Title: SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, vs.

Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI,

Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel
IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS,
MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.
Reference: G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949
Facts:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period
covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened
by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully
disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to
commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and
prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war"
comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of
the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey
and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the
Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the
case of petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of incorporation is applied.
Discussion:
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and
regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of
the Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and
constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present
day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents
of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or
civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of
the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation
of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable
therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68
the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and
policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
Rulings:
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner

for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention
because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947.
It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions
form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international
law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the
United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and
principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately
general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have
been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the
Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound
together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the
treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not erased
by our assumption of full sovereignty.

Title:PHILIP MORRIS, INC., BENSON & HEDGES (CANADA), INC., AND FABRIQUES
OF TABAC REUNIES, S.A.,petitioners vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondents.
Reference:G.R. No. 91332 July 16, 1993
Facts:
At the crossroads are the two (2) contending parties, plaintiffs vigorously asserting the
rights granted by law, treaty and jurisprudence to restrain defendant in its activities of
manufacturing, selling, distributing and advertising its "MARK" cigarettes and now comes
defendant who countered and refused to be restrained claiming that it has been
authorized temporarily by the Bureau of Internal Revenue under certain conditions to do
so as aforestated coupled by its pending application for registration of trademark "MARK"
in the Philippine Patent Office. This circumstance in itself has created a dispute between
the parties which to the mind of the Court does not warrant the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of incorporation is applied.
Discussion:
Petitioner has never conducted any business in the Philippines. It has never promoted its
tradename or trademark in the Philippines. It is unknown to Filipino except the very few
who may have noticed it while travelling abroad. It has never paid a single centavo of tax
to the Philippine government. Under the law, it has no right to the remedy it seeks. (at pp.
589-591.)
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding
the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international
agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal
(Mortensen vs. Peters, Great Britain, High Court of Judiciary of Scotland, 1906, 8
Sessions 93; Paras, International Law and World Organization, 1971 Ed., p. 20). Withal,
the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any
means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere.
Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law
are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments (Salonga and
Yap, Public International Law, Fourth ed., 1974, p. 16).
The aforequoted basic provisions of our Trademark Law, according to Justice Gutierrez,
Jr., in Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (203 SCRA 583 [1991]),
have been construed in this manner:
A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in
commerce in the Philippines is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of
ownership over a trademark or a tradename.

Rulings:
In other words, petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of
lack of business activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark
Law but the question whether they have an exclusive right over their symbol as to justify
issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the
Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous for
petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in
Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually using its
trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have the
personality to file a suit for infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to
protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market.

In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not
engaged in business in the Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage
can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost consideration heretofore discussed
on the absence of their "right" to be protected. At any rate, and assuming in gratia
argumenti that respondent court erroneously lifted the writ it previously issued, the same
may be cured by appeal and not in the form of a petition for certiorari (Clark vs. Philippine
Ready Mix Concrete Co., 88 Phil. 460 [1951]). Verily, and mindful of the rule that a writ of
preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order which is always under the control of the
court before final judgment, petitioners' criticism must fall flat on the ground, so to speak,
more so when extinction of the previously issued writ can even be made without previous
notice to the adverse party and without a hearing (Caluya vs. Ramos, 79 Phil. 640 [1974];
3 Moran, Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 81).

Title: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs.HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding

Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ,
respondents.
Reference: G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000
Facts:
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States.
Private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access
to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the
Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated
July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the
foregoing requests.
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private
respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an
opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate
the request impartially, fairly and objectively);certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's
letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the
extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed
to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104105, Rollo).
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter
raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over
by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who
appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum,
but the same was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of incorporation is applied.

Discussion:
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good
faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by

Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces
war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations." Under the doctrine of
incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the and land no further
legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere
(Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts
should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation
Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996
ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to
be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates
that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101
Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA
984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply
the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty
may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is
the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).
Rulings:
In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of
the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough
that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to
pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse
constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral
conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable
exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no
exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of
the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who
would deny him that right (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal

law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or

convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fasttracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always
incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean precipitous
haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty."
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the
due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of
loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his
forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's favorable action on
the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily
comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described
as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267
SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The
constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality,"
since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by
treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic
law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of
liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our
Constitution is premised.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of
the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No.
99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the same is hereby
ordered dismissed.

