Quantum of evidence in administrative cases

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 7687, December 03, 2014
RAUL C. LANUZA AND REYNALDO C.
RASING, Complainants, v. ATTYS. FRANKIE O. MAGSALIN
III AND PABLO R. CRUZ, Respondents.

actual receipt of the Notice of Judgment with the CA decision

by the PRC Law Office. In the October 31, 2007
Certification,3 issued by Llewelyn F. Fallarme (Fallarme), Chief
of the Records Section, QCCPO, it was stated that the
Registered Letter No. S-1582 addressed to Atty. Magsalin was
delivered by Postman Rosendo Pecante (Postman Pecante)
and duly received by Teresita Calucag on March 29, 2007,
supposedly based on the logbook of Postman Pecante.
With the October 31, 2007 Certification as basis, the
complainants lodged the disbarment complaint against Attys.
Magsalin, Go and Cruz, which was docketed as A.C. No. 7688.

A.C. No. 7688

A.C. No. 7688
RAUL C. LANUZA AND REYNALDO C.
RASING, Complainants, v. ATTYS. FRANKIE O. MAGSALIN
III, PETER ANDREW S. GO AND PABLO R.
CRUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
Before the Court are two (2) separate administrative cases for
disbarment filed by complainants Raul C. Lanuza (Lanuza) and
Reynaldo C. Rasing (Rasing), docketed as A.C. No. 7687,
against lawyers Frankie O. Magsalin III (Atty. Magsalin) and
Pablo R. Cruz (Atty. Cruz) and A.C. No. 7688 against Atty.
Magsalin, Atty. Cruz and Atty. Peter Andrew Z. Go (Atty. Go)
for alleged fraud, deceit, malpractice, and gross misconduct in
violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Court eventually consolidated the two cases as they both
involve the same parties, revolve around the same set of
facts, and raise exactly the same issues.chanrobleslaw
The Facts
These disbarment cases stemmed from a labor case filed by
complainant Lanuza against Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI),
which operated the Dusit Hotel Nikko (Dusit Hotel), a client of
respondents Atty. Magsalin, Atty. Cruz and Atty. Go, all from
the law firm, P.R. Cruz Law Offices (PRC Law Office). Both the
Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) decided in favor of PHI. Lanuza appealed the NLRC
decision before the Court of Appeals (CA).
A.C. No. 7688
On March 23, 2007, the CA rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 92642, favoring Lanuza and directing PHI to reinstate him
with full backwages.
According to Lanuza, his legal counsel, Atty. Solon R. Garcia
(Atty. Garcia), received the Notice of Judgment and their copy
of the CA Decision on March 28, 2007 at his law office located
in Quezon City. Subsequently, Atty. Garcia received by
registered mail the Compliance1 and Motion for
Reconsideration,2both dated April 12, 2007, filed by PHI and
signed by Atty. Magsalin. In the said pleadings, PHI stated that
it received Notice of Judgment with a copy of the CA decision
on April 10, 2007. This information caused Atty. Garcia to
wonder why the postman would belatedly deliver the said
Notice of Judgment and the CA decision to the PRC Law Office,
which was also located in Quezon City, thirteen (13) days
after he received his own copies.
Afterwards, Atty. Garcia requested the Quezon City Central
Post Office (QCCPO) for a certification as to the date of the

In A.C. No. 7688, the complainants alleged that Teresita Tess

Calucag (Calucag), secretary of PRC Law Office, altered the
true date of receipt of the Notice of Judgment with the CA
decision when she signed and stamped on the registry return
receipt the date, April 10, 2007, to mislead the CA and the
opposing party that they received their copy of the CA
decision on a later date and not March 29, 2007. The
complainants added that the alteration was very evident on
the registry return receipt which bore two (2) stamped dates
of receipt, with one stamped date snowpaked or covered
with a liquid correction fluid to conceal the true date written
on the registry return receipt. They inferred that Calucag
concealed what could probably be the true date of receipt,
and that the respondents must have induced Calucag to alter
the true date of receipt because they stood to benefit from
the additional thirteen (13) days to prepare their motion for
reconsideration.
In their defense, the respondents denied the complainants
allegations and countered that they actually received the
Notice of Judgment and their copy of the CA Decision on April
10, 2007 based on the Registry Return Receipt 4 (1st return
receipt) that was sent back to CA. Stamped on the 1st return
receipt was RECEIVED APRIL 10 2007 and signed by Calucag
in front and within the full view of Postman Pecante. The
respondents claimed that examining and finding that the
return receipt had been faithfully accomplished and the date
indicated therein to be true and accurate, Postman Pecante
accepted the said return receipt. As borne out by the records,
the 1st return receipt pertaining to the CA decision was duly
returned to the CA as the sender. Eventually, Atty. Magsalin
filed the required Compliance. Considering that Atty. Cruz was
out of the country from April 5, 2007, to May 6, 2007, based
on a Bureau of Immigration certification,5 Atty. Magsalin
requested Atty. Go, a senior associate in their law office, to
review PHIs motion for reconsideration of the decision.
Afterwards, Atty. Go signed the said motion for
reconsideration and had it filed with the CA.
Relying on the date indicated in the return receipt,
respondents stated the date, April 10, 2007, in the filed
compliance and motion for reconsideration .
To oppose complainants assertion of Calucags application of
snowpake in the 1st return receipt allegedly to conceal the
true date of receipt of the CA decision, the respondents
secured a Certification6from the CA, which stated the
following:
This is to certify that the Registry Return Receipt dated March
23, 2007, attached to the dorsal portion of page 209 of the
rollo of the above-captioned case, as per careful observation,
reveals no snowpaked portion and that the white mark that

appears on the upper, center portion of the subject Registry

Return Receipt bearing the stamp mark of receipt of P.R. Cruz
Law Offices is a part of the white envelope that contained the
decision of this Court which stuck to the said Return Receipt.
A.C. No. 7687
As the records would show, PHI moved for reconsideration of
the said CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its July
4, 2007 Resolution.
On July 10, 2007, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the
Notice of Resolution from the CA. Thereafter, Atty. Garcia
received by registered mail the Compliance,7 dated July 26,
2007, filed by PHI, through the PRC Law Office. In the said
Compliance, it was stated that the Notice of Resolution was
received on July 23, 2007 based on the Registry Return
Receipt8 (2nd return receipt) sent back to the CA.
Again wondering about the delay in the delivery of the
registered mail to the respondents, Atty. Garcia requested the
QCCPO to issue a certification as to the date of the actual
receipt of the said Notice of Resolution by the PRC Law Office.
In the October 25, 2007 Certification9 issued by the QCCPO,
Chief of the Records Section Fallarme, stated that the
Registered Letter No. S-114 addressed to Atty. Magsalin was
delivered by Postman Pecante and duly received by Calucag
on July 16, 2007, based on the logbook of Postman Pecante.
The October 25, 2007 Certification became the basis of the
other disbarment complaint against Attys. Magsalin and Cruz
docketed as A.C. No. 7687.
In A.C. No. 7687, the complainants claimed that Attys.
Magsalin and Cruz must have induced Calucag to alter the
true date of receipt of the Notice of Resolution or at least had
the knowledge thereof when she signed and stamped on the
2nd return receipt the date - July 23, 2007. They contended
that Attys. Magsalin and Cruz stood to benefit from the
additional seven (7) days derived from the alleged altered
date as they, in fact, used the altered date in their subsequent
pleading. Attys. Magsalin and Cruz falsely alleged such in the
compliance filed before the CA; the motion for extension of
time to file a petition for review on certiorari;10 and the
petition for review on certiorari11 filed before this Court. The
complainants insinuated that Atty. Magsalin and Atty. Cruz
deliberately misled the CA and this Court by filing the abovementioned pleadings with the full knowledge that they were
already time barred.
In their defense, Attys. Magsalin and Cruz denied the
allegations in the complaint and retorted that they actually
received the subject Notice of Resolution on the date - July 23,
2007 as indicated in the 2nd return receipt which was also duly
accepted by Postman Pecante and appropriately returned to
the CA as sender. Relying on the date, July 23, 2007, as
indicated in 2nd return receipt, Atty. Magsalin, on behalf of PHI,
filed the compliance and the other pleadings before the CA
and this Court concerning CA-G.R. SP No. 92642. The
respondents asserted that the date in the 2nd return receipt
deserved full faith and credence as it was clearly indicated by
Calucag, witnessed by Postman Pecante and ultimately
processed by the QCCPO to be duly returned to the CA.

Court referred the said administrative cases to the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The complainants and the respondents all appeared at the
scheduled mandatory conference held before the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD). Thereafter, the parties filed their
respective position papers.
IBPs Report and Recommendation
A.C. No. 7687
In its March 9, 2009 Report and
Recommendation,14 Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag
(Commissioner Hababag) recommended that the
administrative complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. It
gave more credence to the date indicated in the 2nd return
receipt which bore no alteration and was duly accepted by
Postman Pecante than the October 25, 2007 Certification
issued by the QCCPO. He stated that the 2ndreturn receipt did
not contain any alteration as to the stamping of the date - July
23, 2007, and that Postman Pecante would not have allowed
and accepted the 2nd return receipt from Calucag if it
contained an inaccurate date other than the true date of
receipt. Finally, the CBD ruled that the complainants failed to
demonstrate the specific acts constituting deceit, malpractice
and gross misconduct by evidence that was clear and free
from doubt as to the act charged and as to the respondents
motive.
On April 17, 2009, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG)
resolved to adopt and approve the CBD report and
recommendation through its Resolution No. XVIII-2009176.15 The complainants moved for reconsideration, but the
motion was denied.
A.C. No. 7688
In its Report and Recommendation,16 dated March 10, 2009,
the CBD recommended that the complaint be dismissed for
lack of merit. It gave credence to the date indicated in the
1st return receipt as the actual and true date of receipt of the
Notice of Judgment with the attached CA decision by the
respondents. It did not subscribe to the complainants theory
that Calucag was induced by the respondents to conceal the
true date of receipt by applying a liquid correction fluid in the
1st return receipt. It found the the Certification issued by Atty.
Teresita R. Marigomen sufficient to explain the presence of the
white substance appearing on the 1st return receipt.
On April 17, 2009, the IBP-BOG resolved to adopt and approve
the CBD report and recommendation through its Resolution
No. XVIII-2009-178.17 The complainants moved for
reconsideration, but the motion was denied.
With their motions for reconsideration in the two cases
denied, the complainants filed their respective petitions for
review before this Court.
ISSUE

Referral to the IBP

The vital issue for the Courts resolution is whether Attys.

Magsalin, Cruz and Go should be held administratively liable
based on the allegations in the complaints.
The Courts Ruling

In its April 2, 200812 and June 16, 200813 Resolutions, the

The petitions lack merit.

The Court deems it appropriate to discuss A.C. Nos. 7687 and

7688 jointly as they essentially revolve around the same
circumstances and parties.
The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension
proceedings always rests on the complainant. The Court
exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant
establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence
that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an
attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of
the charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An
attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have
performed his duties in accordance with his oath. 18
In the cases at bench, the Court finds the evidentiary records
to be inconclusive, thus, insufficient to hold the respondents
liable for the acts alleged in the complaint.
Though there is a variance between the QCCPO Certifications
and the Registry Return Receipts as to the dates of the CA
receipt of the notices, decision and resolution by the
respondents, there is no clear and convincing evidence to
prove that the respondents intentionally and maliciously made
it appear that they received the CA notices, decision and
resolution later than the dates stated in the QCCPO
Certifications. The complainants would like to impress upon
the Court that the only logical explanation as to the
discrepancy on the dates between the QCCPO Certifications
and the Registry Return Receipts was that the respondents
must have induced Calucag to alter the true date of receipt by
the CA for the purpose of extending the period to file, the
otherwise time-barred, motion for reconsideration. Verily, this
leap of inference proffered by the complainants is merely
anchored on speculation and conjecture and not in any way
supported by clear substantial evidence required to justify the
imposition of an administrative penalty on a member of the
Bar.
Even if the postmasters certifications were to merit serious
consideration, the Court cannot avoid the legal reality that the
registry return card is considered as the official CA record
evidencing service by mail. This card carries the presumption
that it was prepared in the course of official duties which have
been regularly performed. In this sense, it is presumed to be
accurate, unless clearly proven otherwise.
The Court finds merit in the respondents argument that had
Calucag stamped an inaccurate date on the registry return
receipts, Postman Pecante, who witnessed and had full view of
the receiving and stamping of the said registry return receipts,
would have called her attention to correct the same or would
have refused to receive them altogether for being erroneous.
Here, Postman Pecante having accepted two registry return
receipts with the dates, April 10, 200719 and July 23,
2007,20 respectively, can only mean that the said postman
considered the dates indicated therein to be correct and
accurate.
While the Court will not avoid its responsibility in meting out
the proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who fail to
live up to their sworn duties, the Court will not wield its axe
against those the accusations against whom are not
indubitably proven.
Accordingly, in the absence of a clear and convincing
evidence, the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaints against Attys.

