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Religious Language

Author(s): Webb Keane


Source: Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 26 (1997), pp. 47-71
Published by: Annual Reviews
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Annu.Rev. Anthropol.1997. 26:47-71
Copyright? 1997 byAnnual Reviews Inc. All rights reserved

RELIGIOUSLANGUAGE
WebbKeane
Departmentof Anthropology,University of Pennsylvania,Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania 19104

KEYWORDS:textandcontext,intentionality,
agency,interaction,
languageideology

ABSTRACT

The effort to know and interactwith an otherworldtends to demand highly


markeduses of linguisticresources.In contrastto less markedspeech situations,
in religiouscontextsthe sourcesof words,as well as the identity,agency, author-
ity, andeven the very presenceof participantsin an interaction,can be especially
problematic.Differentreligiouspracticesalteranyof a varietyof formalandprag-
matic featuresof everydaylanguagein responseto theirdistinctiveassumptions
aboutthe world,otherworlds,andthe beingsthey contain.Thesepracticesarealso
mediatedby speakers'assumptionsaboutthe natureand workingsof language.
Because such assumptionsbearon the presumednatureof humanandnonhuman
subjects,religious debates often dwell on details of verbal and textualpractice.
The studyof religiouslanguagetoucheson moregeneralproblemsconcemingre-
lationsamongperformance,text, andcontext.It also revealschronictensionsbe-
tweentranscendenceandthe situatednatureof practices,with implicationsforthe
natureof agency andbelief

RELIGIONAND MARKED LANGUAGE PRACTICES


Religion,accordingto WilliamJames(1902; cf Wallace 1966, p. 52), is founded
on the subjectiveexperienceof an invisiblepresence.A similarassumptionseems
to underlieEB Tylor'sassertionthatprayersbegin as spontaneousutterancesand
degenerateinto traditionalformulas(Tylor 1873, p. 371). An approach,however,
to the studyof religionthatbegins with subjectiveexperienceencounterscertain
difficulties.One is epistemological,becausethe observercan only have access to
otherpeople's experiencesandbeliefs throughobjectivemanifestations.The dif-
ficulty,however,is duenot only to the skepticismorpositivismof the outsider.To
presumethatreligiouspracticederivesfrompriorexperiencesor beliefs is to play
with theologicallyloaded dice. An emphasison subjectiveexperienceinvolves

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48 KEANE

presuppositionsand entailmentsthat are not sharedby all religious traditions


(Asad 1993). Moreover,concreteactivitiessuch as speaking,chanting,singing,
reading,writing-or theirpurposefulsuppression-can be as mucha conditionof
possibilityfor the experienceof the divine as a responseto it (Ferguson1985).
This can be especiallyevident,for instance,in the contextof proselytizationand
conversion, in which language may help make the supernaturalbelievable
(Harding1987) or induce certainreligiousdispositionsin the worshiper(Rafael
1992, cf Foucault 1980). In general,analyticapproachesthat stress the public
ratherthanthe subjectivecharacterof culture(Rappaport1979, Schieffelin1985,
Urban1991) arealso likely to concurwith CliffordGeertz'sobservationthatit is
"outof the contextof concreteacts of religiousobservancethatreligiousconvic-
tion emergeson the humanplane"(1973, pp. 112-13).
Religiousobservancetendsto demandhighly markedand self-conscioususes
of linguisticresources.Inthisarticle[bearin mindthatthe analyticcoherence,dis-
creteness,anduniversalityof the categoryreligionareproblematic(Asad 1993)],
religiouslanguagewill be provisionallydefinedin termsof the perceiveddistinct-
iveness of certaininteractions,textualpractices,or speechsituations.To the extent
thatparticipantsconsiderreligiouslanguagedifferentfromeverydayspeech,this
distinctivenessseems to respondto some of the commonsemioticandpragmatic
questionsthey face: By what means can we, and in what manneroughtwe, talk
with invisible interlocutors?How can we get them to respond?How shouldwe
talkaboutthem?By whatmarksdo we know thatsome wordsoriginatefromdi-
vine sources?Are these words true, fitting, efficacious, or compelling in some
specialway? These questionstouchon moregeneralproblemsconcerningthe re-
lations among performance,text, and context. They also involve the relations
amongexperience,concretepractices,andwhat is culturallyconstruedto lie be-
yond ordinaryexperience,whetherthatbe in the past,the future,at a spatialdis-
tance, or acrossan ontologicaldivide. The problemsof communicationbetween
this world and another,or of handlingauthoritativewords derivedfrom distant
sources,are criticalto manyreligiouspractices:Not only do they impose special
semiotic difficultieson humanpractitioners,but theirlanguagemust sometimes
contendwith the fact thatthe very presenceof the deity, spirits,or ancestorscan-
not be takenfor granted.1

IThisreviewis confinedlargelyto issuesthathavebeenraisedin empiricalstudiesof therole


of languagein religiouspractice.I havewrittenlittle aboutthe extensiveliteratureon belief
statements,the logic of religiousdiscourse,myth,hermeneutics andscripturalinterpretation,
conversionnarratives, feministcritiquesof religiousrhetoric,orthemorescattereddiscussions
of oaths,blessings,anduses of writingas materialartifact.Thereviewalso does not address
researchattheintersection betweenlanguageandmusic.It does,however,castthenetbroadlyto
includepracticessuchas divinationandso-called"magic,"whichsomedefinitionsof religion
exclude (often on theologicallyparochialand historicallyshifting grounds).Throughout,
citationsarelimitedto worksavailablein English.
RELIGIOUSLANGUAGE 49

