CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL

CM 217 – Mass Media Law

CASE DIGEST required, since Fermin has been specifically identified as “author,
editor, or proprietor” or “printer/publisher” of the publication but also
CHRISTINA FERMIN, petitioner vs. People of the Philippines, the “president” and “chairperson.” Thus, petitioner’s criminal guilt
respondents should be affirmed,
28 March 2008

• The elements of libel were present.

Issue:
o Evident imputation of the crime of malversation
Whether or not Cristy Fermin had actual knowledge and
participation is guilty of libel?
 (converting money for personal use), of vices or
defects for being fugitives from the law (evading
prosecution in America) and of being a wastrel

Facts of the Case: o Attribution made publicly.

Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation.
• Cristy Fermin is the publisher and Bogs Tugas is the editor-in-chief
of Gossip Tabloid o The victims were identified and identifiable.
• The June 14, 1995 headline and lead story of the tabloid says that
it is improbable for Annabelle Rama to go to the US should it be o The article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the
true that she is evading her conviction in an estafa case here in the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainants.
Philippines for she and husband Eddie have more problems/cases  Malice in law - the article was malicious in itself;
to confront there. This was said to be due to their, especially the imputations were false.
Annabelle's, using fellow Filipinos’ money, failure to remit proceeds
to the manufacturing company of the cookware they were selling  Malice in fact - there was motive to talk ill
and not being on good terms with the latter. against complainants during the electoral
campaign as Fermin is a close friend of Eddie's
• Annabelle Rama and Eddie Gutierrez filed libel cases against
opponent in the Congressional race
Fermin and Tugas before RTC of QC, Br. 218.
• RTC: Fermin and Tugas found guilty of libel.
• While complainants are considered public figures for being
• CA: Tugas was acquitted on account of non-participation but
personalities in the entertainment business, journalists do not have
Fermin's conviction was affirmed.
the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by
• Fermin's motion for reconsideration was denied. She argues that indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether
she had no knowledge and participation in the publication of the in broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives.
article, that the article is not libelous and is covered by the freedom
of the press.

Ruling of the Case:

HELD: YES.
G.R. No. L-6465
• Proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication is not

Page 1 of 18

January 31, 1955
NORBERTO QUISUMBING, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
EUGENIO LOPEZ, ET AL., respondents-appellees
ISSUE:
Whether or not The Manila Chronicle’s published article with a
malicious headline is liable of libel?
FACTS:
1. The respondents Eugenio Lopez, Ernesto del Rosario and Roberto
Villanueva are the publisher, editor-in-chief, and general manager
respectively of The Manila Chronicle, a daily newspaper published
and circulated in English in the City of Manila. On July 15, 1949, the
petitioner, Norberto Quisumbing, filed a complaint against said
respondents in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery
of damages in the sum of P50,000 as a result of the following
alleged libelous publication in The Manila Chronicle of November 7,
1947.
“NBI MEN RAID OFFICES OF 3 CITY USURERS"
2. After answer and trial the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered
a judgment dismissing the complaint from which the petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter Court, in its decision
promulgated on January 19, 1953, affirmed the judgment of the
court of origin; and the case is now before us on petition for review
on certiorari filed by the petitioner.
3. The Court of Appeals found "that the context of the article in
question, is a fair, impartial and true report of official or public
proceeding authorized by law. The news item was the result of a
press release in connection with an official investigation of the Anti-
CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL
CM 217 – Mass Media Law
Usury Division, N.B.I., and was a substantial, if not a faithful
reproduction of the said press release which was, in turn, an
accurate report of the official proceedings taken by the Anti-Usury
Division. The article merely reported a raid on the 'business offices
of three alleged money lenders'; and related the steps actually
taken or to be taken by the proper officials relative to the
investigation. It did not go beyond the actual report of official
actuations.
RULING OF THE CASE:
HELD
1) NO. The elements of libel are NOT present.
i) Headlines which are voluntarily defamatory statements of the
publisher are not privileged even though they head a privileged
report of a judicial or other public proceedings. It is not
necessary to reiterate the rule that the headline of an article
might be libelous while the body of the article is privileged. The
whole libel might be included in the headlines.
A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and
construed in the sense in which the readers to whom it is
addressed would ordinarily understand it. So, the whole
item, including display lines, should be read and
construed together, and its meaning and signification
thus determined.
ii) The headline of an article or paragraph, being so conspicuous
as to attract the attention of persons who look casually over a
paper without carefully reading all its contents, may in itself
inflict very serious injury upon a person, both because it may
be the only part of the article which is read, and because it may
cast a graver imputation than all the other words following it.
There is no doubt that in publications concerning private
persons, as well as in all other publications which are claimed
to be libelous, the headlines directing the attention to the
publication may be considered as a part of it and may
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 CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL

CM 217 – Mass Media Law

even justify a court in regarding the publication as Fair Comments on Matters of Public Interest
libelous when the body of the article is not necessarily so.