Title: GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Represented by the

Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs.HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN,
Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO
BATACAN CRESPO, respondent
Reference:G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002
Facts:
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C.
Lantion.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government,
through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522
dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and
accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B.
Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and
documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of
justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his
extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition
before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period
within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter,
the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.
After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was
granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of incorporation is applied.
Discussion:
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the
treaty and the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is
to ascertain and give effect to its intent. Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the

implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory,

understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues
raised here.
An extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both
accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial process. More pointedly, our duly
authorized representatives signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in
the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person
sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be
given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal
proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been
signed, or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
More pointedly, our duly authorized representatives signature on an extradition treaty
signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect
the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full faith
that the accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and
basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty
would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its
unconstitutionality.
Rulings:
The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request
expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be
adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law;
and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to
assist the requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally
escaped -- back to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which
guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which
the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all,
to a courts request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or
has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the
requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would
escape again if given the opportunity.
After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the
applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is
no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or
compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state
for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a
special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to

judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.

On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review
authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow
contortions, delays and "over-due process" every little step of the way, lest these
summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of
international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty
partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted
into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify,
mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international
cooperation.
At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to
determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic
individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may
negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001
is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is
SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted
by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to
conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the
spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our
Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Title: LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180,
petitioner, vs.JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO
SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila,respondents.
Reference: G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
Facts:
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity
and constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and
farreaching in significance. The enactment poses questions of due
process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses
an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the
disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly
springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse,
the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien
retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates,
Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic
independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for
national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures
designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance
of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a
supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and
circumstances justify the enactment?
Issues: Whether or not the municipal law prevails over the international law.
Discussion:
It has been said the police power is so far reaching in scope, that it
has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need
to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be coextensive
with selfprotection and survival, and as such it is the most positive
and active of all governmental processes, the most essential,
insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations
have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and
scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the
fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all
embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated,
as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and
welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by

which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve

interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope
or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set
forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the
due process clause and the equal protection clause.
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation
thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations
Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their
subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the
Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is
the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be
inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and
Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the
world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of
April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty
guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the
nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against
because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are
granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail
trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always
subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258,
Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power
of the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
Rulings:
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed
law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from dominance and control;
that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power
of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality
and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes
the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of

the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident

as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the
Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this
suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the
segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be
void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty
has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power
may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.

Title: RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive

Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as
Auditor General, CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and
Industry, and SALVADOR MARINO, Secretary of Justice, respondents.
Reference: G.R. No. L-21897 October 22, 1963
Facts:
It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary
authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private
sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed of the other respondents
herein for the implementation of said proposed importation. Thereupon, or September 25,
1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo
Palay and Corn Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the
production of rice and corn filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or
attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are
acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452
which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 220 explicitly prohibits the
importation of rice and corn "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government
agency;" that petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law; and that a preliminary injunction is necessary for the preservation of the
rights of the parties during the pendency this case and to prevent the judgment therein
from coming ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said petition be given due
course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued restraining respondent
their agents or representatives from implementing the decision of the Executive
Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment
be rendered making said injunction permanent.

Issue: Whether or not the municipal law prevails over the international law.
Discussion:
Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are merely additional to those
prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 138, entitled "An Act to give native products and
domestic entities the preference in the purchase of articles for the Government."
Pursuant to Section 1 thereof:
The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of the Philippines and
other officers and employees of the municipal and provincial governments and
the Government of the Philippines and of chartered cities, boards, commissions,
bureaus, departments, offices, agencies, branches, and bodies of any
description, including government-owned companies, authorized to requisition,
purchase, or contract or make disbursements for articles, materials, and supplies
for public use, public buildings, or public works shall give preference to
materials ... produced ... in the Philippines or in the United States, and to
domestic entities, subject to the conditions hereinbelow specified. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government, including those made by
and/or for the armed forces,preference shall be given to materials produced in the
Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of our
Government, aside from the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos.
2207 and 3452, it should, nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to the benefit
of the people". Salus populi est suprema lex, it is said.
The people" are either producers or consumers. Now as respondents explicitly admit
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for the benefit of
producers and consumers, i.e., the people, it must follow that the welfare of the people
lies precisely in the compliance with said Acts.
It is not for respondent executive officers now to set their own opinions against that of the
Legislature, and adopt means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws
permit importation but under certain conditions, which have not been, and should be
complied with.
Rulings:
The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements
has been sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not pear to have
regarded the same as executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts
may properly considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null
and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the
American constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous

legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which
is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our
courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the
affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may
not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal,
certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts in (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question". In other words, our
Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

Title: IMBONG vs. OCHOA

Reference: G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
Facts:
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception
program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the
sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays
that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be
maintained." It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As
provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly
licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the
RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the
cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is
made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent
possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all
forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the
widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family planning
methods, devices and supplies.