Frankie O. Magsalin III and Pablo R. Cruz, inA.C. No. 7687;
and the administrative complaint against Attys. Frankie O.
Magsalin III, Peter Andrew S. Go and Pablo R. Cruz, in A.C. No.
7688, are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6056, September 09, 2015
FELICISIMA MENDOZA VDA. DE
ROBOSA, Complainant, v. ATTYS. JUAN B. MENDOZA AND
EUSEBIO P. NAVARRO, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
Before us is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Juan B.
Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) for alleged deceitful acts against his
client, and Atty. Eusebio P. Navarro, Jr. (Atty. Navarro) for
negligence in the handling of his client's defense in the
collection case filed by Atty. Mendoza.
Factual Antecedents
Eladio Mendoza (Eladio) applied for original registration of two
parcels of land (Lot Nos. 3771 and 2489) situated in Calamba,
Laguna before the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) at Los Banos, Laguna and Land
Management Bureau (LMB) in Manila.1 While his application
was still pending, Eladio died leaving all his children as heirs
to his estate; among them is herein complainant Felicisima
Mendoza Vda. De Robosa (Felicisima). Eladio's children
pursued the application and executed a Special Power of
Attorney2 (SPA) in favor of Felicisima. Their relative, Atty.
Mendoza, prepared and notarized the said SPA. They also
engaged the services of Atty. Mendoza as their counsel in the
proceedings before the CENRO and LMB.
On February 20, 1993, upon the behest of Atty. Mendoza,
Felicisima signed a Contract for Service 3prepared by Atty.
Mendoza. The said contract stipulated that in the event of a
favorable CENRO or LMB resolution, Felicisima shall convey to
Atty. Mendoza one-fifth (1/5) of the lands subject of the
application or one-fifth (1/5) of the proceeds should the same
property be sold.
The CENRO and the LMB proceedings resulted in the dismissal
of Felicisima and her siblings' application for Lot No. 2489 and
the partial grant of their application for Lot No. 3771.4 The
Bureau of Lands issued an Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
covering one-third (VV) or about 8,901 square meters of Lot
No. 3771 in the names of Felicisima and her siblings.
Subsequently, Felicisima and her siblings sold the land to
Greenfield Corporation (Greenfield) and received the amount
of P2,000,000.00 as down payment.
On October 15, 1998, Atty. Mendoza, joined by his wife
Filomena S. Mendoza, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tanauan, Batangas a Complaint5 against Felicisima and her
siblings (Civil Case No. T-1080). Atty. Mendoza claimed that
except for the amount of P40,000.00, Felicisima and her
siblings refused to pay his attorney's fees equivalent to 1/5 of

the proceeds of the sale of the land as stipulated in the

Contract for Service.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,6 Felicisima and her siblings
denied the "existence and authenticity of the x x x Contract of
Service," adding that it did not reflect the true intention of the
parties as they only agreed to pay Atty. Mendoza PI,500.00
per appearance and up to P1,500.00 for gasoline expenses.
They also asserted that, based on quantum meruit, Atty.
Mendoza is not entitled to the claimed attorney's fees
because they lost in one case and he failed to accomplish the
titling of the land awarded to them, which would have
enhanced the value of the property.
Felicisima and her siblings hired the services of Atty. Navarro
as their counsel in Civil Case No. T-1080.
On March 29, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Atty. Mendoza and against Felicisima and her siblings. The RTC
ruled that Felicisima failed to substantiate her claim that she
did not enter into a contingency contract for legal services
with Atty. Mendoza, and ordered Felicisima to pay Atty.
Mendoza P1,258,000.00 (for the land sold at P7,120,800.00)
representing attorney's fees as well as the total cost of suit. 7
Atty. Navarro then filed a Notice of Appeal8 on behalf of
Felicisima. However, Atty. Mendoza moved for an execution
pending appeal with the RTC. Since no opposition was filed by
Felicisima and her siblings, the RTC granted the said motion
and issued a writ of execution, which resulted in the levy and
eventual transfer of Felicisima's properties covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-433859 and T-433860 in
favor of Atty. Mendoza as the highest bidder in the execution
sale.9
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered Felicisima to file
an appellant's brief but Atty. Navarro failed to file the same
within the period granted by the CA. Consequently, the CA
dismissed Felicisima's appeal for non-compliance with Section
1(e), Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.10
On June 3, 2003, Felicisima filed a complaint-affidavit for
disbarment before this Court against Atty. Mendoza for
allegedly deceiving her into signing the Contract for Service
by taking advantage of her illiteracy, and against Atty.
Navarro for dereliction of duty in handling her case before the
CA causing her properties to be levied and sold at public
auction.11
Felicisima alleges that Atty. Mendoza made her sign a
document at her house without the presence of her siblings.
Said document (Contract for Service) was written in English
which she does not understand. She claims that Atty. Mendoza
told her the document will shield her from her siblings'
possible future claims on the property because she alone is
entitled to the property as her siblings did not help her in
processing the application for original registration. She was
not given a copy of the said document and she discovered
only during the trial that Atty. Mendoza anchors his claim over
Vs of proceeds from the sale of the land awarded by the
CENRO and LMB on the same document she had signed. 12
As to Atty. Navarro, Felicisima claims that her case before the
CA was neglected despite repeated follow-ups on her part.
She also points out that Atty. Navarro abandoned her case
before the RTC when the latter failed to file an opposition to
Atty. Mendoza's motion for execution pending appeal, which

resulted in the loss of her properties.13

In his Comment,14 Atty. Mendoza avers that he has been a
lawyer since 1954 and retired sometime in 1983 due to partial
disability. Fie went back to practicing his profession in 1996 on
a selective basis due to his disability but completely stopped a
year after. Being 82 years of age at the time of filing his
comment, Atty. Mendoza admits that he is now totally
disabled, cannot walk on his own, cannot even write and sign
his name, and can only move about with the help of his family
for he has been suffering from a severe case of "acute gouty
arthritic attack" which causes extreme difficulty in moving
virtually all his joints. He points out that he had previously
handled pro bono a concubinage case filed by Felicisima
against her husband, having yielded to her repeated pleas as
she was then financially hard-up and psychologically
distraught. For the application with the CENRO and LMB, he
agreed to be paid for his legal services on a contingent basis,
which contract was subsequently found by the RTC to be valid.
When it was time to collect his attorney's fees, Felicisima and
her siblings refused to pay him without any justifiable reason
and even threatened to shoot him if he continued to press for
his compensation. This left Atty. Mendoza with no other
recourse but to avail of the judicial process to enforce his
claim.
Replying to the comment of Atty. Mendoza, Felicisima
maintains that she did not understand the contents of the
Contract for Service and if it was truly their agreement
(contingent basis) they would not have given money to Atty.
Mendoza amounting to P66,000.00. in fact, she points out that
Atty. Mendoza failed to recover one of the lands applied for
and to have the land awarded to them titled because he
became ill. Further, she denies the allegation that she and her
siblings threatened to shoot Atty. Mendoza for how could they
do it to a lawyer who will certainly have them jailed. Besides,
he never mentioned such incident during the hearing of the
case.
On his part, Atty. Navarro asserts that he did his best to win
Felicisima's case although he was unsuccessful. He explains
that even before handling Felicisima's case, he had been
saddled by many cases involving politicians and
sympathizers, having previously served as councilor in the
Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Batangas for two consecutive
terms. He thus emphasized to Felicisima that in order to "keep
the case alive", he could file the Notice of Appeal in her
behalf, and instructed her to look for another lawyer who has
the time to attend to her case and that she would return to
him only when she failed to get one. However, Atty. Navarro
admits that since he was too preoccupied with so many cases
in the local courts, he had altogether forgotten about
Felicisima's case, not having seen her again as per their
agreement.
Atty. Navarro avers that after a long time Felicisima suddenly
showed up at his office complaining why there was no
appellant's brief filed on her behalf at the CA. He claims that
Felicisima blamed her and even accused him of conniving with
Atty. Mendoza. Felicisima would not accept his explanation
and she obviously failed to understand his earlier instruction
as he had filed the Notice of Appeal precisely to give her
enough time to secure the services of a new lawyer having
told her that he was quite busy with his other cases. He
therefore pleads for mercy and compassion if he had
somehow committed some lapses considering that this is the
first time he was charged administratively in his almost 39

years of law practice and that he is too willing to take

complainant's cause if not for such apparent
miscommunication between a lawyer and his client.15
On December 7, 2005, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.16
On November 6, 2006, Felicisima filed a position
paper17 reiterating that Atty. Mendoza clearly abused the trust
and confidence she reposed in him, depriving her of her
material possessions by filing suit to enforce the Contract for
Service. She asserted that they could not have entered into a
contract with Atty. Mendoza for the conveyance of a portion of
the land to be awarded by the Bureau of Lands as his
attorney's fees because they already agreed to pay his fee per
hearing plus transportation expenses and the sum of
P40,000.00. She contended that Atty. Mendoza should be held
liable for deceit and misrepresentation for tricking her to sign,
to her detriment, a document that she did not understand.
As to Atty. Navarro, Felicisima maintained that he abandoned
his responsibility to monitor and keep her updated of the
status of her case before the CA. She also alleges that Atty.
Navarro made it appear to her that he had already filed the
appellant's brief when, in fact, there was no such undertaking.
She thus prayed that Atty. Navarro be held liable for
negligence in the conduct and manner of handling her case
before the CA.
IBP's Report and Recommendation
After two postponements, the mandatory conference was
finally held on September 25, 2006 where all parties appeared
except for Atty. Mendoza. Upon termination of the hearing, the
parties were required to file their position papers but only
Felicisima complied.
On March 6, 2007, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBPCommission on Bar Discipline (CBD) submitted her Report and
Recommendation18 finding Atty. Mendoza guilty of taking
advantage of Felicisima's ignorance just to have the Contract
for Service signed. She held that Atty. Mendoza violated
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) that
a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him, as well as
Rule 20.04, Canon 20 which exhorts lawyers to avoid
controversies with clients concerning matters of
compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent
imposition, injustice or fraud.19
As to Atty. Navarro, the Investigating Commissioner held that
his participation in politics affected his law practice and
caused him to forget about Felicisima's case. Having failed to
file the appellant's brief as ordered by the CA, Atty. Navarro
even filed a Motion to Withdraw Appearance at a very late
stage, leaving no time for Felicisima to secure the services of
another lawyer. His infraction caused the eviction of Felicisima
and her children from their residence by virtue of the writ of
execution and public auction of her real properties. The
Investigating Commissioner further said that Atty. Navarro's
acts showed lack of diligence in violation of Canon 18 of the
CPR and his Lawyer's Oath.20
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that both Atty.
Mendoza and Atty. Navarro be suspended for two (2) years
from the practice of law.21

On September 19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued a

Resolution22 modifying the Investigating Commissioner's
Report and Recommendation by lowering the period of
suspension from two (2) years to six (6) months.
Atty. Navarro filed a motion for reconsideration23 contending
that the IBP Board of Governors failed to consider that after
the filing of the Notice of Appeal, there was no more lawyerclient relationship between him and Felicisima. Insisting that
there was a miscommunication between him and Felicisima
regarding his instruction that she should engage the services
of another lawyer after the filing of the Notice of Appeal, he
stressed that she only later found it difficult to scout for a new
lawyer because she was being charged exorbitant acceptance
fees. Hence, Felicisima should be held equally negligent in not
hiring the services of another lawyer despite a clear
understanding to this effect. He further cites the lack of
communication between him and Felicisima, which resulted in
the late filing of the Notice of Withdrawal that she volunteered
to file a long time ago.
In her comment to Atty. Navarro's motion for reconsideration,
Felicisima reiterated that Atty. Navarro should be held liable
for negligence in failing to update her of the status of the case
and admitting such oversight. She claims that despite several
demands, Atty. Navarro ignored them and made himself
scarce.24
On February 28, 2012, the IBP-CBD forwarded the case to this
Court for proper disposition pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139B of the Rules of Court. Among the records transmitted was
the Resolution dated January 15, 2012 denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by Atty. Navarro.25
The Court's Ruling
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or
disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys
the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment
proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the
evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise
doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.26 For
the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against
the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof.27
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced
by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight
than that of the other.28 It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.29 Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in
determining whether or not there is preponderance of
evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the
facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses'
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying,
the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or
want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as
the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the
number of witnesses, although it does not mean that
preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
After a thorough review of the evidence and pleadings
submitted by the parties, we hold that Felicisima was able to

prove her charges against Atty. Navarro but not Atty.

