People vs Marti

On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to
Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It
was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused
and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment.
Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the
courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard operating
procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him
took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited
agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job
Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case
was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court
a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right
of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was
inadmissible as evidence against him.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY
SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained
in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and
privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that
the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies
as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.
It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of
the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and
siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in
plain sight is not a search.
The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged was AFFIRMED.

Waterous drug corporation v. NLRC

Facts:
Respondent Antonia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug
Corporation. She received two memorandums: the Vice President warned her not to

dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latters accounts because the same
was a prohibited practice; and not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without
consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the companys control of
purchases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained
that her act was due to negligence, since fellow employee Irene Soliven obtained the
medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was
given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept. Catolico then asked the company to look into
the fraudulent activities of Soliven. In another memorandum, the companys supervisor
warned Catolico against the rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents.
The companys control clerk noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin
Pharmaceuticals(YSP) that under the Purchase order with YSP Sales Invoice purchase
of 10 bottles of Voren tablets at P384 per unit when it was showed to be only P320. This
was paid to the respondent through a check
Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from YSP was a
Christmas gift and not a refund of overprice. She also averred that the preventive
suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co s
secretary, Irene Soliven. But, the companys supervisor notified respondents
termination.
Labor Arbiter-In favor of respondent, because petitioners failed to prove what [they]
alleged as complainants dishonesty. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and
due process.
NLRC-affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not
able to prove a just cause for Catolicos dismissal from her employment.
Issues:
1)Whether or not Catolico erred in applying Section 3, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution
2)Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed.
Held
1) Yes. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its
decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti that the
Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the
citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel
admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
2) Yes. It is evident from the Supervisors memorandum that Catolico was dismissed
because of an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners,
their evidence does not establish that there was an overcharge. It is settled that the
burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee,
and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is
unjustified.Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task.

Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine,
there was no proof that she ever transacted, or that she had the opportunity to transact,
with the said suppliers. Again, as the purchase orders indicate, Catolico was not at all
involved in the sale of the Voren tablets. There was no occasion for Catolico to initiate,
much less benefit from, what Valdez called an under the table deal with YSP.

Zalueta v. Court of Appeals

*Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zalueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. The
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine. She forcibly opened
the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between private respondent and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, private respondents passport, and
photographs, in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had
filed against her husband. Private respondent brought an action for recovery of the
documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The RTC rendered
judgment in favor or private respondent, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of
properties described and ordering petitioner to return the properties to him and pay him
nominal and moral damages and attorneys fees, and cost of the suit. Furthermore,
petitioner and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting
or admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
*Issue: Whether or not the documents and papers in question are admissible in
evidence.
*Held: The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and
wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law
insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what

one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other. Petition denied.

Gamboa vs Chan
Facts: On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), Creating an Independent Commission to
Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country.7 The body, which was
later on referred to as the Zearosa Commission,8was formed to investigate the
existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them
before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the
future.9Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zearosa Commission released and
submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled A Journey Towards
H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies Report to the
President (the Report).
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified
her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification,
PNPIlocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zearosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs.
ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report naming
Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG, and as a result, she
claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities
maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters
and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance
operations.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of
their mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa. The
information stored in their database supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which
she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for murder and frustrated murder and (b) a
Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in authority,
as well as indirect assault and multiple attempted murder. Respondents likewise
asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the following
requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right
to privacy was violated or threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life,
liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and recourses she took to secure the data
or information; and (c) the location of the files, registers or databases, the government
office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information.
They also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy to
address the alleged besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa. The RTC nevertheless

dismissed the Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial
evidence that the subject information originated from respondents, and that they
forwarded this database to the Zearosa Commission without the benefit of prior
verification. The trial court also ruled that even before respondents assumed their official
positions, information on her may have already been acquired. Finally, it held that the
Zearosa Commission, as the body tasked to gather information on PAGs and
authorized to disclose information on her, should have been impleaded as a necessary
if not a compulsory party to the Petition. Gamboa the filed an Appeal by Certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the Zearosa Commission be
impleaded as either a necessary or indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that [Gamboa] failed to present sufficient proof to link
respondents as the informant to the Zearosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zearosa Commission to
[sic] the PNP as alleged by [Gamboa] is an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an
agency.
Held: In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to
privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary remedy that seeks
to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize the right to privacy
vis--vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect
the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and
to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy.49 It
seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the
writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and
jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our own
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European tradition
of data protection,51 this Court can be guided by cases on the protection of personal
data decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In the case of Leander
vs Sweden, the ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information

relating to the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the
opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an interference in his right to respect for
private life.57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was justified on the
following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was the
protection of national security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the
citizens adequate indication as to the scope and the manner of exercising discretion in
the collection, recording and release of information by the authorities. Leander
illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to
privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the
determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary
remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion
upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed
groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also provides for the
establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and
is controlled and administered by a national police commission.61Taking into account
these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate
state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently. To enable the Zearosa Commission to achieve its
goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of an investigative body, including the power
to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and
records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zearosa Commission to deputize the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department
of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the commission in
the performance of its functions.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained
in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of
the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zearosa
Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in
life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share
intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of
investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zearosa
Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the
formers mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its
confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable,
even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that
respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are
other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making
a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and
improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence
that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her
supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this

regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her
were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials,
they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far
outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the
collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful
mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

OPOSA VS FACTORAN
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and
healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of
inter-generational responsibility and inter-generational justice. Specifically, it touches
on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the countrys vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth.
FACTS:
the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents, and the philippine ecological network Inc. (Peni) a domestic, non stock and non
profit corporation and engage in the activities of promoting the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The complaint was instituted as a tax payers class
suit and alleges that plaintiffs are all citizens of the republic of the philippines, taxpayer,
and entitled to the full benefit, use and employment of the natural resource erasure that
is the countrys virgin tropical forest.
Petitioner prayed for that judgement be rendered ordering defendant to Cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country; Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs, and granting the plaintiffs such
other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of
7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed
with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora
and fauna may be found. These rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical
pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures
which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial. Scientific evidence
reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land
area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover
and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other
uses. The distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation
have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies. And that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation in the Philiipines are so

capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter

of judicial notice
the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him
and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of Government. On 18 July 1991, Makati RTC
issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not
only was
the defendant's claim : that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that
it raises a political question. sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and asked the Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action.
Issue:
WON the petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the impairment of the Philippine
rain-forests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the countrys vital life support
systems and continued rape of mother earth.
WON the original prayer of plaintiff result in the impairment of contracts.
HELD:
The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The
said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies,
among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary
government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration,
utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy
declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect
and advance the said right.
The case at bar is a common interest to all Filipinos. the right to a balnced and healthful
ecology which carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty
or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave
abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the
full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
**The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare

is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the
non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit
by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the State.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS,

ET AL.
FACTS:
Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable
development, Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority."
This Government Agency is supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared
policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act clearly named, within
the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic
development.
Then Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted. The
municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean
that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to
issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters. Municipal governments thereupon
assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen
operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the
consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages increased. The
implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in the
operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in
the lake and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the
lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and
ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public
that all fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay
Region, which were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or
permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority are declared as illegal.
The owners of these illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures shall
have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why
their said fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures should not be
demolished/dismantled.
One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the
illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them
to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise,
demolition shall be effected.
Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the Authority
before various regional trial courts. The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases

against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were invariably denied.

Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were
issued enjoining the Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in
question.
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction were filed by the Authority with the
Supreme Court. By SCs resolution, the Authority's consolidated petitions were referred
to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Authority's consolidated
petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial
agencies of government whose decision or order are appealable only to the Court of
Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as
fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing
privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local
Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant
permits devolved to and is now vested with their respective local government units
concerned.
ISSUE:
I. Which agency of the Government the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the
towns and municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the
Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is
concerned?
II. Whether or not LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
HELD:
I. We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the
aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the
latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority
constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991,
is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later
legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special
statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general
statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence
of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals
are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent
general law by mere implication.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are
environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is
every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.
The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted
for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local
Government Code empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied
in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions
On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages
and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and

monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927)
and for lake quality control and management. It does partake of the nature of police
power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all
State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority
which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aquaculture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927
provides for the proper sharing of fees collected.
Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of
fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein
and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
II. Pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983, while it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only
such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise
of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter,
as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna
Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce,
implied.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted,
insofar as they relate to the authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to
grant fishing privileges within the Laguna Lake Region.

Mmda vs concerned residents of Manila bay

Facts:
- resp filed a complaint before the Rtc imus cavite against pet for clean up, rehabilitation
and protection of the Manila bay
- complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law specifically pd 1152 or ph environment code
- prayed that pet be ordered to clean the Manila bay
- Rtc ordered pet to cleanup and rehabilitate Manila bay
- pet argue that the pertinent provisions of the environment code relate only to the
cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in generAl and that the
cleaning of the Manila bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus
- ca sustained Rtc; stressing that tc's dec did not require pet to do tasks outside of their
usual basic functions under existing laws
Issue:
1. Can pet be compelled by mandamus to cleanup and rehabilitate the Manila bay?
2. Do secs 17 and 20 of pd 1152 envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only
to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents?
Held:
1. The cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila bay can be compelled by mandamus
- pet's obligations to perform their duties as defined by law on one hand and how they
are to carry out such duties on the other are two different concepts. While the

implementation of the mmda's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process,

the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and can be compelled by mandamus
-mmda's duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste
and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial,
its duty being a statutory imposition.
- any suggestion that the mmda has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste
disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis
2. Secs 17 and 20 of the environment code include cleaning in general
- pet contend that sec 17 and 30 concern themselves only with the matter of cleaning up
in specific pollution incidents as opposed to cleanup in general. They maintain that the
application of sec 20 is limited only to "water pollution. Incident" which are situations
that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the
corresponding containment, removal and cleaning operations.
- sec 17 does not in a way state that the govt agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment removal and cleaning operations when a specific
pollution incident occurrs. It requires them To act even in the absence of a specific
pollute incident as long as the water deteriorated to a degree where its state will
adversely affect its best usage
- sec 20 indicated that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in Which the
pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. The
concerned agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluter's account
- agencies concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to
apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila bay
- impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the polluters are
- pet denied

In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)

Facts:
Near the end of World War II, General Tomoyuki Yamashita commanded the Imperial
Japanese Armys Fourteenth Army Group, which was stationed primarily in the
Philippine Islands. His troops there committ[ed] brutal atrocities, raping, torturing, and
killing thousands of Filipino citizens between October 9, 1944, and September 2, 1945.
These atrocities allegedly occurred as part of Yamashitas deliberate plan and purpose
to massacre and exterminate a large part of the civilian population of Batangas
Province, and to devastate and destroy public, private, and religious property.
On September 3, 1945, Yamashita surrendered to United States forces and
subsequently became a prisoner of war. The United States charged Yamashita with
violating the laws of war by disregarding and failing to discharge his duty as
commander to control the operations of members of his command by allowing them to
commit brutal atrocities against people of the United States and of its allies and
dependencies, particularly in the Philippines. U.S. General Styer, the commanding

general of the United States Army Forces for the Western Pacific, appointed a military
commission of five Army officers to try Yamashita.
Yamashitas attorneys argued that Yamashita was unaware of and did not order his
subordinates acts and that neither United States military law nor the international laws
of war recognized command responsibility in such a situation. Therefore, his attorneys
concluded, the military commission lacked jurisdiction because Yamashitas charges
were not violations of the laws of war. The commission rejected Yamashitas argument
of ignorance, relying on the widespread nature of the atrocities to impute knowledge to
Yamashita.
Yamashitas case proceeded to trial, which lasted two months, from October to
December 1945, and involved the testimony of more than 286 witnesses. The military
commission found Yamashita guilty on December 7, 1945, and sentenced him to death
by hanging.
Yamashita petitioned the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands for a writ of habeas
corpus, which was denied on limited jurisdictional grounds. He then sought review in the
United States Supreme Court, which held that the military commission had authority to
try Yamashita for command responsibility.
Following the United States Supreme Courts decision, Yamashita turned to President
Harry Truman for clemency, but President Truman decided not to intervene. Yamashita
was hanged in the Philippines in February 1946. Two and a half years later, the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East found Yamashitas Chief of Staff, Akira
Muto, to share[] responsibility for these gross breaches of the Laws of War because
Muto was in a position to influence policy. Like Yamashita, Muto was hanged.
Issue:
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Stone addressed two questions: whether the
military commission was lawfully established and, if so, whether the commission could
lawfully try Yamashita after hostilities had ceased for his failure to stop his subordinates
from committing violations of the laws of war
Holding:
1) The majority held that the military commission was lawfully established by the
President and Congress, relying heavily on Ex Parte Quirin (LINK). The President had
instructed his commanders to proceed with the trial, before appropriate military
tribunals, of such Japanese war criminals as have been or may be apprehended.
General Styer, who had command over the Philippines, had validly ordered the creation
of the military commission. Congress had constitutional power to define and punish . . .
Offenses against the Law of Nations, and by enacting the Articles of War (LINK TO 10
U.S.C. 14711593), Congress had exercised its Define and Punish Power by
statutorily authorizing the trial of enemy combatants via military commissions for
violations of the laws of war. Yamashitas military commission was therefore authorized
by both the President and Congress.
Moreover, the commission did not lose its authority to try Yamashita simply because
hostilities had ended. The majority held that Congresss war power, from which the
commission derives its existence, is not limited to victories in the field [of battle], but

carries with it the inherent power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict
and to remedy . . . the evils which the military operations have produced. To hold
otherwise would, the majority recognized, undermine the practical administration of the
system of military justice under the law of war because the vast majority of offenders
would not be apprehended and subjected to trial until after the cessation of hostilities.
Consequently, Congress and the President had the constitutional authority to prosecute
violations of the laws of war via military commission, at least until peace is agreed upon
or proclaimed.
The majority further held that the military commission had authority to try Yamashita for
his failure to prevent his subordinates violations of the laws of war. The military
commissions authority was limited to trials for violations of the laws of war.
2)The question, then, is whether the law of war imposes on an army commander a duty
to take such appropriate measures as are within his power to control the troops under
his command for the prevention of [his troops violations of the laws of war], . . . and
whether [the commander] may be charged with personal responsibility for his failure to
take such measures when violations result. The majority answered that question in the
affirmative. The majority reasoned that the law of war presupposes that its violation is
to be avoided through the control of the operations of war by commanders who are to
some extent responsible for their subordinates.
Yamashita could thus be tried for his failure to prevent his troops atrocities. But the
Court did not decide whether the military commission correctly found Yamashita guilty.
Rather, the majority limited its inquiry to the authority of the military commission to
proceed; because it did have such authority, its verdict was not subject to judicial
review merely because [the commission may] have made a wrong decision on disputed
facts. [C]orrection of [the military tribunals] errors of decision is not for the courts but
for the military authorities which are along authorized to review their decisions.
Lastly, the Court held that the evidentiary and procedural protections guaranteed by the
Geneva Conventions, Congresss Articles of War, and the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution did not apply to Yamashitas trial. The Articles of War applied
only to trials of American personnel, and the relevant portions of the Geneva
Conventions applied only to trials for crimes committed after capture. And in any event,
the majority concluded that the commissions rulings on evidence and on the mode of
conducting [its] proceedings against [Yamashita] are not reviewable by the courts, but
only by the reviewing military authorities. Based on this assessment, the Court declined
to consider whether the Fifth Amendments guarantee of due process applied to
Yamashitas trial.