Professional Documents
Culture Documents
3d 25
Carlos A. Del Valle Cruz, with whom Ricardo L. Torres Munoz, Hato
Rey, PR, was on brief, for appellant.
Teresa Medina Monteserin, with whom Manuel D. Herrero Garcia, Hato
Rey, PR, and Miguel A. Pagan-Rivera, San Juan, PR, were on brief, for
appellees.
Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and
LAGUEUX, District Judge. *
LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge.
(1) because of her political affiliation with Puerto Rico's Popular Democratic
Party in violation of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988), (2) without a hearing in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
and (3) in disregard of her handicapped condition in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 12101-12213 (Supp. IV 1992).
2
3
Before
the Court is the defendants' unopposed motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. After fully reading the same, the Court finds itself in accord with the
legal arguments proffered by the defendants in support of their motion.
4
WHEREFORE,
for the reasons stated in defendants' motion, this case is hereby
DISMISSED pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).4 (footnote supplied).
5
I.
6
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in
support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief." Carney v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 19 F.3d 950, 954 (5th Cir.1994); e.g., Vartanian, 14 F.3d at 700.
7
II.
9
10
Court of Va., 446 U.S. at 732, 100 S.Ct. at 1974; Roberson v. Mullins, 29 F.3d
132, 134 (4th Cir.1994); see Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 108 S.Ct. at 544 ("
[I]mmunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not
by the person to whom it attaches." (emphasis in original)); Acevedo-Cordero
v. Cordero-Santiago, 958 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1992) ("Under current legal
theory, immunity attaches or does not attach depending on what kind of action
was performed rather than on who performed the action."). Acts undertaken by
legislators that are administrative in nature do not "give rise to absolute
immunity from liability in damages under Sec. 1983." Forrester, 484 U.S. at
229, 108 S.Ct. at 545; Acevedo-Cordero, 958 F.2d at 23; Gross v. Winter, 876
F.2d 165, 170-73 (D.C.Cir.1989).
11
12 tests for distinguishing between legislative and administrative activity. The first
two
test focuses on the nature of the facts used to reach the given decision. If the
underlying facts on which the decision is based are "legislative facts," such as
"generalizations concerning a policy or state of affairs," then the decision is
legislative. If the facts used in the decisionmaking are more specific, such as those
that relate to particular individuals or situations, then the decision is administrative.
The second test focuses on the "particularity of the impact of the state action." If the
action involves establishment of a general policy, it is legislative; if the action
"single[s] out specifiable individuals and affect[s] them differently from others," it is
administrative.
13
The district court's dismissal of Negron's Sec. 1983 claim is reversed, and we
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. As Negron does
not argue on appeal that the district court erred in dismissing her claims brought
pursuant to the Due Process Clause and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(i.e., Counts 2 and 3), we do not disturb the district court's dismissal of those
counts.
15
So ordered.
The purpose of the Legislative Library is "to make all kinds of basic reference
material available to the members of [Puerto Rico's] Legislative Assembly and
to persons in the community who may be interested in gathering data on the
legislative proceedings and other governmental activities." 1964 P.R.Laws Act
No. 59 (Statement of Motives)
The district court observed that defendants' motion was unopposed. Pursuant to
Local Rule 311.5 of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico, "[i]f the respondent opposes a motion, [she] shall file a response within
ten (10) days after service of the motion, including brief and such supporting
documents as are then available...." Failure to so respond renders a party
susceptible to involuntary dismissal, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b), for failure
to prosecute. See Local Rule 313.3 (D.P.R.). Here, however, the district court
dismissed for failure to state a claim, not failure to prosecute, and neither the
court nor appellees suggest that Negron has waived her right to appeal from the
dismissal by initially failing to oppose Hernandez and Jimenez's motion
5
Negron filed a second notice of appeal on January 24, 1994, because her Rule
59(e) motion, while denied on November 17, 1993, was not actually entered in
the docket until January 12, 1994