Chavez vs. Romulo G.R. No.

157036, June 9, 2004 A mere license is always revocable FACTS: This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property. ISSUE: Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right HELD: Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision. In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that: Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. xxx In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.

Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform Equal Protection These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties. The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. de Guzman [GR 14681, 21 June 2004] Second Division, Tinga (J): 4 concur Facts: Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro, Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera And Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan, Elnora R. Raqueno, Marissa A. Regodon, Laura M. Santos, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Maria Rosario L. Leonor, Alicia S. Lizano, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Fernando F. Mandapat, Aleli A. Gollayan, Elcin C. Arriola, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Sally B. Bunagan, Rogelio B. Ancheta, Oscar H. Padua, Jr., Evelyn D. Grajo, Evelyn S. Acosta, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio, Valentino P. Arboleda, Evelyn O. Ramos, Achilles J. Peralta, Corazon M. Cruz, Leuvina P. Chico, Joseph A. Jao, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Lydia C. Chan, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Fernando T. Cruz, Melvin M. Usita, Rafael I. Tolentino, Grace E. Uy, Cheryl R. Triguero, Michael L. Serrano, Federico L. Castillo, Melita J. Caedo, Samuel B. Bangoy, Bernardita B. Sy, Gloria T. Jularbal, Frederick D. Francisco, Carlos M. Bernardo, Jr., Hubert S. Nazareno, Clarissa B. Baclig, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Nancy J. Chavez, Mario D. Cuaresma, Ernesto L. Cue, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Derileen D. Dorado, Saibzur N. Edding, Violeta C. Felipe, Herminio V. Fernandez, Jr., Maria Victoria M. Lacsamana, Norma G. Lafavilla, Ruby B. Lantin, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari, Clarisa Sj. Nicolas, Percival H. Pangilinan, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Robert B. Sanchez, Merly D. Sta. Ana and Yolanda P. Unica are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the 79 successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. 11 Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and 10 got 100% in OB-Gyne, another 11 got 99% in Bio-Chem, and 21 scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination. On 7 June 1993, the Board issued Resolution 19, withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure Examination. Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician and authority in statistics, and later president of the Ateneo de Manila University, to conduct a statistical analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the said examination. On 10 June 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported that a comparison of the scores in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, of the Fatima College examinees with those of examinees from De La Salle University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed that the scores of Fatima College examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. He concluded that there must be some unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause "strong enough to eliminate the normal variations that one should expect from the examinees of Fatima College in terms of talent, effort, energy, etc." For its part, the NBI found that "the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions." On 5 July 1993, Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro, Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera, and Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Case 93-66530) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their petition was adopted by the other respondents as intervenors. Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution 26, dated 21 July 1993, charging de Guzman, et. al. with "immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima

examinees be nullified (Adminstrative Case 1687) by the PRC. On 28 July 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil Case 93-66530 granting the preliminary mandatory injunction sought by de Guzman, et. al.. It ordered PRC, etc. to administer the physicians oath to De Guzman et al., and enter their names in the rolls of the PRC. PRC, etc/ then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set aside the mandatory injunctive writ (CA-GR SP 31701). On 21 October 1993, the appellate court granted the petition, nullifying the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the lower court against PRC, etc. De Guzman, et al., then elevated the foregoing Decision to the Supreme Court in GR 112315. In the Supreme Court's Resolution dated 23 May 1994, it denied the petition for failure to show reversible error on the part of the appellate court. Meanwhile, on 22 November 1993, during the pendency of the above petition, the pre-trial conference in Civil Case 93-66530 was held. Then, the parties, agreed to reduce the testimonies of their respective witnesses to sworn questions-and-answers. This was without prejudice to crossexamination by the opposing counsel. On 13 December 1993, PRCs counsel failed to appear at the trial in the mistaken belief that the trial was set for December 15. The trial court then ruled that PRC, etc. waived their right to cross-examine the witnesses. On 27 January 1994, counsel for PRC, etc. filed a Manifestation and Motion stating the reasons for her non-appearance and praying that the cross-examination of the witnesses for the opposing parties be reset. The trial court denied the motion for lack of notice to adverse counsel. It also denied the Motion for Reconsideration that followed on the ground that adverse counsel was notified less than 3 days prior to the hearing. Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board from proceeding with Administrative Case 1687, De Guzman, et. al. moved for the issuance of a restraining order, which the lower court granted in its Order dated 4 April 1994. PRC, etc. then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari (GR 115704), to annul the Orders of the trial court dated 13 November 1993, 28 February 1994, and 4 April 1994. The Supreme Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 34506). On 31 August 1994, the appellate court granted the petition for certiorari, and thus allowing the PRC, etc. to present their evidence in due course of trial, and thereafter to decide the case on the merits on the basis of the evidence of the parties. The trial was then set and notices were sent to the parties. A day before the first hearing, on 22 September 1994, PRC, etc. filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion praying for the partial reconsideration of the appellate courts decision in CA-GR SP 34506, for the outright dismissal of Civil Case 93-66530, and for the suspension of the proceedings. In its Order dated 23 September 1994, the trial court granted the aforesaid motion, cancelled the scheduled hearing dates, and reset the proceedings to October 21 and 28, 1994. Meanwhile, on 25 October 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the partial motion for reconsideration in CA-GR SP 34506. Thus, PRC, etc. filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review (GR 117817, entitled Professional Regulation Commission, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.) On 11 November 1994, PRC's counsel failed to appear at the trial of Civil Case 93-66530. Upon motion of De Guzman, et. al., the trial court ruled that PRC, etc. waived their right to cross-examine De Guzman, et. al. Trial was reset to 28 November 1994. On 25 November 1994, PRCs counsel moved for the inhibition of the trial court judge for alleged partiality. On 28 November 1994, the day the Motion to Inhibit was to be heard, PRC, etc. failed to appear. Thus, the trial court denied the Motion to Inhibit and declared Civil Case 93-66530 deemed submitted for decision. On 19 December 1994, the trial court handed down its judgment in Civil Case 93-66530 in favor of De Guzman, et. al., ordering the PRC to allow De Guzman, et. al. to take the physicians oath and to register them as physicians. As a result of these developments, PRC, etc. filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari (GR 118437, entitled Professional Regulation Commission v. Hon. David G. Nitafan), praying inter alia, that (1) GR 118437 be consolidated with GR 117817; (2) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 August 1994 in CA-GR SP 34506 be nullified for its failure to decree the dismissal of Civil Case 93-66530, and in the alternative, to set aside the decision of the trial court in Civil Case 93-66530, order the trial court judge to inhibit himself, and Civil Case 93-66530 be re-raffled to another branch. On 26 December 1994, PRC, etc. filed their Notice of Appeal in Civil Case 93-66530, thereby elevating the case to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 37283). Meanwhile, in the Supreme Court's Resolution of 7 June 1995, GR 118437 was consolidated with GR 117817. On 9 July 1998, the Court disposed of GRs 117817 and 118437 by dismissing them for being moot. The petition in GR 118437 was likewise dismissed on the ground that there is a pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. While CA-GR SP 37283 was awaiting disposition by the appellate court, Arnel V. Herrera, one of the original petitioners in Civil Case 93-66530, joined by 27 intervenors, manifested that they were no longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved for its dismissal. A similar manifestation and motion was later filed by 22 other intervenors. The Court of Appeals ruled that its decision in CA-GR SP 37283 would not apply to them. On 16 May 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-GR SP 37283, affirming the decision of the lower court and dismissing the appeal. PRC, etc. filed the petition for review, seeking to nullify the 16 May 2000 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP 37283. Issue: Whether De Guzman, et. al. may compel the PRC, etc. to administer them the Hippocratic oath, even in light of unusually high scores acquired by the examinees from Fatima College. Held: A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word "shall" with respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, PRC, etc. "shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board." In statutory construction the term "shall" is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physicians license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 2225 of the Medical Act of 1959. However, the surrounding circumstances in the present case call for serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements by De Guzman, et. al. The unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebres, the consultant of PRC on the matter, and raised grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests. Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with the power to conduct administrative investigations and "disapprove applications for examination or registration," pursuant to the objectives of RA 2382 as outlined in Section 126 thereof. Herein, after the investigation, the Board filed before the PRC, Adminstrative Case 1687 against De Guzman, et. al. to ascertain their moral and mental fitness to practice medicine, as required by Section 927 of RA 2382. Further, Section 830 of RA 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person

