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Political Science: South Asia – Economy, Society and Politics

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I UNIT 1 STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
AND NATIONALISM IN SOUTH ASIA
t structure
1.0 Objectives
1 1.1 Introduction

I
1 1.2 Nationalism in South Asia
i
1.3 Freedom Struggle in South Asia
1.3.1 India

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1.3.2 Pakistan
1.3.3 Bangladesh
1.3.4 SriLanka
1.3.5 Nepal
1.3.6 Bhutan
1.3.7 Maldives

1.4 Let Us Sum Up


1.5 Some Useful Books
1.6 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

1.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit seeks to acquaint you with the idea of nation and nationalism in South Asia and
the struggle for independence from colonial rule launched in different countries of the
region. After going through this unit, you should be able to:
a Explain the rise of national consciousness in different countries of South Asia;
Describe the issues involved in the freedom movement; and
a Identify the different strategies for liberation adopted in the region.

1 . INTRODUCTION
South Asia has a continuous history of seven thousand years. It has a composite culture
developed through a historical process wherein the emphasis has been on unity in diversity.
South Asia has been the victim of repeated foreign aggression. The richness of the
region perhaps attracted the aggressors from far and wide. In the successive waves of
invasions since the ancient times, the Aryans, the Greeks, the Shakas, the Huns, the
Turko-Afgans, the Mughals and others came to the region. In the modem period, the
Europeans viz. Portuguese, Dutch, French and the British came to South Asia, though it
was the British who finally established their hold in the region. The British invasion was
qualitatively different from the earlier ones. Whereas the earlier invaders came, settled
dowkhere and got completely assimilated with the indigenous people, the British integrated
the region into their empire and ruled it from London. The region was linked with the
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!
industrially advanced international market in order to exploit its natural resources. South
Asian economy and society became subordinated to the imperialist political economy
I and social development. The region was transformed int0.a market for the British machine
made goods, a source of raw material and foodstuffs, and an important field of capital
investment. The entire structure of economic relations between Europe and the South
Asia involving trade, finance and technology continuously developed the colonial
dependence and underdevelopment of the latter. This new politico-economic system of
subordination, called as colonialism, resulted in the emergence of Europe as a leading
South Asia as a Region capitalist region while the coloi~ieswere reduced to backward and underdeveloped
regions of the world. In course of time, the economic and political domination led to
numerous conflicts and ~ontradictionswhich ultimately resulted in the growth of
nationalism and movements for independence from colonial rule.

NATIONALISM IN SOUTHASIA
Broadly, there were three patterns of colonial governance in the region. Whereas the
British Indian Empire embraced the area which covered:the present independent
republics of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, Sri Lanka was governed as a 'Crown
colony". The smaller nations of Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives were not British
colonies, but were 'protectorates', that is, in return for surrendering their autonomy
over their external relations, their independent existence was protected by the British.
Given that nationalism in South Asia emerged as a reaction against colonial exploitation
and subjugation, the regions which were under the direct control of the colonial
administration witnessed strong anticolonial and nationalist movements
The rise and growth of nationalism in South Asia was a reaction against colonial
exploitation and subjugation. The new form of nationalism that became the basis of
the new states in South Asia derived much of its ideology and political theory from the
West but was adapted to particular circumstances and experiences. The basis of this
new nationalism was an instinctive and xenophobic hatred for imperialism and symbols
of imperialism. It was a simple hatred against those who had occupied their land by
force, explbited their riches by force, crushed thkir government, and enslaved their
people. Nationalism also became a creative force which aimed at building a nation
based upon the principles of liberty, independence, economicjustice and nationality. It
not only united the people, but also inspired them to contribute their share in the national
reconstruction. The lead in this regard was given by India which produced one of the
biggest mass movements in the world. The movement not only succeeded in freeing it
from colonial yoke, but also left a historically developed, well thought out programme
for free India. The example of India inspired other colonies such as Sri Lanka and
gave raise to political consciousness in countries like Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives.

1.3 FREEDOM STRUGGLE IN SOUTHASIA


1.3.1 India
The rise and growth of nationalism in India was the product of the interaction of
numerous objective and subjective forces which emerged in the historical process
during the British colonial rule. While colonialism resulted in the economic exploitation
of India and the destruction of its agriculture and handicrafts, it also led to the political
and administrative unification of India. This factor combined with the introduction of
modem transport, new education, press etc. resulted in the raise of national
consciousness. Since nationalism in India developed under the aegis of British
imperialism (which remained foreign till its expulsion), a lot-ofhurdles were created in
its development and consolidation.
The Indian national movement passed through various phases and with each passing
phase, its social base broadened, its objective became clearer and its forms of
expression varied. The finst phase of the national movement began in 1885 with the
formation ofthe Indian National Congress (INC) and lasted roughly up to 1905. During
this phase, the leadership of the movement was in the hands of liberal leaders like
Dadabhai Naoroji, G.K. Gokhale, M.G.Ranade, S.N. Banerjee, Ferozeshah Mehta
etc. At this stage, the objective of the movement was not freedom but political,
administrative and economic reforms. At political level, the demand was to reform the
central and local legislatihe councils so as to secure more powers for the Indian
representatives (which resulted in the passing of Indian Councils Act, 1892T. At the
administrative level, the most important demand was to Indianise the higher grades of
administrative services through a simultaneous ICS examination in England and India. Struggle for Independence and
At economic level, the demand was for the industrialisation ofthe country and promotion Nationalism in South Asia
of Indian industries. The methods adopted to achieve these aims were clearly determined
by liberal ideology. Constitutional agitation, effective argument and fervent appeal to
the democratic consciousness and traditions of the British were the accepted methods
of struggle. Gradualism and constitutionalism were the key concepts. They believed
that the main purpose was to educate the masses, heighten national consciousness and
create a consensus on political issues. .
During this phase, the national movement had a narrow base, the masses could not be
attracted to it. Its influence was limited to urban educated class. The Muslims by and
large preferred to accept the leadership of Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan. In 1906, when the
Muslim League was established, the Muslim community was affected by its communal
character and tended to stay away from the rlational.movement.
Meanwhile, discontent against the British increased because ofthe highhanded measures
of Lord Curzon who not only passed a number of laws such as the Indian Universities
Act and the Calcutta Corporation Act curtailing the powers of the Indians but also
partitioned Bengal, ostensibly for administrative convenience but politically to create a
division between the Hindu dominant West Bengal and Muslim dominated East Bengal.
Large number of nationalists became disillusioned with the ideology and methods of
the moderate leaders. With the rise of leaders like Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Aurobindo
Ghosh, Lajpat Rai and Bipin Chandra Pal, the national movement entered a new phase,
the Extremist or militant phase. The extremist leaders practiced a new political philosophy
and methods of struggle. Their programmes included boycott of foreign goods, breaking
of all relations with the British Government, founding of national institutions for education,
and propagation of swadeshi.The boycott movement launched by the nationalists was
aggressively anti-British. It included not only the boycott of British goods but also
renunciation of the government titles and posts and boycott of councils and schools.
By providing -a stimulus to cottage industries, it also became an instrument for the
economic regeneration of the country. The extremists emphasized that there was an
inherentclash between the Indian and the British interestsand that the national movement
was a direct result of this clash. The political propaganda of the militant nationalists
instilled national pride, self-respect and self-confidencein the people. It also broadened
the base of the national movement associating with it the lower middle class, students
and youth. But the movement resurrected Hindu ideas and invoked Hindu symbols
which weaned its secular character. This is perhaps why the movement could not
prevent a large mass of the Muslims from accepting the communal ideology of the
Muslim League.
A new phase in the Indian national movement began with the entry of Mahatma
Gandhi. During the World War I, the political activities were at a low ebb. But after the
war, there was great unrest among the people because ofahe fall in agricultural prices,
increasing poverty of the middle classes, debt due to war, price rise, profiteering etc.
The British government rewarded the Indian people with Government of India Act,
1919that increased the participation of Indian people in the administration. But the Act
did not come to the expectation of the Indian leaders. In these circumstances, the
British severely restricted the civil liberties in India by enacting the Rowlatt Acts in
1919.
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who had returned from South Afiica in 1914, initiated
the struggle against the British mle by organising a series of non-violent acts of resistance
against the Rowlatt Acts of 1919. The following year, Gandhi reorganised the Congress,
transforming it from an annual gathering of national leaders to a mass movement, with
membership fees and requirements set to allow even the poorest of the Indian to join.
In August 1920he launched a full scale non-cooperation movement on the twin issues
of : i) rectifying the wrongs of the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy, and the ii) khilafat
movement. The non-cooperation movement through non-violence and Satyagrah
revolutionized the nature of the national movement. It was transformed into a mass
-
- --

South Asia as a Region movement. It had three-tier programme: boycott of the national assembly, courts and
foreign cloth. Motilal Nehru, C.R. Das, Patel, Rajendra Prasad and many others left
the courts, students left schools and teachers resigned from schools and colleges. The
movement was not limited to boycott, it offered a positive programmes like opening of
national educational institutions and the establishment of cottage and handloom
industries. However, Gandhi ended the non-cooperation movement in 1922 when the
movement turned violem at Chaura Chauri.
A special feature of the non-cooperation movement was Hindu-Muslim unity. But
after the withdrawal of the movement, there were Hindu-Muslim riots throughout
India. Both the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha took belligerent stands.
The national movement got a new lease of life in 1928 when the British government
announced the appointment of Simon Commission to study the next steps of democratic
reforms in India. The Congress boycotted the commission on the ground that Indians
were not represented in the Commission. It began to formulate a parallel constitution
having the consent of the major communities. A committee was appointed under the
chairmanship of Motilal Nehru to prepare a consensus report. The Committee prepared
an All Parties Constitution based on self-governing dominion. The report also recognised
titles in private and personal property. The socialists criticized the scheme for
abandoning the goal of independence. But most impo~antly,the report did not enjoy
the support of Jinnah ar~dthe Muslim League which felt that the Muslim interests
have not been protected. Since the All Party Convention did not accede to the demands
of the League, Jinnah parted company with the Congress.
Meanwhile, the younger leadership of INC represented by Jawaharlal Nehru and
Subhas Chandra Bose was not satisfied with the dominion status and called for
complete independence.On 3 1 December, 1929, Congress, under the presidentship of
Motilal Nehru passed a resolution for Purna Swaraj, that is, complete independence.
The Civil Disobedience Movement began on 6 April 1930 by breaking the salt law.
Gandhi prepared a comprehensive plan for this movement. He wanted every village
to fetch or manufacture contraband salt, women to picket liquor shops, opium dens
and shops of foreign cloth dealers; the young and old to spin khadi and bum foreign
cloth, the Hindus to eschew untouchability, students to leave government school and
government servants to resign their jobs. The government responded by issuing a
number of ordinances, banning the Congress and all its branches, closing down
newspapers and printing presses and arresting as many as 90,000 people. Negotiations
that followed resulted in the Gandhi-Irwin Pact by which all the political prisoners
were release and Gandhi agreed to be sole representative of the Congress at the
Round Table Conference in London. Gandhi placed the views of the Congress on the
federal scheme for India, problems of minorities, the army etc. He opposed the
communal division. But due to differences among the various Indian groups at the
conference, viz. Congress, Hindu Mahasabha, Muslim League, Sikhs, native princes
etc., no agreement could be reached and Gandhi came back from the conference
empty handed. In the meantime, the British government announced the Communal
Award that not only gave separate electorate to Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, but also to
the depressed classes. Gmdhi who was in jail started a fast unto death. This resulted
in the signing of Poona Pact that reserved seats for the depressed classes instead of
separate electorate.
The constitutional reforms finally took shape in the form of the Government of India
Act of 1935. The Act provided for the establishment of autonomous legislative bodies
in the provinces of British India, the creation of a federal form of government
incorporatingthe provhces and princely states, and the protection of Muslim minorities.
The 1935Act opened a new chapter in the Indian constitutionaldevelopment. Although
the Act did not come up to the expectation of the political parties, all the parties
decided to fight elections for the provincial assemblies in 1937. The Congress won
absolute majority in five provinces out of seven and a near majority in Bombay. On
the other hand, the Musl hn League could not form a government in any province and
its idea of coalition government in U.P. and Bombay with Congress was rejected by Struggle for Independence and
1 the later. This further alienated Jinnah. He began to think in terms of Muslims not as a Nationalism in South Asia
I
1 minoriity but as a separate nationality. In March 1940, Jinnah propounded the 'two-
nation' theory and the Muslim League passed its famous resolution demanding a
separate Muslim state constitutingthe geographically contiguous regions on the western
and eastern zones of India.
When the World War I1 broke out, the British declared war on India's behalf without
cons~~lting Indian leaders. The Congress provincial ministries resigned in protest. In
1942, the Congress demanded that British should immediately,quitIndia and passed the
famous 'Quit India' resolution. But before the movement for this could be launched,
all the leaders, including Gandhi were arrested and the movement became leaderless
and took a violent turn. There were strikes, agitations and demonstrations in all parts
of India. Police stations, post offices and railway stations were attacked,
communication wires were cut and railway lines destroyed. This phase showed that, if
Ld need be, the Indian people could take to violence to end British imperialism.
I
I Meanwhile, while the Congress leaders were in jail, Jinnah got a free hand to strengthen
the support base of the Muslim League. The League soon became the chiefspokesman
I- of the Muslims. After 1943,the only question that remained was how the power could
be transferred to India. After the War ended in April 1945, there were fresh elections
in Britain and the new Labour government had to face a number of national and
international'problems. War had weakened the economy of Britain.America and Russia
which had emerged as super powers were in favour of freeing the colonies. Moreover,
Britain found it difficult to maintain a colony like India which had witnessed mass
movements and the revolt of the Indian National Army. In March 1946, the British
government sent a Cabinet Mission to India. After long and detailed discussions with
different political parties and organizations, the Mission rejected the Muslim League's
demand to partition the country and made its proposals for an Indian federation and
the setting up of a constituent assembly. The proposals were accepted both by the
Congress and the League though reluctantly. In September 1946, an interim government
was formed under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru. The Muslim League alsojoined
the government but decided not to participate in the making of a new constitution. On
20 February 1947, the British Prime Minister announced his government's decision to
quit India before June 1948. Lord Mountbatten was to be sent to India to make
arrangements for the transfer of power. In the meantime, the bickerings within the
interim government were threatening the breakdown ofthe administration.The hostility
between the two communities had acquired frightening proportions. Jinnah was
adamant that the Muslims would not agree short of a sovereign state. As such partition
of India and establishment of Pakistan was inevitable. Mountbatten's formula was
that the country would be divided but also Punjab and Bengal so that the limited Pakistan
that emerged would meet both the Congress and the League positions to some extent.
The formula for partition and independence was accepted by all the major political
parties in India and was given final shape by the British Parliament through Indian
IndependenceAct 1947. The act provided for the creation of two independent dominions
India and Pakistan, provided for the partition of Bengal and Punjab and gave the
constituent assemblies of both the countries the power to frame their own constitutions.
Thus, on 15 August 1947 India attained independence.

1.3.2 Pakistan
The origin and the struggle for Pakistan lie in the communal politics of pre-independent
India. One of the major developments during the national movement was the rise and
growth of communalism. According to Bipin Chandra, communalism consists of three
stages: i) the communal ideology starts when persons or groups believe that people of

-
the sam --ligion have common socio-economic interests, ii) the second stage is
reached when a person or a group believes that different religion based communities
have their own special interests, though these interests can be reconciled and
accommodated, iii) the stage is reached when the religious differences are
South Asia as a Region converted into seculag differences and are seen as incompatible with each other. It is
at this stage that the idea of separate nation gets established. In the context of India till
1930,communal ideology of reconciliation and accommodation was prevalent but during
1940s, it reached its extremist form of a separate nation resulting in the partition of the
country.

Communalism started lacquiring something like an all India dimension in the late 19"
century. The reform movements launched by Muslim elite at this stage aimed at
spreading English eduution and was basically intended to prepare the Muslims for the
job market. They hardly tried to enlighten the community with modem ideas. The
sectarian approach of The reform movement created the ground for the emergence
and development of Muslim communal parties and politics. The British responded
positively to these devalopments and did everythingto encourage separatist tendencies
among the Muslims. The British colonial officials gave their blessings to the Muslim
League which was formed as an all India party in December 1906.
,.., -.;.
-9
-. -;- -c;gue dam its inception had been a conservative party with strong
. T

communal bias. Its leddership consisted of persons known for their loyalty to the
British. It raised the damand for separate electorates and safeguards forMaslims in
govemment service. It used communal politics and ideology to mobilise the people
and keep them away f r ~ m the growing national movement.

When the partition of IUengal was annulled in 1912, the Muslim League was dismayed
and disappointed withithe British and began advocating self government for India
within the British Empire. In 1916, it signed the Lucknow pact with the INC, whereby
the Congress approved b e institution of separate electorate and both parties declared
their intention to work tbward the dominion status for India. The Hindu-Muslim unity
was at its peak during the non-cooperation movement. The pact ended in 1922 with
the calling off of the noh-cooperation movement. The following years saw the rise of'
Hindu-Muslim communalism expressing itself in number of riots in different parts of
the country.

Prospects of Hindu Mu Jlim unity became bright when all parties boycotted the Simon"
Commission and decided to formulate an all-parties constitution. Since the demands
put forth by the leader dfthe Muslim League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah were not met at
the Conference, he virtpally parted ways with the Congress. Consequently, all the
Muslim groups joined lands and put forth a single document known as Jinnah's 14
Point Programme which became the basis for any further discussion for the future of
India. During the Round Table Conferences, no decision could be reached because of
the uncompromising attitude of the League. To add fuel to the fire, the British
govemment through the,Communal Award accepted almost all that was demanded in
Jinnah's 14 Point progrqmme.

From 1930 onwards, a section of the Muslim intelligentsia began to think in terms of a
separate independent Muslim state in India. Mohammad Iqbal presiding over 1930
session of the Muslim League said 'I would like to see the Punjab, north-westem
Frontier provinces, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state'. At the
Round Table Conference, a group of Muslim students in England led by Rahmat Ali
proposed a Muslim state PAKISTAN (taking the first letter of four provinces and the
end of the last province).

Despite the yearnings for a separate Muslim state, the League pursued a policy of
cooperation with the Congress and favoured a loose federal relationship among
provinces within a united India. However, after the 1937elections, in which the League
had fared badly winning only 108 seats out of 485 seats reserved for Muslim, the
League evolved into a $trong anti-Congress party. As it went about consolidating
support among the Muslims, the idea of living together as a single nation Ggan to be
renlac~dby the politics of hatred. fear. and separation. The interests of Hindus and
i March 1940, the League propounded the two-nation theory anb passed a resoltition
demanding the creation of 'independent states' for Muslims in the north-western and
eastern parts of India.
Struggle for Independence and
Nationalism in south Asia

Though the resolution was not taken seriously at that time but as months passed thete
was a rapid change. By 1943 it became an article of faith and a matter of life and
diath for the Muslims. The ambitious politicians, legislators and administrators saw
ample opportunities for power in the new state. The professional class of lawyers,
doctors, teachers, entrepreneurs and industrialists saw much scope for their activities.
To the Muslims peasants of Bengal and Punjab, Pakistan was presented as the end of
exploitation by Hindu zamidars and bania.

The League fought the 1945-46 election on the ground that 'avote for the League and
Pakistan was a vote for Islam'. Winning 440 of the 495 seats reserved for Muslims,
the League established itself as the dominant party among the Muslims. Jinnah declared
that there could be no compromise on the issue of Pakistan. The Cabinet Mission plan
rejected the formation of Pakistan and called for the establishment of an interim
government. Initially, the League did notjoin the government, but laterjoined it, declaring
at the same time that it will not participate in the drafting of the constitution. In August,
Jinnah had called for 'Direction Action' for the creation of Pakistan. The following
months witnessed the worst ever communal riots between the two communities starting
from Bengal, Bihar and United Provinces reaching Delhi and culminating in Punjab.
I Mountbatten who had been sent to India for the transfer of power felt that immediate
action was necessary and this action could only be political. The discussions held -
I
between Mountbatten and the Indian National Congress on the one hand and between
I Mountbatten and Jinnah on the other created an outline of the scheme for the partition
I
of India. This was embodied in an Indian Independence Act 1947 which defined the
I territories ofthe two dominions adjustable and fixation ofthe final boundaries after the
Award of the Boundary Commission, partition of Bengal and Punjab and secession of
Sylhet from Assam. Thus the communal divide ultimately led to the political divide and
I the creation of Pakistan.

1.3.3 Bangladesh
Bangladesh was part of Pakistan which was created on the demand that the Muslims
are a nation and therefore must have a separate homeland and a state of their own.
After Pakistan's creation, however, Bengalis came to develop an increasing sense of
distinctiveness which prevented the development of a single national community. It
L was this estrangement that culminated in the secessionist movement as a result of
which Bangladesh ceased to be its constituent part.

The first significant event that was a landmark in the development of Bengali nationalism
in Pakistan was the decision of the ruling government of Pakistan to introduce Urdu as
the national language of Pakistan in disregard of Bengali wishes. Bengalis saw it as an
attempt at cultural intrusion. Different strata of population came out to protest this
I
decision. Police action to disperse demonstrating students leading to the death of some
individuals intensified Bengali hostility towards West Pakistan. The language movement
sparked the first nationalistic sentimentthat got reinforced by the economic and political
treatment meted to the Bengalis by the dominant western Pakistan government. This
demand later got turned into provincial autonomy. Legally, the Bengalis were citizens
of Pakistan but economically the relationship between West Pakistan and East Pakistan
I
was an exploitathe one. East Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings were diverted to
the West to develop its economy while the East was left lagging behind. There was
I some industrialisation, but its benefits were reaped by West Pakistan, because the
ownel, .,?re mostly from West Pakistan. Politically, East Pakistan had a subordinate
position in the state structure of Pakistan. With West Pakistan becoming the seat of
I
central government, the Pb!aslim League did not allow the emergence of Bengali
1 leadership in Em-' " '-' An. Instead, it sought to manage East Pakistan affairs through
South Asia as a Region a combination of non-Bengali Nawabs and Muslim traders of erstwhile Bengal. The
position became worse because both in the bureaucracy and in the armed forces the
eastern wing of Pakistan had no significant participation. As a result, the Bengali
leadership was given much less than its due in top decision making structure. The
overwhelming domination of West Pakistan in government, bureaucracy and armed
f-es allowed them to manipulate and dominate East Pakistan.

The most significant impact of the language movement was on the 1954 general
elections held under limited franchise. The Awami Muslim League that had emerged
under the leadership of Bhashani in 1949 and other Bengali parties came together to
form a United Front. They demanded, among others, autonomy for East Pakistan and
adoption of Bengali as one ofthe state languages. They decisively defeated the Muslim
League in East Pakistan. However, the Muslim League dismissed the United Front
government within six months and imposed military rule in the name of Governor's
rule. With the establishment ofmilitary dictatorship under Gen Ayub Khan in 1959, the
first phase of the struggle of people of East Pakistan ended.
The military dictatorship of Ayub Khan was really aimed at preventing the middle
classes or the vernacular elite from coming to power. Politicians with a mass base
were disqualified and the domination of the armed forces over the military-bureaucratic
complex backed by the industrial and trading bourgeoisie was ensured. The rapid
polarization that followed reflected the cumulative impact of the growing political,
econoinic and cultural differences between the two wings. This found expression in
the Six-Point Programme announced by the leader of the Awami League, Mujib ijr
Rahman, in 1966. He demanded that the government be federal and parliamentary in
nature, its members to be elected by universal adult suffrage with legislative
representation on the basis of population; that the federal government have principal
responsibility for foreibg affairs and defence only; that each wing have its own currency
and separate fiscal accounts; that taxation be done at the provincial level; that each
federal unit having control over its own earning of foreign exchange; and that each
unit could raise its own militia or paramilitary forces. This i a s virtually a der iz,ld for
a confederation. The struggle for linguistic nationalism, autonomy, a balanced eccnomic
growth and democracy had now merged.
The third phase of the struggle was the elections of 1970, the first general elections
conducted since independence. The Awami League not only swept the provincial
assembly polls but also succeeded in securing a majority in the national assembly
because of the larger population of the eastern wing. In such circumstances the
promised constituent assembly would have inevitably legitimised Mujib's six-point
programme. Hence the convening of the national assembly was postponed by the
ruling military elite and an alliance was forged with the opposition i.e. Zulfiquar Ali
Bhutto in West Pakistan. Mujib launched a mass civil disobedience movement hoping
to negotiate with Yahya Khan from the position of authority but the Pakistani ruling
class used the negotiations to buy time to prspare for the military assault calculated to
intimidate the Bengalis in submission.
When tl-c military assault on Bengali nationalists began on 25th March, the civil
disobedience and the non-cooperation movement turned into armed struggle. The
brutal military action accompanied by tort~lre,rape and murder of intellectuals destroyed
the last vestiges of Pakistani nationhood in the people of Bangladesh. The heavy
civilian causalities led to an unprecedented migration of Begali people to India. What
should rightfully have been an internal affair of Pakistan, thus became a major problem
of India. India provided sanctuary and training facilities to the freedom fighters. Besides,
it mounted a massive diplomatic offensive to being to the notice of the world the
genocide in Bangladesh and its liberation struggle. Finally, Pakistan spelt its own doom
by declaring war on India on 3 1 December.
~ The armed struggle ended on 161h
December 1971 when the Pakistani army surrendered to the joint command of the
Bangladesh Liberation Army and the Indian army in Dacca. Bangladesh emerged as
a sovereign independent nation.
1.3.4 Sri Lanka Struggle for Independence and
Nationalism in South Asia
The political history of Ceylon, which later came to be known as Sri Lanka, can be
traced back to the 3rdcentury B.C. During the early years, the island was divided into
snlal ler principalities. Dutthagamini, a Sinhala prince from Rohana, attempted to unify
the'island but complete unification remained a distant hope for a long time. Beginning
from the 3rdcentury BC, Ceylon experienced periodical invasions from South India
and in the I lthcentury the north-western region became a province of the Chola
kingdom. In the 1 2thcentury, the Sinhala king Parakramabahu I unified the whole
country. But after his death, the country plunged into disorder and chaos which attracted
the invaders from South India. It was these invasions which culminated in the formation
of a Tamil kingdom in the Jaffna peninsula in the north of the island. When the
Portuguese arrived in late 16thcentury,Ceylon was divided into three independent
kingdoms: two Sinhalese, one based at Kotte with control over the south and east of
the island, and the other at Kandy ruling the central highlands; and one Tamil kingdom
controlling north and east. This gave them ample opportunities to intervene in Ceylonese
politics and raise their settlements in the coastal region. In the mid 1 7 century,
~ they
were replaced by Dutch traders who were supported by the Sinhalese. The Dutch
ruled the coastal Ceylon for over hundred years when much of the interior remained
independent under the Kandyan kings. The British displaced the Dutch in 1796. In
1802, they abolished the sep>arateTamil state and made it into a 'crown colony'. In
1815, taking advantage of internal dissentions within the Kandya kingdom, the British
- succeeded in overthrowing the Nayakkar dynasty. It guaranteed Kandayans their
privileges and rights and the preservation of customary laws, institutions, and religion.
Though Kandy was administered separately, the trend towards reducing the status of
its aristocrats and bhikkhus was unmistakable; this led to a popular rebellion against
British control in 1818. This Great Rebellion was crushed and the Kandya province
was integrated with the rest of the country.
Becoming the effective rulers ofthe whole of Ceylon, British colonialists quickly began
a reform process. They relieved the native officials ofjudicial authority, paid salaries
in'cash, and relaxed the traditional system of compulsory labour called the rajakariya
system. Restrictions on European ownership of land were also lifted. Agriculture was
encouraged. The Colebrooke Cameron Commission systematised these early changes
through the Charter of Justice of 1833. The British adopted a unitary administrative
and judicial system for the whole island. They reduced the autocratic powers of the
governor and setup Executive and Legislative Councils to share powers in the task of
government. English was made the language of the government and the medium of
instruction in schools.
In the economic sphere, the British abolished all state monopolies, did away with
rajakariya system, and promoted free trade. They encouraged plantation agriculture
by selling Crown land cheaply. As a result, production of cinnamon, pepper, sugarcane,
cotton and coffee flourished. The labour on the coffee plantations was predominantly
immigrant Indians. In the later half of the 19thcentury, commercial crops like tea,
1 rubber, and coconut plantation became the catalyst of modernization of the Ceylonese
economy.
I
I
I
It should however be noted that the capitalist enterprise was restricted to urban areas
and areas under plantation. The rest of the country continued under subsistence
agriculture, using traditional methods, though the isolation of the villages was broken
1
I
somewhat by roads and railways.
National consciousness and the origin of modern nationalism in Ceylon can be traced
back to the religious revivalism, which was a reaction to the Christian missionary
enterprise. In the later half ofthe I 9thcentury, revivalist movements in Buddhism and
Hinduism sought to modernise their institutions and to defend themselves against the
Christianity by establishing schools to impart Western education unmixed with
Christianity. This consciousness gradually spread to the political arena. A number of
south Asia as a Region regional and communal associations that had come LIPin the educationally advanced
parts ofthe country began to demand political reforms within the colonial constitution.
They asked for Ceylonese participation in the executive branch, a wider territorial
representation in legislature, and the adoption of elective principle in place ofnomination.
The colonial administratibn ignored these demands as they were not coordinated or
vociferous. The constitutional reforms of 1910 retained the old structure with an
appointed executive and a legislative branch with an appointed majority. The elective
principle was recognised to a limited extent by establishing 'educated Ceylonese'
electorate to elect one member to the Legislative Council. Other Ceylonese members
were to be nominated on communal basis.
Forces of nationalism gathered momentum during the World War I. The growth of
national political consciousness was aided by the political repression that followed the
civil disturbances in 1915. When the British arrested prominent Sinhalese leaders
during what was then a minor communal riot, leaders of all co~mmunitiescame to
oppose the move. It became the first political agitation on tlie island, Feeling the need
for a common platform ta voice a nationalistic view point, the Sinhalese and Tamil
organisations came together to form the Ceylon National Congress in 1919. The
Congress demanded control of the budget, elected majority in the legislature and
practical control of the executive branch.
The British government, already under pressure because of the decline in the growth
of world trade after World War I, a rise in prices of imported goods including foodstuffs
and heightened working class activity, promulgated a new constitution in 1920. It
provided for an elected majority in the legislature, an increase in the number of
territorially elected members, and the election of communal representatives. Thus, a
representative government came into being in Ceylon. The executive, however,
remained under the governor and the official Executive Council.
Following these reforms, there was the breakdown of the Sinhalese and Tamil harmony
t
of interests. While the Sinhalese leaders wanted to do away with communal
representation and make teplitorial representation universal, minorities desired to retain
communal representation to secure power for their communities. In this context, the
Tamils began to regard themselves as minority community. With the increase in
dissension and mutual suspicion between the Sinhalese and Tamils, the minorities
broke away from the Congress to form their own organisations.
A new constitution framed in 193 1 gave Ceylonese leaders opportunities to Bxercise
political power and to gain governmental experience with a view to achieving eventual
self-government. It provided for a State Council which combined legislative and
executive functions. In addition to being a legislative council with an overwhelming
majority of territorially elected members, the State Council was divided into seven
committees (each headed by a minister or chairman) for executive work. Perhaps the
most significant feature ofthis constitution was that by granting universal franchise, it
brought all Ceylonese intd the political process.
The growing national movement in India and the introduction of adult franchise further
augmented the national movement in Sri Lanka. Movements for social welfare
increased. Working class movement got impetus with the foundation of the Marxist
political party. The introduction of universal suffrage also led to the recrudescence of
religious nationalism i.e. nationali,sm intertwined with Buddhist resurgence and its
associated cultural heritage. This was given expression by S.W.R.D. Bhandaranaike
through his Sinhala Maha Sabha. The universal suffrage also compelled the
constitutionalist leadership during the second State Council (1936-47) to become more
positive towards social and economic facets of the resurgence of nationalism,
particularly in the fields of health, education and food subsidies.
In response to the radical agitations, the British government appointed Soulbury
Commission in 1944 to examine the constitutional problems. The Commission
recommended internal self-government, with defence and external affairs under the
British control. Ceylonese radical elements, however, pressed for complete Struggle for lndependence and
independence. Meanwhile India's independence became a reality. In the context of Nationalism in South Asia
the new situation, Great BI itain was forced to transfer complete power on 4th February
1948 to the representatives of people elected as per the provisions ofthe new constitution
in the general elections held in 1947.
The transfer of power in Sri Lanka was a smooth and peaceful, a reflection of the
moderate tone of the dominant strand in the country's national movement. There was
no bitterness or division at the time of independence as in the case of India. It made
the whole process rather bland. lndependence was granted from above and lacked
the active spirit of nationalism.
Check Your Progress I
~ o t d :i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the one given at the end of this unit.
1) What was the political philosophy and methods adopted by the Extremist leaders
in India?

..........................................................................................................................
2) What were the main grievances of the Bengalis in East Pakistan?

..........................................................................................................................
3) When and on what issue did the Sinhalese and Tamils develop difierences?

1.3.5 Nepal
For much of its early history, Nepal was divided into a number of independent
principalities. In the mid lathcentury, Prithvinaraian Shah, the chief of the Gurkha
principality unified the whole of Nepal and founded the Shah dynasty. The present
borders of Nepal came into being after the war with the British rulers in 1814. Nepal
lost considerable amount ofterritory to British India, but it gained British recognition
of its sovereignty. Even though Nepal was never occupied by the British, it was rarely
in a position to assert its complete independence. When India became independent,
Nepal too declared its independent status.
Since minor heirs succeeded Prithavinaraian, the prime ministers began to wield
immense political power. This resulted in intrigues, conspiracies, killings and counter-
killings and instability. This situation continued until the mid-19thcentury, when Jang
Bahadur Rana eliminated all rival political factions and reduced the king to a titular
head. The Shah ruler, who was secluded in the palace grounds, was asked to issue a
sansad (royal decree) granting Jung Bahadur absolute authority in civil and military
administration and foreign relations. This sansad which also bestowed the office of
prime minister upon the Ranas in perpetuity provided the legal basis for the rule of the
Rana family in the country.
Since the power ofthe Rana prime ministers was ultimately illegitimate, resting on the
abdication of responsibilities by the king and his virtual incarceration, the Rana rule
pouth Asia as a Region became autocratic and reectionary in order to prevent any challenge to their authority.
In the process, they succeeded in isolating Nepal fiom many of the changes happening
throughout the world and even in nearby India.
Nepal, however, did not remain in complete isolation. The reform movements in India
and the rise of national movement under Indian National Congress deeply influenced
the middle classes. The b n a regime's suppression of the modernist aspiratiol~softhe
educated classes gave bitth to an anti-Rana movement. Nepali exiles and those who
had come to India for education set up associations which aimed at building a popular
movement ii~epal and replace the Rana system by a democratic order. I n k 1930s,
some of these organisations, such as the Nepali Nagrik Adhikar Samithi, Prachanda
Ghorka, Praja Parishad, ebc. formed by Nepali people living in exile in India, demanded
immediate political reforms in Nepal and an end to the rule of the Ranas. This
precipitated internal disturbawes in Nepal. These developments in Nepal coincided
with preparations for British withdrawal from the subcontinent. It may be noted that
the Rana system had been supported and sustained by the British rulers in India who
saw in Ranas, a useful and subservient ally. The atmosphere within the country was
also not in favour of the Ranas. The king was aligned with the anti-Rana forces for
obvious reasons. Moreover, the Ranas themselves had internal contradictions owing
to various categories of expanding and amorphous lineage in the family. Accordingly,
may of the Ranas in the lower status of the family hierarchy and lineage (born of less
pure marriage) had either directly joined the anti-Rana movement or were indirectly
opposing the ruling coterie as they had no stakes in the degenerated system. There
were also sharp differences of ideology and tactics among the Rana rulers on how to
deal with the forces of change. In such circumstances, the then Rana prime minister,
Padma Shamsher thought of accommodation with the leaders of the democratic
movement. This change in attitude paved a way for political reforms and constitutional
developments in Nepal.
In 1948, Rana Mohan Shamsher promulgated the first written constitution ofNepal. It
provided fundamental rights to the people and revived the traditional panchayat system
without disturbing the traditional powers ofthe Ranas. When the Rana prime minister
outlawed the Nepali National Congress and showed no interest in implementing the
new constitution, anti-Rana forces came together to form the Nepal Democratic
Congress in Calcutta in August 1948. This group advocated the overthrow of the
Ranas by any means, including armed insurrection. It tried to ferment army coups in
January 1949 and January 1950 but failed. When the Rana government arrested B.P.
Koirala and other organizers in October 1948 and subjected regime opponents to
harsh conditions and even torture in jail, its democratic opponents turned against it
again .
The break for the nationalists came in 1950 when Iding Tribhuvan and his family
sought asylum in India. Several anti-Rana organisations then joined together under the
banner of the Nepali Congress, launched an armed struggle against the Rana regime. a
The Nepali Congress set up a provisional government at the border town of Birganj
after its forces had captured much of the Terai from the Ranas. At this stage, India,
which had just recognised the Rana regime in Nepal and concluded the: Treaty of
Peace and Friendship in 1950, decided to intervene to find a amicable way out. India
mediated with the three segments of the Nepali politics in the crisis situation, the
Ranas, the popular leaders and the King to work out a settlement. India's approach
was that Nepal should follow a middle path where in the traditional elite should be
preserved at the same time some progress should be made'towards democracy. The
agreementconcluded in New Delhi in February 1951 envisaged a coalition glovemment
of the Ranas and the Nepali Congress as well as restoration of the status and power
of the monarchy. An interim ministry headed by Mohan Shamsher with five Ranas
and five Nepali Congress Party members was sworn in February 1951 afte:r the King
returned to Kathmandu. The King issued a la1 rnohur revoking all the hereditary
powers and privileges of the Rana family. Thus, the regime that had lasted for 104
years collapsed in 104 days.
1.3.6 Bhutan Struggle for Independence and
Nationalism in South Asia
Bhutan was divided into several small principalities until 17th century. In the eastern
Bhutan a ruling house was founded by the descendents of a Tibetan prince who had
migrated in 9thcentury A.D. The western region was divided into several estates,
controlled by different Buddhist monastic schools. The prince, Abbot-Shabdrung
Ngawang Namgyal, arrived in Bhutan from Tibet as refugee in 1616. With the help of
existing monasteries belonging to his school of Buddhism, he launched a struggle to
unify Bhutan. In this struggle, Shabdrung defeated the rival schools and also repulsed
successive invasions from Tibet and united the country. But after his death, Bhutan
was in turmoil once again. Out ofthis turmoil emerged Ugyen Wangchuk who restored
order and peace in Bhutan and founded the present hereditary ruling house in 1907.
When the Bengal Presidency was established by Britain in the later half of the 1Sth
century, its borders touched the Bhutanese territory. This resulted in periodic skirmishes
between the British and the Bhutanese. It finally led to the full scale Anglo-Bhutanese
war in 1864-65 which settled the border. Thereafter, the British influence in Bhutan
gradually increased at the expense of China and Tibet. In 1910, despite Chinese protests,
Ugyen Wangchuck signed a treaty with the British rulers of India in which he "agreed
to be guided by the advice of the British government in regard to its external affairs".
In return, the British government pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of
Bhutan.
The following year the king attended the famous Delhi Durbar and he 'knew and
accepted the fact that none but feudatory chjefs of India were to participate in the
Durbar. 'The British, however, did not regard Bhutan as an Indian State and did not
adopt policies normally applied to native princes, such as recognising and regulating
succession, intervening in case of threats to the state or gross misrule.
When India was on the verge of independence, the Bhutanese government was
apprehensive that the new Indian government was likely to interfere in the internal
affairs of Bhutan and as a counter balance wanted to have some relations with the
British government in London. However, when the Bhutanese delegation went to New
Delhi to negotiate a standstill Treaty with the new Indian government, it was impressed
by the sincerity of the new Indian regime. The Bhutan government and the Political
Oficer in Sikkim signed the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949 at Darjeeling in August 1949.
The Treaty clearly established Bhutan as a sovereign power. India undertook not to
interfere in the internal administration of Bhutan while Bhutan agreed to be guided by
the advice of India in its external relations. In case of dispute arising in applying the
Treaty, constitution of an Arbitration Council with an Indian, a Bhutanese representative
and the chairman to be nominated by Bhutan among the Federal High Court judges
from India was also envisaged. These stipulations have worked to the satisfaction of
both the contracting parties.
1.3.7 Maldives
The early history of the Maldives is obscure. The early settlers here were probably
from southern India. Indo-European speakers followed them from Sri Lanka in the
fourth and fifth centuries BC. In the 1 th century AD, sailors from East Africa and
Arab countries came to the island's. Thef43 ldivian ethnic identity is therefore a blend
ofthese cultures, reinforced by religion and language.
Originally Buddhists, Maldivian were converted to Sunni Islam in the mid-12th century.
Since then the Maldives has been governed as an Islamic sultanate for most of its
history. It came under the feudatory subjection of the king of Cannanore in coastal
India. For the first time in its history, the Maldives came under direct control of foreign
power, when the Portuguese occupied the northern islands in 1553. Within 15 years
the Portuguese were driven out by the people led by warrior-patriot, Mohammad Bodu
79kuru. The Sultan later concluded a treaty with Portuguese which restricted their
independenceand Maldives was forced to send a fixed annhal tribute to the Portuguese
in Ceylon.
South Asia as a Region When the Dutch and later the British established their hold 011 Ceylon, the Sultan of
Maldives continued the practice of sending an annual tribute to the European Governors
in Ceylon, a practice that continued till the first half of 20thcentury. The Europeans
left alone the local government and internal affairs of the Maldives.
Knowing the strategic importance of the islands as well as to protect trade conducted
by British subjects, in 1887, the Governor of Ceylon signed an agreement with the
Sultan. By this agreement, Great Britain formally recognized Maldives as its
protectorate. According to the terms of the agreement, the responsibility of recognizing
and installing the sultan and the control of the country's defence and foreign relations
were vested in Great 3ritain. In return, the islanders were left free to decided internal
affairs.
Maldives continued to be ruled under a succession of sultans. The sultans were
hereditary until 1932 when an attempt was made to make the sultanate elective,thereby
limiting the absolute powers of sultans. Maldives remained a British crown protectorate
until 1953 when the sultanate was suspended and the First Republic was declared
under the presidency of Muhammad Amin Didi. The sultanate was however, restored
the following year. Political developments in the Maldives since then have been largely
influence by the British military presence in the islands.
In 1956, the Britain obtained permission to re-establish its wartime airfield on Gan
islands and a radio station on Hitaddu Island. Maldives granted the British a 100-year
lease on Gan that required them to pay £2,000 a year. Before the agreement could be
ratified, the new Prime Minister, Ibrahim Nasir, called for a review of the agreement
in the interest of shortening the lease and increasing the annual payment. But in 1959,
Nasir was challenged by a local secessionist movement in the southern atolls that
benefited economically from the British presence on Gan. He allowed Britain to
continue to use both the Gan and the Hitaddu facilities for a thirty-year period, with
the payment of £750,000 over the period of 1960to 1965 for the purpose of Maldives'
economic development.
On July 26, 1965, Maldives gained independence under an agreement signed with
Britain. The British government retained the use of the Gan and Hitaddu facilities. In
March 1968the sultanate was abolished by a national referendum. Maldives became
a republic in November 1968 under the presidency of Ibrahim Nasir.
Check Your progress 2
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the one given at the end of this unit.
1) What factors contributed to the demise of the Rana system in Nepal?

2) ................................................is regarded as the founder of modem Bhutan.


3) Maldives attained independence on ........................................

LET US SUM UP
As is evident from above, nationalism and the struggle for independence in the South
Asian region were the-directresult ofthe colonialism and imperialism of the western
nations. The lead in this direction was given by Indiathat not only led the most powerti1
liberation movement spanning over a period of more than sixty years but also influenced
directly and indirectly other countries of the region.
Although, the struggle for freedom was anti imperialistic, yet the proto national loyalties Struggle for l~ldepeltdencerr~d
-religious, ethnic or otherwise- among the people proved an obstacle rather than a Nationalism in Soutll Asia
contribution to the national consciousness and national unity. This was readily mobilized
by the imperial masters against the nationalistsby encouraging communalism. The net
result was the partition of India and the creation ofPakistan. Communalism, the resultant
partition of India a ~ the
d creation of Pakistan were the outgrowth of the complexities
; of the national movement. Basically communalism was the disguised expression of
I the struggle between the vested interests belonging to different faiths that gave a
communal form to that struggle. The communal question had no religious issue. It was

I a question of stq~gglebetweep various sections of the professional classes belonging


to different faiths.
The cultural and geographical separation between West Pakistan and East Pakistan.
combined with differences in social, economic and political factors, set the stage for a
second wave of nationalism that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. It was a
struggle for nationalism of a 'nation within a nation'. The idea of 'two-nations theoryc
i.e. Hindus and Muslims form separate nationalities proved wrong.
In Sri Lanka, the freedom struggle evolved in a peaceful, gradual and constitutional
manner. In striking contrasts to other parts of South Asia, Sri Lanka in 1948 was an
oasis of stability, peace and order. The transfer of power was smooth and peaceful, a
reflection of the moderate tone of the dominant strand in the couiitry2snationalist
movement, there was hardly any bitterness or division.
In the case ofNepal, the problem was internal i.e. a power struggle between the royal
family and the reactionary and autocratic Rana system. The anti-Rana democratic
niovement began after the World War I, it intensified following the independence of
Indian in 1947. The Nepali Congress launched a powerful movement against the Rana
rule in 1950. India gave a tacit support to the movement that in the course of time
turned into a violent armed struggle and paved the way for a constitutional monarchy
in February 1951.
In Bhutan, the British interest was very much limited. Till independence of India, the
relations between Bhutan and British Government remained cordial. At no stage Britain
thought of interfering in the internal affairs of Bhutan except controlling its foreign
relations. This tradition was continued by independent lndia by the 1949treaty between
lndia and Bhutan.
In the case of Maldives, no Western colonial power directly ruled the Maldives except
the Portuguese who managed to gain control over it for a short period. Between 1887
and 1965 it remained a protectorate of Great Britain. In the internal matters and the
conduct ofdomestic politics, the Maldives remained largely unhindered. And though
at the constitutional level, certain changes were brought about they did not affect the
pace or the pattern of social structures except in a formal sense.

1.5 SOME USEFUL BOOKS


Chandra, Bipin. (1989) India 's Struggle for Independence. Delhi
Sarkar, Sumit. (1983) Modem India 1885-47. Delhi
Vermani, R.C. (2000) Colonialism and Nationalism in India, Delhi,
Das, Mitra. (1981) From Nation to Nation. Minerva Associates, Calcutta
Banerjee, Subrata (1981) Bangladesh. New Delhi,
K.M. DeSilva, K.M. (1977) Sri Lanka - A Survey, London.
Phandnis, Urmial. (1985) Maldives - Winds of Change in an AtoN State. New Delhi.
Sinha, A.C. (2001) Hirnalyan Kingdom of Bhutan. Delhi
South Asia as a Region
ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS
EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

I) The Extremist were aggressively anti-British and aimed at economic regeneration


of the country. Their programmes included boycott of foreign goods, breaking of all
relations with the British Government, founding of national institutions for education,
and propagation ofswadeshi. Their political philosophy instilled national pride, self-
respect and self-confidence in the people. They also broadened the basis of the
national movement asso<;-:ing the lower middle class, students and youth with it.

2) Nationalistic sentiment among Bengalis was aroused by the decision of the Pakistani
government to introduce Urdu as the official language. The economic and political
treatment meted to h e Bengalis by the dominant western Pakistan government also
strengthened Bengali identity. Economically the relationship between West Pakistan
and East Pakistan was an exploitativeone. Politically, East Pakistan had a subordinate
position in the state structure of Pakistan. Both in the political and administrative
spheres, Bengplis felt left out.

3) Political differences between the Sinhalese and Tamils came to surface in the 1920s.
The constitutional reforms of 1920, subsequently modified in 1924 provided for
communal representation. The Sinhalese leaders wanted to do away with communal
representation and make territorial representation universal. Tamils, who began to
regard themselves as minorities wanted to retain communal representation to secure
power for their communities.

Check Your Progress 2

1) Basically, since the power of the Rana prime ministers was illegitimate, Rana rule
was autocratic and reactionary. The suppression of modern democratic aspirations
gave rise to anti-Rana movement. In the 1940s, the Rana rulers lost the support of
the British following their withdrawal from India. Rana rule was further weakened
when some of Rana family members of lower rank joined forces with anti-Rana
movement. The final blow to the Rana rule came when the king showed readiness
to assume his sovereign responsibilities.
2) Ugyen Wangchuk
3) 26thJuly, 1965
UNIT 2 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROFILE
structure
2.0 Objectives
2.1 Introduction
2.2 What is Human Development?
1
2.2.1 Dimensions of Human Development
I . .
I 2.2.2 Human Development and Neo-liberalism

2.3 Economic Structure of South Asia


2.4 Iluman Development in South Asia
2.4.1 Knowledge: Education in South Asia
2.4.2 Longevity: Status of Health, Nutrition and Sanitation
i
2.4.3 Decent Standard of Living
i 2.4.4. Gender Discrimination
I
t 2.5 Let Us Sum Up
2.6 Key Words
2.7 Some Useful Books
2.8 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

The unit deals with most important perspective of development in South Asia, i.e.,
human development. After going through this unit you should be able to:
a Trace the origin and elaboration of the concept of human development;
a Define tlie concept of human development;
a Point out characteristics of human development in the context of South Asia; and
a Describe the current status of human development in South Asia.

INTRODUCTION
The concept of human development emerged as an alternative to the traditional
development concepts which emphasised on eco~iomicgrowth. While the purpose of
all development, economic or social, is human welfare, for a long time, in most of the
literature and in the international debates development has been identified with economic
growth and measured in terms of aggregate income of a society or per capita income.
The distribution of income in the society, the availability of social choices aild
opyortunities for maximisation of potential of the people were neglected. Efforts to
overcome these shortcomings resulted in the emergence of an alternative approach to
development. This is tlie human development paradigm which shifted away from the
earlier thrust on quantitative to the qualitative improvement of human life. Drawing on
the ideas of prominent economist Amartya Sen, the human development school defined
development as a "process of enlarging people's choices'. It regarded increased incomes
as a means to widen human choices and capabilities, the most critical ones being the
opportunities to live a long and healthy life, to be educated atid to have access to
resources needed for a decent standard of living. After tlie United Nations Development
Programme adopted human development indices to evaluate the progress of nations in
1990, the concept of human development has gained wider recognition. It has evolved
from an idea into an intellectual movement. This unit profiles the progress made by
t
I
1 South Asia as r Region South Asian nations in terms of human development. '['he first section of the unit
&
il introduces and clarifies the features and dimensions of this new approach to
development.

2.2 WHAT IS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT?


The issue of develapment has been central in social sciences since the end of the
Second World War. As nations began efforts to reconstruct their economies damaged
by the war and as the emergent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America began to
remove distortions in their social and economic systems caused by centuries of colonial
rule, a spate of development tlgories emerged. By and large these theories conceived
of development in a narrow quantitative sense of material welfare and command over
material resources. Accordingly, the value of the total goods and services produced in
a community, that is, tlie Gross National Product (GNP) or one of its variants remained
in use an indicator of aggregate welfare of a community.

In the 1970s, equity considerations began to impinge on the idea of development. For
instance, the 'basic needs approach' shifted the focus on to the requirements of the
poor and the disadvantaged in a society. The World Bank also broadened its conception
of development and began to emphasize growth for the poor and resource-weak
groups- along with aggregate growth. While such conceptions of development embodied
the desire to improve tlie living conditions and welfare of all members of a society, the
basic indicators of developnient remained income measurements of one kind or the
other. Consequently, growth in real incomes was the main target of development
plans of nations and international agencies concerned with development.

In the early 1980s,this approach to development was disputed by prominent economists


like Amartya Sen, Paul Streeten and Mahbub ul Haq. These economists believed that
increased incomes should be a means to improve liunian welfare, not as an end in
itself. They argued that income should be regarded as a means for enlarging human
choices and strengthening humah capabilities (the range of things people are able ts
do or be). After all, development is about people, their well-being, their needs, choices
and aspirations.This new thinking on developinent with people as the focus ofconcern
has come to be known as the human development approach.

According to this new thinking, human development is the process of building of human
capabilities, such as to lead a long and healthy life, to have education, information and
knowledge, to have opportunitiesfor livelihood, to have access to the natural resources
for a decent standard of living, to have sustainable development, to have personal and
social security, to achieve equality and enjoyment of human rights, to have partic~pation
in the life of the community, to have responsible government and good governance
and so on.

Traditionally, development theorists have argued that an increase in income would


result in human welfare. Advocates of human develop~nentdisputed this claim. They
argue that the quality and distribution of ecanomic growth is as important as quantity
of economic growth for enlarging human choices. Income may be uiievenly distributed
within a society, in which case people with limited or no access to income will end up
with too few choices. More important, the range of choices available to the people
depends on tlie natio~~alpriorities of a society or rulers; the elitist or egalitarian model
development; political authoritarianism or political democracy, a command economy
or participatory development. 3 y co~nparingper capita incomes with indicators of
education or health standards, these economists demonstrated that countries with
higher levels of per capita income did not necessarily have better education or health
standards. Amartya Sen, for instance, observed that the average life expectancy in
Sri Lanka was 70 years, whereas it was not more than 64 years in Brazil, even though
per capita income of the latter was four times greater than that of Sri Lanka.
The human development approach gained ground when the United Nations Development Human Development
Progra~n~ne (UNDP) presented a comprehensive concept of human development in Profile
the first Human Development Report in 1990. This report, prepared under the guidance
of Mahbub ul Haq, defined human development as a process of enlarging the range of
people's choices by expanding human capabilitiesand functionings. Subsequent annual
Human Development Reports have further elaborated the human development
paradigm.
For bringing forward the human development profile of all countries of the world, the
UNDP constructed the concept of Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is
the cumulative measurement ofthree essential human choices required at all levels of
human development, longevity, knowledge and decent standard of living. Longevity is
a choice to live a long and healthy life. It is measured in terms of life expectancy
(years). Knowledge is a choice to acquire literacy/information. It is measured by
educational attainment percentage, which is combined gross enrolment ratio at various
levels. Decent standard of living is a choice to enjoy a quality and standard of life. It is
measured by national income or income per capita in purchasing power parity in US
dollar (PPP US $).
The UNDP reports ranked a country according to its overall achievement in these
three basic dimensions of human development. HDI ranks countries in relation to
each other to inform how far a coi ntry has travelled in the path of human development.
In this way, the HDI is indicative to the levels of human development and not the
complete measurement of development.

2.2.1 ~imensionsof Human Development


Human development paradigm has four essential components. First is equity or equitable
access to opportunities. Human development is concerned with widening the choices
of all people. Without equity, development restricts the choices of many individuals.
Second is sustainability. Human development emphasises on sustaining all form of
capital-physical, human, financial and environmental so that future generations can
have the same opportunities for well being that the present generation enjoys. Third is
productivity. Human development believes in investing in people so that they can achieve
their maximum potential. People are not seen merely as human resources, that is, as
means for better economic efficiency. People are seen as the ultimate ends of the
development process. Finally, empowerment. Human development focuses on
development by the people. People must participate in the activities, events and processes
that shape their lives.
Over a period of time, the concept of human development has evolved into a
multidimensional approach. The concept of human development has been gradually
extended into basically all areas of societal development. To the original focus on the
missing link between income and welfare has been added concern for the provision of
social infrastructure and services, that are made available on an equal basis to all
citizens; special emphasis on genderequality; and equal opportunities for participation
in political and economic decision-making. The latter requires both an enabling legal
and institutional framework and empowerment of citizens and civil society organizations
so that they become capable of reaching up to the authorities. Some of the adherents
to the concept have furthermore put special emphasis on sustainability, that is,
opportunity to enjoy the same well-being to the future generations.
Successive annual reports of the UNDP reflect this extension of human development
to areas of social development. In HDR report of 1995, for instance, the focus is on
gender equality. The report included a gender related development index (GDI) to
capture the gender bias in the three central human capabilities. The Mahbub ul Haq
Development Centre, which has been bringing out annual reports on Human
Development in South Asian, has introduced a new index-the humane governance
index, to indicate how the governments in the region are faring in terms of serving
their citiwns
- South Asia as a Region It should however be noted that human de*.elopmentis an approach and not a dogma
or doctrine. It does not provide a definite work plan or principles to apply. How much
participation, what degrees of inequality, what regulations are required to moderate
imbalances of power, how much government support is needed to strengthen which
huinan capabilities and other similar issues are the ones for which there are no clear
guidelines. They must be determined by democratic political process. Human
development approach provides an ordering of issues and priorities to be weighed and
considered, not a checklist of decisions to be taken.

2.2.2 Human Development and Neo-liberalism


To clarify the concept of human development, it is useful to compare it with the
dominant school of economic thought, neo-liberalism. Both, the human development
school and neo-liberalism have their ideological roots in the liberal econorrlictradition
which emphasizes the fundamental importance of individual choices and the value of
well functioning markets to enable individuals to exercise these choices. However,
human development differs from the neo-liberalism in many ways. These differences
are summarised in the table below.

Focus of Concern

Poverty Definition n multidimensional

Gender related Development (GNP), GNP growth and


Index (GDI), Gender per cent below income
Empowerment Measure (GEM)
and percent of Human Poverty
Index (HPI).

Source: Jolly 2003

The defining difference between the two is that while tne former is multidisciplinary,
aiming at better quality and content of human life, the latter is exclusively economic,
aiming at maximization of economic welfare. While the two approaches zppear to
share common ground on certain policies, for instance, on education and health, the
rationale is different. Human develqpment recognizes education and health as human
rights, whereas neo-liberalism considers them as investments for economic growth.
In human development, people are the central focus of all analysis and policy, not
markets.
In contrast to neo-liberalism which propounds a minimal state, the human development
school envisages an active role for the state. As we observed, human development
school argues that the link between income growth and human welfare has to be
created consciously through public policies which aim at providing services and
opportunities as equitably as possible to all citizens. State action is essential in several
important areas: in strengtheningthe human capabilities of all the population; in ensuring
a fair distribution of opportunities through a fair distribution of income; in creating
active policies to ensure market work with eqaity as well as efficiently; and in
encouragingthe formation or strengtheningof local institutionsthat provide opportunities
for and empowerment in a whole range of activities and services.
Check Your Progress 1 Human Development
Profile
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
Read the following statements carefully and fill in the blanks
1) Traditionally, welfare was taken to be synonymous with .................................. and
was measured in ............................................

2) The four essential components of human development are ..........................


...................................... , ..................................... .and ...............................
3) The HDI is the cumulative measurement of three essential human choices:

, .......................................................and ................................................

4) What is the role of state from the human development perspective?

2.3 ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF SOUTHASIA


The geographical location and the size of the population of the seven countries of
South Asia have a direct bearing on their economies. Within the region, India is the
largest nation in population and area. Its population in year 2000 has crossed the mark
of one billion people and is next to China, in the world, in the population size. Maldives
is the smallest country in the region, both in terms of population and area. Bhutan and
Nepal are land -locked while Maldives and Sri Lankaare island countries. Bangladesh,
Indiaand Pakistan are the only countries in the region where land and water is adequately
available. Maldives is a tiny island in the Indian Ocean with only 300 sq.krn land and
2,76,000 people (in the year 2000). Bhutan, though, relatively large in terms of area
(that is, 47,000 sq.km) has difficult terrain. Most ofranges are hardly accessible because
of snow coverage. Nepal too is situated in the Himalayan mountains and its area
outwardly appears to be bigger but it is mostly mountainous.
Basic Indicators

- -- -- -

Countries . Area Millions Millions Average Average Density


10000 in year in year annual annual people
square 1990 2000 % growth % growth per sq.
KM) (1990-90) (1990- km. in
2000) year 2000
Bangladesh 144 107 130 2.2
Bhutan 47 140 805 2.6
('000) ('000)
lndia 3288 850 1016 2.1
Maldives 214 276 3.2
('000) ('000)
Nepal 141 19 24 26
Pakistan 796 112 13 8 3.1 2.5 179
Sri Lanka 66 17 19 1.4 1.3 300
World NA NA 6057 1.7 1.4 47
Source :
i) World Bank "World Development Report," relevant issues, Washington, D.C.
ii) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Human Development Report" relevant issues, UN,
Geneva.
Note: The population figures for Bhutan and Maldives are in thousands.
south Asia as a Region With over one-fifth of the world's population living in thk region, South Asia has the
world's largest poor people. A large segment of the population lives in rural areas on
subsistence agriculture. The Geneva based United Nations Development Programme
has categorised four countries of South Asia region, viz., Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldives
and Nepal as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The remaining three countries,
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are categorised as Developing countries. In the last
three to five decades, the countries ofthe region have made planned efforts to overcome
some of the problems associated with low industrialisation and mass poverty. As a
result, significant changes have taken place in their economic structure. The share of
various sectors in national income in respective economies has also undergone a
change.
Changes in the economic structuresofthe region has been rapid in the last two decades,
that is, from 1980 to 2000. The share of agriculture has rapidly declined (barring in
Pakistan) and that of services has gone up in all the economies (barring in Bhutan)
'
while the industrial sector has remained stagnant. Although t$e contribution of
agriculture to GDP has gone down from 40 percent in 1980 to 25 per cent in 2001,
agriculture still provides employment to more than half of the employed people in
South Asia.
The service sector on the other hand has emerged as an important contributor to the
GDP. Providing employment to a little over 22 per cent of the workforce, the service
sector's contribution to the GDP has risen from 36 per cent in 1980 to 49 per cent in
2001. In Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the service sector is contributing
more than fifty per cent of the GDP. This increase has occurred mainly in the
1990s when these countries opened up their 'econymies for (domestic) private and
foreign investors.
The share of manufacturing sector in the GDP has remained more or less constant at
25 per cent during the last two decades. The decline or stagnancy in manufacturing
and industry sector reflects the inherent weaknesses in basic infrastructure. This is a
cause for concern as such a decline not only robs the employment generation potential
of this sector but ultimately adversely affects sustainable development. Ironically,
even in the &e of Infomation Technology (IT) and services boom, the developed
West and the European countries maintain high growth rate in manufacturing and
industry sector. For instance, over the past twenty years US manufacturing share in
its national income is about 25 to 30 percent which provided considerable strength to
its economy to sustain growth in the longer period. The high growth rate in
manufacturing and industry sector is seen as an essential element in enlarging the
other sectors of the economy. The lack of momentum in manufacturing and industry
sector in South Asia has caused deterioration in employment generation and eventually
led to mounting pressure of poverty.

2.4 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA


Since the UNDP brought out the first Human Development Report in 1990, the
human developme~ltapproach has been applied and elaborated in a large number of
different economic and social situations. During the last decade, over 135 countries
have prepared some 300 reports, analyzing aspects of human development in
various national contexts. Regional reports have also been prepared for South Asia,
Africa, Central America and Pacific Islands. For South Asia region, the Mahbub ul
Haq Development Centm set up in 199'5 has been bringing out annual reports of
Human Development in South Asia. The following analysis is mainly drawn from
these reports.
As we saw, HDI is a composite index of progress of nation's which combines both
economic growth and social development. When we go by income measurement, like
the traditional economic growth approach, it appears that development process has
failed in South Asia and other developing countries, as these countries remain at the
bottom ofthe ladder. However, when we evaluate these countries by including the real Human Development
Profile
(social) indicators of human development, we find that most of these countries have
made tremendous progress. Mahbub ul Haq calculates that the average life expectancy
has increased by 16 years, adult literacy by 40 per cent and per capita nutritional levels
by more than 20 per cent. In fact, developing countries have achieved in the past 30
years the kind of real human progress that industrialised countries took nearly a century .
to accomplish. While the gap between the industrialised and the developing countries,
in terms of income is large (the average income of developing countries is only 6 per
cent ofthe industrialised countries) the human gap has been narrowing. Average life
, expectancy in the developing countries is 80 per cent of the average of industrialised
1 countries, adult literacy 66 per cent and nutrition 85 per cent.

I How do these countries fare in human development? Where does South Asia stand in
comparison to other developing regions in terms of human progress? In this section we
will attempt to examine these and other dimensions of human progress by focusing on
the three critical human choices- longevity, knowledge and standard of living.

'
I

2.4.1 Knowledge: Education in South Asia


Education is no longer an achievement ofthe individual but the basis of one's existence.
There is clear evidence that education leads to many social benefits, such as
improvements in the standards ofhygiene, reduction in infant and child mortality rates,
decline in population growth, etc. Education therefore acquires a core position in the
overall framework of human development and is used as a proxy for knowledge.
ducat ion is also important because it directly contributes to economic growth. In the
present context ofrapidly globalizing world, education (knowledge and skills) is also
necessary to compete in global markets. In this context, South Asia presents a dismal
picture. With nearly half of the world's adult illiterates, South Asia is the most illiterate
region in the world.

In the last three decades, the rate of adult literacy has increased from 32 per cent in
1970 to 54 per cent in 2001. The region has made considerable progress in providing
education to its citizens during this period and both the gross enrolment rates and
enrolments at secondary levels have registered a rapid growth.

However, the absolute number of illiterates in the region during the same period has
increased from 366 million to over 600 million suggestingthat the literacy rate has not
kept pace with the increase in population. South Asia still has the world's largest
illiterate population. Further, there are variations among the countries of the region.
While Maldives and Sri Lanka always performed well, registering adult literacy rates
of well over 90 per cent, Nepal and Bangladesh lagged behind with low literacy rates
of 40 per cent.

The general apathy towards female education is one of the biggest shortcomings in
human development in the region. With over 60 per cent of the female population
illiterate, South Asia, along with the Arab states, has the highest number of adult
females. Efforts made to correct this disparity in the 1990s, have not reduced the
educational gaps between girls and boys. While enrolment of girls at the primary level
has improved, their drop out rate at the secondary levels of educaikn has remained
quite high. It indicates that after primary schooling most ofthe girls (especially rural or
belonging to poor families) either get married or wr .k a;, ;'.;Id Isbour which forces
them to abandon education. Only for Sri Lanka and Maldives the female
secondary school enrolment rate is somewhat respectable but not 100 percent. A
significant female drop-out rate at secondary level jeopardizes the process of human
development. Most of the poverty-related problems are directly associated with female
illiteracy.

The HRD Reports indicate that compared to other developing regions of the world, the
level of public investment in education in South Asia is low and has barely kept pace
South Asia as a Region with the rising population. During the 1990s, public expenditure on education in India,
Sri Lanka and Nepal has been little over 3 per cent of the GDP, while it has remained
at 2 per cent in Bangladesh and less than 2 per cent in Pakistan. The decomposition of
public expenditure on education across South Asian countries shows that Pakistan .
spent the most on primary levels of education+angladesh on secondary edilcation
andNepal on tertiary level. In May 2003, at a ministerial conference of South Asia on
Education for All, the countries of the region have committed to increase allocation to
4 per cent of their GDP.

2.4.2 Longevity: Status of Health, Nutrition and Sanitation


Human life is the most precious and long life is priceless amongst all human
achievements. It is both the means as well as the end. Longivity is closely associated
with adequate nutrition, good health and personal safety. In calculatingthe HDI, life
expectancy at birth is therefore used as a proxy for longevity.
Life expectancy in South Asia is low, second only to Sub Saharan Africa. However,
there has been a gradual increase in the life expectancy at birth. South Asians are
expected to live a little longer as the life expectancy for the countries of the region
ranged between the high of 72 years in Sri Lanka to low of 59 years in Nepal. While
there are multiple reasons for this, a gereral improvement in health systems of the
region is a major factor. Data collected b:. the HDR suggests that although there was
no increase in the public expenditure on health services (with only one per cent of the
GDP being spent on health), more than 75 per cent of the population had access to
health services. Improved access to health services was reflected in the marked
increase in the coverage and spread of child immunization programmes. While only a
small percentage ofthe population in the regic 1was immunized in the 1980s,all countries
in the region made re~narkableprogress in the immunization programmes against deadly
diseases like TI3 and DPT.
Improvements in health services isalso reflected in the decline in infant death from97
death for every I000 in 1990 to 67 infant deaths in 2000. Even among the under five
year old children, mortality rates have declined from 147 to 95 deaths for every 1000
However, the number of maternal deaths at the time of child births are much high in
the region. The main reasons for this are low levels of female literacy, low marriageable
age of women, preference for male child and poverty. The non-availability of adequate
health facilities at the time of child delivery, especially in remote rural areas also
increases vulnerability of maternal deaths. Most of the births (more than 80 per cent)
take place without the attendance of skilled health staff. Only Sri Lanka and Maldives
have adequate number of trained health personnel at the time of child birth. High
mortality rates of women at child birth and children below five years of age is related
to malnourishment, unhygienic conditions before and after the child birth, neglect of
female child, etc.
The daily calories intake per head in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka is satisfactory but
for the remaining nations it is below the standard. Overall, the daily calorie supply of
2379 in the region is less than the average for developing countries at 2663. The '

deficiency in calories intake adversely affects the working capacity of people, both
physical and mental. A large chunk of population in the entire region is under nourished,
i.e., either they survive on inadequate food or quality of (intake) food is below standard.
The under-nourishment and malnourishment hampers the workability of the people.
Lower workability is associated with lower productivity and lower income which
intensifies the vicious circle of poverty.
Another area related to health is access of population to safe (drinking) water
and sanitation. About 12 percent of the population mostly living in rural areas of
South Asia do not have access to safe water. The non-availability of safe water
many times spread water-bound diseases and causes epidemic, particularly during
rainy season.
The condition of availability of adequate sanitation facility to rural population is Human Development
worse than safe water. Only 37 per cent of the population of the region has access to Profile
sanitation facilities. It is only 15 per cent in India. Only Sri Lanka and Bhutan have
adequate sanitation facilities for most ofthe rural masses. Lack of adequate sanitation
facilities often poses serious threat to the health of the people and women are the
worst sufferers.
!

2.4.3 Decent Standard of Living


Income is an important measure to determine the choices available to people. Adequate
income is necessary for gaining command over resources, including education and
health. 'This not only makes people more productive but gives them access to
I
opportunities to improve their lives. Purchasing power-adjusted per capita GDP is
therefore used as a rough measure to capture the resources at the disposal of people
and the choices that are available to them.
Tn this context, the people in South Asia have limited choices as the GDP per capita
calculated on the basis of people's purchasing power is low: it was only $ 2238 in
2000, much lower than the average for developing countries at $3783. The only other
) region which is poorer than South Asia is Sub-Saharan Africa. However, within the
I
I
South Asia region, there are variations in the levels of income. At the beginning ofthe
new millennium, Maldives and Sri Lanka had higher levels of income ($4485 and $
3530) and Nepal, Bhutan and Pakistan had the lowest incomes ($1327, $14.12 and
$1928 respectively). Significantly, India had lower levels of income as compared to
Pakistan at the beginning ofthe 1990s. But by the end ofthe decade, India's real GDP
per capita levels ($2358) surpassed that of Pakistan ($1928) because of a high and
sustained economic growth.
As stated earlier, GDP per capita gives a rough measure of the choices available to
the people. Equally important is how that income is distributed. Here, the performance
ofthe region has been depressing, with the gap between the rich and the poor widening
in the 1990s.The Human Development in South Asia for the year 2002 noted that "the
richest 20 per cent of the population of all countries of South Asia on average had
around 41 to 46 per cent share in income, whereas the poorest 20 per cent of the
population had roughly 8 to 10 per cent ofthe income share".
South Asia is characterised by much disparity between the genders in terms of income.
Oficial statistics in South Asia show women's economic participation as a mere fraction
ofthat of men. As the majority of South Asian women work in the informal sector and
as unpaid family helpers, their work goes unrecognized in national systems of
accounting. South Asian women's real GDP per capita at US $874 is lower than any
other region in the world, including sub-Saharan Africa.

2.4.4 Gender Discrimination


Women, on the basis of gender, have always been discriminated in almost all societies
of the world. But, discrimination against women in South Asia is far worse than in
most other developing countries and is perpetuated by the deeply embedded system of
patriarchy. As we noted in the above sections, right from their childhood, women are
deprived of an equal access to education, health care, nutrition, and even the basic
economic right of earning a living.
The Human Development in South Asia report of 2000 observed that discrimination
against South Asian women begins at, or even before, birth. Female foeticide and
infanticide,neglect of health, and gender-biased feeding practices combined with heavy
work burdens: all are manifestations of son preference and the patriarchal structures
which prevail across the region. South Asia has one ofthe most distorted sex ratios in
the world-there are only 940 females for every 1000 males. (The global average is
1060 females per 1000 males.)
South Asia as a Region Check Your Progress 2
Note: i) use the space given below for your answer.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
I) Examine the status of female education in South Asia.

2) How is the present condition of health, nutrition and sanitation in South Asia?

LET US SUM UP
We have seen the concept of human development has emerged as an alterative to the
conventional development theories which focused narrowly on economic growth.
Focusing on people, their well being, their needs, choices and aspirations, human
development is a human centred approach towards development. This paradigm, which
has gained wide acceptance in the last decade or so, has expanded the meaning of
development beyond economic growth. Development is seen today as a process of
both quantitative change and qualitative growth.
As we saw, the human development of countries in South Asia, with the exception of
Sri Lanka, is disappointing, South Asia r;mains one the most populated regions ofthe
world. The region is predominantly agrarian, with 70 percent population living in rural
area. The rural people are either surviving on subsistence agriculture or on casual
employment. Over 35 percent of population of the region is living under poverty
conditions. The prevalence of adult illiteracy, non-availability of primary health and
sanitation facilities, discrimination towards female population in all spheres of life,
corrupt or inefficient governments are some of the causes of low achievement on
human development. For moving on faster growth path of human development the
region needs to address gender related problems (i.e., about female population) on
priority basis. Similarly, there is urgent need to achieve higher economic growth rate.

KEY WORDS
Functionings, capabilities and freedom: The functionings of a person refer to the
valuable things that the person can do or be (such as being well nourished, living long
and taking part in the life of a community). The capability of a person stands for the
different combinations of functionings the person can achieve. Capabilities thus reflect
the freedom to achieve functionings. In that sense, human development is freedom.
Gender-related development index (GDI): The GDI measures the achievements
in the same dimensions and using the same variables as the HDI does, but takes into
account inequality in achievement between women and men. The greater is the gender
disparity in basic human development, the lower is a country's GDI compared with its
HDI. The GDI is simply the HDI discounted, or adjusted downwards, for gender
inequality.
Gender empowerment measure (GEM):The GEM indicates whether women
are able to actively participate in economic and political life. It measures gender inequality
in key areas of economic and political participation and decision-making. The GEM,
focusing on women's opportunities in economic and political arenas, thus differs from the Human Development
GDI, an indicator of gender inequality in basic capabilities. Profile

Human poverty and income poverty: Human poverty is defined by impoverishment in


multiple dimensions--deprivations in a long and healthy life, in knowledge, in a decent
standard of living, in participation. By contrast, income poverty is defined by deprivation
in a single dimension-income-because it is believed either that this is the only
impoverishment that matters or that any deprivation can be reduced to a common
denominator.The concept of human poverty sees lack of adequate income as an important
factor in human deprivation, but not the only one. Nor, according to this concept, can all
impoverishment be reduced to income. If income is not the sum totaI ofhuman lives, lack
of income cannot be the sum total of human deprivation.

Human poverty index (HPI): The HPI measures deprivations in human


development. Thus while the HDI measures the overall progress in a country in
achieving human development, the HPI reflects the distribution of progress and measures
the backlog of deprivations that still exists. The HPI is constructed for developing countries
(HPI-I) and for industrialized countries (HPI-2). A separate index has been devised for
industrialized countries because human deprivation varies with the social and economic
conditions of a community, and to take advantage of the greater availability of data for
these countries.

2.7 SOME USEFUL BOOKS


Asian Development Bank. (Various years) Asian Development Outlook. Manila,
Philippines.
Fukuda, Sakiko and Shiva Kumar. (Ed.) (2003). Readings in Human Development Delhi,
Oxford University Press.
Haq, Mahbub ul. (1995) Reflections on Human Development, New York. Oxford
University Press.
Mahabut u l Haq Human Development Centre. (various years) Human Development in
South Asia, Karachi. Oxford University Press.
Sen, Amartya. (2000) Development as Freedom. New York. Random House.
United Nations Development Programme. (Various) Human Development Report. Years.
UN. Geneva.

2.8 ANSWERS TO CHECKYOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

1) Material welfare and ...... ........ terms of per capita or aggregate income

2) Equity, Sustainability,Productivity, and Empowerment.

3) Longevity, Knowledge and Decent standard of living.

4) State has a crucial role in human development. It has to formulate and implement
polices aimed at strengtheningthe human capabilities ofall the population. Its role in
ensuring a fair distribution of opportunities is crucial. Further, the state has to It has
to ;in creating active policies to ensure market work with equity as well as efficiently;
and in encouraging the fortnation or strengthening of local institutions that provide
opportunities for participation and empowerment in a whole range of activities and
I
services.
South Asia as a Region Check Your Progress 2

1) Compared to other developing regions, South Asia has lower levels of investment in
education. Female education is a neglected area in the region. Whereas the overall
level of literacy is 54 per cent, female literacy levels are lower than 40 per cent. In
the 1990s, enrolment of girls at the primary level has improved, but their drop out
rate at the secondary levels of education has remained quite high. Sri Lanka and
Maldives however had respectable number of females enrolled in secondary schools.
A significant female drop-out rate at secondary level jeopardizes the process of
human development. Most of the poverty-related problems are directly associated
with female illiteracy.

2) The overall heauh conditions and level of nutrition and sanitation is not very
encouraging in South Asia. There is high fertility rate as well as high mortality rate.
Most of the child births take place without proper medical facilities,The cases of
malnourishment are rampant. Particularly the health situation in rural South Asia is
very discouraging. No adequate attention is paid to female children in the matter of
nutrition and medical care. The bias towards male child and negligence of female
child is almost prevalent in the entire region. Access to sanitation facilities and safe
drinking water has improved in urban area but the rural area is neglected. It means
about 70 percent (rural) population ofthe region live without adequate basic facilities.
UNIT 3 INDIA IN THE GLOBAL POWER
I
STRUCTURE
structure
3.0 Objectives
3.1 l~itroduction
3.2 Global Power Structure
3.3 India's Geopolitical Position
3.4 India's Power Capabilities
3.5. India: A Rising Power
3.6 Let Us Sum Up
I 3.7 Some Useful Books
i 3.8 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises
I

3.0 OBJECTIVES ---

There is ambiguity about India's position in the global power structure. This arises from
the fact that India neither commands a subject role in international politics nor is it a
minor power. This unit seeks to analyze the changing position of India in the global
power structure. After going through this unit, you should be able to:
a Identify the features of global power structure;
a Identify the fundamental constituents of national power;
a Describe the changes in the global power structure, and
a Describe the position and potential of India as a major power

3.1 INTRODUCTION
International political system, since its inception in the 17"century, is organised on the
principle of sovereign equaIity of the states. In actual practice, the hierarchy of power
structure renders this equality of states a myth. However, as some of the ingredients of
power capabi lities, the economy and society are under constant change, the position of
a state in the power hierarchy is subject to change A nation which is an enslaved
country at one span of time could emerge as a major power at another period of time.
This unit seek to analyse the position ofIndia in the global power structure by examining
the country's hard power and soft power capabilities. Before we do so, it will be useful
to identify the features of the present global power structure.

3.2 GLOBAL POWER STRUCTURE


An important feature of the international political system is that it has been a near
oligarchy of major powers. All other powers (the minor powers) are consigned to the
role of objects ofthe decisions of the major powers. Though the global political system
is orgailised on the principle of sovereign equality of states, in actual practice, there is a
hierarchy of states based on their power capabilities. Power is the strength or capacity
of state to exert its influence on other state or states. The power of a state is generally
judged by its military capability, economic strength and its will and capacity to mould
international opinion in its favour.
Country Profiles: India While there is no agreement on the relative importance of various elements of power, .
Joseph S Nye suggests a broad categorisation of the elements of power into hard and
soft power resources. Hard power resources are military, economic, technological and
demographic resources. These are the tangible resources which provide the capabilities
for coercion and command. Soft power resources, on the other hand, are intangible.
They include, norms, leadership role in international institutions, culture, state capacity,
strategy, and national leadership. The soft power resources enable the state to inspire
consensus (agreement) and to co-opt (persuade others to share the same goals). Soft
power is less coercive in nature. Some soft power resources, such as state capacity,
strategic or diplomatic strength and quality of national leadership are important in
converting a state's latent capabilities into actualised power.
Major Powers have all the ingredients of power which enables them to determinewhether
in conflict or cooperation,the nature of international system and its future development.
They have the power to influence all other states in the international system as they have
the capacity to project power globally and conduct offensive and defensive operations
beyond their regions. Typically, major powers hold global or continental interests and
their security goals are beyond territorial defence, and include the maintenance of balance
of power and order in international system. States which lack most of these resources
are Minor Powers, vulnerable to pressures from major powers.
In between the major powers and minor powers are another category of states which
are independent centres of power (or system influencing states) which do not have the
leverage to influence the ccwrse of the international system as a whole, but posses sufficient
capabilities to have a considerable degree of foreign policy autonomy and the capacity to
resist the application of untvelcome decisions, especially in the realm of security, in their
own regions. Unlike the major powers which have system wide or global influence, these
independelit centres of power are often dominant or pre-eminent in a certain region.
They are mostly referred to, in Martin Wright's terms, as great regional powers or as
Middle Powers in view oftheir status as lying in between major and minor powers.
Another important feature ofthe international political system is that it is dynamic, that is,
is under constant change. This is not only because some of the ingredients of powers
(discussed below) are subject to change but, as the realists point out, also because of the
constant struggle for power among the major powers. Since the international system
came into being in the 16'" century Europe, it has witnessed the rise and fall of major
powers. This process occurred largely through major wars that engulfed several countries
in many theatres of the globe. The winners with the necessary military and economic
attributes were accorded major power status in the post-war settlements, while the
vanquished in most instances lost such status altogether. Thus, by the 18" century, Spain,
Portugal and the Netherlands lost major power status following their defeat in wars or
loss of colonial empires. Austria-Hungary lost the status of a major power after the
World War I. Germany and Japan were replaced by China as a major power after World
War 11. The United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France and China, which emerged
victorious in that war were accorded major power status and became the five permanent
members of the Security Council of the United Nations. Strictly speaking, only the two
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, could be considered as major
wwers during the Cold War period. The other three-Britain, France and China, which
never Iiad the global reach of the superpowers, are in essence, second tier major powers.
The global power structure in the post-war years has undergone significant changes.
Initially, the Cold War conflict between the two superpowers gave rise to a bipolar power
structure. Most nations had little option other than to join or side with one or the other of
the superpowers.However, this situation could not continue for long as the United States
weakened its position because of prolonged engagement in Vietnam. The global power
structure started heading towards a multi-polar order dominated by the United States,
Soviet Union, Europe, Japan and China. However, before such arrangement could
consolidate, the Soviet Union disintegrated.The United States emerged as the sold state
deserving of the appellation 'mono superpower' as a possessor of systemic capabilities
and influence. The other possible contenders for the role remained simply as either
incomplete powers (Russia, China, Japan) or subordinate military allies of the US India in the Global
(Japan, Europe). Their strategic significance for now lies in their possible emergence Power Structure
in tlie not too distant future as superpowers.

3.3 INDIA'S GEOPOLITICALPOSITION


Right from its inception as a modern state, if not before, Jndia has seen itself as a
potential major power. Sucli an image emerged not only from the fact that India has
been a seat of historic civilisation and recognition of its potential economic and military
strengths but from the geopolitical factors as well.
India is located in the Indian subcontinent,which constitutesa single geopolitical fortress,
bound by the Himalayas in the north and the Indian Ocean ill the south. In addition,
although divided into seven states of South Asia, the subcontinent constitutes in some
measure a single civilization complex. It is a geopolitical unit of massive dimensions,
comparable to Europe. Its location, lying astride the Indian Ocean and flanking the
Persian Gulf and the Straits of Malacca, bestows the region with strategic significance.
The South Asia region as a whole is patently indo-centric, not only in the sense that
India is located at the centre of the region, but also because tndia almost constitutes
the region, holding three quarters of its territory and population. Within the region, India
is singularly central to the geopolitics of the region, as all ofthe other countries in the
region share borders with it but not with each other.
India's predominant position in a largely well defined and self contained Indo-centric
geopolitical region also meant that threats to is security emerged from outside the
region, from the major powers, rather from other powers within the South Asia region.
As a consequence, India is led-much as the US in the western hemisphere-to a
conception of national security which requires the exclusion of external powers from
the subcontinent. It coiiceptio~iof security is thus not simply national, but geopolitical
and regional. However, such a conception of security necessarily entails interaction
with other regions as a major power; role extension on the world scene is thus built into
India's dominant position in the region.
The image of India as a potential major power which was shared by the Indian elite
meant, as Jawaharlal Nehru informed the Constituent Assembly in 1948,"the inevitability
of India playing an important part by virtue of her tremendous potential, by virtue oftlie
fact that she is tlie biggest political unit in terms of population today and is likely to be
in terms of her resources also". Nehru and his successors rejected status for India as
an object of the major powers in favour of the role of a subject.
India's self image as a potential major power and the domestic and foreign policies
aimed at realising that potential cast India in a revisionist role, for the underlying
assumpti011 is that the present global structure of power dominated by a few is to a
certain degree unacceptable because it impinges on India's independence. This
assu~nptionwas firmly held, even if unstated, by Nehru and his successors. This was
manifest in both the domestic and foreign policies- in the development strategy that
empliasised self-reliance and strengthened hard power capabilities and in the non-
aligned foreign policy that empliasised independence and activism in world affairs. It is
also evident in its refusal to accept the hegemony of the major powers and in its
resistance to the efforts of tlie major power to foreclose its options to emerge as a
~iuclearpower by refusing to join the Non-proliferation treaty and similar other security
regimes.
India, however, has not pushed its revisionist role to the point ofassuming the role o f a
full-fledged rebellious power. It has avoided direct confrontation with the major powers
and provided a more or less limited challenge to the major powers in their attempts to
organise the world according to their ow11designs. India, thus, has been a reformist
and middle of the road power, whether at home or abroad.
Country Profiles: India Just as there is a tenacious drive apparent on the part of India to acquire major power
role, there is an equally a powerful resistance to it on the part of the existing major
powers, principally the US and, in the recent years, China. In the early years, concerned
that India's activist role would circumscribe its influence in the developing power, the
US adopted a policy of regional containment of India. This containment policy involved
the building up Pakistan militarily and siding with it in the SouthAsian regional conflict.
It also involved the denial of material and technological assistance that could contribute
to India's hard power capabilities. Since the 1970s, particularly after India demonstrated
its nuclear capability by detonating a nuclear device in 1974, the major powers have
evolved a sanctions regime aimed at denying all technologies that might contribute to
India's nuclear and missile capabilities. In the post-Cold war period, the US intensified
its efforts to institute a nuclear non-proliferation regime that would preserve the nuclear
monopoly of the five major powers while denying it to emerging powers such as India.
China's policy towards India has also been one that ofcontainment. Since 1963, China
has actively sided with Pakistan in the latter's conflict with India and has cooperated
with Pakistan in building its nuclear and missile capabilities by supplying technology,
components and materials.
Check Your Progress 1
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
1) What are soft power resources?

2) Identify the characteristic features of a major power. How do middle powers


differ from them?

3) How have the major powers sought to contain India's power projection
capabilities?

3.4 INDIA'S POWER CAPABILITIES


'l'here is ambiguity about India's position in the global power structure. This arises
from the fact that India is a middle power. It does not belong to the major powers
which cbmmand a subject role in international politics and make vital decisions about
the fate and destiny of the international system. Nor is it, one of the minor powers
which, with limited foreign policy autonomy, an object of the decisions of the major
powers. What is the objective status of India? Where does it stand in comparison to
the existing major powers (US, Russia, China, UK and France) and major economic
powers (Japan and Germany)?
In the area of military capabilities, India's conventional capabilities are no match for
those of the maior Dowers. though it can boast of the third largest armed forces after
China and tlie United States. Moreover, it capabilities for long range or rapid India in the Global
deployment are limited relative to the five major powers. India's power projection Power Structure
capabilities are limited by the need to provide active defence on two fronts-one with
the smaller but determined adversary, Pakistan and the other with the major power in
the north, China.

In terms of economic power, India, as it stepped into the new millennium, has emerged
as the fourth largest economy in the world in Purchasing Power Parity, next only to
US, China and Japan. However, its GNP is only $ 4 5 0 billion, and with a per capita
income of only $450, India ranks low compared to any of the major powers. About 300
million of its population, that is, 30 percent ofthe population, lives below the poverty
line. Even in terms of economic competitiveness, in the year 2000, India ranked forty-
ninth. India's weak economic position is critical because other elements of power,
such as military capability and the productivity of the population, tend to increase
largely along with economic advancement.

In terms of population size, India is next only to China. But, population is both an asset
and a curse for India. Its state of Uttar Pradesh (176 million) holds more population
than that most ofthe major powers, Russia (147 million), UK (59 million), and France
(59 million). India's middle class, which is estimated to he around 300 million and pool
of scientific manpower which is the third largest in the world, is definitely an asset,
especially as all tlie major powers (barring China) are likely to depend on the Indian
human resources because of their falling birth rates and ageing population. However,
India's large numbers of unskilled and illiterate people are a bane for the country's
power capability.

It is difficult to draw comparisons with regard to soft power indicators as these are
intangible. Soft power resources complement hard power resources and in the
increasingly interdependent world, their importance as low cost means for exercising
and preserving a state's power externally is becoming important.

Major Powers use norrns to legitimise their international status. In this regard, India's'
normative influence has been reasonably high in the developing world. India has been
a consistent voice on behalf of the developing countries. As a leader of the non-
aligned movement, it has championed global equality and new international economic
order. This stance lias been manifest in India's positions at the international trade
talks and in the United Nations forums such as the UNCTAD. Further, India's own
track record as a democracy also enhances its normative power.

Major Powers use institutions to legitimise their position. In this context, India has
been an active member of several international economic institutions and regimes.
It has exercised institutional power from time to time, through its leadership in
G-77, G-20 and the non-aligned group. It's contribution to tlie UN peacekeeping efforts
since the early 1950s also enhance its institutional influence.

India, however, ranks low in other sources of soft power such as state capacity, strategy
and national leadership. Indian state has been unable to develop adequate strength to
generate loyalty and discipline among its population. In the 1960s, India was even
described as a 'soft state' because of its failure to enforce enacted policies. In the
area of strategy and diplomacy, India's record has been mixed. While the anti hegemonic
theme of its diplomacy helped in establishing a role in the global institutions, forging
third world solidarity and helped in bargain on North and South issues, it alienated the
US and the Western countries, which attempted to contain and balance India by propping
LIP a weaker Pakistan. National leadership, important to translate other power resources
into international influence, also has been a mixed bag. In tlie early years after
i n d e p . 'snce, India's international influence lias been mainly because of the
commanding leadership of Jawaharlal Neliru. Though India became inward looking
after the reverses in the 1962 Sino India war, Mrs Indira Gandhi did exert some influence
overseas.
Country Profiles: India
3.5 INDIA: A RISING POWER
Tn the post-Cold War period, India is seen as a rising power for two important reasons.
First, its hard power capabilities, while lagging behind those of the major powers, are
nnnreciably higher than those of the other regional powers such as Brazil, Indonesia,
Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt. The Indian middle class of 300 million is niucli larger
the populatiori of Indonesia (287 miiiion) and Brazil (168 million), the two largest regional
powers. Arid none of these regional powers hoid aggregate raw military capabilities
coi~iparedto India. In the economic sphere, India has the largest economy, except that of
Brazil, though in per capita dollar terms, all regional powers, with the exception ofNigeria
:+nd Pakistan, rank above India.
Secondly, India is changinglrapidlyand is strengthening its position in almost all indicators
of hard power capabilities, though the level of improvement varies from one area to
'~nott~er. In the early 19903, faced with liquidity crisis, India opened up its market and
integrated with the world aconomy. Since then, its average annual growth rate has been
over 6 percent. And as its expanding market has beccime an attractive site for foreign
investors and exporters, India has acquired a great degree of self confidence in emerging
as a major cconomic player, at least in niche areas such as information technology,
biotechnology and relatedarea. India has already begun to see its large and expanding
market as the foundation forencouraging regional economic cooperation in the subcontinent
and beyond. In the 1990s, in an effort to foster closer economic relationship within tlie
South Asia region, India has replaced thc concept of reciprocity in ecoi~omiccooperation
w it11 its neighbours with 'more than reciprocity'. India's aspirations extended beyond tlie
South Asia region, and it became an active promoter in 1997 of the Indian Ocean Rim
A s s ~ c i a t i ofor
~ Regional Cooperatio:~(IOR-ARC). It also became a f i l l l dialogue partner
of \vitli the ASEAN i<egibnal Forum. While these moves are pri~marllyeconomic in
orientation, they are likelyto have strategic implications in the long nin.
In the military domain, India's power projection capabilities beyond the region are rapidly
increasing as a result the col~sistentsupport lent by different governments to the Integrated
Missile Development Programme which was launched in ?he early 1980s. This programme
has resulted in the development of a range of ballistic missiles, including the Agni I
missile with a range of 1500 km in the 1990s. The programme has plans to develop
longer range version of the Agni missile as well as an intercontinental ballistic missile.
With these, India's military reach is set to increase to cover the Far East, West Asia, and
Central Asia as well as Australasia. India has already successfully produced a long-
range, cruise missiles in a coproduction arrangement with Russia. By far the most
significant development thht enhanced India's position in the global power structure is its
decision to go nuclear in May 1998.
India's defiance of major powers in its decision to conducted underground nuclear tests
and emerge as a riuclear weapon state followed from its efforts to overcome tlie challenges
In the strategic arena- the collapse of:he Soviet Union and with it the special Indo-Soviet
relationship, the intensified efforts of the major powers to strcngihen the non-proliferation
regime to retain their monopoly over nuclear weapons and foreclose India exercising the
nuclear optiun, and the US negligence of tbe Chinese transfer of nuclear and missile
equipment and technology Ito Pakistan. The major powers, rightly perceived in the nuclear
tests, along with India's declaration that it now stood as a nuclear weapon state, a
challenger to their hegemdny.
The tirst reaction of the major powers was to condemn the nuclear tests. Several of
them souglit to isolate Indila politically and to punish it economically through sanctions,
suspension of economic aid, and denial of loans from international financial institutions.
Confident that its econoqy had the resilience to withstand economic pressures, India
rc~llainedunrelenting, Soon differences surfaced among the major power as to how to
deal with India. Russia and France left no doubt, by word and deed, of their different
approach through oppositian to sanctions and political ostracism. France's posture emerged
-L
these circumstances, tlie US initiated a strategic dialogue with India. The result was a India in the Global
tacit and partial accommodation on the part of the US to India as a de facto nuclear Power Structure
weapon state, even as the US formally remained committed to its ultimate aim of
nuclear non-proliferation. Other major powers, barring China, have initiated strategic
dialogue with Iodia. China is most adversely affected by India's rise to a nuclear
weapons power, as it could end China's unhindered hegemony over Asia. It was most
critical of the Indian tests and irritated by the US dialogue with India, but it too has
come round to establislling normal relations with India and even engaged in a security
dialogue with it. Thus, within two years of the tests, there was a sea change in the
treatment of India by major powers. The nuclear tests have increased India's political
and diplolnatic bargaining power with the other major powers, as evident in the strategic
dialoglies that it has begun to engage in with all the major powers. India is now also
taken seriously, even if not universally, as a candidate for the major power status.
Having repositioned itself from being a middle power in the international system to
become a candidate major power, India has been working towards achieving permanent
membership for itself in the restructured Security Council of the United Nations. For
quite some time now, there has been a demand to restructure the UN Security Council
to reflect tlie changes in the global powef structure. In this context, the acquisition of
permanent membership ill the Security Council will dramatically improve the Indian
power position in the global power structure. As we noted earlier, institutions have
been a source of sofi power capabilities. Established powers have often used institutions
to legitirnise their position. Rising powers such as China have also been increasingly
using institutions in orderqo fi~r-thertheir power ambitions. India already exercises
institutional power intermittently through its leadership in G-77, G-20 and the non-
aligned group. Its contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations also provides India
with some institutional influence. By any possible benchmark for membership, India's
claim for a UN seat is the strongest among tlie contenders like Japan, Germany,
Indonesia, UAE, BraziI etc.
Check Your Progress 2
Note: i) Use the space given beIow for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with tlie model answer given at the end of the unit.

I) Why is India regarded as a rising major power?

3.6 LET US SUM UP


We Ilave seen that the international system is based on the doctrine of sovereign
equality of states, though in practice an oligarchy based on differentiation in power
dominates the political structure. However, the iliternational power structure is dynamic,
as the elements of power are constantly changing. The ambiguity about India's position
in global powers structure arises from the fact that India is middle power, not having
sufficient hard and soft power resources to influence the international system, but at
the same time, not lacking in these resources to be a object in internationa1 politics.
As we saw, over time, India has developed its hard power resources, that is, its
economic, military and techilological resources. Complementing these resources with
soft pnwer capabilities, India was successfi~lin repositioning itself as a major power
candidate.
However, India has yet to over come some internal and external hurdles to claim major
.-
power status. 117;. ,, has yet to overcome the ecoiiomic obstacles and consolidate
Country Profiles: India its society. Externally, it has to successfully deal with the containment efforts of the
major powers and the find a legitimate place in international institutions of governance.

SOME USEFUL BO.OKS


Bajpai, Kanti & Amitam Mattoo (eds.). (1996). Securing India: Strategic Thought
and Practice. New Delhil: Manohar Publishers.
Harrison, S Selig & Geoffrey Kemp (eds.). (1993). India and America after the
Cold War Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Nayar R Baldev & T V Paul. (2003). India in the World Order: Searching for
Major Power Status. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Perkovich, George. (1999). India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global
Proliferation. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Poulose, T.T. (1996). rhe CTBT and the Rise of Nuclear Nationalism in India.
New Delhi: Lancers Books.
Sardesai, Damodar & Raju G C Thomas (eds.). (2002). Nuclear India in the 215"
Century. New Yorkr Palgrave.
Singh, Jaswant. (1998). Defending India. New York: 'st. Martin's Press.

3.8 ANSWERS TO CHECKYOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1 ,

1) Soft power resources are the intangible resources such as norms, leadership role
in international institutions, culture, state capacity, strategy, and national leadership.
Soft power capabilitiesare less coercive and enable the state to inspire consensus
(agreement) and to co-opt (persuade others to share the same goals).

2) Major Powers have command, most, if not all, the elements of power. They have
the will and capabilities to determine the nature of international system. In other
words, they have global or continental interests and their security goals are beyond
territorial defence, and include the maintenance of balance of power and order
in international system.
Middle powers, on the other hand, are often dominant or pre-eminent in a certain
region. They do not have the leverage to influence the course of the international
system as a whole, but possess sufficient capabilities to resist unwelcome decisions
of the major powers.

3) Middle powers are the potential challengers of hegemony of the major powers.
Major Powers therefore, seek to contain the influence of middle powers within
the region. India's aspirations for major power status have been checked by
containment policies adopted by the US and China. Both these powers have not
only built up Pakistan's military capabilities but also sided with it in the South
Asian regional colhflict. The US, in addition, sought to check the growth ofIndia's
military and industrial capabilities in the guise of strengtheningthe non-proliferation
regime.
Check Your Progress 2
2) India is seen as a rising power for two important reasons. First, its hard power
capabilities, while lagging behind those of the major powers, are appreciably
higher than those of the other regional powers. Secondly, India is strengthening
its position in almost all indicators of hard power capabilities, though the level of
improvement varies from one area to another.
UNIT 4 INDIA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC
ORDER
structure
4.0 Objective
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Politics of Protection
4.3 Development through Global Trade
4.4 India turns Global
4.5 Liberalization
4.6 The Achievements of India's Liberalization
4.7 Challenges for Liberalization
4.7.1 Internal Challenges
4.7.2 External Challenges

4.8 Let Us Sum Up


4.9 Some Useful Books
4.9 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

4.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit deals with the politics of Indian economic policy. India pursued a policy of
import substituting industrialization (ISI). India would import intennediate products for
producing finished goods. High customs duties and other non-tariff barriers protected
the Indian market. India decisively moved towards an export oriented development
policy after 1991. This policy tried to promote Indian exports and allowed easier entry
of foreign products into India. After going through this Unit you should be able to:
a Describe the import substituting industrial policy in India;
a Explain how countries benefited due to international trade;
a Explain why India moved towards export promotion after 1991;

a Describe the elements of India's liberalization; and


a Identify the challenges due to India's integration into the global economic order

4.1 INTRODUCTION
Import substituting industrialization (ISI) was adopted by most countries with a colonial
past. The IS1 strategy depended on the infant industry argument. It was considered
essential to protect the home market for the Indian industrialists. Without such protection,
it was felt that Indian industrialization would be destroyed by cheap imports. The
Government of India had the choice between an export-led route to development by
encouragingtextile exports, and an import substitution route that depended on substituting
- imports of finished consumer goods with domestic prod~~ction. The Second Five-Year
Plan gave the verdict in favour of the inward-oriented route. The IS1 model led to the
development of a vast and diversified industrial and technological base, but it soon ran
into trouble as the ecol~ornicgrowth stagnated at the Hindu growth rate of 3.5 percent.
The lilnitations ofthe IS1 model of developmentultimately forced the Indian government
#
!I
Country Profiles: India to move toward export oriented growth. This unit examines how the efforts of the
Indian government to overcome the limitations ofthe IS1 strateg led to a shift towards
export promotion policies, deregulatioii of the econoliiy and the integration of the
Indian economy with the international economy. The challenges faced by the Indian
economy are also examined.

4.2 THE POLITICS OF PROTECTION


The IS1 strategy adopted since the Second Five Year Plan was intended to protect the
home market with high customs duties for finished products. An overvalued exchange
rate made imports cheap but exports expensive. For example, let us assume that the
market driven exchange rate is Rs. 50 = $ 1, but India artificially kept the Rupee
overvalued at Rs. 10 = $ 1. Then a machine costing $ 100 would be worth Rs. 50001
- in the first case, but only Rs. 10001- in the second case. Case 2 with an overvalued
Rupee with respect to the dollar would yield a cheaper machine than Case 1, where
the Rupee was valued at the market determined rate. Imports of capital goods such
as heavy machinery used in factories were necessary for import substitution, since
India could not produce these goods. These imports benefited from the overvalued
exchange rate. Import licensi~igwas used to check the rush of cheap imports, except
where imports were absolutely necessary for import substitution.
Private industry was controlled through industrial licensing. In certain sectors, only
those industrialists who had licenses could produce goods. For example, if an
industrial house had a license for making cars, only it could manufacture the car.
Others had to secure a separate license to manufacture a car. Moreover, multinational
corporations headquartered in foreign countries were discol~ragedfrom setting
operations in India.
This system led to a situationthat promoted bribes and corruption, which is also called
rent seeking. With government regulations in opposition to market forces, firms incurred
substantial costs to gain government favours. For example, if an industrialist wanted
to import a machine, he or she needed a license. If the industrialist needed to
manufacture something, once again he or she had to secure a license. All these licenses
could easily be obtained by doing favours for political parties, politicians or government
servants. The same exwnditure could have been used to make the finished product
better or cheaper. The )Indianeconomy was frittering away substantial sums in the
form of rents when such expenditure on productive investment could have made
Indian goods competitive in the world market. Allocating resources to determine the
size of the license involved making trips to New Delhi, locating an office there, and
bribing officials. According to one study, the total value of rents generated in India
from public investment, imports, controlled commodities, credit rationing and the railways
in 1964 was estimated to be nearly Rs. 15,000 mil lion.
Private sector firms benefited from government involvement through regulations. The
public sector would produce cheap inputs for the Indian private sector, which were
subsidized by the government. Ifthe public sector did not produce these inputs, they
could be cheaply imported with the help of import licenses in the context of an overvalued
Rupee. Private sector firms were funded largely by the government's financial
:..sritutions such as the Industrial Finance Corporation of India. Sometimes influential
industrial houses prodpced more than their licensed capacity, something that the
regulators would simplyloverlook.~ll this involved rents from industrialists to politicians
and govern~nentofficials.
Democracy and elections in India made politicians dependent on funds from domestic
and foreign corporations. This produced a need-based relationship between the
politician, the bureaucrat, and the industrialist. Government support for election funds
is very limited. Even though political parties started filing tax returns since 1996, the
amounts reported were conspicuously low. Since the 1980s, public sector and defence
equipment deals have become a major source of election finance. In recent times,
portfolios such as defence and areas of privatization such as telecommunications have India in the Global
becoine important sources for generating a party's resources. Eeonomic Order

Corr~iptionpromoting import-substitutingindustrialization (1%)negatively affected Indian


productivity and competitiveness.Astudy found that the degree of clout of labour and
industry in a particular sector played an important role in determining the degree of
protection in that sector. The government subsidized bankrupt industrial units, which
would never make profits. According to one study 17 out of 23 bankrupt industrial
units were kept artificially alive through subsidized credit sanctioi~edby the Board of
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. All this contributed to a decline in India's
productivity. Indian goods were expensive and of low quality by world standards.
India's share of the manufacturing exports of all developing countries came down
from 22.1 percent in 1962 to 3.4 percent in 1990. It's share in the manufacturing
exports of the world was 0.54 percent in 1991 compared with 0.84 percent in 1962.
In 1980, low rates of economic growth, the loss of an election, and Chinese success
with trade convinced Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of the need to promote exports.
Various committees of the Government of India had also pointed the need for increased
exports for financing India's development. But business interests still pursued ISI.
'The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), the leading
industry organization, sought reduction in the duty on intermediate goods such as
newsprint, cement, and caustic soda, but was not prepared to take on 100% export
oriented units (EOUs) in the newly established free trade zones. It was tough to
convert industry from manufacturers of low quality products for home consumption,
to manufacturers of internationally acknowledged brands.
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi sought to fight government controls after coming to power
in 1984. His reform efforts met with marginal success because of strong political
opposition. However, a substantial section of bureaucracy and politicians became
convinced ofthe need for policy change. Rajiv Gandhi had brought in Montek Ahluwalia
from the World Bank into the Prime Minister's Off~ce(PMO). In June 1990,Ahluwalia
circulated a paper arguing in favour of customs duty reduction, freer entry of foreign
investment, and, a variety of measures that would increase the competitiveness of
lndian exports and improve the conditions for Indian consumers. India had to find a
way of overcoming political obstacles in the way of policy change.