Mendoza.
Contract for Service with Atty. Mendoza
a contract for contingent fees
The Contract for Service dated February 20, 1993 reads:
That the client hereby employs the Attorney as their counsel
for the titling and recovery of their two parcels of land
situated at Barangay Maunong, Calamba, Laguna, [Lot] No.
2489 with an area of approximately 21,784 Square Meters and
[L]ot No. 3771 with an area of more or less 26,703 and in
consideration of the services of the attorney, the client agrees
to pay the following:
1. For the prosecution of said proceedings (titling and
recovery of the said parcels of land and hearing at the Land
Management Bureau, Manila, and at the Office of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office at Los
Bafios, Laguna the client will give the Attorney one fifth (1/5[)]
of the said two parcels of land or one fifth (1/5[)] of the selling
price of the said properties if sold.
Said Attorney hereby accepts said employment on said terms
and conditions and to do his best care, skill and ability, and at
all times to protect the rights and interest of said client.
2. That the expenses of the proceedings, and such others as
filing fees, expenses of publication, costs legally taxable and
all others shall be for the account of the client.30chanrobleslaw
We cannot sustain the finding of the IBP that Atty. Mendoza
misled Felicisima into signing the above contract which
supposedly was intended to protect her from the claims of her
siblings who did not spend for the application with the CENRO
and LMB. Such finding was based solely on the statements of
Felicisima in her affidavit-complaint. While Felicisima made a
reference to her testimony before the RTC, she did not attach
the transcript of stenographic notes of the said testimony
detailing the circumstances of her signing the Contract for
Service. Neither is the receipt by Atty. Mendoza of the sum of
P40,000.00 after Felicisima and her siblings sold the land, by
itself an indication of fraud and deceit in the execution of the
Contract for Service.
Upon the other hand, Atty. Mendoza presented the RTC
Decision in Civil Case No. T-1080 dated March 29, 2000, the
relevant portions of which state:
It is not disputed that Atty. Mendoza was paid PI,000.00 for
every appearance and he was also given P300.00 for hiring a
vehicle and driver for each scheduled hearing. He also
received P40,000.00 from Felicisima Mendoza when
defendants' one-third portion of Lot No. 3771 was sold.
Atty. Mendoza filed the instant case to collect one-fifth of the
sale price of defendants' land which was sold for
P7,120,800.00 or the amount of P1,424,000.00 minus the
amount of P40,000.00 he received, or the amount of
P1,384,000.00.
During her testimony, Felicisima Mendoza admitted the
authenticity of the Special Power of Attorney whereby her
brothers and sisters authorized her to secure the services of
the plaintiff Juan Mendoza adding that it was in writing, in
English and was explained to her before she signed it; that on

the basis of the authority given her by her brothers and

sisters she engaged the services of Atty. Mendoza; that the
signature in the document, entitled Contract of Service, is that
of her name which she signed in "his house."
On the basis of the evidence, the Court finds no ground to
support Felicisima's claim that she did not enter into any
written agreement with the plaintiff, Juan Mendoza, for the
latter to render legal services and the corresponding
compensation therefor as set forth in the Contract of Service.
However, the Court finds that the amounts received by the
plaintiff Juan Mendoza from defendant Felicisima Mendoza
during the course of his legal services for the twenty hearings
in the amount of P1,300.00 per hearing or a total of
P26,000.00 should also be deducted from his claim of
P1,384,000.00 leaving an unpaid balance of PI,258,000.00
due plaintiff Juan Mendoza for legal services rendered the
defendants.31
Given the above finding of the RTC that Felicisima in fact
entered into a contract for legal services with Atty. Mendoza,
thus debunking her defense in her Answer denying the
existence and authenticity of the said document, it appears
that Felicisima raised the issue of voluntariness of her signing
the Contract for Service only during the hearing when she
supposedly testified that, having reached only Grade IV and
trusting completely her lawyer cousin, Atty. Mendoza who told
her that the document will protect her from the claims of her
siblings, she actually signed the Contract for Service.32 The
RTC, however, found the evidence adduced by Felicisima as
insufficient to defeat Atty. Mendoza's claim for attorney's fees.
Said judgment had attained finality and even pending appeal
was already executed on motion by Atty. Mendoza.
It bears to stress that a contingent fee arrangement is valid in
this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as valid and
binding but must be laid down in an express contract.33 The
validity of contingent fees depends, in large measure, upon
the reasonableness of the amount fixed as contingent fee
under the circumstances of the case.34 Nevertheless, when it
is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by
undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or
by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly
excessive, the Court must, and will protect the aggrieved
party.35
Apart from the allegations in her affidavit-complaint,
Felicisima failed to establish by clear and satisfactory proof of
the deception allegedly committed by Atty. Mendoza when
she agreed in writing for the latter's contingent fees. Fraud
and irregularity in the execution of their contingency fee
contract cannot be deduced from the fact alone that Atty.
Mendoza filed suit to enforce their contract.
Atty. Navarro 's Gross Negligence
With respect to Atty. Navarro, the facts on record clearly
established his failure to live up to the standards of diligence
and competence of the legal profession.
Lawyers engaged to represent a client in a case bear the
responsibility of protecting the latter's interest with warmth,
zeal and utmost diligence.36 They must constantly keep in
mind that their actions or omissions would be binding on the
client.37
In this case, Atty. Navarro agreed to represent Felicisima and

her siblings in Civil Case No. T-1080 and as their counsel he

filed the Answer with Counterclaim. He likewise attended the
hearings of the case until the RTC rendered an adverse
judgment. However, after filing the Notice of Appeal, nothing
was heard of again from him. He did not file any opposition
when Atty. Mendoza moved for execution pending appeal,
which resulted in the sale of Felicisima's properties at public
auction and eventual eviction of Felicisima and her children
from the said premises. Worse, he failed to file an appellant's
brief despite receipt of the order from the CA directing him to
do so within the period specified therein, and to file a motion
for reconsideration when the appeal was dismissed due to
non-filing of such brief. His motion for extension of time to
submit an appellant's brief was filed 93 days late and was
thus denied by the CA. Barely a week after, he filed a notice of
withdrawal of appearance bearing the conformity of his clients
which was granted. It is evident from the foregoing that Atty.
Navarro failed to inform Felicisima of the status of the case so
that the latter was surprised upon being served the eviction
order of the court and eventual dismissal by the CA of their
appeal.
Canon 18 of the CPR mandates that a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 further
provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
Thus:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client
with competence and diligence and champion the latter's
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise
stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to
the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save
by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If
much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court,
to the bar and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty
with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the
bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the
legal profession.38
Atty. Navarro's asseveration that he had instructed Felicisima
to look for another lawyer and given them the Notice of
Withdrawal of Appearance for them to file in the CA, fails to
convince. If it is true that he did not agree to continue being
Felicisima's counsel before the CA, he should have
immediately filed the Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance
himself after filing the Notice of Appeal. Despite receipt of the
order to file appellant's brief from the CA, he did not inform
Felicisima about it nor did he inquire from the latter whether
they already secured the services of a new counsel. That such
withdrawal was filed long after the expiration of the period to
file appellant's brief and the denial by the CA of the motion for
extension also belatedly filed by him, clearly indicate that he
never updated Felicisima on the status of their appeal, such
information being crucial after Atty. Mendoza succeeded in

having the judgment executed pending appeal.

Atty. Navarro, in fact, admitted that he forgot about
Felicisima's case due to his political activities. Despite having
received notices from the CA, he allowed the period of filing
the appellant's brief to lapse and failed to file a motion for
extension before such period expired. He did file a motion for
extension but only three months later and when such motion
was denied, he finally moved to withdraw from the case.
There being no appellant's brief filed, the CA granted Atty.
Mendoza's motion to dismiss the appeal. Under the
circumstances, Atty. Navarro was grossly negligent in his
duties, resulting in great prejudice to Felicisima who lost her
properties to satisfy the judgment in favor of Atty. Mendoza.
We have held that the failure of counsel to submit the appeal
brief for his client within the reglementary period
constitutes inexcusable negligence39 an offense that entails
disciplinary action.40 The filing of a brief within the period set
by law is a duty not only to the client, but also to the
court.41 The failure to file an appellate court brief without any
justifiable reason thus deserves sanction.42
Atty. Navarro's negligent handling of Felicisima's case was
exacerbated by his failure to inform her of the status of her
case. There was no mention in his pleadings of any attempt
on his part to contact Felicisima at the crucial stages when
Atty. Mendoza moved for execution pending appeal and the
CA sent a directive for the filing of the appellant's brief. If
indeed, he had already instructed Felicisima to look for
another lawyer, he should have apprised her of these
developments and explained to her the urgency of filing the
notice of withdrawal of appearance and entry of appearance
of a new counsel she may have already engaged.
Atty. Navarro's failure to communicate vital information to his
client violated Rule 18.04 which provides:
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the client's request for information.
The lawyer's duty to keep his client constantly updated on the
developments of his case is crucial in maintaining the client's
confidence. Indeed, the relationship of lawyer-client being one
of confidence, there is ever present the need for the lawyer to
inform timely and adequately the client of important
developments affecting the client's case. The lawyer should
not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending
the client's interests.43
In cases involving a lawyer's failure to file a brief or other
pleading before an appellate court, this Court has imposed
suspension from the practice of law for periods ranging from
three to six months, and in most serious cases, even
disbarment.44
We find the recommendation of the IBP-Board of Governors to
suspend Atty. Navarro from the practice of law for six months
appropriate under the circumstances. Considering that this is
his first administrative offense, such penalty, and not
disbarment as prayed for by complainant, serves the purpose
of protecting the interest of the public and the legal
profession. For this Court will exercise its power to disbar only
in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and a member of the bar.45

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Eusebio P.

Navarro, Jr. GUILTY of violation of Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months effective upon finality of this Decision, with warning
that a repetition of the same or similar violation shall be dealt
with more severely. The charges against Atty. Juan B. Mendoza
areDISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10635, August 26, 2015
NOEL S. SORREDA, Complainant, v. ATTY. DAVID L.
KHO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
The Case
Before the Court is an administrative case filed by Noel S.
Sorreda (Sorreda) against Atty. David L. Kho (Kho) for
malpractice and/or gross misconduct.
The Facts
The records reveal that on 3 October 2006 Marissa L.
Macarilay (Macarilay), through her then counsel Sorreda,1 filed
an administrative complaint2 against Kho before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case
No. 06-1866 (Macarilay's complaint). Sorreda withdrew as
counsel for Macarilay on 10 March 2007.3 On 5 December
2007, Sorreda filed with the IBP the present complaint 4against
Kho, which contained exactly the same allegations in
Macarilay's complaint. Sorreda alleged that: (1) Macarilay,
through him as counsel, filed an arbitration case against
Candelaria Kholoma (Candelaria) and Imelda Kholoma
(Imelda), Kho's clients, before the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC); (2) Kho notarized Candelaria
and Imelda's affidavit in the arbitration case despite being
disqualified under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, since
Candelaria and Imelda are Kho's sister-in-law and niece,
respectively; (3) Kho did not furnish Macarilay and Sorreda a
copy of his comment on their motion for substitution of
arbitrator; (4) Kho did not countervail the manifestation
alleging the mendacity of Kho and his clients; (5) Kho
intentionally delayed the receipt of Macarilay's motion for
time extension; (6) Kho advised Robert Kholoma (Robert), the
husband of Candelaria, to forcibly eject Macarilay's watchman
in the disputed property; (7) Kho notarized the answer filed by
the Kholomas in the case for forcible entry; (8) Kho also
notarized the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by the
Kholomas, which amounted to "self-notarization," because
"the one being given power is the law firm of Kho Antonio
Velasco & Payos Law Offices, of which [Kho] is the premier
partner"; (9) Kho notarized the SPA with only one of the three
signatories exhibiting her cedula; (10) Kho also notarized the
petition for review filed by Candelaria and Imelda before the
Court of Appeals; and (11) Kho and his clients deliberately
failed to furnish the CIAC with a copy their appeal.

In his Answer,5 Kho admitted that he notarized Candelaria and

Imelda's affidavit, answer in the case for forcible entry, SPA,
and petition for review. Kho, however, alleged that he acted in
good faith for he believed that the decision in Aznar Brothers
Realty Co. v. Court of Appeals,6 where only "those convicted of
the crime involving moral turpitude were disqualified to
notarize documents," was still the prevailing rule. Kho pleaded
for liberality in the application of the then recently enacted
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, since there was no damage
caused by the notarization. He admitted that he was not yet
fully conversant with the new rules. As to the other
allegations, Kho claimed that those were unsubstantiated
conclusions, conjectures and speculations. Kho admitted his
failure to furnish Sorreda with a copy of the comment on the
motion for substitution of arbitrator and his failure to furnish
the CIAC with a copy of his clients' appeal. However, he
alleged that no damage was caused and he immediately
furnished the copies of the pleadings upon discovery of his
inadvertence.
Finally, Kho claimed that "Macarilay's penchant for deliberate
forum shopping and splitting a cause of action, albeit baseless
and unfounded, must be sanctioned." 7 In an Order8 dated 29
January 2009, IBP Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. (IBP
Commissioner) denied Sorreda's motion to consolidate the
present complaint with Macarilay's complaint, because there
was already a report and recommendation by a different
commissioner in Macarilay's complaint. On 4 August 2009,
Kho filed an urgent manifestation,9pleading for the dismissal
of the present case. Kho attached a copy of this Court's
Resolution10 dated 30 March 2009, where the Third Division of
this Court resolved to close and terminate CBD Case No. 061866 (docketed as A.C. No. 8161), considering that no motion
for reconsideration was filed against the IBP
Resolution11 dismissing the case for lack of merit, and no
petition for review was filed before the Court.
The Ruling of the IBP
In a Report and Recommendation dated 31 May 2011,12 the
IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the present
complaint against Kho because Sorreda failed to establish his
allegations by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence.
The IBP Commissioner also found that Sorreda did not
establish how Kho's alleged violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, if proven, would damage Macarilay. In
Resolution No. XX-2013-10713 issued on 12 February 2013, the
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, dismissing the
complaint for lack of evidence. In Resolution No. XXI-201422114 issued on 2 May 2014, the IBP Board of Governors
likewise denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
Sorreda, since the Board found no cogent reason to reverse its
initial findings and the matters raised were reiterations of
those which had already been taken into consideration.
The Ruling of the Court
We dismiss the complaint against Kho. Applying the principle
of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the Court finds that
the present administrative case becomes dismissible. Section
47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court enunciates the rule of res
judicata or bar by prior judgment.15 It provides that a final
judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and
their privies, and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent

actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of

action.16 A.C. No. 8161 and the present case have
substantially identical parties, refer to the same subject
matter, raise the same issue, and claim the same relief. The
present complaint is a mere duplication of Macarilay's
complaint in A.C. No. 8161. Thus, the Resolution of this Court
in A.C. No. 8161 is conclusive in the present case.
Furthermore, Sorreda failed to discharge the burden of
proving Kho's administrative liability by clear preponderance
of evidence.
The legal presumption is that an attorney is innocent of the
charges against him until the contrary is proved.17 The burden
of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always
rests on the complainant,18 and the burden is not satisfied
when complainant relies on mere assumptions and suspicions
as evidence.19 Considering the serious consequences of
disbarment and suspension, this Court has consistently held
that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of administrative penalty.20 In the present case,
Sorreda did not substantiate his allegations, and he relied on
his own assumptions and suspicions. Sorreda did not show
how Kho's alleged actions amount to malpractice or gross
misconduct, which will subject Kho to administrative sanction.
Sorreda cannot shift the burden of proof to Kho by asking him
to rebut his allegations. It is axiomatic that one who alleges
an act has the onus of proving it.21 If the burden of proof is not
overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his
defense.22
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against respondent
Atty. David L. Kho. Costs against complainant. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C.
TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO,
JR., ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F.
VICTORIO, JR., AND ATTY. ELBERT T.
QUILALA, Respondents.
A.C. No. 8725
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C.
TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA,
JR., AND ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondent.
DECISION
In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie
T. Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek the disbarment of
respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F.
Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and
Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a court
order that became the basis for the cancellation of their
annotation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis
pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.
Antecedents
Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel
of the complainants in a civil action they brought to seek the

annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546

of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the first week of
January 2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City
(Civil Case No. Q-07-59598). They impleaded as defendants
Ramon and Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. They caused to be annotated on TCT
No. N-290546 their affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the
notice of lis pendens.1 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was the counsel of
defendant Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.
In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009
(later docketed as A.C. No. 8261),2 the complainants narrated
that as the surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio and
Nemesia Torres, they inherited upon the deaths of their
parents a residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano
Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City;3 that on August 24, 2006, they
discovered that TCT No. RT-64333(35652) had been unlawfully
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City under the names of Ramon and
Josefina Ricafort;4 and that, accordingly, they immediately
caused the annotation of their affidavit of adverse claim on
TCT No. N-290546.
It appears that the parties entered into an amicable
settlement during the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598
in order to end their dispute,5 whereby the complainants
agreed to sell the property and the proceeds thereof would be
equally divided between the parties, and the complaint and
counterclaim would be withdrawn respectively by the
complainants (as the plaintiffs) and the defendants. Pursuant
to the terms of the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed
a Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated February 26,
2008,6 which the RTC granted in its order dated May 16, 2008
upon noting the defendants' lack of objection thereto and the
defendants' willingness to similarly withdraw their
counterclaim.7
The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance
by the RTC of the order dated May 16, 2008, they could no
longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making
several phone calls and visits to his office; that they found out
upon verification at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that
new annotations were made on TCT No. N-290546,
specifically: (1) the annotation of the letter-request appearing
to be filed by Atty. Tolentino, Jr.8 seeking the cancellation of
the affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546; and (2) the
arinotation of the decision dated May 16, 2008 rendered in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC, Branch 95, in Quezon
City, granting the complainants' Motion to Withdraw
Complaint;9 and that a copy of the letter-request dated June
30, 2008 addressed to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of Deeds of
Quezon City, disclosed that it was defendant Ramon Ricafort
who had signed the letter.
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed
an appeal en consulta with the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful
cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice
of lis pendens under primary entries PE-2742 and PE-3828-9,
respectively. The LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on
March 30, 2009, and directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda and/or supporting documents on or
before such scheduled hearing.10However, the records do not
disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was already resolved, or

remained pending at the LRA.

Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty.
Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid him for his professional
services, the complainants felt that said counsel had
abandoned their case. They submitted that the cancellation of
their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis
pendens without a court order specifically allowing such
cancellation resulted from the connivance and conspiracy
between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the
taking advantage of their positions as officials in the Registry
of Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and
Atty. Cunanan, the acting Registrar and signatory of the new
annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby prejudiced.
On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to
comment on the verified complaint.11
Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his Comment dated August 17,
200912 that complainant Robert Torres had been actively
involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598,
which included the mediation process; that the complainants,
after having aggressively participated in the drafting of the
amicable settlement, could not now claim that they had been
deceived into entering the agreement in the same way that
they could not feign ignorance of the conditions contained
therein; that he did not commit any abandonment as alleged,
but had performed in good faith his duties as the counsel for
the complainants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that he should
not be held responsible for their representation in other
proceedings, such as that before the LRA, which required a
separate engagement; and that the only payment he had
received from the complainants were those for his appearance
fees of P1,000.00 for every hearing in the RTC.
In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
refuted the charge of conspiracy, stressing that he was not
acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty. Victorio,
Jr. whom he had met during the hearings in Civil Case No. Q07-59598; that although he had notarized the letter-request
dated June 30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of
Deeds, he had no knowledge about how said letter-request
had been disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and that the
present complaint was the second disbarment case filed by
the complainants against him with no other motive except to
harass and intimidate him.
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1,
200914 that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another Deputy Register of
Deeds, who was the actual signing authority of the
annotations that resulted in the cancellation of the affidavit of
adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. N290546; that the cancellation of the annotations was
undertaken in the regular course of official duty and in the
exercise of the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds; that
no irregularity occurred or was performed in the cancellation
of the annotations; and that the Register of Deeds was
impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 only as a nominal
party, thereby discounting any involvement in the
proceedings in the case.
Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15
As the result of Atty. Quilala's allegation in his Comment in
A.C. No. 8261 that it had been Atty. Caluya, Jr.'s signature that
appeared below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed
another sworn disbarment complaint dated August 26, 2010

alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the signature of Atty.
Cunanan.16 This disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C.
No. 8725, and was later on consolidated with A.C. No.
826117 because the complaints involved the same parties and
rested on similar allegations against the respondents.
Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the
allegation of forgery and to reiterate the arguments he had
made in A.C. No. 8261.18 On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr.
manifested that he adopted Atty. Quilala's Comment. 19
Ruling
We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of
merit.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer
may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders
him unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. 20 Verily,
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of
the Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code not to engage in any
unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure
to observe these tenets of the Code of Professional
Responsibility exposes the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as
provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as
amended,viz.:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The complainants' allegations of the respondents' acts and
omissions are insufficient to establish any censurable conduct
against them.
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) enumerates the general duties of the
Register of Deeds, as follows:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. - x x x
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately
register an instrument presented for registration dealing with
real or personal property which complies with all the
requisites for registration. He shall see to it that said
instrument bears the proper documentary science stamps and
that the same are properly canceled. If the instrument is not
registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and
inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the
ground or reason therefor, and advising him of his right to
appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this
Decree. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is

ministerial in nature.21 A purely ministerial act or duty is one
that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in
a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If
the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him
the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed,
such duty is discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the
exercise of official discretion nor the exercise of judgment. 22
In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the Court
underscores that registration is a merely ministerial act of the
Register of Deeds, explaining:
xxx [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended
to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but
a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to
see whether the documents sought to be registered conform
with the formal and legal requirements for such documents.
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or
irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and
Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice
of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on
TCT No. N-290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May
16, 2008 or the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 had been
falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine
inasmuch as their duty to examine documents presented for
registration was limited only to what appears on the face of
the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request
and the RTC order, they found the same to be sufficient in law
and t]o be in conformity with existing requirements, it became
obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without
unnecessary delay.24
Should they be aggrieved by said respondents' performance
of duty, complainants were not bereft of any remedy because
they could challenge the performance of duty by bringing the
matter by way of consultawith the LRA, as provided by Section
11725 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. But, as enunciated
in Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,26 it was ultimately
within the province of a court of competent jurisdiction to
resolve issues concerning the validity or invalidity of a
document registered by the Register of Deeds.
The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino,
Jr. with having conspired with each other to guarantee that
the parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598 would enter into the
amicable settlement, and then to cause the cancellation of
the affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. The complainants
further fault Atty. Victorio, Jr. with having abandoned their
cause since the issuance of the RTC of its order dated May 16,
2008.
The complainants' charges are devoid of substance.
Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in
order to establish conspiracy because conspiracy may be
inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of
an act, it is nonetheless essential that conspiracy be
established by clear and convincing evidence. 27 The
complainants failed in this regard. Outside of their bare
assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had
conspired with each other in order to cause the dismissal of
the complaint and then discharge of the annotations, they

presented no evidence to support their allegation of

conspiracy. On the contrary, the records indicated their own
active participation in arriving at the amicable settlement with
the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence, they
could not now turn their backs on the amicable settlement
that they had themselves entered into.
Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
initiated ahd participated in the settlement of the case, there
was nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their
obligation as lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz.:
RULE 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end
or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.
In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable
settlement of the complainants and the defendants in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598 subsisted.28
Anent the complainants' charge of abandonment against Atty.
Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility are applicable, to wit:
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the client's request for information.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services
of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in Civil Case No. Q-0759598. Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With Atty.
Victorio, Jr. assistance, the complainants obtained a fair
settlement consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of the
sale of the property in litis, without any portion of the
proceeds accruing to counsel as his legal fees. The
complainants did not competently and persuasively show any
unfaithfulness on the part of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as their
interest in the litigation was concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio,
Jr. was not liable for abandonment.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived
inattention to any other matters subsequent to the
termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise
expressly stipulated between them at any time during the
engagement, the complainants had no right to assume that
Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s legal representation was indefinite as to
extend to his representation of them in the LRA. The Law
Profession did not burden its members with the responsibility
of indefinite service to the clients; hence, the rendition of
professional services depends on the agreement between the
attorney and the client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s alleged failure to
respond to the complainants' calls or visits, or to provide them
with his whereabouts to enable them to have access to him
despite the termination of his engagement in Civil Case No. Q07-59598 did not equate to abandonment without the credible
showing that he continued to come under the professional
obligation towards them after the termination of Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598.cralawred
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless disbarment
complaints against Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato

G. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala

and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014
ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V.
AGTANG, Respondent.
DECISION
This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG),
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dated March 23, 2014,
affirming with modification the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of
respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the
practice of law for one (1) year for ethical impropriety and
ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.
From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a complaint2, dated May 31,
2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent
for unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful3 acts as a
lawyer.
In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to
file his Answer within 15 days from receipt of the order.
Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to
the status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011, the
Investigating Commissioner issued the Order 5 setting the case
for mandatory conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It
was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the
scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified
Answer.6
During the conference, only the complainant together with her
husband appeared. She submitted a set of documents
contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the
respondent. The Investigating Commissioner7 indicated that
the said documents would be reviewed and the parties would
be informed if there was a need for clarificatory questioning;
otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based
on the documents on file. The Minutes8 of the mandatory
conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 oclock in
the morning or after the proceeding was terminated.
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to
respondents Answer.
On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the
January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering
respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant and her
husband the sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00,
respectively, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from
December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit. 10
Complainants Position
From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to
respondent in connection with her legal problem regarding a
deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty,

which respondent had notarized. After their discussion,

complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing
of the appropriate case in court, for which they signed a
contract. Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as
acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.11
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to
Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal problem
referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her
home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty
(60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust
and confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to
lend the amount without interest. A promissory note13
evidenced the loan.
In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra
Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a lot she had
previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent
who recommended the immediate filing of a case for
reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009,
respondent requested and thereafter received from
complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee. 14 When
asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high
value of the land and the sheriffs travel expenses and
accommodations in Manila, for the service of the summons to
the defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that
the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65,
entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development
Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court
records.15
During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds,
complainant also discovered that respondent was the one who
notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she
filed. When asked about this, respondent merely replied that
he would take a collaborating counsel to handle complainants
case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by
respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1]
the major differences in the documents issued by Tierra
Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and
the deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the
complaint discussed the method of payment which was not
the point of contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies
she complained of were not mentioned. Respondent, however,
assured her that those matters could be brought up during
the hearings.
On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant,
requesting that the latter extend to him the amount of
P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 in the moment of urgency or
emergency.16 Complainant obliged the request and gave
respondent the sum of P22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainants house
and demanded the sum of P50,000.00, purportedly to be
given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling.
Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition but
she eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was
covered by a receipt,17 stating that it is understood that the
balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable
judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster. On November 2, 2010,
respondent insisted that the remaining amount be given by
complainant prior to the next hearing of the case, because the
judge was allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again,
complainant handed to respondent the amount of
P25,000.00.18

On September 29, 2010, complainants case was dismissed.

