being only another

consists

is

non-

axe

of

substrate

their

inherence

sounds and

they

qualities

as

since

yet

Ikafa,

is

in

really

name

of

the essence

or

the

Thus inherence

is related

svarupasambandha to the objects between

This means that the relation
which it holds.
which relates inherence to its relata is no separate
by

relation

but

the svarupa or essence of the in'

herence itself.)

experience.

is

'

memory is the
caused only by traces of past

But some however say

consciousness that

'

The adverb

'only'

tion (which arises not simply

require other factors) .

that

precludes recogni-

from traces but

Kecognition

is

also

the cogni-

from the joint operation of traces

with present
of past experience and sense-contact
objects.
The word coincidence (samprayoga)
Non-menmeans contact (of sense aod object)

tion that arises

of recognition)
tion of traces (as a causal condition
will

make recognition

simple cognition like

mention

of coincidence

indistinguishable

'Here
or

is

jar.'

from a

Non-

contact (as a caasal

MADHVA LOGIC [thU^k

50
condition)

make
from memory.
again

will

tinguishable

The above view

knowledge

valid

source

memory,

a valid

to

\>

For

all

ground or

knowledge and therefore since memory

of

one kind

is

due

indis*
.

not tenable.

is

is

recognition

knowledge,

valid

of

cause

the

of past experience,

viz. z the traces

of

will

have to be admitted as an independent pramana

or ground of true

number

the

knowledge.

But

pramanas or

of

valid

case

this

in

sources of
i

knowledge
(as

we have

neither

more nor

less).

tration

of

We

perception

number

unestablished

and

three

is

cannot be said that

It

(Hence

form of perception,

memory to be
by the mind with con
hold

(bhavana)

attention

condition.

is

applies also to our view (of recollec-

memory).

internal

to

the

seen that

the objection
tion or

four and this

be

will

in

as

our view

due

an auxiliary

memory

is

kind of intellectual intuition

where the trace of the past experiences serves

function of contact of the present
past

Thus according

experience.

though memory

is

knowledge,

regarded only

perception,

it

is

and

so

mind with

our view*

to

admitted to be a form of

the

cause of

as

variety

memory

is

not
.

?*

separate source of knowledge,

is

though no doubt |
v *.jk
a ground of true knowledge.) ..;
There are four kinds of perception (as a

of

the

valid

knowledge), viz., the Lord's percepti

Consort's

perception,

the

3
perception ,th ;^
~B
.

PRAMA^ACANDRIKA
belongs
that

belongs

The

objects

are the

Yogin or Seer, and the perception

the

to

an ordinary

to

its

same

as the objects

is

referred

to

the corresponding

of

which each kind induces

respective perceiver.

reader

(ayogin).

mortal

of these different kinds of perception

cognitions or experiences
in

5l

For

fuller details the

Pramana-

Jayatirtha's

we think unnecessary to go into

here).
Thus everything (relating to
has been set forth and therefore we

paddhati (which
over again
perception)

close our chapter

on perception as expounded in

Pramanaeandrika on the

this

by the revered Jayatirtha.

lines chalked

We

bend our heads

in respect to the sage Vyasadeva.

Let us
Inference.

now

out

proceed to the next Pramaija, &.>>

Inference

flawless reasoning, flawless

is

establishment or proof of a conclusion (by means

of

The synonyms
arguing from a mark to

a reason or ground).

are reasoning,

marked, concluding on the basis

which

is

something

of

of

proof

the thing

something

pervaded by an invariable relation to

else.

Inference

cannot be defined simply as reason-

ing or arguing from a mark, for the definition

would then apply to fallacious reasonings such as

where the subject of the inference is

fictitious or unreal and where the mark is known
by a valid
source of knowledge to exdwlr
those

'(instead of

being invariably related to)

marked.

In

these

cases

the thing

the reasonings

are

MADHVA LOGIC

52

<

grounded on an invariable correlation and yet the

(In the former, though

reasonings are fallacious.

the invariable relation
inference

is

holds, the

subject

non-existent and thus the

of the

locus

in

which the relation is to prove the existence of the

probandum does not exist. In the latter, the
invariable

relation

is

asserted

in

reasoning

the

no such relation holds, and

thus the conclusion lacks material truth.)
Hence
but in actual

inference

is

fact

defined not as reasoning

as flawless reasoning.

defined
this

Nor again can

simply as that

case

the definition

which

is

inference be.

flawless for in,

apply

will

but

merely,

equally

Hence

Perception as a source of knowledge.

to'

it is

defined as reasoning (which is flawless).

The instrumental cause of inference is

sign or mark (by means of which we infer
';probandum). The operation or process (of
instrumental cause) which leads to

the
the
the

establishes

or

th$ collusion is reasoning or argumentation

(i.e.,;

reasoning by means of the sign through which the

"subject

of the inference

the probandum).
result

The

is

brought in relation

inferred

which emerges out

conclusion

of the process.

is

to*

the

Keason4

J
:
:l

ing (Paramaria) consists in the cognition of the

mark in the form of its invariable relation to ther;?

probandum as a property of the subject of thet^
inference.

For example

in

the inference

in yonder mountain from the perception of

of. fire

smoke

-.-:

therein,

the reasoning consists in

cognition

ot

-'

&

-;

53

PRAMAljrACANDRIKA

smoke as an invariable concomitant

the

The

from the process,

results

on

is

fire,

Invariable relation

inference.

the resulting

is

which

cognition

yonder mountain

viz. f

and

property of the

as being, as so invariably related, a

mountain yonder.

of fire

means invariable concomitance (or sequence) as in

the case * wherever there is smoke, there is fire/
By concomitance or co-existence is here meant a
relation

merely between the ground of the

ence and
of

the

concomitance

same

ence in the
of

the

is

whole

fixed

comitance

The

invariableness

means simply

that the con-

substrate.

an

in

It

character

essential

consists

defining mark)

the unfailing

in

inference

therefore

follows
(the

unfailing

the

between the ground of

of

invariable

or

vyapti

consists

probandum.

The purport

and unfailing.

that

is

the invariableness

not meant then co-inher-

is

the concomitance

comitance

By

probandunu

its

infer-

regularity of

(between two or more phenomena),

when we observe that wherever smoke
tance

ceived, there fire also is perceived,

cognise the

smoke f

is

relation

defines

the pervaded

is

or

pervading.

said

to

and

and

fire

'fire.'

Here

the pervading

or abode of the invariable

which
called the pervaded wlnle that
the
off the relation is called

The

property.

'smoke'

are

per-

or invariable con-

relation of vyapti

comitance between

we

is

locus

marks

[Thus

if

is

invariably

related

MADHVA LOGIC

54
to

B,

the

is

ing

the locus of the invariable relation

as

(particular)

this

off

while

pervaded,

as defining or

invariable

markrelation

from other invariable relations is the pervading'

By the pervaded being a property
or pervader.]
of

the

subject

existence in
its

invariable

sible.

It

of

inference

the

suitable
relation

does not

place

with

mean

(so

V:

i|

meant its;
as to make

is

the

pervader

that

the

pos--

pervaded |

property should be spatially or temporally included within the pervader). And thus our theory i
'

is

from flaws even of a trivial character.

Some however give the following account

free

invariable

concomitance.

Invariable

olM

concomi^j||

tance (as an element or factor of inference) means;

the coinherence of the ground and the probandum

||

and the same locus so that the probandumM

can never be that which is negated by theg|

in one

absolute negation that coinheres in the locus of thep

ground of the inference and also does not coinhenfe

which it negates. (In othe^

the probandum is not that which; *8|

in the locus of that

words,

if

negated by the absolute negation that occupies thfl|

place where the ground exists and also does not

occupy the place where the object negated by th^

said absolute negation exists, then the relation

same locus between the grot;

and the probandum is an invariable relation.)
Mere coexistence with the probandum inland the same locus does not fully bring out t
coexistence in the

PRAMAtfACANDRIKA

55.

Take the
"Yonder mountain is on fire,

nature of vyapti or invariable relation.

inference,

because

Here

i.,

f.

has

it

coexistence

(between

in

ness,

'oven/ is
i.e., the oven

the

yet

the

inference

exclude such

the locus of knowable

also
is

a knowable object)

is

evidently fallacious.

wherewith will constitute

being

as

which

one

is

vyapti)

not

the place

where

ground

the

(This qualification of the

case

And
To

(coexistence
is

qualified

which

that

negated by the absolute negation

and the

of ** fire/

locus

the probandum

cases,

holds

locus

knowableness/

'fire,', i.e.,

e.g., the

same

the

ground,

the

probandum,

character of knowableness."

the

is

which occupies
or

H etu

exists.

probandum excludes the

above fallacious inference and other

of the

probandum of the
above inference, is that which is negated by the
absolute negation occupying the place where the
like

For

cases-

'

ground, viz.,

-fire/

the

knowableness,' exists;

never exists in the great lake and yet

ness
is

exists

in>

'

e.g.,

fire:

knowable-

the great lake in so far as the lake

a knowable object.

Therefore the probandum*

which is absolutely non-existing

where the ground, ' knowableness/ exists.) Even
this qualification of the probandum, however, fails.
'fire/ is not that

-to

exclude the case of (the evidently fallacious),

inference, "The tree is in contact (with the;

monkey) because
substances."

it

has the generic character ol

(Here 'contact

'

is

the probmdfym^;
v

MADHVA LOGIC

56

and

not that which

it is

where the

hetu,

ground,

or

character of

substances,'

character of

substances

Contact

Hence

exists

'

To

fallacious.)

dum

substances.

in

substances.

And

is

':

absolutely

yet the inference

exclude such cases the proban-

which

further qualified as being one

is

generic

in

that which

not

is

non-existent in substances.
is

'The

exists.

'the generic

viz.,

as a quality also exists

contact

'

non-existent

absolutely

is

also

same substrate with that

non-existent where the ground

does not coexist in the

which

absolutely

is

or hetu exists.

is

contact

l
-;;

like.

But despite

existent in substances.
is also

this, contact

not that which does not coexist with that

which

absolutely

is

with

in

-3"*

substances.

non-existent in

For 'contact* coexists

tact

['Contact' abides in substances.

thus not that which is absolutely non- %

and the
It

This excludes the case of

||

the absence of con*

'Contact'

the same substance.

of thft

*&

t-

and monkey coexists in the tree with th% ^

negation or absence of such contact in another
'Contact' thus coexists with .gs
part of the tree.
tree

the

(with

non-contact

negation

absolute

of

Iff im
one and the same substrate.]
other words, non-contact or negation of cotti-^

contact)

tact

in

coexistent

being

in

the

with contact which

or

substance

of

the negation, the rule, that

should not
that

which

same

exist
.

is

in

the same

absolutely

is

the

substratft||

the object

probandum

substrate

non-existent

with

when*
fe

'*>*"&&

PRAMAtfACANDBlKl
the ground

exists,

and the case cannot

relation or

invariable

one of

as

be regarded

fails,

IJ

'''

vyapti.

But

hold,

Take the case

sound.
rain on

the

below are
at

rivers
at

we

all this,

the

hills

and un-

fallacious

is

of the inference

'

There

is

higher up because the rivers

Here from the fullness of the

rain
the base we infer the occurrence of
full.'

such

In

top.

where the

inferences,

from that
probandum occupies a different place
ground, the above
occupied by the prolans or
invariable

of

definition

existence, in the

same

as

concomitance

co-

of the ground

substrate,

be

It cannot
and the probandum altogether fails.
self-same objecsaid that our view is open to the

above view, for unfailing relation of

in the
and cause holds equally, in our view,
where the prolans and the

as the

tion
effect

ease of inferences

probandum occupy

(We have

..

different places.
far

so

invariable relation.

discussed

We

now

....

the meaning of

proceed

to

explairi

that
relation
invariable
of
forms
the different
Dharmas
inference.)
of
grounds
the
constitute
related in four
be
may
things
properties of

or

ways.

different

Thus two Dharmas

or properties
invariable

symmetrical
may be related by a positive
invariably concomitant
relation so that each is

with the

Two

other.

be so related that
concomitant
:.:-./.,

8;

of

one of them

:..

is

may

an invariable

but not vice versa.

the other,
.."''

again

properties

.'.
.

,'

m-

-*i

MADHVA LOGIC

58

Two

by the

relation

sion.

Lastly,

may

again

properties

mutual negation and exclu-

of

two

one

is,

be

one case where one

the

either

(This last relation

not.

is

so^jj

is,

as also at least in one case where

the other

is,

may

properties

related that at least in

other

be invariably related

is

equal to the

following three propositions taken

together where

A and B

viz.,

'

least in

in

At

one case where

one case where

form of concomitance

two

propositions

Wherever

is,

A is, B
is,

is

not/

is

A is, B
'

'

'

At

least *

At

The

is not.'

first

equal to the;|

similarly

'Wherever

is

Bis,' and

is,

A is/ taken together. The second

will correspond respectively to the

and the third

propositions

express the two properties,

one case where

least in

In

all

'In no case where

cases

A is, B

is.')

first

form

is,

concrete illustration of the

where

We
of

is

'

and

have av|

invariable

concomitance in the unfailing relation that holds

prohibition and con-

f\

duciveness to demerit and sin and between scrip-

between scriptural

tural injunction

righteousness
prohibited

is

and

(Vedic)

conduciveness to merit and

Thus whatever

productive of sin

and demerit and

whatever tends to demerit and sin

Here

prohibited.

properties)' is at
of, the other.

whatever
to merit

each

is

the

scripturafly:.;!

two

(related

once pervaded by, and pervader |

Similarly it is] also observed thsk|

is scripturally

and

of

scripturally

is

enjoined

righteousness

is also

and

conducive

whatever

is

:-:m

59

PRAMAtfACANDRIKi
conducive to merit and righteousness

down by
able

The

scripture.

concomitance

laid

also

is

second form of invari-

again illustrated in the case

is

between smoke and fire, as also

between the product of will and non-eternity.
(
Thus
wherever there is smoke, there is fire but
no invariable relation holds in the form ' Whereof the relation

ever there
of the

there is smoke,' for in the case

is fire,

heated iron-ball (where

fire

Here

is not) the invariability fails.

is'

'

smokiness

and occupies a smaller area while

the pervader and occupies a wider

the pervaded

fireness

area.

is

Similarly,

will-causality

is

'whatever

of this,

viz.,

product

is

'whatever

form

it is

seen to

causality).

The

yet

no

is

third

product

form of

fail

(which

case of antecedent non-existence

and

converse

of the

is non-eternial, is also

product of will-causality,' for

non-eternal

of

but no in-

non-eternal,'

also

variable relation holds in the

the

smoke

but

is,

in
is

will-

of

invariable

con-

the relation

which

holds between the generic character of the

cow and

comitance

is

illustrated

in

the generic character of the horse as also between

that of the elephant

and that

of

the

lion.

