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Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy Author(s): Iris Marion Young Source: Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 5 (Oct.

, 2001), pp. 670-690 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3072534 Accessed: 01/10/2008 02:21
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ACTIVIST CHALLENGES TO DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

IRISMARIONYOUNG Universityof Chicago

creen and song celebratesocial justice movementsthatprotestedin the streetswhen they were convincedthatexisting institutionsand theirnormal proceduresonly reinforcedthe status quo. Many rights have been won in democraticsocieties by means of courageousactivism-the eight-hourday, demvotes for women, the rightto sit at anylunchcounter.Yetcontemporary and ocratictheoryrarelyreflects on the role of demonstration directaction.' Indeed, it might be thought that one of the major strainsof contemporary democratictheory,the theoryof deliberative democracy,shouldbe criticalof typical tactics of activism such as streetmarches,boycotts, or sit-ins, on the groundsthat there activities confrontratherthan engage in discussion with people the movement'smembersdisagreewith. with This essay constructsa dialoguebetweentwo "characters" these difto fering approaches political action, a deliberativedemocratand an activist. for A dialoguebetween them is useful because theirprescriptions good citizenshipclash in some respects.I aim throughthis exercise to bringout some of of the limitations of at least some understandings deliberativelydemoas craticnorms,especially if theyareunderstood guidingpracticesin existing democracieswhere structural inequalitiesunderlie significantinjustices or social harms.At the same time, I aim to foregroundsome of the virtues of criticism.The "characters" nondeliberative politicalpracticesfor democratic of the deliberativedemocratand the activistI constructas ideal types. Many political theorists and citizens doubtless sympathize with both, and the stances often shift and mix in the political world.

Nick Burbules,Natasha Levinson,Emily NOTE:I am gratefulto David Alexander, AUTHOR'S Robertson,and StephenWhiteand an anonymousreviewerforPoliticalTheoryfor helpfulcomments on an earlier version of this essay.
Vol. 29 No. 5, October2001 670-690 POLITICAL THEORY, ? 2001 Sage Publications 670

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As I construeher character, deliberativedemocratclaims thatparties the to political conflict oughtto deliberatewith one anotherandthroughreasonable argumenttry to come to an agreementon policy satisfactoryto all. The activistis suspiciousof exhortationsto deliberatebecausehe believes thatin the real worldof politics, where structural inequalitiesinfluence both proceduresand outcomes, democraticprocesses thatappearto conformto norms of deliberationare usually biased towardmorepowerfulagents. The activist thusrecommendsthatthose who careaboutpromotinggreater justice should in criticaloppositionalactivity,rather thanattemptto come engage primarily or to agreement withthosewho support benefitfromexistingpowerstructures. In the dialogue I construct,the deliberativedemocrat'sclaims that the activistonly aims to promotea partialinterestdoes not adopta stanceof reasonableness.Afteransweringthese commonlyheardchargeson behalfof the activist,I considerfourchallengesthe activistbringsto the recommendation that responsiblecitizens should follow norms of deliberativedemocracyas the best formof politicalengagement.I find thatthe earlychallengesareeasier for the deliberativedemocratto answerthan the latter. The purposeof the dialectic is not to recommendone side over the other because I think that both approachesare valuable and necessary to democraticpracticethataimsto promotejustice. Bringingthe approaches critinto ical relation with one anotherin this way, however,helps sound a caution abouttryingto put ideals of deliberativedemocracyinto practicein societies with structural inequalities.This dialogue also revealstensions between the two stances thatcannotbe thoroughlyresolved.

I. THE CHARACTERS In the effortto give the characters embodiedfeel, I have endowedeach an with genderpronouns,rather thanrepeatedlyusing "heor she"for each. This decision reveals a disturbingdilemma:shall they both be male, both female, or one each male and female? Deciding thatone shall be male and the other female only magnifies the dilemma:which should be which? As I try each one out, I discoverthatmy assignmentevokes undesirablestereotypeswherever way it goes. If the deliberativedemocrat is male, then that position appearsto carryaddedweight of rationalityandcalm, andthe corresponding female activist seems to appearflighty and moved by passion primarily. Despite its own stereotypingdangersof makingthe activist appearaggresdemocratas female andactivistas sive, I havedecidedto cast the deliberative male becauseat leastthis assignmentmoreassociatesthe female withpower.

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For the purposes of this essay, I understanddeliberativedemocracy as both a normativeaccount of the bases of democraticlegitimacy and a prescriptionfor how citizens oughtto be politicallyengaged.The best and most appropriate way to conduct political action, to influence and make public is throughpublic deliberation.In deliberation,partiesto conflict, decisions, disagreement, and decision making propose solutions to their collective problemsand offer reasons for them; they criticize one another'sproposals and reasonsand are open to being criticizedby others.Deliberativedemocracydiffersfrom some otherattitudesandpracticesin democraticpolitics in thatit exhortsparticipants be concernednot only with theirown interests to but to listen to and take accountof the interestsof othersinsofaras these are compatible with justice. Practices of deliberativedemocracy also aim to bracketthe influence of power differentialsin political outcomes because shouldbe reachedon the basis of argument, agreementbetween deliberators ratherthan as a result of threator force. The theory of deliberativedemocracythus expresses a set of normative ideals accordingto which actualpoliticalprocessesareevaluatedandusually found wanting.Political decisions ought to be made by processes thatbring all the potentiallyaffectedpartiesor theirrepresentatives a public delibinto erativeprocess. Deliberatorsshould appealto justice and framethe reasons for theirproposalsin termsthey claim thatothersought to accept. Doing so rules out the assertionof simple partisaninterestor the attemptto compel assent by means of threatsand sanctions. As I constructthe characterof the deliberativedemocrathere, however, she not only finds in the ideals of deliberativedemocracymeans to criticize political processes. She also advocatesprocesses and action to implement deliberativeproceduresin actuallyexisting democracy,with all its conflict, disagreement,and economic, social, and political inequality.The deliberative democratthinks that the best way to limit political dominationand the naked imposition of partisaninterest and to promote greatersocial justice throughpublic policy is to fosterthe creationof sites andprocesses of deliberationamongdiverseanddisagreeingelementsof the polity.She thusattributes severaldispositionsto the good citizen. The politically engaged citizen aimingto promotesocialjustice seeks to criticize anddebatewith those with whom she disagreesorthose with whomherinterestsinitiallyconflict in public settings where she tries to persuadeothersthatsome policies or interests have unjustor harmfulaspects or consequences.Throughcritical argument thatis open to the point of view of others,she aims to arriveat policy conclusions freely acceptableby all involved. the Likethatof the deliberative democrat, stanceof the activistoffersitself as a model of citizen virtue. The activist is committedto social justice and