4.3 DEVELOPMENT THROUGH GLOBAL TRADE


East Asian countries, which were more backward than India in 1947, were growing
faster than India and improving the quality of life of their citizens by participating in
international trade. South Korea and Taiwan, which were relatively small countries,
were among the first countries in East Asia that gave up import substitution and adopt
trade promotion policies. Unlike India, they had no large internal markets to exploit,
and were therefore heavily dependent on foreign markets for selling their products.
South Korea followed the Japanese way of promoting large corporations, which
strengthened international trade. Taiwan promoted smaller enterprises. Both
nevertheless became heavily dependent on trade and grew at phenomenal rates.
Whereas India was growing at about 3.5 percent per annum in the 1970s, these countries
registered a growth rate of over 7 percent per annum.
China was the biggest surprise. China and the Soviet Union were two communist
countries whose development policy was premised on opposition to trade, especially
with tlie capitalist world. All this changed for China towards the end of the 1970s.
China realized that it had lost tlie decade of the 1970s that Taiwan and South Korea
had harnessed to promote its exports. Thereafter, Chinese policy too turned global. It
began to attract massive inflows of export oriented foreign investment and began to
export low technology commodities to Western markets. This development orientation
Iias given China growth rates over 7% over a long period and a substantial trade
surplus with the US.
Country Profiles: India The collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the debt crisis in Latin America in the 1980s lent
further support to global trade as a viable route to development. The Soviet Union, which
was the only country that covld challenge the US militarily, had provided strong legitimacy
to the IS1 as a model of development. The decline and collapse of the Soviet Union
because of the serious economic problems that it faced in the 1980sweakened the appeal
of the IS1 model. Latin American countries which had followed different versions of the
policy of import substitution were confronted with high level of inflation and sometimes
with balance of payments crises. With the appeal of the IS1 model already weakened and
with the IMF putting pressure on these countries to open up their economies, many Latin
American countries increased their trade orientation.

4.4 INDIA TURNS GLOBAL


In 1991, India moved away from IS1towards trade-led growth (TLG) when the executive
used the balance of payments crisis of 1991 to push trade oriented policy reforms. Prime
Minister P. V.Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister (Dr.) Manmohan Singh ofthe Congress
Party carved out the political and economic strategy for the transition.
Prime Minister Rao and Dr. Singh radically changed India's trade, industrial and financial
policies at a time when industry's opposition to liberalization was minimal. The GulPWar
had led to a temporary rise in the price of oil. The government's spending was in far in
excess of what it could afford. Largely as result of the combination ofthese factors, India
was faced with a foreign exchange crunch. In the early 1990s, India had resources only
for about two weeks of imports.
Indian industry could not pursue import substitution without imports. They needed the
International Monetary Fund's resources to fund the import of intermediate goods
essential for'1~1.They also underestimated the threat from foreign corporations and
overestimated the benefits of deregulation of industrial licensing. The result was
overwhelming support for liberalization by Indian industry between 1991 and 1993.
Industry's opposition to the entry of multinationals and the dernand for a "level playing
field" was articulated only in 1993, by which time important trade promoting policy changes
had already been initiated. Trade unions successfully opposed the IMF inspired policy
related to the easy firing of inefficient workers, which is the key for industrial restructuring.
They did not oppose the liberalization of imports or the entry of multinationals, or the
del icensi~igof industry.
The pro-trade executive exploited this window ofopportunity to rise above the politics of
IS1 mentioned above. Dr. Singh's budget speech of 1991 clearly laid out the problem of
the low productivity of investments leading to unsustainable deficits in the Government's
budget and in the trade account. While Dr. Singh handled the economic management,
Prime Minister Rao deftly handled the political situation. Under their stewardship, India
witnessed significant customs duty reduction, the encouragement of investment from
foreign firms and individuals, industrial delicensing, devaluation ofthe Rupee, and, the full
convertibility of the Rupee on the current account.
The pro-trade orientation was continued by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which
une to power in 1996. As the cadres of the RSS, the apolitical ideological heart of the
BID were the famous proponents of the "swadeshi" or the self-reliance driven doctrine
of economic management, many thought that the pro-trade orientation would end. The
budget of 1998 which wag a mild retreat towards IS1 confirmed their fears. However,
Prime Minister Atal BihariVajpayee and Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha portrayed the
liberal face of BJP, against the more self-reliance oriented groups within the RSS and the
Swadeshi Jagran Manch. They sustained the momentum of economic liberalization.
The BJP's losing elections in three states in the aftermath of the nuclear bomb blast, and
the budget of 1998, was a setback for the supporters ofISI. Jaswant Singh's ascendance
to the position of Foreign Minister was a clear assertion of Prime Minister Vajpayee's
liberal outlook. Yashwant Sinha became convinced about the need for a trade-oriented
3)

4.5
.
regime after tlle political setback of 1998. Finance Minister Jaswant Singh's Budget
for 2003/04 maintained the pro-trade orientation. The major policy achievements of
the BJP included the removal of all quantitative restrictions, deregulation of the insurance
and telccoin sectors, reduction in import duty, and, the initiation of public sector
disinvestment.
Check Your Progress 1
Note: i)

1)

2)
Use the space below for your answers.
ii) Check your progress with the model answers given at the end of the unit.
Deseribe import substituting industrialization in India.

How did IS1 hurt India's competitiveness?

How did Indian economy get integraied witli ihe global economy'?

LIBERALIZATION
India's economic policy was substantiaIly liberalized after 1991. Liberalization implies
a reductiou in government intervention and free play of market forces at tlie national
and international level. This section briefly describes changes witli respect to industrial
policy, tariff reduction, the removal of quantitative restriction, and full convertibility of
the Rupee on tlie current account. India has made fairly liberal co~nmitmeiitsin e-
commerce and services. 'The foreign investment regime governing foreign direct
investment, portfolio investment, and venture capital was liberalized to attract foreign
capital.
Inrlusfrirrl Licensing
?'lie policy-makers killed a number of bribing opportunities by abolishing .industrial
licensing. Ind~~strial
licensing had ensured that the government will decide wh'ich Indian
India in the Global
Economic Order
Country Profiles: India company will produce how much of a good for the large Indian domestic market. The
domestic producer had an interest in obtaining licenses and increasing capacity, both
of which were possible by obliging government officials and politicians. Innovation
and efficiency was not the hallmark of Indian manufacturing industry, as rents to
officials and politicians easily helped them secure advantages in the Indian market.
Tarifis, Qerrotas and Rupee Convertibility
India's abolishing all quantitative restrictions (QRs) two years ahead of the World
Trade Organization" schedule on March 3 1, 2001, is a significant event in India's
trade policy. Quantitative restrictions restrict trade with a certain country to a certain
quantity, no matter what the demand may be. If India has quantitative restrictions that
limit the quantity of imports of the pho;ocopy machines from Japan to 1000, then
Indians can buy only up to 1000 photocopy machines from Japan. The US had
successfully challenged India's QRs in the WTOYsdispute settlement proceedings on
the grounds that India could no longer maintain them on balance of payments grounds.
India lost the case in December 1998, and used international commitments to pursue
domestic reform. The removal of QRs will boost retail trade in India. A. T. Kearney
estimated that organized retailing will be a $37 billion market in India.
Indian tariffs were reduced drastically. Industrialists depended on high customs duties
to protect themselves against the low productivity and quality of Indian products. The
simple average tariff came down from 125 percent in 199011991 to 35 percent in
199711998. The import-weighted tariff over the same period came down from 87
percent to 30 percent. India has entered the Information Technology Agreement that
will bring down Indian tariffs on information technology goods to zero by 2005.
India entered into a textile agreement with the US and the EU in 1995. It removed
fibres, yarns and industrial fabrics from the restricted list. Most textile exports of the
US and the EU would gain free entry into India by 2005. In return, the US agreed to
provide increased market access and a total phase out of quotas by 2005. The EU
agreed to remove all restrictions on Indian handloom products, increase its quota by
Rs. 3 billion, and completely phase out quotas by 2004.
Foreign exchange controls were relaxed. After 1991, the Rupee was steadily allowed
to become fully convertible on all current account transactions by 1994. The market
now largely determines the Rupee - Dollar exchange rate. Earlier, Indian industrialists
had depended on an overvalued exchange rate, which made intermediate goods imports
cheap but excessively dependent on import licenses and foreign exchange granted by
the GOI. After 1994, the largely market determined exchange rate of the Rupee
made imports expensive and exports cheap. The devaluation of the exchange rate
increased the competitiveness of Indian exports.
Investment by a foreign company in India can lead to jobs, access to technology, and,
better products. Low US interest rates in the 1990s saw the average FDI to emerging
markets more than double from 1985 - 1990 ($ 142 billion per year) to 1996 ($350
billion). FDI began to trickle into India following a shift in the government towards
foreign investment in the 1990s. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (1973) was
,
'

amended to liberalize foreign investment in India. Automatic approval of foreign equity


up to 5 1 percent is granted in 48 sectors. Foreign equity up to 74 per cent is allowed in
many sectors and 100% foreign equity is allowed in some infrastructure areas such as
ports and roads. Insurance sector, banking, telecommunications, and civil aviation
have been opened i ~ pfor foreign investment. India has signed bilateral treaties with
countries like the UK, France, Germany and Malaysia, as well as a double taxation
treaty with the US. It has became a member of the World Bank's Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency from 1992.
Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha liberalized the taxation of venture capital funds with
a view to establishing the Silicon Valley connection. Incubators, which are mostly
non-profit entities, provide finance and infrastructure support to young entrepreneurs
at an early stage of commercial development. Venture Capital Funds do not need India in the Global
SEBI approval after the 200 1 budget. Economic Order

India's rising competitiveness in the software sector has resulted in the si~nplification
of procedures regarding Indian companies accessing foreign funds, and the acquisition
of foreign assets. The GO1 has granted permission to Indian firms to freely raise
resources via American Depository Receipts and Global Depository Receipts. These
firms may spend up to 50 percent ofthe resources raised to acquire overseas companies.
The pol icy for portfolio investment has been liberalized. Portfolio investment relates
to the hivestment of fund managers in rich countries who invest the savings of rich
I
L
country citizens all over the world to earn the highest returns. Before 2000, foreign
i~istitutionalinvestors (Flls) were allowed to invest up to 24 percent of the equity of an
1
Indiaii company. This could be increased to 30 percent subject to the approval of a
company's board of directors and the passage of a resolution at the company's general
meeting. The Union Budget of2001 kept the equity limit for portfolio investment at 40
percent. subject to the approval of a company's board of directors.
In September 2001, the Reserve Bank raised the equity limit for foreign institutional
investors in a sector to tlie equity limit permitted for foreign direct investment in that
sector. Any participation in a company's equity above 24 percent will require the
company board's approval. This implies that FIIs can theoretically invest up to 100 per
cent equity in companies in sectors like power, oil, pharmaceuticals, software and
hotels.

4.6 THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF INDIA'S


LIBERALIZATION
Benefiting from the industrial and technological base created by the IS1, the economic
reform programnles which opened up and integrated the Indian economy with the
international economy have placed India on the fast track to becoming an important
economic force. The results of India's liberalization have been impressive. India has
recorded one of the fastest growth rates (annual growth rate of 6 per cent per annum)
in the world between 1993 and 2000. Inflation was been controlled below the 5 percent
level. At the decade's end, India's foreign exchange reserves were approximately $
40 billion and could cover nine months of imports. This was sufficient to weather a
Gulf War type oil price hike without panic.
India emerged as a major software pr~ducerand one ofthe world's leading outsourcing
locations. Foreign firms took advantage of the cheap availability of highly skilled
manpower to carry out advanced research and development activities in India. India's
exports of gems and jewellery grew more rapidly in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Gems
and jewellery maintained its pre-eminent status in India's export basket.

Table I : Foreign Investment in India


(Net inflows in US $ billions)

- .-
Investment
Direct 0.073 0.276 0.550 0.973 2.143 2.426 3.577 2.634 2.168 2.315
Portfolio 0.004 0.283 1.369 5..491 1.590 3.598 2.555 -0.601 2.317 1.619
(equ it^
secur~r;~~~
Total 0.774 0.559 1.919 6.464 3.733 6.02 6.132 2.033 4.485 3.924
Foreign investment resporded to tlie liberalized regime. The total stock of foreign
investment was mu,. ,i, oillion in 1990. In 199711998 fz'=;.;ipninvestment inflows at $
Country Profiles: jadia 6.1 billion could finance a substantial proportion of India's $6.5 billion foreign exchange
deficit. In the early 1 990s, tlie inflows were largely from portfolio investment. Foreign
direct investment picked up after 1995. When portfolio investment dried up in tlie aftermath
cf the East Asian c! isis, foreign direct investment had picked up. Portfolio investment
picked up again from 1999.

India's success pales in co~nparisonwith East Asia's ability to attract foreign capital. In
1996, developing co~ui~ries received $ 130 billion worth of foreign investment. Of this,
China received $42 billioii. FDl inflows accounted for about 25 percent of China's gross
capital formation. By comparison India's inflows of $ 2 to 3 billion per year accounted for
less than 5 percent of India's domestic capital formation. Moreover, actual inflows in
India have been about 20 percent of the approvals.

Despite that fact that the FDI inflow is relatively low and that the country's share in the
inter~iationaltrade is relatively small, Indian economy is on the rise. Indian eco~iomyis
already the fourth largest economy in the world today. Its growtli rates are among the
second and third fastest in the world. particularly in the fields of IT, telecommunications
and business process outsourcing. A Goldman Saclis report ('Dreaming witli BRIC7s:
The Path to 2050') states that among Brazil, Russia, India an3 China, India will grow the
Ihstest over the next ?O to 50 years by leveraging its demographic advantages and through
co~ltinueddevelopment. At its present rates of growth, the burgeoning market in the
country "would be adding nearly one France every 3.5 years and olle Australia every
year".

CHALLENGES FOR LIBERALIZATION


4.9.1 Internal challenges
Major domestic challenges to 1iber;ilization still remain. Trade and competitiveness
depend on die quality of physical infrastructure in the form of roads, ports and power.
India is deficient in all these. Labour laws in India have negatively affected tlie
manufacturing sector. I ~ d i a ' sfiscal deficit and the conseqt~entimpact on interest rates
can have a deleterious effect 011 investment in infrastructure and other areas. India's
states have become far Inore unequal in econoniic terms in the 1990s than they were in
the 1980s.

Compcliliveness in Manifncturing

Markets need to be well connected in order to reap tlie benefits of greater market
orientation. India:(. rouds, ports, rrlrtl airl~ortsare in dire need of expansion and
LI pgradat ion.

Second, the manufacturing sector suffers from the poor quality and quantity of electricity
gzneration. India needs to increasepower g~nerationto 1 niillion megawatts. Frustrated
with the government's electricity generation, India's large industrial houses are generating
their o\vn 1;eeds. There is rampant theft and virtually free electricity, which is being paid
for by the government out of the taxpayer's pocket. This adversely affects the quality
a~ldquantity of power generation for tllose tlia~are willing to pay. The case for reducing
political intervention in power generation and distribution by enforcing a powerful and
benevole~itindependent regulator is a strong one.

'I'llird, India's labour !awl$ make it very tough to fire anyone in the organizcd sector.
Trade ini ions in India represent approximately 8.5 percent of India's skilled workers.
Over 90 percent of the wbrk force in the unorganized sector has no job security. Job
security increases witli a firm's size. The liberalization programme since 1991 has not
been able to makt: a dent on job security oftlie privileged few. Low labour productivity in
manufacturing sector due to the excessive job security for a minority of workers, has
adversely affected domestic and foreign investment in export oriented manufacturing
",>-t..".
r The con~hinc~dj.~cul depcit of the Centre and tlie states at about 10 to 11 percent of India in the Global
GDP is cause for alarm. The fiscal deficit is government revenue plus capital grants Economic Order
minus government expenditure. The deficit has been rising steadily since 1992193.
'This can generate a vicioi~scycle of rising debt, increased interests payments, and a
fall in the growth of development expenditure in areas like health, education and
infrastructure. Lack of government expenditure on physical and human resources will
b hurt India's conipetitiveness adversely.

Regional Ztzequality
Economic liberalization has provided the freedom to states within the Indian union to
I seek developmental resources on their own. Tlie Centre's role as tlie provider of
I resources to the states declined, and states began competing for private investment.
I k3etter-governed states such as Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharaslitra
and Chirat could succeed in attracting more investment. What will happen to those like
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, which are not governed well and may therefore not lure
investment in an era of liberalization?
Tlie ability of states to lure private capital has increased the disparity among the
performing and non-performing states. I11 tlie 1980s, tlie fastest growing state was
growing about twice as fast as the slowest growing state. In the 1990s, the backward
state of Bihar grew at 2.7 per cent per annum compared with Gujarat's 9.6 percent. If
we consider per capita growth rates, the disparities are even more pronounced. Among
the backward states, Madhya Pradesh and Rajastlian were able to grow at a rate
higher than 6 per cent per annum in the 1990s. The challenge for economic liberalization
is to improve the lot of tlie worst governed states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, so that
inequality does not breed enmity among states.

4.7.2 External challenges


(flndia's liberalization has to succeed it needs to access foreign markets. Industrialized
countries are practicing protectionism, fearing tlie cheap labour advantage of exports
from developing cou~itries.The World Trade Organization has assured the liberalization
oftextile trade, but industrialized countries have not shown signs of liberalizing market
access. Second, labour and environmental standards are emerging as the new non-
tariff barriers to trade. If import liberalization in India is not matched with access to the
markets of foreign countries, this may be a setback for India's trade and further
liberalization.
Textiles ,

The Multifibre Agreement is one of tlie niost blatant double standards in international
trade. It discriminates between countries, and quotas distort trade to a much greater
extent than tariffs. Moreover, quoias are less transparent than tariffs in terms of the
impact of distortions. The US and tlie EU accounted for 73% of India's total garment
and textile exports. A study found that the US was more restrictive towards garment
exports from India than the EU. For the US as a whole, the level of protection in 1999
was greater than 1993. The same was true for the EU as well.
Trade and Labor
India's objection that the Iiiternational Labour Organization rather than the World Trade
Organization should deal with labour standards is a very strong case. India worries
that labour standards could become another lion-tariff barrier to trade. Rich countries
argue that poor countries have lower wages and work conditions. This hurts better-
paid workers in rich countries. They also argue that workers have right to certain
mininium standards of livelihood.
Professor Paul Krugman, has argued persuasively, that trade has a positive impact on
incomes. Industrialized countries should let rising incomes follow trade rather than
force developing countries to ensure high incomes and workconditions before allowing
developing countries to trade. The logic of Krugman's argument suggests that low
Country Profiles: India wages can facilitate international competitivelless in a particular sector. When this
comparative advantage generates exports and improves pluductivity, it will have a positive
impact on the wage rate of the poor low wage country.
Poorer countries like India can build their comparative advantage through a low wage
rate. However, the phendmenon of a Ion wage-rate will be short-lived, as export-promotion
would lead to a rise in the wages of the poorer country, 'This argument is supported by the
success stories in East Asian countries like South Korea and Taiwan. Dictatorial regimes
in these countries. which worked closely with industry and repressed labour rights, could
not stop the rise in wages, after these countries participated in export-oriented trade and
enhanced their productivity. These economic ideas do have a place in the US policy set
up. However, if special interest groups like labour unions in the US and Europe hijack
policy for the sake of prdtecting 3 , , P i ijobs,
~ this will be to the detriment of both developed
and developing countries.
Labour rights, especially the rights of women and children demand greater investment in
human capital formation through better health and education. The clamour for trade
restrictions in the name of labour rights wil I increase the cost of goods in the US, and lead
to unemployment in developing countries like India.
Trade and Environment
India has objected that ecological standards may become a non-tariff barrier to trade.
The benefits from trade liberalization may not be realized if special interests in the US try
to hide behind turtle excluder devices in order to check shrimp exports from India into the
US. Equipment used for catching shrimps in the Bay of Bengal was thought to be
endangering turtles. Since, the life of turtles in the Bay of Bengal was dear to the US it
has checked shrimp imports from India. Indian shrimp exporters argue that the US is
citing ecological considerationsonly to protect its domestic shrimp industry. Ifenvironmental
considerations have to play their legitimate role in trade, rather than just being a protectionist
measure, it must be de-linked from the WTO. A purely scientific Global Environmental
Organization could pursue the objective of enlightening the world about the real
enviro~l~nental problems facing trade.
Check Your Progress 2
Note: i) Use the space below for your answers.
ii) Check your progress with the model answers given at the end of the unit.

1) What policy changes were effected in the area of foreign investment, portfolio
investment and venture capital?

........................... ..............................................................................................
i

2) How is the lack of infrastructure hurting India's competitiveness?


India in the Global
4.8 LET US SUM UP Economic Order

India's opting for inlport si~bstiti~ting


industrialization provided the opportunity to the
politician, the businessman and the government official, to benefit from a regime of
government controls in tlie context of a closed economy. Government controls prompted
I
the businessmen to benefit from monopoly positions within a protected market, in return
for favours to the politician. The system generated a bias in favour of the status quo.
! While India was operating within a closed economy, many countries of East Asia
including South Korea, Taiwan, and China, among others, were promoting exports and
growing rapidly. Subsequently the Soviet Union also collapsed and so did many import
si~bstitutingregimes in Latin America.
Liberalization became possible in 1991 when Prime Minister Rao and Dr. Manmohan
Singh used the balance of payments crisis to overcome the political obstacles to
t
increasing India's market orientation. Robust growth, low inflation, and good export
I
performance followed liberalization. Sectors like software services, IT enabled
services, gems and jewellery, and research and development services received a boost.
There was substantial improvement in foreign investment inflows compared with
the past.
The bad news is that many domestic impedi~nentsto productivity and competitiveness
remain. India's physical infrastructure is in a poor condition. Privatization of public
sector i111it.sis faced with internal bureaucratic and political fights between a pro-liberal
executive and rent seekers who favour tlie status quo. India's fiscal deficit is alarmingly
high. Liberalization has left much of the developmental initiatives with the states. This
has resulted in rising disparities among states, a phenomenon that does not augur well
for national integration.
If India liberalizes but the external environment becomes illiberal, this will inspire
protectionism and controls in India. Quantitative restrictions continue to protect textile
trade despite tlie World Trade Organization. If the liberalization of textiles and other
commodities of interest to developing coi~ntriesare accompanied with non-tariff barriers
I
such as labour and environmental standards, then the economic arguments in favor of
gains from trade become less convincing. Developing countries like India need an
open trading regime in which the world's most important traders need to practice what
they preach! India's best external environment is a strengthened multilateral and rule
boi~ndsystem, that leaves little incentive for protectionism.

4.9 SOME USEFUL BOOKS


Pranab Bardhan, 1984. Political Economy of Development in India (Basil Blackwell,
New York).
Jagdish Rhagwati. 1993. India in Transition (Clarendon Press, 1993).
Anlit Bhaduri and Deepak Nayyar, 1996. The Intelligent Person's Guide to
Lihemlization (New Dellii, Penguin).

GIobaIBusiness, Review, 2002 vol. 2, no. 3 (Sage, New Delhi) (July-December 2002).

4.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR


PROGRESS EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

1) The IS1 strategy aimed at substituting imports of finished goods with domestic
product. This was intended to protect and strengthen domestic industry. It involved
the protection of the doniestic market with high customs duties and control of
private induqtrv through licensing.
2) As government regulations were at variance with market forces, industrial firms
incurred heavy costs to gain government favours. With the rise in election expenses
of politicians a need based relationship between the politician, the bureaucrat and
the industrialist emerged. Corruption became rampant.

3) The Narasimha Raa goveriiment utilized.the foreign exchange crisis that gripped
the country to initiate ref'brqs. The industry in want of imports could not resist the
liberalization programme as it overestimated the benefits of deregulation and
underestimated the threat froin foreign corporations. The bade unions also did not
oppose the liberalization of imports or entry of multinationals.
Check Your Progress 2

1) The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1973 was amended to allow automatic
approval of foreign equity up to 51 percent in 48 sectors and up to 100 percent
foreign equity was allowed in infrastructure areas such as ports and roads. Similarly,
taxation and approvals for venture capital was liberalized. Portfolio investment was
also liberalized by allowing FII's to first invest up to 24 percent of the equity and up
to 30 percent later. These are however, subject to approval of company boards.

2) Industries need transportation and communication infrastructure to expand the


markets. They also need energy resources. It is in these sectors that there is a dire
need for expansion of capacity, upgradation oftechnology through minimal political
intervention and establishment of independent regulatory authorities.
UNIT 5 INDIAAND ITS NEIGHBOURS
Structure
Objectives
Introduction
Pakistan: India's most important neighbour
India and Sri Lanka
India and Nepal
India and Bangladesh
Let Us Sum Up
Some Useful Books
Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

OBJECTIVES
The objective of this unit is to critically analyse the relations of India with its South
Asian neighbours viz Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The relationship has
been examined from different perspectives covering the political, economic and other
bilateral issues. After going tl~roughthis unit, you should be able to:
0 Critically analyse India's policy towards its neighbours; and
Identify the main issues that strain India's bilateral relations with its neighbours.

5.1 INTRODUCTION
The present states-system of South Asia emerged in the wake of the withdrawal of
the British Raj from the India sub-continent. These states are all geographically
proximate - most of them are part of a distinct geographical entity, the sub-continent
oflndia. Even the Maldives and Sri Lanka, which are separated from the sub-continent
by stretches of sea, are linked through other factors - common civilization heritage,
ethnicity, religious and linguistic affinities and existence ofcloser and enduring interaction
determined::by the fact of geographical proximity as well as by juxtaposition to the
regional pole, India.
However, an important feature oftheir interaction has been the asymmetry of India in
relation to her neighbours as well as her dominance and centrality in that states-system.
It is not merely that India is bigger and more populous than its neighbours. It is not
merely that tecl~nologicallyand militarily India's achievements surpass that of others,
Pakistan included. But it is also a characteristic of the regional interaction that it is
marked more by India's bilateral relations with her neighbours than by the generality
of relations inter se.
Another important feature has been regional conflicts and tensions. A generic cause
has been this asymmetry, and this has been compounded by a divergence of basic
strategic perception. India has inherited the British Raj's strategic perception of a
sub-continental defence system based upon a view of the close proximity ofthe region.
But all her neighbours subscribe to the theory of 'threat perception' of India and see
her as an entity against which security is necessary.
There have also been some problems bequeathed to these states by the British Raj
and some that cropped up due to their own policies. In the former category we can list
Country Profiles: India these problems as their undefined borders, the status of Indian residents living in these
neighbouring countries and related migration problems etc. while in the second category
each neighbouring country is surrounded with problems of their own creation. Pakistan
has a military coup, and before that successive changes of government; due to dismissal
of elected Prime Ministers. Sri Lanka remains enmeshed in the ethnic crisis compounded
by a civil war situation. The entire Royal family ofNepal was assassinated on the first of
June 200 1. Assassinations took place in the context of incremental violence perpetrated
by the Communist Party (Maoist) in that country. There have been ten changes of
government since the restoration of democracy there in 1990. Bangladesh went through
a new election in October 2001 under incremental violerice and disruption of law and
order. Bhutan remains challenged by dissidence amongst its Nepalese subjects and the
presence of separatist movements from North-Eastern India on its territory. Thus
structuringof practical and stable relations with its neighbours is quite a complex challenge
which India has faced over the last several years especially because with each one of its
neighbours, India has a number of issues which remain unresolved, whether it is the
question ofKashmir, problem of illegal migration and enclaves in adverse possession with
Bangladesh and so on.

PAKISTAN: INDIA'S MOST IMPORTANT


NEIGHBOUR
The history of India-Pakistan relations since the partition of India creating two countries,
India and Pakistan can be analysed through a review of the nature of the problems and
d i ~ u t e which
s kept the; two countries engaged in hostile, strained and conflictual
interactions and even in major wars. These adverse relations have already resulted in
.four full-fledged wars and India is now facing a proxy war conducted by Pakistan in
Jammu and Kashmir aimed at separating this Indian state from the rest of India. In public
perception and more so in the perception ofour,armed forces, Takistan remains identified
as an adversary, as an enemy although in terms of history, culture, language, religions and
geography both countries have much in common.
Let us try to understand why the situation between India and Pakistan remains adrift in
adversity when geographical, locational, historical connections, and socio-cultural
commonalities, ethnic aqd linguistic affinity would have led to harmony rather than
confrontation.
Both countries are at loggerheads with each other because of lack of communications,
mutual apprehensions and deliberately nurtured misunderstandings. Let us first try to
understand Pakistan's apprehensions.Pakistani elite have a bitter memory of the opposition
to the partition from the IndianNational Congress which the Muslim League had to face.
Consequently, the Muslim League did not get Pakistan of the geographical parameters
which it expected. It is one of ironies of hist-ry that many of those who now live in
Pakistan did not approve of the two-nation theory. The pro-Pakistan movement drew its
main strength from Bengali Muslims and Muslims ofNorth-Central India, even this support
did not come from the Muslim masszs but from the Muslim elite. We must remember that
till Jinnah was eclipsed as a leader ofthe Indian National Congress by Mahatma Gandhi
and Jawahar La1 Nehru, he was lionized as an ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. The
Pakistani view is that the machinations of Lord Mountbatten and and the Indian National
Congress prevented the emergence of a Pakistan encompassing the entire Muslim
population of India. This bitterness still permeates the psyche of the Pakistani power
structure
India's strong action in Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagadh heightened this
bitterness and more importantly, generated a genuine apprehension that India would try to
nullify the partition by sdbverting the state of Pakistan, either by breaking it up or by
reabsorbing its territory illto what the Pakistanis called Hindu plans of 'Akhand Bharat'.
India's stand on the distribution of military resources and for foreign exchange reserves
convinced Pakistan that I ~ d i had
a disruptive plans. The disparity in size, population and
resources between the two countries fuelled these annrehensions.
' India's role i s the iiberation of Bangladesh only reinforced this Pakistani fear psychosis.
Ifthis is so, why did Pakistan indulge in ~nilitaryadventures against India in 1948 and
India and its
Neighbows
31965'? Probably, the answer lies in the subconscious desire to rectify the unfair
arrangements of the partition. The conflict of 1971 tempered Pakistan's inclination
towards military adventurism for getting even wit11 India, but short of that its power
structure continues to have the same mindset.
In the backdrop of the above facts etlveloping the India-Pakistan relations, let us
examined some ofthe important developments that took place between two nations.
Besides the initial probleins of partition as mentioned cursorily above like the problem
of natiwe states in which the state of Junagarll, Hyderabad and Kashmir were finally
acceded to India much against Pakistan desire and the problem of sharing of water
of rivers of Ravi, Sutlej and Beas which also was amicably settled between the
cor~ntriesthrough an agreement concluded between the two countries on September
t 10,1960, the main problem which is souring the relation between the two countries
I pertains to Kashmir. Therefore, it is important to describe in detail the so-called
'Kash~nirDispute' between the two nations as it is the only bone of contention
between them.
Kashmir Dispute
The erstwhile native state of Jammu and Kashmir, having total area of 86,024 square
miles. is predominantly populated by Muslims and was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja,
Maharaja Hari Singh. He did not take acy decision regarding the state's accession
before or immediately after August 15, 1947. The Maharaja was planning to declare
his state as an independent country. But this vacillation on the part of Maharaja
prompted Pakistan to irlvade with the help oftribesmen from North-Western Frontier
Province. They launched the attack on October 22, 194'7 and within a short period
of'tjvc. days reached Baramulajust 25 miles away from Srinagar. Overawed by this
attack Ilari Sing11 decjded to seek India's help and pleaded with the Goveniment of
India iha: he is willing to sign the l~istrunientof Accession in return for saving the
state. The accessioli of Jammu and Kasllmir was finalized by 27 October, 1947 and
thc armj. was airlifted to clear the aggression. While accepting the accession of the
Stste of Jammu and Kashmir. India had said that after the aggression is vacated the
wishes ofthe people of Jammu and Kaslimir would be ascertained. Pakistan did not
:rccept this accession and called it an aggression by India. Pakistan in the meanwhile
installed a so-called Azad Kashmir government in the territory occupied by the
invaders. In tlle meantime, India had inoved to the Security Council under article 35
of the Charter, In fact the decision of the Nehru government to offer plebiscite to
ascertain the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir seemed to be a serious
mistake as it is this cl?use the support ofwhich Pakistan has taken to prolong its case
with regard to Kashmir:
The Security Council took many decisions on this issue starting with the appointment
of a three member Commission on January 20, 1948, which was subsequently
expanded and came to be known as United Natiotis Commission for India and Pakistan
(UNCIP). The UNCIP conducted enquiry, met representatives of both lndia and
Pakistan and finally submitted a report on December 11, 1948. This report contained
the following recommendations aimed at ending the hostilities and holding of plebiscite.
First, Pakistan should withdraw its troops from Jammu and Kashmir as soon as
possible after the cease fire and that Pakistan should also try for withdrawal of
tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who are not ordinary residents of Kashmir. Second,
the territorythus vacated by Pakistani troops should be administered by local oflicials
under the supervision of the Commission. Third, after these two conditions are
fulfilled and India is informed about their compliance by the UNCIP, India should
also withdraw substantial strength of its troops. Finally, pending a final agreement
India should maintain only such limited troops as should be essential for law and
order: After initial reluctance Pakistan accepted these proposals and a cease fire
agreement was signed which was implemented by the two commanders on the
Country Profiles: Indlr midnight of January, 1949. The war ended and a cease fire became effective. It is to be
pointed out here that the Indian army was in a position to push the invaders out and
liberate the whole state when suddenly the cease fire was announced.
The cease fire line (now called the Line of Control) was drawn where the fighting ended.
An agreement on ceasefire line was reached in Karachi on 27" July, 1949. It left 32,000
sq. miles of J & K territory in possession of Pakistan which is called Azad Kashmir by
Pakistan. Subsequently, many proposals and commissions were formed by the United
Nations but none of them was able to resolve the Kashmir tangle. In the meanwhile, the
Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of adult franchise, ratified the State's accession
to India on February 6, 1954. A Constitution of the State was adopted on November 19,
1956 which declared Jammu and Kashmir to be an integral part of India. India's stand
now is that with the ratification of accession by directly elected Constituent Assembly of
Kashmir, the promised 'ascertaining of pishes' of the people had been accomplished.
India finalized accession on January 26, 1957.
The Kashmir issue has been raised time and again by Pakistan in the United Nations and
other international forums. It has been harping on religion of majority of people as the
basis for Kashmir becoming a part of Pakistan. But for India it is a matter of faith that
religion should not be the basis of political actions. Pakistan is actively indulging in cross-
border terrorism and is killing innocent people in Kashmir. It has already waged four wars
to take revenge from India despite India's best attempts to normalize relations between
the two countries.

5.3 INDIA AND SRI LANKA


Another important neighbour ofIndia in the south is Sri Lanka, an island republic situated
in the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka got its independence from British on February 4, 1948.
Like India, Sri Lanka is an active member of Non-aligned Movement (NAM) right from
1961 when it was founded. It is also a member of South Asian Association of Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) and has full faith in the United Nations and the ideal of world
peace. Thus, this southern neighbour of India has so much in common with this country
that one cannot but believe that there can be any areas of conflict between the two.
India-Sri Lanka relations have generally been cordial, through there have been tensions
caused mainly because of ethnic conflict between people of Indian Origin - mainly Tamils
- living in Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese. Usually a small country is suspicious of a big
neighbour. But, India has never tried to play the role of a dominant big neighbour. India's
foreign policy has always been based on friendship with all its neighbours. Despite ethnic
problems of Sri Lanka, India has never sought to impose its will on Sri Lanka.
The Tamil Problem:
Jaffna Province in northern Sri Lanka has a large concentration of Tamil people. The
problem became serious when Tamils began demanding a national homeland or Republic
of Eelam in an area of about 18000 sq. km. in northern Sri Lanka. There are essentially
two categories of Tamils in Sri Lanka. There are about one million people, whose
forefathers migrated from India in ancient times. They are known as Ceylon Tamils. The
other category includes another about one inillion people, many of them without citizenship,
who went to Sri Lanka during the nineteenth century. The problem oftheir status dominated
early India-Sri Lanka relations. The conflict with Ceylon Tamils came later. The Sinhalese
fear Tamil domination, and that is the principal reason behind the conflict.
After independence justice was assured to the Tamils by the then Prime Minister of Sri
Lanka, Dudley S. Senanayeke. But after his death discrimination against Tamils started.
Although an agreement was concluded with the Tamils by Prime Minister Bandaranaike
but it could not pacify the Tamils. The Tamil youth who had lost faith in non-violence
organized themselves into the Liberation Tigers. The aim of the 'Tigers' is a sovereign
Tamil state or Eelam. The earliest efforts made for finding a solution to the ethnic problem
was an agreement signed in 1953 by the Prime Minister of India Pt. Nehru and Prime
Minister of Sri Lanka, Kotelawala. Tamils alleged that Nehru-Kotelawala Agreement India and its
was not implemented sincerely. Consequently, large number of persons of Indian Neighbours
origin could not get citizenship of Sri Lanka and they became 'stateless persons'. This
caused serious tensions in India-Sri Lanka relations which were aggravated by the
1956 language disturbances. Sri Lankans blamed India for these disturbances
Problem of Stateless Persons
On October 1964 after prolonged negotiations between Prime Minister of India, La1
Bahadur Shastri and Sri Lankan Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike an agreement
was signed to resolve the problem of stateless persons. It sought to solve the problem
of about 9 lakh 75 thousand stateless persons in Sri Lanka. About three lakhs of these
people were to be granted Sri Lankan citizenship, and about 5 lakh 25 thousand persons
were to be given Indian citizenship. The fate of remaining I lakh 50 thousand stateless
persons was to be decided in future. During her second tenure as Prime Minister,
Mrs. Bandaranaike visited India in 1974 and her talks with Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi resulted in a fresh agreement whereby half of these persons were to be given
citizenship of Sri Lanka and the rest would become Indian nationals. Thus, this issue
of stateless persons was sought to be peacefully settled.
The Kacchativu Dispute
A territorial dispute arose in regard to the ownership of a one square mile uninhabited
island, called Kacchatiw, off the Jaffna coast in the Palk straits. Pilgrims from both
India and Sri Lanka used to go to Kacchativu Island every year in the month of March
during the four-day St. Anthony's festival for worship at the local Roman Catholic
Church. India protested over the presence of Sri Lankan police during the festival in
1968. This caused conflict. Both India and Sri Lanka were keen to avoid a serious
situation. The Prime Ministers of India and Sri Lanka met twice and pending a final
decision on the issue of island's title, resolved to maintain status quo in and around the
island. Neither India nor Sri Lanka would send its policemen in uniform or custom
officials, or resort to aerial reconnaissance or naval patrolling of adjacent waters during
the St. Anthony's festival. Finally, through a comprehensive agreement India accepted
Sri Lanka's ownership of the Kacchativu Island.
The Ethnic Conflict
The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka between Tamils and Sinhalese assumed serious
proportions in 1983. It was described as 'ethnic explosion' and the 'Sri Lankan Carnage'.
During 1983-86two lakh Tamils became refugees as they lost their homes. Thousands
were killed and wounded. Despite all-party talks, peace eluded the island Republic.
Finally an attempt was made by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to help Sri Lanka find a
solution to the ethnic violence. On the invitation of Sri Lankan government, Indian
Prime Minister paid to two day visit to Colombo and concluded an agreement to
provide for ~ndianPeace Keeping Force (IPKF) to be posted in Sri Lanka to restore
normalcy in the strife-torn areas.
In accordance with Rajiv-Jayawardene agreement hundreds of thousands of Indian
troops were sent to Sri Lanka for maintenance of peace. But the posting of IPKF
proved to be costly for India. Crores of rupees were spent on Indian troops trying to
restore order. Hundred of Indian soldiers were killed in clashes with the Tamil
extremists. Even then ethnic conflict could not be brought under control. Having
realized the futility of IPKF, India decided to pull its troops out. By March 1990 all the
Indian troops were recalled.
The separatist movement in Sri Lanka had an adverse effect on India-Sri Lanka
relations, although India had taken all positive steps to ensure that Indian Territory
was not used for anti-Sri Lanka activities. Nonetheless, sending of Indian troops had
its fall out and during the run-up to the Lok Sabha, former Prime Minister Raj iv Gandhi
was assassinated in an alleged human bomb explosion.
Country Profiles: India The present President of Sri Lanka, Mrs. Chandrika Kumarantunga visited India which
created an atmosphere of better understanding between the two countries. India continues
to favour a peaceful solution to ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka within the framework of
'
sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country through negotiation and without outside
interference. India welcomes the recent proposal of Sri Lanka for devolution of power to
secure some element of autonomy to the areas largely inhabited by Tamil minority.
Check Your Progress I
Note: i) Use the space below for your answers.
ii) Check your progress with the model answers given at the end of the unit.
1) What is UNCIP? What were its main recommendations?

2) How was the Kacchativa dispute between India and Sri Lanka resolved?

5.4 INDIA AND NEPAL


Nepal, the only Hindu kingdom in the world, lies in the north of India. India's interest in
Nepal was natural for historical, religious and strategic reasons. India's security was
perceived to be closely related to Nepal in the north.
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1950
On 3 1" July, 1950, both countries signed Treaty of Peace and Friendship and initially
Indo-Nepalese relations have been based on this treaty. After the signing of the treaty,
India established seventeen check posts to watch the passes between Tibet and Nepal
and Bhutan. These posts were jointly manned by Indian and Nepalese personnel. An
Indian military mission was also established in Kathmandu for the organization and training
ofNepalese army. Nehru was keen that Nepal must enjoy all the attributesof independence
and sovereignty. Even during the democratic movement againstthe autocratic regime of
Ranas, India adopted the attitude of restraint and patience.
Nepal assumed greater importance in India's security perception after the Sino-Indian
border war of 1962. India's desire for improvement of relations was reciprocated.Nepal
King's 13 day visit to India and President Radhakrishnan's return visit further cemented
the improved relations. Relations were further improved when Foreign Minister of India,
Sardar Swaran Singh visited Nepal in 1964 and signed an agreement of large economic
assistance to Nepal. The King of Nepal also visited India in 1965 and conferred with
Indian Prime Minister, La1Bahadur Shastri. Nepal gave full support to India's position on
Kashmir. The King appreciated the economic assistance being provided by India to his
country. However, the bilateral relations received another setback when a border dispute
relating to Susta region arose. This region was claimed by Nepal in 1966. This one-
square mile territory on Bihar-Nepal border remained a subject of dispute. Finally, a
boundary commission was appointed to resolve the issue.
I Economic assistance to Nepal India and its
Neighbours
In the field of economic assistance, by 1967, India had extended over Nepalese P lpees
50 crores for Nepal's economic development and had pledged another Rs. 40 ctores.
4
India was the single largest donor by 1967. Road building and power development
were two major areas in which India assisted Nepal. India also helped NepaI in the
construction of the Kingdom's first airport at Kathmandu. But by this time China had
become an important factor in Nepal's economic and political relations. King Mahendra
reaffinned Nepal's decision to stay neutral between India and China. For India, however,
China factor in Nepal's foreign poIicy had opened a dangerous situation.
In the meantime, anti-India demonstrations were repeatedly held in Nepal. Nepal
made public demands for the withdrawal of Indian personnel from the northern check
I
posts and its military liaison group in Kathmandu.
I
The demand of withdrawal, however, was contrary to treaty provisions and Nepal
was questioning the very basis of Indo-Nepalese relationship. It was believed in New
Delhi that the Palace was trying to play China against India and now even Pakistan
against it. However, by early 1971 Nepal realized the futility of anti-India campaign.
Eventually that would have hurt Nepal's own economy. Negotiations were opened
and a New Treaty of Transit was signed in Kathmandu in August 1971. Thus, by the
end of 1971, Indo-Nepal relations started Iooking brighter.
King Birendra succeeded his father Mahendra when the latter died in early 1972.
Under his reign, Nepal began to work for better and normal relations with India. India
participated in Nepal's development of power and irrigation, the major projects being
the Kosi, the Gandak, the Karnali, the Trisuli and the Devighat and Pokhra Hydel
projects. India and Nepal planned the harnessing of Himalayan rivers. There were
Indian aid and cooperation activities in areas such as road building, airport construction,
telecommunication,horticulture, agriculture, forestry, education and health.
The friendly relations with Nepal were further consolidated after Mrs. Gandhi returned
to power in 1980. King Birendra visited India in 1981 and the visit was returned by
I President Sanjiva Reddy the same year. However, being a big power, and a neighbour
of Nepal, China had been taking keen interest in Nepal. China had been trying to
widen the rift between India and Nepal whenever tension developed in the bilateral
relations. However, India continued to be Nepal's main trading partner. During 1984-
85 Nepal's 52 percent of total export-import trade was with India. Most of the goods
produced in Ihdia and needed by Nepal are usually made available without much
difficulty.
The age-old system of absolute monarchy in Nepal was replaced by constitutional
monarchy on April 8, 1990. King Birendra agreed to the demands of the people for
putting an end to partyless panchayat system. The King agreed to a new constitutional
arrangement in which he would continue to be head of state, but the governance
would be responsibility of a Cabinet answerable to Parliament. Elections would be
held on the basis of multi-party system. Eventually the partyless democracy was
replaced by party-based parliamentary democracy.
t
Economic relations between the two countries improved on account of liberalisation of
their economies since 1991. The Treaty of Trade and Transit of 1991 and their
amendments in 1993 have also had positive results. During 1992-94 period India's
commitment to Nepal's economic development continued to be expressed through
various programmes. India andNepal signed atreaty on the development of Mahakali
Project during Prime Minister Deuba's visit to India in February, 1996. This project
represents a major breakthrough in the harnessing of river waters for mutual benefit.
The two countries are working through Joint Technical Level India-Nepal Boundary
Committee on a time bound programme for identification of boundary. Thus India's
hand of friendship remains extended to Nepal.
Country Profiles: India
5.5 INDIA AND BANGLADESH
The birthGf ~ a i i ~ l a d e sinhDecember 1971 was a direct outcome of the Indo-Pakistan
war in which Pakistani troops surrendered u~iconditioliallyin erstwhile East Pakistan.
The emergence of Bangladesh was described as an event of major importance in the
Sub-continent. India was forced to liberate East Pakistan as it was faced with an
unprecedented crisis caused by massive influx of 10 million refugees and all efforts by
the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi to persuade Pakistan for a negotiated
settlement with Awami League leaders bore no fruits.

On March 9, 1972 both countries vgned a treaty of Friendship and Peace. Mrs Indira
Gandhi assured Bangladesh of India's full support and cooperation in securing its admission
to the United Nations. This Treaty was signed for a period of 25 years. Pakistan was
disturbed at the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Peace and'klescribed it as a
virtual military alliance. But study of provisions of the Treaty makes it clear that it was
signed to strengthen bilateral relations and promote regional peace and international
cooperation. It was certainly not a military pact against any country or bloc of countries.
The signing of friendship treaty was followed by the conclusion of a comprehensive
trade agreement of March 25, 1972. Thus the Treaty of Friendship and the Trade
Agreement were concluded in the spirit of equality and mutual benefit, friendship and
good neighbourliness.

Sharing of Ganga Water

'The biggest bone of contention between India and Bangladesh relates to sharing of
Ganga waters. This dispute is mainly concerned with sharing ofwaters during lean season,
January to May, particularly mid-March to mid-May, when the flow of Ganga reduces to
minimum level of 55, 000 cusecs. The crux of the problem is that if India withdraws
40,000 cusecs which is the barest minimum required to flush Hooghly to save Calcutta
port, Bangladesh then receives only 15,000 cusecs which is highly insufficient to meet its
needs. The extraction of this larger amount of water by India gives rise to multifarious
problems in Bangladesh. Thus, the dispute between India and Bangladesh relates to
equitable sharing of Ganga waters by the two countries. The Farakka Barrage built by
India on the river Ganga is situated on the Bengal- Bihar border near Farakka about 400
km. North of Calcutta. The primary reason for the constniction of this Barrage was the
preservation and maintenance ofthe Calcutta port a i d navigability of Bhagirathi-Hooghly.
Now that the barrage is constructed Calcutta port is saved but diversion of water for the
port became an issue of international discord and misunderstanding. Although different
agreement were concluded to regulate the water of Ganga and to resolve the Farakka
barrage issue but the final agreement was concluded between the two governments in
the year 1996. Sheikh Hasina government negotiated with India a treaty for sharing
Ganga waters for 30 years. India was represented by H.D.Deve Gowda, the prime
minister of India. The main feature of this Treaty regarding sharing of Ganga water at
Farraka is that Ganga water at Farakka would be determined by 15 blocs of 10 day
period from January 1 to May 3 1 every year.

The New Moore Island Dispute

There have been tensions between India and Bangladesh over certain territorial claims
also. These include the dispute over New Moore Island, the problem related to the Teen
Bigha corridor and the clash in Muhuni Char in the Belonia sector. Of the three the
dispute over New Moore Island persists as a major problem. New Moore Island covering
an area of 2 to 12 sq. km., depending upon rising and receding of tide, is located in the
Bay of Bengal. It is about 5200 meters from the nearest Indian coastal point and 7000
meters from Bangladesh coastal point. Indian flag was hoisted on the island on March
12,1980 and subsequent to that all problems arose. Bangladesh questioned the ownership
rights of India. The dispute has remained unresolved though it has been discussed at
different levels.
I Indo-Bangladesh relations were adversely affected on account of dispute regarding India and its
Till Righa corridor also. During Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's tenure this small patch Neighbours '
of an acre of Indian Territory called Teen Bigha was leased out to Bangladesh. Tliis
agreement of leasing could not be imp!emented as it required a constitutional amendment.
Other Bilateral issues
Among other problems in lndia Rangladesh relations is the problem of Chakma refugees
who have mostly taken shelter in Indian state ofTripura. Negotiations during 1994 led
to the repatriation of Chakma refugees from Tripura to Chittagong Hill tracts in
Bangladesh. Most of them have already been repatriated and some are still awaiting
their repatriation.
India is facing another problem of Bangladeshi migrants, majority of them belonging to
weaker sections who have settled in different parts of India. Their number, which is
estimated to be more than 10 lakh people, burdens the Indian economy. Despite Lndia's
repeated requests Bangladesh government is taking no action for their recall and Indian
government is left with no choice but to take stem measures to deport them to Bangladesh.
Check Your Progress 2
Note: ij se the space below for your answers.
ii) Clheck your progress with the model answers given at the end of the unit.

1) Describe the nature of economic relations between India and Nepal in the 1990s.

2) What are the central issues in Indo-Bangladesh dispute over sharing of Ganga
waters?

5.6 LET US SUM UP


One of the cornerstones of India's foreign policy has been to build a strategically
secure, politically stabie and harmonious and econo~nicallycooperative neighbourhood.
lndia has always given a high priority to friendly relations with our immediate neighbours.
India's relations with Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as discussed above
give a clear indication of India's desire to avoid conflicts, to seek peaceful settlement
of international disputes and build friendship with all the neighbours. Many of India's
neighbours are non-aligned and have generally responded to India's approach of peace.
Nevertheless, India has had moments of conflicts and even regular wars. Despite
India best efforts to cultivate most friendly relations with Pakistan by initiating so
Inany unilateral decisions without expecting a retum favour ( Priilie Minister 1.K.GujralYs
"Gujral Doctrine"giving whatever Indiacan to its neighbours without expecting in return
as lndia is a bigger country - Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's Lahore Bus
Service, Agra Summit etc.) Pakistan gave in return Kargil War and increased cross-
border terrorist activities. Pakistan continues to internationalise the Kashmir issue.
Indian Parliament was attacked by Pakistan's supported terrorists. In fact Pakistan is
trying to destabilise India in every possible manner and is perfect example of state
which is supporting terrorism against a neighbouring country.
India has good relations with all other neighbours. The new governments installed in
Nepal and Sri T anka have euvreqsed their desire to consolidate and strengthen relations
with India. Purposive efforts contin
as well as political cooperation. Close proximity between India and its neighbours is
evident from the continuing visit of its Prime Minister and King to India who were here
right in the month of March 2003. Likewise the Prime Ministers of Sri Lanka has also
visited India recently. Except perhaps Pakistan all other India's neighbours including
mighty China are havingvery cordial relations with India. This underlies India's tremendous
faith in good neighbourliness relations.

5.7 SOME USEFUL BOOKS


Dutt, V.P.(1984). India k Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Vikas.
Rasgotra M., Chopra V.D. & Mishra 5.P. (1990). India S Foreign Policy in the 1990s.
New Delhi: Patriot Publishers.
Mansingh Lalit. (1998). Indian Foreign Policy-Agenda for the 21" Century. Vol.11,
New Delhi: Konark Publishers.
Khilnani R.K. (2000). RestructuringIndiaB Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Commonwealth.
Dixit J.N. (2002). India k Foreign Policy - Challenge of Terrorism.New Del h i: Gyan.

5.8 ANSWERS TO CHECKYOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

1) LTNCIP is the United Nations Commission for 1ndiaand Pakistan which was appointed
by the UN Security Council in 1948. . The UNCTP enquiry report submitted in
December 1948 contained the following recommendations aimed at ending the
hostilities and holding of plebiscite: First, Pakistan should withdraw its troops from
Jam~nuand Kashmir as soon as possible after the cease fire and that Pakistan
should also try for withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who are not
ordinary residents of Kashmir. Second, the territory thus vacated by Pakistani troops
should be administered by local officials under the supervision of the Commission.
Third, after these two conditions are fulfilled and India is informed about their
compliance by the UNCIP, India should also withdraw substantial strength of its
troops. Finally, pending a final agreement India should maintain only such limited .
troops as should be essential for law and order.

2) The status of Kacchativa, an uninhabited island off the Jaffna coast, became an
issues between India and Sri Lanka in the late 1960s. It was resolved through
bilateral talks, when India accepted Sri Lanka's ownership of the island
Check Your Progress 2

1) Both the countries launched economic liberalisation programmes at around the same
time in the early 1990s. India renewed the Treaty of Trade and Transit in 1991 and
committed to Nepal's economic development through various programmes. India
and Nepal signed a treaty on the development of Mahakali Project in 1996. This
project seeks to harness river waters for mutual benefit

2) This dispute is mainly concerned with sharing of waters during lean season,
particularly mid-March to mid-May, when the flow of Ganga reduces to minimum
level of 55,000 cusecs. The crux of the problem is that if India withdraws 40,000
cusecs which is the barest minimum required to flush Hooghly to save Calcutta
port, Bangladesh then receives only 15,000 cusecs which is highly insufficient to
meet its needs. Thus, the dispute between India and Bangladesh relates to equitable
sharing of Ganga waters by the two countries.
UNIT 6 POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND
PROCESSES .IN PAKISTAN

. 6.0 Objectives
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Legacies at Foundation
6.3 Political Developments and Processes
6.3.1 Constituent Assembly
6.3.2 Jinnah-Liaquat Period
-
6.3.3 Bureaucracy Army Coalition
6.3.4 First Spell of Military Rule: Ay'ub-Yahya Period
/
6.3.5 The First Ever Elected Government: Z. A. Bhutto Led PPP Regime
/ ,

6.3.6 Second Spell of Military Rule: Zia ul Haq Period


6.3.7 Restoration of Democracy: The Ghulam Ishaq Khan's Period
6.3.8 Military as Mediator in Politics: The Political Crisis of 1993
5.3.9 General Musharraf s Military Rule

6.4 Bureaucracy
6.5 Army
6.6 Election and Parties
6.7 Let Us Sum Up
6.8 Some UseFul Books
6.9 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

I 'This unit examines politicaI structures and processes in Pakistan.After going through
this unit, you should be able to:

iI i'dentiflthe key political developments in Pakistan;


trace the political history of the country;

I
L
locate the role of the army and bureaucracy in the political system of Pakistan;
and

I identift the regional disparities in the State.

I 6.1 INTRODUCTION
Pakistan came into being on 14thAugust 1947 as a result of the separatist movement
L of the Muslims in the Muslim minority provinces of British India. The Muslim separaEist
nfovement had emerged as the result of the support of the British rulers and the rise of

i
the Muslim middle classes in the late 19th century. The Lahore Resolution of the All
India Muslim League on 23d March 1940 calIed for a separate homeland comprising
the entire north western part and the north eastern part of the Indian sub-continent.
However the Mountbatten Plan partitioned the Punjab and Bengal also. The new
state of Pakistan which ultimately emerged was a geographical oddity as it was divided
Country Profiles : intwo wings separated from each other by one thousand miles of Indian territory. As
Pakistan there was very little common between the two wings except religion, East Pakistan
soon emerged as an indtpendent country. The present day Pakistan comprises Punjab,
(formerly East Punjab), Sind,North-western Frontier Province, (N.W.F.P), Baluchistan,
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, (FATA) and the federally administered Capital
of Islamabad. The country has a population of 15 crores. Poverty, high birth rate,
illiteracy, unemployment etc, are still the major problems facing the country. Even
after three spells of military rule spreading over more than 24 years the country has
again passed under military rule three years ago under General Musharraf.

6.2 LEGACIESAT FOUNDATION


Pakistan comprised of two wings East Pakistan and West Pakistan with nothing common
between the two except religion. The new nation didn't have any infrastructureof a
state. Even the armed forces had to be built out of the British army. The areas which
constituted Pakistan were economically, politically, and socially backward. The
provinces were predominantly agrarian; dominated by feudal landlordsor tribal Sardars.
Whatever industry and business that had existed there, was controlled by ~ i n d uand
s
Sikhs who migrated to India in the wake of communal riots during the partition days.
A few financial institutions operated in the urban centres like Lahore, Karachi and
Peshawar in the western wing and in Dhaka in the Eastern wing. Transport and
communications system was also underdeveloped. While the Eastern wing was the
major exporter ofjute, the one major commodity which Pakistan exported, there were
no developed ports to handle the business. In these circumstances, the administration
became preoccupied with the settlement and rehabilitation of thousands of refugees
from India.
Being a colonial state, the new country had well organized bureaucracy and armed
forces trained in the British traditions. The British Indian Army had been partitioned
and Muslim officers were given the option ofjoining either the Indian or the Pakistani
Army. It should be noted the Pakistani army continued to have many British officers
for some time after independence.
Check Your Progress 1
Note : i) Use the space below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

1) What were the legacies inherited by Pakistan at its foundation.

6.3 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND


PROCESSES
The new state of Pakidan lacked the political institutions necessary for developing
democratic processes. The Pakistan movement was mainly a movement of the Muslims
of the Muslim minority provinces and it was weak in the areas which constituted the
new state. The Muslim League was in power only in Bengal and Sind. A Congress
government was in office in theNorthwestern Frontier Province even after one week
of independence, till it was dissolved by a fiat of the Governor-General of Pakistan
Mohammad Ali Jinnah himself. Muslim migrants who came from India occupied a
very large share in the power structure. It took some time for the native political elite
who had opposed the Pakistani movement to emerge on the political arena. The entire
Pakistan movement had been run on slogans and no effort had been at any stage to Political Structures and
intellectually prepare for nation building in the new country. Most ofthe statements of Processes in Pakistan
Jinnah on this issue were vague and confusing though it was clear that he did not
cherish the idea of Pakistan being an Islamic state.
There was no consensus among the ruling elite on the principles on which the political
system would be built on. While one section, mostly the Western educated, wanted
Pakistan to be secular democratic state another section, particularly those with religious
orientation wanted an Islamic state. The ruling Muslim League had lost its credibility
soon after Pakistan came into being. The result of this was Pakistan could not build
political institutions and develop democratic processes in the country.

6.3.1 Constituent Assembly


The Constituent Assembly which was entrusted with thejob of framing a Constitution
for the new country had been elected in 1946 for the undivided India. This Constituent
Assembly was also to act as the Central Legislaiure of Pakistan. Some of the leaders
of the Pakistan Muslim League who hailed from India and did not have seats in the
Assembly were later found seats from the vacancies created by the migration of Sikh
and Hindu members to India. However, the Constituent Assembly had members
belonging to Hindu community who hailed from East Bengal. Some of them belonged
to the Congress Party in India. Though they were small in number, they constituted the
Pakistan National Congress and put forward their point of view forcefully. However,
because of pre-partition prejudices and bitterness their loyalty was challenged and
I
I they were looked at with suspicion. Even the other emerging opposition parties were
I
condemned as 'enemies of Pakistan'. The leadership of the ML ignored the fact that
in a democracy, the opposition has a role to playjust as the ruling party has an assigned
I role. The result was that democratic institutions failed to take firm roots.
The ML leadership also ignored the Constituent Assembly. The ML discussed the
issues in its forum and placed them before the ConstituentAssembly for approval. The
Constituent Assembly instead of being respected as a sovereign body was converted
into an appendage of the executive. The atrophy of the constitutional bodies led to a
situation where these bodies were passing many unconstitutional acts of the Governor-
General and the Prime Minister. Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad dismissed the
elected leader of the Constituent Assembly, Prime Minister KhwajaNazimuddin, and
appointed Mohammad Ali Bogra without receiving the sanction of the Assembly. The
tradition of subordination of the legislature to the executive was thus set in the early
years of the nation.

6.3.2 Jinnah-Liaquat Period


Pakistan like India had adopted the Government of India Act 1935 to set up
its administrative machinery. The Act had empowered the Governor-General, the
head of the state, to amend it. This provision was used by Jinnah himself several
times to amend the Act. By one such amendment, he acquired the powers to
dismiss the provincial governments at will. The amendment was applied on
subsequent occassions to dismiss the elected governments. Jinnah also concentrated
powers in his hands by occupying three of the four top posts of the political system-
the Governor General, President of the Constituent Assembly, and the President of
the Muslim League. The other important office, that of the Prime Minister was
occupied by Liaquat Ali Khan. But as Liaquat Ali Khan could not match the
stature and charisma of Jinnah, the position of the Prime Minister was denigrated.
The Governor-General came to be regarded as the repository of all power. In
these circumstances, bureaucracy began to play a leading part in running the
country. For instance, Ghulam Mohammad, an officer of the Audit and Accounts
Service was appointed as the finance minister, although he had played no part in
the Pakistan movement. After Jinnah died in September 1948, Liaquat Ali Khan
became the President of the Muslim League and emerged as the supreme ruler.
He nominated a cololrrless and pedestrian regional leader KhwajaNazimuddin as the
Country Profiles: new Governor-Generid. Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman, a former Muslim League leader
Pnkistnn \from Uttar Pradesh was appointed as the new President ofthe ConstituentAssembly.
Liaquat Ali khan quickened the pace of the constitution making. The Assembly passed
the Objectives Resolution in 1949 and the Basic Principles Committee Report was
submitted in 1952. Both the Resolution and the Report provoked a storm of protests in
the country. The religious parties in West Pakistan protested that the ~esolutionhad
not declared ~ a k k a an
n Islamic State while in East Pakistan the Report's proposal to
make Urdu as the official language of the country caused indignation and opposition.
-
6.3.3 Bureaucracy Army Coalition
By the turn of the decade, the Muslim League had lost all credibility in East Pakistan
because of its language poIicy. There the mainstream Muslim League broke; away
and formed the Awami League in 1949. In West Pakistan, the Muslim League split
into two informal groups-one consisting of old Leaguers who were mostly migrants c
from India and the other comprising the new entrants, mostly Punjabis and a few
Sindhis and Pathans. While the former were mostly urban people imbibed with liberal
democratic values, the latter were mostly rural based feudal landlords with a'streakof
Islamic fundamentalism. They had no idealism boh.nout of the struggle for a cause.
Traditionally, the British had recruited its armj: and officers from rural areas and
conservative feudal landlord families.Naturally, the Army in Pakistan had close links
with the new entrants of the League.
Following the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951,
Khwaja Nazimuddin became the Prime Minister and the president of the Muslim
League. The Finance Minister Ghulam Mohamrnad was named the new Governor
General. Ghulam Mohammad was not a politician. He revived the Jinnah's style of
functioning and operated through the civil servants. He brought Maj. Gen. lskander
Mina into the government as the Defence Secretary. Mirza was not a fighting General.
He belonged to the British Political Service and had spent most of his career in the
Frontier quelling Pathan insurgency. It was also the time when General Ayub Khan
became the first Pakistani Chief of the Army Staff. These three men were responsible
for the destruction of democracy and ushering in the first military coup in October
1958. Once the armed forces came to power, they ensured that military would have a
permanent place in the politics of the countiy. After Liaquat, most ofthe heads of the
Muslim League were from the feudal families. With bureaucracy already enjoying an
important place in the power structure, the alliance of the army, landlords and
bureaucracy came into king. If was this oligarchy or alliancewhich survived through
all the ups and downs of Pakistan's history that pushed Pakistan into the neocolonialist
trap of the United States.
The three leaders Ghulam Mohammad, Mirza and Ayub entered into an alliance with
the United States which at that time was looking for military allies in its efforts to
contain the Soviet Union. iuch an alliance was mooted even when Liaquat Ali Khan
was the Prime Minister, but he along with Nazimuddin had resisted it.
The Constituent Assembly endorsed the various decisions of the Governor General
Ghulam M o h a m d for dismissalsand appointments.When Prime Minister Mohammad
Ali Bogra proposed to the Assembly to curtail the powers of the Governor General,
Ghulam Mohammad hit back by dissolving the Constituent Assembly in 1954. Thus,
the first Constituent Assembly ended its career without performing its task of framing
the Constitution. The dissolution ofthe Assembly created a serious constitutionalcrisis
as there was no provision for the dissolution and reelection of a new Constituent
Assembly. The Governor General had no authority to dissolve the Assembly. In the
legal and constitutional wrangling at the Sind High Court and the Supreme Court,
Justice Mohammad Munir propounded the 'doctrine of necessity' and legalized the
dissolution of the ConstituentAssembly. The doctrine of necessity was in fact a unique
form of authoritarian law which was presented as not inconsistent with principles of
democracy. The effect of the Munir's doctrine was that those in command of the
coercive power of the state had the right to suspend constitutional government whenever Political Structures and
> and however long they thought necessary. Later military bkeovers by General Ayub
Processes in Pakistan
I in 1958, by General Zia ul Haq in 1977 and General Pemez Musharraf in 1999 were
legalized by this doctrine.
Fresh elections to the Constituent Assembly were held in 1955. In that election, the
Muslim League lost its majority. But no other party- the Awami League, the United
Front (non-Awami League East Pakistani parties), and the Republican Party- secured
a ma-jority.The major contribution ofthe new Constituent Assembly was that it passed
a new Constitution (1 956) based on the system of 'One Unit' under which the four
provinces of West Pakistan i.e., Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the Northwest Frontier
Province were amalgamated into one unit, that is, West Pakistan and East Bengal and
the Sylhet districts into another unit. Pakistan, in effect, was divided into two units
East and West Pakistan. Politically it meant that the Bengali people were deprived of
the political advantage oftheir being the majority ofthe population ofthe country. The
1956 Constitution, whatever it ineritsor demerits, introduced the parliamentary system
of democratic government. As per the provision of the Constitution elections to the
House of Representatives were to be held in 1959. By this time the pro-American
group of Ayub, Mirza and Ghulam Mohammad was well entrenched in the power
structure. Washington was convinced that Ayub and Iskander Mirza would support
the US plans in the region and would cement U.S-Pak military alliance as represented
by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and later Central Treaty

I
t
Organisation (CENTO). Election at this juncture would have strengthened the political
parties and augmented political consciouslless among the people. The oligarchy which
would have lost its influence therefore acted fast. In September 1958, the Army seized
power by staging a coup. The Constitution of 1956was abrogated, political parties and
I
! activities were slandered and banned and the entire country was placed under Martial
Law.

6.3.4 First Spell of Military Rule: Ayub-Yahya Period


t

I Gen. Mohammad Ayub Khan was a Defence Minister as well as the Chief of Staff
!
during Ghulam Mohammad's tenure in 1954. He launched the coup with the support
I of President Iskander Mirza. But within a month of taking over, the two fell apart.
Suspecting that Mirza was conspiring against him, Gen. Ayub sacked President Mirza
and exiled him to London.Ayub Khan ruled for four years as Martial Law Administrator.
In 1962 he introduced the Basic Democracy system which envisaged a constitution
based on the presidential system and indirect voting from bottom to the top. The
administration was centralized and there were no separation ofthe executive, legislature,
and judiciary. In 1962, the National Assembly was elected on indirect voting system
which approved the Constitution and formalized the election of Ayub Khan as the
President. The President was elected by an electoral college with about eighty thousand
members which could easily be manipulated by those in power.The National Assembly
had no powers even in financial matters. Ministers appointed by the President were
not answerable to the National Assembly. No wonder, the Ayub Constitution was
called Constitutional Autocracy.
Ayub ruled for over a decade. Some ofAyub7seconomic policies under the advice of
the Harvard Group of economists led to high rate of growth. This period was even
described in the West as a decade of development. However, the benefits of growth
did not percolate to the poor. Instead, the gap between the rich and poor widened. It
was the result ofthis policy that famous 24 families of monopolists emerged in Pakistan
Ayub's land reform also failed as most of the big landlords evaded it. His Bonus
Voucher Scheme for encouraging exports and improving foreign exchange reserves
bred galloping corruption. Regional disparities widened, particularly, between the East
and West Pakistan. Naturally, the alienation of Bellgal intensified which ultimately
ended in the separation ofthe province within two years ofAyub's downfall in 1969.
The India-Pakistan war of 1965 also resulted in a political crisis. The war was mainly
an enterprise ofAyub who was well entrenched in power and thought of adding one
Country Profiles : more feather of victory over India to his cap. The Tashkent Summit with Indian PI-imc
Pakistan . Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri was seen as surrender in Pakistan. Another result ofthe
Tashkent summit was that Zulfkar Ali Bhutto parted company from him. By 1968,
Ayub's charisma had begun to fade. Increasing poverty and failure ofthe land reforms
on the one side and corruption and frustration of the urban middle classes, on the other
aggravated the economic and political crisis. Ayub tried to suppress the rising demand
for autonomy in East Pakistan by harsh repression but it only intensified the movement
against his rule and the political system he had set up.
The growing contradictions in the society which resulted in social unrest culminated iit
the outbreak ofwidespread mass upsurge in mid-1968. This forced Ayub to leave the
stage unceremoniously, handing power to the Chief of the Army Staff, General Agha
Muhammad Yahya Khan in March 1969.Yahya Khan imposed martial law and accepted
the major democratic demands of the anti-Ayub agitation viz; the breaking up of the
One Unit and direct election on the basis of one man one vote. In the first general
elections in December1 970, the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman secured
absolute majority, capturing almost all the 162 National Asse~nblyseats for which the
election was held in East Pakistan. In West Pakistan, the Pakistan Peoples Party
(PPP) won a majority of seats. The election reflected the ethnic and geographical
divide ofthe new nation. While the Awami League with its Six Point programme was
dominant in East Pakistan, the PPP with its programme for a strong centre was dominant
in West Pakistan. Yahya Khan in league with Zufikar Ali Bhutto did not allow the
Awami League to form the government. This provoked a bloody civil war in Pakistan
which ended in the break up of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh.
6.3.5 The First Ever Elected Government: 2. A. Bhutto Led PPP
Regime
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had emerged as a political leader in his own right during the
movement against Ayub regime in 1968-69. Following differences with Ayub over the
Tashkent Declaration in 1966, Bhutto left the government and founded the PPP in
1967 with the help of some left-wing intellectuals. He led his party to victory in West
Pakistan for the National Assembly in the 1970 election. After the collapse of the
Yahya regime in the wake of the defeat in the India Pakistan war of 1971 Bhutto was
sworn in as the President and the Chief Martial Law Administrator, probably the only
civilian Martial Law Administrator anywhere in the world. He had tremendous
responsibility on his shoulders. The country after the shattering defeat in 1971 was in
shambles, divided and demoralised and almost on the verge of bankruptcy. Moreover,
some 90 thousand Pakistani soldiers remained in prisoner war camps in Jndia. He set
about with some determination to resolve the problems and salvage his country. Within ,
few weeks he promulgated an interim Constitution as preparatory to a permanent
Constitution. The 1973 Constitution was promulgated and had the support of all the
political forces of the country. It is the first ever Constitution framed by the elected
representatives of the people of the country. The Constitution of I973 envisaged a
federal system with parliamentary form of government. The President was merely a
figure head. After the promulgation of the Constitution, Bhutto formed the government.
Fazal Jlahi Chaudhary was elected the President.
After taking office as the Prime Minister he introduced several refonns which included
the sacking of several Generals who were responsible for Pakistan's defeat and disaster
during the Bangladesh crisis, raised a paramilitary force, the Federal Security Force
(FSF), to avoid the use ofthe military for civilian purposes; nationalisation of several
banks and other key industries and progressive land reforms. The Bhutto government
also recognised Sindhi language as a medium of instruction in the Sind province, but
this led to violent agitation by the supporters of Urdu. He introduced the all Pakistan
unified grade in the services in place ofthe elite system inl~eritedfrom the British days
of the India11Civil Service. The various governmental activities were divided in the
groups like the district management group and the foreign affairs group etc. The 1977
election led to allegations of rigging against the PPP. It was clear that Bhutto's popularity
had suffered erosion and his legitimacy had also been struck a blow. T i ~ r:trmy took
advantage of this weakening of the goverllmellt and on 5"' July 1'977 Gen. Zia ul Haq Political Structures and
overthrew the government, suspended the Constitution, banned all the political parties Processes i n Pakistan

and imposed Martial law. The second spell of military rule began.

6.3.6 -I
Second Spell of Military Rule: General Zia ul Haq Period
Gen. Zia ul Haq did not abrogate the Constitution but held it in abeyance. In September
1977, he withdrew tlie state of emergency but continued the Martial Law. He allowed
the President to continue to perform his ceremonial functions. He pursued Bhutto with
a vengeance. Bhutto was arrested for alleged hand in tlie murder of the father of a
fornier member of the PPP. Tlie Lahore High Court sentenced liim to death for
conspiracy to murder. The suprelne court upheld the judgement and Bhutto was
hanged in April 1979.
Sooii after the coup, Gen Zia announced his inlention to hold election within 90 days.
IHowever, as Gen Zia had no legitimacy whatsoever, he went on putting off tlie election
f on one pretest or the other. Resentment against the military regime gradually began to
building up among the people.. It took an organised form when in March 1981 an
1. alliance of political parties led by PPP formed the Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy (MRD). In response. Gen. Zia inducted some civilian ministers in his
I governlnent and allowed more civilians to be included in the governments in the
provinces. He prom~llgatedan interim constitution and formed a Consultative Assembly
called the Majlis i Slii~ra.Tlie Shura, consisting of 300 members, was intended to
advice the government on legislative issues. Gen Zia believed that the introduction of
Islamic measures would not only give him the legitimacy but also enable him to set up
i a new political system which would be difficult for any democratic government to
I change. The Shura was asked to evolve a democratic system in accordance with the
1 requirelnents of Islam. Meanwhile. he introduced Islamic rituals, appointed prayer
wardensto enforce observance of Islamic rituals, introduced Islamic Banks, compulsory
deduction ofZakat, and similar other measures. Restrictions on civil liberties, political
1
activities. and the press were not relaxed. Criminals and political dissidents were put
on public trials and publicly flogged or canned. In December 1984, lie conducted a
referendum on his position as tlle President. The referendum was boycotted by all the
political parties. 'The collvoluted languageofthe ballot and the low voterturnout ensured
a favourable vote for Gen. Zia. Interestingly, Gen. Pervez Musharraf was to organise
a similar referendum with almost the same result.
After having got victory in the so-called referendum, Gen. Zia decided to hold the
election for the National Assembly in March 1985 on non-party basis. Political parties
were not allowed to nominate candidates. Further, the normal features of any election
mobilisation- processions, demonstrations, canvassing or even nianifestoes, etc-were
banned. Most political parties, except the pro-Zia parties, boycotted the poll. It was
also known that without tlie participation ofthe PPP the electio~lwould not carry any
legitimacy. Gen Zia, therefore, tried to persuade Benazir to participate in the election
and even offered to remove tlie partyless provision for the poll. But Benazir declined
to participate in the election. She was to regret this decision later. She did ignore the
fact that elections have their own dynamics and tliat was what happened. Prime Minister
Moliammad Khan .lunejo, who was an ordinary district level leader of the Muslim
League who had been picked up by Zia and made Prime Minister in the non-party
National Asseliibly later assumed importance and wanted to exercise power as the
head of tlie Gover~imentof Pakistan and did not want to be treated as a puppet of the
military. He manoeuvred to take several decisions against the wishes of President Zia
and later paid for tliat temerity by being sacked by him in May 1988.Theelection had
produced surprising results for Gen. Zia as many candidates known to be supporters
of the PPP had been elected and many supporters of the Zia regime had been defeated.
Once the National Assembly was elected it was realized that a government could not
fi~nctionwithout a ruling party. Hence Gen. Zia was forced to allow the parties to be
revived and Mohammad Khan Junejo became the leader of tlie Muslim League
(Pagara). The new National Assembly replaced the nominated Majlis i Shura.
I
1
Country Profiles : It was on the eve of the inaugural session of the National Assembly that Prime Minister
Pakistan Junejo demanded the withdrawal ofthe Martial Law. Gen. Zia agreed to it on condition
i$
of some constitutionalamendments being accepted by the Assembly. The amendments
to clause 58(ii) b of the 1973 Constitution which were accepted enhanced the power
and authority of the President. These came to be known as the 8thAmendment.
Originally, the President was nothing but a constitutional head. The 8thamendment
empowered the President to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, to dissolve the
National Assembly and veto legislations passed by it, to call for fresh elections, to fill
the top positions in the armed forces and the judiciary. Thus, the 8h Amendment
changed the basic character of the 1973 constitution from a parliamentary to a
presidential system. It is interesting that the dismissals of all the Prime Ministers
thereafter till that of Benazir in 1996 were done under the power given to the President
under this amendment and each dismissal carried the same language; charging the
prime minister for corruption, ineptitude, maladministration etc. There was also one
provision for the creation ofa National Security Council as super constitutional body
to monitor the Government and the National Assembly. Another provision in the 8th
Amendment approved all changes that Gen. Zia had imposed on the Constitution
since the martial law was proclaimed in July 1977.
In December 1985, Gen. Zia lifted the Martial Law and military rule. Junejo now
formally became the leader of the Muslim League and the country's Prime Minister.
But the civilian garb ofthe military regime failed to convince the people. The Movement
for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) continued its campaign vigorously. The
political, economic and social crisis became intensified. There were ethnic conflicts
and movements against the growing regional disparities in the provipces. The local
bodies' poll in November 1987 provided the people an opportunity to air their
grievances. Junejo was also getting more self confident and he wanted more freedom
to act. Gen. Zia did not like the increasing independence of Junejo and dismissed him
in late May and announced new elections for National Assembly and Provincial
Assemblies to be held in November of the same year. Before the elections could be
held, Gen. Zia died in an air crash on 17"'August 1988.

6.3.7 Restoration of Democracy: The Ghulam Ishaq Khan's Period


Ghulam lshaq Khan was a typical bureaucrat who had risen from the lowest to tlie
highest positio~iin the services. As he was also the Chairman ofthe Senate, he assumed
the office of President on the death of President Zia ul Haq, as required by the
constitution. He formed an Emergency National Council consisting of top military
officers, the four Governors of the provinces, and four federal ministers to run the
government. Even as Ghulam Ishaq Khan was pondering with the political situation in
which the postponement ofthe elections or re-imposition of martial law had become
difficult, some judicial decisions came in favour of the political parties. One court
judgment declared the dissolution of the National Assembly by Gen. Zia illegal while
another court decided that election should be held on a party basis. In the election held
in October 1988, the PPP emerged as the largest party in spite of the efforts by the
military establishment and the bureaucracy to prevent that. Benazir Bhutto was sworn
as the Prime Minister in December 1988. The PPP government, in its efforts to
strengthen democracy, withdrew all cases against political workers and removed
restrictions on the trade unions and student's unions. The PPP also took steps to get
the 8thAmendment repealed even though it did not have the requisite majority in the
Senate. The opposition, led by Nawaz Sharief, a protCgC of Gen. Zia, created many
problems in the way of Benazir's policies.
In the provincial election, the PPP could not get majority in any of the provinces,
though it managed to form coalition governments in Sind and the NWFP. The Islamic
Democratic Alliance (IDA) led by Nawaz Sharief was able to form the government
in Punjab. In Baluchistan, regional parties like Baluchistan National Party, Jamiatill
Ulamai Islam and the IDA formed a coalition government. But the coalitions in Pakistan
have been rather brittle and the PPP led coalitions in the two provinces soon broke
down. This also weakened the Benazir government in the centre as it was also a Political Structures and
Processes in Pakistan
precariously balanced coalition The Muhajir Qawmi Movement (MQM) had complaints
that the promises made to it were not being implemented. However, the problem with
the PPP was that the any concession made to the MQM in Sind went against the
interests of the PPP support base in that province. By this time the opposition parties
banded themselves into a combined opposition parties (COP). In October 1989, the
MQM left the Government. Soon a vote of no-confidence was moved against the
Guver~iment.This time again, as in 1988, the Tnter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was
active mobilising the members of the opposition parties in support ofthe motion. The
motion however, failed. There was resurgence of ethnic strife particularly in Sind.
There was aggravation of the attacks on the Muhaj irs and their organization the MQM.
The PPP government was constantly being accused of bribery, corruption and
maladministration. Law and order situation had also deteriorated, Economic situation
also began to worsen because of inflation and unemployment. In August 1990, President
r Ishaq Khan, with the consent of the army, dismissed the government citing
unconstitutional acts of corruption and economic ineptitude. Announcing fresh election
in November, the President appointed a caretaker government headed by the COP
leader Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi.

6.3.8 Military as Mediator in Politics: The Political Crisis of 1993


Nawaz Shariefwas beholden to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan for creating conditions
iri which he could defeat Benazir and form the government. However, once in power
Nawaz and Ishaq Khan fell apart. It was alleged that the President was involved in
the resignation of some of the ministers in the Sharief government to destabilise it.
This ~nanip~~lation went on for several days before the President acted to dismiss the
government and dissolve the National Assembly on 1 81hApril 1993. The President had
charged the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief of maladrninistration, corruption, economic
manipulation, incompetence and subversion ofthe Constitution.Acaretaker government
consisting of dissidents, some members of the PPP and others was appointed. Whatever
might have been the charges, which in fact did not differ from those that had been
made against Benazir in 1990 and Junejo in 1988, the issue in contention was the
immense powers enjoyed by the President under the 81h Amendment. Sharief had
been attacking the Amendment virillently while the President supported it and called it
a safety valve.

It was the first time in the history of the country when there was popular resentment
against the dismissal ofthe government by the President. The speaker ofthe National
Assenlbly filed a petition in the court charging the dismissal as malafide and ultra
vires. The Chief Justice, Nasim Hasan Shah, declared the dismissal as void and
unconstitutional and overturned it. TheNational Assembly was convened and Nawaz
Sharief secured a vote of confidence and was back in office. It was one of the rare
j~dgmentsin the history of Pakistan's judiciary. On all earlier occasions, the Court had
upheld the decisions of the Presidents including the dismissal of Mohammad Khan
Junejo and Benazir.
However, the political feud between Sharief and Ishaq Khan did not subside and the
President decided to strike at the political base of Sharief. The provincial Muslim
League government in Punjab was dismissed. The deadlock continued and caused
nervousness and uncertainty in the stock market and seriously affected the national
economy. The army was dragged into the conflict and sought to resolve the crisis.
After several days of hectic parlaying Gen. Abdul Waheed Kakar brought about an
agreement under which both the President and the Prime Minister resigned and a
caretaker government was formed with Dr Moeen Queishi, an employee ofthe World
Bank as the Prime Minister. Wasi~nSajjad former chairmall of the senate had taken
over as the interim President. Senior bureaucrats were ministers in the cabinet of
Qureishi. Elections to the national and provincial assemblies were fixed for October
1993. This was to be third election within a period of five years. The PPP emerged as
the largest single party in the National Assembly. The poll showed that people wanted
Country Profiles : a democratic system to flourisll in the country. The fundamentalist parties were routed.
Pakistan Though the PPP had not got a clear majority, Benazir got elected as the Prime Minister
with the help of some friendly parties and a few independents.

6.3.9 General Musharraf's Military Rule


In the decade after Gen. Zia ul Haq's,death it appeared as if some sort of balance had
been struck between the civilian and military leadership. Four elections were held and
four governments were elected and took office, though none of them completed its
full term. But theNawaz Sharief government wl-ricl~ took office in early 1997 aggravated
the political crisis. Having an absolute majority in the legislature, Nawaz Sharief
government took some controversial decisions. First, it repealed the Eighth Amendment
which had given extraordinary powers to the President. Later, in order to have a
greater say in the appointment of the judges to the higher courts, the government
engineered a revolt of judges of the Supreme Court against the then Chief Justice,
Justice Sajjad Ali Shah. In his efforts to establish civilian authority over the armed
forces, Nawaz Sharief forced the then army chief Gen Jahangir Karamat to resign. It
was h the wake of the misadventure in KargiI that the new Army Chief Gen. Pervez
Musharraf fell out with the government. On October 12,1999, Nawaz Sharief sacked
Gen Musharraf and appointed his crony Gen. Ziauddin Butt as his successor. Gen
Musharraf who was at that time on his way back from Sri Lanka could not have done
anything to save himself. However, the corps commanders refused to accept the
dismissal of their chief and refused to hand over charge to the new Chief Ziauddin.
Once Musharraf landed, he dismissed the government; placed Prime MinisterNawaz
Sharief and other leaders under arrest and prom~~lgated a new Provisional Constitutional
Order (PCO). The PC0 was later endorsed by the Supreme Court. Gen Musharraf
did not declare a martial law, but called himself as the Chief Executive. Later in June
200 1 he assumed the position of the President, after forcing President Rafiq Tarrar to
resign.

The Supreme Court had given three years to Gen. Musharrafto hold election which
he did in 0ctober 2002. Tn the run up to the election Gen. Musharraf brought several
amendments to the Constitution to take care ofany inconvenient result ofthe election.
He also created a new party out of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawm) defectors
called the Pakistan Muslim League (Q). Both the former Prime Ministers, Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharief, were not allowed to return from forced exile abroad. The
October election did not give majority to any party. By engineering defection from the
PPP, Zafar~~llahKhan Jamali of PML (Q) secured a majority of one vote and formed
the governtnent government. The opposition parties have refused to accept the
amendments to the Constitution imposed by the President Musharraf called the Legal
Frameworkorder (LFO) and also his decision remain the army chief while being the
President.

Check Youi- Progress Exercise 2


Note : i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

1) When and how did the coalition of army, landlord and bureaucracy emerge in
Pakistani polity?
2) Why is tlie 8th Amendment so much dreaded? Political Structures and
Processes in Pakistan

3) What were tlie measures taken by the Nawaz Sharief government which
precipitated political crisis resulting in the coup by General Mussaraf!

BUREAUCRACY
The Indian bureaucracy, a part of which became Pakistan's bureaucracy, had
been developed by tlie British as part of tlie centralized administrative machinery
headed by selected cadres who were called as the Indian Civil Service (ICS). They
held all the key posts in tlie central and provincial administrations. They also headed
tlie district administration. The provincial civil cadres and the men belonging to the
specialized services held positions under these elite cadres. Pakistan maintained
this structure by introducing Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) in place of ICS. The
political leadership of Pakistan contributed to strengthening ofthe old system instead
of trying to adopt the colonial bureaucracy to the needs of an independent country.
Jinnah had first recruited a top bureaucrat, Ghulam Mohammad as a minister. He had
also creatcd the post of the Secretary General of the Government of Pakistan. The
Secretary General controlled all the secretaries of the government of Pakistan. He
was t l ~ ehead of the secretaries of the various ministries. All the important decisions
were taken by committee oftlie Secretaries which during long periods of military rule
and authoritarian regimes acted as the super cabinet. The PPP government ofzulfikar
Ali Bhutto introduced reforms in this system when a unified grade system was
introduced. During the Zia period some of those reforms were rescinded and reverted
to the old system.

6.5 ARMY
Pakistani army was part of the British Indian army and was steeped in its traditions.
'There was one exception to this. While the British army was non-political the Pakistani
army got involved in politics from the very inception ofthe country in 1947. During the
British period the army officers and the soldiers .were recruited from the rural areas
and from the landlord class. They were not drawn from tlie urban and educated
classes. Pakistan continued the tradition and recruited its officers and men from the
same classes. During the several spells of the military rule in the country officers and
men in the armed forces were given land from the newly reclaimed land made available
from the newly built dams Similarly, military personnel were given import-export
licences and during military rule made heads of big corporations and business houses.
The military has set up several business enterprises of its own and they have grown
imninensely because of the preferential treatment given to them during the military
regimes ofAyub, Zia and Musharraf. These military officers and men have emerged
as the new class of landlords, business men and industrialists. In the post-Ayub and
during the Zia period the middle classes never had it so good. The main beneficiaries
were also the military establishment.
-

Country ~rofiles
:
Pakistan 6.6 ELECTION AND PARTIES
A major factor in the weakness of the democratic movement in Pakistan has been
the weakness of the political parties. Political parties are strengthened by active
democratic processes and in turn strong political parties strengthen the
democratic processes. The irony of the situation was that the Muslim League which
championed the cause of Pakistan had no strong popular base in the areas which
came to comprise the new nation. Moreover, the leaders of the Muslim League could
not evolve any consensus on the outlines of the polity for the nation. As a coiistitution
could not be framed for the country, the question of elections to the central legislature
did not arise. However, sorne elections were held in the provinces but the electorate
was restricted under the 1935 Constitution. Later, when the 1956 Constitution was
promulgated it was abrogated by the Ayub Khan's coup in 1958 even before the first
election could be held. The Ayub Constitution, based on indirect voting from top to
bottom, had banned political parties for a long time. Though the ban was lifted later,
political parties found no placed in Ayub's constitutional autocracy. The first ever
general election on the basis of adult franchise and territorial constituencies were held
under the military rule of Gen. Yahya Khan in 1970.'The election in which the PPP got
a majority in West Pakistan and the Awami League capturing almost all the seats in
East Pakistan projected the national divide between the two wings of the country.
This has a disastrous result as the eastern wing eventually got separated and emerged
as an independent nation.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto formed the first democratically governmelit in Pakistan in 1971.
Bhutto had come to power in a Pakistan which was reeling under the blows inflicted
by the defeat and loss of eastern wing. The economy was in shambles and there was
total demoralisation among the people. Bhutto did try to strengthen democracy but he
was severely handicapped by his background of belonging to one of the largest
feudal families in Pakistan. Whatever freedoms he gave with one hand he took them
away with the other. His authoritarian conduct antagonised the opposition and his own
party could not cope with the hostility ofthe people. It is therefore, not surprising that
when Gen. Zia took over and arrested Bhutto, there was no protest from the people.
Gen. Zia banned political parties and political activities during his eleven years of rule.
He even tried to set a partyless polity. However, that did not work. He died in an air
crash in 1988. During the next eleven years of democratic rule four elections were
held in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997. In these four elections, the contest has been
between the two major parties, the Pakistan Muslim League (Sharief) (PML-S), a
distant successor of the erstwhile Muslim League and the Pakistan's People Party
(PPP), with each ofthese parties forming government twice. It appeared that Pakistan
was moving toward a two party system. However, it should be noted that the PPP did
not get an absolute majority in neither of the two elections when it was able to form
the government with the help of other smaller parties. The PML-S, because of the
Muslim League's base in Punjab, was however, able to sweep the poll both in 1990
and in 1997 and form the government on its own. The regional parties in Pakistan like
the MutahidaQawmi Movement (MQM) in Sind and the National Awami Party in the
NWFP and the Baluch National Party in Baluchistan have done well but in their own
provinces. The MQM is a major regional and ethnic party. In fact, it's the third largest
party in the country after the PPP and the PML-S. There are other ethnic parties
which also do well in certain areas and sorne time play a role at the national level
when the major party does not have adequate majority. The religious parties like the
Jaina'at-i-lslami, the Jahliat al Ulamai Islam led by Maulana Fazalur Rahman, the
Jamiatal Ulamai Pakistan in combination or on their own cannot make much of an
impact as their electoral base is limited. Jamiatal Ulamai Islam has strong pockets of
influence in Baluchistan and in the NWFP. Its late leader Maulana Mufti Mahmood
was the chief minister of the province in coalition with National Awami Party in the
early seventies.
The fractured nature of the political parties in Pakistan was reflected during October Political Structures and
2002 elections in which some 71 parties were registered by the Election Commission. Processes in Pakistan
However, there are about nine Muslim Leagues, three PPPs and similarly most of the
religious parties are represented by their factions which split away from their parent
parties and are now contesting as independent parties. In that election, no party secured
a clear majority. Observers say that the results have been manipulated by the military
regime which had exiled three national leaders ofthe national parties from the country
and debarred them from participating in the election. Shortly before the poll, Musharraf
had declared himself as the President for the next five years. The emergence of an
alliance of fundamentalist parties called the Muttahida Majlise Amal (MMA) was
another sign of the weakness of the democratic movement and the manipulation of the
poll by the military rulers. Since no party was in a position to form a government, the
military pressurized some PPP members to defect and help the PMYQ) to form the
government.

The PMYQ) government headed by Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali is a weak government
as it is wholly obliged to the General for it existence. Attempts are made to get the
MMA to support the government but the opposition is insisting that the amendments
includingtheLF0 incorporated in the constitution be purged from it and Gen. Muahsarraf
resign from the army to be the President as a President in uniform was against the
Constitution. There is a constitutional deadlock in the National Assembly and so far
there is no chance of a compromise.

Check Your Progress Exercise 3

Note : i) Use the space given below for your answers.


ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

1) What was the role of bureaucracy in the early years of Pakistan?

2) What is the role of political parties in the political system of Pakistan?

6.7 LET US SUM LTP


We have examined the political developments, structures and political processes in
Pakistan. As we observed, Pakistan had to start from a scratch. Civil political structures
were very weak. But the country inherited a strong and huge army along with an
organised bureaucracy. In the context of a weak civil political structure, the army
backed by the bureaucracy usurped the political power. The army gradually managed
Country Profiles : to gain a firm foothold in the socioeconomic structure. Though there has been mass
Pakistan upsurge against the army led government, Pakistan could not establish a democratic
system of government. In the 1990s,just as democratic structures were gettinga new
lease of life with the possibility of the emergence of a two party system, praetorian
political forces intervened once again. The army remains a very strong institution in
Pakistan.

6.8 SOME USEFUL BOOKS


Sayeed, Khalid. (1992) Pakistan; The Formative Phase; Oxford University Press.
Karachi .

Husain, Mushahid and Akmal Husain. (1993) Pakistan: Problem of Governance.


New Delhi.

Khan, amid. (2001) Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. Oxford ~

University Press. Karachi.

Kukreja, Veena. (2003) Contemporary Pakistan, Sage Publications, New Delhi.

Maluka, Zulfikar Khalid. (1995) The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan. (Oxford


University Press. Karachi.

McGrath, Allen. (1996) The Destruction ofPakistan k Democracy. Oxford University


Press. Karachi.

Rizvi, Hasan Askari. (2000) Military, State and Society in Pakistan. Milton Press.
London.

6.9 PROGRESS
ANSWERSTOCHECKYOUR
EXERCISES
Check Your Progress Exercise 1

1) Your answer should include the following points: economic backwardness-


insufficient infrastn~cture-weakcivilian political structures- strong army and
bureaucracy.

Check Your Progress Exercise 2

1) The traditional linkages between the army and the feudal landlords combined
with the predisposition of the early rulers to politicise bureaucracy brought the
oligarchy or the coalidon armed forces, landlords and bureaucracy into being in
the 1950s.

2) The 8th amendment fundamentallyaltered the parliamentary structure in Pakistan


by giving enormous power and authority to the President visa vis the executive
and the legislature. The President had special powers to dismiss elected
govemment at will, bo veto any legislation and dissolvethe legislature. Both Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharief went down fighting for its repeal.

3) Nawaz Sharief, who formed the govemment with an absolute majority, antagonised
the armed forces by repealing the 8th amendment and forcing the chief bf the
army Gen Jahangir Karamat to resign. The government's interference in the
working of the judiciary also resulted in a crisis and loss of support to the
government.
Check Your Progress Exercise 3 Political Structures and
Processes in Pakistan
1) Pakistan inherited a well trained bureaucracy at the time of independence. It
was, however, politicised by successive rulers in the early period. Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto took the first steps to reduce the influence of the elite cadres in key
positions.

3) Political parties are strengthened by active democratic processes and in turn


strong political parties strengthen the democratic processes. Due to the delay in
framing the constitution of Pakistan and the partyless system of government
introduced by the military regimes ofAyub and Zia, parties system remain stunted.
Political parties here lack discipline and are fractious.About 7 1 parties contested .
the October 2002 elections, though the Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan
Muslim League and their factions dominate the political arena.
UNIT 7 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN
PAKISTAN
Structure
7.0 Objectives
7 .1 Introduction
7.2 Economic Development
7.2.1 The Early Years: Quest for Survival
7.2.2 The Ayub Decade of Development
7.2.3 Bhutto's Experiment with Socialism
7.2.4 Military Government of Zia
7.2.5 Return of Democracy and Structural Adjustments: 1988-98
7.2.6 Economy in the New Millennium
I 7.2.7 Structural Change

7.3 Social Development


7.4 Pakistan's Society
7.4.1 Linguistic Groups
7.4.2 Ethnic Groups
7.4.3 Religion

7.5 Let Us Sum up


7.6 Key Words
7.7 Some Useful Books
7.8 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

7 .O OBJECTIVES
This unit examines the economy and society ofPakistan. After going through this unit,
you should be able to:
Trace various phrases in the development of Pakistan's economy under different
regimes;
Explain the features and structural changes in Pakistan's economy;
Recognise the social dimensions of Pakistan's development; and
Describe the nature of Pakistan's society, its linguistic ethnic and religious
characteristics.

7.1 INTRODUCTION
- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -

Pakistan is the second biggest country in South Asia. It is about 1500 kilometres long
from north to south and on an average four hundred fifty kilometres in breadth like a
rectangle stretching from the Pamir region in the north to the Arabian Sea in the soutl~.
In the north, the high mountain ranges, the Himalayas, the Hindu Kush and the
Karokaram separate the country from China and central Asian states and Afghanistan.
In the west of Pakistan lies southern Afghanistan and eastern Iran, on the eastern side
the country borderslndian states of Jammu and Kashmir, the Punjab, Rajasthan and
Gujarat. The Arabian Sfa which connects the nation with the high sea, forms the
southern boundary of the country.
Pakistan is a country of many splendours and physical diversities. The natural Economy and
features of the country change almost every hundred kilometres or so. There are Society in Pakistan
coastal beaches, lagoons, mangrove swamps in the south, deserts, desolated plateau,
fertile plains, and dissected uplands in the central region and high mountains in the
northern sector.
Pakistan is the third biggest country in South Asia, in terms of population size. Its
population consists of five major ethnic groups: Punjabis, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Baluchis
and the Muhajirs or the emigrants from northern India.
Pakistan inherited a predominantly agricultural economy. With over 90 percent of
the country's population living in-villages, it was even more agricultural than the
Indian economy. Pakistan also had very little mineral resources and modern factory
industry was virtually absent. Since then, Pakistan has made significant progress in
industry and has recorded impressive growth rates. But most of the GNP growth
r came from the industrial sector than from the agricultural sector, which for some
years failed to increase production of food grains at a rate sufficient to compensate
for the rise ofpopulation. Moreover, the fruits of economic growth have been unevenly
distributed, whether spatially or class wise. Pakistan has remained a very unequal
society.
Efforts to correct these imbalances were made during the Bhutto regime, the first
elected civilian government in Pakistan. Before a significant progress could be made
in this direction, Pakistan returned to military rule. As we shall see in this unit, the
disturbed political history of Pakistan has hindered or distorted economic development
in Pakistan. In this unit, we will examine the economic policy and planning in Pakistan
under successive political regimes to highlight the policy thrusts of each regime and
the impact of external environment on the economic progress.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
When Pakistan was formed in 1947,the new state had to start almost from a scratch.
The areas which constituted Pakistan were mostly agrarian and backward and were
dominated by a few feudal landlords. The few industries it inherited were based on
either handicrafts or on processing of agro-products. The country's industry and trade
were again largely under the ownership of Hindus and Sikhs who left the country with
their capital immediately after the partition. These communities had managed much
of the'commercial activity of West Pakistan. Hence their departure caused a vacuum
in these critical areas.

Pakistan's initial problems were further aggravated by the influx of a vast number of
refugees. It is estimated that nearly 12 million people from India migrated to Pakistan
during the first three years of partition. Y

The partition of the sub-continent disrupted the principles of complimentarity that


earlier prevailed in the region. For instance, West Pakistan traditionally produced more
wheat than it consumed and had supplied the deficit areas in India. Cotton grown in
West Pakistan was used in mills in Bombay and other western Indian cities.
Manufactured products such as coal and sugar were in short supply in areas that
constituted Pakistan and came from areas today nart of India.

The division of administrativemachinery, the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police
Service, was also problematic. Out of a total of 1,157 officers, only 157 joined the
Civil Service of Pakistan, which became one of the most elite and privileged
bureaucracies in the world.

The substaiitial irrigation network inherited from British rule was the only redeeming
feature of the new state. Given the predominantly agrarian nature of the economy at
partition, a viable irrigation system was a necessary input forthe revival of the agrarian
I Country Profiles:
Pakistan
economy, given the inadequacies of other infrastructure such as roads, power,
railroads, etc.

7.2.1 The Early Years: Quest for Survival


In the early years (1 947-58), economic policy and planning in Pakistan was dominated
by a small group of bureaucrats. Given the profound adverse conditions at the time of
partition, the focus drf economic planning was on keeping the economy going. The
herculean task of building an economic base was left to the state sector as the private
sector was too weak and lacked the capital to launch industrial developnient in the
country.
An analysis of economic policy from 1947-58 shows a series of ad hoc reactions to
crises. On refusal of Pakistan to devalue its currency with the devaluation of pound
sterling and India fallowing it, India severed its trade relations with Pakistan. The
Korean War of 1952, however, proved a blessing for Pakistan by causing an upsurge
in demand for Pakistani exports, mostly raw jute and raw cotton, and assisting in the
creation ofa nascent entrepreneurial class. It was this windfall that laid the foundation
of industry in Pakistan.
The end of Korean boon1 led to a re-examination of policy that led to the rigid system
of import Iicensing designed to manage Pakistan's adverse balance of payme~~tsproblem.
The cumbersome web of administrative and licensing control that resulted later formed
. the backbor~eof Pakistan's import substitution strategy.
Thus, the first decade after independence was essentially bureaucratic-led and assisted
industrialisation. Since much of the bureaucracy was composed of urban migrants
from India, it had little knowledge of or interest in agriculture and felt that mani~facturing
should receive far greater state patronage. The big landlords and nuwabs who enjoyed
some political clout could not translate it into economic clout. While a small number of
industrialists who secured high profits in the early years acquired economic clout, they
did not have the political clout; they were dependent on the benevolence ofthe licence-
raj of the civil servants. With disarray in the ranks of the political groups that existed,
the military stepped in to restore law and order and to promote bureaucratic capital ism
that had emerged in the 1950s.
7.2.2 The Ayub Decade of Development
General Mohammad Ayub Khan's military regime was characterised by controversial
and paradoxical combination ofthe most impressive growth rates in Pakistani history,
combined with large increases in income inequality, inter-regional disparities and the '

concentration of economic power.