Thus

wherever there is the generic character of the cow,

there is nowise the generic character of the horse

and wherever there

is

the generic character of the

horse there is nowise the generic character of the

cow. No relation of pervader and pervaded holds

betwAPn *\thaT mio and

*

thfl

other,

all relation

MADHVA LOGIC

so

being non-existent between the two. Simila;

~ T
whatever is an elephant, is nowise a lion' ar
:

'

whatever

is

a lion,

nowise an elephant'

is

The

noted in this connection.

concomitance

invariable

case of the

relation

fourth kind
the

in

illustrated

is

which

to

relations

exclusive

well-known mutually

between tbe

exists

the property of being a cook and the property of;

man

one

of

as also between the

the

five

elements and the

Thus though

moving.

man may

the

of

and the prop

being a

man

being a

property

of

another

co-exist, yet in

may

property of being a cook

that of

property

in one particular ins

the property of being a cook

.of being a

being

property of

woman

co-exist

to the exclusion of

also in a third instance

as

being a

man may

co-exist with t

property of being a non-cook to the exclusion

the property of being a cook.
-no relation

of

pervader

and

In this case
pervaded

between either one and the other, for inspite

relation

existing

between the two, there

instances in which the relation fails.

In the

way, though the property of being an ele

is co-existent in some instances with the pro
of moving {viz., in earth, water, air and
yet in the case of Skaia or ether

(which

element but does not move) the property of

an element

exists to the exclusion of the

of movingi and

in

is

being;

pro

the case of the mind

::"":-H9

v^

property

of

moving

not an element and yet

In

all

these

the

to

being an element.

of the property of
is

exists

it

when the

moves.)

>
.

property which

is

per-

vaded produces the cognition of the property that

is the pervader,
we have what is called an inference or

anumana*

property (of

The pervading

which the inference produces the knowledge) is

called the inferred character, anumeya, or object
of inference.

The following
raised to the
viz.,

that

exists

valid

in

it

objection

may

however

be

view of inference expounded above,

is not possible for the smoke that

the mountain far away to produce a

cognition of

here in his house.

fire

The

in the

man who

exists

reply to this objection is

In the case of inference the instru- ||

mental cause is a known agency and not an im- *

as follows.

'

known condition as in the case of perceptioa^

(The relation of smoke to fire is known to the man|^^
who makes the inference, but in perception the
action of the sensibilities with reference to the
object perceived is not known before the

*W*
*8

P^|M

ception.)

"'~;*&ea#'

be
coffto
seem
not
does
The reply however
vincing, for there are people (e.g., the savage**!^

the Cocoanut

Island) in

whom

a distance does not

The answer
cognition of fire.
case though they have a cognition

smoke

at

the perception-of
call
is

forth

the

$Hs

that

of the

form of

mIdHVA

62

LOGIC

of
the smoke, yet they have no knowledge

concomitant of

invariable

an object

like

as an

it

For even when

fire.

smoke might previously be cognised

an invariable concomitant of something else

account
such as fire, it may fail to be cognised on
as

-,vl

*i

of failure of

memory

as an invariable concomitant

*i

and thus

of the latter in a fresh instance

produce the cogniton of

smoke was never

nised as invariably related to

and

correctly

1
accurately

panied by a recollection of

cog-

possibly

cannot

when an
we conclude
cognised mark or sign

is

invariable

its

accomcon-

;|

comitance with the thing marked or signified

and is thereby able to produce the cognition of
the thing marked or

*anumana.
marked

yet since the inference

inferential

fit

place or

an inference or ,|
Hence even though the form of the^jj

or signified thing

relation to

in

signified

we have what

locality,

"

a cognition of

fire,

smoke in the first instance

produce the knowledge of fire.)
Therefore

'

to

(Therefore in the

fire.

case of savages where the

fail

is

called

may

makes

a particular
process

is

already

be
it

place

known

known

further in

or locality,

the||

not useless or superfluous.

(The inference, in other words,

march of thought conducing as

entails
it

a real

does to a:|t%

known thing with a :|

place or situation to which it was not previously
known to be related.) Hence inference consists

new

of

synthesis of the already

two factors: (1) invariable concomitance

3ft

.(of
srsE

63

PRAMAtfACANDRIKA
the

with the

mark

presence of
as

mark

the

make

will

thing marked either in

(causally

There

is

no

in

rule

the same place or some

that

existing

(for the

inference

the

of

and the thing marked,

be proved to exist in

should also

in the

mark may

one place, e.g., the fullness

the base,

place.

connected)

mark

the

be cognised as a property
of

inference of the

the

otherwise

or

(2) the

place such

suitable

possible

other

marked)

thing

the
viz.,

subject
exist in

rivers

at

may

rain,

some other

place, e.g., at the

how

does the cognition

top of the hill).

question here arises

of the

other

invariable concomitance

words, do

we

arise?

How

in

arrive at the knowledge of an

invariable concomitance between different objects

The answer is, by means of the
or events ?

corresponding perceptions, inferences and

Thus

mony.

comitance of

testi-

in the case of the invariable consmoke and fire, we arrive at the

fire
knowledge of the concomitance of smoke with
with the
by the perception of the one together
other places.
other in the domestic oven and

of
Here repeated observation and non -observation
But
the auxiliary conditions.

the contrary are

how can
which

only that
perception which apprehends
with the
present and is in contact

is

sensibilities,

concomitance
apprehend an invariable

that extends not

and possible)

merely

but also

to

to

all

cases

(actual

the past (and

the

j
MADHVA

64

LOGIC
:

future and the

(pratyasatti) of

and
to

far

you,

It

past

according

but

do),

contact exists

transcendental

no such

cont

and present and of

Naiyayikas

(as

would be possib

transcendental

admitted

you

if

remote) ?

T"'

(between the present sense organ and the past

and distant objects). The answer to this is:.

though there is no transcendental contact between J
classg
a particular instance and its samanya or
capable
yet since the past and the distant are
instan
being drawn into relation to the present
?

by means of similarity or resemblance, the cognj|

extendi
tion of an invariable concomitance as
possible) is ful||
(actual and
to all instances
'

established.

as

concomitance

Invariable

will
known mediately by means of inference
The following are inst
illustrated later on.
known from authj
of invariable concomitance

tative

person

'Whoever

testimony.

is

touched with the

.

a Brahmin,

not be put to

who must

animal that

is

cow
feet,'

'

one that must not

is
'

death,'

Whatever

is

enjoined

as a duty/ |
the Vedas, ought to be accomplished
*^
Inference is of three kinds: inference
effects, inference

from causes, and inferenceJroi|J

phenomena that are neither causes

When an effect is the ground of our inference
effi
the cause, we have an inference from an
smoke we J|
e.g., when from the presence of
p the existence of

fire.

When

the cause
'-**

-'

65

PRAMAtfACANDWKl

we have
when we say,

the ground of an inference of the effeet,

mass

'yonder

to

character

own

its

When

rain-fall.'

which owes

clouds

of

e.g.,

cause,

an inference from a

cause proves an impending

mark proves the

particular

special

its

a probandum without being either

the cause or the effect of it, we have an inference
from something which is neither a cause nor an

existence

of

the presence of taste proves

when

effect, e.g.,

the,,

existence of colour.

may be

Inference
classes

from another standpoint,

viz.,

two

into

again

divided

into infer-

inference
ence of what is specifically observed and
Thus whei*|*he
of what is generically observed.

we have an inference
observed, e.g., when

object inferred is perceptible

of

the specifically

inferred
is

the

object

inferred

we have an inference
when the
e.g.,
observed,

of

not perceptible,

sensibility is inferred

Some
of

Where

from smoke.

generically
;

&

three

from the cognition

the,

visual,

of colour.

inference is
(the Naiyayikas) hold that
Kevalanvayl inference,
viz.,

kinds,

i Kevalavyatireki

inference

and

AnvayavyatireMM

'C-

;*;

;,:

inference.

pakja or the
(According to the Naiyayikas) the
that substrate which is
property.
the, probandum as its

subject of an inference
to be proved to

To exclude
Isttbject and

is

o*H^

the sapaksa or the co-ordinate

subject is
other like substrates, the

defined as that

tfer,-

own

:?-- t

which

own

is to

the proband*** as a

.,

.'

66

Since the property here means that the $|

whereof is to be produced by the sign

property.

cognition

or

mark

'MADHVX LOGIC

(in the inference), the definition is not too

(The sapaksa

wide.

also a substrate of

is

perty, but it is not the substrate

the cognition whereof

or sign.
is

is

of

property which

may

by the mark

it is

the

is

not the substrate of the

probandum

**

But

itself.).

it

be said that the hetu or ground has also this m

as being related to

probwndum^^

ground as

by conjunction (and thus the |

it

wide as applying to the hetu or ^

definition is too

To

well).

meet this objection the

:

not the substrate of the property that constitutes

the probandum,

concomitance

or

the substrate
proved

but

to

related

is

to

conjunction,
in

but

the

as

paksa
is to

is

that substrate which

owns

is

homogeneous

that

with

property

which

The

property.)

sapaksa or co-ordinate of the inferential subject

a

J|

by J .^|

only

it

which the probandum

abide

(The hetu r$

paksa has been defined as a substrate.

be

which

property

character of being characterised by the

is

"z

homogeneous with the property that constitutes

the probandum, but

is

a pro-

the property

to be produced

It is the substrate of a

which

constitutes the

To preclude a too wide application^

to the case of the smoke in the oven, the definition
includes the word 'substrate.'
[The smoke in the

probandum.

oven

is

the familiar instance or drstanta and n

* #

the sapaksa.

by the

It is distinguished

from the

fact that it is not the substrate,

la

while

67

PRAMAtfACANDBIKA
sapaksa
case

is

the

the substrate of a property

kitchen

homogeneous

fire)

property constituting the

in the

mountain)].

probandum

To have

(in

this

with

the

(i.e.,

the

fire

the sapaksa

defined

simply as the substrate of the probandum (and not

of a property homogeneous with the probandum)

(For the sapaksa and

would have been absurd.

the paksa would in that case have been identical,

and a sapaksa other than the paka would have

been an impossibility.) Therefore in the defini-

word homogeneous has been included.

The meaning is that the sapaksa is the substrate
of a property homogeneous with the probandum
and

'

'

tion the

such

as

uncertainty
the paksa

is

of

the

the

substrate of

The vipaksa or contra-ordinate

subject

is

of

character

the uncertainty that characterizes

(i.e.,

as

devoid

the probandum).

of the inferential '^

devoid alike of the pro-

substrate

bandum and every property homogeneous with

The words devoid of the pro*
the probandum.
bandum' distinguishes the vipaksa from the
'

devoid of every property,

homogeneous with the probandum' distinguishes
(The sapaksa is a similar
it from the sapaksa.
like
instance in which the existence of a pror^iy

paksa while the words

the

probandum

is

known

vipaksa is a dissimilar
non-existence
properties

of

similar

for certain.)

;-,"

'

the
to

for

and the

certain,

which the

instance in

probandum and of all

known
the probandum is

;.'*-.:>;'

'-'
'

'-

MADHVA

68

LOGIC

[These definitions of the inferential subject,

the co-ordinate of the inferential subject and the
the inferential subject, prepare

contra-ordinate to

way

the

and

the definitions of Kevalanvayi

for

other forms of inference.]

Thus the Kevalanvayi inference is one which

is based on a ground that pervades the subject
and also exists in its co-ordinates but which has
no contra-ordinate

existing.

to its subject actually

[In other words, a Kevalanvayi inference

is

one

based on numerous instances of agreementin presence but is without any instance of agreement in absence.]
^

that

is

Kevalanvayi

cannot

inference

simply as an inference in which

to

no co-ordinate

be

defined
existed

there

the subject, for in this case if

;;

be indistinguishable from the inconclusive

reasoning 'All things are nameable, because theyg
will

(Here the subject

are knowable.'

being

'all

ordinate

things'

'everything/

or

the subject

to

of the inference

exists,

no eontraN^

but since there

is

here also no co-ordinate to it, the ground of the

inference, viz., the invariable relation between
*

knowableness

corroborative

'

and

is

nameableness/

familiar

material certitude.)

the ground

'

instance

Hence

existent

in

and

the words

is

without a

thus lacks
*in whi

the co-ordinate.*

even thus the definition remains imperfect for

inference which has no <x>ntra-ordinate to its
ject

and in which the ground

is

existent

a3m
Yjp iki
:

H'

Swh

6$

Prama^acandbikI
f*w-

distinguishable from the

not
Ithe
I fallacious reasoning in which the ground does not
e.g., the
Sexist in the subject of the inference,
is

co-ordinate,

inference 'sound is

To exclude such
it is

'

are
''?

viz.,

the

'sound.'

land

and not

'jar,'

itself

does not

in the other part, viz.?

To exclude such

prevent

fallacious reasonings

confounded

being

these

is

stated as

subject

but also

ground

existent in the

with

pervasion of the subject

viz., (1) Where the
forms,
of
two
again
be
may
and its eo-'
ground pervades both the subject
where the ground pervades the

pervading

as

however,

only in one part of the subject,

Kevalanvayi inference, the

by

this,

it

{ being not merely

Even
this

for

viz., 'shape,' exists

ft

which the ground must

from such fallacious reasonings

they
The jar and sound are nameable, for
ground,
characterised by shape' where the

distinguish
as

in

subject.

the

not sufficient,

is

visible.'

fallacious reasonings Kevalanvayi

specified by the qualification

an inference

in

exist

it is

further

inference is
that

nameable because

ordinates,

it.

The

and (2)

portion (i.e., in some)

subject but exists only in a

i-0f the co-ordinates.

is

knowable,

>

Sound

is

namable, because*

illustrates the case

just as is the jar'

merely the subject

where the ground pervades not
reasoning
same
the
In
co-ordinates.
but also its
the words 'because

On

IP*
m.

place of the

it is

a quality

words

just as is colour

'because

the
as is the jar ') illustrates

it is

case

knowaWe
where the

MADHVA LOGIC

70

ground exists only hrsome

'quality'

some nameabl

of

predicable

is

(The gro\&

the co-ordinates.

entire extent) of
viz.,

a portion of

(i.e.

things, but not of all narneable things.)

The

the ground of

inference

agreement

as

invariable

the

in

consists

fe

agreement

as

Invariable concomitance

presence

viz., in-

agreement in presence

and invariable concomitance

absence.

constitu

two kinds,

of

is

variable concomitance as

in

which

invariable concomitance

confj

comitance of the ground of the inference with

the

probandum.

concomitance

Invariable

agreement in absence consists in the

invariabli

concomitance of the absence of the probandm

In the

with the absence of the ground.

agreement in presence, the ground

and fhe probandum

is

the pervad

is

In the

the pervader.

of agreement in absence, the absence

bandum

is

concomitance

able,

In every case an

'

just

the

pro--

sound
as

comitance of

is

is
'

invariable

understood as following in

is

In the case

of the pervaded.

inference

of

the pervaded and the absence of

ground the pervader.

wake

case

of

narneable, because

the

jar,'

knowable

'

the abov^
it is

know-

cam

invariable

the

with

'

narneable

based on an agreement in presence only.