(a) In Borjal vs. Ct. of Appeals, (301 SCRA 1, Jan. 14,

1999) it was held that the enumeration in Article 354 is not
an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications
iii) If so, the petitioner's positions would be untenable, since by because “fair comments on matters of public interest are
reading merely the headline in question nobody would even privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for
suspect that the petitioner was referred to; and "libel cannot libel or slander”
be committed except against somebody and that
somebody must be properly identified". It may be insisted (b). They refer to events, developments, or matters in
that the identity of the petitioner is revealed in the body of the which the public as a whole has a legitimate interest.
news item, but we should remember that nowhere in the
context is the petitioner portrayed as one charged with or
convicted of the crime of usury.
Truth And Good Motives or Justifiable Ends.
Third Element: The Person libeled must be identified.
(Identity of victim) A. It is not enough that what was publicized about another
is true. The accused must also prove good motives or
intentions and justifiable ends, in order to disprove malice.
This means the complainant or plaintiff must prove he is
the person subject of the libelous matter, that it his B. This defense is available only if: (a) What is imputed to
reputation which was targeted. another is a crime regardless if the victim is a private or
public person or (ii) if the victim is a public officer
This element is established by the testimony of witnesses regardless of whether a crime is imputed, so long as it
if the complainant was not directly mentioned by name. relates to the discharge of their official duties
They must be the public or third persons who can identify
the complainant as the person subject of the libel. If third
persons cannot say it is the plaintiff or complainant who is
the subject, then it cannot be said that plaintiff’s name has
been tarnished.

2) The Court of Appeals found as a fact that "there is no evidence in the G.R. No. L-16027
record to prove that the publication of the news item under
consideration was prompted by personal ill will or spite, or that May 30, 1962
there was intention to do harm," and that on the other hand there was
"an honest and high sense of duty to serve the best interests of the
public, without self-seeking motive and with malice towards none." LUMEN POLICARPIO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE MANILA TIMES PUB.
CO., INC., CONSTANTE C. ROLDAN, MANUEL V. VILLA-REAL, E.
AGUILAR CRUZ and CONSORCIO BORJE, defendant-appellees.
Matters Considered Privileged By Jurisprudence

Page 3 of 18

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of having published
libelous/defamatory articles?
FACTS:
• Policarpio was executive secretary of UNESCO Nat’l Commission.
As such, she had filed charges against Herminia Reyes, one of her
subordinates in the Commission, & caused the latter to be
separated from the service. Reyes, in turn, filed counter-charges
which were referred for investigation. Pending completion, Reyes
filed a complaint against Policarpio for alleged malversation of
public funds & another complaint for estafa thru falsification of
public documents.
• Policarpio filed a libel suit to Manila Times Publishing Co. for
publishing two defamatory, libelous and false articles/news items in
Saturday Mirror of August 11, 1956 and in the Daily Mirror of
August 13, 1956.
Saturday Mirror (Aug 11, 1956):
“WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED
RULING OF THE CASE:
PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUDS
Unesco Official Head Accused on Supplies, Funds Use by
Colleague”
Daily Mirror (Aug 13, 1956):
CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL
CM 217 – Mass Media Law
“PALACE OPENS INVESTIGATION OF RAPS AGAINST
POLICARPIO
Alba Probes Administrative Phase of Fraud Charges
Against Unesco Woman Official; Fiscal Sets Prelim Quiz
of Criminal Suit on Aug 22”
• The articles contain news on Reyes’ charges against Policarpio for
having malversed public property and of having fraudulently sought
reimbursement of supposed official expenses. It was said that
Policarpio used several sheets of government stencils for her
private and personal use. The other charge refers to the supposed
reimbursements she had made for a trip to Quezon and
Pangasinan. Reyes’ complaint alleged that Policarpio had asked for
refund of expenses for use of her car when she had actually made
the trip aboard an army plane. Policarpio was said to be absent
from the Bayambang conference for which she also sought a
refund of expenses.
• CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had not
proven that defendants had acted maliciously in publishing the
articles, although portions thereof were inaccurate or false.
• The headline of the Aug 11 article was given prominence with a 6-
column (about 11 inches) banner headline of 1-inch types. Its sub-
title – ‘PCAC raps Policarpio on fraud” – printed in bold 1 cm type is
not true. Also, the statement in the 1st paragraph of the article, to
the effect that plaintiff “was charged with malversation & estafa by
Page 4 of 18

