Case: PAGCOR vs. Atty. Dante A.
-In his “Opposition” to the complaint,
Carandang
Facts:
-Atty. Carandang, respondent, is the
president of Bingo Royale, Incorporated
(Bingo Royale), a private corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines.
-On February 2, 1999, PAGCOR and Bingo
Royale executed a “Grant of Authority to
Operate Bingo Games.” Article V of this
document mandates Bingo Royale to remit
20% of its gross sales to PAGCOR. This 20%
is divided into 15% to PAGCOR and 5%
franchise tax to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
-In the course of its operations, Bingo Royale
incurred arrears amounting to P6,064,833.14
as of November 15, 2001. Instead of
demanding the payment therefor, PAGCOR
allowed Bingo Royale and respondent Atty.
Carandang to pay the said amount in
monthly installment of P300,000.00 from July
2001 to June 2003.
-Bingo Royale then issued to PAGCOR twenty
four (24) Bank of Commerce checks in the
sum of P7,200,000.00 signed by respondent.
-However, when the checks were deposited
after the end of each month at the Land
Bank, U.N. Avenue Branch, Manila, they were
all dishonored by reason of Bingo Royale’s
“Closed Account.”
-Despite PAGCOR’s demand letters dated
November 12 and December 12, 2001, and
February 12, 2002, respondent failed to pay
the amounts of the checks. Thus, PAGCOR
filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila criminal complaints for violations of
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against
respondent.
-PAGCOR contends that in issuing those
bouncing checks, respondent is liable for
serious misconduct, violation of the
Attorney’s Oath and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and prays that
his name be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
respondent averred that he is not liable for
issuing bouncing checks because they were
drawn by Bingo Royale. His act of doing so
“is not related to the office of a lawyer.”
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Atty.
Carandang is liable for serious misconduct
and violated the Attorney’s oath and code of
professional responsibility.
Held:
Whether to issue or not checks
in favor of a payee is a voluntary act.
It is clearly a choice for an individual
(especially one learned in the law),
whether in a personal capacity or
officer of a corporation, to do so after
assessing and weighing the
consequences and risks for doing so.
As President of BRI, he cannot be said
to be unaware of the probability that
BRI, the company he runs, could not
raise funds, totally or partially, to
cover the checks as they fell due. The
desire to continue the operations of
his company does not excuse
respondent’s act of violating the law
by issuing worthless checks.
Moreover, inability to pay is not a
ground, under the Civil Code, to
suspend nor extinguish an obligation.
Specifically, respondent contends that
because of business reverses or
inability to generate funds, BRI should
be excused from making good the
payment of the checks. If this theory
is sustained, debtors will merely state
that they no longer have the capacity
to pay and, consequently, not obliged
to pay on time, nor fully or partially,
their debt to creditors. Surely,
undersigned cannot agree with this
contention.
As correctly pointed out by
complainant, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is
an offense that involves public
interest.
Atty. Dante A. Carandang is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months
Case: Teodosio vs. Nava
A.C. No. 4673.
April 27, 2001
Facts:
Respondent Mercedes Nava used to be the manager
of Melanie Batislaong’s lending business and, in
that capacity, dealt with several borrowers,
including Letecia Espinosa and Maria Gilda Palma.
Due to acts of mismanagement committed by Nava,
Batislaong, sued Nava for accounting and damages
and in turn, Nava charged Batislaong, Espinosa and
Palma with estafa.
While the complaints against them were
pending preliminary investigation, Espinosa
and Palma hired petitioner Atty. Hector
Teodosio’s services in seeking the annulment
of certain trust receipt agreements allegedly
falsified by Nava, which was the basis of the
criminal complaints against them. As a
result, Teodosio filed on their behalf civil
cases against Nava and Batislaong for
annulment of contract and damages.
Teodosio impleaded Batislaong as Nava’s
co-defendant because Espinosa and Palma
wanted to settle the balance of the amount
they had borrowed from Batislaong
through Nava but they were unsure to
whom the payment should be made. Both
were, therefore, impleaded so that they
could interplead who between them should
receive the payment. After Teosdosio had
filed these cases Batislaong offered to hire
him as her counsel not only in the civil case
she had filed against Nava but also in the
two estafa cases, filed against her by
Nava. He claims that he agreed to represent
Batislaong in these cases only after he had
explained to her the nature of the complaints
filed by Espinosa and Palma against her and
Nava in the Civil Cases.