Languageis one medium by which the presence and activity of beings that
are otherwiseunavailableto the senses can be made presupposable,even com-
pelling, in ways that are publically yet also subjectively available to people as
membersof social groups. However, no single set of formal or pragmaticfea-
tures is diagnostic of religious as opposed to other markeduses of language,
such as poetic or ceremonialspeech. Rather,differentreligious practicesseem
to select from among the entire spectrum of linguistic possibilities (Murray
1989, Sherzer 1990, Tedlock 1983). They suspend or alter certain aspects of
everydayways of speaking (even when religious language is taken to be prior
to the everyday) in responseto problemsposed by theirparticularotherworlds
and their assumptionsaboutthe everyday.Religious language is deeply impli-
cated with underlying assumptions about the human subject, divine beings,
and the ways their capacities and agencies differ. At the same time, religions
face chronic dilemmas posed by the tensions between transcendenceand the
situatedand concretenatureof verbalpractices. So much dependson these as-
sumptionsand tensions that much religious debate dwells on linguistic forms
(Bauman 1990; Bowen 1989, 1993; Ferguson 1985; Samarin 1973). The re-
view begins with one common denominatoramong many varieties of religious
language, the problems raised by interactionwith invisible beings. It then ad-
dresses linguistic form and pragmatics. The final two sections consider the
emerging scholarly interest in entextualizationand the dilemmas posed for
practitionersby otherworldlyauthorityand agency.
Invisibilityand Interaction
Thatthe peculiarityof certainspeech situationscan supportreligious interpre-
tation is famously evident in Augustine's conversion to Christianity
(Augustine 1961, pp. viii, 6-10). Upon hearingthe words "takeand read,take
and read"(tolle lege, tolle lege) spoken in a "sing-song"voice by an unseen
child from the other side of a wall, Augustine understoodthem to be a com-
mandfromGod. Openingthe Bible, he took the words he encounteredto be an-
othermoment of communication.Two featuresof the speech situationpermit-
ted this. First, the invisibility of the speaker allowed Augustine to wonder
about the true source of the words. Second, the fact that words written in one
context can be takenup and read in anotherallowed him to see himself as their
addressee.This episode illustratesthe importanceboth of participantroles and
of the tension between text and context in understandingthe efficacy of relig-
ious language. Moreover,the repetitivenessand assonance that drew Augusti-
ne's attentionto the child's utterancehint at the power of linguistic form as
well.
Such speech situationsare made possible by generalpropertiesof language
that allow otherwise nonperceptiblebeings to play a role in human societies,
50 KEANE

interactionsthat some scholarsview as defining religion (Boyer 1994). To the


extent thatreligion does involve interactionwith invisible and intangibleenti-
ties (or even, say, visible but silent icons), it poses certainpracticaldifficulties.
This is implicit in Hanks's remark that "it is distorting to describe a sha-
man... as acting alone simply because his spirit others are nowhere visible to
the untrainedobserver"(1996a, p. 167). Invisibility, however, may pose di-
lemmas for even the trainedobserver,as suggested in the words of a practitio-
ner, which form the title to an ethnographyof prayer:"Whereareyou spirits?"
(Metcalf 1989).
Religious speech situations can differ from the familiar parameters of
everyday speech in several respects. In doing so, they can challenge ordinary
habits as well as the theoreticalmodels of speech that are predicatedon them.
If everyday conversation is a joint production that depends on the partici-
pants sharingcertaindefault assumptions(Hanks 1996a, p. 168; cf Sperber&
Wilson 1995), such as who is participatingand what counts as the relevant
context of "here"and "now," religious speech frequentlyoccurs in situations
in which those assumptionsmust be suspended(Howell 1994). In contrastto
the face-to-face encounters of conversation analysis, the presence, engage-
ment, and identity of spiritualparticipantsin the speech event cannot always
be presupposed or guaranteed.Prayer often seeks to bring about interaction
between human beings and other kinds of beings that would (or should) not
otherwise occur (Atkinson 1989; Gill 1981; Hanks 1990, 1996a; McCreery
1995; Shelton 1976). In some traditions,humanbeings must be reassuredby
auralmeans "thatthe ancestors and spirits have not forsakenus" (Peek 1994,
p. 475). Even belief in the omnipresence of divinity does not assure that one
can interactwith it (KH Basso 1990, Peacock & Tyson 1989). Spiritsmay be
the real audience, even of performancesnot explicitly directedto them as ad-
dressees (Becker 1979, McDowell 1983), and even practitionerswho agree on
how to pray may disagree on who their prayers actually address (Frisbie
1980a).
In contrastto everyday conversation,where such matterscan be tacitly as-
sumed, addressinginvisible interlocutorsmay requirethat the participantsin
the speech event or even its location be clearly referredto (Gill 1981, Hanks
1996a, McCreery 1995, Metcalf 1989, Schipper 1974, Thomas & Afable
1994). The need to be explicit may also extend to the natureandpurposeof the
speech act being undertaken.Much of the contentof spells andprayersis meta-
pragmatic, thatis, it reflexively refersto the very actions it is undertaking(Sil-
verstein 1976; cf Jakobson1971). One reason is presumablythatthe supposed
participantsdo not all sharethe same spatiotemporalcontext, or do not shareit
in quite the same way. Metcalf observed of one Berawanprayerthat half the
verses are devoted to "tryingto ensurethatthe recently dead man whom he ad-
RELIGIOUS
LANGUAGE 51

dresses knows exactly what is happeningand why" (1989, p. 266). Such meta-
pragmaticmeans may help effect communicationwith the spiritworld or per-
mit a textual world to direct concrete actions (Atkinson 1989, Bell 1987,
Bowen 1993, Gill 1981, Hanks 1996a, Malinowski 1965, Sherzer 1990, Tam-
biah 1970). Some Gayo spells center on passages from the Qur'an that de-
scribe events in which certain powers were grantedto charactersin the text
(Bowen 1993). By reciting these passages, the speakermay obtainthose pow-
ers in turn.This appearsto work by recontextualizingnarrativesas metaprag-
matic statements:Their linguistic form remains the same, but their function
shifts. Ratherthanbeing construedas accounts of actions thatwere carriedout
in the past, the words are taken as reportson and directives for the action they
themselves carryout in the moment of speaking.
The problem of presence is often compoundedby anotherfeatureof other-
worldly beings. If these beings are sufficiently transcendent,then the ordinary
means by which people speak of or to entities in the world of everyday experi-
ence may be ruled out in principle. Some traditions, fearing hubris or blas-
phemy, index the transcendenceof divinity by enjoining name avoidance or
circumlocution(Janowitz 1989, 1993). Reflexive referenceto the very prohi-
bition itself-e.g. the "unspokenname"(Keane 1997a, p. 131)-may serve to
refer to a deity. As fully developed-for example, in negative theology and
many mystical traditions-the concept of transcendenceleads to the dilemma
that even to say that the divine lies beyond discourse is alreadyto reduce it to
discursive form, which should thereforebe eschewed (Clooney 1987, Lopez
1990, Sells 1994, Wright 1993; cf Katz 1992). The divine may be avoided not
just as an object of discourse. According to some Jewish traditions,the power
of the divine name lies in the fact that,because the deity Himself uttersit, it is
"themost importanttoken"of divine speech (Janowitz 1989, p. 85; 1993). The
prohibitionon speakingthe divine name thuspreventshumanbeings frompre-
sumingto take on a speakingpartreservedfor God. Prohibitionmay also serve
not only to protectthe speakersfrom otherworldlydangers,it may also serve to
bound off an entire sacredcode from the effects of secularcontexts (Kroskrity
1992). To protectthe statusof Hebrewin Israel,where it is also the languageof
secularaffairs, UltraorthodoxJews will not speak it outside liturgicalsettings
(Glinert & Shilhav 1991, Kantor 1992). From a pragmaticperspective, this
preservesthe presuppositionthat any actual instance of speakingHebrewwill
in fact be sacred.
Most religious traditions,however, do requirepractitionersto engage with
the invisible world in some respect, andthey providethe linguistic means to do
so. Whatin theirown speech activities enablespeople to have interactionswith
divine or spirit beings? Wherein lies the efficacy of religious language? An-
swering these questions requires examination of formal characteristics of
52 KEANE

speech performanceand the explicit beliefs or implicit assumptionsthat ac-


company them.