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normativevalue and the idea that politically responsible persons ought to takepositive actionto promotethese. He also believes thatthe normalworkings of the social economic andpoliticalinstitutionsin which he dwells enact or reproducedeep wrongs-some laws or policies have unjust effects, or social and economic structurescause injustice, or nonhumananimals and rules andpracthings arewronglyendangered,and so on. Since the ordinary tices of these institutionstend to perpetuate these wrongs, we cannotredress themwithinthose rules.The activistopposes particular actionsor policies of or privateinstitutions,as well as systems of policies or actions, and public wants them changed. Sometimes he also demands positive policies and action to reduceinjustice or harm. Besides being motivatedby a passion forjustice, the activistis often also at of propelledby angerorfrustration whathejudges is the intransigence peoin powerin existing institutions,who behavewith arrogance indifferand ple ence towardthe injustices the activist finds they perpetuateor flatly deny them andrationalizetheirdecisions andthe institutionsthey serve as beneficent. Since many of his fellow citizens are ignorantof these institutional harmsor acceptthem with indifferenceor resignation,the activistbelieves it to important expressoutrageatcontinuedinjusticeto motivateothersto act. Typically,the activist eschews deliberation,especially deliberationwith of personswielding political or economic power and official representatives institutionshe believes perpetuateinjusticeor harm.He finds laughablethe suggestionthathe andhis comradesshouldsit downwith those whom he criticizes and whose policies he opposes to work out an agreementthroughreasoned argument they all can accept.The powerfulofficials have no motiveto sit down with him, and even if they did agree to deliberate,they would have the power unfairlyto steer the course of the discussion. Thus, the activist takes otheraction thathe finds more effective in conveyinghis criticismand the furthering objectiveshe believes right:picketing,leafleting, guerillatheater,large and loud streetdemonstrations, sit-ins, and other forms of direct action, such as boycotts. Often activists make public noise outside when deliberationis supposedlytaking place on the inside.2Sometimes activists invadethe houses of deliberationanddisrupttheirbusinessby unfurlingbanners, throwing stink bombs, or running and shouting through the aisles. Sometimes they are convinced that an institutionproduces or perpetuates such wrongthatthe most morallyappropriate thing for themto do is to tryto stop its business-by blocking entrances,for example. Morallyacceptabletactics are muchdisputedby activists.Shouldthey be strictlynonviolentor not, andpreciselywhatdoes being nonviolentmean?Is being annoyingandinsultingacceptable,or shouldthe activistbe respectful? Is it acceptableto destroy or damage propertyas long as one does not hurt

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people or animals?I do not herewish to enterthese debates.Forthe purposes I of this characterization,will assumethatthe activistbelieves thatintentional violence directedat others is neithermorally nor politically acceptablebut thathe has the rightphysicallyto defendhimself if he is physicallyattacked.I will assumethatthe activistrejectstacticsof intentionallyproducingserious damageto property-such as bombingor burning.Less damagingforms of defacementor breakage,especially as by-productsof protestactions, need not be condemned.

II. DELIBERATIVE JUDGMENTOF ACTIVISM Theories of deliberative democracy rarely mention political activities such as those I have madetypicalof activism,andthuswe cannotderivefrom them a directaccountof the extentto which political virtueas understoodby deliberativedemocratsstandsopposedto political virtueas I have characterized it for the activist.Nevertheless,we do knowthatmanyresponsiblepolitical participantsroutinely condemn activists, claiming they are irrational nihilists who bring a bad name to good causes. Fromthe point of view of principlesof deliberativedemocracy,whatreasons might they have? We can reconstructtwo kinds of reasons, I suggest. Some who see themselvesguidedby normsof deliberativedemocracymight say thatactivists engage in interestgrouppolitics ratherthanorientingtheir commitmentto principlesall can accept.They might also say thatthe stance of the activistis flatly unreasonable. HereI review suchpossible criticismsof activismfrom the point of view of deliberativedemocracyand answerthem on behalf of the activist. the demoAs I construeherfor the purposesof this encounter, deliberative cratjudges the approachto democracythe activist takes as little different fromthe pressuregroupinterest-based politics thatshe thinksshouldbe transcendedto achieve workableagreementand legitimatepolicy outcomes. An interestgroupapproachto politics encouragespeople to organizegroupsto or ends throughpolitics andpolicy by pressuring cajoling promoteparticular policy makersto servethose interests.By meansof lobbying,buyingpolitical fundsto partiesandcandidates,andmobilizing advertisements, contributing votes for or againstcandidateswho hold positions on certainissues, interest theirgoals anddefeattheiropponents.They feel no obligation groupsfurther to discuss issues with those with whom theirinterestsconflict to come to an agreementthey all can accept. They simply aim to win the most for their group and engage in power politics to do so.

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Tothis charge,the activistrespondsthathis stancediffersfromthatof simple interestadvocacy because he is committedto a universalistratherthan partisan cause. There is a significant difference, he claims, between self-interestor groupinterestandan interestin redressingharmandinjustice. The good citizen activist is not usually motivatedby personalgain or by the gain of groups he defends at an unfairexpense of others. He sacrifices his and time, careeradvancement, moneyfor the sakeof the causes to which he is committed.He does indeed seek to bring pressure,the power of collective action,disruption,and shameto effect change in the directionof greater justice. The powerhe andhis comradesexertin the streets,however,is usuallya mereDavid to the Goliathof powerwielded by the stateandcorporateactors whose policies he opposes and aims to change. The deliberativedemocrat who thinksthatpowercan be bracketed the soft tones of the seminarroom by is naive. While he is suspiciousof the claim thathe oughtto engage in deliberation with the powerful agents he believes perpetuateinjustice and harmor with those who supportthem, moreover,the activist does not reject discussion altogether.The promulgationand exchange of informationand ideas are a majorpart of his political work, both within his activist organizationsand more broadlyamong othercitizens whom he aims to convince thatthereare seriousharmsandinjusticesthatthey shouldprotestandresist.When social, economic, and political institutions produce unjust structuralinequalities and other serious social and environmentalharms,insists the activist, it is importantfor citizens to try to avoid complicity with the workingsof those institutions.Activities of protest,boycott, and disruptionare most appropriate for gettingcitizens to thinkseriouslyaboutwhatuntilthen they may have foundnormalandacceptable.Activities of deliberation, the contrary, on tend more to confer legitimacyon exiting institutionsand effectively silence real dissent. The deliberativedemocratmight claim that the stance of the activist is unreasonable.Reasonablepoliticalengagement,on this account,consists of the willingness to listen to those whom one believes is wrong,to demandreasons from them, and to give argumentsaimed at persuadingthem to change their views. For the most part,the activist declines so to engage persons he disagrees with. Ratherthan on reason, accordingto this deliberativedemotaccrat,the activistrelies on emotionalappeal,slogans,irony,anddisruptive tics to protestand make his claims. It is common in the political life of many democraciesthus to label an activist stance unreasonableand even "extremist." One can interpretsuch blanketlabelingitself as a powerploy whose functionis to ruleout of bounds all claims that question something basic about existing institutionsand the

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terms in which they put political alternatives.It is important,therefore,to considerthe activist answerto the chargeof being an irrational extremist:it relies on far too narrowan understanding what is reasonable. of in here, I mean having a sense of a rangeof alternatives By "reasonable" belief and action and engaging in consideredjudgmentin deciding among them.The reasonablepersonthus is also able andwilling to justify his or her claims and actionsto others.As I have constructedthe stanceof the activist, he is principledand reasonable in this sense. He reflects on some of the thingsandhas an accountof some wrongsthatcome to people andnonhuman of the social causes of those wrongsthathe believes arealterable.He considers alternativemeans for bringingattentionto those wrongs and calling on othersto help redressthem, andhe is usuallyquiteprepared justify the use to of specific means on specific occasions, both to his comradesand to others, such as television reporters.While his principlesoften lead him to protest outside of or disruptthe meetings of powerful people with whom he disagrees, one of his primaryreasonsfor such protestis to make a widerpublic awareof institutional wrongsandpersuadethatpublicto join him in pressurthen, in the sense of ing for changein the institutions.While not deliberative, engagingin orderlyreasongiving, most activistpoliticalengagementsaim to communicatespecific ideas to a wide public. They use slogans, humor,and alone arenot likely to command ironyto do so becausediscursivearguments attentionor inspireaction.3 In the real world of politics, some nihilistic and destructivepersonsdemonstrate and protest from blind rage or because they get pleasure from destruction.Such a nihilistic stance describesfew activists, however;activists are often more self-conscious than other political actors about having good reasonsfor whatthey do anddiscipliningtheirfellows to follow rulesin their collective actions. The common rhetoricalmove of official powers to shouldbe resistedby anypaintall protestactionwith the tarof "extremism" one committedto social justice and reasonablecommunication. Now thatthe activisthas answeredthe deliberativedemocrat'ssuspicion recomthathe is not worthtalkingto, we can hearhis criticismof deliberative mendationsfor political engagementand citizen virtue.I will presentthese to challenges in four steps, giving the deliberativedemocratthe opportunity respondto each.

ARE EXCLUSIVE PROCEDURES III. DELIBERATIVE Exhortingcitizens to engage in respectfulargumentwith othersthey disfor agree with is a fine recommendation the ideal worldthatthe deliberative

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democrattheorizes, says the activist, where everyone is included and the political equal of one another.This is not the real world of politics, however, where powerful elites representingstructurallydominant social segments have significantinfluence over political processes and decisions. Deliberationsometimesoccursin this realworld.Officialsanddignitaries meet all the time to hammerout agreements.Theirmeetings areusuallywell and organizedwith structured procedures, those who knowthe rulesareoften able to further theirobjectivesthroughthemby presentingproposalsandgiving reasons for them, which are considered and critically evaluatedby the others,who give theirown reasons.Deliberation,the activistsays, is an activand ity of boardrooms congressionalcommitteesandsometimeseven parliaments.Elites exerttheirpowerpartlythroughmanagingdeliberativesettings. Among themselvesthey engage in debateaboutthe policies thatwill sustain theirpowerandfurther theircollective interests.Entrance into such deliberative settings is usually rathertightly controlled, and the interests of many affectedby the decisions made in them often receive no voice or representation. The proceedingsof these meetings,moreover,areoften not open to general observation,andoften they leave no public record.Observersand membersof the presscome only by invitation.Deliberationis primarily activity an of political elites who treatone anotherwith cordialrespect and try to work out theirdifferences.Insofaras deliberation exclusive in this way,andinsois far as the decisions reachedin such deliberativebodies supportandperpetuate structural inequalityor otherwisehave unjustandharmfulconsequences, says the activist, then it is wrong to prescribedeliberationfor good citizens committedto furtheringsocial justice. Under these circumstancesof structuralinequalityandexclusive power,good citizens shouldbe protestingoutside these meetings, calling public attention to the assumptions made in them, the control exercised, and the resultinglimitationsor wrongs of their outcomes. They should use the power of shame and exposure to pressure deliberators widen theiragendaandincludeattentionto moreinterests.As to long as the proceedingsexercise exclusive powerfor the sake of the interests of elites and againstthe interestsof most citizens, then politically engaged citizens who care aboutjustice and environmental are preservation justified even in taking actions aimed at preventingor disruptingthe deliberations. Manyof the thousandswho filled the streetsof Seattlein December 1999, it seems to me, assumedjust this accountof the relationbetweendeliberation andprotest.Headsof stateor otherhigh officials came fromall overthe world to a meeting of the WorldTradeOrganization (WTO)to deliberateandtry to agree on a new roundof global traderules. Protestorscriticizedthe meeting, and manythoughtit should simply be stopped.They protestedthe exclusive methodsof the WTO,thatthe proceedingsof its commission areclosed, and

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thatthe Seattlemeetingitself was not public.They claimedthatthe WTOis a tool of transnational corporatepower and that its deliberationsgive little attentionto the effects of the free traderegimeon averagecitizens, especially the world'spoorestpeople. The deliberations the WTOarenot legitimate, of andthe agendaof the organization morallywrong.As I writethis, some of is my fellow citizens prepareto protestsimilardeliberationson agreementfor free tradein the Americas.Not only arethe meetingsexclusive, buteven the documentthey will discuss is not public.Thereis no alternative protestand to the activist thinks, when decisions affecting so many people are disruption, made by so few and almost in secret. The advocateof deliberative for democracyas a prescription politicalprocesses and the behaviorof good citizens has an easy answerto this criticism of deliberation.She agrees with manythings the activist says. Insofaras the proceedingsof elite meetingsareexclusive andnonpublic,they arenot democratic, even if they are deliberative.The norms of deliberativedemocracy call not only for discussion among parties who use the force of argument alone andtreateach otheras equals.They also requirepublicity,accountability, and inclusion.4To be democraticallylegitimate, policies and actions decided on by means of deliberationought to include representation all of affectedinterestsandperspectives.The deliberations such inclusivelyrepof resentative bodies oughtto be publicin everyway.The people who speakand vote in such deliberativesettings,finally,oughtto be accountableto theirfellow citizens for theiropinions anddecisions. The deliberativedemocratwill likely join the activistto protestoutside exclusive and privatedeliberations. She exhortsthe activist to join her call for deliberationswhose proceedings are public, accountable, and inclusive, and she allies with the activist in deliberative regarding processesas illegitimateunless they meet these conditions. She may consideractivistprotesta healthymeansof deepeningdemocracy,of creatingopen and inclusive settings of deliberativedemocracy.

IV FORMAL INCLUSION NOTENOUGH IS Criticismof politicalprocesses of discussionanddecision making,which include only powerful insiders and take place behind closed doors, is frequent and often effective in democraticpolitics. In response to such criticisms, official deliberativebodies have sometimestakensteps to make their by processesmorepublic andinclusive.They open theirdoorsto observation press and citizens, as well as publish their proceedings and evaluationsof their operations.Some legislative and other official bodies have discussed

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andimplementedmeasuresintendedto open theirseatsto a widerdiversityof representatives,including campaign finance regulation, electoral process reform, or even quotas in party lists for underrepresented groups. In the United States in the past thirtyyears, norms of inclusiveness and publicity have been takenmore seriously thanbefore. Public agencies and even some powerfulprivateagencies hold hearingsto discuss policy proposalsat which membersof the public are invitedto testify. Influencedby some of the ideas of JamesFishkin,some local officials or nongovernment have organizations "citizenjuries"thataim to be broadlyrepresentative the profile of organized of the electorate.5Members of these panels listen to and question political candidates on issues and then deliberate among themselves, often also from citizens listening to proceedreceivingphone ande-mail contributions on the radio.Manystudentsof democracyhavecommendedthe broadly ings participatory process of public deliberationthe stateof Oregonundertookin the 1990s in its process of restructuring low-income healthcare program. its Anothernotableexampleof a heroiceffortto makepublicdeliberation inclusive is the consultativeprocessthe governmentof SouthAfricaranto discuss the new constitutionthatbecamelaw in 1996. Not only did the constitutional commissionersinvite commenton the draftconstitutionby mail and e-mail, but they also conductedpublic meetings for those unable to read the draft, explainingto attendeesits content and invitingresponse. The deliberativedemocratendorses measures such as these. She thinks the good citizen should vigorously advocatefor creativeways to expandthe publicity of deliberationsabout problems and policy proposals and make theminclusive.If theyhavethe opportunity participate suchconsultative to in deliberativeprocesses, they should do so, and if they are invited to help design them, they should accept. The activist is more suspicious even of these deliberativeprocesses that claim to give all affected by projectedpolicies, or at least representatives of the opportunity expresstheiropinions in a deliberativeprocess. to everyone, In a society structured deep social andeconomic inequalities,he believes by that formally inclusive deliberativeprocesses neverthelessenact structural biases in which more powerful and socially advantagedactorshave greater access to the deliberativeprocess andthereforeareable to dominatethe proceedings with their interestsand perspectives. Under conditions of structural inequality,normalprocesses of deliberation often in practicerestrictaccess to agents with greaterresources,knowledge, or connections to those with greatercontrol over the forum. We are familiarwith the manymanifestationsof this effective exclusion from deliberation.Whereradioandtelevision aremajorforafor further for deliberation,

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example,citizens eitherneed the money or connectionsto get airtime.Even when a series of public hearings are announcedfor an issue, people who their mightwish to speakat themneed to know aboutthem,be able to arrange work and child care schedule to be able attend,be able to get to them, and of have enough understanding the hearing process to participate.Each of these abilities is unevenlypresentamong membersof a society. Some have arguedthat such differentialaccess and participation characterizedboth of the ostensibly inclusive public deliberativeprocesses I cited above: the OregonMedicaid process and the deliberationsaboutthe South Africanconstitution.In the firstcase, participants the consultativeprocess in turnedout to be largely white, middle-class,able-bodiedpeople, despite the fact that the programspecifically was to serve lower income people. Many too citizens of SouthAfricaunderstood little aboutthe meaningof a constitution, or their lives were too occupied by survival, for them to become involved in thatdeliberativeprocess. The activist thus arguesthat citizens who care aboutjustice should continueto criticizeprocessesof publicdeliberation fromthe outside,even when the latterhave formal rules aimed at producingwide participation.To the extentthatstructural inequalitiesin the society operateeffectively to restrict access to these deliberative and processes,theirdeliberations conclusionsare not legitimate.Responsiblecitizens shouldremainat least partiallyoutside, protestingthe process, agenda,and outcome of these proceedingsand demthat onstratingagainstthe underlyingrelationsof privilegeanddisadvantage condition them. They should aim to speak on behalf of those de facto excluded and attemptto use tactics such as strikes,boycotts, and disruptive demonstrations pressurethese bodies to act in ways that respondto the to needs and interestsof those effectively excluded. If we participatein these formally inclusive processes, the activist says, we help confer undeserved legitimacy on them and fail to speak for those who remainoutsiders. The recentWTO meetings offer anotherexampleof an attemptat a more inclusiveprocessthatmost activiststhererejectedas illegitimate.In response to the advancecriticismof the WTOas an exclusive forumdominatedby corporateinterestsin the service of northern hemisphericeconomies, some of its officials hastily organizeda meeting to takeplace the day before the official WTO meeting, to which representatives nongovernmental of organizations (NGOs) were invited. Many activists considered this gesture an absurd attemptto co-opt anddampenan oppositionto the WTOproceedings,which even beforetheybeganhadbeen very effective in bringingissues of transparoutside ency and global inequalitybefore a worldpublic;they demonstrated who decidedto attend the NGO meetings. Some of the NGO representatives

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the meeting, moreover,were sorely disappointed.They found the agenda alreadydecided and thatthey were passively listening to the WTO head, the U.S. trade secretary,and other powerful figures, with only minimal time availableto questiontheirspeeches or makespeeches of theirown. Whenthe agents of exclusion try to reform political processes to be more publicly for inclusive, it seems, they fall far shortof providingopportunity real voice for those less privileged in the social structures.Given these realities, the activistsays, the most responsiblestancefor the citizen who cares aboutjustice is to expose this manipulative powerandexpressthe legitimatedemands of those sufferingunderstructural injustices,whetheror notthe powerfulwill listen to them. The deliberativedemocratagreeswith the activist'sexposureandcritique of the way thatstructural inequalitieseffectively limit access of some people to formally inclusive deliberativesettings. Unlike the activist, however,she thinks that the responsiblecitizen should engage and arguewith those who design andimplementthese settingsto persuadethemthatthey shoulddevote thoughtand resourcesto activities that will make them more inclusive and of representative all the interestsandperspectivespotentiallyaffectedby the outcome of policy discussions. In a polity that claims to be committed to democracy,it should be possible to persuademany membersof a formally inclusive deliberativepublic that special measuresmay need to be taken to facilitate voice and representationfor segments of the society subject to structural disadvantages.Protestingand making demandsfrom the outside be an effective way to bring attentionto injusticesthatrequireremedy, may says the deliberativedemocrat,but on theirown they do not propelthe positive institutional change that would produce greaterjustice. Those who believe such change is necessary must enter deliberativeproceedings with those indifferentor hostile to themin an effortto persuadea democraticpublic of theirrightness.6 The activist'sfirsttwo challengeshave focused on the publicityandinclusiveness of the deliberativepublic, ratherthan on the terms and content of deliberations.So far, the deliberativedemocratand the activistperspectives are ratherclose on the issues of morallylegitimatepolitical processes, inasmuchas bothcriticizeformalandde facto exclusions fromdeliberations. The difference between them may reduce to how optimistic they are about whetherpolitical agents can be persuadedthatthereare structural injustices, the remedyfor which an inclusivedeliberative publicoughtto agreeon. Once we turnto analyze issues of the termsand contentof deliberations,however, we see moredivergencebetweenthe deliberative democratandthe activist.

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V CONSTRAINED ALTERNATIVES Let us supposethatby some combinationof activistagitationanddeliberative persuasion,some deliberativesettingsemerge thatapproximately representall those affectedby the outcomeof certainpolicy decisions. Giventhe world of structural inequalityas we know it, the activistbelieves such a circumstancewill be rareat best butis willing to entertain possibilityfor the the sake of this argument.The activist remains suspicious of the deliberative democrat'sexhortationto engage in reasoned and critical discussion with people he disagrees with, even on the suppositionthat the public where he engages in such discussion really includes the diversityof interestsand perspectives potentiallyaffected by policies. That is because he perceives that have set unacceptable constraintson existing social andeconomic structures the termsof deliberationand its agenda. Problems and disagreements in the real world of democratic politics of appearandareaddressedagainstthe background a given historyand sedimentationof unjust structural the activist, which helps set inequality,says that agendaprioritiesandconstrainsthe alternatives politicalactorsmay considerin theirdeliberations. When this is so, both the deliberativeagendaand the institutionalconstraintsit mirrorsshould themselves be subjectto criticism, protest,andresistance.7 Going to the tableto meet with representatives of those intereststypicallyservedby existinginstitutional relations,to discuss how to deal most justly with issues thatpresupposethose institutionalrelations, gives both those institutionsand deliberativeprocess too much legitimacy. It co-opts the energy of citizens committed to justice, leaving little constraintsanddecisiontime for mobilizingpeople to bash the institutional fromthe outside.Thus,the responsiblecitizen oughtto withmakingprocess and drawfrom implicit acceptanceof structural institutionalconstraintsby aboutpolicieswithinthem.Letme give someexamples. refusingto deliberate A local anti-poverty advocacygroupengaged in many forms of agitation and protestin the years leading up to passage of the PersonalResponsibility andWorkOpportunity ReconciliationAct by the U.S. Congressin the spring of 1996. This legislationfundamentally changedthe termsof welfarepolicy in the UnitedStates.It abolishedentitlementsto publicassistancefor the first time in sixty years,allowing statesto deny benefitswhen fundshaverunout. It requiresrecipientsof Temporary Assistance to Needy Familiesto work at jobs aftera certainperiodand allows statesto varysignificantlyin theirproadvocacygrouphas grams.Since passage of the legislation,the anti-poverty organizedrecipientsandotherswho care aboutwelfarejustice to protestand lobby the state house to increase welfare funding and to count serving as a welfare rights advocatein local welfare offices as a "workactivity."

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In its desireto do its best by welfareclients, the countywelfaredepartment proposesto establishan advisorycouncil with significantinfluence over the and of implementation administration welfareprogramsin the county.They have been persuadedby advocatesof deliberativedemocracythat proceedings of this council should be publicly accountableand organizedso as to facilitate serious discussion and criticism of alternativeproposals. They believe thatdemocratic justice calls for makingthis councilbroadlyinclusive of countycitizens, andthey thinklegitimatedeliberations will be servedparif they includerecipientsandtheiradvocateson the council. So they ticularly invite the anti-poverty to advocacygroupto send representatives the council andaskthemto namerecipientrepresentatives fromamongthe welfarerights organizationwith which they work. After deliberatingamong themselves for some weeks, the welfare activists decline to join the council. The constraints federalandstatelaw have that on welfarepolicy, they assert,makeit impossibleto administer humane a put welfarepolicy. Such a council will deliberateaboutwhetherit wouldbe more just to place local welfare offices here or there but will have no power to expandthe numberof offices. They will decide how best to administerchild care assistance,butthey will have no powerto decide who is eligible for that assistance or the total funds to supportthe program.The deliberationsof a council face numerousotherconstraintsthat county welfareimplementation will makeits outcomes inevitablyunjust,accordingto the activistgroup.All citizens of the county who agree that the policy frameworkis unjusthave a and responsibilityto stayoutsidesuchdeliberations insteadpressurethe state to expandwelfare options, by, for example, staging sit-ins at the legislature state department social services. of The deliberativedemocratfinds such refusalandprotestactionuncooperative andcounterproductive. Surelyit is betterto workout the mostjust form of implementation legislation thanto distractlawmakersand obstructthe of routinesof overworkedcase workers.The activistreplies that it is wrong to cooperatewith policies and processes thatpresumeunjustinstitutionalconstraints.The problemis not thatpolicy makersand citizen deliberationsfail to make argumentsbut thattheir startingpremises are unacceptable. It seems to me thatadvocatesof deliberativedemocracywho believe that deliberativeprocesses are the best way to conduct policies even under the conditionsof structural democraciestoday have inequalitythatcharacterize no satisfactory responseto this criticism.Manyadvocatesof deliberative proceduresseem to find no problemwith structures institutionalconstraints and that limit policy alternativesin actual democracies, advocating reflective political reasoning within them to counter irrationaltendencies to reduce issues to soundbites anddecisions to aggregatepreferences.In theirdetailed

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discussion of the termsof welfarereformin Democracyand Disagreement, and for example,Amy Gutmann Dennis Thompsonappearto acceptas given that policy action to respondto the needs of poor people must come in the formof poor supportratherthanchanges in tax policy, the relationof private andpublic investment,public worksemployment,andothermore structural James Fishkin's ways of underminingdeprivationand income inequality.8 nationalissues in connectionwith the innovativecitizens'forumdeliberating 1996 political campaign, to take anotherexample, seemed to presume as on constraints policy alternatives given all the fiscal, power,andinstitutional thatthe U.S. Congressandmainstream assumed.Tothe extentthatsuch press constraintsassume existing patternsof class inequality,residentialsegregation, and gender division of labor as given, the activist's claim is plausible thatthereis little differenceamongthe alternatives debated,andhe suggests that the responsible citizen should not consent to these assumptions but insteadagitatefor deepercriticism and change. The ongoing business of legislation and policy implementation will assumeexisting institutionsandtheirprioritiesas given unless massive concertedaction worksto shift prioritiesand goals. Most of the time, then,polithatare producedby and tics will operateunderthe constrainedalternatives structuralinequalities. If the deliberativedemocrattries to insert support into existing publicpolicy discussions,she is forced practicesof deliberation constraintsallow. to accept the range of alternativesthat existing structural for While two decadesago in the UnitedStates,therewere few opportunities theoristsof deliberativedemocracyto try to influencethe design andprocess of public discussion, today things have changed. Some public officials and privatefoundationshave become persuadedthat inclusive, reasonedextensive deliberation good for democracyandwish to implementthese ideals in is the policy formationprocess. To the extent that such implementationmust presuppose constrainedalternativesthat cannot question existing institutional prioritiesand social structures,deliberationis as likely to reinforce injusticeas to undermineit. I think that the deliberativedemocrathas no adequateresponse to this challengeotherthanto acceptthe activist'ssuspicionof implementingdeliberativeprocesses within institutionsthat seriously constrainpolicy alternatives in ways that,for example,makeit nearlyimpossiblefor the structurally disadvantagedto propose solutions to social problemsthat might alter the structural positions in which they stand. Only if the theory and practiceof deliberativedemocracyare willing to withdrawfrom the immediacyof the alreadygiven policy trajectorycan they respond to this activist challenge. The deliberative democracyshouldhelp createinclusivedeliberativesettings can in which basic social andeconomic structures be examined;such settings

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for the most partmust be outside of and opposedto ongoing settings of official policy discussion.

VI. HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE The deliberativedemocratresponds to this activist challenge, then, by proposing to create deliberativefora removed from the immediacy of the where representatives of given economic imperativesand power structures, diverse social sectors might critically discuss those imperativesand structures, with an eye to reformingthe institutionalcontext. Even at this point, however, the activist remains suspicious of deliberativepractices, for still anotherreasontraceableto structural inequality.He worriesthatthe majority in of participants such a reflectivedeliberativesettingwill be influencedby a commondiscoursethatitself is a complexproductof structural inequality. By a "discourse,"I mean a system of stories and expert knowledge diffused throughthe society, which convey the widely acceptedgeneralizationsabout how society operatesthat are theorizedin these terms, as well as the social normsand culturalvalues to which most of the people appealwhen discussing their social and political problemsand proposedsolutions. In a society with longstandingandmultiplestructural inequalities,some such discourses most of the people in are, in the termsderivedfrom Gramsci,"hegemonic": the society think about their social relations in these terms, whatevertheir location in the structural inequalities.When such discursivesystems framea deliberative process,people may come to an agreementthatis neverthelessat least partlyconditionedby unjustpowerrelationsand for thatreason should not be considered a genuinely free consent. In some of his earlier work, Habermastheorizedsuch false consensus as "systematicallydistortedcommunication."9 When such hegemonicdiscourseoperates,partiesto deliberation may agree on premises, they may accept a theory of their situationand give reasons for proposals that the others accept, but yet the premises and terms of the accountmask the reproduction power and injustice. of Deliberativedemocratsfocus on the need for agreementto give policies legitimacy, and they theorize the conditions for achieving such agreement, butthe idea of false or distortedagreementseems outsidethe theory.In opening the possibilitythatsome consensusis false andsome communication systematicallydistortedby power,I am not referringto consensus arrivedat by excluding some affected people or that is extortedby means of threatand coercion.The phenomenonof hegemonyor systematicallydistortedcommunicationis more subtle thanthis. It refers to how the conceptualand normative framework the membersof a society is deeply influencedby premises of

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andtermsof discoursethatmakeit difficultto thinkcriticallyaboutaspectsof their social relations or alternativepossibilities of institutionalization and action. The theory and practiceof deliberativedemocracyhave no tools for raisingthe possibility thatdeliberationsmay be closed and distortedin this way.It lacks a theoryof, shall we call it, ideology, as well as an accountof the genealogy of discourses and their mannerof helping to constitutethe way individualssee themselvesandtheirsocial world.Formost deliberative demdiscourse seems to be more "innocent." ocrats, James Bohman's deliberativetheory is an importantexception to this claim. Centralto Bohman'saccountof the normsof public deliberationis a concern to identify ways that structuralinequalities operate effectively to block the political influence of some while magnifyingthat of others, even when formal guaranteesof political equality hold. Withoutdistinguishing them in the way I have above, Bohmananalyzes how the forms of exclusion and agendadominationI have discussed so far inhibitpublic deliberationin which all interestsand perspectivesare properlyconsidered.An important test of the deliberativelegitimacy of a political process, he argues, is the degreeto which groupsmay not only gain a hearingfor theiropinions about issues andproposalsalreadyunderdiscussionbutarealso able to initiatediscussion of problemsand proposals. In analyzinghow actualpublicdiscussionsmay fall shortof the normative of requirements legitimatedemocraticdiscussion, Bohmaninvokesa notion of distortedcommunicationor ideology. This level of the influence of structuralinequalityover public discussion is the most insidious because it is the least apparentto all participants.It concerns the conceptual and imagistic framefor discussion, which often contains falsifications, biases, misunderstandings, and even contradictions that go unnoticed and uncriticized largely because they coincide with hegemonic interests or reflect existing social realities as thoughthey areunalterable.Forexample, a discoursemay distortcommunication,for example, by means of a rhetoricthatpresentsas universala perspectiveon experienceor society derivedfroma specific social position.'0 Let me offer a couple of examplesof hegemonicdiscoursesthatmay produce false consensus. The first comes from discourses about poverty and ways of addressing poverty through policy. Despite wide and vigorous debatesaboutthe causes and cures of poverty,both in the United States and increasinglyin otherpartsof the world,thereis a significantnew consensus on manytermsof the debate.Thereseems to be wide agreementthatpoverty shouldbe conceptualizedas a functionof the failureof individualsto develop variousskills andcapacitiesnecessaryfor inclusionin modernlabormarkets. Disagreementrages aboutthe degreeto which responsibilityfor such failure

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should be laid on those individualsand their families or instead should be locatedin social institutionsof education,social service, or economic develindividualsto fit opment.Thatanti-poverty policy mustultimatelytransform better into the contemporarystructuresof wage employment, however, almostgoes withoutsaying. Thereis almostno otherway to thinkaboutpoverty policy than as a labor marketpolicy. Internationaldebates about greenhouse gas emissions, to take another aboutwhetherandhow suchemissions example,containfierce disagreement should be reducedand how the burdensof reductionsshould be distributed across the globe. Should richer,more advancedindustrialstates be required to reduce emissions in greaterproportionto less developed countries?Are marketsin pollution rights useful policy tools? Should governmentssubsidize developmentof "green"technologies for industrialproductionand private transportation? These debatestakeplace withintermsof discussion that environmentalists only marginalized question.The discussions assume that the economies of any developed society must rely heavily on the burningof fossil fuels and thata high standard living involves air-conditioned of buildand lots of consumer goods, including a privateautomobilefor every ings household. The social imaginationsof both "developed"and "less develforms of living thatwould not oped"countrieshave few ideas for alternative carbonemissions. producelarge Certainactivistsconcernedwith specific areasof social life claim to identify such ideologies andhegemonicdiscourses.Theirdoing so is necessarily partialwith respect to social problems and policy issues because ideology critiqueof this naturerequiresconsiderablethoughtand study,even for one set of issues. Democratictheorythatemphasizesdiscussion as a criterionof legitimacyrequiresa moredevelopedtheoryof the kinds andmechanismsof ideology and methods for performingcritique of specific political discussion. Such ideology critique needs not only to be able to analyze specific to exchangesand speech butalso theorizehow mediacontribute naturalizing and makingit difficultfor participants a discussion to speak in assumptions outside of a certainset of concepts and images.1'Because he suspects some agreements of masking unjust power relations, the activist believes it is to important continueto challenge these discoursesandthe deliberativeprocesses thatrely on them, and often he must do so by nondiscursivemeanspictures,song, poetic imagery,andexpressionsof mockeryand longing performedin rowdyandeven playful ways aimednot at commandingassentbut disturbing complacency.One of the activist'sgoal is to makeus wonderabout what we are doing, to rupturea streamof thought,ratherthan to weave an argument.