Nava filed a complaint against Teodosio for
representing clients with conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Teodosio admits that Batislaong,
Espinosa, Palma are his clients but denies that their
interests are conflicting and contends that his clients
in fact have a common interest against respondent
Nava.
Teodosio submitted affidavits executed by
Batislaong, Espinosa, and Palma stating that
they have no complaints in the way
petitioner handled their cases and that each
of them was aware that the other was
represented by petitioner. He further
submitted another set of affidavits executed
by Espinosa and Palma stating in detail the
extent of their knowledge of petitioner’s
involvement in Batislaong’s cases as well as
the basis of their consent for him to act as
their common counsel.
Nava assails the affidavits of Batislaong,
Espinosa, and Palma on the ground that they
were notarized by a lawyer from petitioner’s
law firm and that they do not bear the data
as to the residence certificates of the
affiants. She also claims that Teososio failed
to ask the court to declare Batislaong in
default despite the latter’s failure to answer
the complaints filed by Espinosa and Palma,
and contends that this is proof of petitioner’s
bias for her (Batislaong).
When the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation IBP Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit. The IBP Board of
Governors, however in Resolution XIII-99-23 of
February 23, 1999, found petitioner guilty of
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and ordered him suspended from the
practice of law for one year.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be suspended for
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
Rule 15.03? NO, the complaint is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
Held:
Court held that Teodosio’s conduct did not amount
to a violation of the Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts.
Under Canon 6 of the previous Canons of
Professional Ethics, a lawyer is deemed to
represent conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend
for that which duty to another client requires
him to oppose. The rule is designed to
remove from attorneys the opportunity to
take advantage of the secrets of clients
obtained during the existence of the client-
attorney relation.
Teodosio contends that based on the causes
of action of the cases involving Batislaong on
one hand and Espinosa and Palma on the
other, he could simultaneously represent
them without any possible violation of the
client-attorney confidentiality. In the cases
filed by him for Espinosa and Palma, it is only
Nava against whom the former have an
adverse interest as it was the latter who
allegedly falsified the trust receipt
agreements to the prejudice of Palma and
Espinosa. Indeed, were it not for the offer of
Palma and Espinosa to settle their obligation,
there would have been no need to implead
Batislaong as a defendant. On the other
hand, in the other cases in which Batislaong
is a party, either as plaintiff in Civil Case or
as an accused in Criminal Cases, neither
Palma nor Espinosa are parties. Indeed, it is
Nava who is the respondent in the first case
and the private complainant in the last two
criminal cases. Under the foregoing
circumstances, the danger that petitioner
may abuse his clients’ confidences to the
detriment of the other is absent.
Even granting that the interests of Espinosa, Palma,
and Batislaong are conflicting, Teodosio cannot be
held liable for acting as their common counsel in
view of the fact that, as stated in their affidavits,
petitioner explained to them the consequences of his
representation and that they gave their consent to
the same. Indeed, Espinosa and Palma stated that it
was they themselves who brought Batislaong to
petitioner’s office so that the latter could engage his
services. The fact that the first set of affidavits were
uniformly notarized by an associate in petitioner’s
law firm and that they did not state certain data
relating to the residence certificates of the affiants
do not adversely affect their validity absent any
proof that the affiants did not execute them of their
own volition or that their signature therein are not
authentic.
Case: Donton vs Tansingco
A.C 6057
June 27, 2006
Facts:
• On May 20, 2003, Peter T. Donton
(complainant) filed a criminal
complaint for estafa thru falsification
of public document against Duane O.
Stier, Emelyn A. Maggay, and
respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.
Tansingco, as the notary public who
notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
• Subsequently, respondent Tansingco
filed a counter-charge for perjury
against complainant. The affidavit-
complaint stated that:
The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated
September 11, 1995 was prepared
and notarized under the following
circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and
long-time resident of a real property
located at No. 33 Don Jose Street,
Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao,
Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr.
Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby
disqualified to own real property in his
name – agreed that the property be
transferred in the name of Mr. Donton,
a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr.
