Civpro Digests Block2b2016 Master

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
BLOCK B
2016
BLOCK B 2016
Rule 3 ........................................................................................22
Contents
Korea Exchange Bank v. filkor ..................................................22
Filing Fees ....................................................................................2
Relucio v. Lopez ......................................................................23
SUSON VS CA AND ODILAO........................................................2
Uy v. CA..................................................................................24
Manchester Development Corp. v. CA........................................3
Borlongan v. Madrideo............................................................25
Mijares v Ranada ......................................................................5
International Express v. CA ......................................................26
DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES vs. SECURITY BANK ........................6
Rule 4 ........................................................................................26
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals ...............7
Auction in Malinta v Warren Embes Layuben............................26
Jurisdiction...................................................................................9
Gumabon vs. Larin ..................................................................27
CSC v. CA..................................................................................9
Paglaum v. Unionbank.............................................................28
Melana v. Tappa .......................................................................9
Rule 5 ........................................................................................30
Herald Black Dacasin v. Sharon del Mundo Dacasin.....................9
Republic v. Sunvar...................................................................30
Far East Bank v. Shemberg.......................................................10
Uy v. Javellana ........................................................................32
Rule 1 ........................................................................................11
Rule 6 ........................................................................................35
San Miguel v. Sandiganbayan...................................................11
FINANCIAL SERVICES vs. FORBES..............................................35
Gochan v. Gochan...................................................................11
Arenas v. CA ...........................................................................37
De Leon v. CA. ........................................................................11
Rule 7 ........................................................................................39
Rule 2 ........................................................................................12
General Milling v. NLRC ...........................................................39
Sta. Clara Homeowners Association v. Spouses Gaston ............12
Spouses Hontiveros v. RTC of Iloilo...........................................40
Centeno v. Centeno ................................................................15
Five Star Bus v. CA...................................................................42
Citytrust Banking Corporation v Isagani Villanueva....................18
Digital Microwave v. CA...........................................................42
Macaslang v. Zamora ..............................................................19
Iglesia ni Kristo v. CA ...............................................................42
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Vallacar Transit v. Catubig .......................................................44
Rule 8 ........................................................................................46
KALILID WOODS INDUSTRY CORP. v. IAC...................................46
Rule 9 ........................................................................................47
Sps. Diaz v. CA ........................................................................47
Vlason Enterprises Corporation vs. CA and Duraproof Services 47
Mediserv Inc. et al. v. Chinabank..............................................48
Republic v. Hidalgo .................................................................53
Rule 10 ......................................................................................55
Siasoco v. CA ..........................................................................55
Versoza v. CA..........................................................................57
Chua v. CA..............................................................................58
Asean Pacific v. Urdaneta ........................................................58
Tiu v. PBCOM..........................................................................58
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TANTUICO v REPUBLIC ............................................................59
Filing Fees
SUSON VS CA AND ODILAO
GR 126749 AUGUST 21, 1997
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Facts:
1. Odilao filed a P5.15 million civil suit for damages against
Suson before the RTC of San Juan, Southern Leyte. Odilao
claimed that petitioner made false and groundless
accusations of graft and corruption against him before the
Office of the Ombudsman, and thereafter caused their
publication in a Cebu-based local daily under the headline
ODILAO SUED FOR GRAFT. He paid the sum of P25,600.00
in docket fees to the RTC of Southern Leyte.
2. Suson filed a motion to dismiss the complaint of private
respondent Odilao on the ground of improper venue,
alleging therein that Odilao resides in Talisay, Cebu and not
in Himonganan, Southern Leyte. RTC of Southern Leyte
dismissed the case then.
3. Thereafter, Odilao went to the RTC of Cebu to re-file the
same complaint. There the Clerk of Court advised his
counsel to file a formal request with this court thru the
Court Administator for an authority to apply the payment
for docket fees previously made to the RTC - Southern Leyte
to the docket fees to be paid to the RTC Cebu City, which
he did.
4. The Supreme Court Deputy Court Administrator Abesamis
sent a reply-letter to Odilao informing him that he should
present the OR of the fees he paid in Leyte to the RTC of
Cebu. On the basis of the letter, the clerk of court docketed
the complaint without requiring private respondent to pay
anew the prescribed docket fees.

5. Suson then filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of
jurisdiction for non-payment of filing fees.
Issue: Whether or not the filing fees paid in RTC Leyte could be
applied to the filing fees for RTC Cebu?
provided, of course, that the applicable prescriptive or

reglementary period has not yet set in.
Doctrines:
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate

initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, which vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject-matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not

accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fees within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
Held:
The non-payment, however, does not automatically cause the
dismissal of the case if the non-payment is not beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
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Strictly, the complaint cant be deemed to have been refilled as i t

was not originally filed in the same court. Thus when Odilao filed
the complaint in RTC Cebu, it became an entirely separate case.
Further, when the respondent did not appeal from the dismissal of
the case in Leyte, the order became final and executory. Plus, the
dismissal of the complaint did not stop the running of the
prescriptive period within which to file his complaint in the court of
proper venue.
Consequently, the Deputy Court Administrator committed an error
when he stated i n his letter reply to private respondents counsel
that he can re-file the complaint in the RTC Cebu City and present
the official receipt corresponding to the filing fees paid in the RTC
Branch 26, San Jose, Southern Leyte. The OCA has neither the
power nor the authority to exempt any party not otherwise exempt
under the law or under the Rules of Court in the payment of the
prescribed docket fees. Since his case has already been docketed as
Civil Case No. 16336 in the RTC Branch 6 Cebu City, the procedural
remedy of paying the prescribed docket fees is still available to him
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Manchester Development Corp. v. CA
Doctrine: The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading.
Facts:
-
The petitioner filed: a case of an action for torts and

damages and specific performance with a prayer for
temporary restraining order.

-
The amount of damages sought by petitioner was not

specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint
alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as damages
suffered by plaintiff.
The amount of docket fees paid by petitioner was only
P410.00.
The petitioner then amended the complaint and reduced

the damages to P10M only.
The petitioner asserts that the filling fees to be paid should

be based on the amended complaint (which states that the
damages = P10M) instead of the original complaint (which
stated that the damages = P78M).
The CA ruled that the filing fees to be paid must be based

on the original complaint. And since this was not followed
by the petitioner, the lower court failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the case.
* NOTE: The petitioner relies on Magaspi v. Ramolete. Refer to

original case for SCs explanation why reliance on this case is i nvalid.
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Issues:
1. Whether the court acquired jurisdiction in this case?
2. Did the amended complaint vest jurisdiction in the court?
Held:
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1. The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee.
o As reiterated in the Magaspi case: "that a case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court.
o In the present case, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only
P410.00 as docket fee, despite the amount of
damages stated in the body of the petition
amounting to roughly P78 Million.
2. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest
jurisdiction upon the Court. In the first place, there is no
such original complaint that was duly filed which could be
amended because the court failed to acquire jurisdiction to
begin with. Consequently, the order admitting the amended
complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions
taken by the trial court are null and void.
3. The Court frowned at the practice of counsel of petitioners
who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any
specification of the amount of damages in the prayer
although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the
body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other
purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees
if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the
filing fee. It was only when the trial court directed that the
amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint,
that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the

much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the
complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid
payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
THE SC ORDERED: all complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the
prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of
the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with
this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record.
Mijares v Ranada
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Facts:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of
whom suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era,
obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the
late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory
and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law
in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed
by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the
RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410
as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, 7(b) where the value
of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of
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the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating
that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it
involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the
payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy
determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the
proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.
Issue:
Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper
filing fee.
Held:
Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds
to the same amount required for other actions not i nvolving
property. RTC Makati e rred in concluding that the filing fee should
be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated
value of the property i n l itigation. The Petitioners Complaint was
lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a
judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the
Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of
pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point,
Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first
level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a
foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested
with such jurisdiction. 33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein
the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of
rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject
matter is the foreign judgment itself. 16 of B.P.129 reveals that the

complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of
pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is
one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also
an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it
beyond the ambit of 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper
computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement
of foreign judgments i s 7(b)(3), i nvolving other actions not
involving property.
DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES vs. SECURITY BANK

G.R. No. 176339
January 10, 2011
PONENTE: Abad
PETITIONERS: Do-All Metals Industries Inc., Sps. Domingo Lim and
Lely Kung Lim
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RESPONDENTS: Security Bank Corp., Titolaido E. Payongayong,

Evylene C. Sison, Phil. Industrial Security
Agency Corp., and Gil Silos
DOCTRINE:
A supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that
the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing
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FACTS:
This case is about the propriety of awarding damages based on
claims e mbodied i n the plaintiffs supplemental complaint filed
without prior payment of the corresponding filing fees.
From 1996 to 1997, Dragon Lady Industries, Inc., owned by
petitioner spouses Lim took out loans from respondent Security
Bank Corporation totaling P92.4 million. Unable to pay the loans on
time, the Lims assigned some of their real properties to the Bank to
secure the same, including a building and the lot on which it stands,
located at M. de Leon St., Santolan, Pasig City. In 1998, the Bank
offered to lease the property to the Lims through petitioner Do-All
Metals Industries, Inc. (DMI) primarily for business although the
Lims were to use part of the property as their residence. DMI and
the Bank executed a two-year lease contract from October 1, 1998
to September 30, 2000 but the Bank retained the right to preterminate the lease. The contract also provided that, should the
Bank decide to sell the property, DMI shall have the right of first
refusal.
In 1999, before the lease was up, the Bank gave notice to
DMI that it was pre-terminating the lease on December 31, 1999.
Wanting to exercise its right of first refusal, DMI tried to negotiate
with the Bank the terms of its purchase but the Bank, wanting a
higher amount, declined its offers. While the negotiations were on
going, the Lims claimed that they continued to use the property in
their business. But the Bank posted at the place private security
guards from Philippine Industrial Security Agency (PISA). The Lims

also claimed that on several occasions they were harassed by the
guards and that they were unable to enter the premises as the bank
representatives had the property padlocked. The Lims also alleged
that they were unable to retrieve assorted furniture, equipment,
and personal items left at the property.
The Lims eventually filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City for damages with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction
against the Bank and officers. They won in the RTC and the Bank
moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among other
things the RTCs authority to grant damages considering plaintiffs
failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint. The
RTC denied the motion, but on appeal to the CA, the decision was
reversed, and the complaint as well as the counterclaims were
dismissed. DMI and the Lims filed a motion for reconsideration but
the CA denied the same, hence this petition.
ISSUE & HELD:
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1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and

adjudicate plaintiffs supplemental complaint against the Bank
considering their failure to pay the filing fees on the amounts of
damages they claim in it
YES. What the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for
their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over
plaintiffs action from the moment they filed their original
complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the
same. The plaintiffs non-payment of the additional filing fees due
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on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it
already had over the case.
2. Whether or not the Bank is liable to DMI and the Lims for the
machineries, equipment, and other properties they allegedly
lost after they were barred from the property in their
supplemental complaint.
NO the bank is not liable. The supplemental complaint specified
from the beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought
against the Bank but the plaintiff paid no filing fees on the same.
And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to pay the
additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered
to pay the same. They merely said that they did not yet pay the
fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it. But a
supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that
the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing.
The rules do not require the court to make special assessments in
cases of supplemental complaints.
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127326, December 23, 1999, 321 SCRA 524
BELLOSILLO, J.
Facts:
For 5 years up to the time of his death, Jose Bernardo managed a
stall at the Baguio City meat market. On 14 January 1985, Jose
together with other meat vendors went out of their stalls to meet a

jeepney loaded with pigs in order to select the meat they would sell
for the day. Jose was the very first to reach the parked jeepney.
Grasping the handlebars at the back of the vehicle, Jose suddenly
stiffened and trembled as though suffering from an epileptic
seizure. The other vendors rushed to Jose and found that the
antenna of the jeepney had gotten entangled with an open electric
wire at the top of the roof of a meat stall. Jose released his hold on
the handlebars of the jeep only to slump to the ground. He died
shortly in the hospital of electrocution.
Joses widow, Caridad, along with their three minor children, filed a
complaint against Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO)
before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City for a sum of money
and damages arising from the electrocution of Jose Bernardo. In the
same civil action, BENECO filed a third party complaint against
Guillermo Canave, Jr., the jeepney owner.
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In its decision dated 15 August 1994, the trial court ruled in favor of
the Bernardos and ordered BENECO to pay them damages. CA
affirmed, hence this appeal, BENECO contending that the appellate
court gravely erred in ordering them to pay damages in light of the
clear evidence that it was third party defendant Canaves fault or
negligence which was the proximate and sole cause, or at least the
principal cause, of the electrocution and death of Jose Bernardo.
Issues:
a. Is BENECO correct in asserting that the jeepney driver
Canave should be held liable for Bernardos death?
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b. (relevant to CivPro) BENECO contends that exemplary

damages should not be awarded as the amount claimed
was not specified in the body nor in the prayer of the
complaint, in contravention of the mandate in Rule 11 of
the Interim Rules and Guidelines implementing BP 129
which requires the amount of damages to be specifically
alleged apparently for the purpose of computing the docket
fees.
Held:
a. NO. BENECO was grossly negligent in leaving the splicing
point between the service drop line and the service
entrance conductor unprotected and uninsulated, which
connection was only 8 feet from the ground level, in
violation of the Philippine Electrical Code. BENECO
demonstrated its utter disregard for the safety of the public.
Indeed, Jose Bernardo's death was an accident that was
bound to happen in view of the gross negligence of
BENECO. On the other hand, Canave is not liable since he
was well within his right to park the vehicle in the said
area, and there was no showing that any municipal law or
ordinance was violated nor that there was any foreseeable
danger posed by his act. The proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of BENECO, and it should be
solely liable for damages to the heirs of Bernardo.
b. BENECOs contention deserves no merit. The amount of
exemplary damages need not be pleaded in the complaint
because the same cannot be predetermined. One can
merely ask that it be fixed by the court as the evidence may

warrant and be awarded at its own discretion. In fact, the
amount of exemplary damages need not be proven
because its determination is contingent upon or incidental
to the amount of compensatory damages that may be
awarded to the claimant. Moreover, this Court in a number
of occasions ruled that the amount of docket fees to be paid
should be computed on the basis of the amount of the
damages stated in the complaint. Where subsequently
however the judgment awarded a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified, the same was left for the
determination of the court, an additional filing fee therefor
may be assessed and considered to constitute a lien on the
judgment.
Jurisdiction
CSC v. CA
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Melana v. Tappa
Herald Black Dacasin v. Sharon del Mundo Dacasin
G.R. no. 168785 February 05, 2010
J. Carpio
FACTS:
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On April 1994, petitioner Herald, an American and

respondent, Sharon, a Filipino, got married here in the Philippines.
The following year, Sharon got pregnant and gave birth to a baby
girl they named Stephanie. In June of 1999 Sharon sought and
obtained from the Illinois Court a divorce decree against petitioner.
In its ruling, apart from dissolving the marriage of petitioner and
respondent, the Illinois court also awarded to respondent sole
custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for
enforcement purposes.
On 28th of January 2002, petitioner and respondent
executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of
Stephanie. Two years after, Herald sued Sharon in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City for exercising sole custody over Stephanie
contrary to their Agreement. Respondent sought the dismissal of
the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction, since Illinois Court hold the
jurisdiction in enforcing the divorce decree.
The trial court held that (1) it is precluded from taking
cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois courts retention of
jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order
awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce
decree is binding on petitioner following the nationality rule
prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for
contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting
compromise agreements on jurisdiction.
ISSUE:

Whether the Trial Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
petitioners suit and e nforce the agreement on the joint custody of
the parties child.
HELD/RATIO:
The trial court has jurisdiction but it cannot enforce a void
agreement
The RTC is vested with jurisdiction to enforce contracts.
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. When petitioner
filed suit, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific
performance, such as petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on
joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions. Thus
jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
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Also, petitioners suit seeks the e nforcement not of the

various provisions of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce
Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the
zone of the Illinois courts so-called retained jurisdiction and
making the case within the jurisdiction of RTC.
Note: Even as the court cannot enforce a void agreement, it still
ruled that factual and equity considerations militate against the
dismissal of petitioners suit and called for the case to be remanded
to settle the question of Stephanies custody.
Far East Bank v. Shemberg

FACTS:
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Shemberg and Co. are owners of parcels of land in Mandue

City. Shemberg obtained loans from Far East Bank. In order to
secure the loans, Shemberg mortgaged these lands to Far East Bank.
Unfortunately, Shemberg failed to pay the loan, thus forcing Far
East Bank to foreclose the mortgage. However, Shemberg filed a
Civil Case in the RTC, alleging that the employees of Far East Bank
required them to sign "standard pre-printed forms in fine print"
such as Promissory Notes, Mortgage Forms, Trust Receipts, etc. It
turned out that the Bank's employees filled the blanks with "false
and inaccurate entries." Far East Bank then filed a Motion to Dismiss
alleging that the docket fee that Shemberg paid was deficient.
According to the Bank, In real actions, the assessed value of the
property or if there is none, the estimated value thereof, must be
alleged in the complaint and shall serve as the basis for computing
the fees. Shemberg's defense is that the action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation because the suit primarily involves
cancellation of mortgages. Therefore, there is no deficiency in the
payment of docket fees.
ISSUE:
W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction.
HELD:
YES. UNDER SCTION 19 (1) OF BP 180 AS AMENDED BY RA
7691
try and decide all civil actions in which the subject of litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.

In Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill, this Court laid the test for
determining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation:
1. Ascertain the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought.
2. If the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation.
Whether he trial court has jurisdiction would depend upon
the amount of the claim
3. However, there the basic issue is something other than the right
to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is only
incidental or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the action
is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Here, the primary reliefs prayed for is the cancellation of
the mortgages for want of consideration. Jurisprudence provides
that where the issue involves the validity of the mortgage, the
action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
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Rule 1
San Miguel v. Sandiganbayan
Gochan v. Gochan
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De Leon v. CA.
Facts:
On August 8, 1991, private respondents filed in the Regional
Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment or rescission of a
contract of sale of two (2) parcels of land against petitioners. Upon
the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court required private
respondents to pay docket and legal fees in the total amount of
P610.00. This amount was paid.
On September 26, 1991, petitioners moved for the dismissal
of the complaint on the ground that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by reason of private respondents'
nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners
contended that in addition to the fees already paid based on the
claim for P100,000.00 for attorney's fees, private respondents
should have paid docket fees in the amount of P21,640.00, based on
the alleged value of the two (2) parcels of land subject matter of the
contract of sale sought to be annulled. Private respondents filed
opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing that outright dismissal
of their complaint was not warranted on the basis of the alleged
nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees, considering that
the amount paid by them was that assessed by the clerk of court.
The trial court held the fees should be based on the value of
the property, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the
flat rate should be charged. Hence this petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue:
In assessing the docket fees to be paid for the filing of an action for
annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, should the value of
the real property be the basis or should it be considered as one
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and therefore the fee
charged should be a flat rate of P400.00 as provided in Rule 141,
7(b)(1) of the Rules of Court.
Held: The decision of the court of appeals holding that the 400 peso
flat rate should be charged is affirmed.
Rule 114 section7 (b) For filing:
1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated P400.00
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Ratio:
Bautista v. Lim, held that an action for rescission of contract
is one which cannot be estimated and therefore the docket fee for
its filing should be the flat amount of P200.00 as then fixed in the
former Rule 141, 141, 5(10) Although eventually the result may
be the recovery of land, it is the nature of the action as one for
rescission of contract which is controlling. The action should not be
confused and equated with the "value of the property" subject of
the transaction.
Based on Jurisprudence, this is the rule:
1) If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
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jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first

instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
2) However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought (as in specific performance, annulment of mortgage etc.)
this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject
of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.
The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class
cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry
into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the
competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest
courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the
Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction
Rule 2
Sta. Clara Homeowners Association v. Spouses Gaston
G.R. No. 141961 || January 23, 2002
Doctrines:
1. A motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction and lack of
cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. It is not dependent on the

pleas or the theories set forth in the answer or the motion
to dismiss.
2. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains these
three essential elements: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff,
(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the
act or omission of the defendant in violation of the said
legal right.
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Facts:
Spouses Gaston filed a complaint for damages before the
Regional Trial Court against the Sta. Clara Homeowners Association
(SCHA). The complaint alleged that the Spouses purchased their lots
in Sta. Clara Subdivision and at the time of the purchase, there was
no mention or requirement of membership i n any homeowners
association. From that time on, they have remained non-members
of the SCHA. They also stated that an arrangement was made
wherein homeowners who were non-members of the association
were issued non-member gate pass stickers for their vehicles for
identification by the security guards manning the subdivisions
entrances and exits. This arrangement remained undisturbed until
sometime in the middle of March 1998, when SCHA disseminated a
board resolution which decreed that only its members in good
standing were to be issued stickers for use in their vehicles.
Thereafter, there were three incidents where the Spouses (and their
son) were prevented from entering without showing identification.
The Spouses filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case as it involved an intracorporate dispute between SCHA and its members. The proper
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forum must be the Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation

(HIGC) (this is pursuant to R.A. No. 580). They stated that that the
Articles of Incorporation of SCHA, which was duly approved by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, provides that the association
shall be a non-tock corporation with all the homeowners of Sta.
Clara constituting its membership. Its by-laws also contain a
provision that all real estate owners automatically become
members of the association. Moreover, the private respondents
allegedly enjoyed the privileges of membership and abided by the
rules of the association, and even attended the general special
meeting of the association members.
The l ower court denied SCHAs motion to dismiss, finding
that there existed no intra-corporate controversy since the Spouses
alleged that they had never joined the association; and, thus, the
HIGC had no jurisdiction to hear the case. Afterwards, SCHA
submitted a Motion for Reconsideration, adding lack of cause of
action as ground for the dismissal of the case. This additional
ground was anchored on the principle of damnum absque injuria as
allegedly there was no allegation in the complaint that the Spouses
were actually prevented from entering the subdivision and from
having access to their residential abode. The courts denied the MR
without ruling on the issue of lack of cause of action. CA opined that
jurisdiction and cause of action were determined by the allegations
in the complaint and not by the defenses and theories set up in the
answer or the motion to dismiss.
Issue:
1. Did the RTC have jurisdiction over the Complaint?

2. Did the Complaint state a cause of action?
Held/Ratio:
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1. (Not related to Civ Pro, but sir might ask) It is a settled rule
that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected
by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an
answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction
would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims
of the defendant. The Complaint does not allege that
private respondents are members of the SCHA. In point of
fact, they deny such membership. Thus, the HIGC has no
jurisdiction over the dispute. the HIGC exercises limited
jurisdiction over homeowners disputes. The l aw confines
its authority to controversies that arise from any of the
following intra-corporate relations: (1) between and among
members of the association; (2) between any and/or all of
them and the association of which they are members; and
(3) between the association and the state insofar as the
controversy concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity.
It should be stressed that the Complaint here is for damages. It
does not assert membership in the SCHA as its basis. Rather, it is
based on an alleged violation of their alleged right of access through
the subdivision and on the alleged embarrassment and humiliation
suffered by the plaintiffs.
2. RELATED TO TOPIC: A defendant moving to dismiss a
complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action is
regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the factual
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averments in the complaint. The test of the sufficiency of

the allegations constituting the cause of action is whether,
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment on the prayers. This test implies that the issue
must be passed upon on the basis of the bare allegations in
the complaint. The court does not inquire into the truth of
such allegations and declare them to be false. To do so
would constitute a procedural error and a denial of the
plaintiffs right to due process.
A complaint states a cause of action when it contains these
three essential elements: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission
of the defendant in violation of the said legal right.
In the instant case, the records sufficiently establish a cause
of action. First, the Complaint alleged that, under the Constitution,
respondents had a right of free access to and from their residential
abode. Second, under the law, petitioners have the obligation to
respect this right. Third, such right was impaired by petitioners
when private respondents were refused access through the Sta.
Clara Subdivision, unless they showed their drivers l icense for
identification.
Given these hypothetically admitted facts, the RTC, in the
exercise of its original and exclusive jurisdiction, could have
rendered judgment over the dispute.

Centeno v. Centeno
G.R. No. 140825 | October 13, 2000
Doctrines:
The rule is that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide
any agrarian dispute or any incident involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.
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Participation by certain parties in the administrative

proceedings without raising any objection thereto, bars
them from any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse
decision is rendered against them.
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right or rights of another. The
elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach
of the obligations of the defendant to the plaintiff for which
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
FACTS
Ignacia Centeno is the owner of 2 parcels of riceland. The
said parcels of land were the subject of an earlier case filed by
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Ignacia against petitioners before the Department of Agrarian

Reform (DAR), for cancellation of certificates of land transfer
(CLT). In said case, it was established that petitioners, through fraud
and misrepresentation, obtained CLTs in their names.
On November 15, 1986, the then Minister of Agrarian
Reform issued an order directing the recall and cancellation of
petitioners' CLTs and directing the generation and issuance of new
Certificates of Land Transfer in favor of Ignacia. The aforesaid order
was affirmed by the Office of the President in its decision dated July
8, 1987, which had become final and executory.
Subsequently, Ignacia filed a complaint with the
Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB)
for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction, Ejectment and Damages." Ignacia
alleged that, despite the decision of the DAR recognizing her
ownership over the subject lots as affirmed by the Office of the
President, Cipriano Centeno, Leonila Calonzo and Ramona Adriano
have interfered with and prevented her from exercising acts of
possession over the lands earlier adjudicated to her and kept on
harassing, molesting and disturbing her peaceful possession as well
as the enjoyment of the fruits thereof, to her great damage and
prejudice. She prayed that petitioners be restrained from
committing acts tending to deprive respondent of her possession,
and that they be ordered to vacate the premises.
In their answer, petitioners insisted that they are better
entitled to the possession of the lots in dispute, having been
allegedly in long possession thereof, with their houses thereon. On
the other hand, the award of said lots to respondent is

unauthorized, not only because she has no possession thereof but
also because she has other landholdings in the locality. They
averred that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of
action and for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the DARAB over the
case.
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On April 14, 1993, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a

decision, after hearing, favorably to respondent, adverting to the
decision of the DAR, which was held to be determinative of the
rights of the parties under the principle of res judicata. This decision
was affirmed on appeal by the DARAB on September 10, 1997, with
the directive "to immediately reinstate Ignacia to the subject
landholdings and for Cipriano, Leonila and Ramona to respect her
security of tenure thereon as mandated by law." Herein petitioners
appealed the matter to the CA. But the CA affirmed the decision of
the DARAB. So, this instant case.
Petitioners allege that the DARAB does not have jurisdiction
over the complaint for maintenance of possession since the dispute
is not agrarian in character. They aver that there is no allegation in
the complaint of the existence of a tenancy relationship nor the
presence of an agrarian dispute that would place the case under the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. Rather, petitioners allege that the instant
case is clearly one for recovery of possession which falls under the
jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Petitioners further assert that the appellate court gravely
erred in declaring that they are estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the board because from the start of the proceedings,
they had already raised said issue of jurisdiction.
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Petitioners likewise allege that the complaint states no

cause of action. They contend that respondent cannot claim
maintenance of peaceful possession when she does not in fact have
actual possession of the subject property. They claim that it is they
who are in actual possession of said land. Furthermore, they claim
that respondent did not even make a demand for them to vacate
the land; nor did she present evidence to show that their acts of
possession resulted in loss or damage to her.
ISSUES + HELD/RATIO
(1) Whether the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case at hand
-YES
The present case for maintenance of peaceful possession with
prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction is a mere offshoot of the suit for cancellation of CLTs filed by herein respondent
against herein petitioners before the DARAB. Having found
therefore, that the instant case is related to and is a mere off-shoot
of the said previous case for cancellation of CLTs, then the DARAB
continues to have jurisdiction over the same. As aptly stated by the
Court of Appeals, under Section 50 of R.A. 6657 (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), the DAR is vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The rule is
that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian
dispute or any incident involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB
provides:
Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both
original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving
the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229,
228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and
their implementing rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to
the following:
x x xx x xx x x
f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT),
Certificate of Landownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation
Patent (EP) and the administrative correction thereof; (Underlining
added)
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(2) Whether the petitioners are estopped from questioning

the jurisdiction of the DARAB- YES
A perusal of the records will show that petitioners participated
in all stages of the instant case, setting up a counterclaim and asking
for affirmative relief in their answer. This Court has ruled that
participation by certain parties in the administrative proceedings
without raising any objection thereto, bars them from any
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jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered

against them.
(3) Whether there is a cause of action -YES
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation
of the legal right or rights of another. The elements of a cause of
action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on
the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligations of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
In the instant case, the complaint for maintenance of
peaceful possession contains the following allegations, to wit:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Defendants are persistently interfering in and preventing
plaintiff's possession and cultivation of farmlot no. 122, and
continue to commit acts tending to eject, oust and remove the
plaintiff therefrom, to her great damage and injury; Similarly,
defendants are harassing, molesting and disturbing plaintiff's
peaceful possession of Home Lot No. 111;
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Without the knowledge and consent of herein plaintiffs,
defendants constructed two (2) houses on two portions of Home
Lot No. 111, one house belonging to defendant Cipriano Centeno,

and the other to defendant Leonila Centeno Calonzo, but occupied
by defendant Ramona Adriano; The construction of said houses is
patently illegal and deprives plaintiff of the possession and
enjoyment thereof, to her great damage and injury.
Clearly, the above allegations regarding petitioners' actions
with regard to the subject land, if true, violate respondent's rights
as adjudicated by the DARAB; hence, these constitute causes of
action which entitle the respondent to the relief sought.
Citytrust Banking Corporation v Isagani Villanueva

GR No. 141011
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Facts:
Isagani Villanueva opened a savings account and a current
account with Citytrust Bank. On May 1986, Villanueva deposited
money in his savings account in the Legazpi Village branch of the
bank. When he realized that he was running out of blank checks, he
requested a checkbook from the Bank representative. He filled out
the necessary form but could not remember his bank account
number. He expressed this to the bank representative who in turn
assured him that she will be the one to supply the information.
Another representative got the form and proceeded to the bank
register which contained all the banks client information. Upon
seeing the name Isagani Villanueva (another person) , she copied
the account number and put it into the form. In a month, Isagani
Villanueva received his checkbook with the wrong account number.
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He issued a check to Kingly Commodities for a trading order.