During this decade, the economic i~~dicators were extremely impressive, with GNP
growth rate liovering around 6 percent mark throughout the decade. Agriculture grew
at a respectable rate of 4.1 percent over the period, while manufacturing growth rate
recorded 9.1 percent and trade 7.3 percent. However, statistics on inco~nedistribution,
wages and human capital development present a dismal picture. The indices of income
inequality worsened and the ranks of the poor increased. Wage increases did not
match productivity gains as the living standards of a large majority of the population
stagnated.
The centrepiece of Ayub's economic strategy was the commitn~entto rapid
industrialisation. Policy making was tailored to promote industrial investment. This
system provided a plan and procedure for investment licensing and credit disposal.
Furthermore, the Pakistan Industrial Developme~~t Corporation (PIDC) was formed to
spearhead the industrialisationdrive by providing the critically needed capital and then
withdrawing in favour of the private sector, which lacked the skills or tlie finances to
undertake very large projects. As industrial profits were no re widespread, an
entrepreneurial class emerged. It was this class which provided the dynamism that
had been absent during tlie 1950s. This class helped accelerate the rate of growth in
the large scale manufacturing sector to more than 15 percent during the decade.
The Ayub decade also witnessed a series of reforms aimed at strengthening the Economy and
agriculture sector. The land reforms of 1959 were designed to make a dent on the Society in Pakistan
straliglehold of the dominating landlord class while at the same time encouraging
capitalist agricultural development.
lliis was followed by the Green Revolution in mid-sixties. The Green Revolution was
characterised by the introduction of high yielding varieties of rice and wheat and the
~nechanisationand diffilsion of technology aimed at boosting Pakistan's agricultural
growth. The expansion of irrigated acreage witli the installation of private tube wells,
and increased use of chemical fertilizers contributed to agricultural growth. The rapid
mechanisation of agriculture however led to tlie displacement of small farmers, thereby
aggravating rural inequality.

TIILIS
tlie legacy of the Ayub years is mixed. While the consolidation of economic
management and tlie high growtli rates were important achievements, the growing
income inequality, wage stagnation, the neglect of human capital, and the growing
dependence on foreign capital in flows, all pointed to the challenges that future regimes
would need to face.

7.2.3 Bhutto's Experiment with Socialism


In 1971 Pakistan lay traumatised by the cessation of East Pakistan and the defeat in
tlie war with India. The end of the war marked tlie accession of Zulfikar Ali Bliutto,
then a charismatic elected leader who encouraged a broad restructuringof the country's
industrial and agricultr~ralsector along socialist lines. It marked the strongest attempts
to day of tlie assertion of political authority over the country's army and bureaucracy.
It sought to rectify tlie social and econonlic imbalances that characterised the previous
decade.
Bhutto promised a new development strategy that was more equitable than previous
policies. One of tlie key decisions of the Bhutto administration upon accession to
power was the devaluation of the rupee in 1972 by 57 percent and abolition of the
multiple exchange rate system. This led to a phenomenal surge in exports as Pakistan
found new markets to replace the loss of trade witli its erstwhile eastern wing.
The most dramatic decision of the Bhutto regime was the nationalisation of large
private manufacturingand financial institutions. In 1972 all private banks and insurance
companies and thirty-two large man~~facturing plants in eight niajor industries were
nationalised with the avowed objective of reducing the concentration of wealth and
dilutingtlie power of private industrialists.Consequently,the composition of investment
changed dramatically from private to public sector. Nevertheless, nearly 80 percent
oftlie value added in the large scale nianufacturing sector, particularly in textile and
consumer goods remained in the private sector.
The outcome of nationalisation was not favourable as the large scale nationalised
sector perfornied very sluggishly during this period owing to lack of able managers
and technicians, many of whom migrated to the Middle East lured by higher salaries.
Private capital fled the country or went into small scale manufacturing or real estate.
One positive outcome ofthis was that the small scale manufacturing sector registered
a growtli rate of I0 percent per annum in this period compared to 4.2 percent for the
large scale sub-sector. Another positive feature of industrialisation during this period
was that for the first time an attempt was made to set up basic industries in steel,
fertiliser and chemicals which laid the foundation for future growth that benefited
subseq~lelitregimes.
Agricultural growtli slowed during much of the decade, due to a combination of
exogenous and policy factors. Firstly, climatic shocks and viral diseases affected the
crops, with marked damage to cotton production. Secondly, there was an overall
<
,
shortageofthe critical agriculture inputs such as water and fertiliser that were required
to maintain productivity gains of the high yielding varieties.
Country Profiles : One unfavourable trend relating to Pakistan's external sector during Bhutto years
Pakistan was the growing balance of payments difficulties and the consequent increase in the
country's external debt. However it was during these years that Bhutto's policy
contributed to rapidly increasingremittances that also helped to cushion the country's
external dependence.
Thisis also the period of one of Pakistan's slowest economic growth, constrained by
a series of exogenous shocks, causing significant macro economic instability. Firstly,
the cessation of East Pakistan after a brutal civil war led to a break-down in inter-
wing trade. Secondly, the 1970smarked the beginning of a series of oil shocks induced
by the newly formed OPEC cartel. Thirdly, the 1970s was a period of substantial
fluctuation in international prices of Pakistan's commodity exports, making export
performance highly uncertain. Finally, a combination of bad weather, flooding and
pest attacks adversely affected the production of cotton, weakening the economy.

7.2.4 Military Government of Zia


This period coincided with the military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq, who acceded to
power with the goals of restoring political stability, liberalisation of the economy and
islamisation of society.
In explicit contrast to 1970s,the 1980swas a period of reversal from public sector-led
growth strategy. Destabilising exogenous shocks were absent in this period. As a
result, the growth rate in GNP was over 6 percent. High rates of industrial growth
were led by the coming an stream of the earlier investment made in the public sector
under Bhutto, especially in heavy industries, and also by rapid expansion in domestic
demand.
The Russian intervention ofAfghanistan in 1979 propelled Pakistan to the forefront
of international political attention.Not only did it give political legitimacy to the regime,
it also set the way for substantial infusion of foreign aid and war-related assistance
that together with generous inflow of remittances provided a safety value for the
Pakistani economy.
One of the negative effe~tsof the Afghan war was the mushrooming of parallel and
illegal economy estimated at about 20-30 percent of the GDP.
The 1980s wigessed a surge in inflow of remittances from Pakistan, averaging about .
$3 billion per year for most of the decade. These remittances accounted for 10
percent of GDP and 45 percent of current account receipts. The flow of remittances
supplemented household incomes and,financed the private sector with a pool of funds
for investment.
The 1980s, however, witnessed the widening of fiscal deficits, which averaged 8
percent of GDP in the second half of the 1980s. This had serious repercussions for
public finances and macroeconomic stability in the 1990s.
On the industrial front, the Zia regime began to deregulate and liberalise the economy
to encourage private-sectar investment. The denationalisation of certain public sector
projects, the provision of a package of fiscal incentives to the private sector, and the
liberalisation of regdatory controls characterised the government's industrial policy in
the 1980's.
During this period the continued growth of small-scale sector and the development of
intermediate and capital goods industries led to the diversification of Pakistan's
industries.
The 1980s also witnessed $ignificantstructural change for Pakistan's agriculture with
deregulation of markets and production. Policies to revamp agricultural sector included
the deregulationofthe sugar, pesticide and fertilizer industries,the removal of monopoly
power d the Rice and Cotton Export Corporations, and the removal of bans on the .
private sector's import of edible oils. As subsidies on pesticides and fertilizers were ~conbrn and
~
Society in Pakistan
removed, the price system became more market oriented.
Overall, this was a period of substantial macroeconomic stability and revival of private
investment. However; but the burgeoning trade and budget deficits did not bode well
for economy in the subsequent period.

7.2.5 Return of Democracy and Structural Adjustments: 1988-99


Following the death of General Zia in 1988, democratic institutions were restored.
Between August 1988 and August 1997, Pakistan had four general elections with
both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif being returned to power twice. None of the
elected governments were able to complete their full term.
The excessive non-bank borrowing by the government in the 1980sto finance budget
deficit left a le c . of debt and debt servicing in the 1990s with total interest payments
'%i
amounting to o -third of total expenditures. The persistent high deficit/GDP ratio
which averaged 6.8 perbent during the 1990s, was beginning to take its toll on the
economy. Not only were thetl@itdarge compared to other developing countries,
the inflexibilityin expenditure reduction imposed by domestic debt servicing obligations
and defence outlays did not permit much room for manoeuvre to reduce the current
expenditures.
While there was a fundamental consensus on basic economic policies among the
major political parties-the Pakistan People's Party and the Muslim League, there was
lack of continuity of programines and policies. Administrative ad hocism and policy
reversals failed to cash in the advantages ofthis economic policy consensus. Instead,
each group of the two rival political contenders used these mechanisms to establisll
political power and supremacy.
During this period a number of reforms were introduced in the trade sector. In the
1990s a series of policies were introduced that reduced the items under Negative List,
abolished industrial licensing, and simplified procedures for foreign investor.
Furthermore, a generous package of incentives was given to exporters. A package of
policies was introduced in 1990to encourage deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation
of industry. Further, a combination of fiscal incentives- tax holidays, delicensing of
invest~nentregimes, and reduction oftariffs on capital goods were meant to encourage
the flow of private investment. However, owing to financial repression and lack of
transparency, the response of the private sector to privatisation has been halting and
hesitant.
Agricultural performance during the 1990s was missed. Heavy flooding and pest attacks
during 1991 and 1993 reduced cotton output and exposed the vulnerability of the
Pakistani economy to its dependence on the vagaries ofthe weather and a single cash
crop.
In sum, Pakistan's economic growth decelerated in the 1990s for a variety ofreasons,
including worsening of macroeconomic environment, serious lapses in implementation
of stabilisation policies and structural reforms, adverse law and order situation,
inconsistent policies and poor governance. As against an average growth rate of 6.1
percent in the 1980s,the real GDP growth rate slowed to an average of 4.9 percent in
the first half, and 4.0 percent in the second half ofthe 1990s. The external sector and
particularly the management of debt put the econ~tnyu n A s~verepressure. The
cumulative imbalances of fiscal and current accounts combined with the decay of key
institutions and poor governance have neutralised the liberal economic policy regime.

7.2.6 Economy in the New Millennium


A military government was installed for the fourth time when on October 12, 1999
when in a military coup, General Parvez Musharraf, Chief of Army Staff, took over
the country's administ]-ntion.
Country Profiles: The economy of Pakistan was in total chaos when the military regime took over power.
Pakistan The country was heavily dependent on foreign loans to meet deficit repayment obligation,
with 56 percent of the budget going towards debt servicing. The total external debt
was US $39 billion, and foreign exchange reserves were a mere $1.45 billion.
Tax collections had plummeted, while fiscal deficit had risen to 6.45 percent of GDP .
in 2000.

Pakistan's GDP slumped to mere 2.2 percent and 3.4 peicent in fiscal years 2000-01
and 200 1-02 respectively. These growth rates were the lowest in Pakistan's recorded
history.

The above indicated weaknesses notwithstanding, the military regime has been able to
reduce the fiscal deficit to 5.6 percent of GDP compared to 6.1 percent of the 1990s.
What needs to be noted here is that as much as 40 percent of this reduction in deficit
was achieved by drastic curtailment of public investment.

The performance of agriculture in the first two years of the new millennium was most
dismal. Agriculture recorded negative growth of 2.64 percent and 0.07 percent in the
first two fiscal years. The main reason for this poor performance was shortage of
irrigated water caused by severe drought conditions.

Since Musharraf's takeover, Pakistan was in increasing danger of defaulting on its


foreign debt. But then came September 11,2001 terrorist attack on the United States
which made Pakistan a frontline state supporting the US war against the Taliban and
Al-Qaida movement. The US pledged over one billion US dollars in aid and the Paris
Club creditors restructured and rescheduled much of Pakistan's external debt. The
US further lifted all economic sanctions that 'it had imposed against Pakistan for
conducting nuclear tests in mid-1998.

The fiscal year 2002-03 has witnessed a sharp recovery in economic growth
accompanied by equally impressive performance of agriculture and large-scale
manufacturing. While the travails of water shortages persisted, the extent of water
shortage was less detrimental. The production of major crops recorded substantial
recovery. The overall manufacturing sector also grew by 7.7 percent.

7.2.7 Structural Change


Over time Pakistan's economy has undergone profound structural changes. Soon after
independence in 1949/50, West Pakistan's GDP from agriculture contributed around
53 percent of the country's GDP, manufacturing 7.8 percent, and retail trade and
services, 39.0 percent. By 1996-97 agriculture contributed a mere 24 percent,
manufacturing 26.4 percent and services 49 percent. The labour force employed in
agriculture declined fmm 65.3 percent in 1990-91 to 46.8 percent in 1994-95. During
this period the labour force in manufacturing increased from 9.5 percent to 18.5 percent
while those engaged mostly in services and trade increased from 25.2 percent to 34.7
percent. In terms of uribanisation in 195 1 only 17 percent of West Pakistanis lived in
urban areas which increased to 40 percent by the end of the nineties.

Check Your Progress Exercise 1


Note : i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

1) When was the foundation for heavy industry laid in Pakistan?


What factors contributed to the stowing of econornic growth during the Bhutto Economy and
2)
Society in Pakistan
years?

3) What was the main thrust of Pakistan's industrial policy in the 1980s?

It is generally acknowledged that Pakistan's social development indicators have failed


to keep pace with the country's economic development. In 1999 the literacy rate in
Pakistan was only 46.4 percent (being 58.3 percent for males and 33.5 percent for
females). In the same year the primary enrolment ratio was 56.4 percent (64.5 percent
for males, 47.7 percent for females.
Pakistan's health-related indicators present a dismal picture. In 2001 Pakistan's infant
mortality rate stood at 84/1000 and under five mortality rate 10911000. With a fertility
rate of 3.8 and a life expectancy of 6 1 years, Pakistan reflected very underdeveloped,
demographic characteristics.
In 2001 Pakistan had a population of 136.3 millions of which 70.6 millions were males
and 65.7 rnillion females giving an adverse gender imbalance of 108 males per 100
females. Even during periods of buoyant growth rates, the poor in Pakistan appear to
have been left behind. In 1964, 40.2 percent of the population was estimated to be
poor. This percentage dropped to 17.3 in 1987-88 but began to climb again. According
to some estimates, by 2000-01 the poverty levels had reached the 1964 level of 40.1
percent. In terms of poverty ratio therefore, the country has arrived at where it was
four decades back. Given higher population today, this implies a much larger number.
of poor today than in the past.
In terms of inequality too, Pakistan's record has been dismal. Over the four decades
beginning 1963-64, the share of income of the lowest 20 percent of the population
increased marginally from 6.4 percent to 6.6 percent in 1998-99, while the share of
the ~niddle60 percent declined from 48.3 percent to 45.6 percent, while the share of
the highest 20 percent increased fro11145.3 percent to 47.8 percent.
since the 1980s Pakistan's ilnemployment rate has sinlilarly shown an adverse trend.
The unemploy~nentrate increased from an average of 3.5 percent during 1981-90, to
5.7 percent during 1991-2000 and further to 6.7 percent in 2000-01.
Tlie structural adjustment programme beginning 1988-89 under the tutelage of the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank has required the slashing of the
budget and current account deficit and a number of sectoral programmes. In the
process, the poor have not only borne the major brunt of the adjustment, but also ofthe
policy responses as may be seen from the poor social development indicators.

7.4 SOCIETY IN PAKISTAN


7.4.1 Linguistic Groups
Language is an important marker of ethnic identity. Among the more than twenty
spoken languages in Pakistan, the most conlmon ones-Punjabi, Sindhi and Urdu, as
Country Profiles: well as Pakhtu (or Pashtu), Baluchi, belong to the Indo-Aryan branch of Indo-European
Pakistan language family. Some other languages are linked to Dardic branch ofIndo- European
and early Dravidian language family. Brahui is one of them and is spoken by a group
in Baluchistan.
Nearly half (48 percent) of all Pakistanis speak Punjabi. The next most commonly
spoken language is Sindhi (12 percent), followed by Punjabi variant, ~iraiki(10 percent),
Pakhtu or Pashtu (8 percent), Baluchi (3 percent), Hindko (2 percent), and Brahui (I
percent). Native speakers ofother languages including English, Burushaski and various
other tongues account for 8 percent.
Muslims of the Indian sub-continent have long felt that Urdu symbolises their shared
identity. It had served as a link among educata Muslims. The Muslim League promoted
Urdu as the national language to help the new Pakistani state develop an identity, even
though it was spoken as a native tongue by only 8 percent of the population. A large
number of people from educated backgrounds, who aspired for upward mobility, began
to speak Urdu. However, because many of the elite were fluent in English, English
became the de facto national language.
Punjabi, spoken by nearly half of the population, is an old, literary language whose
early writings consist chiefly of folk tales and romances. Although Punjabi was originally
written in Gurumukhi script, in the twentieth century it has been written in Urdu script.
Punjabi has a long history of being mixed with Urdu among Muslims, especially in
urban areas. An example of the latter is the variant of Punjabi spoken in Sargodha in
Central Punjab.

7.4.2 Ethnic Groups


The ethnic composition of Pakistan in mid-1990s roughly corresponds to the linguistic
distribution ofthe population, at least among the largest groups. 59.1 percent of Pakistanis
identify themselves as Punjabis, 13.8 percent as Pakhuns, 12.1 percent as Sindhis, 7.7
percent as mujahirs, 4.3 percent as Baluch, and 3 percent as members of other ethnic
groups. Each group is primarily concentrated in its home province, with most Muhajirs
residing in urban Sindh.
Most Punjabis trace their ancestry to pre-Islamic Jat and Rajput castes. Other Punjabis
trace their heritage to Arabia, Persia, Baluchistan, Afghanistan and Kashmir. Thus,
Punjabis had diverse origins yet they have coalesced into a coherent ethnic community
that has historically placed as great emphasis on farming as on fighting.
Punjabis predominate in the upper echelons of the military and civil service and in
large part run the central government. This situation is resented by many Pakhtuns
and Baluch and particularly by the Sindhis who are under represented in the public
sector.
During British rule, Sindh, situated south of Punjab, was the neglected hinterland of
Bombay. Tlie society was dominated by a small number ofmajor landholders (Waderm).
The oppressed tenant farmers, who formed the majority, were subject to outright
servitude. The province approached independence with entrenched extremes of wealth
I
and poverty.
There was considerable upheaval in Sindh in the years following partition. Millions of
Hindus and Sikhs left for India and were replaced by roughly seven million muhajirs
who took the positions.of the fairly well educated emigrant Hindus and Sikhs in the
commercial life of the province. Later the muhajirs provided the political basis of the
Refugee People's Movement (Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz - MQM). As Karachi became
increasingly identified as a muhajir city, other cities in Sindh, notably, Thatta, Hyderabad
and Larkana became the headquarters for Sindh resistance.
The North-West Frontier Province is closely identified with Pashtuns, one of the
largest tribal groups in the world. They are a major group in Baluchistan and southern
Afghanistan. At the time of British withdrawal from the Indian sub-continent, the Economy and
Society in Pakistan
1
Frontier Congress, which was quite active in this region under the leadership of Khan
Abdul Gaffar Khan, demanded the creation of a separate state of Pashtunistan. As
this was not accepted this region became a part of Pakistani state. But it also laid the
seeds for a Pashtun movement.

Since 1980s many Pashtuns have entered the police forces, civil service and military
and have virtually taken over the country's transportation network. They also secured
representation in the political structure of Pakistan which has to some extent dampened
the Pashtun movement.

Baluchis are another important ethnic minority of Pakistan belonging to the frontier
region. Divided into four major groups- Marric, Bugtis, Bizonjor, and Mongals, the
Baluchis are by and large, a tribal and postural community. Although sparsely populated,
Baluchis have succeeded in preserving their separate cultural identity. Language has
been an important unifying force among them. Like the Pashtuns, the Baluchis also
resisted joining Pakistan. The Baluch movement for autonomy took a violent turn
during 1958-69 and also after 1973. The Baluch leaders demanded autonomy within
a federal structure of Pakistan. Their main problem today has been that of preserving
a separate Baluch identity against the Punjabi domination.

Muhajirs are Urdu speaking people originating from north India who opted to move
to Pakistan after partition of India. It is small group of people concentrated mainly in
Sindh, particularly as an urban class of Karachi. Because of their identity with India,
they have not been totally accepted in Pakistani society even today. On the other hand
the Sindhis consider them as their main competitors and hence are opposed to them.

I In 1984,the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) was launched under the leadership of
! .Altaf Hussain. The MQM was an expression of growing ethnic consciousness among
the Muhajirs which sought address their ethnic grievance.
I The Ahmadiya may be viewed as a separate ethnic minority in Pakistan in view of
i
their distinct religious faith for which they have been declared non-Muslim by the
Government of Pakistan. They constitute nearly 0.12 percent population of Pakistan
settled mostly in Punjab.

During the colonial period Ahmadiyas occupied high positions in bureaucracy and
army. When the Ahmadiyas tried to promote idea of their sect, this was strongly
! opposed by the fundamentalists who had strong resentment against the ideology of
Ahmadiyas. Violent agitations took place against Ahmadiyas during the fifties. They
are subject to continuous attacks by religious leaders and persecution by the government.
Thus, Ahmadiyas are strangers and an isolated community in their own homeland.
I
Political development in Pakistan has been characterised by the assertion of ethnic
minorities in different ways and directions. Hence ethnicity has been major destabilising
factor in the domestic politics of Pakistan. The minority ethnic communities have
been strugglingagainstthe majority Punjabi domination. The problems ofethnic minority
groups have been to maintain its identity and to secure socio-economic and political
benefits from the state on an equitable basis.

7.4.3 Religion
About 97 percent of Pakistanis are Muslims, 77 percent who are sunnis and 20
percent Shia, the remaining 3 percent of the population is divided equally among
Christians, Hindus and other religions.

Islam was brought to the South Asian sub-continent in the eighth century by wandering
suJi mystics known aspir. As in other areas where it was introduced by Sufis, Islam
to some extent syncretizedwith pre-lslamic influences, resulting in a religion traditionally
more flexible than in the Arab world.
Country Profiles : The Muslim poet-philosopher Sir Mohammad Iqbal first proposed the idea of a Muslim
Pakistan state in the subcontinent in his address to the Muslim League at Allahabad in 1930.
His proposal referred to the four provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and North
West Frontier, essentially what would constitute the post-1971 boundary of Pakistan.
Iqbal's idea gave concrete form to the "Two Nations Theory" of two distinct nations
in the subcontinent based on religion (Islam and Hinduism) with different historical
background, social customs, cultures and social mores.
Islam was thus the basis for the creation and the unification of a separate state, but it
was not expected to serve as a model of government. Mohammad Ali Jinnah made
his commitment to secularis~nin his inaugural addressto Pakistan ConstituentAssembly.
This vision of aMuslim majority state in which religious minorities would share equally
in its development was however questioned shortly after independence. The debate
continued into the 1990s amid questionsof the rights ofAhmadiyas, issuance of identity
cards denoting religious affiliation, and government intervention in personal practice
of Islam.
Check Your Progress Exercise 2
Note : i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

1) ~ r i e fdescribe
l~ the linguistic profile ofPakistan.

2) Who are the Ahmadiyas?

7.5 LET US SUM UP


At the time of independencePakistan inherited a largely agrarian economy with depleted
infrastructure and limited human resources. Since then the record of Pakistan's
development has been uneven. Econonlic growth was sluggish in the early years
(1947-58)' which was followed by vigorous growth during tlie 1960s. The growth
slackened during the seventies, but picked up during the eighties. In the subsequent
decade ofthe nineties the growth again slackened. This decade has been characterised
as one of lost opportunity for the country. In the first two years of the new millennium,
Pakistan's growth rate was the slowest ever in its recorded history. While the third
year has witnessed recovery, its sustainability appears to be uncertain.
It is widely acknowledged that Pakistan's social development indicators have remained
abysmally low in relation to the country's economic growth and structural change.
While Islam is practiced in Pakistan by the overwhelming majority of the popillation in
tlie country, religion has not been an adequate cementing force given the vast
differentiation among the ethnic minorities and their feeling of relative deprivation in
Pakistan's development.
Following Supreme Court's verdict, the military government held national elections in
October, 2002. Given the historical precedents of democratic mal-governance, it is too
premature to expect that the recent recovery of Pakistan's economy could be self
sustaining.
Economy and
7.6 KEYWORDS Society in Pakistan

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): This is the sum total of goods and s
produced within a country.
Gross National Product (GNP): This is the sum total of goods and services pr~<ged

' within the country net inflow (outflow) of income from abroad.
Fiscal Deficit: This is the difference between the total government revenue and
expenditure. It is generally expressed as percentage of GDP.
1
Muhajirs: Muhajirs are Urdu speaking people originating from north India who opted
to move to Pakistan after partition of India. It is small group of people concentrated
mainly in Sindh, particularly as an urban class of Karachi.

7.7
--
SOME USEFUL BOOKS
- -

S. Akbar Zaidi, (1999) Issues in Pakistan's Econonzy, Oxford University Press,


Oxford.
Ishrat Hussain, (1999) Pakistan: The Economy ofan Elitist State, Oxford University
Press, Oxford
Ramakant, et al., (200 1) Contenzporary Pakistan: Trends and Issues. (Vols. 1 & 11),
Kalinga Publications,Delhi.

7.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

1) Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto laid the foundations for heavy industry in Pakistan in the
1970s.

2) The cessation ofEast Pakistan, the oil crisis of the early 1970s, fluctuations in
international commodity prices and a combination ofclimatic factors, viral disease
and fertiliser shortages adversely affected the agricultural productivity.
Nationalisation of industry also contributed to the slow growth as able manages
and capital fled the country.

3) There was a reversal from public sector-led growth strategy.To encourage private
participation, the economy was deregulated and liberalised and fiscal incentives
were given to private sector. With the rapid expansion in domestic demand and
returns from the industrial investment of Bhutto regime contributed to high
industrial growth
Check Your Progress 2
1) See section 7.4.1.

2) The religious ideas ofAhmadiya differ from the painstream Islam. Though they
had occupied high positions in society during che cok;li31 times, they are now
declared as non Muslims and have been subject to attack by religious leaders as
well as the government
8 MILITARY IN THE POLITICS OF
PAKISTAN

8.0 Objectives
8.1 Introduction
Genesis of Pakistan
Political Developments in Pakistan 1947-58
Theoretical Explanations for Military Intervention
Pakistan Army: Origin and History
Army's Intervention in Political Process
Let Us Sum Up
Key Words
Some Useful Books
Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

8.0 OBJECTIVES
Military intervention in politics has been an important feature ofthe developingworld.
In South Asia, Pakistan has faced repeated military interventions in the political system.
We will examine this phenomenon in this unit. After going through this unit, you will be
. able to
Explain the reasons for the failure of democracy in Pakistan
Describe civil military relations in the country
Describe social, economic and political factors for the armed forces to take over
Analyse the role of the armed forces in the political system of Pakistan.

8.1 INTRODUCTION
This unit deals with the most important aspect of domestic political developments in
the country-the role of the military in the political system. The issue is specifically
important because it reflects on or provides reasons'as to why political institutions are
in the pathetic state that they are today. The inability of the state to steer initial years
through a politically stable path saw the decline of traditional structures like political
parties, pressure groups, parliament,judiciary, executive and virtual death of political
processes like constitutionalism and political processes. All this in turn led to
strengthening ofthe military as an institution, it being the only alternative organized
force to walk into the political vacuum created because of repeated failure of civiliaa
governments.

8.3 POLITICALDEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN


1947-58
Pakistan was confronted with several serious problems in the immediate years after
independence. The dichotomy between the eastern and western wing, with the former
being more populous and the latter wielding more political power posed serious political Military in thi
Poli~icsof Pakistan
and constitutional challenges. Second,the communal riots which accompanied partition
I and the influx of refugees thereafter posed heavy burden to the nascent state with
meagre resources. Thirdly, the country faced leadership crisis soon after inception
with the death of Qaid-I-Azam in 1948 and the assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan in
1951. The resultant leadership vacuum further weakened the Muslim League whose
hold on the area which formed Pakistan was anyway shallow. In the absence of
federal government and its institutions, the new nation was engulfed by crises of sorts
-legitimacy, participation, distribution, etc. This in turn enhanced the power of the
military and the civilian bureaucracy which had implications in the political history of
the country later also.
The All India Muslim League (AIML) which formed the government in the new state
had no strong roots in the provinces which formed Pakistan. After being successful in
creation of Pakistan and three years of its initial progress in the new state, the party
failed to march with-times in terms of ideology and style of working. Soon the AIML

i split into groups, each around one personality. Both the'main party and the groups
formed from it ceased to be instruments of mass mobilization.
Differences surfaced between various institutions. In 1954 a bill was moved in the
Constituent Assembly, which required the Governor General to act on advice of Prime
Q Minister. The Governor General preempted the bill by dismissing the cabinet, dissolving
the Assembly and declaring an emergency on the ground that institutions "could no
longer function". The Governor General's unconstitutional act was legitimized by the
judiciary. In October 1954 Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra formed another
Cabinet. Ayub Khan was the Defence Minister in this Cabinet (and also remained
commander-in-chief). Between 1953 and 1958 seven prime ministers were nominated
and removed through palace intrigues. The political system was made more fragile
by the formation of the officially sponsored Republic Party.
The Constituent Assembly took seven years to frame the Constitution. Delay in the
framing of the constitution resulted because of debate on several issues, most important
being role of Islam in the state. There was no consensus on the role of the religion in
the new state. The Objectives Resolution of 1949 and the report of the Basic
Committee were also debated hotly. Other debates revolved around the nature of
system federal or unitary, presidential or parliamentary, joint or separate electorates.
The irony is when the ill-fated Constitution, which envisaged a parliamentary form of
government came into being in 1956, it was abrogated two years later. After Ghulam
Mohammad's successor General Iskander Mirza (who had also been secretary, Minister
of Defence) realized he would not be able to get himselfelected to the post ofpresident
under the new Constitution, in October 1958 he dismissed the central and provincial
governments and declared Martial Law. Contrary to his expectations of maintaining
supremacy over armed forces, he was forced to resign by them and Ayub Khan
himselftook over the reigns. Ayub Khan remained in power till March 1969when he
handed over power to Gen. Yahya Khan.
The situation at the end of the first phase has been best summed up by Keith Callard
who wrote before the military formally took over power, political parties have waxed,
waned and suffered eclipse. Political leaders have argued and reduced each other to
impotence. Men of religion have laid claim to complete authority and have achieved
almost none. In the meanwhile the state has been run largely by civil service, backed
by the army, which was carried on much as did before independence.
The Constitution Commission in 1961 identifiedthe following factors for the failure of
parliamentary democracy.

I 1) "Lack of proper elections and defects in the late Constitution"

t 2) "Undue interference by the heads of the state with ministers and political parties
and by the Central Government with the functioning of the governments in the
Provinces".
Countrv Profiles : 3) "Lack of leadership resulting in the lack of well organized and disciplined parties,
Pakistan the general lack of character in their politicians and their undue interference in
the administration".
Check Your Progress 1
Note : i) Use the space given below for your answers.
iii Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

1) Roots of Democracy were weak in Pakistan right from inception: Comment

2) How do you evaluate the role of Muslim League in the initial years of Pakistan?

8.4 THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR


MILITARY INTERVENTION
The most interesting aspect of theories on civilian -military relations is that while they
may explain one situation or the other in which the model is operational, if not based
on, it fails to explain many other nitty gritties. This is not to undermine the importance
of theory but to highlight the dynamism of the issue, particularly in countries like Pakistan.
One of the first theories on military intervention in Asian societies, for example, by
Samuel P. Huntington conceptualizes army as subservient to its master in a civilian-
dominated democratic state. In what he calls 'Traetorian" states the civilian institutions
are weak. A vacuum in the institution and leadership impels groups to strive for
control for their own ends, and armed forces count among many potential contenders
for power. Praetorian state, accordingto him, is the one in which there is politicization
of social structures because of absence of political institutionalization.
This argument may explain why army in Pakistan intervened in 1958 but it does not
explain why did a state which inherited essentially a Western model being ruled over
by a political power for almost two centuries turned out to be essentially a military
state. The army which Pakistan inherited in 1958 was very different from the army in
1947. It was much more professional and organised than the army of 1947. On the
contrary whatever existed in the name of political structure in 1947 saw a decline, and
eventually reached a state where military takeover seemed to be the only solution.
This proved yet another assertion by Huntington that rise of military professionalism is
inversely related to military intervention, that is, the modern professional sense of
mission military mindedness and corporate economy incline the military against political
intervention.
Then there are scholars like Lucian Pye and Morris Janowitz et al who portray the
military as being more sensitive to forces of social and political change. Showing
military intervention as a result of positive qualities of military, the military is seen as an
instrument of modernization by virtue of its positive qualities as an organized force.
What makes Pakistan, a case apart is the repeated military intervention with interregnum
of civilian rules. The legitimacy of civilian supremacy, in theory, remains. This is
evident from the fact that all the generals-from Ayub to Musharraf- initially after
capturing power promised to return to civilian order as soon as ~ossible.The latest is
1 from General Musharraf who has launched a massive devolution plan giving
impression of setting up a grass root participatory democracy. That this declaration
Military in the
Politics of Pakistan

i
doesn't mean much is evident by the fact that General Zia, who had promised elections
in 90 days, did actually hold what can at best be called sham of elections in the name
of "Party less elections" only towards the end of his tenure.
Yet another lesser-known aspect of Pakistan's civil-military relations is their nature in
the civilian regimes. In other words, what has been highlighted, is repeated military
interventions at the end of chaotic civilian orders. The fact that whenever the civilian
rulers came to power they have taken measures to keep the army in check has not
been talked about much. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that the supremacy of
the Prime Minister in a normal civilian order is an accepted fact. The counterpoint
here is that the army in Pakistan needs to be looked at differently because apart from
being the guards in the external security of the nation, the army in Pakistan is now a
well-accepted political institution.

1 8.5 PAKISTAN ARMY: ORIGIN AND HISTORY


To being with the Pakistani army, like any other army in the civilian regimes was a
guardian of external security. While Stephen Cohen and Hasan Askari Rizvi have
said that in the British Indian Army there were no all-Muslim units (as there were
pure Hindu and Sikh units) a legacy ofthe British distrust of the Muslim loyalty dating
back to the Mutiny of 1857), Cloughley has said that the "Indian Indian" regiments-
such as Jat, Rajput, Sikh, and Dogra Regiments, went to India: and Baluch and Frontier
force Regiments were allocated to Pakistan and the five regiments wearing Punjab
badge were divided between the countries. The division was in the ratio of 64:36,
which roughly matched the communal balance.
The new Pakistani army was almost entirely Muslim, dominated by the Punjabis and
Pathans. In 1955, East Pakistani representation in officer cadre was a mere 1.57 per
cent. By 1963, the proportion of Bengalis in the army had increased to five per cent
'or the officers. Although in recent yeas Pakistan has maintained four major infantry
regiments, the Punjab, Baluch Frontier force and Sindh regiments, all ethnic groups do
not find representation in proportion to their share in the national population. Some
units in Baluch regiments do not have any Balochis and very few Pathans and Sindhis.
The increasing use of the armed forces f w civilian administrative tasks has been a
significant feature in the new state of Pakistan. As early as 1948 the army was pressed
I
into service to meet the threat posed by the Indus to Sukkur Barrage, breaching the
dykes in Shikarpur and Rohri in Sindh and cutting the railroad to Quetta. In 1949,
troops were called in again to save Jehangir tomb from Ravi waters. In September
the following year, army was once again called to save the walled city of Lahore. In
b 1952, the army was involved in anti-jute smuggling operation. The following year it
was involved in controllinganti-Ahmadiya agitation.
, Thus, by the mid-50, military had become an important factor in the decision making
I process of Pakistan, but it did not assume a direct political role. The only instance
was its interest in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case when the 11 army officers and
I
three civilian officers had conspired to arrest the top military officers and seize power
' to establish communist-type dictatorship in the mid-1956, the Army launched the
Operation Service First in East Pakistan do deal with the serious food crisis in the
province, created largely by political mismanagement. In December 1957, the armed

1 forces launched the third non-military operation called Operation Closed Door, an
anti-smuggling drive.
During the Ayub regime (1958-69) retired military officers emerged as a class
occupying the top posts of public and private enterprises. The new constitution
institutionalized army's role in the country's power structure. Article 17 of the
constitution declared the President to be the supreme commander of armed forces
Country Profiles: - with the powers to appoint chief commanders of the army. It is significant to note that
Pakistan the constitution declared under Article 238 that the Ministry of Defence would have to
be headed by person who had held a rank not lower than the lieutenant general and
equivalent in the first 20 years after the constitution comes into force.
Ayub Khan attempted to give his structure a quasi-democratic structure. With the
executive branch fully under the control of the president, the president was chosen by
an electoral college of 80,000 Basic Democrats or union councillors. Each of them
represented 1,000 or so adult voter who had elected him. Twenty Basic Democrats
would form a Union Council in the c o u h areas or a ward council in the town. Since
the provincial and national assemblies were given limitedjurisdiction over money bil Is,
their powers were severely restricted. In terms of its relationship with the civilians,
Ayub was heavily dependent on civilian. In 1958, his deputy Chief Martial administrator
was a civilian - Aziz Ahmad. He was also the Chief Secretary to the government,
with day-to-day control of the entire machinery of the government. An advisory
council-consisting of newly appointed civilian chief secretary to the government and
civilian secretaries of the eight ministries of the cential government was appointed
and army was asked to withdraw from the streets.
Even after 1962 when Ayub's rule had stabilised, the senior civil servants continued to
rule the roost. His senior advisers were civilians. The civil servants monopolized all
policy-makingjobs, and gradually took over all the corporations and autonomousjobs.
While Ayub Khan's reforms failed to take off, demand for parliamentary form rose in
1966 but the real problem was the 1965 war with India which created disillusionment
with his regime. By 1969Ayub had lost support of his military commanders. When it
was no longer possible to hold on to power, he handed it over to Commander in Chief
of the army, Gen. Yahya Khan believing that the military was the only "legal and
effective instrument to take over" the country.
Army was discredited after the defeat and surrender in the 1971 India-Pakistan war
and by the separation of Bangladesh. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took over reigns of the
country, based on the mandate of the 1970 elections. The Civil Service of Pakistan
was abolished and a single integrated structure was set up. By permitting lateral entry
from other professions bureaucratic power was further eroded. Expansion of public
sector saw a nexus between Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and civil servants
while 1,300 off~cialswere dismissed.
Bhutto began by establishing the civilian supremacy. He appointed a commission of
enquiry headed by the then Chief Justice of Pakistan-the Hamoodur Rahman
Commission-to look into the circumstances that led to the military debacle in East
Pakistan and surrender in West Pakistan. The service chiefs were replaced; a large
number of civilian officers were removed. The service chiefs designation was changed
from Commander in-Chief to Chief. The President became the sole commander-in-
chief. A permanent chairman,joint chief of staff was established with the Prime Minister
in control. This was supposed to reduce the authority of the army chiefs the vice-
chiefs were also under his command. The tenure of the service chiefs was fixed for
four years and in 1975 it was reduced to three years. For the first time the functions
of the military were defined in the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan: Article 245 stated
that the military was required to "defend the country against-external aggression or
threat of war and, subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so"
. The constitution also incorporated a high treason clause.
Army was however called in several times to aid the civilian administration between
1972 and 1977- in Sindh to deal with Language riots of 1972, in Baluchistan to fight
insurgency in 1973, anti Ahmadiya riots in June 1974 in Dir in Frontier Province in
October 1976. The Defence budget saw a rise of 89 percent during 1971-71 and
1975-76. More ressurces to military were allocated than any previous government.
Thus, despite the creation of the Federal Security Force (FSF), a paramititary force, in
1973, the army was called to deal with civil unrest. A defence production division in
Ministry of Defence was set up to encourage indigenous production. Discontent in Military in the
Politics of Pakistan
the army which was reflected a conspiracy to overthrow the government hatched by
army and air force officers.
Mass campaign by the opposition coalition-Pakistaniuational Alliance-with no other
1
I
common agenda other than "to throw Bhutto out" in the aftermath of electoral rigging
by him in 1977 made the situation uncontrollable. The unrest led to yet another military
takeover in 1977- this time under General Zia ul-Huq.

i
Under Zia a "truly military regime" came in being. Military officers were appointed
not only as officers in key ministries like defence, information, interior, communications,
housing and labour, a number of them were also appointed as joint secretaries. He
formed a military council of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the
three service chiefs of staff. The Chief Martial Law Administrator was to be the
Chief Executive of the Nation and the Martial Law orders were not to be challenged.
By a proclanlation he suspended the Constitution, dissolved the federal and provincial
assemblies, sacked the prime minister and all the ministers, dismissed provincial
I governors and brought the entire country under Martial Law. Initially, corps
commanders were appointed as governors in the provinces. Although Lt. Gen.
Muhamniad Sawar Khan was appointed vice chief ofArmy and had "all facilities as
authorized to the Chief ofArmy Staff for so long as the COAS holds the office ofthe
president". He was head ofArmy but he could not take independent action on issues
like senior promotions and appointments. Zia had three hats: COAS, CMLA, and
President.
The country was divided into five military zones under the command of five serving
men. In 1981, seven ministers were retired army officers. Even when the civilian
bureaucracy was co-opted into the Federal Cabinet that year, it was a junior partner.
The involvement of the Army in civilian duties weakened it. A constant complaint
I
was that many good officers who should have been gaining command experience
I were forced to have their postings cut short or disrupted by carrying out administration
on Martial law in addition to normal military duties.
Apart from moving against Bhutto and then physically removing him, Zia attempted to
tame the opposition by promising election. The opposition was then gradually weeded
out in the name of accountability. With Bhutto's arrest and crackdown of PPP there
was very little reason for the opposition PNA to stick together. Zia's party less elections
turned out to be pointless when a number of government supporters failed to win
elections. The elections anyway were boycotted by the Movement for Restoration of
Democracy, an alliance of opposition that was formed in the early 1980s.
Zia also made use of religion as an instrument of legitimacy. Arguing that Islam and
Pakistan were two sides of the same coin, he introduced a series of reforms in
conformity with Islamic tenets and values. One of the first changes Zia made was
upgrading maulvis attached to each unit and made it compulsory for them to go into
battle with the troops. Thus wheli the military apparatus regained power in 1977, it
was the religiously inclined Generals who were dominant in it. In March 1985 he
even sought referendum on his Islamisation moves which was taken as an approval
for continuing as President. The public voted "yes". The other factors which helped
Zia gain legitimacy was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, although Gen.
Fazle Haq, then governor of NWFP had claimed that even before the Soviet
intervention, the Central IntelligenceAgency was supportinb :c5tls in Afghanistan.
I n May 1988,Zia dismissed Junejo government for incompetence and "lack of attention
i to the Islamic faith". The real reason, however, was the Junejo intended to reduce the
Army and Zia'a directing role in military affairs. Zia formed a new government with
himself at its head. In June he announced that Islamic law would henceforth be
supreme source of law in Pakistan and any existing law not in accordance with it can
be declared null and void. General Zia's untimely death in an air crash saw the
restoration ofcivilian rule till 1999 in which four governments (two ofBenazir Bhutto
Country Profiles : and two of Nawaz Sharif alternating) were formed till military once again took over
Pakistan under Gen. Musharraf.
One of the legacies of the Zia regime was the emergence of the new political setup in
the country. The power equation which thus emerged between the President, the
Prime Minister and the army chief- the troika-dictated the civil-military relations in
years to come.
Ghulam Ishaq Khan became the acting president following Gen. Zia ul Haq's death.
He had a difficultjob of balancing the civil-military relations. Burki says to keep the
army at bay he had to "demonstrate to senior officers that a return to formal democracy,
a necessary outcome of the elections scheduled for November 1988, need not sacrifice
the armed forces principal interests" These interests included the continued flow of
large amount of budgeby resources to the military, support for the nuclear weapons
development programme, Pakistan's continued involvement in the Mujahideen struggle
against the Najibullah government and maintenance of hard position against India.
In the 1988 elections Benazir Bhutto did less than expected; the PPP got only 92 of the
204 seats. Acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan took some time before calling her to
form the government and that too after she accepted some of the conditions which
included non-interference with the military affairs, the continuance of the economic
reform programme of the caretaker government had agreed with the IMF and the
World Bank and continuation of the foreign policy of Gen. Zia.
Benazir's term was too small to get into any serious kind of rift. Accordingto Cloughley,
she wanted to have an army chief of her choice. She wanted to change the Joint Chief
ofArmy StaffAdmiral Iftikhar Sirohi on the pretext that his term of three years would
be over in August 1989. However, she had to back out after the Presidentintervened.
The "Sirohi affair" as it came to be known was debated intensely raising the issue of
distribution of powers between the prime minister and the president. The affair did not
lead to the resolution of the issue but only served to heighten the suspicion among the
armed forces that the prime minister was not prepared to abide by the understanding
reached at the time of her appointment.
Similarly, Ms Bhutto's attempts to extend the term of Lt. Gen Alam Jan Mashud,
Commander 1V Corps, after his retirement, as the deputy chief of army, could not
succeed. She, however, succeeded in removing the Director General of Inter Services
Intelligence Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, after the Jalalabad fiasco, replacing him with Lt
General Rehman Kallue. But Benzair could do so after conceding to Gen Beg's
pressure and appointing Hamid Gul as head of the Ar~nouredStrike Corps at Multan.
Benazir thought that a change in the command would be popular in Washington because
the Agency's Afghan policy had been criticized in the United States. Besides, she
wanted to dilute the power of an agency that had in the past eleven year rule of Gen.
Zia had become well entrenched in the domestic political intelligence. Only then could
the armed forces be kept out of politics. The army and the President accepted the
change, albeit, reluctantly.
The move by the opposition to bring the government down by a no-confidence motion
failed but uncertainties continued to dog political developments. Despite the repeated
rumours of army takeover, by and large, Gen. Beg was supportive of democracy. He
did not step into shoes of General Zia. But when the President decided that she had to
go, a move facilitated by the infamous Eighth amendment, he threw his hat with the
latter.
In the elections that followed, in October 1990,under the interim Prime Minister Ghulam
Mustafa Jatoi, Nawaz Sharif and his coalition emerged victorious. However, it did not
bring the expected stability.'Benzair's successor was no less ambitious than her. Two
deaths- that of Muhammad Khan Junejo, the president of PML, and Asif Nawaz
Januja, the then army chief- in 1993 gave him the opportunity he wanted. Januja was
replaced, by what Cohen says "least visible of the serving Corps commanders."
According to him, the selection of Gen. Abdul Waheed Kakkar created a Military in the
conflict between Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif. He believed that the Politics of Pakistan
military would not resist the move, since the new army chiefAbdul Waheed Kakkar
was known to be apolitical. Nawaz Sharief's moves to strike out on his own were,
1 however, met with reaction from the President and he was dismissed in 1993 like his
predecessor.
Sharif, like Benazir and Mohammad Khan Junejo, then moved the court and unlike
previous governments his was reinstated. The President however proved to be
) uncoorperative. A constitutional crisis ensued which was resolved by the army acting
behind the scenes. It forced both the Prime Minister and the President out of office.
"For me it was an extraordinary spectacle to see two grown up men behave as if they
were children" said Kakkar later. "I had to intervene. I ordered both ofthem out of
office". In July 1993, Moeen Qureshi was called back as a caretaker prime minister,
heading the fourth caretaker government in five years. The elections of October
1993,the fourth to be held in eight years, produced a result not too dissimilar from that
of October 1988. Neither PML nor PPP won absolute majority. Benazir Bhutto was
sworn in as prime minister- second time in five years. It brought a new line-up
Benazir, Farooq Leghari and Abdul Waheed.
Contrary to expectations, (Leghari was an old PPP hand) the next period was marked
by bilateral conflict between the two. Leghari demonstrated his independence
immediately by appointing Lt. Gen. Jehangir Karamat as the army chief without
consulting Benazir. The army was irritated at the political budget and the weapon
purchases (where allegations of kick-backs were made) but by and large army played
I
a minor role. It is not clear what role the Army played in December 1997 when
President Leghari resigned. Benazir got into controversies in the appointment of
judges, murder of her brother and not the least, corruption charges, the last two mainly
because of her husband Asif Zardari. The result was yet another dismissal, setting up
of another caretaker government and the elections in which Nawaz Sharif emerged
victorious like never before. He got 66 per cent seats in National Assembly and 58
per cent of the 450 seats in the provincial assemblies.
Sharif's attempts to concentrate power in his hands saw the removal of 58.2 (b)
clause ofthe constitution which was invoked rather frequently to dismiss the civilian
governments by the President. Another amendment took away the rights of the
members of the assemblies to cross-floors. His moves to tame the judiciary were
resisted by the then Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah. He wanted to curtail the power of
judiciary by wanting to retain the control over appointments. The chief justice hit
back as a contempt of court issue. The President tried to intervene by telling the
prime minister to work within the system and refused to remove the chiefjustice. The
Prime Minister retorted by threatening to impeach the President. The crisis was
resolved only by the resignation of President Leghari and removal of the chiefjustice.
'The new president Rafiq Tarar was a friend of Nawaz Sharif and was ready to tread
with caution. Thus says Burki "within one year of assuming oflice, Nawaz Sharif
had assumed as much power as Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Mohamrnad Ayub Khan
in their times. Instead of being dispersed among three official's, power had become
concentrated in one office that of the prime minister". It was in this background that
the then army chief Gen Karamat had talked about translating poli;;,al mandate into
institutional strength and talked of setting up structurally tiered National Security Council
that apex that would institutionalize decision making Gtx-zl Kpramat resigned after
that and Gen Pervez Musharraf took over.
1 A second change in the army chief in one year's time that too surreptitiously while the
incu~nbentarmy chief was away in Colombo- proved to be the triggering event and
Army executed what was reported as an old plan. Like Gen. Zia, and unlike Ayub
and Yahya, General Musharaff has not abrogated the constitution; it has been held in
abeyance, treating it as "cutting the limb to save the body". Martial law has not been
imposed. He also declared that the armed forces had no intention to "stay in charge
Country Profiles : any longer than is absolutely necessaly to pave the way for true democracy to flourish .
Pakistan .
in Pakistan. Among the various objectives stated by him in his famous seven-point
plan are depoliticizing state institutioiis, devolution of power to grassroots levels and
ensuring accountability, apart from removing inter provincial disharmony, restoring
law and order and reviving economy.

The Devolution Plan of the Chief Executive, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, is reminiscent
of the Basic Democracy Plan of Gen. Ayub. Under the plan, local government elections
have been held. Powers have been be delegated to the elected representatives at the
district, Tehsil and union council levels to enable the local population to execute
development projects.

The weeding out of corruption is being claimed achieved through setting up aNational
Accountability Board (NAB). The high profile corruption cases have been transferred
to the Attock Fort office, which is described as the police station of the Board.

As the country goes to its next elections, the military government has suggested several
amendments to the constitution that will empower the president to sack the elected
prime minister, his cabinet and the parliament which are to be chosen in elections later
this year. The president will also have the authority to name a person of his own
choice as prime minister. The government plans to shorten the term of the parliament
from five to four yews and lower the voting age to 18 years.

A National Security Council (NSC), dominated by the representatives of the


armed forces, will have overriding powers over the elected parliament. The NSC
consists of President as the Chairman with the Prime Minister, the chief ministers
of the four provinces, the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff Committee, the chiefs
of staff of the Pakistan army, air force, and the navy and the leader of the opposition
as its members. While it is designated as a consultative forum its mandate is extensive
and covers a large canvass including matters relating to: strategic matters
pertaining to the sovereignty, integrity and security of the state; structures, systems
and state of federal democracy and governance; and removal of federal or provincial
cabinets, dissolution ofNational Assembly or Provincial Assemblies and proclamation
of emergency.

President Musharraf, has already declared himself president for another five-year
term through a controversial rigged referendum. He will continue to hold the office of
chief of army staff as well. The establishment of a National Security Council also
raises serious concern over the continuing domination ofthe military in the new political
setup that will emerge after the October elections.

Check Your Progress 2

Note : i) Use the space given below for your answers.


ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
I) What are the factors which encourage the military to take over power? Discuss
different views.

.........................................................................................................................
2) What were the features of the army inherited by Pakistan?
3) Compare and contrast Military systems under Gen. Ayub Khan and General Military in the
I
Zia-ul Haq. ' Politics of Pakistan

I ........................................................................................................................

i 4) Discuss the role of military in the civilian interlude of 1989-99.

LET US SUM UP
Pakistan was carved out of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. he state had come into
existence of the basis of Two-nation theory and a large credit goes to Muhammad Ali
Jinnah, the father of the nation known popularly as the Qaid-I- Azarn. Post partition,
the army was divided between the successor states-India and Pakistan. The country
failed to evolve into a democratic polity for a variety of reasons. The political institutions
from constitution to parliament did not mature and the existing ones saw a decline.
The only other organized institution to walk into the political vacuum was the army.
The story did not end here in fact nowhere because since then the story of Pakistan's
1 political history is essentially a replica of musical chairs, when army and the civilian
I
i orders alternate, each in turn perpetuating the political instability. It would however
not be wrong to say that it is the army that wields the power even if sham democracies
are erected in between.

8.8 KEYWORDS
Wo-Nation Theory : Religion is the basis of nation hood. Muslims and Hindus
were two nations. This \yas the basis for the Muslim League to seek partition.

Political Vacuum : Situation in which a political system collapses, and no single


authority exists which can take over power.

Praetorianism :Military rule.

Civil-military relations : The relationship between the civilian institutions and the
army particularly explainingthe power equation between the two.

Islamisation :Implementinglslamicprinciples in social, economic and political life of


a country.

8.9 SOME USEFUL BOOKS,


Burki S.J. (1988) Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1971-77. Macmillian, London.

Callard Keith. (1 957) Pakistan: A Political Study. Allen and Unwin. London.

Cloughley Brian. (1999) A History of Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections.


Oxford University Press. Karachi.
- *.
Cohen. Stephen P. (1998) The Pakistan Army. Oxford University Press. Karachi.
Country Profiles: Gardezi Hasan and Rashid Jamil Pakistan. (1983) The Roots of Dictatorship. Zed
Pakistan Press. London.
Jalal, Ayesha. (1990) The State of Martial Law. Cambridge University Press.
Cambridge.
Kukreja, Veena. (1991) Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: Pakistan Bangladesh
and India. Sage. New Delhi.
Rizvi Hasan Askari. (2000) The Military, State and Society in Pakistan. Macmillian.
Lbndon.
. (1986) The Military and Politics in Pakistan. Progressive
Publishers. Lahore.
Shafqat, Saeed. (1997) Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto. Westview Press London.
Ziring, Lawrence. ( 1 999) Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History.
Oxford University Press. Karachi.

8.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

1) Your answers should cover the following points i) problems arising out of partition,
ii) Decline of leadership, delay of Constitution, and iii) Role of religion.

2) Your answer should cover the following points: i) Status of Muslim League, ii)
Demand for Pakistan, and iii) Nature of organization and decline
Check Your Progress 2

I) Your answer should cover the following points: i) Praetorianism in Developing


Societies, ii)Views of Huntington, Lucien Pye, et al, and iii) Their relevance for
Pakistan

2) Your answer should cover the following points: i) Lackldearth of all MusTim
regiments in British India, ii) Ethnic composition Punjabi dbminated, and iii) Well
trained, organized, role in civilian functions also.

3) Your answer should cover the following points: i) Ayub's dependen~eon Basic
Democrats, and civilians, ii) Zia's dependence on Islamisation, Constitution, ISI,
and iii) Contmsting role of external factors

4) Your answer should cover the following points: i) Benazir's rise and Army's
control, frictions, ii) Nawaz Sharif's rise and relation with the Army, and iii)
Delicate balancing by the two in second phases, failures.
UNIT 9 POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND
PROCESSES IN BANGLADESH
structure
9.0 Objectives
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Constitution of 1972
. 9.3 Primacy of Constitution and Civilian Rule
9.4 Praetorian Intervention
9.5 "CiviIianisation"of Military Rule
9.6 Recurrence of Praetorianism and Democratic Challenges
9.7 Democracy Reinstalled
9.8 Bureaucracy
9.9 Army
9.10 Let Us Sum Up
9.1 1 Some Usefill Books
9.12 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

9.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit examines the political developments in Bangladesh with focus on the formal
and informal political structuresor institutions. After going through this unit you should
be able to:
e Identify the main features of Bangladesh polity;
e Trace the political history.ofthe country;
Identify the changes in the polity that occurred during the military rule;
e Locate the role of army and bureaucracy in the political system of Bangladesh;
and
Explain how democracy was restored. in Bangladesh.

9.1 INTRODUCTION
Bangladesh, the youngest nation in South Asia, emerged as an independent nation
through the process of national liberation movement. The national movement began in
1948 to protest against West Pakistan's efforts to impose-Urdu as the sole ~fficial
language. Gradually, this movement took the shape of a nation wide struggle against
the economic exploitation of rulers of Pakistan. The Awami League which spearheaded
the national movement adopted a Six-point programme in 1966demanding autonomy
for Bangladesh. When the verdict of the 1970electionswas not honoured by Pakistan,
the Awami League was left with no alternative but to push forward the liberation
struggle for the attainment of complete independence which it achieved in 1971.
The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh envisaged a parliamentary
form of government and the principles of democracy, socialism, secularism and
Country Profiles: nationalism were to bq the foundations of the state. These principles reflected
Bangladesh longstanding popular dkmands and therefore had strong political legitimacy. As we
examine the political developments in Bangladesh, we shall see that these principles
have been disregarded by successive undemocratic regimes and yet how this tendency
has been curbed by popular movements. You will realize that politics in Bangladesh
has, most of the time, revolved around power struggle between democratic and
undemocratic forces. Politics, here, has essentially been the politics of democratization
and not the normal competitive politics of stable democracies.

CONSTITUTION OF 1972
The Constitution adopted by ~ a n ~ l a d eon
s h4th November 1972,contained 153Articles
divided into 1 I parts and four Schedules, came into force on 16th December 1972. It
embodied the democratic yearnings of the long struggle for independence and
guaranteed human rights and political freedoms within a system of checks and balances
similar to those existing in India.

The President elected by the Jatiyo Sangsad (Parliament) for a five year term and
removable through impeachment, is a nominal head. It was the Prime Minister who
exercised the executive power of the Republic. The President was required to act in
accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.

A major theme of the Constitution was the supremacy of the Parliament-the single
chamber Jatiyo Sangsad-comprising 330 members, of whom 300 were elected by
universal adult franchise and the rest 30 exclusively from among women by those 300
elected members.

The judicial power was vested in the Supreme Court whose independence was ensured
by providing the judges a fixed tenure and prescribing a rigorous .procedure for
impeachment.

Since the adoption of this constitution, Bangladesh, as we shall see, has witnessed
abrupt political changes, as the first populist regime soon became an authoritarian
regime which was soon replaced by military-authoritarian regimes and multiparty
democracy. These changes have caused the suspension of the constitution and led to
amendments in almost every section of the constitution. Significantly,the authoritarian
and military regimes that came into being in the first two decades of the new nation,
have couched major administrative changes in terms of the Constitution and have
attempted to legitimize Changes by legally amending this basic document.

9.3 PRIMACY OF CONSTITUTION AND


CMLIAN RULE -- - -

The Awami League (AL) ever since it came to power in 1971 took the lead in the
framing of a democratic constitution but failed to strengthen democratic institutions.
In the first National Assembly election in 1973, the party won 307 out of 31 5 seats.
The new government, led by Mujib ur Rahman, the leader of the natibnal liberation
movement was soon overwhelmed by the enormity of the problem of reconstruction
and rehabilitation following the immensely destructiveconflict for independence.Very
few in the new government had any experience in governing. Mujib had briefly served
a8 a minister, but he was not able to adapt to the new situation. He did not tap the
services of many senior members of the civil service on the ground that they had not
quittheir posts to join the liberation struggle. Many persons qualified only by political
persuasion were appointed to key positions. This led to inefficiency and corruption.
The economy failed to r&rn to the pre-independence levels. Factional struggle which
erupted within the AL began to paralyze not only the party but it filtered down to the
administration and the armed forces. The role ofopposition parties, which were weak
and fragmented, was fulfilled by the press and the public in the streets. There were Political Structures and
frequent strikes, hartals and other demonstrations which deteriorated into law and Processes in Bangladesh
ii order problems.
I
In response to this situation, Mujib declared a state of emergency in December 1974
and suspended all the rights and freedoms of the people. Serious restrictions were
placed on the political activities.Amonth later, Mujib introduced the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution and became the President of the Republic. This Amendment changed
the form of government from the multiparty parliamentary system to one party
presidential system. It conferred all the executive powers and the legislative powers
on the President. This amendment also gave the President the right to introduce one
party system in the country. Soon after this, Mujib declared the formation of single
National Party called the BAKSAL (Bangladesh Krishak Sramik AL). It was to be a
, cadre based party but its membership was open to bureaucrats, technocrats, military,
para-military and police personnel ofthe state. The constitution of BAKSAL provided
for the affiliation of the mass organization to the party i.e., the workers, peasants,
youth, students, women's national leagues which were to follow the programmes of
the party.
During the short period of its existence, the BAKSAL could not become a party capable
of functioning. The leadership and its other constituents and its membership were
amorphous and disparate. Instead of giving stability and efficiency to the governance
it only promoted ~naladministrationand corruption. Various classes of the people including
the landlords, bureaucrats, the middle classes saw in the new system as a threat to
their interests. This provided the ground for the successful launching of the coup of
1975.
Check Your Progress 1
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
*
I) IdentifLthe basic principles of state policy laid down in the constitution adopted in
1972? Did it have legitimacy?

2) IdentifL the salient features of the fourth amendment.

9.4 PRAETORIAN INTERVENTION


One ofthe legacies ofthe Pakistani history and the liberation warwas the politicisation
of the armed forces. The armed forces seized the opportunity provided by the
weakening charisma of Mujib, factionalism in the ruling political party and weakness
of the opposition parties to stage a coup. In August 1975, Mujib was assassinated in a
plot led by a group of offices in the Bangladesh army. These officers handed over t h e
presidency to Khondkar Mushtaq Ahmed, the next senior person in the cabinet, Mushtaq,
a known conservative, gave prominence to conservative and rightwing elements who
had opposed the ideology of the Mujib of secularism, democracy and socialism.
The politicisation and factionalism within the armed forces surfaced in November
1975. In a series of coups and attempted coups, by soldiers loyal to different parties
-
1 Country Profiles: and individuals, Mushtq was dislodged. Chief Justice Sayem became the Preside*
and the chief martial law administrator. The key person in the martial administration
was Major General Ziaur Rahman. /

General Ziaur Rahman, popularly known as 'Zia' was a hero of the liberation war. He
quickly emerged as the leading member of the ruling group. In November 1976, he
replaced Justice Sayem as the martial law administrator and later took over the
Presidency as well. Zia k l d a referendum to acquire legitimacy. During this referendum,
Zia proposed a nineteen point programme to revitalise Bangladesh both economically
and socially. This programme, among other things, laid greater emphasis on Bangladeshi
nationalism rather than Bengali nationalism. It also included an affirmation of Islam as
the basis of national life.
The military regime attarnpred to undo some the policies ofthe Mujib regime. Political
forces which had oppoeed Bangladesh liberation and had supported Pakistan army
action were released. Retired military personnel and controversial civil bureaucrats
trained in the Pakistani Civil Services who had been marginalized in the wake of
liberation were given important positions in the administiation.All elements who could ,

pose a threat to Zia were eased out of the armed forces. The military regime also
changed the economid policies, for example, payment of compensation for the
government acquisition of property was made mandatory. Subsequently, steps were
taken for denationalization, liberalised investment including foreign private capital, etc.
In the latter part of 1977, there were several attempts at military coups. Gen. Zia,
therefore, felt the need for popular legitimacy in a highly political society like that of
Bangladesh. In preparation for his campaign for the elected presidency, Zia formed a
party of his own, the Jagodal, which adopted the nineteen point programme as-its
own. In the Presidential elections of June 1978, Zia was supported by the Jatiyatawadi
Front (JF), an alliance of a faction of the Muslim League, leftist faction of Abdul
Hameed Khan Bhashani's National Awami Party, the United Peoples Party, and the
Federation of Scheduled Castes. He was opposed by Gen. M. A. G. Osmani whose
name was proposed by another hastily formed electoral alliance, the Ganatantrik Oikyo
Jote (GOJ) comprising the AL, the National Party (Muzaffar), and National Party of
the People of Bangladesh and some other left and democratic parties. In the election
campaign, the JF supported the presidential form of government as run by Zia and
concentrated its campaign against the misrule ofthe AL-BAKSAL. The GOJ, on the
other hand, focused on the issue of revival of parliamentary democracy. Zia ur Rahman
won the election with 76 percent of votes. It must be kept in mind that the General had
not withdrawn the martial law which was still in force.

9.5 "CMLIr?LNISATION"OF MILITARY RULE


- --

Most military rulers know that it would not be possible to continue the military rule for
ever, and therefore they attempt to give military authoritarian rule a civilian faqade of
democracy. General Ayub in Pakistan had promulgated a constitution, and then held
an indirect election to a so-called National Assembly; Gen Zia ul Haq also went through
the same exercise. In September 1978, Gen. Zia launched his own political party, the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). It comprised of those elements which were
part of the Jagodal and some of the splinter groups of other parties. In the meantime,
the Awami League whibh'had been in the throes of political crisis, suffered several
splits. In November 1978, Zia announced the holding of the parliamentary election in
January 1979 and the repeal of martial law after the election. The opposition parties,
however, demanded the immediate lifting of the martial law. Zia was forced to ease
up the hahishipsofthe niartial law. ~ o w i ito
g the opposition demands, he also announced
some amendments to tYbe constitution which included the expansion of the powers of
the Sangsad, that is, the Parliament.
There was no widesprdad public interest in the elections. The main campaign issues
appeared to be the cohtinuation or otherwise of the Zia regime. In this, the BNP
empliasised more on the negative aspects of the AL and warned the people of the Political Structures and
consequences if the AL-BAKSAL combine were to return to power. The AL and Processes in Bangladesh

other opposition parties highlighted the military character of Zia's regime and
campaigned for return of parliamentary democracy. The BNP emphasized its right of
the centre image as against the left of the centre image of the AL and parties close to
it. Obviously, the target of BNP's campaign was the surplus farmer, emergent
bourgeoisie and the urban white collar segment ofthe population who had been worried
about the future in the AL-BAKSAL set up.
The election, second since independence, was won by the BNP with an impressive
majority of 207 seats out of 300 seats. The AL won only 39 seats, though it won about
25.4 percent of the popular votes. BNP's success marked the strengthening of a
political regime headed by a military ruler. Zia indemnified the laws and actions ofthe
rulers, elected or unelected, since the military coup ofAugust 1975 through the Fifth
Amendment ofthe Constitution. Following this, he lifted the martial law and completed
the 'civilinisation'of the Bangladesh polity.
Zia's BNP had won the election and through it had acquired the legitimacy, but the
party was not ideologically united. It comprised of people of diverse ideologies and
political orientation. Zia completely dominated the party. He tried to contain both the
civilian political opponents and those inside the military establishment by tactful moves.
His career was, however, terminated suddenly in May 1981, when he was assassinated
in a military coup.
Ziaur Rahman had taken some positive measures to resolve the problems in the field
of agriculture. Considerable economic progress was made during his regime, partly
because of good weather conditions and partly because of the inflow of extensive
foreign assistance. He restored democratic processes to some extent, yet the fragility
and weakness of the democratic fagade that he had set up were evident soon after he
was removed from the scene.
Check Your Progress 2
Note: i) use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

I) What factors contributed to the military intervention in the politics of Bangladesh?

............................................................................................................................
2) How did Ziaur Rahman consolidate his position till the referendum was held?

9.6 RECURRENCE OF PRAETORIANISM AND


DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGES
Following Zia's death; Vice President Abdul Sattar became the acting president. As
required by the constitution, elections for the office of the president were conducted
within 180 days. Abdul Sattar won the election with the support ofthe Muslim League,
the Jama'at-i-Islami and some other groups. The government formed by Sattar, for
the first time, comprised of people none ofwhom had participated in the independence
movement. Initially, Sattar received the support of the army, the state machinery and
Country Profiles: the press. But soon, the elderly man came to be seen as an ineffective leader, surrounded
Bangladesh by corrupt and incompetent ministers. Moreover, the armed forces began to demand
a constitutional role for the military in the governance of the country. Gen. H.M.
Ershad, the chief sf staffof the Bangladesh army, demanded the setting up ofNational
Security Council, which would give a place to the army in the national decision making.
President Sattar refused to comply. Sensing the vulnerability of the government due to
the infighting within the BNP and irreconcilable differences between various political
parties, in March 1982, Gen. Ershad staged a coup and dismissed President Sattar
and his government.

With Gen H M Ershad taking over power, Bangladesh returned to the political point it
had left with the gradual liberalisation by Gen. Zia. The constitution was suspended,
martial law was declared, Parliament was dissolved and parties were banned. Gen.
Ershad took over all the executive and legislative powers. The new government called
the Consultative Council comprised of the serving and retired officers of the armed
forces, non-party senior bureaucrats.

In the beginning, Gen. Ershad showed some moderation in dealing with the problems
facing the country but later he started a vigorous campaign against corruption. Many
former ministers were arrested and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.However,
most of them were relased after serving only part of the sentences. It was alleged at
the time that those were only populist measures designed to gain publicity. It was well
known that many military officers were deeply involved in corruption.

At this time, anti-military regime mood of large sections of students, professionals and
intellectuals began to take deeper roots and effective articulation. Political parties,
which were hitherto divided, gradually began to unite and form groups to mobilise
people against the military government. With this, a pattern of confrontation politics
emerged which dominated the public life ofthe country until early 1990.Paradoxically,
the governmentsIslamic polices- plans to introduce English and Arabic as compulsory
subjects in schools- provided a common cause for the first large scale anti-Ershad
demonstrations, particularly by the university students. The student movement stirred
the opposition into more unified coalition

The main opposition against the government was led by a alliance of 15 parties
(Communist Party of Bangladesh, the National Awami Party, the Jatiya Samajtantrik
Dal, the Workers' Party, the Samayawadi Dal, etc) led by Hasina Wajed, the daughter
of late Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman. Another alliance of parties was led by Khaleda Zia,
the widow of the late President Zia ur Rahman, of the BNP and some right wing and
conservative parties. These two major alliances distrusted each other intensely, but
they formed the core of the 32 party front, comprising socialists, communists and
Islamic groups, called the Movement for Restoration of Democracy. This movement
adopted a five point programme demanding an end to martial law, restoration of
fundamental rights, parliamentary elections, release of political prisoners and the trial
of persons responsible for police brutality against students in February 1983.

Political events in the next few years revolved around attempts by the Ershad
government to move from a military dictatorship to a civilian government with the
cooperation ofthe political opposition. In December 1983, Ershad assumed the office
of the president. Next, he went on to hold election for the local bodies to strengthen
the hold of the regime at the grass root level. The government also attempted to
suppress the opposition movement by arresting its leaders and activists. New
parliamentary elections were announced for 6th April 1985. The military regime made
some concession in vibw of the coming poll like release of the political prisoners,
dissolution of military courts, etc, but the main political demand of the withdrawal of
the martial law was n d accepted. Eventually, both the opposition fronts decided to
boycott the poll. ~rshadkespondedby imposingthe martial law with its full rigor on 1st
March 1985. Hasina Wajed and Khaleda Zia were both arrested.
In 1985, Ershad went ahead with a 'civilinisation' programme without the participation Political Structures and
Processes in Bangladesh
of the opposition parties. A referendum was organized to elicit support for the
government. With the opposition not participation in the referendum, Ershad secured
94 percent of the votes polled. In May, Ershad conducted elections to the local bodies,
Upzila, in which 40 percent votes were cast. The election was marked by unprecedented
violence in which Ershad's Jatiyo Party won 151 seats.
In March 1986, when Ershad eased some martial law restrictions, the AL and seven
other minor parties agreed to participate in the parliamentary elections. The BNP
boycotted the May 1986 elections. The elections which were marred by extensive
fraud, gave the Ershad sponsored Jatiyo Party an absolute majority of 153 seats in
parliament. With all the thirty seats reserved for women going to the supporters of the
Jatiyo party, Ershad's supporters secured a comfortable majority. With parliament under
his control, Ershad proceed with plans for a presidential election. He resigned as the
army chief of staff in August 1986, though he continued to remain the commander in
chief of the armed forces. In September, he officially joined the Jatiyo party and became
its chairman. Opposition tried its best to expose the Ershad's regime and eventually
boycotted the presidential elections in November 1986.In this election, Ershad defeated
eleven other presidential candidates, securing 84 percent of the votes.
Firmly in control of a civilian government as well as the military establishment, Ershad
secured the passage of the Seventh Amendment which ratified all the past actions of
the martial law administration. Legitimising his rule ofthe previous four years, Ershad
lifted the martial law and revived the Constitution.The opposition parties were unable
to unite to oust Ershad because they were pursuing competing objectives. Khaleda Zia
wanted to revive the Constitution with amendmeilts carried out upto 1982, while Hasina
wanted to revive the complete Constitution of 1972.
In 1987, a new phase of cooperation between the two opposition alliances began.
Ershad's plans to introduce the District Council Amendment bill allowing families of
military personnel to take part in the council as non-voting members and the failure of
the government to mitigate the misery of those affected by heavy floods brought the
opposition parties together. The resulting political crisis compelled Ershad to dissolve
the Parliament and suspended the fundamental rights. New elections to the local bodies
were held in February 1988. In the parliamentary elections held the following month,
Ershad's party secured a handsome majority. In June 1988, Ershad through the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution declared Islam as the state religion even while Providing
for religions freedom.
In the meantime, the movement for the restoration of democracy against Ershad's
authoritarian rule continued unabated spearheaded by the students. The student during
the agitat'ion often turned violent. President Ershad invited the opposition for a dialogue
for a new parliamentary election. The All-Party Students Unity (APSU) forced the
opposition leaders to reply in a joint statement that they would not participate in any
election under Ershad unless a vice-president acceptable to the opposition alliances
was appointed to head the interim caretaker government and hold a free and fair
election to a sovereign Parliament within three months under the supervision of a
reconstituted Election Commission.
Check Your Progress 3
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
iii Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
1) What was the difference between President Sattar and General Ershad on the
role of the military?
I Country Profiles: 2) What were the five demands of the opposition in response to the invitation by
i '
Bangladesh Ershad for a dialogue with it?

3) What made the opposition leaders to issue ajoint statement in reply to the invitation
for talks by President Ershad?

9.7 DEMOCIQACYREINSTALLED
The opposition agitation against the Ershad regime intensified in response to the
government's harsh repression. 'The opposition parties announced a dusk to dawn
hartal on 28th November 1990 in Dhaka and in the entire country in protest against
the killing of three demonstrators the previous day. Even the government servants
joined the strike demanding Ershad's resignation. Ershad retaliated by declaring
emergency and press censorship. He also announced a 10 point proposal for talks but
the opposition rejected it outright. Eventually General Ershad was forced to resign
and announced the election to the National Assembly. He handed over power to the
Vice-President for which the Chief Justice had been sworn in earlier. According to
the 19th November 1990 agreement, the Vice President (acting President) was to
hand over power to a sovereign Parliament which would be revived but the BNP
leader and Prime Minster designate, Khaleda Zia, stated that only a sitting Parliament
could make systemic changes. Formally, this also required a change in the BNP
constitution as it provided for a Presidential system. In the general elections held in
1991, Begum Khaleda Zia emerged victorious.
Khaleda Zia's government was confronted by a concerted and frequently effective
campaign of opposition, with frequent demonstrations and strikes, orchestrated by the
AL, the Jatiyo Dal, the party of ex-military dictator Gen. Ershad, and the increasingly
influential Muslim fundamentalistsofthe Jama'at-e-Islarni. Faced with growing political
instability during the latter part of 1995, Khaleda Zia announced the holding of general
elections in February 1996. The government's failure to stand down in favour of a
neutral administration to supervise the electoral process was fiercely denounced by
all opposition parties, including the AL leader, Sheikha Hasinii. Awami League and
the others organised a mccessful boycott of the poll which undermined its legitimacy,
as only 10% (at the very most) of the electorate voted. Khaleda Zia remained in
office, however, which did not augur well for the country's immediate future. Abroad,
relations with Pakistan, normalised in 1976, have since been stable. However, border
disputes with both India and Myanmar have flared up and in both cases, especially the
latter, relations remain tense.
The combined opposition had boycotted the Assembly (national parliament) during
the last two years of its life i.e., (1994-96), protesting against corruption and rigging of
by-elections by the BNP. Khaleda Zia tried to ignore the opposition parties and ruled
the country without their participation. This led to political unrest in the administration
which was soon brought to a stand-still. Under pressure, Khaleda Zia agreed to the
appointment of anon-partisan interim governmentto hold new elections. The constitution
was duly amended to provide for such an arrangement. The election was held in June
1996. This time the AL won 147 seats and, with the cooperation of the Jatiyo party
(3 1seats) and the Jama'at-e-Islami (3 seats), Shaikh Hasina formed the government.
However, Khaleda Zia's BNP had also won a respectable 1 16 seats in the Assembly, Political Structures and
Processes in Bangladesh
despite the serious charges of corruption levelled against the BNP prior the election.
'
Though the June 1996 election were free and fair, the BNP protested vote rigging by
the AL. Hasina Wajed's tenure was marked by similar frequent boycott of Parliament
by the main opposition party, the BNP and demonstrationsand strikes by the opposition
led by the BNP. Among other grievances, the opposition alleged that the police and
AL activists were engaging in large-scale harassment and jailing of opposition activists.
The four party opposition alliance formed in early 1999 boycotted the parliamentary
by-elections and local government elections. In July 200 1, the AL government stepped
down to allow a caretaker government to preside over parliamentary elections. In the
run up to the October 2001 elections, the caretaker government was effective in
dealing with political violence that had become a common feature in the 1990s.
In the 2001 elections, the AL, too sure of itself, decided to go virtually alone. It had
already severed links with some of its allies such as Kader Siddiqui and made no
attempt to bring the leftist parties on its platform. Fundamentalists like the Jama'at-i-
lsla~niand others ran a vigorous campaign against the AL government. Khaleda Zia,
who led a four-party alliance to seek the mandate of the people, scored a landslide
victory in the elections, capturing an absolute majority of 182 seats by itself and 201
seats along with its allies. With only 62 seats, it was worst p&formance of the AL
ever.
Refusing to accept the result of the 2001 election, the AL called for a programme of
national resistance against the government and immediately announced a boycott of
the eighth parliament. The Chairman of the BNP, Khaleda Zia, took the oath of ofice
as the 11th Prime Minister of Bangladesh on October 10,2001. After boycotting the
first two sessions ofthe eighth parliament, the Awami League announced it was forming
a shadow cabinet and ended its boycott of parlianient on June 24,2002, entering the
parliamentary debate on the national budget.
Check Your Progress 4
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
I) What made Ershad to abdicate power? In whose favour did he do so.?

2) What were the reasons for the defeat of the Awami League in the Parliamentary
elections of 2001? '9

9.8 BUREAUCRACY
When Bangladesh became independent, the members of the civil service who
joined the new nation brought with them the heritage of the Indian civil service,
administrative competence. Because of it's over-developed nature vis a vis other
institutions in the society, bureaucracy became firmly entrenched within the socio-
political fabric. The members of Bangladesh civil service soon emerged as the nation's
most influential group ofcivilians.
Country Profiles: In the early years, however, bureaucracy was viewed with deep suspicion by the
Bangladesh political establishment. Civil servants, across the board, were censured for all the ills
that befell the country before independence, including its dubiou~role in thwarting
democracy and in being an accessory to military rule. The Awami League openly
castigated specific groups of bureaucracy or even individuals with a view to demeaning
and humiliating them in front of people. The result was that the services of the
professional officers remained underutilised during the critical phase of national
development.
It was left to the military regimes to take the initiative in streamlining. public
administration. In 1977, recruitment system based on patronage was replaced by
one that laid emphasis on merit and equality. The open competitive system of
recruitment brought bright young talent into bureaucracy. Zia also introduced new
training concepts to imbue civil servants with the principles and practices of development
administration.
Ershad's regime brought some changes in the bureaucratic set up of the state, particularly
in emphasisingdecentralisationand development. The recruitment system was modified
to eliminate the entrenched power of the old elites and to decrease the bias that
favoured candidates from wealthy, urban families. These changes were, however,
seen as attempts to militarise the bureaucracy and strengthen the army's position at
the village level.
In general, the reforms initiatives undertaken by different political regimes turned out
to be limited and parochial in nature. The fundamental contours oftheadministrative
system remained unaffected.

9.9 ARMY
While the armed forces of India and Pakistan were bequeathed by the British, the
Bangladesh armed forces, including the Bangladesh Rifles came into existence only
after 1971.They emerged as political creatures due to the circumstancesthat prevailed
at the time of creation of the nation. Initially, it was composed of the repatriated
Bengali personnel of the Pakistan Army (East Bengal Regiments) and the freedom
fighters of the Mukti Bahini.
The top hierarchy of the army for some time was composed of officers who had
served in the Pakistan army during Field Marshal Ayub Khan's regime. Most of them
had urban backgrounds. The bulk of the rank and file of the armed forces came from
the poor and economically backward rural areas. Given this socioeconomic composition
ofthe armed forces it is not surprising that its leaders, conditioned by the imperatives
and system of military rule in Pakistan were comfortable with military rule, while the
rank and file was susceptibleto Islamic fundamentalist influences prevaling in backward
rural areas. The army, during its political power tenures, therefore, drew heavily on
the support of Islamic fundamentalist parties to win over the masses.
Like the Pakistani army, the Bangladesh armed forces perceives itself as the only
unifying force ofthe country; has a poor opinion of the competenceof political parties
to govern and see a constitutional role for themselves.

LET US SUM UP
In this unit, we havie examined political developments in Bangladesh bringing out the
factors and forces that have shaped the political structures. As we saw, the populist
regime led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman brought out the deep fissures and contradictions
within the democratic structure of the Bangladesh polity resulting in the curtailment of
fundamental right$ and a shift towards presidential government based on one-party
system. These abrupt and fundamental changes culminated in the first military coup in
1975. Coups, counter coups and assassinations continued till the nineties. The two
military rulers Gen. Ziaur Rahman and H.M.Ershad made some nominal changes in Political Structures and
Processes in Bangladesh
the Constitution on the pretext democratisation of the system but the changes were
only cosmetic and did not help in the democratisation of the system. Popular resistance
finally resulted in the restoration of democracy and parliamentary institutions in the
early 1990s. Since then, the Bangladesh National Party and the Awami League have
dominated the political scene in Bangladesh.
A distinguishing feature of political culture in Bangladesh has been the high levels of
political activism. While this has helped in the restoration of democracy, it has also led
to factionalism resulting in the absence of strong opposition. Bangladesh is a young
country whose transition to democracy has been limited by strong tensions between
the main political parties, resulting in constant parliamentary boycotts, street
demonstrations,and hartals.

9.11 SOME IJSEFUL BOOKS


Ahmed Maodud, (1983) Bangladesh: Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Dhaka)
Ahmed, Emajuddin, (1980) Bureaucratic Elites in Segmented Economic Growth:
Pakistan and Bangladesh. Dhaka.
Islam. Nurul, (1979) Developing Planning in Bangladesh: A Study in Political
Economy. Dhaka.
Jahan, Raunaq, (1980) Bangladesh Politics- Problems and Issues. Dhaka.
Talukdar, Maniruzzaman (1988) The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath.
Dhaka.
Ray, J. K. (1 992) An Uncertain Beginrting: Perspectives on Parliamentary
Democracy in Bangladesh. Dhaka.

9.12 ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

1) The basic principles were nationalism, socialism, secularism and democracy. These
principles reflected longstandingpopular demands and therefore had strongpolitical
legitimacy.

2) The Fourth Amendment replaced the parliamentary system with a presidential


one. It provided for a cadre based single party system.
Check Your Progress 2

1) The weakening of democratic forces due to factionalism 'in the political


parties on the one hand and the politicization of the armed forces, a legacy of
the liberation struggle, contributed to the first military intervention in the politics
of Bangladesh.

2) Ziaur Rahman consolidated his position by taking over presidency from Justice
Sayem in April 1977. The army was cleared of adverse elements, constitutional
amendments were undertaken to do away with secularism and socialism, pro-
Pakistan bureaucrats were given responsible positions etc.
Check Your Progress 3

1) While President Seattarrefused to allow the army any role in the governance of
the country, Gen. Ershad wanted a constitutionally guaranteed status for the
. .
army.
Country Profile: Lifting of martial 'law, restoration of fundamental rights, parliamentary polls to
2)
Bangladesb
precede all other blections, release of all political prisoners, and trial of those
responsible for thedeath of studentsof Dhaka'Universityduring the I 983 elections.

3) This was done with the initiative ofthe studentswho formed the All Party Students
Unity.
Check Your Progress 4
1) Opposition unity and mass uprising forced Ershad to abdicated power in favour
ofvice President to which office, the Chief Justice of Bangladesh was sworn in.

2) While the opposition BNP forged a four party alliance, the Awami League went
to polls on its own. It failed to rope in the active support of left parties. The
attack from rightist parties like the Jama'at-i-Islami also weakened it.
UNIT 10 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN
BANGLADESH
Structure
10.0 Objectives
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Population
10.3 Society
10.3.1 Religion

10.3.2 Ethnicity

10.4 Economy
10.4.1 Economic Policy and Planning
10.4.2 External Dependence
10.4.3 Liberalisation and Foreign Direct Investment
10.4.4 Environmental Challenges

10.5 Crisis in Governance


10.6 Let Us Sum Up
10.7 Some Useful Books
10.8 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

10.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit examines main features of society and economy in Bangladesh and describes
some ofthe problems and issues confronting the youngest nation in South Asia. After
going through this unit, you should be able to:
Describe the demographic, linguistic and ethnic features of Bangladesh;
Identify the main issues in the ethnic problems confronting Bangladesh;
Describe the economic features and problems confronting the new nation;
Identitj, the thrust and impact of economic planning; and
Comment on the crisis of governability.

10.1 INTRODUCTION
Bangladesh is the newest country of South Asia. Formerly known as East Pakistan, it
was one of the five provinces in Pakistan that was separated by about 1,600 kilometres
of the Indian territory. Bangladesh emerged as an ;.ldeper,.!~rt nation as a result of
liberation war in 1971 .
Bangladesh is the third largest state in South Asia with an area of 148, 393 square
kilometres. It is bordered on three sides by the Indian territory of West Bengal,
Meghalaya, Assam and Tripura and by Burma toward the southwest. On the south it
extends to the Bay of Bengal which provides access to the high seas. Most of the land
ofthe Bangladesh is formed by alluvial soil oftwo ofthe world's major river systems,
the Ganges (called Padma in Bangladesh) and the Brahmap~~tla (called Jamuna). The
I*I Country Profiles:
Bangladesh
river Brahn~aputraraises on the northern slopes in Tibet and the Ganges rises on
the southern side ofthe Himalayan mountain range. Both these river systems are joined
e: by the Meghana, which raises in the Assam hills. The streams that run
throughout Bangladesh provide a valuable network for water transport of people and
goods. The river systems are both a blessing as well as a curse to the people of
Bangladesh. During the rainy season floods bring rich silt that replenish fertile soil and
provide water for major crops such as rice and jute, which require large amounts of
water. The damage caused by floods to crops is also substantial. In a typical year,
about one tenth of the land is subjected to severe flooding and at least one half to some
inundation.

10.2 POPULATION
With a population of about 130 million people, Bangladesh is the second largest country
in South Asia. Population density here is among the highest in the world, though it is
not uniform across the country. As in other countries of South Asia region, the most
developed regions are the most densely populated one. In Dhaka and Chittagong, for
instance, the population density is 4000 persons per square mile. Chittagong Hill Tract
region is sparsely populated, because it is rugged and underdeveloped. About 80 per
cent ofthe population lives in rural areas. Urbanization has been slow in Bangladesh,
though Dhaka, the national capital and the principal seat ofculture and Chittagong, the
principal sea port and an industrial centre, have registered a high rate of population
growth. Other towns with a large urban population are Narayangunj, Khulna, Barisal,
Saidpur, Rajshahi, Mymensingh and Comilla.

The rate of population growth in Bangladesh is obviously very high. According to


estimates, it was nearly three percent per annum at the time of its independence.
Today it is little above two percent per annum. At this rate of growth, Bangladesh is
by all estimates caught in a vicious cycle ofpopulation expansion and poverty. Improving
the standard of living very much depends upon control of population growth. Even
political stability depends upon reducing the gap between access to resources and
availability of resources. Successive governments have therefore framed policies to
induce people to have small families. Foreign and international organizations, including
the United Nations are providing assistance to popularize family planning methods.
However, because of high infant mortality rates as well as the perceived social security
function of children, that is, their role in serving and supporting the old aged, small
family norm has not gained currency.

10.3 SOCIETY
Though Bangladesh is the youngest nation, the region has a long history. It has been a
part of successive Indian empires. It was in the 13thcentury that the region came
under the influence of Islam. During the ~ r ' l t i scolonial
l rule, the region formed the
eastern part of a hinterland of Bengal, which was dominated by the British rulers and
Hindu professional, commercial and landed elites. As the eastern wing of Pakistan,
the region came under the hegemony ofthe non-Bengali Muslim elite ofwest wing of
Pakistan. With its eFnergence as an independent nation, a new social order began to
take shape.

Bangladesh has an overwhelming majority of people speaking Bengali, though it is not


a monolingual state. While 98 per cent of the total population of the country speak
Bengali, the Chittagong Hill Tracks are predominantly inhabited by the people who
speak languages whkh originated from Assamo-Burman linguistic families. Though
they have been grouped as tribal languages, many of them are quite developed with
rich literary traditions. In Rajshahi, Dinapur and Mymensingh, there are people who
speak a language ofthe Austik linguistic family. However, all citizens of Bangladesh
understand and are fluent in Bengali.
Economy and Society in
10.3.1 Religion Bangladesh

Bangladesh is the largest Muslim country in the world, with over 85 percent of its
population being the followers of Islam. With Hindus constituting about 12 percent,
Buddhists 1.2 and Christians .O1 percent of the population, Bangladesh is a multi-
religious society. Muslims are dominant in all parts ofthe country, excepting Chittagong
Hill Tracks where Buddhists are predominant. Hindus are present in all regions, though
they constitute a majority in some parts of Khulna division.
The tradition of Islamic mysticism known as Sufism played an important role in the
spread of and conversion to Islam, particularly in the Bengal region. Sufism is essentially
a popular movement emphasizing love of God rather than fear of God. Sufism stresses
a direct, unstructured, personal devotion to God in place of the ritualistic, outward
observance of the faith. An important belief in the Sufi tradition is that the average
believer may use spiritual guides in his pursuit of the truth. These guides - friends of
God or saints - are commonly called fakirs or pirs.
The Qadiri, Naqshbandi, and Chishti orders are the most widespread Sufi orders in
Bangladesh. The beliefs and practices of the first two are quite close to those of
orthodox Islam; the third, founded in Ajmer, India, is peculiar to the subcontinent
and has a number of unorthodox plaactices,such as the use of music in its liturgy. Its
ranks have included many musicians and poets. Pirs do not attain their office through
coilsensus and do not normally function as community representatives. The villager
may expect a pir to advise him and offer inspiration but would not expect him to lead
communal prayers or deliver the weekly sermon at the local mosque. Some pirs,
however, are known to have taken an active interest in politics either by running for
public office or by supporting other candidates. For example, Pir Hafizi Huzur ran as
a candidate for president in the 1986election. The pirs ofAtroshi and Sarsinaapparently
also exerted some political influence.Their visitors have included presidents and cabinet
ministers.

111 spite of being a Muslim majority state, the Constitution of 1972 emphasised
secularism. In the united Pakistan, Islam was divided by language and discrimination
of one segment of society by another. It is therefore not surprising that there was a
strong preference for secularism. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
in 1975, the new rulers turned towards Islamisation of the country. The first Martial
Law regime, in order to establish its Islamic credentials, inserted an invocation (Bismillah
ar Rahman ar Rahim) on the top of the Constitution, added new articles and clauses
reposing absolute faith in the Almighty Allah and omitted all references which provided
guidelines for realising secularism. In 1988, Gen. Ershad inserted an article in the
constitution which declared that "the state religion of the Republic is Islam, but other
religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in the Republic". Though the rights
ofthe minorities have not been taken away, still fundamental changes in the nature of
politics in Bangladesh has taken place. A number of religious parties have emerged
which press the government to implement Islamic principles in governance.

10.3.2 Ethnicity
The Bengalis are the mixed people, having emerged through a continuous process of
assimilation of the Aryan, Dravidians, and the Mongoloid races. But in the process of
assin~ilationall of them lost their original identity and emerged as the Bengalis, who
live not only in Bangladesh but also in West Bengal, Tripura and in parts ofAssam in
India. While the Bengalis constitute about 98 per cent of the population, the rest are
divided small ethnic groups living in undeveloped border areas. In the Dinajpur and
Rajshahi districts, there lives a small tribe, known as the Santals who belong to the
Munda ethnic group. There are Khasi people in Mymemsingh and Sylhet districts.
There are people ofTibeto-Burma origin in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the southeast
of the country. They are divided into eleven tribes such as the Chakmas, Marwas,
Moghs, Tipuras, Murungs Tanchaungs, Kamis, Ryangs, Khyangs, Bons and Pankhos.
Country Profiles: Though Bangladesh is characterized by a high degree of homogeneity in terms of
Bangladesh religion and language, it has not been free from ethnic conflict. Some of ethnic and
tribal groups that have posed domestic problems and have been a factor in Bangladesh's
relation with neighbours - Pakistan, Myanmar and India are the Biharis, Chakmas
and Rohingyas.
Biharis are the Urdu speaking non-Bengali Muslim refugees from Bihar and other
parts of north India. At the time of the "Great Calcutta killings" in August 1946, about
1.3 million Bengali Muslims migrated to Pakistan. Of these, about 700,000 people
came to East Pakistan. Dominating the upper levels ofthe Bengali society, the Biharis
collaborated with the Pakistani army during the 1971 civil war which culminated in the
creation of Bangladesh. They have expressed the desire to migrate to Pakistan. After
the Delhi Agreement in 1974 between Bangladesh, Pakistan and India, many migrated
to Pakistan. Some 250,000 people who were left in the country are considered Pakistani
citizens who are to be repatriated to Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, has been
reluctant to accept them. With the result, the Biharis are still living in camps hoping to
return to Pakistan one day.
The Chakmas are the largest tribal group of Bangladesh living in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts (CHT). They are the dominant group in cultural, educational and economic as
well as political terms. Their number in 1981 was estimated at around 210,000 or 48
percent ofthe tribal population. Historically, the people of CHT have remained largely
secluded from the plains people. In the late 18" century, they had resisted with some
success the British efforts to settle Bengalis in the region. In 1900, the British granted
special status to the region by which it restricted settlement in CHT and gave limited
self government. At the time of partition, the CHT was allotted to Pakistan. This was
opposed by the tribe's people who preferred union with India. As a Mongoloid,
professing Buddhism, the Chakmas wanted to be autonomous rather than be part of a
state created in the name of religion. But their protests were of no avail. Thus, from
the very onset, a mutual suspicion existed between the Chakmas and the Pakistani
government. With the widening ofthat gulf between the two, the Ayub government in
1964 withdrew the special status of the region.
During the liberation war, Chakmas supported Pakistan and many entered into India
along with other refugees. India provided residence camps for Chakmas in Tripura
and Mizoram. In 1972, the Chakma member of the Bangladeshi parliament,
Manobendra Narayan Larma demanded autonomy and restoration of special status to
the CHT. Mujib ur Rahman rejected these demands and advised the hill people to
assimilate with mainstream Bengali nationalism. Consequently a revolt among the
tribal people against the Bangladeshi government took place. In 1976, the Bangladeshi
government used armed forces to quell the Chakma rebellion. Successive governments
in Bangladesh maintained an uncompromising position on the demands of the CHT
people, and as a consequence armed confrontation has continued between the
government and the CHT people. Compounded with this, the demographiccomposition
of the region has undergone change. The percentage of Bengalis increased from 1 1.6
per cent in 1974 to 42 per cent in 1981 and 48.5 per cent in 1991. Whenever Bangladesh
tried to use force against Chakmas they crossed into the Indian territory. It is estimated
that more than five lakh Chakma refugees entered illegally into India between 1971
and 1981.
Bangladesh has to deal with another ethnic problem, the Rohingyas refugees. The
Rohingyas are also referred to as the Arakanese as they primarily reside in the
mountainous western state ofArakan that borders Bangladesh. Historically, the relations
between the Buddhist Myanmarese and the Muslim Rohingyas have been tense. During
the World War I1 the British promised them a Muslim National Area within Burma.
When the promised was not fulfilled, the North Arakan Muslim League engaged in an
armed rebellion with an objective of securing the merger ofthe northern part ofArakan
with East Pakistan. But the armed rebellion was quelled. With the military junta in
Mynmar adopting discriminatory policies against religious minorities, Rohingyas were
subiect to restrictions including de'nial of citii-enshin riehts. forced lahnllr euressiv~
and arbitrary takes, forced relocation and restrictions on freedom of movement. These Economy and Society in
? Bangladesh
policies have resulted in mass exodus of Rohingyas into Bangladesh. In 1977, in response
i to the military government's attempt to identi@ illegal immigrants, some 200,000 people
sought refuge in Bangladesh. While most ofthem subsequently returned, in 1981-82
there was another exodus as Rangoon implemented a new citizenship law that required
residents to prove that they have lived in the country since 1824. In the 1990s, further
I
migrations to Bangladesh occurred, many of which were reportedly due to forcible
expulsions by state authorities. In 2001, there were some 20,000 Rohingyas living in
the refugee camps of Bangladesh. By most accounts, the condition of these stateless
people is pathetic because of deteriorating public health conditions, declining caloric
intake, dispossessionfrom their land, and internal resettlement as a result ofgovernment
I
policies.
Check Your Progress 1
Note: i) Use the space below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
1) How is population growth an issue in development of Bangladesh?

...........................................................................................................................
2) What is the role of Sufism in Bangladesh?

3) What is the root cause of conflict between the people of the Chittagong Hill
Tracks and the government of Bangladesh?

'10.4 ECONOMY
When Bangladesh emerged as a sovereign independent nation, it was confronted with
the highest rural population density in the entire world, an annual ypulation growth
rate of nearly 3 percent, cllronic malnutrition for perhaps the majority of the people,
and the dislocation of between 8 and 10 million neuple who had fled to India and
returned to independent Bangladesh by 1972. As East Pdistan, the region's political
and economic systems were dominated by elements from West Pakistan. Once they
left, the new nation had few experienced entrepreneurs, managers, administrators or
engineers. There were critical shortages of essential food grains and other staples
because of wartime disruptions. Even jute exports which were the main source of
foreign exchange earner suffered because of the disruption of supply. Bangladesh did
have a large ofwork force, but it was largely illiterate, unskilled, and underemployed.
Commercially exploitable industrial resources, except for natural gas, were lacking.
6
Country Profiles: Inflation, especially for essential consumer goods, was as high as 300 percent. Moreover,
Bangladesh the new country was yet to recover from the damage inflicted by the severe cyclone
of 1970. Foreign exchange resources were minuscule, and the banking and monetary
system was unreliable. In addition to domestic crisis, the global economic environment
of sharp increase in oil prices in 1973,deterioration ofterms oftrade, fall in commodity
prices, recession in world economy, and decline in volume of international development
assistance exacerbated the economic problems of the new nation
India was the first nation to come forward with massive economic assistance to the
tune of US$232 million mostly in the form of 900,000 tons of food grains. The United
States and the World Bank thereafter became leading foreign aid donors, and the
World Bank organized a consortium known as the Bangladesh Aid Group, comprising
twenty-six international financial institutions and foreign governments interested in
assisting Bangladesh" development.

10.4.1 Economic Policy and Planning


Bangladesh ranks as the eight largest country, in terms of population. According to
World Bank estimat$s, the per capita income ranging between $ 130 and 140 in the
1980s, Bangladesh is ranked second from the bottom. With nearly two-third of the
population living below the poverty line, Bangladesh is the "largest-poorest" nation
and is categorised as "least developed nation".

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the first president of Bangladesh, set up a national-level


Planning Commission to direct economic priorities. As in India, the Planning Commission
of Bangladesh drafts development plans for five year periods. But unlike in India, the
drafting ofthe five year plans is undertaken exclusively by technocrats with very little
input from the political and bureaucratic establishment.

The principal objectives of the five-year plans have been to reduce poverty, bring
down the annual rate of population growth, increase exports and domestic savings,
attain self-sufficiencyin food production, and realize around five percent growth of
annual gross domestic product. These goals have been ambitious to say the least,
given the predominance of the agricultural sector, wide-spread poverty and limited
mineral resources. In the early 1980s,the Ershad government introduced land reforms
which reduced the land ownership per family from the earlier 33 acres to 20 acres.
But this has meant very little, as only 0.4 percent farmers held land in excess of 25
acres. The 1980s also witnessed a greater thrust towards industrialization. Both Gen
Zia and Ershad have diluted the socialist thrust of the 1970s by denationalisation of
industries and encouraging private investment. In addition, attempts were made to
attract foreign investment. But liberalisation of the economy did not achieve much
owing to lack of infrastructure and resources. Bangladesh stepped into the 1990s as a
predomina~itlyrural economy, with agriculture contributing nearly 50 per cent of the
value of gross domestic product. Approximately 82 percent of the country's population
lived in rural areas, virtually all ofthem making their living exclusively or substantially
from agriculture. Though domestic production increasing at a relatively steady rate, it
was not fast enough to close the gap created by the continuing rapid growth of
population. Bangladesh continued to import food grains to meet minimum needs for
the subsistenceof the population.

10.4.2 External Dependence


Bangladesh's econqmy is heavily dependent on foreign aid. The dependence is not a
recent origin but that can be traced to the days of pre-liberation. At that time it was a
net exporter of capital to West Pakistan and a net importer of foreign aid. After
independence, the war ravaged economy made Bangladesh to depend on foreign aid.
What initially began as a necessity for the rehabilitation ofmillions ofrefugees displaced
by war soon became a pattern of dependent development.
For more than a quarter century Bangladesh has been receiving aid bilaterally well as Economy and Society in
Bangladesh
multilaterally.Normally aid is received in the form of grants, loans, food aid, commodity
aid and project development aid. Main donors include Japan, US, Canada, UK, Saudi
Arabia, Germany, Netherlands and India. Japan is the largest bilateral aid donor. All
these states account for nearly fifty per cent of aid Bangladesh receives. Bangladesh
also receives aid from multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, Asian Development
t Bank, OPEC and the European Union. Between 1971 and 1989, it received $ 19
billion in aid and loans. The external aid is about nine per cent of GDP, and 116 per
cent of annual develop~nentplan. About 55 percent of the funds for the Third Five
Year plan (1 985-90) came from foreign sources, including private investment, the aid
programs of international financial institutions,and bilateral donor nations.

In spite ofmassive aid flow, there appears to be little discernible improvement in the
economy. It not only failed to improve the standards of living of people, eradicate
poverty but its external dependence seriously distorted the development pattern. This
in turn widened the gap between rich and poor. The increasing dependence on external
aid resulted in the decline of domestic savings. When per capita foreign aid went from
TK 840 in 1981 to TK 2,720 in 1987, domestic savings went down from 3.4 per cent in
1981 to 1.1 percent in 1988. It is also alleged that the conditions attached to aid are
curtailing Bangladesh's sovereignty and freedom to be self-reliant. The media calls
the dependency as "neo-colonialist". According to some studies, external aid helps the
donors more than the receivers as most of the money goes back in some form or the
other. Shoban Rehman and Ifftekharuzzaman have estimated that 75 per cent of aid
goes to the donors in the form of costs for procurement of project inputs and consultancy
fees to foreign experts.