the Pres’l Complaint & Action Commission” (PCAC) is not true, the
complaints for said offenses having been filed by Reyes. Neither is
it true that said “criminal action was initiated as a result of current
administrative investigation.”
• PLAINTIFF maintains that the effect of these false statements was
to give the general impression that said investigation by Col. Alba
had shown that plaintiff was guilty and that, as a consequence,
PCAC had filed the corresponding complaints w/ the fiscal’s office.
She also said that the article did not mention that fact that the
number of stencils involved in the charge was only 18 or 20; that
the sum allegedly misappropriated by her was only P54, and that
the falsification imputed to her was said to have been committed by
claiming that certain expenses for which she had sought
reimbursement were incurred in trips during the period from July 1
– Sept 30 1955, although the trips actually were made from Jul 8-
Aug 31, 1955. By omitting these details, plaintiff avers that the Aug
11 article had the effect of conveying the idea that the offenses
imputed to her were more serious than they really were.
• DEFENDANTS contend that though the complaints were filed, not
by the PCAC but by Reyes, this inaccuracy is insignificant &
immaterial to the case for the fact is that said complaints were filed.
As regards the number of sheets & the nature of the falsification
charged, they argue that these “details” do not affect the
truthfulness of the article as a whole. Besides, defendants had no
means of knowing such “details.”
SC: Prior to Aug 11, Col. Alba had already taken the testimony of
witnesses; hence, defendants could have ascertained the “details”
had they wanted to. The number of stencil sheets used was
actually mentioned in the Aug 13 article.
• Moreover, the penalty for estafa/embezzlement depends partly
upon the amount of the damage caused to the offended party.
Hence, the amount or value of the property embezzled is material
to said offense.
CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL
CM 217 – Mass Media Law
• It is obvious that the filing of criminal complaints by another agency
of the Govt, like the PCAC, particularly after an investigation
conducted by the same, imparts the ideal that the probability of guilt
is greater than when the complaints are filed by a private individual,
wspecially when the latter is a former subordinate of the alleged
offender, who was responsible for the dismissal of the complainant
from her employment.
• Newspapers must enjoy a certain degrees of discretion in
determining the manner in which a given event should be
presented to the public, and the importance to be attached thereto,
as a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational manner is
not per se illegal. Newspapers may publish news items relative to
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of
confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth
with respect to such proceedings. But, to enjoy immunity, a
publication containing derogatory information must be not
only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and
without any comments or remarks.
• Art. 354, RPC provides:
“Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious even if it
be true, if no good intention & justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except, “A fair and true report, made in good faith, w/o
any comments or remarks….”
• In the case at bar, aside from containing information derogatory to
the plaintiff, the Aug 11 article presented her in a worse
predicament than that in which she, in fact was. Said article was not
a fair and true report of the proceedings therein alluded to. What is
more, its sub-title “PCAC raps Policarpio on fraud” is a comment or
remark, besides being false. Accordingly, the defamatory
imputations contained in said article are “presumed to be
malicious”
Page 5 of 18

• In falsely stating that the complaints were filed by PCAC, either
defendants knew the truth or they did not. If they did, then the
publication would actually be malicious. I f they did not, or if they
acted under a misapprehension of the facts, they were guilty of
negligence in making said statement.
We note that the Aug 13 article rectified a major inaccuracy in the
1st article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the PCAC had filed
the complaints. It likewise indicated the number of stencil sheets
involved. But, this rectification or clarification does not wipe out the
responsibility arising from the publication of the Aug 11 article,
although it should mitigate it.
HELD: Decision reversed. Defendants ordered to pay plaintiff moral
damages, atty’s fees plus cost.
G.R. No. 133575.
December 15, 2000
JUDGE MARTIN A. OCAMPO, Petitioner, v. SUN-STAR PUBLISHING,
INC., Respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not on the basis of the facts admitted in the pleadings
and Respondents affidavits submitted to the Court a quo Petitioner
is entitled to a judgment for civil libel as a matter of law considering
that only a preponderance of evidence is required to prove
Respondents liability?
FACTS:
RULING OF THE CASE:
CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL
CM 217 – Mass Media Law
1. Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to
set aside the April 20, 1998 Decision[1 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 57, which dismissed petitioners Complaint for
Libel.
2. Petitioner is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 7. He filed a Complaint[2 for Libel on account of two
articles which appeared in the August 28, 1997 and August 30,
1997 issues of Sun-Star Daily, a provincial newspaper published
and circulated by respondent in Cebu.
The August 28, 1997 article, which appeared on pages two (2)
and twenty two (22) of the aforesaid newspaper, reads in full
as follows
Judge Ocampo facing graft raps at Ombud
chanrobles virtual law library
3. BRANCH 7 Judge Martin Ocampo of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) faces graft charges before the Office of the Ombudsman for
the Visayas.Ocampo, in an interview yesterday, down-played the
filing of the case saying it is natural for the losing party to hate the
judge. He considers the case as pure harassment.
4. Instead, Tan said, Judge Ocampo adjudged counsel Tagra guilty of
direct contempt on May 9, 1997 for filing a motion for
reconsideration to the order granting the relief.
5. The August 30, 1997 article, appearing on pages two (2) and
twenty six (26) of the paper, reads
No jurisdiction, says Judge on Ombudsman
6. Judge Ocampo, in a letter to Sun-Star Daily, complained that the
news report was libelous and damaging to his reputation. He said
the paper should have known better that the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction to investigate the case, only the Supreme Court.
7. Sun-Star Daily delayed publication for one day to get the judges
comment. He was quoted in the report as describing the case as
pure harassment and part of the professional hazards of a judge.
Page 6 of 18