T]
..

agreement in presence
knowable,

here

narneable,

is

just

is

as

'

whatever
is

the

But we have no agreement in absence

what is not narneable is
in the form
1

M + +;

jai

71

PBAMi^TACANDRIKA.
knowable,'
of

case

an object

nameable and there

This

which

why

is

is

is

inference based

any

all

things are

is

not name-

on such con-

agreement in

inference of

called

get

to

not nameable as

nothing that

comitance consisting of
only

is

such absence, since

illustrative of

able.

impossible

being

it

presence

the Kevalanvayi type.

the ground pervades the subject, where no

co-ordinate of the subject exists and where further

Where

from every instance of a

contra-ordinate to the subject, we have an inference
Nyaya).
of the Kevalamjatirekl type (according to
the ground is excluded

If

Kevalavyatirekl inference had been

defined as

one in which the ground is excluded from

instances of) the

the

definition

(some

contra-ordinate to the subject,

would have been too

would have applied to

wide and

the fallacious reasoning

based on a non-invariable ground, 'yonder

tain is on fire, because it is a mountain.'

mounTo ex-

that
clude such reasonings the definition lays down
the ground must be excluded from every instance
of a contra-ordinate to the subject.
case, the

In the present

ground, viz., 'being a mountain,' though

great
excluded from such contra-ordinates as 'the
excluded
lake,' 'the sheet of water,' etc., is yet not

from

such

mountain/

other contra-ordinates as
'a hill

without

fire.'

'a

fireless

Hence the ground

not excluded 'from every case of a contra-ordinate

the
to the subject' and thus does not come up to
requirements of the definition (of a Kevalavyatireki

is

:V
MADHVA LOGIC

72

Thus the

inference as set forth above).

defi

does not apply to such cases and is not too wi

(as applying to such fallacious reasonings as wel

must be noted however that the mere fact of

ground being excluded from every instance of
It

complete definition of the Kevatid.

as

suffice

instance does no

or dissimilar

contra-ordinate

from

distinguished

as such

for

vyatirekl inference,

it

remains

Anvayavyatirekl

inferen

based both on agreement in presence and agre

ment in absence. To exclude such inferen

the

the definition stresses

ordinate of

the

that

fact

should exist,'

subject

similar instance where the existence of

bandum should be known

'

no

i.e.,

the pro

for certain should e

existence of t|
(In Anvayavyatireki inference, the
n
co-ordinate or similar instance is a sine qu&

while
.

Kevalavyatireki the

in

$hs> co-ordinate is

definition

as such
fallacious

ground

of

does

the
the

not

Bute

suffice

aig

the Kevalavyatireki inference,

of
it

qud non.)

sine

added qualification

this

*in

non-existence

has a too

inference

wide
on

based

application to
a

Svarupasi

on a ground that does not exu

'The
inferential subject), viz.,

(i.e.,

finite

individual

has

panyingit, since this body

soul

aceo$

is conscious. '....

non-existent
the ground, viz., 'consciousness' is
subject,
the body which is the inferential
'

'

dead body,

e.g., is devoid of consciousness.

S.1'

73'

PRA&f AtfACANDBIKl
exclude such cases, the
existence

suffice, for as so qualified

applies

definition

to

the fallacious inference

based on a ground that exists

subject (and not in the

in one

whole of

Lord

and the

individual

finite

the finite individual, i.e.,

and not

such

an

it

viz.,

are

omniscient,

holds good of one part

the whole of

of

answering to

Lord

of

The

'The

following

Kevalavyatireki in

the above requirement

all

all-knowing,

is

To

it,)

says,

definition

the

cases

instance

"The

it),

ground must pervade the subject.'

is

of the

only of the Lord and not of

'all-creating' is true

of the subject

part

(Here the ground

because they are all-creating."

exclude

Even

the ground in the subject.

however, does not

this,

the

of

on the

insists

definition

because

He

is

alft^^ting/ v^Jr

It is

based on the invariable agreement/if bsen<^

viz.,

'Whatever

creating,

not all-knowing,

is

as

just

is

ment
'what

none

this

illustrating the positive

what is all-creating and

other
all-knowing,' for Kamkrna and

in presence
is

^n^ ^

Devadatta.'

innumerable instances illustrating

in absence but

is

between

'

'

in the
Incarnations of the Lord are comprised
cannot serve
subject of the inference (and therefore
while other finite
as corroborative illustrations)
therefore
are non-omniscient (and
individuals

cannot be cited as
in presence).

based on an

10

illustrations

of

the

agreement

it is
For these reasons (., that
can be
invariable relation which

j>

MADHVA

74

actually observed only

and not as agreement

is called

An

LOGIC

:&S

agreement

as

in

absence!

such inference

in presence)

kevalavyatireki inference.

inference in

which the ground pervades

subject, exists in the co-ordinates or

instances wherein the

probandum

known

similar

and

exists,

the

ex- .|

is

eluded from every instance of a contra-ordinate to

the subject

an anvayavyatireki inference.

is

anvayavyatireki inference

is

not completely defined

as one in which the ground

existent

the

in

definition

fails

the finite

contra-ordinates, for as such

the

to exclude the fallacious inference

'

The body

individual is non-eternal, because

has the character of the element of earth.'

inference

the

fl

found to be non-

is

based on a non-invariable ground, viz.,

of

An.'-$

ground,

element of earth,'

viz.,

it

In

this

'character of

the

though non-existent in such|f

eternal entities as the ether, etc.,

is

yet existent

ii

such other eternal entities as the atoms of earth^j

etc.
(Thus though excluded from some objects

which are not non-eternal, it is yet not excluded

from some other objects which are also not non-1
eternal.)
To exclude such cases, the definitioi||
says,
the ground must be excluded from ever^
'

instance of a contra-ordinate.'
itself

for

does not

such

as

it

kevalavyatireki

suffice

as

remains
inference

But

this also

by

a complete definitioi

indistinguishable

based

Hence the
the ground must exist

on

from

agreement

in absence only.

definition

words,

in the co-ordinates!

'

V-

adds il

16

tRAMAtfACAND&IKA
ffi-

(The kevalavyatireki

Even with
if"
"
;,

co-ordinates.}

added qualification, the definition

this

wide application

too

has a

of

devoid

is

the

to

fallacious

on a svar&pasiddha ground

inference based

(i.e.,

|
;

from

excluded
:V

also exists

J:.-'

Lord.

|-

subject

tion

the
\y.

of 'not all-knowing'

cases

'what

in

is

and
the

viz.,

all-knowing,'

is

does not exist in Devadatta, the

the (inference). Hence the defini-

But

it

of

further adds,

bhagasiddha ground

the definition

(i.e.

on

based

a ground that

inference

fallacious

the

to

exist in

ground must

'the

Even now however

subject.'

applies

&,a

all

all-

'all-creating'

ground

(Here the

creating.'

V.

viz.,

ground that does not exist in the subject),

'Devadatta is all-knowing, because he is

exists;

y
.;;?

only in one part of the subject and not the whole

of

%'

fire,

it), viz.,

jfc*

in

exists

oafW"

ground,^
subject, tiz.^y

(Here the

smoke.'

one part of the

and not in the other part, viz., the |

To exclude such cases the definition

-*;

'lake.')

says 'the ground must pervade

of)

') it

'lake'

(i.e., exist

^:-

is

(being true only of the

character of pervading

lacks the

the subject (in the above case) .

''"-^M

inference

Such anvayavyatireki
on agreement in

the,

in

'smokiness'

As

subject.'

the

absent in the

h 'mountain

and

presence

H absence may again be

9mi.tf .< inference
l

are

'mountain,'

f whole

they

because

J' smoke'

the lake

The mountain and

'

of

two

based

bo^jg

agreement in
kinds.

with a ground

33^ v
that

MADHVA LOGIC
in every

exists
it

may

only in

exists

co-ordinates.

is

because

eternal,

an end to

put

an anvayavyatireki inference

existing in
respect
etc.,

cases

all

eternal

of all

the ground,

smokes

'

'

with

a ground

on

is

things

(which
exist.

all) its

an

of

is

iron

This latter example

is

and absence) on which

smokes,

Whatever

'

'

fiery V

smoke

its

a typical anvaya-

name from

following two invariable relations

'

some

ball)

some

in

the ground of the inference) does not

vyatireki inference and takes

ever

it-

anvayavyatireki

co-ordinates, for in

the red-hot

(e.g.,

W\

because

fire,

inference with a ground that exists only

(and not

case;

Again, the

holds good.

'

an instance

is

absence of a cause of|A

The mountain

is

'

it'

no

is

such as the ether,

things

viz.,

there

the co-ordinates.

of

an end or destruction
inference

some (not all) instances of

For example, the inference, 'The

cause that can

of

or aga

with a ground

inference

individual

finite

of a co-ordinate,

case

be an

is

on

based, viz.,

it is

fire, just

not on

is

(of

the

presence

'What-

as is the oven

'

anig

does not smoke, just

fire,
'

as is the great lake.'

Inferences based on

?|jj

agreement in presence

and agreement in absence take their character

from the corresponding invariable concomi

Thus we have
agreement

in

smoke, there

invariable concomitance based o

presence
is

fire.'

in

Wherever there

And we have

invari

77

PBAMA^ACANDBIKA

fc

in
concomitance based on agreement in absence

'Wherever

fire

forms of

two

are

together

considered

concomitances

And

not.'

is

these

resemble

that

inferences

smoke

not,

is

called

based on
Anvayavyatireki Inferences or inferences
absence.
agreement in presence and agreement in
All this
into

however

kevalanvayi,

vyatireki)

we

(the

(i.e., this division of

inference

and

anvaya-

kevalavyatireki

Madhvas)

reject as untenable.

as being
For we consider an agreement in absence
of the sadhya
unsuitable for proving the presence
presence of a
the
proving
In
probandum.
or
positive

by means

entity

of

the presence of

an invariable relation
the absence of
and
one
of
absence
between the
(An m-'
scope.
logical
no
has
the other
the negation of one
variable

relation

thing and
justify

(entity),

positive

another

the

between

negation

of

another

does

not

presence of one
any positive step from the
For in this case
of the other.)

to the presence

the subject of the

in
exists
ground
the positive
the domain of
within
falls
inference (and thus
relation as an
invariable
the
while
affirmation)
of
agreement in absence (the absence

dum and

the absence of the

the proban-

ground) belongs to the

occupies a different
thus
and
negation
domain of
one
relation occupies
invariable
place.
Thus the
the ground as a
and
negation)
of
place (the domain
different place
a
occupies
property of the subjeot
there 18 no
(Hence
(the domain of affirmation).

MADHVA LOGIC

78

two

relation between the

How

step.)

vyatireki

Here

then,

is

In

'omniscience

'

and

But

'

an invariable relation

all-creativeness

demand

response to the

where

actual places

this invariable

an invariable

relation

relation

above instance

in the

we

proof have

and

'

'

can say at once that

that

which

pervades

absence ac-

of

For example,

asked:

"What
? "

w6g
must

'all-creativeness'

'omniscience,*

by

by the

negated

is

omniscience

the negation of

one thing

of

of an invariable relation between

all-creativeness

pervaded

is

it

holds.

end by means

quires relevancy (for our purpose).

be

in the above

'

an indication of the

for

for accomplishing this

inference,

'

between

impossible to cite positive

is

it

way.^

instances of this agreement in presence in

similar

if

this

e.g., the invariable relation

in presence,

Hence

be asked, are kevala4

vogue?

in

ground

also the real

inference.

may

it

inferences

to justify an inferenti

for

it

ift||

negation which

'omniscience.'

When

so related to another thing that the

is

negation of the former pervades the negation of

the latter, the former thing
to

the

(Thus

latter.

the negation of

B,

i.e., if 'All

related to

admitted,

holding

In

B,

not-B

is

i.e., 'All

e.g.,

is

so related to

of

'

not-A,' then

is

B.')

smokiness

the

relatafij

that

pervasive of the negation of

A is invaria

This relation

by the person seeking

between

the case

is

if

invariably

is

is

'fire,'

and ' fireness^

so-called dtwayavyatire^^
'

'

ft*?--'

PRAMAtf ACANDRIKA

79

inferences supposed to be based on agreements in

% presence as well as absence, the agreement in

absence is in reality purposeless and out of place.

The

invariable relation in such cases

by perception,

established

etc., (of the instances of

agreement in presence).
in absence is

(Thus

it

may

indicating in a

way

that

agreement in presence
instances of

Notwith-

be conceded that the agree-

ment in absence serves some

.

the agreement

without real usefulness.)

standing this

is sufficiently

sort of purpose as

the positive relation of

is

not negatived by any

the failure of the agreement

(i.e.,

by

any instances to the contrary.)

According to another (Nyaya)

inference

of

is

and

oneself,

two kinds,

viz.,

(2) inference

classification,

inference

(1)

for convincing others.

t Of these, inference for oneself

is

the cause of

| conviction and the knowledge one gathers

own

g-:

inference for

|foUowing way.
repeated
of

'

'

and

^v.

From

^places.

there

and

is

for one's

in the

oneself takes place

person in the

first

place makes\

personal observation of the togetherness

smoke

:.:'

self-

...'.,

self.

An

for

'

fire

'

and other

in the oven

such observation

he gathers that'

an invariable relation between

'

smoke

Having gathered the invariable

when he draws near a 'mountain' and

'fire/

relation,

^thrown
the

4-

into doubt as to the existence of

mountain,

from

the

he notes the

mountain

and

trail

'

fire-

of smoke

recollects

the

-A'-a-

MADHVA LOGIC

80

between 'smoke' and

invariable relation

'fire

(which he gathered from repeated previous obser

"When the recollection takes place (t

'where smoke is, fire also is'), and the saitj
person draws near the mountain (with the trailin

vation).

smoke), the knowledge at once flashes forth that

an
'the mountain yonder has smoke which is
concomitant of

invariable

make an
smoke

which

'

last step

invariably related to

is

(reasoning

that

'the mountain

inference for others,

it is

convince others

as

As

abov$
regard^

a fully-expressed reason-

steps

five

ing consisting of

(The

fire.'

oneself.)

for

inference

illustrates

on

is

From

knowled

the

arises

process)

this

fire ') is

'

reasoning.

called paramars'a or inferential

to

This

himself.

for

hej

the knowledge that the mountain possesses

(i.e.,
'

inference

Thus does

fire.'

to

which are employed

the

way

inferring

of

smoke^*
from the (observed) presence of
The five steps are : (1) ' Yonder mountain is
*

fire

'

'

fire,'

'because

(2)

has smoke,
(4)
*

'So

therefore
this

of

'fire'

of

it

it

fire,

mountain)

as

just

'Whate

(3)
is

the oven*

is

so (on

from the knowledge

mark

the sign of 'smoke').

respectively

Udaharanaffl, (4)

fire).'

second or third person

the established

called

smokes,'

with this (mountain yonder),' (

(the

even

all

on

is also

is

it

(1)

is

or sign thereof

Pratijiia,

Upanayah and

ass

the pres

of

The above

({

five steps
(2)

(5)

Hetu,

Nigamm

'

81

PRAMltfACANDBIKA

Of these pratijna

the statement of the

in

consists

proved)

be

to

statement of the proposition

'(the

subject of the inference as possessing

dum

as

e.g.,

the statement

is

inference)
"

(2)

The

concrete

case

vyapti

apprehended.

is

and

called

ference

oven.

drstantah

the

two kinds, viz.,

(6) midharmya-

presence

of

is

example in which

concrete

relation

invariable

statement

invariable relation or

It is of

sadharmyadrstantah,

drstantah.

is

The

which the

in

fire

mark or sign

the

e.g. t

'(3}

smokes.'

it

on

instrumentality

its

conclusion),

'because

is

hetu (the ground of the

with a suffix indicative of

(a)

is

an

apprehended

a sadharmyadrstantah, e.g., in the in(of fire)_ from smoke, the case of the

concrete

in absence

'smoke,'

the

udaharana

which an agreement

in

same

the

in

of

case

is

a vaidharmyainference from

the great

The

lake.

the statement of the concrete case

as exemplifying or illustrating the

is

or example
invariable

case

apprehended

is

dfstantahx e.g.,

relation

(The udaharana
?'!'