Form
Some of the richest work on religious language can be divided into thatwhich
focuses on meaning and that which focuses on form, though the two are usu-
ally closely linked. Studies that focus on meaning, especially as conveyed by
metaphor(Calame-Griaule1986; Fernandez1982, 1986; Wagner 1986; Wei-
ner 1991; Witherspoon1977), tend to stress the richness andpolyvalent quali-
ties of religious language (althoughoften only accordingto semanticcontent).
Conversely, studies of form often ascribeto rituallanguage a certainsemantic
poverty. Here I concentrateon questions of form, which have been more cen-
tral to those interestedin verbal practicesper se.
It is unusualfor religious languagenot to bearsome formalmarksof its spe-
cial character.Even the so-called plain speech of Quakersis recognizableby
certainstylistic features(Bauman 1990, Irvine 1982, Maltz 1985; cf Coleman
1996). In herpioneeringwork, Reichard(1944) soughtthe "compulsive"force
of Navajo prayer in its formal patterns. Developing the theme, Gill (1981)
claimed thatit is a generalcharacteristicof the languageof prayerthatits repe-
tition and formal elaborationare far out of proportionto the message, con-
struedas denotation.One evident function of this elaboration,he proposes, is
to signal a special frame of interpretation.Virtually any means, including
changes in phonology, morphology, syntax, prosody, lexicon, and entire lin-
guistic code can frame a stretchof discourse as religious. Shifts in phonology
can mimic shifts in language code. I have observedIndonesianChristianstake
on Arabic-inflectedpronunciationsto index the religious (albeit not Muslim)
characterof a speech event. Linguistic form is multifunctional,however, and
such devices are likely to entail more thanjust a shift of frames.For example,
when practitionersof local religions in the Indonesianbackcountrytake words
from the prayersof their Muslim neighbors,they are also tryingto tap into the
power held by politically dominantgroups and to claim some of the status as-
sociated with spatially distantsources of knowledge (Atkinson 1989, Metcalf
1989, Tsing 1993).
A useful summary of characteristicscommonly found in ritual speech is
providedby Du Bois (1986). Du Bois's list can be divided into featuresof per-
formanceand of text, and an associatedbelief thatritualspeech replicateshow
the ancestorsspoke. The performancefeaturesconsist of markedvoice quality,
greater fluency relative to colloquial speech, stylized and restricted intona-
tional contours, gestalt knowledge (speakers often learn texts as a whole and
cannot recite them in parts), personal volition disclaimer (crediting a tradi-
RELIGIOUS
LANGUAGE 53

tional source for one's words), avoidance of first and second personpronouns,
and mediation through several speakers. Du Bois argues that these features
tend to shift apparent control over speech from the individual proximate
speaker,who is bodily present at the moment of speaking, to some spatially,
temporally, or ontologically more distant agent (see also Urban 1989). This
shift of control and thus responsibilityis reinforcedby the textual features,in-
cluding the use of a ritualregister(differentlexical items for the same words in
colloquial and ritual speech), archaisticelements (including words and gram-
matical forms that speakers believe to be archaic), elements borrowed from
other languages, euphemism and metaphor, opaqueness of meaning, and
semantic-grammaticalparallelism (the latter having inspired an especially
large literature,e.g. EB Basso 1985, Boyer 1990, Fox 1975, 1988, Gossen
1974, Jakobson 1960, Keane 1997a, Kratz 1994, Kuipers 1990, Sherzer 1990,
Urban 1991).
Boyer (1990) proposed to explain the special forms taken by ritual speech
on the grounds that listeners always assume that those forms are somehow
caused by their divine sources and are thus evidence of the workings of forces
that are otherwise imperceptible.Du Bois's survey of ritualspeech, however,
suggests that the authorityritual speech holds for its hearersneed not require
us to attributeimplicit theories of causality to them. The formal properties
listed above have such effects as playing down the indexical groundingof ut-
terances in the context of the specific speech event, increasingthe perceived
boundedness and autonomouscharacterof certain stretchesof discourse, and
diminishingthe apparentrole of the speaker's volitional agency in producing
them. The resultingdecenteringof discourse (Bauman& Briggs 1990; Silver-
stein & Urban 1996a, p. 15), can encouragethe perceptionthatthe words come
from some source beyond the presentcontext. For example, each recitationof
Zuni prayershould be an exact repetitionof words "accordingto the first be-
ginning"(Bunzel 1932a, p. 493). But the participants'sense that such prayers
do indeed repeatprimordialwords need not rely merely on their acceptanceof
some explicit doctrine.Rather,the decenteringeffects producedby the formal
propertiesof prayershelp supportthis belief as an intuitionthat is reinforced
by each performance.
A second influentialapproachfocuses on sociopolitical effects of linguistic
form. One version of this approachbuilds on Durkheim's observation(1915;
cf Briggs 1988, Kratz 1994) that ritualform can create a unified congregation
by regimentingvocal andbodily movements and,by its emotionaleffects, may
transformindividuals' subjective states (Davis 1985, George 1996, Goodman
1972, Lawless 1988, Maltz 1985, Nelson 1985, Pitts 1993, Roseman 1991, Ti-
ton 1988). Anotherapproachlooks at how linguistic form can restrictaccess to
the circulationof discourse (Briggs 1993, McDowell 1983, Urban 1996; cfKH
54 KEANE