1. While the law presumes every defamatory imputation to be
malicious, there are exceptions to this general rule, set forth in
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code,
ART. 354. Requirement of publicity. Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true,
if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral or social
duty;
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or
of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions.
2. First, the articles complained of are fair and true reports of a
judicial/administrative proceeding, which is not confidential in
nature. They quote directly from the affidavit-complaint filed before
the Ombudsman. Indeed, a perusal of the first article would readily
show that it merely reported the filing of graft charges against
petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas. In
so reporting, the article quoted from the affidavit-complaint filed by
the complainant lawyer, Elias Tan, and narrated the antecedent
facts leading to the filing of the graft charges. On the other hand,
the second article presented petitioners own reactions against the
graft charges filed against him; with explanatory statements from
Office of the Ombudsman Director Virginia Santiago refuting
petitioners claims that the said office had no jurisdiction over graft
charges against judges for alleged violations of judicial canons.
Second, there were no comments or remarks made by the reporter
of private respondent in both instances. The articles were pure
reports of the graft charges filed against petitioner.
CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL
CM 217 – Mass Media Law
Third, they were both fair reports. The fairness and balance
exercised by private respondent is evident in the fact that petitioner
was given a chance to air his side on the graft charges filed against
him. In fact, before the first article was published, private
respondents reporter took pains to interview petitioner on the
matter; and his reactions were equally published in both articles.
Finally, the reports were also true accounts of a newsworthy event,
the filing of graft charges against a local judge. It cannot be denied
that petitioner did face graft raps at the Ombudsman as the
complaint filed against him was for violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Neither can the narration in
the articles be denied as these were merely culled from the subject
affidavit-complaint.
3. Petitioner cannot insist that the case against him is confidential in
nature because it has already been ruled that complaints are public
records which may be published as such unless the Court directs
otherwise in the interest of morality or decency. Neither should the
case of In Re: Abistado, relied upon by petitioner, be applied to
the instant case since, unlike In Re: Abistado where the
proceedings were on charges of malpractice against a lawyer which
are confidential in nature, the charge filed before the Ombudsman
against petitioner is not administrative in nature, such as to fall
under the confidentiality rule of the Rules of Court, but criminal in
nature, being a graft charge under Republic Act No. 3019. Unlike
the proceedings in this Court, which expressly mandates that its
disciplinary proceedings for lawyers and judges are confidential in
nature, the Office of the Ombudsman has no such confidentiality
rule.
4. While the administrative nature of proceedings before us allows the
protection of the personal and professional reputation of our
colleagues in the profession of law and justice against baseless
charges of disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible clients and
litigants, the criminal nature of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act does not allow the same protection to our brethren in the
judiciary, who are placed on the same level, without distinction, as
other government employees. Violations of this law partake of an
infinitely more serious nature, touching as it does on what has been
perceived to be an endemic social cancer eroding our system of
government. It cannot be denied that this is a matter in which the
Page 7 of 18
 CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL

CM 217 – Mass Media Law

public has a legitimate interest and as such, media must be free to

report thereon.

1. Petitioner was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros

Oriental during the May 11, 1992 elections.

2. Two days before the elections, or on May 9, 1992, respondent

Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Manila Bulletin)
published the following story:

The Comelec has disqualified Hector

G.R. No. 164437 G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD
candidate for mayor of Bais City for
May 15, 2009 having been convicted in three
administrative cases for grave abuse of
authority and harassment in 1987, while
HECTOR C. VILLANUEVA, he was officer-in-charge of the mayor’s
office of Bais City.
petitioner, vs.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., LETTY JIMENEZ MAGSANOC, ROSAURO G.
ACOSTA, JOSE MARIA NOLASCO, ARTEMIO T. ENGRACIA, JR., RAFAEL
CHEEKEE, and MANILA DAILY BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION,
NAPOLEON G. RAMA, BEN F. RODRIGUEZ, ARTHUR S. SALES, CRIS J. ICBAN,
JR.,
A day before the elections or on May 10, 1992,
respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) also came
out with a similar story, to wit:

The Commission on Elections

respondents. disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as
Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of
Bais City for having been convicted
ISSUES: in three administrative cases for
grave abuse of authority and
1. Whether or not petitioner is required to prove malice to be harassment in 1987, while he was the
entitled to damages? officer-in-charge of the mayors office
2. Whether or not the respondents are liable for malicious in the city.
and imputing statements to the petitioner?