Yonder mountain

'

the statement of the

is

(towards the

(In the above inference),

a property.

the pratijna.

the proban-

is

of

which

it is

a case in point.

thus a statement of a case in

point while the drstantah

and no statement of

it

is

just the concrete case

as

illustrative

of

the

two kinds, viss,^

(b) vaidharmyo|; (a) sadharmyodaharanam, and
daharanam. A statement of a concrete example
;

invariable

li

relation.)

It

is

of

mIdha

82

logic

*",^a

agreement

an

illustrating

presence

in

is

if

sadharmyodaharanam e.g., the statement 'Whafc|

ever is smoky, is fiery, just as is the oven.'
statement of a concrete example illustrating an
>

in absence

agreement
smoky,
is

'What

statement

the

e.g.,

a vaidharmyodaharamnitfi

is

not

is

a&is the great lake/

just

relation whereof has

not

is

Upanayah^

(4)

the mark,

the statement of

fiery,

the

invariable!

been well-established in the

Concrete example, as existing in the subject of the

inference.

It

also

is

two kinds according to

concrete
example (which
of

the nature

of

the

establishes

its

invariable

mountain yonder has a trailing smoke

oven'

manam

'(as

proved

or

of a

vaidharmyopanayah.

conclusion)

(the

subject

characterised

there

is

hold,

no scope

is

the

e.g.,
is

om

necessity

proved assumption.

set forth in

of

udaharana

there
(illustratl

Besides, the alleged rule as

steps in inference is an

The way

posed necessity of the

has been

4f|

the two kinds of vydpti

for

of five

as

fire-'

unsound and untenable.

no scope for the two kinds

the

thfe>

statement

invariable relation (in inference), so also

ing such relation).

Nigt$

by the probandum)

demonstrated,

we

(5)

the statement of

is

Therefore, yonder mountain

All this,

'The

not devoid of smoke like the lake:

is

a- case

Th^t

just as the

a case of a sadharmyopanayah.

is

mountain
is

'

relation)*

in

which the 8

five steps

may

be refu

the Paddhati and the

'

*',

''.

PRAMll?ACANDBIKA

;'

an understanding

for

thereto

referred

is

This closes our

method of the refutation.

on the nature

tation

We

The

ing.

and

(virodha),

are

disser-

viz., (I)'

from discrepancy or contradiction

fallacies of

(2)

inappropriateness

fallacies of contradiction

contradiction

viz.,

kinds,

are of three

two kinds,

of

Of these, the

(asangati).

the

of inference.

fallacies

fallacies arising

of

83

discuss the fallacies of reason-

now

shall

in

.;

the

pratijM or proposition to be proved, contradiction

in the hetu 01 ground, and contradiction in the

..

)- drtantah or

pratijM again

*.':

diction

of the

with what

J:

is

Contradiction

illustration.

may be

of

two kinds,

in

to

the

contra-

viz.,

pratijM or proposition

be proved

;.

established by the recognised source^

I^Vof knowledge, and internal

J
self-contradiction ifrjM

Of

the proposition in question.

these again, --con^#

tradiction with the evidence of the accepted sources

'

knowledge may be of two kinds, viz., contradict ^|

evidence
tion with the deliverance of a stronger

of

and contradiction with the deliverance of

an evidence of equal strength or force. The followor proof,

-ing is

an example of a proposition in contradictioig

: 'The
with the deliverance of stronger evidence
j^subject-matter of controversy (i.e., the world)
false;

is

Whatever
as

is

because
is

an object

the silver that

^shining

is

is

an object of perception

of perception, is false,
(falsely)

by

perceived

.KiSr>

pfc

iaJWO;

This

conch^ /$.;:

the ,e*idence <t

*! MM

mother-of-pearl.'

ieotradicted
.

it

=*>

MADHA LOGIC

84

which

by the evidence

real,

the opposite, viz.,

world)

(the

results,
lastly

as

just

of inference also as
*

The

yields

it

admittedly real

by the evidence

proves

it

subject under discussion^

because

real,

is

presented

are

objects like the jar, etc.,

of

expected

things do,'

testimony^

scriptural

which declares the world to be

and

It thus

real.

runs counter to the combined evidence of percept

tion,

inference

Hence

it

in

is

stronger force

and

or

(1)
false

'

we have

evidence of

it is

perceptible

as

of

'The disputed subject

because
is

is

it

the

(i.e.,

<H?:;

i:|

just as is the silver

mother-of-pearLVJ

the

(i.e.,

the world)

the world)

is real;

the object of valid knowledge

self.'

corresponding

equal force

the following pair of inferences

perceived in the locus

(2)

of

As an example of|

strength.

The disputed subject

because

testimony.

with evidence

contradiction

contradiction with

strength

authoritative

josfeS

In these two inferences, the

invariable

relations

as

the

also

presence of the respective grounds in the corres-

ponding subjects being exactly of the same order,

we have

here a contradiction

of equal strength

between evidences

An

and force.

internally discre-

pant or self-contradictory statement may,

be of two kinds.
a jatL

An

It

may

apasiddhanta

agafliJJ

be an apasiddhanta
is

an asserted

pro]

tion that contradicts the accepted beliefs of one'

own

school of thought.

to the tenets

of

Since one has subscril

the school to which one

85

PRAMA^ACANDRIKA

making a statement

elected oneself, in

contradict-

ing such tenets one is really contradicting oneself.

This

why an apasiddhdnta

is

form of self-contradiction.
existence of

kind of

statement of the

God by one belonging

Sankhya School

thought

of

regarded as a

is

to the atheistic

an example of

is

When

self-contradiction.

one

this

refutes

by the very assertion one makes we have

form of self-contradiction which is called

oneself

that

For example, one who says 'My mother

childless
commits this form of self-contradic-

jati.
is

'

tion.

Virodha or contradiction

ground

is also of

The

and avyaptih.
svarupasiddhih.:
it

is

two kinds,

'

Sound

Here

visible. '

sound being

sound,

Avyaptih again
avyaptih

is

is

visibility is non-existent in

(and not

audible

is related

visible).

We

kinds.

of three

have

or sign (the ground of

to the

probandum as

absence of the probandum.

as the

an example of

non-eternal, because

is

when the mark

the inference)

or

svarupdsiddkih

viz.,

following

the hetu

in

well

iWe have also

mark or sign is related to the

absence of the probandum without being related
Lastly, we have avyaptih
to the probandum.
avyaptih where the

where the mark or sign

is

probandum and the absence

of the

ing

first

able/

(of

Sound

The

is

unrelated both to the

of it

these three)

As an example

we have

non-eternal, because

following

is

an

ra.

second :^-' Sound is

eternal,

the follow-

it

is

know-

example of
because it

the
is

MADHVA LOGIC

86

As an example

product of will/

have

that

'All

In this last example, the subject of tbli

exists.'

being

inference

or ground

both to the probandu

unrelated

is

case

is

'all,'

there

possible,

is

(Since the subject

everything

i.e.,

actual

nothing outside the subject

probandum or the

serve the purpose of a

property of the subject

abse:

hetu or ground as

the

Therefore

thereof.

hetu^

the

whatsoever that is'

and the absence thereof.

this

because

non-eternal,

is

is,

of the third

without relation to

is

probandum as well as the negation of it. T

being no probandum, there is also no absence
probandum and thus the hetu or ground
out relation

example

to

of

is

arising from the

to the

Contradiction

either.)

two

kinds,

viz.,

and

in

contradicti

example being without

probandum,

wi

is

relati

contradiction

arisi

from the example being without relation to

The former is illustrated in the follow
ground.
ing:

'The

shape, just

mind
as

non-eternal, because

is

the atom

has.

The

by the same inference if in place

atom' we substitute the
'the
shall

now

of inappropriateness.)

An

action.'

of

(We

inappropriateness

theist

the

is

deal

of.

with the

example of the

addressing to an admitted!

traditional theistic

earth and the rest

ha|

second*;*}

illustrated

words

it

argument:

*Tfce

have an intelligent

because they are effects, just as

is

a piecey
.

... -

"h

\\

'

PBAMAtfACANDRIKl

-'W-

The inappropriateness consists here in

absence of any demand for such an inference

cloth.'

the

addressee being

(the

in need of

standing

appropriate

This

need.

real

is

and therefore not

theist

The

being convinced).

which there

for

that

just

is

in-

is

no

the definition of the inappro*

-

priate.

Others

Naiyayikas) enumerate the

(the

fol-

as the essential characters of the hetu

or ground of a valid inference : (1) existence in
the subject of the inference as its property or

lowing

five

Hharma,
'

existence

'(2)

similar instances,
ordinates

(3)

the co-ordinates or

in

exclusion from

i.e.,

subject,

the inferential

to

the contra-*

or

object*

absence

(5)

from
:

dissimilar instances, (4) non-sublation of

its

visaya

a counter-feef u

of

or

:
:

,|

:
contradictory concluf' counter-ground leading to a
Of these, all the five characters are attrision.

The ground

(^inference.

ground

the

buted to

no

being

instance

an

amayavyatirete-j

of a kevalanvayi inference;

possess

however should
there

of

only

contra-ordinate

in such inference

and

of

four

or

w
A *i

instance

being

impossible

in

these^-j

dissimilar

so the exclusion of

Ij the ground from the contra-ordinate or

this

:|:

-^

dissimilar

case.

The

ground of the kevalavyatireki

is likewise required

four characters, there being no

inferen^g^
co-ordinate or similar instance in such

feto possess

only

|bkI therefore

existence of the ground in the:

lidmate.or- similar, instance being <*M4jg

4-2

fW

"**

MlDHVA logic

88
question

The

case.

this

in

ground (according

fallacious

Naiydyikas)

these

to

hetu
is

ground that possesses only some of the abo

fallacious

and does not possess the rest. T

ground is either the asiddha, or t

viruddha,

or the anaikantika,

characters

-.1-

:&

or the kalutyay
:

-Ki

An

padista, or the satpratipak$a ground or hetu.

asiddha or unestablished hetu or ground -is one th

is

devoid either of the character of invariable

rela-

probandum) or of the character

tion (to the

afg

being a property of the subject of the inference

There

three

are

kinds of

established hetu, viz.,

an asiddha

an diraydsiddhah

or

hetu,

smrUpasiddhah hetu and a vtjdpyatvdsiddhah

An

d&raydsiddhah hetu,

.1

r t*

^
yf't

hetu>

a ground with

i.e.,

diraya or substrate unestablished,

-

uflg

is

of

two kin

mz. r z, ground with an asserted substrate 'that d

not actually exist, and a ground with an assertftjp

bandum
former
'

The

just

which the existence of

the

admitted as an established

fact,

in

substrate

is

is illustrated

sky-lotus

as

is

substrate

the
of

is

in the following inference It,

fragrant, because

lotus

the ground

a sky-lotus nowhere
is

in

illustrated

inference

author,
piece of

in

'The

the
is

exists.

the

lake/

convinced theist.

is

Here

The second

case where the

earthy etc.,

'

a lot

the sky-lotus,

have an intelligent!

because they are effects,

cloth

it is

Just as

employed for the

jfej
r

benefit

Here the probandunbs:

"

prama^acandrikI

89

(before

admitted

the inference) to be a character

no subject

of the subject, there is

existence

Thus
which the probandum

the probandum

of

being no subject to

there

may be (hypothetical^)

non-existent
subject

is

'

the in-

of

hetu or ground

is

(Here the

purposes.

inference

the

of

means

the

logical

for

purpose of

attributed for

of

substrate

the

ference,

doubted.

is

and proof by

demonstration

which the

in

the earth, etc,/ and

according to the theist, being admittedly the

handiwork of God, the proving of the same b
this,

means

the presence of the ground

of

Thus the hetu has no

superfluous.

logic

tion

with reference to the asserted su

this

is

subject

the same

no

is

logical subject,

for logical purposes.

ground

that
i.e.,

the

does

The svarupasiddhah

illustrated in the following

is

non-eternal,

ground

saying

as

is

because

is

it

'visibility/

Here the

visible.'

and this

is

Sou

non-existent

sound being audible (and not visible).

The vyapyatvdsiddhah hetu or ground is of twflK^
kinds, viz., a hetu or ground devoid of all relatio&g|

is

sound,

probandum, and a hetu or ground rdateSg*

to the probandum only through an extraneous
to

the

|cdition.

The

^following

^exists/

-Here

'

former

All that is,

as

ia
is

-th^|gg
becao*#p|||

illustrated

momentary,

the subject of the

in

infei^^gfe||"
"'

WW?

thus comprises everything), there

similar instance or co-ordinate to the subject outside

SB4 (and

12

m
':,'

MADHVA LOGIC

90

the subject, and therefore the hetu or ground has

relation to anything outside the subject, i.e.,

no relation

to

probandum

in

in

following

the

life,

as

just

Vedic

'

prohibition

scriptural

which

productive

of

destruction of

tion

of

source

life

of

'

is

'

as

as such, but

that

the;

prohibited^

is

sin.

Thus

such

'

(What, then,

defined

one

as

'

or

extraneous!

ground.

the

the above inference)^

Tlnl^

an extraneous condition in this sense.

wherever

there

productivity

is

&|

which pervades thp|

pervade

(in

is

an extraneous|

is

An upadhi

not^

des

scripturally prohibited,

is

Scriptural prohibition

is

Efere^

become*^

'

condition

a source of

probandum but does not

'

life

one that

is also

it

life

sin.)

is

destruction of

the extraneous condi^j

is

(On

condition or upadhi ?)
condition

sacrifice (of animals)

destruction of

'

life

destruction of

latter is illustrated

entails

it

sin.'

by scriptures,
'

being n#

(there

the killing of a Brahmin.'

is

tion through
*

a cause of sin, because

is

'

probandum
reality).
The

the

haal

of sin,

therfc
a

*::*>.

scriptural

prohibition

is

But how,

it

life

may

may

not be.

Iff

by Vedic prescription) there

sanctioned

destruction of

or

above inference, e.g., (&*,.!$

the subject of the

sacrifice

may

but no scriptural prohibition:

be asked,

is

the

presence of '

extraneous condition a defect in reasoning?

this

way, we reply.)

neous condition
of

is

The presence

of

an

a defect as revealing the

the concomitance

(on

extra-

faita

which the inference

&m

'

; ,

m->:-*

8f

fRAMA?TACANl)RIKi

showing the inference to lead to a

contradictory conclusion, i.e., as showing forth
the subject as related not to the probandum
based) or as

but to the contradictory of

may

ground

of the

Vedic

(viz.,

excluded

may

And

viz.,

the
!

so

it

may show

'animal sacrifice/

probandum,

probandum.
failure

of

the

pervades,

it

but

to

other

(In

animal

sacrifice),

effect

probandum which
of sin.