Basso 1990). To the extent that their use demands esoteric knowledge, relig-
ious speech genres or lexicons can become scarceresources(Bledsoe & Robey
1986, Carpenter1992, Frisbie 1980a, Irvine 1989, Lindstrom1990). Theirdis-
tinctive aesthetic and semantic characteris then sometimes projected onto
those who command them. Those who customarily speak refined or sacred
words may themselves be creditedwith essential qualities of refinementor sa-
credness (Bourdieu 1991, Buckley 1984).
If those who emphasize metaphorare often inclined to see religious lan-
guage as richerthan ordinaryspeech, anotherapproachsees it as more impov-
erished. Bloch (1975, 1989) claimed that the formal structureof ritual speech
leads to diminished propositional meaning and in other ways restricts the
range of what can be said (cf Rappaport1979). By these effects, highly formal
speech comes to serve the perpetuationof authority.Bloch has drawn criti-
cism, both for his account of language and for the conclusions he draws from
it, even from some who concur with aspects of his thesis (Boyer 1990,
McDowell 1983). Formality,redundancy,and repetitionare not incompatible
with semantic meaning (Briggs 1988, Janowitz 1989). As Gill (1981) pointed
out, formality only looks noncreative when we take texts in isolation rather
than as componentsof largeractions. In a fundamentalchallenge to Bloch, Ir-
vine (1979) showed that he had groupedtogethera heterogeneousset of prop-
erties under the rubricof formality, conflating linguistic properties,kinds of
events, and aspects of social order,when demonstrablyformalityof one does
not necessarily follow from the other.Thus, rigid poetic canons may correlate
with political hierarchy but leave performers powerless (Metcalf 1989),
whereas flexible speech normsin relatively egalitariansocieties may reinforce
individualdifferences of social status(Atkinson 1989). We need to be careful,
then, aboutwhat aspect of society is being correlatedwith the formalityof its
ritual speech (Brenneis & Myers 1984).
Few would be willing to claim that the linguistic and pragmaticproperties
of ritual speech are without effect. A third approachhas been to link these
propertiesto the actionsthatritualspeech is supposedto undertake.In an influ-
ential paper, Silverstein (1981) arguedthat ritual speech is persuasive in part
because of the mutuallyreinforcingways in which its form, at multiplelinguis-
tic levels, serves as a metapragmaticfigure for the accomplishmentof the suc-
cessive stages of the action being undertaken.For example, the sequence of
verbs in Navajo prayers moves from plea for expected future actions to de-
scription of actions taking place to descriptionof result of accomplished ac-
tions (Gill 1981; cf Vitebsky 1993). Thus, over the course of the actualtime of
the speech event the portrayalof time by the grammaticaltense system shifts,
until finally the outcome is implicitly taken to be something already accom-
plished.
RELIGIOUS
LANGUAGE 55

Such analyses focus on the effects of form on the consciousness of hearers,


speakers,or readers.The forms taken by ritual speech also reflect the partici-
pants' assumptionsaboutagency or aboutwhat is requiredto communicateef-
fectively across (or even talk about) (Wright 1993) the semiotic and ontologi-
cal gap between human beings and invisible interlocutors(Gill 1987). If hu-
man beings cannotbe sure their addresseessharethe same language,wordless
song (EB Basso 1985) may be the best way to communicatewith them; con-
versely, spiritsmay manifesttheirpresenceby producingunintelligiblesounds
(Hinton 1980) or changes in voice quality (Howell 1994, Irvine 1982, Schief-
felin 1985) in possessed human beings. When people use a sacred language,
such as Arabic,they may debatemattersof pronunciationin the effortto repro-
duce the soundof revelation(Nelson 1985). Sonic form itself can be seen as di-
vine (Alper 1988, Buckley 1984, Dusenbery 1992, JD Hill 1993, Janowitz
1993, Lopez 1990, Sullivan 1988, Witherspoon1977). If the utteranceof man-
tra is tantamountto divine presence (Staal 1990), the speaker's intention and
semantic intelligibility become irrelevant.Conversely, those who receive part
of their scripturein translation(e.g. from Hebrew to the Greek of some early
Christians) may find the "spirit" to lie in semantics, in contrast with the
"fleshly" linguistic form (Janowitz 1993, p. 400; cf Stock 1996).
At issue in the formalcharacterof religious language,therefore,arenotjust
aesthetic,emotional,or social functions,but also assumptionsaboutwho is ac-
tually speakingand listening in any given speech event. Closely boundup with
these arelocal assumptionsabouthow languageworks. These questionscan be
addressedin turn as problems of intentionality,participantroles, and author-
ship.

Intentionalityand Responsibility
The means by which humanbeings communicatewith invisible beings tend to
reflect underlyingassumptionsaboutthe natureof these beings, of the human
subject, and of the social relations between them (Buckley 1984, Bunzel
1932a, Gossen 1974, Rosaldo 1982). In some traditionsprayersare shapedby
humandeference towardthe beings addressed(Robson 1994); others, like the
Zuni, "donot humblethemselves before the supernatural;they bargainwith it"
(Bunzel 1932b, p. 618). Some forms of speech seek to persuade, flatter, or
please the listener (Calame-Griaule1986) or influence the spirits by display-
ing the speaker's privileged knowledge of their names or origins (Atkinson
1989, Bowen 1993, Lambek 1981, Sherzer 1990). It is precisely the assump-
tions about the participantsimplicit in linguistic form that are often at issue
when religious reformersseek to transformor forbid certainspeech practices.
One complaintby reformersis that if God is all-powerful,then cajoling words
56 KEANE

are arrogant,and magical words-to the extent that they seek to act directly
upon their addressee-a denial of divine agency. Another complaint is that
persuasive words that seem to be addressed to offerings, sacralia, or altars
therebyinappropriatelyimputesubjectivityto an inanimatelistenerand are ef-
fectively a form of fetishism (Keane 1996).
Similar concerns about the role of speakersas agentive, volitional, and in-
tending subjectsanimatedebates in the academicstudy of language.Religious
language raises difficulties, for example, for the view that the meaning of ut-
terances depends on the listener's construalof the speaker's intentions(Grice
1957, Sperber& Wilson 1995). Do shamans or worshippersnecessarily ad-
dress beings from whom they expect recognition of their intentions?Do glos-
solalia (Goodman 1972, Samarin1972), the use of a languageunknownto the
addressee (Bauman 1990), or other esoteric or unintelligible speech (Hinton
1980) communicatean intention,and if so, whose? Must I imputeintentionsto
spirits when seeking signs from them in return?In collective worship, must
every participantsharethe same intentionsor assumptionsaboutwhat is hap-
pening?
Religiouspracticeshaveplayeda centralrole in scholarlyeffortsto understand
languageas a formof action(Malinowski1965;cf Lienhardt1961, p. 238), nota-
bly under the influence of Austin's concept of speech acts (Austin 1975; see
Ahem 1979; Du Bois 1992; Finnegan 1969; Gill 1981, 1987; Rappaport1979;
Tambiah1979;Wheelock1982).Modelsof actiontypicallyrequiresome account
of actors'intentions;for example,in the case of language,those of speakers',as is
evidentin Searle's(1969) versionof speechact theory.In response,ethnographic
counterexamples-largely drawn from ritual contexts-have been adduced
againstthemodelsof speechthatgive centralplaceto the intentionalityof individ-
ual speakers(Duranti1993, Rosaldo 1982). In his debatewith Searle, Derrida
(1982) stressedthe degreeto which languageis independentof the intentionsof its
speakers.WhatDerridacalls the iterabilityof languagemeans thatbecause any
given utterancemustdrawon a preexistinglinguisticsystemandthuscanneverbe
fully determinedby or confinedto the specificcircumstancesin whichit is uttered,
it is alwaysvulnerableto being takenout of context,being citedratherthanused,
takenin jest ratherthanin seriousness,and so forth.Derridacan be criticizedfor
overlookingthe social characterof speech,becauseover the courseof a given in-
teractionparticipantstendto worktogetherto limitthe possible interpretations of
theirutterances(Borker1986, Brenneis1986, Duranti& Brenneis1986, Tedlock
& Mannheim1995). In manyreligiousspeech situations,however,the possibili-
ties for such interactivework arehighlyrestricted:Becausethe spiritsarenot full
coparticipantsin the shapingof meaningin the sameway othersortsof conversa-
tion partnersare, the ambiguitiesdue to language'siterabilitycan be especially
prominent.
RELIGIOUS
LANGUAGE 57