Heavy dependence on aid has its impact on domestic front. Decline ofdomestic savings
resulted in low investments in capital goods sector, and irrigation. It means growth in
the productive capacity of the economy-recorded contraction. The economic growth
rate averaged only 4 per cent during 1973 and 1993. This in turn influenced the nature
and stability of the political system.

Aid has become a soft option for the political leadership to avoid hard decisions on the
economic front. Some times donors had the dubious distinction of influencing even the
political process. For example, it is reported that in 1990 the Japanese and the British
threat to withdraw all aid put additional pressure on Ershad to resign from office. This
paved the way for the conduct of elections, which in turn restored parliamentary
democracy in Bangladesh.

10.4.3 Liberalisation and Foreign Direct Investment


Faced with a huge external public debt of 37 per cent ofthe GNP, Bangladesh abandoned
the import substitution policies in the late 1980s. In consultation with international
financial institutions, Bangladeshi initiated market oriented reforms to revitalise the
economy. These included export promotion schemes, liberalisation of exchange rates,
reform and privatization of state owned enterprises, removal of price controls and
subsidies, restructuring of the financial sector, and tax reforms. These were aimed at
encouraging domestic and foreign investment in the private sector. In addition, import
liberalization was undertaken and an abundance of imported goods werp ~ a davailable
e
to both consumers and producers. Foreign aid in the form of both loans and grants
were used to finance these imports.

Though there are infrastructural bottlenecks, the market oriented reforms have resultej
in substantial increase in the flow of FDI in the 1990's. It increased from $ 60.27
million in 1990 to $804 million in 1993-94and to $2,119 million in 1999-2000.Most of
the FDI was in the form ofjoint ventures. A number of multinational national companies
collaborated with local investors to start joint ventures. Global companies such as
General Electricals, Reckit & Colman, Glaxo, Berger paints, Singer, Ptizer, Coca-
Cola, Pepsi, Siemens, Philips invested in Bangladesh. Significantly, unlike in the past
Country Profiles: when foreign investment was dominated by Western nations, the newly industrialized
Bangladesh econoqjps (NIEs) of East Asia made significant strides by investing more in Bangladesh
in the 1&0s. Most ofthe FDI is concentrated in the sectors like garments, textiles, and
knitweal operating in the export processing zones. It is also observed that the FDI is
generating greater efiployment opportunities,as it is largely labour-intensive because
of availability of cheap labour in Bangladesh. It is said that there are 100 per cent
equity, 'non-equity' and 'licensing' forms of foreign investment.

One of the greatest attractions for FDI is the oil and gas sector. It is estimated that
Bangladesh is having 13.74 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. International agencies like
World Bank and Asian Development Bank claim that the natural gas reserves range
from 30 to 80 trillion cubic feet. To exploit these resources Bangladesh government
has shown keen interest in collaboratingwith India and US in helping it pump its natural
gas. The US too has shown considerable interest in Bangladesh's energy sector. Its
companies have alrezjdy made investments in the gas sector to the tune of about $250
million. But there is domestic opposition for co-operation with India.

The market oriented reforms are seen as being important in sustaining growth in the
future. While the reforms have generated employment, growth, and development in
Bangladesh, critics ofthe new economic policies argue that they have not encouraged
an autonomous domestic industrial capability.

The reforms have led to some resource shifts in the economy, but the growth and
diversification in the industrial sector has been limited. Given the low per capita income
and low purchasing power of the people, the domestic market is not large enough to
absorb a substantial increase in industrial output. The only option is to tap the export
markets. However, the country's access to foreign market is limited and limited to low
value added products. For instance, Bangladesh has encouraged the growth of garment
industry since the late 1970s.This industry which is primarily geared to Western market
has emerged as a major source of foreign exchange. But reliance on garment industry
as a source of foreign earning has left the country vulnerable to the mercy ofthe same
countries which influence international donor agency policies. A small number of
electronic and plastic firms have come up in the export processing zones, but these
rely little on domestic inputs or human capital. The lack of a large entrepreneurial base
and skilled labour force has been a problem as has been an absence of familiarity with
international technology and marketing standards.

In the early phase of the reforms, resistance to change has come from labour unions in
the public sector and a variety of civil society groups. The resistance was one of the
factors that caused the Ershad government to fall in 1991. When the BNP government
came to power and continued the liberalization, it also lost to the opposition led by the
Awami League which received support from labour unions and anti-reform groups.
While resistance from interest groups such as selected producer groups or unions
remains, today there is a general consensus in the public and media that Bangladesh is
too small to be insulated and must integrate with the global economy. However, the
nature of this integration is said to be passive, superficial, and with little linkage to the
bulk of people and eaonomic activity in the country.

The market reforms undertaken to integrate with the world economy have resulted
in reallocation of resources away from public expenditure for the provision of
health, education, and other services. There was a general perception that the earlier
emphasis on poverty alleviation had shifted to a more strict focus on market determined
ecpnomic efficiency, A simultaneous rise in democratic and popular movements has
led to a search for alternative approaches to poverty alleviation and the provision of
basic needs. This is wen in the expansion of non-govenlmental organizations (NGOs),
both local and international, which have concentrated on empowerment, health,
education, and micreenterprises. In the long run, better social services and greater
participation of the people in development can lead to a greater success of market
based policies.
Economy and Society in
10.4.4 Environmental Challenges Bangladesh
Bangladesh faces alarming environmental problems affecting its economic activity.
Most ofthe problems lie beyond its own control because of its geograpllical position.
These include deforestation in the Himalayan range, rise in sea level due to global
warming, floods; cyclones and drought, deterioration in water and soil quality and
waste dumping. Some of the Bangladesh scllolars opine that these not only have
impact on the economic activity ofthe people but also raise the question of viability of
the country.
Floods cause immense damage to crops, displace thousands of people every year. It is
estimated that floods affect 18 per cent of the total land area in Bangladesh. There
have been fourteen devastating floods in the last forty years. This is affecting
employment and agricultural production forcing the country to import food grains.
Global warming, too, would affect the future of Bangladesh in a serious manner.
According to scientists that one meter rise in sea level would result in displacement of
eleven per cent of population and complete inundation of 17.5 per cent of the total land
area. In order to off set the effects of global warming; Bangladesh would have to
spend ten billion dollars. Everyone knows that Bangladesh do not have that much
money. Only international help and assistance can help in addressing the problem.

CRISIS IN GOVERNANCE
Governance is a new criteria adopted by scholars and activists to understand and
analyze the social, political and economic performance of a state. In a sense, governance
is the function of the institutional capacity of the state to provide political stability,
maintain social peace and optimal economic development through efficient use of
available resources.
The performance of public institutions and government in Bangladesh is mixed one:
normal to poor. At worst, it is dismal in many areas of governance. The principal
challenge being faced by government is ungovernability - gradual declining capacity
of governments to perform basic functions. Ungovernability is manifested in three
forms: first, the complex social, political and economic problems have accumulated
over a period oftime and have no easy solutions; second, governments are not willing
to confront them to avoid political costs; third, they have became stubborn. Some of
the problems of governance in Bangladesh are the existence of corruption at every
level and every sphere of national life, failure ofthe state to protect the life and property
of people, denial of rightful place to women in society, and incapacity of the state to
deliver basic services and amenities to the people.
The crisis in governance is not unique to Bangladesh. Most developing countries have
been facing this crisis. In the case of Bangladesh, it is the result of the circun~stances
in which the new nation was born and the euphoria and uncertainties that accompanied
it. Political culture and social conditions tolerated concentration of powers under the
charismatic political head, subsequently sustained by successive military regimes. The
undivided Pakistan's inability to come to terms with the electoral verdict exposed the
flaws in the political system. Mujib's own authoritarian tendencies led to unrest and
dissatisfaction with the masses, military rule and the elections that lacked legitimacy
further exposed the weakness ofconstitutional govenlment. The rivalry and competitive
politics of the two major parties under Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia resulted in
frequent 'hartals' and 'strikes' disturbing civic life. Low literacy and state controlled
media forces the opposition parties to take the issues to streets to mobilize masses to
win their support to their programs. 'Thus, democracy has to go a long way in
Bangladesh.
The crisis in governance had its impact on the functioningof eco~lomicinstitutions and
economic perforn~anccof the country. As the economy grew at slow pace, domestic
Country Profiles: investment was low. Bangladesh emerged as one of the heavily dependent countries
Bangladesh on foreign aid and borrowings.
Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space below for your answers.


ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

1) What has been impact of foreign aid on society and economy of Bangladesh?

2) Describe the main features of liberalisation. What was its impact?

3) What is governance? What has been the impact of the crisis of governance on
the economy?

LET US SUM UP
Bangladesh is the second largest country in terms of the size of the population and
third largest country in terms of area in South Asia region. The country, as we saw, is
noted for the remarkable ethnic and cultural homogeneity of its population, though it is
a plural society and a home for a number of ethnic minorities, the Santals, the Khasis,
the Chakmas, Marwas, Moghs, Tipuras, Murungs Tanchaungs, Karnis, Ryangs,
Khyangs, Bons and Pankhos. These ethnic and tribal groups have by no means been
assimilated into the new nation. Some of these ethnic and tribal groups, as we observed,
have been a factor in the country's relations with neighbours.
With nearly two-third ofthe population living below the poverty line, Bangladesh is the
"largest-poorest" nation and is categorised as "least developed nation". Planned
development efforts have not made much dent in the structure of the economy which
remains a predominantly rural economy, with agriculture contributing nearly 50 per
cent of the value of gross domestic product. Though agricultural output has increased
at a steady rate, it was not fast enough to close the gap created by the continuing rapid
growth of population. The country continues to import food grains to meet minimum
needs for the subsistence of the population. Market oriented reforms taken up since
the late 1980s have not encouraged an autonomous domestic industrial capability.
Bangladesh continues to depend on a heavy dose of foreign aid and borrowings to
sustain its economic growth and generate employme~~t opportunities.
As we saw, the crisis in governance and the environmental problems have also
affected the economic performance. Some of the issues confronting Bangladesh are
complex and require a lot of effort on the part of civil society and government to
resolve them.
Economy and Society in
10.7 SOME USEFUL BOOKS Bangladesh

Hossain, A. ( 1996). Macroecoi~omicIssues and Policies: The Case of Bangladesh,


New Delhi, Sage Publications
Maclean. S.J et al. (1 997), "Structuml Adjustment and the Response o f Civil Sociery
in Bangladesh and Zimbabwe: A Comparative Ana!,,sis " New Political Economy,
Vo1.2, No. l
Qui bria, M.G. (ed.) (1 997), The Bangladesh Economy in Transition, New Del h i.
Oxford University Press.
World Bank, The. (I 999), Bangladesh Trade Liberalization: Its Pace and Impacts,
Washington, D.C.

10.8 ANSWERS TO CHECKYOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

1) Your answer should mention the effects high rate of population growth on a rural
economy characterised by widespread poverty, the political problem of reducing
the gap between access to resources and availability of resources.

2) Sufism played an important role in the spread of Islam in the region. Most
Bangladeshis are influenced by Sufi ideas. Sufi fakirs or pirs command respect
, in society and some of them have even shown interest in politics.

3) The Chakmas have largely lived a secluded life from the plains people. Though
they desired a 'native state', the Chittagong Hill Tracts were made part of
Pakistan. Fear of lositig their life style and control over the local economy to
outside settlers has made them seek autonomy or special status. As the new
state of Bangladesh did not share their concerns, they took to armed rebellion.
Check Your Progress 2

1) Excessive dependence on foreign aid has distorted the development pattern,


decreased domestic savings and even thecountry's sovereignty and freedom of
action.

2) Liberalisation or market oriented econo~nicpolicies were aimed at encouraging


domestic and foreign investment in the private sector, It involved such policies as
export promotion schemes, exchange rate liberalization, reform and privatization
of state owned enterprises, removal of price controls and subsidies, restructuring
of the financial sector, and tax reforms
These reforms have resulted in reallocation of resources away from public
expenditure for the provision of health, education, and other services. There
was a general perception that the earlier emphasis on poverty alleviation had
shifted to a more strict focus on market determined economic efficiency.

3) Governance is the function of the institutional capacity of the state to provide


political stability, maintain social peace and optimal economic development through
efficient use of available resources. Slow economic growth, low domestic
investment and the consequent dependence on foreign aid and investment are
the adverse effects of the crisis of governability facing Bangladesh.
, UNIT 11 POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND
PROCESSES IN NEPAL
I Structure
Objectives
lntroduction
Historical Background
1 1.2.1 Emergence of Ranacracy
1 1.2.2 Fall of Ranacracy

Post-Rana Politics
11.3.1 The Royal Democratic Constitution of 1959
1 1.3.2 The Panchayat System
11.3.3 'he Present Constitution of Nepal

Working of the Constitution of 199b


Rise of the Maoists
Let Us Sum Up
Some Useful Books
Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

11.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit seeks to acquaint you with the political developments in Nepal, particularly
with reference to the structures and processes. After going through this unit, you
should be able to:
Trace the evolution of democratic politics in Nepal;
Describe the contemporary structures and processes; and
Identifjl the main obstacles in strengthening democracy in Nepal.

1 1 . INTRODUCTION
Nepal has been under the sway Of a hereditary monarchy or ruling family for most of
its known history, largely isolated from the rest of the world. We therefore call it a
kingdom. This unit will first narrate the political history ofNepal since its unification in
1769, and then examine the rise and fall of Ranacracy. Thereafter, the restoration of
monarchy, Nepal's brief experiment with multi-party politics in 1959, and the
establishment of monarchy under the grab of Panchayat constitution are discussed.
Finally, the unit discusses the political developments under monarchy and how they
culminated in the overthrowing of the Panchayat system and the installation of
parliamentary democratic institutions in Nepal.

11.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND


The history of the region which comprises Nepal is quite ancient and its early political
history can be traced back to P and 8'h Century BC when Kiratis arrived from the
east. It \\ as during the Kiratis that Buddhism first come into the valley. Towards the
country Profiles: end of 200 AD, Hinduism came into the country along with the Licchavis who invaded
Nepal, Bhutan from north India. The decline of the Licchavi power in the 9h century resulted in the
rise of numerous principglities. In the mid 1 8century
~ the Gorkha king, Prithvinarayan
' Shah, unified these principalities through conquest and established the Kingdom of
Nepal. Further expansion ofthe Gorkhakingdom, however, was checked by the Chinese
empire in the 1790sand by the British East India Company in the 1814-16. Nepal was
squeezed into the boundaries that it has today.

The Shah rulers established an absolute political system in which the monarch was
the centre of power. The words and commands of the king constituted the rules and
regulations of the country and these took the shape of laws. In the highly segmented
pyramidal structure of the political system that evolved, the king was advised by a
number of prominent Brahmin families such as the Chautaria, the Pandey and the
Thapa families which came to occupy dominant position in quick succession between
1785 and 1837. The operation of administration did not differ much from family to
family as the overriding consideration of these families was the enhancement of their
respective material and political fortunes. The administration and army were likewise
staffed along familial lines. The number of regiments assigned to a family came to be
the most reliable index to its relative power and influence.

11.2.1 Emergence of Ranacracy


After the death of Prithivinarayan Shah, the internal struggle for power within the
ruling family weakened the position of the monarch. Except for a brief chaotic interlude
in the last decade of the 18th century, the throne was occupied by minors. This provided
opportunityto the regents and ministers (mukhtiyars) to concentrate authority in their
own hands, virtually isolating the king from the political process. King Rajendra, the
last in the line of ruling Shahs, engaged himselftoo much in intriguing politics-playing
one political faction against the other. As a result, the country came to the urge of a
civil war and total disintegration. This situation was exploited by a remarkable man in
the history of Nepal, Jang Bahadur Kunwar, better known as Jang Bahadur Rana. In
1846, when a fight broke out at a gathering of the members of the military and
administrative establishment of Kathmandu in the court yard of the palace armoury
(kot), Jang Bahadur suppressed the fighting. Many leading nobles were killed in the
process. Following the Kot massacre, Jang Bahadur became the prime minister. He
soon eliminated or overawed all of his major rivals, imprisoned the king and elevated
Rajendra's son to the throne as Surendra Bikram Shah.
Jang Bahadur institutionalized the position of his family within the political structure by
the Royal Sansad (dekree) of 1856. This sansad which was wrested from the reluctant
but hapless monarch, granted Jang Bahadur and his successors absolute authority in
civil and military administration,justice and foreign relations, including the right to
ignore the commands of the king if these were found to be inappropriate or contrary
to national interest. The king later bestowed on Jang Bahadur the honorific title of
Rana which was used by successive prime ministers. In return, the Shah kings were
addressed by the more exaltd, if somewhat ironic, title of Maharajadhiraja (King of
the Kings). In other words, monarchy was retained in form, but the powers of the king
were usurped by the Rana prime minister. The royal family henceforth became a
captive in the royal palace.
Thus began a centup long period of 'Ranaism' or 'Ranacracy'. The Rana rulers
retained the despotic character of the politico-administrative system wherein the Rana
prime minister became the source of power. The old nobilities which had enjoyed
political and administrativepositions during the Shah rule were replaced by members
of the Rana family. The ofice of the Rana prime minister moved from one brother to
another in succession.
The Rana rulers codified the Nepalese law through Muluki Ain (Civil Code)which in
principle assured equality before law. They also abolished the practice of sati (1920)
and slavery (1929) and set up several high schools. But overall, Rana regime was Political Structurs and
Processes in Nepal
oppressive. Since their power was ultimately illegitimate, resting on the abdication of
responsibilities by the king and his virtual incarceration, the Ranas ruled ruthlessly and
suppressed political consciousness that challenged their authority. Almost the entire
population remained illiterate and uninformed about any part ofthe world outside their
villages or, at best, their valleys.

As the people had no say in the governance, politics of the kingdom were nothing more
than the rivalry and interplay among the personalities of the Rana family for power and
position. Family feuds and intrigues came to characterize the political process as
ambitious members of the family were dissatisfied with the succession system. Right
from the beginning every Ranaprime minister had tampered with the roll of succession
keeping in mind the interests of his nearest and the security of his own political position.
In spite of this, the Rana system was sustained owing to the weakness of the king and
the support ofthe British authority in India which found in the Ranas a reliable protege
and surrogate in promoting their interests in India and the Himalayan kingdom.

11.2.2 Fall of Ranacracy


Beginning in the second quarter of the 20" century democratic ideas began to take
roots among Nepalese. Nepalese soldiers who participated in the First World War
became exposed to new ideas. Some of the elite and middle classes, particularly those
living in India and studying in Indian universities also got influenced by the Indian
national movement. They soon organized themselves to bring democracy in the kingdom.
They set up weekly newspapers in Kumaon and Benaras which became the forums
where Nepalese exiles could criticize the backwardness and repression of the Rana
regime. By 1935,the first Nepalese political party, the Praja Parishad (Peoples Council)
came into being among Nepalese exiles. It began advocating multi-caste, democratic
government and the overthrow of the Ranacracy. In 1946, the Nepali Congress came
into being on the India soil.

The British withdrawal from India weakened the Rana regime which drew support
from the British in times of crisis. It also encouraged the Nepali nationals for freedom
in their own country. The rise of communists to power in China also made the ruling
class panicky. The liberal section of the ruling Ranas led bythe then prime minister
Padma Shamsher tried to contain the Nepalese movement by granting a constitution,
but the die-hard elements were not prepared to concede even this and they forced the
prime minister to resign. Confrontation between the people and the rulers on the question
of changing the Rana system, thus, became inevitable. In this confrontation,the leaders
of the democratic movement in Nepal got support from the monarch, who was being
kept in virtual captivity by the Ranas and the disgruntled Ranas (known as C category
of Ranas on the basis of their inferior lineage) who were deprived of their share of
ruling positions and some of whom had made substantial fortunes in India. The anti-
Rana democratic upsurge in Nepal was viewed with sympathy by the independent
government of India. The pro-Western linkages of the Ranas and their refusal to
accommodate democratic aspirations of people were not to the liking of the nationalist
Indian leadership.

Th'e Nepalese popular movement launched from India overthrew the Rana regime in
1951. The three segments of the Nepalipolitics at that time, the Ranas, the popular
leaders and the monarch worked out a settlement in Delhi under the guidance of
Indian Prime Minister, Nehru. King Tribhuvan who had fled the country in 1950 and
taken shelter in India, was restored to his position as a monarch free from the control
of the Ranas. In February 1951, a coalition cabinet headed by Mohan Sharnsher was
formed with five Ranas and five Nepali Congress party members. This was to be an
interim arrangement until the formation and installation in office of a de~nocratically
elected government. It was agreed to have a constituent assembly for framing of the
constitution and holding the general election within a period of two years hence.
Country Profiles: Check Your Progress 1
Nepal, Bhutan
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
1) What is Ranacracy?

2) Explain the genesis of democratic movement in Nepal.


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11.3 POST-RANA POLITICS


The coalition government of incompatible elements could not last more than a few
months. When the entirebloc ofNepali Congress ministers resigned over police brutality
in November 1951, King Wbhuvan, appointed a new government, excluding the
conservative Rana power bloc. But the political leaders due to their inadequate
socialisation in democratic norms and practices and greed for power could not bring
political stability. Betyzen 1951 and 1959, there was a succession of short lived
governmentsruling under terms ofthe interim constitution or under the direct command
of the King. As soon as the king found a ministry uncooperative or unable to function
because of deep contradictions among the members, he replaced it with members
who had smaller political base.
Upon King Tribhuvan's death in 1955, his son Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah succeeded
him. King Madendra who was publicly opposed to democracy in principle carried
on as before, experimenting with types of councils or ministries that would do his will
behind a democratic faade. He, however, came under pressure from large scale
civil disobedience campaigns to hold elections in February 1959. A week before the
election, the King drafted a constitution and presented it as a gift to the nation.

11.3.1 The Royal Democratic Constitution of 1959


The most significant feature of this Royal Constitution is that it was granted by the
king rather than drawn up by a constituent assembly as had been specified in the 1951
constitution. The Royal Constitution envisaged a parliamentary system under a
constitutional monarchy. It provided for representative institutions like the bicameral
legislature, the ofices of the prime minister and the council of ministers. But at the
same time, it conferred unlimited and overriding authority on the King in every sphere.
The King could suspend the operation of the cabinet and perform its hnction himself
if he determined that no pason could command a majority in the lower house. Moreover,
the king had control ovdr the army and foreign affairs and could invoke emergency
powers to suspend all or part ofthe constitution. The King was, thus, both the effective
and ceremonial head of the state.
The first national elections held in the history of Nepal in February 1959gave a clear
majority (74 seats out of 109) to the Nepali Congress (NC). B.P. Koirala, the
leader of NC became the Prime Minister. Some of the reforms initiated and proposed
by the new government, threatened to undermine the traditional power base of the
army, the former aristocracy and the conservative landowning groups. ~ v e the
n king
feared that a popular prime minister backed by a popularly elected parliament might
impose severe restraints on his personal power and reduce him to a figurehead. The Political Structurs and
Processes in Nepal
King tried to destabilisethe government. In December 1960,citingthe nation's chronic
violence, widely believed to be orchestrated by the monarch himself, the King invoked
the emergency powers to dismiss the cabinet and arrest its leaders on the charge that
they had failed to provide national leadership or maintain law and order. The experiments
in liberal socialism and democracy, thus, came to an abrupt end.

1 11.3.2 The Panchayat System


Soon after the royal coup, King ~ a h e n d r astarted a campaign to convince the nation
that parliamentary democracy was not appropriatefor meeting the needs and aspirations
of the people of Nepal. As an alternative he worked and launched what came be
known as Panchayat democracy. The new political system was formalized in a new
constitution bestowed on the country in December 1962. The most striking feature of
Panchayat democracy was that it established a party-less system. The Panchayat
system was organized on a three tier system. At the lowest level were the village and
town panchayats. The second tier consisted of the district panchayats, one each for
the 75 development districts. At the top was the national panchayat. The primary units
alone were popularly elected. All other panchayats were elected by the level directly
below from among its own members, thus providing, at least, in theory a pyramidal
, structure on a popular base.

Local elections were held throughout Nepal in 1962 and village and town panchayats
were elected, and then zonal and national panchayats were established. By April
1963, the Panchayat system became fully operational.

The Panchayat system supposedly represented an attempt to decentralize both political


power and government process and was frequently defended as a higher form of
democracy.As political activities on party lines were banned, the system was termed
as party-less democracy, free from the ills of the party politics.
The Panchayat system instead of bringing genuine decentralization, helped in greater
concentration of power in the Palace. The Panchayat constitution underlined that
sovereignty was located in the hands of the King by constitutional laws, customs and
usages of the land. The King was to be the executive, legislative, and judicial power.
The constitution provided for a Council of Ministers to assist the King in the exercise
of his executive power. But the King retained the discretion to fix the tenure of office,
portfolios etc of the ministers who were appointed from among the members of the
national Panchayat. Further, the national Panchayat, which was to be the legislative
organ, was a mere advisory body whose recommendations could become law only
with the approval of the King. The King had the power to call, suspend or close the
session of national Panchayat.

Under the Panchayat system, real power was concentrated in the king's secretariat,
and in the countryside influence rested in the offices of zonal commissionersand their
official staffs or the parallel system of development officers. People had to be either
pro-palace or anti-palace. All anti palace activities were treated as anti-national and
the people's participation in such activitieswere subjectto all kinds of coercion including
banishment from the country.

Although political parties were oficially banned, they did continue to function both
from within and outside the country. While the King allowed some factions and leaders
ofthe left parties to function, the proxy presence of other political parties was always
discernible in the actual working of the system at every level. Worst of all, the non-
partisan panchayat members themselves functioned as a party by rigidly adhering to
panchayat ideology.
Despite all this, King Mahendra contained all opposition, maintainingtight grip over
state machinery by exercising absolute power and managed to run the system effectively.
He was also successful in manioulatine wide mnular suomrt bv oroiecting a new kind
Country Profiles: ofNepali nationalism and assertingthe country's personality in international society of
Nepal, Bhutan states.

King Birendra inherited the system as well as the absolute authority to rule the
kingdom after the death of his father in 1972. But he could not resist the pressure for
change in the system. In 1975, he announced various changes in the system.
Membership of the national Panchayat was raised from 90 to 112 and the king's .
power to nominate 15 percent of its members was raised to 20. The most obnoxious
change was the elevation of an extra-constitutional body "Back to the Villages National
Campaign" under the direct control of the crown. This body was given enormous
powers to control the political process at the level of village panchayats and function
somewhat like a politburo.
As these changes were essentially cosmetic and did not affect the fundamentals of
the Panchayat system, oppositional activities against the system continued. The left
parties and Nepali Congress, though legally banned, became active. The Panchayat
system almost came to n collapse because of a violent upsurge against the system in
May-June of 1979. Under these circumstances, the King announced a referendum to
decide whether to continue with the existing system with suitable reforms or go for a
multiparty system that the politically articulate sections were demanding. The ban on
political parties and political activities was removed so that people could participate in
the referendum freely and fearlessly.
In the referendum held in December 1980, the advocates of the Panchayat system
won by a narrow majority of 54 percent. This was due to various factors like the
complacency of the pro democracy forces, sabotage by some left-oriented political
parties, and some malptactices including the use of state machinery by the Panchayat
forces. Since the referendum also made it amply clear that a large section of the
people were against the Panchayat system, the king had to liberalize the system, while
adhering to the basic norms and values of the Panchayat system. The Panchayat
constitution was amended to introduce universal adult franchise. Three fourths of the
members of the national Panchayat, now raised to 140, were to be directly elected.
The Prime Minister was to be appointed on the recommendations of the national
Panchayat and other members of the Council of Ministers were to be appointed on
the advice of the Prime Minister. The council of ministers was to be accountable to
national Panchayat. Thus, the political system was moulded on parliamentary lines.
Though the ultimate political authority continued to be vested in the king, politics in the
kingdom became more open in the 1980s. But the Panchayat system, a major source
of local patronage, became the stage for factional fights and shufflingcoalitions. The
government formed by Surya Bahadur Thapa after the May 1981 election collapsed
in 1983 because of a serious food crisis and corruption charges. A rival faction in the
Panchayat led by Lokendra Bahadur Chand formed the government.After the second
elections in 1986, Marich Man Singh Shrestha became the prime minister.
It should however be doted that the democratic forces in Nepal did not accept the
amendments to the Panehayat constitution. They wanted nothing less than a multiparty
democratic system. Convinced that such a system cannot be established in Nepal
through constitutional reforms, the Nepali Congress and other political parties boycotted
the 1981 and 1986 elections and decided to continue their struggle to uproot the
Panchayat system.
The final blow to the Patrchayat system came in the form of a prodemocracy movement
launched by the Nepali Congress and the Communist partiesjointly. They organised
satyagraha demanding the government to lift the ban on political parties and restore
fundamental rights. With the political parties acting in concert, the pro-democracy
movement gathered momentum, commanding the loyalty and imagination of the
overwhelmingmajority of the urban population. Meanwhile, the economic crisis arising
from the decline in the agricultura~ductionand the decision of the Indian government
to close all but two entry points with Nepal (following the expirv of the trade and ,
transit treaties between the two nations) in March 1989 added to the woes of the Political Structurs and
Panchayat regime. In April 1990, tens of thousands Nepalese marched on the royal Processes in Nepal
palace in Kathmandu, demonstratingagainst the King Birendra, who was traditionally
revered as an incarnation of god. Police and troops shot and killed many of the marchers.
As shock waves reverberated through Nepal, the King quickly scrapped the Panchayat
.-system, lifted the ban on political parties and formed an interim government from the
ranks of the veteran opposition leaders under premiership of Kishna Prasad Bhattarai,
a Nepali Congress leader. The primary task of this interim government was to conduct
free and fair elections within a stipulated period under a new constitution framed by an
independent constitutional commission appointed by the council of ministers. A new
constitution was drafted by an independent ConstitutionRecommendation Commission
which was discussed extensively and approved by the interim cabinet. Following this,
King Birendra promulgated the new constitution on 9thNovember 1990 and abrogated
the constitution of 1962.

11.3.3 The Present Constitution of Nepal


The 1990 Constitution of Nepal describes the country as a "multiethnic, multilingual,
democratic, independent, indivisible, sovereign, Hindu and ConstitutionalMonarchical
Kingdom". It vests sovereignty of Nepal in the Nepalese people.
It bestowed on the Nepali citizens all the fundamentalrights availableto their counterparts
in a democracy. Though Nepal has been termed as a Hindu state, the people have
been given the freedom of religion. This safeguards the interests of the minorities.
Similarly, although, Nepali has been recognised as the national language, all other
languages of the people have received recognition in the constitution.
The constitution states that the monarch is the symbol of the Nepalese nation and the
unity of the Nepalese people. The constitution has retained the tradition relating to the
succession order of the throne. The king has also been given privileges and exemptions
from tax.
The constitution vests the executive powers with the King, but these have to be exercised
with the aid and advice of a Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. Thus,
the King is a nominal head of the executive.The Council of Ministers, the real executive,
is responsible to the House of Representatives for its acts of omission and commission.
The King is bestowed with emergency powers. In case of emergency arising out of
external aggression or internal armed revolt or extreme economic depression, the King
can declare a state of emergency. Such an order, however has to be approved by the
House of Representatives within three months and if approved will remain effective
4
for a period of six months.
The constitution provided for a bicameral legislature. The House of Representative
consists of 205 members elected directly by the people for a five year term. The upper
house, theNational Council, is a permanent house consistingof 60 members. Of these,
35 members are elected by the House of Representatives on the basis of proportional
representation, 15 are elected by the five development regions and 10 are nominated
by the King. Like the Lok Sabha in India, the House of Representative has greater
power in the exercise of legislative functions.
Thejudicial system comprises of a Supreme Court, appellate court and District Courts.
This apart, courts or tribunals could be established for the purpose of hearing special
cases. Provisions regarding the appointment and service conditions of the judges have
been made to ensure that the judiciary functions in a free and fair environment.
During the royal regime, bureaucracy was neither independent nor impartial and efficient
in functioning. The career of the administrative personnel depended on patronage of
the palace. The constitution sought to lay foundations for a sound administrative set up
by providing for an independent Public Service Commission to deal with the recruitment,
training. oromotion and other as~ectsof the administrative~ersonnel.
Country Profiles: Check Your Progress 2
Nepal, Bhutan
I Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
t
I ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
1) Describe the main features of the Panchayat system of government introduced
by King Mahendra.

2) What changes were introduced in the Nepali polity by King Birendra during the
first decade of this rule?
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11.4 WORKING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF


1990
Since the promulgation of the first democratic constitution in 1990, establishmentof a
workable democratic system in Nepal has been an enormously difficult task. In the
first general elections held in May 1991,Nepali Congress (NC) and the United Marxist
Leninist Communist Party of NepaT(UML) shared most of the votes. The leader of
the Nepali Congress, G.P Koirala became the prime minister. But factionalism soon
engulfed the NC in which Koirala, Ganesh Man Singh, the party supreme leader and
KP Bhattarai, the party president sought to distribute power among their supporters.
GP Koirala finding it difficult to implement policies and programmes of the govenunent
resigned and called for mid-term elections in 1994.
The mid-term general election in November 1994 gave no party a clear majority. The
UML secured 89 seats while the Nepali Congress secured 83 seats. Significantly, the
National Democratic Party (NDP), formed by politicians from the former Panchayat
era, won 20 seats. Man Mohan Adhikari of the UML formed a minority government
with the support of small parties like the Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party and Communist
Party of Nepal (Masal). Nepal, thus, became the first communist monarchy. But the
government collapsed within a few months. Thereafter, with splits emerging in all the
major parties, a series of four coalition governments came to power before next general
elections were called in 1999. This time, the NC got a clear majority of 1 13 seats. KP
Bhattrai became the Prime Minister. But due to factionalism within the NC, he was
replaced by GP Koirala in early 2000 and later by the leader of the younger generation
in the party, Sher Bahadur Dcuba in July 200 1.
By this time, the Maoist 'people's war' which was launched in 1996 had assumed
grave proportions. The Maoist used terror tactics to spread their influence in the rural
areas and taken effective control of administration in five districts. In the early years
ofthe Maoist movememt, Nepalese politicians belonging to the leftist camp displayed
a fraternal resistance to taking any harsh measures toward the Maoists. The CPNI
ML, the third largest political party in Nepal, openly endorsed the aims of the CPN
(Maoist) even while disapproving of its working style. The majority ruling party, the
NC, beset with internal problems, could not take concrete action to deal with the
Maoist problem.
The Maoist insurgenay added confusion in the democratic politics of Nepal that was
already reeling under factionalism which ultimately led to a constitutional crisis. In
May 2002, the Deuba government recommended the dissolution of the parliament but Political Structurs and
found it difficult to hold elections because of the Maoist insurgency. King Gyanendra Processes in Nepal
seized this opportunity and invoked Article 127ofthe Constitution to dismiss the prime
minister and his cabinet for "incompetence" in October 2002. He nominated Lokendra
Bahadur Chand, leader of the royalist Rastriya Parjatantra Party (RPP), to head a
nine-member interim government with a mandate to restore law and order, hold mid-
term elections and elections to the local bodies which were dissolved in July, solve
Maoist insurgency, implement development works and stop the economy sliding further
downhill.
Major political parties which were critical of the king's action did not participate in the
Interim government. In March 2003, the mainstream forces in Nepal forged an alliance
and finalised an 18 point common minimum programme and launched a movement
against the monarchic takeover. Since then, a tripartite power struggle has dominated
Nepali politics, between the king, the mainstream political parties and the Maoists.
Monarchy, backed by the Royal Nepal Army, is seeking to resume the role in the
national polity that it enjoyed before the 1990 constitution came into effect and
circumscribed its power. The mainstream political parties are demanding a return to
constitutional government through the restoration of the dissolved parliament or the
creation of an all-party interim government. The Maoists remain adamant in their
demand for the creation of a constituent assembly to draft a drastically revised
constitution.

11.5 RISE OF THE MAOISTS


As we noted, with democratic politics in Nepal being extremely factionalised successive
governments in Nepal found it difficult to implement governmental policies and
programmes. One result of this was that the rate of economic growth was modest,
but it did not match the rate at which population grew. You will read more about the
economy and society of Nepal in the next unit. Here, it is sufficient to note that that
massive unemployment and illiteracy in a society that had an ethnically and religiously
fragmented population provided a fertile ground for the emergence of Maoist movement
in Nepal.

The Maoists were once a part of the mainstream politics under the banner of United
Peoples Front of Nepal (UPFN) led by Baburam Bhattarai. Following a split in the
party, the Baburam faction failed to get the recognition ofthe Election Commission to
participate in the mid-term elections in 1994. This group joined hands with the
Communist Party ofNepal (Maoists). The declared aim of the Maoists is to establish
a 'people's government' through peoples war that is inspired by Marxism-Leninism-
Maoism. In 1996 they launched the 'Peoples Movement' (Jana Andolan) by carrying
out attacks in different parts of Nepal.
Characterisingthe states as a semi-feudal organisation, the Maoists held it responsible
for the prevailing socioeconomic ills within the country. They have also projected India
and the US as the imperialist powers trying to subvert the interests of the people of
Nepal by aligning with the rightist forces within Nepal. Among other demands, they
have asked for the revocation of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed with India
in 1950, controlling and systematising the open border, discontinuation of Gorkha
recruitment in the Indian armed forces and preventing the cultural imperialism through
Hindi films and magazines.

By the end of 2000 AD, the Maoists were active in over two thirds of the 75 districts
ofNepal. They had set up 'people's government' in five districts of western Nepal. In
the areas under their control, the Maoists do local policing, settle local disputes, collect
levies from the people and even set up banks.
The government of Nepal has used force, persuasio; and negotiation to tackle the
Maoist problem. Since March 2001, several rounds of peace negotiations have been
Country Profiles: held between the government and the Maoists. But due to irreconcilable differences
Nepal, Bhutan and mutual suspicion, these efforts have not borne result. Terror and violence by the
insurgents continued and the security forces have stepped up counter insurgency
operations. According to official sources, by early 2004, the fight against the eight
year Maoist insurgency has claimed nearly 8,000 lives on both sides, including 2,800
security force personnel.

Check Your Progress 3

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.


ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

1) What are the reasons for absence of political stability in Nepal in the 1990s?

2) Why did King Gyadendra dismiss the Deuba government?

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11.6 LET US SUM UP


Nepal, as we know it today, came into being in 1769, when King Prithvinarayan Shah
of Gorkha unified the different principalities through conquest and established the
Kingdom of Nepal. But the Shah dynasty soon became a tool in the hands of Rana
prime ministers. This situation prevailed until 1950 when as a result of the rising
democratic aspirations of the people and its own internal contradictions, the Rana
regime collapsed. Monarchy was restored and efforts to establish parliamentary
democratic institutions began'in the 1950s.

The failure of these efforts resulted in the restoration of monarchy under the guise of
Panchayat system launched by King Mahendra. But continuing demands for democratic
reforms forced the King to reform the Panchayat system and later to introduce a
parliamentary democratic system in 1991. However, democratic politics in Nepal
remained extremely factionalised with frequent changes of government. This only
added to the political influence of the monarchy.

Since 1996, Nepal has been besieged by Maoist movement. The Maoists rebels have
been waging a campaign against the constitutional monarchy.

SOME USEFUL BOOKS


Agrawala, H N. (1980) Nepal: A Stu& in Constitutional Change, New Delhi.

Gupta, Anirudh. (1964) Politics in Nepal: A study of Post Rana Political


Development and Party Politics, Allied, Bombay.

Shaha Rishikesh. (1990) Politics in Nepal, New Delhi

Hunt, Michael (ed.). (1994) Nepal in the Nineties: Versions of the Past, Visions of
the Future, OUP, Delhi.
Political Structurs and
ANSWERS TO CHECKYOUR PROGRESS Processes in Nepal

EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

1) Ranaism or Ranacracy refers to the political regime in which the Ranas prime
ministers were the de facto rulers. While monarchy was retained only in form
and all the powers of the king were usurped by the prime ministers.

2) The genesis of democratic movement in Nepal can be traced to the early decades
of the 20&century. Nepali soldiers who participated in the First World War and
some sections of the Nepali elite and middle classes staying in India were first
' exposed to new ideas. The development of national movement in India also
, inspired many Nepalese to struggle for democracy in Nepal.
Check Your Progress 2

1) Monarchial absolute rule in the grab of Panchayat democracy-concentration of


power in the Palace in the name of decentralization through zonal panchayats-
ban on political parties.

2) King Birendra had to accommodate many democratic changes due to popular


pressure. The Panchayat system was amended to remove some of the inherent
weaknesses in the system. National Panchayat members were henceforth to be
directly elected through adult franchise. Prime Ministers and Council of Ministers
were made responsible to the National Panchayat.
Check Your Progress 3

1) Political parties are new entrants on the political profile of Nepal. When the
Ranacracy fell, their leaders were not adequately socialised in democratic norms
and practices. The introduction of party-less Panchayat system further weakened
the party system. With personalities rather than principles coming to dominate
the party system, almost all were afflicted with factionalism resulting in frequent
changes in government and political instability. This instability directly contributed
to strengthen monarchy.

2) The Deuba government was dismissed by King Gyanendra because after


recommending the dissolution of parliament, the government could not conduct
the elections within the stipulated six months because of Maoist insurgency.
UNIT 12 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN
NEPAL
Structure
12.0 Objectives
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Land
12.3 Society
12.3.1 Ethnicity and Caste
12.3.2 Religion
12.3.3 Language

12.4 Economy
12.4.1 Planned Economic Development
12.4.2 Economic Rekrms in the 1990s.

12.5 Economic Sectors


12.5.1 Agriculture Sector
12.5.2 Land Reforms
12.5.3 Industry
12.5.4 Industrial Policies
12.5.5 Tourism
12.5.6 Trade

12.6 Nepal-India Trade Relationship


12.7 Let Us Sum Up
12.8 Some Useful Books
12.9 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

12.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit provides an introduction to the economy and the society ofNepal. It presents
an analysis of the economic backwardness of Nepal and its various economic sectors.
The demographic structure, the ethnic groups and the social structure of Nepal are
discussed in detail. After going through the unit you will be able to:
Analyse the complex ethnic and social structure of Nepal;
Describe the status of the economy;
Explain the development objectives of five year plans and their impact; and
Explain the reasons behind Nepal's special trade relationship with India.

12.1 INTRODUCTION
Nzpal is situated in the Himalayas sandwiched between two powerful countries of
Asia, India in the south and China it, the north. An isolated, agrarian society until the
mid twentieth century, Napal entered the modem era in 1951 with the restoration of
monarchy. At that time, Nepal did not posses any significant infrastructure for
modemisation. There were hardly any schools, hospitals, roads, telecommunications,
electric power, industry or civil service. With planned economic development efforts,
Nepal has made progress towards sustainable economic/growth. Yet, the country Economy and Society
in Nepal
ranks among the world's poorest countries with a per cap* income of,ust over $240.
Nearly half of its population lives below the poverty line.
Nepal is primarily an agricultural nation. It has a feudal society with well-defined
social stratification. The diverse ethno-religious mix of people provides Nepal with a
unique cultural heritage. We will first examine the ethnic composition of society in
Nepal. Later, we will examine the inherited and prevailing economic conditions, and
evaluate the impact of development plans.

12.2 LAND
Nepal is very mountainous and hilly. Roughly rectangular in shape, about 650 kilometres
long and about 200 kilometres wide, Nepal is the third biggest country in South Asia,
with an area of 147,181 square kilometres of land. Nepal is a land-locked country,
surrounded by India on three sides and by China's Xizang Autonomous Region (Tibet)
to the north. It is separated from Bangladesh by an approximately fifteen kilometre -
wide strip of India's state of West Bengal, and from Bhutan by the eighty-eight-
kilometre-wide Indian state of Sikkim. Due to its confined geographical position, Nepal
is almost totally dependent on India for transit facilities and access to the sea-that is,
the Bay of Bengal.
Despite its small size, Nepal has great physical diversity, ranging from the Terai plain-
the northern rim of the Gangetic Plain situated at about 300 meters above sea level in
the south-to the almost 8,800-meter-highMount Everest, locally known as Sagarmatha
(its Nepali name), in the north. The country is commonly divided into three broad
physiographic areas: the Mountain region, the Hill region, and the Terai region. All
three parallel each other, from east to west, as continuous ecological belts, occasionally
bisected by the country's river systems.
The Mountain region or Parbat is situated at 4,000 meters or more above sea level to
the north of the Hill Region. Some of the world's highest peaks are located in this
region. The region is sparsely populated, and whatever farming activity exists is mostly
confined to the low-lying valleys and the river basins, such as the upper Kali Gandaki
Valley.
South of the Mountain range is the Hill or Pahar region. With altitudes ranging from
1,000 to 4,000 meters, this region includes the Kathmandu valley, the country's most
fertile and urbanized area. Two major ranges of hills, commonly known as the
Mahabharat Lekh and Siwalik Range (or Churia Range), occupy the region. Although
the region is geographically isolated and has little agricultural potential, the region has
been historically the political and cultural centre ofNepal. The Kathmandu valley and
t l ~ lower
e hill regions are densely populated.
South of the Hill region, stretching along the Nepal-India border is the Terai region. It
is a lowland tropical and subtropical belt of flat, alluvial land. Commencing at about
300 meters above sea level and rising to about 1,000 meters at the foot of the Siwalik
Range, the region is the life line of the country. Rivers rising in the Himalayas emerge
in the Terai and continue southward, some ofthem becoming tributaries of the Ganges
in northern India. The region is susceptible to flooding, which occurs regularly with the
summer monsoon runoff from the mountains. The fertile soils of the Terai make it the
richest economic region, both in terms of farm and forest land. It has become the most
coveted internal destination for the land hungry hill peasants. Nearly half ofthe country's
population lives in this region.

12.3 SOCIETY
According to 2003 estimate, Nepal has a population of 26.5 million with 13.58 million
males and 12.88 million females. Since the 1950s, population has been rising at an
Country Profiles: average rate of more than 2 percent per annum. ihe major factor contributing to the
Nepal, Bhutan increase of population is high birth rate, decline in the infant mortality rates and increase
in the average life expectancy. The 2003 estimates put the birth rate ofNepal at 32.46
births per 1000 population, whereas the death rate stands at 9.84 deaths per 1000
population.
There is a geographicvwiation in the population growth. It is observed that the western
part of Nepal gained more population as compared to the eastern part both in the
mountainous and Terai region. The central part of the Hill region has also recorded the
highest growth of population. This trend of population growth started in the 1970sand
is likely to continue in future also. The highest densities were recorded in Kathmandu,
followed by Bhaktapur, Lalitpur and Dhanusha districts. The mountainous regions,
however, have low population densities.
As a result of rapid population growth, there has been a progressive deterioration of
the ratio of people to cultivable land. In the Hill region, population pressure has led to
the depletion of forest cover for crops, fuel, and fodder. The forest cover in the Tarai
region is also rapidly vanishing with the migration of the land hungry hill people.
Since the 1950s, the government of Nepal has emphasised control the population
growth by integrating planning programmes with the programme of general health and
welfare ofthe mother and child, encouragingtwo children per family norm, promoting
women health and education and improving the status of women in the society.

12.3.1 Ethnicity and Caste


Nepal is a nation said to be "materially poor but culturally rich". Because of its
geographical location, Nepal has been a meeting point of races. From India came the
Indo-Aryan or Caucasoid peoples, and from Tibet came Mongoloid or Tibeto-Burman
peoples. The Mongoloid racial groups generally reside along the eastern part ofNepal.
The Sherpas and Tamangs belong to this stock. They generally practice Buddhism.
The Indo-Aryans predominantly inhabit the western part ofNepal. There is a mixture
of both these races in central part of Nepal. Some prominent ethnic groups here are
the Newars, Rais, Limbus, Gurungs, and Magars.
Nepali people can be broadly categorized into two main cultural groups: Parbatias (hill
people) or Gorkhalis and the Madhsias. The Parbatias belong to the mountain culture
of Nepal that is the hill valley culture which has been a syncretism of two religio;
cultural streams- Buddhism from Tibet and Hinduism from India. The Madhsias, on
the other hand, belong to the culture of the plains, that is, the culture of the Indian
states of Bihar and Uttat Pradesh. The two groups differ in their language and dre'ss
with the Parbathis speaking Nepali and the Madhsias speaking the dialects of Hindi,
that is, either Maithili or Bojpuri or Awadhi.
Within the category of the Parbathis there are a number of cultural collectivities like
the hill Hindus, Newars, Tamangs, Kiratis, Gurungs, Magars and Limbus, Sherpas,
Sunwars, Sunthals and Thakalis.
The Hill Hindus are largely the people of Indian origin and have migrated to Nepal
around the fourteenth century. They are large in number but are widely dispersed.
Although the hill Hindus and the Terai Hindus follow the same religion, they differ in
their language and culture. Like the other people of the hills, the hill Hindus speak
+>
Nepali and share hill culture, but the Terai Hindus speak one of the dialects of Hindi
and are under the influence of the culture of the plains.
Among the hill Hindus, Chhetris and the Brahmins are the dominant castes. They
constitute about 15 perqent and 12 percent of the population of Nepal. The Takuri
sub-caste of the Chhetris constitutes the ruling elite of the country. Both the royal
family and the Ranas, who ruled Nepal for more than a hundred years, are of the
Chhetri caste. The Brahmans provide the country's intelligentsia.
The Newars are the indigenous people and are concentrated in and around the Economy and Society
in Nepal
Kathmandu Valley. The Newars who are about three percent of the population have
their own language called Newari. They were originally Buddhists, but a large number
of then1 have adopted several aspects of Hindu caste system. The Newars trace
their ancestry to the Lichavi rulers and have been prominent in Nepali society as
merchants and government administrators. They have a high rate of literacy.
The Magars, who constitute over seven percent of the population of the country, are
the largest indigenous ethnic group of Nepal. They speak Magar, Kham and Tarali
languages. Chiefly residing in the western and central parts, tAey have close affinity
with the Gurungs. Those living in the north practice Buddhism while those in the south
have adopted Hindu practices. The Magars traditionally engaged in subsistence
agriculture, pastoralism and day labour. Like the other martial ethnic groups from the
hills of Nepal, such as the Gurungs, Rai of Kiratis, the Magars are prominently
represented inNepal's military, as well as in theBritish and Indian Gurkha regiments.
Tamangs and Kiratis are about five and three percent of the population respectively.
The Gurungs, Limbus, Sherpas, Sunwars, Santhals and Thakalis are small in number
accounting for one to two percent each of the population. These groups traditionally
practiced a form of Lamaist Buddhism which mixes Buddhist tradition with pre-
Buddhist practices of BBn religion.

12.3.2 Religion
Nepal is a Hindu kingdom, and the king is looked upon as the protector and is deified
as the earthly manifestation ofthe Hindu god, Vishnu. This central place of Hinduis~n
in Nepal's political set up has been accepted by all segments ofthe population.

Before the advent ofthe Gorkha rule in tlie I 8th century, Buddhism was a flourishing
religion in the region. The Gorkha rulers projected Nepal's distinct identity as Hindu
state. The Hinduisatio~iof the kingdom was completed by the Rana rulers who brought
the various ethnic groups into the Hindu social hierarchy through the Civil Code of
1854. 'The codification and standardisation of religious and social practices led to the
assimilation of many ethnic groups into the dominant Nepali culture. A vast majority
of today practice a syncretic blend of Hinduism, Buddhism and/or animist traditions.
They worship the same gods/goddesses and celebrate some festivals commonly.
With the introduction of democracy, many ethnic and minority religious groups have
started asserting their group identities. The impact of tliese identity movements is
reflected in the celisus reports of 1991 and 2001 . People identified as Hindus decreased
from 86.5 percent to 80.6 percent. The 2001 census identified l l percent of the
populatio~ias Buddhists and 4.2 percent as Muslim. About 3 percent ofthe population
follows the indigenous Kirant Mundum religion. Christianity is practiced by less than
0.5 percent of the population.

12.3.3 Language
There are 125 different documented languaqes spoken in Nepal. These belong to two
distinct language sub groups-the Indo-European and the Tibeto-Burman languages.
Nepali, the national language ofNepal, was formerly known as Gurkhali or Khaskura.
It belongs to the Indo-European language subgroup. It is written in devnagiri script.
Maitliili, Bho-jpuri, Awadhi, Tharu, Danuwari and Majhi are the second group of
languages belonging to Indo-European language subgroup, which are spoken by the
people residing in the Tarai.
The languages belonging to the Tibeto-Burman language subgroup are spoken by tlie
ethnic groups residing in the mountainous areas. Tibetan language and its dialects are
spoken by the Sherpas and the Bhotiyas or Tibetans residing in Nepal. Apart from
these two families of languages some minor language groups are also found. They
are Satar, whicli belong to the Munda family and Dhangar, which belong to the
Dravidian family.
Country Profiles: In 195 1, the National Education Commjssjon set up by the government recommended
Nepal, Bhutan the use ofNepali as the medium of instruction in all schools. Since then, the government
has used every means possible to unite the kingdom under one language. By the
1990s, an overwhelming majority, nearly two thirds of the people, were speaking the
language. However, for many minorities and ethnic groups, language has become a
powerful means to achieve their potitical ends- to have a due share in the central
decision making process. Since the introduction of multiparty democracy in the 1990s,
they have launched demaratic struggles to oppose the dominant role ofNepali language
and demand equal status for all languages. Several local government institutions have
already begun to use local languages as official languages. The government has
recognized some languages such as Hindi, Newari, Gurung, Ljmbu, Gorkha as national
languages.
Check Your Progress 1
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

1) Describe the religious composition of society in Nepal.

2) Among the indigenous ethnic groups, the most influential one is the ........... .while
the largest group is .............................

12.4 ECONOMY
Nepal's modern history of political and economic development began with the end of
the family rule ofthe Ranas and the establishment ofconstitutional monarchy in 1951.
The new democratic government virtually had no modern means of development. All
that was inherited from the despotic regime was a weak transport and communication
system, a few educational institutions and an antiquated bureaucracj. As educational
opportunities were limitgd to a few colleges in townships and some traditional schools,
only two percent ofthe population was literate. The economy, which was self-sufficient
at the bare subsistence level, was already facing the problem of population growth.
Cultivable land was limited and non-agricultural employment opportunities were limited
to those provided by the armed forces and a few industries that were set up in the
Tarai region in the 1940s. It is in these circumstances that modern Nepal embarked
upon the task of economic and social development.

12.4.1 Planned Economic Development


In the early phase of the new constitutional set up, there were differences between
the king and the leaders of political parties. However, there was a consensus on the
need for economic development and modernization of the country. The five year
plans adopted since 1956generally strove to increase output and employment; develop
the infrastructure; attain economic stability; promote industry, commerce, and
international trade; establish administrativeand public service institutions to support
eco~~omic development; and introduce labour-intensive production techniques to alleviate
underemployment. The social goals of the plans were improving health and education
as well as encouraging equitable income distribution.
Each plan had different developme~~t priorities. The first four plans accorded top
priority to the develop~entof infrastructure. This was done with a view to facilitate
8 the smooth movement ofgoods and services within the country and expand the domestic
market. These plans did not increase the per capita inco~nenor have much impact on
--
poverty levels. The agricultural sector, which contributed 56 per cent of the GDP. Economy and Society
remained more or less stagnant. This forced the planners to alter the development in Nepal
priorities. The fifth and sixth plans (1975-85) addressed the problem of poverty and
accorded high priority to agriculture. In spite of significant increase in the production
of cash crops such as sugar cane and tobacco, the economic growth stagnated because .
of losses incurred by the public sector enterprises. During the seventh plan period, the
government adopted economic policies prescribed by international financial institutions
such as the International Monitory Fund and the World Bank. The plan sought t a
encourage private sector and local government participation in the economy. For the
first time, the plan set goals to meet basic needs of people. Forest and soil conservation,
development of water resources, export promotion, developmentof tourism, population
control, and domestic resource mobilization were accorded priority.
These development plans were overwhelmingly financed from external sources.Initially,
foreign assistance came in the form of grants and loans. The main donor countries
were India, United States, China, Japan, Soviet Union, and other developed countries.
Since the 1970s, multilateral assistance programmes of the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank began to play an important role in financing these development
plans.
A critical assessment of the planned development efforts under the party-less panchayat
system (1961-1990) reveals that overall the five-year plans failed to fulfil their purpose.
Despite the expansion of roads, enhanced power generation capacity, increased
irrigation facilities, improvements in literacy rates and health care, the rapid growth of
population could not be checked. As a result, the per capita income remained low.
' Moreover, there was large-scale income disparity among the masses. The poorly
implemented plan also resulted in increased regional disparity between the mountainous
areas and the Tarai region of the country. This was primarily due to unequal investments
in various geographic areas, which also adversely impacted the fragile ecosystem of
the country. Apart from this, the planning process failed to generate public participation
as all the decisions were taken by politicians and bureaucrats who were influenced by
foreign aid donors. The members of the National Development Council and the National
Planning Commission, the principal organs in planning remained unaccountable to the
people.

12.4.2 Economic Reforms in the 1990s


After the installation of multiparty democracy, the structural programmes initiated in
the past few years were carried forward under the enhanced structural adjustment
facility'(ESAF) of the IMF with the objectives of a 5 percent annual increase in the
GDP growth. The Eighth five year plan (1992-97) formulated by the first democratic
government led by Nepali Congress set the target of bringing the level of poverty
(defined as a level of income enough to consume 2124 calories of food and other
minimum non-food items.) from 49 percent to 42 percent. The plan drew a long-term
perspective plan for agricultural development, sustainable development, reduction in
regional imbalances and resource conservation.
During this plan period, far reaching market oriented economic reforms were introduced.
The government enacted the Privatization Act and accompanyi..,: regulations and
guidelineswith the objectives of reducing the burden on the government and releasing
resources to other sectors. Wide ranging financi~'r ~ ~ were ~ also
~ ~introduced
a s to
strengthen the liberalization process. Nepali currency was made fully convertible in all
current account transactions. Monetary policy was improved to increase domestic
resource mobilization, enhance efficiency of capital and provide credit to the priority
and productive sectors. The trade policy in the changed context had the objective of
reducing the trade imbalance through improved import management, export promotion
and diversification.
As a result ofthese policy initiatives, cottage and small-scale industries, an important
source of employment, grew at a n ~ m u a ratel of 11 percent. Tourism, which is the
Country Profiles: backbone of the Nepal,&seeconomy, grew at an average annual rate of six and half
Nepal, Bhutan percent during the period. Despite the failure of the agricultural sector, the cou~ltry
registered an overall economic growth of 4.65 percent per annum.

The Ninth plan (1998-2002) carried forward the structural changes initiated during
the previous plan. An ambitious long-term development plan was also drawn to make
Nepal into a competitive, competent and technologically oriented society. However,
political instability and the violence unleashed by the Maoist insurgency movement
during this period have adversely affected the development in all sectors. The GDP
recorded a negative growth rate or remained stagnant at less than five percent; tourism
suffered a set back, industrial productivity declined as a result of labour and political
unrest. Nepal's export earnings from readymade garments, pashmina products, and
woollen carpets suffered due to slow-down in demand from abroad. Despite the
growing trade deficit, Nepal's balance of payments has increased due to money sent
home from Nepalese working abroad.

12.5 ECONOMIC SECTORS


12.5.1 Agriculture Sector

Agriculture is the mainstay ofNepalese economy. It provides livelihood to approximately


80% of the population and accounts for 45% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Due to rugged terrain, only 20 percent of the total land is arable. In fact, Nepal has the
lowest per capita arable land (0.1 7 ha) in the world. Agriculture is mainly confined in
the Tarai region ofthe country, whereas the cultivation in mountainous region is mostly
for local consumption. Agricultural products include rice, corn, wheat, sugarcane, root
crops, etc. Rice is the most important crop as it is the staple diet ofNepal. From the
fifth five-year plan agriculturewas given top priority. In order to increase the agricultural
production and diversify the agricultural base, the government has focused on improving
irrigation facilities, providing credit facilities to the farmers and encouraging the use of
high yielding varieties of seeds, fertilizers, insecticides and pesticides, etc. Despite
these measures, agriculture grew at a dismal rate of 2.4% and failed to keep pace
with the population growth rate, which was to the tune of 2.6% per annum. The
absence of efficient distribution system and environmental degradation due to
unscientific agricultural practices also adversely affected the agricultural progress in
Nepal.

12.5.2 Land Reforms


Nepal is predominantly an agricultural society with limited arable land. Access to land
and the farm size have an important bearing on economic development. However,
land in Nepal is held by a handfbl of people, a legacy ofthe feudal system the dominated
the region for long. In the mid 1960s, the government embarked upon the twin policy
of land reforms and land settlement. The basic purpose of land reform was to protect
the tenant farmers, take away excess holding from landlords and distribute property
to farmers with small holdings and landless households. The Agricultural Reorganisation
Act of 1963 and the Land Reform Act of 1964 emphasised security for tenant farmers
and put a ceiling on land holdings. At around the same time, land development and
settlement programmes were initiated to bring additional land under cultivation and
settle the landless and small farmers. Unfortunately, all the land reforms and resettlement
programme had lots of loopholes, which hampered the effective implementation of
the programmes. A Wbrld Bank Survey estimated in 1991 that 5 percent of the owners
control about 40 percent of the cultivated land, while 60 percent of the population
controls only 20 percent of the cultivated land. Since the late 1970s, the government
has initiated schemes specifically to help the small farmers, but once again with limited
impact. I
I
12.5.3 Industry
Nepal has a limited industrial base. Industries contribute nearly 20 percent of the
Economy and Society
in Nepal

GDP. Most of the industries are agro-based industries like sugar, jute and tea. Other
industries are dependent on the raw materials, which are imported from abroad,
especially India. The major manufacturing industries are jute, sugar, beer, oilseeds,
carpet, garments, cigarette, shoes, matches, chemicals, paper, etc. Most of the
manufacturing industries are small-scale or cottage in nature. Intermediate and capital
goods industries are very few in Nepal.

Majority of the manufacturjng industries of Nepal are located in the Kathmandu and
in the eastern Terai region. The large-scale enterprises are concentrated in the
Kathmandu valley, Hetauda, Birganj, Janakpur, Biratnagar and Jhapa. Textile,
engineering, construction, food processing industries, timber and forest-based industries,
sugar, cigarette, match and metal works industries are the prominent industries in this
industrialcorridor.A few industrial centres like Nepalganj, Birganj, Biratnagar, Janakpur
and Bhairawa are situated close to the Indian railheads providing an easy access to
Calcutta and other Indian markets. Apart from Hetauda, which was established as a
new industrial centre, the geographical pattern of industriesremained the same despite
government's policy to bring about balanced regional industrial development.

12.5.4 Industrial Policies


Nepal endeavoured to promote industrial development by encouraging investments in
different industries. The 1957 Industrial Policy statement declared many steps to
enhance industrial investments like tax relief for new ventures, repatriation of profits
by forei- lestors, development of infrastructure,suitable labour legislation, providing
power z .wmaterial at low and confessional rates, providing land for establishing
industrial plants, tariff protection, etc. The Industrial Enterprises Act of 1961 offered
10 years tax "holiday" for new venture and various other incentives to encourage
industrial investments. In the 1960s, the industrial estates of Balaju, Hetauda and
Patan were established to promote industrialization.The government also encouraged
the establishment of public sector undertaking as it realised that private industries
were incapable of meeting the goals of industrial growth. In 1985-86, the industrial
policy was reviewed. The new policy simplified registration p d u r e s for the industries,
emphasised resource-based industries, provided incentive to export oriented industries.
The government also initiated the privatisation process. However, due to low level of
profits in the public sector undertakings, there were few takers of the shares of these
undertakings. Since the liberalisation of the economy in the early 1990s, there are
efforts to strengthenthe participation of the private sector in the industrial development
of the country.
One of the major causes for low level of industrialisation is inadequate capital for
investment. Other reasons include the geographic remoteness of the country, limited
market base, lack of natural resources, untapped energy resources like hydro-electricity,
paucity of skilled labour, absence of entrepreneurial and technical skills, high level of
import dependence. Despite providing incentives, Nepal failed to attract foreign
\
investments in the industrial sector.

12.5.5 Tourism
Tourism is the largest industry of Nepal, attracting 15 percent of total foreign exchange
earnings of the country. It provides direct and indirect employment to over 300,000
people in Nepal. Nepal is endowed with natural scenic beauty, rich cultural heritage
and diverse sites for sightseeing and adventure opportunities.Tourism was introduced
in the 1950s, which got a further boost when restrictions on the entry of the foreign
nationals were lifted. Since then there has a steady rise in the number of tourist visiting
Nepal from all over the world. Most of the tourists are however, from Asia especially
from India followed by Japan. The tourists come for holidaying, trekking and
I

b Country Profiles:
Nepal, Bhutan
mountaineering purposes. In the recent years, the slowing down of global economy,
Maoist insurgency and terrorist attacks in different parts of the world have adversely
1 affected the flow of tourist in Nepal.
t
Foreign trade of Nepal is characterised by the import of manufactured products and
export of agricultural raw materials. Nepal exports carpets, garments, leather goods,
jute goods and grains. Imports into Nepal mainly consist of gold, machinery and
equipment, petroleum products, fertilizers, etc. India is the main trading partner of
Nepal. Nepal exports nearly 48 percent of its goods to India followed by United
States and Germany with 26 percent and 11 percent of the total exports of Nepal
respectively. Similarly, Nepal import 39 percent of its goods from India followed by
Singapore with 10 parcent and China with 9 percent of the total imports. To increase
exports, Nepal had undertaken many fiscal and monetary measures like Export
Entitlement Programme and Dual Foreign Exchange rate together with tax relief and
cash grants. Imports however, have registered an increase over the years. In 1989,
Nepal initiated the Structural Adjustment Programme to address among other things,
the trade deficit and sought to increase the economic development of the country.

NEPAL-INDIA TRADE RELATIONSHIP


Nepal's geographical location and historical ties have linked the Nepalese economy
irrevocablywith India. The prospect for developing export markets with India towards
south is easy as there are minimal transportation constraints as compared to the
mountainous north. Moreover, many of Nepal's agricultural and industrial centres are
concentrated in the Terai region. In the 1950s, over 90% of the foreign trade was
carried on with Indiq but over the years the total amount of trade between India and
Nepal has reduced substantially. Nevertheless, despite several attempts to diversify
foreign trade and make it less dependent on India, India remains the main trading
partner of Nepal. Most of Nepal's basic consumer goods and industrial machinery
and equipment are imported from India; where as agricultural goods are exported to
India. Apart from the legal trade between the two countries, there is a huge unrecorded
trade, which is carried on between the two countries.
Nepal's trade with other countries other than India involves the transit of goods to and
from foreign countriesthrough Indian territory. Therefore, the smooth transit of goods
over India depends on the friendly relations between the two countries. In 1950, under
the Treaty of Trade and Commerce between India and Nepal, India agreed to provide
transit facilities to Nepal. Subsequently, custom duties on goods transited through
India was waived, 2 I border transit points provided and a warehouse in Calcutta port
was made available to Nepal for storing goods in transit. India and Nepal signed of
Trade and Transit Qeaties in 1960 and in 1971. These treaties provided for most
favoured nation statqps to each other on a reciprocal basis and also extension of some
preferences by India on a nonreciprocal basis. In 1978, separate treaties for trade
and transit were signed between the two governments. In March 1983, this treaty
was renewed, which subsequently expired in March 1988. Since a new treaty could
not be agreed upon between the two countries, India closed all but two border entry
points to Nepal.
The 1989 stalemate in trade negotiations between the two countries, adversely affected
the Nepalese econopy. Nepal's exports were subjected to high tariffs and import
from India also carried increased costs. There was an overall shortage of essential
commodities like salfkfirel, baby fwd, medicines, etc. Eventually, with political changes
taking place in both the countries, the trade and transit dispute was finally resolved in
June 1990. In order to avoid any economy difficulties, it is therefore, important for
Nepal to maintain a friendly relation with India.
I check Your ~ l o g ~ 2s s Economy and Society
in Nepal :

I Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.


ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

I 1) The main objective of the early five year plans was

I 2) Which is the most important trading partner of Nepal and why?

I 3) What is the impact of high population growth on Nepali economy?

LET US SUM UP
In this unit, we have seen that Nepal has three distinct latitudinal geographical regions.
As a landlocked country with no direct access to sea, Nepal had to experience many
difficulties in the form of delays, damages and planning and investment uncertainties.
The constraints in the transit facilities are a disincentive for exports. Moreover, Nepal
depends on imports for the development of all its sectors. A higher transit cost also has
a negative impact on developmenttargets and in reducing input costs to control inflation.
United Nation has declared Nepal as one of the poorest least developed nations in the
world with neqly half of its population living below the poverty line. Nepal is primarily
an arrricultural nation. It has a feudal societv with well-defined social stratification. As
w

I we saw, the diverse ethno-religious mix of people provides Nepal with a unique cultural
heritage.
With monarchy giving way to multiparty democracy, both Nepalese economy and
society are gearingtowards massive changes. However, as we noted, political instability
and high growth rates of population remain the main stumbling blocks.

12.8 SOME USEFUL BOOKS


Karan, Pradymna. et. al. (1994) Nepal Development and Change in a Landlocked
Himalayan Kingdom, Tokyo. Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of
Asia and Africa.
Chauhan, R.S. (1989) Society and State Buildircr ;.iNeLnal. New Delhi. Sterling
Publishers Private Limited.
Sharma, K.N. (1994) Nepal's Economic Development Policies- Political
Implications. New Delhi. Reliance Publishing House.
Joshi, S.C. (ed.). Nepal Himalaya, Ecological Perspectives. New Delhi. Himalayan
Research Group.

I Pant, YP. (1991) Trade and Cooperation in South Asia, A Nepalese Perspective.
New Delhi. Vikas Publishing House.
I Country Profiles:
12.9 ANSWERS TO CHECKYOUR PROGRESS
Nepal, Bhutan
EXCERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

1) Religion occupiesan integral position in Nepalese life and society.Although Nepal


is constitutionallydeclared as a Hindu state, there is a great deal of intermingling
of Hindu and Buddhist beliefs. However, latest census identified about 80 percent
of the population as Hindu, 11 percent as Buddhist and 4 percent as Muslims.
2) Newars; the Magars
Check Your Progress 2
1) Development of Infrastructure

2) India is the most important trading partner of Nepal because 48% of Nepal's
exports are destined for Indian markets and it imports 39% of its goods from
India. Moreover, geographically also, it is easy and beneficial for Nepal to increase
its trading relation with India.

3) As a result of rapid population growth, per capita income has remainM more or
less stagnant. The deteriorating land-people ratio has led to the depletion of forest
cover for crops, fuel, and fodder.
UNIT 13 ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND
POLITICS IN BHUTAN
Structure
13.0 Objectives
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Land
13.3 Society
13.3.1 Language
13.3.2 Religion

13.4 Political History


13.5 Political Processes
13.5.1 System of Government
13.5.2 Nation Building
13.5.3 External Relations

13.6 Economy
13.6.1 Planned Economic Development Efforts
13.6.2 Social Sector

13.7 Let Us Sum Up


13.8 Some Useful Books
13.9 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

13.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit deals with historical background, societalstructure,evolution of political process
and economic development ofBhutan. After studying this unit you will be able to:
I

trace the historical background of Bhutan;


analyse characteristics of the Bhutanese society;
trace the evolution for political processes;
identify the factors involved in the economic development; and
identify the main achievements in social sector.

13.1 INTRODUCTION
For most part of its existence, Bhutan has been a hidden country in the mountain
slopes of the Himalayas. The land-locked stat^, Tr:2.~rl,a large part of which is
located in the high Himalayan region, was largely responsible for the decision of its
people and rulers to remain isolated from the world till about the close ofthe 1950s. It
evolved its own pattern of existence-distinct culture and religious practices. The
inhabitants of Bhutan have named the country Druk Yul or "the Land of the Thunder
Dragon" and the Monarch is called Druk Gyolpo. The King has a great say in the
nation's affairs. Its democracy is unique in its own way: it has legislature but it practices
politics of non-election where members of the legislature get elected by consensus
and nominated by the King.
Country Profiles: The unit examines the basic features of society, economy and polity in Bhutan. It
Nepal, Bhutan traces the political histiory of Bhutan and describes political processes in Bhutan in the
light of some ofthe important changes taking place in its economy and society. It also
analyses the process of economic development in Bhutan, particularly with regard to
the progress in the social sector.

LAND
Bhutan is a tiny nation in South Asia with a surface area of about 47,000 sq. km,
Bhutan stretches along the southern slopes of the Himalayas for some 400 km.It is
flanked on the north by Tibet, on the south by the West Bengal and Assam, on the east
by Arunachal Pradesh and on the west by Sikkim and Chumbi Valley of Tibet.

Bhutan's traditional boundary with Tibet follows for the most part the crest of the
Great Himalayan range. Though this boundary has been sanctified by custom and
usage, China, which took effective control of Tibet in 1951, does not recognize this
boundary. The country's boundary with India lies to the south of the Himalayan range
in the Duar plains. This boundary evolved as a result of the British annexation of a
major portion of the Duars region in the mid-1gh century.

Physically,the country can be broadly divided into three lateral zones, with each having
a distinct ecology. Bordering Tibet are the northern Highlands or the Great Himalayas.
Six major passes in the peaks reaching up to a height of 24000 ft lead to a very thinly
populated areas of northern Bhutan. The alpine pastures here are used for grazing
yaks and cultivation of few grain crops and potatoes. Until China occupied Tibet,
Bhutanese traders used to cross the passes taking cloth, spices and grains into Tibet
and bring back salt, wool and sometimes herds of yaks.

Below the Great Himalayan region is the Inner Himalayan region where the principal
rivers of Bhutan flow. Because of lower elevation and exposure to moist monsoon
winds, this region has vegetation ranging from dense forests in the lower slopes to
alpine vegetation at the higher levels. Most of the cultivable land of the country is in
this region, where rice and other grain crops such as barley, buck wheat and maize
are cultivated. With most of the population ofthe country concentrated in this region,
it is the economic and cultural heartland of Bhutan.

South of the Inner Himalayas and the foothi Ils are the narrow Duar plains which form
a strip 20 to 25 km wide along the southern borders of Bhutan. Subject o excessive
rains, the Duar plains have a hot and humid tropical climate. Because of unhealthy
climate and dense tropical forest cover, the region is thinly populated, though a few
market centres and towns have sprung up in recent past.

Bhutan has rich mineral deposits such as graphite, lead-zinc, gypsum, and limestone,
dolomite, slate and marble. Its main natural resources are the hydro-electric potential
of its perennial and fast flowing rivers and abundant tropical and alpine forest wealth.
The principal rivers- Torso, Raidak, Sankosh and Manas- criss-crossing the main
geographical regions derive their water from rainfall and snow. The forests are spread
over two-thirds of its area. The agricultural area has been expanding over the recent
years largely through clearance of forests. It is, however, as small as 9 per cent of the
total area. About 7 per cent of the area comprises of pastures and meadows and
shrubs. The rest of the area is snow-bound land or barren land.

SOCIETY
In this diverse physical setting in which the climate ranges from bitter cold winters in
the north to hot and steamy tropics in the south, many ethnic groups have settled. In
2001, Bhutan had a population of 276000. The people of Bhutan can be broadly divided
into two cultural groups: the Drukpas and the Lhotshampas. The Drukpas comprise a Economy, Society and
Politics in Bhutan
number of groups like the Ngalopas in the west, the Mongolpas, the Khenpas, the
Bumthangpas, and the Kurtoepas in the central region, and the Sharchopas in the east.
Although these groups speak different languages and dialects, they all follow the Drukpa
school of Mahayana Buddhism. The Ngalops and the Sharchopasare large in number.
The Ngalops constitute about 28 per cent of the country's population and are largely
concentrated in the western part of Bhutan. They speak Dzongkha, a Tibetan dialect
which has developed distinct Bhutanese characteristics of its own over the past few
centuries. The Sharchopas account for about 44 per cent of the population and live in
the eastern part of the country. They are akin to the inhabitants of the north-western
states of India. They speak different dialects of non-Tibetan origin and have their own
dress, food habits and festivals. The Mongolpas, the Khenpas, the Bumthangpas and
the Kurtoepas are small in number, accounting for 2 to4 per cent each of the population.
They all are indigenous people and they belong to the Drukapa culture, the mainstream
culture of Bhutan.

The Lhotsharnpas are the southern Bhutanese of Nepalese origin. Constitutingnearly


on; third ofthe country's population, the Lhotshampas, by and large follow Hinduism.
They are the main ethnic group in Bhutan as they constitute a distinct linguistic and
cultural group. Most of them migrated into Bhutan in the 19 century. They possibly got
mixed up with the Koches of north Bihar and Bengal, the Rajbansis of north Bengal
and ShanahomsofAssam. Even since the road building activities began in early 1960s,
a large number of Indian and Nepali Gorkhas also came to Bhutan as labourers. Since
these people are issued work permits, they are not treated as full fledged citizens. In
1959, Bhutan passed a law banning immigration.

13.3.1 Language

There are four main languages in the country: Dzongkha, Bhumthangkha, Sharchagkha
and Nepali and approximately 14 minor dialects. However, Dmngkha is the official
national language of Bhutan. It is closely related to classical Tibetan script. Though
Dmngkha is largely spoken in western regions of the country, the government has
sought to advance the diffusion and status of this language by making it obligatory
study in all schools throughout the country. The purpose behind adoption of one language
is clearly to have a cohesive force which may bring different linguistic groups, living in
different valleys, under one national community.

1 13.3.2 Religion
I Religion plays a unique role in the social, cultural and political life of the people of
F
i
Bhutan. The original religion of Bhutan is said to be Bon. The Drukpa sect (Red Hat)
of Mahayana Buddhism, which is the state religion of Bhutan, is believed to have

I; been introduced into Bhutan by Guru Padmasambhave, an Indian Buddhist monk,


in the Sh century. It is, however, Lama Ngawang Namgyal who gave a distinct
political identity to Bhutan and establishedtheocracy.Buddhism has become inseparable
i from Bhutanese state and society. The ecclesiastical class, the Lamas, constitute a
1 very powerful group in Bhutanese society. According to some estimates, there are
about 8500 Lamas in the country. With the process of modernization, the institution of
Lamaism and the privileged position of the Lamas in the Bhutanese society are being
questioned.

The head ofthe monastic establishment is the Je Khempo, the head priest. Though the
monarch is now the head of both the state as well as the religious establishment, the Je
Khempo retains authority over all religious matters, and is the only person, besides the
ruler, permitted to wear the saffron scarf, symbolic of highest authority. The central
monastery of Bhutan, Tashidmng, is at Thimpu, the capital of Bhutan and is among the
oldest in the country. It is the headquarters of the Government of Bhutan. '
Country Profiles: Check Your Progress 1
Nepal, Bhutan
Note: 3 Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
Read the following carefhllyand fill in the blanks.
I) .................+.
established a theocratic state in Bhutan in 17&century.
2) The official language of Bhutanese ..................................
3) The Lhotshampas are....................................................
4) The region which is the economic and cultural heartland of Bhutan is ...........
......................................
5) The headquarters of the Government of Bhutan is the central monastery of Bhutan,
........................................at Thimpu.

13.4 POLITICAL HISTORY


Bhutan as an indepethdent geographical entity did not exist during the larger part of the
first millennium. According to the account of the famous Chinese traveler of 7m century,
Hiuen Tsang, Bhutan did not have a separate status outside the political framework of
Indian. It lay under the sway of kingdom of Kamarupa (Assam). Following the death
of King Bhaskaravarma of Kamarupa in 650 AD, a period of instability and turmoil
prevailed in northeastern India, and Kamarupa lost effective influenceover Bhutan.
ThereafterBhutanese lived more or less in isolation-free from any external domination.
At the beginning of the Sthcentury when Tibet was at the peak of its military strength,
Tibetan armies invaded Bhutan. There was little resistance from the Bhutanese side.
Some of the inhabitants fled to the plains of Assam. The rest submitted to the Tibetan
rule. Tibetan armies were followed by groups of Tibetan emas, farmers and herdsmen.
But the direct political domination of Tibet over Bhutan was short-lived and ended with
the decline of Tibet in 9&century. However, Tibetan cultural influence continued as
the bulk of the Tibetan people stayed on. A notable development during this phase was
the arrival of Padmasambhava, known in Tibet as Guru Rimpoche (the Precious
Teacher) at the invitation of a local prince in central Bhutan. Guru Padmasambhava
was primarily responsible for the introduction of Buddhism in Bhutan.
Following the withdrawal of the Tibetan armies, central authority collapsed in Bhutan
and the country once again plunged into a state of fragmented subregions. This situation
continued till early 17"century when the country was unified by a remarkable leader
who arrived from Tibet and adopted Bhutan as his homeland.
In 1616, Shabdung Nawang Namgyal, a lama of the Drukpa sect came to take in
refhge in Bhutan. He was determined to build a homeland for his religious school and
unite the country on a permanent basis. Nawang Namgyal repulsed attacks from
Tibet, controlled the numerous warring factions within Bhutan and established a strong
centralized rule over the entire country.After establishinghis military authority, Ngawang
Namgyal proclaimed himself as the religious (Dharam Raj) as well as political head of
Bhutan. Bhutan thus became a theocratic state. The Dev Raj, the temporal authority
was elected by a council of lamas. The state administrationwas completely dominated
by Lamas, i.e. religious leaders. However, since mid- 18&century, the control of Lamas
deteriorated and gradually feudal lords started gaining control in the state system. The
Shabdung was totally ineffective in stemming the tide of revolt and counter revolt.
There was virtually no central authority as regional governors (Penlops) asserted their
autonomous powers. The Tongsa Penlop and the Paro Penlop were major figures in
the wrangle. The last and decisive civil war took place in 1884,when Ugyen Wangchuk,
the Tongsa Penlop emerged victorious and became the most powerful figure and the
virtual king of the country. In 1907, an assembly of representatives of the monastic
community, civil servants and the people, unanimously decided to install Ugyen konomy, Society and
Politics in Bhutan
Wangchuk, the most influential chief among the contenders for the office of Dev Raj
as a hereditary ruler of the country. With this, hereditary monarchy replaced the noble
institution of Shabdung in the political life of Bhutan.
The idea of stabilizing the country by introducing hereditary monarchy received full
support from the British Government in India. Throughout the 19" century, the British
in India were at a loss to negotiate with Bhutan as the central government in Bhutan
was weak. In 1865, they launched a full scale war against the Bhutanese and annexed
the Duars or entrances in the Bhutan hills which were being used by the Bhutanese to
launch raids into the plains of India. By the treaty of 1865 Bhutan had become a
protectorate state of British Government in India although it never became an Indian
state. After Ugyen Wangchuk became the hereditary monarch, the British revised the
Treaty of 1865 in 1910. By this revised treaty, the Bhutanese government agreed to be
guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external relations, and
the British, in return, undertook to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of
Bhutan. The British Government in India also committed itself to protecting Bhutan
from Chinese expansionist policies. With the end of British rule in India, the British
protectorate over Bhutan came to an end. Though the India-Bhutan Treaty of 1949
was patterned after the Anglo-Bhutanese treaty of 1910, it did not lay claim to
protectorate over Bhutan.

POLITICAL PROCESSES
13.5.1 System of Government
The third monarch, Jigme Dorji Wangchuck (1952-72) who is regarded as the builder
of modern Bhutan introduced several reforms in the socioeconomic and political set
up of the country. The,existingpolitical structureswere established during his time.
Established as an absolute monarchy in 1907, Bhutan moved towards a constitutional
monarchy with the setting up of the National Assembly or Tsongdu in 1953. It is the
chief law making body of Bhutan and all civil, criminal and personal laws emanate
from it. The Druk Gyalpo retained veto power over actions of the National Assembly
until 1969 when the National Assembly, following his 1968 decree, became the
kingdom's sovereign institution.A bill passed by the Assembly can only be returned by
the ruler once, but if it is passed again with a simple majority, it automaticallybecomes
an Act.
The ruler or Druk Gyalpo is the head of the state, government and the church. Jigme
Drogi Wongchick revived the institution of Council of State established by Ngawang
Nangyal to assist and advise the ruler. Renamed as the Royal Advisory Council (Lodi
Tsokde) it emerged as the principal executive organ of the government of Bhutan.
Headed by a chairman, rise of its members are the representatives of the people, two
representativesof the monasteries, and one representativeof the Government of Bhutan.
The Council is advisory in character and its principal role is to assist the ruler in day to
day administration.Since all its members are also members of the National Assembly,
it seldom comes in conflict with the legislature.
Besides the Advisory Council, there is the Council of Ministers. The ministers are
appointed by the ruler, but with the approval of the National Assembly. The first Council
of Ministers was constituted in 1968. The ministers are responsible to the ruler and
take orders from him. Since the ruler is also the head of the government, there is not
such office as that of the Prime Minister.
The strength of the legislature varies from 140 to 200 as the Assembly or Tsongdu is
allowed to set its size every five years. The Assembly has three categories of members:
representatives of the people elected by indirect vote every three years and comprising
between half and two-thirds of the National Assembly membership; monastic
I
Country Profiles: represientatives, also appointed for three-year terms and constituting about one-third
Nepal, Bhutan of the membership; and government officials nominated by the Druk Gyalpo.
'
The administrative system which is inherited from Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyel
times, divides the country into 20 Dzongkhags (dzong districts or states). Each district
has a district officer, appointed by the Druk Gyalpo. Since the Penlop system was
abolished, these officers come under direct central rule. Larger districts are divided
into blocks, comprising 500 families each. The head of each block is chosen by the
villagers; he is the main link between them and the district administration.
Bhutan has no political parties. But political organizations are not altogether absent. In
1952, some of Nepalese from southern Bhutan who had settled in West Bengal and
Assam formed the Bhutan State Congress (BSC). The BSC tried to expand its
operations into Bhutan with asatyagraha (nonviolent resistance) movement in 1954.
But the movement Eailed due to lack of enthusiasm among the Nepalese in Bhutan
and also because of the mobilization of Bhutan's militia. The BSC movement was
further weakened when the government granted concessions to the minority and
allowed Nepalese representation in the National Assembly. The BSC declined and
eventually disappearance in the early 1960s.
The country's judicial system, both civil and criminal, is based on the foundations laid
by Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyel. The highest-level court is the Supreme Court of
Appeal-the Druk Gyalpo himself. All citizens have been granted the right to make
informal petitions to the Druk Gyalpo. The Supreme Court of Appeal hears appeals of
decisions emanating from the High Court (Thrimkhang Gongrna). The High Court,
which was established in 1968 to review lower court appeals, has six judges, two
elected by the National Assembly and four appointed by the Druk Gyalpo, for five-
year terms. Below the High Court are the district courts headed by a district judge
who is usually drawn from the ranks of the civil service. Minor civil disputes are
adjudicated by a vi Ilage head.

13.5.2 Nation Building


Revolutionary changes taking place in the neighbourhood of Bhutan in the post-war
period- India emerging as a democratic republic, China emerging as socialist state
and the overthrow of the Rana system in Nepal- had their impact on Bhutan. The
king was enlightened enough to grasp the situation and introduce many reforms which
were not even demanded by the people. For instance, Jigme Dorji Wagchik put a 30
acre ceiling on land holdings, made land revenue more equitable, and abolished land
revenue in case of poor farmers with smaller holdings. He made slavery and serfdom
in the country illegal and later on, abolished capital punishment. He also established
the ~ational'~ssembl~, the legislative organ of the government and eventually made it
into a sovereign institution. Consequently, Bhutan unlike other neighbouring states
remained for long period calm and quite.
Wit- opening up of Bhutan to outside world and exposure to the industrial culture,
life style of the people began to undergo a change. The old value system of a feudal
society is changing fast. The traditional elite, the Lamas and feudal classes, are gradually
losing ground to the emerging middle class. This class, manning administrative and
technical positions, is educated more in a secular tradition. As a result, the elite have
become highly consoious of preserving their traditional identity and position.
However, the ruling elite perceive threats to their traditional identity and position from
another quarter-the assertion of separate identity by the Nepalese in the southern
region. With the inflow of large number of unskilled and semiskilled Nepalese into the
country since it launched economic development programmes in the 1960s, the ruling
elite fears that the ethnic Nepalese would one day out number them and seize political
power. This fear became ingrained in their mind when in Sikkim the Nepalese
immigrantswho constituted about 75 per cent ofthe population, rose against the Sikkim
ruler in 1973-74 and deprived him ofhis absolute Dower.
In order to maintain country's territorial integrity and cultural identity, the ruling elite Economy, Society and '

Politics in Bhutan
has adopted a twin pronged strategy. First, it tightened the citizenship laws. In 1977
and again in 1985 citizenship laws were enacted barring persons staying in Bhutan
since 1958 and whose names are not recorded in the census register from acquiring
citizenship. Secondly, it took steps to strengthen Drukpa identity. In 1989, the King
promulgated decrees aimed at preserving Bhutan's cultural identity in a "one nation,
one people" policy called driglam namzha (national customs and etiquette). These
decrees made it compulsory for all citizens to adopt the Bhutanese style of living,
including the dress. Women are required to cut their hair short in the traditional
Bhutanese style. The conduct of all individualswas to be based on precepts of Buddhism,
the only religion legally recognized for practice. The government also stressed
standardizationand popularization of Dzongkha, the primary national language.
The declaration of 15000Nepalese as illegal immigrants and the strict enforcement of
diiglam namzha caused discontent among the ethnic Nepalese. Inspired by the triumph
of democracy in Nepal in 1990,the Nepalese in Bhutan launched a political movement
under the banner of the newly established political party, the Bhutan Peoples Party
(BPP). The BPP presented a charter of demands to the King, which among others,
demanded unconditional release of political prisoners, change from absolute monarchy
to constitutional monarchy, proportional representation for various ethnic groups in the
cabinet, and amendment of the 1985 Citizenship Act. When the government refused
to yield to its demands, the BPP organised violent demonstrations. Suppression of this
uprising by the government resulted in the exodus of a large number of ethnic Nepalese
from Bhutan to Nepal, where they stayed in several refugee camps. With this, the
government of Nepal has emerged as an important player in the efforts to resolve the
ethnic conflict in Bhutan.

13.5.3 External Relations


The mountainous character of the terrain, lack of any intra-societal demands, and
above all, a fear of loss of identity, mctivated Bhutan to lead a life of splendid isolation.
This isolation also prevented the ruling elite an exposure to the happenings abroad.
Conscious of their Limited capability and the desirous of preserving their
independence existence, Bhutan kept her doors shut to the outside world even after
the World War 11.
However, with the winds of change sweeping in Asia, particularly the withdrawal of
British from India and a successful socialist revolution in China, the Dragon Kingdom
slowly and cautiously became a member of the international community of states. In
1947,Bhutan participated in the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi. Later
the King of Bhutan visited India to seek assurance from the new rulers in India regarding
Bhutan's status and position vis a vis India. It was, however, the visit of the Indian
t
Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to Bhutan in 1958 which proved to be the most
decisive event which finally led to the end of centuries old policy of isolation. The first
step Bhutan took in this direction.wasto accept the economic and technical assistance
offered by India.
A major consideration evidently behind his change was the Chinese intervention in
Tibet in the 1950sand their irredentist claims on Bhutan, Sikkim 9 - i the NEFAarea of
India, threatening the very existence of Bhutan. Bhutan became convinced that
recognition by the larger global community would act as a deterring factor on the part
of Chinese to repeat a Tibet in Bhutan and ensure its separate existence. It would also
end all uncertainties regarding Indian intentions towards Bhutan. This goal was
eventually realised in 1971 when Bhutan was admitted to the Untied Nations as its full
fledged member. Two years later, Bhutan joined the Non-aligned Movement. In the
1970s,Bhutan also began efforts to achieve diversification of economic and technical
assistance, particularly through the help of the UN agencies and multilateral financial
institutions. Bhutan also diversified her external contacts, with the countries of Asia
and Europe. With Bangladesh and Nepal, Bhutan has full-fledgedambassadorial level
Country Profiles: diplomatic relations. The assertive role of Bhutan as an independent actor has been
Nepal, Bhutan evident on several occasions in the UN, Non-aligned Movement and in'other
international forums. Membership of SAARC also enabled Bhutan to project its
independent status and play an active role in the management of regional affairs. .
Check Your Progms 2

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.


i Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
1) Who is Guru Rimpoche?

...........................................................................................................................
2) How was the political situation during 19* and 20&century in Bhutan?

...........................................................................................................................
3) What are the principal political andjudicial institutions of Bhutan?

4) The strategies adopted by Bhutan to deal with the growing number of Nepalese
migrants in the country are:

13.6 ECONOMY
Being a land-locked aountry with difficultterrain, Bhutan's economy, until the advent
of planned economic development in the early 1960s, was by and large characterised
by an extreme degree of isolation and pastoral self-sufficiency. Almost the entire
population was engaged in subsistence farming. Infrastructural facilities were totally
lacking. There was n6 pool of skilled labour. There were only 59 primary schools and
no middle or higher secondary schools. There were only four hospitals and eleven
dispensaries and only two hospitals had qualified doctors. Bhutan did not posses any
resources beyond its normal civil revenue and the meagre assistance that was provided
by the British Government in Indian and later by the Government of independent
India. It had no bank or any other kind of monetary institution. There were no motorised
vehicles or metalled roads, no electricity. There were no telephones or postal system
connecting the countfy with the outside world. p a t kindof physical isolation from the
modern world accounted for Bhutan's closed economy. UN estimates published in the
late 1960s placed Bhutan at the bottom of economic growth ladder, with the lowest
levels of per capita income.
13.6.1 Planned Economic Development Efforts Economy, Society and
Politics in Bhutan
The idea of planned economic development of Bhutan was conceived when Jawaharlal
Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, visited that country in 1958.By then the Bhutanese
leaders had become aware that their country could not continue indefinitely in isolation,
for the countries around it were moving ahead in the growth of communications and
social services. Moreover, Bhutan aspired to take its place as a member of the Untied
Nations and [tothat end it had to project to the world its image as a progressive country
with concern for the welfare of its people.
Jigrne Dorji Wangchuck therefore decided to end isolation and initiated the process of
change by planned development efforts. The first five year development plan chalked
out for 1961-1966 was designed with the help of the Planning Commission of India.
This plan, as well as the second plan was also fully financed by the Government of
Jndia. Subsequent plans too were substantially financed by India. In a way, the
Bhutanese economy over a period of last forty years has become heavily dependent
on Indian assistance.
In 1972, a Planning Commission came into existence in Bhutan. The Bhutanese
King is the ex-officio Chairman of the Planning Commission. Over the past
four decades the priorities of various plans have been i) building an infrastructure,
ii) self-sufficiency in agriculture and food, iii) education, and iv) transport. In recent
years, the thrust of Plan has diversified to development ofhorticulture, hydel-power
generation, conservation and proper utilization of forest- wealth and promotion of
medium and small-scale industry.
A significant feature of development effort in Bhutan is the prominent presence
lndian expertise and resources. For instance, the hydel directorate was set-up with
the help of lndian engineers. Similarly, the telecommunication system and highway
constructions are done by Indian engineers. The government of Bhutan has set up its
own bank, the Bank of Bhutan, in 1968. The use of Indian currency and coins is valid
in Bhutan. The Bank of Bhutan has entered into collaboration with the State Bank of
India to advice Bhutanese government in monetary and banking affairs.
During the recently concluded Eighth Five-Year Plan (1998-2002), Bhutan's real GDP
(i.e. national income) grew at 6.7 per cent per annum, led mainly by forestry and
livestock. The industry sector grew at 7.lper cent wherein construction activity and
electricity generation performed well. The hydropower development in 1990s has
become the principal source of Bhutanese growth. The electricitygenerated is exported
to India, earning revenue to the Bhutanese government. The contribution of services
sector in Bhutanese annual national income is 8 per cent. There is gradual improvement
in transport and communication system which is helping to attract tourists from out
side the country.
The Bhutanese currency is tied up with the Indian rupee and because ofthis arrangement
there is limited scope for flexibility in monetary policy of Bhutan. The limited existence
of private sector restricts generation of domestic investment. There are very few
enterprises which can be called as major units. The overall small size of the econom).
adversely affects the private entrepreneurshin. In the absence of Jequate domestic
investment the economy has to rely on external loans and debts to meet the needs of
the economy. For Bhutan, India is the prime lender ?t 6nsncial assistance.About 90 to
95 per cent of Bhutanese trade is with India.

13.6.2 Social Sector


There exists direct correlation between achievements in economic sector and social
sector. Since the beginning of 1980s, there has been a remarkable improvement in
Bhutanese social sector. For example, in case of health indicators, life expectancy has
risen to 68 years in 200 1 from 36 years in 1961. Similarly, between 1986and 2001 the
infant mortality rate has decreased from 143to 62 per 1000 live births and the maternal
Country Profiles:
Nepal, Bhutan
mortal
from ;
1 j
rate from 7.8 to 2.7 per 1000 live births. The mortality rate for under-5 fell
to 85 per 1000 live births.
Bhutan also made considerable progress in raising the literacy levels in the last four
decades. In 1960, less than 500 children in the whole country ahended secular primary
schools and till 1964 there was no secondary school in the country. Now in 2001,
about 75 per cent children (of the total child population) attend primary school and of
them 47 per cent are girls. The overall adult literacy rate in 1998 was 55 per cent and
for women it was 30 per cent.
On employment front, the perfonynce is somewhat modest mainly because
private sector is not yet adequately developed and the public sector cannot provide
jobs beyond certain limit. In fact, providing jobs to the unemployed youths has
become a major challenge in recent times. Lack of basic infrastructure, such as roads,
electricity, telecommunications, etc, is constraining the expansion of medium and
small scale industry. The capital intensive nature of industrial development in
Bhutan is also limiting employment generation in the public sector. For instance the
major industrial activities in public sector are hydro-power generation, production
of cement, ferro-alloys, calcium carbide, processed foods, particle board etc, which
provide jobs to limited number of people. Even here, many jobs, including those
involving low skills, are being taken up by Indian migrants (to Bhutan). Since rising
unemployment may spurt social uncertainties in future, the government has started
focusing on building basic infrastructural facilities and in recent years started to
promote private sector.
Check Your Progress 3
Note: i) Use the sp&e given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

1) What is the role df India in the economic development of 'Bhutan?

2) Analyze the achievements of Bhutan in social sector.

LET US SUM UP
Bhutan is one ofthe smallestcountries in the world, area and population wise. Monarchy
stgl prevails in the country although it has National Parliament but the King has larger
say in the nation's affairs. It practices politics of non-election and the representatives
in the Parliament are elected by consensus and nominated by the King. The people
pay little attention to the secular matters. The Lamas constitute the mainstay of the
social and religious life of the nation.
After British quit India in 1947, the free India entered into aTreaty in 1949 whereby
India assured Bhutan's sovereignty in case of external threat. Under the Treaty India
controls Bhutan's external relations. India has also been playing a major role in the
economic development of Bhutan. In its path of economic development, Bhutan
has to contend with pmblems of severe physio-climatic environment, seriousresource
shortage, physical aocessibility, lack of human resources and administrative
incapacity. Bhutan'strade is who1ly dependent on India. The small size of the Bhutanese
economy is seen as a major constraint in generating domestic investment. Almost Economy, Society and
Politics in Bhutan
there is no existence of the private entrepreneurship in manufacturing activity which
puts restrictions on generating employment opportunities. Since the late 1970s, the
pace of development has picked up substantial momentum and the country has made
significantprogress in education and health sectors.

I 13.8 SOME USEFUL BOOKS


1

Olsct&, C. Blache. (1971) Bhutan: Land of Hidden Treasures. New Delhi.


I
, Gupta, Shantiswarup. (1974) British Relations with Bhutan. Jaipur.
Rustomji, Nari. (1978) Bhutan: The Dragon Kingdom in Crisis. New York.
\

Ram, Rahul. (1983) Royal Bhutan. New Delhi.


White, J. Claude. (1984) Sikkim and Bhutan. New Delhi.
Verma, Ravi. (1988) India b Role in the Emergence of Contemporary Bhutan, Delhi.

13.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1
1) Nawang Namgyal
2) Dzongkha.

3)
4)
* -
People ofNepalese origin living in southern region of Bhutan.
The Inner Himalayan region.
5) Tashidzong.
Check Your Progress 2

1) Guru Rimpoche is the Tibetan name for the Buddhist monk from India
Padmasambhava. He visited Bhutan in 8th century and popularised Buddhism in
Bhutan.

2) Initially in the 19th century Bhutan was in a state of anarchy mostly because local
chieftains of different regions were fighting with each other. British government
put an end to the raids of Bhutanese on the Indian plains after the 1865 war. The
Anglo-Bhutan Treaty signed after the war made Bhutan a British protectorate.
Bhutan agreed to be guided by the British in its external policies and the British in
return agreed not to interfere in internal affairs of the country. The Indo Bhutan
treaty of 1949 is patterned after this treaty; though India did not claim to be a
protectorate over Bhutan. The present day Bhutan continuesto be under monarchy
where King holds major power of state administration. Since 1952 Bhutan has a
National Assembly whose members are elected by consensus.

3) The principal political andjudicial institutionsare: Druk Gyolop,the Royal Advisory


Council, the Council of Ministers, the National Assembly (Tsongdu) and the High
Court h him khan^ Gongma).

4) It tightened citizenship laws and enacted laws to strengthen Drukpa identity.


Check Your Progress 3

1) Bhutan had r i ~ hforest and mineral resources but lacked financial and skilled
human resources. Over the past forty years, India provided financial assistance,
whollv financine the five vear Plans in the beginning. It also ~rovidedtechnical
I
Country Profiles: expertise in several areas and is assisting Bhutan in the construction of
Nepal, Bhutan infrastructure and services industries.
Bhutan is one ofthe least developed countries in the world. Till 1964 it did not
have a secondary school. However since 1980 there is gradual progress in social
indicators, particularly in the field of health and education. Unemployment of
educated youth is one of the greatest challenges before the Government. It is
trying to encourage private entrepreneurshipin medium and small-scale industry
but shortage of domestic investment is the obstacle in its progress. With the help
of India, Bhutan is trying to address this issue.
UNIT 14 POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND
PROCESSES IN SRI LANKA
Structure
14.1 Objectives
14.2 Introduction
14.3 Constitutional History
14.4 Political Parties and Elections
14.4.1 The Party System
14.4.2 Electoral Politics

14.5 Constitutional Changes


14.6 L-cal Government
14.7 Xecent Political Developments
14.8 Lst Us Sum Up
14.9 Some Useful Books
I 14.10 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

I
14.1 OBJECTIVES
i This unit deals with the structure and process of politics in Sri Lanka. After going
i through the unit, you should be able to:
I
I
Trace the evolution and features of political institutions in Sri Lanka;
I
1
t Describe the constitutional changes in the island;

i Explain the political processes in the island-state;

ir Describe the local government and people's empowerment; and


Identify the main issues confronting the polity in recent times.

14.2 INTRODUCTION
Sri Lanka earlier known as ceylon, benefited from the traditions of the rule of law and
constitutional government that emerged during 150 years of British colonial rule. These
traditions fostered the development of a political system characterized by broad popular
participation in the political process, generally strict observance of legal guarantees of
human and civil rights, and an orderly succession of elected governments. Since the
early 1980s, however, ethnic polarization and violence threatened to weaken the
democratic institutions and erode democratic vaIues. In this unit, we trace the historical
background of the present constitution; describe the features of the party system and
political processes in Sri Lanka.