Subsequently, he deposited to his account P31600, enough to cover
the check he issued. The check was later dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. Villanueva informed the bank of the incident
and was advised to call his client to re deposit the check. The check
was l ater dishonored again due to insufficiency of funds and a stop
payment order i ssued. Villanueva asked Kingly if i t could
accommodate him until 5:30 PM of the same day to make good the
check he issued. He went to the bank right away to settle the
problem and later found out of the wrong assignment of account
number. Genuino, the bank officer, promised to Villanueva to send
Kingly a managers check before 5:30 PM.
On June 1986, Villanueva wrote a letter to the bank asking
for indemnification for alleged damages losses suffered due to the
incident. He demanded 70,000 as actual damages and 2 Million for
moral damages. The bank replied through their VP saying his
apologies for the untoward incident but reminded Villanueva that
the incident was due to his failure to indicate the account number
when he requested a check book. And the bank was able to give to
Kingly the check promised before 530. Villanueva filed suit against
the bank in the RTC.
The RTC dismissed the case and pointed out that the main
issue in the case was who was most negligent regarding the
incident. The trial court ruled that Villanueva was the most
negligent and caused the chain of events to happen. The court
doubted also Villanuevas accusation that he suffered actual
damages in the amount of P240,000 when the actual loss was
merely 70,000. He appealed to the CA.

The CA reversed the ruling and awarded Villanueva moral
damages of P100,000 and attorneys fees of 50,000. This was based
on the fact that Villanueva had every reason to rely that the checks
were on order. Both parties appealed. The bank questions the CAs
ruling that the Banks processing of the checkbook was the cause of
the loss and not Villanuevas forgetful memory. Also i t questions the
award of moral damages and fees despite lack of bad faith.
Villanueva on the other hand asserts that the CA erred in not finding
that his actual losses amounted to 230,000.
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true that Villanueva suffered discomfort as a result of the dishonor

of the check however, it is not intolerable and grave to impress
upon the court. Moreover, the bank was able to i ssue a managers
check before the deadline with Kingly. Attorneys fees cannot also
be awarded because there was no showing of bad faith. The court
need not deliberate who is most negligent as there is no
compensable injury suffered in the case. Damnun absque injuriadamage without injury, loss or damage without a violation of a legal
right.
Issue:
W/N the repeated dishonor of a check drawn against a well funded
account but bearing the account of another depositor with the
same name as the drawer would entitle him to compensatory and
attorneys fees.
Ruling:
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Reversed. The RTC decision is reinstated.

Villanueva, as found by the lower court has failed to
establish his demand for compensatory damages arising from the
loss. His evidence was found inadequate, speculative, hearsay. The
court cannot rely merely on mere assertions, speculations,
conjectures,
He i s also not e ntitled to moral damages and attorneys
fees. To award moral damages, the requisites are: a) there must be
an injury sustained by the claimant; b) culpable act or omission
factually established, c) wrongful act or omission is the proximate
cause of the injury d) predicated on Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. It is
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Macaslang v. Zamora
Bersamin. May 2011.
FACTS
Mar 10, 1999: Zamoras FILED: Unlawful detainer with

MTCC, alleging among others:
o Macaslang sold to them a residential lot in Sabang,
Davao City. 400sqm. Including a residential house,
where Macaslang was then living.
o After the sale, Macaslang requested to be allowed
to live in the house. Zamora granted the request on
the reliance of Macaslangs promise to vacate as
soon as she would be able to find a new residence
o After 1 year, Zamora demanded upon the
defendant to vacate but she failed and refused. The
demand letter (Sept 1998) reads: This is to give

notice that since the mortgage to your property has
long been expired and that since the property is
already in my name, I will be taking over the
occupancy of said property two (2) months from the
date of this l etter.
ISSUES
1. W/N the RTC in its appellate jurisdiction is limited to
assigned errors
2. W/N in an action for unlawful detainer, where there
was no prior demand to vacate and comply with the
conditions of the lease, a valid cause of action exists.
o Zamoras sought the help of the Lupon, but no

settlement was reached
Despite the due service of summons, Macaslang did not file

an answer. Hence MTCC declared her in default.
MTC: In favor of Zamora, ordered Macaslang to vacate and

pay rental until they shall have vacated the properties in
question.
Macaslang appealed to the RTC alleging:

o Extrinsic Fraud
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o Absolute sale relied upon is a patent nullity as her

signature therein was procured through fraud and
trickery.
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3. W/N there was a violation of the Rules on Summary

procedure.
HELD
1. RTC in its appellate jurisdiction may rule upon an issue
not raised on appeal.
a. CA said that RTC cannot rule on issue not
assigned as an error. This may have been
correct if the appeal to the CA was a first appeal
from RTC to CA (R41). There is an express
limitation of the review to only specified in the
assignment of errors.
RTC: Ruled in favor of Macaslang and DISMISSED Zamoras

complaint, for failure to state a cause of action. The same
maybe refilled in the same court by alleging a cause of
action, i f any. Zamoras Motion for Execution of MTCC
decision rendered moot by this judgment.
b. But HERE this is a, MTC to RTC appeal governed

by a specific rule for unlawful detainer cases.
R70 18 provides that MTC judgment may be
appealed to the RTC which shall decide the
same on the basis of the entire record
CA: REVERSED RTC decision for having no basis in fact and

law. MTCC decision reinstated.
c. This difference in procedure is traceable from

BP129 22, then in the 1991 Rules on summary
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procedure21, then 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure R40 7
d. Even if the rules did not differentiate in
the procedure, the review on the entire case is
still allowed as an exception (c) and (d).
i. GN: Appellate court may only review
errors assigned and properly argued
ii. Exceptions:
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(a) When the question

affects jurisdiction
(b) Matters that evidently plain
or clerical errors
(c) Matters whose
consideration is necessary for a
just and complete resolution
(d) Matters of record having
bearing on the issue that
parties failed to raise
(e) Matters closely related to an
error assigned
(f) Matters upon which the
determination of a question is
dependent
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2. CA Correctly delved into w/n there was a cause of

action.
a. RTC: there is no cause of action because there was
no demand to vacate.
b. CA: No, the complaint readily reveals that there was a
demand to vacate.
c. A complaint for Unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges
the withholding of possession or the refusal is unlawful
without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
i. Demand was not only made but also alleged
in the complaint.
d. A complaint has sufficient cause of action for unlawful
detainer if it states the following:
i. Initial possession by defendant was by
contract or tolerance
ii. Eventually possession became illegal upon
notice
iii. Defendant still remained in possession and
deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment
iv. Complaint was instituted within one year
from last demand to vacate.
e. TEST for sufficiency of complaint: is W/N the court can
render a valid judgment based on facts alleged in complaint.

f.
SC: Complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action.

Complaint complied with 1-4.
ii. What MTC should have done was

provided for in R70 7: to simply
render judgment as may be warranted
by the facts alleged in the complaint
and limited to what is prayed for
3.Ejectment was not proper due to defense of ownership.

a. Zamoras cause of action is based on right to
posses resulting from ownership.
iii. Failure to file an answer under R70,

results only to a judgment by default
not a declaration of default.
b. However exhibits show that the real transaction

is one of equitable mortgage not sale.
2. MTCs reception of oral testimony is also a

procedural lapse.
i. Land was sold for P100K, when the

demand letter was for a sum of P1.6M.
Price inadequate. Then the vendor
remained in possession of the property.
Deed of sale was executed as a result or
by reason of a loan.
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c. Nonetheless, findings favorable to Macaslangs

ownership are not finally definitive because R70
16provides: that when the defendant raises
ownership, and the question of possession
cannot be resolved, ownership shall only be
resolved to determine possession [not title].
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i. R70 envisions the submission only of

affidavits of the witnesses under 10
ii. 11 (2) that should the MTC need
to clarify material facts, it may require
parties to submit affidavits or other
evidence. (Note: In both sections no
mention of testimony, only affidavits.)
WHEREFORE GRANTED. Complaint for unlawful detainer dismissed.
4.MTC committed procedural lapses.

1. MTC granted Motion to Declare Macaslang in
default for failure to file an answer.
i. This motion is expressly prohibited
under R70 13 (8)
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Rule 3
Korea Exchange Bank v. filkor

Relucio v. Lopez
Facts:
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Respondent Lopez filed a petition for the appointment as

sole administratix of the conjugal partnership of properties against
the petitioner Relucio. Lopez alleged that sometime in 1968, she
was married to Alberto Lopez who thereafter abandoned her and
their four legitimate children. Alberto Lopez excluded his wife (the
respondent) and their 4 children from benefitting from their
conjugal properties and the income and fruits therefrom. Alberto
Lopez transferred and concealed such properties by placing
substantial portions of it in the name of the petitioner Relucio. It
was also alleged by the respondent-wife Lopez, that Alberto Lopez
has sold, disposed, alienated conjugal properties for his sole benefit
and to his illegitimate wife, the petitioner Relucio and their two
illegitimate children.
The petitioner Relucio then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the respondent Lopez has no cause of action against
her. In an Order by the judge denying the petitioners Motion to
Dismiss, it was dismissed on the ground that Relucio was impleaded
as an indispensible party because some of the subject properties
are registered in her name. Relucio then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to the aforementioned Order but the same was
likewise denied. Relucio then filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for Certiorari assailing the trial courts decision of denying
her motion to dismiss but which however, was likewise denied.
Hence, the present appeal.
Issue/s:
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W/N respondent Lopez petition for appointment as sole

administratix of the conjugal property established a cause of action
against petitioner Relucio
W/N Relucios i nclusion as party defendant i s e ssential in the
proceedings for a complete adjudication of the controversy.
Ratio/Held:
No, regarding the first cause of action (the judicial
appointment as administratix), the petitioner Relucio is a complete
stranger to this cause of action. The administration of conjugal
properties is entirely between Alberto Lopez and the respondent
Lopez. There is no righ-duty relation existing between Relucio and
the respondent Lopez.
A cause of action is defined as an act or omission of one
party where the defendant is in violation of the legal right of the
other. The elements of a cause of action are:
1.) A right in favor of the plaintiff
2.) An obligation on the part of the defendant to respect
such right
3.) An act or omission on the part of the defendant
violating such right
No, the petitioner Relucio is not a real party in interest and
thus cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable party is
one without whom there can be no final determination of an action.
The trial court can certainly issue a judgment against Alberto Lopez
without involving the petitioner Relucio. Neither is Relucio a
necessary party. A necessary party is defined as one who is not

indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief
is to be accorded or for a complete determination of the claim
subject of the action.
Uy v. CA
Facts:
Uy and Roxas are agents authorised to sell 8 parcels of land
by its owners. By virtue of such authority, Uy and Roxas offered to
sell the land to the NHA to be utilised as a housing project.
Later, the NHA, through a resolution, approved the
acquisition of said lands, pursuant to which the parties executed
Deeds of Sale covering the said lands. Of the 8 lands however, only
5 were paid for by the NHA due to a report it received from the
DENR that the remaining area is located on an active landslide area
and therefore not suitable for housing.
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Because of this, the NHA, through a resolution, cancelled

the sale over the 3 parcels of land and offered to pay P1.25M as
danos perjuicios to its owners.
Because of this cancellation, Uy and Roxas filed a case for
damages against NHA in the RTC of QC.
The RTC awarded damages of P1.25M. CA reversed holding
that Uy and Roxas were mere attorneys-in-fact and therefore, not
real parties in interest in the action, and that since the real owners
of the lands were not made party-plaintiffs in the case, it should be
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dismissed. Also, it held that the cancellation made by NHA was

justified.
Hence this appeal by Uy and Roxas, claiming that the
owners need not be made party-plaintiffs because they themselves
had standing due to the fact that the cancellation of the sale
"damaged" them insofar as they lost "unearned income" and
advances.
Issue:
W/N the case should be dismissed because Uy and Roxas failed to
join as indispensable party plaintiffs the selling lot-owners - Yes
Held:
Yes.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest, who is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.
"Interest", within the meaning of the rule, means material
interest, an interest in the issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from a mere incidental interest. A real party in
interest is a party who, by substantive law, has the right sought to
be enforced.
The applicable substantive law in this case is Article 1311 of the Civil
Code which provides that,

"Contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns, and heirs, except in case where the right and obligations
from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, by
stipulation or by provision of law.
If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a
3rd person, he may demand its fulfilment provided he
communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A
mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is no sufficient. The
contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a
favor upon a third person"
In this case, Uy and Roxas are not parties to the contract of
sale between their principals and the NHA. They are mere agents
who represent their principals. Their rendering of such service did
not make them parties to the contract. Therefore, since a contract
may be violated only by the parities thereto as against each other,
the real parties in interest, either as plaintiff or defendant, in an
action upon that contract must, generally, be either of the parties to
said contract.
They do not appear to be:
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1. Heirs of their principals as no proof was shown to substantiate

this
2. Assignees of their principals because they have not shown any
agreement granting them the right to "receive payment and to
reimburse themselves for advances and commissions" relating to
the sale
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3. Beneficiaries of a stipulation pour autrui because there is no

stipulation in the Deeds of Sale "clearly and deliberately" conferring
a favor to any third person.
As Uy and Roxas are not parties, heirs, assignees or
beneficiaries of a stipulation pour autrui under the contract of sale,
they do not, under substantive law, possess the right they seek to
enforce. Therefore, they are not the real parties in interest.
(Non-Civpro issue: W/N the NHA was justified in cancelling the sale Yes)
The cancellation of the contract of sale here falls not under
rescission which involves a substantial breach of the obligation, but
on the negation of the cause arising frizzing from the realisation
that the land were not suitable for housing. The cause of NHA in this
case, which also predetermines its motive, is the suitability or the
quality of the lands for housing.
Borlongan v. Madrideo
G.R. No. 120267. January 25, 2000.
Facts:
Mrs. Dalisay Camacho was the owner of a parcel of land in
Tondo, Manila. Consolacion Sempio originally rented a certain
portion of the land, which was the subject land in this case. On this
subject land, two (2) houses were built, one owned by spouses
Leonardo and Dominga Borlongan and the other owned by private
respondent Consuelo Madrideo, who paid rentals to Mrs. Camacho.