Not having been notified by respondent, complainant learned
of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally
checked the status of the case with the court. She went to the
office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the
office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and
gave her a copy of the motion for reconsideration. On January
15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested
him to prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty
on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts
because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the
documents unless these were amended; and to make the
additional averment that the defendant was using false
documents.
On January 18, 2011, respondents driver delivered to
complainant a copy of the reply with a message from him that
the matters she requested to be included were mentioned
therein. Upon reading the same, however, complainant
discovered that these matters were not so included. On the
same occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on
respondents directive for the reimbursement of the value of a
bottle of wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant
was also told that oral arguments on the case had been set
the following month.19
On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the
services of respondent as her counsel and wrote him a letter
of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents
showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra
Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant
wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts
he received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost
of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.
Respondents Position
In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old
and had been engaged in the practice of law since March
1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from
1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized the
Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainants case, but he
qualified that he was not paid his notarial fees therefor. He
likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which
he claimed to have received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee
and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of
P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was complainant, at
the behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount
to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for his
services. The transaction was declared as no loan and he
was told not to worry about its payment. As regards the
amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent
claimed that the said amount was suggested by the
complainant herself who was persistent in covering the
incidental expenses in the handling of the case. He denied
having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the
money for their hotel accommodations. Complainants
husband approved of the amount. In the same vein,
respondent denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and
having received P22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied
having told her that the case would be discussed with the
judge who would rule in their favor at the very next hearing.
Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the
possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He
never said that he would personally present a bottle of wine to

the judge.
Further, respondent belied the Registrars comment as to his
representation of Tierra Realty in the past. Respondent saw
nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully
aware that another counsel was assisting him in the handling
of cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her
cause of action and the consequences of the suit, complainant
was aware of the applicable law on reformation of contracts.
Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent demanded just
compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases
for the complainant.
Reply of Complainant
In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondents
defenses by making reference to the receipts in her
possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the
amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also
emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations
long before she met him. While respondent was employed as
Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos
Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several
documents involving Flying V, an oil company owned by
Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra Realty.
Complainant insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she
extended to respondent was never considered as no loan.
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating
Commissioner copies of the Resolution, dated June 20, 2012,
issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City,
finding probable cause against respondent for estafa.23
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the
Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of ethical
impropriety and recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.
In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted
and approved with modification the recommendation of
suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered
respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan of
P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to
P127,590.00.
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January
16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto,
informing the IBP-BOG that an information charging
respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that
a corresponding order for his arrest had been issued. 26
In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied
respondents motion for reconsideration but modified the
penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing
it from one (1) year to three (3) months. Respondent was
likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee
received from complainant amounting to P127,590.00.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Courts Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the

Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondents
violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however,
modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on
representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the
penalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that [a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. It is well-established that a lawyers conduct is not
confined to the performance of his professional duties. A
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in
his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.27
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private
capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into
believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more
than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned
reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the
extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other
words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related
to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of
P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted
only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who
suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one,
it is highly improbable that complainant, who was then
plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such
amount that would further burden her financial resources.
Assuming that the complainant was more than willing to shell
out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with
the trial court, still, respondent should not have accepted the
excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be
knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise
duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due,
consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected
of all members of the legal profession.
Moreover, the fiduciary nature of the relationship between
the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or
from his client.28 Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific
purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately
returned. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such
act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment.29
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed
out, he received various amounts from complainant but he
could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny
the authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant.
Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the
alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives
rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust
reposed in him by, the client.30 When a lawyer receives money
from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to
render an accounting to the client showing that the money
was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the

lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the
lawyer must immediately return the money to the client.31
Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and
unwarranted amounts from his client, respondent displayed a
reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of
P50,000.00 as representation expenses allegedly for the
benefit of the judge handling the case, in exchange for a
favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt
showing that he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and,
worse, he subsequently demanded and received the other half
of the amount at the time the case had already been
dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross
misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of
disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money from his
client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a positive
outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his clients trust
but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the
public in the legal profession and the entire Judiciary. This is
the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe
their utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of
justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act that
would damage the image of judges, lest the publics
perception of the dispensation of justice be overshadowed by
iniquitous doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that
the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him from
any liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was
indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate
respondents actuations would seriously erode the publics
trust in the courts.
As it turned out, complainants case was dismissed as early as
September 29, 2010. At this juncture, respondent proved
himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his
client of the status of the case, and left the client to
personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not
only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his
client.
Respondents unbecoming conduct towards complainant did
not stop here. Records reveal that he likewise violated Rule
16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that [a] lawyer
shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client. In his private capacity, he requested from his
client, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts.
The first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed
P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he
implored her to extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or
P50,000.00 in the moment of urgency or emergency but
was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These
transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and
receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by
respondent. These acts were committed by respondent in his
private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with
complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by
complainant because of the trust and confidence reposed in
him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the
defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans
fell within the exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of
P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Respondents
assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the
liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as no

loan, does not justify his inappropriate behavior. The acts of

requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and
thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of
integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present,
respondent has not yet paid his obligations to complainant.
Time and again, the Court has consistently held that
deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments
for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all
times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the
courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of
financial obligations.32
Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of conduct or
misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones behavior
exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyers
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct which,
albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would
show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law vest him with.
Unfortunately, respondent must be found guilty of misconduct
on both scores.
With respect to respondents alleged representation of
conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to modify the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded
that complainant presented insufficient evidence of
respondents lawyering for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that [a] lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interest except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client
should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and
confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must
prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a
client can only entrust confidential information to his/her
lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost
secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound
to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and
transactions with the client. Part of the lawyers duty in this
regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests.33 Thus,
even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at
stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the
same would trigger the violation of the prohibition against
conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is
a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is
substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for
representing conflicting interests in handling the case of
complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he
had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore
the fact that respondent admitted to having notarized the
deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned
in complainants case. While the Investigating Commissioner
found that the complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not
question the validity of the said contract, and that only the
intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof were

challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the
proscription was made exists. The Court cannot brush aside
the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the
allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and
the clear admission of respondent that he was the one who
notarized the assailed document. Regardless of whether it
was the validity of the entire document or the intention of the
parties as to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell
short of prudence in action when he accepted complainants
case, knowing fully that he was involved in the execution of
the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid
notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel
would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent that
respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings
with each other. More significantly, there is no record of any
written consent from any of the parties involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited not
only because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the
principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the
duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and
represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is
abused or violated the entire profession suffers.34
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or
suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of the
lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the CPR.35 For the practice of law is
a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which
is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good
moral character.36 The appropriate penalty for an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts.37
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of
the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of
the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney
for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard
of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the trust of
his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court
finds that the suspension for three (3) months recommended
by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the
unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of
the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct
in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling
indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society
render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in
him as a member of the Bar.
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the
complainant, for engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct,
for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the
trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the
entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests,

respondent deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment. 38

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the
money he borrowed from complainant in his private capacity.
In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order
the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted
in a private capacity because its findings in administrative
cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic
link to the lawyers professional engagement. In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the
officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the
determination of respondents administrative liability. Its
findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions
which the parties may choose against each other.
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his
right to appeal since administrative cases are filed directly
with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence
required in civil cases is different from the quantum of
evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases,
preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.40 In administrative cases, only
substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is
more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively
liable.41 Furthermore, the Court has to consider the
prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to
administrative cases which are, as a rule, imprescriptible. 42
Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to
return the amount of P127,590.00 representing the balance of
the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was
intimately related to the lawyer-client relationship between
them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which
respondent received from complainant, as representation
expenses for the handling of the civil case and for the
purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These
were connected to his professional relationship with the
complainant. While respondents deplorable act of requesting
the said amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with
mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same
as it was borne out of their professional relationship. As to his
other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable
for the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the
small claims cases filed against him.
All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession.43 The Court
likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest administration
of justice by purging the profession of members who, by their
misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.44
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V.
Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him
from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the
complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00,
P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar

Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Res Judicata in Administrative cases:
See Sorreda v. Kho
Effect of complainants desistance/disinterest

EN BANC
A.C. No. 9603, June 16, 2015
DOMINIC PAUL D. LAZARETO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
DENNIS N. ACORDA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is the present administrative case which
arose from the affidavitcomplaint for disbarment 1filed with
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on July 7, 2006, by
Dominic Paul D. Lazareto (Lazareto) against Atty. Dennis N.
Acorda (respondent), for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Antecedents
Lazareto, eldest son of the late Damaso R. Lazareto, for
himself and on behalf of his co-heirs (family), specifically
charged respondent with violating the following provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
xxxx
CANON 7 -- A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
xxxx
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the clients request for information.
In January 2004, Lazareto and his family engaged the
respondents services (the respondent was a member of the
law office Jaromay Baylon Acorda Landrito & Associates3) to
handle the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Lazaretos

father who died intestate. They agreed to set the deadline for
the filing of the extrajudicial settlement action on May 26,
2004, to enable the family to avail of a P100,000.00 deduction
in estate taxes.4They also agreed that titles to a parcel of
conjugal land (Lots B & E) at Tomas Mapua St., Sta. Cruz,
Manila, left by the deceased, be transferred to Lazaretos
mother, Cleotilde D. Lazareto.
Lazareto gave the respondent the original duplicate copies of
TCT No. 206006 for Lot B and TCT No. 206008 for Lot E,
together with cash5 representing the respondents acceptance
fee (P50,000.00), and initial deposit to answer for extrajudicial
transactions which include transfer taxes and cost of
publication (P70,000.00) for a total of P120,000.00. Since
then, Lazareto had followed up the developments with the
respondent by phone, but he could not be contacted until he
received a fax message from him asking for an additional
P88,000.00,6 which Lazareto gave in installments of
P66,000.007 and P20,000.00.8
May 2004 passed without the papers for extrajudicial
settlement being filed. Lazareto had not heard from the
respondent all this time, although the lawyer sent a certain
Manny Pacheco (Pacheco), allegedly the liaison officer of the
law firm, to get the second installment of P20,000.00. The
family received a liquidation report from the respondent on
August 24, 2004.9

nonchalant and negligent attitude and his refusal to provide

his family a signed affidavit of loss, Lazareto filed the present
complaint.
Thereafter, Atty. Rufino I. Policarpio, III (Atty. Policarpio), the
respondents lawyer, proposed an amicable settlement with
Lazareto. As proposed, part of the money given to the
respondent for legal services would be returned to the family
and they would be given the document extrajudicial
settlement with deed of sale, as well as the official receipts
for land taxes and other expenses. Lazareto agreed to the
proposal and submitted a manifestation on the matter to
the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Gerely Rico (Comm.
Rico).15
Once again, Lazareto was greatly disappointed. The
respondent failed to deliver on his commitments: there was
no return of part of the money given to respondent, no copy
of extrajudicial settlement with deed of sale, and no receipts
of payments for transactions the respondent had entered into
in representation of the Lazareto family. With this
development, Lazareto had no choice but to agree to
just accept an affidavit of loss for the receipts and to
rely on the word of respondents counsel that he was
assured by his client that he (respondent) had filed the
extrajudicial settlement papers with the Register of
Deeds of Manila.

On several occasions after August 24, 2004, Lazareto gave

additional funds to respondent consisting of P150,000.00 for
property taxes and issuance of new titles; P15,000.00 for
additional transfer expenses; and another P10,330.00 for
additional property taxes. Since then, Lazareto had not heard
from the respondent, until he wrote the family on April 8,
2005, saying that Pacheco had not given an accounting of the
monies the family had given him (respondent).

Consequently, Lazareto consented to the compromise

offer, in exchange for his affidavit of desistance. His
family decided to work on the extrajudicial settlement
themselves, to shorten their agony16and in doing so, they
discovered that:

Meantime, Lazareto and his family entered into negotiations

to sell Lot B with a certain Mrs. Nel Manzano. They asked the
respondent to prepare the deed of sale for the transaction;
however, even if the respondent promised to give the matter
priority, he failed to attend to it. On August 15, 2005, the
family wrote him a letter reminding him of his promise, as well
as of his failure to act on the filing of the extrajudicial
settlement action which had expired a year ago.10

(2) what was on file with the Register of Deeds was only a
Deed of Absolute Sale17 of Lot B dated September 20, 2005,
where the signature D. Lazareto appeared above the name of
his father, Damaso R. Lazareto, who had been dead since
November 26, 2003; and

On October 8, 2005, Lazareto and respondent agreed that the

deed of sale and tax declaration for Lot B would be forwarded
to the family on or before November 1, 2005, and in a weeks
time, they would discuss the extrajudicial settlement
question.11
After more than a week without hearing from the respondent,
Lazareto was constrained to write the respondent another
letter on April 3, 2006, and one more on May 21, 2006,
demanding the return of the title to Lot E.12Thereafter,
Lazareto made several follow-ups with the respondent
through his (respondents) relative Ma. Teresa Puntero and his
mother, as well as through text messages to no avail, until
the respondent admitted that he had lost TCT No. 206008
covering Lot E.13
With this admission, Lazareto requested the respondent to
execute an affidavit of loss so that the family could secure a
duplicate copy of the TCT. The respondent did send a copy of
the affidavit of loss, but it was unsigned.14 Exasperated with
the difficulties he was having with the respondents

(1) no Extrajudicial Settlement was on file with the Manila

Register of Deeds, nor was there an Affidavit of Publication;

(3) three copies of the tabloid Balitang Detalye,18 given to the

family by the respondent, where the lawyer claimed the
extrajudicial settlement was published, were one and the
same issue VOLUME VIII-NO. 31 MAY 24-30, 2004; 3.a, the
published notice was merely ONE DETACHED SEPARATE PAGE
appearing on a mere insert (page 6) titled Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate of Damaso Lazareto with Deed of Sale;
3.b. below it was the statement: Publisher: Balitang Detalye;
Dates: May 24, 31 and June 7, 2004.
Alarmed and shocked at his discovery, Lazareto moved for the
admission of newly discovered evidence,19 but the motion was
denied by Comm. Rico, as well as his subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
His affidavit of desistance and respondents apology
notwithstanding, Lazareto expressed grave concern over
respondents misrepresentations in performing his tasks as
the family lawyer in the settlement of his fathers estate.
Nonetheless, he left it to Comm. Rico to resolve the case in
the light of his affidavit of desistance and the circumstances
of the case.
The Case for the Respondent

In his position paper,20 dated March 21, 2007, the respondent

alleged that upon his engagement as counsel by Lazaretos
family, he advised them that he could not determine the exact
date of completion or termination of his assigned task,
considering that he did not have full control over the
processing of documents by the concerned agencies.
He denied Lazaretos submission that he had been negligent
in the performance of his duties as lawyer for the settlement
of the estate of Lazaretos deceased father. He claimed that
he performed the tasks assigned to him with honesty and
diligence and that he intended, in good faith, to complete his
tasks at the soonest possible time.
Additionally, the respondent alleged that Pacheco stole a
substantial amount of money from the firm, as well as several
original documents, and that Pacheco could not be found
despite efforts to locate him.21 Lazareto, however, alleged that
the documents were returned to the respondent. 22 The
respondent claimed that the he had to borrow money from his
relatives, friends, and even from informal lenders to enable
him to continue performing his work for Lazareto and his
family. He stressed that despite the losses he suffered, he
was able to finalize all documents and transactions and to
deliver the certificate of title covering Lot B. 23
The respondent further claimed that he was determined to
complete the task assigned to him despite the fact that
Lazareto, his mother Clotilde, and Ramon Lazareto became
impatient and intrusive in their language and dealings
with him.24
He insisted that he was not negligent in handling the task
entrusted to him by the Lazareto family and that he was
entitled to the presumption of diligence as the Court held
in Adarne v. Aldaba.25 He stressed that Lazareto had executed
an affidavit of desistance and had, in fact, agreed to let him
continue as the family lawyer. This being the case, he
maintained, Lazareto should be deemed to have abandoned
his cause of action against him. He thus prayed that the
complaint be dismissed.
The Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation
Commissioner Angelito C. Inocencio (Comm. Inocencio), who
took over the investigation from Comm. Rico, rendered a
report dated May 14, 2008,26 recommending that disciplinary
action be taken against respondent. He resolved the case
based on the following issues: (1) whether respondent was
negligent in handling the legal matter entrusted to him; and
(2) whether respondent acted in bad faith in dealing with
complainant Lazareto and his family.
Comm. Inocencio found respondent liable in regard to the first
issue. He was convinced that respondent committed a breach
of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by his
negligence in handling the legal matter entrusted to him by
Lazareto. Comm. Inocencio believed that had the respondent
been conscientious, diligent, and efficient in rendering legal
services to Lazareto and his family, the complaint could have
been avoided. He faulted the respondent for making excuses
Pacheco absconding with the funds of the law firm and the
negative attitude of the Lazareto family in dealing with him
for his failure to fulfill his contractual obligation to them rather
than what he had accomplished.

