A DISSERTATION Presented to the Youlty of ?rincetan University in Candidscy for the Degree of Doctor af Philosophy ‘Recomended for Acceptance by the stays 1960Abstract: ‘This paper introduces the concopt of a non-cooperative gaxo and develops methods for the mathenatical analysis of such games. the ganee considered are nmporson gumes represented by means of pure stra= togies and payoff functions defined for the combinations of jure stratesiess ‘The distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative canes is unrelated to the uathematical doseriztion by means of pure strategies and peyeoff functions of a game. Rather, it depends on the possibility or impossibility of coalitions, commnication, ani cide-paymontss ‘The concepta of an equilitriim point, a solution, a strong solution, fa sub-solution, and valuas ere introduced by natheuntical definitions. and in later sections the interpretation af those concepts in non-cooper= ative gamee is discussed. The min mathematical result is the proof of the existence in any kane of at least one equilibrium poimte Other results concern the geo~ 4 mrtrioat structure of the set of equilthriun pointe of « guns with « son f lution, the geometry of sub-solutions, and the existence of « symetrical equilibrim point in a symmetrical game As on illustration of the possibilities for application «, treatasnt : of « sinple three-man poker model 1s includede S + 26 50 ~ Bocterel Dees ota