Dominga was Consolacions sister, while Madrideo was a ward of
Consolacion. Petitioners Borlongan in this case were the
granddaughter and great granddaughters of Dominga.
On May 6, 1993, Madrideo filed a complaint against the
Borlongans for unlawful detainer in the MeTC of Manila. She
averred that without any monetary consideration and out of pure
liberality, she allowed the Borlongans to continue occupying the
portion of the land subject to the condition that upon demand they
will vacate the premises but that they failed to do so after her
demands.
The Borlongans, on the other hand, denied that they were
possessors by mere tolerance or that they were sublessees of
Madrideo. As e vidence, they presented Mrs. Camachos affidavit,
which the latter also confirmed during the preliminary conference,
declaring that the Borlongans and Madrideo were her tenants.
As such, Madrideo is not the real party in interest. Since

Madrideo and the Borlongans are not privies to a contract, there
can be no relief by one against the other. One who has no right or
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
party-plaintiff in action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party i n i nterest. A real party in i nterest i s one who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. In the instant case, Madrideo is not
a real party in interest inasmuch as she failed to establish her claim
of being the sole lessee of the disputed property or the sublessor of
the petitioners, Borlongans.
International Express v. CA
Issue:
Whether or not Madrideo is the real party in interest in the
unlawful detainer case.
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Held:
No. First of all, Madrideo failed to prove her allegations by
preponderance of evidence. The evidences she presented (receipts
of her rental payments) simply confirm she is a lessee, and not that
she is the only lessee of the property. Mrs. Camacho, the owner, has
been unwavering in her declaration that the Borlongans are also
lessees of her property.
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Rule 4
Auction in Malinta v Warren Embes Layuben
DOCTRINE: absent qualifying or restrictive words, the venue shall
either be that stated in the law or rule governing the action or the
one agreed in the contract.
FACTS:
Warren Embes Luyaben filed a
complaint for damages against Auction in Malinta, Inc. (AIMI) in

RTC-Kalinga where Luyaben resides. AIMI is a corporation engaged
in the auction of heavy equipment. Warren alleged that in an
auction conducted by AIMI, he was declared the highest bidder for a
wheel loader. He tendered the payment for the said item but AIMI
could no longer produce the loader. It offered a replacement but
failed to deliver the same. Thus he filed this case. AIMI moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue by invoking
the following stipulation in their agreement: ALL COURT LITIGATION
PROCEDURES SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN THE APPROPRIATE COURTS
OF VALENZUELA CITY, METRO MANILA.
from bringing a case in other venues. It must be shown that such

stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words, such as exclusively and waiving for this purpose any other
venue, shall only preceding the designation of venue, to the
exclusion of all the other courts or words of similar i mport, the
words should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional
forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
RTC: Ruled in favour of AIMI dismissing the complaint due to

improper venue.
G.R. No. 142523. November 27, 2001. Ponente: Vitug.
CTA: Reversed and reinstated the case.

ISSUE:
Did the stipulation in the agreement effectively limit the venue of
the case exclusively to the proper court of Valenzuela City?
HELD:
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Gumabon vs. Larin

Petitioners: Mariano Gumabon, Josefa Gumabon Tolentino, Teresa
Gumabon Eugenio, Mario Guevarra, Faustino Gumabon Ondevilla,
Wilfredo Gumabon, Guillermo Gumabon, Braulio Gumabon and
Noel Dolojan
Respondent: Aquilino T. Larin
Facts:
No. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court: All other actions

may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident
defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Petitioners executed a deed of sale with right to

repurchase over a parcel of l and located at Candaba, Pampanga in
favor of respondent Larin. It was stipulated therein that the vendors
or anyone of them may repurchase the property at any time from
the date of the contract by repaying Larin the purchase price and
any such other sums advanced to them.
This does not apply when the parties, before filing the
action, have agreed on an exclusive venue. Mere stipulation on
the venue of an action however is not enough to preclude parties
Thirty-nine years later, the petitioners filed a complaint

against Larin before the RTC of Quezon City seeking the return of
the certificate of title from Larin who refuse to return the same
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despite being paid in full. The RTC of Quezon City however motu
proprio dismissed the complaint on the ground that, being a real
action, the case should have been filed in the RTC of Pampanga
and not of Quezon City.
The petitioners argued that Larin never assailed, at any
stage, the venue of the case nor raised the competence of RTC of
Quezon City to try the case but that he has impliedly assented by
persistently seeking affirmative reliefs from the court. They also
asserted that they do not seek to be declared the owners of the
land, nor to regain possession of the same since they have been the
continuous occupants, but merely to compel the respondent to
return the certificate of title to them.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the RTC of Pampanga was the proper venue for
the complaint
2) Whether or not a trial court judge can motu proprio dismiss an
action for improper venue
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located at Candaba, Pampanga, the proper venue is the RTC of

Pampanga.
2) No. Venue, unlike jurisdiction, looks primarily at the
convenience of the litigants. A plaintiff impliedly elects venue by
choosing the court where he files his complaint. Venue can even be
the subject of agreement by the parties and under the old Rules,
this may be implied if the defendant fails to seasonably object to it.
Furthermore, the motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally
limited to instances when: the court clearly had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, when the plaintiff did not appear during trial,
failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or
neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court.
Any motu proprio dismissal not under these instances would
amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. The
wrong venue in this case, being merely a procedural infirmity, not a
jurisdictional impediment, does not disallow the RTC of Quezon City
to try the case. Also, since respondent failed to raise his objection to
it and by his having sought relief from the court, respondent is
deemed to have assented to the venue of the action.
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Held/Ratio:
1) Yes. Real actions are those which affect the title to or possession
of real property. When there is a question as to who, between the
contending parties, would have a better right to the property, the
case can only but a real action. Such is the case at bar. Since Section
1, Rule 4 of the Rules on Civil Procedure provide that venue of real
actions shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated and the land subject of the litigation is
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Paglaum v. Unionbank
Facts:
Petitioner Paglaum Management and Development
Corporation (PAGLAUM) is the registered owner of three parcels of
land located in the Province of Cebu. Union Bank of the Philippines

(Union Bank) extended HealthTech a credit line in the amount of P
10,000,000.8 PAGLAUM executed three Real Estate Mortgages on
behalf of HealthTech and in favor of Union Bank. Petitioners
defaulted and Unionbank extra-judicially foreclosed the properties.
Petitioners filed for annulment of sale and preliminary injunction
from RTC of Makati.
Unionbank says proper venue is Cebu and filed a motion to
dismiss. RTC and CA granted the motion.
Pertinent provisions of the contract:
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Section 9. Venue. The venue of all suits and actions arising out of
or in connection with this Mortgage shall be in Makati, Metro
Manila or in the place where any of the Mortgaged Properties is
located, at the absolute option of the Mortgagee, the parties
hereto waiving any other venue.
place where any of the Mortgaged Properties is located, at the

absolute option of the Mortgagee, the parties hereto waiving any
other venue.
Thus, on 11 December 1998, both parties entered into a
Restructuring Agreement, which states that any action or
proceeding arising out of or in connection therewith shall be
commenced in Makati City, with both parties waiving any other
venue.
PAGLAUM and HealthTech argue that: (a) the Restructuring
Agreement governs the choice of venue between the parties, and
(b) the agreement on the choice of venue must be interpreted with
the convenience of the parties in mind and the view that any
obscurity therein was caused by Union Bank.
Issue:
However, under the two Real Estate Mortgages dated 11 February

1994, the following version appears:
Which contract is controlling in terms of venue, the Restructuring

Agreement or Mortgage contracts?
or in connection with this Mortgage shall be in Cebu City Metro
Manila or in the place where any of the Mortgaged Properties is
located, at the absolute option of the Mortgagee, the
xxxxxxxxxxxxx any other venue.
Held:
Meanwhile, the same provision in the Real Estate Mortgage dated

22 April 1998 contains the following:
The mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not

enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues.
The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive.
In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation
or in connection with this Mortgage shall be in _________ or in the
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The Restructuring Agreeement is controlling. Makati is the proper

venue.
Ratio:

should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum,
not as limiting venue to the specified place (doctrine).
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing
of the action on the exclusive venue thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Rules provide an exception, in that real actions can be

commenced and tried in a court other than where the property is
situated in instances where the parties have previously and validly
agreed in writing on the exclusive venue thereof.
Rule 5
The Restructuring Agreement explicitly mentioned the 3

mortgages and that it had the phrase both parties waiving any
other venue to denote exclusivity of venue. It was concluded that
the intention of the Agreement was to not just refer to the loan
agreement but also to mortgages. The Court looked at the previous
mortgage contracts and said that the one dated Feb 11 had the
phrase parties thereto waiving stricken off from the original
provisions and therefore lacking in qualifying or restrictive words.
Rule 4 Venue of Actions
Section 1. Venue of real actions. Actions affecting title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced
and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
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Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in

the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Sec. 3. When Rule not applicable. This Rule shall not apply
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
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Republic v. Sunvar
DOCTRINE:
The mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 is to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases subject of
summary procedure. To achieve this, rules like Section 19 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure were created to bar petitions
for relief from judgment, or petitions for certiorari, mandamus, or
prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court in
order to avoid what former Chief Justice Panganiban calls a sorry
spectacle of a counterproductive ping pong e very time a party is
aggrieved by an interlocutory order.
FACTS:
Petitioners Republic and NAPOCOR are registered coowners of a parcel of land which they leased to the Technology
Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years
ending on December 31, 2002. The TRCFI was given the right to
sublease this land, which it did, to Sunvar, through sublease
agreements with the common provision that their sublease
agreements were going to expire on December 31, 2002, the date

that the TRCFIs lease agreements with the petitioners would
expire.
Dismiss and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration and required

Sunvar to submit their Answer.
In 1987, when the government was reorganized, the TCFRI

was replaced with the Philippine Development Alternatives
Foundation (PDAF). Before the expiration date, Sunvar wrote to
PDAF and expressed its desire to renew the sublease over the
subject property and proposed an increased rental rate and a
renewal period of another 25 years. PDAF forwarded the letter to
petitioners. By June 25, 2002, PDAF had informed Sunvar of
petitioners decisions not to renew the lease.
Despite filing an Answer, Sunvar still filed a Rule 65 Petition

for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City to assail the denial by the
MeTC of respondents Motion to Dismiss. To answer this petition,
petitioners questioned the RTCs jurisdiction and prayed for the
outright dismissal of the petition. The RTC denied the motion for
dismissal and granted the Rule 65 Petition, directing the MeTC to
dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction.
Thus, the instant petition.
When the lease contract and the sublease agreements

expired, petitioners recovered all the rights over the subject
property. Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the
property.
ISSUE: Did the RTC violate the Rules on Summary Procedure when it
took cognizance and granted the certiorari petition filed by Sunvar?
Six years after the expiry date, petitioner Republic, through

the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised respondent Sunvar
to vacate the subject property. Although Sunvar duly received the
Notice, it did not vacate the property. Almost a year after the first
notice, respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a final
notice to vacate within 15 days. When the period lapsed,
respondent Sunvar again refused to vacate the property.
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Petitioners then filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer with

the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. Sunvar moved to
dismiss the complaint, questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC as
the action was supposed to an accion publiciana rather than one for
unlawful detainer. The MeTC denied respondents Motion to
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HELD: YES
RATIO:
The RTC should have dismissed Sunvars petition outright

for being a prohibited pleading.
Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari

petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued
by the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited
pleading.
According to former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, the

proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an
adverse judgment on the merits incorporating in said appeal
the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing
appeals from i nterlocutory orders would result i n the sorry

spectacle of a case being subject of a counterproductive
ping pong to and from the appellate court as often as a trial
court is perceived to have made an error in any of its
interlocutory rulings.
The Court mentioned only two cases in which they allowed

exceptions to this rule1 and since Sunvar could not
substantiate its claims of extraordinary circumstances that
would allow those same exceptions to apply to his case, the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 remains, for him, a
prohibited pleading.
If the Court were to relax the interpretation of the
prohibition against the filing of certiorari petitions under
the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the RTCs may be
inundated with similar prayers from adversely affected
parties questioning every order of the lower court and
completely dispensing with the goal of summary
proceedings in forcible entry or unlawful detainer suits.
Uy v. Javellana
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A.M. No. MTJ071666.