14.3 CONSTITUTIONALHISTORY
When the Portuguese arrived on the island in the early 1 6 century
~ they found the
island divided into three independent kingdoms. Internal dissensions and frequent
squabbles between these kingdoms provided opportunities for the Portuguese to
intervene in Sri Lankan affairs. By the end of that century, they established their
Country Profiles: control over the kingdom bascd at Kotte and by the early 17 century brought the
Sri Lanka, the Maldives kingdom based at Jaffna under their control. The Kandyan kingdom, however, remained
independent. The Portuguese authority, however, was short lived on the island. In
1756, they were replaced by the Dutch East India Company. During the wars of the
French revolution, when Netherlands came under the French control, the British moved
into Sri Lanka from India and defeated the Dutch in 1796. As the British had no
permanent interests in the island, they administered the island from Madras. However,
they soon realised the island's strategic value and decided to make their hold on the
island permanent. In 1802 Sri Lanka was made a crown colony. The British unified
the whole of Sri Lanka for the first time in several centuries in 1815-1818 by absorbing
the Kandyan kingdom.
Sri Lanka's crown colony status meant that the island's affairs were administered by
the Colonial Office in London, rather than by the East India Company that governed
India at that time. The administration was carried on by the Governor who was appointed
by the British Crown. The first legislature, a nominated Legislative Council was
established in 1833. Its composition was based on coinmunal representation. The
Cv initiative in all matters of government was vested with the Governor and the officials
such as the cb~nmanderof troops, the colonial secretary and tlie Chief Justice. Over
the next hundred years, there was a gradual increase in the legislative and financial
powers of the Legislative Couneil.
By the beginning of 20thcentury, the nationalist consciousness that permeated the
social and religious fields in the latter half of the 19Ihcentury had gradually spread to
the political arena. Several regional and communal associations began to voice proposals
for political reforms. They asked for Sri Lankan participation in the executive branch,
a wider territorial representation in the legislature, and the adoption of the elective
principle in place of nomination. In order to press their demands, they came together
to form the CeyloneseNational Congress in 1919. This resulted in the introduction of
representative government under the Constitution of 1920. This constitution, which
was modified in 1924 to satisfy nationalist demands, provided for an elected majority
in the legislature, an increase in the number of territorially elected members, and the
election of communal representatives. The executive powers, however, remained with
the Governor and the official Executive Council.
Amajorturning point in the island's political development was implementation in 1931
of comprehensive reforms recommended by a royal commission headed by the Earl
of Donoughmore. The so-called Donoughmore constitution abolished the former
executive and legislative councils and provided for a State Council with both legislative
and executive functions. The State Council, after a general election, divided itself into
seven executive committees, each of which took charge of a group of government
departments. A salient feature of this constitution was the adoption of universal adult
franchise. Sri Lanka became the first Asian polity to bring the entire adult population
into the political process. Earlier, only four percent ofthe male population, defined by
property and educational qualification could vote.
The Donoughmore constitution gave Sri Lankan leaders opportunities to exercise political
power and to gain governmental experience with a view toward eventual self-
government. However, the provisions for minority representation included in the
constitution gave scope for articulation of group interests, which worsened intergroup ,
relations. A number of communal associations such as the Sinhala Mahasabha and
the All Ceylon Tamil Congress came into being. While the Sinhalese leaders utilised
their power to improve tlie conditions of the Sinhalese electorate, the minorities,
especially Taniils felt neglected and dominated and at every stage demanded safeguards
which, however, were construed by the Sinhalese leaders as impediments in the path
of self-government.
During the World War 11, national leaders in Sri Lanka cooperated with the British
war effort, but exerted pressure on the colonial rulers to grant self-government. This
6 resulted in the setting up of a constitutional commission, headed by Lord Soulbury.
The constitution drafted by Soulbury was modelled on the British Westminster system Political Structures and
of government. Adopted in 1946, the Soulbury constitution established a parliament Processes in Sri Lanka
headed by the British monarch (represented by the Governor General) and two houses,
the Senate and the House of Representatives. The latter, was the more powerful
chamber of the government as its members were elected directly by the people in a
combination of single and multi-member electoral districts. In the Senate, some members
were nominated by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the cabinet and
the rest were elected on the basis of proportional representation. Executive power,
formally vested in the monarch (in the person of his or her representative, the Governor
General), was in actuality exercised by the Cabinet headed by the Prime Minister. The
Soulbury constitution became the basic document of Sri Lanka's government when
, the country achieved independence on February 4, 1948.

14.4 POLITICAL PARTIESAND ELECTIONS


14.4.1 The Party System
The evolution of party system in Sri Lanka can be traced to the formation of Ceylon
National Congress in 1919. The Ceylon Congress which was modelled after the Indian
National Congress, fought for independence from the colonial rule. In its beginning, it
was a broad-based party with members from all ethnic groups. With the introduction
of electoral politi.cs, divisions within the ranks of the Congress party emerged. Sinhalese
leaders wanted to do away with communal representation and make territorial
representation universal, but minorities desired to retain it to secure power for their
communities. As divisions became wide, the Tamils broke away in 1944 and formed
their own party, the Tamil Congress. In the subsequent years, these two parties split up
into several groups and there were alignments and realignment in their structure.
Sri Ldnka also saw the emergence of leftist parties during the colonial period. These
were formed by some Gpper middle class youth who were western-educated and
attracted to the Marxist ideas. Three prominent Marxist parties that were active in
politics were the Lanka Sama Samaj Party (LSSP), the Communist Party (CP) and
the Bolshevik-Leninist Party of Indias(BLP1).!

There were also a gradual evolution of other moderate and liberal parties like the
United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) in the political
process. In 1946, Don Stephen Senanayake broke away from the Ceylon National
Congress and formed the UNP. Under Senanayake, the UNP which advocated a
liberal democratic order became quite popular among the masses and there was a
complete alignment of forces under it. It attracted prominent leaders like S.W.R.D.
Bandaranaike of the Sinhala Maha Sabha, Sir John Kotelawala, J.R. Jayewardene
and Dudley Senanayake into its fold. The UNP also included some prominent Tamil
and Muslim politicians. Therefore, the UNP was placed at the top of all political parties
in the 1947election. While the party represented various ideologies and personalities,
it was united in its emphasis on agricultural development as the basis of economic
progress and commitment to social welfare policies.
In this realignment of political forces, an important political development was the split
in the UNP. In July 1951, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike left the UNP with a group of
supporters and founded the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Though its membership
included both leftists and rightists, it emerged as a party of moderate left, holding the
centre between the UNP and the left. The SLFP, which was also more sympathetic to
the cultural sensitivitiesofthe Sinhalese, adopted a nationalist and anti-western posture.
Thus, in the spectrum of the Sri Lankan politics, the multi-party system provided the
voters a range of choices from Marxist fringe groups to the UNP and from ethnic
parties to the multiethnic units.
On the other hand, the minority Tamils had come under the umbrella of the Tamil
Congress which was led by G.G. Ponnambalam who served their interests well. But in
1951, a section of the Tamil Congress broke away to form the Federal Party (FP).
This new party, led by S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, pleaded for a federal set-up in order to
Country Profiles: safeguard the rights ofthe minority Tamils. This was in contrast to the Tamil Congress's
Sri Lanka, the Maldives moderate approach under Ponnambalam who continued to support the UNP government
even after it initiated some discriminatory policies against Indian Tamils.

In the early 1970s, several Tamil political groups, including the Tamil Congress and
the Federal Party, came together under the banner of the Tamil United Front (TUF).
The TUF was rechristened as the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1976
after it adopted a demand for an independent state, a "secular, socialist state of Tamil
Eelam': In the general election of July 1977, TULF won eighteen seats in the legislature,
including all fourteen seats contested in the Jaffna Peninsula. But in October 1983, all
the TLTLF legislators forfeited their seats in Parliament for refusing to swear an oath
unconditionally renouncing support for a separate state in accordance with the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution. The TULF later softened its position and proposed a
federal set up within the Sri Lankan constit~ltionalframework.
The party system in Sri Lanka has remained volatile witnessing the alignment and
realignment of political parties. In the electoral politics, several new small parties
emerged and passed into oblivion. The two major parties i.e., the UNP and the SLPF,
survived many elections, but they often required the s~~pport of smaller parties in order
to govern effectively.

14.4.2 Electoral Politics


The first general elections of 1947 resulted in a qualified victory for Don Stephen
Senanayake and his newly formed UNP which claimed credit for the new-found
independence. As the leftists were divided, the UNP could win more than half of the
seats while the Tamil Congress emerged as the dominant party in Tamil areas. In this
process the UNP7sdominance continued in the early 1950s.
When D.S Senanayake died in 1952, his son Dudley Sccanayake took over the reigns
and led the UNP to a massive victory in the general elections that year. However, the
UNP received a major challenge, when Solomon Bandaranayeke broke away from it
and formed a new party, the SLFP. The SLFP7spopulist programme offering political
change, social justice and economic independence from external control appealed to
the masses as it emphasised on economik development and economic equality. It
attracted the major chunk of rural votes and the sizeable protest vote that had gone to
the Marxist parties for want of a democratic alternative to the UNP. By the mid-50s,
the position of the UNP was undermined, even though its hold on parliament appeared
to be as strong as ever. The economy was in a bad shape after a period of prosperity.
An attempt to reduce the budgetary allocation for food subsidies provoked violent
opposition from the left-wing parties. Moreover, the religious, cultural and linguistic
issues were gathering momentum with the rise of Buddhist Sinhalese sentiments. In
this situation, Bandaranaike's SLFPwhich championed the cause of Buddhist Sinhalese,
swept the polls defeating the UNP in the 1956 general elections.
With the SLFP in power, the Buddhist Sinhalese agenda now came to be implemented
at the expense ofthe minorities. For instance, the new government adopted the Official
Language Act, which declared Sinhala as the official language. The act caused a
reaction among Tamils, who perceived their language, culture, and economic position
to be ~lnderattack. The Federal Party launched a safyagraha (nonviolent protest)
that resulted in a pact between S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and S.J.V. Chelvanayakam.
The agreement provided a wide measure of Tamil autono~nyin Northern and Eastern
provinces. It also provided for the use ofthe Tamil language in administrative matters.
But the pact could not be implemented because of a peaceful protest by Buddhist
clergy, who, with support from the UNP, denounced the pact as aUbetrayalof Sinhalese-
Buddhist people." These serious differences between the Sinhalese and Tamils
ultimately resulted in race riots. On economic front, the SLFP under Mrs. Bandaranaike
also carried out the nationalisation of economic enterprise. 'l'he socialist pattern was
found suitable in redressingthe balance in favour of Sinhalese Buddhists as the island's
economy was dominated by the foreign capitalists.
In the mid 1960s, there was a new alignment of political forces at the centre with Political Structures and
Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samaj Party (LSSP)joining the SLFP government in coalition. Processes in Sri Lanka
The SLFP's shift to the left was a calculated move. It was designed to stabilise the
government after extended periods of emergency rule and serious ethnic and religious
confrontations under Mrs. Bandaranaike's rule. However, with the emergence of
internal rifts within the SLFP, the party lost mandate in the general election of
March, 1965.
A coalition of parties led by Ductley Senanayake's UNP returned to power in the 1965
elections. During its tenure, the UNP dominated coalition attempted to maximise
agricultural productivity to achieveself-sufficiency in food-grains production. Dudley
Senanayakegave importance to ethnic and religious reconciliation in his government's
policy as he had formed the coalition government with the Federal Party (FP). On the
other side, the opposition led by the SLFP, had entered into a loose alliance with the
leftists. Such a balance of forces at the political level had also raised the issue of
predominance ofthe SinhaleseBuddhists in its background. Gradually, the competitive
pdpulist politics resulted in the decline of status of ethnic and religious minorities.
In the 1970 general elections,the SLFP fought the election in alliance with left parties
such as the Communist Party (CP) and the LSSP. In its manifesto, it promised to
introduce a republican constitution with new political institutionsthat reflected indigenous
values more perfectly than the 1946 constitution. The SLFP alliance defeated the
UNP and formed a government under the banner of United Front (UF).-In 1972, the
UF dominated legislature adopted a republican constitution that introduced presidential
system. However, the new government, like the previous UNP government faced
serious problems like unemployment, rising prices, scarcity of food items. It zhould be
noted that like most of the developing countries, Sri Imka faced serious problems due
to rise of cost imports in 1970's. In these circumstances the governments move to
reduce subsidies for food made the UF government unpopular. The UF government
faced a serious threat when in April 1971, a leftist group known as the Janata Vimukthi
peramha (JVP) or Peoples Liberation Front launched blitzkrieg operation to take
over the country. The JVP insurrection was suppressed only after considerable fighting
during a protracted state of emergency declared by the government. The JVP movement
'for the revolutionary transformation of society, as subsequent developments show,
had impact on economic and social spheres.
The economic and political crisis led the UF governmentto adopt authoritarianmeasures
to meet the exigencies. It vigorously carried out the nationalisation of plantations. In
the aftermath of the JVP insurrection,the government sought to adopt a new republican
and indigenous constitution in order to bring under its control the reactionary elements
in the society.
Check Your Progress 1
;.Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
1) On what issue did fissures in the Ceylon National Congress emerge?

2) The two main factors responsible for the victory of SLFP in the 1956 eIections
are
Country Profiles:
Sri Lanka. the Maldives 14.5 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
During the 1970 election campaign, the United Front had promised to promulgate a
republican constitution reflecting indigenousvalues. The first steps to effect the transition
to republican status was taken by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in the mid 1950s, when he
secured the approval of the Commonwealth Prirne Ministers in 1956. However, the
declaration of a repubiic was postponed until May 1972 as no government during the
intervening period had sufficient time or the required majority to amend tlie constitution.
By the time the UF took LIPthe issue, there were also many who were critical of the
parliamentary system wliich was regarded as imsuitable for tlie new challenges facing
a small colmtry like Sri Lanka. So. the SLFP-led UF government opted for a Presidential
systeln combining features from different constitutions.

The new Constitution was democratic, socialist and republican in'nature. With its
adoption in 1972. Sri Lanka ceased to be a dominion and became a free sovereign
and independent republic. The constitution abolished the Senate and established a
unicameral National State Assembly. The assembly was defined as the embodiment
of the power o'f the state and provisions in the constitution denied the judiciary the
authority to challenge its enactments. The executive was given a wide range of
emergency and special powers, and judicial curbs on the executive were also greatly
restricted.

Apart from the concentration of power in the executive, the 1972 constitution included
two other controversial features. It abandoned the idea of a secular state, which had
been incorporated into the 1946 constitution, giving Buddhism a special place. It also
declared Sinhala as the sole national language. These measures became controversial
because of opposition from the Tamil minorities. The UNP also opposed the changes
fearing the emergence of an authoritarian government. So on the eve of nexl elections,
the UNP announced that it would change the constitution and adopt a presidential
form of go\ernment with necessary changes if it came to power. When the lJNP won
the elections the National State Assembly adopted a constitutional amendn~ent
establishing a Presidential for111of government and J.R. Jayawardene became the
first exccutive head of the government. Since the changes bro~lghtoilt by the
amendment \\ere not sufficient, in September 1978 a new constitution was adopted.

The 1978 Constitution changed the country's fol-mal name from the Republic of
Sri Lanlia to the De~nocraticSocialist Republic of Sri Lanka and established a
presidential form of government similar to that operating in France under the
Fifth Republic. Like the 1972 constitution, it recognized the special status of the
Buddhist religion (assuring it, again, "foremost place" while guaranteeing the
freedoin of other religious communities). It, however granted "national" status to the
Tamil as well as Sinhala language although only Sinhala was recognized as the "official"
language.

The govenunental institutionswere divided in the custolnary way between the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches. However, the constitution did not provide for genuine
separation of powers. The president's powers as the head of tlie state and as the
chief executive are formidable conipared to those of the legislature. The president,
who is elected for a six year term, can declare war and peace, grant pardons, and
carry out any action approved by the legislature or ordered by the Suprenie Court.
The president appointed the prime minister and the cabinet with the approval of the
parliament. In addition, the president rather than the prime minister presided over the
cabinet when it met. The president, moreover, could keep any n~inisterialportfolio.
The parliament also has a six year term, but the president has the authority to dissolve
Parliament at any time and call for new elections.

The Constitution of 1978 was adopted in order to meet some urgent problems like the
maintenance of national uniQ and territorial integrity. As we noted, the new presidential
system of government gave due consideration to the question of minority rights, by Political Structures and
declaringTami1along with the Sinhala to be the national languages of Sri Lanka. This Processes in Sri Lanka
was a major development since mid-1950s as it restored the confidence ofthe Tamils.
There was also greater emphasis on individual rights in matters of freedom of speech -
and religion and formati011of trade associations. Another important feature of the new
constitution was the abolition of the distinction between citizens by residence and
citizens by registration. This benefited the Indian Tamils who were so far treated as
second-class citizens by earlier governments. Thus, the Indian Tamils settled in the
plantation were guaranteed all civil and political rights. The Indian Tamils, in return
responded positively to these conciliatory gestures and the Congress Working Committee
(CWC), the main political party-cum-trade union representing the Indian Tamils even
joined the Jayawardene government.

For most Tamils, these measures appeared to be a classical case of too little too late.
The separatist call for a Tamil Eelam, or "Precious Land," that emerged out of Tamil
political disillusionment soon was accompanied by attacks on government targets. The
government was compelled to pass the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Intended to be a
temporary measure, it became a permanent piece of legislation giving unbridled powers
of search and arrest to the police and military. Jayewardene subsequently initiated a
series of negotiations on increased autonomy with the major Tamil political organization
on the island. However, with the Tamil Tigers escalating their terrorist attacks, there
was a Sinhalese backlash against Tamils. Serious rioting again broke out 1981 and in
greater magnitude in July 1983 riots, unleashing an unprecedented wave of viole'nce
that engulfed the island and divided Sri Lankan society. Jayewardene's efforts to bring
Tamils and Sinhalese together to negotiate a political settlement failed as the moderate
TULF had already lost ground to the LTTE (Liberation Tigers ofTamil Ealam) which
was steadfast in establishing a separate state, the Tamil Ealam. In the meantime, the
Sinhalese extremists who were opposed to ally plan of devolution of power to the
Tamils became active in Sinhalese majority areas.

Facing serious internal crises from different fronts, the Jayawardene government
signed an agreement with the Indian government which provided it with military
assistance under the Indo-Lanka Agreement of 1987. We will examine this in some
detail in other units. Broadly, under the UNP rule, the ethnic conflict became worse
with the Tamil insurgents raising a bloody separatist war in the north and east of the
island-state.
In December 1988, the UNP nominated the then Prime Minister Rariasinghe Premadasa
for presidential election. Premadasa won the election by acomfortable margin. Sirimavo
Bandaranaike of SLFP obtained 45 per cent of the votes. These elections saw much
violence and rioting as the JVP and the LTTE opposed the elections and indulged in
violence. Later, the parliamentary elections were held in February 1989 in which the
UNP won 125 out of the 225 seats. This election was also marked by widespread
violence and became the bloodiest election in the history of independent Sri Lanka.

Gradually, with the rise in terrorist violence and insecurity, the government resorted to
some-dr'asticmeasures. It implemented some draconian laws which compromised the
pri~iciplesof justice and democratic rights. Otherwise, Presidential powers were
increased in an effort to restore stability. But it seemed that the situation had gone
beyond control when President Ranasinghe Premadasa was assassinated on 1 May
1993 by a LTTE cadre. Later, with changing political climate, the opposition SLFP
rode back to power when Mrs. Bandaranaike's daughter Chandrika Bandaranaike
Kumaratunga became the Prime Minister after the 1994 general elections. Later she
was elected as President in November 1994 and she appointed her mother as Prime
Minister. In the December 1999 presidential election, Chandrika Kumaratunga was
re-elected as the President. In the parliamentary elections held the following year, the
SLFP-I,: ooalition retained mandate. However, the SLFP lost the 2003 election to the
UNP led by Ranil Wikremesinghe who became the Prime Minister and started
negotiation with the LTTE.
I Country Profiles:
Sri Lanka, the Maldives
Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.


ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

1) What were the controversial features of the Constitution of 1972?


...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
2) What were the major features of the 1978 Constitution?

14.6 LOCAL GOVERNMENT I

As a parliamenmy democracy, Sri Lanka had experienced the formulation and exercise
of political power at different levels. In this context, it is pertinent to examine the
institutionsof government at the lowest level. During the colonial rule, the Government
Agents (GAS)were very powerful and important agents of the central government.
Though they were mainly revenue agents, they were given other powers to control all
government activities in their regions. However, after independence, their influence
declined as they had to compete with the elected members of Parliament and other
authorities ofthe government.
Local government revolved around a system of councils at the village, town, and
municipal levels. These governments had limited revenues and carried out a relatively
small number of functions such as over seeing public works in the city or village under
theirjurisdiction. In 1981,these village, town and municipal councils were replaced
by the District Development Councils (DDCs). The DDCs were created largely to
satisfy minority aspirations for local self-government and were designed to exercise a
significant measure of autonomy, especially-as the name implies-in the area of
economic planning and development. However, these district councils floundered from
the very beginning. Major opposition parties such as the SLFP, the LSSP ar,b il;:- ??
opposed the scheme and even boycotted the first elections to the DDCs in 1981. The
scheme did not get attention from successive governments and was finally replaced
by provincial councils in 1988.
As of now, there are eight provincial councils covering the geographical regions ofthe
island. The first election to the North-East Council was held in 1988 as per the Indo-
Lanka accord to grant some sort of autonomy to the Tamil regions in the north and
east of the island. Each province has an elected council with a chief minister and a
group of ministers approved by the council. The councils have started the removal of
the former system of the local administration. Each province is divided into two or
three administrative districts. Each district has a set of government offices called
kachcheri, which are main functionaries in each district. Apart from the kachcheri
and the provincial councils, there are several elected local government councils in
each district, which carry out a small number of hnctions.
Over all, local government has remained very weak in Sri Lanka. As a unitary state,
most of the revenue generated by the government is in the hands of the national
government in Colombo. Often the decisions made by the national government are Political Structures and
implemented by the local government. The intensification of the Tamil demand for a Processes in Sri Lanka
separate homeland, partly due to the failure of the decentralisation experiment under
the DDC, resulted in further centralisation of the polity with the government trying to
meet the ckallel~geby resorting to authoritarian measures and emergency laws in the
name of national security.

RECENT POLITICAL DEWLOPMENTS


By some recent political indications, the country seems to be plagued by problems of
political uncertainty, ethnic polarization and economic crisis. For instance, in the last
general elections held in April, 2004, the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA)
led by President Chandrika Kumaratunga emerged as the single largest combine in
the 225-member Parliament but fell short of a majority to form a government on its
own. The point is though the UPFA as a combine of the left-of-centre parties like
Kumaratunga's SLFP and the JVP, it did not obtain the majority-mark of 113. On the
other hand, Wickremesinghe's UNP ended up with just 82 seats and lost power to the
Kumaratunga-led front. These latest elections were held for the third time in the last
four years after the collapse of a bitter cohabitation government between the
constitutionally powerful executive President Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremesinghe ofthe UNP-led alliance.

Another important feature of the current electoral politics is the emergence of voting
on ethnic lines. For instance, the four-party Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which
was backed by the LTTE, swept the Tamil-majority areas in the north and the east. It
emerged as the third largest party with 22 seats. On the other hand, the Jathika Hela
Uru~naya(JHU), which fielded Buddhist monks in all constituencies, succeeded in
sending nine of them to Parliament. Likewise, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC)
won five seats in the Muslip-inhabited regions. Broadly, the voting pattern reflected
ethnic polarization as the hard-core Sinhala and Tamil parties swept the polls in the
soutll and north of the country respectively. Moreover, the elections condkted under
the proportional representation system, has once again created a situation where the
main parties could not form a government without the support of smaller parties.

Therefore,the present political alignments do not indicate any positive signs of a healthy,
democratic and stable politics for the country. Another point is that the main reason
that triggered parliamentary polls four years ahead of schedule was the political
machinations of the SLFP-JVP combine to gain power. Although the two are left-of-
centre parties, they have serious differences on the crucial issue ofTamil problem and
peace process as their positions are diametrically opposite. In January 2004, when the
SLFP and the JVP joined hands after year long negotiations, they agreed to disagree
on the fundamental issue of solving the decades-long separatist crisis. While the SLFP
wants to end it through greater devolution of power, marking a move away from the
unitary state, the JVP is sharply opposed to these concepts and does not want any
dilution of the nature of the present state. The JVP's views on this issue are closer to
that ofthe JHU which consists ofBuddhist monks. Otherwise, there is relatively some
convergence of opinion between the SLFP and the LNP on the Tamil issues that
dominate the Sri Lankan politics. But they cannot come together due to the historical
rivalry and the need for political sui-vival.

On the other hand, the Tamil party, the TNA had contested the elections on the twin
planks of accepting the LTTE as the sole representatives of ethnic Tamils and its
proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) as the basis for negotiations.
For the LTTE, which participated in elections for the first time, the verdict in theTamil
areas was a message to both Sri Lanka and the international community. Paradoxically,
the LTTE which refused to lay down arms or renounce violence during the negotiations
with the I JNP anvernmcnt is rinw renresentcd hv its nominees in P a r l i a m ~ ~ iSn
t with
Country Profiles: Sinhala chauvinists in Parliament, providing the setting for the clash of hard-line
Sri Lanka, the Maldives opinions. The success of the arithmetic is evident from the vote tally of the UPFA. In
the 2001 election, the SLEP won 37.2 per cent and the JVP won 9.1 per cent, making
a total of 46.3 per cent of the vote while the UNP and won 45.6 per cent of the vote
then. In the 2004 election, the UPFA secured 45.6 per cent while the UNP's electoral
alliance with the CWC and the SLMC ensured it a majority in the last elections. In a
sense, the Kumaratunga-led the UPFA's victory is a result of the poll arithmetic ofthe
SLFP-JVP alliance and an endorsement of its main concetion that UNP was conceding
too much to the LTTE in the negotiations that have been stalled for a long time.
But as of now, there is some willingness on the part of government to re-start the
peace process as it is under external pressures from aid-donor countries. india has
also played a positive role in sustaining the democratic process in Lanka which is
crucial foi peace and progress' in South Asia.
Check Your Progress 3 '

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.


ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
1) What is the position of the SLFP and the JVP on resolving the separatist
movement of the Tamils?
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................

LET US SUM UP
Though the political process in Sri Lanka has undergone changes in different times,
democracy has taken roots in the polity. The political parties and pressure groups have
played a major role in this process. The government has carried out necessary changes
in the constitution according to the need of the times. It has further enhanced the
position of political institutions and processes in the country. But the rise of competitive
and populist politics on ethnic basis presents a picture of a fractured polity which is not
a good sign for democracy. So there is a strong need for the practice of bipartisan
politics by all political actors at local and national levels in order to solve the national
problems.

SOME USEFUL BOOKS


De Silva, Chandra Richard. (1987) Sri Lanku: A History. Vikas Publication. New
Delhi.

Kearney, Robert N. (1967) Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon.


Durham, N.C. Duke University Press.

Manor, James. (ed.) (1984). Sri Lanku in Change and Crises. Croom Helm.London.

Phadnis, Urmila. (1976) Religion and Politics in Sri Lanka. London. C. Hurst &
Co. Ltd.

. (1973) Sri Lanku. .National Book Trust.New Delhi


Political Structures and
14.10 ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS
' Processes in Sri Lanka
EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

I) Fissures in the ranks of the Congress party emerged on the mode of representation.
While the majority Sinhalese wanted to do away with communal representation
and make territorial representation universal, the minorities, particularly Tamils
wanted to retain it to secure power.

I
t
2) The economic crisis that gripped the country in the fifties and the rise of Buddhist
Sinhalese sentiments.

i Check Your Progress 2

Ii 1) Concentration.of power in the executive, abandonment of secularism and


declaration of Sinhala as the sole official language were some of the controversial
i features of the Constitution of 1972.
ii
2) The 1978constitution modeled after the French system abolished the provision
i of separation of powers and it vested the executive powers in the president who
i was made very powerful
I
I
Check Your Progress 3

1) While the SLFP wants resolve the separatist problem through greater devolution
of power, marking a move away from the unitary state, the JVP is opposed to
these concepts and does not want any dilution of the nature of the present state.
UNIT 15 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN
SRI LANKA
Structure
25.0 Objectives
15.1 Introduction
15.2 Geography
15.3, Society and Culture
15.3.1 Ethnicity
15.3.2 Caste System

15.4 Economy
15.4.1 Economy since Independence

15.5 Political Economy of Sri Lanka


15.5.1 Evolution of Ethnic Identities
15.5.2 Education and Employment
15.5.3 Discrimination against the Tamils

15.6 Let Us Sum Up


15.7 Some Useful Books
15.8 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

15.0 OBJECTIVES - - - - -

This unit deals with the broad features of society and economy in Sri Lanka. After
going through the unit, you will be able to:

Describe the ethnic composition of Sri Lankan society;

Explain the ilnpact of colonialism on economy and society;

describe the inherited and prevailing economic structures; and

Identify the policies that accentuated the ethnic problem.

15.1 INTRODUCTION
Sri Lanka, or former 'Ceylon' is a small island-nation strategically located in the
Indian Ocean. Separated from the Indian sub-continent by a narrow strip of shallow
water called the Palk Strait, the country shares common race, language and history
with the Indian mainland. The country is multi-ethnic in nature with varied racial
and religious groups inhabitingthe island. But in recent times, the country has seen a
long and bloody ethnic conflict between the majority Sinhalese and the Tamils.
This conflict has its roots in colonial period. In the competitive politics ofthe independent
Sri Lanka, the search for economic and political power has driven the Sinhala
dominated governments to adopt policies favouring the Sinhala Buddhist majority. In
the 1970s,the grievances of the Tamil minority culminated in the demand by the Tamil
United Liberation Front, the main political party of the Tamil community, for an
independent Tamil state comprising the northern and eastern provinces. In this unit,
we will examine the nature of Sri Lankan society particularly with reference to ethnic
I . 1 3 . . . -"a .. .I, 1 . .l - 1 . . I I .I.
structures of the island nation giving due attention to the factors that have contributed Economy and Society in
Sri Lanka
to the widening chasm between the two ethnic communities in Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese
and the Tamils.

15.2 GEOGRAPHY
Separated from the Indian sub-continent by a narrow stretch of water, the Palk Straits
in the south of India, Sri Lanka is an island spanning over an area of 65,525 square
kilometres. It has a maximum length of 432 kilometres from north to south and width
of 224 kilometres from east to west. Geographically, the island can be divided into
three parts: the flat coastal plain, the hilly country covering the south central part
rangingfiom 3000 to 7000 feet, and the mid-country region at the height of 1000 to
3000 feet surrounding the mountain country. With the mountain mass in the centre, a
radial pattern is made by the rivers flowing out in all directions. The longest and the
most important river, the Mahaweli Ganga, however, originates on the western slopes
of the highlands and flows to the north east.
Of the 4 million acres of developed agricultural land, a large portion is under tea,
rubber and coconut plantations and about 1.5 million acres is used for paddy cultivation.
The island's agriculture is largely dependent on the two monsoons (the south-west
monsoon from May to September and the northeast monsoon from December to
February), although major and minor irrigation schemes have been established in some
parts of the islands. The country is divided into broad agro-climatic regions known as
the wet zone, covering largely the south western sections of the country and the dry
zone covering largely the north eastern parts of the country.Average annual rainfall in
the wet zone varies from 100 to 200 inches and in the dry zone it is often below 75
inches.

15.3 SOCIETYAND CULTURE


At independence Sri Lanka had a population of about 6.5 million, which by the early
2000 had increased to more than 19 million. The rate of population growth averaged
about 2.6 percent annually up to the early 1970s and declined to about 1.7 percent
over the next two decades. The population density is at 289 per sq. kilometre.

15.3.1 Ethnicity
Despite its small size, the island of Sri Lanka is marked by a relatively wide
diversity of ethnic groups. The society is divided by language, religion, and to a lesser
extent by caste, The linguistic and religious cleavages tend to reinforce each other,
that is, the members of each major linguistic group tend to share the same religion.
The principal ethnic community in Sri Lanka is the Sinhalese, who constitute about 74
percent of the population, The second largest ethnic group, the Tamils, constitute
about 18 percent of the population. Besides these two large ethnic communities, there
are the Moors (who constitute about 7 percent of the population) the Burghers, Malays
and Veddhas,
The Sinhalese are a distinct ethnic group speaking the Indo-Aryan language Sinhala.
They trace their origin to north India, claiming to be the earliest 'civilised' inhabitants
on the island. Most of the Sinhalese practice a variant of Theravada Buddhism which
had received continuous support from the rulers since it wa~introducedon the island
in the 3rdcentury BC. Though a significant minority of the Sinhalese were converted
to Christianity during the colonial period, Euddhism became closely allied with rising
nationalism in the latter half of the 19" century. Today, most Sinhalese consider
themselves to be the protectors of Buddhism.
From a geographical standpoint, the Sinhalese are categorised as Low-country and
Up-country or Kandyan Sinhalese. The Low-country Sinhalese are mostly concentrated
in the west and the south of the island. They experienced significant change through
Country Profiles: 400 years of European rule with many of them taking to Christianity and English
Sri Lanka, the Maldives education. The Kandyan kingdom which maintained its independence for along time
was late in coming under the European influence. The Kandyar~or the Up-country
Sinhales have largely preserved their social pattern which was feudal, hierarchical
and conservative in nature. Regarding themselves as the repository of pure Sinhalese
tradition, the Kandyan Sinhalesehave emphasised traditional Buddhist education rather
than English education.
The Tamils as a minority group have a distinct identity in racial and cultural terms.
They trace their ancestry to the same period as that of the Sinhalese arrival and
challenge the Sinhalese versions of the historical ?rigins of Sri Lanka. They are ~nostly
Hindus and speak the south Indian Dravidian language Tamil. Asignificant number of
them have converted to Christianity after the arrival of the European powers.
Tamils are, however, divided into Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils dependingon
their descent. The Sri Lankan Tamils, who constitute the majority of the Tamils, are
concentrated in the northern and eastern provinces and they make up 12.6% of the
total population. They trace their immigration to the distant past and are effectively a
native minority. The Indian Tamils, on the other hand, who make up 5.7 per cent of the
total population, are mostly concentrated in the plantation areas situated in the central
highlands. These people had been brought from the Indian mainland by the British to
work on the coffee, tea and rubber plantations in the island.
Although Indian Tamils are not indigenous to the island, they had the same legal status
as the Sinhalese and the Sri Lanka Tamils during the British rule. After independence,
the first Sinhalese-dominated government took steps to deny citizenship to the Tamils
of Indian origin on the ground that even though many of them were born in Sri Lanka,
they were only temporary residents of the island and did not have long term ties to the
country. The government sought to deport most of the Indian Tamils and other non-
citizens to India and Pakistan. As both India and Pakistan were not receptive to the
repatriation ofthese people because most of them were born in Sri Lanka, they remained
as stateless citizens. The Sirimavo-Shastri pact of 1964 and Sirimavo-Indira Gandhi
pact of 1974 attempted to solve the problem of stateless people. Under these two
pacts, India and Sri Lanka agreed to grant citizenship to 6,00,000 and 4,00,000 Tamils
respectively. However, the process was slow and following the escalation of ethnic
violence in the 1 9 8 0 repatriation
~~ was suspended. In 1988, after a prolonged struggle
within and outside parliament, the Indian Tamils managed to extract citizenship rights
from the government.
Another important ethnic minority group is that of Moors or Muslims who ;ake up
some 7.4% of the total population. They trace their ancestry to Arab traders who
moved to southern India and Sri Lanka some time between the eighth and fifteenth
centuries, adopted the Tamil language that was the common language of Indian Ocean
trade, and settled permanently in Sri Lanka. They are mostly concentrated in the
coastal areas of the eastern part of the island.
Apart from the Moors, there are other small minorities like Malays and Burghers who
constitute some 0.4% of the total population. The Malays are the descendents of the
Javanese who were brought to the island by the Dutch (1640- 1796) for military
service and canal building. They speak Malay language (Bahasa Melayu), which
includes numerous words absorbed from Sinhalese and Tamil. The Burghers are'the
Portuguese and Dutch people who had intermarried with the local population and
became permanent residents of the country. During colonial period, they had occupied
high educational and administrative positions but have lost influence after the island
became independent. The community is shrinking in size because of emigration.
15.3.2 Caste System
The caste system in Sri Lanka developed its own characteristics. While it shares an
occupational role with its Indian prototype, caste in Sri Lanka is based on hereditary
roles and functions rather than on ~ r i n c i ~ l of
e s ~uritv-im~uritv.
Buddhism which in
principle discourages distinctions based on caste apparently lessened the severity of Economy and Society in
Sri Lanka
the institution. Adistinct feature of the caste system is that both among the Sinhalese
and the Tamils, the highest status caste is also the largest in size. Among both these
ethnic communities, the cultivator caste is placed high in the social hierarchy. Goyigama
is the cultivator caste among the Sinhalese which is dominant both in terms of population
and influence. According to most estimates, they constitute about one half of the
Sinhala population. All Sri Lankan heads of state have, since independence, belonged
to the Goyigama caste. Beneath the Goyigamas are the smaller non-cultivator castes
that are accorded lesser status. These are the Karawa (fishermen) the Salagama
(cinnamon peelers) and the Durawa (toddy tapper) castes. They are principally found
along the southwest coast of the island and generally constitute a majority in the
regions they are found.
Among the Sri Lankan Tamils, the cultivator caste known as the Vellala dominates the
caste structure. Like the Goyigama among the Sinhalese, the Vellala is numerically
dominant, constituting about one halfofthe Sri ~ a n k a ~ a mpopulation.
il Beneath the
Vel lala are several important castes such as the Koviyar (domestic servants) and the
two fishermen castes, the Karayar and Mukkuvar. Among the Tamils, castes such as
the Palla (agricultural labourer),Ambattar (barbers), Valava (toddy tappers) and Paraya
(scavengers) are regarded as untouchable. It is estimated that one fourth of the Tamil
population is composed of these untouchable castes.
Within their separate caste hierarchies, Sinhalese and Tamil communities are
fragmented through customs that separate higher from lower orders. There is nearly
a complete absence of inter-caste marriages. Several members of the lower status
j caste groups have seized the opportunities provided by the modem economic system,
and have become wealthy. These differences in wealth have created wide class
1 cleavages that cut across boundaries of caste, religion, and language. Because of all
1
these divisions, Sri Lankan society is complex, with numerous points of conflict. As
i we shall see later in this unit, uneven economic development and periodic economic
1 crisis that gripped the country have reinforced these divides.
I
i
Check Your Progress 1
1
I

1 Note: i)
i
Use the space given below for your answers.
Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
L
b
I I) Who were the original settlers in the island of Sri Lanka?

2) How did the 'stateless' Indian Tamils obtain their citizenship?

15.4 ECONOMY
The basic features of the plantation raj in Sri Lanka, until the nationalization of foreign
owned estates in 1975, appeared in early phase of British colonial rule (1830 to the
1870s) when coffee plantations were established in the central highlands. Under
legi-'-+ionpassed in 1840, the title of most forestland was vested in the government.
In order to stimulate the production of coffee crop for export, the colonial administration
sold large tracts to persons who wished to develop plantations. In this phase, most the
Country Profiles: 80,000 hectares of these lands were purchased by the British civilian and military
Sri Lanka, the Maldives officials. The British not only owned but managed most estates which were financed
by British banks. It was during this phase that the colonial rulers began to bring labour
under indenture contracts from south India to overcome the labour shortage during
coffee harvesting season. The Tamil labour used to be sent back to India after the
season was over. The British controlled the export trade and imported all supplies for
the estates, including food. The 1850s and 60s were the years of the 'king coffee'.

Though coffee plantation was wiped out in the 1870s by a leaf disease, it set the
pattern for tlie latter development of the plantation system. Tea quickly replaced coffee
as the plantation crop and rapidly spread along the upper and lower slopes of the hill
country. At around the same time, rubber and coconut were introduced as plantation
crops. A significant feature ofthis phase of intensified pla~itationagriculti~rewas that
many middle class Sri Lankan's entered the plantation economy by acquiring small
land holdings for cultivating rubber and coconut. This was particularly marked in the
cultivation of coconut with small holders accounting for 70 percent of the acreage.

With the soaring demand for tea in the Western nations and the automobile industry in
Europe and North America requiring rubber, tea and rubber emerged as large scale
industries in the early 20thcentury. Capital investment poured in and the colonial
government took measures to settle permanently Indian labour on the plantations as
tea which was harvested throughout the year required a permanent labor force.
increasing export trade also led to the development of tlie Colombo harbour and to
railway and road construction. This created opportunities for the Ceylonese
entrepreneur, and generated employment opportunities for the English-educated.
Plantation exports provided the export earnings that enabled the colonial government
to import food, textiles, and other consumer goods. At the time of independence,
almost all of the islands' foreign exchange earnings were derived from the export of
tea, rubber and coconut.

The capitalist enterprise, was however. restricted to the urban areas and the plantation
country. 'Fhe rest of the country remained under tlie traditional economy made up of
small holdings of two to five acres in the dry zone and about half an acre in the wet
zone growing paddy and other cereals and field crops such as chillies and onions.
Unlike in the plantation sector, there was little or no capital investment in {hetraditional
sector. Family labour rather than hired labour was the basis of enterprise. The level of
teclinology remained simple. Production was either for subsistence or for a limited
local market with tlie result that more than half of the rice consumed was imported.
Overall, the emphasis ofthe colonial government on plantation sector resulted in the
neglect of peasant agriculture which was marked by stagnation and decline in growth.

15.4.1 Economy since Independence


Independence did not mark any significant departure from the colonial economic policies.
During the first decade of independence, the plantation sector remained tlie mainstay
of the economy. Nearly all items of food and consumer goods, including luxury and
semi luxury items were imported liberally into the country. Social welfare measures
that were initiated by the elected legislati~resin the 1930s and 1940s to satisfy the
expectations of the electorates were continued.

The first sign of vulnerabilities of these policies of dependence on a few exportable


primary commodities, importation of all consumer goods and maintenance of costly
welfare policies came in the late 1950s when foreign exchange began to decline as a
result of gradual decline in the value of tea, rubber, and coconut in the international
marketplace. The problem of dwindling foreign exchange was further compounded
by the growing demands of an increasing population and rising unemployment among
the educated youth. The government responded to this alarming situation by intervening
directly in the largely free-market economy-restricting imports and exports and
E,conomy and Society in
expanding the state sector. In the early 1960s. imports of a variety of consumer items,
Sri Lanka
ranging from food items such as potatoes. onions, sugar and pluses to agricultural
machinery, transport vehicles was drastically reduced. A new and vigorous push was
given to agriculture and industry. By the end of the decade, important advances were
made in agriculture. Paddy production doubled while production of potato and chillies
increased manifold. At tlie same time, a number of state sponsored cement. ceramics,
paper, plywood, sugar, mineral sands and leather industries came into being. Significantly
these advances were made in the context of very low foreign exchange reserves and
rising unemployment problem.

Unfortunately. the upward turn of the econoniy could ngt be maintained in the 1970s
even though tlie government made vigorous attempts to restructure arid diversify the
economy by way of imposing land ceilings (where a'ceiling of 50 acres-and 25 acres
in the case of paddy land was imposed), nationalising large plantations and developing
tourism and gem export industries. With UNP government coming to power in 1977,
there was a shift away from the earlier policies aimed import substitiltion toward ones
aimed at liberalizing the econolny and promoting exports. Efforts were made to
dismantle the state sector in agriculti~reand manufacturing, encourage private enterprise,
welcome foreign investment and reduce import controls. It also shifted spending away
from subsidies and social welfare to investment in the nation's infrastructure. The
most ambitious one is the massive irrigation project, the Mahaweli Ganga Program,
which was intended to make tlie island self-sufficient in rice and generate hydroelectric
powcr to meet the country's requirements. These policies resulted in higher rates of
econonlic growth. LIPto 6 percent per annum till the early 1980s. This was achieved,
however, at the cost of a mounting external debt. Foreign aid from the United States,
Western Europe, Japan. and international organizations kept the economy afloat.
.
Fro111tlie mid- 1980s. there has been a marked deceleration of growth, caused mainly
by tlie disruptive effects of the ethnic conflict on economic activity. Most analysts
attribute this to the rise in defence expenditure to meet the internal security threats
and the consequent 14eductionin the capital expenditure, including foreign investment.
To offset the balance of payment crisis, Sir Lanka approached the International
Monetary Fund in 1987. 'The 1MF inspired reforms included further privatization, tariff
cuts and reduction of fiscal deficit. These reforms helped the econolny to rejuvenate
growth rate to a little over 5 percent during the first half of the 1990s. The containment
ofthe LTTE's rebellion during this period also helped in attracting foreign investment
and focusing on developmental activities.

The result ofthe import substitution policies since tlie 1960s and tlie market oriented
export promotior1 policies since the late 1970s have dramatically altered the nature of
t l ~ economy.
e Today, the economy is more diverse. Sri Lanka's most dynamic industries
now are food processing, textiles and apparel, food and beverages, telecommunications,
and insurance and banking. l'he country also had some success in diversifying exports.
The proportion of exports liked to the plantation crops has rapidly fallen from 90 percent
in the 1960s, to 46 percent in 1980s and to 20 percent by the late 1990s. Today, textiles
an& garments accounted for more than 60 percent of the export earnings. Other
important sources of foreign exchange included remittances from Sri Lankan's working
overseas, foreign aid, and tourism.

The condition ofthe economy has come to be largely linked to the ethnic crisis and the
overall peace process. These issues have also figured prominently in aid-donor
conferences in western capitals. For instance, in the year 2004 about $4.5 billion in aid
has been pledged by donors including Japan, the U.S. and the European Union on
condition that the peace process that was initiated towards the fag end of 2001 should
continue with tlie resumption of dialogue between tlie governlnent and the LTTE.
Otherwise. the Sri Lankan economy has seen the results of peace dividends as in the
recent past the economy has bounced back and some analysts forecast a growth rate
of 7 per cent in the first decade of 2 1 st century.
country Profiles:
Sri Lanka, the Maldives 15.5 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SFU LANKA
Sri Lanka was a 'crown colony' under the British Empire with close links to London.
So the colonial rulers coi~ldimpose their own economic models for modernisation and
growth in a traditional agrarian society. As we saw, the British transformed the
traditional agrarian economy into an 'export-oriented' economy based on tea and
rubber plantations. This plantation raj economy remained in place even after the country
became independent, till the political leaders were confronted by serious socio-economic
problems.
The uneven capitalist development that was characteristic of the plantation raj created
serious socio-economic divisions within the Sri Lankan society. When the colonial
masters occupied and introduced plantatio~isin the highlands of tlie Kandyan region,
the Kandyan Sinhalese boycotted the colonial masters as they lost their rights over
their own lands. Tlie Kandyans remained attached to their traditional social pattern
and disregarded English education. The British quickly handed overthe cultivatiori of
the land to the Indian Tamils who were brought on indenture contracts from south
India. The wholesale and retail trade and other allied services like transport and supply
in the Kandyan areas were taken over by the Low-country Sinhalese who were exposed
to the Western influences even before the British rille. This resulted i n social divide
between tlie Low-coi~ntrySinhalese and the Kandyans and they frequently perceived
their interests to be divergent. During the 1920s, the Kandyan National Assembly
advocated a federal state in which the Kandyan community would be guaranteed
regional autonomy.
The intensification of plantation agriculture in the latter half of the 19hcentury created
a legion of new trades arid occupations: landowners, planters, transport agents,
contractors, and businessmen. Certain Sinhalese caste groups, such as the fisher~tien
(Karava) and cinnamon peelers (Salagama), benefited from the emerging new economic
order, to the detriment of the traditional ruling cultivators (Goyigama). Tlie traditional
elite-the chiefs and headmen among the low-country Sinhalese and the Kandyan
aristocracy- formed a new class that transcended divisions of ethnic and caste. Mostly
concentrated in urban centres, they took to English education and joined tlie services
and professions such as medicine, engineering and the academic field.
In the northern and eastern arid regions where the scope for agricultural development
was limited, people looked towards other means of employment. Here a large number
of Tamils, mostly from the cultivator caste ofvellala benefited from English education
provided by schools and colleges set up by the American missionaries. They found
access tojobs in the colonial administration and in the various upper-bracket professions.
Asizable number ofTamils from more modest background also moved out and settled
'
in Colombo to avail of opportunities provided by boom in trade and commerce.
Sri Lankan society, thus, stood divided on the basis of economic and social classes.
The ethnically-divided society became economically differentiated and socially stratified.
. ~ ~ capitalist
i : class comprised two main strata: one arising from plantation and
commercial sector and the other from colonial bureaucratic and professional system.
On the other side, tlie peasant agriculture which suffered at the expense of the
plantation sector saw the rise of a large, economically depressed class in the rural
areas.
This trend continued in the post-independence phase, with the capitalist structure
unfolding in stages which saw the growth of an outward-looking economy. The stages
can also be described as the transition from a 'colonial mode of production' (as it
existed in tlie plantation sector) to an indigenous capitalist sector and later to a stage
of 'state capitalism'. The state continued with the 'inherited' economic policies of the
colonial period. Tlie export oriented economy of independent Sri Lanka remained
dependent on the world market. It grossly neglected the agriculture sector, upon which
the,vast majority of rural men depended for their livelihood. This created a small class
of highland proprietors on the one hand and a pauperised landless as well as tenant Economy and Society in
Sri Lanka
labourers on the other. The fluctuations in the world market affected the export-oriented
economy resulting in uneven developme~itand widened the ethnic cleavages in the
society.
From the above analysis, it becomes clear that the socio-cultural fabric of Sri Lanka
was torn by group cleavages. There was hardly any broad based political platform to
gather all sections of society for tlie larger interests ofthe state: The great void caused
by tlie near absence of a united mass struggle led to politicisation of the society along
tlie most deeply cut cleavage which was ethnic in character. It is pertinent here to
examine tlie ethnic divide between the Sinhalese and Tamils which had its origin in the
British colonial period.

15.5.1 Evolution of Ethnic Identities


An important development that contributed to the strengthening of identity among the
two major communities in Sri Lanka is the Buddhist revivalist movement. Sri Lanka is
the only country in the world where Threavada Buddhism had the largest following.
In response to the growing influence of Christian religion and English language in
matters of social and cultural living, in the middle of 19th century, there was Sinhala
Buddhists cultural movement to assert the rightful place of Buddhism. The ideologues
of this movement propounded a theory of cultural nationalism which established a
special relationship between Buddhism, the Sinhalese people and the island. The central
premise oftliis was that Sinhala Buddhists alone had the original rights to Sinhaladvipa
or tlie land sfthe Sinhalese and Dhammadvipa or the land of Buddhism. In this line of
thinking, Tamils, Muslims, Christians or other non-Sinhalese did not have a place. By
the time of independencethis type of Sinhalese-Buddhist ethno-nationalism had become
a part ofthe popular thinking. A fear of Indian domination, particularly of being swamped
by the Tamils from across the Palk Strait, figured prominently in tlie Sinhala-Buddhist
discourse. This had a serious impact on the subsequent social and political developments.
Iiiitially, the Sri Lankan Tamils did not feel threatened by the Sinhalese revivalism.
English educated Sinhalese and Tamil elites worked together for constitutional reforms.
1111919 they came together under the banner of Ceylon National Congress. Its first
president was a prominent Tamil, Sir. Ponnambalam Arunachalam. However,
differences between tlie two communities surfaced following the constitutional reforms
of 1920 which introduced territorial representation and enlarged the legislature with an
unofficial majority. These differences centred on the question of communal
representation. While the Sinhalese insisted upon representation according to population
strength, the Sri Lankan Tamils wanted representation in excess of their numbers.
This development combined with the growing appeal to ethnic identity and language
by the Sinhalese revivalists widened the divide between the two. In the early 1940s,
the-Tamils broke away from the Congress to form a separate political grouping.

15.5.2 Education and Employment


After Independence, there was a sharp rise in ethnic divisions as some Sinhalese
leaders adopted populist measures to secure the interests of the majority co~nmu~lity
at the cost of others. Particularly, the language and education policies adopted by the
Sinhala dominated government affected the educational and employment opportunities
of minority Tamils. The OfFicial Language Act adopted in 1956 gave precedence to
Sinhala language over Tamil and Englisl~.Major Sinhala parties supported this move
by confusing tlie anti-English and anti-elitist movement with the anti-Tamil movement.
The matter of the fact is that during the colonial period, the Sinhalese did not take
advantage of western education as they considered their Buddhist Sinhalese culture to
be pure and superior. The minority Tamils, on the other hand, took advantage ofChristian
~nissionaryeducation and gained in terms of employment and other opportunities. When
colonial rule ended in 1948,the Tamils had a disproportionate share ofjobs and economic
positions compared to the majority Sinhalese who had lagged behind due to their lack
/j Country Profiles:
Sri Lanka, the iMadives
of English education. This becanie a major issue in the middle of 1950s when the
political arena saw the growth of competitive and populist politics with tlie mainstream
Sinhala political parties demanding more share for the Sinhalamasses in terms ofjobs
and educational opportunities.
In this context, the discrepancy in standards of education is evident from the nature of
university admissions from tlie 1960s. Prior to 1956, the university exams were
conducted in English which was the language of the elite and the potential pool of
university applicants was relatively small, and only 30 percent of all applicants were
admitted. By the mid-1960s, the examinations were conducted in Sinhala and Tamil,
opening the universities to a larger body of applicants, many of whom were trained in
the vernacular languages in state-run secondary schools. At the same time, university
expansion slowed down because of lack of funds, and it became impossible to admit
the increasing nu~nbersof qualified candidates. Of those seeking admission in
universities, only 20 percent of applicants got admission in 1965 and only 1 1 per cent
in 1969. Those students who did manage to enter the university followed the traditional
road to a bachelor's degree, until neither tlie government nor private enterprises could
absorb the glut ofgraduates. In this way, the direction of educational expansion by the
late 1960s led to two major problems surrounding the university system: the growing
difficulty of admissions and the growing irrelevance of a liberal arts education to
employment. The big losers were members of the Sinhalese community, who were
finally able to obtain high school or university degrees, but who found further
advancement difficult. The resulting frustration led to the radicalisation of some
Sinhalese youth. In the early 1970s. some of them made an ~~nsuccessful atte~iiptto
overthrown the government under the banner of the Peoples Liberation Front (Janata
Virnukthi Peramuna).

15.5.3 Discrimination against the Tamils


The Tamils, on the other hand, were seriously affected by the 1956 'Sinliala only'
language policy which discriminated against the Ta~niIswho were mostly educated in
English. Though the language problem was partially resolved by the 1978 Constitution's
conferral of national language status on Tamil, Sinhalese still remained the higher-
status official language and persons joining tlie civil service were expected to acq~uire
proficiency in it.
Other areas in which the Tamils felt discriminated was in matters of preference given
to Sinhalese applicants for university admissions and public employment. Until 1970,
university admissio~iswere determined solely by academic qualifications. Because of
the generally higher educational standards of Tamils, their percentage of university
enrolments substantially exceeded their percentage of the general population. In 1969
for example, 50 percent of the students in the country's faculties of medicine and 48
percent of all engineering students were Tamil. During tlie 1970s, however, the
government i~nplenienteda preferential admissions system known as the "policy o f .
standardization." This was a geographically based criterion, but because the two ethnic
communities tended to be regionally segregated, such a policy increased Sinhalese
enrolments. Tlic scheme also established quotas for 70 percent of university places
on the basis of revenue districts and this included a special allotment of 15 percent of
all openings reserved for educationally u~iderprivilegeddistricts, which were
predominantly Sinhalese. Only 30 percent of openings were allotted nationwide on
merit considerations. By the early 1980s, the policy had proved a disaster for the
Tamils as they were denied access to employment opportunities. In 1983, only 22
percent of medical students and 28 percent of engineering students were Tamils.
Moreover, political factors played a role in the decline of the number of Tamils in
public service. Under the so-called chit system, which became pervasive when Sirimavo
Bandaranaike was in power during the 1970s, the influence of a parliamentarian was
needed to secure a government job (the chit being a memorandum written by the
legislator to inform personnel authorities of tlie preferred candidate). The Jayewardene
government made the machinery of patronage still more overt by giving each legislator Economy and Society in
'job banks' of lower level positions to be distributed to their followers. The expanding Sri Lanka
role of patronage at all levels of the civil servicehad two implicationsfor Tamils. First, ,
merit qualifications that would have benefited educated Tamils were sacrificed to
patron-client politics. Second, the patronage system provided Tamils with little or no
access to public employment because their political representatives, especially after
the 1977 general election,had limited influence.
The net result of the education and employment policies adopted by the Sinhala
dominated government was the alienation of Sri Lankan Tamil from the mainstream
society. In the political arena also, the Tamils found themselves totally ignored. The
disillusionment that set in among the Tamil youth eventfUlly led to the demand for a
separate state of 'Eelaam' meant for the Tamils only. In the early 80s, the differences
between the Sinhalese and the Tamils escalated into a violent conflict with debilitating
effect on the economy. In the next unit of this block, we will examine is detail the
efforts made to resolve the conflict between the two ethnic communities.
Check Your Progress 2
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
iii Check-your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
12: What was the impact of export-oriented economy during the colonial period?

2) What were the main issues of ethnic discrimination against the Tamils in the
post-independence phase?

...........................................................................................................................
3) How did the 'policy of standardisation'affect the minority Tamils?

15.6 LET US SUM UP


Sri Lanka, like other countries of South Asia, is ti s - ~ ; i ; - ~ tcountry
h i ~ with social
cleavages based on religion and language. The export oriented plantation ecohomy
introduced by the British resulted in ~neven-develo~ment and resulted in social and
economic crisis. Despite this, it remained one of the leading countries in South Asia in
terms of its social and economic indicators which point to a higher quality of life.
In 1960s, it adopted import substitution policies in response to the fluctuations in the
value of plantation crops in the international market. In the 1970s, it adopted market
oriented export promotion policies which have dramatically altered the nature of the
ecommy. Today, the economy is more diverse. This is reflected in its exports. Tea and
rubber no longer constitute the major export items of the country. Its most dynamic
sectorsare the food processing and apparel industries, banking and tourism. The ethnic
conflict, however, has seriously eroded the gains of economic development.
Country Profiles:
Sri Lanka, the Maldives 15.7 SOME USEFUL BOOKS
Bhargava, Pradeep. (1987) Political Economy of Sri Lanka, New Delhi
De Silva, Chandra Richard. (1987) Sri Lanka: A History. New Delhi
K.M.De Silva (ed.). (1977) Sri Lanka: A Survey. h n d o n
Farmer, B H. (1963) Ceylon: A Divided Nation. London
- -
Phadnis, ~rmila.(1973) Sri Lanka. New Delhi

15.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS


\
EXERCISES ,'
Check Your Progress 1
1) 'Though there are conflicting versions with regard to the original settlers in the
island of Sri Lanka,it is widely believed that the Sinhalese Buddhists first landed
in the island from the north east of the Indian sub-continent.

2) The stateless Indian Tamils could get their citizenship rights in 1988when they
emerged as a political party with a voice. This was facilitated by Indian initiatives
in the signing of two agreements known as the Sirimavo-Shastri pact of 1964
and Sirimavo-Indira Gandhi pact of 1974 which attempted to solve the problem
of stateless people.
Check Your Progress 2

1) It created small elite of landed aristocrats and capitalists and bureaucrats who
had common political interests. On the other hand, there was a growing rise of
economically deprived masses in the rural areas

2) In the political sphere, the Sinhalese leaders adopted populist measures to secure
the interests of the majority community at the cost of others. The government
policies resulted in discriminationagainst the minority Tamils in matters of language
and employment which were broadly linked to the medium and standards of
education.

3) The policy of standardisation was followed in matters of university admissions


to give representation to all regions and people on numerical calculations and it
benefited the majority Sinhalesewho gained access to education and employment.
On the other hand, the Tamils' share in university admission and employment
opportunities declined at a faster rate.
UNIT 16 ETHNIC ACCOMMODATION IN
THE POLITICS OF SRI LANKA
Structure
16.0 Objectives
16.1 Introduction
16.2 Evolution of the Ethnic Conflict
16.3 Ethnic Divide after Independence

16.4.1 The 1983 Riots.

16.5 The Inter-ethnic dialogue


16.5.1 The Thimpu Talks
16.5.2 Indo-LankaAccord
16.5.3 Mangala Moonesinghe Select Committee
16.5.4 The Chandrika Plan
16.5.5 Government-LlTE Peace Talks
16.5.6 Future Prospects

16.6 Let Us Sum Up


16.7 Some Useful Books
16.8 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

In this unit we will examine the divergent Sinhaleseand Tamil perceptions of ethnicity
and nation building and the efforts made to resolve the conflict between the two through
negotiations and political compromises. After going through this unit you should be
able to:

Trace the evolution of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka;

Identify the factors contributingto the rise ofTamil extremism; and

Describe the landmarks in the inter-ethnic dialogue.

16.1 INTRODUCTION
In the early years after Independence, Sri Lanka was referred to as a Model Colony
not only because independence was negotiated smoothly between the British officers
and Ceylonese nationalists, but also because of the apparent communal harmony. It
was believed that the country would soon attain political stability and the major ethnic
groups would get integrated-intoone nation. Since then, however, the chasm between
the Sinhalese and the Tamils, the two major ethic groups in Sri Lanka, has widened.
The extremist Tamil groups have begun to demand a separate state of Tamil Eelam
and have been carrying out a prolonged guerrilla struggle. 'The violence unleashed by
the Tamil guerrillas and the counter-violence by the Sri Lankan army has made Sri
Lanka one ofthe notorious 'killing fields' of South Asia. In this unit, we will examine
the factors responsible for the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and the efforts made to
resolve the conflict.
Cjountry Profiles: ,
$ri Lanka, the Maldives 16.2 EVOLUTION OF THE ETHNIC CONFLICT
While there was an apparent communal harmony during the colonial Ceylon, the seeds
of the cleavage between the Sinhalese and the Tamil were laid in those times. During
the colonial period, mutual suspicion between the Sinhalese and the Tamils followed
the textbook pattern. As it generally happens, certain aspects ofcolonial policy tend to
affect the majority interests more than the minority interests for the simple reason that
the minorities being already conscious oftheir numerically inferior status do not react
so sllarply to those aspects of the policy as does the majority. But as soon as the
majority reacts to those policies it indirectly harms the interests of the minority or at
least it is perceived as such, and in tM'process a cleavage is created. This happened
in Sri Lanka when, for example, the Morgan Commission Report of 1867 was
introduced.
The Sinhala Resurgence .,

The Sinhalese feared that the idea was to promote Christian missionary schools and
hence English education at the cost of the indigenous mode of instruction. Known as
the Denominational System, it gave fieedom to all religious denominations to establish
schools for their own children without any restrictions on religious teachings. On the
face of it, it was a democratic policy but its impact was differentiated. On account of
paucity of fundiand lack of political support, the Buddhist or Hindu organizations
were not in a position, like their Christian counterparts,to take much advantage ofthe
situation. The actual beneficiaries were, therefore, the Christian missionaries. In 1868,
65 per cent ofthe Sri Lankan children attending schools were Christians and only 27
per cent Buddhists. The British policy that left the develop~nentof secondary education
largely to private schools after 1884 enabled the Christians to maintain this lead.
The British educational policy not only disadvantaged the Sinhalese Buddhists vis-A-
vis the Christians, some of its aspects also affected them vis-his the Tamils. For
example, in 1869, the Department of Public Instruction was opened to financially
assist schools through various schemes of grant-in-aid. Followingthis, several Sinhalese
Buddhist schools were established. This system, however, had a different kind of
impact in predominantly Tamil Jaffna where it was left entirely to the Christian
missionaries to promote education. People here benefited from the education their
children received at modest cost. In due course they were so proficient in English aud
mathematics that they fil led most of the vacancies in the public and mercantile sectors
and held important professional position. It is no wonder that the Sinhaleseenthusiasts
soon began asking for the abolition of the denominational system. They saw in the
system the root cause ofttheir backwardrless in spite of their being the majority.
The Sinhalese resurgence also found its expression in the demand for the restoration
of their language to its pristine glory. Munidasa Cumaratunga (1887-1944), an
outstanding figure on the Sinhalese literary scene between the 1920s and the 1940s,
started a movement for the 'purification' of Sinhalese language by changing all borrowed
European and Indian words of Pali, Sanskrit, or any other origin, and by introducing
newly coined words modelled after the classical Elu idiom. He brought changes in its
grammatical form reminiscent of the 12hcentury Sinhalese. His idea was to raise the
Sinhalese language to the status of a cause and a mission. He called this revival
Helese. The slogan 'Language,Nation and Country' actually meant 'Helese language,
the Helese nation and the Helese country'.
The Sinhaleseresurgencealsofound its expression in religion. Many Sinhalese Buddhist '

organizations, such as, the Maha Bodhi Society,theYoung Men's Buddhist Association
(YMBA), the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, the Bauddha Jathika Balavegaya
(Buddhist National Force), etc. emerged. They did that job which was once done by
the Sangha but which the latter subsequently was not in a position to do effectively on
account of restrictions imposed upon them by the British government. It, however,
should be noted that as the mouthpiece of Sinhalese Buddhist interests, the Sangha
re~nainedtlie final authority and was never actually replaced by these organizations Ethnic Accomnaodation
many of which were rather short-lived. The revival of political Buddhism contributed in the Politics of
Sri Lanka
to tlie crystallization of several Sinhalese myths. The Sinhalese people came to be
viewed as tlie defenders ofthe faith against 'heathen' e~icroachnientswhich connoted'
both the Europeans and the Tamils, more so the latter. The ancient Sinhalese King
Duttliugamini was projected as a Sinhalese national hero who had repulsed tlie Tamil
invaders and defended the Buddhists.
The Tamil Resurgence
Sinhalese resurgence was matched by Tamil resurgence. It must not be confused
witli Hindu resurgence for the circumstances of Sri Lanka were different. Here
Buddhism did not pose any threat to Hinduism. If at all, the latter faced any threat it
was from the Christian missionaries. As a Hindu community tlie challenge that the
Taniils faced from the Sinhalese Buddhists was only in the realm of social institutions.
Arumuga Navalar ( 1 833-1870), who was the pioneer of Tamil resurgence, emphasized
on the return to orthodoxy which included the institution of untouchability. The pre-
eminence of the Vellalas of Jaffna, who had for centuries dominated the political and
economic affairs of the Tamils, was highlighted. This Vellala consciousnessconceived
tlie Sinhalese numerical dominance as a threat to its basic values because it tended to
intervene into the Tamil social system on tlie pretext of weeding out its undesirable
features.
While klinduism did not playa significant role in building the Tamil consciousness, the
community's historical image contributed considerably to its shaping. It drew its
inspiration from concepts pertaining to territory, dynasty (the Nallur Kingdom) and
language. Overthe years these concepts got rigidified by the mythology of 'tlie other'-
'Sinhalese bucolic hordes, bent on brutal oppression.'
Ethnicity and the Nationalist Movement
CJnlike the Indian nationalist movement under Mahatma Gandhi's leadership, the Sri
Lankan inovement was essentially elitist which included both Sinhalese and Tamil
elite. But this elitism was also marked by a strong presence of ethnicity in which one
community considered its loss as the other's gain and vice versa. This distrust, which
was noticeable during the formation oftlie Ceylon National Congress in 1919,deepened
witli the introduction ofthe universal adult suffrage in 1931. Fearing marginalisation
by the Sinliala majority, Tamils began to demand 'balanced representation' in tlie
legislature, which meant 50 per cent reservation for the minorities and strived for a
~nultiracialor multiethnic setup. A 1937 memorandum of the All-Ceylon Tamil
~onferencesent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated, inter alia: "The
conception of corporate unity... in the minds of the Sinhalese is in the nature of a
merger, absorption, ofthe minorities in the major community. Ajust and more correct
idea of a united Ceylon is that of a rich and gorgeous many-coloured mosaic, set and
studded with the diversities of communal consciousnesswithin a glorious one-minded
solidarity.. ."

16.3 ETHNIC DIVIDE AFTER INDEPENDENCE


After independence the Sinhala-Buddhist majoritarian politics had a field day. Tlie
two main pressure groups in the forefront of this movement were the Buddhist
Committee of Enquiry, an unofficial body of prominent Buddliist monks and laymen
appointed by the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress in 1954 to enquire into the state of
Buddhism in Sri Lanka, and tlie Eksath Buddhist Perarnuna (EBP), tlie United Front
ofthe Buddliist monks. Tlie report, Betrayal ofBuddhism, published by tlie Buddliist
Committee of Enquiry in 1956 was a severe indictment of the ruling United National
Party (UNP) for its neglect of Buddliist interests and for its pro-Christian bias. Its
major demands were: the creation of a Buddha Sasana Council; the repeal of the
section in the constitution dealing with protective clauses pertaining to tlie minorities;
Country Profiles: the take-over of all government-aided schools and training colleges by the state; and
Sri Lanka, the Maldives the termination ofthe services of Christian nuns working in government hospitals. All
these demands had a mass appeal and the majority Sinhalese supported it in th&r'
narrow partisan outlook.
So the year 1956 was indeed a watershed in Sri Lankan politics. That year S.W.R.D.
Bandaranaike (father of the present president Chandrika Kumaratunga Bandaranaike)
came to power. Bandaranaike was willing to identify himself with the sentiments of
the Buddhist chauvinists. Deciding to abide by the Ten Commandment drawn up by
the Buddhist clergy, he made Sinhalese the official language. The establishment ofthe
Ministry of CulturalAffairs in 1956,for the first time in Sri Lanka's history, also indicated
the government's pro-Buddh~stcommitment.
Thus, unlike India, where the government decided not to build the nation on the basis
of religion, the nation building experiment in Sri Lanka was based on tlie language of
the majority community,namely Sinhala and religion ofthe majority community, namely
Buddhism. Some of the decisions taken by Bandaranaike's government, pertaining to
language, education and settlement schemes affected the Tamil community both
politically and economically. By making Sinhalese the sole official language in 1956, by
abolishing the denominational system in 1960, and by introducingthe weightage system
for technical and higher education the interests of the Tamils were affected materially.
Another important factor that intensified the Tamil fears of marginalisation and
suppression was the "land colonisation" of traditional homeland ofTamils by Sinhalese
population. For the Tamils, the north and east of the island are considered as their
'traditional homeland' as they have inhabited these regions from times immemorial.
But just before independence, Sinhalese began to settle in eastern and northern parts
of Sri Lanka. For instance, in 1921 Sinhalese constituted only three percent of the
population of Trincomalee. By 1946, their numbers increased to 20.6 percent of the
population. In this context, the Bandaranaike's centrally sponsored settlement schemes
were viewed with suspicion as efforts to alter the demographic composition of the
eastern province, the traditional homeland of the Tamil population. But the mainstream
parties in Sri Lanka, in general, uplield the right of any community to move and settle
in any part of the island. On tlie other hand, the Tamils, concerned of being reduced
into a minority even in their homeland areas, began to argue that colonisation in the
Tamil areas should be exclusively reserved for the Tamils.
Tamil Response
In August 1956, the Federal Party, the principal Tamil party, at its annual convention
held at Trincomalee, made the following four demands and threatened to take direct
action by non-violent means if they were not met within a year:

1) Enactment of a democratic constitution based on the federal principle and the


establishment of one or more Tamil linguistic state or states.

2) Restoration ofthe Tamil language to its riglltful place enjoying absolute parity of
status with Sinhalese as an official language of the country;

3) Enactment of laws recognizing the right to full citizenship on the basis of a simple
residential test of all persons who have made this country their home;

4) Immediate cessation of colonisation of traditional Tamil-speaking areas by the


Sinhalese people.
To accommodate the Tamil grievances, Bandaranaike tried to introduce the Regional
Council Bill and make amends in the language policy through the Bandaranaike-
Chel~anayagar~l (B-C) Pact of 1957. Neither the B-C Pact nor the subsequent Dudley
Senanayake-Chelvanayagaz(D-C) Pact of 1965, though well intentioned, could do
mucL to contribute to harmonize the relations between the two communities. The
disillusionment amc..g the Tamils led to the birth ofthe idea of 'a separate state' which
wrs cham~ionedbv a ~oliticalDam named the Tamil United Liberation Front (lTJI,F\.
This growing Tamil disaffection became manifest in the election of 1977 when in the Ethnic Accommodation
in the Politics of
Northern Province, the TLTLF bagged all the 14 seats with 68.5 per cent votes while
Sri Lanka
in the Eastern Province it won three seats out of four. The only constituency it lost
was a Muslim majority constituency.
But the election was followed by the outbreak of communal riots in many parts ofthe
island leaving an estimated 300 Tamils dead and thousands homeless. The UNP
government took effective steps to suppress the riots and when the first session of the
new parliament opened in August 1977 a statement of Government Policy declared
that 'there are numerous problems confronting the Tamil-speaking people. The lack
of a solution to their problems has made the Tamil-speaking people support even a
movement for the creation of a separate state.'

RISE OF TAMIL EXTREMISM


In the evolution of the Tamil extremist movement, the years 1977-78 were of crucial
importance. Shortly before the 1977elections, two important elder politicians of Jaffna,
namely S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, the founder leader of the Federal Party, and G.G.
Ponnambalam, founder of the Tamil Congress, had passed away. They had been a
great integrative and moderating force among the Tamils. In their absence the militant
groups which were already in the field, and which had made their presence felt in the
ki I I ing of SLFP mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiyappah, in I 974, were unleashed. Among
these militant groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or LTTE vowed to achieve
a separate state or Eelam through bloody and violent confrontation with the Sri Lankan
state. Its arrival on the centre-stage of Tamil politics was signalled by the murder of
four policemen in Velvettithurai in April 1978. The incident triggered off a confrontation
with the government that injected a new and most complex dimension to Sri Lanka's
ethnic problem and eventually plunged the country into a virtual civil war.
The Jayewardene government, confusing the effect with the cause, resorted to military
suppression of the guerrillas without undertaking correspondingmeasures to meet the
challenge politically. As a response to the Velvettithurai incident, the government first
banned the LTTE and other similar groups in May 1978 and then imposed emergency
in Jaffna in January 1979 that continued for an year. Even as the government dealt
with the terrorist problem militarily, the National Assembly adopted tlie Anti-Terrorism
Bill on 19 July 1979. There was no opposition to the bill since the TULF members
were on a boycott of the House at that time in protest against the administrative
adjustment ofthe Vavuniya district.Although the SLFP attacked the bill on the floor
none of its members actually voted against it. The reason for the SLFP acquiescence
may have been the call issued by the Minister of State for Information, Ananda Tissa
de Alwis, to the SLFP to sink party differences when the entire Sinhalese majority
was being attacked by the minority.
However, the bill did not curb terrorism. On the contrary, it radicalized the extremists
and boosted their popularity among the Tamils. Besides the LTTE, there were five
active Tamil guerrilla groups, namely, the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil
Eelam (PLOTE), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), the Tamil Eelam
Liberation Army (TELA), the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF),
and the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS). Their ideological
differences and internal factionalism notwithstanding, these groups were averse to
political bargaining and sought an armed solution to the Tamil problem. Their relative
success vis-a-vis the TULF to draw the government's wrath raised their popularity
among the Tamils. .The LTTE ridiculed the TULF as 'Tamil United Lawyers Front'.

16.4.1 The 1983 Riots


Gradually, all efforts to resolve the ethnic conflict through constitutional and political
means came to a grinding halt when the country was rocked by anti-Tamil riots in July
1983. Riots had taken place earlier also but the 1983 riots were unprecedented in the
Country Profiles: sense that in this case even the elite members of the Tamil community were targeted.
Sri Lanka, the Maldives Following the riots the Jayewardene government was under tremendous pressure from
the Tamils of Sri Lanka behind whom were the government of India and the fifty five
million Tamils of Tamil Nadu. Javewardene realised that time was runninn- n ~and ~ t
something- must be done. Hereafter, India became an imwortant variable in Sri Lanka's
ethnic politics.
Check Your Progress 1
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

1) How did the colonial education policy contribute to the ethnic divide in Sri Lanka?

2) What factors shaped the Tamil consciousness during the colonial weriod?

3) What demands did the Federal Party place on the Bandaranaike government in
the mid 1950s?

............................................................................................................................
4) When and why did Tamil extremism emerge in Sri Lanka?

THE INTER-ETHNIC DIALOGUE


--

It is not necessary to go into all the details of what happened after 1983. To put our
subject in perspective it would, however, be necessary here to highlight some of the
landmarks in the evolution of the inter-ethnic dialogue. These landmarks are: the
Thimpu Talks (1985), the Indo-Lanka Accord (1987), the Mangala Moonesinghe Select
Committee (1991), the devolution proposal announced by President Chandrika
Kumaratunga (1995-97), and lastly, the present on-going peace negotiations between
the government of Rani1 Wickre:nesinghe and the LTTE with Norwegian facilitation.

16.5.1 The Thimpu Talks


k.1 late 1983 there wu; a series of talks between the Indian and the Sri Lankan
governments the result of which was the so-called ~arthasarathiPlan contained in the
1

Annexure C proposal. After Rajiv Gandhi became the Prime Minister, Parthasarathi's Ethnic Accommodation
in the Politics of
role was assumed by Foreign Secretary Romesh Bhandari. He held several parleys Sri Lanka
with the Sri Lankan authorities which resulted in a summit conference in New Delhi in
June 1985. The upshot of the summit was not clear, but at least it paved the way for
the Thimpu talks ofJuly 1985 between the representatives ofthe Sri Lankan government
and those of the six Tamil groups which included the moderate TULF and five extremist
groups, namely. LTTE, TELO, EPRLE; EROS and PLOTE.
At the Thimpu Talks, the proposals put forward by the Sri Lankan government were
the old ones dealing with devolution through district councils which the Tamil delegation
rejected. It announced four cardinal principles as the basic minimum to solve the
problem, which again were the reiteration of old Tamil demands, namely,

t 1) Recognition ofthe Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality.

I 2)

3)
Recognition of an identified Tamil homeland and the guarantee of its territorial
integrity;
Based on the above, recognition of the inalienable right of self-determination of
the Tamil nation;

4) Recognition of the right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic


rights of all Tamils, who look upon the Island as their country.

i 16.5.2 Indo-Lan ka Accord


By the end of May 1987, a rumour spread in Jaffrla that the Sri Lankan authorities
were preparing to launch an 'invasion' of Jaffna. The 'Tamil areas were already
subjected to bombings and military operations and the supply of essential commodities
to Jaffna had been stopped. There was strong pressure from Tamil Nadu government
for an Indian military intervention as thousands of Jaffna Tamils arrived on Indian
shores to escape the atrocities in northern Sri Lanka. Faced with diplomatic as well as
internal pressure India decided to send relief supplies to Jaffna by boat. When the Sri
Lankan navy prevented the boats from reaching Jaffna India air -dropped dry rations
and vegetables near Jaffna.
The mission drew sharp reaction from Colombo. Sri Lankan government called the
Indian action an act of 'cowardice' and lodged protest with the United Nations Secretary-
General in June against the entry of the Indian Air Force 'in violation of the country's
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity'.
I
India's message, however, was clear to Colombo. The day the airlift took place, the
k Sri Lankan government lifted the six-month old fuel embargo on Jaffna peninsula.
TheNational Security Minister, Lalith Athulathmudali,announced 'operation goodwill'
which provided forthe distribution of 900 tons of food to the Tamils in the Vadamarachi
region over which the Sri Lankan army had gained control.
Followingthe relief mission, attention again shifted to the possibility of finding a political
solution to the strife. On 19 July 1987, President Jayewardene proposed the creation
of an autonomous unit comprising the Northern and Eastern provinces. The proposal
envisaged the creation of a single province consisting of the Northern and Eastern
provinces which would have one Governor and one ChiefMinister. The two provinces,
however, would remain distinct for administrative purposes. There would be 36 seats
in the Northern provincial council and 35 in the Eastern. If the scheme was acceptkd
there would be a special referendum in the Eastern Province to decide whether or not
it wanted to merge with the Northern Province. It was further proposed that the
militants should surrender their weapons before the provincial council elections and
the army should return to their barracks. An independent committee headed by the
Chief Justice should monitor the elections. India agreed to underwrite the scheme and
1 promised assistance in eliminating residual violence from any parties against the
1 qettlement.
Jayewardene's proposal galvanized the peace process that soon culminated in the
signing of an accord between India and Sri Lanka on 29 July 1987 which came to be
known as Indo-LankaAccord. The importance ofthe accord lay not only in its provisions
but also in the exchange of letters between the two governments that was almost
simultaneously undertaken. The accord had essentially two aspects. The first dealt
with India's commitment to uphold Sri Lanka's sovereignty and territorial integrity on
the condition that the latter agreed to grant a reasonable amount of autonomy to the
Tamils to their satisfaction. The second dealt with Sri Lanka's commitment to disallow
any extra-regional power to dabble in its affairs which had either a known or a potential
intention to harm India's security interests in the region.

Following the signing ofthe Indo-Sri Lankan accord, India sent a peace keeping force
(IPKF) to ensure that peace returned to the strife-torn Tamil areas. In operational
terms this meant the disarming of the LTTE cadres. Politically, the Sri Lankan
government commenced preparations for working out a model through which power
could devolve on the reorganised provincial councils. The model envisaged the eventual
amalgamation of Northern and Eastern provinces, the area that was claimed by the
Tamils as their 'traditional homeland'.

There was an inherent flaw in the accord because the LTTE had not approved it.
Vellupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE supremo, explained that the accord did not address
any ofthe Tamil demands, namely, an end ofthe illegal Sinhala colonisation, recognition
ofthe Tamils as a nation, the permanent merger of the northern and eastern provinces,
and the withdrawal of Sri Lankan troops from the province. There was strong opposition
to the accord even amongst certain sections of the Sinhalese. Prime Minister Premadasa
was himselfopposed to it. Many Sri Lankans, including the JanathaVimukthi Peramuna
(JVP) an ultra Trotskyite party came to regard the IPKF as an 'occupation army'.
The President's popularity plummeted and there was an attempt on his life.

The relations between the Indian government and the LTTE touched an all time low.
The political power ofthe LTTE emanated from its guns and, understandably, it refused
to surrender them witliou t any credible guarantee that political power would be handed
over to it.

16.5.3 Mangala Moonesinghe Select Committee


In Ailgust 1991, a Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) was set up to 'recommend
ways and means of achieving peace and political stability in the country'. Headed by
a SLFP MP Mangala Moonesinghe, the PSC called for written representations. It
received 253 representations, curiously none from the UNP and the SLFP.

From the beginning the PSC got bogged down with one single issue whether or not to
agree with one merged North-Eastern province. While the Tamil parties including the
Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) went on repeating their demand for the merger of
the north and the east, the Sinhala parties including the SLFP and UNP members
within the PSC kept opposing it. During the course of the deliberations it became
obvious that the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) had emerged as an interested
party and it wanted to have its share of the cake too, which meant that it was not in
favour of North-Eastern merger without sufficient safeguards for the interests of
Muslims in the provinces.

In June 1992, the PSC circulated a 'Concept Paper' which contained the following
points:

1) Two separate Councils, one for the Northern Province and another for the Eastern
Pro\ ince.

2) An 'Apex Assembly', to be elected by members of the respective Councils 'to


plan common policies for both Councils, and coordinate programmes relevant to
the two Councils etc.'
3) A 'National Chamber', comprising of the respective Chief Ministers. The main Ethnic Accommodation
function would be to 'establish harniony and coordination between the Centre in the Politics,;of
Sri Larika
and the Peripheral Units with a view to integrating the nation firmly'.

4) As an interim measure, a 'separate institution should be established to supervise


tlie immediate implementation, smooth functioning and mo~iitoringof all devolved
powers'. I n this cor~text,the 'Concept Paper' suggested the appointment of an
Interim Administration for tlie Northern and Eastern Provinces, comprising of
representatives of political parts within and outside the Parliament.
On the same day, Tamil parties (EPRLF, 'TULF. ENDL,F, TELO, EROS, all represented
in parliament, as well as PLOTE and ACTC, which had no representation in parliament)
presented to the PSC their Four-Point Formula:

1) A unified politico-administrative entity for the pernianently merged North-Eastern


Province.

2) Substantial devolution of power ensuring ~neaningfillautonomy to that unified


unit.

3) Institutional arrangement within the larger framework ofthe unbifurcated North-


Eastern Province for the M ~ ~ s l ipeople
m ensuring their cultural identity and
security.

4) The Sinhalese people (in the North-Eastern province) to enjoy all the rights that
other minorities have in the rest of the country.
The hiatus between the two sides was quite manifest. But the 'Option Paper'tliat the
PSC circulated 011 14 October 1992 indicated some compromise. It recommended:
, 1) A Regional Council forthe entireNorth-East region constituwd by the two elected
Provincial Co~~ncils.

2) 'rhe Regional Council to be headed by a Chief Minister for tlie entireNorth-East


region. The two executive ministers for the two provinces shall each year
alteniatively function as tlie Chief Minister of the entire region.

3) There shall be one Governor for the Region.

4) In each Province, tlie rights ofethnic and religious minorities shall be guaranteed
by constitutional arrangements.
~ji.erewas one point made in the 'Option Paper' which was rather ambiguous. Almost
in passing it mentioned that the Regional Council would be constituted only 'when the
two Provincial Councils meet together on matters pertaining to the entire region.'
There was no certainty whether tlie two Provincial Councils should fu~ictionas a
single Regional Council on specified subjects,
During the entire period ofthe PSC there was only once that some dent was noticeable
on the solid Tamil plank of North-East merger. On 1 1 November 1992, K. Srinivasan,
an M P from Jaffiia. submitted a proposal to the PSC under the title 'A Realistic
Sol~~tionto tlie National Crisis.' Its main elements were:
1) 'The Unitary nature of the Sri Lankan Constitution be converted into a Federal
one. subject to a national refereiidu~n.
2) The de-merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces into distinct units of
devolution and substantial devolution.

3) Special institutional arrangements be made for tlie security of the Muslims of


each unit.

4) State land to be alienated, in keeping with the demographic composition in each


district. and to maintain tlie ethnic balance of each unit as at the year 1971.
w i t h n ~ d~itc n l a r i n o C i n h a l e c e w t t l e m ~ n t tch a t hnrl nlrparlv t n k p n n l n r p
Country Profiles: The proposal received support from the UNP, SLFP, LSSP, SLMC and CP so far as
Sri Lanka, the Maldives the de-merger ofNorth-Eastern Province was concerned but not on making Sri Lanka
a federal state. The Tamil parties any way had viewed tlie Srinivasan proposal as a
'horse deal' engineered by UNP's Muslim leader A.C.S. Harneed to sabotage tlie
on-going talks between the TULF and the SLMC. Three days later, on 14 December
1992, the Tamil parties in a Joint Statement declared: 'It is now abundantly clear that
the entire process ofthe PSC had been designed to give effect to the promise, contained
in the UNP Manifesto for the Presidential Elections of 1988, to demerge the presently
merged North-East Province. This design suited the SLFP as well.'

However, the PSC did not take notice oi'the Tamil parties' view and two days later,
on 16 December 1992, issued its Interim Report entitled 'Matters Agreed Upon By A
Majority of the Members.' Tlie agreements were (a) on the establish~nentof two
separate units of administration for the Northern and Eastern Provinces, (b) to adopt
a scheme of devolutio~~ on lines similar to those obtaining in tlie Indian Constitution,
and (c) to devolve Inore subjects that are in List 111 (Concurrent List) or to dispense
with the List. On the salne day the Tamil parties rejected these 'agreements' and
declared that they confirmed tlie 'lack of will of the Sinhala polity represented in
Parliament, regardless of whether it is the ruling UNP or the major opposition, the
SLFP, to come to grips with tlie legitimate grievances and aspirations of tlie Tamil
People.'

So the failure of the PSC was evident because neither the Sinhalese nor the Tamils
were willing to budge from their uncompromising positions about the North-East
merger. But there were other organisational problems also. The size of the Committee,
consisting of 40 members, was too large to do any meaningful business. Tlie political
parties did not prepare working papers nor were there technical experts to guide the
committee on specific issues. So the failure of tlie Parliamentary Select Committee
on the ethnic question was mainly the failure of politics and the style of politics that
did not allow for the resolution of conflict.

16.5.4 The Chandrika Plan


As promised during the parliamentary and presidential campaigns of 1994, President
Chandrika Kumaratunga came out with a detailed devolution package within the
framework of a proposed new federal constitution. It proposed to give the federating
units much more power than any time in the past. It also talked about the permanent
merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces in which the Tamils would have their
say. But since the People's Alliance (PA) government was under pressure from tlie
UNP in particular and the Sinhala-Buddhist forces in general it retracted from its
original stand on federalism and went in favour of more safeguards for the central
authority. It was seen that the power of the centre was not diminished and the
integrity and security ofthe nation was not compromised. Any disintegrative tendency
was to be nipped in the bud by interfering in regional affairs if the situation so demanded.
The idea ofthe so-called Tamil hornelaild was also diluted beyond recognition through
providing various possibilities in respect ofthe territorial reorganization of the Eastern
Province. Since the Muslilns were an important political force this engineering was
easily possible.

The biggest mistake that the PA did while proposing tlie devolution plan was that it
did not consider the fact that as to how tlie plan could be passed when it had only a
thin majority in the parliament., A minimu~nof two-thirds majority was required to
pass it for it amounted to an amendment to the constitution. Without UNP's support,
therefore, it was not possible and no political effort was made to enlist it. Tlie other
problem was that Chandrika became over-confident after the initial military reverses
of the LTTE in 1995 which included the restoration of state power in Jaffna to totally
ignore them and trying to find a solution by talking to other groups only, which did not
really matter.
~ t kfc Aceommodation
16.5.5 Government-LTTE Peace Talks in the Politics of
I I Sri Lanka
In the general election held in October 2000 no party got a clear mandate to form the
government. The minimum required number was 113, which no party had. Since JVP
refused to form a coalition with either the PA or the UNP the future looked uncertain.
Eventually, however, the PA formed the government with the help of the EPDP and
the Muslim NUA, an offshoot ofthe SLMP. Because ofthe narrow margin of majority
the Ku~narat~inga government remained insecure and after a year it was forced to call
for another election as its efforts to work out a coalition with the JVP also floundered.
In December 2001, a mid-term election was held in which 26 political parties and 120
independent groups contested. The verdict went in favour of the UNP although it
could not get enough number of seats to form the government on its own. The LINP
led by Ranil Wickreniesinghe formed tlie government with the support of SLMP, it
pre-poll alliance partner.
In the election campaign, the issue of devoluti8n was not discussed. Since the UNP
and SLMP could barely manage to form the government it was not expected either
that any bold step would be taken to grant effective powers to the Tamils to rule their
areas. The real challenge for the government, however, was as to how to resume
negotiations with tlie LTTE given President Kumarantqga's unequivocal position that
military action was the only solution. Still with the idea of initiating peace talks with the
LTTE the government announced a month's cease-fire in December. This was
reciprocated by tlie LTTE the very next day. At the end of tlie month period, on 24
January 2002, the government extended the cease-fire by another month. The
confidence building measure worked and on 22 February 2002 a long-term cease-fire
agreement was signed between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. In early
September the government lifted the ban on the Tigers and within a few days peace
negotiations started in Thailand with Norwegian facilitation. In the first round oftalks
it was decided that three more rounds would take place, namely, between 3 1 October
2002 and 3 November. between 2 and 5 December 2002 and between 6 and 9 January
2003. The rounds scheduled for December and January would be most critical because
in those rounds the contentious questions of powers to be devolved to the Tamil majority
province or provinces and unit ofdevolution would be taken up.

16.5.6 Future Prospects


From the foregoing it is evident tliat while on the one hand there are inherent
contradictions in Sinhalese and Tamil perceptions ofetlinicity and nation building, there
have been constant efforts too to resolve tlie conflict through negotiations and political
compromises. In the same tradition the on-going peace negotiations between the
government and tlie LTTE are being carried out with all seriousness by both the parties.
But given the polarisation of Sri Lankan politics, one would have to wait and watch to
see the final outcome ofthe process. The critical question is not how much of political
power is devolved to the provincial units, the real question is whether the Northern and
Eastern provinces are to be treated as one single permanently amalgamated unit.
Would the Sinlialese opinion at large agree to that arrangement? More so, would the
Muslims of Easter11Province agree? Indeed there is the possibility of redefining the
boundaries of Eastern Province to accommodate the Sinhalese and Muslim
apprehensions but there is no escape from the fact that the spectre ofTamils controlling
a large chunk ofterritory disproportionate to their numerical strength would continue
to haunt the Sinhalese. Since the LTTE may not budge on that point, that is accepting
Northern Province and Eastern Province as two separate provincial entities, the
negotiations might eventually collapse on tliat critical issue.
The other critical question is whether tlie LTTE would be ultimately able to reconcile
itselftojust goveniinga province, arelatively very small compensation for its dream of
an independent Eelam. Even if the LTTE is allowed to rule a unified North-Eastern
province, it is too small a province as Sri Lanka itself is sn~all.Only time would answer
the two critical questions raised above.
Country Profiles : Check Your Progress 2
Sri Lankn the Maldives
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
hi Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
1) The main limitation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 was
..........................................................................................................................

16.6 LET US SUM UP


We have seen that roots of the ethnic divide between the two major communities in
Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese and the Tamils can be traced to the colonial times. After
independence, the nation building experiment based on the language of the majority,
namely Sinhala and religion of the majority community, namely Buddhism further
widened the chasm between the two communities. With the polarisation of politics
since the mid- 1970s, resulting in the rise of Tamil extremism on the one hand and the
counter- violence by the Sri Lankan armed forces, efforts to resolve the conflict through
negotiations and political compromise have not yet yielded any significant results. The
Island state continues to reel under unprecedented domestic violence born out of
divergent perceptions of ethnicity and nation building.

16.7 SOME USEFUL BOOKS


. Phadnis, Urmia, et al (1986) Domestic Conflicts in South Asia, vo1.l: Political
Dimensions. New Delhi
Radhika Coomaraswamy, Radhika. (1984) The Crisis of Anglo-American
Constitutional Traditions in a Developing Society. New Delhi
Misra, SS. (1995) Ethnic Conflict and Security Crisis in Sri L a n k New Delhi
Tambiah, SJ. (1986) Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of
Democracy. Chicago

16.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1
1) Colonial education policy had differential impact on Ceylonese society. Christians
and Tamils were the main beneficiaries of the modem education system which
enabled them to find employment in the public and mercantile sectors. The
Sinhalese, though being a majority, did not benefit from colonial policies.
2) More than religion, it was the community's historical image and their minority
status that shaped Tamil consciousness during the colonial period.
3) The main demand of the Federal Party relate to introduction of a federal
constitution, recognition ofTamil as an official languagealongwith Sinhala, repeal
of the existing citizenship laws, and end to the colonisation of Tamil dominated
areas.
4) The failure of the moderate Tamil leaders in getting any concession from the
government and the <issing away of some of these leaders in the early 1970s
brought the extremist groups to the fore in the late 1970s.
Check Your Progress 2
1) India undertook tcl bring peace between the government and the Tamil guerrillas,
but the LTTF was not Involved in the dialogue. It did not address the demands of
the Tami!;.
UNIT 17 ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND
POLITICS IN THE MALDIVES
structure
17.0 Objectives
17.1 Introduction
17.2 Land and People
17.2.1 Climate, Soil andvegetation
17.2.2 Demographic Profile

17.3 Society
17.3.1 Ethnicity and Language
17.3.2 Social System

17.4 Politics
17.4.1 Constitutional Development
17.4 2 The Political Events of 1940s and 1950s
17.4.3 The I960 Agreement
17.4.4 Political System under President Nasir
17.4.5 The Regime of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom

17.5 Economy and Fiscal policy


17.6 Foreign Policy
17.7 Let Us Sum Up
17.8 Some Useful Books
17.9 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises
,

17.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit examines some ofthe important features ofthe society, economy and politics
in the Maldives. After going through the unit you will be able to:
Describe the demographic features of the Maldives;
Identify the nature and important features of the Maldivian society;
Trace the political developments leading to the emergence the modern political
institutions in Maldives;
Describe the main features of the Maldivian polity; and
Analyse the economic issues and challenges facing the Maldives.

I 17.1 INTRODUCTION
1 Maldives is an archipelago situated in the Indian Ocean. Maldives had long been an
L isolated country. However, its economic compulsions and the ever-changing global
political scenario have persuaded it to reach out to the outside world. Though it's a
small state, today Maldives is an active member of several international organisations
and is committed to the principles of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. These
commitments as well as its strategic location in the lndian Ocean have brought
international attention to this tiny island nation. These factors have also a bearing on
tha fmatmara nnI;t;~nlA ~ x ~ ~ l n n m in
a ntho
t Inrlinn n F ~ a rcsn;nn
n
Country Profiles:
Sri Lanka, the Maldives LAND AND PEOPLE
Maldives is an archipelago consistingof 1195 coral islands. These islands are grouped
into atolls, spreading over an area of 90,000 square kilometres (sq. km) in the Indian
Ocean. However, only 202 islands are inhabited. For administrative purpose, the
Maldives government has organised the atolls into 19 administrative units, with Male
forming a separate unit. Male the capital is strategically located at a distance of 480
km southwest of Kanyakumari. 670 km west of Sri Lanka and 282 km north of the
United States' military base on Diego Garcia Islands in the Indian Ocean.

The country stretches 823 krn from north to south and 130 km from east to west.
However, the coral islands form a total land area of 282 sq. km. About 99% of Maldives
comprises of sea and most of the atolls-consist of a large ring shaped coral reef
supporting numerous small islands, which are cut by deep, natural channels and lagoon.'
The word "atoll" is "an adoption ofthe native name "athollu" applied to the Maldives
islands which are typical example of this structure. The reef structure is peculiar to
.
Maldives and is popularly known as "Faru". The reefs provide natural defence against
wind and waves.

The average area of the coral islands varies from one to two square kilometres with
an average elevation of almost 1.6 meters above the mean sea level. The highest
place is located on Wilingli Island in the Addu Atoll at an average elevation of 2.4
meters. The islands are generally flat with few mounds. There are no hills, mountains
or rivers. Some of the larger islands have small fresh water lakes while others have
. brackish water with mangroves along the edges.

17.2.1 Climate, Soil and Vegetation


Maldives enjoys a tropical type of climate, which is largely determined by monsoon.
However, because of its geographical proximity to the equator, the influence of mon'soon
is not as pronounced as in other South Asian countries. The weather is hot and humid
and the average temperature ranges from 24OC to 33O C. Although humidity is
relatively high, the constant sea breeze keeps the air moving, thus bringing the much-
needed respite to the islanders. Maldives has two distinct seasons. First is the rainy
season from the month of May to October that starts with the onset of monsoon. The
season experiences heavy rainfall accompanied by strong winds. The rainfall increases
from north to south. The average annual rainfall in the north is 254 cm whereas it
increases to 380 cm in the south. The second is the winter season from November to
April which is associated with the northeast monsoon. The weather is dry with fewer
winds.

'The soil, which is sandy and highly alkaline, is deficient in nitrogen, potash and iron.
This severely limits the agricultural potential of the country. Only 10% ofthe Maldives
is suitable for cultivation. Based on the type of crops grown, the country can be broadly
divided into a northern zone where monsoon millets are cultivated; intermediate zone
in which due to poor soil there is little agricultural output apart from coconut, papaya,
breadfruit and minor gardening crops; and the southern zone in which a number of
islands are predominantly agricultural. In this zone, only the island of Fuah Mulaku
produces fruits such as oranges and pineapples partly because the terrain of this island
is higher than most other islands, leaving the groundwater less subjected to seawater
penetration. Rice, which is the staple food of Maldives is not grown here but imported
from other countries.

Freshwater, which is used for drinking and agricultural purposes floats as "lens"
or layers over the seawater. This freshwater gradually permeates through the
limestone and coral s a n 5 of the islands to form one of the sources of underground
water. This underground water and rainwater are the only two sources of freshwater
in Maldives.
17.2.2 Demographic Profile Economy, Society and
Politics in the Maldives
According to the estiniates of 200 1 population census, tlie country has a total population
of 3 10,764. Out of this, 1 59,232 are males and 151,532 are females. The average
population growth rate is at 3.01%. A look at the crude birth (38.15 births per 100
population) and death rates (8.09 deaths per 1000 population) indicate that there is a
huge gap between these two rates, which results in rapid population growth. Net
~nigratio~i
is zero, which means the migration does not contribute to ally changes in the
total population. Despite this rapidly growing popuiation posing a serious problem,
Maldives lacks an effective population c o ~ ~ t rpolicy.
ol
The country has an average pop~~lation density of 706 persons per sq. km. According
to a government survey conducted in mid-1 980s, out of the 200 inhabited islands only
28 had fewerthan 200 inhabitants, 107 islands had a population between 200 to 500,s
had population ranging from 500 to 1000 persons, and 25 islands had population greater
than 1000. With nearly 25 per cent ofthe country's population living in the capital city,
Male has largest concentration of population. Tliere is hardly any other town in the
Maldives. Villages comprise most of the settlements on the inhabited islands. The
sparsely populated nature of the islands makes it extremely difficult to develop
econo~nicallyviable infrastructural facilities. This in turn limits inter-atoll interaction
thereby severely hampering all round development of the country.
Check.Your Progress 1
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
1) .....,............ has the highest concentration of people in the Maldives.
2) Maldives archipelago con~prisesof ....................... Coral islands.
3) The main sources of drinking water are ...................... and ...................

17.3 SOCIETY
Arcliaeologically, the history of Maldives dates back to early 2000 B.C. In those times,
Maldives had links with the early Egyptians, Mesopotamians and the Indus valley
civilization. Thor Heyerdahl, a noted explorer and an expert in marine navigation,
believed that the early sun worshipping seafarers called the Redin were the first settlers
in Maldives. Even today, the mosques in Maldives face the Sun and not the Mecca.
Theravada Buddhism became the dominant religion of the people as a result of
colonisation by south Indian and Sri Lankan settlers from the 6th century AD onwards.
Sonie believe that tlie name Maldives is derived from the Sanskrit word "maladvipa",
which means a garland of islands.
Maldives by virtue of its strategic location astride the important maritime trade routes
and abundance of cowrie shells (that were used as a form of currency throughout
Asia and east Africa till the 16th century) attracted the attention of traders of the
Middle East in the 10th century. With the Arab seafarers establishing their ~nonopoly
over the Indian Ocean trade routes, their culture began to have a deep influence on
the Maldivian society. In 1153 A.D, the Buddhist King converted to Islam and
adopted Muslim title and name of Sultan Muhammad a1 Adil. He initiated a series of
six dynasties consisting of eighty-four Sultans and Sultanas, which lasted until 1932
when the Sultanate became elective.
With the rise of the European nations as maritime powers in the 16thand 17"' century,
the Arab hegemony over the maritime trade routes came to an end. In 1558, Maldives
came under the Portuguese rule, which administered it from Goa on India's west
coast. Fifteen years later, a local guerrilla leader Muhammad Thakurufaan organised
popular revolt and drove the Portuguese out of Maldives. This event is now
commemorated as national day in the Maldives.
Country Profiles: In the mid-sixteenth century, when the Dutch replaced Port~lg~~ese (n Ceylon, Maldives
S r i Lanka, the Maldives also came under the Dutch control for some time. The Dutch, however, didn't exercise
any direct control over the internal matters of Maldives, which was governed according
to Islamic customs. In the late lathcentury. the ~ r i t i s hexpelled the Dutch from Ceylon
and included Maldives as a British protectorate. In 1887, through an exchange of
letters between the British and the Maldivian Sultan, the suzerainty of Great Britain
over Maldives was formally recognised and its protectorate status was affirmed.
Under this agreement, the responsibility of recognising and installing the Sultan as
well as the control of the country's defence and foreign relations were vested in Great
Britain. The colonial power was expected to follow the policy of non-interference in
the internal matters of Maldives. During the British era from 1887 to 1965, Maldives
continued to be ruled under a succession of Sultans. The Sultans were hereditary until
1932 when an attempt was made to make the Sultanate elective, thereby limiting the
absolute power of Sultans. At that time, a constitution was introduced for the first
time, although the Sultanate was retained for an additional twenty-one years. Maldives
remained a British crown protectorate until 1953 when the Sultanate was suspended
and the First Republic was declared under the short-lived presidency of Muliammad
Amin Didi. In 1954, the Sultanate was again restored. In 1956, Britain obtained
permission to re-establish its wartime airfield on Gan in the southernmost Addu Atoll.
On July 26, 1965, Maldives gained independence under an agreement signed with
Britain. The British government, however, retained the use ofthe facilities in the Can
and Hitaddu islands. In anational referendum in 1968, Maldives abolished the Sultanate
and became a republic under tlie presidency of Ibrahim Nasir.

17.3.1 Ethnicity and Language


The population of Maldives is derived from four ethnic communities viz. Sinllalese,
Dravidian, Arab and African. Tliis ethnic mix of population is a consequence of the
migration ofdifferent communities into tlie couiltry over a period oftime, which is also
indicative of the various historical changes in regional liegemony over the marine
trade routes. According to Clarence Maloney, an anthropologist, the earliest settlers
in Maldives were the Dravidians from south India. This ethnic group was gradually
displaced by the Dhivehi speaking Sinhalese people who migrated from Sri Lanka.
Today, their language is the official language of tlie country. The Arabs were tlie last
major ethnic group which began to settle down in the Maldives beginning from the 9Ih
century. Maldives also has an endogamous subgroup of population ofAfrican origin
called the Ravare or Giraavaru. This subgroup with only 200 members is however,
rapidly disappearing. Apart from the above-mentioned ethnic communities, the trading
community of India also forms a distinct ethnic and religious minority, which migrated
to Maldives in 1800s.

Islam is the state region of Maldives and the majority ofthe population of Maldives
belong to the Sunni branch of Islam. The Maldivian Dhivehi is the national language of
Maldives. It belongs to the Indo-Iranian language family. This language is derived
from "Elu", an archaic form of Sinhala (the language spoken in Sri Lanka). It has
many words borrowed from Arabic, Tamil and Hindi. The traditional script is called
"Thaana" and it is written from right to left.