Du Bois (1992) arguedthatdivinationworks by suppressingspeakerinten-


tionality, distinguishingbetween the propositionalcontentof questionsformu-
latedby humanbeings andthe pragmaticforce carriedby the oracle's answers.
By restrictingimputedintentionalityto only one componentof the communi-
cative event, divination allows people to avoid responsibilityfor what is said.
Still, Du Bois's analysis appears to take intentionalityto be the default as-
sumptionin speech and fails to explain why suppressionof intentions should
be more successful thanthe ascriptionof intentionsto, say, oraculardevices or
hidden spirits (for an alternativeapproach,see the following section).
Speaker intentionalityis a central issue in the debates among Indonesian
Muslims discussed in detail by Bowen (1989, 1993). Some modernists de-
mand that believers pray with sincere intentionsby utteringthe words with a
"powerfuldepictive imagination"of their goal (1993, p. 84). As this example
shows, intentionalitycan be crucial even when the words used are highly for-
mulaic andthus not subjectto manipulationby speakers.As an element of par-
ticular language ideologies (culturally specific assumptions about the rela-
tions between languageform and function) (Woolard 1992), the concept of in-
tentionalitycan produceeffects in its own right. Swedish Evangelicals, for ex-
ample, emphasize the intentionality of the individual speaker. According to
Stromberg (1993), however, because speech can express unacknowledged
aims, therewill be occasions of stress when they find themselves saying things
they have not consciously meant. To explain such utterances,which their lan-
guage ideology rendersmysterious,they ascribethem to divine agency. Simi-
larly, CatholicCharismaticstell roundsof stories thatoften develop a thematic
unity over the course of a gathering.Because the collective productis outside
the volition of any particularstoryteller, the participantstake this unity to
manifest the presence of a single divine source (Szuchewycz 1994; cf Borker
1986). This conclusion seems to be predicated on their assumptionthat any
agency that lies beyond the level of the individual is not likely to be human.
The role of intentionalityacross the range of known speech practicesremains
subjectto debate.But these examples show that any theory of intentionsmust
consider both extraordinaryinteractionsand the mediating role of language
ideologies.
ParticipantRoles
In Du Bois's view, divinatoryprocedureswork in partby distributingrespon-
sibility for different components of speech among the several participantsin
the communicativeevent. Notice, however, that what Du Bois takes to be the
suppressionof individualintentionalitycan also be describedas an expansion
of the presupposedspeaking subjectbeyond the level of the individual(Keane
1997a) and a fosteringof collaborativeauthorshipandinterpretation(Brenneis
58 KEANE

1986, Lambek 1981). This expansion can be effected throughthe elaboration


of participantroles. Erving Goffman (1981, cf Irvine 1996) distinguishedsev-
eralroles involved in speech events, includingtheprincipal who bearsrespon-
sibility for what is said, the author who formulatesthe actual words, the ani-
mator who uttersthem, the proximal addressee of the utterance,the target to
whom the words areultimatelydirected,andthe overhearer.To treata spiritas
the addresseeof words is to impute to it a differentsort of presence, and per-
haps agency, thanthat of an overhearer.Roles that can be held in combination
by one person may also be distributedamong several incumbents(e.g. priests
who, in the name of ritual sponsors, utter words attributedto spirit authors).
Distributionof roles may serve to displace responsibilityaway fromparticular
individuals or diffuse it among many. Elaborationsof participantroles may
help invoke sources of authoritythatarenot limitedto the perceptiblehere and
now, so that, for instance,the speech event makes plausiblethe presence of in-
visible andinaudiblespirits(Hanks 1996a). Religious belief thus finds support
in the concrete forms of speech practices as much by what they presupposeas
by what they depict.
If some speech events distributeparticipantroles amongmany persons,oth-
ers combine several roles in one physical individual (Hill & Irvine 1992, Sil-
verstein& Urban 1996a). This is evident in possession (Boddy 1994), in which
the deity or spirit and the humanbeing both use the same body, and in Pente-
costal speaking in tongues or glossolalia (Goodman 1972, Maltz 1985, Muel-
ler 1981, Samarin1972). In possession, however, linguistic forms may not be
sufficient to determine what being has entered the scene (Goodman 1972,
Whyte 1990), or for thatmatter,whetherthe speakeris simply insane:The ulti-
mate decision may be determinedas much by the politics of interpretationas
by the characterof the speech (Irvine 1982).
An importantkindof religioustransformation consistsof takingon a new role
as speaker.The conversionnarrativeof preachersis often aboutthe call to preach
(Titon 1988), and full conversionmay entailbeing transformedfromthe listener
to the speakerin acts of "witnessing"(Harding1987, Lawless 1988, Peacock&
Tyson 1989, Titon 1988) or developing"attunement" with a teacher'sdiscourse
patterns(Trix 1993). As such studiesshow, the speaker'sreligiousidentityis ap-
proachednot only or most usefully as an object of discourse(as in the "life-
history"),but also as an inhabitablespeakingrole (Kratz1994, McDowell 1983),
with all the discursiveandmoralpossibilitiesthatmay entail.
Authorship
The analysis of participantroles calls into question who counts as present in
any given event, and to whom the words manifested in any event are to be at-
tributed.Of particularimportancein many situationsis the questionof author-
RELIGIOUS
LANGUAGE 59