Issue:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it
mandates the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which
contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by
compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers,

under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their

conscientious objections
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring
would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to
attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant
nutrition
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
Discussion:
1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life
begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this
stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that
individual Members could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the
traditional meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited
by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support
the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to
the moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon
fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm
and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization
should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of
the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a
measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The
RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By
using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law
prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those
that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers
womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and
that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they

redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily.

Recognizing as abortifacients only those that primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec.
3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This
violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the
definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the
term primarily, must be struck down.
2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because
it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the
regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals
(Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using
e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se.
Rather, they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained.
These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the
prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729
in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that
only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling
its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the
provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the
actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be
done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be
considered mandatory only after these devices and materials have
been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective.
3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or
participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief.
However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to
dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to

adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the
State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if
the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g.
the petitioners.
3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services
under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their
conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. These
provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI
of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service
providers to refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail
to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate
information and perform RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)
(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom
of religion. While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it,
a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the effective
implementation of the law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under
Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause. There is no
perceptible distinction between public health officers and their private
counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual
and the protection of this freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the
government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state
interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no
immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived
scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain
to life-threatening cases.
The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least
intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature has
already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right to health is
protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the Philippines)
and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).
3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a
seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as
a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of
police power by the government. The law does not even mandate the type of

family planning methods to be included in the seminar. Those who attend the
seminar are free to accept or reject information they receive and they retain
the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the
State.
4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with
only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal
content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against
the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social
institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates
the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood
and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The
RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the
institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a
procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH
Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution,
which states: The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government. In addition, the
portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the written
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising
parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical
procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases
where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about
family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and
control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception
may be made in life-threatening procedures.
5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH
Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate
Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection
to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of
Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of

parents in the development of their children with the use of the term
primary. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of
the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of
the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents
in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and
other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very
well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.

Rulings:
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and
enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with
coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional,
there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No.
4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No.
9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle
of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should
be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares
R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a)
require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minorparents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of
family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services
on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as
they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as

defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as
they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical
procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider
within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his
or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to
support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the
rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires
and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its
Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No.
10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.

Set 5
Title:THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI
BANKING CORPORATION Petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, Respondents.
Reference: G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937
Facts:
Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended
party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the
defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands
vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon.
Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano
Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.
The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila on October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case as private prosecutor.
After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence
both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the
testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance
of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing
the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng.
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by
the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the
trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine
Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter
alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has
no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The
Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the
application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended
denial of the same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of
Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for
hearing on April 5, 1937.
Issue: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
Discussion:
The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties

and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority.

Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the
principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. Judge Cooley enunciates
the doctrine in the following oft-quoted language: "One of the settled maxims
in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make
laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority.
Where the sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it
must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made
until the Constitution itself is charged. The power to whose judgment,
wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot
relieve itself of the responsibilities by choosing other agencies upon which the
power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and
patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit
to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed.,
Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil.,
327.) This court posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by
the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately
upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of
another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not
absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by
immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities.
Rulings:
It is a cardinal principle of our system of government, that local affairs shall
be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central
authorities; and hence while the rule is also fundamental that the power to
make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of the municipalities exercising
local self government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such
legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but
rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according
to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior
in cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick, supra.) On quite the same
principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such agencies
in the territories of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in
the same relation to Congress as a municipality or city to the state
government. (United States vs. Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 742; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr vs. United States [1904],
195 U.S., 138; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.)
Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at
large.
Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself.
Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines

provides that "The National Assembly may by law authorize the President,
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within
specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and
wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution
provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National
Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject
to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out a declared national policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision
to determine whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional
provisions, the President could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby
vested in him. Upon the other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has
been removed by the Constitution itself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove
mentioned.
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the
simple transference of details of execution or the promulgation by executive
or administrative officials of rules and regulations to carry into effect the
provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our own decisions would be
sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina [1914], 29
Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu
Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez [1915], 31
Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.)
It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as
law after it leaves the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be
made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive
or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman
vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of
the United State ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not
legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.(Vide, also, Dowling vs.
Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W., 738; 31 L. R. A., 112.) The
power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is
nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or
conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law.
The Welfare of society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the individual
convict is merely incidental. But while we believe that probation is
commendable as a system and its implantation into the Philippines should be
welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside
because of the repugnancy to our fundamental law.