17.3.2 Social System


Historically, the Maldivian society was broadly divided into four categories in order of
social importance. At the top of this social structure was the King and his direct
descendants who were called the Mannipul. The fourth generation descendants of
the reigning Sultan and relatives of former Sultans were endowed with the title Didi.
Below the King and his relative were the Great Lords called the Kilegefanu and tlie
Takurufanu. Tliis category included officials of the state and other such persons on
whom such title was conferred by the King in return of paying of a sum to the state
treasury. The third category comprised of the aristocracy called Maniku. When the
Marziku received a title of honour from the Sultan, they were known as Maniku- Economy, Society and
funu. Tlie fourth category colnprised of the common man who were known as the Politics in the Maldives
Kulo. Toddy-tappers called the Ra-veri formed the lowest in tlie caste hierarchy.
Barring the second category of the Kilegefanu and Takurufunu, the rest of the
categories were ascribed from birth. A:tliough, the caste system was not so rigid in the
Maldives, it came into existence to fulfil the basic economic needs of kinship and
nobility. It did provide some social exclusivity with functional specification vis-a-vis
the common nian. Social behaviour was controlled by customary sanctions and a rigid
code of conduct guided the relations between castes/social categories in the most
niundane day to day affairs like form of address, seating arrangements or dining, etc.
The advent of Islam, also introduced the ranks of Kazi (Magistrate), Naib and the
Khatib (Island Magistrate) and they perpetuated the unequal social order. However,
Islani was also responsible for preventing the further crystallisation of the caste-system
in the Maldives. In addition to the above mentioned caste structure, slaves and bonded
labourer also existed. These bonded labourers were called Feniuseri and they formed
another exclusive c a t e g o j outside the caste system. Despite its stratified structure,
the Maldivian social order had flexibility with the King being the dispenser of titles.
Thus, though the status of the colnmon people was initially inscriptive, they could
presumably have an upward mobility through the royal dispensation. Even the bonded
labourers could become free and absorbed into the various caste systems after paying
off their debts.

I11 the contemporary Maldivian society,the process of modernisation is gradually eroding


tlie caste system. This in turn is making the society more homogenous and egalitarian.
'Today only two distinct communities exist in Maldives, tlie elite population residing in
Male, and rest ofthe population inhabiting tlie outer islands.

Male is the traditional seat of the Sultans and of the nobility and remains an elite
society wielding political and economic power. Members of the several traditionally
privileged ruling families: government, business, and religious leaders, professionals
and scholars live here. Male differs from other islands also because as many as
40 per cent of its residents are migrants. Tlie island communities outside Male are in
most cases self-contained economic units, drawing meagre sustenance from the sea
around them. Islanders are in many instances interrelated by marriage and form a
small, tightly knit group whose main economic pursuit is fishing. Apart from the heads
of individual households, local influence is exerted by the government appointed island
Khatib, or chief. Regional control over each atoll is administered by the Atolu verin,
or the atoll chief and by the gazi, or community religious leader. Boat owners, as
employers, also dominate the local economy and, in many cases, provide an informal,
but effective, link to Male's power structure.

Check Your Progress 2


Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
1) When and how did Maldives become a Islamic state?

POLITICS
17.4.1 Constitutional Development
The constitution of Maldives underwent several changes before it crystallized into its
present form. Different events shaped the various stages of its genesis as discussed
below.
Country Profiles: Traditionally, the source of political power and the rules ofgovernance were sanctioned
Sri Lanka, the Maldives according to the Islamic law and the prevalent customs and traditions. In the early
1930s,the necessity ofa written constitutioti defining the rules and I-egulationsregarding
the exercise of political authority was felt due to a political turmoil arising from the
absence of a successor to Sultan Muhammad Samsud-Din Iskander 111. The Sultan,
to safeguard the dominant position of the Sultan in Maldivian politics and society,
requested the assistance ofthe British crown in introducing a written constitution in
Maldives. The result was the Constitution of 1932. Largely based on the Donoughrnore
Constitution of Ceylon, the 1932 Constitution provided for a People's Assembly,
consisting of forty-seven elected members. Only the literate males were permitted to
vote. It also provided for Legislative Council consisting of twenty-eight members. Out
of which seven members were nominated by the Sultan and the rest were elected by
the People's Assembly. The Prime Minister, the head of the Council of Ministers was
appointed by the Sultan in consultation with the Legislative Council. Other ministers
were chosen by the Prime Minister with the consent of the Sultan. The Legislative
Council had the power to remove the Council of Ministers by passing a vote of no
confidence in the People's Assembly.
,
The Constitution of 1932 was, however, not successful. It legalised the rights and
privileges of the Sultan and his coterie. The constitution had barred tlie ministers from
indulging in any business or trade, but the minister continued to indulge in private
trade. Since they gained substantial privileges froin buying goods from the government,
therefore any provision of the constitution, which prevents them from doing so was
strongly opposed by the ministers. Thus, the government of Maldives remained an
oligarcliy, with the power remaining in the hands of a few. .

During the Second World War, tlie island country became important to the Allied
powers because of its strategic location. The Sultan of Maldives came under pressure
from the British to modify the constitution to enable them to establish a base in the
Gan Island. Later, in 1952, a fresh constitution was introduced in order to abolish the
Sultanate and declare Maldives a Republic. This was done to liberalise the constitutional
framework. As the first President, Amin Didi brought about many constiti~tional refonns.
He introduced universal adult suffrage enabling all citizens above the age of 18 years
to exercise their franchise. An elected senate of 80 members and a lower house of
46 members including 13 women was constituted. This, however, lasted only for a
short period. He also brought about many reforms in tlie educational system and
promoted women's rights. His rule was short-lived. In 1953, lie was ousted by the
Vice President Ibrahim Muhammad Didi with the assistance of the Muslim
conservatives. There upon the Sultanate was again restored in 1954.

With the restoration of the Sultanate, a new constitution was promulgated in 1954.
This constitution is regarded as a milestone in the constitutional history marking a
trend of political liberalisation.A Majlis (legislature) comprising of 48 members was
constituted. It a h g with the nobility, elected the Sultan. Moreover, the Majlis had the
power to override the Sultan's veto. One of the most significant social measures
adopted by tlie Majlis was the abolition of "unreasonable" forced labour system in
Maldives. This constitution remained in force until March 1968 when a national
referendum abolished the Sultanate and establislied a Republic.

A new constitution was promulgated in 1968 and the present institutional


framework of administration of Maldives is based on this. This constitution, duly
revised in 1970. 1972 and 1975, provided the basis for a highly centralised
presidential form of government. Its philosophical frame of reference is derived from
Islam. Constitutional provisions regarding the basic rights of the people are broadly
phrased. They refer to freedom of speech and assembly, equality before the law and
the right to property, but these rights are to be exercised within the framework of the
Shariath.
Institutional Structure Economy, Society and
Politics in the Maldives
Article 23 of tlie 1968 Constitution lays down the procedure for the election of tlie
President. The President is not solely elected on popular vote. First he has to be
nominated by the Majlis.And then his election must be for~iialisedthrough confirmation
in a popular referendum in which the entire nation is involved. In case he fails to win
tlie popular vote, lie is not elected as President of the Republic. In such an event, the
Majlis has to propose another candidate for the post through a secret ballot, after
obtaining the consent of the candidate in writing. 'Then again the same procedure is
followed to elect the President. The elected President has a renewable five-year
term.

Under tlie constitutional provisions, the President enjoys a vast amount of power. All
the executive powers are vested with the President. A law or legislation can be enacted
only after tlie consent of the President. The President has the power to grant amnesty
to offenders, to confer titles and other awards. In event of an emergency situation, the
President is empowered to pass temporary orders, which do not disregard the
constitution. He nominates the members oftlie Cabinet and all the members need not
be tlie members of legislature. He also has the power to nominate certain number of
members to the legislature and judiciary. q

The legislature, Majlis is unicameral. It consists of 48 members elected for five years
terms. Eight out of forty-eight members are appointed by the President and the rest
are chosen popularly, two each from Male and two from each of the 19 administrative
atolls. The Majlis has the power to enact laws except constitutanal amendments.
The Mq1is also sanctions budget. It can pass a no confidence vote against any minister.
lfthe vote is passed, then the minister in question had to resign. The President and his
ministers have the right to participate in the proceedings of the Majlis. The ministers
can vote only if they are the members of the Majlis.

The constitution also has a provision for the establishment of a Citizen's Special
Majlis for enactment of constitutional amendments. Along with the Cabinet and the
members of the legislature, this Citizen's Majlis has an additional forty-eight
members. Out of tlie forty-eight members, forty are elected from various atolls and
eight ark nominated by the President. The Maldivian polity is notable for the absence of
political parties. Although, the constitution does not prevent the formation of
political parties, the impetus for the formation of political parties has been lacking
because of tlie prevailing socio-cultural uniformity. The elections to the Majlis are
held on a non-partisan basis. Candidates fight independently on the basis of personal
qualifications.

The Constitution of Maldives devotes only two articles, namely Article 85 and 86
for the judicial powers. According to these articles, "the administration of justice
and Shariath shall be conducted by a body appointed by the President of the
republic and that no law contradicting the Constitution shall be promulgated". The
judicial system of Maldives consists of a three-tier system. At the top of the judicial
hierarchy stands the Chief Justice, followed by t ~ l e -* ,i the atoll level, and Mudim
at the island level.'
Check Your Progress 3
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.
1) When did Maldives gain independence?
Country Profiles: 2) What is the name of the Maldivian Legislature?
Sri Lanka, the Maldives

3) How is the President elected?

17.4.2 The Political Events of 1940s and 1950s '

During the Second World War, Maldives, due to its strategic location, proved to be
quite important for the Allied forces. In 1942, the British built a secret base on Gan
Island in Addu Atoll called "Port T". This event along with the prevalent general
discontentment among the masses co~npelledthe Sultan to abdicate his throne in
1943. Subsequently, a new Sultan took over the reigns of the Maldives. Following
the independence of Sri Lanka from the British in 1948,the Sultan signed an agreement
with the Governments of Britain by which the Maldives became a protectorate
of Britain. Britain, however, did not register this agreement with the United Nations
under the clause 102 of the United Nations, Charter, on the strange ground that only
agreements between "international persons"could be registered in the UnitedNations,
whereas the "Sultan of the Maldives islands is not an international personality". In
reality, Britain wanted to use Maldives for its own strategic and defence needs.

In 1952, after the death of the Sultan and the declaration of Maldives as a Republic,
Amin Didi was elected as the first President of Maldives. He concentrated all powers
in his hands. He was not only the President, but also the Chief Minister, Minister for
Home and External Affairs, Commerce and Public Safety, Finance and Education
apart from being the leader of the Majlis (legislature). In 1953, he was overthrown by
the Vice President and the Sultanate was restored with Muhammad Farid Didi as the
Sultan and Ibrahim Ali Didi as the Prime Minister.

Beginning from 1950s the political history of Maldives was largely governed by the
British military presence in the island. In 1956, Britain obtained permission to re-
establish its wartime airfield on Gan in the southern Addu Atoll. According to the
agreement signed between the two governments, Britain was granted a 100 years
lease on Gan on payment of £2000 per year. It also granted some forty-four hectare
on Hitaddu island for radio installation as a "free gift'. The Maj lis refused to ratify the
agreement on the ground that it violated the sovereignty and independenceof Maldives.
The political crisis that followed forced the Prime Minister Ali Didi to resign. Ibrahim
Nasir, who took over as the new Prime Minister in 1957, called for review of the
agreement with the objectives of shortening the lease, increasihg the annual payment
and use of Gan islands only for the protection of Maldivian citizens. The Nasir
government also demanded a revision of the 1887 Treaty, enabling Maldives the right
to conduct its economic and cultural relations independent of Britain. Accepting the
conditions of the Nasir government, the British government offered an immediate
payment of £ 10,000on the conclusion of the agreement, shortening of the lease from
100 to 50 years and economic aid for five years.

The use of Gan Island as a base by the British administration and granting of
facilities to the Gan people created a rift between Maldives and Britain. The
Maldivian government alleged that the British were encouraging secessionism in
the Addu Atoll. The economic prosperity ofthe people ofthe Addu Atoll generatd by
various British projects alienated from Male. Therefore, the Maldivian government's
decision to prevent the people to work for the British project led the people of the
southern Islands to launch a secessionist movement in 1959. This group of secessionists
severed its ties with the Maldivian government and formed an independent state with
independent state with Abdulla AfifDidi as the president. The short-lived state (1959- Economy, Society and
I
Politics in the Maldives
1962), called the United Suvadian Republic, had a combined population of 20,000
! inhabitants scattered in the atolls then named Suvadiva, (since renamed North Huvadu
I

c
and South Huvadu), Addu and Fua Mulaku.
1

17.4.3 The 1960 Agreement


Britain which wanted to maintain a footl~oldin the strategic Indian Ocean region was
in no hurry to relinquish its hold over the Gan Island. On the other hand, the revolt in
the southern atolls had put the Maldivian government in a very weak position. It,
therefore tried to gather diplomatic support from the surrounding countries. After
much negotiation, the conflict between Maldives and Britain was amicably settled. In
1960, an agreement was signed between both the governments in which the Britain's
right over Addu Atoll were reduced to a period of 30 years from 100 years. Payment
of $100,000 was made to the Male governmnt immediately and another $ 750,000
was promised over a period of five years for developmental works.
This agreement however, did not solve the problem of parallel government in the
southern atolls. It was resolved in 1963, when a settlement was reached wherein the
Male administration pardoned all the dissidents. THb event led to the flaring of anti
British demonstrations in Maldives. Thus, the issue of Gan Islands played a very
important role in Maldives struggle for independence.The establishment of a military
base and the alleged support to secessionism by the British were seen by the Maldivian
people as a challenge to their sovereignty. They clamoured for complete independence
and demonstrated against Britain. Finally on July 26,1965, Maldives gained independence
under an agreement signed with Britain. But the British government retained the use
of the Gan and Hitaddu facilities. Three years later, Second Republic was proclaimed
in November 1968 under the Presidency of Ibrahim Nasir.

17.4.4 Political System under President Nasir


The President enjoys such vast powers under the constitution that if he desires, he can
have a completely centralised power structure. This is what, President Ibrahim Nasir,
the first President ofthe republic did to eliminate any challenge to his position. Sensing
a threat to his own position from the growing popularity ofthe Prime Minister Ahmed
Zaki, in 1975, President Nasir declared emergency and dismissed the Prime Minister.
When Ahmed Zaki was re-elected, the President again sacked him. In order to
strengthen his position further, the president convened the Special Citizen's Majlis
and introduced few constitutional amendments. The post of the Prime Minister was
abolished and replaced by four vice presidents with executive powers. The number of
legislative members was reduced from 54 to 48 with Male's representation being
equalised with that of other atolls. The elected Atoll Committees were abolished and
replaced by Atoll Chiefs, who were nominees of the Home Department under the
President. The Ministries of External Affairs, Finances, Communication, Information
and Broadcasting, Fisheries and Education were abolished and Lought under the
President's office.
The Majlis had been quite weak as it failed to curb tht ,"nrra;isation of all the power
in President's hand. It was traditionally used as an instrument to repress the dissenting
- voice of the political opponents. President Nasir proclaimed his rivals as political
offenders or dissidents and exiled them to distant Villingli islands. The present president
Abdul Gayoom was also in exile for a brief period for voicing his protest against the
Nasir government.
6
17.4.5 The Regime of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom
In 1978, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom became the President of Maldives and pledged to
. administer the country in fair and more open manner by restoring civil rights and
>

undertaking balanced regional development.Under his "new style of open leadership",


the legislature became more open and active but i~ did nor emel.ge as a strong and
Country Profiles: independent organ of the state. This was primarily because the members of the
Sri Lanka, the Maldives legislature also held positions in the government. In 1980, the Special Citizen's Mujlis
was convened to introduce structural reforms in the constitution. After many
deliberations in 1981, the President proposed a 'model' for the new constitution. He
declared that the new constitution would incorporate "technicalities which were essential
to a constitution, clarifying the nature of the administration, the position of the state
organs, the rights of citizens and the relationship between the citizen and the
government". This new constitution has not taken its final shape so far.
Apart from introducing constitutional reforms making the Maldivian polity more
democratic and secular, President Gayoom, strived for the overall development of the
Maldivian society. He has taken steps for the rapid economic development of the
country, integration ofthe outlying areas with the national mainstream and introduced
reforms for the uplift~nentof women. Unfortunately these reforms did not lead to a
balanced development of the country's regions. As a result, the population of the less
developed atolls, especially of the southern islands remained discontented and have
been voicing their protest against this economic disparity.
In 1988, Gayoom had to face an unsuccessful coup attempt against his government
started by some mercenaries. It could only be suppressed with the assistance of the
Indian government. Later in the 1990s, the radical reforms started by the President
were opposed by the Islamic fundamentalists,who wanted to impose a more traditional
way of life. oreo over, there are many politically active leaders and journals like the
Songu (the Conch Shel I), which are voicing their protest against the alleged corruption
and nepotism of the Gayoom government. In the face of growing dissidence, President
Gayoom gradually started to assert his power and came down heavily against his
political dissidents. Despite coup attempts in 1980,1983and 1988, Gayoom's popularity
remained strong. And in absence of any alternative leadershipAbduI Gayoom co~itinues
to be the President of Maldives wining all the subsequent elections.

17.5 ECONOMY AND FISCAL POLICY


The Maldivian economy is based on both modern and traditional sectors. Tourism
and fishing are the two most important industries. Apart from this, agriculture,
shipping and other traditional industries contribute substantially to the economy ofthe
country.
The tropical islands and the surrounding reefs provide the country with natural
scenic beauty, which has been developed and utilised for tourism since tlie 1970s.
Today, tourism has emerged as the most crucial industry for the Maldives contributing
over 30 percent of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and over 80 percent of.
the foreign exchange earnings. The GDP per capita income of the population has
expanded steadily as tourism expanded, now standing at roughly US $2200 per
person in 2002.
The second major source of foreign exchange is fishing industry. Employing about 20
percent of the labour force, the fishing industry contributes approximately 10 percent -
of the GDP. Since the use of nets is illegal, fishing done on line. The fishing fleet
consists of some 11,400 small, flat-bottomed boats locally called the dhonis. Fish
production consists primarily of skipjack tuna. About 50 percent of the product is
exported to countries like Sri Lanka, Germany, the United Kingdom, Thailand, Japan
and Singapore. Fish is exported in dried, canned, frozen and fresh forms.
Other industries provide for about 7 percent of the GDP. Traditional industries such
as boat building, mat weaving, rope making, black-smithing, handicrafts and other
cottage industries account for about a quarter of the work force. This sector also
employs a considerable number of women. The modern industry comprises of fish
canning, manufacture of garments, production of poly vinyl chloride (PVC) pipes,
construction of fibreglass boats, production of cleaning fluids, soap, furniture and food
and bottling plant.
Due to poor soil and scarce arable land, agriculture is limited to a few subsistence Economy, Society and
Politics in the Maldives
crops such as coconut, banana, breadfruit, papayas, mangoes, taro, betel, chilly, sweet
potatoes and onions. Agriculture provides about 6% of the GDP.
Fiscal Policy
In socio-economic terms, Maldives is categorised as one of the least developed countries
in the world by the UN and other development agencies for its poor GNP and standard
of living. The economy ofthe country had been quite weak with a very slow economic
growth in the initial years of independence. However, since 1970s, planned efforts to
develop the economy have been initiated by the government. It had taken several
measures to expand the economy into new areas like tourism and shipping. New
technological innovations were applied to modernise the fishing industry. Despite all
these measure, there were many factors like the small size of the domestic market,
shortage of skilled and semi-skilled manpower, non-availability of raw materials, poor
infrastructure and severe regional imbalance, which hampered the rapid industrial and
fiscal development. Development of industries is very important for meeting the growing
demands of the economy. The Maldivian government began an economic reform
programme in 1989. Initially, it lifted import quotas and opened some exports to private
sector. Subsequently, it has liberalised regulations to allow more foreign investment. It
is expected that with the development of transport, communication and other
infrastructural facilities, the economic base of the country will broaden further. Over
the years, Maldives has received economic assistance from multilateral development
organisations, including the United Nation Development Programme, Asian
Development Bank and World Bank. Several individual donor countries like Japan,
India, Australia, European and Arab countries (including Islamic Development Bank
and Kuwaiti Fund) have also contributed towards the development of Maldives.
Maldives is a member of Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) and the World Trade
Organisation. Today the GDP of Maldives stands at US $435 million and it is growing
at an impressive rate of 7.6 percent.

17.6 FOREIGN POLICY -


The foreign policy of Maldives is primarily guided by its strategic and geographical
location and its limited resource base. In earlier times, Maldives had close cultural and
economic relations with Sri Lanka and Malabaris or Mapillas on the western coast of
India. It had also developed ties with the Arabs and the Moors in the Middle East and
Africa. These close economic and cultural ties have left a great impact on the culture
and society of Maldives, which can be seen in the Islamisation ofthe country. Maldives
1 however, never developed any political links with outside countries. When it became a
British protectorate, Maldives had little or no interaction with the outside world. Its
external relations were limited to the neighbouring South Asian countries. After its
independence, the imperatives of developments induced Maldives to look beyond its
! immediate neighbours. It became a member of United Nations and its agencies like
Colombo Plan, United Nations Developmental Programme (UNDP), World Health '

Organisations (WHO), Asian Development Bank etc. It also established tries with
donor countries, which finance its developmental activities.
Maldives has broadly followed the policy of its SouthAsian neighbours like commitment
to the principles of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. It had sponsored a
Resolution in 1989 in LTN General Assembly for the protection of security of small
states. It had also taken various initiatives in the UN towards the ~ecl&tion of Indian
Ocean as a Zone of Peace. In 1982, Maldives was granted a special membership of
the Commonwealth and in 1985, and Maldives became one of the founder members
of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). Later, in 1990,
the fifth SAARC annual conference was held in Male. Maldives has close relations
with India. In 1976, it signed an agreement demarcating the maritime boundary between
the two countries. It has also received military assistance from India at President
Gayoom's request to repel a group of invading mercenaries.
Country Profiles: Currently, this small state is caught up with the international issue of global warming
Sri Lanka, the Maldives and climate change as sea levels are rising around its atolls. It has raised a host of
questions as to the future of this atoll-state.
Check Your Progress 4
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

1) What are the major industries of the Maldives?

2) What is the place of agriculture in the Maldivian economy?


............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................

3) What are the main principles that inform the foreign policy of the Maldives?

4) Maldives is not a member of:


a) Commonwealth

b) South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation


c) United Nations

17.7 LET US SUM UP


Maldives lies astride the important trade routes in the Indian Ocean. This strategic
location has influenced the history and socio-political environment of the country. .
Maldives had long been a Sultanate, first under the Dutch and then under the British
. protection. During the Second World War, Maldives served as a strategic point for the
-
allied forces. In 1948, Maldives signed an agreement with Britain where by it
continued to remain a "protectorate" ofthe British ~ m ~ i rThereafter,
e. all the political
developments in the country were largely guided by its relation with ~ritain.In
1965, Maldives gained independence.Three years later, in 1968, it was proclaimed a
republic. Abdul Gayoom, who took over as the President in 1978 continues to hold his
post even today. Maldives has been quite active in various international gatherings. It
is a member of various international organisations like the United Nations, the
Organisation of Islamic Conference, and South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation. Maldives enjoys a cordial relation with its neighbours. Its relation with
T.rA:n in ncl-nn:nll., sxrnrm n-rl nln-n
Economy, Society and
17.8 SOME USEFUL BOOKS Politics i n the Maldives

I
i
Didi, Amin A.M. (1952) The Maldives Island. Colombo. Ceylon Government Press.
1i Bell, H.C.P. (1883) The Maldives Islands: An Account of the Physical Features,
i Climate, History, Inhabitants, Production and Trade. Colombo. Ceylon Government
i Press:

I Maloney, C. (1980) People of the Maldives. Madras. Orient Longman Ltd.

?
I
Phadnis, Urmila and Ela Dutt L. (1985) Maldives: Wnds of Change in an Atoll
State, New Delhi. South Asian Publishers Pvt. Ltd;

I Zaki, A. (I 954) Constitution of Maldives Islands. Colombo. H W Cave.


1
17.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS
EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1
1) Male

3) underground water and rain water


Check Your Progress 2

1) Between the lothand 12 century, Maldives became an important for the sea
faring Arabs who had established monopoly over the trade routes in the Indian
Ocean. They had a deep influence on the people of Maldivians. In the mid-12h
century, the Buddhist king corlverting to Islam and assumed the title of Sultan.
Check Your Progress 3
1) 26thJuly 1965
2) Majlis

3) The President of the Maldives is first nominated by the Majlis. The he had to
win the popular referendum. He is elected for a five years renewable term.
Check Your Progress 4

1) Tourism, fisheries and some traditional handicrafts form the industrial base of the
Maldivian economy.

2) The agricultural base of the Maldivian economy is weak because of poor soil and
scare arable land. It has, however, a few subsistence crops such as coconuts,
bananas, breadfruit, papayas, betel, chilly etc,.

3) Maldives has broadly followed the policy of its South Asian neighbours as a
follower of the principle of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. It is a
founding-member of the SAARC .It has taken political initiatives at the UN
towards the declaration of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and small state
security.
UNIT 18 HUMAN RIGHTS
structure
18.0 Objectives
18.1 Introduction
18.2 Meaning of Human Rights
18.2.1 Shifting Perception of Human Rights: from Legal and Political to Social and
Economic Rights

18.3 History of Human Rights in South Asia


18.3.1 Human rights movement during colonial period
18.3.2 Human rights practice in the post-colonial period

18.4 Issues of Human Rights


18.5 Human Rights in South Asia and Globalisation
18.6 Comparing Human Rights in South Asia and West
18.7 Let Us Sum Up
18.8 Some Useful Books
18.9 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

18.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit aims at explaining the human rights situation in South Asia region in order to
signify its specificity.Afier going throuih this unit, you should be able to:
explain the different meanings of human rights;
trace the evolution of human rights in South Asia; and
explain the specific nature human rights problems in the region.

18.1 INTRODUCTION
The unit attempts to explain human rights situation in South Asia primarily at
three levels. First, it seeks to clarify different meanings, sometimes contending
each other, of human rights. Second, it traces the evolution of human rights in
South Asia to its colonial legacies and the formation of nation-states. Third, it
locates the contemporary dynamics of human rights practice in the context of
internationalisation of human rights issue. It brings out the specific nature of human
rights problem in the region.

18.2 M ~ N OF
GHUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights are understood variously at various levels. Often they produce
contradictory meanings. Keeping this amorphous nature of understanding human rights
in view, it is necessary to clarifL the different usage of the term rights in general and
human rights in particular.
..
Rights are defined variousJy as opportunities, interests, and conditions of freedom of
individuals. In today's context, rights are increasingJy viewed as entitlements. However,
two major dimensions of rights remain consistently in the perceptions and practice of
human rights through the history: one, limiting the arbitrary exercise of authority by
a a I S . I... .EE - 1 1 1 1
. 1 A.
Democracy in South Let us first look at the range of rights that people talk about in a very generic way - .
Asia natural rights, legal rights, political rights, socio-economic rights, personal rights,
collective rights and so on. Rights are broadly used to seek protection from arbitrary "
authority and oppression in the realms of state, civil society and market. All the above-
cited rights in some or the other way are perceived in these three realms. However, it
is important to clarify some of the categories of rights, because of the contexts in
which they acquire meaning.
The discussion on rights dates back to 17&and 18&century Europe when concept of
natural rights was invoked by the social contractualists like John Locke to counter
divine origins of kingship and arbitrary authority of the feudal and religious order. It is
said that rights are basic to the nature of human personality. The liberties and freedom
of individuals are neither created by state nor by any divine power. This notion has
asserted the individuals freedom beyond any power or authority and liberated the
individuals from external constraints.It has inspired the Glorious Revolution of 1688in
England, the American Revolution in 1775 and the French Revolution in 1789.Thus,
the origins of rights were closely associated with the struggles against the arbitrary
authority of state.
18.2.1 Shifting Perception of Human Rights: from Legal and
Political to Social and Economic Rights
However, rights started acquiring new meanings towards the late 19&century with
the rise of inequalities contingent upon the capitalist development. The development
of socialist ideas and the birth of Soviet Union on the one hand and World Economic
Depression of 1929 on the other brought the limitations of the capitalist market into
light. The unregulated market in capitalist system resulted in rampant inequalities.
That brought state into prominence. It was realized that in order to overcome the
vagaries of the laissez faire market, certain element of state regulation of economy is
necessary.
Thus there was a shift in the understanding of rights from one of negative rights,
which believed in absolute absence of constraints whether of the state or society or
economy, to that of positive rights which seeks positive action on the part of the state
to intervene into societal processes. This shift also indicates significantly a
transformation of meaning of rights. It moved from political and legal realms to social
and economic realms, as human rights would now mean not only freedom from state
authority but also claims for social and economic equality.
Such shift in the notion of rights is more pronounced in the third world context as A -

colonialism in this part of the world initiated and introduced new institutions and
formations. The colonial and post-colonial formation of state in South Asia and
elsewhere in Third World makes the question of human rights distinctly different from
Western experiences. Here, people acquired the consciousness of human rights through
their struggles against the exploitative alien rule. After colonialism,they could obtain
the legal and political rights countries,but social and economic rights remained illusive.
Even within South Asia, experience with the practice of human rights varies in degree
and kind.
The notion of human rights today is not merely concerned with political democracy,
but it also imbibes the whole range of what the UN Covenants have labelled civil and
political rights on the one hand and social and economic rights on the other. The Rights
of Man as pronounced in American and French revolutions were merely civil and
political rights. Their tone and tenor could easily be traced to the needs and ideas
thrown up by the social revolution that accompanied the rise of capitalism as a mode
of economic life. But radical movements of the poor, women, ethnic minorities,
organised labour and the political movement for socialism forced an extension of its
scope. And by the latter part of the twentieth century, the notion of the rights of Man
that was born with the rise of capitalism had come to include, under the title ofhurnan
rights, a range of rights having the potential to transform the social, economic and
f-?
- .% .
I
The human rights that international charter recognised today could be categorised into Human Rights
1

1 two types: the civil and political rights, and social, economic and cultural rights. The
Ii former originated with capitalism and the latter more or less in opposition to it, questioning
the inequitous social, economic and cultural order.

The twentieth century, particularly the later part of twentieth century has generated
apparently a paradox in the human rights situation. Human rights put a constraint on
the state authority in the legal and political realms and enhance the scope of the state
as a developmental agency in the social and economic realms. This creates contradictions
in the practice and perception of human rights.
f

18.3 HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN


SOUTH ASIA
Ideas of democracy and civil liberty began to take roots among the English educated
hdians who became acquainted with the English revolutionsofthe Seventeenth century,
the firench revolution of the 18thcentury and the various European radical democratic
movements of the nineteenth century. The writings of Tom Paine, John Stuart Mill,
Jeremy Bentham and others had a powehl impact. It is, for example, interesting that
Tom Paine's The Rights of Man was smuggled into India and sold in the street of
Calcutta at a black market price that was thirty times its normal price. -

Politicallyconscious Indians were powerfully attracted to these ideas. And they hoped
that the British rulers would gradually transplant democracy and civil liberties In India.
But they were in for a disappointment. Gradually, the rulers evolved a new political
theory. They began to preach that because of India's hot and humid climate and the
historical traditions of the I~dianpeople and the nature of their religious and social
structure, democracywas not suited to India -that India must be ruled in an authoritarian
and despotic,though benevolent, manner. The British also increasingly tampered with
and attacked the freedoms of speech and the Press.

Consequently, it was left to the Indian national movement to fight for democracy and
to internalise and indigenise it, that is, to root it in the Indian soil. The Indian National
Congress from the beginning fought for the introduction of a representative form of
government on the basis of popular elections.

There is a marked differencebetween the struggle for civil liberties against the colonial
state and that against the post-colonial state. Many scholars as well as activists view
the post-colonial state in India as being little different from its colonial counterpart as
far its responses to people's movements are concerned. But there are indeed some
dissimilarities. One that concerns us here is the use of nationalistic discourse.

18.3.1 Human Rights Movement during Colonial Period


The champions of civil rights in the colonial days were themselves the intellectual
products of nationalist ideas and had the privilege of having nationalism as a strong
supportingforce. But their present day standard-bearers have to reckon not with foreign
rule, but with their own elected sovereign government as 'the other', the latter having
the advantage of using nationalist discqurse against the civil rights activists, branding
them as subversive and anti-national.

The civil libertarians of yore could freely quote from the Manga Carta, the American
Bill of rights or the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, and yet remain nationalists.
But today, those who cite the Universal Declaration of Human rights, the UN covenants
orAmnesty International's Standard Minimum Rules now run a two-fold risk: they are
often charged by the state with working with foreign aid against national interests, and
also accused by a section of the intelligentsia and media of negating the realities of
1
I
Democracy in South
Asia
In the initial phase the consciousness about the civil liberties was manifested in the
educated subjects' demands for equal opportunity in employment, freedom of the
press and the abolition of racial discrimination in legal proceedings. One researcher, in
fact, suggests that '[olne of the many causes which led to the organization of the
Indian National Congress in 1885 was the failure of Indians to get the Ilbert Bill
passed in its original form proposing to give Indian magistratesthe power to try British
subjects in criminal cases. By the turn ofthe century, this consciousness crystallises in
a new generation with new thoughts and new ideas, impatient of its dependent position
and claiming its rights as free citizens of the British Empire'.

The Indian Civil Liberties Union (ICLU) was founded in Bombay on 24 August 1936.
RabindranathTagore was made its president, and Sarojini Naidu the working president.
K.B. Menon took charge as the general secretary. Soon after, branches of the ICLU
were set up in Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Punjab.

As a result of the ICLU's campaigns, considerable consciousness about civil rights


was created within the major party ofthe national movement, the Congress. In 1937,
when the Congress came to power in some provincial governments for a short period,
a circular was sent to all at is ministries regarding the preservation of civil rights.
According to Gopinath Srivastava, a contemporary commentator, '[tlhe main function
of the popular governmentswas the extension ofthe scope and content of civil liberties'.
Nonetheless, lapses in the protection of these rights in Congress-ruled provinces
continued to occur, and this led to serious differences within the ICLU as large majority
of it was drawn from the Congress.

18.3.2 Human Rights Practice in the Post-colonial Period

After India won independence in 1947,'the reins of the state were taken up by the
same people who had once championed the 'right to oppose the government'. And,
ironically, their perceptions had now changed. The 'infant state', they now felt, had to
be protected even at the cost of some rights of the citizens. The hearts of the people,
on the other hand, were filled with new aspirations. They wanted the state to
immediately satisfy their hunger for not only basic human needs like food, clothing and
shelter, but also rights and justice which had eluded them under two centuries of--
colonial rule. The interests of the state and the interests of the people stood pitted
against each other. The former wanted to silence the latter. As a result, the citizens'
rights were violated, and to defend them, the civil liberties movement again became
active. This is exactly where the dilemma ofthe post-colonial state in South Asia lies.
With its weak resource base, failing to meet raising aspirations of the people, state
becomes more oppressive. It endangers the human rights on both fronts, peoples' civil
and political rights and their social and economic rights; the same dilemma is reflected
in the human rights thinking. Looking to ensure social and economic rights, the scope
of the interventionist state is enhanced. The same goes against the foundations of
human rights. The situation is further complicated in South Asia with the introduction
of liberalisation and privatisation. Market has assumed primacy on the claim that the
state has failed to fulfil the promises that it made. It shifted the focus of rights to a
different direction.

In the post-Emergency phase in India, most civil liberties groups broadened the focus
of their activities beyond the defence of political rights. The struggle against social
and economic discrimination against the poor, religious and ethnic minorities, women
and children, all gained equal importance. Community rights attracted almost as much
attention as individual rights. New issues such as environmental rights and the right to
sustainable development have been taken up both by older civil rights groups and
more recent ones, such as the Indian People's Tribunal for Environment and Human
Rights formed in 1993.
One of the factors behind this widening of focus has been the greater interaction Human Rights
of Indian activists with international human rights organisations. &nesty
International's mission to India in 1977 and its subsequent concerns are worth
mentioning in this regard. The 'new social movements7, such as the dalit
movements, the women's movements and environmental movements also had a
significant influence.

18.4 ISSUES OF HUMAN RIGHTS


As it is said earlier, though many of the countries in South Asia share an experience
of common colonial legacy, they also have their distinct problems in securing
human rights. Let us first examine the similarities which actually shape South Asia as
a region and later dissimilarities which explain the levels of difference in experiencing
the rights.
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives all had experienced anti-colonial
struggles.They have inherited the consciousness ofthe civil liberties. Nepal and Bhutan
which were British protectorates remained as monarchies. The development of human
rights consciousness always hinges upon the development of civil society which acts
as a countervailing force to the authority of state. Because of the near monopoly of
the nationalist elite during the anti-colonial struggles over the rights movement, there
was naturally confusion in the perception of civil liberties thinking in the aftermath of
independence. However, when the ruling elite failed to accommodate different sections
in the nation-building process, there emerged severe unrest in different parts of the
South Asia region. It primarily resulted in two fold situation: on one hand, the legitimacy
of the state authority started declining with the rise of many voices of marginalised
sections, and on the other hand, the state apparatuses became more and more coercive
and oppressive.
This situation manifested differently in different countries of the region. In India, it
resulted in the imposition of emergency during Indira Gandhi period in the 1970's.
Subsequenlty with the state institutions like political parties becoming less responsive
there has been a surge of many autonomous non-party movements. The authority of
the ruling elite also severely constricted with the rise of Dalit and backward caste
movements, women, environmental and sub-regional movements. These movements
have questioned the social and development policies of the state.
In Pakistan, it resulted in perennial military dictatorships with short honeymoons in
constitutional experiments which never fnrctified in any meaning full democratic rights
to the people. The state in Pakistan dominated by the nexus between military,
bureaucracy and landed aristocracy never allowed civil society to grow. It has also
resulted in communal strife such as massacre of Mujaahirs in Karachi, Sunnis in Punjab
region of Pakistan.
Though Sri Lanka experienced fairly a better democratic institutional set up, the society
has been wrought with a massive ethnic violence since the early 1980s. The Tamil
nationalism in Sri Lanka seriously challenges the credentials of the state. Efforts to
meet the challenge of Tamil nationalism has resulted in the emergence of oppressive
state without being able to provide basic security to the people.
The Bangladesh experience is no different from other countries. Though it is a
country of recent origins, it could never establish strong democratic institutions
because of violent changes in the political establishment. Bangladesh with its
lowest economic base in the world was never able to provide basic amenities to the
people.
InNepal and Bhutan with their monarchical legacies, the human rights were the biggest
casualty. The Maoists violence in Nepal and refugee problem of Bhutan could be a
good example of the way the human rights are shaped. Though there have been
Democracy in South demands for democratisation of political institution in Nepal resulting in experiments
Asia such as reforming panchayats or party based elections, the political power still rests
predominantly with the king. /
Check Your Progress 1
Note : i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answers at the end of the unit.
1) What do you mean by human rights?

2) What was the situadon of human rights during colonial period in South Asia?

...........................................................................................................................
3) Identify the principal human rights issues in South Asia?

18.5 HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH ASIA AND


GLOBALISATION
There is a fresh spate of debate on the human rights at the international level indhe
recent times. Ever since United Nations adopted the Universal Development of
Human rights in 1948, violation of human rights in any part of the country has been
recognised as a matter of concern for internationalcommunity. However, in the context
of the present sweep of globalisation, the human rights issue has acquired a complex
character.
There have been attempts on the part of great global powers to bring the human rights
issues in the third world and elsewhere under the international regime. Human right
violations are now linked to the trade issues. The global economic agencies such as
World Bank and IMF which are controlled by the big powers are putting pressures on
the third world countries by linking aid and grants with human rights record of these
countries. Though it could help to some extent stem the rot in these countries, it also
severely impeded the capacities of the third world countries to negotiate at the
international fora. While it is not wrong to check the human rights violations through
instrumentation of internationalism, it is also a matter of grave concern to use issue of
human rights as a political tool to promote Western hegemony over the developing
countries in an essentially iniquitous global order.
It is in this context that the regions like South Asia face severe dilemma internally and
externally. As we saw, because of the poor economic base the state in South Asia,
unable to meet the rising aspirations of the people has after become oppressive and
violated human rights. Very often the violations of human rights such as nuclear issue
in Pakistan, ethnic strife in Sri Lanka, police brutalities in Bangladesh, Maoist violence
in Nepal or caste and communal issues in India or Kashmir issue between Pakistan
and India, have become foreign policy tools in the global power politics. Some of the
big powers, particularly the United States, which have assumed the role of global
policemen are selectively using human rights violations in South Asia to achieve their
foreign policy goals.
On the other hand, with the rise of identities in South Asia region, the local communities Human Rights
are seekingcross border support against state's violation of human rights. This situation,
whether intended or not, is creating suitable enviroment for global intervention in the
region.
Though the changes that are taking place at the global level with regard to human
rights may have some positive results in the South Asia region, it may also restrict the
scope of the state to act independently.

18.6 COMPARING HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH


ASIA AND WEST
The third world countries have been arguing that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and t11e Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reflect only the Western ideas.
These documents are based on principles of individualism. Therefore, human rights
predicated on these values can not be transplanted to the third world.
The South Asian countries have been placing emphasis on socioCconomic rights.
These countries strongly believe that the socio-economic rights create conditions for
the realisation ofcivil and political rights. They are not against civil and political rights.
They say that given the realities - poverty, unemployment, social inequaiities - in this
region, socio-economic rights should be given priority. But the international human
rights organisations which are dominated by the Western nations are sensitive to the
violation of civil and political rights. Socio-economicrights remain unnoticed. Due to
this factor the third world countries accuse the West of using the human rights as a
political weapon to interfere in the third world.
Against this background, the human rights practitioners in South Asia and third world
countries have been making attempts not only to emphasise socio-economicrights but
also to promote different set of human rights suitable to their requirement. These rights
include the right to development, right to peace, right to environment and right to
communicate, right to property over common heritage of mankind. Of these new
generation rights, the third world countries have been giving priority to the right to
development.
These rights are in a very early stage of formation. The right to development was used
for the first time in 1972. After lot of debate the General Assembly of the United
Nations finally adopted a declaration on the right to development in 1986.This right is
in the form of an entitlement. Hence development must be seen as an entitlement. It
guarantees a right to choose econo~nicand social system without outside interference.
The state seeking development is also entitled to demand that the other states should
not take away from it, what belongs to it or should not deprive what is due to it. State
is entitled to a fair share of what is common property.
Check Your Progress 2
..
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
iii Check your answers at the end of the unit.

1) Place the human rights in South Asia in the context ofglobalisation.

2) Compare the human rights situations between south Asia and West.
18.7 LET US SUM UP
The understanding of human rights has undergone radical change since the days of
French and American revolutions. It has moved fiom seeking protections fiom the
authority of state to ensuringconditionsfor equal opportunities in the social and economic
realms. This shift added new dimensions tothe human rights practice in the twentieth
century. The social movements in the late twentieth century have further added cultural
dimension to human rights.
Similarly South Asia region also experienced these shifts. The human rights
understanding has got enhanced through the people struggles, firstly, in the political
realm, later in the social and economic fronts. The legacy of anti-colonial struggles
gave them the consciousness of political rights. After the independence, the struggle
for human rights in this region on one hand sought the democratisation of state
apparatuses, on the other fought for the equal rights for communities on ethnic, caste
and gender lines. The right to development as an entitlement has been most
pronouncedly felt.
We have also learnt that the internationalisation of human rights in the globalisation
context has made the human rights issue in the region more complicated. The nation
- states in the region have been cornered internally and externally.
SOME USEFUL READING
Alavi, H. (1973) 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', In
Kathleen Gough and Hari Sharma (eds), Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia,
New York, Monthly review Press.
Balagopal, K. (1997) 'The Human Rights Movement its Context and its Concerns', in
Indian Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 1, January-June. /

Baxi, Upendra. (1999) 'Human Rights: Between suffering and Market' In Robin Cohen
and Shirin Raj (eds.) Gdobal social Movements, 32-45, London: Altheone.
(1998) 'The State and Human Rights Movement in India, In Manoranjan
Mohanty et a1 (eds.), Peoples Rights: Social Movement and the state a d third
world, Delhi, Sage Publications.
. (1999) 'Voices of Suffering, Fragmented Universality and the Future of
Human Rights' In Burns.H. Weston and Stephen P. Marks (eds.), The Future of
International Human Rights, 101-56, New York: Ardsley, Transnational Publishers.
Hasan, Z. (1989) 'Introduction: State and Identity in Modern Indiau,In Z. Hasan, S.N.
Jha et a1 (eds.), The State, Political Processes and Identity: Reflections on Modern
India, New Delhi, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd.
Phadnis, U. (1989) 'Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South Asia ', New Delhi,
Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd.
-

18.9 ANSWERS TO CHECKYOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1
1) Rights are generally defined as opportunities, interestsand conditions for freedom
of individuals. They are also meant as the entitlements of people.
'
2) The people during the colonial period were subjects ofthe colonial power. They
were deprived of their rights. But it was during that period that the intellectuals
started the civil rights movements for getting the civic and democratic rights.
3) There are mainly -encroachment of people rights by army, ethnic conflict, religious Human Rights
fanatics.
Check Your Progress 2
1) The human rights issues have got linked to the conditionalities ofthe international
aid agencies in the developing countries - the World Bank and the [MF. They
give the funds to these countries on the condition if they ensure the rights of the
people. However, these conditionalitiesare tilted in favour ofthe donor countries.
2) The western concept of human rights is based on individualism. Conversely, in
the countries of South Asia it is mainly based on the communitarian principles.
Besides, the Western notion gives more emphasis on the civil and political rights.
And in South Asia it is more focused on the socio-economic conditions of the
people.
UNIT 19 C M L SOCIETY
structure
19.0 Objectives
19.1 Introduction
19.2 Civil Society in South Asia
19.2.1 Sri Lanka
19.2.2 Pakistan
19.2.3 Bangladesh
19.2.4 Nepal, Bhutah and Maldives

19.3 Let Us Sum Up


19.4 Key Words
19.5 Some Useful Books
19.6 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

19.0 OBJECTIVES
- -

This unit examines the role of civil society in the process of democratisation of South
Asia. After reading this, you should be able to:
a Explain the meaning civil society in the context of South Asia;
a Identify its components;
a Highlight the issues which it takes up;
*
a Comprehend the challenges it faces in the subcontinent; * ,
a Describe its relationship with the state, market and the community; and
a Assess the contribution of civil society towards the democratisation of the sub-
continent.

INTRODUCTION
Before we discuss the civil society in South Asia it is necessary to understand
what actually it means. The term civil society refers to that space between a
community and the state which strengthens the democratic elements in a society. It * ,
is symbolised by the non-governmental organisations (NGOs), intellectuals,
academics, journalist and all those informal and formal associations which are
concerned with the rights of the community and its various segments. The civil
society organisations generally operate independent of the state. But the
organisations of the civil society are not always against the state. Some of them
enter into collaboration with the state and the market. The basis of their formatio~is
generally secular, not the primordial loyalties like caste, religion or tribe. However, in
the context of SouthAsia even the religious or faith-based organisationsare considered
as members of the civil society, if they are concerned with the democratic rights of the
people. But if they infringe upon them, they are not a member of the civil society.
Sometimes, the civil society is able to positively influence the decisions of the state.
Let us examine the features of civil society, the challenges it faces and the impact it
has on South Asia.
Since the 1980s, there has been rise of civil
-.
society in various parts of the
- --. - - world.
- -- The
.
and the globalisation have been the main reasons for its emergence. The world-over Civil Society
the NGOs, the human right activists, the academics and intellectuals have occupied
the space created by the failure of the state in various sectors of the society. In the
third world countries including South Asia, the civil society has intervened to help the
society at large. It has been striving to achieve democracy where it has been lacking,
and has been struggling to restore it wherever it has failed.
Though the civil society is supposed to operate independent of the state, in order to get
legitimacy the civil society organisations have to get registered by the rules of the
state. In many cases they also have to depend on the state for finances. The success
or failure of the civil society organisations depends to a considerable extent on the
nature of regime, and the social milieu in which they operate. The army rules and the
religious and faith-based organisations in South Asia pose a great challenge to the civil
society.

C M L SOCIETY IN SOUTH ASIA


19.2.1 Sri Lanka
Civil society in Sri Lanka is represented by the intellectuals, academicians,journalists,
students, community groups (Tamils and Singhalas), trade unions and the NGOs. The
civil society organisations there first emerged mainly in the early 1980s. The ethnic
riots which took between the Tamils and Singhalas in 1983, and the social tension and
'threat to social security were the immediate context of the rise of the civil society
organisations. The riots displaced a large number of people, especially the Tamil
minorities, in which the security forces - the army and police had played partisan
roles. It involved the violation of the human rights, disturbance of peace, and affected
the process of development. The state in Sri Lanka was found wanting in restoring
peace, providing security, protecting the human rights, reconciliation of ethnic groups
etc., The civil society organisations in Sri Lanka have occupied the space vacated the
state on these. Thus the main reason for the rise of the civil society organisations in
Sri Lanka has been failure of the state.
Civil society organisations observe the month of July as "Black July" to mark the riots
of July 1983.The religious and social organisations of Sri Lanka, which have the
representation of both communities - Tamils and Singhala, hold public meetings in
order to restore peace and appeal to the government to gain the confidence of the
Tamil minorities who suffered the ethnic strife in 1983(knows as the July riot). Similarly,
thousands of the peace and human right activists representing some forty NGOs
staged a demonstration on the 9 December, 1994, on the eve of International Human
Rights Day. The demonstrators consisted of the theatre activists who staged plays
and sang on the issues of democracy, human rights and peace. The rally ended with
an appeal to both the LTTE and government to restore peace. Similarly, the theme of
one such meeting of the civil society organisations of Sri Lanka held on July 3 1,2003,
was "Never Again" referring to the July riots. An appeal signed by 217 civil and
religious organisations asked for an apology of the President and the Prime Minister
for ''wrongs that have been committed" on the Tamil minorities, which would help in
restoring peace and security among the minorities. The NGOs in Sri Lanka also support
..
the devolution of power to seven regions in order to end the ethnic conflict. The
associations like the Peace Council and the Free Media Movement, with their
commibnent to human rights and freedom checkmate the government in case it violates
the human rights.
Nira Wickramasingheobserves that with the introduction ofthe new economic policies,
which signify privatisation, the role of the state has been reduced in the economic and
service sectors. In such a situation theNGOs are influencing the decision-making
process of the state in Sri Lanka. A large number of Colombo-based NGOs like the
MARGA Institute, the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, the Institute of Policy
n-.Jr-_ LL- O _ - : _ I ~_I--L:-L_ A __--:_A:-- LL- 1 # _-L~--T__L-_ _->
n _ _ : _i__-A:-_
i
Democracy in South Equality, the Centre for Society and Religion, and the Centre for Policy Alternatives
Asia are involved with the issues of the human rights violation by the state agencies. They
are inspired by the Declaration of the Human Rights and International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights of UN. Their critique of the government's record on the
violation of the human rights had created a distance between the NGOs and the state
in the initial phase.
The civil society during the regime of Chandrika Kumaratunga played an important
role in the decision-making process in Sri Lanka. A believer in socialism and dependency
theory approach to economics of liberalism with human face, she took help of a think
tank which consisted of university lecturers, journalists and human right activists, who
had the leftist background like her in drafting the programme on the eve of 1994election.
The emergence of the civil society in Sri Lanka depended to a large extent on the
nature of the regime. The regime preceding that of Chandrika Kumaratunga, especially
since 1983 till 1994, when most ofthe time Sri Lanka had emergency, was inimical to
the existence of the civil society. It was marked by the harassment, extra-judicial
torture, arrests, and reprisal massacre of the people. Under the UNP government even
to criticise the government was considered a crime against the state which resulted in
the crime by the security forces. Besides, the limited mass appeal of the civil society
organisations, the sectarian organisationswhich are organised on the ethnic lines also
pose a threat to the existence and the functioning of the civil society in Sri Lanka.
It is also important to note that the conditions of the donor countries on the Sri Lanka
government to link the aidtloan to the record on human rights and democracy
compelled the regimes to allow the civil society to operate. However, in the electoral
politics, the political parties have often manipulate the ethnic cleavages in Sri Lanka.
This contradicts the principles of universalism on which the civil society organisations
are based.
The NGOs have contributed even to the field of development in Sri Lanka. The indigenous
NGOs, international NGOs, state, private agencies and the donor agencies have
established a network and these have emerged as "new circle of power". They are
involved in reliefand rehabilitation, socialjustice, social welfare, environmental protection,
gender equity, development and human rights. Following the collaboration with the
International NGOs, the civil society in Sri Lanka has become a member of the "global
civil society". The NGO's in Sri Lanka operate at various levels - grass-roots
organisations working in the villages, province and the national levels. Some of them
collaborate with each other. Mahrandhara Samiti or Kulangana Samitis are examples
of grass-roots organisations. They came into being due to the support ofthe foreign aid
projects. Such organisations are formed on the basis of activities of neighbouringvillages
or "through internal learning process". They belong to the farmers, fishermen, women,
neighbourhood groups, informal sectors, workers, youth, etc.
Check Your Progress 1
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answers at the end of the unit.
1) What do mean by civil society? ,
I 2) How is the civil society in Sri Lanka related to the ethnic conflict? Civil Society

I
3) Identify the main issues which have been taken-up by the civil society in Sri
Lanka
...........................................................................................................................

f 19.22 Pakistan
In context of Pakistan, the term civil society refers to a range of organisations which
include non-market and non-state citizen's organisations. These organisationsare not
related to the state that means that they do not aspire to be the party in the running of
the government. The civil society organisations in Pakistan include the NGOs,
professional associations, trade unions, philanthropist.,academiciansand think-tanks.
Even the faith-based organisations - traditional organisations, shrines, seminaries,
neighburhood associations, burial societies,jirgas (council of elders) are considered
as a part of civil society in the disEourse on Pakistan. Though by the classical defmition
of the civil society the faith-based organisations cannot be considered as civil society,
in the light of the fact that some of them are involved in the activities for the
development of the society and do not form part of the government they qualify to be
consideredas the civil society. Pakistani civil society, thus, consists of mixed groups in
t m s of value system and multiple inheritances. On the one hand there are elements
with modern and liberal outlook, on the other hand there are organisationsand individuals
in Pakistani civil society whose outlook is affected by the traditions .This shows that
there are conflicting world views and opposing interests in Pakistani civil society.
- According to a preliminary report on the civil society by the Agha Khan Foundation,
Karachi, there were more than 10,000 registered NGOs operating in Pakistan in
2001. Most of these existed in the provinces of Punjab, Sindh and NWPF. The number
of the non-registered NGOs is much more than that of the registered ones. The
operation of the civil society organisations is restricted to the urhan areas. In the
urban area they are controlled by the middle classes, while in the rural areas traditional
elite hold the sway on the social, economic and po!;tical spheres. The civil society
organisations are almost absent in the province 01 13; ' , i r i ~ a .Their absence could
be attributed to the widespread illiteracy, limitations of women's mobility and the
tribal-feudal system which is opposed to social change. The issues which the civil
society organisations in Pakistan take up are; promotion of human rights, gender
equity, tolerance, education, health, childhood development, sustainable development,
community development, etc.

I
Like in any other third world country, the NGOs in Pakistan are dependent on domestic
and foreign funding. For example, in 1991, Pakistani government provided substantial
financial endowment to initiate the National Rural Support Programme. In 1991-92,
the government also set up with the support of USAID, the Trust of Voluntary
Organisations in order to provide financial support to the NGOs as a social investment
c.-A u--.-=.- 4
1.
- ---c---:---t &
.: -:- &-A- ---:---
--A AL- ---:---
-PAL-
Democracy in South employees depend on the funding by their members. A large number of individuals
Asia also give funds to the NGOs as zakat. Zakat is one ofthe five "pillars of Islam" which
means " giving of alms by the wealthy persons to the poor, widows, recent converts to
Islam, those in debt through circumstances beyond their control, travellers and those
who do the 'good work of Allah"'. The community-based organisations receive
funds largely from their communities. Besides, the corporate sector also funds a large
number of the NGOs in Pakistan.
The coordination among the civil service organisations in Pakistan is very weak and
they work in the isolated manner. However, in opposition to the government's negative
attitude a large number of the civil society organisations established the Pakistan
NGOs Forum (PNF) in 1995-96 in order to have coordination among them. The sector-
based NGOs have established network in the country. The main sector-wise
coordination-bodies are -the Advocacy Development Network, Coordination Council
for Child Welfare, Women in Development (WID), Rural Support Network (RSPN),
Pakistani Reproductive Health Network (PRHN), Pakistan Education Network (PEN),
Pakistan Microfinance Network and Environmental NGOs Network.
The scope of the civil society organisations in Pakistan is very limited. They are not
only dominated by the elitist sections, they also suffer from the internal limitations.
There is also a lack of internal democracy, and transparency within them. These
factors also account for the lack of transparency within the Pakistani'civil society.
The civil society organisations in Pakistan operate under lot of limitations. While the
Industrial Relations Ordinance (1969) and the Essential Service Act debars the
employees from forming associations, the NGOs face problems due to the existence
of multiplicity of the registration laws. There are six different laws under which the
NGOs have to get registered. These are - the Societies Act (1860), the Co-operative
Act (1925), the Charitable Endowments Act (1890), Companies Ordinance (1984),
the Trust Act (1882), the Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies (Registration and Control)
Ordinance (1961). These complicate the process of registration of the civil society
organisations.
Moreover, civil society has been subject to the repression of the army in Pakistan.
The repression took many forms like ban on the civil society organisations, arrest of
the civil society organisation leaders and political pressure. Though the situation
improved a little with the restoration of democracy in the 1980s, the situation largely
remain grim in practice. Even the social atmosphere remains hostile to certain NGOs
which raise issues relating to the gender equity. Certain forces representing the
traditional feudal and tribal values are opposed to the democratic rights. They, in
league with the army create hurdles.
Though Article 17 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan guarantees
freedom of association, the fundamental rights have often been infringed upon and
restricted in the name of national interest. The ban bn public demonstration, assemblies
and arrest of civil society organisations are the common features in Pakistan.
The state does not encourage the civil society to be involved in the issues concerning
democratic rights. For example, it does not oppose the charity role and the service
delivery activities of the NGOs. But it is intolerant of NGOs' involvement in the
issues which are related to the advocacy of values - education, gender equity, human
rights, etc. The Zia regime imposed restriction on the human rights and women's
organisations. But on the other hand it protected and supported the activities of the
madrassas, shrines, seminaries and jigras, in league with whom the Zia regime
functioned.
The NGO- state relations in Pakistan are marked by hostility. In 1996the government
proposed a bill in the senate called the Social Welfare Agencies (Registration and
Regulation) Act. It was opposed by the Pakistan NGO Forum which considered it as
a device to get legitimacyto intervene in their affairs. The bill also aimed at excluding
the government launched a campaign against a large number of the NGOs. It Civil Society
deregistered around 2500 NGOs in Punjab, Sindh and NWPF. The government's move
was a reaction to the protest of these NGOs against the proposed religious legislation
(Shariat Bill) and the nuclear tests conducted in May 1998. The NGO activists were
I
intimidated by the personnel of intelligence agencies. Encouraged by the government,
the religious extremists accuse the development and the advocacy-oriented NGOs

i of working against "national ideology" by spreading secular and liberal values.


Prominent human right defender Asma Jehangir has faced numerous death threats
from them.
19.2.3 Bangladesh
The seeds of civil society in Bangladesh were shown even before its birth. As the
inhabitants of the then east Pakistan, the academicians, intellectuals, lawyers, doctors,
teachers, students,journalists, etc., had launched the relentless battle against culturally
I
and politically discriminatory policies ofthe political elite of West Pakistan from 1947-
1971. Establishment of Bangladesh as sovereign nation in 1971 raised the hopes ofthe
, democratic sections of the society there. The 1972 constitution of Bangladesh actually
endorsed space for the operation of the civil society under the regime of Sheikh Muzibur
Rehman. But the same regime reversed its stance by enacting the Fourth Constitutional
Amendment. This sought to assault the civil society in Bangladesh. The military regimes
that dominated Bangladesh till 1990 virtually blocked all avenues for the growth of
civil society through various amendments to the constitution.
The civil society, however, succeeded in getting the democracy restored through the
mass upsurge in 1990 against the repressive and corrupt regime of General Ershad.
Following the 1991 parliamentary election, the newly elected Jatiya Parishad restored
the democratic rights of the civil society through the 12h Constitutional Amendment.
But the elements hostile to the existence of the civil society remained in some form or
the other. The successive governments have refrained from purging the society of
such elements. The civil society in Bangladesh faces multiple challenges. These include
a section of political forces, military regime from 1975-1990,and the lumpen bowgeoisie
which conspire against the civil society.A section of the civil society succumbs to the
onslaught of the regime. For example, newspapers like Manglar Bani and Sangbad
wrote editorials welcomingthe martial law. The religious fundamentalists infringe upon
the freedom of the intellectuals, especially women.
In the face of such adverse situation, the civil society in Bangladesh is seeking to
make up for the failure of state, especially following the formation of government by
KhalidaZia in 1991.TheNGOs are involved in the "grass-root" solution of the problems.
It is contrary to the top-down planning, which leads to the exclusion of the ordinary
jxmple from availing ofthe aid. The NGQs are involved in rural development activities,
helping the "floating popuration" of the migrants, garment industries, etc. They take
recourse to strike, demonstrations, and litigation in order to get their demands met. In
1998,the women's organisationsfiled a writ petition in the SupremeCourt against the
Eight ConstitutionalhendmentBill which sought to establish Isla.. as the state religion.
The petition argued that the Amendment was against political rights of women. The
women's organisations also protested against tb- , \ .,.?ionof prostitutes from the
dwelling places.
19.2.4 Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives
While the civil society in Nepal is relatively new, and as a consequence weak, in other
two countries of South Asia - Bhutan and Maldives it is nearly absent. In Nepal the
concept of civil society became popular through the project of development. It was
the democratic revolution of 1990,which ended the repressive, Panchayat regime that
provided avenues for the emergence of the civil society. Since then a large number of
theNGOs and other organisationsemerged in Nepal. They are, however, being largely
criticised for misappropriation of the funds. The undemocratic nature of regime in
Bhutan does not provide conducive atmosphere for the emergence of civil society
Democracy in South Check Your Progress 2
Asia
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
iii Check your answers at the end of the unit.
1) What is the attitude of the traditional chiefs have towards the women's issues in
Pakistan?

...........................................................................................................................
2) What challenges does the civil society in Bangladesh face?

...........................................................................................................................
3) Why is the civil society almost absent in Bhutan ?

19.3 LET US SUM UP


The countries of South Asia have seen the emergence of civil society in varying degrees
and at different points of time since the last two decades of the twentieth century. The
civil society there consists of those organisations, associations and individuals, which
take up the issues of society, its various components. The existence of the civil society
is an indication ofthe democraticvalues in a society. The most important characteristic
of the civil society is that it is autonomousof the state. It is not always against the state.
But if state does not protect the basic rights of the people or infringes upon them, the
civil society fights of the protection and restoration of peoples' rights. It also does not
involve in the pursuit of state power. The civil society in South Asia consists mainly of
the NGOs, intellectuals, academics,journalists, some religious organisations,etc. It has
been concerned with restoration of democratic rights, including those of the children
and women, environment, sustainabledevelopment, restoration of ethnic harmony and
peace, etc.,
The civil society organisationsare funded mainly by the international donors orland the
state. In many cases there is collaboration between the civil society, state and the
market. All countries of South Asia - Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and
Maldives except Bhutan practice democracy, of which the elections are most important
feature. But the elements opposed to the existence of civil society like the army, religious
fanatics, traditional elements and other vested interests pose a challenge to the civil
society in South Asia. In some cases the state has to reluctantly recognise the civil
society under the conditions of the donor countries. Nevertheless, the civil society has
made its presence felt in most countriesof SouthAsia to varying extent. It is contributing
towards the democratisation in the sub-continent.

19.4 KEY WORDS


Jigra: The Council of elders
Grass-rootsOmanisations: The organisations which work at the villane- localitv or
Civil Society
19.5 SOME USEFUL BOOKS
Alam, S. M., Shamshul. (1 975) The state, Class Formation and Development in
Bangladesh, Uhiversity Press of America, Inc., New York.
Baig, Adnan Sattar Rabia. (2001) Civil Society in Pakistan, A Preliminary Report
on the
CIVICUS Index on Civil Society Project in Pakistan, Occasional Paper Series,
Vol. 1, Issue 11, A Project of Agha Khan Foundation, Karachi, Pakistan.
Wickramasingha, Nira. (20,01) Civil Society in Sri Lanka: New Circles of Power,
Sage Publications, New Delhi.

19.6 ANSWERS TO CHECKYOUR PROGRESS


EXCERCISES
Check your Exercises 1

I) Civil society consists ofthe NGOs intellectuals, academics,journalists, informal


and formal organisation. It is independent of the state. The civil society takes up
the issues of general concern for the society. Though independent of the state,
the civil society often works in collaboration with state and market. Existence of
civil society in a country is an indication of the level of democracy there.

2) It is the riot of 1983 which provided the context ofthe emergence of civil society
in Sri Lanka. The failure of state to provide peace and security, ethnic harmony
in the wake of riots which caused the rise of the civil society there.

3) These are mainly :Human rights, Peace and Security, Environment, Sustainable
Development, Education, Gender Equity, Right to Children and Heath etc.,
Check your progress Exercise 2

I) The tribal chiefs have generally been opposed to the issues of equity for women,
and their other democratic rights. -

2) The challenges to civil society in Bangladesh come from the military regime and
re1igious fanatics.

3) The reason for this lie in the nature of regime. The absence of democracy there
is the main cause of it.
UNIT 20 CHALLENGES TO MANAGING
PLURALISM IN SOUTH ASIA
Structure
20.0 Objectives
20.1 Introduction
20.2 What is Pluralism?
20.3 Pluralism in Social and Political Sphere
20.4 The South Asian Situation
20.4.1 Pluralism and Democracy in India
" 20.4.2 Pluralism and,Democracy in Other Countries

20.5 Managing Challenges: A Conceptual Toolkit


20.6 Let us Sum Up
20.7 Some Useful Books
20.8 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercise

20.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit discuss the challenges which the countries of South Asia face in managing
pluralism. After going through it, your should be able to:
explain the meaning of pluralism;
describe pluralism in South Asian countries;
identifj theoretical models for managing the pluralism challenge to; and
South Asian countries are manageing the challenges to pluralism describe how.

20.1 INTRODUCTION
Most of the countries in SouthAsia are multi-cultural and multi-national. These countries
are composed of plural societies, communities or cultures. Let us call them groups.
They have their independent cultural traits and world views. Such plurality needs careful
management, especially because it leads to inevitable competition and often conflict
among these disparate groups. The political systems in South Asia are generally biased
in favour of majority. Another unfortunate fact of life has been the numerical
preponderance ofone group over others. In case of Pakistan, it is the Punjabis; in case
of Bhutan; it is the Bhutanese, in case of Bangladesh it is the Bengali speaking Muslims
and in case of Sri Lanka it is the Sinhalese. This engenders a feeling of insecurity
among the minorities.
The majority communities are also internally divided and can be split into several groups
and sub-groups which compete for power and influence in their own ways. The clashes
between various groups are quite visible in all these states and this has posed problems
for national integration efforts, and affected national security as well. The South Asian
states have sought to manage such competitive plurality politically through a state
sponsored process which has been often called 'nation building'. The basic thrust of
such efforts has been to privilege one dominant perception over others and ignore
differences.All cultural and national identities rolled into a singular whole i.e., 'one
nation'. Such assimilative nation - building efforts have failed because such state
sponsored ideas of 'nation' have failed to appeal to all the groups. The challenge to
vluralitv basically comes from such misdirected efforts by the state.
As such there is a need to introduce an accommodationist posture and recognise Challenges to Managing
Pluralism in South Asia
plurality at the cultural levels. The state should stay neutral and accept, accommodate,
protect aqd promote plurality and diversity rather than seek to homogenise and assimilate
them. There are several conceptual models which deal with management of such
plurality and they deserve our attention and understanding. These states are in need
o f a balanced state structure, accommodative of all and partial towards none and a
political order which protects civil liberties of individual members and groups. The
discussion below elaborates upon fhe ideas introduced here.

- 20.2 WHAT IS PLURALISM?


i

Pluralism is aconcept which accommodates diversity and regards diversity as inevitable.


I Unlike the advocates of monism who ignore multiple, disparate identities, cultures and
traditions and often make deliberate efforts to roll combine them into one artificial
I political unit, pluralism accepts plurality as a fact of life. It seeks to protect and promote
such diversity in spite of (or more so because of) the differences among them.
I
Pluralism has a long history of evolution. It basically emerged as a protest against
monism ofthe German idealistic school ofthought led by Hegel. As early as the 1830s
the idea of pluralism as an approach to philosophy, psychology and even theology had
started taking roots. It was then argued that pluralism could be interpreted either in a
psy.chological, a cosmological, or a theological sense. Simply for the sake of
acquaintance,psychological pluralism claimed that, there exist other independent beings,
spiritual beings, or souls, and that they cannot be regarded as mere parts of a universal
cosmic soul. Similarly, cosmological pluralism advocated the belief in the plurality of
worlds inhabited by rational beings or the belief in various systems ofbodies (the Solar
System, the Milky Way etc.). Theological pluralism reintroduced the concept of
I polytheism.

After further philosophical churning by the European philosophers, by 1 870s, pluralism


l e i its mark in other fields like various social sciences as well. John Dewey isolated it
as a tendency to emphasise on differences and multiplicity and famously stated that
pluralism gave birth to "the theory that reality consists in a plurality or multiplicity of
distinct beings." Pluralism made its way into the domain ofapplied politics in the early
Twentieth century. The pluralists like Harold Laski, Frederic Maitland, G.D.H Cole,
Sidney and Beatrice Webb and others criticised the core of monist theory of sovereignty
which held sovereignty of state as inalienable and indivisible. According to them power
of the state was limited by the influence of other social, economic and political actors
L
in the political domain. And they argued that it is in the interest ofstate to concede
power to these plural institutions.
i
20.3 PLLTRALISM IN SOCIALAND POLITICAL
SPHERE
We are here only concerned with' plural socio-cultural identities within a state and
.how the interplay ofthe politics various plural groups can be managed in a productive
and profitable way.
In order to understand su& 'Pluralism', one has to understand the philosophical tradition
that built up around the very word and the inbuilt rejection ofthe coercive singularism
of the monists. 'The monists held that there is a single harmony of truths into which
genuine everything, must fit in the end. This ancient belief gave birth to the notion of
nation - state i.e., the states need to be based on a single nation for politics to be
effective. The monists said that only a homogeneous socio-cultural order can make
the political system functional. On the contrary, a plural and fragmented socio-cultural
environment.will lead to 'aggravation of political divisions and intensification of
differences'. John Stuart Mill, one ofthe ardent champions of individual rights with
liberal views said: "Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of
A ; f F ~ r ~ nnt ~ r c n n ~ l ; t ; A m n n m a nannlo rxr;thni*t
~ c fnlln.=r FD-I;~"normn:nll.r ;F+h,, -A
,
Democracy in South and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of
Asia representative government, cannot exist". The myth of successful coupling of liberal
democracy and mono-national state haunts all liberal thinkers. For them, the plurality
of the third world societies is an insufferable incongruity. Many liberal political
philosophers like Maurice Duverger, Gabriel Almond, Lucian Pye, Sigmund Neumann,
even agreed that a unifying and centralisingsocio-cultural order (which means singular
ethno cultural order) was the most basic necessary for a political system to work
effectively.
Some liberal thinkers highlight.thatpluralism has also its constraints. For example,
Harry Eckstein regards plural society as a 'society divided by segmental cleavages',
where political divisions follow the line of social differentiation and division. The
cleavages may be 'religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic in
nature'. Even political parties, voluntary associations, interest groups, media of
communication tend to get organised around such segmental cleavages. Furnival17s
characterisationof groups which play a dominant role in a plural polity is very interesting.
According to him in a plural society, each group holds onto its own religion, culture,
language, ideas and ways. Even if 'different sections of the community live side by
side', they live separately within the same political unit7.It is in the strictest sense a
medley (of peoples), for they mix but do not combine'.
In such a case, domination by one of the segments becomes inevitable. The group
relationships get regulated in a non-democratic manner and one group may dominate
the rest. Gabriel Almond also distinguishes such plural societies as 'regulated societies
characterized by dissensus and cultural pluralism7while contrastingthem with 'integrated
societies characterized by consensus and cultural homogeneity'.

THE SOUTH ASIAN SITUATION


South Asia has often been characterised by some as a melting pot and by others as a
boiling pot of competing and conflictingcultures and civilisations. The countries in the
region are unmistakably multi-cultural. Some scholars call it multi-national.
Apart from the Maldives, all the countries have a rich linguistic diversity. Again, in
terms of religion on diversity, all the major re1igions of the world are followed in South
Asia. There is also the factor of caste cross-cutting religious diversity in most of the
states. There are other faultlines on the basis of regional identities and geo-cultural
differences. It will be apt to bring in these elements,in the major countries in the
region.

20.4.1 Pluralism and Democracy in India


India is home to all the major religions ofthe world. But Hindus and Muslims divide the
religious-cultural matrix in India. The competition for resources between the two
communities, basically initiated by the elite-driven politics during the colonial days led
to partition ofthe British colonial India into two separate states. One of them, Pakistan,
later split up on the basis of language. The Bengali speaking ~ u s l i m of s the eastern
Pakistan split to form Bangladesh. This single example is perhaps best illustrates the
cross-cutting religious-cultural sympathies that define the Sopth Asian political reality,
In India, in spite ofthe partition on the basis of religion, the elite ensured the introduction
of secular, parliamentary democracy which has exhibited exemplary capacity for
evolution and endurance. However, in the post-independence India, ironically the system
of democratic governance, especially through the electoral method of selection ofthe
ruling dispensation, has enabled political mobilisation on the basis of all possible group
loyalties - caste, class, community, region, religion and language. This has deeply
politicised the peripheral identities and groups and fragmented the polity. At another
level the unifying appeal of Hindu religion has sought to bridge the intra-communal and
intra-religiousdivide. This has, in turn, communalised the polity and resulted in communal
clashes and disturbed nolitical order in the state.
There have also come up regional demands for the formation of autonomous states Challenges to Managing
Pluralism in South Asia
within the Indian union. The cases of Bundelkhand, Vidarbha (eastern Maharashtra),
I
Vindhya Pradesh (northern Madhya Pradesh), Telengana (north western Andhra
1 Pradesh), Kosala, Purvanchal (Eastern Uttar Pradesh), Harit Pradesh (Western Uttar
1 Pradesh) illustrate such examples. The provinces within the Indian Union have been

ii reorganised in the past keeping one or another criterion in mind. Besides, there have
also been separatist movementslin certain pasts ofthe country like north - east, Jammu
and Kashmir and Punjab.
The primary reason for such fissiparous tendencies has been the dysfunctioning of
democracy and the shrinking capacity of the state to deliver. The root cause for the
rise of militancy in Kashmir was the manipuIation of the democratic process by the
regional elite and the gross and injudicious oversight of such a phenomenon by the
central administration. The same has been true of the north - eastern states as weIl.
The primary cause of disaffection in these states has been a perception that the people
there have been discriminated against. The crisis of governance at the local level has
thrown up a secessionist elite at the periphery. The introduction of the element of
force into the whole framework of resistance has created more problems for the
lndian state than it has resolved. This in turn has engendered the right wing and militant
politics.
The overwhelming assertion of the Hindu right wing in politics in recent years has
emerged as yet another indication of the nature of political transformation taking place
at certain levels. This has compelled analysts to observe that a hegemonic Hindu
majoritarian political culture is in ascendance in India, which will seek to impose an
artificial uniformity on the Hindus themselves. At the same time, in spite of such
assertion, the intra-religious divides have evolved into lasting political constituencies,
i.e, the Yadavas, the Bhumihars, the Dalits or Bahujans. The left wing extremist
constituency-Naxals, Maoist Communists or Peoples War Group, is slowly rising on
the political horizon as yet another political class. This again traces its origin primarily
to dysfunction of democracy and inability of the state to address the grievances of a
underprivileged section ofthe population.
I Check Your Progress 1
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answers at the end of the unit.
1) What you mean by plural ism?

2) What are the challenges of pluralism in South Asia?

How plurality is managed; Assimilation vs. Accommodation


India with its emphasis on unity in diversity indirectly emphasises on the cultural unity
that acted as a unifying thread to tie together diverse cultural groups. But this cultural
unity had an inevitable Hindu cultural or communal overtone. The image ofAkhand
Bharat (unified India). spreading from the Himalayas in the north to Kanyakumari in
the south was born out of a mythical romantic past which had definite Hindu reflexes.
It is true that such unihl was conceived purely from geo-cultural perspective by secular
Congress leadership led by Jawaharlal Nehru. But it is also a fact that the idiom that
people employed to demonstrate such unity were dfawn from Hindu Puranas and
other religious texts. The enthusiastic nationalistic historians of such a resurgent nation
resorted to contrived throwbacks into history for attesting ancientness of such unity, in
order to portray it as natural and eternal. The lure of establishing a nation-state modelled
after the post-1648 Westphalian states of Europe and especially the writings by
nationalists like Garibaldi, Mazzini, Cavour, Bismarck, the heroic efforts at unifLingthe
German and Italian nation made them look into distant past to root such nationality in
an ahistorical past. The administrative unity brought about by Muslim rulers during the
\
immediate medieval history was either overlooked or completely forgotten.
The enthusiasm to build such a nation had induced in the elite a reflexive urge to unite
disparate groups. They adopted mostly an assimilative posture, where intra-communal
differences were even glossed over. It was considered natural and perfectly just to
expect them to shed their differentiating characteristics in favour of a centralised,
hegemonic and construct. There was an absence of efforts at the level of the elite to
accommodate diversity initially; they interpreted their nation building endeavours in
hegemonic ways. But gradually, as democracy has matured, there are positive signs
of the elite adopting an accornrnodationist posture. Thus one finds the progressive
nationalist leadership accommodating linguistic diversity in no uncertain terms in the
early years of independence. Even ethno-cultural and regional diversities have been
accommodated progressively as has been seen in the cases of demands for Jharkhand,
Chhatisgarh etc. However, such accommodative posture leaves out certain types of
diversities and it will take some more time for the Indian polity to take it to its logical
end.

20.4.2 Pluralism and Democracy in Other Countries


In other countries of the region, democracy has not had a smooth run so far. In
Pakistan for example, the military-bureaucracycombine alongwith a class of opportunist
politicians have ruled the country for most part of its sovereign existence. The ruling
elite has suffered from crisis of legitimacy from time to time. For example, Nawaz
Sharif who was elected into power with a huge mandate was dethroved by the army
chief Parvez Musharraf. 'The main reason for army action is generally attributed to
the undemocratic assertion of absolute power by Nawaz Sharif. The army has in its
own way sought to derive popular legitimacy through rigged referendum, poorly
participated local bodies elections and even a stage-managed national election. An
unequal competition, in terms of the power they weild, has been going on between the
military administration headed by Mushamaf and his crony-democrats in power and
the political forces he shut out of the electoral fray.
It is also imperative to add here that the intra-Islamicplurality in Pakistan has come to
the fore in recent years in a militant way. It has been a free for all battle among the
Sunnis and within Sunnis among the Deobandis and Barelvis, the Shias, and the
Ahmadiyas. The growing militarisation has effectively shut the door on democracy.
The plural face of Pakistan in the shape of Pakistan Oppressed Nationalities (PONM),
the combination of Balochis, Sindhis,Pathans and Seraikispitted against majority Punjabis
is also slowly emerging as a political reality in Pakistan.
In Sri Lanka, the majority Sinhalese has effectively dispraced an otherwise influential
minority Tamils from the system of governance since the 1950s and this has led to a
civil war in the island since the 1980s. In the absence of an effective and genuine
federal, democratic anangement, no working solution to the crisis will ever be possible
as has been amply demonstrated by the failure of the talks between the two parties
mediated by the Norwegians.
In Nepal too, democracy has developed in a very warped way where the elites have
shamed the very system of democracy by their fights ever since they shifted from
. I . . .. . I . a . 11 ,
I . A 1 -
Renacracy to ConstitutionalMonarchy. The failure and malfunction of the democratic
.- -
L , C - .
P-lL.
pitched battle and here again no solution will ever be possible unless and until the Challenges to Managing
ruling political elite demonstrates its wisdom in accommodating the Maoists and letting Pluralism in South Asia
them democratically place their demands on the states.
In Bangladesh, the utter criminalisation and deep politicisation ofthe society has divided
it into two hostile camps: the liberationists or the followersof Sheikh Mujibur Rehman
and the anti-liberationists who are now aligned with Islamist right wingers. The latter
had opposed the creation of Bangladesh at one point of time. Democracy is fast
establishing itself in Bangladesh in electoral terms but with a booming population and
rising indices of illiteracy and poverty, the real spirit of democracy may take years to
take roots in Bangladesh.
A cursory look at the political situation in South Asia reveals that the system of
democracy that has been adopted in various ways in the countries in the region, with
perhaps some exception in the Indian case, still fall pathetically short of the standards
they have set upon themselves. The root causes of their inability to deal with the
plurality in their midst in a democratic fashion have been analysed below from a
conceptual point of view.
How Plurality is Managed: Coercive State, Centralising Reflexes
As has been shown above, countries other than India in South Asia have adopted a
warped model of democracy. In all these states, a hegemonic 'ethnic order' has
emerged which jealously guards its privileges. If it is the Punjabi elite in Pakistan, it is
the Sinhalese elite in Sri Lanka. The Punjabi elite in Pakistan has accommodated
Pushtun elite in some ways, but the Sindhi and Balochi elites are kept out of the
domain of political power. In Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese elite, ironically empowered by
democracy and game of numbers, has completely marginalised the Tamils. Similarly
the Islamic reflexes of the Bangladeshi state have been quite obvious. The fact that
there has been a steady outflow of Hindus from Bangladesh proves the point that the
state in Bangladesh has consolidated a hegemony that is intolerantof other communities.
This is also borne out by the way Bangladeshi elite has treated the Buddhist Chakmas.
The state has adopted a coercive style in dealing with cases of assertion by the plural
identities. The state of Pakistan during the early years of its history was seen caught
up in a serious power struggle between the Bengali-speaking East Pakistani popular
leadership and the Punjabi dominated political, bureaucratic and military leadership of
West Pakistan. In a bid to overpower the more numerous Bengalis the Punjabi
dominated-west Pakistan leadership brought about a forced unity among disparate
nationalities who had no obvious common thread of unity among them except Islam.
This imposed sense of an artificial unity has been continually reinforced by the ruling
elite over the years. Even an otherwise suave and westernised politician like Bhutto,
~ l i gave
o Pakistan its first well-negotiated constitution, was seen replicating the
coercive measures the Pakistani army had employed in East Pakistan. He ordered
the same army recovering from the shock of a division to silence the Balochis during
1973-1974. Of late, in view of the Balochi assertion and the united movement by
Oppressed Nations of Pakistan, the military admir.;stration has demonstrated restraint
until now. But the style of management of ett~nc -i~ur,l differences still remains
primarily coercive. Some times the power elite in South Asia have also attempted to
accommodate the dissenting groups.

20.5 MANAGING CHALLENGES: A


CONCEPTUAL TOOLKIT
The essence of politics is management of difference. Politics works on well laid out
principles, around which consensus has to be either spontaneous or constructed. The
main problem with plural societies is the divergent way in which common political
principles are approached, interpreted and acted upon. This often leads to contrary
Democracy in South interests. With the introduction of democracy into the scene, the democratic sympathy
Asia for majority rule crystallises in artificial political bonding among disparate groups and
the nature ofthis opportunistic combine changesfrom time to time. This influen:m th&
nature of politics and reduces democracy to mere electocracy. In some other cases,
like Smith has pointed out, where society is deeply divided and fragmented,the rule by
a numerical majority group(majority hegemony), even if such group may be divided
within itself, becomes inevitable. Such plural societies indeed pose a real challenge to
political theorists.
The whole of empiricist and rationalist school in the West working on issues of political
development,democratisation of societies in the underdeveloped countries have sought
to analyse functioning political systems in plural societies and drawn lessons from
them in spite of the aberrations and deviations from real democracy.The prescriptions
they have for such societies can be basically developed into two models: liberal and
consociational.
The liberal model emphasises on:

i) civic equality of all citizens in spite of the group affinities they have,

ii) protection of civil and political rights through constitutional means

iii) neutrality of the state in ethnic matters


iv) minimisation of state intervention in the private sphere
v) participatory inclusion of groups in the political process
The liberal model, however, has failed to dilute group appeal. Its thrust on individualism
seeks to reduce the strength of communal affinity and ensure that the real political
atom in the polity is the individual and not community or group. Moreover, liberal
democracy in plural societies facilitates the process of elite formation within groups
and consolidates the process of group solidarity. Thus, groups become increasingly
important and politically competitive. In a bid to gloss over plurality the liberg1democracy
falls a victim to the lasting appeal of such plural identities around which political
mobilisation mostly takes place.
The consociational model, advocated by Arend Liiphart, takes into account the inherent
weaknesses of the liberal model which seeks to gloss over ethnic diversity. It
accommodatesethnocultural diversities and grants them legitimate space within the
political realm. It recognises group interests. At the same time it puts a premium on
individual rights and liberties. The elements ofa consociational political order are:

i) A grand political alliance at the helm of affairs wedded to power sharing. In


plural societies, more often than not, one finds that political leaders of various
groups often come together to exercise power in a cooperative way whereas in
bi-party systems obtaining mainly in homogeneous states leaders tend to adopt
adversarial style. The consociational leadership style, as such, tends to be
coalescent. One close example of grand alliance in the South Asian politics is the
Indian National Congress Party of India. However, Lijphart has revised his views
on consocialism regarding Congress in the wake of its decline and the rise of
BJP since the 1990s.

ii) Commitment to accommodationist solution. The leaders simply because of the


fact that they come together tend to avoid conflictive postures and seek to
accommodate contrary and contradictory viewpoints.

iii) Segmental autonomy and non-territorial federalism. Different groups are allowed
to operate independent of each other and their autonomy is guaranteed through
written and formal legal instruments. Thus, social and cultural rights ofthe groups
.- .
are well recognised and secured. As the groups may not be clustered within
. . ... . - . . . --
kind of distribution of power among such groups may be called non-territorial Challenges to Managing
Pluralism in South Asia
federalism.

iv) Mutual Veto. This provision of mutual veto for all the groups makes the exercise
of power most interesting in a consociational arrangement. This is a guarantee
that no decisjon which injuriousto the vital interests of a group will be acceptable
in such a system. John C. Calhoun calls this arrangement 'concurrent majority'
which invests every group, a minority by itself, with power to protect itself and
overcomes the fear of being obtvoted by any possible oppressive majority.

v) Right to political divorce (secession and partition). Samuel P. Huntington remarked


once that the resistance to political divorce was the hallmark of the twentieth
century state system like resistance to marital divorce was the hallmark of
nineteenth century social system. Like the consociationalists, he argues that the
minority groups need to have power to disassociate from the dominant group
whenever they feel so, to protect their interests.
vi) Proclivity of power elites to come' to arrive at negotiated solution. As has been
outlined above, the centrifugaltendency of the plural society is counterbalanced
by the cooperativeattitude of the group leaders who are always looking for alliances
in a consociational form of democracy. And this lends stability to the system.
In the states of South Asia, it is imperative to help build an atmosphere of trust and
harmony for democracy to succeed. The cross-cultural links among South Asian states
should enable a regional model of growth and cooperation. The states in the region will
have to evolve further as states and not representatives of one particular community or
group of select communities.At the internal level, they have to ensure justice and'fair-
play and encourage political participatian by the people in the affairs of the state. The
political elite in all these countries will have to show enough maturity to accommodate
the interests of other groups and help other groups develop in their own ways. Plurality
will succeed ~ n l when
y differences will be allowed to play themselves out in an impartial,
open, liberal and nondiscriminatory atmosphere.
Check Your Progress 2
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answers at the end of the unit.

1) How have the challenges of pluralism managed in South Asian countries?

2) What are the theoretical models which dealt with the management of challenges
of pluralism in South Asia?

Pluralism in a society denotes existence of differences in terms of culture, language, ,

customs, traditions, etc. These differences are also known as diversities. But pluralism
is different from diversities. While the latter showsjust the existence of diverse groups
with political rights. All countries of South Asia are pluralist. There are large number
groups with different culture, languages, customs, ethnicity, etc. These groups have
both harmonious and conflicting relationships. Conflict in South Asia takes various forms
-ethnic conflict 1riots, autonomy movements, etc. Autonomy movements even threaten
Democracy in South the sovereignty of the nation-state; the ethnic conflicts threaten the public order. These
Asia pose challenge to pluralism in South Asian countries. There are two models available
for managing challenges to pluralism - the liberal and consociational. The states in
South Asia have largely attempted to manage challenge to pluralism by accommodation
and coercion of the various groups.

20.7 SOME USEFUL BOOKS


Bose, Sugata and Ayesha Jalal (eds.). (1998) Nationalism, Democracy and
Development: State and Politics in India. Oxford University Press. New Delhi.
Cornell. (2002) "The Progress of Pluralism and the Tug of War of Civilisations".
Perceptions. June-August.
Dahl, Robert A. (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University
Press. New Haven.
Gvosdev, Nicholas. (2002) "Managing Pluralism". World Policy Journal, mnter.
Jalal, Ayesha. (1995) Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A
Comparative and Historical Perspective. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
Lij phart, Arend. (1989) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration.
Bombay. Popular Prakashan.
Oommen, T.K. (2002) Pluralism, Equality and Identity. New Delhi. Oxford University
Press.
Paleg, Illan. (2004) "Transforming Ethnic Orders to Pluralist Regimes", in Andrian
Guelke (ed.) Democracy and Ethnic Conflict: Advancing Peace in Deeply Divided
Societies, Palgrave Macmillan. New York.
Thakur, Ramesh and Oddny Wiggen. (2004) South Asia in the World: Problem
Solving Perspectives on Security, Sustainable Development, and Good
Governance. Tokyo. UNU Press.

20.8 ANSWERS TO CHECKYOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

1) Pluralism means existence of multiple differences among people in a society. It


is different from diversities. While the latter refers to the existence of differences,
pluralism refers to the existences of differences along with political rights.

2) All countries of South Asia are beset with cleavages in society among the social
groups on the basis of language, religion, culture, customs, traditions, etc. The
political elite manipulate them to their advantage, which causes a great harm to
the rights of people and democracy.
Check Your Progress 2

1) The South Asian countries have used mainly coercive and accommodative means
to manage the challenges of pluralism.

2) There are two models -the liberal and consociationist.


UNIT 21 LIBERALISATIONAND SAPs
Structure
2 1.O Objectives

21.1 Introduction
i
2 12 Liberalisation
2 1.2.1 Motivation Behind Liberalisation

21.3 StructuralAdjustment Programmes

2 1.4 Economic Characteristics of South Asia

21.5 . ~iberalisationand SAPs in Bangladesh

2 1.6 Liberalisation and SAPs in India

21.7 Liberalisation and SAPs in Pakistan

21.8 Liberalisation and SAPs in Sri Lanka


21.8.1 The First Phase (1977-89)
2 1.8.2 The Second Phase of SAPs

21.9 Let Us Sum Up

21.10 Some LJsefbl Books

2 1.1 1 Answers to Check your Progress Exercises

21.0 OBJECTIVES
The unit analyses an important issue related to economic development in South Asia,
liberalisation and structural adjustment programmes. After going through this unit, you
should be able to:
e. define the concept of liberalisation;
identi@the main ingredients of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs);
identi@the issues involved in liberalisationand SAPs in South Asia;
evaluate the impact of liberalisation and SAPs on South Asian economies; and
analyse the merits and demerits of liberalisation and SAPS,

21.1 INTRODUCTION
The experience of the Great Depression of late 1920s and the economic ruin caused
by the World War ll forced the industrialised nations to coordinate economic relations
among nations. In 1944, the Allied nations met at Bretton Woods and agreed on a
system of rules, institutions, and procedures to regulate the international political
economy.They established the InternationalBank for Reconstruction and Development
(the World Bank) and the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF). The former was intended
to provide finance to restructure and rebuild economies which were damaged by the
World War I1 and provide assistance for developmental work such as building
South Asia in a infrastructure, programmes for eradication of poverty, education and health etc. The
Gtobdising World IMF, on the other hand, was intended to provide financial assistance to countries
which sufferedfrom balance of payment problems and for correcting fiscal deficits in
government expenditure. In 1948,the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)
was set up to facilitate internationaltrade between nations by reducing tariff and non-
tariff barriers. With these three organisations coming to play an influential role in the
post-World War period, the international economic order has came to be called the
Bretton Woods order.
In the post war period, the industrialised countries of the North opened up their
economiesand adopted massive liberalisation programmes. Liberalisation helped these
countries to expand rapidly between 1950 and 1973. Their annual average growth
rate during the period was nearly 5 percent which was almost twice the trend rate of
growth of the previous 100 years. The period of 1950-73 has therefore, come to be
regarded as 'Golden Age' in world economy. The expansion ofthe industrial economies
benefited the world and the driving force of this expansion was growth in international
merchandise trade.
However, in late 1973, when the prices of oil and petroleum products suddenly shot
up, the world economy plunged into recession. While the developed economies of the
North were adversely affected, the worst sufferers were the least developed (LDCs)
and the developing economies of the South. Their balance of payments witnessed
severe deficit crisis. Some of these countries went into debt-trap. When they
approached the IMF for relief assistance, the IMF sanctioned the loan on the condition
that these borrower countries would introduce Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAPS) aimed at enhancing the role of the market and diminishing that of the state.
Currently, the SAPSare being implemented in many countries including South Asia.
In this unit, we will analyse the liberalisation and SAPSin the South Asia and bring out
their various facets.

21.2 LIBERALISATION
Before we proceed further, it will be useful to clarifL the two terms, liberalisation and
globalization that have come to dominate the discourse in development economics. In
simple words, liberalisation refers to the freeing of trade, investment and capital flows
between countries. It implies the simplifLingprocedures of business, i.e. merchandise
trade, foreign investments, trade in services, etc., so that countries can do business
without hassles. It underlinesthe less interventionist and more cooperative role of the
government in facilitating international business. The core of trade liberalisation is
reduction in import tariff (i.e. custom duties) and non-tariff bamers. The liberalisation
of investment underscores the fact that the private domestic and foreign investors can
participate either in production activities or in management of manufacturing /service
sector companies as per the procedures laid down by the government. The liberalisation
of capital flows implies an investor (domestic and foreign) can bring in or withdraw
his investment on short term current as well as long term capital account at any point
of time.
Globalization, on the other hand, is relatively a broader term which encompasses a
wide range of phenomena. It refers both to the integration of production facilities in
different countries under the aegis or ownership of the multinational corporations
(MNCs) and to the integration of product and financial markets facilitated by
liberalisation. In simple words, globalization means expansion of economic activities
across the political boundaries of nation states. It underlines the increasing economic
openness and growing economic interdependence between countries.
Another term that has gained currency in recent years is privatization. It indicates the
disinvestment of state assets (i.e. stocks/shares) in government owned enterprises.
By doing so, the ownership of public enterprisesget transfmd to private entrepreneur.
Under privatization, private participation is permitted in management of public sectors
*,
~ ~ n d ~ r t n k i n(PC1
o r Icl
21.2.1 Motivation Behind Liberalisation \, Liberalisation and
Structural Adjustment
The economic processes of liberalisation and globalization have been around since Programmes
1 9 4 if not earlier. Initially, the implementation of these processes was limited to the
developed countries of the North (the industrial countries of the North America and
Europe). Moreover, these processes did not occur at one go but in varying phases.
First, the liberalisation of trade and freedom of capital movements was implemented to
the greatest degree. Trade in manufactured products was liberalised gradually over
the whole post-World War I1 period through successive rounds of international trade
negotiations under GATT.
The liberalisation of capital movements among developed West had also occurred in
stages, but in somewhat different ways than the deregulation of foreign trade. In many
respects capital market liberalisation between these countries has gone further than
trade liberalisation.Most of these countries achieved current account convertibility in
the late 1950s. However, capital account convertibility took place only iathe 1970s-
initially in the US, Canada, UK and Germany and in 1980 in Japan, and in France and
Italy in 1990.
Liberalisation has been much less evident with respect to flows of labour between
countries. Moreover, unlike trade and capital movements, over time there has been
retrogression in this sphere in many industrial countries. However, aft& 1980, there
has been considerablerelaxation in the domestic rules and regulation in industrialcountries
in maintaining labour standards, minimum wages and labour rights. These changes
resulted in massive inflows of labour and their services, particularly from information
technology (IT) sector to the developed countries.
Globalization and liberalisationoccurred at a slower pace in developing countries. These
countries, which had recently emerged from colonial domination, were reluctant to
switch over from orthodox development programme to a new development paradigm
fearing that it may challenge their economic sovereignty. The underlying philosophy
was that liberalisation and globalization would benefit the industrialised economies
more and marginalisethe developing countries. A shift in the position of these countries
began to occur with the end of the 'golden age' (1950-73) followingthe 'oil shock' in
1973. That year, when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
suddenly increased prices of oil and petroleum products, the developing countries were
the worst-hit. Their import bill of oil and petroleum products shot up to unprecedented
high levels affecting adversely their balance of payments position. These countries
were caught in a miserable situation - stagnancy in export earnings and rise in import
bill. This led to the crisis of foreign exchange reserves which dropped to the rock-
bottom level causing serious concerns in external debt servicing. Many developing and
LDCs were caught in debt-trap.To overcome this situation,these countries approached
the World Bank and the IMF for financial assistance. But assistance was given on the
condition that these barrower countries would carryout economy-wide policy reforms,
. mostly in trade and financial sectors. This led to the implementation of liberalisation
and globalization processes.

21.3 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT


PROGRAMMES .
StructuralAdjustment Programmes (SAPS) are thus the adjustments in the economies
(of borrower countries) as per programmes modelled by the IMF and World Bank.
These programmes placed greater emphasis on structural measures to promote domestic
resource mobilization, remove price distortions, ensure increased access to imports
(i.e. opening of markets to foreign products), and reorder investment priorities.
The impact of 'oil shock' was more on developing than on developed countries mainly
because the developing countries followed the model of 'import substitution' which
dampened the prospects of increasingexports. These countries got caught in the situation
where there was no growth or stagnancy in exports and rise in imports on account of
industrial and services expansion. ~ x ~ d r were
n s never looked u'pon as an engine of
growth. Under SAPs, these countries were asked to shift development strategy from
import substitution to export promotion. TQe ultimate goal of this strategy was to
restore stability on the BOPS and enable the &?eloping countries to service their
external debts. Earningmore foreign exchange tkbugh exports was an option before
developing countries no matter how poor they were.
The inherent thinking behind this strategy was that the developing countries must
trade and exchange goods and develop their sector of 'tradables'. This mechanism
for forcingpotentiallyreluctant participantsto engage in the world market is the set of
economic policies called structural adjustmentsand its vital component was the doctrine
of export-led growth. The SAPSaims to increase the role of exports in the economy
and stimulate the private sector through the combination of wage and price stabilization
pdlices and austerity programmes. The SAP package includes a mix of the following
measures:

1) privatization of state and Semi-state government enterprises in order to reduce


inefficiencies and government protection or monopolies;

2) high interest rates and credit squeeze in order to reduce inflationary tendencies;

3) trade liberalisation in order to open up the internal market and expose local industry
to world market competition and boost foreign trade exchange;

4) domestic demand management leading to a lowering of government budgets and


decreasing expenditures;

5) currency depreciation in oder to improve the balance of payments by raising


import prices and making exports more competitive;

6) free-market prices in order to remove distortions resulting from subsidized food,


fertilizers and power.
Along with this package it was recommended to bring in institutional reforms in the
functioningof labour market and changes in social security system and privatization
of social services. The SAPSgave greater weight to growth objectives than to income
distribution objectives. The thrust of SAPs was realignment of overall domestic
expenditure and production patterns in order to bring the economies (of developing
countries) to a path of steady and balanced growth. The SAPSwere based on 'shock
therapy' replacing the policy of import substitution, economic interventionism and
protectionism which were considered to be responsible for evils such as high inflation
rates, unemployment, and balance of payments and trade deficits, inefficient operating
productive systems, etc. It underlined the fact that state interventionism had to be
confined to the organization of public services (such as defence, justice, etc.), to the
installation of a regime of law and order, and to the support of activities the private
sector was unwilling to provide.
By the early 1980s, some 30 African countries adopted SAPSwith the approval and ,

support of the World Bank and the IMF. In Latin America, East and Southeast Asia,
SAPSwere introduced during the mid-1970s. In East Asia, Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan implemented SAPSwith pro-active role of government in economic activities.
SAPs were accommodated in their long term growth strategy, emphasising macro-
economic stability and investment in human capital. These countries p r e f d strategic
integration to widespread opening of the market. China opened up the economy in
1978, but did not accept the World Bank's perspective on developmental paradigm. It
charted out its own plan of liberalisation and privatization. Undoubtedly, there has
been a large-scale introduction of markets into China, these markets are far from
being either flexible or competitive. Moreover, in many important areas like labour,
capital and land such markets can hardly be seen to exist at all.
In case of Southeast Asia, since the beginning of 1980s, the ecor~omiesof the region Liberalisation and
Structural Adjustment
shifted to outwara-looking strategy replacing the inward-looking policies. However,
Programmes
these countries too developed their own developmental parabigrn instead of relying on
policy pills from the World Bank and IMF.But the financial crisis of mid 1997to 1999
compelled some of these countries (Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines) to rush to
IMF for financial assistance and IMF insisted on implementation of SAPs.
In South Asia SAPs were introduced in different periods, in Sri Lanka in 1977, in India
in mid 1991. In South Asia, SAPs were implemented as per IMF and World Bank
prescription and the respective governments almost accepted it as blue print for future
economic strategy.
Check Your Progress 1

~ot;: i) Use the space given below for your answers. I

ii) Check your answers at the end of the unit.


1) Write a brief note on the prevalent situat~onin world ecorlomy before the
emergence of the concept of liberalisation and SAPs.

2) Liberalisation is
...........................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
3) What are the ingredients of SAPs.?

21.4 ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICSOF


SOUTHASIA
South Asia region comprises of four least developed countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan,
Maldives and Nepal) and three developing countries (India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka).
No country (of the region) has yet achieved the status of developed economy. The
entire region is poverty-ridden where one-third poor of the world are living. India is the
largest country in the region: population-wise, land area-wise and economy-wise. The
region has a large number of rural population and most of them survive on subsistence
agriculture.
The merchandise trade (export and import) of the region is minuscule in the total
world trade: the combined share of the exports (of the region) in world exports in
1990swas below one per cent. Similarly, its combined share in total inflows of world
foreign direct investment was hardly 2 per cent in 1990s. With little over $ 2 billions
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), India hosts the largest FDI in region. However,
given the large size of its economy, the FDI inflows are small and below its potential.
Countries in the neighbouring East and Southeast Asia host much hider levels of
FDI. For instance, China attracts about US $40 billion FDI annually, Singapore US $ -
6 bill ion..
south &ia in a Currently the region is passing through many problems, particularly persistent poverty
Giobalisiag World for a long period, which is central to the overall economic backwardness. The poverty
related social problems such as terrorism, ethnic conflicts, etc. are abundantlypresent.
The hard-earned economic resources are diverted to tackle the menace of terrorism
and providing security to the civilians. The military expenditure is increasing while
social expenditure is decreasing.
In the following section we will focus on the four big economies of the region,
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. This is because statistics and economic
information about these economies is adequately available. Secondly, these economies
have embarked upon liberalisation and SAPs for quite some time. Their evaluation
could throw light on the merits and demerits of these programmes. Thirdly, the left out
three countries, i.e. Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal are dependent economies. India
supports them financially in many respects. India provides considerable external aid
to these countries. For instance, India helped to finance Bhutan the entire development
plans in the initial years. Currently, nearly oqe third of Bhutan's Five Year Plans are
financed by India.