(viz.,

sacrifice),

from the subject of the

excluded

also be

inference
so

being non-

e.g., scriptural prohibition,

condition,

pervasive

For the extraneous

it.

and

exclusion
viz.,

being
of

the

productivity

forth the ground*

as being related, not to

the contradictory of the

words,

it

proves

the

concomitance between the ground

the

and the probandum,

for

as non-pervasive of the

shows forth the ground as capable of

falling outside its range and thereby as failing to
be related to the probandum which it pervades.)
ground,

it

For the pervading (i.e., the extraneous condition

pervading the probandum) being itself nonpervasive
the

i.e.,

of,

ground,

capable of being unrelated to,

the pervaded

(i.e.,

the

/;

:,'

probandum '%

which is pervaded by such extraneous condition) ^||

must also be similarly capable of being unrelated
to

the

ground.

And

so the subject of the infer-

be reduced to the position

of the contraordinate to the subject, the ground
/asserted to be existing in the subject is shown ta
ence being shown

:be, reduced

to

to

the position of a fallacious non-

,..,.

?m
'

MADHVA LOGIC

92

upadhi

the

Further,

ground.

invariable

&]

shows forth the subject as related to the cont#i||

dictory of the probandum, i.e., it gives rise to an||

*m

contradictory conclusion,

proving

inference

';i^a

The upadhi

the following way.

being

condition,

of the

from

the

excluded from the subj

itself

also effects the exclusion the ^

inference,

of

probandum which

thus the absence

Hence we

establishing

counter-inference

of

sin,

'Vedic

because

sacrifice

contradicto
productft&f

not

is

way

In this

the daily meal.'

get

not prohibited, just as

is

it

pervades,

it

the upadhi establishes

of

absence of the probandum.

conclusion:

extrane

or

'

sacrifice of

a vyapyatmsiddah hetu or ground, being subj

to

an extraneous condition

invariable relation

may

to the

life

is

(in

the matter of

probandum).

be of four different kinds.

In the

u$)ad
first

an upadhi may be an extraneous condition

vading the probandum
restriction.

probandum

without

Secondly, an upadhi
as

qualified

by a

qualification

may

pervade

<

property of

Thirdly, an upadhi "R*;

subject of the inference.

be a condition pervading the probandum as quaJk

fied

by a property

of the

an upadhi may be

bandum

as qualified

property which

is

ground or sddhana. La

condition pervading the f|!jfl

:

by

first

neutral property (**&>:$

neither a property of the

nor a property of the

The

of these

is

subje<S||

ground of the inference)*!

illustrated in the

i
VS

ssff*

'

W;i^y

93

PRAMA^ACANDKIKA
*

Yonder mountain

smoky, because

is

fiery,'

is

it

V*'.

where the presence of greenwood is the upadhi or

(Provided the fire is greenextraneous condition.

wood
is

a sign of smoke. Thus

fire, it is

the condition of the

Now

greenwood

'

this

fire

being a sign of smoke.

is

pervasive of the proban-

'

illustrated

is

the following

in

because

tible touch.'

Here the upadhi is

which

is

is

'

Here

'

Now

In quality,

etc.,

there

e.g.,

the,:...

probandujn

'perceptibility/

is

'generated colour.'

'perceptibility

Hence we have to say

Generated colour
as such, but
.perceptibility

stances.'

is

simply without qualification.

the absence of

of

(which

the

pervade

not

(viz., perceptibility)

external

inference, viz.,.

colour'

'generated

does

upadhi)

inspite

in

being an external substance',

a property of the subject of the

air.

is

generated colour

pervasive of perceptibility

substances.

:' Air

the substrate of percep-

perceptible,

it is

The

qualification.)

dum 'smoke' without any

second

greenwood

'

('

'

sub-

does not pery*dfcp|

'

'

in

itk^

perceptibility

external substances.' This excludes

'

perceptibility

which is not pervaded by 'generated^

But even this does not suffice. The

of quality, etc'

colour.')

Atman

or

self,

e.g.,

perceptibility of the

pervaded

!?have

to

l^wices.'
bstance.

by
say,

Atman

generated

is

Atman

substance

as

colour.

in

'perceptibility

(The
It

a perceptible substance,

is

,4f

not

And

is

so

^|g|
we

external,

an

^"J*?
revealed
substance
an internal

?<t:
.

~'*

*'/

'

s*t:

v\

..-mm

MADHVA

LOGIC

perception.)

The

94
to

internal

upadhi

womb

ehild in the mother's

because

coloured one,

upadhi

Here the

Maim:

of

there

and

diet/

to
\

proband^

(unbaked) ja^

the

darkness of colour, but there

is

is

no

'

the,

Therefore we have to say

'vegetable diet/

it

the tipaihif

In this case
In

Maitri.|.

with respect

colour

without 'qualification/
e.g.,

the child of

does not pervade the

vegetable diet,'

a dark-

to be

vegetable

'

'darkness of

pervades
child

is

ought
is

it

.^

form

third

following:'!

the

in

illustrated

is

..#

upadhi pervades darkness of colour as relating

The fourth form

: The colour of

a child of MaitrV
in

following

the

'

perceptible, because

substance
is

not a property of

the atom').

ground

(*

Now

It

is

also

knowability
say that

there

generated

comitance

'being an

the subject

we cannot
also

perceptibility relating

ifl|

ext

a neutral property in this case,

is

'

is

an object of knowledge
Here the upadhi is genera

substances/

external

the atom

it is

pervades

it

is illustrate^

'

just as is the jar/

colour/ and

fe|

').
'

not

the colour

Further in

where

this

cast|

perceptibility

is/

colour

property of the

in the case of

fails

('

the con-

since

quality

;1S^

and tb^

'

Hence 'generated colour' is not pervasi*6;

simplj
of the probandum (i.e., perceptibility)
Hence we say
without qualification.
like.

ceptibility relating to external

the meaning

is

'

substances

1
.

where perceptibility relating

.>

prama^acandrik!
substances

external

and

also is,'

is,

this

in this respect the upadhi,

ground,

pervade the
'

say

whatever

perceptibility

cannot

characterised

also

is

does not

We

knowability \

'

knowable,

is

'

generated

'

'generated colour/

upadhi,

colour

generated

there

colour/ pervades the probandum,

But

95

by generated colour/ the concomitance being seen

of

to fail in the case of the subject

(the

colour

atom

is

we

If

knowable, but

it is

pervade

the

colour of

non-generated colour.)

merely as a condition that

define upadhi

not

does

(The

atom).

the

of

inference

the

the

ground (and leave out the

other part of the definition,

i.e.,

that such condition

must also be pervasive of the probandum), then

it is

jar

'

inference

the

in

sound

the property of

a product of will'

'

will

be.

an upadhi,

for in

product of will, there

of

of

is

being a

a sound which

is

is

definition

upadhi, and therefore our mutilated

upadhi

'

absence of the property

(But the above inference is free from an

jar.

non-eternal, because

is

of

the cause of the illegitimate assumption

Again

an upadhi in this case.)

upadhi simply

as

if

we

define

a condition that pervades the

probandum (omitting the other part of the definition that 'it must be non-pervasive of theground'),
*
then in the inference of fire from smoke/ the
'

'

nature of being a substance

(Fire

is

substance

by 'the nature

of

and

being

St

'

will

therefore
substance'.)

V-*

tore

(to

avoid

the

be an upadhi.

absurdity of

pervaded

There-

supposing an

^v*

MADHA

96

:w

padfei where there

must

nature

smoke

the

'

none) we say

is

non-pervasive

be

also

(The
*

LOGIC

ground.)

contradictory ground,

one that

is

E.g., the grou0j|

in the inference 'sound is eternal,

will/

pervaded

is

the negation of the probandum.

because

pervaded by 'non-eternality' which

is

one that

is

will'

the negation
or gro

one

which

non-invariable

(i.e.,

probandum).

to

anaikdntika ground

of three

is

the

kinds,

viz.,

common, the asadharana

or

common and

is

of

The anaikantikah hetu

not invariably related

sadharana

is if

in this inference is 'being

product of will/ and 'being a product

of 'eternality/

it

a contradictory or viruddha

is

The ground

ground.

perv

and thus is not non-pervasive

The viruddhah heta, i.e., t

also

product of

ground,;

substance

being a

of

the

of

tfpadhi:^

the

the

or

anupasathhdri or inconclusive

Of these the sddhdranah anaikantikah is a gro

that exists also in that which is a negation of
probandum.
and

its

(It

is

common

or

common

the proba

to

negation and therefore

anaikdntika

is called

it is

knowable'

is

is

'being a

also of the

uncommon

lake

anaikdntika

excluded from

all

on

The ground in

knowable*

which

is

an example of this

of a non-invariable ground.

case

sad

non-invariable.)

ground in the inference 'the mountain

because

the

is

and this holds

devoid
is

of

fire.

ground^ that

co-ordinates and contra-ordi

?*>?.; A

Hal

97

pramI^tacandrika
subject

to the
?':

For example,

and exists only in the subject.

the ground in the inference 'the

element of earth

a case of an

is

because

is eternal,

Here 'possession of odour' which

subject

viz., in

is

the ground or
inference,

of the

the element of earth, and

is

ground.

non-invariable

uncommon

hetu exists only in the

has odour

it

excluded alike

and non-eternal objects.

which
The inconclusive anaikmtika is a ground
agreement
of instances showing its
from

other eternal

all

'is bereft alike

in presence

showing

its

with the probandnm. and instances

For
agreement in absence therewith.

.,

inference 'All that

example, the ground in the
is a
it is knowable
because
non-external,
m, is
ground.
-case of an inconclusive non-invariable
'all *l*gi
subject of the inference being
'

Here the

is*

-an

there

is

nothing outside the subject

illustration of the invariable

the ground and the

probandnm.

t padista hetu or ground

a

of

between

relation

The kalMyaya-

one that seeks

probandnm the negation

which

is

^YjMg

established

property of the subject.

the
be
to
evidence
by valid
mblated

1
v-

ground
following inference

is

a case in

point

Fire is

Here

knowable/
devoid of heat, because it is
but tfie
heat
of
'absence
is
the probandnm
viz., 'heat, is proved

Rogation

is

to serve as

of this

probandnm,

tactual perception to

by
which

is

plfccY.13

the

subject

be the property of
of

the

inference.

fire

The

&

-V'

^
MADHVA

98

LOGIC

satpratipaksa hetn or ground

is

one which has a

proving the negation 0|

of the probandum (in the subject of the inference). i$
For example, the ground of the inference 'sound
counter-ground opposed to

is

because

eternal,

it

it

audible, just as

is

class-character or generic nature

countered and stopped from

the

is

sounds'

of

is

functioning by the

ground of the inference 'sound

is

non-eternal,

an

is

the jar/

because

is

it

hindered

or

countered

just as

effect,

ground

is

also

called a

prakaranasamafy hetu.

pseudo-ground

fallacious

ground

various forms) so also

(in

K
or

we have

the fallacies of the example or ud&harana,

fallacious

we have the

Just as

i.e.,

>

^
..."

examples or pseudo-examples (udaharana-

There are

bhasah).

many

different

kinds of the

For example, with

fallacious example.

reference

to examples illustrating relations of agreement in

presence,

we have

example

which

is

Thus

probandum.

is

ment

is cited

in presence is

For the atom

is

it

i3

as

is

also

as illustrating

say

mind

the

the agree-

devoid of 'non-eternality' and so

Secondly,

have pseudo-examples that are bereft

'just as

is

In the same inference

action

'

(in place of

.-

is

a pseudo-example in this sense.

of relation to the ground.

we

the

to

the atom,'

devoid of relation to the probandum.

we may
if

relation

of

has shape; whatever has

non-eternal; just

which

'atom*

bereft

in the inference 'the

non-eternal, because

shape,

the case of a fallacious

first

just
..

^
:-,r

it.

99

PRAMAtfACANDBlfcA

as is the atom')

we

ground, for action, though

bereft of relation to the

non-eternal,

we may

thirdly,

devoid

yet

is

a pseudo-example

shall have

of

have

also

And

shape.'

examples

fallacious

which are bereft of relation both to the ground

and the probandum, e.g., in the same inference,
if

we

say

atom')

as is the

devoid

just

'

of

as

we

is

devoid

of

shape and

is

agreement in absence, we

illustrating relations of

have pseudo-examples devoid of relation

the absence of the probandum. For example, in

may
.the

also

same inference

if

we say

and therefore

is

'

is

non-etemal

devoid of relation to the negation

absence of non-eternality.)

also

just as is action (by

(Action

absence).'

agreement in

or

just

In the case of examples

devoid of non-eternality.)

to

'

the ground as well as the

to

(Ether

(in place of

'

have a pseudo-example

shall

relation

probandum.

ether

is

we may

Secondly,

have in such cases fallacious examples in the

of
form of examples bereft of relation to the absence

we

'

say

what

is

with a shape,
lastly,

in the

For example

the ground.

not non-eternal,

may

we

is

as

just

have also

inference,

same

the

is

if

not an object
atom.'

fallacious

And

examples

both to the absence of the

For
ground and the absence of the probandum.

bereft

of

example,
'just

relation

in

as is

the
the

same
jar.'

inference,

(The

jar

is

if

we say

non-eternal

to the negation
if and therefore bereft of relation
has a shape
further
jar
The
non-eternality.
feflf
:>5

V
si

*-

MlDHVA LOGIC

100
and

is

of relation to the negation

therefore bereft

of shape.)

All these
forth)

we

some

of these

fallacies so far set

Why

untenable.

as

reject

Nyaya

the

(i.e.,

Because^

so-called fallacies are not

strictly speaking,

fallacies?

while the rest are comprehended

in 'conflicting evidence

and the other fallacies weg|

have explained above.

The manner
fallacies

may

which some

in

of these so-called

flawless as

be proved to be logically

which the rest may be showa,1|

to be comprehended in our enumerations of the
fallacies are fully set forth in the PaddhaU ioj&
also the

manner

in

which the reader

We

thereof.

is

from going over the same

refrain

ground here

fear of

for

Anumana

on

follows

the

track

Sri Jayatlrtha.

the

closes the chaptej|

Pramanacandrika

the

shown by

name

let

which

the reverend feet-<$J)g

Let our heads bend

Vedavyasa and

sage

vocation of the
of

of

been correctl||||

has

This

intelligibly set forth.

honour to|p

in

us close with an i* l|
:

Hari and the incantation

of

Om.

We

now

Authority or

proceed

Agama

to

as

discuss

nature

the

of

source of knowledge

Any verbal communication free from defects b

Sgama. The qualification *free from defects'
(in the above definition) distinguishes agama h
the mere

:?*

W-

:--

(deceptive)

appearance thereof,
:

Thus every-||

prolixity.

thing (relating to inference)

and

understanding;!^

referred for an

101

PRAMA^ACAMDMKA

Hie

communication'

words 'verbal

differentiate

it

sources of knowledge.
from perception and other
verbal
'&.'.
What, then, are the defects of a

The

^jporamunication?

nication are

:-(D

of the opposite of

(3)

defects of a verbal

conveying

the true or correct information,,

already known, (4) con-

conveying of what

is

which nobody

(for

veying of "useless information

cares), (5)

(2)

unintelligibility,

commu-

derived,
conveying of information not
con-

:,

whom it is
or sought for by the person to
command or injunction,
veyed, (6) conveying of a
conveying of
(7)
impossible,
the
to accomplish
means when
Of these
within reach, etc.

advice of a

I are well

more

to

want

of

intelligibility
;
:

(a)

viz.,

two kinds,

gibility is of

I due

difficult

due to want

of

means

(1) umntelli-,

unintelligibly.

words,

significant

easier

and

un-r.^

(6)

intelligible relation

communication)..
(between the words of a verbal
-'Because ka^a-ta- .,..
Examples of the former are
:

ta-pc'B

ja-ba-ga-da-ha'

are

Examples

of

the latter are

Pf horse,"Manisan
The
'i cumin seed,'
'

elephant,'

(of.

abracadabra).