With respect to the second issue, however, Comm. Inocencio

believed the respondents dealings with Lazareto and his
family were not attended with bad faith. He explained that
while the respondents efforts did not produce the desired
results as fast as they should have, a modicum of living up to
expectations could be discerned. He succeeded, though
belatedly, in finalizing all documents and transactions and
delivering the certificate of title covering Lot
B.27ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Notwithstanding Lazaretos affidavit of desistance, Comm.
Inocencio recommended that the respondent be severely
censured for his malfeasance as lawyer for the Lazareto
family.28 Although the family gave the respondent the
opportunity to make amends for his negligence in the
handling of the legal matter entrusted to him, Comm.
Inocencio pointed out, the affidavit of desistance did not
completely exculpate him from liability for what has
occurred.29
The IBP Resolution and Related Incidents
On July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-347,30 approving, with
modification, Comm. Inocencios recommendation. The
board suspended respondent from the practice of law for one
month, for his failure to comply with his obligation towards
Lazareto and his family.
The respondent moved for reconsideration31 of the IBP
resolution, praying that the case be dismissed on the grounds
of supervening events which occurred after the case was
submitted for resolution. He claimed that the very reason why
the complaint was filed his failure to return to Lazareto the
TCT for Lot E of the estate of his deceased father was nonexistent as the document was found among the records of his
former law office and was returned to Lazareto on June 9,
2007.32
The respondent argued that in the light of Comm. Inocencios
finding that he did not act in bad faith in dealing with Lazareto
and the fact that he had returned the TCT of Lot E and
substantially all of the amounts paid to him, substantial
justice, fairness and equity demand that the case be
dismissed.
Lazareto opposed33 the respondents bid to have the case
dismissed. He strongly argued that while he and his family
had accepted the respondents personal apology for the
grievous betrayal of their trust and confidence and the
wanton disregard of their interest in the extrajudicial
settlement of his fathers property, it did not mean that the
respondent did not commit a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Lazareto bewailed the fact that he was not given the
opportunity to present to Comm. Rico the full facts and
issues of the case, as the IBP investigator denied his motion
to admit newly discovered evidence such as the fake deed of
sale and the bogus publication of the non-existent extrajudicial settlement that respondent used in accomplishing his
contract of legal services with them. He lamented that he and
his family are now suffering from the falsification that
respondent resorted to as they were having difficulties in
transferring the title of the property (Lot E) to his mother.
He thus maintained that the loss of the TCT of Lot E is not the

only basis of the complaint, but also respondents negligence,

misrepresentations, and bad faith in handling the legal matter
the family entrusted to him. Lazareto prayed that respondent
be meted the penalty of at least six months suspension from
the practice of law for the betrayal of their interest.

of the estate of Lazaretos deceased father were very much

relevant to the proceedings before Comm. Rico. They were
inextricably linked to the charge of negligence against
respondent in his handling of the extrajudicial settlement
matter entrusted to him by Lazareto and his family.

On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors passed

Resolution No. XX-2012-19634 granting respondents motion
for reconsideration. Consequently, it dismissed the
administrative case against the respondent, with a warning
that he be circumspect in his future dealings.
The Courts Ruling

After the family gave him his acceptance fee and provided
him with the necessary funds for the undertaking, respondent
became inaccessible and unheard of with respect to his task
(except when he was asking for funding), until the agreed
deadline for the filing of the extrajudicial settlement papers
expired. For some time, he could not even produce the title to
one of the lots (Lot E) handed to him by Lazareto, and when
pressed to produce it, he admitted he could not find it.42 The
TCT of Lot E was returned to Lazareto only on June 9, 2007,
after it was found among the files of the respondents former
law office, almost a year after the complaint was filed on July
7, 2006, and three years after it was entrusted to him by
Lazareto in January 2004.

After an objective examination of the facts and the

evidence, we find the dismissal of the case
unacceptable, notwithstanding Lazaretos affidavit of
desistance and his silence with respect to said
dismissal. The IBP Board of Governors misappreciated the
gravity and the scope of the respondents breach of his
contractual obligation with Lazareto and his family. He had
been negligent in carrying out the task entrusted to him by
Lazareto and his family as found by Comm. Inocencio, a clear
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 35 He had
been grossly dishonest with respect to certain actions he
claimed he had taken in relation to his task.
We refer particularly to Lazaretos discovery of a
misrepresentation committed by respondent in relation to the
amicable settlement proposed by respondents lawyer, Atty.
Policarpio, where Atty. Policarpio assured him that respondent
had already filed the extrajudicial settlement papers with the
Manila Register of Deeds. Atty. Mayla Domingo (Atty.
Domingo), another lawyer for the respondent, testified that
she talked with Atty. Acorda and he said that all proceedings
of the extrajudicial settlement have already been
completed.36 It would be recalled in this respect that, as
agreed upon, the respondent would furnish Lazareto with
papers pertaining to the extrajudicial settlement of the estate
of Lazaretos father,37 as the family decided to work on
respondents unfinished task themselves, to mitigate their
agony.38
To the Lazareto familys shock, they learned that only the
following were filed with the Manila Registry of Deeds: (1) a
copy of a Deed of Absolute Sale,39 which made it appear that
his father, who died on November 26, 2003,40 signed the
document on September 20, 2005, and that his mother signed
it also, without her and the family knowing about it; (2) a copy
of a detached page 6 of the tabloid Balitang Detalye, Vol.
VIII-No. 31, May 24-30, 2004, with notice of the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of one Damaso Lazareto (Lazareto
was given three copies of the same issue of the paper to
comply with the three-weekly publication requirement).
With the discovery, Lazareto moved for the admission of
newly discovered documents by Comm. Rico, for marking, but
she denied the motion on the grounds that [t]o admit these
pieces of evidence now would have the effect of introducing
new matters, which the Respondent is entitled to rebut in the
interest of complying with the requirements of due
process.41 Further, Comm. Rico declared that the pieces of
evidence alluded to did not relate to any allegations of the
complaint and were irrelevant to her investigation.
We disagree with and cannot accept Commissioner
Ricos conclusion and reason. The filing of the fake deed of
sale and the bogus publication of the extrajudicial settlement

While the respondent might have manifested, in good faith,

his intention to complete the task referred to him at the
earliest possible time, the results proved otherwise. He did not
complete the legal matter referred to him by Lazareto,
especially their agreement that titles to Lots B and E were to
be transferred to Lazaretos mother Clotilde. Only the TCT of
Lot B was delivered to the Lazareto family in late December
2005. The transfer of Lot E to Clotilde was put on hold
because of the respondents negligence in the custody of the
TCT of Lot E, compelling the family to work on the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Lazareto on
their own.
Moreover, we are bothered by Lazaretos submission that the
respondent resorted to dishonest means to make it appear
that he had finally taken action on the legal matter referred to
him thereby responding, although belatedly, to the charge of
negligence when one of his lawyers (Atty. Domingo) testified
at the hearing before Comm. Rico that she was told by
respondent that all proceedings of the Extrajudicial
Settlement have already been completed.43
Had Atty. Domingos testimony been based on fact, then the
dismissal of the complaint could have been well justified
inasmuch as Lazareto accepted the compromise agreement
offered by respondent after he was assured by Atty. Policarpio
that the papers for the extrajudicial settlement of his fathers
estate had already been filed with the Register of Deeds of
Manila.44 As it turned out, all that were on file were a fake
deed of sale for Lot B and a bogus publication of the
extrajudicial settlement. It is quite unfortunate that Comm.
Rico denied Lazaretos bid to have the newly discovered
documents admitted in evidence on the pretext that they
were irrelevant to the proceedings before her.
On the contrary, and as we had stressed earlier, the
respondents claim that all the proceedings for the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Lazaretos father had
been completed was necessarily relevant to Lazaretos
contention that the lawyer had been seriously remiss in the
fulfillment of his contractual obligation to his family. The filing
of the falsified documents by the respondent or by someone
acting upon his instructions was clearly a dishonest attempt
to mitigate the adverse effect of his inaction or negligence on
the legal matter entrusted to him.
Necessarily also, the respondent committed a violation of

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, cited in

Lazaretos complaint. Rule 1.01, in particular, requires that [a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. The IBP Board of Governors completely
disregarded this particular aspect of the complaint against the
respondent which, to our mind, should have been given
proper consideration, if only to remind the members of the
Bar to always keep faith with the tenets of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and as importantly, with their oath.
Further, the ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoins every
lawyer to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair
play, and nobility in the course of his practice of law. 45 Stated
differently, any member of the legal fraternity should do
nothing that would lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession.46
Considering the foregoing, we find the dismissal of the
administrative case improvident. What to us comes out in bold
relief in reading through the records of this case is a web of
deceit and negligence perpetrated by the respondent against
the complainant and his family, to their prejudice and to the
prejudice of the profession that now has been brought to
disrepute by the respondents sharp practices. How the
respondent was able to extricate himself for what he did is
reprehensible and casts doubt on the integrity of the IBP and
its Commissioners. Thus, the respondent should be made to
answer for his dishonest dealings with Lazareto and his family,
as well as for his negligence in the handling of the task
Lazareto had entrusted to him. We say this notwithstanding
the layman Lazaretos desistance, as the respondents action
was a transgression not only of what is due Lazareto as a
client but also of the profession and the nation that expect its
lawyers to live up to the highest standards of performance in
this noble profession.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2012196, dated June 9, 2012, of the IBP Board of Governors is SET
ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Dennis N. Acorda
is ORDERED suspended from the practice of law for three (3)
years from and after notice of this Decision. We
also WARN him that the commission of the same or similar
act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.

DECISION
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4,
2002 a Complaint for Disbarment[1] before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD)
against

Atty.

Jose

M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent)

Emmanuel

for

grossly

immoral

conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers oath.

In

his

complaint, Guevarra gave

the

following

account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his
(complainants) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne
(sometimes spelled Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom he had
three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000,

complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene
had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as
messages some of which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet
you at Megamall.

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went

home very late at night or early in the morning of the
following day, and sometimes did not go home from
work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that
she slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she
was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene

Atty. Dennis N. Acorda is DIRECTED to formally MANIFEST to
this Court, upon receipt of this Decision, the date of his receipt
which shall be the starting point of his suspension. He shall
furnish a copy of this Manifestation to all the courts and quasijudicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as
counsel; to his employer (if he is employed); and to his law
firm.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Acordas
records with the Office of the Bar Confidant and posted on the
Supreme Court website as a notice to the general public.

and respondent together on two occasions. On the second

occasion,

he

confronted

them

following

which

Irene

abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to

Irenes birthday celebration

at which

he saw her and

respondent celebrating with her family and friends.Out of

embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue

SO ORDERED.

immediately. Following

that

incident,

Irene

went

to

the

conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings,

EN BANC

pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.