Title: THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.

Reference:G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922
Facts:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled
"An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn
under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and
authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the
necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose,"
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which
rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him
with the sale of rice at an excessive price.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower
court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in
finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.
Issue: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
Discussion:
These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate
it legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is
pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any
other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental
principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the
system of government established by the constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself,
it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or
event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to
delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the
industrial or merchant may demand." The law is a general law and not a local or special
law.

The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different
prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power
to determine the other and different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies.
Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General,
and a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who
"are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from
the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of
the above regulations in their respective localities." The issuance of the proclamation by
the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was
even a sub delegation of that power.
Rulings:
The promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of
the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under
what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation,
but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any
cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General.
The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left
to the discretion of the Governor-General.
It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how
long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or
when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner
specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and
discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or
what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule
or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act.
The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is
a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the
Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the
Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the
other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some
legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is
vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is
unconstitutional and void.
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to
authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price
of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale
of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

Title: EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs.PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS

EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO,
respondents.
Reference:G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
Facts:
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband.
The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had
no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move
for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Issue:Whether or not thete is an undue delegation of power.
Discussion:
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order
No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment
of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created
earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said
executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or
by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen."
These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment
issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other benefits" arising out of
such employment.
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was
made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective
on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both
foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas
employment. A similar contract had earlier been required by the National Seamen Board
and had been sustained in a number of cases by this Court. The petitioner questions the
validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation
of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate
the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Rulings:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the

first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.
the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative
bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of
the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social
justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counter-balanced by the sympathy and
compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be
given the opportunity and the right to assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate
but as a peer of management, with which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a
mere employee of capital but its active and equal partner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The
temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.

Title: EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, vs.THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

Reference. G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965
Facts:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued
Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities enumerated in the margin.1 Soon after the date last mentioned, or on
November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines
and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power.
Issue: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
Discussion:
The Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself
it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or
formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but,
also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end
sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of
powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very
foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a
law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred
to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first
sentence of Section 68, the President:

... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require.

Rulings:
Insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the
public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is
true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328),
this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient
standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid
down in these cases as all judicial pronouncements must be construed in relation to
the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute
precedents and have no binding effect. The law construed in the Calalang case conferred
upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations topromote safe transit upon
national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the
authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or
permits for the sale ofspeculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative
officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the
determination of questions of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the
creation of municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially
and eminently legislative in character.
Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in
the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of
such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him
to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the
officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the
President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act
Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal
council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed
thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take
appropriate disciplinary action therefor.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or

offices implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to
interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not
include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a
new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create municipal
corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater
than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In
other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to
comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President
less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by
conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over
said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly
does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March
10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in
1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab
initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.

Title: ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. ERMITA

Reference: G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
Facts:
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., Pimentel, Jr., et al., and Escudero, et al.
contend in common that Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106,
107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC giving the President the stand-by authority to
raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when a certain condition is met, constitutes undue
delegation of the legislative power to tax.
Petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the President to increase the
VAT rate is a virtual abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such
delegation is not within the purview of Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
government.
They argue that the VAT is a tax levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services, which cannot be included
within the purview of tariffs under the exempted delegation as the latter refers to customs
duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed
on goods or merchandise imported or exported.
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., further contend that delegating to the
President the legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism. They insist that
accountability, responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and
they should not pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that
the law also effectively nullified the Presidents power of control, which includes the
authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of
Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.
Issue: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
Discussion:
A brief discourse on the principle of non-delegation of powers is instructive.
With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that

"the Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." The powers which Congress is
prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively,
legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described
as the authority to make a complete law complete as to the time when it shall take
effect and as to whom it shall be applicable and to determine the expediency of
its enactment. Thus, the rule is that in order that a court may be justified in holding a
statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must appear that the power
involved is purely legislative in nature.
In Edu vs. Ericta, the Court reiterated:
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to
alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there
is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislative does not abdicate its functions
when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of
his authority. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power
to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion
as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no
valid objection can be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying
the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
Rulings:
The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is
nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions
as the basis of the taking into effect of a law.
The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent
may determine when the circumstances are such as require the application of a
law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is granted, the rule
of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the
legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it is its duty to do, determines that,
under given circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be
taken, and that, under other circumstances, different or no action at all is to be
taken. What is thus left to the administrative official is not the legislative
determination of what public policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of
what the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by
which he is governed. The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will
must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency
upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may

designate. The legislature, then, may provide that a law shall take effect upon the
happening of future specified contingencies leaving to some other person or body
the power to determine when the specified contingency has arisen.
Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to
determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the
operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature must prescribe
sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority. While the power to tax
cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and
administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them, including the power to
determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends.
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a
delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increase rate under the law is contingent.
Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or
modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Congress simply granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the
existence of a fact.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to
the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible.
The Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.