:-'The cow
'The

ten apples are

M^ga

bowl.rr%g|
U)

five cakes.

is true
what
of
opposite
the
Conveying
world is
trated in the following -'The

is illus-

unrea^|

I:

'

The Sudras have the

right of

access

to

the,

right, etc.
such
no
have
IfeVedas,' 'The Brahmins
what is already k^||J
conveying
of
Examples
&.
east, and sets
the
in
rises
The
sun
e :-
:/.
-*!-. < u.i AMUH . WRet * 'The Nimbajr^rt
->s
'

gJSg?


MADHVA LOGIC

102
bitter,'

The

etc.

known cannot

'conveying

objection that

be a defect as

it

thfc

adds to the forced

of the evidence that is already available (and thus

strengthens our knowledge), misses the real pointw-^

Later evidence strengthens our know-

at issue.

where

ledge only

evidence

earlier

has

failed

to

remove uncertainty and produce complete certitude

in regard

that about

to

which we were

(Hence where no uncertainty

means

further enlightenment by
nication

crow ?
egg

which

(for

How many

teeth has the

What is the weight of the sheep's

How many threads of hair are there,';|
blanket?'
What is the news of the province
'

Cola?

'

(Gola being the

name

of the place
etc.

where

persons to

whom

of business

they are conveyed are

c
:

Advice v;I

Examples

of

communications enjoining the accomplishment

of

the impossible are

elixir

that
called

'

When

(6)

alluding to a person

dead and gone, one proceeds

that

may

will

an

to describe

bring the dead back to

life

and

be found in the north of a certain hiHl

Mrtiharamahtdhara,*

advising more

difficult

and

where easier ones are

at

etc.

Examp

(7)

less accessible

hand are

the*.;/

and trade to one who has subdued

the desires of the world,' etc.

is

-:

Examples

(5)

communications which are of no use to

who

'

'

the questioner himself lives),

of

(4)

'

in the
of

at

commuExamples of

communications

nobody cares) are : '

attempt

of verbal

waste of energy.)

is

pointless

stupid,

exists, the

in doubt.

remedi

To

ask

'

103

PRAMA^ACANDRIKA

man

axe which

down something with an

to cut

by

he can easily remove

man on

advise a thirsty

finger-nails,'

his

'To
sink

the Ganges banks to

a well for quelling his thirst,' etc.

communication

verbal

and sentences.

word

is

is

made up

words

of

of

combination

'with
with a case-ending. The words
exclude
(in the above definition)
a case-ending
ja-balike
letters
of
non-sense combinations
letters

'

A
(which are devoid of case-endings).
characterised
sentence is a combination of words
relation, and
by mutual expectation, suitability of
Expectation is that relation
proximity (in time)
ga-da-ia

"

(or others)
one word of a sentence to another
which the relation
of the same sentence without
apprehended,
sentence will not be

of

expressed by the
e.g.,

in the

without

('bring')

'

sentence

Bring the

the object

the verb

jar,'

will

('jar')

relation

produce the apprehension of the

' bring'
verb to its object, and so the verb

not
of

has the

Or we
object jar .
the
to
expectation
relation of
part
fulfilling (on the
the
is
may say, expectation
intent or expectathe
of
word)
of the subsequest
word preceding it
tion which is generated by the
'

'

(in

horse,'

Therefore,

sentence).
'

sentences,

Man
for

is

in

i.e.,

n\

consciousness,

is,

cow

etc,

is

are not

expect
the words do not
another. Though
to, one

these

enter into relation

/^'expectation'

elephant,'

an

;
:

'The

strictly speaking

yet objects

.(denoted

a property of

by words),

"

104
as

MADHA

producing

the bearers of their respecti

in

names an expectation

these objects in

of

said

also

are

relation,

LOGIC

to

expect

mut

one ano

words (the names of objects) denote su

objects (with mutual expectation), words also a

And

as

said to have

By

expectation.'

'

or

suitability

fitness of relation

the words of a sentence)

(bet

meant the absence

is

the cognised relation (between the said words)

iif^
of?;

any clash with valid evidence. Thus in the words

'moistening by water/ the relation of effect and!

which

cause
*

moistening

between

asserted

is

and the agency of

'

'

water

the

and the agency of

or fitness of the

lity

this

of

constitutes the s

'He

there

is

moistening

is

do not constitute a real sen

fire,'

there being no suitability of relation in

Between

coBff^

relation between them.

the words,

reason

means

water

remaiM

'moistening'

between

relation

'

act

Here the

uncontradicted by valid evidence.

patibility of

the

'fire'

and the

act

of

this

'moistening

no question of a mutual agreement^

compatibility of relation.

By

proximity (in time)

words

ing of the
long

pause

or

ferent words.

uttered

(in

interval

is

meant the

sentence)

a
of

express-

without -aBj;|j

time between the

Thus the words,

'

Bring the

without

time between

any long break or interval'

them, have this character

proximity (in time) .

For

1|

this reason* -tfeR

105

PRAMA^ACANDRIKA
'

cow/

Bring the

uttered separately, each

hour or thereabout

sufficient

character of

one, will

after the previous

lack

they

a sentence, for

constitute

not

an

after

the

proximity (to

(temporal)

produce a unity of meaning).

In

knowledge,

of

the

meaning

of

the

result

(of

the

process).

communication

also

(like

inference)

the

sentence,

Verbal

meanings

the

words, the intervening process,

knowledge of

the

of

instrumental

the

is

of

recollection

the constituent

and

sentence

the

the

cause,

a source

communication as

verbal

Comconveys knowledge only of such correctly

municated objects as are accompanied by the
the constituent

knowledge of the meanings of

words of the communication. In this respect it

of knowis unlike perception (as an instrument
ledge)

bare

things

makes

which

(without

existence

known

being

by

itself

its

known

apprehended), for an authoritative commuknown

nication like inference depends on a
instrumental cause (i.e., the knowledge of the
or

meanings of

its

constituent words).

Otherwise

authoritative
absurdity will follow that an
v knowledge will have to be admitted where a

the

verbal

(of

truth),

though existing

in itself, has not been actually heard

k
:{

declaration

cular

person,

or,

even though

5 has not been understood because of

ledge of the

'

14.

by a

parti-

heard by him,
lack of know-

meanings of the constituent words.

MADHVA LOGIC

106

(We now

objects.)

tteir respective
like 'the cow,'

mean only

etc.,

these being the

first

class-characters,

be presented as attribul

to

The

words are heard).

(as soon as the

are reached

how words mi
Some hold that woi

proceed to discuss

through

(mediately)

individuals

these

class-

which drag them behind themselves.

hold that words mean the individuals

characters

Others
as

specified

by their corresponding class-charao^

a class-name

this view,

According to

ters.

which regulate the use

subject to the conditions

^ok words. Thus all words such

mean specified individuals, these
conditions

Otters' hold

that words like

mean

etc.,
/.

as

of

'

use

words

etc.^

words.

of

the jar,* etc., meatt

proper names like

individuals

ether/

alone being thftf

the

determining

class-characters;

is

like

'

Devadatta,'

possession

make; while words

The real
the cow,' etc., mean all the three.
like
fac however, is that the meaning of a wordil
the "dewlap*

mean shape

or

>
'

jusf "{fiat object

to

which

is

consciousness as soon

immediately presented^
as

word

the

is heara-i

Tn the apprehension of the meaning of a w<

similarity

Thus

acts

since

both of

connecting or mediating link-

the word

individuals.'

and

forth the i<k

calls
'

the class-characte||J
,

word must be supposed

meaning both the

forth

'jar'

individual jars

of jars,' this
of

as

class-character

Again, since the word

the idea of the

to be cap)

'

white

quality of white

and

'

thi

'

<$$%

-.-V'.-ry-:

SB
i~

:**

prama^taoandmka

as the

well

pithing),
quality

it
'

substrate

the quality (the white

of

must be supposed

and

'

to

mean both the

'

Similarly, the

the substrate.'

H 'gone' means both the

'* ifft c

action of

word

having gone

'

'

W and the agent of the action,' the word 'stick-.

# in-hand' means both the 'stick' and 'the
'

^person, Devadatta, who holds it in his hand,' etc.

being
Or, we may say, words like 'cow' etc.,
must denote individuals,
5 nouns or substantives,
i.

while words like

'

bring,' etc., should

mean

attri-

combinations of words
bringing
| such as 'bring the cow,' the act of
an individual
being made possible through
butes or

.In

adjectives.

conceived
agent of the act, the meaning should be
individual
v.; as consisting in the individual (in the

'.].

':

'"'"'

agent of the act)

T'-

(The question

SPwe

acquire

to

of

foof words from the

T" (by our

uttering the

words.)

Our view

is

elders while

be discussed, how 3
meanings of
the

now has

we learn the meanings

signs made with the fingers

'';/%

knowledge

-i

that

words).

Thus

its father or
the child sitting on the person of
l-mother begins to learn the meanings of
rouse '$g|
I- when the said father or mother tries to
!;

wmgg

draw
from a state of inattention and to
towards himself or

words which he or she

signs

atten-

her^a^J *gp

tion

its

with

the

fingers,

feoft sound by Striking

ri=v

"another- In

this

may
or

one

waj^be

uttef^ by'

producing

by

finger-tip

hild

mabn|j|=

is

against

taught the

*
v

MADHVA

108

LOGIC

meanings
is

mother/ 'that,

your

'the

your brother,'

man

gradually learns that

in

a general

way

to

the

'

that
that*

words are
objects

said

and

the child

signs

that

related

pointed^;

the

Later on when such words as

objects.

relational

meaning or signifying

of

relation

father,

said

the

'Child,

eating the plantain

is

the said

out by these gestures

is

as

your

Thus by the

etc.

fruit,'

sentences

such

of

these

This

'

is

your

'That

sister/

eating

cake/

'He

your friend/

is

is
'w

etc., are uttered in his presence,

and he begins to note the different contexts in. is

which these different words are uttered, he
learns, through the differences of the contexts

.-.83

.*

"'MS

to

distinguish the

specific

to particular

words,

attaches to

'the

meanings that

e.g., that

female

the word

parent,'

attach

||

'mother'

Otherof"

etc.

however opine that the meanings of words are<s

learnt from the behaviour of the seniors or elders.

Thus the

when he hears a senior

Bring the cow/ and notes that?

inquisitive child,

say to a junior,

'

immediately afterwords
to

the

the junior

act of bringing

prompted^

is

t$

the cow, concludes

agreement and difference that the action of the

junior is prompted by the knowledge produce^

by the words
himself,

of the

when he

in other contexts

hears

the

other

And

so

assuring!

sentences spo

such as 'Bring the

'Secure the cow with

from

senior.

divergent

rope/

contexts

hor

etc.,

he ga

that

the
<<#*&

PRAMAJjTACANDRlKA

cow

'

word

'

'

this

means one
is

109

particular kind of animal, the

animal of a different kind,

horse,'

view

not tenable.

The

etc.

But

quickly-forgetful

cannot possibly retain the consciousness of

the
the word he hears till the actual bringing of
child

object desired.

word has two kinds of function or vrtti, viz.,

non-primary or
(1) primary (mukhya) and (2)
The direct or primary
secondary (amukhya).

function
referring

Sakti

word is its iakti or power of

object.
to, or meaning, a particular
word
defined as that relation between a

of

is

and an object which

is

conducive to the recollec-

tion of the object (as soon as the

word

is

heard)

used
Samaya, sangati, sanketa, vacaka, etc., are
This iakti is of three
as synonyms of sakii.
yogarudhih. Of
kinds, viz., yogah,
by virtue
these, the power to refer to an object

rtMmA

of the
powers of the constituent parts
which
word is yogah. The power of meaning
of the
belongs to a word as a whole irrespective

of
.

the

powers of

its

constituent parts

is

meaning which
both from the word

ru4hih.

the power of

is

both

as

(i.e.,

the meanings of the

constituent

Lastly,

derived

from

a whole and
parts), is yoga-

words mean their

of its
respective objects through the meanings
pdthaka
words
the
as
such
only,
H. "constituent parts
man with a
'<
(reader), pacaka (cook), dan& (the

ruMh.

Of

these,

some

stick in hand), kun4all {the coiling

thing),

etc.

jM

PW

MADHVA

110

Some

mean

words, again,

LOGIC

?::

their respective

object*

by the powers inherent in the words as a whol

irrespective

Such

words

are

cloth),

the powers of

of

ghata

like

(jar),

pata

(piece

mean

some words

Lastly,

etc.

the constituents,

objec

through their powers as a whole as reinforced by|

the powers of the constituents such as the word|

pankaja

(the

In

etc.

manner

this

att'g

with primary meanings, such as thef

other words

mahayogafr,

lotus),

should be understood (as signi-

etc.,

fying their objects).

The non-primary or secondary function of a^

word is called Laksana or Implication. Implication

a kind of relation to the object of a word's!

is

power

&akt% or

meaning.

of

Implication which

of Implication, viz., (1)

dependent of

relation

(Jahallaksana) ,
the

direct

'

Ganges

'

the

meaning

going*
i.e. 9

also

means not the

illustrates

'men with

'

the

lives

facte

in

(Here

the!

'

with umbrellas

latter.

umbrellas,'

but the banks

river,

Men

--..

whioK|

in

as

former.

the

Ganges.)

enters

in*

is

meani

direct

milkman

The

illustrates

river

the

to

and (2) Implication

(ajahallakfana).

Ganges

There are two kin

(Here

means

chatriti

pedestrian.

According to another classification, Implicat

is

of the following

tion

in

which

the

two

kinds, viz., (1) Impli

implied

meaning

is

ij

dependent of any special end or purpose to

subserved,

and

(2) Implication

depending
Is

<&

L#l

111

prama^tacandrikI
.*

*.

Travellers are
some purpose that is subserved.
(Here
going' is an example of the former.
"'

I'm&rgaht

Here the

by implication.)
roads by

means

'roads,'

literally

being

travellers

'travellers'

traversing of the

observed

to

happen

without any special end or purpose to be served,

*
,:

such implication

'The milkman
of

the

is

also

lives in

the Ganges'

(Here

latter.

called

'

mjhalakma.
is

an example

the Ganges ' means

'

the

In this case ' living near

the Ganges' being prompted by considerations
banks of the Ganges.')

of

and the

sanctity

The

kevalalak?ana.

the

primary

like,

the implication is called

inapplicability or

meaning

is

the

real

failure of

cause of an

a similar way should be conof words such

f ceived other non-primary functions
,';.,;
"/'as the gaunt (the deferred), etc.
In

implication.

an authoritative verbal communicommunication

cation is of two kinds, viz., (1)
communication
having a personal source, and (2)
The Rg-veda and
personal source.
"

A~gama,

i.e.,

IS devoid of a

impersonal
orthodox scriptures are the
source.
k&gamas, or Agamas without a personal
;

:>

other

those recorded
Valid personal communications are
works.
>in"'the Mahabharata and other sacred

^
>

Thus,

it

is

said,

"

Scriptures

are of

two

kinds,;

the non-eternal.
and
(2)
(1)
beginning with
Such, for example, are the Vedas
Paflcaratra, the
the
MahSbharata,
Rg-vefa the

|V viz.,

original

the eternal,

Ramayana, and. the Puxanas.