September 5, 2012
Justice Leonardo- De Castro
1
Bayog vs. Natino where the Court gave due course to an appeal from an interlocutory order
lest grave injustice and irreparable injury that visited him through no f ault o r n egligence on
his p art will only be p erpetuated and Go vs. Court of Appeals where the Court was confronted
with a procedural void in the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that justified the resort to
a Rule 65 Petition in the RT C. Details in the full text.
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Doctrines:
The revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely
adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of
litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.
Facts:
This is an administrative case which arose from a verified
complaint for gross i gnorance of the l aw and procedures e tc filed
by Public Attorneys Gerlie Uy et al. against Judge Javellana of the
MTC, La Castellana, Negros Occidental.
The complaint against Judge Javellana alleged that he was
grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Several
cases were cited
(1) People v. Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief wherein he issued a
warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure;
(2) People v. Celeste, et al. for Trespass to Dwelling wherein he did
not grant the motion to dismiss for noncompliance with the Lupon
requirement under Section 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, insisting that said motion was a prohibited
pleading;
(3) People v. Celeste, et al. wherein he refused to dismiss outright
the complaint even when the same was patently without basis or
merit, as the affidavits of therein complainant and her witnesses
were all hearsay evidence;

(4) People v. Lopez for Malicious Mischief wherein he did not apply
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and instead, conducted a
preliminary examination and preliminary investigation in
accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set
the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that
therein complainant and her witness had no personal knowledge of
the material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been
a ground for dismissal of the case.
Judge Javellana stressed that the charges against him were
baseless and malicious and sought the dismissal of the instant
complaint against him.
Issues: W/N Judge Javellana, is guilty for gross ignorance of the law
and procedures
Held:
Yes, he is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
procedures when he did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure as correctly found by the Office of the Court
Administrator.
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the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
the following cases falling within their jurisdiction.
x x xx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law).
(5) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law
for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months,
or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise,
or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does
not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00). (Emphasis supplied.)
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Ratio:
[with regard to] People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez et al.
Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code States:
The Revised Rule of Summary Procedure shall govern the following

criminal cases:
ART. 328. Special cases of malicious mischief.Any person who

shall cause damage to obstruct the performance of public functions,
or using any poisonous or corrosive substance; or spreading any
infection or contagion among cattle; or who causes damage to the
property of the National Museum or National Library, or to any
SECTION 1. Scope.This Rule shall govern the summary procedure

in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
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archive or registry, waterworks, road, promenade, or any other
thing used in common by the public, shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor, if such value does not exceed the
abovementioned amount but is over 200 pesos;
penalty would be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum period

which under Article 329(a) of the RPC, would be imprisonment for 2
months and 1 day to six months, clearly being governed by the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
[with regard to] People vs. Cornelio
3. By arresto menor, if such value does not exceed 200 pesos.
Judge Javellanas i ssuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the

accused in People v. Cornelio is in violation of Section 16 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically stating that
Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code states:
[t]he court shall not order the arrest of the accused except
for failure to appear whenever required.
ART. 329. Other mischiefs.The mischiefs not included in the next

preceding article shall be punished:
1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if the
value of the damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such
value is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 1,000 pesos; and
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3. By arresto menor or fine of not less than the value of the damage
caused and not more than 200 pesos, if the amount involved does
not exceed 200 pesos or cannot be estimated. (Emphasis ours.)
People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez et al were for
malicious mischief. The facts of these cases did not show that they
were special cases falling under Art. 328 of the RPC. These cases fall
under Art. 329 of the RPC and if the amounts of alleged damage to
property of 6,000 and 3,000 pesos are proven, the appropriate
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Judge Javellana never claimed that the accused failed to

appear at any hearing. His justification that the accused was wanted
for the crime of attempted homicide, being tried in another case,
Crim. Case No. 04096, is totally unacceptable and further indicative
of his ignorance of law. People v. Cornelio, pending before Judge
Javellanas court i s for malicious mischief, and i s distinct and
separate from Crim. Case No. 04096, which is for attempted
homicide, although both cases involved the same accused.
Proceedings in one case, such as the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
should not be extended or made applicable to the other.
[With regard to] People v. Lopez
In People v. Lopez, et al., Judge Javellana conducted a preliminary
investigation even when it was not required or justified.
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide
for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case

under said Rule. Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation
be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an
offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine.
As has been previously established herein, the maximum penalty
imposable for malicious mischief in People v. Lopez, et al. is just six
(6) months.
[With regard to] People v. Celeste et al.
In People vs. Celeste et al, in insisting that said Motion to dismiss
was a prohibited pleading, the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
reads:
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Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon.Cases requiring referral to the Lupon

for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such
requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be
revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with.
This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused
was arrested without a warrant.
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions.The following
pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases
covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or
information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section.
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Given the express provisions of the Revised Rule on

Summary Procedure, Judge Javellanas arguments i n i nsisting his
position of not dismissing the case is irrelevant.
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted
to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the
speedy disposition of cases. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to
arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid down
by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or
delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express
purpose of said Rule
Rule 6
FINANCIAL SERVICES vs. FORBES (taken from the wonderful
digests of 3A)
Summary: USSR, through financial building, tries to build an office

for their trade rep in Forbes by telling the forbes assoc that theyre
building a residence. Forbes finds out and bans the entrance of
financial building. FB files a case of injunction vs fobres who then
fila motion to dismiss. Case is dismissed in CA. then forbes files a
case of damages vs FB. SC says they should have filed a compulsory
counterclaim and by filing motion to dismiss, they are barred by
seeking relief in this 2nnd case.

Facts:
Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) was the owner of a 4,223
square meter residential lot in No. 10, Narra Place, Forbes Park,
Makati.
Dec 2, 1985, the USSR engaged Financial Building for the
construction of a multi-level office and staff apartment building at
said lot, which would be used by the Trade Representative of the
USSR. But USSR claimed it to be a residence home for the trade
Representative so that Forbes Park would authorize its construction.
It worked!
In Fact, USSR evern reassured Forbes its compliance. But later,
Financial Building submitted to Makati Govt a 2nd building plan for
a multi-level apartment building, which was a different plan then
what was given to Forbes
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Forbes discovered this, made an ocular inspection, and confirmed

USSRs violation and suspended all permits of entry of Financial
Building
April 9, 1987, Financial Building filed in RTC of Makati filed for
Injunction and Damages with a prayer for Preliminary Injunction
against Forbes. Forbes then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that Financial Building had no cause of action because it was not the
real party-in-interest. (Civil Case No. 16540)
RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction but CA nullified it and
dismissed case. This case was then terminated with finality
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Oct 27, 1989, Forbes filed with RTC of Makati a Complaint for
Damages, against Financial Building arising from the violation of its
rules and regulations. RTC ruled in favor of Forbes. CA affirmed.
Thus, petition for review on certiorari
Issue: Financial building claim CA erred in not dismissing case

despite it being barred by prior judgment or deemed waived for
failure to interpose a compulsory counterclaim
Held: FBS is correct! SC grants petition! Forbes should have filed it

as a counterclaim
Instant case i s barred due to Forbes failure to set a compulsory
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 16540, the prior injunction suit by
Financial Building against Forbes park.
A compulsory counterclaim is one which arises out of or is
necessarily connected with the transaction/ occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing partys claim. in case, i ts the
construction work and same parties
If it is within the jurisdiction of the court and it does not require for
the presence of 3rd parties the court cannot acquire jurisdiction,
such compulsory counterclaim is barred if it is not set up in the
action filed by the opposing party. in case, claim for damages
would have been in RTC juris (P4.5m)

To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, SC
devised the following tests:
ALSO! Since Forbes Park filed a motion to dismiss in Civil Case No.
16540, a compulsory counterclaim at that time is now barred.
Are the issues of fact or law the same in the claim and the
counterclaim?
A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the

original suit and derives its jurisdictional support therefrom. A
counterclaim presupposes the existence of a claim against the party
filing the counterclaim.
Case at hand, the factual issue is whether the structures erected by

Financial Building violate Forbes Parks rules and regulations,
The legal issue is whether Financial Building, as a contractor working
for USSR, could be enjoined from continuing with the construction
and be held liable for damages if it is found to have violated Forbes
Parks rules
In other words, if the dismissal of the main action results in the

dismissal of the counterclaim already filed, it stands to reason that
the filing of a motion to dismiss is an implied waiver of the
compulsory counterclaim because the grant of the motion
ultimately results in the dismissal of the counterclaim.
(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim

absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (wasnt answered, but
okay lang yan! Halata naman!)
Thus, the filing of a motion to dismiss and the setting up of a

compulsory counterclaim are incompatible remedies. He must
choose only one remedy.
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs

claim as well as the defendants counterclaim? (same as 4(a))
(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim? Affirmative answers to the above queries indicate
the existence of a compulsory counterclaim
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Financial Building started by filing an injunction case, claiming

Forbes Parks prohibition on the construction work was improper.
The instant case was initiated by Forbes to compel Financial Building
to remove the same structures it has erected. Thus, the logical
relation between the two cases is patent and it is obvious that
substantially the same evidence is involved in the said cases.
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The ground for dismissal of Forbes was lack of cause of action.

There was no need to plead such motion since the same was not
deemed waived if it was not pleaded. Nonetheless, Forbes Park still
filed a motion to dismiss and thus exercised bad judgment in its
choice of remedies.
Arenas v. CA
Facts: Respnondent Rosalina B. Rojas was the coowner

of a two story building located in Calasiao, Pangasinan.

In 1970, Rojas entered into a verbal contract of lease with Arenas
over one stall in the ground floor so that Arenas can operate an
optical clinic. This was on a month to month basis. In 1990, wanting
to reconstruct the building, Rojas terminated his contract with
Arenas. Despite being sent a notice of termination and demand to
vacate, Arenas remained. Rojas filed for eviction in the MTC for
unlawful detainer and damages against Arenas. The MTC ruled for
Rojas. Arenas counterclaim was dismissed for l ack of e vidence.
However, pending trial, Arenas filed an action for damages,
certiorari with Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining
Order The RTC issued a temporary restraining order i n favor of
Arenas. On appeal to the CA, Rojas won and the CA reversed the
RTC. The Court of Appeals reasoned that since petitioners
interposed a counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages in the
MTC case, they were barred from instituting the RTC case.
involves the removal of signboard in front of the stall, dumping

gravel and sand in front of the stall and cutting off Arenas
electricity. They were not on the basis of lease but of violations on
the civil code provisions on Human relations ( art 19-21)
Secondly, In De leon, Where the issues of the case extend beyond

those
commonly involved in unlawful detainer suits, the case is
converted from a mere detainer suit to one incapable of
pecuniary e stimation thereby placing i t under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. V erily, since the
municipal trial court could not have taken cognizance of the
Issue: Whether the causes of action complained of in the Regional

Trial Court were in the nature of compulsory counterclaims that
must be pleaded in Civil Case No. 658 of the Municipal Trial Court?
claims in Civil Case No. 16890, then such claims could not
be considered as compulsory counterclaims in Civil Case No.
658. The fact that the rule on summary procedure governs
Held: It is different. Arenas wins.
ejectment cases emphasizes the point that an action for
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damages incapable of pecuniary estimation can not be

Ratio:
pleaded as counterclaims therein.
First. In Civil Case No. 16890, the damages prayed for arose
not from contract but from quasidelict. They constitute
separate and distinct causes of action. MTC involves an unlawful
detainer with damages. The basis is the contract of lease. RTC
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Lastly, the acts complained of were committed after the complaint

and the answer was filed.
However, as the Court of Appeals erred, so did the trial court.
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In Civil Case No. 16890, the trial court ruled that the lease was still
subsisting and that the ejectment case was maliciously brought. It
should not have done so. These issues were already decided in Civil
Case No. 658 and affirmed on appeal in Civil Case No. D9996. These
issues, stemming from the lease contract are barred by res judicata.
* note, the case was not decided. It was remanded back to to

determine whether there was bad faith.
Rule 7
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it. The corresponding board resolution to establish that fact was

attached to its motion for reconsideration before the appellate
court. Its plea for reconsideration having been denied, the instant
petition for review was brought up to this Court.
When asked to comment, private respondent bewailed the

belated submission of the required certification. Private
respondent cited the case of Melo vs. Court of Appeals to the effect
that x x x compliance with the certification requirement of nonforum shopping should not be made subject to a partys
afterthought, lest the policy of the l aw be undermined.
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General Milling v. NLRC

*This case is so short, I basically just copied everything and edited
the names to make it less confusing. HAHA.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
W/N the motion for reconsideration should have been granted by

virtue of a substantial compliance with the prescribed procedural
requirements
The case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by

Dativo M. Cacho against General Milling Corporation. The Labor
Arbiter found Cacho to have been illegally dismissed by General
Milling. On appeal before it, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the
Labor Arbiter. General Milling appealed to the Court of Appeals but
the petition was denied for the failure of petitioner to attach the
board resolution to prove that the person who signed the
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was duly authorized by the
board of directors of petitioner corporation. In its motion for
reconsideration, General Milling explained that the signatory of the
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was duly authorized to make
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HELD/RATIO:
Unlike the case of Melo vs. Court of Appeals where there was a
complete failure to attach a Certification of Non-forum Shopping, in
this instance, however, petitioner complied with this procedural
requirement except that it was not accompanied by a board
resolution or a secretarys certificate that the person who signed it
was duly authorized by petitioner to represent it in the case. It

would appear that the signatory of the certification was, in fact,
duly authorized as so evidenced by a board resolution attached to
petitioners motion for reconsideration before the appellate
court. It could thus be said that there was at least substantial
compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the
prescribed procedural requirements.
The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than

frustrate, the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of
court dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be
met at the expense of substantial justice. Technical and
procedural rules are intended to help secure, not suppress, the
cause of justice and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the
rules may be allowed to attain that prime objective for, after all,
the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of
courts.
Spouses Hontiveros v. RTC of Iloilo
BLOCK B 2016
FACTS:
Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for
damages against Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before
the RTC of Iloilo. In said complaint, petitioners alleged that they are
the owners of a parcel of land as shown by an OCT issued pursuant
to the decision of the IAC in a land registration case filed by private
respondent Gregorio Hontiveros; that petitioners were deprived of
income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration
case; that such income consisted of rentals from tenants of the land
in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to 1987, and
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P595,000.00 per year thereafter; and that private respondents filed

the land registration case and withheld possession of the land from
petitioners in bad faith.
In their answer, private respondents denied that they were married
and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Ayson was
single. They denied that they had deprived petitioners of
possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, they
alleged that possession of the property in question had already
been transferred to petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a
writ of possession, the return thereof having been received by
petitioners counsel; that since then, petitioners have been directly
receiving rentals from the tenants of the land; that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action since it did not allege that earnest
efforts towards a compromise had been made, considering that
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private respondent Gregorio
Hontiveros are brothers; that the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court in the land registration case was null and void since
it was based upon a ground which was not passed upon by the trial
court; that petitioners claim for damages was barred by
prescription with respect to claims before 1984; that there were no
rentals due since Gregorio was a possessor in good faith and for
value; and that Ayson had nothing to do with the case as she was
not married to Gregorio and did not have any proprietary interest in
the subject property. Private respondents prayed for the dismissal
of the complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay
damages to private respondents by way of counterclaim, as well as
reconveyance of the subject land to private respondents.
On May 16, 1991, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert
therein an allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise
have been made between the parties but the same were
unsuccessful.

In due time, private respondents filed an Answer to Amended
Complaint with Counterclaim, in which they denied, among other
things, that earnest efforts had been made to reach a compromise
but the parties were unsuccessful.
Of course, there are instances when the trial court may order the
dismissal of the case even without a motion to that effect filed by
any of the parties. In Baja v. Macandog, this Court mentioned these
cases, to wit:
On July 19, 1995, petitioners moved for a judgment on the

pleadings on the ground that private respondents answer did not
tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted the material
allegations of the complaint. Private respondents opposed the
motion alleging that they had denied petitioners claims and thus
tendered certain issues of fact which could only be resolved after
trial.
The court cannot dismiss a case motu proprio without violating the
plaintiffs right to be heard, except in the following instances: if the
plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial; if he fails to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or if he fails
to comply with the rules or any order of the court; or if the court
finds that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
On November 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners

motion. At the same time, however, it dismissed the case on the
ground that the complaint was not verified as required by Art. 151
of the Family Code and, therefore, it did not believe that earnest
efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal,
but their motion was denied. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUES + HELD/RATIO:
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(1) W/N THE RTC ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS -NO
Petitioners contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint when no motion to that effect was made by any of the
parties. They point out that, in opposing the motion for judgment
on the pleadings, private respondents did not seek the dismissal of
the case but only the denial of petitioners motion. Indeed, what
private respondents asked was that trial be held on the merits.
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However, none of these exceptions appears in this case.

Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegation of the
adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of the party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
Under the rules, if there is no controverted matter in the case after
the answer is filed, the trial court has the discretion to grant a
motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party. Where there
are actual issues raised in the answer, such as one involving
damages, which require the presentation of evidence and
assessment thereof by the trial court, it is improper for the judge to
render judgment based on the pleadings alone. In this case, aside
from the amount of damages, the following factual issues have to
be resolved, namely, (1) private respondent Teodora Aysons
participation and/or liability, if any, to petitioners and (2) the
nature, extent, and duration of private respondents possession of

the subject property. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied
petitioners motion for judgment on the pleadings.
(2) W/N THE RTC ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE

GROUND THAT IT DOES NOT ALLEGE UNDER OATH THAT EARNEST
EFFORTS TOWARD A COMPROMISE WERE MADE PRIOR TO THE
FILING THEREOF AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY
CODE -YES
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2016
respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as

plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family
Code. Under this provision, the phrase members of the same
family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children,
ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full
or half-blood. It does not e ven comprehend sisters-in-law.
Five Star Bus v. CA
BLOCK B 2016
Digital Microwave v. CA
The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not affect
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
complaint. The verification is merely a formal requirement
intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are
true and correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations
regarding efforts made to settle the case among members of the
same family, it could simply have ordered petitioners to verify
them. As this Court has already ruled, the court may simply order
the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be
served. Otherwise, mere suspicion or doubt on the part of the trial
court as to the truth of the allegation that earnest efforts had
been made toward a compromise but the parties efforts proved
unsuccessful is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Only if
it is later shown that such efforts had not really been exerted
would the court be justified in dismissing the action.
Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does
not apply in this case since the suit is not exclusively among family
members. Whenever a stranger is a party in a case involving
family members, the requisite showing of earnest efforts to
compromise is no longer mandatory. The inclusion of private
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Iglesia ni Kristo v. CA
Facts:
The heirs of Santos represented by Enrique G. Santos filed a
complaint for Quieting of Title or Accion Reinvindicatoria before the
RTC of Quezon City against petitioner Iglesia ni Kristo(INC). The heirs
of Santos allege that their predecessor have been in open,
continuous and peaceful possession of the property in controversy
covered by the TCT issued by the RoD since 1961.
However, the RoD of QC burned down in 1988 which along
with i t the original copy of the said title. When the Sanots tried to
reconstitute such title they found out that INC was also claiming
ownership over the property as well. The Santos had the property
fenced but it was the INC who deprived the Santos of the final use
and enjoyment of the property.
Relevant CivPro Part:

The complaint appeared to be filed by the heirs of Enrique
Santos (dead guy) who is represented by Enrique G. Santos (buhay
pa and not a zombie). It is Enrique G. Santos who signed the
verification and the certificate of non forum shopping. Complain
states:
I, ENRIQUE G. SANTOS, of legal age, under oath, state that I am one
of the children of the late Enrique Santos and I represent the heirs
of said Enrique Santos who are my co-plaintiffs in the abovecaptioned case and that I directed the preparation of the instant
complaint, the contents of which are true and correct to the best of
my knowledge and the attachments are faithful reproductions of
the official copies in my possession. Blah blah blah point is i t was
only Enrique who signed and not the other co-heirs.
So what did the INC do?
They filed a MTD ofc! On the ground that:
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1. Plaintiffs failed to comply with Sec 5 Rule 7

2. Action for quiet title has prescribed.
3. Complaint was defective in many respects (WTF is that even
a ground?)
The RTC issued an Order denying the MTD and declared that the
signature of Enrique Santos alone constitutes as substantial
compliance with the said rule. CA basically affirmed the RTC
decision.
Issue:
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W/N the signature of Enrique Santos alone is in substantial

compliance of Rule 7 Sect. 5.
Ratio/Held:
YES, The purpose of verification is simply to secure an
assurance that the allegations of the petition (or complaint) have
been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely
speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the
form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not
necessarily render it fatally defective. Indeed, verification is only a
formal, not a jurisdictional requirement. In the case at bar, the
verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with
when, as in the present case, only one of the heirs-plaintiffs, who
has sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the petition (complaint), signed the verification
attached to it. Such verification is deemed sufficient assurance that
the matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or
are true and correct, not merely speculative.
The same liberality should likewise be applied to the
certification against forum shopping. The general rule is that the
certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the
signature of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has
also stressed in a number of cases that the rules on forum shopping
were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration
of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.
The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to
the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of
strict compliance with the provisions merely underscores its

mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.
Hence, the CA ruling was affirmed, and PETITION OH SO FUCKING
DENIED.
Vallacar Transit v. Catubig

Facts:
Vallacar Inc. ownes a Ceres Bulilit bus, driven by Cabanilla, its
employee. Quintin, husband of Jocelyn Catubig, was on his way
home driving a motorcycle with a certain Teddy, when they collided
with the said bus as they were trying to overtake a ten-wheeler
truch in front of them. Both of them died.
Cabanilla was charged with reckless impudence resulting in double
homicide but was acquitted. So, ON JULY 19, 1995, Jocelyn filed
before the RTC a COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES against Vallacar Inc
seeking a total of P484,000 as damages.
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2016
Catubig has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are
true and correct of her personal knowledge or based on authentic
records. It contends that a pleading l acking proper v erification is
treated as an unsigned pleading having no legal effect.
RTC received evidence and then proceeded to pre-trial and ruled for
Vallacar.
CA reversed holding that they were both negligent, and awarded
P250k damages to Catubig.
Hence this petition
Issue:
W/N the complaint should be dismissed for Catubigs failure to
verify the same - No.
Held:
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No.
In its answer with counterclaim, Vallacar contends that the
proximate cause of the collision was the sole negligence of Catubig
when he imprudently overtook another vehicle. As a special and
affirmative defense, Vallacar asks for the dismissal of the complaint
for not being verified and for failure to state a cause of action
because there is no allegation that Vallacar was negligent in its
supervision of its employee Cabanilla.
Vallacar contends that the certification against non-forum shopping
is invalid because it cannot substitute for the verification that
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The complaint was filed in 1995 when the 1964 Rules of Court was
still in effect. The Rule prevailing at that time provided that,
Sec. 6. V erification.A pleading is verified only by an affidavit
stating that the person verifying has read the pleading and that the
allegations thereof are true of his own knowledge.
Verifications based on information and belief, or upon
knowledge, information and belief, shall be deemed insufficient.

On July 1, 1997, the new rules on civil procedure took effect. The
new rule provides that,
any person who personally knows the truth of the allegations in the
pleading may sign it.
SEC. 4. V erification.Except when otherwise specifically required

by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
Basically, the rule for verification of pleadings is this:
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the

pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
knowledge and belief.
Exception: When a law or rule specifically requires verification
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification

based on information and belief, or upon knowledge,
information and belief, or l acks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.
In both cases, the rule is that pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by an affidavit, EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE
SPECIFICALLY REQUIRED BY LAW OR RULE.
In this case, there i s no l aw or rule specifically requiring Catubigs
complaint for damages to have been verified.
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2016
Pajuyo v. CA held that, a partys failure to certify against forum

shopping is different from the failure to sign personally the
verification. The certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed
by the party, not by counsel. Non-compliance renders the petition
defective. On the other hand, verification of a pleading is a formal
and not a jurisdictional requisite. It is intended simply to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct
and not the product of imagination or speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith. A partys representative or lawyer or
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GR: Pleadings need not be verified
Examples of exception:
1. all pleading filed in civil cases under the 1991 Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure
2. petition for review from the RTC to SC raising pure
questions of law
3. petition for review from RTC to CA
4. petition for review from quasi-judicial bodies to CA
5. petition for review to the SC
6. petition for annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions
7. complaint for injunction
8. application for TRO or preliminary injunction
9. application for appointment of a receiver
10. application for support pendente lite
11. petition for certiorari against constitutional commissions
12. petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under
Rule 65
13. petition for quo warranto
14. complaint for expropriation
15. petition for indirect contempt
16. all complaints or petitions involving intra-corporate
controversies
17. complaint or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of
payment

18. petition for declaration nullity and annulment of marriages
under the Family Code
The rule for certification is this:
All initiatory pleadings must be accompanied by a certificate against
forum shopping
In this case, there was such a certificate.
However, Vallacar wins the case because Catubig failed to prove
imputable negligence on its part.
Rule 8
KALILID WOODS INDUSTRY CORP. v. IAC
G.R. No. L-75502 November 12, 1987
BLOCK B 2016
Facts: Joaquin Miguel de Jesus and Alfredo Salonga, President and

Comptroller, respectively, of the P.B. De Jesus & Co., Inc. executed
two promissory notes (PNs) in favor of respondent Philippine Bank
Corporation (PBC) in the amount of P600,000 and P300,000. In the
PNs, it was stated that there would be interest rate of 14% from the
day of execution until paid and De Jesus and Alfredo signed them in
behalf of P.B. De Jesus and in their personal capacity.
Later, P.B. De Jesus changed its company name to Kalilid Woods
Industry Corporation. Thereafter, PBC served several letters of
demand upon Kalilid for the payment of the two PNs. Kalilid,
however, disowned its alleged indebtedness under the PNs. Thus,
PBC filed a complaint for collection against Kalilid, alleging it should
be held solidary liable with de Jesus and Alfredo. In addition to the
PNs, the bank submitted two Statements of Account to substantiate
its claims for a total of P1,780,253.08 due under the PNs with
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service charges, penalty charges, and interest charges due on

interest.
Kalilid, i n its answer, alleged that i t had no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material
allegations and that since de Jesus and Alfredo were not
authorized to contract such loans, they should be held solely liable.
This answer, however, was not verified.
Unable to arrive at an amicable settlement, a summary judgment
was rendered, through an unopposed motion by PBC. The summary
judgment found Kalilid, on its implied admission, liable to
respondent Bank for the obligations under the two PNs. This was
affirmed in toto on appeal. On petition for review before the
Supreme Court, Kalilid no longer denies its liabilities and obligations
under the PNs, but contests the correctness of the aggregate
amount of its indebtedness, as claimed by PBC.
Issue: W/N petitioner Kalilids failure to deny under oath
respondent Banks material allegations in the complaint made the
former liable to the claims of the latter.
Held: No. The Court agrees with the appellate court that Kalilid, due
to its failure to verify its answer, is deemed to have admitted by
implication the authenticity and due execution of the PNs, placing
Kalilid in estoppel for disclaiming liability under the PNs. There
being no genuine issue regarding the existence and validity its
liabilities in its PNs, summary judgment was properly and
appropriately rendered.
However, with respect to the amount of Kalilids total i ndebtedness
to PBC, it was error for the appellate court to have expanded the
scope of Kalilids i mplied admission of genuiness and due execution

to include the two Statements of Account. On this point, Rule 8, Sec.
8 of the Rules of Court is quite specific:
Sec. 8. How to contest genuineness of such documents. When an
action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in
or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party,
under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims
to be the facts; but this provision does not apply when the adverse
party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when
compliance with an order for an inspection of the original
instrument i s refused.
In this case, both Statements of Account were prepared exclusively
by PBC since they were printed under the official letter head of PBC,
prepared by the Loans and Discounting Dept. of PBC, and bore the
signature of PBCs authorized officer. Not having been privy thereto,
Kalilid did not admit the genuineness and due execution of the
Statements despite its failure to verify its answer to the complaint,
and that it is not conclusively bound by the charges nor by the
computations of amounts set out therein. The aggregate amount of
Kalilids monetary obligations to PBC i s determinable from the
common stipulations and conditions contained in PNs, under which
Kalilid bound itself to pay PBC.
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Permanent Savings Bank v. Velarde
Rule 9
Sps. Diaz v. CA
Vlason Enterprises Corporation vs. CA and Duraproof
Services
GR Nos. 121662-64. July 6, 1999. Ponente: Panganiban
Petitioner: Vlason Enterprises Corporation

Respondent: Court of Appeals and Duraproof Services, represented
by its General Manager Cesar Urbina
Facts:
Poro Point Shipping Services requested permission for its
vessel, which had engine trouble, to unload its cargo and store it at
the Philippine Ports Authority compound in San Fernando, La Union.
It was approved by the Bureau of Customs. However, the customs
personnel still boarded the vessel and seized the same ad its cargo
believing that it was the hijacked vessel owned by Med Line
Philippines, Co. A notice of hearing for seizure proceedings was
served to its consignee, Singkong Trading, and its shipper, Dusit
International. While the same was ongoing, La Union was hit by
three typhoons causing the vessel to run aground and abandoned.
In line with this, Cadacio, its authorized representative, entered into
a salvage agreement with respondent Duraproof to secure and
repair the vessel.
The vessel and cargo were eventually forfeited in favor of
the government despite the finding that no fraud was committed.
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So, to enforce i ts preferred salvors lien, Duraproof filed a complaint
with RTC assailing this action, and in an amended petition included
the petitioner as respondent but failed to include any allegation
against it nor any prayer for relief against it. Summons were served
and respondents therein were declared in default (however, there
was no order of default in the case of Vlason). Duraproof was
allowed to present evidence ex parte against them and eventually,
judgment was rendered against them.
Issue: Whether or not judgment by default was proper i n V lasons
case
Held/Ratio:
No order of default was issued ordering Vlason in default since the
motion to include it was denied by the trial court. There being no
order of default against Vlason, trial court has no authority to order
the presentation of evidence exparte against the petitioner and
there could not have been any valid default-judgment rendered
against it.
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The issuance of an order of default is a condition essential in order

that a judgment of default be clothed with validity. There was never
any record which shows that the court allowed the presentation of
evidence ex parte against Vlason.
(Also: The trial court did not have jurisdiction over Vlason because it
was not informed of any cause of action against it since it was not
validly summoned. A new summons for the amended complaint is
needed.)
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Mediserv Inc. et al. v. Chinabank

Private respondent China Banking Corporation filed a complaint for
a sum of money to recover deficiency judgment in foreclosure
proceedings against the petitioners. Mediserv et al. executed and
delivered three promissory notes covering an aggregate sum of P18
million, and secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land
but defaulted.
Mediserv, Incorporated, Hernando Delizo and Marissa Delizo filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion to Dismiss and/or
Answer, praying that they be given an additional period of 15 days
from April 16, 1998 or up to May 1, 1998, within which to file their
appropriate pleading or motion.
The counsels for Mediserv et al. withdrew their appearance.
On April 30, 1998, the Mediserv et al. filed another motion for
extension for an additional 15 days, from May 1, 1998 or up to
May 16, 1998, within which to file their pleading or motion, averring
that they were shopping for a new counsel.
His Honor granted the motion, with the warning this time that no
further extension would be entertained. Despite such warning, on
May 15, 1998, the defendants filed yet another motion for a last
extension of time to file their motion to dismiss and/or Answer,
seeking yet another ten days from May 16, 1998, or up to May 26,
1998 to do so, claiming anew that they were still looking for a new
counsel. THIS MOTION WAS DENIED.
On May 26, 1998, the Mediserv et al. filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of litis pendentia, lack of cause of action
and payment of claim. Subsequently, Chinabank moved to declare
petitioners in default.