Donton, requested me to prepare
several documents that would
guarantee recognition of him being
the actual owner of the property
despite the transfer of title in the
name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among
others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT,
recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and
undisturbed use of the property for his
residence and business operations.
The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied
 up with a loan which Mr. Stier had
extended to Mr. Donton.
• Thereafter, complainant prayed that
respondent be disbarred in violation of
the Code for the act of preparing the
Occupancy Agreement, despite the
knowledge that Stier was disqualified
to own a real property for being a
foreign national.
• On Oct 1, 2003 the Court referred the
matter to the IBP for investigation and
on Feb 26, 2004, Commissioner San
Juan found respondent liable for taking
part in a scheme to circumvent the
constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership of land in the
Philippines and recommended
respondent’s suspension from the
practice of law for 2 years and
cancellation of his commission as
Notary Public.
• On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the report with
modification and recommended
respondent’s suspension from the
practice of law for 6 months. Then on
July 28, 2004, respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration before the
IBP stating that his practice of law is
his only means of supporting his
family and 6 minor children.
Issue:
• WON respondent is guilty of violation
of Canon I and Rule 1.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Held:
• A lawyer should not render any service
or give advice to any client which will
involve defiance of the laws which he
is bound to uphold. Respondent’s
knowledge that Stier, a US citizen, was
disqualified from owning real property
and his preparation of Occupancy
Agreement that would guarantee
Stier’s recognition as the actual owner
of the property, aided in
circumventing the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership
of lands. Thus, he violated his oath
and the Code when he prepared and
notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
Respondent used his knowledge of the
law to achieve an unlawful end. Such
an act amounts to malpractice in his
office, for which he may be
suspended.
Case:WILFREDO M. CATU vs. ATTY.
VICENTE G. RELLOSA
A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008
Facts. Petitioner initiated a complaint
against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor
who were occupying one of the units in a
building in Malate which was owned by the
former. The said complaint was filed in the
Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723,
Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where
Respondent was the punong barangay. The
parties, having been summoned for
conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive
at an amicable settlement, were issued by
the respondent a certification for the filing of
the appropriate action in court.
Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for
ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where
respondent entered his appearance as
counsel for the defendants. Because of this,
petitioner filed the instant administrative
complaint against the respondent on the
ground that he committed an act of
impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the
defendants despite the fact that he presided
over the conciliation proceedings between
the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed
that as punong barangay, he performed his
task without bias and that he acceded to
Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for
free as she was financially distressed.
The complaint was then referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
where after evaluation, they found sufficient
ground to discipline respondent. According to
them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and, as
an elective official, the prohibition under
Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently,
for the violation of the latter prohibition,
respondent committed a breach of Canon 1.
Respondent was then recommended for
suspension from the practice of law.
Issue. At issue here is whether the
foregoing findings regarding the
transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty
of the respondent were proper. No.
Rationale.
First, respondent cannot be found
liable for violation of Rule 6.03, CPR as this
only applies to former government lawyers
who are prohibited from accepting
employment in connection with any matter
in which [they] had intervened while in their
service. In the instant case, respondent was
an incumbent punong barangay. Apparently,
he does not fall within the purview of the
said provision.
Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but
Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which governs
the practice of profession of elective local
government officials. While RA 6713
generally applies to all public officials and
employees, RA 7160, being a special law,
constitutes an exception to RA 6713.
Moreover, while under RA 7160,
certain local elective officials (like governors,
mayors, provincial board members and
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total
or partial proscription to practice their
profession or engage in any occupation, no
such interdiction is made on the punong
barangay and the members of the
sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Since they are excluded
from any prohibition, the presumption is that
they are allowed to practice their profession.
Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to
practice his profession.
Third, notwithstanding all of these,
respondent still should have procured a prior
permission or authorization from the head of
his Department, as required by civil service
regulations.1 For this failure, responded
1
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules provides that no officer or
employee shall engage directly in any …
profession … without a written permission from
the head of the Department.
violated his oath as a lawyer, that is, to obey
the laws, Rule 1.01, CPR and, for not
complying with the ethical standards of the
legal profession, Canon 7, CPR.
Ruling. Respondent was found GUILTY of
professional misconduct, SUSPENDED from
the practice of law and was strongly
advised to look up and take to heart the
meaning of the word delicadeza.