FACTS:
Page 8 of 18

3. On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held as
scheduled. When results came out, it turned out that petitioner
failed in his mayoralty bid.
4. Believing that his defeat was caused by the publication of the
above-quoted stories, petitioner sued respondents PDI and Manila
Bulletin as well as their publishers and editors for damages before
the RTC of Bais City. He alleged that the articles were maliciously
timed to defeat him. He claimed he should have won by landslide,
but his supporters reportedly believed the news items distributed by
his rivals and voted for other candidates. He asked for actual
damages of P270,000 for the amount he spent for the campaign,
moral damages of P10,000,000, an unspecified amount of
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees of P300,000 and costs of suit.
5. Respondents disclaimed liability. They asserted that no malice can
be attributed to them as they did not know petitioner and had no
interest in the outcome of the election, stressing that the stories
were privileged in nature.
6. On April 18, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner that the defendants Philippine Daily Inquirer, [Inc.] and
Manila [Daily] Bulletin Publishing Corporation with their respective
officers are liable [for] damages to plaintiff:
1. As moral damages, the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, [Inc.] and the Manila
[Daily] Bulletin Publishing Corporation
are ordered to pay P1,000,000.00 each
CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL
CM 217 – Mass Media Law
to plaintiff; 2. Both defendants are
likewise ordered to pay an exemplary
damage in the amount of P500,000.00
each; 3. To pay plaintiff’s attorneys fees
in the amount of P100,000.00 4. And to
pay the costs.
7. This petition for review on certiorari assails the Amended Decision
dated May 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
54134, reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch 44 in Civil Case No. 206-
B, which had awarded damages to petitioner for respondents false
reporting.
RULING OF THE CASE:
1. YES. The news items derogatory and injurious to petitioner’s
reputation and candidacy. It faulted respondents for failing to verify
the truth of the news tips they published and held respondents
liable for negligence, citing Policarpio v. Manila Times Pub. Co.,
Inc. the news items lacked truth and fairness, they were not
privileged communications.
2. Although the stories were false and not privileged, as there is no
proof they were obtained from a press conference or release,
respondents were not impelled by malice or improper motive. There
was also no proof that petitioner’s supporters junked him due to the
Page 9 of 18

reports. Neither was there any proof he would win, making his
action unfounded.
3. YES. Petitioner argues that his cause of action is based on quasi-
delict which only requires proof of fault or negligence, not proof of
malice beyond reasonable doubt as required in a criminal
prosecution for libel. He argues that the case is entirely different
and separate from an independent civil action arising from libel
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. He claims he
proffered proofs sustaining his claim for damages under quasi-
delict, not under the law on libel, as malice is hard to prove. He
stresses that nowhere in the complaint did he mention libel, and
nothing in his complaint shows that his cause of action had some
shade of libel as defined in the Revised Penal Code. He also did
not hint a resort to a criminal proceeding for libel.
4. PDI and its officers argue that petitioner’s complaint clearly lays a
cause of action arising from libel as it highlights malice underlying
the publications. And as malice is an element of libel, the appellate
court committed no error in characterizing the case as one arising
from libel.
CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL
CM 217 – Mass Media Law
G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999
ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLAO, respondents.
Facts:
1. A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before
the court against Borjal and Soliven for writing and
publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and
offensive against Francisco Wenceslao, attacking among
others the solicitation letters he send to support a
conference to be launch concerning resolving matters on
transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous
activities.
2. Wenceslao however was never named in any of the
articles nor was the conference he was organizing. The
lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the private
respondent for damages which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. A petition for review was filed before the SC
contending that private respondent was not sufficiently
identified to be the subject of the published articles.
Issue:
Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of
petitioners for libel?
Page 10 of 18

Ruling of the Case:
1. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be
identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also
not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the
person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a
third person could identify him as the object of the libelous
publication. These requisites have not been complied with in the
case at bar. The element of identifiability was not met since it was
Wenceslaso who revealed he was the organizer of said conference
and had he not done so the public would not have known.
2. The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom
of the press and that privileged communications must be protective
of public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest
are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or
slander.
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent
until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person
in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In
order that such discreditable imputation to a public official
may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of
fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the
comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion
happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be
inferred from the facts.
CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL
CM 217 – Mass Media Law
3. The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the
declared objective of the conference, the composition of its
members and participants, and the manner by which it was
intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being
genuinely imbued with public interest. Respondent is also deemed
to be a public figure and even otherwise is involved in a public
issue. The court held that freedom of expression is constitutionally
guaranteed and protected with the reminder among media
members to practice highest ethical standards in the exercise
thereof.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------
A privileged communication may be either:
1. Absolutely privileged communication à those which are not actionable
even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11,
Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from
liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee
thereof.
2. Qualifiedly privileged communications à those containing defamatory
imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without
good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private
communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or
remarks."
Page 11 of 18