Judge i ssued an order denying the defendants motion to dismiss,
and declaring the defendants in default.
On August 20, Mediserv et al. filed an Omnibus motion to lift the
order of default and to dismiss the case due to Chinabank's violation
of certification of non-forum shopping.
The Judge denied the motion to lift the order of default but did not
rule on the other issues.
Petitioners appealed to CA but CA upheld the RTC's dismissal due to
default.
Issue: W/N the court erred in dismissing the motion to lift default
without taking cognizance of the other issues
Ruling: NO.
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(full quote, emphasis mine)

A party declared in default is deprived of the right to take part in the
trial and forfeits his rights as a party litigant except the right to
receive notice of subsequent proceedings. To obtain relief from an
order of default, the said party may at any time after notice thereof
and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside order of
default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a
meritorious defense. If not accompanied by an affidavit of merit,
the trial court has no authority to consider the same. Petitioners
failed to set aside the order of default and must suffer the
consequences thereof.
Petitioners submission that their Motion to Dismiss, having been
filed ahead of respondent banks Motion to Declare Defendants in
Default, must take precedence and should have been resolved first,
does not i mpress us. Petitioners period to file responsive pleading
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had expired, and was overtaken by respondents motion to declare

them in default, which was filed eight (8) days later (or on June 4,
1998). There is no rule or jurisprudence that mandates that both
incidents cannot be resolved together. In fact, an order of default
can be made only upon motion of the claiming party and the motion
herein was precisely based on the defendants failure to file his
responsive pleading/motion to dismiss on time. The second motion
to dismiss contained in the August 20, 1998 Omnibus Motion and
the Motion to Cite for Contempt cannot be entertained until the
default order is lifted and the petitioners standing as party litigant
is restored.
Petitioners claim that respondent bank slept on i ts rights
apparently because it did not immediately file its motion to declare
petitioners in default. But they committed a more serious delay,
fatal to their rights, by filing a motion to dismiss way beyond the
forty five (45) days granted for them to do so, and without any
satisfactory explanation under oath for their late action, despite the
courts warning that no further extension would be granted after
the earlier motions for extension were granted, nor any showing
that they have a meritorious defense. The defective Omnibus
Motion was correctly denied and the reliefs sought therein could
not be granted as petitioners failed to purge themselves of the
effects of a declaration of default.
TITLE: Jose R. Martinez vs. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 160895
DATE: October 30, 2006
PONENTE: Tinga, J.

DOCTRINE: A defendant has the remedy of appealing from a
judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to
the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has
been presented by him. This remedy is not found in the current
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, it is anchored on Section 2,
Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules of Court. While the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure did not replicate the provision that allowed this remedy,
this remedy finds legal basis, among other legal bases explained in
the ratio, in the principle of stare decisis which is evidenced by
jurisprudence applying the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which has
continued to acknowledge the right to appeal as among the
remedies of a defendant, and no argument in this petition
persuades the Court to rule otherwise.
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2016
Despite the opposition of the OSG, the RTC issued an order

of general default during the hearing of the case, when no
party appeared before the court to oppose the application.
The OSG appealed with the CA, which reversed the RTC
decision and instead ordered the dismissal of the petition
for registration. The CA found the evidence presented by
Martinez insufficient to support the registration of the
subject lots.
ISSUES:
FACTS:
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Martinez filed a petition for the registration of 3 parcels of

land included in the Cortes, Surigao del Sur Cadastre. He
alleged that he purchased these lots in 1952 from his uncle,
whose predecessors-in-initerest were traceable up to the
1870s, that he remained in continuous possession of the
lots, that they have remained unencumbered, and that they
have become private property through prescription
pursuant to Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141
The OSG, on behalf of the Republic, opposed the petition on
the grounds that the possession of the appellee was not in
accordance with Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, that his
muniments of title were insufficient to prove acquisition
and possession, and that the properties were part of public
domain.
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1. (CIVPRO RELATED) Does an order of general default issued

by a trial court in a land registration case bar the Republic of
the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
from interposing an appeal from the trial courts
subsequent decision in favor of the applicant? [GENERALLY,
does an order of default bar a defendant from interposing
an appeal from a judgment rendered against him?]
2. (unrelated) Did Martinez sufficiently adduce the necessary
evidence to secure the registration of the subject lots in his
name?
HELD/RATIO:
1. NO.
In the first place, the default order was improper

because the pertinent provision of the law

regarding general orders of default (Section 26, P.D.
No. 1529) states that a general order of default may
be issued if no person appears and ANSWERS
within the time allowed. Citing Director of Lands
vs. Santiago, the Court said that the l aw cannot be
interpreted to mean that the court can just
disregard the answer before it, which has long been
filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing
less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust.
law, even if no petition for relief to set aside

the order of default had been presented by
him in accordance with Rule 38
HISTORY OF EFFECT OF AN ORDER OF DEFAULT:

o 1920, Velez vs. Ramos: a party in default
loses his standing i n court, he cannot be
entitled to the service of notices in the case,
nor to appear in the suit in any way. He
cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be
heard at the final hearing.
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o 1948, Lim Toco vs. Go Fay (expanded Velez):

a defendant in default had no right to
appeal the judgment rendered by the trial
court, except where a motion to set aside
the order of default has been filed
o Section 2, Rule 41, 1964 Rules of Court
(reversed Lim Toco): [a] party who has
been declared in default may likewise
appeal from the judgment rendered against
him as contrary to the evidence or to the
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Clearly specified that the right to

appeal was available even if no
petition for relief to set aside the
order of default had been filed
o 1997, the Rules of Civil Procedure amended

the provision found in the 1964 Rules of
Court, DELETING the provision that
categorically allowed the right of a
defendant declared in default to appeal an
adverse decision
o The OSG did not challenge its propriety

therefore it would be improper for the
Court to make a pronouncement as to the
validity of the default order itself
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2016
Was the Lim Toco doctrine resintated? NO: The

Court does not hesitate to rely upon the doctrine
laid down in the case of Lina vs. the Court of
Appeals which enumerated the remedies available
to a party declared in default:
o Before judgment, file a motion to set aside
the order of default on the ground of FAME
and he has a meritorious defense
o After judgment, before finality, file a
motion for new trial
o After judgment, after finality, file a petition
for relief
o Appeal from the judgment rendered
against him as contrary to the evidence or
to the law, even if no petition to set aside

the order of default has been presented by
him
in this petition persuades the Court to rule

otherwise
What is the legal basis relied upon by the courts to

continue to enforce this right?
o Annotated textbooks on the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, notably those by:
Justice Francisco
Justice Regalado
Former Court of Appeals Justice

Herrerra, who added that A
judgment by default may be
considered as one that completely
disposes of a case when explaining
that appeals are confined to cases
from a final judgment or final order
that completely disposes of a case.
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o The principle of Stare Decisis: jurisprudence

applying the 1997 Rules has continued to
acknowledge the Lina doctrine which
embodies this right to appeal as among he
remedies of a defendant, and no argument
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All of which reiterate the

Lina doctrine
o The new provision regarding appeals found

in the 1997 Rules of Procedure enumerates
the various rulings from which no appeal
may be taken, judgments in default are not
included
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2016
Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina vs. Land

Bank of the Philippines provides a
comprehensive restatement of the
remedies of a party declared in
default, INCLUDING the right of
appeal from a judgment in default
and assail said judgment on the
ground that said judgment was
contrary to evidence or to the law
THEREFORE: [W]e hold that a defendant party

declared in default retains the right to appeal from
the judgment by default on the ground that the
plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of
the complaint or that the decision is contrary to
law, even without need of the prior filing of a
motion to set aside the order of default. We
reaffirm that the Lim Toco doctrine was no l onger
controlling in this jurisdiction upon the effectivity of
the 1964 Rules of Court, and up to this day.
2. NO
The Court upheld the decision of the CA stating appellee has
apparently taken the absence of representation for appellant at the
hearing of his petition as license to be perfunctory in the
presentation of his evidence It i s not enough for an applicant to
declare himself or his predecessors-in-interest the possessors and
owners of the land for which registration is sought. He must present
specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just
offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law
requiring e videntiary support and substantiation.

-
Republic v. Hidalgo
G.R 161657 || October 4, 2007
On July 7, 2003, court issued an order declaring the

petitioner Republic in default and allowing the private respondent
to present her evidence ex parte
3. Mendoza filed a suit with the RTC of Manila for

reconveyance and declaration of nullity of a deed of sale
and title against the Republic, Register of Deeds of Manila
and Atty. Fidel Vivar.
4. Mendoza alleged being the owner of the disputed Arlegui
property which the Republic forcibly dispossessed her of
and over which the Register of Deeds of Manila issued TCT
in the name of the Republic
RTC of Manila dismissed the complaint
CA reversed the RTC order and remanded the case to court

a quo
On May 5, 2003, Mendoza filed a Motion for Leave of Court
to file a third amended complaint
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No answer was ever filed
Trial court rendered a judgment by default for Mendoza and

against the Republic
Facts:
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2016
On May 16, 2003 RTC admitted the third amended

complaint, ordered the Republic to file its answer within 5 days
and set a date for pre-trial
On May 21, 2003, Republic, represented by OSG filed
motion for extension where it manifested its inability to simply
adopt its previous answer and, accordingly, asked that it be given
a period of 30 days from May 21, 2003 or until June 20, 2003
within which to submit an Answer
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a. declaring the TCT issued in favor of the republic has

no basis and is null and void from the beginning
b. ordering Republic to pay 1.48 billion as reasonable
rental compensation from july 1975- July 30, 2003 (the period
when Republic took over the property)
Republic moved for, but was denied, a new trial per order of
the trial court of October 7, 2003
-
Hence, petition for certiorari
Issue:
W/N respondent Judge Hidalgo acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing an order declaring the petitioner Republic in
default and rendering judgement by default in favor of Mendoza
and against the Republic.
Held:
a. Petition is without merit with regard to the declaration of
the TCT of the Republic over the land as null and void.
b. Petition is with merit regarding the order of the trial court
to pay respondent 1.48 billion as rental compensation
Ratio:

justification to join issue upon the allegations tendered by the
plaintiff
a.
-Due process, in its procedural aspect, guarantees in the minimum
the opportunity to be heard. Grave abuse of discretion, however,
cannot plausibly be laid at the doorstep of the respondent judge on
account of his having issued the default order against the petitioner,
then proceeding with the hearing and eventually rendering a
default judgment. For, what the respondent judge did hew with
what Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court prescribes and allows in
the event the defending party fails to seasonably file a responsive
pleading. The provision reads:
b. The court finds the monetary award set forth therein to be

erroneous
-
respondent judge brazenly went around the explicit

command of rule 9, section 3d of the Rules of court which defines
the extent of the relief that may be awarded in a judgment by
default, i.e, only so much as has been alleged and proved. 2
The court acts in excess of jurisdiction if it awards an
amount beyond the claim made in the complaint or beyond that
proved by the evidence
The act of the respondent judge in rendering the default

judgment after an order of default was properly issued cannot be
struck down as a case of grave abuse of discretion.
The court took account the facts that the Arlegui property is
relatively small with an assessed value of only 2.38 million and
that it had minimal rental value during the relatively long amrtial
law years. Hence, the award of 20,000 pesos per month is a more
reasonable rental compensation.
The mere issuance by the trial court of the order of default

followed by a judgment by default can easily be sustained as
correct and doubtless within its jurisdiction.
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Respondent only claims 371 million as rental claim
Trial court ordered to pay private respondent the total of

over 1.48 billion representing reasonable rental for the property
from the time the Government took over the property until before
trial court rendered judgment-28 years.
Section 3: Default; declaration of-- If the defending party fails to

answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon
motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and
proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default.
Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the
claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in
its discretion requires the claimant to submit e vidence...
The petitioner may have been deprived of such hearing, but

this does not mean that its right to due process had been violated
2
The defaulting defendant is deemed to have waived his

right to be heard to take part in the trial
The law itself imposes such deprivation of the right to
participate as a form of penalty against one unwilling without
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Rule 9, Section 3: (d) Extent of relief to be awarded- A judgment

rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or
be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated
damages.