2 1.5 LIBERALISATIONAND SAPs IN


BANGLADESH
Bangladesh since its liberation in December 1971 followedthe path of 'inward looking'
or 'import substitution'. The fall out of this policy was that the country suffered low
growth rate and the industrial and manufacturing sector registered a modest growth.
The emphasis of industrial and trade pol icy was on development of traditional industries
such asjute products, textiles, readymade cotton garments, etc. The share of agriculture
in GDP during the first decade of independencewas about 40 percent which gradually
declined to about 25 per cent in year 2000. The share of manufacturing remained
stagnant over the period while the share of services in GDP increased to 52 per cent.
The share of industry has risen to 24 percent in year 2000 from 16 per cent in 1980.
The rise in services' share cannot be seen as a healthy indicator of real progress for
a least developed economy. Because of an increasing population, in such countries,
what is needed is proportionate rise in employment opportunities, which only
manufacturing sector can provide. In fact, in the last 20-25 years, the share of
manufacturing sector in the national income of the developed economies of the West
has remained over 30 per cent. The substantial presence of manufacturing sector has
strengthened the fundamentals of their economies.
Against the background of modest economic performance, Bangladesh decided to
launch economic reforms and adopted the policy of SAPS in 1990. It followed the
policy of 'outward looking' i.e. export-led growth. The impact of economic reforms
was that the exports increased by over three times: from US$] .72 billion in 1991 to
US$5.76 billion in year 2000. Imports too rose but not as rapidly as exports. There
was overall improvement in GDP growth rate - rising from 3.3 percent in 1991 to 5.5
per cent in year 2000. The liberalisation of foreign trade regime helped to boost up the
growth rate. Under the liberalisation programme the quantitative restrictions (QRs)
on imports has been brought down. However, the major challenge is diversification of
export basket. Currently the 76 per cent of Bangladesh exports are of cotton garments
and knitwear. By early 2005 the protection to exports of cotton garments and apparel
under the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) of WTO will end and that would expose the
,. exports of Bangladeshi products to international competition
Bangladesh announced a new industrial policy in 1999 which emphasises expansion
of the industrial base with higher participation of private sector, including foreign
investors. The policy places considerable importance on stimulating competitiveness,
both in internal and external markets. The diversification of the manufacturing base,
which is ovemhelminglydominated by textiles, chemicals,and food processing, remains
a maior challenge. The new areas of vroduction - for diversification are - computer
software, agro processing and food processing. ~ i t h o u ~the h information and Liberalisation and
communications technology sector has promising potential, the country is not well Structural Adjustment
Programmes
equipped to face intense global competition. The major constraints in building a sound
industrial base are inefficient infrastructure, unstable macro-economic environment,
inefficient markets, particularly capital (both debt and equity), least transparency in
decision-making process at government level, etc. The country needs rapid sectoral
reforms, especially in financial sectorwhich continues to be shallowand underdeveloped.
The lack of efficient banking system is the biggest hurdle in the country's developmental
prwess. Besides, the capital market is also at nascent stage. A well-developed, long
tern saving market has yet to emerge. A well-developed capital market is the pre-
requisite to earn the benefit of financial globalization and Bangladesh is very much
lacking in this area.
The launching of liberalisation and SAPs has helped the economy to attract FDI. The
amount of FDI inflows which was almost negligible until 1991 has gone up to US$280
million in 2000. The FDI is mainly attracted in the field of explomtion of energy (oil,
gas and petroleum products) and development of physical infrastructure like ports,
road, electricity,telecommunications,etc. So far the impact of liberalisation and SAPs
on Bangladesh economy is positive in the sense that the growth rate has been accelerated
and per capita income has increased. However, the distribution of national income on
public goods is unsatisfactory. The government expenditureson education, health, etc.
are inadequate to transform social sector into an efficient sector, which is essential to
attain sustainable development in'the longer period. Although military expenditure
apparently looks within the limit, there is need to reduce it to less than 1per cent of the
GNP; that would help to raise the allocation of resources on other developmental
heads.

LIBERALISATIONAND SAPs IN INDIA


India launched massive economic reforms in July 1991 to overcome the economic
crisis which has set in the economy because of shortage of foreign exchange (forex)
reserves. The forex reserves since the beginning of 1990 was in bad shape mainly
because of rising import bill, fall in exports and meagre inflows of FDI. Severe strain
on forex reserves was placed by the high levels of imported raw material component
in India's exports. Especially the import of oil and petroleum products amounts to
about 20 per cent of total import bill; The US-Iraq Gulf War of 1990-91 which led to
sharp increase in international oil prices affected India directly and forex reserves
began to decline from US$ 1.1 billion in August 1990 to US$896 million in January
1991. The Gulf War also affected India's exports to Iraq, Kuwait, and other West
Asian countries following United Nations trade embargo on Iraq and tense situation in
the Arabian Sea. Besides, the remittances of the Indian labour working in Kuwait
ceased to flow in as they were evacuated and shifted back to India following the War.
The impact of all these factors was multiple on the Indian economy and it disrupted
industrial production, accelerated inflation to peak level of 16.7 per cent in August
1991 and sharp decline in real GDP growth rate to 2.5 per cent.
Amidst all this economic chaos, there was political instability at the national level and a
caretaker Central government was in the office. The elections were declared and the
new government assumed ofice in June 1991. Immediately,the new government took
series of corrective measures to rejuvenate economy. The short-term measures were
aimed at crisis management such as devaluation of the Indian currency to boost up
exports. The long-term measures were of structural reforms, aimed at improving
efficiencyand productivity. To correct imbalance in the BOPs, the government borrowed
huge loans from the IMF. The devaluation of the Indian currency helped to curb non-
essential imports. These measures helped to overcome the problem of forex reserves
crisis (on BOPs) as exports began to pick up.
Along with these measures, the government launched large-scale economic reforms
in July 1991 as per the guidelines provided by the IMF and the World Bank. The
South Asia in a in July 1991 as per the guidelines provided by the IMF and the World Bank. The
Globalising World process of these reforms is still continuing. The principal thrust of 'First Generation
Reforms' of 1990swas opening the economy to foreign producers and investors. The
reforms were initiated in the following four areas:
.
i) Fiscal Correction
Under fiscal correction the principal concern was macro-economic stability by bringing
government expenditureunder control. As maintained here, the government financial
position was in bad shape in 1990-91 mainly because the expenditure was much higher
than income. To meet the increasing need of the expenditure the government often
borrowed heavily from abroad (mostly from IMF) and this over-borrowing. led the
situation to debt-trap. The mounting pressure of external debt and limited mobilization
of domestic income created serious trouble in the management of the economy. To
come out ofthe situation and reduce the expenditure, a suggestion was put forward to
abolish various subsidies, including export subsidy. Another suggestion was to increase
fertilizer prices, keep non-plan expenditures (including defence expenditure) in check.
The government applied these measures and brought macro-economic situation under
control.
ii) Trade Policy Reforms
The thrust of the trade policy reforms was to provide stimulus to exports. The pursuit
of 'import-substitution policy' since independenceadversely affected exports. Under
the new trade policy it was decided to pursue 'pro-active export policy' by reducing
the degree of regulation and licensing control. The first task was to improve price
competitiveness of exports by devaluing the currency (i.e. rupee). For encouraging
the competition in the domestic market tariff barriers to imports were reduced. The
high tariff level of 150 per cent in 1991 was brought down to 35 per cent in 2001 and
to 20 per cent in the Budget of 2003-4. Quantitative restrictions on imports were also
phased out. Trade liberalisation opened the gates for large-scale foreign products in
the indigenous market.
iii) Industrial Policy Reforms
The revamping of industrial sector was another important item on reform agenda.
The dismal performance of industrial and manufacturing sector (both in private and
public sector) was a matter of serious concern. The slow down of public and private
sectors had badly affected employment opportunities. To enhance private and foreign
participation, the government decided to deregulate industry. For doing so the industrial
licensing was abolished for all projects except in industries where strategic or
environmental concerns are paramount. Now about 80 per cent of industry has !pen
taken out of the licensing framework. Besides, areas resewed for the public sector
have been narrowed down, and greater participation by private sector is permitted in
core and basic industries.
With the opening up of the industrial sector, the foreign investment is flowing in the
economy. Thejoint ventures and collaborations (between the Indian and foreign industry)
are rising. Even defence (production) industry is opened up to private domestic and
foreign investors and upto 26 per cent foreign investment is permitted (subject to
licensing). And for the Indian private sector (participation), the defence industry is
opened upto 100 percent, subject to licensing.
iv) Public Sector Reforms
One of the principal thrusts of the reform process is to re-structure public sector
enterprises. Over the years, the public sector units incurred huge losses. To run them
,.'involvedhuge investment with no hope for adequate returns. Under the reform process
a sizeable number of public units have been either partially privatized or fully sold out.
The process of disinvestment has been continuing and the government is offering
equity to private and foreign investors. Rather the disinvestment of public sector is on
top priority under the agenda of 'Second Generation Reforms' which have been
Isiin~hPAin 3nn1
Currently the government is showing great interest in opening the economy further by Liberalisation and
liberalisation of equity limits for private domestic and foreign investors, for example, Structural Adjustment
Programmes
petroleum refining(under public sector) should be opened up 100 per cent; civil aviation
49 per cent, pipeline (oil and gas) 100 per cent, real estate (complexes) 100 per cent,
etc.
So far, the economy has shown the mixed-result of the process of liberalisation and
SAPs. Initially, after launching the process in July 1991the exports rose rapidly. This
rise was mainly because of currency devaluation. Similarly, between 1991 and 1996
the GDP growth rate was impressive. The FDI inflows and the forex reserves improved
to a comfortable level. However, the process lost momentum because of two reasons:
first, the political instability between mid 1996 and October 1999 at the central
government level created uncertainty about the continuity of the process. Secondly,
the Asian Financial Crisis of July 1997 affected India's exports adversely and the
value of rupee (vis-bvis US dollar) deteriorated to new low, affecting the sentiments
of the foreign investors. Since October 1999 the political instability as well as the
Asian financial crisis has ended. The government in the subsequent period has been
showing commitment to widening the scope of reform process. The result of this
determination is quite evident as the FDI inflow has increased to about US$3 billion
per annum. Exports have also picked up again.
Check Your Progress.2
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answers at the end of the unit.
1) What is the impact of liberalisation and SAPSon the Bangladeshi economy?
.....................................................................
.....................................................b

...........................................................................................................................

2) What are the factors that prompted India to liberalise and accept SAPS in the
early 1990s?

...........................................................................................................................
3) How would you evaluate the performance of liberalisation and SAPSin India?

LIBERALISATIONAND SAPs IN PAKISTAN


As we noted in Block Three, the armed forces play a important role in the functioning
ofthe Pakistani government even if the country is not under the martial rule. A sizeable
section of Pakistani society believes that the military alone can bring discipline in
functioning of the government which is sine qua non for economic prosperity.
\-

South Asia in a Pakistan launched SAPS in 1988 under the guidelines of the IMF and World Bank.
Globalising World The 13 years of military rule (1975 to 1988), had ruined the economy. The new
democratic regime was confronted with low GDP growth rates, high external debts,
low exports, low industrial production, and deteriorating forex reserves. The overall
condition of the economy was extremely bad and the democratic government had no
choice other than to approach the IMF and World Bank for financial assistance. While
granting loans the IMF and World Bank advise'd the government to initiate economic
reforms.
The main focus of the reforms was to reduce fiscal deficit in government finance.
The IMF asked the government to lower its fiscal deficit to 4 per cent of GDP which
was in double digit. For achieving this target, the IMF advised high taxation and a
decrease in public expenditure. The largest cuts in public expenditure came in the
area of development: from 9.3 per cent in 1981 to 3.5 per cent (of GDP) in 1997.
Another key area of the SAPSwas reduction in tariff rates which were brought down
to 45 per cent in 1999 from 125 per cent in 1992. For boosting up the exports the
devaluation of the Pakistani currency was recommended and since 1988the devaluation
is continuing at regular intervals.Along with these steps, the selling-off of state-owned
enterprises was also advised.
The IMF advised the Pakistani government to implement SAPSinitially in six areas.
First, reforms in trade policy by adjusting the country's currency vis-a-vis US dollar.
This was to be done by consistently depreciating the currency and keeping level of
exchange rate competitive. In addition, restrictions on exports were to be removed
and quantitative restrictions on imports, i.e. quotas, and tariffs were to be reduced.
The trade policy thus focussed on outward-oriented export-led path. Secondly, reforms
in fiscal policy to reduce and eliminate fiscal deficits by curtailing public expenditure.
This was to be achieved by increasing prices in the public sector so as to meet costs
and increase revenues. Reforms in the tax system, substantial cut or elimination of
subsidies to agricultural and energy sectors were the other ingredients. Thirdly, reforms
aimed at privatizingunprofitable public sector units. Fourthly, reforms in financial sector
by way of relaxing interests rates ceilings as well as liberalizing time deposit and
lending rates. Fifthly, reforms in industrial policy include removal of protection to
industrial sector and price controls over goods. Lastly, reforms in agriculture sector by
eliminating bias against agriculture by adjusting the exchange rate and by removing
protection offered to industry. The reforms should see liberalisation of agricultural
prices and discontinuation of subsides.
What is the impact of SAPSon the Pakistani economy? After the implementation of
SAPS,the GDP growth rate has declined and there was a moderate rise is exports.
This is attributed to the currency depreciation rather than quality appreciation in export
products. The rise in FDI inflows is also very moderate indicatingthat foreign investors
have not paid enough attention to the liberalisation programmes. In other words, mere
opening up of the economy is not a sufficient condition for attracting higher doses of
foreign investment; an efficient infrastructure plus social and political stability are
important. Currently Pakistan is lacking on this front.
The SAPS have not helped Pakistan in bringing fundamental change in the
structure of economy. The share of manufacturing sector in national income
remained low and overthe period has gone down. As we noted earlier, the decline in
manufacturing sector adversely affects the employment generation. An economy
with growing manufacturing sector provides macro-economic stability. The rise in
services sector can provide temporary relief to employment problem. Similarly,
the question of good governance always looms large over Pakistan. Frequent
military take over of the government sends wrong signal to the private domestic and
foreign investors. The rise in the military expenditure which is beyond 5 per cent of
the national income is excessive, especially for a developing country like Pakistan.
The government expenditure on developmental heads such as education and health
has been declining.
Liberalisation and
LIBERALISATIONAND SAPs IN SRI LANKA Structural Adjustment
Programmes
Sri Lanka is the first South Asian nation to adopt, rather fully, the liberal outward-
looking policies. It has brought in series of changes in its trade regime since it gained
independence from British colonial rule in 1948. During the first decade after
independence, it continued with a liberal trade regime. However, growing BOP problems
and ichange in political leadership induced a policy shift-towards protectionist import
substitution policies. By the mid-1970s the Sri Lankan economy had become one of
the most inward-oriented and regulated economies. The fall-out of these polices was
the slowing down of the economic growth since the early 1960. In the later half of the
1970s, the govenunent, therefore, decided to embark upon the path of extensive
economic liberalisation. It launched SAPSin two phases, first in 1977-89 and second
in 1990 and onwards.
21.8.1 The First Phase (1977-89)
The process of economic reforms began in late 1977 first by initiating the task of
revising tariff structure, reducing restrictions on foreign investment, announcing new
incentives to export-oriented foreign investment under a Free Trade Zone (FTZ)
scheme. It also undertook financial reforms includingadjusting interest rates to levels
above the rate of inflation, opening the banking sector to foreign banks and allowing
credit markets to determine interest rates, exchange rate realignment and incentives
for non-traditional exports. It devalued its domestic currency by more than 100 per
cent (in nominal terms).
The impact of these reforms on the economy was quite substantial as the GDP growth
rate went up from 2.9 per cent in the first half of the 1970sto 6 per cent during 1978-
83 The FDI inflows which were US $0.2 million (annualaverage) in 1970-77 reached
to about US $41 million in 1978-87 .The exports went up to US $1.5 billion in 1988
from US $0.80 billion in 1977. Most importantly the confidence of the foreign investors
increased and number of jointventures between domestic and foreign investors
increased. However, these reforms lost momentum in the early 1980smainly because
of two reasons: first shift in policy priorities away from structural adjustment towards
politically appealingglamorous investment projects and secondly, the intensification of
the ethnic conflict between the Sri Lankan Tamil and the government forces.
21.8.2 The Second Phase of SAPs
The movement for separate land for the Sri Lankan Tamil picked up around mid-
1980s under the banner of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTE) which caused
immense economic loss and instability in political and social fields. The LTTE's revolt
and militant activities resulted in sharp escalation in defence expeqditure, which, in
turn led to widening fiscal deficits, growing macroeconomic problems, and a rapid
erosion of international competitiveness. By the end of 1988, the forex reserves had
fallen sharply. The FDI declined and there was balance of payments crisis which
compelled the government to approach the IMF in June 1987 for financial support.
The loan was sanctioned with the conditionalityof launching economic reforms.
The reform package included privatization progrdmmes, further tariff cuts and
simplification,removal of exchange controls on current account transactions (of BOPS),
commitment to flexible exchange rate, and an initiative to cut the fiscal deficit. The
implementation of reforms package helped the economy to rejuvenate growth rate
from 3.5 per cent in the later half of the 1980s to 5.03 per cent in the first half of the
1990s. The containment of the LTTE's rebellion (for a while) during 1990-96 also
helped the government to make concerted efforts to refocus attention on developmental
activities. With the return of social stability and peace, the foreign investment began
flowing in the country. In 1997, the FDI inflows rose to US$433 million. There was
also marked improvement in exports. However, the question of reducing military
expenditure could not be resolved. The country spends over 4 per cent of national
income on military which is quite high for a modesteconomy like Sri Lanka.
14
P
South Asia in a Check Your Progress 3
Globalising World
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answers at the end of the unit.

1) How would you see liberalisationand SAPs in the context of Pakistani economy?

2) ldentify the main features of economic reforms undertaken by Sri Lanka since
the late 1970s.

21.9 LETUSSUMUP
A severe recession was set in the world economy following first 'oil shock' in1973.
Many developing and least developed countries were shattered and they were forced
to approach to the IMF and World Bank for assistance to rebuilding their economies.
The assistance came with policy prescription in the form of liberalisation and SAPs.
The borrower economies were to initiate the process of opening their economies1
markets to foreign products. At the same time they were to restructure their economies
to do away with inefficient elements such as public sector enterprises, etc. The
underlying principle in this thinking was that market should play more role than the
state or government.
The impact of SAPs and liberalisation on South Asia was mixed: some countries
reaped the benefits while some faltered. Sri Lanka and India benefited in the sense
that their growth rates picked up. Exports rose and foreign investment inflows increased.
Pakistan did not get benefit mainly because of political instability coupled with insecure
social environment.
In order tq benefit from liberalisationand economic transformation,existence of efficient
infrastructureis essentiat. This infrastructure is either fullyor partially, lacking in South
Asia. Besides, there is oppositionfrom private domestic industry to the entry of foreign
industry; mainly on the ground that 'level playing field' to the indigenous players is not
available. Despite such opposition, the policy is under implementation and its full
evaluation can be viewed only when it remains in practice for some more time.

21.10 SOME USEFUL BOOKS


Chenery, H. (ed.). (1979) Structural Change and Develapment Policy. New York.
World Bank. (Several Years), World Development Reports. Washington, D.C. ,
Asian Development Bask. (Several Years) Asian Development Outlook. Manila.
Sobhan, R. (ed.).(2000) Structural Adjustment Policies in the Third World: Design
and kperience. Dhaka.
I

Dasgupta, B. (1998) Structural Adjustment, Global Trade and the New Political I
Economy of Development. New Delhi. 1
Liberalisation and
21.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS Structural Adjustment
EXERCISES Programmes

Check Your Progress- 1

1) The end of World War I1 saw drastic change in the trade policies of the developed,
developing and LDCs. While industrial (developed) economies liberalized their
trade regime to give export-led growth strategy a chance, the developing and
LDCs adopted import-substitution strategy to protect their indigenouS market.
The outward-looking export strategy benefited devel~pedcountries to accelerate
their growth rates whereas inward-looking strategy brought stagnancy to
developing and LDCs economies. Besides,the developingand LDCs relied heavily
on public sector enterprises for mass production which curbed the development
of private sector. This created disequilibria in the structure of these economies
and led to inefficient allocation of the factors of production. The 'oil shock' of
1973 exposed the weaknesses of the developing and LDCs and the need was
felt to implement liberalisation and SAPs.

2) Liberalibtion implies the freeing of trade, investment and capital flows between
countries. It underlines the simplification of business procedures involved in
merchandise trade, foreign investment, trade in services etc. It also underlines
the less interventionistand more cooperative role ofthe government in international
business. Reduction of import duties (i.e., tariff) is the core of trade liberalisatinn

3) The SAPs include prkvatization of state owned enterprises, amendments in trade


policy, i.e. discarding import-substitution strategy and acceptance of export-led
strategy. It also includes raduction in fiscal deficit, changes in industrial policy to
remove protection to industtial sector, and liberalisation of agricultural prices and
discontinuation of subsides.
Check Your Progress 2
1) Bangladesh embarked upon liberalisation and SAPs in 1990 and improved its
growth rate from 3.3 per cent in 1990 to 5.5 per cent in 2000. The change
occurred because of rise in exports. The foreign investment has also risen, although
moderately. However, the major challenge is diversification of export basket
which mainly consists of cotton readymade garments. Besides, physical
infrastructure continues to be inefficient and is unable to attract large foreign
investments.
Severe economic crisis had set in the Indian economy because of shortage of
foreign exchange (forex) reserves arising from rising import bill; fall in exports
and meagre inflows of FDI. As a result of the US-Iraq Gulf War of 1990-91 and
the embargo on Iraq, India's oil expenses shot up, exports to West Asian countries
dwindled and halted the flow of remittances of Indians wc-'kg in West Asia.
This disrupted industrial production, accelerated inflation to peak level and reduced
GDP growth rate. Amidst this economic cri.riq.t:~r-p.t? was political instability at
the national level. In these circumstances, Ina~adevalued its currency and
corrected imbalance in the BOPS, by borrowing huge loans from the IMF. It
initiated structural reforms in July 1991 as per the guidelinesprovided by the IMF
and the World Bank.

3) India is essentially a democratic country where every palicy of the government


comes under debate not only in the opposition parties but within the ruling party
too. To build a consensus on economic matter involves a long time and rigorous
exercise and in the process foreign investors sometimes get disappointed and
withdraw their commitment. Even after getting green signal there is no asslirance
of continuation of the policy with the change in the government. Currently, the
disinvestment of public sector units is in debate and government finds it difficult
to Dursue the matter because within the government there is no consensus.
South Asia in a Check Your Progress 3
Clobalising World
i! 1) Pakistan began implementing liberalisation and SAPs in 1988and after a decade
or so its growth rate has declined. The opening of trade regime could moderately
boost up the exports mainly because the export-basket is restricted to few
traditional items. Moreover, modernization of industrial sector could not take
place. Secondlythe doses of FDI inflows could not expand because of political
instability and social insecurity. Currently, the rise of religious fundamentalism is
restrictingthe flow of FDIs. Finally, the non-availability of efficient infkstructure
is the greatest obstacle in successful implementation of liberalisation and SAPs.
Sri Lanka implemented economic reforms in two phases, first in 1977-89 and,
second in 1990 and onwards. Sri Lanka realized the drawbacks of import-
substitution strategy in mid 1970sand began removing the quantitative restrictions
(QRs) on imports, opened the economy to foreign products. The export-led
strategy was put into practice which helped to increase exports and the GDP
growth rate was accelerated. During the second phase of reforms the attention
was paid to attract foreign investment. The FDI inflows increased and there
were rise in joint ventures between private domestic and foreign industry.
However, the reforms suffered setback because of the Tamil separatist movement.
-- -

UNIT 22 GLOBALISATIONAND THE


STATE
Structure
' 22.0 Objectives
22.1 Introduction
22.2 Globalisationand its Multiple Meanings
22.3 Nation-State and Sovereignty
22.4 The South Asian state and Globalisation
22.4.1 Challengesto Nation-state in South Asia
22.4.2 The Relevance of Nation-state in South Asia

22.5 The Dynamics of Regionalism in South Asia


-
22.5.1 Globalisation-Regional Cooperation Nation States in South Asia

22.6 Let Us Sum Up


22.7 Some Useful Books
22.8 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

22.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit examines the meaning and dynamics of globalisation, particularly its impact
on nation-states in South Asia. The unit also explores the critical aspects of South
Asian states integration with the global economic order. After going through this unit,
you should be able to
Define and explain the salient features of the process of globalisation;
Describe the impact of globalisation on nation states particularly those in South
Asia; and
Critically evaluate aspects of South Asian states' integration with the global
order.'

22.1 INTRODUCTION
Sovereign state has been the basic unit of intemational relations since the treaty of
Westphalia in the 17h century. Many wars are waged around the h-mation of nation-
states in the modem age. The nation-state has symbolised the spirit of freedom. The
sovereigntyof state signifies liberties of a people v. '5:- :zseified temtorial boundaries
around which the modem internationalsystem is built. That central position of state in
the international relations is increasingly being affected by many forces unleashed by
global developments. State is undergoing a major transformation as it seeks to
redefine its relationship with its people at different levels. Though the sovereignty
of state remains important, it is getting constricted by fragmentation at the local
level and integration at the global level. This lesson tries to outlinethe various dimensions
of it.
The transformation of nation-state in different regions of the world assumes difErent
forms depending upon the specificity of regional formations. The transformation of
state in South Asia also bears its own form. This unit examines the multiple meanings
of globalisation and their implications to nation-state. It particularly brings out the
South Asia in a different dimensions of the transformation of the nation-states in SouthAsia. The unit
Clobalising World also discussesthe dynamics of regional formation in South Asia that are beik shaped
by the current wave of globalisation.

22.2 GLOBALISATION AND ITS MULTIPLE


MEANINGS
There are two apparently contradictory trends in the present process of globalisation.
First, states seem to be giving up their autonomy in their rush to sign regional trading
and political agreements. In the process, the state is losing its previous pre-eminent
position giving way for the supra nation entities like World Trade Organisation (WTO)
in the global system. Secondly, ethnic, caste, class, gender, tribal and ecological
groups within the states are struggling to assert greater autonomy. We call these
movements by various names such as identity movements, new social movements or
local movements. They are spread across the world and have truly become global
phenomenon. Culturally, the idea of national identity for individuals or groups is fast
eroding in favour of tho fortification of ethnic, regional, caste and religious identities.
Previously, identity of people was more tied to a nation's identity. Now the credentials
of nation-state to claim monopoly over allegiance from its citizens has been seriously
challenged by the rise of identitieswhere people betray their loyalties to more immediate
formations such as caste, gender, ethnic or linguistic.

Globalisation is most visible and pronounced in the economic dominion. A large number
of national economies are getting integrated into a global market. Financial markets
and capital flows are transcending national boundaries, often bypassing sovereign
state controls at will. International trade accounts for 20 percent of global output and
is estimated to be worth $5 trillions per annum. Cross border transactions, Foreign
Direct Investments (FDI) and the Multinational ~orpo&i6i'is(MNCs) are growing in
importance in determining the economic destiny of nations.

The factory-centred production of Fordism harboured on protectionist policies of nation


states is rapidly being replaced by production facilities spread across different regions
and countries. In this post-fordism, production and even distribution is contiolled by
MNCs. Presently, the top five hundred MNCs are responsible for a huge and increasing
share of global production. The sectoral distribution of these corporations in the year
2000 reveals an interesting trend. The maximum number of corporations (56) are
concentrated in the banking and financial sectors where quick profits could be reaped
from speculative investments in the global financial markets without making long-
term investments in the real economy. The other sectors are petroleum refining,
automobiles, telecommunications, food and drug stores, and electronic industries. The
predominance of the MNCs in the banking and financial sectors is illustrative of the
phenomenal rise of finance capital in the recent years.

Some MNCs are bigger than many states in terms of the number of people employed
and the finances at their disposal. While these MNCs are for most part not amenable
to state control, they nevertheless need the nation-states. It is the state which has to +.
take decision for their entry into their territories. It is the state which has to provide
facilities and ensure the political, social and economic stabilityfor the smooth operation
of their transactions in its territory. The MNCs, therefore, seek the support of nation-
states and internationalgovernmental organizationssuch as World Trade Organisation,
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, etc to shape the contemporary global
economy.

Globalisationinvolves the most fundamental centralizedrestructuring of socic~conomic


and political relations since the industrial revolution. Its basic principle revolves around
the absolute primacy of exponential economic growth and an unregulated free market,
*with t h e need fnr h e )ride tn c t i m l ~ l a t em n d h Free trade favni~rc
eunnrt-imnnrt-
oriented economies with their accelerated privatization of public enterprises, and Globalisation and the State
aggressive promotion of consumerism, which when combined with global developments,
correttly reflect a Western vision. These guiding principles of the new international
economic structure also assume that all countries, despite their diverse culture& will
gradually get homogenised and attain cultural uniformity in products and services.
The ongoing economic globalisation will, therefore, place continuous pressure on
developing nations to abandon local traditions and dismantle programmes geared to
developing more self-sufficient economies.

Though globalisation advocates a uniform order across the globe, the process of
globalisation has divided the world into two camps. The developed nations of the
North argue that the benefits of globalisation are inclusive and benefit both the
developed and the underdeveloped nations. The developing countries ofthe South, on
the other hand, tend to view globalisation with scepticism, if not with abject cynicism.
The apprehension of the developing countries arises not only from their weaker
economic po'Sition, but also from the economic divide between the North and the
South. The uneven distribution of the fruits of globalisation seems to widen the gap

I
further. Moreover, though globalisation favours the resolution of international issues
through multilateral forums, the reality is that these forums are currently controlled or
dominated by the advanced countries ofthe North. In these circumstances, the interests
of the weaker countries get sidelined or submerged. The developing countries are
therefore exercising extreme caution in embracing globalisation.
.
With the emergence of multilateral institutions like World Trade Organisation,
every country has opened up its economy and joined the global regime of trade.
Several countries which a decade ago relied on state control and ownership
have begun to privatize their economies. The countries in the South Asia region
are not exception. Most of them have started liberalising their economies in the
early nineties.Twentieth-century economic liberalism champions private ownership,
a reduced role for the state in business, fewer trade barriers, lower taxes, and a
general reliance on the market as the most efficient distributor of resources in a
given economy.

It is interestingto look at the political corollary of this apparent shift toward economic
liberalism. The individual nation states negotiate the emerging global order mainly at
three levels- regional, national, and domestic. New institutions, structures and
, organisations are being created at different levels to cope with the conditions. In
different parts of the worlci, countries are coming together and forming regional groups
to handle the global situation, lest it becomes a dificult task for the states to bargain
individually. In some parts, efforts are on to give a new direction to the existing regional
organisations.

Some efforts have been made to create new political structures that transcend national
boundaries. The European Union instituted a Single Market within its twelve member
countries at the end of 1992. In addition, it is making efforts to create a political and
monetary union with the underpinningof economic cooperation. Similarly, governments
in the Far East are discussing plans that would increase political cooperation within
the region, in line with growing economic ties. The US, its Free Trade Agreement
with Canada and Mexico already in place, is now ready to extend the FTAconcept to
South America as well.

As we know from the experience of the SAARC countries in the recent times, South
Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) has been a compelling exercise on the part of
these countries, in spite of the differences between them, particularly, the animosity
between Pakistan and India. SAFTA is a step towards free trade area. SAARC's
i
. urge to emerge as a strong regional body in order to cope with the vicissitudes of
globalisation was very much evident at its Summit meeting in Islamabad in January,
2004 where the idea of a monetary union was mooted.
South Asiain a Yet, at the national level the relative decline of the autonomy of nation-states in
Globalising-World the sphere of global economy raises concerns about democratic aspirations
of the people, particularly in the developing countries. Here, the people's
expectations on the state are very high even though the state capacities in mobilising
and distributing the &sources are low. As global integration involves certain crucial
policy adjustments on the part of national governments such as privatisation,
disinvestment of publlc sector, retrenchment of workers, it is naturally bound to cause
anxieties about the role of the state.

At the domestic level, nation-statesface considerable challengesthrown up by different


movements. The citizens continue to hold their national governments accpuntable on
issues over which states have no autonomous control. Yet the strong sense of allegiance
to the nation-state borne by its citizens, and developed through the anticolonial struggles,
has not weakened in line with the decline of the autonomy of national governments
vis-a-vis global processes. One can say it is far fetching to expect the belongingness
of the citizens in the developingcountries to such supranational bodies when the people
of developed countries have little allegiance to emerging supranational bodies such as
the European Union. It is a challenge that a nation-state continues to face in mediating
global and local pressures.

22.3 NATION-STATEAND SOVEREIGNTY


The concept of sovereignty has been a key idea in the evolution of the modem world
and the all-powerfulnation-state. Initially, it involved the state's authority to exercise
legal violence in order to maintain order within a given territory. Gradually nation
states have assumed more legitimate claims over the exclusive authority within its
territorial boundaries by adding welfare hnctions. With this, citizens have developed
expectations on their nation states' ability to resolve their problems. Objectivity in the
exercise of authority lends legitimacy to the acts of nation-state.

In the late twentieth century, the nation state, however, enters into crisis with the
advent of globalisation. Its ability to act independently has been strained by the external
forces at the global level and internal forces at the local level. Nation-states are W i x e d
by the forces of global integration and of local fragmentation. The most important
structuring of relationship in most peoples' lives has been their relationship to the
nation-state. The people who have hitherto had a privileged link to the state, no longer
have it, as sites are neither able to negotiate with global forces on their own nor are
capable of forging a sense of unity among their citizens who choose to live through
exclusi% identities. The developing countries feel this more intensely because the
(dis)ability of the state on both fronts is more prominent. Citizens are seeking new
forms of organization, which involve asserting their identities in different ways. The
effects are manifold. Local communities, seeking a greater share of resources, will
sometimes see that their interests lie in underpinning nation-states, at other times in
subverting them.

The rising local forces are increasingly seeking to project their issues at global level
putting pressure on nation-state. The recent phenomenon of world summits is a case
in point to explain haw the local communities are seeking to become trans-border
entities. The Vienna Summit of human rights groups, the Beijing Summit of women
groups, Rio Summit of ecological groups, Durban Summit against Racism or the World
Social Forum (WSF) are all mobilizing the local communities across nations on the
lines of ethnic, caste, gender, ecological issues. They raise the questions of social
justice beyond the purview of nation-states and connect these local groups with the
global processes. For instance, the track record of human rights within a country has
emerged as a crucial issue in disbursement of loans or grants by international lending
agencies. This explains how nation-state is coming under the pressure from both the
domestic and global forces.
I Check Your Prdgress 1 Globalisation and the State

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.


ii) Check your answers at the end of the unit.
1) Explain the role of MNCs in today's world order.

..........................................................................................................................
2) How is the sovereignty of the nation state affected in the context of globalisation?

22.4 THE SOUTH ASIAN STATEAND


GLOBALISATION
The international system in operation today is certainly far less state centred than in
the past. But, to swear by the "globalisation gospel" or proclaiming the "End of the
State" is equalty premature. While the postcold war world is certainly not state centric,
it is also not a stateless or a state-free dispensation. A process of regional integration
at the supra-national level is also taking place in different areas of 'the world at
varying degrees of pace, intensity and extent. The European Union is most
integrated and South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has a
long, long way to go.
22.4.1 Challenges to Nation-State in South Asia
The nation-state in South Asia has been facing serious challenges fiom different forces
emerging out of local, regional and global contexts. Prominent among them are identity
movements andcommunitarian arguments,regional movements and the global agencies.
Each of them is contendingto substitute or to act independent of the nation-state. It is
important to appreciate the arguments of these forces to understand direction in which
nation-state in this region is moving.
Several reasons can be sighted why a supra-national region has emerged as a strong
contenderto nation-state. There can be certain possible advantageswith supra national
regional formations. A supra national region can respond to economic, technological
and strategic challenges much more competently. Wherever regional integration has
been reinforced, there local conflicts have been eased, milita~yexpenditurehas declined
or has been kept within limits and there has been better economic performance.
Moreover, supra national regions can acknowledge sub-national identitiesmuch more
confidently than nation-state can dare to afford. If nation is not something natural but
imagined, region could be imagined too albeit on different foundations. It can safeguard
a regime of rights much better than states as nationalism has often tended to be
chauvinistic and so on. Add to these reasons the process that seems to be at work in
the present where regional relations are increasingly being consolidated. These reasons
seem to suggest region & the natural telos of the nation-state.
However, the emergence of regionalism is unlikely to weaken nation-state units. In
SouthAsia, despite the great scope for regional cooperation, the divergent interests of
nation-states in the region have placed hurdles in the consolidationof regional identity.
In South Asia there is an evident ambivalence with regard to efficacy of regional
formation.
South Asia in a One major challenge that South Asian states are facing in the recent times is the
Globalising World consolidation of communities/identitieson ethnic, caste, gender, and regional lines. For
instance, issues of marginalisation and displacement of large chunk of tribal populations
owing to dam construction,mining etc. are getting articulated in the form of ecological
movements seriously questioning the development model adopted by these states. In
India, the Dalit movements in their search for identity often question the validity of
the state as being dominated by the upper castes. Similarly, the gender construction of
power and nation-state is a serious poser to the state's support bases. It questions the
male dominated political, social and economic order, in one word, - its patriarchal
base.
All these are erdding the nation-states' position as a sole claimant of citizen's allegiance.
They assert that the member's primary loyalty lies with one's own community as the
self of an individual member is constituted in and through the community, through its
values, lore and traditions and can assume its agency only by being so situated. Often
it is true that the claims of these communities come into conflict with each other in
sharing resources or power structures. But who can arbitrate when there are conflicts
between and within communities? There need to be a point of anchor independent of
communities.
Besides, the boundaries of communities are very porous, and they are constantly
reinvented. Take cases such as Hindutva or Ummah or any other construction of
communities on religious lines. The boundaries of such communities are not permanent
and often undergo a change. They seek to build large blocks of communities constantly
ignoring divisions within. They often come into conflict over their exclusive claims.
Further, they refuse to recognise or accept the existence of multiplicity of beliefs and
ways of life. In such a situation, state alone can arbitrate between the communities
that are in conflict. Therefore, the arguments for communities being seen as some
kind of alternative to the nation-state are far too tall a claim. Besides, for communities
to negotiate their ways across globally without the mediating presence of the nation-
state seems well nigh impossible.
Over and above the states, is there a global system that is an alternative to the nation-
state? There are today a number of issues which can be substantially tackled only at
a global level such as ecological imbalance, terrorism, pollution, disarmament, etc.
Already, the growing number of international organisations and the tasks before and
expected of these organisations is constantly on the increase. Besides, there has
emerged a broad consensus on certain issues such as human rights and democracy.
Advocates of the global or world system point to the thick outlay of institutions and
processes at work across states as evidence of the global system, however, nascent it
may be. They therefore support globalisation not merely in the economic arena but in
the political realm as well.
However, a global system or government as an alternative to the nation-state is not a
feasible proposition and even if it is, it is not desirable.In fact, growing interdependence
and functional cooperation has been strengthening the nation-state, rather than
weakening it. The nation-state is the space to fall back upon not merely for recognition
but also in moments of crisis. Though world system offers a unified world, it is wrought
with several contradictions. A world system with more advanced countries of the
North dominating, would provide no security to less developed countries and less so to
their vulnerable sections.

22.4.2 The Rekvance of Nation-State in South Asia


Over the last two centuries, nation-states iirespective of their'ideologicalfocus have
shaped the popular imagination of citizens about the way they organise and relate
themselves with their state. The nation-state has been not merely the organised
expression of a collectivity but several times an active agency of transforming relations,
economic development and popular empowerment at least to the extent possible. It is
nation-state in South As'ia, which bears the memory of the national movement and Globalisation and the State
gathers within its fold remembrances and recalling-of ages. In spite of the chinks in
the authority of state in South Asia owing to ethnic strife, peoples of South Asian
countrieshold their cultural moorings around their respective states. Right from sports
to military conflicts in the subcontinentrouse huge emotional outburst. Besides, in our
conditionsthe nation-state alone can be the instrument, however imperfect, in standing
up to external domination and intimidation either on its own or in association. This
ability of the state could help a great deal in carving out autonomous spaces of culture
and political life and at least a limited regulation of the economy.
Further, the nation-state as an organisational form is sufficiently flexible in
accommodating a range of relations and identities within and outside it. Nationalist
ideology could assume a large number of orientations. Such flexibility is not possible in
any narrowly carved identities nor in any remotely conceived idea of supra national
entity which is too far from the imagination of an ordinary citizen.
Check Your Progress 2
Note: i) Use the space given below for y our answers.
ii) Check your answers at the end of the unit.

1) What are the main challenges that Nation-State is facing in South Asia?

2) Do you think the emerging World System is an alternativeto the Nation-State?

THE DYNAMICS OF REGIONALISM IN


SOUTH ASIA
South Asia is the home of 1.2 billion people, and accounts for over one fifth of the
world's population. With a GNP per capita of $309, which is only one-third the average
for the developing world and less than one-fiftieth of the industrial world, South Asia
is indeed the "most deprived region" of the world. South Asia not only lags behind
other regions not only in income levels but also in human development levels. Nearly
one-half of the world's illiterate population lives in South Asia. This is partly because
of the relatively higher levels of military expendim- due to the arms race between
India and Pakistan and the ongoing ethnic conflict t r ~'*; h - k i r .
With the trend of regional approach to address the common problems becoming popular,
countries of South Asia sought to initiate the formation of a regional group in the late
1970s.After a series of official level meetings outlining the structureand hnctions of
the new organization, the South Asian Regional Cooperation came into formal existence
in 1985. This organisation was soon renamed as South Asian Association of Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) in order to give it a formal recognition.
Among the main highlights of the new regional organisation were: emphasis on
interdependence or "balanced interdependence" in view of the centrality of India and
asymmetrical economic positions of the member countries; avoidance of contentious
and bilateral issues; concentration on soft areas rather than on-sensitive
-
areas pertaining
South Asia in a main thrust of the SAARC in the early years was in the areas of health, education,
Globalising World culture, communication, agriculture, rural development, etc. With almost all member
states of the SAARC getting integrated with the global economy by adopting policies
of liberalization and market economy in the 1 9 9 0 they
~ ~ have not only signed the South
Asian Preferential Arrangement in 1993 but have signed an agreement to move into
the Free Trade Area (SAFTA) at twelfth SAARC Summit held in Islamabad in
January, 2004.
22.5.1 Globalisation-Regional Cooperation - Nation -States in
South Asia
h e r e are three basic compulsions, which warrant regional cooperation among the
countriesof South Asia region in the context of globalisation: security environment in
the region, economic cooperation and common historical heritage.
Dramatic changes such as disintegration of socialist block and waning of old notions
of balance of power in the wake of the end of the Cold War did not create concomitant
impacts on changing the South Asian security environment.The dynamics of security
and regional cooperation in South Asia to a large extent have been affected by the
relations between India and Pakistan. The old threat perceptions and old mindsets
continue to haunt the strategicelites of India and Pakistan. So, the sudden transformation
of bipolar nature of the world politics into a 'unipolar' world short of a 'New World
order' did not desist the two competitive regional powers-India and Pakistan-from
reducing their defence budgets or from stockpilingsophisticated weapons, including
nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, the presence of the US in the region always
has a destabilisingeffect on the security environment in South Asia.
South Asia is a unique region from global perspective. Its problems and conflicts have
. their own dynamics and most, if not all, of these are created within the region, by its
history, its geo-politics, its economy and ecology. Marginalized to some extent from
the mainstream of global developments, South Asia continues to be less active insofar
as its relations with other powers and regions are concerned. However, India's policy
of economic liberalisationmaking it an integral part of international global development
has brought India into international limelight in the 1990s. The United States sees
India as a potential market for its products and services. As a result, though it is _
unhappy over India's nuclear pursuits, it is willing to accommodateIndia because of
its own long-term economic interests.
How the other South Asian countries see the US and its impact on maintaining South -
Asian strategic balance is yet another aspect. The other South Asian countries are
bogged down too much in their internal problems and come out with formal statements
for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or for peace and non-interference in other
countries' internal affairs. The smaller countries feel deprived of the Cold War era's
manoeuvrability vis-A-vis India or other powers. Internationally,they are at the mercy
of the industrialized West and Japan because of their domination in the international
financial institutions or in providing bilateral aid. Japan is now the leading donor to
many South Asian countries followed by European countries.
Over the last two decades, inter-governmental economic institutions-the IMF, the
World Bank and the WT@ have been determiningthe course of economic policies in
the developing countries. The monitoring and guidance of these organizations has
been in respect of the objectives to be pursued, policies to be formulated, instruments
to be used and institutions to be developed. This is because most of the developing
countries have come under a system of various high and low conditionalties, arising
out of the borrowings that these countries have made from the IMF and the World
Bank. The package of these conditionalities is normally referred to as the 'Washington
Consensus'. This consensus includes macro-economic policies, specifically in terms
of adherence to a fiscal balance limiting the budget deficit to 3 percent of the,gross
I
domestic product (GDP), liberalisation of foreign trade and foreign direct investment
policies, privatisation, permitting the market to play a dominant role in the economy
and. above all. mareinalisation of the state in the economic domain.
6
Significantly, the IMF and the World Bank crossed the rubicon in the 1990s taking Globalisstion and the State
upin themselves the role of adviser/stipulatorwith regard to the nature of governance
in addition to their original mandate. These institutions insist on ensuring a suitable
political environment in the countries for successful implementation of the projects
that they support. The South Asian countries are no exception. They too have come
under the dominant influence of these organisations over the years. Thus, their
intervention in political reforms in these countries has come to stay.
However, the reforms undertaken by the countries of South Asia under the guidance
ofthe international financial institutions have not really led to an acceleration economic
growth rates. The Human Development Report on Globalisation and Human
Development in South Asia, published by United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) did not find any dramatic increase in the growth rates of the South Asian
economies in the last decade and half. The Report reveals that while Bangladesh and
Nepal had modest growth rates, the growth rate faltered in the case of Sri Lanka in
the second half of the 1990s while it declined in the case of Pakistan. Only India has
been able to achieve a growth rate of above 6 per cent.
One of the main causes for this situation was that the sequencing of reforms hasnot
been correct. For instance, none of the South Asian countries expanded the tax base
before reducing tariffs. The result was that the governments lost revenue which was
crucial for carrying forward reforms. Similarly, adequate measures were not taken to
protect the agricultural sector, before introducing market reforms in this sector. As a
result, the performance of the agriculture sector across the countries of the region
was bad.
It is significant that the Human Development Report advocates a certain economic
solidarity among South Asian countries. It recommends the setting up of a strong
regional trading bloc which would not only promote economic co-operation among
members but also improve the competitive position of the group in a globalised set-up.
It would facilitatepolitical harmony, which is vital, and also help create a situationthat
would enable them to bargain collectively at global negotiations.
Despite democratic decision-making in the WTO, the participation of developing
countries in the decision-making is not significant. Hence it is vital for the countries of
South Asian region to emerge as a coalition to substantially influence the decision-
making without altering the present provisions of the WTO including the consensus
approach in practice.
As to how the 'weaker states will use coalitions as vehicles of cooperation as well as
influencingthe stronger ones has emerged as subject of debate in international relations.
Coalition building, it may be noted here, is a continuous process. In fact, coalition
building by the developing countries in promotingtheir causes in international economic
relations is not a new phenomenon. In the 1960s,the developing countries came together
and this unity was extended in the 1970s. This group came to be known as Group-77.
Even within this grouping, before presenting their cases unitedly at v a rous international
forums, various trade-offs had been made so that they could present their needs
consistent with the varying demands of varying grou, - * c1 4 e Group-77. However,
:a

the strategy of Group-77 had been often criticized as being ineffective.


In the early 1980s, selected developing countries, in fact, formed informal and formal
coalitions, which included India and Pakistan, to oppose the introduction of new issues
such as trade-related intellectual property rights, trade related investment measures
and trade in services in the agenda for negotiations in the Eight Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. While they did not succeed in achieving their objectives, they
were at least successful in postponing the inclusion of these subjects for negotiation,
though not for long.
At the WTO, the emphasis on cooperation has been continuously made. In view of the
far-reachingconsequences of the decisions of WTO on member countries of SAARC,
South Asia in a it was r. ~Ivedthat SAARC countries would endeavour to coordinatetheir decisions
Globelising World on these issues in areas of common concern so as to protect and promote the interests
of the developing countries and also about the exclusion of non-trade issues such as
labour standards and environmental conditions.

Therefore, the only way to cope with this difficult situation is to build an effective
coalition of South Asian countries and develop a.capacityto handle the ever-growing
challenges of negotiations on new issues in international economic relations. The
SAARC seems to have realised the need for a strong coalition as is evident in almost
all the declarations of the Heads of States of SAARC countries through the 1990s.

To conclude, the dichotomy between nation-state and globalisation demands greater


autonomy and accountability on the part of international actorsof a variety of categories.
Ifthe multilateral organisationssuch as WTO or international forums on human rights,
gender issues, ecological problems or international financial agencies such as World
Bank, IMF are not favourably inclined to consider the conditions of less developed
countries, the global integration is neither feasible nor desirable. Similarly, the option
before the nation-statas in South Asia to negotiate with the global economic, political
and cultural order has to be one of critical engagement lest it leads us to believe that
"the nation-state is dead: long-live the nation-state" because "neither the age of super-
states, nor the end of all states is about to happen".

Secondly, South Asian regionalism is contingent upon the benefits that the states of
South Asia region accrue from the emerging global order. Stifled by backwardness,
these countries need to come together as a regional group to cope with the unevenness
of global integration. However, it is important to note that while promotingthe conditions
for regional cooperation, the states in South Asia must strive for sustaining their own
autonomy. This is necessary because the interests of vulnerable sections in their
territories would be better secured by the nation state than by the global order dominabid
by the interests of more advanced countries.

Finally, globalism pewades both nation-states and regions in whatever fonn and intensity. '

It is so because engagement of the nation-states with the global processes has become
indispensable. This does not however mean the total subordination of nation-state
autonomy to the global order. Nation-states in the developing parts of the world will
have to build their abilitiesto critically negotiate with the compulsiorls of globalisation
either through strong regional grouping or larger blocks of cooperation. Such efforts
do not mean the integration with the global order, but strivingto have share in it, while
keeping their autonomy intact.

Check Your Progress 3


Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answers at the end of the unit.
1) What is Washington Consensus?
2) What has been the impact of economic reforms under taken by South Asian Globalisation and the State
countries in the 1990s?

22.6 LET US SUM UP


--
We have learnt in this unit different meanings of globalisation. We have also seen the
dimensions of globalisation at different levels.

We have seen how nation state has come under severe strain because of the pressures
from both global and local forces. The nation state's sovereignty appears to have
received a jolt.

Most importantly we read in this unit that globalisation is not a uniform process that
stands similar to all the countries. On the contrary, the experience of the advanced
countries and least developed countries with globalisation is,diagonallyopposite. As
we saw, the efforts of the developing countries to deal with global order must be
critical and cautious.

The unit also examined the various challenges facing the nation states in the South
Asian region and discussed efforts towards regional group formation, in recognition of
the need to coop with the global order.

22.7 SOME USEFUL BOOKS


Behera Navinitha Chadha. (2001) State Formation Processes, Weak States and
SustainableDevelopment in South Asia, Journal of Peace, Sewiiy and Development,
Vol. VI..

Hirst, P and G Thompson. (1996) Globalisation in Question, Cambridge, Polity.

Ispahani Mahnaz. (2002) "Alternative South Asian Futures". Seminar No. 51.
September.

Muni, S.D. (ed.) (1994)Understanding South Asia. South Asian Publishers. New
Delhi,

Newell Peter. (2003) Global challenges to the future state, Seminar,No.503. July.

Sengupta, Chandan. (2001) 'Conceptualizing Globalintion: Issues and Implications',


Economic and Political Weekly, 18 August. pp.3 137-43.

Vanaik Achin. (Ed.) (2004) Globalization and South Asia; Multi Dimensional
Perspectives. Manhor Publications. New Delhi.

22.8 ANSWERS TO CHECKYOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

1) MNCs, with their huge manpower and financial resources have enormous clout
in the international economic order. They are for most part not amenable to state
South Asia in a control. Nevertheless, they are still dependent on the state to create conducive
Globalising World conditions for their entry and operation within the national territories.

2) The principle of sovereignty asserts autonomy or indepdence ofthe nation state.


The forces of globalisation and local fragmentation are straining the states ability
to act independently. States are finding it increasingly difficult to negotiate with
global forces on their own. The increasing assertions of ailtonomy by local groups
which are forging links with other similar groups across the border are also
reducing the autonomy of states.

Check Your Progress 2

1) At the local level, the rise of strong local groups is eroding the states position as
the sole claimant of citizen's allegiance. At the regional level, divergent interests
of states in the south Asia are preventing the emergence of strong regional
grouping. At the global level, the domination of the countries of the North in .
different global institutions poses a major challenge to these states

2) The world system, whose emergence is reflected in the growing number of


international organisations, new issues requiring global attention and wide
consensus on some issues such as human rights and democracy, cannot replace
the nation state. The nation state remains the basis of international relations. The
world system will remain dependent on nation states.
Check Your Progress 3

1) It refers to the package of macro economic polices that international financial


institutions, the IMF and the World Bank impose on the barrowing developing
countries.

2) Reforms undertaken at the behest of international financial institutions have not


accelerated growth in the region. As a result of improper sequencing of reforms
and inadequate protection to the agriculture,the primary sector, the gains for the
countries ofthe region have been negligible or negative. Only India had a healthy
growth rate of about 6 percent.
UNIT 23 POVERTYALLEVIATION AND
RURAL DEVELOMENT
Structure
23.0 Objectives

23.1 Introduction
23.2 Poverty in South Asia
23.3 Anti Poverty Policies
23.3.1 Land Reforms
23.3.2 Policies Promoting Self-employmentby StrengtheningAsset Base
23.3.3 Public Provision of Basic Needs

23.4 An Assessment
23.5 Let Us Sum Up
23.6 Some Useful Books
23.7 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

23.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit deals with the overarching development issue in SouthAsia, poverty alleviation
and rural development. After goins through this unit, you should be able to:

a Describe the magnitude of the problem of poverty in South Asia;

a Recognise the linkage between rural development and poverty alleviation;

a IdentifL the mdcro and micro level strategies adopted by the countries in the
region to,deal with the ~roblem;and

a Assess the impact of various anti-poverty measures.

INTRODUCTION
Several governmental institutions, social scientists and organizations have been
conducting studies on poverty in South Asia. While the estimates of the incidence of
poverty vary widely there is consensus that mass poverty is deeply entrenched in all
the seven countries of South Asia. The region accounts for over 40 percent of the
world's poverty in income terms. Here, about one third to almost one half of the rural
population is poor, except in the Maldives where only 22,percentof the population is
estimated to be below the povew line. Although some progress has been made in
reducingthe prevalence of income poverty, the proportion of people still living in poverty
and their absolute numbers is exceedingly high.

As an overwhelming majority of the pop'ulation in the region continue to depend on


agriculture poverty is disproportionatelyconcentrated in rural areas. Poverty alleviation
proghmmes are, therefore tied closely with rural development. In this unit, we will
first examine the dimensions of the problem of poverty in the region and then proceed
to examine some of the macro and micro level strategies aimed at poverty alleviation
and rural development in the region.
Regional Co-operation
23.2 POVERTY IN SOUTH ASIA
Most studies on incidence of poverty are based on two basic parameters, the calorie
count and the level of income to meet the minimum calorie requirement. They do not
take into account other basic necessities of life. As we observed in Unit 2, human
poverty is much more than income poverty, more than a lack of what is necessary for
material well being. Human poverty is the denial of choices and opportunitiesto lead
a long, healthy, creative life and enjoy a decent standard of living. Besides income,
what distinguishes the poor from the non-poor is the inadequate access to public
services such as education, health, drinking water, and electricity. From this perspective,
the levels of human poverty are alarming. The UNDP's Human Development Index -
(HDI) rates South Asia lower than all regions other than sub-Saharan Africa in terms
of average achievements in basic human development. In the context of India, the
Human Development in South Asia, 1997, authored by Mahbub ul Haq says that
"the extent of human deprivation is staggering: 135 million people have no access to
basic health facilities; 226 million lack access to safe drinking water; about half of
India's adult population is illiterate.. .nearly one third of the total number of absolute
poor of the world live in India".

Poverty is basically a rural problem in South Asia. In all countries of this region,
poverty is disproportionately concentrated in rural areas. This is not surprising given
that a large number of the people, from 42 per cent in Sri Lanka to 80 per cent in
Nepal are still dependent on agriculture as a source of employment. Most of the poor
are employed in agriculture or in related occupations. They are predominantly small
farmers and landless laborers. They have kimited or no access to land and other
productive resources. Poor rural households tend to have larger families, with higher
dependency ratios, lower educational attainment and higher underemployment. The
poor also lack basic amenities such as water, sanitation and electricity. Their access
,
to credit, inputs and technology is severely limited. As a result of their low levels of
social and physical infrasb'ucture, the poor are vulnerable to not only natural calamities
such as famine and disease, but even economi- fluctuations.
~istributionof poor in rural and urban households in South Asia

Distribution of Poor
Rural Urban

India (1994)
Pakistan ()990191)
Bangladesh ( 1995196)
Nepal (1995196)

In Bhutan, no authentic and independent study has been done on poverty and income
distribution. However, it is estimated that the majority ofthe 75 percent people living
in rural areas are poor. There is skewed distribution in the size of landholdings. Bhutan
does not have any poverty data based on calorie intake and consumption expenditure.
Even while calculating the Human Development Indices Bhutan National Human
Development Report 2000 takes into consideration per capita wealth rather than per
capita income. Poverty Assessment andAnalysis Report 2000, published by Planning
Commission of Bhutan showed that 33 per cent of the households have income below
the national average. The same document mentions that, "average per capita household
income of around Nu 1200 per month, about Nu 40 per persca per day, is less than a
dollar per person per day on average." This as per the definition of the World Bank
paints towards the existence of huge portion of the population living below poverty
line.
India has 72 per cent of its population living in rural areas. Agriculture contributes 28 Poverty Alleviation and
per cent ofthe cmntry's gross national income (GNP). Poverty in all forms is alarmingly Rural Development
massive iri India, The issue of poverty alleviation has been central to the planning
process right s h the First Five Year Plan (195 1-56). Though several economists and
organisations have been consistently conducting studies on the state of poverty in
India, the broad methodological questions like criteria for identifying the people below
poverty line, the samples, their geographical coverage and the periodicity have always
dominated the poverty studies. The poverty scenariowhich has been showing a declining
trend after the mid-1970s, has acquired an enigmatic dimension particularly in the
1990s. As per the Tenth Plan Document (2002-2007), the percentage and absolute
population below poverty line came down steadily from 54.88 per cent (32 1.3 million)
in 1973-74to 26.10 per cent (260.3 million) in 1999-2000. In 1973-74,the concentration
in the rural areas used to be as high as 8 1 per cent of the total which gradually came
down to 77 per cent 1999-2000. Official claims that poverty is declining continuously
came into a sharp criticism particularly in the light of ongoing economic reforms. The
Planning Commission estimate has been critically contested by a number of experts
and institutions.

In India, there are regional imbalances in distribution of poverty. These imbalances


tended to increase gradually during the 1980s and rather steeply after the economic
reforms were initiated in the early 1990s. It is expected that there will be a great
variation in the projections of people below poverty line in the states by the end of the
Tenth Five Year Plan in 2006-07. It varies from 2 per cent in States like Gujarat,
Haryana, Himacbal Pradesh and pinjab to 41 percent and 43 per cent respectively in
Orissa and Bihar.

In the island state of Maldives, the disadvantaged groups, namely those living in the
atolls are synonymous with the poor. Although there is no absolute poverty in the
country, about 22 per cent of the rural population is poor. One of the major challenges
that are facing Maldives has been to ensure that the benefits of growth and development
are equitably shared between the nation's highly dispersed populations.

In Nepal, agriculture still contributes over 40 percent to national income. Agricultural


growth has been poor and rural poverty is much higher than urban poverty. As per the
Ninth Plan, 1997-2002,the size of population living below the poverty line has been
found to b 4 2 percent in 1996. Within this also, 24.9 per cent is considered to be the
poor and the remaining 17.1 per cent is estimated to be ultra poor. In Nepal, the per
capita consumption level has been treated as the criterion. The Living Standard Survey
launched by Central Statistical Organization in 1996 determined 2124 calorie as per
capita per day necessity. On this basis, the per capita annual expenditure to purchase
this determined calorie equivalent of food worked out to be Rs. 2637. Ifthe expenditure
on non-food items is added to it, the per capita annual expenditure is estimated to stand
at Rs 4404. 'Those living in the mountainous regions are poorer than those in the hills
and Terai.

Pakistan has 64 per cent of its population residing in the rural areas. Agriculture
contributes 26 per cent to the country's GNP. The early substantial decline in rural-
urban inequality has now come to a halt and more recently, inequality has started to
increase. Rural poverty is now much higher. The latest Economic Survey (2003)
emphatically mentions that poverty significantly and steadily increased from 26.1 per
cent in 1987-88 to 32.1 per cent in 2001. In the income inequality trends also, the Gini
coefficient rose from 0.355 in 1985-86 to 0.410 in 1998-99 showing a definite
consolidation of inequality in Pakistan. The highest 20 percent of the income group
continue to usurp almost 50 percent and the lowest 20 per cent gets hardly 6 per cent
of the income. Rural areas of South Punjab and Baluchistan are very poor. At the
World Summit for Social Development, the government ofPakistan has admitted that
after the first Structural Adjustment Programmes were initiated in 1988, trends in both
the incidence of poverty and inequality have shown an increase.
Regional Co-operation Three household income and expenditure surveys covering the entire Sri Lanka, except
the North and East were conducted during the 1990s. The Department of Census and
Statistics (DCS) data suggest the absolute poverty increased significantly from 33 to
39 percent according to the higher poverty line, and from 20 to 25 per cent according
to the lower poverty line. The DCS conducted another Household Income and
Expenditure Survey in 2002. A preliminary report, based on the first three months
survey data covering about 40000 households indicates that around 28 percent ofthe
population is experiencingconsumption poverty. This finding, even though tentative,
suggests that there has been no significantchange in the poverty level in the latter half
of the 1990s.
The World Bank's poverty assessment found that the incidence of poverty varies
across the major ethnic groups (Sinhalese, Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils and
Muslims) with the exception of Indian Tamils, most of who are classified as poor.
Indian Tamils (often referred to as estate Tamils) are among the poorest people in Sri
Lanka.
Sri Lanka has been immersed in ethnic war from 1982 to 200 1 (nearly 19 years). The
humanitarian, social and economic impact of the war is felt most directly by population
in the North and East and the area bordering it. Some of the effects of the conflict
include: loss of civilian lives and psychological trauma, damage to infrastructure and
homes, displacement, restricted mobility in some areas in the country, disruption of
local economies, disruption of community and institutional networks, high dependence
on relief, deterioration in the health status ofthe population, and widespread vulnerability
and insecurity among the population.
Qualitative reports suggest that income poverty, healthcare, education and economic
conditions are far worse in areas racked by war than in other parts of the nation.
Among the worst affected groups are households that have been displaced, sometimes
repeatedly, as a result ofconflict in or threats to their home villages. Displaced families
have lost productive assets, including in some cases lands they had cultivated before
being displaced. The Sri Lanka Integrated Survey (SLIS) found that nearly all
households in the northeast (97%) that moved due to the war suffered loss of property.
Check Your Progress 1
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answers at the end of the unit.
1) What is the percentage of people living below povery line in the following South
Asian countries.

Country India Pakistan Sri Lanka Nepal

Poverty levels

2) What are the economic and demographic characteristics of the poor in South
Asia?

-
ANTI POVERTY POLICIES
- - pp - - - - - - - - - - - - -

a in rural areas, what is the appropriate strategy


If the bulk of the poor in iouth ~ s i are
for alleviatingpoverty in the countries of the region? The perception of policy makers
and economic analysts regarding appropriate policies for alleviating poverty has
undergone significant changes over the years and as we shall see in the following Poverty Alleviation and
discussion, wavered between ecdnomic growth and redistribution as the potent weapon Rural Development
for assault on poverty. Till the early 1970s,the dominant ideology governing development
efforts was that economic growth would lead to a 'trickle down' and 'spread' effect
benefiting the poor. Rural development efforts during this period, such as Community
Development Programmes in India and Village Aid Programmes in Pakistan aimed at
increasingaccess to education, health, housing and social welfare, they did not explicitly
aim at poverty alleviation. The pressing objective ofthese programmes was to increase
agricultural production.
By the early 1970s, it became clear that the process of economic growth had bypassed
the rural poor, and in some cases had even worsened their condition. A series of
developmental studies highlighted that economic growth, by itself, cannot lead to
redistribution of assets or incomes and that the condition of the poor will remain largely
unaltered. Pakistani economist and the author of Human Development in South Asia
I Report 1997 aptly remarked, "my own rude awakening came quite early after a
1
decade's experience with Pakistan's development planning. After generating a GNP
i growth rate of 7 per cent per annum during 1960s, our team of young and enthusiastic

I economic planners was getting ready to a bow on the national stage in 1968. It greatly
puzzled us that the majority of the people were not as impressed with the quantum of
growth as we were and instead were asking for an instant demise of the government.
What had really happened was that while national income had increased, human lives
had shrivelled, as the benefits of growth had been hijacked by powerful pressure
groups". Therefore, it is not just the pace of economic growth that matters for poverty
alleviation, but also the kind and quality ofgrowth.
It is in these circumstances that redistributive measures to address the problem of
poverty alleviation gained popularity. Since the late 1970s,most South Asian countries
launched special policies and programmes aimed at poverty alleviation and rural
development. In a significant departure from the past, this phase saw the involvement
of a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in poverty alleviation and
rural development programmes. The NGOs came to the fore in the late 1980s, when
there was a decYine in the expenditure on social sectors in most countries in South Asia
because of adverse external trade environment and debt crisis.
Policies that are concerned with the issue of removal of poverty may be broadly
classified as falling under three groups. First, there is the set of policies which are
directly oriented towards productibn and income generation such as tenancy and land
reforms which increase the asset base and productivity of the poor. A second set of
policies that affect the flow of incomes or consumption to individuals or households
include employment and wage employment. A third set of policies relate to public
expenditure schemes which seeks to provide certain basic infrastructureand amenities
such as rural roads and drinking water supply, which are essential for improving the
living conditions of the poor. Let us examine a few policies and programmes aimed at
poverty alleviation in South Asia.
23.3.1 Land Reforms
Most South Asia countries embarked upon land reforms soon after independence.
The ceiling-cum-redistribution policy is by far the most radical in nature, yet one that
has been least successful in practice. Indian land reforms began in the 1950s. By the
mid-1980s about 1.5 per cent of the cultivated land was acquired under ceiling laws
and less than 80 percent of it was actually distributed. Moreover, since the amount of
land availablefor distribution was itself small, the total number of beneficiaries amounts
to a miniscule proportion of poor households.
The record of Bangladesh is even more dismal. The excess land over the stipulated
ceiling would have amounted to no more than one per cent of the cultivated land even
if the ceilings were strictly enforced. In practice, only15 percent of the potential has
been distributed.
Regional Co-operation In Nepal, the results of the most comprehensive land reforms programme through
Land Acts of 1964 have been equally dismal. Only 3 per cent of total cultivated area
was found to be in excess of the ceilings. The area that was redistributed was 23,588
hectares (a little over one percent of the cultivated area).
In Pakistan, land reforms of 1959 resulted in acquiring only 2.50 million acres,
representing about 4 per cent of the then cultivated land. In the next phase of land
reforms in 1972 and again in 1977another five per cent of cultivable land was resumed
for redistribution.
Sri Lanka's achievements appear to be more remarkable. As much as 20 per cent of
the cultivated land was promptly acquired following the legislation of 1972 and 1975.
But the landless and small peasants gained very little -only 12 percent of the land
acquired, which amounts to 2.4 per cent of the land cultivated land, accrued to the
peasantry. The reason is that the reform was aimed mainly at the plantation sector-
only one per cent of the paddy land was acquired in the process. The bulk of the
plantation land came under state run corporationswhich did very little to enhance the
control of the landless poor.
The general picture all over the region is thus one of negligible impact of redistributive
land reforms. In general, the stipulated ceiling was too high to release adequate surplus
land. Even the meagre amount of land that should have been legally available, could
not be fully acquired as the land owners made use of various legal loopholes such as
benami transfers to keep possession of land .Further, much of the meagre land actually
surrendered was found to be extremely poor, made up of ditches, marshes and waste
land.
Tenancy Legislation
Most South Asian states have enacted legislations providing for ownership rights to
tenants as also determiningthe sharecropper's share of the produce. These legislations
however not only failed to improve the tenants control over land, but in fact, made
their condition worse by promoting large scale eviction. Given the existing ownership
rights and the acute land hunger on the part of the landless and marginal peasants, the
mere existence of legislation is not enough. The tenants must have countervailing
political power at the local level to neutralize the preexisting superior power of landlords.
Further, even ifthe tenants get access to land, they will need new sources of consumption
loan, working capital loan and other elements of subsistence insurance which will no
longer be forthcomingfrom the landlord. It is precisely the non-fulfilment of these two
conditions that led to almost complete failure of tenancy reforms in most South Asian
countries.
23.3.2 Policies Promoting self-employment by StrengtheningAsset
Base
Given the acute shortage of land, a number of poverty alleviation schemeshave emerged
which seeks to promote self-employment in non-farm activities by strengthening the
asset base ofthe poor. Case studies of schemes in South Asian countries are examined
below:
The Grameena Bank
The Grameena Bank (GB), a voluntary organization which emerged in Bangladesh in
the mid seventies, became a novel antipoverty programme in the country. It was
aimed at the bottom 40 per cent of the rural population in selected areas of the country.
Its target group generally covers households who own no more than half an acre of
land.
a

GB takes banking services to the door step of the target groups through its workers
who attend weekly meetings of loanees, at which credit is disbursed and instalments
of loan repayments are collected. GB has progressed rapidly and by the end of 1984
1-A +A -,r.A- ? C n
,-+ ,
.
C
a
l +I..- ..:lln.-.-~ ;.r Rnm.-.lnrlaoh
A notable feature of GB is that about 5 1 percent of its members are females who Poverty Alleviation and
receive about 37 per cent of total loans disbursed. GB loans are being used basically Rural Development
7
for undertaking rural non-crop activities such as trading, shop keeping, processing and . .
manufacture of livestock and fisheries.
It is significant to note that GB has encouraged higher female participation in non-farm
activities. The per capita incomes of loanee households have 'increased more rapidly
as compared to non-loanee households. It is noteworthy that this has been very high.
GB has thus succeeded in giving income support to the poor without degenerating into
a dole giving institution that so many other poverty alleviation programmes have tended
to become.
It must be noted however, that so far GB covers only a small proportion of the total
i
population of Bangladesh and the question arises whether it can be replicated widely
to produce a significant impact on poverty alleviation at the national level.

i Integrated Rural Development Programme


Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) was conceived as an ambitious
anti-poverty programme in India's Sixth Five year Plan (1980-85) and was designed to
help 15 million families in rural areas to rise above poverty line.
IRDP provided the eligible families with financial assistance, by way of both loan and
subsidy, to enable them to acquire productive and income generating assets. The
programme marked a distinct departure from the earlier plans in which poverty
alleviation was taken up largely on the fruits of overall development.
Most case studies on IRDP concede the success of the programme in raising the level
of income of a large number of targeted beneficiaries. However, the evaluation reports
of the IRDP have highlighted a series of administrative and organisational weaknesses.
Block level machinery was found to be quite weak for providing appropriate and
integrated delivery system. As the bulk of the beneficiaries were identified by block
development officials, and not by elected village assemblies, the proper targeting of
more deserving households was not possible.
Another drawback of IRDP was the preponderance of schemes of assistance in the
primary sector and that too in the animal husbandry sub sector. The programme
floundered in many cases because of the low level of investment and non-availability
of good quality animals. The programme did not provided for feed and fodder and the
beneficiaries were unable to market their product, especially milk. The beneficiaries
were handicapped in respect of availability of raw materials, access to working capital
and lack of infrastructural facilities in terms of marketing. Consequently, the initial
- increase in incomes could not be sustained over longer periods. What is further
disheartening is that the majority of the beneficiaries have credit overdue. Attempts
are now being made to plug loopholes and leakages in the programme and integrate
them along with sectoral and area development programmes into a comprehensive
form of integrated development of each area.
Small Farmers Development Programme of Nepal
The Small Farmers Development Programme (SFDP) in Nepal is also a credit based
programme intended to raise the productivity of the small and marginal farmers. SFDP
launched during the fourth Plan (1970-75) has been a major programme where the
thrust was multi-sectoral and it used as its base a group of villages. The objective of
the programme was to channel available resources and services to small farmers so as
to raise their standard of living.
Group responsibility on group-decided projects promoted the sprit of cooperation. By
the end of the 1970s, there were 24 SFD programmes including nearly 7000 farm
families. Evaluation reports have found that participants in SFDP were better off with
an average household income of 24 per cent higher than the non-participants. This had
a favourable impact on the access to food of small farmers included in the programme.
Regional Co-operation Though the SFDP has had a positive impact, it is not without limitations. The problems
of the programme as identified by farmers and group organisers, relate to lack of
clarity about the objectives of the programme, complicated loan procedures, misuse
of loans, large farmers taking advantage of the programme, and high rate of mortality
of livestock because of poor support services.
Wage Employment Schemes
Food for Work Programme (FFWP) was introduced in Bangladesh in the mid-1970s
with a view to creating employment opportunities for the landless and the poor and for
creating infrastructure. Payment is made in terms of wheat received through food
aid. Despite the progress made in the number of schemes and man-days, employment
generated by the programme accounted for 1 per cent of the total available man-
days. Secondly, the wage rate of workers under the programme has been found to be
substantially lower than the officially stipulated rate in terms of quantity of wheat.
Finally, the quality of the infrastructure developed under the programme has been
found to be poor.
India has had more extensive schemes for wage employment. Though it launched the
Rural Manpower Programme in 1960, it was only in the mid-1970s that such
programmes acquired greater thrust. In 1977, the Food for Work Programme was
introduced. It was replaced by National Rural Employment Programme (NREP) in
1980.The NREP aimed at providing supplementary employment opportunitiesto those
seeking work during lean periods, thereby creating durable community assets. The
programme aimed at creating 300-400 million man-days of employment per annum.
The Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme (RLEGP) was launched in
1983 with the aim of providing guaranteed employment to at least one person of every
landless rural labour household up to hundred days a year, to generate employment of
300 man days a year, in addition to employment generated under NREP.
In 1989, the NREP and the RLEGP were merged into a single expanded new
programme called the Jawahar Rozgar Yojna (JRY). This scheme was estimated to
create approximately 650 million man-days of unskilled employment per annum. It
was expected to provide jobs for approximately 10 per cent of unemployed labour
force in rural India.
These schemes have had some positive impact in the stabilisation of wages in rural
areas and in providing landless labourers a certain degree of security, particularly
during lean and drought periods. They, however, tend to give too much emphasis on
building roads and buildings to satisfy local pressures, which in turn has led to wide
and thin coverage in terms of community assets as well as neglect of more beneficial
projects such as watershed based land development works, soil conservation and
irrigation.

23.3.3 Public Provision of Basic Needs


It is well recognised that by targeting public expenditure in relation to basic needs
fulfilment of the needy, much could be achieved in terms of enhancing the human
resource potential of an individual. The experience of Sri Lanka and the state of
Kerala in India has already attracted widespread attention in this regard. Here, it is
not the high levels of per capita income or land reforms and employment generating
programmes, but the public provision of basic amenities such as food, health care and
education that has played a crucial role in improving the quality of life of people in
these areas. Both Sri Lanka and the Kerala state are distinctly far ahead of the rest of
South Asia by all indicators of quality of life.

23.4 AN ASSESSMENT
The dominant approach to development did not make a major dent into endemic poverty
and could not reverse the process of poverty reproduction. The failure ofthis traditional
intervention has been attributed to three glaring assessments. Firstly, the stock of Poverty Alleviation and
Rural Development
knowledge that was perfected and experimented in the industrialised countries were
forcefi~llytransferred and imposed on this region. Secondly, it assumed poor communities
to be harmonious entities thereby disregarding the hard realities like dominant-
dependence relationship in a village and gender and equity conflicts which adversely
influence the effectiveness of delivery system. Finally, it neglected the issue of income
distribution.When the cumulative benefits failed to trickle down to the poor, all kinds of
state mechanisms were used which paid insufficient attention to detail. This failure of
delivery approach by the statk could largely be traced to the heavy reliance on
I
I bureaucratic system.
I
1 The delivery of poverty alleviation programmes through state mechanisms did not
I reduce poverty. In fact, bureaucracy became the main hurdle for delivery of goods
and services to the poor. There has been much less accountability, lots of leakages and
no capacity building. A negligible effort has been made to empower the downtrodden
in the entire anti-poverty interventions.
As the magnitude of crisis widened, many micro-level mobilisations and non-
governmental intervention against poverty started appearing. Learning from the tedious
delivery systems of the state mechanism, a new undefstanding began to emerge and
focus gradually shifted from macro-interventionsto participatory micro development
organisations. The main thrust of micro development organisations, mostly non-
governmental organisations, has been on involving local leadership, use of local
resources, empowerment and capacity building. All the micro level success stories of
poverty alleviation in South Asia such as the Rural Advancement Committee of
Bangladesh, Aga Khan Rural Support Programme of Pakistan, Small Farmer
Development Programme of Nepal, Self Employed Women's Association of India,
Janasakti Banku Sangam of Sri Lanka and Mongar District Health Project of Bhutan
have indicated that where the "poor participate as subjects and not objects of the
development process, it is possible to generate growth, human development and equity".
Most ofthe success stories in poverty alleviatio~iand rural development are built upon
participation and community effort. They are also "incremental in nature in the sense
that they rely on societal experiences, memories and mobilisation systkms and outside
resources are marginal. This is true of Grameena Bank of Bangladesh and Pani
Panchayats in India". When ever local communities have been involved in the control
and management of their resources, it has been possible to protect the environment
and regenerate it productivity.
The NGOs across South Asia have repeatedly shown through their work that community
self governance has invariably led to improved human development as in the case of
environmental project in Karachi in the urban context; the villages of Sukhomajri,
Nada, Seed, Bhusadia and Ralegaon Siddhi in India; and, the Grammena Bank in the
flood affected plains of Bangladesh. In Nepal, rural communities continue to manage
their fragile Himalayan environment with great care and labour inputs. The enormous
labour inputs ofthe poor in environmental management-such as those ofthe Himalayan
farmers in terracing their agricultural fields-remain an invisible factor often far more
than official expendituris: whether they result from national funds or foreign aid.
Check Your Progress 2
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answers at the end of the unit.
1) In the assessment of the author, why have ceiling cum redistribution policies had
negligible impact in South Asia?
...........................................................................................................................
-.
...........................................................................................................................
Regional Co-operation 2) Assess the role of NGOs in poverty alleviation programmes.

23.5 LET US SUM UP


In this unit we saw that the bulk of the population in the countries of South
Asia resides in rural areas and is dependent on agriculture. With about one third to
almost one half of the rural population in poverty, poverty in South Asia is mostly a
rural phenomenon. Despite this, it was only in the 1970s that specific policies and
programmes aimed at poverty alleviation were taken up. Until then, it was assumed
that economic growth and agricultural growth in particular would trickle down and\
lift the population above poverty levels. But just as th states in South Asia began to
1
design poverty alleviation programmes aimed at speci c sections and regions, their
expenditures on rural development and service sector declined because of the
economic instability arising out of the debt crisis on the one hand and adverse
external trade environment on the other. It was at this stage that a number of non-
governmental agencies became involved with poverty alleviation and rural
development programmes.
As we saw, the success of 'rural development and poverty alleviation programmes
in South Asia depended on not only on how much the state has spent on them, but
also on the way they have been organised and the extent to which the intended
beneficiaries have been involved in them, both in design and implementation.
Participatory approaches to rural development where they have been adopted have
generally shown promising results in targeting the poor and providing sustainable
livelihood to the poor.

23.6 SOME USEFUL BOOKS


Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre.(Various years) Human Development
in South Asia. Karachi: Oxford University Press
Singh, KK and S Ali. (200 1) RuralDevelopment Strategies in Developing Countries.
New Delhi: Sarup and Sons. ..
Lama P Mahendra. (2001) Globalisation and South Asia: Primary Concerns and
Vulnerabilities. In International Studies, Vol. 38 (2), Sage Publications.
Besley, T and R. Burgess. (1998) Land Reform, Poverty Reduction and Growth:
Evidence from India. No. 13. London: London School of Economics.
Krishna, A et al (1997) Reasons for Hope, Instructive Experiences in Rural
Development. West Hartford: Kumarian Press.
Sen, Amartya. (1996) Economic Reforms, Employment and Poverty: Trends and
Options. Economic and Political Weekly. Special Number.

23.7 ANSWERS TO CHECKYOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

India Pakistan Sri Lanka Nepal


I Over 26%
I

( Over 32% 1
I '

28% .. 1
I

. 42% 1
2) The rural poor in SouthAsia have little or no access to land and other productive Poverty Alleviation and
resources. They tend to have larger families, with higher dependency ratios, Rural Development
Lower educational attainment and higher underemployment. The poor also lack
basic amenities such as water supply, sanitation and electricity. Their access to
credit, inputs and technology is severely limited.
Check Your Progress 2

1) The impact of redistributive land reforms has been negligible. In general, as the
ceiling was too high, little land was released as surplus. Moreover, land owners
made use ofvarious legal loopholes to retain land. Much ofthe meagre land that
was surrendered was found to be unsuitable for cultivation.

2) Since the 1980s, many NGOs have become involved in poverty alleviation and
rural development programmes. They lay emphasis on involving local leadership,
using local resources, empowerment and capacity building. They involved the
poor in designing and implementing the schemes. This has contributed to their
success. NGOs are complementing the government's macro development efforts.
Objectives
Introduction
History
SAARC Summits
Problems Besetting the Organisation
Prospects for SAARC
Let Us Sum Up
Some Useful Books
Aqswers to Check Your Progress Exercises

24.0 OBJECTIVES
In this unit we will study the SAARC, the first concrete expression of regional
cooperation in South Asia. After going through this unit, you should be able to:
Trace the genesis ofAsian regionalism leading to the formation of SAARC;
e Identify the objectives of SAARC;
Give a brief resume of the SAARC Summits;
Identify the problems besetting SAARC, and
Analyse the prospects of the organisation.

24.1 INTRODUCTION
In the history of regionalism, {he South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) is a unique experiment. In terms of national profiles or superpower
connections (till the end ofthe Cold War), it has few parallels in the world. Comprised
of seven unequal states in terms of size, population, political system and development
status -Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka-
on one extreme it has India, the second most populous country in the world (after
China), and on the other, the Maldives, with a population of barely 200,000. Similarly,
on one side it has such nuclear powers with large armed forces as India and Pakistan
and on the other, small states like Bhutan and the Maldives, the combined military
strength of which would not exceed the police force of New Delhi or Karachi. The
position of Indonesia in ASEAN (Association for South h t ~ s i a n ~ a t i o nors that
) of
Saudi Arabia in GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) can provide only a limited comparison
in this regard. With llegard to super power connections also, they were, during the
Cold War, asymmetrical. India, although a non-Soviet bloc nation, had a record of
three and a half decades of friendship and trust with the Kremlin. This contrasted ,

*,glaringlywith Pakistan, which was closely aligned to the US global strategy.

The realm in which the SAARC countries have something really in common is their
state of underdevelopment. All are developing nations, and four of them (Bangladesh,
-. - - . .. --- - - . - - -. - - - . - -
developed' countries. Understandably, the rationale behind the formation of SAARC SAARC

!
was the economic development of the region.

South Asia is a fairly well-defined geographical unit. In terms of historical experience


also it has uniformity. Yet, strangely enough, SAARC is the first experiment of its kind
in the region. It came into being in December 1985 at the first-ever South Asian
summit held in Dhaka, capital of Bangladesh.

HISTORY - - -

Earlier efforts at regionalism in Asia in general and South Asia in particular were both
un-pragmatic and far fetched. Being too diffused in both membership and scope they
did not have any lasting significance. For example, the seven conferences were
convened between 1947 and 1955:the Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March
1947;Conference on Indonesia, New Delhi, January 1949; Baguio Conference, Baguio,
I

r
Phillippines,May 1950;Colombo Plan, formally launched on 1 July 1950,after a decision
at the meeting of the Ministers of Independent British Commonwealth countries in
Sydney and London in 1950; Colombo Powers Conference, Colombo, April 1954;
Afro-Asian Conference, Bandung, Indonesia,April 1955;and Simla Conference, Simla,
May 1955.

Convened against the background of recent decolonization movements, the meetings


were prompted either by an anti-colonial ethos or by prodding ofex-colonial masters
as reflected in the Colombo plan. They included countries fiom several world regions.

Tilt towards Western Bloc

One notable characteristic ofthe first generation experiment in Asian regionalism was
South Asia's unanimous tilt towards the Western bloc, notwithstanding its anti-colonial
and anti-imperialist rhetoric. From the mid 1950s onward, however, as Pakistan became
increasingly entrenched in the US strategic network, the division between India and
Pakistan became wider and deeper. During the same period, the growing Sino-Soviet
conflict added another complicated dimension. As a result, by the time India and
Pakistan fought their third war in 1971 (the earlier ones were in 1947and 1965)on the
issues of liberation of Bangladesh the lines were clearly drawn. Against this background,
any call for regional cooperation was a cry in the wilderness.

Revival of the ldea of Cooperative Arrangement

The idea was revived towards the end of the 1970s. It was Ziaur Rahman, the then
President of Bangladesh, who first suggested that the seven states of South Asia work
out a cooperative arrangement to amelioratethe stark economic problems of the region.
Although the proposal did not evoke much enthusiasm in the beginning, following the
change in the leaderships in the countries the proposal caught the im-.dination of the
people in power. It was a time when the political leadership in South Asia was passing
into the hands of a new set of rulers. In India, Indira t?.:idhi's Congress Party was
replaced by the Janata Party led by Morarji Desai; in P a k ~ ~iulfiqar
~ a n Ali Bhutto was
replaced by a military ruler Zia-ul-Haq, and in Sri Lanka Srimavo Bandaranaike was
replaced by Junius Jayewardene. In Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman had consolidated his
position and there was no immediate threat fiom pro-Mujib forces. All these leaders
had a pro-US image and unlike their predecessors, tended to build regional relations on
new premises.

Effective Steps Towards SAARC

Ironically, however, the first effective step towards building SAARC was taken at a
time when the political landscape of South Asia had returned nearly to its earlier state.
Indira Gandhi had staged a dramatic come-back in India in 1980,which coincided with
Regional Co-operation the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979and the return of the US-Pakistan 'special
relationship'. Indira Gandhi's virtual endorsement of the Soviet move sharpened the
strategic cleavage between India and Pakistan. While all this was happening, in May
1980, Ziaur Rahman sent formal letters to the six South Asian leaders urging serious
thought for the creation of regional cooperation body. Interestingly, the appeal received
a positive, though lukewarm, response.

Without directly referring to the political questions and without touching upon sensitive
regional issues, the leaders thought it worthwhile to explore areas of mutual economic
cooperation. It was a time when North-South dialogue had practically failed and the
slogan of economic cooperation among developing countries (ECDC) under South-
South Cooperation had started gaining high grounds. The global recession was
increasinglycripplingthe world economy. Hardest hit was the oil-importingdeveloping
world to which South Asia belonged. By the mid-70s real growth rates had touched a
low of almost two per cent. The 'second oil shock' of 1979-80 worsened the situation.
In 1980, the balance oftrade record of all South Asian countries remained very critical.
Against this background the advisabilityof regional cooperation in particular, and South-
South Cooperation in general, took high priority on the developmental agenda. The
creation of SAARC was only a matter of time.

Several meetings took place at the secretarial level to identify areas of cooperation.
The highlight ofthese meetings was that all ofthem decided not to discuss any 'bilateral
or contentious' issues in their regional meetings and whatever decisions they take
would be on the basis of consensus. Interestingly, the first point was made on India's
insistence and the second, on both India's and Pakistan's, the other countries having
no particular reason to worry about them. These two conditions continue to guide the
basic functioning of SAARC. On the contrary, they would have preferred the inclusion
of bilateral issues whic/h could have given them confidence to deal with India--the
colossus and often referred to as the 'Big Brother'. In a way, therefore, it was a
major diplomatic gain for India.

Launching of SAARC

In August 1983, the ongoing process was given a political push. At the first Foreign
Ministers' Conference in New Delhi, the South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC)
Declaration was adopted. Following this the organisational structure of SAARC was
.finalid.

Thereafter, the first summit meeting took place in Dhaka in December 1985 and
SAARC was formally launched. The leaders decided in favour of aCouncil of Ministers
and a Secretariat, certifying their enduring commitmentto the organization. In February
1987, the SAARC Secretariat came into being with a secretary general and four
directors. Later, the SAARC Council of Ministers was formed consisting of the
foreign ministers of respective member states.

Organisational Structure

Following the New Delhi meeting of foreign ministers in 1983 the organizational
structure of the SAARC assumed a clear form and shape. It developed as a four-tier
structure. At the lowest level were the Technical Committees of experts and officials
formulating programmes of action and organizing seminars and workshops. Next
was the Standing Committee of Foreign Secretaries to review and coordinate the
recommendations of the Technical Committees, which was to meet at least once a
year. Above this was the Foreign Ministers' Conference, also to be held which was to
meet at least once a year to grant political approval to the recommendations of the
Standing Committee. At the apex was the Summit Meeting to be held annually to give
political significance to SAARC.
Check Your Progress 1 SAARC

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.


ii) Check your answers with that given at the end of this unit.

1) Identify at least three factors that contributed to the formation of SAARC

I
2) The four-tiers of SAARCYsorganisational structure are:
t

24.3 SAARC SUMMITS


So far, twelve Summits have taken place-Dhaka (1985), Bangalore (1986),
Kathmandu (l987), Islamabad (1988), Male (1990), Colombo (l991), Dhaka (1993),
New Delhi (1995), Male (1997), Colombo (1998), Kathmandu (2002) and Islamabad
(2004). However, in the past several summits have been postponed or not held at all
because of domestic and bilateral problems of member countries.
The SAARC has a fairly impressive record of meetings, seminars, studies and reports
that it has sponsored. The Calendar of Activities released by the SAARC Secretariat
from time to time, enumerates a large number of activities pertaining to such diverse
developmental fields as agriculture,animal husbandry, horticulture, health and sanitation,
forestry, population, meteordlogy, postal services, drug trafficking And abuse, integrated
rural development,transfer of technology, sports, transport, telecommunication, women's
development, trade and commerce, and otheis.
SAARC7sactivities are not confined to developmental issues only. Even such an
issue as terrorism, which has been hanging fire in Indo-Pak relations for several years
and has serious political overtones, had earlier received attention. Despite deep-rooted
divisions amongthe SAARC countriesover this question, they could adopt a convention
against terrorism. Its highlight was the identification of offences, which 'shall be
regarded as terroristic and for the purpose of extradition shall not be regarded as a
political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives.' The convention provides
the necessary follow-up through the signing of bilateral extradition treaties. This
convention has not been implemented because Bangladesh and Pakistan have not
ratified the same as they do not have the enabling domestic legislations against the
terrorists. However, a new dimension was given to this Convention in the Islamabad
Summit of 2004.
The first SAARC summit was held in Dhaka in December 1985. At this'meeting,
SAARCwas formally launched. This Summit was particularly important in two respects.
In the first place, there was the use of expressions 'Non-use of Force' and 'Peaceful
Settlement of All Disputes' (Preamble and Article 11). It may be noted that similar
expressions were used in the original Working Paper (1980) prepared by Bangladesh,
but in the first Meeting of Foreign Secretaries (April 1981) they were dropped on
account of Pakistan's reservations. Pakistan's no-war pact proposal to India came
later in September 1981. The use of these expressions in the SAARC document,
therefore, made the no-war proposal virtually redundant. Secondly,the summit decided
in favour of a Council of Ministers and a Secretariat thereby giving permanence to
SAARC.
Regional Co-operation At the second SAARC summit held in Bangalore in November 1986, the leaders
forged a regional convention on suppression of terrorism, agreed to set up a regional
food security reserve and decided to commission a study on the causes and
consequences of natural disasters and the preservation of the environment. In response
to the Afghan application for membership, the summit directed the Standing Committee
to draw up the criteria for membership. (SAARC charter is silent on the admission of
new members).

The third SAARC summit was held in Kathmandu in November 1987. In the
summit, the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism was signed,
which came into force on 22 August 1988.

The fourth SAARC summit was held in Islamabad in 1988. At this summit, an
integrated development plan called 'SAARC 2000--a basic needs perspective' was
drawn. The plan envisaged a regional perspective programme with a specific target
in core areas like food, clothing, shelter, education, primary health care, population
planning and environmental protection, to be met by the year 2000.

The fifth SAARC summit was held in Male in November 1990. At this summit, the
leaders called for the welfare ofthe disabled and the girl child, convention on narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances to deal effectively with the menace of drug abuse
and suppression of illicit traffic in the region, enlargement of visa-free travel facility
beyond the existing categories of members of Parliament and Supreme Court Judges
to include the heads of national academic institutions, their spouses and dependent
children, and, most importantly, the extension of the core areas of economiccooperation.
It was decided that by the end of February 1991 the regional study dealing with the
contentious issue of trade, manufactures and services should be completed. This was
particularly important because evetlyone agreed that to meet the challenges posed to
the global economy by the collapse ofthe socialist economies, new pattern of production,
consumption and trade would have to be conceived, and that sooner it was realized
the better it was for South Asia.

The Summit sixth SAARC summit at Colombo was originally scheduled to be held in
November 1991. But following the last moment decision of the Bhutanese King not
to participate in the summit because of his pressing domestic problems, the meeting
had to be postponed. This was unavoidable because both India and Nepal insisted
that since the King ofBhutan was not participating, they too would not. They strongly
felt that in the absence of any one member of the summit, the meeting, even if held,
would amount to going against the collective spirit of SAARC.

The summit was later held on 2 1 December 1991. Most ofthe issues in the Colombo
declaration that was adopted at the summit were part of SAARC's continuing agenda
over the previous years. The need to curb terrorist activities, the Maldivian initiative
to seek international consensus on reinforcing the security of small states, the call to
take effective steps to combat narco-terrorism in South Asia, the plea to articulate a
collective stand on global and regional environmental issues fall in this category. The
summit leaders also agreed that the inter-governmentalgroup, already set up to study
the prospects for regional cooperation in the areas of trade, manufactures and the
services, should also examine the Sri Lankan groposal for the establishment of a
SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) by 1997.

But the most significant of all the decisions taken at the Colombo Summit was the
agreement that a special session of the SAARC Foreign Secretaries should be held in
Colombo in 1992to study the ways and-meansto streamline the working norms of the
organization. This study could cover a wide spectrum of proposals, including those
designed to seek changes in the SAARC charter. Even the issue of establishing
suitable 'external linkages'with other regional organizations such as ASEAN and EU
could also be considered.
The seventh SAARC summit was held at Dhaka in April 1993. In this summit, the SAARC
SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) was signed. The agreement
was supposed to provide the member countries with the basic legal framework for
step by step trade liberalization amongst them through tariff, para tariff, non-tariff and
direct trade deals.
At the eighth SAARC summit held in New Delhi in 1995, the SAPTA was formally
launched.
At the ninth SAARC summit at Male held in 1997, the SAARC Group of Eminent
Persons was established. The group contemplated the creation of SAARC Economic
Vision through creating a SAARC common market and effecting macro-economic
policy coordination.

Encouraged by the progress made by SAPTA negotiations, at the tenth SAARC Summit
meeting in Colombo in 1998, the SAARC leaders decided to set up a Committee of
Experts to draft a treaty on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). The treaty was
expected to lay down legally binding schedulesfor freeing trade among SAARC countries
and to provide a predictable and transparent time path for achieving a free trade area
in the region.
The eleventh SAARC Summit at Kathmandu was originally scheduled for November
1999 but had to be postponed because ofthe military coup in Pakistan on 12 October
I 1999. Eventually, the summit was held in January2002. The highlight of the summit
was the signing of a convention to prevent illegal trafficking of girl children and women
/ for immoral purposes across the region. The delay in holding the summit, however, did
1 not mean that SAARC remained inactive. The sixth meeting of the Governing Board
of the South Asian Development Fund (SADF) was held in Maldives on 22-23 May
2000 in which the activities of the Fund were reviewed and proposals for placing the
Fund on a professional footing discussed. SAARC consortium examined proposals
for cooperation in the SAARC region to promote the use of open and distance learning
at all levels of education. The growing people-to-people contact of all kinds was a
notable development during the year. The third meeting of the SAARC Network of
Researchers on Global, Financial and Economic issues was held at the SAARC
Secretariat on 31 October 2000. The 19th meeting of the SAARC Audio Visual
Exchange Comm~tteewas held in Dhaka from 19-20 December 2000.
In November 2000, a special SAARC Senior Officials' Meeting was held in Colomba.
The meeting finalized the calendar for holding the meetings of technical committee,
I expert-level meetings of the South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA)
and the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). The SAARC Technical Committees
are the primary mechanism for the implementation ofthe SAARC integrated programme
of action (SIPA). 'A regional meeting on FinancingRenewable Energy for sustainable
Development and Alleviation of Rural Poverty in South Asia' was held in Colombo
from 12-14 June 2000, jointly with the World Energy Council. A South Asian Business
Leaders summit was held in Bangalore from in August 2000 as a~ointinitiative of the
federation of Karnataka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Federation of Indian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and -1 -: "'p " I C Chamber of Commerce
and Industry. The SAARC Law Conference, a recognized regional apex SAARC
body, held its 8thAnnual Conference in Nepal in September 2000. As part of its effort
to improve the health sector in the South Asian region, SAARC signed a Memorandum
of Understanding with the WHO on 23 August 2000.
The twelfth SAARC summit was held in Islamabad from 4-6 January 2004. This
summit was acclaimed by many as the two leaders of India and Pakistan met with
great bonhomie that augured very well for both improvement in bilateral relations and
fo the development of SAARC process. This summit made far reaching
recommendations in many areas of regional cooperation. Firstly, it signed the SAARC
Social charter which covers issues like poverty alleviation, population stabilisation,
empowermentof women, youth mobilisation, human resource development, promotion
Regional Co-operation of health and nutrition.Al1these are likely to have far reaching impact on the lives of
millions of South Asians. Secondly,wh,ilereaffirming conunitrnent to regional convention
on combating terrorism signed in 1987, they signed an additional protocol to this
convention to deal effectively with financing of terrorism. Thirdly, the members signed
the Framework Agreement of South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and implement
the same by January 2006. And finally, the SAARC award was instituted to honour
and encourage outstandingindividuals and organisations within the region in the fields
of peace, development, poverty alleviation and in other areas of regional cooperation.
C
Check Your Progress 2
Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answers with that given at the end of this unit.

1) What were the achievements of the first SAARC summit meeting in Dhaka?

24.4 PROBLEMS BESETTING THE


ORGANISATION
From the above discussions it would appear that the goals of SAARC have been kept
development-oriented. When SAARC was conceived as a regional organization the
vision was clear: to make the region a thriving example of mutual cooperation,collective
self reliance and peacehl coexistence.Acceleration of economicgrowth, the promotion
of welfare of people and improvement in their quality of life have been the central
objectives. Conscious efforts have been made to encourage economic cooperation
and to exclude all contentious and bilateral issues. But while it is laudable to have
development-oriented ambitions, it is uncertain as to what would happen to the
organization once it is called upon to address more down-to-earth political questions
that have vitiated the inter-state relations in the region for decades. The region is full
of contradictions that broadly fall under two heads: divergent security interests and
the Indo-centric nature of the region.
Built in Contradictions
SAARC suffers from a built-in contradiction. India's disproportionately large size
inhibits its neighbour's participation as equal partners, crucial in any cooperative
endeavour. India accounts for 72 per cent of the region's area, 77 per cent of its
population, and 78 per.cent of its GNP. Its armed forces account for about 50 per
cent of the region's total armed strength and if one excludes Pakistan (which accounts
for about 25 per cent), the ratio between India and the remaining five taken together
would be nine to one.
Conflicting Security Perceptions
This gross disparity coupled with distrusts emanating from socio-historical reasons
gives rise to conflicting security outlooks. Excepting Pakistan, India perceives no
threat from any other country within the region. Threat to its security is actually
extra-regional and in this context Pakistan's linkages with China assumes relevance.
For others in the region (excludingBhutan, whose foreign policy is more or less guided
by India, and the Maldives, which is too small to protect itself without India's help, as
the 1988 coup attempt showed), India itself is a threat, which can be faced only
through extra-regional connections. This dichotomy in the region's perceptions and
correspondingsecurity doctrines cannot augur well for the SAARC. It is important to
note that except for rhetorical commitments to Third World solidarity, the New SAARC
International Economic Order, etc., in almostall down-to-earthEast-West confrontations
in the past such as Afghanistan or Kampuchea, the position tended to be India versus
the rest of the region.
Problem of Diverse Political Culture
The diverse political culture ofthe region is also not conducive to cooperation. From
the point of view of governmental systems operative in the region, there are four
democracies (Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka), one military dictatorship
(Pakistan), one monarchy (Bhutan), and one one-party presidential system (the
Maldives). On the question of state-religion relationships, India, notwithstanding its
being predominantly Hindu and of late witnessing an unprecedented Hindu militancy,
stands for secularism, while all the remaining six avoid to declare themselves as such.
Bangladesh, the Maldives and Pakistan have an Islamic thrust; Bhutan and Sri Lanka,
Buddhist; and Nepal, Hindu. With respect to structural linkages with the global system,
which has indeed undergone massive change of late, there were two categories, broadly
speaking. The first,-inwhich India was included, had a fairly powerhl capitalist class
which had over the years developed stakes in both the world capitalist and socialist
systems, though remaining independent of both. The other had deep structural linkages
with the world capitalist system and the bourgeoisie there was largely comprador.
Bangladesh, Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka belonged to this category. Bhutan's
economy is largely Indo-centric. That ofNepal is both Indocentric as well as developed
market economies oriented.
These systematic diversities led to divergent nation building strategieswhich tended to
i thrive at each other's expense rather than contribute to each other's gain. For example,
: the region's ethnic mosaic is so complex that the slightest ineptitude by one nation in
2
handling its inter-ethnic relationships casts its shadow on the neighbouring states. In
this context, India bears the brunt in more than one way. Situated at the core of the
region, its boundary touches that of almost all the countries of SAARC while no two
other members have common borders. As a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-
religious society, India offers all the countries in the region some connection to their
ethnic, linguistic, or religious brotherhoods, while no two other countries have cross-
national ethnic populations visible enough to be of any consequence barring the notable
exception of Bhutan and Sri Lanka. The 'Indo-centricity' of the problem often drags
India into the region's ethnic strife, which it seldom relishes. At the same time, however,
India has the opportunity to twist the arm of a recalcitrant neighbour to gain strategic
concessions. If not for India's role in Sinhala-Tamil ethnic strife, the Sri Lankan
government would not have made commitments of the kind enshrined in the Indo-Sri
Lanka accord of July 1987.

b Indo-Pak Conflict
At the crux of South Asia's 'insecurity syndrome' (the phrase was used by Stephen
P. Cohen in 'Security Issue in South Asia,'Asian Survey, Berkeley, 1 2 5 )is the mutual
b
suspicion between India and Pakistan. What Cohen wrote 25 years ago seems to be
still valid. He wrote: "The South Asian security sy-te.n i s an insecurity system, and
the t r a d ~ f ffor
s each regional government involve minimmg insecurity, not maximizing
security. Insecurity, whether due to internal disorder or external conflict, has become
the norm after 25 years of independence, and one cannot honestly say that the situation
will radically change for the better in the foreseeable future. Military bureaucracies
have become an entrenched component of the political order even where they have
I not taken it over; their civilian allies are numerous and powerful and outside powers
have done precious little to ameliorate the situation." The problem, which could not be
solved within the framework ofthe nationalist movement and which led to the partition
of India in 1947, has continued to remain a threat to the region's stability. External
dabbling within and around the region have further complicated the matter. India and
Pakistan have fought three wars so for and have had many border skirmishes. At the
moment they are engaged in a war of words over Kashmir. India alleges Pakistan's
Regional Co-operation moral and material support to Kashmiri militants while Pakistan alleges human rights
violation by the Indian government in Kashmir.
Main Problem: Absence of Required Political Thrust
The cumulative effect of the problem discussed above is the absence of a political
thrust to make SAARC take bold strides. By shying away from 'bilateral and
contentious' issues the organization deprives itself of the opportunityto deliberate on
the most important questions that need to be addressed. This lack of confidence in
each other has its ramifications in &her fields. For example, inter-state trade is still
minuscule. India is a potential supplier of industrial goods and services to almost all
the South Asian states but they prefer to depend on the industrial West, Japan, and
even China instead of India.
India has always been a strong advocate of a South Asian common market ever since
the days of Rajiv Gandhi. There are a number of organisationsand academic institutions
in India including Jawaharlal Nehru University and Research and Information System
for the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries (RIS), which have been steadfastly
advocating the cause of regional cooperation and integration in South Asia. They
have carried out very extensive and useful studies and have also worked out the cost
of non-cooperation. A study done by Mahendra P Lama of Jawaharlal Nehru
University indicated that Pakistan lost more than $ 110 million during 1995-97by not
importing tea from India and other SouthAsian countries ("Integrating the Tea Sector
in South Asia : New Opportunities in the Global Market". South Asian Survey,
Delhi, January-June 2001). Pakistan is one of the largest consumers of tea in the
world. However, it imports hardly 16 percent of its total imports of over 150 million
kgs of tea from South Asia. Over 60 percent of its tea imports are from far off Kenya
which is done at a much higher price. Though it attributes the Kashmir problem with
India as the main reason behind such import pattern, it is actually because of the huge
stakes the multinational companies located in Pakistan have in the Kenyan tea gardens.
These companies are the biggest tea traders in Pakistan.
-
Problem of Resource Development
Another area in which progress is negligible is resource development. The Indian
subcontinent's river system is such that if properly tapped, with the entire region in
mind, it would do wonders in terms of development, affording irrigation, power
generation, and drinking water. Here again, regional consciousness gives way to
national susceptibilities. B.G Verghese's book Waters of Hope (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1990) is a clear testimony of how little has been done in this regard
when so much can be done. 'Ultimately" writes Verghese, 'boundaries do not matter,
people do. The vision of SAARC is perhaps most strongly embodied in a collaborative
endeavour to harness the potential of Ganga-Brahmaputra-Barak waters. These are
waters of hope.'