Title: ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. PURISIMA

Reference: G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
Facts:

This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing

and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations
of RA 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created for such purpose.
Petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue
targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter.
Issue: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
Discussion:

Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when
it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is declared
invalid by a competent court, the remainder of this Act or any provision

not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and

effect.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to
isolate and detach any invalid provision from the other provisions so that the
latter may continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand
independently of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining
provisions still constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law which carries
out the legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of rewards and
sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board.
Rulings:

Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it

has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the
law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves
the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of
the legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of
the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled
by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of
publication under the due process clause, the determination as to when a law
takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress. As such, it is only upon its
effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch acquires the
duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the role of the
executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or
vetoing the law.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation
of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that
requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law
after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that
allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by
the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the
law.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two
newspapers of general circulation and became effective 15 days
thereafter.Until and unless the contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed valid

and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee.

Title: TATAD vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Reference: G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997
Facts:
President Marcos through Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956, created the Oil
Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in the price of
oil caused by exchange rate adjustments or increase in the world market prices of crude
oil and imported petroleum products.
In May, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172 creating the
Energy Regulatory Board to regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting,
shipping, transporting, processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy resources
when warranted and only when public necessity requires.
On December 9, 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department
of Energy to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs,
projects, and activities of the government in relation to energy exploration, development,
utilization, distribution and conservation. 9 The thrust of the Philippine energy program
under the law was toward privatization of government agencies related to energy,
deregulation of the power and energy industry and reduction of dependency on oil-fired
plants.
In March 1996, Congress took the audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil
industry. It enacted R.A. No. 8180, entitled the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation
Act of 1996. Under the deregulated environment, any person or entity may import or
purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and
market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to
monitoring by the Department of Energy. 11
On February 8, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream
Oil Industry through E.O. No. 372.
The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A No. 8180 and
E.O. No. 372.
Petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Joker P. Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tanada, Flag
Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and Sanlakas
contest the constitutionality of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. Section 15
provides:
Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation. Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic Act
No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation
of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE

shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US
dollar is stable.
Petitioners urge that the phrases as far as practicable, decline of crude oil prices in the
world market and stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar are ambivalent,
unclear and inconcrete in meaning. They submit that they do not provide the
determinate or determinable standards which can guide the President in his decision to
fully deregulate the downstream oil industry.
Issue: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
Discussion:
The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by this
Court. As early as 1916 in Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. The Board of
Public Utility Commissioners, 21 this Court thru, Mr. Justice Moreland, held that the true
distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter no valid objection can be made. Over the years, as the legal engineering of
mens relationship became more difficult, Congress has to rely more on the practice of
delegating the execution of laws to the executive and other administrative agencies. Two
tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute
laws does not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the
metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA, thus:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional
landscape. As sagely observed, delegation of legislative power has become an
inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of government. Thus, courts
bend as far back as possible to sustain the constitutionality of laws which are assailed as
unduly delegating legislative powers. Citing Hirabayashi v. United States as authority, Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz states that even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the
standard, the courts will bend over backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to

spare the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity.

Rulings:
Given the groove of the Courts rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section
15 on the ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can
hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that
Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of
March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of
March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full
deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide
the judgment of the President he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of
crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
It ought to follow that the argument that E.O. No. 392 is null and void as it was based on
indeterminate standards set by R.A. 8180 must likewise fail. If that were all to the attack
against the validity of E.O. No. 392, the issue need not further detain our discourse.
The question is whether these offending provisions can be individually struck down
without invalidating the entire R.A. No. 8180. The ruling case law is well stated by author
Agpalo, 37 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution,
while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and
be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption
that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To
justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it
is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed
that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . .
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually
dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as
a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute
dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the
statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in
which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent,
conditional, or connected must fall with them.
R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that if for any reason,
any section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not
affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect.