PCIB V. ESCOLIN d.
If charles already deemed sole heir, why PCIB
Short Summary:
Mr. and Mrs Hodges both made in their wills provisions that
upon their deaths, their whole estates should be inherited by
the surviving spouse and that spouse could manage and
alienate the said lands, with the exception of the Texas
property. Upon death of the latter spouse, the residue of the
estate inherited by the later spouse from the spouse who
predeceased him would redound to the brothers and sisters.
Mrs. Hodges died first then Mr. Hodges, but since there was
no liquidation of Mrs. Hodges’ estate, the brothers and sisters
of Mrs. Hodges wanted to determine the extent of her estate
that they could inherit. (believe me, this is a short summary…
case is long…)
Facts
-Charles & Linnie Hodges, both TEXAN nationals, provided in
their respective wills that
• bequeath remainder of estate to spouse…during
lifetime
• remainder goes to brothers and sis of surviving
spouse
-Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. Hodges appointed as EXECUTOR
• in Financial Statements submitted before the court,
he made statements that the estate of Mrs. Hodges
is 1/2 of conjugal estate
• that he allegedly renounced his inheritance in a tax
declaration in US
• for 5 years before his death, he failed to make
accounting, failed to acquire final adjudication of
wife's estate
-Charles died. Magno, initially administratrix of both spouse's
estate, later replaced by PCIB for Charles' estate
WON Action is prescribed?
NO. 33 appeals were timely made
-Court did not pass upon its timeliness
WON Certiorari and Prohibition is proper?
YES. Appeal insufficient remedy
-many appeals, same facts, same issues = multiplicity of suits
WON THERE IS STILL A RESIDUE FOR MRS. HODGES'
HEIRS?
YES.
1. WON SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR SETTLEMENT OF MRS.
HODGES ESTATE SHOULD ALREADY BE CLOSED, BASED ON
THE DECEMBER 1957 COURT ORDER ALLEGEDLY
ADJUDICATING MR. HODGES AS SOLE HEIR? NO
….no final distribution to all parties concerned of the estate
2. R90.1 (on RESIDUE):
…after residue assigned to parties entitled to it, S.P. deemed
ready for FINAL CLOSURE:
1. Order issued for distribution/assignment of estate
among those entitled
2. Debts
• Funeral expenses
• Expenses of administration
• Widow allowance
• Taxes
• Etc.
…should be paid already
3. Motion of party requesting the same (not motu proprio)
Would include distribution of residue of estate
-Here:
a. No final distribution of residue of Linney's estate
b. No special application made by charles/PCIB
c. Merely allowed advance or partial
payments/implementation of will before final
liquidation
needed to file a motion to declare that Charles is
indeed the sole heir?
3. ON ALLEGED INTENTION OF MR. HODGES
PCIB: He intended to adjudicate whole estate to himself (Thus,
no residue left, thus ulit, tapos na special
proceeding)
BUT SC:
1. Whatever was intended, he can't deprive those who
have rights over the estate
2. Order - motion filed merely for exercise of ownership
pending proceeding
3. Mr. Hodges was aware that wife's siblings had rights:
• In FS, stated that 1/2 of conjugal estate
belonged to Estate of Linney
• In Petition for will's probate, he listed the
bros and sis as heirs
• Lawyer of Magno was initially lawyer of
Charles when latter was still executor of
Linney's estate – so may know what Charles'
intended
• Charles admitted omitting a bro of Linney
• He even allegedly renounced his share of
the estate (but was not proven)
• Charles had duty, as Surviving spouse, of
trustee of wife's estate so had to act in GF
4. ON PROPERTIES FOR SIBLINGS: since there's still a residue,
can't close SP yet
>PCIB: NO LIQUIDATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTIES YET, PCIB
SHOULD SOLELY ADMINISTER EVERYTHING TO DETERMINE
THE SEPARATE ESTATE OF LINNEY, OVER W/C MAGNO COULD
ADMINISTER H:
NO. both PCIB and Magno should administer
a. It was Charles' fault why no administration of estate
yet
b. Admin should both be
• impartial
• extent of interest
c. Executor (PCIB) of Executor (Charles, over Linney's)
Can't administer estate of decedent (Linney) _ R78.6
d. Liquidation of conjugal partnership may be done in
either spouse's probate proceedings - R73.2
SUCCESSION: WON THERE'S SUBSTITUTION? None
1. No simple or vulgar substitution (A859, NCC)
• no provision for:
i. Predecease of T for designated heir
ii. Refusal
iii. Incapacity of designated heir to
accept inheritance
2. No fideicomissary substitution
• no obligation on Charles to preserve the
estate
3. There's simultaneous institution of heirs subject to
resolutory condition of Charles' death
• Charles was to enjoy the whole estate
• but he can't dispose of property mortis
causa (because it's already subject to the
will made by his wife, which he agreed in
the provision of his will)
4. Charles didn't get mere usufruct: he exercises full
ownership
PRIL: WON RP LAW GOVERNS LEGITIME OF CHARLES?
No answer yet. Remanded
Art 16, NCC > applies: law of nationality
If we apply Texas PRIL law:
• Personal property: law of domicile

• Real property: law of situs (both in RP)
IF Art16 applies, then Texas law should govern; Texas law
provides no legitime
So renvoi to RP: RP Law provides that the Surviving Spouse,
being the sole heir,
gets 1/2 o the conjugal property, then 1/2 goes to the estate
of the spouse. If 1/2 of the estate of the spouse goes to the
surviving spouse which is the sole heir, then Charles gets 1/4
of the whole conjugal property.
Court said that Texas law may apply, but since not proven
as…
• Courts can't take JN
• should show foreign law:
o As certified by person holding/having
custody of such law
o Certificate that such officer does have
custody over said law
o Aznar can't be used to show what Texas law
may contain, as there's a time difference
between this case and that case, thus the
Texas law might have changed in between
the rulings
BUT WHATEVER HAPPENS, PCIB can't claim that the estate of
Linney is not entitled to at least 1/4 of conjugal property, they
having argued that it is so.
stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper
application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of
the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear
that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2)
whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and
effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the
circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the
record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position
to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of
these two issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for
further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the
court o quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however,
that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at
this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil
that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her
husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused
to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal
partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof
during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of
which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less
than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of
the time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have
been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor
of third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that,
as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and
applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones
ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free
disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of
her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.

NOTES:
1. will executed in Texas - Oklahoma
2. Charles made executor by Linney, but Charles had no
executor - so administrator dapat
3. as regards foreign laws:
• Should be proved as a fact
• R132 on Public documents
• SIR: Dapat use an expert witness
• Prove in accordance w/RP law

PCI Bank vs. Escolin

If there is no absolute obligation imposed upon the first heir to

preserve the property and transmit it to a second heir, there
is no fideicomisaria. The institution is not necessarily void; it
may be valid as some other disposition, but it is not a
fideicomisaria.

PCIB VS. ESCOLIN

56 SCRA 266

FACTS:
Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to
her husband. At the time of her death, she was citizen of
Texas but, was, however domiciled in the Philippines. To see
whether the testamentary provisions are valid, it is apparent
and necessary to know what law should be applied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable.

RULING:
It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must
be proven whether a renvoi will happen or whether Texas law
makes the testamentary provisions valid. In line with Texas
law, that which should be proven is the law enforced during
the death of Hodges and not in any other time.

The Supreme Court held that the estate of Mrs. Hodges

inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than just