[A.C. NO. 7136 : August 1, 2007]

Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE
EMMANUEL EALA, Respondent.

folded social card bearing the words I Love You on its face,

which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter

dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene,
reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, youll be moments away
from walking down the aisle. I will say a
prayer for you that you may find meaning in
what youre about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for
me to find fleeting happiness but experience
eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true
love but then lose it again? Or is it because
theres a bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness
with me. I have done everything humanly
possible to love you. And today, as you
make your vows . . . I make my own vow to
YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from
the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time
we spent together, up to the final moments
of your single life. But more importantly, I
will love you until the life in me is gone and
until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I
have enough memories of us to last me a
lifetime. Always remember though that in
my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU
WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL
ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR
ALWAYS. AS LONG AS IM LIVING MY TWEETIE
YOULL BE![2]
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of
Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila
where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene
was already residing. He also learned still later that when his
friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with
respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent

the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was
handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even
FLAUNTING
THEIR
ADULTEROUS
RELATIONSHIP as they attended social
functions together. For instance, in or about

the third week of September 2001, the

couple attended the launch of the Wine All
You Can promotion of French wines, held at
the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B
at MandaluyongCity. Their attendance was
reported in Section B of the Manila
Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on
page
21. Respondent
and
Irene were photographed together; their
picture
was
captioned: Irene
with
Sportscaster Noli Eala. A photocopy of
the report is attached as Annex C. [4] (Italics
and
emphasis
in
the
original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their
adulterous relationship supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4.
Respondent
specifically denies having
ever
flaunted an adulterous relationship with
Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the
Complaint, the truth of the matter being
that their relationship was low profile
and known only to the immediate
members
of
their
respective
families, and that Respondent, as far as
the general public was concerned, was
still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis
and
underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondents adulterous conduct with
the
complainants
wife and
his
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his
own family, demonstrate his gross moral
depravity, making him morally unfit to keep
his membership in the bar. He flaunted his
aversion to the institution of marriage,
calling it a piece of paper. Morally
reprehensible was his writing the love letter
to complainants bride on the very day of her
wedding, vowing to continue his love for her
until we are together again, as now they
are.[6] (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies
the allegations in paragraph 15 of the
Complaint
regarding
his adulterous relationship and that his acts
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby
making him unfit to keep his membership in
the bar, the reason being that Respondents
relationship with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstancesand that as far
as his relationship with his own family:
5.1
Respondent
has
maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful
relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne
as in fact they still occasionally meet in
public, even if Mary Anne is aware
of Respondents special friendship with
Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies
that he has flaunted his aversion to the

institution of marriage by calling the

institution of marriage a mere piece of
paper because his reference [in his
above-quoted handwritten letter to
Irene] to the marriage between
Complainant and Irene as a piece of
paper was merely with respect to the
formality of the marriage contract.
[7]
(Emphasis
and
underscoring
supplied)
Respondent

admitted[8] paragraph

18

Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH

MOTION

DISMISS[14] dated January

TO

10,

2003 from

respondent in which he denied having personal knowledge of

the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainants
Reply.[15] Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to
the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the
of

the

COMPLAINT reading:

annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint

for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending
before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.

18. The Rules of Court requires

lawyers to support the Constitution and
obey the laws. The Constitution regards
marriage as an inviolable social institution
and is the foundation of the family (Article
XV, Sec. 2).[9]

During

19. Respondents grossly

immoral
conduct runs
afoul of the Constitution and the laws
he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to
uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit
love for the complainants wife, he mocked
the institution of marriage, betrayed his
own family, broke up the complainants
marriage, commits adultery with his wife,
and degrades the legal profession.
[10]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

investigation

before

the

IBP-CBD,

complainants Complaint-Affidavit and REPLY to ANSWER were

adopted
[16]

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

the

as

his

testimony

on

direct

examination.

Respondents counsel did not cross-examine complainant.

[17]

After

investigation,

IBP-CBD

Investigating

Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION[18] dated October

26,

2004,

found

the

charge against respondent sufficiently proven.

The

Commissioner

thus

recommended[19] that

respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1

of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent
specifically
denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of
the Complaint, the reason being
that under the circumstances the acts of
Respondent with respect to his purely
personal
and
low
profile special
relationship with Irene is neither
under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral
conductas would be a ground for
disbarment pursuant
to
Rule
138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
[11]
(Emphasis
and
underscoring
supplied)

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not

engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and

To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,

[12]

alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named

respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girls

set

aside

the

Recommendation

of

the

Investigating

Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of

merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:

father. Complainant attached to the REPLY, as Annex A, a copy

of a Certificate of Live Birth[13] bearing Irenes signature and
naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha
Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St.
Lukes Hospital.

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02936
Joselano
C.
Guevarra vs.
Atty.
Jose
Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is
hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the

Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner,
and
to
APPROVE
theDISMISSAL of the above-entitled case
for lack of merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in
the original)
Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before
this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139 [22] of the
Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting

aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
and

dismissing

the

reason therefor as

its

case

for

lack

above-quoted

of

merit,

33-word

gave

no

Resolution

shows.

indeed an illicit relationship between

respondent and Irene which resulted in
the birth of the child Samantha. In the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha
it
should
be
noted
that
complainants wife Irene supplied
the information that respondent
was the father of the child. Given the
fact that the respondent admitted his
special relationship with Irene there is
no reason to believe that Irene
would
lie
or
make
any
misrepresentation regarding the
paternity of the child. It should be
underscored thatrespondent has not
categorically denied that he is the
father of Samantha Louise Irene
Moje.[25] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny
carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene, adultery
being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as

Respondent contends, in his Comment

[23]

on the

that committed by any married woman who shall have sexual

present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence

intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who

against

him.

[24]

The

contention

fails. As

the

Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the
love
letter
dated October
7,
2000 (Exh. C) and the news item
published in the Manila Standard (Exh.
D), even taken together do not
sufficiently prove that respondent is
carrying on an adulterous relationship
with complainants wife, there are other
pieces of evidence on record which
support the accusation of complainant
against respondent.
It should be noted that in his
Answer dated 17 October 2002,
respondent through counsel made
the following statements to wit:
Respondent specifically denies having
[ever]
flaunted
an
adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in
paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the
truth of the matter being [that] their
relationship was low profile and known
only to immediate members of their
respective families . . . , and Respondent
specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the complaint, the
reason
being
that
under
the
circumstances
the
acts
of
the
respondents with respect to his purely
personal and low profile relationship with
Irene
is neither
under
scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct . . .
These statements of
respondent in his Answer are an
admission that there is indeed a
special relationship between him
and
complainants
wife,
Irene,
[which] taken together with the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha
Louise
Irene
Moje (Annex
H-1)
sufficiently prove that there was

IBP-CBD

has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even

if the marriage be subsequently declared void.[26] (Italics
supplied) What

respondent

denies

is havingflaunted such

relationship, he maintaining that it was low profile and known

only to the immediate members of their respective families.

In other words, respondents denial is a negative

pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading responded
to which are not squarely denied. It was in
effect an admission of the averments it was
directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative
pregnant is a form of negative expression
which carries with it in affirmation or at least
an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in
the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the
words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been
held that the qualifying circumstances
alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.[27] (Citations
omitted; emphasis and
underscoring
supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of
having personal knowledge of Irenes daughter Samantha
Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate,
Irene named respondent a lawyer, 38 years old as the childs
father. And the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired
information on DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison
of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate [28] with

disbarment or suspension if the basis of

such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.

her signature on the Marriage Certificate [29]shows that they

were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is

The judgment, resolution or order of the

foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for
disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),

that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent

never denied being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St.

Lukes

Medical

Center,

in

his

January

29,

2003

under scandalous circumstances.[34]

Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand, declared

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the

that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth

that the childs father is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who
was 38 years old and a lawyer.[31]

grounds

for

disbarment

respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more

than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by
one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of
the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the
other[32] which is the quantum of evidence needed in an
administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative
cases
against
lawyers belong to a class of their own. They
are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of
cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or
suspension,clearly
preponderant
evidence is all that is required.
[33]
(Emphasis supplied)

suspension

uses

the

phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous

circumstances. Sexual

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between

or

intercourse

under

scandalous

circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal

Code reading:
ART.
334. Concubinage. - Any
husband who shall keep a mistress in the
conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual
intercourse,
under
scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his
wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other
place,
shall
be
punished
by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man
has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.

Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman

not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on the

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does

surrounding circumstances.[35] The case at bar involves a

not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under

relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman

Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit,
malpractice,
or
other
gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was

The disbarment or suspension of a member

of the Philippine Bar by a competent court
or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for his

carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement

of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]
On the charge of immorality,
respondent does not deny that he had
an extra-marital affair with complainant,
albeit brief and discreet, and which act is
not socorrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree in order
to
merit
disciplinary
sanction. We
disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in
disbarment cases that the mere fact of
sexual
relations
between
two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such
illicit behavior, it is not so with respect

to betrayals of the marital vow of

fidelity. Even if not all forms of extramarital relations are punishable under
penal law, sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate
disregard
of
the
sanctity
of
marriage
and
the
marital
vowsprotected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.[37] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209),

which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the
husband and the wife to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.[40]

Furthermore,

respondent

violated

Rule

1.01

of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which

proscribes
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:

lawyer

dishonest, immoral or

from

deceitful

engaging
conduct,

and

in unlawful,
Rule

7.03

[38]

of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from

The Court need not delve into
the question of whether or not the
respondent did contract a bigamous
marriage . . . It is enough that the
records of this administrative case
substantiate
the
findings
of
the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as
the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that
indeed respondent has been carrying on
an illicit affair with a married woman,
a
grossly
immoral
conduct
and indicative of an extremely low
regard for the fundamental ethics of
his
profession. This
detestable
behavior renders
him
regrettably
unfit
and
undeserving of
the
treasured honor and privileges
which his license confers upon him.
[39]
(Underscoring supplied)

engaging in any conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he

Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had

took before admission to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted
to continue in the practice of law in the
Philippines, do solemnly swear that I
recognize the supreme authority of the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; I
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same; I will
delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to
my clients;and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help
me God. (Underscoring supplied)

to practice law.

Clutching

at

straws,

respondent,

during

the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP

Commissioner, filed a Manifestation[41] on March 22, 2005
informing the IBP-CBD that complainants petition for nullity of
his (complainants) marriage to Irene had been granted by
Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that
the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against
respondent and Irene based on the same set of facts alleged
in the instant case, which was pending review before the

been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16,

2004 granting complainants Motion to Withdraw Petition for
Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion
was filed before the final resolution of the
petition for review, we are inclined to grant
the same pursuant to Section 10 of
Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3,
2000, which provides that notwithstanding
the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner
may withdraw the same at any time before
it is finally resolved, in which case the
appealed resolution shall stand as
though no appeal has been taken.
[42]
(Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The

Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.

was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The

acts complained of took place before the marriage was
declared null and void.[43] As a lawyer, respondent should be
aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [44] In carrying

on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial

declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and
void, and despite respondent himself being married, he
showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law.
And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for

review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state
that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion

Center. What finally militates against the

respondents is the indubitable fact that in
the
certificate
of
birth
of
the
girl, Moje furnished
the
information
that Eala was the father. This speaks all
too eloquently of the unlawful and
damning nature of the adulterous acts
of
the
respondents. Complainants
supposed illegal procurement of the birth
certificate is most certainly beside the point
for
both respondents Eala and Moje have
not denied, in any categorical manner,
that Eala is the father of the child
Samantha
Irene
Louise Moje.
[45]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already

promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense

of

which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ

complainants complaint for adultery. In reversing the City

no choice but to grant complainants motion to withdraw his

Prosecutors

petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be

the

dismissal by

theQuezon City

Resolution,

Prosecutors

DOJ

Office

Secretary

Simeon Datumanong held:

acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery

were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the

Parenthetically
the totality
of
evidence adduced by complainant would, in
the fair estimation of the Department,
sufficiently establish all the elements of the
offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed,
early
on,
respondent Moje conceded to complainant
that she was going out on dates with
respondent Eala, and this she did when
complainant
confronted
her
about Ealas frequent phone calls and text
messages
to
her. Complainant
also
personally witnessed Moje and Eala having
a
rendezvous
on
two
occasions. Respondent Eala never
denied
the fact that he knew Moje to be married
to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself
was
married
to
another
woman.Moreover, Mojes eventual
abandonment of their conjugal home, after
complainant had once more confronted her
about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit
relationship
involving
both
respondents. This becomes all the more
apparent by Mojes subsequent relocation in
No.
71-B,
11th Street,
New
Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks
away from the church where she had
exchange marital vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two
lovers
apparently
cohabited. Especially
since Ealas vehicle and that of Mojes were
always seen there. Moje herself admits that
she came to live in the said address
whereas Eala asserts that that was where he
held office. The happenstance that it was in
that
said
address
that Eala and Moje had decided
to
hold
office for the firm that both had formed
smacks too much of a coincidence. For one,
the said address appears to be a residential
house, for that was where Moje stayed all
throughout after her separation from
complainant. It was both respondents love
nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was
carried out there bore fruit a few months
later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the
nearby hospital of St. Lukes Medical

present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent
Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar
to these [administrative] proceedings. The
standards of legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct which merely enables
one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal
law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment
proceedings is acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts assume in
trying criminal case[47] (Italics in the
original),
this Court

in Gatchalian Promotions
[48]

Atty. Naldoza,

Talents

Pools,

Inc.

v.

held:

Administrative
cases
against
lawyers belong to a class of their own. They
are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution
No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of
Governors

of

the

Integrated

Bar

of

M.

Eala,

the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent,

Atty.