Case: Paras vs. Paras
343 SCRA 414
Facts:
Atty. Justo De Jesus was charged by her
wife Rosa Paras and initiated a case for disbarment
falsification of public documents and fraud for
counterfeiting using his wife’s name and signature
to obtain loans from certain banks.
Respondent was also charged with grossly
immoral conduct and concubinage for siring a child
with another woman; obstruction of justice by using
his legal skills to derail all the proceedings in the
criminal actions initiated against him; and unethical
and unprofessional conduct by using his legal skills
to frighten, harass and intimidate.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent can be disbarred
on the grounds of falsification of public documents,
grossly immoral conduct and concubinage?
Held:
Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law;
continued possession is also essential for remaining
in the practice of law; Power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution and only in clear case
of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and as a member of the bar; It should never be
decreed where any lesser penalty such as temporary
suspension could accomplish the end desired - It is
a time-honored rule that good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law. Its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law. the
case at bar, respondent has fallen below the moral
when he forged his wife’s signature in the bank loan
documents, and, sired a daughter with a woman
other than his wife. However, the power to
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court
and as a member of the bar should never be decreed
where any lesser penalty such as temporary
suspension could accomplish the end desired.
Therefore, respondent is suspended from the
practice of law for six months on the charge of
falsifying his wife’s signature in bank documents
and other related loan instruments; and for one year
on the charges of immorality and abandonment of
his own family.
Case: SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR vs. ATTY.
FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS
FACTS:
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of
years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and
IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance)
in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP
Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least
three years already, as shown by the following
attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995,
1996 and 1997. Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is a
member of Rizal Chapter.
Respondent’s "last payment of his IBP dues was in
1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any
amount to cover his membership fees up to the
present."
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being
covered by the exemption and if only to show that
he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately
failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is
willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues
even with interests, charges and surcharges and
penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or
payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again
irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for
vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an
honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality
for him to pay such dues despite his candor and
honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.
Defenses of the respondent:
1. he has invoked and cited that "being a
Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally
exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No.
7432 which took effect in 1992 in the
payment of taxes,
2. he is only engaged in a "limited" practice
and that he believes in good faith that he is
exempt from the payment of taxes, such as
income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a
senior citizen since 1992.
Respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION,
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled
by any artifice.
HELD:
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can
engage in the practice of law only by paying his
dues, and it does not matter that his practice is
"limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4
grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment
of individual income taxes: provided, that their
annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty
level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the
exemption does not include payment of membership
or association dues.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and
his misrepresentation in the pleadings he
filed in court indeed merit the most severe
penalty. However, in view of respondent's
advanced age, his express willingness to pay
his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law,8 we believe the
penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his
IBP dues, whichever is later.
Case: AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.,
complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANTONIO M.
LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON,
respondents.
Facts:
Then Senatorial candidate Aquilino
Pimentel Jr. alleged that the respondents
tampered with the votes received by them
by either adding more votes for particular
candidates in their Statement of Votes (SOV)
or reducing the number of votes of particular
candidates in their SOV. Pimentel filed an
administrative complaint for disbarment.
Respondents argued that the discrepancies
were due to honest mistake, oversight and
fatigue.
Held:
A lawyer who holds a government
position may no be disciplined as a member
of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of
his duties as a government official. However,
if the misconduct also constitutes a Violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility of
the Lawyer's Oath or is of such character as
to affect his qualification as a Lawyer or
shows Moral Delinquency on his part, such
individual may be disciplined as a member of
the bar for such misconduct. Here, by
certifying as true and correct the SOVs in
question, respondents committed a breach of
Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that
“A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By
express provision of Canon 6, this is made
applicable to Lawyers in Government service.
In addition, they likewise violated their Oath
of Office as Lawyers “to do no falsehood”.
The court found the respondents guilty of
misconduct and fined them P10, 000 each
and issued a stem warning that similar
conduct in the future will be severely
punished.