G.R. No. 135306
January 28, 2003
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA
and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., petitioners,
vs.
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID
DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO,
respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an existence of the elements of libel in the
Bulgar article.
FACTS:
1. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local
federation of more than seventy (70) Muslim religious
organizations, and some individual Muslims field in the RTC of
Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class
suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS
PUBLICATIONS, INC and some its staff arising from an article
published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid.
2. The complaint:
a) The statement was insulting and damaging to the
Muslims;
b) that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the
Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance
but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and
CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL
CM 217 – Mass Media Law
disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this
country, in violation of law, public policy, good morals and
human relations;
c) that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted
not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire
Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual in non-
Muslim countries.
3. MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC. and BINEGAS, JR., in their defense,
contended that the article did not mention respondents as the
object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages;
and, that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion
and was published without malice nor intention to cause damage,
prejudice or injury to Muslims.
4. The RTC dismissed the complaint holding that Islamic Da’wah et al.
failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly
defamed by the article were not specifically identified. The alleged
libelous article refers to the larger collectivity of Muslims for which
the readers of the libel could not readily identify the personalities of
the persons defamed. Hence, it is difficult for an individual Muslim
member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him.
5. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. It opined
that it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation was
directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith. This libelous
imputation undeniably applied to the plaintiff-appellants who are
Muslims sharing the same religious beliefs." It added that the suit
for damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH
COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as a
Muslim umbrella organization gave it the requisite personality to
sue and protect the interests of all Muslims.
6. MVRS brought the issue to the SC.
RULING OF THE CASE:
HELD
The article was not libelous. Petition GRANTED. The assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision
Page 12 of 18

of the RTC was reinstated.
1. There was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly
injured by the Bulgar article. An individual Muslim has a
reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the
community. Each has a varying interest and a divergent
political and religious view. There is no injury to the
reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this
community that can give rise to an action for group libel.
Each reputation is personal in character to every person.
Together, the Muslims do not have a single common
reputation that will give them a common or general interest
in the subject matter of the controversy.
2. Defamation, which includes libel (in general, written) and
slander (in general, oral), means the offense of injuring a
person's character, fame or reputation through false and
malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure
reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or
confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or
opinions about the plaintiff.
3. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it
involves the opinion which others in the community may
have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. Words which are
merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per
se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious,
ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not
constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the
absence of an allegation for special damages.
4. Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be
interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable
individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or
alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of
such class has a right of action without at all impairing the
equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as
well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights.
5. The SC used the reasoning in Newsweek v IAC: where the
defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or
class, it is essential that the statement must be so
CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL
CM 217 – Mass Media Law
sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in
that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each
individual in the class or group can prove that the
defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he
can bring the action separately.
6. The SC cited some US cases wherein the rule on libel has
been restrictive. It was held that there could be no libel
against an extensive community in common law. With
regard to the largest sectors in society, including religious
groups, it may be generally concluded that no criminal
action at the behest of the state, or civil action on behalf of
the individual, will lie.
7. "Emotional distress" tort action has no application in this
case because no particular individual was identified in the
Bulgar article. "Emotional distress" means any highly
unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry,
nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror,
and chagrin. This kind of tort action is personal in nature,
i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the
injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks
on his character. Under the Second Restatement of the
Law, to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress the plaintiff must show that:
(a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional
or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff;
(b) The conduct was extreme and outrageous;
(c) There was a causal connection between the
defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental
distress;
(d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme
and severe.
8. "Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is
so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency. The actions
must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate,
embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.
Page 13 of 18

9. Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove
more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment,
or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other
trivialities. Intentional tort causing emotional distress must
necessarily give way to the fundamental right to free
speech.
10. Respondents' lack of cause of action cannot be cured by
the filing of a class suit. An element of a class suit is the
adequacy of representation. In determining the question of
fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the
court must consider:
(a) whether the interest of the named party is
coextensive with the interest of the other
members of the class;
(b) the proportion of those made parties as it so
bears to the total membership of the class;
and,
(c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the
named party to speak for the rest of the class.
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert the
interests not only of the Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim
world as well. Private respondents obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers
to represent such a global group; neither have they been able to
demonstrate the identity.
Richard Gutierrez, petitioner vs. Jo-Ann Maglipon, editor in chief of
PEP, respondent
ISSUE:
Whether or not Maglipon is liable of malicious published articles on
PEP website?
CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL
CM 217 – Mass Media Law
Whether or not PEP’s apology constitutes and or mitigate the libel
suit from Guttierrez?
FACTS:
1. Actor Richard Gutierrez filed on Monday a P25-million libel
complaint at the Makati City Prosecutor's Office against the editor-
in-chief of a showbiz website.
2. The lead actor of GMA-7's "Zorro," who arrived past 2 p.m. with his
family, claimed that Jo-Ann Maglipon, editor in chief of Philippine
Entertainment Portal, and two others, maliciously published an
article on March 29 that accused him of being in a gun-toting
incident with actor Michael Flores.
3. Gutierrez said that as an endorser of several brands, the article
discredited him by portraying him as a "troublemaker" when "no
such incident took place."
4. Also named as respondents in the five-page complaint were Karen
Pagsolingan, PEP managing editor and Ferdinand Godinez, staff
writer.
5. PEP earlier posted an apology on its website, acknowledging its
mistake of posting the story on the alleged gun-toting incident
without getting the statements of Gutierrez and Flores.
6. Maglipon said that Gutierrez’s mother and manager, Annabelle
Rama, had agreed not to press charges against PEP if they would
issue an apologize on the website.
7. Actor Richard Gutierrez has lost his legal battle with Philippine
Entertainment Portal (PEP) after the Department of Justice (DOJ)
dismissed the libel suit he filed against the entertainment Web site.
RULING OF THE CASE:
1. The Associate Prosecutor Mary Jane Sytat, cited "lack of probable
cause" in dismissing Gutierrez’s libel complaint against editor-in-
chief Jo-Ann Maglipon, managing editor Karen Pagsolingan and
writer Ferdinand "Bong" Godinez.
2. The resolution acknowledged that PEP committed a lapse when it
published a story on the gun-toting incident allegedly involving
Gutierrez and fellow actor Michael Flores in March. The article,
Gutierrez complained, gave an impression that he was a
troublemaker.
Page 14 of 18

3. The resolution, however, opposed the actor's argument,
maintaining that PEP's "lapse" did not constitute an “imputation of a
discreditable act or condition to another.”
“No evidence was presented which would prove that a
reasonable mind, in this case that of the public or the Facts:
readers, would believe that complainant was a
troublemaker based on the statements in the questioned
article,” the resolution said.
4. The resolution also pointed out that the complainant failed to
prove that the publication of the PEP article “was attended with
malice.”
Malice in Fact or Malice as a Fact. -. It is the malice which
must be proven by the plaintiff. He must prove the
purpose of the accused is to malign or harm or injure his
reputation. This arises either because:
(i) the article is not defamatory on its face or if libelous it is
ambiguous
(ii) the accused was able to overcome the presumption of
malice. Issues:
5. YES. It cited Maglipon’s apology and order to immediately pullout 1.
the article and PEP’s attempt to get Flores’ side of the story as
“sufficient evidence to show that the respondents have no desire to 2.
deliberately injure the reputation of the complainant.” 3.
Ruling of the Case:
1.
CASE DIGEST
GR Nos. 161032 and 161176
Attorney Ding So of the Bureau of Customs, petitioner vs. Erwin Tulfo,
CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL
CM 217 – Mass Media Law
respondent
16 September 2008
1. In the column entitled “Direct Hit” published in the daily
tabloid Remate, the said column was accusing Atty. Ding
So of the Bureau of Customs of corruption. On the
published article Atty. So was portrayed as an extortionist
and a smuggler.
2. Atty. Ding So of the Bureau of Customs filed a libel suit in
four separate information against Erwin Tulfo, Susan
Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo, and Philip Pichay of
Remate.
3. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found Tulfo guilty of
libel. The CA affirmed the decision.
Whether or not Tulfo is guilty of false and malicious imputations in
his column in Remate.
Whether or not the assailed articles are privileged.
Whether or not the assailed articles are fair commentaries.
YES, For the ruling in Borjal case was not applied to this libel case:
a. The case was based on a criminal case.
b. There was sufficient identification of the complainant.
Page 15 of 18