Jose

Emmanuel

is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his

oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let

copy

immediately executory, be

of

this

made

Decision,

part

of

the

which

is

records

of

respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court

of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all
courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 5914, March 11, 2015
SPOUSES ROGELIO AMATORIO AND AIDA
AMATORIO, Complainants, v. ATTY. FRANCISCO DY YAP
AND ATTY. WHELMA F. SITON-YAP, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
This pertains to the complaint for disbarment filed by Spouses
Rogelio Amatorio and Aida Amatorio (Aida) (complainants)
against Attys. Francisco Dy Yap (Francisco) and Whelma SitonYap (respondents) for violating Rules 1.01, 7.03, 10.01, 10.02
and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In their complaint, the complainants alleged that the
respondents employed deceit to obtain favorable judgments,
specifically by failing to inform the trial court that there was
already an out-of-court settlement between them and
maliciously manifesting that their counsel, Atty. Justo Paras
(Atty. Paras) was suspended from the practice of law. 1
The complainants asseverated that they are clients of Atty.
Paras in two collection cases, particularly, Civil Case No. 2000319 and Civil Case No. 2000-321, which were filed against
them by the respondents. In Civil Case No. 2000-319,
respondents sued the complainants to compel them to pay
their indebtedness of P18,000.00, which was evidenced by a
promissory note. After they filed their answer to the
complaint, however, the respondents filed a motion to strike
out the same and to declare them in default on the ground
that the said pleading was prepared by a lawyer suspended
from the practice of law and lacked proper verification. The
motion was however denied.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 2000-321, the
respondents sued the complainants to collect the amount of
P94,173.44. The answer filed by Atty. Paras was however
stricken off the record for the reason that he was suspended
from the practice of law at the time of its filing.3
Unable to find a lawyer to replace Atty. Paras, the
complainants decided to seek an out-of-court settlement. On
May 23, 2001, Aida went to the respondents law office. She
appealed for the respondents consideration and asked that
they be allowed to pay their obligations by way of installment.
The parties agreed on the terms of payment and, on that
same day, Aida tendered her first payment of P20,000.00,
which was received and duly acknowledged by Francisco in a
written document with the letterhead of Yap Law Office. When
Aida asked the respondents if they should still attend the pre-

trial conference scheduled on May 28, 2001 and June 18, 2001
in the civil cases filed against them, the latter told them they
need not attend anymore as they will be moving for the
dismissal of the cases. Relying on the respondents assurance,
the complainants did not attend the scheduled hearings.
Subsequently, they were surprised to receive copies of the
decisions of the trial court in the two civil cases filed by the
respondents, declaring them in default for non-appearance in
the pre-trial conference and ordering them to pay the amount
of their indebtedness and damages. The decision however did
not mention the out-of-court settlement between the parties.
Nonetheless, the complainants continued tendering
installment payments to the respondents upon the latters
assurance that they will disregard the decision of the trial
court since they already had an out-of-court settlement before
the rendition of said judgment. They were surprised to learn,
however, that the respondents filed a motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 2000-319 and were in
fact issued said writ.4 This prompted them to seek legal advice
to address their predicament. They went to Atty. Jose V.
Carriaga who, after learning of the factual milieu of their case,
told them that they have a good ground to file a disbarment
case against the respondents. He, however, declined to
handle the case himself as he disclosed that his wife is a
relative of the respondents. Instead, he referred the
complainants to Atty. Paras, who had just resumed his practice
of law after his suspension.5
As advised, the complainants went to Atty. Paras to engage
his services as their counsel. Initially, Atty. Paras refused to
handle their case as he revealed that the personal animosity
between him and the respondents may invite unwelcome
repercussions. Even then, the complainants insisted to retain
his services as their counsel. Thus, Atty. Paras proceeded to
file a disbarment case against the respondents with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).6
As foretold by Atty. Paras, the complainants experienced
unpleasant backlash which were allegedly instigated by the
respondents who come from a very powerful and affluent
clan. They received threats of physical harm and Aidas
continued employment as a public school teacher was put in
jeopardy. Also, suspicious-looking individuals were seen
loitering around their house. When they refused to yield to the
respondents intimidation, the latter resorted to the filing of
charges against them, to wit: (1) an administrative case
against Aida for failure to pay the same debts subject of this
case; and (2) a criminal case for perjury against the
complainants. To alleviate their situation, they filed a JointAffidavit,7 seeking the assistance of this Court to warn the
respondents and to stop them from employing deplorable acts
upon them.
In their Comment on the Complaint and Counter-Petition for
Disbarment dated March 14, 2003, the respondents denied
having resorted to deceitful means to obtain favorable
judgments in Civil Case Nos. 2000-319 and 2000-321. They
admitted that they agreed to an out-of-court settlement,
through the intercession of Rosa Yap Paras, estranged wife of
Atty. Paras, but denied that the complainants ever tendered
any installment payment. They claimed that Atty. Paras
merely employed cajolery in order to entice the complainants
to file the instant case to retaliate against them. They
asseverated that Atty. Paras resented the fact that the
respondents served as counsel for his former wife, who
previously filed the administrative case for immorality,
abandonment of family, and falsification and use of falsified

documents which resulted to his suspension.8

On their counter-petition for disbarment, the respondents
asserted that Atty. Paras clearly defied the authority of this
Court when he represented the complainants and filed an
answer on their behalf during the period of his suspension
from the practice of law. They alleged that he appeared in
several cases and filed numerous pleadings despite his
suspension.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After the parties submitted their respective position papers,
the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline issued a Report and Recommendation10 dated June
23, 2005, which pertinently states as follows:
There is substantial evidence that Respondent Francisco Yap
ha[s] deliberately neglected, at the very least, offered and/or
pleaded inaccurate allegations/testimonies to purposely
mislead or confuse the civil courts in Dumaguete City.
Francisco Yap failed to controvert the existence and the
authenticity of the Acknowledgment Receipt dated May 21,
2001 which bore his signature and written in a Yap Law
Office letterhead. Such documentary evidence supports the
theory of the Complainants that there was indeed an out-ofcourt settlement prior to the pre-trial hearings and that they
were most likely assured that these cases would be dismissed.
Their absence during the pre-trial hearings evidently resulted
to decisions adverse to them. Moreover, the Motions for the
Writ of Execution did not fail to mention the existence of
partial payments and the prior agreement which, if disclosed,
would have led the court not to issue such writs. Since
Respondent Francisco Yaps signature appear in all the
Acknowledgement Receipts and in all Motions filed in the civil
courts, he alone should be penalized. On the other hand,
Respondent Whelma Siton Yap should not be penalized in the
absence of any evidence of her participation in such conduct.
x x x.
All told, this Commissioner recommends that only Respondent
Francisco Yap should be suspended from the practice of law
for six (6) months. At the same time, the Counter Petition for
Disbarment filed by herein Respondents against Atty. Justo
Paras, which appears to be VERY meritorious, be given due
course in another proceeding with utmost dispatch. 11
Upon review of the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, the IBP Board of Governors
issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-15912 dated December 17,
2005, disposing thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex A, and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and for deliberately neglecting, offering inaccurate allegations
to purposely mislead or confuse the courts, Atty. Francisco D.
Yap is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) months. Atty. Whelma F. Siton-Yap is exonerated in the
absence of any evidence of her participation in such conduct;
however Respondents are Warned for indirectly misleading
the Commission.13
On March 27, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration/Petition for
Review.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On August 9, 2007, the complainants filed a

Manifestation,15 terminating the services of Atty. Paras and/or
Paras-Enojo and Associates as their counsel for the reason
that they can no longer afford the services of a private
counsel.
Surprisingly, on the same day, the complainants executed a
Judicial Affidavit,16 disclaiming knowledge and participation in
the preparation of the complaint and the pleadings filed on
their behalf by Atty. Paras in connection with the disbarment
case against the respondents. They claimed that they merely
signed the pleadings but the contents thereof were not
explained to them in a dialect which they understood. They
likewise expressed lack of intention to file a disbarment case
against the respondents and that, on the contrary, they were
very much willing to settle and pay their indebtedness to
them. Further, they asserted that it was not the respondents,
but Atty. Paras who instructed them not to attend the pre-trial
conference of the cases which eventually resulted to a
judgment by default against them. They claimed that Atty.
Paras told them that he will be the one to attend the pre-trial
conference to settle matters with the respondents and the
court but he did not show up on the scheduled date. They also
asseverated that most of the statements contained in the
complaint for disbarment were false and that they wished to
withdraw the said complaint.
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XIX-2011-172,17 which reads:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondents Motion for Reconsideration
there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters
which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XVII-2005-159 dated 17
December 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.18
On August 18, 2011, the respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration, claiming that the admission of the
complainants in the Judicial Affidavit dated August 9, 2007
proved that the disbarment case filed against them was just
fabricated by Atty. Paras. They pointed out the complainants
statement that they were just made to sign the complaint for
disbarment by Atty. Paras to retaliate against them for having
filed a case against him for falsification of documents which
sent him to prison for some time.
On August 18, 2011, the complainants sent a letter19 to the
IBP, expressing disappointment over the fact that the IBP
Board of Governors did not dismiss the disbarment case
against Francisco. The letter pertinently stated:
We are very concerned and saddened by the fact that the
disbarment case against ATTY. FRANCISCO DY YAP was NOT
DISMISSED. The reason is that we have submitted our
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT relating the facts and
circumstances wherein the said disbarment complaint
was prepared by our former legal counsel, ATTY. JUSTO
J. PARAS consisting of fabrications and not on facts. It
was upon the machination and instigation of ATTY.
JUSTO PARAS, that the simple collection case of
P94,000.00 more or less, became a multifaceted case
in several forums.20(Emphasis in the original)
The instant case is now referred to this Court for final action.
The Court notes that on September 16, 2011, the
complainants filed a Motion to Admit Judicial Affidavit with

Motion to Dismiss and/or Withdraw Complaint, 21 reiterating

their claim that the filing of the disbarment was a product of
Atty. Paras maneuverings and that the allegations against the
respondents stated therein were false.
After a careful examination of the facts of this case, the Court
finds no compelling reason to deviate from the resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors.
Notably, the respondents seek a reconsideration of the
resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors primarily on the
basis of the Judicial Affidavit dated August 9, 2007, wherein
the complainants cleared them of the charges of misconduct
and turned the blame on their own counsel, Atty. Paras, for
allegedly having made up the allegations in the disbarment
complaint. When the IBP Board of Governors sustained the
imposition of suspension to Francisco, the complainants
themselves submitted a motion to admit the said judicial
affidavit to this Court, together with a motion to dismiss and
withdraw complaint.
The question now is whether the statements of the
complainants, specifically contesting the truthfulness of the
allegations hurled against the respondents in their own
complaint for disbarment necessarily results to Franciscos
absolution. The answer is in the negative.
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who
are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good
moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves
with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in
order to promote the publics faith in the legal
profession.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated to
guide the members of the bar by informing them of the
deportment expected of them in leading both their
professional and private lives. Primarily, it aims to protect the
integrity and nobility of the legal profession, to breed honest
and principled lawyers and prune the association of the
unworthy.
It is for the foregoing reason that the Court cannot simply
yield to complainants change of heart by refuting their own
statements against the respondents and praying that the
complaint for disbarment they filed be dismissed. It bears
emphasizing that any misconduct on the part of the lawyer
not only hurts the clients cause but is even more disparaging
on the integrity of the legal profession itself. Thus, for
tarnishing the reputation of the profession, a lawyer may still
be disciplined notwithstanding the complainants pardon or
withdrawal from the case for as long as there is evidence to
support any finding of culpability. A case for suspension or
disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so
warrant.23 It follows that the withdrawal of the complainant
from the case, or even the filing of an affidavit of desistance,
does not conclude the administrative case against an erring
lawyer.
This is so because the misconduct of a lawyer is deemed a
violation of his oath to keep sacred the integrity of the
profession for which he must be disciplined. The power to
discipline lawyers who are officers of the court may not be cut
short by compromise and withdrawal of the charges. This is as
it should be, especially when we consider that the law

profession and its exercise is one impressed with public

interest. Proceedings to discipline erring members of the bar
are not instituted to protect and promote the public good only
but also to maintain the dignity of the profession by the
weeding out of those who have proven themselves unworthy
thereof.24
Therefore, in the instant case, the Court cannot just set aside
the finding of culpability against the respondents merely
because the complainants have decided to forgive them or
settle matters amicably after the case was completely
evaluated and reviewed by the IBP. The complainants
forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case does not ipso
facto obliterate the misconduct committed by Francisco. To
begin with, it is already too late in the day for the
complainants to withdraw the disbarment case considering
that they had already presented and supported their claims
with convincing and credible evidence, and the IBP has
promulgated a resolution on the basis thereof.
To be clear, [i]n administrative cases for disbarment or
suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is
clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant.25 In the present case, it was clearly
established that Francisco received P20,000.00 as initial
payment from the complainants in compliance with the terms
of their out-of-court settlement for the payment of the latters
outstanding obligations. The amount was duly received and
acknowledged by Francisco, who drafted the same in a paper
with the letterhead of his own law office, a fact he did not
deny. While the respondents deny that they told the
complainants not to attend the pre-trial of the case anymore
and that they will be the one to inform the trial court of the
settlement, they did not bring the said agreement to the
attention of the court. Thus, the trial court, oblivious of the
settlement of the parties, rendered a judgment by default
against the complainants. The respondents even filed a
motion for execution of the decision but still did not inform the
trial court of the out-of-court settlement between them and
the complainants. They deliberately failed to mention this
supervening event to the trial court, hence, violating the
standards of honesty provided for in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which states:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice.
The complainants belated claim that the respondents were
faultless and that the allegations stated in the disbarment
complaint were just fabricated by their former counsel cannot
stand against the clear and preponderant evidence they
earlier presented. It is inexplicable how the complainants
could now claim that the respondents were blameless when
the records tell otherwise. That they were simply duped by

Atty. Paras into signing the numerous pleadings he filed on

their behalf is hardly believable considering that Aida is welllettered, being a public school teacher. They also do not claim
that they were prevented from reading the contents of the
pleadings or that their signatures were simply forged. At any
rate, while it may be true that Atty. Paras fabricated some of
the facts stated in the disbarment complaint, these matters
are trivial and do not relate to the facts material to the charge
of misconduct against Francisco. What clearly appears is that
the facts material to the violation committed by Francisco are
well-established notwithstanding Atty. Paras supposed
fabrication of some insignificant particulars.
WHEREFORE, for deliberately misleading the Court, Atty.
Francisco Dy Yap is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of

law for a period of three (3) months effective upon receipt of

this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with
severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator
which shall circulate the same in all courts in the country, and
spread upon the personal records of the respondent lawyer in
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.