ship. One speech genre in a single ritualcan encompassquite differentkinds of


authors;an Episcopal service can include prayerswhose sources areboth local
(thatfor Congress) and divine (the Lord's Prayer,as taughtby Christ).In Boy-
er's (1990) hypothesis, listenerstake the special forms of ritualspeech to index
a divine source. The hypothesis, however, does not fully account for the role
played by the human animator who utters words imputed to otherworldy
authorsor principals. Often participantsare primarilyinterestedin the social
relationshipsalong which speech is transmittedfrom otherworldto manifest
actors. Shamans, for instance, are commonly said to develop individual rela-
tionships with spirits who then provide them with songs or chants (Atkinson
1989; Briggs 1993; LR Graham1995; Hanks 1990,1996a; Howell 1994; Lam-
bek 1981; Roseman 1991; Sullivan 1988). For listeners who are awareof this,
the performanceitself will be sufficient to index the existence of the relation-
ship, and the relationshipin turnprovides the warrantfor the performance.In
addition,the efficacy of ritualor sacred speech may stem from the fact that it
originatesfrom those to whom it speaks, somethingthatgives the speakerspe-
cial authorityor persuasiveness,or places the listenerunderspecial obligations
(Bledsoe & Robey 1986, Briggs 1993).
Whenthe authorof wordsis distinctfromtheiranimator,relationshipsbetween
the two can displaysignificantvariation.YucatecMayanshamansreceive speech
in dreamsor fromothershamans,but each individualcontinuesto "beautify"this
speechthroughouta lifetime,leadingHanksto ask "whatkindof speakeris this?"
(1996a, p. 161-62). Waraoshamansreceive chantsin dreamsthatareinducedby
tobaccothathas been receivedfrom an oldershaman(Briggs 1993). In this case,
the chantappearsto index two sources,both the spirit'sauthorship(of linguistic
forn) andthe teacher'sauthorization(of pragmaticcapacity).Distinctionsamong
participantroles can have politicalconsequences:Lawless (1988) arguedthatdi-
vinely inspiredtestimonyallows Pentecostalwomen in patriarchalcommunities
to exertinfluencethatwould not be availableto them were they to claim full re-
sponsibilityfor theirwords. Howell (1994) correlateddistinctionsof authorship
with sociopoliticalprinciples.Whereasthe egalitarianChewongtreatspiritsand
shamansas coproducersof thetext,ritualspeakersof the morehierarchicalLio are
not supposedto innovate(see also Atkinson1989, Metcalf 1989). Whatthese ex-
amples show is thatthe handlingof imputedauthorshipmay have more general
implicationsfor local assumptionsabout agency. At one extreme,if words are
compulsivelyeffective in themselves,then anyonewouldbe able to use them,re-
gardless of the speaker'spersonalcharacteror intentions,and without conse-
quencesforpersonalstatus-unless, like earlyQuakers,one is the chosenbutrela-
tively emptyreceptaclefor God's words(Bauman1990).At the otherextreme,if
one's wordsare supposedlyonly one's "ownvoice" (Metcalf 1989), the speaker
takes on considerableresponsibilityandrisk.
60 KEANE

A single performancecan manifest a range of speakercontrol and a variety


of presumedpresences and actors, visible and invisible. Many ritualstake ad-
vantage of this "heteroglossic"variabilityby undergoing,for example, a shift
over performancetime from what Bakhtin (1981) called relatively "dialogic"
towardmore "monologic"and authoritativespeech forms (Kuipers 1990). In
the process, the identityof the presupposedauthorcan shift by degrees along a
wide spectrum.For example, Baptist preacherswork towarda climactic stage
marked by a staggered stanza pattern created by breath groups bounded by
audible gasps or nonsense syllables (Pitts 1993; cf Davis 1985, Rosenberg
1970, Titon 1988). Participantstake this final stage to be evidence of the divine
speakingthroughthe preacherbecause "no mortalcould possibly projectsuch
a design so farin advance,and so consistently,upon what appearsto be sponta-
neous speech" (Pitts 1993, p. 165). When Xavante narratetheir dreams, ac-
cording to LauraGraham,pronounuse, altered voice quality, and other fea-
tures come to identify the speakerwith the spirits(LR Graham1995). This ex-
emplifies Urban's (1989; cfBesnier 1995, JD Hill 1993, Kroskrity1992, Law-
less 1988) thesis that duringa performance,animatorscan shift between fuller
and lesser identificationwith the narratedspeaker,positioning themselves as
commentatorson the spirits, who thereby remain relatively absent from the
presentevent, or performingas a spirit,therebybringingtheirworld relatively
close to the present,while also distancingthe speakerfromthe self of everyday
speech. A shift in presumedauthorentails a shift in the animator'srelationship
to his or her words. Falling shortof full possession, in which one socially rec-
ognized identity can supplant the other, is what Hymes (1981) called the
"breakthrough"by which a speaker may shift from report (taking some dis-
tance on his or her words) to performance(fully identifying with the role of
authoritativeanimator,even if not that of author).
Shiftsin performancemay thusrestructurerelationsbetweenthe speechevent
and an otherworld.As a preachershifts into divinely inspiredspeech, not only
does an otherworldlyauthorbecomepresentin the contextof theparticularspeech
event,butthe speecheventmay come to be projectedinto another,scriptural,con-
text (Davis 1985, Peacock & Tyson 1989). The relativedominanceof text and
contextcan vary,as shown in Briggs's (1988) analysisof New MexicanCatholi-
cism: WhereaseverydayBiblical allusionsbringscripturalpassagesto bearon a
here-and-nowcontextthatitself remainsthe centerof attention(cf Meigs 1995),
the mass may collapsethe distinctionbetweenBiblicaltext andritualcontext.
Quotation
Because not every society provides explicit, doctrinal explanations of the
sources of ritualwords, it may lie primarilywith linguistic form to make the
spiritworld manifest, inferable,or presupposablefor the participants.In addi-
RELIGIOUSLANGUAGE 61