PROSPECTS FOR SAARC


In his book Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia (1989), Partha Ghosh presented
the view that although SAARC had been launched 'the domestic contradictionsofthe
states would militate against making the associationsan effective vehicle of regional
cooperation.' He mentioned several broad systematic diversities and felt that unless
they were removed, the future of SAARC was bleak. These diversities have been
referred to above; viq foms of government, statereligion interactions, structurallinkages
with the global system, nation-building strategies, and so on. The situation does not
seem to have changed much. In the comext of IndoPak relations it has worsened.
Inherent Positive Points of the Region
Given the historical context, topographic and demographic features, natural resource
endowments and socio-cultural ethos, South Asia could be the most natural unit of
cooperation and integration. There are certain inherent points with the region that
must, however, be kept in mind. For example, the regional 'insecurity syndro~ne'has SAARC
probably been overstated. South Asia is one of the world's least militarized regions.
The region, where 20 per cent of the world's population lives, accounts for only 1 per
cent of the world's military expenditure. Other developing regions (excluding China)
with comparable populations spend about 15 per cent of the global military expenditure.
If compared to the developed world, the region's record is even better. The developed
world, which is proud to announce that there has not been any war on its soil since the
Second World War, spends 80 per cent of the global military expenditure and is
responsible for 97 per cent of the world's arms trade and 97 per cent of the global
military R&D. South Asia's fiscal defence burden accounts for about 3 per cent of the
region's GNP, which is higher than Latin America's remarkably low 1.2 per cent, but
less than Africa's 3.2 per cent, and East Asia's 10.9 per cent. It is even lower than the
overall developing world's 4.3 per cent.
Without being optimistic about the future of SAARC, it must be conceded that the
organisation by giving opportunities to regional leaders to meet at somewhat regular
intervals has provided a diplomatic forum in wh'ich they have either settled or watered
down their differences. The Indo-Sri Lankan accord of July 1987 had its origin in the
bilateral talks between India's the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lanka's
President Junius Jayewardene during the Second SAARC Summit at Bangalore in
November 1986. It has been argued that without SAARC Indo-Pak relations would
have been even worse.
Despite a snail's pace progress, one of the remarkable contributions of SAARC has
been the fact that it has been able to trigger off a whole range of activities outside the
official SAARC forum. These activities in private sector, in non-governmental
organisations and community level activities across the region, have in fact, withstood
all kinds of political ups and downs. The SAARC History Congress, the SAARC
Sociological Congress, anti-Child labour coalitions, traders forum, SAARC writers forum,
SAARC forum of media people and gathering of human rights activists and other
professional including engineers, architects, chartered accountants are resulting in an
ever increasing inter-state intellectual tourism. So the process goes on regardless of
SAARC's officialdom. In fact, the parallel process of activities has far overtaken the
official process with the latter pulling back the former. These are the activities which
will hold SAARC in good stead in the long run and sustain the process.
This also goes to emphasize the emerging vital and critical roles of non-state actors in
the management of South Asian affairs. In a way, the entire spectrum of confidence
building measures (CBMs) we have addressed to in the past in South Asia have to be
re-evaluated, redesigned and rebuilt. So far we have extensively depended on military
and political CBMs in South Asia. However, in the last 50 years, no political and military
CBMs have sustained. The peace and cooperation constituency in the region always
got marginalised. A majority of these CBMs were addressed to only those who had
serious stake holding in perpetuating the conflict and keeping the conflict alive.
Fortunately, these negative stake holders have always been in microscopic minority.
-So we have to think of designing new CBMs particularly'in case of India-Pakistan
conflicts. This takes us to the domain of economic CBMs - the business and other
economic cooperation (Track III diplomacy) as a measure of CBM and peace building
in South Asia. As there are stake holders in keeping the conflict alive, there are stake
holders for building the peace. We have never addressed ourselves to the latter.
The ongoing economic reforms triggered challenges have started drastically changing
the political economy of regional cooperation in South Asia. Economic liberalisation
have tended to increasingly outclass political prejudices, inhibitions and are literally
forcing South Asia to shed the old mind sets of latent hostility. The impact of internal
schisms overflowing the regional vestiges is getting outweighed by the steady rise in
the cost of non-cooperation. The very context and modalities of public policy making
which were neither transparent nor accountable have begun to show more openness
,.A L-IA ..em-
Regional Co-operation Against this background, major macro issues like harmonisat ion of economic reforms
with socio-political shift in paradigms in the region as a whole, the widening base of
MNCs participation with a distinct slant on natural resource, technology and
management and the ability and capability of the SAARC partners to withstand both
endogenous and exogenous shocks and forge ahead towards a collective survival are
the three fundamental challenges. The absorptive and the manoeuvring capacity of
the SAARC partners would largely be determined by the approaches towards and
consolidation of each area as they together represent a vast majority of the regional
core competence.

South Asian 'Economic Union


The Ninth SAARC Summit held in Male in 1997 directed the establishment of two
regional high level committees viz., the Independent Expert Group to examine the
functioning of the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) and the Group of Eminent
Persons (GEP) primarily to develop a long range vision, formulate a perspective plan
of action including a SAARC agenda for 2000 and beyond and spell out the targets
that can and must be achieved by the year 2020. The IEG recommended the drastic
revamping and restructuring of the entire programmes of SAARC. As a result, the
areas of activities under SIPA were reduced from the original eleven to five which
included energy and environment also. On the other hand, the GEP provided a very
comprehensive and clear road map. The GEP recommended that regional economic
integration is necessary and suggested a time bound plan which includes negotiation
of a Treaty for South Asian Free Trade Area by 1999 with implementationcommencing
immediately thereafter and stretching to 2008 for SAARC members and to 2010 for
the SAARC LDCs. It also envisages a SAARC Customs Union by 2015 and a SAARC
Economic Union by 2020. It also made far reaching recommendations in social arena
including on poverty alleviation, empowerment of women and trafficking of women
and children.
The 12h SAARC Summit held in Islamabad also marked a remarkable improvement
in the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. It reiterated its commitment
made at the 1 lh SAARC Summit at Kathmandu for the creation of a South Asian
Economic Union. Accordingly, the summit decided to move towards the first step of
integration process i.e. the operationalisation of South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA)
by 2006.

Check Your Progress 3


Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answers with that given at the end of this unit.

1) Some ofthe problems that come in the way of strengthening regional cooperation
in South Asia are:

2) What factors augur well for the SAARC in the future?


SAARC
- - -
LET US SUM UP-

SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) is the first major concrete
expression of regional cooperation in South Asia. It comprises seven states-
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Starting from
1985, so far twelve SAARC summits have been held, namely, Dhaka, Bangalore,
Islamabad, Male, Colombo, Dhaka, New Delhi, Male, Colombo, Kathmandu and
Islamabad. The organization has been facing problems on account of certain built in
contradictions,conflicting security perceptions, diverse political cultures and absence
of requisite political will. The predominant position enjoyed by India has also been a
problem. However, there are certain inherent positive points in the region that hopefully
will facilitate building up of a better tomorrow by the SAARC countries.

24.7 SOME USEFUL BOOKS


Agwani, M.S., et al, 1983. South Asia: Stability and Regional Cooperation
(Chandigarh: CRRID).

Ghosh, Partha S., 1989. Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia, New Delhi.

Gonsalves, Eric and Nancy Jetly, 1999. The Dynamics of South Asia :Regional
Cooperation and SAARC, Sage,
Lama, Mahendra P, (et al), 1990. Economic Cooperation in the SAARC Region:
i Potential, Constraints and Policies, Interest Publications, New Delhi
Lama, Mahendra P (Ed), 2001. South Asian Growth Quadrangle: Emerging
Opportunities for Economic Partnership, FIICI, New Delhi,
L

i Muni S.D., and Anuradha Muni, 1984. Regional Cooperation in South Asia, New
Delhi.

Sen Gupta, Bhabani, 1988. South Asian Perspectives: Seven Nations in Conflct
and Cooperation, Delhi.

Research and Information System for the Non-Aligned and Developing Countries,
2004. South Asia: Development Cooperation Report 2003/04. New Deihi.
i
Shand, Ric, (ed), 1999. Economic Liberalisation in South Asia, Macmillan, Delhi,

24.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

1) Your answer should the following points: Continuing efforts to have a regional
organisation since 1947, failure ofNorth South dialogue, rising oil prices, change
in the perception of the leaders of the region..

2) At the apex of the four-tier structure of SAARC is the annual summit meeting of
head of states. Below this are the Foreign Ministers Conference, Standing
Committee of Foreign Secretaries and the Technical Committees of Experts and
Officials.
Check Your Progress 2

1) The summit restored the terms 'non use of force' and 'peaceful settlement of all
disputes' in its preamble. It also decided to give permanence to the organisation
hw h n x r i n n n C ~ ~ r o t n r ; n
nnrl
t s Pninn~;lnf h A i n ; c t n m
Regional Cooperation Check Your Progress 3

1) Divergent political cultures ofthe member states, conflicting security perceptions


in general and Indo-Pakistan conflict in particular, absence of political thrust etc.

2) SAARC has great prospects:the region is least militarised; the region has a
common history and culture; the middle class has by and large a uniform
outlook
UNIT 25 DYNAMICS OF SOUTH ASIAN
SECURITY
Structure

25.0 Objective
25.1 Introduction
25.2 Dynamics of South Asian security
25.2 1 Political dynamics and Inter-state conflict
25.2.2 Indo-centrism
25.2.3 Asymmetry

25.3 Nuclearisation of South Asia


25.4 Non-traditional Security
25.4.1 Environmental Issues

25.5 Towards Regional Cooperation


25.6 Let Us Sum Up
25.7 Some Useful Books and Articles
25.8 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

25.0 OBJECTIVES
This unit deals with the sources ofconflict in the South Asia region. After going through
this unit, you should be able to:

to identifjl the sources of conflict,

explain the impact of nuclear factor in South Asia,

define non-traditional security,

explain how environmental issues impinge on security, and

explain the future prospects of security of the region of South Asia.

25.1 INTRODUCTION
South Asia is the epitome of Third World and occupiesjuxtaposed problems, assets and
culture with distinguished variance in economics, scientific and technological levels and
factors accompanying development. In concepts, ideology and philosophy and hypothesis
of international relations the South Asian subcontinent interacts with dimensions
uncommon in the developed North. This unit focus on the security dynamics in the
region not just in military terms but also political, economic and environmental security.
Traditionally,security has been conceptualised in terms of protection of state's territorial
integrity, political independence and sovereignty. In the post-Cold war period, it is
increasingly being realised that this conception of security fails to address the issues
that arise from the two dominant treads of the times- increasing globalisation and rapid
fragmentation. Both are trends which the nation-state is not particularly suited to deal
with. It is in this context, that the security paradigm was deepened to focus on not just
Regional Security on the state but on the groups and interests as well. The notion of security was
broadened to include not only military but political, economic and social dimensions as
well. These new dimensions are generally categorised as non-traditional security concerns.
The principal thrust ofthis Unit is to analyze the dynamics of South Asian security which
inter-alia shall involve discussion on various facets related to South Asian security. We
will first examine the broad features of the South Asia region that have a bearing on
security and then proceed to examine the traditional and non-traditional dimensions of
security.

25.2 DYNAMICS OF SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY


Geographically, South Asia is a natural strategic unit surrounded by the great chain of
mountains- the Himalayas, Karakorum, Hidukush in the north and by the Indian
Ocean in the south, east and west. Historically from the earliest times, the peoples of
this region have been intimately linked by race, culture, religion, and sometimesby political
allegiance.

Political boundaries have not been constant in South Asia. Empires have grown and
fallen. There have been different foci of political authority, though Delhi has the longest
history of being the imperial capital. The British Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth
century encompassed not only what is known as the region of South Asia but also some
region which is now-a-days part of West and Southeast Asia regions. It was during this
period that the political boundaries were drawn over contiguous cultural landmass. The
territorial boundaries of the seven cour~triesof the region are thus colonial creations. -

The most conspicuous feature on the face of South Asia is India, a veritable powerhouse
in the region. In size, population, natural resources, level of economic development, standard
of education, scientific and technological progress, gross national product and evolution
of democratic political institutions, India is a relative giant.

In absolute terms, therefore, India is a big country surrounded by small ones, with the
exception of China. Further, both as a consequence of geography and history, every
country in South Asia is intimately connected with India. The same ethnic and religious
groups to which their peoples belong are also found in India, which is a vast and
heterogeneous cou~itry.Social organization and styles of managing the environment are
similar between each South Asian country and its adjoining part in India; for example,
between Nagaland and northern Burma, West Bengal and Bangladesh, Tamil Nadu and
Sri Lanka. Formal boundaries do not, and indeed cannot, contain the cultural overlap.
There are matrimonial alliances, family ties and social associations across the borders
between India and all of its South Asian neighbours. For better or worse, this intermingling
of peoples, cultures, and religions imparts a familial quality to inter-state relations in
South Asia. This is in contrast to other geographical regions including Europe.

Families are often disrupted by sib1ing rivalry and the identity problems of family members;
so also in South Asia. Sibling rivalry, with its intricate causes and bitter consequences,
characterizes many public stances adopted by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh towards
each other which have the longest history of shared political allegiance. To a large
extent the ruling elites of Bangladesh, Pakistan and India resemble sibling rivals. They
contested for the affection and material rewards handed out first by the British colonialists,
and then by the imperial substitutes, the new super powers, to the detriment of thsir ties
with each other.

While the sources of conflict in a region with multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies
are manifold, broadly, they can be traced to the colonial legacies, particularly, the drawing
of political boundaries on a common cultural landmass and economic space and to the
political dynamics in these post-colonial phase. The two geo-political features of the
region, Indo-centrism and the asymmetry of power and resources among states in the
in chanincr t h e c ~ c l l r i i vdvnnmicq
have their n w n t n l ~ in the region.
25.2.1 Political dynamics and Imr-state Conflict Dynamics of South
Asian Security
In South Asia, British colonialism not only acted as a unifying force but also as a force
creating dissonance and division. While it brought the South Aiian countries within the
common colonial system, colonialism simultaneously sowed several seeds of discord
which continue to plague interstate relations in South Asia even today. The differences
between India and Pakistan over the two-nation theory and between Sri Lanka and
India over the nationality of Tamil plantation workers are only two outstandingexamples
of dissensions among South Asian states which owe their origin to British (mis)rule.
The final hasty retreat of the British and the ensuing bitterness generated between the
ruling elites of the two major countries of the region gravely disrupted the traditional
complementarity and cohesion.

In the post-colonial phase, the political dynamics in the countries of the region have
been different owing to differences in the evolution of the forces of nationalism, the
socio-cultural set up and the inherited economic structures. In India and Sri Lanka
politics have remained generally stable and evolved smoothly. Other countries of the
region have witnessed a cycle of democratic distortions and resurgence. Pakistan,
Nepal and Bangladesh witnessed erosion of democratic processes and assertion of
authoritarian governments in 1958, 1960 and 1975. Bhutan has always remained a
monarchy, though there are now signs of democratic processes being introduced. There
was a democratic resurgence in all these countries in the early 1990s, but forces of
regression have again been on the ascendance in Pakistan and Nepal.

While such political divergences act as hurdles in strengtheningregional cooperation,


the emergence of sectarian forces in South Asian countries in the recent past is vitiating
the intra-state and inter-state relations: It is difficult to precisely identify the factors
that led to the rise of authoritarian and sectarian forces. But, you should note that the
search for ~ e ~ i t i m aby; ~the authoritarian forces (like in Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh
and Bhutan) and struggle for democratic power (as in India and Sri Lanka) has led to
the mobilisation of sectarian constituencies. The rise of sectarian forces in the m~ltiethnic
and multi-religious societies of South Asia has alienated the minorities resulting in the
rise of ethnic and separatist movements. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil insurgency since the
early 1980s that poses a challenge to Sri Lankan unity and inte ity has resulted from

%rr
the politics of ethnic consolidation of the Sinhalesein the political stem. In Pakistan,
the separation of Bangladesh was the consequence of the domi ance of Punjabi
ethnicity under the grab of the Islamic state. Similarly, the sense of deprivation in
North Western Frontier Province, Balochistan and Sindh as well as the rise of the Shia
and Sunni sectarian conflict are the result of alienation caused by over centralisation
and sectarianism. In Bangladesh, the Chakrna unrest is a reflection of Bengali and
Islamic assertion. In Nepal, the Terai movement of the Maoist insurgency of the late
1990s are manifestations of protest against the dominance of hill people, and against a
Hindu state, respectively. In India, the unrest and ethnic turmoil in the northeast is a
clear evidence of the failure of even a secular state to integrate its socially divergent
groups.

Clearly, nation-building process is still an unfinished task in the region. Almost all the
countries in the region face the threat of political disintegration. Given the ethnic and
religious over lap in the region, ethnic, religious and linguistic conflicts in one country
invariably have an impact in the other country of the region. The contiguous and open
boundaries allow easy flow of people, goods and ideas across the borders interfering
with economic and political relations. Most of the internal security crises that plague
South Asian states have a cross-border dimension, and many are inter-related. Whether
its is the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the persistent ethnic problem in Sri Lanka, the
increasing use of Bangladeshi territory by Islamist extremists, the proliferation of small
arms, or the menace of drug trafficking and narco-terrorism, each has significant
transnational dimensions. States in the region, often accuse each other of covertly or
overtly lending support to separatist and the dissident movements.
With none of the South Asian countries sharing borders with each other, except with
and through India, the region is geopoliticallyIndocentric in character. One consequence
of this is that India's intra-regional interactions are inherently bilateral. India cannot
avoid interactions with its neighbows, while none of its neighbours have a similar
compulsion to interact with the other South Asian country, except India. It is, therefore,
not surprising that India figures prominently in the inter-state problems of the region.
25.2.3 Asymmetry
The asymmetry in size, population, power and resources between India and the rest
of the countries of South Asia is another feature of the region that has a bearing on
inter-state relations in the region. The predominance of India in the region has had an
intimidating impact on its small neighbours. India's neighbours have often perceived
India as a big brother seeking to translate its physical domination of the region into a
political and economic one. They have often raised concerns over motives of Indian
actions. Though the India troops intervened in Sri Lanka (1971 and again in 1987-89),
in Bangladesh (1971) and in Maldives (1989) and returned upon completion of their
mission, these interventions were seen by the neighbouring countries as benign and on
the other occasions as hostile. 'Hostile interventions' have raised the spectre of Indian
hegemony, but 'benign interventions' have been welcomed as aiding the cause of
regime security. On its part, India at one time, was concerned over the possible
ganging up of the neighbours to embarrass, if not emasculate its regional pre-eminence.
Such mutual suspicions and fears arising from the asymmetry in the region has also
been an obstacle in the strengtheningregional cooperation. Almost all the countries of
the region suspect that both in bilateral and regional economic engagements, the larger
and stronger economy of India will secure more benefit at their cost.
An important consequence of the predominance and centrality of India in is region is
the differences in the pursuit of strategic goals. While India has a sub-continental
approach to its security, its neighbours have much restricted visions that are coloured
by their local views rather than their perception as members ofthe South Asia region.
Indian security concerns are related not just to the conflicts in the region, but to events
in Central Asia, the Indian Ocean and to the changing world environment. India has
sought to play an independent role consistentwith its policy of nonalignment, avoided
joining the Cold War alliances, and sought to minimise the role of the external powers
in the region. On the other hand, its neighbours have sought to counter balance the
regional predominance of India by cultivating extra-regional powers. India figures
prominently in the security concerns of its neighbours. Conflict with India has wholly
defined the security debate in Pakistan. In Sri Lanka the security debate has been
defined by its Tamil problem and by the Indian presence in the north. The security
concerns inNepal centre around its efforts to balance India and China on its southern
and northern borders and by perceived threat to its identity from the civilisation
similarities between itself and India.
And much to the consternation of India, external powers have often exploited the
regionahtrategic dissonance to promote their specific interests in the region and around.
While the United States has taken advantage of Indo-Pakistan differences from the
early 1950s, China took advantage of the Indo-Nepal tensions resulting from
consequences of King Mahendra's dismissal of democracy in the Himalayan Kingdom
in 1962. The haphazard emergence of a variety of conflicting international strategic
interests in the post-Cold War exacerbated regional tensions. Since the September 11
terrorist attacks in the US, the focus of the international community has shifted to this
region and Afghanistan. The US engaged Pakistan as an ally in its campaign against
international terrorism. Despite Pakistan's emergence as 'a frontline state' in the US'
efforts to capture Osama bin Laden and eradicate his A1 Qaeda network, the Pakistani
state, through its external intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI),
continued with its policy of aiding terrorist organizations active in the state of Jammu
,A Vnchm:r nnrl nthnr - r ~ c nFTnrl;s
Among the factors that shaped the security relations in South Asiq since the 1980s is Dynamics o f South
the nuclear issue. The nuclear factor in the security dynamics of the region emerged Asian Security
covertly in the 1980s and overtly in the late 1990s.

25.3 NUCLEARISATION OF SOUTH ASIA


Indo-Pakistan relations have not been harmonious right from the start as they arose in
the history of partition, suspicion, fear and insecurity. They remain tense as the major
problems between the two- the Kashmir problem, Pakistan's involvement in encouraging
terrorism in Kashmir, the Siachen glacier etc-remaining unresolved.
It is in this context, that the nuclear issue began to impinge on South Asian security.
While India nuclear capability was demonstrated as early as the mid-1970s, when it
conducted a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, it preferred to maintain nuclear ambiguity.
Pakistan, according to most estimates, had acquired nuclear capabilities with the help
of China in the later half of the 1980s. Both India and Pakistan ended their nuclear
ambiguity in May 1998 by conducting a series of tests at Pokhran and Chagai,
respectively.
t The raison deter of nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan has been different,
India pointing to security threats from China and the nuclear monopoly of the big five
while Pakistan pointing fingers at India itself. However, the shared perceptions between
the two new ni~clearweapon states have been that nuclear weapons would guarantee
i national security and provide an element of stability in bilateral relations.
The most important impact of nuclearisation has been felt in the area of regional
peace and stability. The rapprochement between the two countries that was evident
from events of that followed the tests- the 10" SAARC summit, the bus diplomacy
between the two countries and the Lahore declaration- suggested that mutual deterrence
has come to prevail between two new nuclear weapons states. However, the
rapprochement was shattered by a limited war, the Kargil conflict, and the military
take over in Pakistan by General Perves Musharraf. Pakistan also did not dilute its
strategy of using Islamist extremism as an instrument of state policy. The Indian state
of Jammu and Kashmir remained the prime target of this strategy, and of the activities
of Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist groups. The Kargil conflict clearly indicated the
failure of deterrence. Thus, while the existence of nuclear weapons appears to have
diminished the probabilities of large-scale conventional wars, a range of 'non-standard',
irregular' or low intensity wars have become the most prevalent manifestations of
confrontation between India and Pakistan. South Asia remains the most dangerous
region, a nuclear flash point, as a limited war could escalate into a nuclear conflict or
terrorist activities could trigger off a chain of actions leading to the use of nuclear
weapons.
Factors affecting stability in Soutlz Asia
On the political front, there have been institutional restraints on leaders in India while
taking decisions, though at critical moments, these have been sidetracked as in 1987 in
Operation Brass tracks. In Pakistan, restraints have been non-existent, as it has always
been dominated by the armed forces that have decided peace and security issues in
the region. Leaders on both sides are aware of high state of tension in which they
coexist where even a trivial conflict sometimes can assume serious proportions. In
the case of risk taking, it is evident that South Asian leaders oscillate between extreme
caution and irresponsible gambling.
..
Technically, both, India and Pakistan, have the capability to deliver nuclear warheads
to big cities- with the remotest chances of missile interception. Missiles cut flight-time
to just three minutes-too meagre for preventive action, and bound, according to former
naval chief N. Ramdas, to trigger instant retaliation with devastating consequences.
At no point in the Cold War conflict between the two superpowers was lag time less
P 1 .
than 30 minutes. Moreover, between the Eastern and Western bloc ofcountries, there
. .. . . .. ... . ..
Regional Security defusing devices. Tliere are none between India and Pakistan. The region, therefore,
requires dealing the nuclear issues with a sense of urgency.
Finally, in South Asia, a structural asymmetry exists and confronts the region making it
less stable in the future than in the past. China is a wild card in South Asian security
issues particularly in the context of Indo-Pak nuclear proliferation and regional anns
control. Even though China is not a direct threat to India there is a considerable force in
China's nuclear presence in the subcontinent as a result of China's military relationship
with Pakistan. Despite the thaw in the India-China relations, China is, and is likely to
remain the primary security challenge to India in the medium and long terms.

Prospects for Stability in Soutlt Asia:

A nuclearised South Asia is a reality as neither India nor Pakistan would be inclined to
renounce nuclear weapons unilaterally or bilaterally. A multilateral convention inducing
them to give up nuclear weapons is still in dialogue and unlikely to translate into reality in
the near future. It has also been understood by both countries that a war, conventional or
nuclear cannot be beneficial to either side politically, economically or militarily. Yet the
assumption is that South Asia remains an area of crisis where stability is wafer thin
although such a situation need be stabilized through a series of measures that can be
operationalised most effectively within a cooperative framework. In this context,
cooperative security in South Asia becomes more relevant and a viable alternative to
competitive security. Cooperative security envisages inter-state relations where disputes
may take place within agreed upon norms and established procedures without any kind
of violence. It seeks to address relations through collaboration and mutually accepted
basis rather than confrontation via military involvement. Confidence Building Measures
(CBM's) and Confidence Security Building Measures (CSBM's) are tools to maintain
cooperative security. A beginning in this directidn of nuclear risk reduction measures has
been made through a series of bilateral agreements including the one that concluded on
28 June 2004 in New Delhi envisaging the setting up of hotlines at various decision
making levels between Islamabad and New Delhi.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.


ii) Check your answers with the model answer given at the end of the unit.

I) In what ways does the asymmetry of power and resources in South Asia affect the
security dynamics of the region?

2) How does the rise of sectarian forces affect the security in South Asia region?

...........................................................................................................................
3) .-.Whyis the South Asia region described as a nuclear flash point?
Dynamics o f South
NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY Asian Security

In the past decade or so, several scholars and security analysts have felt that the
traditional concept of security has failed to deliver meaningful security to a significant
proportion of the people of South Asia- who between them comprise more than one
fifth of the world's total population. They point out that that for most people in the
region, the greatest threats to security come from poverty, disease, environmental
contamination, crime, and unorganized violence. For many people, a still greater threat
may come from their own state itself, rather than from an "external" adversary. They
urge for deepening of the conception of security to include not only threats to the state
but also threat to human security, that is, security of the individuals and groups in a
society.After all, the fundamental purpose ofthe state is not only to protect the security
but also to promote the welfare of its citizens. These scholars also urge for broadening
ofthe notion of security to include not only "external" or military threats but also non-
- military threats emanating from political, economic, social and environmental sources.
These include cross-border movements of population, ethno-political, socio-economic,
and communal-religiouspolitics; terrorism with its seminal linkagesto money-laundering
1
operations, and arms smuggling; environmental degradation spawning its related
problems of deforestation and desertification; internal migration; chaotic urbanisation
and so on.

, It is only in recent times that security studies have begun to grapple simultaneously
I
with problems of external threats and human and non-traditional security concerns.
Accordingly, problems of external threats, internal social cohesion, regime capacity,
failed states, economic development, structural adjustment, gender relations, ethnic
identity, and transnational and global problems like AIDS, drug trafficking, terrorism,
and environmental degradation have become areas of concern for security studies.
One danger in broadening of the notion of security is the difficulties in drawing a line
between non-traditional security, broadly conceived to include human security and
issues of welfare and governance. Those who advocate the broadening of the conception
of security, however, argue that non-traditional security does not include'all health,
welfare, and development challenges. They say these issues become security concerns
when they reach crisis point, when they undermine and diminish the survival chances
of significant proportions of the citizens of society, and when they threaten the stability
and integrity of society.
It is beyond the scope of this unit to examine all non-traditional security threats. We
will take up environmental issues. Like other non-traditonal security threats these have
I
L
complex linkages with state security (non-military) and security of individuals and
groups (human security).
1 25.4.1 Environmental Issues
Environment has ~nultifoldimplications for security-regional, non-military and human
security. It can also potentially lead to conflict between communities and states, as a
result of spill over effects of pollution and competition over scarce resources.
Environmental degradation poses a threat to the national security by increasing the
prospect of conflict. Environmental issues become identified as threats to international
or regional security when they undermine the social, economic and ecological health
and well-being of neighbouring countries. Environmental stress creates a condition
where political processes are unable to handle its effects resulting in political upheavals
and military violence.
Environmental degradation also has human security implications. It can represent a
direct threat to individuals-through the effects of pollution, ill health and vulnerability to
natural disasters. It can represent a threat to the coherence and stability of cmmunities-
by undermining their capacity to operate as productive communities, or their capacity
for the provision of public services.
1:
Regional Security Poverty, injustice, environmental degradation and conflict interact in complex and potent
ways. Climate changes, ~narginalizationof sections of population due to desertification,
deforestation, or displacement of people as refugees, as in Bangladesh, deforestation
in Nepal, resulting in mass movement of population to India exemplify human security
issues.
The problems of South Asian countries present a grim scenario of environmental
resource exploitation because of accompanying increase in population, poverty along
with educated unemployed youths resulting social chaos and political instability. While
there is a great deal of effort for growth and development adverse trends in economy,
inadequate development'policies,inequities in multi-racial and multi-ethnic societies
complicatethe linkage between environment, development, security and conflict making
the region inore complex and insecure.
Environmentalconflicts often manifest themselves as political, social, economic, religious
or territorial conflicts, or conflicts over resources or national interests, or any other
type of conflict. They am traditional conflicts induced by an environmental degradation.
Environmental conflicts are characterized by the principal importance of degradation
in one or more of the following fields: overuse of renewable resources; overstrain of
the environment's sink capacity (pollution); or impoverishment ofthe space of living.
A major challenge that the states of South Asia face today is one of reconciling the
huge population resource with the finite resources of the region. The possibility of
co~~flict
remains high as the capacity ofthe states in the region to support their current
population is decreasing due to the scarcity of resources.
Water has bee11a major source of regional discord. Due to the geographical proximity
ofthe region all the major rivers that form part of the most populous regions are in the
northern part of South Asia flowing through the territories of more than one country.
And it is here that there are recurrent disagreements over water sharing. The Indus
Basin, the Farakka Barrage were perennial sources of disagreement. Likewise,
recurrent floods are also a major problem between India and Bangladesh. Pollution
also contains the seeds of conflict. Pollution of rivers, inland water bodies and seas is
on the rise. Pollution can contributeto secondary social problems as migration beyond
national boundaries damaged food production and human health resulting in scarcities
to induce conflict. Similarly, South Asian food requirements which are growing can
lead to limited food availabilityand famines which in turn contribute to political instability
and these seemingly local events have regional implications also.
Thus, at the regional levels SouthAsian nations need to arrest the processes of ecological
damage and to preserve peace, security and develop the human resource potential of
Soutli Asia in consonance with environmental resources.

25.5 TOWARDS REGIONAL COOPERATION


The efforts at exploring avenues of cooperation within South Asia on amultilateral
basis and institutionalization of these preliminary attempts in South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have been a manifestation of the ingra~nedfeeling
atqong the political elite and decision makers in the Indian subcontinentthat there is an
inherent geographic, cultural unity, similar climate conditions as well as economic
complementaries that needs institutional expression.
The creation of SAARC in December 1985 has been a tangible manifestation of
seven member nations determined effort to cooperate regionally to work together
towards finding solutions towards their common problems in a spirit of friendship,
trust and mutual understanding. The goal to create an order based on mutual iespect,
equity, shared benefits will help to promote the welfare and prosperity of their people
and will improve their quality of life.
C i n r c t h e nstinn-ct-tec arc thcmcelvec in t h e nrnrecc n f hpinu fnrrnprl in t h e reoinn
the concept of a supra-national region seems novel and contradictory to the immediate Dynamics of South
task of nation building. Nation-states are absolutely central and crucial for any project Asian Security
in South Asia. If regional economic cooperation has failed to take off, it is because
most nation-states themselves are major failures.
The success of SAARC will ultimately depend on the wisdom and prudence of member
states to take advantage of the goodwill generated by fhe enterprise and resolution of
political differences. With the pace of democratization gaining momentum in the region,
along with the cornpulsioi~of the emerging world order the journey begins towards
achieving rhe goal "United we stand and divided we fall". This in essence is the
challenge before SAARC.
Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.


r ii) Check your answers with the model answer given at the end of the unit. ,

1) From the non-traditional security perspective, when do development challenges


J
become security threats?

I 2) How is environmental degradation both a non-traditional and human security


threat?
i

LET US SUM UP
South Asia is beset with numerous problems- the traditional problems arising out of
proximity of member countries in the region, the predominance and centrality of India
in the region and the political dynamics in the states. With the nuclearization of two
important and antagonistic members of the region, namely India and Pakistan, the
region has emerged one of the major flashpoints for nuclear conflict.
The SAARC, the first manifestation of regional cooperation in the region is trying to
shatter sickles of mutual distrust and strengthen cooperation between the countries of
the region. However, political problem is proving to be major hurdle. As we observed,
the political problem has its roots in the South Asia nation-state. The drawing ofpolitical
map on a uniform cultural landmass and economic space has not only resulted in
inter-state conflicts but has eroded the foundation of regional thinking. The division
into nation-states is strong.
Some commentators have argued that it would be appropriate to define a new
concept of security, which encompasses not only military security but also broader
issues such as poverty reduction, environment conservation, energy and food security.
It is argued that such an approach will: (a) contribute to a shift from state-centric
security perception to individual security, and (b) will encourage countries to jointly
address the issue of "Common Enemy". While the Indo-Pak cooperation in sharing
lndus waters strengthens such arguments and institutional mechanism in the'form of
SAARC exists, the initiatives on meeting the challenges of human development and
security are yet to concretise.
1. Regional Security It would be, however, erroneous to conclude from this unfortunate past experience
that there cannot be any strategic harmony in South Asia. The region is a natural
strategic unit surrounded by the Himalayas in the north and the Indian Ocean in the
south. Moreover, countries in the region often coordinated their approaches to the
questions of disarmament, including chemical and nuclear weapons, at the United
Nations or elsewhere. In the 1970s, they have displayed a strong consensus on some,
of the key aspects of the proposal on Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Furthermore,
there are areas of bilateral security arrangements, understandings and concrete
cooperation among the South Asian countries, notwithstanding occasional irritants
and apprehensions in implementation. The only serious dilemma in South Asia's strategic
harmony is that of India-Pakistan conflict, which seems to be erupting into more
serious dimensions when the army becomes politically assertive in Pakistan.

25.7 SOME USEFUL BOOKS AND ARTICLES


Iftekharuzzaman. (ed.). (1997). Regional Econonzic Trends and South Asian
Security. Manohar: New Delhi. +

Cohen, Stephen P. (ed.). (1987). The Security of Soutlz Asia: American andAsian
Perspectives. Vistaar: New Delhi.
A.R.Deo. (1991). South Asian Neighbours. World Focus. Vol. 12 Nos. 11-12.
A. Singh. (1997). The Military Balance: 1985-1994. ACDIS, Occasional Paper,
\
Univ. of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign: UIP.

25.8 ANSWERS TO CHECKYOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1
Asymmetry in power and resources breeds suspicion and mistrust. It is
responsible for the pursuit of divergent strategic goals by the countries of the
region.

2) The rise of sectarian state alienates ethnic and religious minorities resulting in
conflicts within a state. Given the socio-cultural overlap and contiguous and open
borders between the countries of the region, such intra-state conflicts have the
potential to turn into inter-state conflicts.

3) Nuclearisation has diminished the possibility of large scale war in the region, but
limited conventional wars and state sponsored terrorism that have become the
new modes of conflict have the potential to escalate or trigger nuclear conflict.
: Hence, the region is described as a nuclear flashpoint
Check Your Progress 2

1) Developmental issues become security concerns when they reach crisis point,
when they undermine and diminish the survival chances of significant proportions
of the citizens of society, and when they threaten the stability and integrity of
society.

2) Poverty, injustice, environmental degradation and conflict interact in complex


and potent ways. Desertification and deforestation marginalises and displaces
people which exemplify human security issues. On the other hand, depletion of
resources and mass movement of people have potential for inter-state conflict
and therefore constitute non-traditional security threats.
UNIT 26 NUCLEAR ISSUES
Structure
26.0 Objectives
26.1 Introduction
26.2 How and Why of Nuclear Tests?
26.3 India's Nuclear Programme
26.4 The Pakistani Nuclear Programme
26.5 Nuclear Status
26.6 Nuclear Disarmament
26.7 Post 1998 Nuclear Issues
26.8 Let Us Sum Up
26.9 Some Useful Books
26.10 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

OBJECTIVES
The nuclear issue in South Asia arise out of the nuclear programmes and policies of
India and Pakistan, the two countries of South Asia which have acquired nuclear
weapon capability.After going through this unit, you should be able to
e Explain how and why India and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons,
e Describe the nuclear weapon capabilities of India and Pakistan,
e Explain the position of India and Pakistan on nuclear issue, and
e Discuss the need for dialogue between the two nuclear powers of South Asia.

26.1 INTRODUCTION
South Asia is a region with growing political, economic and strategic significance.The
bitter rivalry between India and Pakistan, which dates to the partitioning of the
subcontinent in 1947, remains the impetus behind the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and missiles in the region.
Nuclear issues in South Asia focus on the policies of India and Pakistan. Both, India
and Pakistan had nuclear programmes to facilitate the process of development in
these countries. These civilian programmes became *e basis of the technological
capability to move from a purely civilian programme to a weapons option. India exploded
its first nuclear device at Pokhran on 12 May 1974. This was the first demonstration
of nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan had also started to move towards a nuclear
weapons option in the 1970s. It is with the nuclear tests conducted by India and
Pakistan in 1998 that both the countries formally announced their nuclear weapons
capability.
Today, both India and Pakistan maintain active nuclear and missile programmes, and
both are producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Neither country has signed
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
although they adhere to self-imposed moratoriums on nuclear tests. The security
dynamics of the region are complicated further by India's perception of China as a
threat. Pakistan's efforts to develop nuclear weapons and missile systems are intended
Regional Security primarily to counter India's substantial conventional military advantage and its perception
of India's nuclear threat.

HOW AND WHY OF NUCLEAR TESTS?


The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 had generated a great deal of
debate on the rationale and implications of these tests. Both the governments have now
announced that they are nuclear weapon powers. This means that the number of states
having nuclear weapons has risen from the original five to seven. The decision to produce
nuclear weapons has raises two questions: (i) why do nations produce nuclear weapons?
(ii) How do they produce nuclear weapons?
Nations choose to go in for the production of nuclear weapons for several reasons. Security
is obviously the most important reason. Nations may perceive certain security threats
that they would like to be prepared to confront. In the nuclear age, nuclear weapons have
offered nations with technological capability to consider their use as a deterrent against
aggression. Nuclear weapons also provide an increased strategic autonomy in their security
pol icy.
Nations also opt for nuclear weapons to increase their international status. Historically,
military power has always determined one's power status in the world. Nuclear weapons
are looked as one ofthe important path to achieve this status. Some developing countries
also feel that the possession of nuclear weapons would provide a method of bargain
against the industrialized nations.
Finally, in some cases domestic political pressures also force the political leadership to
decide to go in for the nuclear weapons option.
How do nations acquire nuclear weapons? The core of a nuclear bomb is made up of
highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Fifteen to twenty-five kilograms of highly enriched
uranium or five to eight kilograms of plutonium are generally considered the necessary
minimum for the core of a multi-kiloton atomic bomb
A nation seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons must have a source of this fissile
material. This is a major technical barrier. Nuclear material can be obtained by any one of
the three main ways:

a) Diversion of material from ackilian nuclear programme: Diversion of material from


civilian facilities, atomic power plants, can be done by either evading safeguards or
using unsafeguarded facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is'
an agency that works to ensure that diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful
uses to military purposes does not take place. Its main purpose is to institute
'safeguards' or controls on nuclear facilities.

5) Construction of facilities specially designed for its production: A nation that decides
to build a nuclear facility has two basic options: (a) construct a plutonium production
reactor plus a reprocessing plant to separate plutonium from sped fuel. A variant of
this option is to feed a dedicated reprocessing plant with spent fuel from an already
existing research or power reactor; and (b) construct an enrichment plant to produce
weapons grade uranium from natural or low enriched uranium.

c) Illegal trading in nuclear weapons components or theft of either the weapon itself or
the necessary raw material.

26.3 INDIA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME


Indian nuclear policy as it came to be fortnulated in the early years, revolved around two
principles: promotion of research and development for harnessing nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes.and attainment of self sufficiency in the nuclear programme. The key
architects of this policy were Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Homi Bhaba.
Based on these principles India designed a three stage nuclear strategy. Its main Nuclear Issues
elements were as follows: (i) building of heavy water moderated reactors which could
produce power as well as plutonium needed to start the breeder reactors; (ii) utilizing
the plutonium produced from the first stage reactors in the fast breeder. This stage
was to continue until suitable thorium-uranium 233 reactors become available; and (iii)
to run the I1 type of breeders on tlie thorium-uranium 233 cycles.
The Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the Indian debacle in the war brought in some
rethinking about defence policy. However, the direction that defence rebuilding took
was essentially in the area of conventional weapons systems. The detonation of the
Chinese nuclear device in 1964 led the Indian decision makers to look at the nuclear
option. Homi Bhaba, then the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission stated that
India could produce a bomb within eighteen months, if it so wished. Prime Minister Lal
'Baliadur Shastri admitted to the Parliament that he was willing to consider the use of
nuclear blasts for peaceful purposes. In late 1964, Shastri is reported to have authorized
the Indian Atomic Energy Commission to go ahead with the designing of a nuclear
device and preparing the non-nuclear component so that the lead-time required to build
an explosive could be reduced from eighteen to six months.
The decisions of 1964 were followed by a protracted debate on the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty. Both, Shastri and Homi Bliaba died in 1966. The early years of
Indira Gandhi's Prime Ministerial tenure saw a lot of political uncertainty in India. At
the level oftechnological capabilities, there remained some uncertainty. Indian decision
of not signing the NPT confirmed the end of the uncertainty of tlie sixties.
In the early seventies, Indian nuclear agenda began to take a definitive direction. In
September 1971, the Chairman of the Indian AEC announced at the Fourth Atoms for
Peace Conference that India had been working, on top priority basis, iq the field of
nuclear explosive engineering for peaceful purposes. Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi
also made it clear that the AEC was constantly reviewing tlie progress in the technology
of underground nuclear explosion from, both, the theoretical and experimental angle.
Mrs. Gandhi, however, denied that there was any schedule fixed for a nuclear explosion.
India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 at Pokhran in Rajasthan. This was an
underground test. This test has been called a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) as its
purpose was to pursue research in peacehl applications of nuclear technology and not
construct a bomb.
It was after the nuclear test in 1974 that India finally developed a coherent nuclear
doctrine to suit the changed circumstances. The test had demonstrated the Indian
capability of producing a nuclear explosion. India now had the raw materials, the
scientific and technological know-how and the personnel to construct an atomic bomb.
What remained in question was the intent. India made it clear that this test was not
conducted for production of a nuclear weapon and that India had no intention of going
in for nuclear weapons. At the policy level, the earlier Shastri position of peaceful uses
of nuclear energy with a go ahead for research in PNE was now further expanded.
The test did not divert Indian stand on nuclear disarmament and peace policy. In her
statement to the Indian Parliament, Mrs. Gandhi went at great length to stress that the
test was part ofthe research and development work, which the AEC had been carrying
out in pursi~ingtlie iiational objective of harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
By conducting the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, India demonstrated its capability to
prdduce a nuclear bomb. But it simultaneously stated that it would not produce a
nuclear bomb. This created a sense of uncertainty about India's real intentions. It is
because of this that one can describe Indian policy as being a deliberately vague
nuclear posture. This was to remain the basis of Indian nuclear policy for a long time.
This underwent a change in the early nineties following some important initiatives
taken by the nuclear weapons states, namely, ti, indefinitely extend theNPT in 1995, to
sign the Compreheqsive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 and to begin discussions on the
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Nuclear debate in India in the first half of the nineties
fn~iicorlnn tho noorl tn o n h ~ n n~ir'loar
~ o ~can~hiI;h~
On 11 and 13 May 1998 India conducted series of tests at Pokhran. India declared
that it was now a nuclear weapon power. In his statement to the Parliament Prime
Minister Vajpayee spelt out the nuclear policy of his government inAhe post Pokhran
I1 phase: One, India would maintain a minimum but credible nuclear deterrent. To
achieve this India did not require further testing and hence it was accepting a voluntary
moratorium on further nuclear testing. Second, India would adhere to a 'no first use'
doctrine as regards nuclear weapons. Finally, India continued with its commitment to
global nuclear disarmament.

The Indira Gandhi line about a deliberately vague nuclear doctrine had been continued
by successive Congress governments of Rajiv Gandhi and P.V.Narsimha Rao. It was
I.K.Gujral, Prime Minister of the United Front government who sought to end this
ambiguity. Gujral wanted to keep the nuclear weapons option open as a security
measure. However, he refused to define the exact nature of threat that forced him to
articulate a clearer position on the nuclear issue. The BJP in its National Agenda was
still more specific about keeping the option open. The 1998 nuclear tests ended the
lingering ambiguity in Indian posture.

A lot of discussion took place about Indian nuclear policy after the tests. Questions
came to be asked about the exact nature of Indian nuclear policy and its long term
direction. The Draft outline of IndianNuclear Doctrine was prepared by the government
and released on 17 August 1999. It argues for autonomy in decision making about
security for India. It takes the long established Indian line that security is an integral
part of India's developmental process. It expresses concerns about the possible
disruption of peace and stability and the consequent need to create a deterrence
capability to ensure the pursuit of development. It argues that in the absence of a
global nuclear disarmament policy, India's strategic interests require an effective
credible deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail. It
continues to hold on the 'no first use doctrine' and the civilian control of nuclear
decision-making. It also expresses India's strong commitment for global nuclear
disarmament.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space below for your answers


ii) Check your answer with the one given at the end of this unit.

I) Why do nations go nuclear?

...........................................................................................................................
2) The main elements of India's three stage nuclear development strategy are:

...........................................................................................................................
3) What prompted the shift in India's nuclear posture in the 1990s?
I 4) The central elements of India's nuclear doctrine are: Nuclear Issues

I ...........................................................................................................................

THE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR PROGRAMME


Pakistan's nuclear programme began in the mid 1950s when the Pakistan Atomic
Energy Commission was created under the chairmanship of Dr. Nazir Ahmed. For a
decade from the mid Fifties through the Sixties, several hundred Pakistani scientists
received training under various 'Atoms for Peace' type programmes in the United
States. Pakistan's principal nuclear research facility was established at Nilore near
Rawalpindi in 1965. This facility, the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology,
provided for research and training facilities for scientists and technicians in the country.
The first reactor, PARR is also located here. This reactor was supplied by the US in
1965 and operates under IAEA safeguards.
Zulfakir Ali Bhutto was the key architect of the Pakistani nuclear programme. Single-
handed and with great determination, he built the nuclear programme &om almost
scratch to a viable nuclear deterrent capability. His primary concern had always been
the Indian threat. He firmly believed that India was on the path to produce a nuclear
weapon and if Pakistan did not follow suit, it would have to face a nuclear blackmail
from India.
The 1971 war and the creation of Bangladesh had a far-reaching impact on Pakistan's
nuclear programme. Bhutto promised to restore his country's lost pride. In 1972 he is
reported to have held a secret meeting of nuclear scientists at Multan. It was at this
meeting that the decision to develop an atomic bomb was taken. In 1974 Indian
conducted its first nuclear test. Pakistan's reaction was sharp. Pakistan considered it
a fateful development that had brought about a qualitative change in the situation in the
subcontinent.
Initially, Pakistan focused on the plutonium path for building anuclear weapon. Plutonium
can be obtained from fuel that has been reprocessed from nuclear power plants, and
in October 1974 Pakistan signed a contract with France for the design of a reprocessing
facility for the fuel from its power plant at Karachi and other planned facilities. However,
over the next two years Pakistan's international nuclear collaborators withdrew as
Pakistan's nuclear ambitions became more apparent
Pakistan's nuclear programme got a fillip with the arrival of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan in
1975,who brought with him the plans for uranium enrichment centrifuges, and lists of
sources of the necessary technology. On this basis, Pakistan initially focused its
development efforts on highly enriched uranium (HEU), and exploited an extensive
clandestine procurement network to support these efforts. A.Q. Khan evidently
persuaded Pakistan to work with Urai~iumas compared to Plutonium. Pakistan's
activities were initially centred in a few facilities. A.Q. Khan founded the Engineering
Research Laboratories at Kahuta in 1976, which later became the Dr. A. Q. Khan
Research Laboratories (KRL).
Pakistan's nuclear linkage with the Arab world came into existence around 1973. The
economies of West Asia changed after the 1973 war. The phenomenal rise in oil
prices opened up new opportunities for Pakistan to trade its technology for oil. Libya
soon emerged as the key supplier of uranium to Pakistan and also its main financier.
Bhutto's testament that 'only the Islamic civilization was without it (the bomb), but
that position was about to change' has been singled out as the indication of a Pakistani-
Arab ambition to build the bomb. This has led to the labelling ofthe Pakistani bomb as
nn 'Tclnmir Rnmh' T h e rcacnnc inrl~irlcthe ernnnmir need n f PaCictan nnrl the Arnh
I
i
Regional Security need to deter Israel. There has also been a lot of discussion about the Chinese help to
Pakistan in its effort to build its nuclear arsenal. The impetus provided by Bhutto continued -
to be pursued after Zia-ul-Haq came to power in 1977.
In the late 1970s, Pakistan had become a country of paramount geo-strategic importance
for the United States following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The United States
considered Pakistan a "frontline state" against Soviet aggression and offered to reopen
aid and military assistance deliveries. Despite the acquisition of new weaponry from the
United States, Pakistan believed that it could never match India's conventional power
and that India either had, or shortly could develop, its own nuclear weapons. President
Zia therefore continued to pursue the nuclear programme initiated by Bhutto.
As long as Pakistan remained vital to United States interests in Afghanistan, the United
States generally ignored Pakistan's developing nuclear programme and no action was
taken to cut off United States support. Western nations, led by the United States, however
began to strengthen controls on export of nuclear and other advanced technologies and
began to enforce them with some stringency. One result of these Western export controls
and stringent enforcement mechanisms was the increasing dependence of Pakistan's on
China. Even before the signing of the Sino-Pakistani atomic cooperation agreement of
1986, China began to transfer some of the most critical nuclear technologies to Pakistan
in the early Eighties. China is reported to have provided Pakistan with the design of one
of its warheads, as well as sufficient Highly Enriched Uranium for a few weapons. As of
the mid- 1990s it was widely reported that Pakistan's stockpile consisted of as many as 10
nuclear warheads based on a Chinese design.
On 28 May 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear
tests. On 30 May 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead. The tests were
conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has also
been claimed by Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for
detonation on 30 May 1998, remained emplaced underground ready for detonation. These
tests came slightly more than two weeks after India carried out five nuclear tests of its
own, and after many warning by Pakistani officials that they would respond to India.
Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.


ii) Check your answer with the one given at the end of this unit..

1) Who can be regarded as the architect of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme


and why?

...........................................................................................................................
2) What does the term Islamic bomb connote?

...........................................................................................................................

-
NUCLEAR STATUS -

India is believed to have enough weapons-grade plutonium for 45-95 nuclear weapons.
However, the number of fully assembled weapons is likely to be smaller, and warheads
are currentlv stored senaratelvfrom aircraft and missile deliverv svstems.'~akistanlacks
an extensive civil nuclear power infrastructure, and its weapons programme is not as Nuclear Issues
broad-based as India's. Almost its entire nuclear programme is focused on weapons
applications. However, Pakistan is believed to have enriched enough uranium for 30-
50 nuclear weapons, and now has a facility in Rawalapindi capable of reprocessing
enough plutonium for approximately two weapons per year. Unlike India, Pakistan is
thought to have used much of its fissile material to manufacture nuclear weapons.
India's missile force consists of approximately 50 short-range, liquid-fuelled Prithvi
~nissilesand a limited number of solid-fuelled Agni-I missiles. In January 2001, India
tested the 2500 kilometer-range Agni-11, which now appears ready for operation. In
addition, a navdversion of the Prithvi is under development, as is the 3500 kilometre-
range~gni-~fi;whicb will be able to hit targets deep in Chinese territory. In April 200 1,
India successfully launched an experimental satellite into space using rocket booster
technology that could also be used to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile.
However, it is believed that most of India's nuclear weapons are intended for delivery
by aircraft. For this purpose, India possesses Mirage 2000 fighters of French origin
and Sukhoi SU-30 fighters acquired from Russia.
Pakistan possesses between 30 and 80 short and medium-range ballistic missiles. The
liquid-fuelled Ghauri-I and II are most likely derived from the North Korean No-Dong,
while the solid-fi~elledShaheen-I borrows Chinese technology. Two other medium-
range missiles- the Ghauri-I11 and Shaheen-11- are being developed. Pakistan's force
of nuclear-capable aircraft includes A5 fighters of Chinese origin, Mirage fighters
from France, and 32 American-made F- 16s.
-

INDIA AND PAKISTAN: STATUS OF WMD PROGRAMMES


Nuclear Weapons : Both possess fissile material.

Chemical Weapons : India, with its large industrial base, can produce
precursors for chemical warfare agents. Pakistan must
obtain precursors for chemical agent production.
Biological Weapons : Pakistan is conducting research and development with
potential bioiogical warfare applications. India's efforts
are geared towards defense.
Delivery Systems : Both have aircraft capable of delivering nuclear and
chemical weapons. Both are developing missiles.
India: has two missile programmes:
Prithvi - short range (150-250 km)
Agni - intended range (2,000 km)
Pakistan: has two missile programmes:
Hatf I - short range (80 km)
Mobile SRBM - appr~x. .-d!jp3C0 km range

26.6 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT


Indian stand on nuclear disarmament goes back to the call for a 'stand still' agreement
that Pandit Nehru made in 1954. The Indian position had been that any agreement on
a test ban would help reverse the process of competitive armament. It would also pave
the way for an agreement on disarmament. By the end of 1956, the different approaches
of the States to the issue of a test ban had become clear. The Soviet Union and India
advocated an early and separate agreement on a ban on all nuclear tests without
international verification; as such nuclear tests would not go undetected in any case.
Regional Security The Western countries sought limitation of and an eventual ban on nuclear testing with
li adequate verification. Eventually, the United States, Britain and Soviet Union began
negotiations for the Partial Test Ban Treaty. This treaty was formalized in 1963 and India
became party to it. The late Sixties saw a concern being expressed by India that the
nuclear powers were reluctant to institute any chicks on their own stockpiles. The concern
was articulated in the debates on the NPT. The NPT had sought to divide the countries
into those who possess a nuclear bomb and those who do not. The 'have nots' had to
undertake not to produce nuclear bomb, while the 'haves' could continue to increase their
nuclear arsenal. In fact this discriminatory nature of the NPT became the single point of
mention for its rejection by India.
The NPT Review Conference in 1995 decided to extend the NPT for an indefinite period.
The Coinprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1996. The debate on the CTBT
provides for a clearer articulation of the disarmament policy of India. Indian stand at the
CTBT had been that the treaty was to 'contribute effectively to the prevention of
proliferation in all its aspects, to the enhancement of international peace and security'. It
was thus anchored in the commitment to nuclear disarmament, to the achievement of a
nuclear weapon free world within a time bound frame. Indian opposition to the final
version of the CTBT came because it permitted the nuclear weapon states to continue
their weapons related research and development activity using non-explosivetechnologies.
It lacked any meaningful commitment to disarmame~tand instead only served to retain
the existing status quo. It must be noted that India continues to call for universal nuclear
disarmament even after the tests.
Pakistan's refusal to join the NPT has its roots in its perception of the strategic situation
in the region. Pakistan called for an effective security guarantee that would contain the
following provisions: (i) prohibition of first use of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon
states; (ii) immediate assistance for a non-weapon state which is a victim of a nuclear
aggression; (iii) assistance before the Security Council can act; and (iv) a security guarantee
which would include all non-weapon states which have renounced the manufacture or
acquisition of nuclear weapons, irrespective of whether they have signed the NPT.
Following the Indian nuclear test of 1974,Pakistan made a public declaration of its intention
to enter the nuclear field. It also introduced in the United Nations the concept of aNuclear
Free Zone in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. In the later years, Pakistan's posture on
the CTBT came to be closely linked to the Indian stand. Pakistan did not oppose the
CTBT but abstained on the issue in the United Nations.
The Indo-Pakistan nuclear relationship attempted a significant step in form of a non-
formalized 1985 agreement tNat neither India nor Pakistan would attack the other's nuclear
facilities. The second step wasxijoint agreement for inspection ofall nuclear sites by the
International Atomic Energy Agency. A pact between the two countries to allow for
mutual inspection of sites was also proposed. Pakistan had also proposed a South Asian
nuclear-free zone.
In the post 1998 scenario, Pakistan has rejected Indian proposals for a treaty of no-first-
use of nuclear weapons, and has said that it would consider using nuclear weapons if it
felt its existence to be threatened. Pakistan relies on this threat of first-use because India
possesses superior conventional military forces.

26.7 POST 1998 NUCLEAR ISSUES


Regional Security
Regional security problems have been articulated as some of the key determinants of the
nuclear tests. In the case of Indian nuclear policy, both Indian and Western analysts have
sought to highlight the threats from Pakistan and China. The growing nuclear capability
of China and the close links that China has with Pakistan in the nuclear area have been a
matter of concern to India. In case of Pakistan, the Indian nuclear capability has been
:A--&:C-A -- &L- I---. --.----
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.
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base that is recognized to be far superior to Pakistan. Pakistan has failed to gain any Nuclear Issues
military advantage in the past conflicts with India. Kashmir has been highlighted as the
critical element in the bilateral dispute. Here too, Pakistan strategy has shifted from
conventional warfare to low intensity conflict. Pakistan looks at nuclear option as an .
important deterrent against India.

The post-Cold War era has brought about a change in the perception of security threats
to Indian and Pakistan. These can be identified as non-military pressures like trade,
intellectual property rights, environment and technology control as threats to national
security. Non-strategic pulls and pushes by foreign nations that affect the nation's
economy should be looked upon as a security threats and not as an isolated trade
related activity. Trade embargoes, technology control regimes and diplomatic pressures
E
I to sign various treaties were growing in recent times. This has had an adverse impact
! on the South Asian economy.
Restrictions on nuclear and related dual-use technology had begun with the NPT in
I 1968. The Nuclear Suppliers Group formed after the Indian test of 1974 had placed
restrictions on the transfer of nuclear related technology and material to such nuclear
capable states like India. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) instituted
in 1987 had placed restrictions on the transfer dual-use technology related to missiles.
It was under this regime that the Russians were forced to cancel the technology transfer
agreement on the cryogenic engines for the ISRO programme. In 1995 came the
Wassanaar Arrangement that further prohibited the transfer of dual-use technology.
The CTBT and the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty further strengthened the
nonproliferation regime. Besides these international arrangements, bilateral restrictions
of the United States in form of nonproliferation legislations have also affected India.
Both India and Pakistan, as have some of the other nuclear (technologically) capable
states, have been at the receiving end of this regime that has been sponsored by the
developed world.
Over the years these restrictions had come to symbolize the core of the developed
world's status quoist agenda. The first symbolic defiance of this restraint came in form
of the 1974 nuclear test at Pokhran. The May 1998 tests of India and Pakistan represent
this defiant independence at an age when the nonproliferation regime has become
more stringent over the years. The Indian nuclear tests were a demonstration of
capabilities - teclinological and political. The former in the context of the ability to
develop in the face of restrictions; the latter was the demonstration ofthe political will
to take on the developed world. The Pakistani tests were also a demonstration of their
defiance of the pressures instituted by the developed world in form of the threat of
sanctions. It is this reassertion of the ability to take independent decisions in the face of
i anticipated sanctions that makes the nuclear tests a symbol of the a resurgent Third
World.

Dialogue
Looked at through the conceptual lenses of this approach, one can argue in favour of
a dialogue between India and Pakistan
The bilateral level dialogue would rest on the new equation of a nuclear weapon capable
India and Pakistan. The Western logic of deterrence has been based on the premise
that the mutual vulnerability to attack proves a deterrent and an eventual nuclear
confrontation is avoided. This logic accepts that the number ofweapons is not the real
determinant, that the minimal nuclear deterrence is possible through even a single
weapon with a reliable strike capability. Arguably therefore, India and Pakistan would
have achieved this mutual deterrence with their stated weapon capabilities. To extend
this argument further, neither of the countries needs to enter into the much publicised
nuclear arms race to further their security. Of seminal concern is the fact that the
crucial ~roblemsof securitv faced bv both the cou~itriesare in the area of inter~ial
Regional Security security and not border war. Insurgency, terrorism, low intensity conflict and such kinds
of internal security threats are not tackled by nuclear weapons; they require a combination
of political, social and economic policies. The security level argument therefore does not
lead one to fear the rapid escalation of, or proliferation of nuclear weapons in an hdo-
Pakistan scenario.
In case of China, the Indian position is slightly different. Here too the key problems are
mainly in the area of internal security. Over the last decade or so, the arena of the border
dispute has shifted to the discussion tables rather than the field level skirmishes. The main
arena of India-China confrontation remains the diplomatic one. At the nuclear level, India
can only expect to create a minimal level deterrence against the vast Chinese capability.
The main asset of the nuclear capability is to raise India's diplomatic leverage in the
bilateral dialogue.
It is at the global level that the parameters of an India -Pakistan dialogue become clear. In
the post test phase both India and Pakistan have had to face the brunt of international and
bilateral sanctions. These have had an adverse impact on the economies of both the
countries. Both the countries have been asked to accept the NPT - CTBT as a precondition
to lifting of sanctions. The success of the Western world in containing the spread of
nuclear technology depends on the manner in which they are able to quarantine the two
countries, raise their bilateral disputes to explosive levels and force a compromise on
nuclear issues. It is in this context that Indian and Pakistan would have to realise their
vital national interests and rise above these pressures to initiate a dialogue. This dialogue
should enable them to cooperatively tackle the developed world rather than accept their
agenda and comply.
Check Your Progress 3

Note: i) Use the space below for your answers


ii) Check your answer with the one given at the end of this unit.

1) Identify some of tlie technology control regimes that seek to check the proliferation
of nuclear and related capabilities in the Developing countries.

...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
2) What are the compulsions for an Indo-Pakistan dialogue on nuclear issues?

...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................

26.8 LET US SUM UP


Nuclear issues in South Asia relate-tothe nuclear policies and programmes of India and
Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan had civilian nuclear programmes which became the
basis of the technological capability to move to a weapons option. India exploded its first
I . r. 1, 4 . .rr-r r 1 1 . ,..
capability. Pakistan had also started to move towards a nuclear weapons option in the Nuclear Issues
1 1970s. It was, however, only in 1998 that both the countries conducted a series of
nuclear tests and formally emerged as nuclear weapon states.
'
i

Pakistan, however, lacks an extensive civil nuclear power infrastructure. Moreover,


its weapons programme is not as broad as India's.
The security dynamics of the region are complicated by India's perception of China as
a threat and Pakistan's perception that India's substantial conventional military
advantage could only be offset by nuclear weapons.
In the post test phase, both India and Pakistan have had to face the brunt of international
and bilateral sanctions.
I
Neither country has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive
I
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), although they adhere to self-imposed moratoriums on nuclear
tests.
I The success of the Western world in containing the spread of nuclear technology
I depends on the manner in which they are able to quarantine the two countries, raise
their bilateral disputes to explosive levels and force a compromise on nuclear issues. It
is in this context that Indian and Pakistan would have to initiate a dialogue which will
I
enable them to cooperatively tackle the Western nation's pressures to accept and
comply with their agenda.

26.9 SOME USEFUL BOOKS


Kapur, Ashok. (1987) Pakistan S Nuclear Development. London. Croom Helm.
Lewis, J Wilson and Xue Lital. (1 988) China Builds the Bomb. Stanford. Stanford
University Press.
Perkovich, George. ( I 999) India's Nuclear Weapon: The Impact of Global
ProliJi?ration.New Delhi. Oxford University Press.
Singh, Jasjit. (1998) Nuclear India. New Delhi. Institute for Defence Studies and
Analysis.
Spector, Leonard. ((1 990) Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,
Colorado. Westview Press.
Weida, William. (1 998) Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of Nuclear
Weapons Since 1940. Washington DC. Brookings Institution.

26.10 ANSWERS TO CHECKYOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1
1) To meet their security requirements, to enhance their international standing and
in some cases due to domestic political pressures.
2) The key features of Indian nuclear programme included (i) natural uranium fuelled
reactors, (ii) fast breeder reactors fuelled with plutonium from the first phase,
and (iii) a thorium-uranium fuel cycle utilizing the country's large reserves of
thorium sands.
3) The indefinite extension ofthe NPT, the signing of the CTBT and the negotiations
for a Fissile Materi~lCut off Treaty.
4) Indian Nuclear Doctrine: (i)No first use; (ii) minimal ~iucleardeterrence and (iii)
nuclear disarmament
I
Check Your Progress 2
I Regional Security

1) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Believingthat India was on the verge of acquiringnuclear weapons
which could be used to blackmail Pakistan, he initiated nuclear weapons development
programme in the early 19870s.

2) In the early 1970s, linkages emerged between Pakistan and oil-rich Arab nations
mainly in the form of supply of uranium and funds for the formers nuclear programme.
Pakistan's weapons programme came to be described as a Islamic bomb.
Check Your Progress 3
1) The Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassanaar
Arrangement are some of the multilateral technology control regimes. Besides, there
are bilateral restrictions on transfer of nuclear and related technologies.

2) From the security point of view, both the countries have achieved the mutual
deterrence with their stated weapon capabilities. Western nations have placed
sanctions and technology denials on both the countries to comply with their non-
proliferation agenda. In this context, any escalation of tensions between India and
Pakistan would give the Western world a leverage to quarantine the two countries
and press for the denuclearisation.An Indo-Pakistan dialogue should enable them to
cooperatively tackle the pressures from the Western world to accept their agenda.
UNIT 27 RESOLUTION AND'
MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS
Structure
27.0 Objective
27.1 Introduction
27.2 Defining the Concepts
27.3 South Asian Regional Characteristics
27.4 Nature of Conflicts
27.4.1 lndia-Pakistan Territorial Disputes
27.4.2 Tndia-Sri Lanka Dispute over Kachchativu
27.4.3 Conflict over Water-sharing

27.5 Management and Resolution of Conflicts


27.5.1 Arbitration
27.5.2 Mediation
27.5.3 Bilateral negotiations

27.6 Let Us Sum Up


27.7 Some Useful Books
27.8 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises

27.0 OBJECTIVES
South Asia is a conflict ridden region. This unit deals with the methods adopted by
the countries of the region to manage and resolve conflict. After going through this
unit, you should be able to

Define the key concepts of conflict, conflict management and conflict


resolution,

Identify the.sources of interstate conflict in South Asia,

Describe the nature of conflicts, and

Critically evaluate the methods adopted to resolve conflicts.

27.1 INTRODUCTION
Conflict is inherent in every society. It remains latent in s ~ r n societies
e and in many
others, it manifests in violence and destruction. Conflicts occur at individual, family,
national and international levels. As such, the unit of analysis and nature of actors
differ in each case even though all conflicts possess certain generic features. This
unit deals with international conflicts involving sovereign states of South Asia.

South Asia is a region of many protracted conflicts. They have remained the cause
for three wars and many crises between India and Pakistan. The military engagements
have exposed the fragility of peace in South Asia to the extent that some of the
Western commentators and governments have termed it as a 'dangerous region' or
potential 'nuclear flash-point'. It must be stated that despite tension and rivalry, South
Asia is also endowed with strong political culture and mechanisms to resolve
Regional Security differences. It means that conflicts have concurrently created certain opportunities for
their management or settlement, if not resolution and efforts to that end have proceeded
almost simultaneously even though their success has not been very encouraging in some
cases. Before we examine the management and resolution of conflicts in South Asia, it is
necessary to understand the meaning of the concepts of conflict, conflict management
and conflict resolution.

27.2 DEFINING THE CONCEPTS


Conflict is defined in many ways; there is no unanimity among the scholars about what
constitute a conflict. One school, dominant in North America, defines conflict in terms of
clash of interest between two parties. Kenneth Boulding for instance, states: "Conflicts
over interests are situations in which some change makes at least one party better off and
the other party worse off, each in their own estimation.. .A fight is a situation in which
each party to a perceived conflict over interests acts to reduce the welfare of the other".
Johan Galtung, who represents another school, maintains that "injustice and structural
violence" mark a conflict situation. According to him, absence of physical violence and
direct confrontation between actors does not necessary mean that structural violence is
totally absent. Adam Curle presents a broader definition. For him, conflict is a situation
where "potential development" of one party is "impeded" by another. However, the most
widely used definition links a conflict situation with "incompatible goals" of parties.
According to MichelNicholson, "A conflict exists when two people wish to carry out acts
which are mutually inconsistent. [They may both want to do the same thing, such as eat
the same apple, or they may want to do different things where the different things are
truly incompatible, such as when they both want to stay together but one wants to go to
the cinema and the other stay at home.] The definition of conflict can be extended from
single people to groups (such as nations) and more than two parties can be involved in a
conflict. The principles remain the same". A common element found in all definitions is
the divergent goals and interest of two actors or parties who resort to various means in
pursuit of achieving their objectives.

Closely related to the concept of conflict is the term conflict resolution. John Burton
terms conflict resolution as a political philosophy. It is defined as an outcome as well as a
peaceful means by which such an outcome is obtained. According to Hugh Miall, conflict
resolution denotes a "change in the situation which removes the underlying source of
conflict. This may come about through a change in relationships between them, or through
the dissolution and replacement ofthe original parties. If a conflict is settled by the military
victory of one side and the other does not accept the outcome and begins organizing
another fight, the underlying conflict has clearly not been removed and such a conflict
would not be considered resolved". Thus, the fundamental principles of conflict resolution
are two: the parties should be satisfied with the outcome which meets their felt needs and
interests, and there should not be use of any coercion to achieve such an outcome. John
Groom says that a complete satisfaction of parties comes only if "they have, and do
actually have, full knowledge of the circumstance surroundingthe dispute and the aspirations
of other parties". He also maintains that conflict resolution is a goal rarely realized in
practice.

Before analyzing the methods of conflict resolution, it is necessary to define the term
conflict management. It is regarded as a necessary preliminary step in the direction and
process of conflict resolution. In other words, whether a conflict reaches a stage of
resolution or not is dependent in part upon the ways in which it is managed. Conflict ,
management process entails adoption of various measures including establishment of
communication links and personal interactions between the adversaries, setting up of
mechanisms to end or minimize violence, and seeking commitment of the parties to a
political solution to their problem. The last measure paves the way for a peace process
whose success will determinethe resolution of the given conflict. John Burton finds three
important components in conflict management-participation, communication and third
This includes bargaining power available, influence on tlie decision making institution Resolution and
or forum concerned, knowledge and negotiating skills available, and other power Management of
attributesofthe participants". Second, '%liereis the degree and quality ofcommunication Conflicts
between the parties" which includes "their perceptions and understanding of the
i
, situation, abilities to receive information and to commu~iicateto it7'.Third, "ifthere is

1 a third party involved, there are the degrees of decision making power, degrees of
neutrality, levels of analytical skills, and other attributes ofthird parties".

Conflicts are resolved in a number of ways. Some of the most significant methods are
arbitration, mediation and direct negotiations. Arbitration is part of the larger process
ofadjudication. It is one oftlle oldest methods of conflict resolution. Under this method
a given conflict is referred to an impartial tribunal (arbitration tribunal or international
court). Unlike a permanent court, an arbitration tribunal is an adhoc forum set up by
an agreement between the disputants or conflict parties. It means that it is valid for a
single conflict. The size of a tribunal is always small; it can have three or five or nine
members. In case of a three-member tribunal, each disputant chooses one member
and tlie third one is neutral arbitrator cliosen by both national nominees. Ifthey fail to
do so, an impartial tliird party such as the President of tlie International Court of
Justice nominates a person. It is also possible to have three neutral members in a
tribunal of five; in some other cases the parties select a single arbitrator such as the
UN Secretary General. The arbitrators are reputed judges or lawyers or diplomats or
retired government officials. An important condition is that states are expected to
comply with the award and therefore the tribunal decision is binding on the disputants.

Third party mediation is also an important method. It is an integral part of a larger


bargaining or negotiation process in conflict.AvarieQ ofactors like private individuals,
governments and regional and international organizations undertake mediation. The
main ob-jectiveof mediation is to change the behaviour, choice and perception of the
adversaries so that a settlement between them can be reached. Each mediator adopts
different strategies. They include facilitation of co~nmunicationbetween the parties
and putting pressure on them to give up their tough position in negotiations. Amediator
clarifies ambiguous issues, offers suggestions to the adversaries, participates in
negotiations and form~rlatesproposals. A mediator is biased or impartial. Coercion is
forbidden in a mediation process, but some mediators in practice use pressure tactics
or provide various incentives to the adversaries with an objective of reaching a solution.

A bilateral negotiation is yet another method for conflict resolution. Here, both the
parties to the dispute engage in direct negotiations without any third party support. It is
a bilateral affair because the parties establish communication with each other, create
atmosphere for talks, set the agenda, conduct hard bargaining and commit themselves
to an agreement reached between them. The negotiation process can be long and
difficult. It is also possible that talks can easily break down since there is no third party
P
to moderate their position.

SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL


CHARACTERISTICS
South Asia is a conflict-ridden region. It has experienced four full-scale wars (in
1947-48, 1962, 1965and 1971)and one limited war (Kargil war). In order to understand
conflicts in South Asia, it is important to appreciate the characteristics of the region
because tlie structure ofthe region itself provides the conditions for a conflict. One of
the prominent characteristics of South Asia is "Indo-centricism". It means that India
occupies the centre of the regional subsystem in every sense-geographical, historical,
socio-cultural and economic. Geographically, with its centrally located vast landmass,
India is the only connecting point to the other states of the region. It shares frontiers
(either land or sea) with all the states and separates most of them. The history of most
of tlie states is either linked with or rooted in India. It means that India looms large in
revinnal liistnrieq hv v i r t ~ ~
n fet h e fact that i t effectivelv infli~encedand chanerl eventc
Regional Security from time immemorial. Furthermore, India provides a civilizational link to all the South
Asian states. As such, the socio-religious and linguistic contours of the region have a
strong element of 'Indian-ness' that is blended or harmonised with the local traditions.
Clearly, the vast components of collective persona of these states are drawn from the
Indian antecedents. Finally, the economic centrality of India is explained in terms of its
capacity to assist and even influence some of the national economies. It is even better
illustrated by the fact that India holds the key to success of the SAARC as a regional
economic grouping. Implication ofthis regional framework is that India is the focal point
of contest by its neighbours whose interests invariably clash with that of India. It means
that most of the conflicts are between India and its immediate neighbours.

The second important characteristic of South Asia is its 'asymmetric and hierarchical
power structure'. India is indeed by far the largest (in population and territory) and biggest
(in economic, technological and military strength) state in South Asia. India is larger and
bigger than each one of its neighbours or even all of them "put together7'in South Asia. In
fact, the asymmetry is so overbearing that "significant differences of power potential"
among India's other neighbours are "obscured". As a result, countries like Pakistan want
to compete with India to attain parity of power.

The third characteristic of South Asia is the "common colonial experience" of the member
states. It is widely agreed that the colonial history has sown seeds of many conflicts in the
post-colonial period. It happened, not so much due to the de-colonisation process itself,
but because ofthe peculiar way of building the British Empire through a coercive process
of integration of disparate groups and their territories. The British colonial rule established
territorial unity of the subcontinent: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were at the core of
the integrated British raj with which Nepal and Bhutan maintained peripheral linkages,
and Sri Lanka and Maldives were independent of the raj but controlled by the colonial
government. All of them shared a common destiny and were forced to defend imperial
interests at the cost of their own. But this shared destiny became highly individualistic
when the British rule ended. The process of de-colonisation simultaneouslytriggered off
a process of territorial fragmentation and disunity in the subcontinent. In many cases the
post-colonial state formation followed absurd and illogical patterns; demarcation of State
boundaries became incomplete and interests and status of many ethnic and religious
groups were not defined. Post-colonial South Asia has lived with these colonial legacies,
giving rise to various disputes and conflicts within states and between states of the region.

27.4 NATURE OF CONFLICTS


There are many bilateral problems between the countries of South Asia; some of them
result from the coinpetition for power, security and prestige. Conventional arms build-up
and nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan can be cited as an example. Then there
are open bilateral conflicts in South Asia over territory and water resources. Importantly,
given the Indo-centric nature of the region, these conflicts are between India and its
South Asian neighbours.

On the basis of their duration and intensity, territorial conflicts in South Asia can be
divided into two categories-protracted and peripheral conflicts. Protracted conflicts
include India's disputes with Pakistan, especially over Kashmir and Siachen. Peripheral
conflicts are those between India and its smaller neighb~urssuch as Sri Lanka. Again,
one can make a further categorisation in terms of the nature of the contested territory:
most of the conflicts are related to border demarcations and only Kashmir has the distinct
character of being an irredentist dispute. The India-Pakistan territorial conflict is a multi-
pronged affair in the sense that both countries haye competed for more than one part of
territory at a time. If Kashmir, according to the Pakistanis, is a 'core issue' between India
and Pakistan, Siachen, Kutch and Sir Creek have been crucial issues from the standpoint
of their national security. The dispute between India and Sri Lanka over Kachchativu
was less contested, at least from the Indian side. This made the task of its resolution easy.
27.4.1 India-Pakistan Territorial Disputes Resolution and
Management of
As stated earlier, there are four major disputes between India and Pakistan over Conflicts
territory-Kashmir, Siachen, Rann of Kutch and Sir Creek. Out of these, only the
Kutch dispute has been resolved. The Kashmir conflict is the oldest, which started in
the wake ofthe British withdrawal from the subcontinent and subsequent partition of
India in 1947. At the time of independence, the Indian Union had two categories of
states. They were states of British India and princely states. There was no problem
with the integration of British Indian states; they became either part of India or Pakistan.
But the princely states posed a serious problem. When the doctrine of paramountacy
of the British Crown lapsed, Lord Mountbatten urged the princely states to join either
lndia or Pakistan depending upon their geographic contiguity and demographic
composition. It means that the Hindu dominated areas could join India and the Muslim
dominated areas should go to Pakistan. Herein lay the Kashmir problem. Jammu and
Kashmir had a Hindu ruler (Maharaja Hari Singh) but majority of its population was
Muslims. As regards territory, it adjoined both India and Pakistan. The Maharaja did
not want to join either ofthese countries. Seeing his vacillation, Pakistan sent its troops
to aid a tribal rebellion which broke out in Poonch in October 1947. Soon the rebels
supported by Pakistani forces marched towards the capital, Srinagar, threatening the
very positio~iand authority of the Maharaja. Since he did not have any military power
to counter the invasion, Maharaja appealed to India for military assistance. Prime
Minister Nehru put two conditions: first, he wanted the Maharaja to seek the approval
of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the leader of the Kashmiri National Conference.
Second, the Maharaja needed to accede the state of J&K to the Indian union ifAbdullah
gave assent to the Instrument ofAccession. On fulfilling these two conditions, Nehru
1 sent the Indian troops to put down the rebellion and evacuate the Pakistani forces.
i; However, India's success was only partial. Its troops managed to stop the rebel advance
but they had to concede about one-third ofJ&K to Pakistan. Subsequently,on 1 January
1948, India took the issue to the United Nations Security Council which, in April 1948,
passed a resolution urging both the countries to settle the dispute through a plebiscite in
J&K to determine the will ofthe people on their accession. This marked the beginning
of a long drawn process of conflict management and resoIution which has coexisted
with war, insurgency and violence. So far the result has been negative. We will examine
these in the next section.

'The dispute over Siachen is primarily linked to the Kaslimir conflict. The peculiarity of
the issue lies in the fact that the Siachen glacier is one ofthe most inhospitable regions
in the world because of its tough weather conditions, high altitude and rough terrain. It
receives heavy snow of about 7 meters every year, snowstorm occurs at a speed of
nearly 300 Kilometres per hour and the temperature drops to 40 degrees below zero
!
level. Its high altitude is explained by the fact that India has its base camp at a place
which is 12,000 feet above the sea level. It means that the altitude of some of the
forward bases are much higher (varies from 22,000 feet to 16,000 feet). The area is
prone to avalanches. It is estimated that over 95 per cent ofthe Indian casualties have
been due to the high altitude, adverse weather and inhospitable terrain.

Until the mid-1980~~ neither India nor Pakistan controlled the Siachen glacier. The

I
I
I
I
i
India-Pakistan cease-fire line created in 1949 did not clearly delineate territory to
either side. Nor the Line of Control (LoC) described the position of the glacier. As
such, the region was left un-demarcated. Since it is located in the "un-delimited area"
beyond the LoC, both India and Pakistan made competing claims over the glacier. It is
evident that Pakistan insists on drawing a straight line in a north-easterly direction
from NJ 9842. This goes up to the Karakorum Pass on its boundary with China. On
the other hand, lndia likes to draw a line in the north-north west direction from NJ
I 9842 along the Saltoro Ranges southern offshoot of the Karakorum Range.

lndiacame to know ofthe glacier in the late 1970s from mountaineeringmaps published
t in Europe and North America. Earlier India did not allow any mountaineering expedition,
Regional Security whereas Pakistan allowed and encouraged such activity to gain legitimacy over territory.
However, in 1978, India changed its policy. It despatched an "operational reconnaissance
patrol" ofthe army io the area in the guise of a mountaineering expedition. Subsequently,
the army made many more expeditions, and patrolled the glacier in summer. Pakistan did
not militarily oppose the Indian army's activities initially, but since 1978 it made several
protests against Indian presence in the glacier. In 1983, Pakistan also made an attempt to
station its troops in the glacier. India pre-empted the Pakistani move by airlifting a platoon
of its troops in 1984, thereby making itself the first country to occupy the glacier. Since
1984, Pakistan has regularly made attempts at dislodging the Indian troops. At the same
time, the Indian military objective has been to retain its control over the territory at any
cost. The ensuing military confrontation has resulted in heavy loss of life and the economic
cost of it is also mounting.

The dispute over Rann of Kutch arose soon after independence of India and Pakistan.
Rann of Kutcli is situated between the Sind province of Pakistan and the Indian state of
Gujarat. It is a 23,000 sq. km of marshland, "not wet enough to navigate and not dry
enough to farm". It is divided into two different formations--Great Rann and Little
Rann. The Great Rann, which covers 18,000 sq. km., lies within Gujarat. The Little Rann
is about 5000 sq. km., which extends from the Gulf of Kutch to touch the Sind province.
In 1947, the boundary between Sind and Kutch became an international border. The
dispute started when Pakistan made a claim over one-third of the Great Rann (which is
about 3,500 square miles. The area claimed run along the "24thparallel (north latitude),
which it argued had always been under the control and administratio? of Sind". India
rejected tlie Pakistani claim on the ground that the whole of the Rann of Kutch was part
of tlie Kutch region of Gujarat. For several years after their independence both the
countries exchanged notes and letters reiterating their claims and counterclaims on the
Rann of Kutch.

The dispute took a military dimension in February 1956 when Pakistani forces intruded
into Chhad Bet in the northern half ofthe Rann of Kbtch. India responded by sending its
troops. But Pakistani soldiers could not be tracked down. Pakistan played the hide-and-
seek game. It wanted to draw India's attention to the dispute with the aim of seeking a
solution. What followed next was a series of exchange of letters reiterating their claims
and counter-claims by referring to the colitroversial historical facts. Finally, an arbitration
tribunal resolved the dispute in 1968.

The dispute over Sir Creek remained a part of the Rann of Kutch dispute. When the
latter dispute was resolved, the solution did not coverthe Sir Creek. The Creek, a fluctuating
tidal channel, is a 100 km long estuary marsh of the Rann of Kutch. Pakistan held the
view that boundary dispute in the Kutch-Sind sector covered Sir Creek and claimed the
entire Sir Creek as its territory. India repudiated the Pakistani claim on the ground that
there was no territorial dispute over Sir Creek as its boundary was well-established with
the creation of boundary pillars in the middle of the creek. During the arbitration of the
Kutch dispute, both India and Pakistan agreed before the tribunal to limit their dispute to
the boundary in the north. In the south there was an agreed boundary. It started from the
Sir Creek and extended itself in tlie eastward direction along the 24h parallel. However,
India held the view that "this line moved up sharply at a right angle to meet the north
boundary of the Rann". Pakistan wanted to extend the line further eastward to claim half
of tlie Rann. Despite some efforts on the part of India and Pakistan, the dispute remains
unresolved.

27.4.2 India-Sri Lanka Dispute over Kachchativu


The territorial dispute between India and Sri Lanka was over Kachchativu, a tiny barren
island in the Palk Straits. All historical evince shows that the island formed a part of the
Zamindari of Raja of Ramnad in Tamil Nadu. At the same time, Sri Lanka did not have
sufficient evidence to show that the island belonged to it. Yet the Sri Lankan government
made a claim on the grdund that its ownership of the island was tacitly accepted by the
Rritich Tndinn onvernment. While d i q a ~ r e e i n
with
~ Sri 1.anka. successive lndian leaders
showed apathy and indifference towards the territorial dispute. Nehru and his successors Resolution and
underplayed the dispute in the interest of bilateral relations. This was evident from Management of
Conflicts
theirvarious statements.Nehru virtually toed the Sri Lankan line ofargument when he
said that the Zamindari rights of the Raja of Ramnad did not confer sovereignty over
the Kachchativu Island. He showed his ignorance and casual approach to the problem
when he stated that he was not sure about the location of the disputed island. He
appeared to be over-cautious about Sri Lanka's sensitivity when he maintained that
there was no "national prestige" involved in the issue. Similarly, fearing an adverse
impact onbilateral relations, Indira Gandhi was even reluctant to take pro-India position
on Kachchativu which, in heropinion, was a "sheer rock with no strategic significance".
The difference between the two leaders was that even though Nehru did a soft-pedalling
on the issue, he did not enter into an agreementwith Sri Lanka to recognise its sovereignty
over the island. But Indira Gandhi signed an agreement in 1974against the wishes and
interests of Tamil Nadu.

27.4.3 Conflict over Water-sharing


Conflict over water sharing occurred between India and Pakistan, and India and
Bangladesh. It must be noted that there has been no conflict over water sharing between
India and Nepal; the major issue between them is related to development of water
resources (hydropower, irrigation and flood control, etc). As such, in the context of
conflict resolution, it is essential to concentrate on those conflicts which involved the
issue of water sharing. India's dispute with Pakistan and Bangladesh are the cases in
hand.
Apart from the territorial conflict, India and Pakistan had a major dispute over sharing
the Indus water. The partition of India necessitated dividing the Indus water system
because the line of partition cut across the Indus river system, which remained the
lifeline of agricultural development in undivided Punjab. The Indus water system included
six rivers-the Jhelum, the Chenab and the Indus itself in the west; the Ravi, the Beas
and the Sutlej in the east. The interests of India and Pakistan clashed since both the
countries demanded a larger share of river system. What complicated the issue was
the India-Pakistan war after the partition and the continuing tension-ridden relations
between the two countries in the subsequent years. As such, prolonged bilateral talks
did not yield any result until the World Bank extended its good offices to clinch a deal
in 1960.
'The Ganges water dispute was much more complicated and intractable than the Indus
water dispute, and the contending parties-India and Bangladesh-adopted intransigent
positions at various negotiating stages. The issue was not merely of sharing the Ganges
water but also its augmentation during the lean season (between January and May)
when the flow remains low. It must be noted that India is an upper riparian state and
Bangladesh is lower riparian state. The contention of Bangladesh was that India always
involved in a unilateral diversion of the Ganges water at Farakka, which adversely
affected the interests of the lower riparian state. Perceiving uric-:.sciously that the
Ganges was an Indian river, India, on the other hand, maintained that the diversion of a
part of the Ganges water at the Farakka barrage to tile Shagirathi/Hooghlyriver was
necessary to arrest the deterioration of Calcutta port a ~ protect
~ d Kolkata's drinking
and industrial water supplies from salinity. Bangladesh always insisted on an equitable
water-sharing formula which India considered unreasonable given the cultivable area
and the population in India which are larger than that of Bangladesh. As regards the
augmentation, there was always sharp disagreement on the ways and means of
augmenting the water flow during the lean season. In the past, India proposed that a
link canal from Jogighopa to Farakka across Bangladesh be constructed to augment
water flow in the Ganges from the water-surplus Brahmaputra. river. On the other
hand, Bangladesh proposed to have augmentation from within the Ganges system by
storing its lnonsoon flows behind seven high dams in Nepal. Each side disagreed with
other's proposal and, as such, the problem remained unresolved despite many rounds
of political negotiations until an agreement uas reached in 1996.
Regional Security Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space below for your answers.


ii) heck the answers with the answers given at the end of this unit.

1) According to Hugh Miall the two fundamental principles of conflict resolution are:

2) What is arbitration?

27.5 MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF


CONFLICTS
In South Asia the governments have follo,wedthree approaches-arbitration, mediation
and bilateral negotiations-at different points in time to resolve their conflicts. The first
two approaches were tried in tlie past and tlie third one remains the single most preferred
approach of India even though countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh prefer international
mediation. Now, India is opposed to any form ofthird party mediation or arbitration of its
bilateral disputes with any of its neighbours and insists on bilateral negotiations-a norm
of conflict resolution which others like to change. This is despite the fact that the third
party involvement as arbitrator or mediator in the past was successful in resolving some
of the disputes once for all.

27.5.1 Arbitration
The Rann of Kutch dispute was arbitrated by a three member tribunal set up for this
purpose. India nominated Ales Bebler (a judge ofthe Constitutional Court ofthe former
Yugoslavia) as its representative. Pakistan nominated Nasrollah Entezam (an Iranian
diplomat). The UN Secretary General appointed Gunnar Lagergren (a judge of the
Swedish Supreme Court) to be the chairman oftlie tribunal. The tribunal examined about
10,000 pages documents and 350 maps. India submitted 250 documents and Pakistan '
produced 350 documents in support of their claims. The tribunal had 171 sittings and
made its decision on 19 February 1968 in Geneva. The decision was taken by a majority
of two votes because the Indian nominee cast a dissenting vote. The tribunal awarded
about 900 sq. km territory in the northern part of the Rann to Pakistan. Although the rest
of the disputed territory remained with India, it was not happy with the tribunal award.
India considered it was more of apolitical verdict than a leqal decision. Since the tribunal
decision, as per the commitment and undertaking, could not be questioned, India accepted
it with much reservation. Given this experience, it has never agreed for arbitration of any
of its international dispute with its neighbours.

27.5.2 Mediation
In the history of conflict management in South Asia, international mediation formed an
important strategy till the 1960s. While other South Asian countries made their choice
first for third party mediation, India willy-nilly accepted the same. As global power
competition ureated imperatives for peacemaking in South Asia, both the US and the
former Soviet Union pushed India and Pakistan to resolve their conflicts. In 1966, in the
wake of the India-Pakistan war, the former Soviet Union mediated the Tashkent ~esolutionand
agreement between the two countries. Apart from ending the war, the agreement Management of
t

provided the framework for restoring peaceful relations which, however, did not end Conflicts
1

I the hostility.
The most successful mediation happened in the Indus water dispute between India
and Pakistan. The World Bank extended its good offices to reach a settlement in 1960.
According to the treaty signed by both the countries, Pakistan got three western rivers-
the Jhelum, the Chenab and the Indus-and India received three eastern rivers- the
Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej. The equal sharing of rivers made the task of resolving
the dispute very simple. Importantly, the treaty set up a permanent Indus Commission
with a Commissioner each for India and Pakistan. The Commission meets regularly
and exchange visits to both the countries, even during the time oftension and diff~culties
in India-Pakistan relations. The Commission is empowered to resolve all the differences
over the implementation of the treaty and only if it fails to reach an agreement, the
matter is referred to the governments.If there is no agreement between the governments,
the matter is taken for arbitration by a third party. Significantlythe arbitration clause of
r
the treaty has not been invoked so far. The treaty has been working well despite many
t wars and tensions between India and Pakistan.

1 The Kashmir dispute represents a case of unsuccessful mediation by the United Nations
1 between 1950 and 1958. In 1948, the UN Security Council appointed a five member
mediation commission-known as the UN Commission on India and Pakistan-to
restore peace and arrange for plebiscite to resolve the dispute. A cease-fire and truce
agreement between India and Pakistan was worked out in August 1948. Importantly
both the countries agreed in principle to withdraw their forces from each other's territories
and the disarmament of the local forces in the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. The UN
secured India's consent for a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the people on
Kashmir, but in 1949 India rejected the proposal. The Commission worked for about
two years and submitted three interim reports to the Security Council. However, it
could not bring India and Pakistan anywhere closer to agree on a settlement of the
dispute. Both the countries made varied interpretation of the plebiscite and
demilitarisation proposals. Under these circumstances, a suggestion was made that
the dispute be referred for arbitration. India did not agree with the proposal. At the
same time, Pakistan was not in favour of the idea of partitioning Kashmir. Disappointed
with the lack of progress in mediation, some of the Commission members came around
the idea of leaving the problem to be solved by India and Pakistan through bilateral
negotiations. By 1958 the LTN mediation came to naught and was eventually abandoned.

1 27.5.3 Bilateral negotiations


1 India's most preferred form of conflict resolution is bilateral negotiations. In the recent
period, this has become the dominant method because India, a focal party in almost all
South Asian conflicts and rivalries, has rejected arbitration and mediation. India's
neighbours are not able to change what they describe as the Indian mode gf peacemaking,
which has practically become the regional approach. The Shimla agreement is a result
of successful bilateral negotiations in 1972. It has emyhasised the relevance of
bilateralism to conflict resolution and sought India anc, --.tiri~;nnot to seek any form
of external involvement in peacemaking. It must be stated that despite some of India's
neighbours' reservation about the bilateral approach, it has been successfully and
unsuccessfully tried in many conflicts.
Successful negotiations were'held on the India-Sri Lanka territorial dispute and India's
Ganges water dispute with Bangladesh. Following protracted negotiations between
the leaders of India and Sri Lanka, the two countries signed an agreement on 26 June
1974; under which India agreed to accede t9 Sri Lanka's claim over the Kachchativu
island. This was probably one of the very few instances of India surrendering a small
portion of its territory over which it enjoyed a rightful claim of ownership by virtue of
the historical evidence. This was an extraordinary move to cultivate and befriend the
Regional Security regime in India's neighbourhood. Though the Kachchativu dispute was resolved, the island
has introduced a new irritant in India-Sri Lanka bilateral relations because, lured by a
heavy stock of demersal fish around Kachchativu, many fishermen from Tamil Nadu
often cross the Indian maritime boundary to only get shot or captured by the Sri Lankan
navy.
Protracted negotiations and a number of short-term agreements marked the Ganges water
dispute. It was finally resolved on 12 December 1996 when India and Bangladesh signed
a treaty to share the Ganges river water. The treaty is valid for 30 years and renewable
if both the countries are so willing. Also, if they so desire, they can review the treaty at
the end of every five or two years. It was more a political rather than a technocratic
resolution of the dispute that the treaty brought about. It was an exercise in compromise
made by both the countries on their stated positions. The water sharing formula adopted
in the treaty is based on the equality principle (5050) at the lower end, i.e., equal sharing
of the lean season flows. At the upper end, there is a slight variation. When the flow level
is 75,000 cusecs, India is given 40,000 cusecs and the balance goes to Bangladesh. The
treaty has also provided a mechanism for consultation and monitoring of flows. It has
been working well to the satisfaction of both the countries.
Bilateral negotiations have been unsuccessful in India's territorial disputes with Pakistan.
On numerous occasions, the Kashmir dispute has figured in bilateral talks since 1953
without much success. Three major high level talks were held in the 1950sand the 1960s.
The first of these were held in Karachi and New Delhi in July-August 1953 between the
Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan-Nehru and Mohammed Ali. In August 1953 both
the leaders reiterated their desire foi a fair and impartial plebiscite to determine the
wishes of the people of J&K. In this context, they sought the appointment of a Plebiscite
Administrator. However, due to the differences over the bilateral security issues, the
negotiations were broken off in December 1953. Again, both the countries resumed the
talks on 14" May which continued until 18" May. This round also did not make any
progress. Moreover, within weeks of talks, India and Pakistan accused each other of
insincerity in conducting negotiations. In the third phase, six round of talks were held
during December 1962 and May 1963. An important highlight of these talks was that
India was prepared to concede about 1500 square miles of Indian-held territory in Kashmir.
In return, it sought Pakistan's recognition of the rest of the areas. Pakistan rejected the
offer. It wanted the entire Kashmir valley. Thereafter, the Kashmir briefly figured during
the negotiations in Tashkent (1966) and Shimla (1972).
On the Siachen conflict, several rounds oftalks were held at the highest level since 1986.
The talks made some progress in 1989 and 1992 but did not lead to the resolution of the
dispute. In the talks between the defence secretaries of India and Pakistan held in June
1989, the two sides agreed to reach a settlement on redeployment of forces to reduce the
chances of conflict and avoid the use of forces. The progress was distinct in November
1992 when, it was reported, India and Pakistan prepared a draft agreement which
emphasised the mutual withdrawal of troops from key passes to new positions and creation
of a zone of military disengagement. Eventually, the idea was to create a zone of peace
and tranquillity without altering the position of both the sides. However, internal political
compulsionsand the disagreement over the interpretation of some of the provisions ofthe
draft agreement led to its total abandonment.
Subsequently, all the issues have become a part of the composite dialogue process, which
has reinforced once again bilateralism as a mode of conflict resolution. The composite
dialogue was offered in the mid-nineties by the I.K. Gujral government. Unfortunately,
the process was not sustained and the spirit of it was dampened until September 1998
when both Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif reached an agreement, which
underlined the need for creating an environment of peace and security and resolution of
all outstanding bilateral issues including Jammu and Kashmir. This paved the way for the
resumption of bilateral dialogue in November 1998. The composite dialogue was aimed at
improving bilateral relations on a broad front, building confidence and trust, putting in
place a stable structure of oo-operation and addressing all outstanding issues. An important
,
part of the dialogue process was the Defence Secretary-leveltalks on Siachen dispute, Resolution and
in which both sides reiterated their known positions. With a view to defusing tension Management of
and hostilities, the Indian side proposed an agreement on cease-fire in Siachen; Conflicts
j.

negotiations on disengagement/redeployment could start subsequently. But Pakistan


seemed to have not been favourably disposed towards the proposal. Another issue for
the dialoguewas Sir Creek and delimitation ofmaritime boundary, and was held between
the Surveyor Generals of India and Pakistan. It was the continuation of earlier
discussions held at both technical and government levels since 1969; the last round
took place in 1992. The talks revealed diametrically opposite positions of both the
countries: while India wanted to focus only on the unsettled pq-t of the boundary,
Pakistan sought to seek an absolute view of its resolution. India also made a proposal
that maritime boundary could be delimited from seawards even before resolving the
dispute over Sir Creek, to which Pakistan did nor agree
The Lahore Declaration (1 999) has also underlined the relevance of bilateral approach.
It provided for certain regulatory measures for achieving peace. Apart from
"intensifjling" their efforts to resolve all bilateral issues, India and Pakistan agreed to
"refrain" from interfering in each other's internal affairs, ''intensiw their composite
and integrated dialogue process, "reaffirm" their condemnation of terrorism and
"promote and protect" human rights and findamental freedoms. In March 1999,
Pakistan's Foreign Minister, SartajAzizand India's External Affairs Minister, Jaswant
Singh, worked out the modalities of implementingthe 'Lahore decisions'. ~ uthet war
in KargiI has derailed the entire peace process. Following Indian Prime Minister AE
Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan in 2004, the composite dialogue process has been given
another chance. It is said that so long as the Kashmir dispute persists, every Indian
effort to insist on the bilateral mode of conflict resolution will bound to be challenged
by Pakistan's demand for multilateral approach with a specific desire for involvement
of the US in peacemaking between India and Pakistan.
Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space below for your answers.


ii) Check the answers with the answers given at the end of this unit

1) Match the disputes listed in column A with the methods adopted to resolving
them listed in column B:

a) Rann of Kutch i) Bilateral negotiations


b) Indus Water dispute i Mediation
c) Ganges water dispute iii) Arbitration

2) What has been India's preferred method of conflict resolution and why?

LET US SUM UP
In this unit we have seen that South Asia is a conflict ridden region. As a result of the
t particular characteristics ofthe region, these conflicts are between India and its South
A -:-.--:-LL
Regional Security As we saw, open bilateral conflicts in the region centre on territory and water sharing.
While all the three methods of conflict management, arbitration, mediation and bilateral
negations have been tried with some success, since the 1960s, India has rejected arbitration
and mediation, and preferred to resolve conflicts with its neighbours through bilateral
negotiations. This Indian mode of peacekeeping has practically become the regional
approach. The Indo-Sri Lanka territorial dispute and the Indo-Bangladesh dispute over
Ganges water were successfully resolved through bilateral negotiations. However,
bilateral negotiations with Pakistan to resolve territorial disputes have so far not yielded
results. But one cannot give up peacemaking ventures out of frustration. There are no
quick fix solutionsto intractable problems and the process of peacemaking should continue
until the goals are reached. The experience the world over is that success comes only in
the process and as a result of bitter failures. South Asian countries accept this reality;
breakdowns in peace processes do not normally undermine their interest in conflict
management.

27.7 SOME USEFUL BOOKS


Bose, Sunandra. (1 997). The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, SelfDetermination
and International Peace. Delhi. Sage Publications.
Ganguly, Sumit (1986). The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflict
Since 1947. Boulder. Westview Press.
Gulahti, Niranjan. (1973). Indus Water Treaty:An Exercise in International Mediation.
Bombay. Allied Publishers
Raghavan, V.R. (2002). Siachen: Conflict Without End. New Delhi, Penguinbooks.
Sahadevan, P. (2001). Conflict and Peacemaking in South Asia. Delhi. Lancers.

27.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS


EXERCISES
Check Your Progress 1

1) One, both the parties should be satisfied with the outcome which meets their felt
needs and interests and two, there should not be any use of coercion.

2) Arbitration is part of the larger process of adjudication. In this method of conflict


resolution, the parties to the conflict refer the dispute to an impartial tribunal or
int'ernational court and agree to comply with its decisions.
Check Your Progress 2
1) a-iii, b-ii and c-i

2) Though India was willing to try all methods to resolve conflicts with its neighbours,
since the 1960s, it has insisted on bilateral negotiations to resolve conflicts. The
award of the tribunal on Rann of Kutch was not to the liking of India. With the
failure of international mediation to resolve conflict between India and Pakistan in
the 1950s, India rejected arbitration and mediation as methods for resolving conflicts
with its neighbours.

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