who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must have "satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination." Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be administered "to physicians who qualified in the examinations." The operative word here is "satisfactorily," defined as "sufficient to meet a condition or obligation" or "capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance." Gleaned from Board Resolution 26, the licensing authority apparently did not find that De Guzman, et. al. "satisfactorily passed" the licensure examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify the examination results obtained by the latter. Thus, while it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements; like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine. It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. Under the view that the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power. Herein, the guidelines are provided for in RA 2382, as amended, which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physicians license, or revoking a license that has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.

Phil. Press Institute, Inc. v. Comelec 244 SCRA 272 Facts: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free Comelec Space and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression. On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of Comelec space, the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidates utilization of the Comelec space procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid. Held: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letterdirectives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to donate free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.

COMMISSIONER OF IR VS CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORP GR 148512June 26, 2006 Azcuna, J.: FACTS:This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of Rules of Court seeking the nullification of CA decision granting respondents claim for tax equal to the amount of the 20% that it extended to senior citizens on the latters purchases pursuant to Senior Citizens Act. Respondent deducted the total amount of Php219,778 from its gross income for the taxable year 1995 whereby respondent did not pay tax for that year reporting a net loss of Php20,963 in its corporate income tax. In 1996, claiming that the Php219,778 should be applied as a tax credit, respondent claimed for refund in the amount of Php150, 193. ISSUE:

Whether or not the 20% discount granted by the respondent to qualified senior citizens may be claimed as tax credit or as deduction from gross sales? RULING: Tax credit is explicitly provided for in Sec4 of RA 7432. The discount given to Senior citizens is a tax credit, not a deduction from the gross sales of the establishment concerned. The tax credit that is contemplated under this Act is a form of just compensation, not a remedy for taxes that were erroneously or illegally assessed and collected. In the same vein, prior payment of any tax liability is a pre-condition before a taxable entity can benefit from tax credit.The credit may be availed of upon payment, if any. Where there is no tax liability or where a private establishment reports a net loss for the period, the tax credit can be availed of and carried over to the next taxable year.

Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220 F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought the expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay Malubog and Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property, the CFI authorized the PTA to take immediate possession of the property. The charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire through condemnation proceedings lands for tourist zone development of a sports complex. The petitioners who are occupants of the lands, filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They contended that (1) the taking was not for public use; (2) the land was covered by the land reform program; and (3) expropriation would impair the obligation of contracts. HELD: The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes for the construction of roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has been discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The petititioners have not shown that the area being developed is land reform area and that the affected persons have been given emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. The contract clause has never been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise eminent domain. Source: http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/1767226-case-digest-heirs-juancho-ardona/#ixzz1fX62O0Oh

REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, digested GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking) FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the taking of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present. ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse. HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959. The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease.

Tablarin v. Gutierrez (J) [GR 78164, 31 July 1987] En Banc, Feliciano (J): 13 concur Facts: Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction. Issue: Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional. Held: No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical Act of 1959 defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.

MMDA vs Garin GR No. 130230 Chico-Nazario, J.: FACTS:

April 15, 2005

Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for his case to be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist from confiscating drivers license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding. Thus this petition. ISSUE: Whether of not Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers license in the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations constitutional? RULING: The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit of a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and welfare of the commonwealth and for subjects of the same. There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council to enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, Peoples Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are administrative in nature.