tion to the linguistic and paralinguisticcues alreadynoted, one means of mak-


ing evident thatwords have otherworldlysources is the use of quotation.Sha-
manistic speech seems to fall ambiguously between that of priests and of the
possessed. The distinctionlies in whetherperformanceis taken to be a kind of
quotation or whether the spirits are speaking through the performer.Words
that are framedas reportedspeech can therebybe portrayedas originatingout-
side the present context in which they are being reported(Buckley 1984). The
Sufi teacher's authoritycomes in partfrom animatingthe words of otherswho
have actually seen the other world (Trix 1993). When Baptists hear the voice
of the Spiritin the inwardself, the only evidence lies in the public act of talking
about it, a common reason for quoting divine speech (Titon 1988). Jewish,
Christian,and Islamic scripturesaboundin reportedspeech of God (Wolter-
storff 1995).
The different ways in which the quoted words are framed by the quoting
speech can have entailments for their respective authority. What is quoted
might be the original moment in which the words were received (LR Graham
1995), previous performances(Hanks 1996a, Howell 1994), or words formu-
lated by other participantsin the same speech event. Because the reported
speech given in the rabbinictext analyzed by Janowitz (1989; cf Trix 1993)
consists of past didactic dialogues, the reader, as addressee of that reported
speech, becomes one more link in the chain of transmission.Simultaneously,
the authorityof those words is displayed by quotationframes that show them
to have their origins in the past. The relations between quoter and quoted
speakermay be subjectto contestationandhistoricalreconfiguration.Accord-
ing to William Graham (1977, 1987), early Islam did not differentiate the
authorityof divine words and the prophetic words ascribed to Muhammed.
The divine words found in the Qur'anarequotation,God's words framedas re-
ported in the words of the Prophet.Conversely, the Prophet's words bear di-
vine authorityas utterancesof God's appointed.Subsequentefforts to distin-
guish "propheticspeech"from "revelation"in effect sharpenthe boundarybe-
tween authorand animator,and thus between reportedtext and reportingcon-
text, thereby keeping the original prophecy at a greater, potentially more
authoritative,remove from subsequentevents.
What distinguishes direct from indirect quotation is the purportedresem-
blance of formbetween the words as they occurredin the originalspeech event
and their reoccurrencein the subsequent, quoting, speech event (Volosinov
1973). In contrastwith directquotation,indirectquotationgrantsto the person
reportingthe original words responsibilityfor interpretingthem from the per-
spective of the subsequentspeech event (Lucy 1993). Whereas direct quota-
tion separatesanimator(the person doing the quoting) from author(the person
being quoted), indirect quotationcombines the two roles (because the person
62 KEANE

doing the quotingindicatesthatthe originalwordshave been rephrased),while


still locating the principal-the speaker responsible for the original utter-
ance-in some previouscontext. Consequently,people often feel directquota-
tion to be more deferentialto the originalspeakerbecause it maintainsa clearer
distinctionbetween the voices of quoted and quoting speakers,does not pre-
sume to interpretanother'swords, and does not superimposethe speaker'sin-
dexical frameof referenceonto thatof the originalspeech event (Hanks 1996b,
p. 211; cf Urban 1989). Volosinov points out that such differences in form re-
flect the relative authority of the reported words and their authors: "The
strongerthe feeling of hierarchicaleminence in another'sutterance,the more
sharplydefined will its boundariesbe, andthe less accessible will it be to pene-
trationby reportingand commentingtendencies from outside"(1973, p. 123).
As William Graham's(1977) discussion of prophetic speech suggests, how-
ever, direct quotationcan also come to identify animatorwith author.For ex-
ample, Janowitz(1989) arguedthatthe hymns given by a rabbinicascent text
are supposed to be identical to the words sung by angels in heaven. Because
these hymns are replicas of angelic speech, the humanbeing who recites them
in effect joins the heavenly chorus, "collapsing the distance between heaven
and earth"(p. 91). Differences in how reportedspeech is framedare evidence
for a rangeof ways in which the animatoris thoughtto benefit from or identify
with the divine sources of the reported words (Irvine 1996, p. 150; Meigs
1995; Urban 1989). Thus, questions about religious authorityand ritual effi-
cacy can demanda closer examinationof the relationsbetween text and con-
text.

Entextualizationand Contextualization
As the question of authorshipdemonstrates,there is a wide range of forms by
which speech can manifest the presence of divine or spiritbeings in concrete
events or cast particularcircumstances as instances of eternal or originary
truths.This variationcan be seen in terms of agency, as shown above, and it
can also be viewed in relationto the definition and transformationof context
(Schieffelin 1985, Wheelock 1982). The emphasison the textualaspects of rit-
ual is, more specifically, part of a growing scholarly interest in the particular
ways by which the transformationof context comes about, and a move away
from an earlier anthropologicaltendency to privilege "face-to-face"interac-
tion and oral performance(Blackburn1988, Boyarin 1993). A key concept is
entextualization,"theprocess of renderingdiscourse extractable,...[so that] it
can be lifted out of its interactionalsetting"(Bauman& Briggs 1990, p. 73; cf
Silverstein& Urban 1996b). This process can be affected by anythingthatem-
phasizes the internalcohesion and autonomyof a stretchof discourse,permit-
RELIGIOUSLANGUAGE 63

ting it to form a text (whetheroral or written)that is perceived to remaincon-


stant across contexts (Bauman & Briggs 1990). The process can include lin-
guistic and performancedevices, such as the formalfeatureslisted by Du Bois
(1986), thatdiminishthe speaker'scontrolover the utterance.Entextualization
is thus an ubiquitousfeatureof languageuse [cfJakobson's (1960) poetics and
Derrida'snotion of iterability].For example, it is one means by which anima-
tor can be distinguishedfrom author,because it permits stretchesof discourse
to be removed from one context and resituatedin anotheras reportedspeech.
Note, however, that text is one moment in a dialectical process through
which words undergoboth contextualizationand entextualization(Bell 1987).
(Re)contextualization,the (re)insertionof text into a context, may, for exam-
ple, take the form of reading aloud, reciting formulaic verse, or quoting an-
other's words (Becker 1983, Boyarin 1993, Janowitz 1993, Meigs 1995, Sil-
verstein 1996). When scriptureis believed to reportthe actualwords of divine
revelation,the act of readingaloud effectively closes the circuitfromutterance
in context to written text and back to utterance again (Janowitz 1989, pp.
102-3). To the extent that a scripturaltext merges with a context, it can be
takenas makingdivinity present(Nelson 1985, Peacock & Tyson 1989). Reci-
tations, however, often retainsome markedlinguistic or performancefeatures
(Blackburn1988, Rabin 1976, Silverstein 1996), which testifies to theirpersis-
tent connection to and difference from the prior-and distant-context. Thus,
to the extentthatperformancepermitsa distinctionbetween text and contextto
remain perceptible (e.g. by reading with an exaggerated monotone), it pro-
vides materialsubstantiationfor the participants'intuitionsthatthe presentin-
teractionstandsout againsta more authoritativesource thatis in some way ab-
sent (Besnier 1995, George 1996, Valentine 1995). The relation,however, be-
tween text and context can also be understoodas an instance of a pervasive di-
lemma for many religions, thatthe divine is in practiceentangledwith the con-
crete human acts it should transcend(Lopez 1990, Lutgendorf 1991, Nelson
1985). Groupsthat seek immediateaccess to divinity tend to be suspicious of
any overtly textual mediation,including not only actualwritten artifactssuch
as prayerbooksor notes (Bauman 1990, Maltz 1985, Peacock & Tyson 1989,
Pitts 1993, Stock 1996, Titon 1988), but also memorized, formalized, or aes-
thetically appealing words, the use of which can be seen as inauthenticand
idolatrous(Coleman 1996, Janowitz 1993, Keane 1997b, Nelson 1985, Prell
1989).
The concept of entextualizationmeans that context is not the court of final
appealfor any analysis, or somethingresidualthatmust only be taken into ac-
count. Rather,what is relevantto context-and even whethercontext is to be
consideredrelevant-is the result of ongoing social processes, genre expecta-
tions, and languageideologies. Because entextualizationtends to decenterthe
64 KEANE