AH

these

.Vi

i>3

MADHVA

112
as also

LOGIC

wake

those that follow in the

all

of tliesii

be regarded as the (authoritative) sacre^l

are to

Those that are other

scriptures.

Janatdana,

are

they

heretical

than

these.

and should not

;

be regarded as authoritative scriptures, etc."

But

may

it

be said

The Vedas

.1

have

1^

personal source, because they consist of collections

sentences,

of

and the

rest.'

not follow,

as are the verses of

just

Our

reply

inference

the

by the presence

vitiated

The extraneous

tion.

does v

conclusion

this

is,

Kalidasa r

being

question

in

an extraneous condK

of

condition

origin established by tradition/

'

is

a personal

In other words,
,

a collection of sentences

'

(which

of the inference) is in itself

origin.

It

is

the ground

is

no proof of a personal

sign thereof only on the

condi-

that such personal origin is established by

tion

tradition.

But

it

evidential

may

be said

value

The Vedas

are devoid of

and validity, because despite the

due accomplishment
the promised

'

fruits

Vedic prescriptions

the

of

are not

just

realised,

as

^
$

the hopes generated

are

Our

deceitful people.'

by the

reply

is,

this

case, because the above inference

following

valid

reasoning:

utterances

not the

contradicts the

'The

authoritative, because they consist

is

Vedas
imperso

of

prescriptions, i.e., of sentences without a perso:

origin, just as are the lunatic's ravings

ment

in

absence.'

(The

of;^|

lunatic's

by a

ravings

are

113

PRAMA^ACANDRIKA
and they are

non-authoritative,

And

source.

personal

not without a

thus they illustrate the

what is not authoritaagreement in absence

not without a personal source.')
tive is also
'

cannot be said that this inference entails

unestablished
the fallacy of an asiddha hetu or

It

For

ground.

Vedas

the

of

sentences

the

that

declares

scripture)

(authoritative

Sruti

the Vedic prescriptions) are eternal verities.

(Thus the eternity, i.e., lack of a personal
(i.e.,

is

not asiddha

or

primary scriptures)
sentences are
end,

authority

derived

or

and are

timeless,

the

and

without

have

inherent

self-existent.

(of the

Nor

is

non-

Vedic prescriptions

fruitfulness or non-efficacy of

a proof of invalidity

from

(i.e.,

declares that the Vedic

also

without beginning

eternal

are

sentences,

Smjii

unestablished.)

scriptures

secondary

the

Vedic

the

of

respect

in

origin,

Vedas), for the pres-

bear the promised fruits

qualified agents accomplish-

criptions being seen to

only in the properly

ing them,

other cases

the fruits in
the non-perception of
attributed to the inherent

must be

disqualifications of the agents.

But

it

may

be said

u.,

evidence, bacause

as a

deceitful

it

Agama

is

not valid

just
does not prove anything,
Thus the visaya or

utterance.'

of two
proved by valid evidence is
the
fjdn&s, viz., (1) the immediate, and (2)
is
these, the immediate
remote
emote or
nr mediate,
mediate. ui
Of *

I;;

object to be

m;

15

:*-

Ua

MADHVA LOGIC

1X4

f?ft

There

the object evidenced by perception.

these two, which can servel

other object, besides

be

as an object to

Kgama

by the evidence rf|

established

or authoritative

Agama

say that

communication.

you

If

knowledge of the

the

causes

in your view, nothing

mediate, then as,

no

is

valid ":||

is,

independent evidence which causes the knowledge

already known, and

of the

Agama

has application

only to objects proved by other forms of evidence,

Kqamas

so all

be shorn of evidential value

will

aft|!|
""2*

wanting in any distinctive objects to be proved^

we

All this,

thereby.

reply, is wrong.

Just as

the evidential value of visual perception in regard

objects

distinct

cannot be

denied

to

just

hearing does,

as

Kgama

in spite

regard

in

so

from

indistinguishable

mediateness

be

cannot

'liberation/

and so
be

said
etc.,

Agama

is

established

this,

being

we

shall

evidence

of

that
are

its

ii

the objects

proves.

that

it

heavenly

objects

special

evidence.

For

mediate

objects

If|

m
pr^m8

happiness,

of inferential

say contrary wise that

of

inference in

fact

devoid of any

by

inference),

Kgama
the matt~*

unimpeachable despite the

the

from

regard to s

in

(which are not objects of

etc.

obje

heavenly happiness, libera

special objects as

of

distinct

e.g.,

evidence

the

also

objects

to

inference,

objects of

fact

the

of

hearing

of

proves only immediate

perception

visual

from the objects

objects'
if

"ttf

you s|

Kg
(sue

&2fiM

happiness,'

'heavenly
of

.115

PRAMA^ACANDRIKi

4v.

knowledge,

proper special

etc.)

source

valid

is

while inference, being devoid of

not charac-

objects

objects (i.e.,

terised

by the mediateness that characterises the

objects

proved by Igama)

devoid of

is

evidential

authority.

The Vawesikas hold that Igama

in

(i.e.,

is

inference.

variety of)

included

is

But

this

wrong, for even in the absence of the

recollection of invariable concomitance and the
view

is

like,

there

verbal

is

realisation

of the

being a matter of

communication, this

common

meaning of a

experience.

Bhaskara and his followers hold that Agama

without a personal source

Agama having

but

sum

independent evidence,

a personal origin

This also

of inference.

is

of conditions for

import of sentences,

is

is

a variety .g-

For the

wrong view.

$*^

the comprehension of
viz.,

expectancy,

suitability

words,
mutual relation between the constituent
(i.e., both Personal
etc., being identical in both
of

and Impersonal Igama), there

for

assuming any

only one of these.

of

...

knowledge.

rf
01

no

ground^

valid

to
special character attaching

_....'--

''.

sS

.'

g|

three forms
Thus have we described all the
other than
evidence or Pramana. Anything

these (three) is not

:

is

a'prdmSm or
-"

-:-'

valid

source-

/<4jj|

'-''

.''*j& ?i'-

another form
But it may be said: there is
three, tnz.,
above
the
from
distinct
avid**
tnswuoevidence

mIdhVa

116

logic

When

Arthapatti or Presumption.

event

seen

is

be

to

m
of%

a thing

&

except on the

inexplicable

assumption of something else and when on the

basis of our observation of this otherwise inexpH*yf|

cable thing

we

necessary to account for

to the

method

we proceed

it,

Arthapatti or

of

knowledge.

a source of

presume that which

led to

are

is T|

according

Presumption

Thus when we

as

learn

by perception or reliable testimony that Caitra

the house, we at once
is alive and yet is not in

j>
"

..-|

presume that he must be somewhere outside, for

absence inside of one who is alive is not ;%
the assumption of his i
on
explicable except

;;

Hence

existence outside.
existence

consists in the Arthapatti or

which

tion

is

therefor

created

is

of

fact

inexplicable

who

the proof here of outside

inside

This process

alive.

Presume

by the otherwise :|
41

non-existence of one

from the

-^

is

distinct

processes of

perception and the rest, for outside

existence

not an object of perception and the

is

Til

H
4

-test.

called

we

Caitra
is

hold,

not the case, for the v?| I

is

presumption

is

only

(The inference

disguise).

he

"

This,

"

must

an

does not exist

inside
in

cVl

follows:

as

is

exist outside, because,

absent

inference '&&$$

whoever

a certain place,

though
is

alive,

alive,

must

%j.

and

exist in
m
+

some other
inference

place,

just

being quite

as

myself do.

competent to produce

knowledge of the outside existence, whati#|

11?

PRAM A?A C AKDBIK A

use of

assuming a separate source of knowledge

In

such as Presumption?

the

inference

preclude the case of the

'though living'

words

this

(who are non-existent because not alive).

by the
(qualified
substantive
the
Similarly,
dead

alive '), i.e.,

case

the

precludes

who

though

'

adjective

'absence inside,'

Devadatta and the

of

like

are existent within the house.

But

may be

it

said

there

source of knowledge, viz.

son

Upamana)

is

is

another separate

comparison.

cognition of an object as

the

characterised by likeness to another,

to the

cow

as

Compari-

e.g., of

likeness

produced by the recollection of a

comparative statement as an auxiliary condition.

Thus person ignorant of the meaning of the
a

word

'

gavaya

first

'

learns from a forester that

an animal resembling a cow.'

across in a
Thereafter when later on he comes
'gavaya*

means

'

recollects
an animal looking like a cow, he
' gavaya
the previous advice of the forester that
Thereon the knowledge
is an animal like a cow.
cow)
dawns on him * That animal (resembling the
gavaya.'
must be what is meant by the word
perception
As this knowledge is not caused by

jforest

'

and the
'

i^

the process

(which generates the

independent source
an
as
regarded
knowledge) is
comparison.
of knowledge called Upamana or
This,

rest,

called)

Terence.

we

hold,

comparison

The

is

sonot the case, for (the

is

really

inference

in

comprised in
such

cases

is
MI

mas

MADHVA LOGIC

118

follows: ' The subject

meaning of the word
being a cow,
just
.

as

(What
to

meaning

agreement

meaning

cow, just as

the

not

because,

of

absence.*

in

gavaya,

noil

is also

not being a cow, bears resemblance

which,

that

t&|

is

possesses resemblance to a cow|

it

not the

the enquiry

gavaya,

the jar by

is

is

of

the jar which

is

gavaya and

of

cow,

not being a

is

bears

is

not

the;||

also not that which,||

resemblance

tbe||

to

To preclude illegitimate application to a v|

second cow resembling a first cow, the words
j

cow.)

',.*

have been included, and

*not being a cow'

to

preclude illegitimate application to the jar an<|

which bears
'that
the rest, the substantive

resemblance to the cow

But

may

it

source

separate

has been included.

be said:
of

there

knowledge,

account

for

viz.,

apprehension)

(i.e.,

of the

in

negation or

jar

negation^
order

^ln^

negation.

the cognition of

non-apprehension

anoth*

yet

is

This must be admitted

Abhava.

'

and the

absence of
rest

assures;
.--:

us of the absence or negation of the jar, etc.;

This non-apprehension is just the negation or
absence of apprehension.

The

non-apprehensioiiu

being apprehended or realised in consciousness*

the negation,
is also

reality

the

absence, of the

jar, etc.,

cognised or apprehended.

This
called

i.e.,

is

not the case,

negation

as

we say;

for this

a source of knowledge

comprehended in one or

other

is

<>t.
i

X t

*** to

'

ffe%
y

'

Pramanas we

explained

have

knowledge of negation

Devadatta's lack of vision

proof

as

: The

negation

we have

results

tion.

It

only,

for

absence

The

from a quickly-produced percep-

non-apprehension
condition.

ignorant

non-existence of a jar before

effect

No

experience.

positive

is

or

(Deva-

intelligence.

non-apprehension

of

is

also

But the mere

immediate

an

has the nature of

it

the

evidenced by the immediate

is

not an

is

he

Similarly, the

witnessing

the

of the

realisation

oneself

etc.,

of

intuition

the lack

subject of controversy

of the nature of colours.'

pleasure,

is

the following

or evidence of

datta) is devoid of vision, because

of

is

In the case of

the Mahabharata.

of

inference

the

regard to the

in

Kauravas

the

non-existence of

testimony

causes

a particular case)

(in

For example, the evidence

present

Thus,

above.

or evidence of the negation in that

Pramana

case.

119

..'

which

that

our view,

to

according

the

'''''

PRAMAKACANDRIKA

-"

doubt, a proximate

indispensable

an
fact

a proximate

of

non-apprehension as an indispensable condition

independent
does not constitute the latter an
case by a similar
of knowledge, for in that
source

line of reasoning
w-

tion
its

v ?

of

may

say that in

the

cogni-

non-apprehension of
positive reality the
the real evidence or proof.

negation

Where

one

in

is

the midst

of darkness

we

cognise the

means of exabsence of a jar and the like by

non-apprehension
ploring with the hands, the

MADHVA LOGIC

120

qua non-apprehension is not the real cause of*

our knowledge of the negation or absence. Thejl
non-apprehension is a cause here only as itia 1
of

as

The

an inference.
follows:

though

'The

serving as the ground

inference in such

does

jar

be perceived,

to

fit

as

here, just

observed

mark

a sign or

as

treated

cases is

not exist here,

it

for,

*:

not actually

is

But

an elephant.'

it

may

a negation or absence being admittedly

incapable of positively stimulating the sensibili-

be said

ties,

we cannot

negation being

talk of

sensibly

Our

this is

.,

negation

;.:

being in contact with the sensibilites just as there

perceived

not the

is

by the

-senses.

case as there

reply

no bar

is

to

is

none with respect to a positive entity.

.^ \
But it may be said we have mathematical -|
:

reasonings (sambhava) and these

or quantitative

should constitute a separate source of knowledge,

of

knowledge that there

as

follows

For

example,

'
:

because he owns

There

is

the

one hundred yields or

is fifty-five.

is

Devadatta must own

fifty-five,

one-hundred, just as I myself

.'

do/

or

quantitative reasoning is
inference.
The inference here

this our reply

only a variety of
is

is

knowledge that there

establishes the

To

we have sambhava

the less

reasoning.

quantitative

of the greater leads to

Thus when the cognition

the cognition

";

y._;:\,

another kind of knowing, viz., knoWr,J

ing by the method of exhaustion.

Thus whe^l
f'Zl

43,

,151

PRAMAtfACANDBIKA

after

we

another

arrive at the last

our knowledge

alternative,

one

alternatives

by eliminating other possible

remaining

or

the truth of this

of

gained by the method of exhaus-

last alternative is

two kinds, viz., (1) that which

proceeds by the method of affirmation, and (2)
that which proceeds by the method of negation
The former is illustrated in the
or exclusion.
of

is

It

tion.

following

When we know

that the two

persons

us are Gaitra and Maitra, then the know'

Caitra,'
ledge, this one of the two persons is
entails the knowledge, the other one is Maitra.'
before

'

The second

in the

illustrated

is

When we know

following

:*r

that the two persons before us

' this
Caitra and Maitra, then the knowledge,
one (of the two) is not Caitra entails the know_-_
j;
ledge, ' this, then, must be Maitra.'

are

'

This

a case of inferential

we hold, is
The inference

also,

knowledge.

disputed subject

is

is

as

follows

The

Maitra, because, being either

Gaitra or Maitra, he

is

not Caitra (in fact), just

(In
(by agreement in absence).
also not he
other words he who is not Maitra, is
Caitra,
who, being either Caitra or Maitra, is not

as

is

just

Gaitra

as

who

Caitra,

is

not Maitra and

is

Maitra,
not he who, being either Caitra or

is

also

is

not

the illegitimate extenthe jar, etc., the

sion of the hetu to the cases of
have been
h^ords ' being either Caitra or Maitra

Here

Caitra)

to preclude

'

included.
-5-

v_

16

**

.-*#> Ji-i

*t-

r^y* ^

"v

"

*"
'

MADHVA LOGIC

122
Upakrama,

also forms

etc., are

tradition without any

This

is

is

For example, the hearsay,

known

Aitihya or Traditionfig-tree lives a

of the

An unbroken continuum of

purport of sentences.

In this

inference?!

produce an inferential knowledge

for they

of

originator thereof

demon'

a case of aitihya).

(is

nothing but verbal testimony (and should not

count as an independent source of knowledge).

now

we have

intrinsic nature

in

and

validity itself .

respect

intrinsicality

(2)

We

forth above.

set

:
.

in respect of

shall

The ^
t>t0

(utpattt),

::;

verification

origin

of

'_*

-.

two kinds?

validity is of

of

(1) intrinsicality

the three we have

(i.e.,

the nature of

explain

knowledge are included

as sources of

forms of evidence

explained)

gesture language (cesta)

written language (Upi)>

ail these

"So

such as omens and signs (Sakuna) 9

also all the rest

in the

r|

in

consciousness

Of

(jiiapti).

intrinsi

these,

means that the

validity arises from
same conditions as
the
cause the cognition itself of which the validity
cality

is

respect

in

logical

of

character.

origin

In other words,

character of -a

being an intrinsic or essential

cognition in the matter of

its

validity

origin

means

that

which produce a cognition are also

the causes which produce the validity of the cognithe causes

tion.

in

By

intrinsicality in respect

knowledge

is

meant that the

which

it is

a logical

verification

validity

hended by the same agency a&

itself of

of

is. the

character,

is

apprefj

cbgnitic

Itt-^

128

PRAMAtfACANDRlKA

character

known

an intrinsic or

being

validity

words,

inherent

a cognition in respect of

of

as such

means that

being

its

that which apprehends

the cognition also apprehends the validity of the

cognition.
...

of

The

two kinds,

of the

of

extrinsicality
viz.,

origin

trinsicality

in

consciousness

its

such.

Of

these,

or adventitiousness

in

that the

arises

than those which

Again,

extrinsicality

in

exin

extrinsicality

respect of

cause

(2)

confirmation

of

invalidity

in respect

and

invalidity,

respect
as

likewise

is

extrinsicality

(1)

the

of

invalidity

origin

means

from conditions other

cognition

the

itself*

respect of the invalidity

such means that the invalidity

is cognised by an agency other than the agency
which cognises or apprehends the cognition itself.

known

being

as

set forth in its proper

Thus everything has been

place.
-

both validity and

their being

on

The Naiyayikas,

as such.

hold

are intrinsic alike

invalidity

in respect of their origin and

that both

connection

caused

by

that

etc.,

validity of the cognition is caused

certain
il

specially

efficacious

cognition.

causes

of

didity of the cognition is

r"

*~\>

+.

they

a cognition

the sense-organs,

known

contrary,

the

And

are extrinsic.

in this

of

hold that

The Sankhya philosophers however

itself

while

say
is

the

by the presence
in

the

Similarly,

the

qualities

due to the presence

"MADHVA LOGIC

124

*|,
V, *
mm
*

causes

And

cognition.

of

or

defects

special

certain

of

-^
'*

deficiencies in th#i

so

also

(in

matter of being known) a cognition

tito

itself

i|

cognised immediately by internal perception by tb#f|

mind. But the validity of a cognition is
cognised mediately by inference from the
sign

of

valid cognition

NySya) of

is

and the

the cause),

an efficacious quality

(in the

defect or deficiency

The Buddhists,

cause).

invalidity

But the

intrinsic

is

real

fact

is,

But the

cognition and

by the

invalid

it is

mark

is

witnessing

cognition

/&^

is

both

Similarly,

intelligence.

cognised

only

intelligence.

known mediately by
it

may

be
is

said

the

not tenable.

theg;

immediate
But

as

The

cogn
invalidity

inference from

position taken by

The

author's v

the agency which cognises the cognition a

cognises the validity thereof.

of

generated by

validity are cognised

its

the author here

:

its]

of practical unfruitfulness or failure.

But
is

extrinsic^

together with certain defect^

by the witnessing
of

is

say^T

both the cognition and

conditions.

auxiliary

ly

while validity

invalidity

sense-organs, etc.,
as

again,

caused by the sense-organs and the

are

validity

condition dfjjj

general

invalid cognition is a certain

rest.

or

j|
successful or unsuccessful practical re^;^
Thus the general condition (according to ]

action.

(in

mark

Further the po

the instruments of cognition to produce

Cognition

becomes

the

power to

produce

l2

jPRAMi^ACANDRIKA
*

invalidity
invalidity.

were

it

of the

invalidity.
the matter of producing
instruments
the cognition of these

in

Moreover,

different

through a

place

takes

as

power through the influence

a different
defects

causes of

when aided by the special

The power thus becomes

sense-organs,

etc., are

for the

agency,

themselves cognised each

knowing process
by inference
(e.g., the sense-organs are cognised
At
from the results which their actions produce).

by

its

own pramana

or

suitable

the production
the same time their conduciveness to
by inference
of valid knowledge is also cognised
(i.e.,

by another

so?

(i.e.,

Why

mark

But why should

f ruitf ulness) .

practical

from the

inference

you suppose

should

of

this

that

be

the

cognises
agency which cognises a cognition also
the sensibilities to
its validity, but the fitness of
'?

cognised by the
not
is
cognition
valid
produce a
cognises the
agency, i.e., the inference that

same

sensibilities

themselves?)

What

I;

the bar to the

is cognised by an
validity
that
the
supposition
cognises the cognition
which
that
than
other
agency
sensibilities is cognised
(just as the fitness of the
cognises
which
that
from
different
inference

by an

the sensibilities themselves) ?

^

is

Our

reply to this

is

'
.

this cannot be

admitted,

will entail an
.because any such admission
regress.

of

infinite

a valid

validity
Thus we say the
as such
must itself be cognised
:

cognition

I?

.im virion, otherwise

by

there will be no

126

LOGIC

And

anywhere.

cognition

valid

MADHVA

such

validity

cannot possibly be cognised by any agency other

cognises the cognition

than that which

itself..

In the event of any other agency apprehending

the validity, the validity of this apprehension will

have

itself

be apprehended by another

to

we

regress

may

also

fore

by

possible
is

method

the

of

holds equally in

the

that

cognised

said that the objection

by

view)

is-

self-revealing

and

itself

the

Because,

as

we

Intelli;

regard

reply,

(in

such

and as such

being

cognition

illumination

or

instruments

self -revelation.

should

lines of the Paddhati.

fully explained.

incapable

is

The

is

is

of

nonself-

validity of

be understood

Thus

not

cognition

to

a state or function of the internal organ

intelligent

our

reveals

why

But

':

imme*

is

Intelligence

and

with

respect

witnessing

validity.

its

same

validity

the

the witnessing

the

other;;-

the only position that remains

for

also?

sq

There-?

elimination of

gence,

assume

then

cognition.

of

regress

view

our

both

cognition

self-evident,

cannot be

It

infinite

diately

infinite

alternatives, the intrinsicality of validity

unshaken.

an

or

primary

be the

established as

of

the

second

the

an

to

the validity of the primary cogni-

self-validating

is

avoid

to

if

that

say

apprehending
tion

And

regress.

infinite

leading

thus

apprehension,

third)

(i.e., a

on

everything

the

beauti-i

**

Ui

y\r:

PRAllAtfACANDBIKA
This brings the chapter on

Iga

Pramanacandrika by Srimacchalarifefi
close.

May

the sage Sri Vedavyasa be pleas

M^I*lNfe*l
ire*r.

frft urannk

17

^rlr^:

1*1 **

*#^

wJ*""

MADHVA

130

T?W

4IT4K3

!el<tfd

^rn^ff^

BW

*fa

^flt 'TTOfa

LOGIC

irt^T'WTt^src :

WUd*II ^lRpffet 4ld)B&

^4*ddiMi

^JufdUKctiifti*;;

rfSTfo

WWt

*3*

3T3W

H'*WdM'nJ<chlfd^l?BWiyK^y^iqMi.l3W'

rftrr^r^^^i

r:

mi

e
*T-

131

PRAMA^ACANDRIKA

m^fai

* foc&rd

mr :

fifrramfri wraroi^i

^a

aift?iTra

stow* fa

a* *fffS*9

****

srafcs^

-V

* "

^P^T^'wsnfir.

www

MADHVA LOGIC

132
q*arq"

STW3TW

^wm^i^n
qz *t>

<NHHy*ft

ar^ara yg:

isr^juj

^T

f^ctft5He(i^

vrsis^rrfH*.

ni'wg*

fsjapn,

*rt sra

W3T*l

*^#

*ni

<nft#Bi^nn9n#i^im

gjqz^WT^TT

*?3TT> **I?T-

sir $^fadi n^Hfcfdmirn

?^ ^to^
i*

*S*jTH*lfq

Srffalfi I

*ra1

--"*!

MqqiTHTqT-resiaT:

tok^n&mi:

#jrat

tot

^jiwsn*-

133

PRAMAtfACANDRIKi
xpjqt

wst fMfafsreTOrat wugwfaflig*

*toAnjM*j^

fam

Wfrawn'wi

fdm!ij*^aiMd: 'swt

TOUt^wwftft

wrw-

jprat

^^rf^w:

*rfafl w2Tt *?n*fa

*i*U<ff?f

^rerarr^-

*refo

firatf

^>rat

ami

wh1iu<iwwwH set

*mt gznft*i ^5nT^nqHH^<r*<rd

*pjq*w:

MADHVA

134

LOGIC
^/

<t.qfafd

CTflBV

wroniirert

g#

*mra:

*rai

M*H*\y\^i>Tf\oH\VH:

^^t *m ^ifa

xstsrrimrH$%

*?$<< WT3T-

=^n^tf?r

?nr,

irans-

^fifsarre:

"Jfl

* For the use of the word vfflpf in masculine,

<anr*ftsfa

sr

compare

j'finrt *m<: s^ffir a

SarasvatiA:antJia6fearano, eh.,

61.

70.

X.

135

PRAMA^ACANDRIKA

'j
*

Wt

t^

Jl^l^

Hltrt

ff^T

to. nHT^p^TOt^Jtra?T \fh %j,

ijfoMm$l warrtmifkfow*:
toto ftfro

t^wgroro

wt

tm ^faft

?rerw3sfa

to

'w-

to

*reT*i-

to>kto

ifcHfof-

%fa

s*wiR{wir<i"ifH;

to

MADHVA

136

tow?

^rata^rawf?

aftnn* g Jprrcatsril^

LOGIC

fa<*

tfonmrw-

**mfa f^wlf

<icn*i

sfa

tundra

^t^wssrcrafaiw

wt

mfe*-

137

PRAMA^ACANDMKi

trefwitf^fti

W&wnfc

wsst^i

<j**u

ynt^T^n^-

Hih^wifrwaftiig-

'V

* r

*"

<#'

f*^"

'^"^^^"^^r
^sii

.vijrf^Be

18

-' -

138

MADHVA LOGIC

y
K

139

praMasacandrika

?nrafc

*3*ffignT

**

?^T^t wrssmfon

niMt ^ft?ro ftwn

M iW ^i**"

***

iw

**<**;

m
140

MADHVA

LOGIC)

/-

*i,

>S

'^

?*

141

PRAMAtfACANDRIKA

*pi

tut *w**rat: wrararcj.

rm ^wmww

"

cnraii

hm<wW *

iEww^a* M *****

**

"

<

,ll

"-

Jll4J

?"

'...!

wii^fo***

-Ta.

142

>;*

MA.DHVA LOGIC

i*
i

*afn

wwi-

TGTOT3W P9ita<3TO

#mwi

?ra

TOT

^gf*N lfSTO(

5W

^:

wiitu

Ml

v
..^r

FreK

farot

*nfm

anting

aa

*rat

to wto

wt m:

forbid

tat:

Tipnaw

wfr ww-

*fa*W.

aWfer aro tmPwfaiBftkJ faafwwj

amrafe-

*ft

4a

;**
"

mIdhva logic

144

qrcqrarosnfafwnT

?m*lf

'

;|

w$&

&m

Sweeny

fo mafafa sura:

?rar^rsf^ flM|

** fi^i

sb&^to^i

^*iwit*iiw-w^|

tot

fentar

5Bsi*f v

w^sfa *****

info<*w

gfeas*r* ^fasmfvi ftft to:

y.

?w sRwafafa

145

PRAMA.NAGANDRIKA.

3iTBi3TTirawT9:

**ra^wn*ni

m wa *

3^3m^ra
**n^
S**f^
qmaswaa:

19

MADHVA LOGIC

14G

tm:

sitow:

qa*nwmi g ^TfinjTHdteufww:

* i

^erai:

*n ^: *t

=!

q?T

ft

wsan

\8

3ft

41<Ud)fdf<!l$*r

*Mfrd<4l

W[>sft

w:

lfli n
"

Tift

<-

147

PkAMAtfACANDRIKA

^%nt wff

smfa:

fore:

^sf^fonw*

*rt. *nra^tfii

wwN4,fafo

?renta irf?rerat

*ifirftife:i

**,,

*m*z

tfsfawn

*<re3fa

*nrcf*?T-

*fa*wwfow

w^^qf-^^-

g^f^fcfa

<m#*S*3fti

mr *

f^ ^ *

ifin

" 9

***<

*****

*****

MADHVA

i48

*refa

*nfo*?rr

LOGIC

* w^fh tot

t^m

*fa

arf?ft*-

***<.

qrfhrtre*n^

tot:

^:

*i*dffiif<fd

3fltapm

?H^

^RfaqwsjTafTSTWF* *fa

^qiftrisfosrTfH:

qlriV^ ^fe*dt

ihfljj

*ra:

vm-

OTH^Tf^fe

149

t-BAMA^ACANDEIKi

?THns3:

WW
g^

*? fs

qtsfrWT^

^T^l %feWT^
T T*f?l W^l 1 *fo
3*

TOT
TOT

^TfirroH&RftTOfaww ^ TO ta t*

to

W^fM

wpi#

firnffiqfti^raa^

t* sntm

at$gr^i at st^itto

*s^rf^

sgar

g *fr wi

st

f*^ *nf*r?re*^foawi$*gii

^nt^fNtiTO

wr

?PH1iTO^arTMi

w-

TO*<ta

<*iirHr*i*i*iyi

ft*|i

fiHmaifo

*PTO*af?tft%ftr

tTOt%asrra:

wtr

Sfii i

S^rcgnM ftfro ^ra <wro

ianfaftfil

to *ro

to:
*nt* *s*tar ?i^ffrf to?ttoW

nrt wiro Ptot*

to

* ifiii

fMMMMM

* ^ **
^
f*
*****

wfin

'***'**

J
MA.DHVA LOGIC

150

0\

wh<w<hhJ

forssw

tot

iTTO

*TWcf

*$$&

fea- q-

wJTTrjJna

twsBrer. tot

^fai "BT*<*JrtJ^

treat

fg:

i?H:

tot

nr^mV

^%WT^ ^q-wic^

^<wifcfd

srrtw-

5^t?tfan*nfFrw >ra^
,

fifewpra

w&tf?.

*nffr-

--*

*mrafeiiriifoiM

^ra^i^iHuj

^sfrwnr tot sirre ^fa

tot qt

w^H

^fa^STfinRsi'fJE?

T5[

a wMa spur, a

3RTctf

^r^gtrro:

aa mw mvi

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