Roberto Soriano vs Atty. Manuel
Dizon
A.C No. 6792
January 25, 2006
Facts:
A complaint-affidavit for the
disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by
Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Intergrated Bar of the
Philippines. Complainant Soriano alleged that
respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and that the conviction of the latter for
frustrated homicide, which involved moral
turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
According to the unrefuted statements of
complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to
comply with this particular undertaking, even
appealed the civil liability to the Court of
Appeals
Issue:
Whether or not the atty. Dizon violates
Canon 1 of rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibilities
Held:
Yes. It is also glaringly clear that
respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
through his illegal possession of an
unlicensed firearm his unjust refusal to
satisfy his civil liabilities. He has thus
brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the
lawful orders of the courts. We remind him
that, both in his attorney’s oath and in the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound
himself to “obey the laws of the land.”
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this
incident that he is wanting in even a basic
sense of justice. He obtained the
benevolence of the trial court when it
suspended his sentence and granted him
probation. And yet, it has been four years
since he was ordered to settle his civil
liabilities to complainant. To date,
respondent remains adamant in refusing to
fulfill that obligation. By his extreme
impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his
violent reaction to a simple traffic
altercation, he has taken away the earning
capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of
his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges
complainant the measly amount that could
never even fully restore what the latter has
lost.
Case: JOSELANO GUEVARRA vs. ATTY.
JOSE EMMANUEL EALA
A.C. No. 7136
August 1, 2007
Facts:
He first met respondent in January
2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee
Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to
him as her friend who was married to
Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann")
Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7,
2000, complainant noticed that from January
to March 2001, Irene had been receiving
from respondent cellphone calls, as well as
messages some of which read "I love you," "I
miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene
habitually went home very late at night or
early in the morning of the following day,
and sometimes did not go home from work.
When he asked about her whereabouts, she
replied that she slept at her parents' house
in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with
her work. In February or March 2001,
complainant saw Irene and respondent
together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following
which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went
uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at
which he saw her and respondent
celebrating with her family and friends. Out
of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he
left the venue immediately. Following that
incident, Irene went to the conjugal house
and hauled off all her personal belongings,
pieces of furniture, and her share of the
household appliances. Complainant later
found, in the master's bedroom, a folded
social card bearing the words "I Love You" on
its face, which card when unfolded contained
a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000,
the day of his wedding to Irene. Complainant
soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene
constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street,
New Manila where, as he was to later learn
sometime in April 2001, Irene was already
residing. He also learned still later that when
his friends saw Irene on or about January 18,
2002 together with respondent during a
concert, she was pregnant. The relationship
gave birth to Samantha Louise Irene Moje.
Respondent specifically denies having ever
flaunted an adulterous relationship. He avers
that their relationship was low profile and
known only to the immediate members of
their respective families. Although, from
respondent's Answer, he does not deny
carrying on an adulterous relationship with
Irene. The IBP-CBD found the charge against
respondent sufficiently proven. The
Commissioner thus recommended19 that
respondent be disbarred for violating Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of
the same Code. However, the IBP-CBD
annulled and set aside the recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner and
accordingly dismissed the case for lack of
merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006.
Hence, the present petition before this court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not an illicit relationship
with a married woman in a discreet
manner would constitute a gross
immoral conduct that would warrant
disbarment against a lawyer.
2. Whether or not the acquittal of an
accused in a criminal charge is a bar
to an disbarment proceeding.
Ruling:
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, The immediately-
quoted Rule which provides the grounds for
disbarment or suspension uses the phrase
"grossly immoral conduct," not "under
scandalous circumstances." "Whether a
lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not
his wife or without the benefit of marriage
should be characterized as 'grossly immoral
conduct' depends on the surrounding
circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a
relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is
immaterial whether the affair was carried out
discreetly.
 Although it may be true that the RTC
of Quezon City granted the nullity of their
marriage (complainant’s) and later the
complainant withdraw the criminal complaint
against the respondent thus leaves acquittal
of the respondent, the same would not have
been a bar to the present administrative
complaint. Citing the ruling in Pangan v.
Ramos, the acquittal of respondent Ramos
[of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards
of legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape
the penalties of criminal law. Moreover, this
Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in
an entirely different capacity from that which
courts assume in trying criminal case. Also in
Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v.
Atty. Naldoza, administrative cases against
lawyers belong to a class of their own. They
are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.

Held: Petition granted, ATTY. JOSE

EMMANUEL EALA disbarred.