Philosophy Of Science Take-home Exam

Karl Popper

prepared for Professor Bela Egyed

by Shawn Monaghan

this Oct. 23/96

Part 1: The boundary twixt essentialism & instrumentalism

Part 2: Popper's three requirements for the growth of knowledge

Part 1

The boundary twixt essentialism & instrumentalism

Popper's 'third view' is displayed here in precisely the same manner in which he

'displays' it within chapter 3 (and as it is fleshed-out by the rest of the book).

The manner of display to which I refer is not as a thing in itself, concepts are

hardly so concrete, but as a concept defined by that which it opposes. In chapter

three Popper does not find any need to display his view positively he merely

opposes his view to other important concepts which define and shape it --

instrumentalism and essentialism.

Popper disagrees with essentialism he wants to assert that there exists no

"ultimate explanation beyond which there is no need of further explanation" (p

105). He does not wish to assert the nonexistence of truth merely that we cannot

attain the essence of reality. He wants to argue against essentialism on the

primary grounds of obscurantism.

In Popper's view, holding to essentialism as a framework through which one views

the world is only to obscure that world, it hampers the scientists' search for

knowledge and therefore is contrary to a rational science. Essentialism is a seeking

for the ultimate end of science in Popper's view this goal is unrealisable and can

only lead to obscurantism. He clearly labels himself as a utilitarian in this view and
asserts that he cannot possibly deny a critical cry of 'instrumentalism', "but I am

concerned here with a problem of method which is always a problem of the fitness

of means to ends" (footnote 17).

Popper's other important criticism of essentialism comes from the realm of

absolutes and projects us into his (and Kant's) global narrative. Essentialism posits

an ultimate world which we attempt to discover, the world which we see every day

could be considered false and the world of atoms (for instance) is perhaps the true

world. Conversely the Popparian world is one in which one theory can be wholly

different from the world of a seemingly compatible theory while both are in turn

different from the world we see. All of these worlds have their own relative

versimilitude. Combined they are much more likely to be truth-like than any one of

the pictures (theories or views).

There is no ultimate world to discover in Popper's view, ultimate reality "collapses

with that of ultimate explanation (p115)." In Popper's view essentialism is naive to

believe in an ultimate explanation of the world. Reality to Popper is much more like

a global narrative the world is described by theory which then is described by a

further world which is then described by a further theory. Each level is a horizon

of greater abstraction, universalization and testability. This conceptualization of

Popper's is evocative of the universal horizons of which Heidegger spoke in

answering (asking) the question of being -- there will always be a further horizon.

In comparison to this conceptualization of reality as a global narrative the

essentialists really appear far too simplistic. When compared to Popper's

narrative their naive, cardinal belief in attaining the basic truths of the world

seems to vanish into the thin air from which they have come. Popper certainly

seems to have set up a satisfactorily complex tapestry with this global narrative.

Unfortunately, complexity does not always correspond with greater versimilitude.

That we can infinitely approach the truth without ever attaining it, is a

marvellously complex paradox. Yet is not complex enough to seem at least in the

final estimation -- almost absurd, unsupported.

Tarski's greatest achievement, and the real significance of his theory for the
philosophy of the empirical sciences, is that he rehabilitated the correspondence
theory of absolute or objective truth which had become suspect. He vindicated
the free use of the intuitive idea of truth as correspondence to the facts. (The
view that his theory is applicable only to formalized languages is, I think, mistaken.
It is applicable to any consistent and even to a 'natural' language, if only we learn
from Tarski's analysis how to dodge its inconsistencies; which means, admittedly,
the introduction of some 'artificiality'--or caution--into its use...)(p.223).

Popper's reference to the Tarskian conceptualization of truth is no help to him in

his theory (in fact he states that he was happy to do without it). It does not seem

exceptionally plausible that the fundamental limits Tarski places on his own theory

can so easily be replaced by "caution". His simplification of Tarski's theory of

truth, in order for it to slide easily within his own (already thoroughly established)
system of human knowledge, is as much a crime as his sweeping judgement of

Wittgenstein's picture theory as "surprisingly naive" (p.223).

In his critique of instrumentalism Popper seems to try overly hard to establish its

limits, perhaps he is here wrestling with his own karma. Popper claims that under

instrumentalism Newtonian theory would now be considered only applicable where

its concepts can be applied and thus is not considered falsified but merely limited

in use. Not only is this not interesting and not saying anything of use, this he

claims "is not saying much". Furthermore, this is not merely not much it is

evidence of the obscurantist tendencies of instrumentalism (p113).

For it is only in searching for refutations that science can hope to learn and to
advance. It is only in considering how its various theories stand up to tests that it
can distinguish between better and worse theories and so find a criterion of
progress (p.113)

A question comes to mind, in this perhaps too hasty labelling of instrumentalists’

obscurantist; what precisely is the difference betwixt a falsified theory (under

Popper's view) and a theory which is considered of limited application (under

instrumentalism)? I do not think that Popper wishes to claim that the

instrumentalist cannot tell the difference between Newton and Einstein, yet he

does claim that somehow the instrumentalist is missing out. Certainly the

reasonable instrumentalist would prefer Einstein's theory to Newton's as it has a

wider basis of application, but there seems to be very little qualitative difference
between this and regarding Newton's theory as falsified. # The difference Popper

might contend is within the criterion of progress. This seems simple enough,

Popper has a concept, a criterion for progress that gives his view an edge that gets

beyond obscurantism. While the instrumentalist merely is able to recognize a

theory that has a wider applicability and this will inevitably lead to opacity

unclarity and thus lead the way from not toward progress. Consider the following

scenario.

In Popper's conceptualization we know if we test two theories each with the same

background knowledge that if one is disproven it should well be that the only

difference is the theory and that because it is the only thing different from the

other theory (grouped with the same background knowledge) that we are in fact

testing the theories and not the background knowledge. It seems plausible that a

theory could readily be falsified merely because the background knowledge

negates its usefulness while its successor theory claims something wholly different

of which our background knowledge is silent perhaps because it is altogether new

(atomic theory) and yet the first theory could well be closer to the truth and we

would never be the wiser. Instrumentalism would be quite suitable in this sense

holding on to the theory (for application where applicable) despite knowing it to be

'false' (or limited in application). Thus eventually this bit of background knowledge
which limited the spectrum of the old long-falsified theory may be disproven and

voila we have a viable vibrant theory -- unless we subscribe to Popper's third view

in which case we would have rejected it long ago "knowing" it to be false.

... in the search for knowledge, we are out to find true theories, or at least

theories which are nearer than others to the truth--which correspond better to

the facts; whereas in the search for powerful instruments we are, in many cases,

quite well served by theories which are known to be false (p226).

His second major critique of instrumentalism is that as a way of seeking knowledge

of the world it is not creative enough it would not lead to the 'new effects' (the

creation of new non-natural elements for instance) (p.117).

Not to be content with offering predictions, but to create new situations for new
kinds of tests: this is the function of theories which instrumentalism can hardly
explain without surrendering its main tenets (p.118).

This would appear to be an excellent, and hard to answer, statement but not

perhaps because it is an excellent critique so much as it does not posit anything but

attitude on the part of the scientist and it claims to narrate the mind of an

instrumentalist. On the contrary it would appear to be all the more plausible for an

instrumentalist to be able to create "new situations" and generate new tests from

entirely artificial phenomena precisely because they are not required to think that

they are discovering the essence of the world nor are they restricted by the
notion that they must be forever heading closer and closer to the truth. For the

instrumentalist any sort of creative endeavour seems plausible for they are trying

to devise a tool for interacting with the world not trying to ascertain or delimit

reality.

The view which Popper holds-forth, to take the place of these first two

(instrumentalism and essentialism), asserts that the scientist aims for a true

description of the world while declaring that this goal may not be attainable. This

view holds, however, that one can at times know reasonably well if a theory is

indeed false. (This brings to mind the story of the man who said in reply to any

argument uttered in his presence, "There is no truth and this is the only truth I am

willing to accept.")

Summing up we may say that instrumentalism is unable to account for the

importance to pure science of testing severely even the most remote implications
of its theories, since it is unable to account for the pure scientist's interest in
truth and falsity. In contrast to the highly critical attitude of instrumentalism
(like that of applied science) is one of complacency at the success of applications.
Thus, it may well be responsible for the recent stagnation in quantum theory. (this
was written before the refutation of parity.)

And yet it seems plausible to assert that an instrumentalist would be keen to

discover the limits of applicability of each theory. Thus recognizing that a theory,

which applies over a wider realm is more useful than another which only applies to a

portion of the above-mentioned realm.

Truth as a regulative principle makes a good theory of strength and complexity but

as a final end that exists that we shall never attain, never even know even if we do

-- this is mythological. This seems is a little too conveniently like instrumentalism

with all the good elements of essentialism all tied together with a pretty string.

One might wish to claim that Popper's own third requirement is far too

obscurantist on the grounds that it could readily cause scientists to believe their

new theory so well proven that they have indeed reached the realm that is as close

as possible to the truth (without actually achieving it). Thus lulling them into a

complacency never dreamed of by the instrumentalists (one can always devise a

better instrument) but this is also the same complacency he claims labels

essentialism obscurantist.
Part 2

Popper's three requirements for the growth of knowledge

These requirements are not just requirements for growth or progress in the

common conceptualization. They are requirements that science must fulfill to

demonstrate a "getting nearer to truth" (p240). As such from the very start

Popper has fundamentally circumscribed these requirements within his 'third view'.

From the start it is clear that this is Popper's way to distinguish and circumscribe

his own method, his own narrative of the search for knowledge. This niche is

carved out, as I have shown (above), precisely as if it were traced along the

shadows of the other two views carefully avoiding the most grotesque features of

these (very important) views with which he formulates his own view through

opposition -- always via the negative.

The first requirement is simplicity. A new theory should have a simple unifying

idea. A unification of simple elements (things or concepts) never connected

together in the past. This requirement, by his own admission, is vague and perhaps

dangerous (a sort of infinite regression reverberates when the intuitive concept

'simple' is analysed). Testability is one definite corollary of simplicity that Popper

plays upon. It is in sink with his message thus far. It does not seem clear that
simplicity in this sense, the sense that unifies previously unconnected things, is

necessarily readily amendable to testing. Nonetheless, we will carry on with the

second requirement.

The new theory should be independently testable as a means of satisfying us that

it avoids the ever uncertain and problematic ad hoc device. This element of

testability is not so simple as explaining that which it was designed to explain. It

must have new results (never before projected) which are confirmable (testable).

This second requirement is loaded with still more! This new theory must lead to

the "prediction" of new phenomena (never before observed phenomena).

These first two requirements are requirements only formal in nature. They may be

observable without actual testing without the nitty gritty cold hard facts. They

are observable whilst the theory is on the drawing board. These requirements

should be sufficient to ensure new data and new means of testing data even should

the theory become immediately falsified.

It is only the third requirement which is actually applied to the theory 'in motion'

this requirement must be applied empirically. A new theory must pass new and

severe tests. This final requirement is severe enough for Popper to declare it

dispensable, unlike the first two requirements this third one is not absolutely

necessary for the assurance that the theory has an important contribution to make
to the scientific endeavour. The third requirement is indispensable in quite a

different way from the first two. As a principle of progress this third

requirement is indispensable.

As the principle of progress the third requirement must be attained, at least

occasionally, for without it the progress of science and the rationality of science

would surely grind to a halt. This, the rationality and progress of science, can only

be ensured by the third requirement, Popper contends, because without it we

should never be able to distinguish our way through the "theoretical maze" (p.243).

Without occasional corroboration, empirical corroboration, of at least some

element of a new theory we cannot expect to tread a clear rational path. We

cannot expect our theoretical journey to progress undaunted toward truth. Even a

falsified theory may leave behind in its tatters a gem of corroborated theory a

substance to which we can link our theoretical maze to satisfy us that we have

indeed progressed. His examples include such things as Dirac's anti-particles

(which have long since survived the dissolution of other parts of his theory).

In this way Popper hopes to achieve a series of corroborated background theories

which we can, with reasonable certainty, cling. Thus he also helps us on the path of

separating our modern theories from the background knowledge which it is feared

can treacherously destroy a viable new theory without our knowledge (for how can
we separate ourselves from our background knowledge in avoidance?). This final

requirement is a weapon, just as the second and first requirements are weapons

against the demon known as ad hoc, it is meant to dislodge that which it seems

Popper fears the most -- that science is not progress but ad hoc(ery) incarnate. It

would seem that if not ad hoc a new theory would be verified in this third

requirement.

The other major consideration of importance in Popper's third requirement comes

it would seem from attitude. If we do not consider that each of our new theories

is indeed an attempt to find the truth then we are reduced to the level of

instrumentalists stepping from one lifeless tool to the next. This third

requirement is fundamental to the attitude that we are indeed seeking an

explanation of the world through our theories. This is where Popper begins his

attempt to link his theory of progress with something more concrete something

less psychological, he wants to assert that there is something logical or

methodological to his third requirement.

Successful predictions must be obtainable from a true theory. Of course here we

must allow Popper's underlying premise that a theory can indeed be true.

Successful predictions would then be considered a necessary condition of a theory

which we posit to be true. Since we can never actually know that a theory is true
(for truth we can only approach) we cannot assert successful predictions as

sufficient conditions of veracity. If truth is indeed accepted as regulative (if

truth is considered a fundamental formal rule to the game of science) then we

must accept that it is a necessary condition that this third requirement hold true

for new theories.

The argument from falsity-content and truth-content. If our aim here is to

approach higher levels of versimilitude then we must reduce the falsity-content of

our theories while increasing the truth-content. This argument seems applicable

only in cases in which a theory makes new predictions which the old one was not

capable of making wherein the old theory has not been previously falsified. A

theory is said to have greater truth-content ("true consequences") than the one

which it replaces if it has more verified content. Likewise the old theory can be

said to have a higher falsity-content ("false consequences") as it does not make

true predictions where the new theory does (p.246).

If our new theories do not pass independent tests (the third requirement) and

then become part of our background knowledge we would have a great loss of

rationality. If our background knowledge becomes too filled with this sort of

problematic theory, we will lose a great deal of explanatory power from our

theories.
The only arguments I feel confident I can make are those about which I feel the

least reserved. Though I fear that my arguments are not as powerful as Popper's

I do not also fear that his arguments are unanswerable. What if a theory is

designed through the manner which Popper describes as ad hoc?

That is, if we connect an ad hoc theory "with any testable but not yet tested

fantastic ad hoc prediction" and it becomes verified according to his third

requirement (p.244). If it is severely tested and passes that test, then it is no

longer considered ad hoc by his negative definition of ad hoc. If a theory passes

all of his three requirements no matter the source, then it is by definition a

verified theory in Popper's eyes. What this then says to me about the whole game

of verificationism is that it is inevitable that it shall fail absurdities will always

crawl up because we can never know if the truth is something we have attained.

Whereas, we can only be fairly certain about the falsity of a theory and we can

never know the veracity of a theory we perhaps should be silent on.

My second statement on the topic of ad hoc(ery) is only to seek a consistency of a

small order in his work and his philosophy. His own theory could easily succumb to

jibes of ad hoc(ery) taking a bit of instrumentalism a smidgeon of essentialism

(carefully excluding its obscurantist elements) and at the end adding a dash of

verificationism if for no other reason than to just distinguish himself from

instrumentalism:

I admit there may be a whiff of verificationism here; but this seems to me a case
where we have to put up with it, if we do not want a whiff of some form of
instrumentalism that takes theories to be mere instruments of exploration
(footnote 31 p248).

Clearly 'ad hoc' is not absent from Popper's vocabulary but perhaps his need to

assert the means beyond the ends are all the blinders required to avoid realization

of this self-inflicted device. Why should it be that this is an important critique of

Popper's work? Simply because his system of progress for science does not seem

to apply in the least to his own theories. He wants his theory to play a regulative

role for the seeking of knowledge but it is not clear that it is any different from

Plato’s myth of the republic (some are born of gold others silver, and bronze). I am

not here contemplating a battle with Plato, merely with the viability of using myths

within an important truth-seeking philosophy.