event (Bauman& Briggs 1990, p. 70), reorientingit arounda prior or other-


wise absent origin, what counts as context becomes problematic.This would
seem to supportBloch's (1989) contentionthatritual suppressesthis world in
favor of the otherworldly.Ritual, however, need not serve only one function.
To the extent thatentextualizationand contextualizationexist in a dialectic re-
lation to each other, neither can serve as a final ground for analysis. Because
language use moves between the poles of entextualizationand contextualiza-
tion, speech events can also stress the boundarybetween text and context-as
when rituallanguageremainsincomprehensibleto listeners-maintaining the
separationbetween worlds. To the extent thattexts can move across contexts,
they allow people to create the image of something durableand shared,inde-
pendentof particularrealizationssuch as readings,interpretations,or perform-
ances or their historicaltransformations(Barth 1990; Urban 1991, 1996). One
effect of the transportabilityof texts is the identificationof spatialwith tempo-
ral distance: Local practitionersmay find the authorityof both the scriptures
and the practicesthey ordainto derive simultaneouslyfrom their global reach
and their ancient origins (Bledsoe & Robey 1986, Bowen 1993, Briggs 1988,
Pitts 1993).
Dilemmas of Belief and Agency
The ways in which differentreligious practiceshandle languagecan shed light
on some generaldilemmasof belief and agency. One implicationfollows from
the challenge these practicespose to any strongversion of linguistic determin-
ism. Irvine (1982) arguedthat a diagnosis of spirit possession is never deter-
mined directly by how the possessed person speaks but requiressome degree
of social negotiation. Otherspoint out that linguistic form alone cannottell us
what people take their words to be doing, where they believe those words
originate,or even whetherthey considerthe languageto be intelligible (Briggs
1988; Irvine 1982, p. 243). Practitionersthemselves may remainin some doubt
aboutthese matters(Goodman1972). An importantconsequenceof the under-
determinedrelationshipbetween linguistic form and function is that existing
ritual forms can take on new functions and meanings duringperiods of relig-
ious reform,in the name eitherof change or of continuity(Bowen 1989, 1993;
Keane 1995; Tambiah 1979).
A second implicationconcernsbelief. Academic discussions of belief have
tendedto presupposethe view characteristicof conversion-orientedreligions,
that one either believes or does not, and often that co-religionists can be as-
sumed to possess a high degree of sharedbelief. But mattersneed not be so
clear-cut:If linguistic form and function are not mechanicallyboundtogether,
then particular practices need not require particularbeliefs (Boyer 1990,
Favret-Saada1980). In fact, some languagepractices seem designed to permit
RELIGIOUSLANGUAGE 65

people to carryon withoutdemandingan explanationof what is happening(Du


Bois 1992). Moreover, in contrastto Bloch's thesis that ritual speech is suc-
cessful only to the extent that it brooks no deviation, some religious speech
practices may be effective precisely because they can supportambivalentor
contradictorybeliefs in the practitioner.This is one implication of Rafael's
(1992) view that Tagalog speech practicesin the confessional were simultane-
ously ways of convertingto Catholicismand of fending off missionaries' de-
mandsfor belief. Ivy (1995), using the psychoanalyticmodel of the fetish, pro-
poses thatJapanesespiritmediumsprovidemembersof a highly industrialized
society with the solace of communicationwith the dead without needing to
fully persuadethem that such communicationhas been achieved.
Religious language also raises questions about agency. In studies of ritual,
performance,and conversation,attentionhas increasinglyshifted from formal
patternsto the emergenceandnegotiationof meaningsover the course of inter-
action (Bauman & Briggs 1990, Kratz 1994, Schieffelin 1985, Silverstein &
Urban 1996b, Tedlock & Mannheim 1995). Wary of the determinismalleged
of some varieties of structuralism,analytic approachesthat stress interaction
often give great weight to the agency of participants.The problem of agency
becomes especially acute, however, in circumstancesthat are supposedto in-
volve otherworldlyagents, and in practices that impose severe constraintson
the humanpractitioner.Religious language frequentlyputs the role of the ap-
parentperformersinto question and situates the more efficacious, moral, or
liberatingagency in all sorts of other loci, such as sounds, canonical words,
teachers, deities, divinatorymechanisms, congregations,or books.
That language practices presuppose certain constructionsof agency helps
explain why religious reformmovements give so much attentionto the proper
uses of words. Reformers in several religions (Bauman 1990, Bowen 1993,
Maltz 1985) often attack existing speech practices as either grantinghuman
beings too much agency (relative to divine beings), or too little (relative to
false idols or objectifiedwords). Traditionalistsmay in turndefendthemselves
by asserting their superiorrespect for forebears or accusing reformers,who
seek unmediatedaccess to the divine, of excessive pride. At stake is the rela-
tionshipbetween the exteriorityof languageand its implicationsfor the interi-
ority of speakers (Keane 1997b). As has often been observed, language can
seem both deeply subjective (as an apparentmedium of inner thought), and
eminently social (as a preexisting system and a medium of communication).
Those who stress sincerity or direct access to divinity tend to be suspicious of
language,to the extentthatits concreteformsbearevidence of its conventional
or social origins outside the individualspeaker.Those who stress the distance
or difficulty of access to the divine often lay great weight on the mediating
power or intersubjectivityprovided by those same propertiesof language. In
66 KEANE

one view, speakersshould shape their words; in another,sacredwords should


offer something to speakers that they would not otherwise have. Implicit in
these differing stances is a broaderpoint, that human agency is not always
somethingpeople want entirelyto celebrateor claim for themselves; they may
preferto find agency in otherworlds. To the extent, however, thattheir access
to other worlds is mediated by language, it involves persistent tensions be-
tween transcendenceand the pragmaticpresent.Those tensions sustain a wide
range of certainties,ambivalences, and ambiguities and thereby keep open a
host of historicalpossibilities.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

JohnLucy, Adela Pinch, Michael Silverstein,and StephenF Teiser generously


commented on versions of this article. I thank Jacqueline Fewkes, Matthew
Tomlinson, and Jeremy Wallach for research assistance, and colleagues too
numerousto list here for references.

Visit the Annual Reviews home page at


http://www.AnnualReviews.org.
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