Rule 10
Siasoco v. CA
Memory Aid: Sale of parcels of land to INC. Sale not perfected.
During the case, complaint was amended.
Doctrine:
In their letter dated January 8, 1997, petitioners claimed that the

INC had not really accepted the offer, adding that, prior to their
receipt of the aforementioned reply on December 24, 1996, they
had already contracted with Carissa for the sale of the said
properties due to the absence of any response to their offer from
INC.
1) Notwithstanding the filing of a responsive pleading by

one defendant, the complaint may still be amended
once, as a matter of right, by the plaintiff in respect to
claims against the non-answering defendant(s).
Maintaining that a sale had been consummated, INC demanded that

the corresponding deed be executed in its favor. Petitioners
refused. The ensuing events were narrated by the Court of Appeals,
as follows: This is the procedural part. The ones in bold are the
important ones.
2) Amendment may be refused if there are circumstances

such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse
party by surprise or the like, which might justify a
refusal of permission to amend
On January 14, 1997, private respondent filed a civil suit for

[s]pecific [p]erformance and [d]amages against petitioners and
Carissa Homes and Development & Properties, Inc. docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-97-29960.
Facts:
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Petitioners were the registered owners of nine parcels of land

located in Montalban, Rizal. In December 1994, they began to offer
the subject properties for sale. Subsequently, Iglesia ni Cristo (INC)
negotiated with the petitioners, but the parties failed to agree on
the terms of the purchase. More than a year later, both parties
revived their discussions. In a letter dated December 16, 1996,
petitioners made a final offer to the INC. The l atters counsel sent a
reply received by Petitioner Mario Siasoco on December 24, 1996,
stating that the offer was accepted, but that the INC was not
amenable to your proposal to an undervaluation of the total
consideration.
Petitioners filed therein a Motion to Dismiss on the

ground of improper venue and lack of capacity to sue.
Carissa Homes filed i ts answer to the complaint on

February 24, 1997.
Pending resolution of petitioners Motion to Dismiss,

private respondent negotiated with Carissa Homes which
culminated in the purchase of the subject properties of
Carissa Homes by private respondent.
On April 24, 1997, private respondent filed an

[A]mended [C]omplaint, dropping Carissa Homes as one
of the defendants and changing the nature of the case to
a mere case for damages.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Strike Out Amended

Complaint, contending that the complaint cannot be
(Basically it appeared that the contract of sale was not perfected)
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2016
amended without leave of court, since a responsive

pleading has been filed.
receipt of the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss which will not be

forthcoming.
On August 11, 1997, the first assailed order denying

petitioners Motion to Strike Out Amended Complaint was
rendered.
Issue: The only one that relates to procedure:
On August 31, 1997, petitioners filed a Motion for

Suspension of Proceeding pending the resolution [by] the
respondent court of the Motion to Dismiss earlier filed.
On September 11, 1997, the second assailed order
denying petitioners Motion to Suspend Proceeding was
rendered[;] the Order reads:
Filed also l ast September 1, 1997 [was] a Motion for Suspension by

the defendant Siasoco thru their counsel Atty. Clara DumandangSingh. Although the court could not consider the motion filed
because it violates the new rules on personal service, in the interest
of justice, the court will resolve the motion. In the resolution of this
court dated August 11, 1997, it state[d] that defendants [were
being] given a period of five (5) days within which to file [an] answer
to the Amended Complaint. The defendants here obviously refer to
the defendants Mario Siasoco, et. al. In the Motion for Suspension
filed by the defendants Siasoco, et al., the latter insist on the court
resolving the motion to dismiss. As stated in the resolution, the
motion to dismiss is now moot and academic because of the
Amended Complaint from Specific Performance with Damages to
just Damages. For this court to resolve the Motion to Dismiss xxx
the first complaint, would be an exercise in futility. The main
complaint now is damages and no longer Specific Performance with
damages which [was] actually what the Resolution dated August 11,
1997 [was] all about. Be that as it may, the court gives defendants
Siasoco, et al. fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order to file their
respective Answers to the Amended Complaint, not from the
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Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in

holding that the respondent Judges admission of INCs Amended
Complaint was proper?
Held: The amendment was properly admitted.
It is clear that plaintiff (herein private respondent) can amend its
complaint once, as a matter of right, before a responsive pleading is
filed. Contrary to the petitioners contention, the fact that Carissa
had already filed its Answer did not bar private respondent from
amending its original Complaint once, as a matter of right, against
herein petitioners. Indeed, where some but not all the defendants
have answered, plaintiffs may amend their Complaint once, as a
matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the nonanswering defendants, but not as to claims asserted against the
other defendants
The rationale for the aforementioned rule is in Section 3, Rule 10 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that after a responsive pleading
has been filed, an amendment may be rejected when the defense
is substantially altered. Such amendment does not only prejudice
the rights of the defendant; it also delays the action. In the first
place, where a party has not yet filed a responsive pleading, there
are no defenses that can be altered. Furthermore, the Court has
held that [a]mendments to pleadings are generally favored and
should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that
every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and
in order to speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuitry of action
and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as

inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or
the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend.
In the present case, petitioners failed to prove that they were
prejudiced by private respondents Amended Complaint. True,
Carissa had already filed its own Answer. Petitioners, however, have
not yet filed any. Moreover, they do not allege that their defense is
similar to that of Carissa. On the contrary, private respondents
claims against the latter and against petitioners are different.
Against petitioners, whose offer to sell the subject parcels of land
had allegedly been accepted by private respondent, the latter is
suing for specific performance and damages for breach of contract.
Although private respondent could no longer amend, as a matter of
right, its Complaint against Carissa, it could do so against petitioners
who, at the time, had not yet filed an answer.
The amendment did not prejudice the petitioners or delay the
action. Au contraire, it simplified the case and tended to expedite its
disposition. The Amended Complaint became simply an action for
damages, since the claims for specific performance and declaration
of nullity of the sale have been deleted
Versoza v. CA
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A case of amended complaints and confusion over the status quo

FACTS:
Uson mortgaged land in Pangasinan to Verzosa for P25,000. Verzosa
foreclosed on the mortgage when Uson was unable to pay the debt
in full. Uson filed with the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan a complaint
for annulment of mortgage with a petition for the issuance of a writ
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of preliminary injunction against the foreclosure sale. The complaint

was dismissed, however, because Uson failed to personally verify it.
She moved for reconsideration, which was granted, and she
thereby filed an amended complaint bearing the proper
verification.
While the case was pending, the auction sale was conducted and
Verzosa emerged as the highest bidder. Subsequently, the RTC
admitted the amended complaint of Uson. Verzosa filed a petition
for certiorari in the CA, alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse
of discretion in admitting the amended complaint. After the
redemption period of 1 year, the OCT of Uson was cancelled and a
TCT was issued in the name of Verzosa. Verzosa promptly sold the
property to Martinez, and a TCT was i ssued in Martinezs name.
Later, the CA issued a decision sustaining the validity of the RTCs
admission of Usons amended complaint. Uson filed a second
amended complaint to implead Martinez and the Register of
Deeds of Pangasinan and prayed that Martinezs TCT be annulled.
The RTC issued two orders prohibiting Martinez and/or Verzosa
from exercising acts of ownership over the property. Verzosa moved
for clarification, and the RTC explained that the status quo being
maintained was Usons possession of the land and not the fact
that Martinez had secured a TCT. Verzosa and Martinez filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA, which were dismissed.
ISSUE: What constituted the status quo ante in the application of
the injunctive writ, given that Usons complaint was amended? Was
it Usons possession or Martinezs title to the property?
HELD: The status quo was Usons possession. The status quo is
the last actual peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a
controversy, and its preservation is the office of an injunctive writ.
Amending a complaint only changes the status quo referred by the

application for an injunctive writ if the amendment introduces a
new or different cause of action.
because he has performed these acts before final hearing

has been had, but after the beginning of the action. A
defendant thus acts at his peril. It
has been held that [t]he general rule of law is
that, where a defendant completes, after the beginning of
an action, the act thereby sought to be restrained, and
before the issue of any final order or decree,
the court has the power to, and may, compel, by a
mandatory injunction, the restoration of the former
condition of things and thereby prevent the giving of an
advantage by reason of the wrongful act.
In this case, the first amendment only included the proper

verification of the complaint. The second amendment, on the other
hand, only impleaded Martinez and the Register of Deeds because
Verzosa and the Sheriff proceeded with the sale despite the
pendency of the case for the annulment of the mortgage. It was thus
that Verzosa acquired the property and immediately sold it on to
Martinez, who subsequently secured a TCT. The case still remained
one for annulment of the mortgage and securing Usons ownership
of the property.
Doctrines:
1) It follows that when the amended complaint does not
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introduce new issues, causes of action, or demands, the suit

is deemed to have commenced on the date the original
complaint was filed, not on the date of the filing of the
amended complaint. In other words, for demands already
included in the original complaint, the suit is deemed to
have commenced upon the filing of such original
complaint. In short, for purposes of determining the
commencement of a suit, the original complaint is deemed
abandoned and superseded by the amended complaint only
if the amended complaint introduces a new or different
cause of action or demand.
2) Where the acts have been performed prior to the filing of

the injunction suit, the general rule is that consummated
acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. However,
where the acts are performed after the injunction suit is
brought, a defendant may not as [a matter] of right proceed
to perform the acts sought to be restrained and then be
heard to assert in the suit that the injunction will not lie
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Chua v. CA
Asean Pacific v. Urdaneta
Tiu v. PBCOM
Facts:
-
In June 1993, Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI),

represented by petitioners, applied for a real estate loan
guaranteed with a collateral with PBCOM to fund its
purified water distribution business.
In August 1996, AWRI applied for another loan from PBCOM

but without any additional real estate collateral.
Considering that the proposed additional loan was

unsecured, PBCOM required all the members of the Board
of Directors of AWRI to become sureties.

-
Thus, a Surety Agreement was executed by its Directors

and acknowledged by a notary public on the same date. A
copy was sent to the Records Management and Archives
Office, through the Office of the RTC Clerk of Court.
Issue: WON the RTC made a valid order in allowing allowing the
substitution of the document (Surety Agreement).
Thereafter, AWRI informed the bank of its desire to pay the

loan through dacion en pago for AWRIs e xisting l oan
obligation to the bank. PBCOM denied the request and
demanded payment.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings

to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that the real
controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined, and the case decided on the merits without
unnecessary delay.
Because of non-payment, PBCOM filed a complaint for

collection.
Petitioners, in their Answer, allege that that they were not

personally liable on the promissory notes, because they
signed the Surety Agreement in their capacities as officers
of AWRI. They claimed that the Surety Agreement were
falsified, considering that when they signed the same, the
words In his personal capacity did not yet appear in the
document and were merely inserted without their
knowledge and consent.
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PBCOM then filed a Reply, admitting its mistake in making

the insertion and explained that it was made without the
knowledge and consent of the notary public. PBCOM also
filed an Answer to Counterclaim with Motion for Leave of
Court to Substitute Annex A of the Complaint, wherein it
attached the duplicate original copy retrieved from the file
of the notary public.
The RTC issued an Order allowing the substitution of the

altered document with the original Surety Agreement
The petitioners appealed to the CA to disallow the

substitution; the appellate court ruled in favor of PBCOM.
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Held / Ratio:
Petition DENIED / WITHOUT MERIT.
Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be

liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case,
may so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and in order
to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuity of action and
unnecessary expense. That
is, unless there are circumstances
such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by
surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to
amend.
In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of
PBCOM in submitting the altered surety agreement. In fact, the
bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to have submitted
it in the first place instead of the original agreement.
TANTUICO v REPUBLIC
Facts:
The Republic filed a case against defendants Kokoy Romualdez,
Imelda and Ferdinand
Marcos as principal defendants, with the Sandiganbayan. Tantuico
who was the Chairman of the Commission on Audit during the
Marcos regime was included as a defendant. Republic contends that
1.) Tantuico connived with the principal defendants, and acted as a
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dummy, nominee, or agent by allowing himself to be a stockholder
in the corporations held by the other defendants (where the
Marcoses got their ill gotten wealth) and 2.) Tantuico supposedly
abused his powers as a public officer (through illegal disbursement
of public funds). Tantuico filed a motion for a bill of particulars
saying that he is being sued both as a public officer and a private
individual and that the complaint against him is couched in
general terms without particular factual basis of specific acts he
committed (ex. What
duties did he breached?, when was the issuance of the resolutions
in question? , what departments and gov agencies were allegedly
involved in his acts, what are the names of auditors that he
connived with?, etc.) Sandiganbayan denied his motion saying that
the particulars Tantuico sought are evidentiary in nature. Tantuico
filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied.
Issue: W/N Sandiganbayan acted with Grave Abuse of Discretion
when i t denied Tantuicos motion for a bill of particulars
HELD: Yes, Sandiganbayan acted with GAD. The Republic is ordered
to PREPARE
and FILE a Bill of Particulars. Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court
provides that before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive
pleading is permitted by these rules, within ten (10) days after
service of the pleading upon him, a party may move for a more
definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is
not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable
him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for
trial. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of and the
details desired.
The allegations that defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with
the other defendants "embarked upon a systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth" and that said defendants acted "in
flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as
public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and in
Coming Soon
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2016
brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines", are

conclusions of law andunsupported by factual premises.
Furthermore, as to the allegation that Tantuico abused his position
as chairman of COA , the duties that were allegedly breached was
not stated in the complaint in fact the Chairman of COA does not
participate or personally audit all disbursements and withdrawals of
government funds, as well as transactions involving government
property. The averments in the particular paragraph of the
complaint merely assume that petitioner participated in or
personally audited all disbursements and withdrawals of
government funds, and all transactions involving government
property. Hence, the alleged withdrawals, disbursements and
questionable use of government funds could not have been, "within
the peculiar and intimate knowledge of petitioner as Chairman of
the COA." Without the particulars prayed for in Tantuico's motion
for a bill of particulars, it can be said the petitioner cannot
intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.
BLOCK B 2016
Coming Soon
BLOCK B
2016

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CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

Korea Exchange Bank v. filkor ..................................................22

Filing Fees ....................................................................................2

Relucio v. Lopez ......................................................................23

SUSON VS CA AND ODILAO........................................................2

Manchester Development Corp. v. CA........................................3

Mijares v Ranada ......................................................................5

International Express v. CA ......................................................26

DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES vs. SECURITY BANK ........................6

Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals ...............7

Auction in Malinta v Warren Embes Layuben............................26

Gumabon vs. Larin ..................................................................27

Melana v. Tappa .......................................................................9

Herald Black Dacasin v. Sharon del Mundo Dacasin.....................9

Far East Bank v. Shemberg.......................................................10

San Miguel v. Sandiganbayan...................................................11

FINANCIAL SERVICES vs. FORBES..............................................35

De Leon v. CA. ........................................................................11

General Milling v. NLRC ...........................................................39

Sta. Clara Homeowners Association v. Spouses Gaston ............12

Spouses Hontiveros v. RTC of Iloilo...........................................40

Centeno v. Centeno ................................................................15

Five Star Bus v. CA...................................................................42

Citytrust Banking Corporation v Isagani Villanueva....................18

Digital Microwave v. CA...........................................................42

Macaslang v. Zamora ..............................................................19

Iglesia ni Kristo v. CA ...............................................................42

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

TANTUICO v REPUBLIC ............................................................59

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

provided, of course, that the applicable prescriptive or

It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate

Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not

Strictly, the complaint cant be deemed to have been refilled as i t

Manchester Development Corp. v. CA

The petitioner filed: a case of an action for torts and

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

The amount of damages sought by petitioner was not

The petitioner then amended the complaint and reduced

The petitioner asserts that the filling fees to be paid should

The CA ruled that the filing fees to be paid must be based

* NOTE: The petitioner relies on Magaspi v. Ramolete. Refer to

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES vs. SECURITY BANK

RESPONDENTS: Security Bank Corp., Titolaido E. Payongayong,

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and

Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

b. (relevant to CivPro) BENECO contends that exemplary

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

On April 1994, petitioner Herald, an American and

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

Also, petitioners suit seeks the e nforcement not of the

Far East Bank v. Shemberg

Shemberg and Co. are owners of parcels of land in Mandue

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

forum must be the Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation

CIVIL PROCEDURE DIGESTS