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I have presentedthe deliberativedemocratand the activistas two distinct characterswith different recommendationsfor the best forms of political engagement.Such exclusive oppositionbetween the stances is artificial,of course. Many people and organizationsmove between the stances in their with politicallives, dependingon the issues at stake,who they areinteracting or confronting,andwhatthey see as possibilitiesfor actionandachievement. I have put the stancesin dialogue with one anotherprecisely because I think for they both are important democratictheory and practice. I have separatedthe stances into two opposing characters,however, to highlight the activist stance more than most recent democratictheory has done and to cast a criticaleye on some tendenciesin deliberativedemocratic theory and practice.The activist's charges are serious, and they raise some issues not thematizedin recentdeliberative theory.Fromthis dialogue,I draw two conclusions aboutwhere democratictheory should go. First,democratictheoryshouldkeep a distancefromdemocraticpractices in existing structuralcircumstances.While theorists ought to learn from ongoing processesof discussionanddecision making,andas citizens should in participate themin whateverways seem mostjust andeffective, we should resistthe temptation considerthatideals of deliberative to democracyareput into practicewhen publicofficials or foundationsconstructprocedures influenced by these ideas. Democratictheory,includingthe theoryof deliberative democracy,should understanditself primarilyas a critical theory, which exposes the exclusions and constraintsin supposedfair processes of actual decision making,which make the legitimacyof theirconclusions suspect. Second, we can deny that deliberativedemocracyrecommendsthat citizens be willing always to engage discursively with all interestsand social segments, reasonably expressing opinions and criticizing others. We can conceive the exchangeof ideas andprocessesof communication takingplace in a vibrantdemocracyas farmore rowdy,disorderly,anddecentered,to use Habermas's term.'2 In this alternative conceptualization, processes of engaged and responsibledemocraticcommunicationinclude streetdemonstrationsand sit-ins, musical works, and cartoons,as much as parliamentary speeches and lettersto the editor.Normativelyemblematicdemocraticcommunicationhere shifts from simply a willingness to give reasons for one's claims and listen to othersto a broaderunderstanding the generationand of influenceof public opinion.In this broader articunderstanding, participants ulate reasonableappeals to justice and also expose the sources and consequences of structural inequalitiesin law, the hegemonic termsof discourse, and the environmentof everydaypractice.

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Even if we follow these recommendations,however, the dissonance betweenthe stanceof the deliberativedemocratandthe activistdoes not dissolve. Individualsandorganizationsseeking to undermineinjusticeandpromotejustice need both to engage in discussion with othersto persuadethem thatthereareinjusticesthatoughtto be remediedandto protestandengage in directaction.The two kinds of activitiescannotusuallyoccurtogether,however, and for this reason one of them is liable to eclipse the other.The best democratictheory and practicewill affirmthem both while recognizing the tension between them.

NOTES
1. There are some exceptions. AndrewArato and JeanCohen theorizethe place of social movementsandcivil disobediencein the contextof civil society; see Civil Society and Political MA: MIT Press, 1992). JohnDryzek's argumentsaboutthe importanceof Theory(Cambridge, oppositionalmovementsof civil society that standoutside the state also referto demonstration and protestactivity.See DeliberativeDemocracyand Beyond:Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), esp. chap. 4; see also Demcracy in Capitalist Times:Ideals, Limitsand Struggles(Oxford,UK: OxfordUniversityPress, 1996). The distinction betweenthe normsof deliberationandthe normsof activismthatthis essay explores,however,shouldnot be mappedonto a distinctionbetweenstateandcivil society.Civil society is certainly a site for deliberativepolitics, as many by now have pointed out, including Dryzek, althoughit is also usually the site for activism as well. 2. MichaelWalzeroffers a useful list of political activitiesin additionto deliberation,some the of which characterize activist. See "Deliberation, WhatElse?"in DeliberativePolitics: and Essays on Democracyand Disagreement,ed. StephenMacedo(Oxford,UK: OxfordUniversity Press, 1999). 3. See I. M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), chap. 2. 4. Amy Gutmann Dennis Thompsoninsist on criteriaof publicityandaccountability and in theirbook, Democracyand Disagreement(Cambridge,MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1996). Althoughtheycertainlyagreethatinclusionis a criterion,they do notmakethis a separate princiin ple. For reasonsto do so, see I. M. Young,"Justice,Inclusionand DeliberativeDemocracy," DeliberativePolitics: Essays on Democracyand Disagreement,ed. StephenMacedo (Oxford, UK: OxfordUniversityPress, 1999). 5. JamesFishkin,TheVoiceofthe People (New Haven,CT:YaleUniversityPress, 1995). 6. This is the position I arguefor in early chaptersof Inclusionand Democracy. 7. This is one of Ian Shapiro'smain responses to ideas of deliberativedemocracyin his essay, "Enoughof Deliberation:Politics Is aboutInterestsandPower,"in DeliberativePolitics, ed. StephenMacedo (Oxford,UK: OxfordUniversityPress, 1999), 28-38. 8. Gutmann Thompson,DemocracyandDisagreement,chap. 8; they arerepresentative and here of policy discussion on these issues in the United States, as well as of Americanpublic opinion.

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9. See Jiirgen Habermas, "On Systematically Distorted Communication,"Inquiry 13 (1970): 205-18. In light of the fact thatHabermashas had much to contributeto contemporary theoriesof ideology or distortedcommunication,it is surprising disappointing his own and that theoryof deliberativedemocracyas expressedin BetweenFacts and Norms (Cambridge,MA: MITPress, 1996) gives almostno space to theorizingdistortedcommunication its effects on and the legitimacy of political outcomes. 10. See James Bohman, Public Deliberation (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1996), esp. Communication: FormalPragmatics a CriticalTheory," as chap.3. See also Bohman,"Distorted in Perspectiveson Habermas,ed. L. Hahn (Indianapolis: Open Court,2000). 11. JohnThompsonoffers a contemporary of theoryof ideology thatincludesconsideration media.See Ideologyand Modem Culture(Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversityPress, 1990). John Dryzek has a useful discussion of ideology in Democracy in CapitalistTimes,chap. 6. 12. Habermas,Between Facts and Norms, chap. 7.

Iris Marion Young teachespolitical theoryat the Universityof Chicago.Her latest book is titled Inclusionand Democracy(OxfordUniversityPress, 2000).

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