c. The subject was not a private citizen, in this case, the
subject is a public official.
d. In this case it is not in the scope of “fair commentaries
on matters of public interest.”
2. NO. The columns were mere trivialized and editorialized, the
columns don’t have evidences to substantiate the claims and
attacks to Atty. So. The articles cannot be privileged simply
because the target was a public official.
a. Tulfo made no effort to verify the information given by
his source or even to ascertain the identity of the person
he was accusing.
b. Tulfo abandoned the “consistent with good faith and
reasonable care” when he wrote the subject articles. This
is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a
journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify his story
and instead misinforming the public.
c. Tulfo had written and published the articles with reckless
disregard of whether the same were false or not.
d. Evidence of malice: The fact that Tulfo continuously
published articles lambasting Atty. So after the
commencement of an action. This is a clear indication of
his intent to malign Atty. So, no matter the cost, and is
proof of malice.
3. NO. Tulfo failed to substantiate or even attempt to verify his story
before publication. Moreover he added facts based on his
standards of veracity.
CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL
CM 217 – Mass Media Law
a. The absence of details of the acts committed by the
subject. These are plain and simple and mere “gossip”
accusations, backed up by the word of one unnamed
source.
Journalists do not rely on fictions instead on truth. There
must be some foundation to their reports; these reports
must be warranted by facts.
b. The columns of Tulfo are not fair and true. Tulfo failed to
do research before making his allegations, and it has been
shown that these allegations were baseless.
Velasco, Jr., J:
Elements of fair commentary (to be considered privileged):
a. That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or
other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of a statement, report, or speech delivered in
said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a
public officer in the exercise of his functions;
b. That it is made in good faith;
c. That it is without any comments or remarks.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, petitioner vs. Philippine Daily Inquirer and
Alfonso Yuchengco,
ISSUES:
Whether or not Yuchengco is liable of imputations and allegations
detrimental to Estrada?
Whether or not the Philippine Daily Inquirer is liable of false and
malicious statements against Estrada?
Page 16 of 18

FACTS:
1. Former President Joseph Estrada filed yesterday a libel suit against
business tycoon Alfonso Yuchengco and the Philippine Daily
Inquirer over allegations that he coerced the businessman to sell
his shares in the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT),
the country’s largest telecommunications firm.
2. In his six-page complaint Estrada also named as respondents
Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) publisher Isagani Yambot, editor-in-
chief Letty Jimenez-Magsanoc and reporters Daxim Lucas,
Christine Avendano and Doris Dumlao.
PDI published the story entitled “Erap bullied me, says
Yuchengco-Taipan confirms coercion in PLDT deal,”
which was based on a privilege speech delivered by
Senator Panfilo Lacson last Monday.
3. In filing the complaint, Estrada denied Yuchengco’s allegation and
said the news report was based on false and malicious statements.
4. The former president said in his complaint. “Respondent
Yuchengco’s statements imputing to me the commission of serious
crimes are mere fabrications. I vehemently deny having committed
any unlawful or criminal act against respondent Yuchengco or the
members of his family in relation to the sale made by the
respondent of his Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corp.
(PTIC)/PLDT shares in favor of First Pacific (First Pacific Co. Ltd),”
5. As to the liability of the Inquirer, Estrada said the respondents
caused the printing, publication and circulation of false and
malicious statements without first validating them.
6. Estrada asked P10 million to P20 million worth of damages.
7. February 22, 2010 the CA dismissed the libel suit to PDI.
RULING OF THE CASE:
1. In dismissing the libel case, the Justice department pointed
that Yuchengco never said that Estrada intimated and
threatened him to sell his PLDT shares.
“The questioned statement can be interpreted in no other way
than that Yuchengco’s shareholdings in PTIC were taken from
CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL
CM 217 – Mass Media Law
him through intimidation and threats to himself, his family and
his businesses.
2. Yuchengco did not cast any aspersion on complainant
Estrada’s or any other person’s character, integrity and
reputation,” the ruling said.
The resolution further said that Yuchengco statement was
privileged in nature because it constitutes fair comment on
matters of public interest.
Matters Considered Privileged By Jurisprudence
1. Fair Comments on Matters of Public Interest
(a) In Borjal vs. Ct. of Appeals, (301 SCRA 1, Jan. 14,
1999) it was held that the enumeration in Article 354 is not
an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications
because “fair comments on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for
libel or slander”
(b). They refer to events, developments, or matters in
which the public as a whole has a legitimate interest.
3. “Since the privileged character of a communication destroys
the presumption of malice, the onus of proving actual malice
lies on complainant Estrada [but] no malice can be presumed
from the questioned statement because complainant is a public
figure,” the Justice department said.
Doctrine of Privilege Communication
Qualifiedly/Conditionally Privileged Communication: this
refers to communications in which the law presumes the
absence of malice, thus they are initially not actionable.
The burden therefore is on the plaintiff to prove the
existence of actual malice.
Page 17 of 18
 CASE DIGESTS ON LIBEL

CM 217 – Mass Media Law

4. It added that Estrada failed to prove that Yuchengco was

prompted by personal ill-will to inflict harm on the latter’s
reputation in circulating the questioned statement.

5. In the same resolution, the Justice department also dismissed

the charges against the PDI editors and reporters, saying that
Estrada has not shown the falsity of the contents of the news
report or that respondents were aware that they were false or
that there was reckless disregard as to whether the statements
were false or not.

Page 18 of 18