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perfect being could possibly be free and still maintain the height of
perfection are chancy at best, yet the most powerful critique of a given
philosophy may come from within its own limits -- otherwise the philosopher’s
Both God and ‘his creatures’ possess free will. God as the most
our notion, which only God can know, includes everything about us including
our future and our essential characteristics and “. . . everything that can
absolute fatalism with an attempt at a fine tuning which his brisk phrasing
does not appear to allow, namely the distinction between the certain and the
necessary.
. . . even though it is certain that God always chooses the best, this does not
prevent something less perfect from being and remaining possible in itself,
even though it will not happen, since it is not its impossibility but its
imperfection which causes it to be rejected. And nothing is necessary whose
contrary is possible (p14).
working at ordering the universe instead she has such a degree of perfection
that all the universe was created at once including the contingencies which
Leibniz calls certain but not necessary. Of course this does not exclude the
is, since the various substances of the universe cannot affect one another
they have to be both predisposed to allow for the effects of other objects
(including God) and at the same time (according to section 28) God must
our perceptions which exists outside of us. To this degree then we are God
in some vague sense of the word because not only do we become somewhat
independent upon creation but we also express both God and the universe.
fully realize;
. . . the full extent and independence of our soul, which makes it contain
everything that happens to it, and makes it express God and, with him, all
possible and actual beings, just as an effect expresses its cause (p31).
God alone is the immediate object of our perceptions, which exist outside of
us, and he alone is our light (p30).
It is through God’s continual action upon us that we have ideas but this does
not mean that we do not think through our own ideas. It would appear that
these two sections viewed in isolation contain that which would seem
contradictory but given that they are placed so closely together we must
attempt to iron out a continuity. The soul contains passive and active powers
affects. We do not think through God’s ideas yet we do need her continual
action upon us to have ideas of anything. Perhaps this only appears to be a
problem if we consider God as if she were human but perfect. Perhaps God
could create us with a permanent connection, a conduit, for ideas which both
are our own and God’s at once, thus we remain independently dependent
oddly strikes me as a ‘natural’ idea. The best way, in fact, to view our
. . . the influence of one monad over another can only be ideal, and can only
produce its effect through God’s intervention, when in the ideas of God a
monad rightly demands that God take it into account in regulating the others
from the beginning of things (p75).
Clearly interactions between individuals in the world are illusion, only God
interacts with any individual substance and it is her task to allow the
universe to move smoothly by planning things out, such that each substance
has the freedom to move and affect other substances by her mediation and
her mediation alone. Perhaps it could be said then that we are indeed free
to the extent that we are not determined our only trouble is to decide just
how free this is and what sort of freedom it is -- not absolute fatalism, yet
obviously not absolute freedom either.
It would seem that our own freedom in comparison to that of God is quite
there is no middle ground not settling upon one or the other just does not
defining in any absolute terms just how free we are -- such it would appear is
indeed an impossible task. Just how free can any one thing be when all is
interrelated with such intricacy not to mention our very intimate relation to
as appears possible from within Leibniz’s system it seems we must now enter
more deeply into his own specific justifications for rejecting absolute
fatalism. Thus, we return to a deeper investigation of the difference
between the necessary and the certain. This appears to be the test, that
principle of contingency. The reason that the certain will end up the way
it would allow for a degree of imperfection that God would not permit.
It is reasonable and certain in almost the same way that God will always do
the best, even though what is less perfect does not imply a contradiction. . .
Based on God’s first free decree always to do what is most perfect and on
God’s decree with respect to human nature, following out of the first
decree, that man will always do (although freely) that which appears to be
best. But every truth based on these kinds of decrees is contingent, even
though it is certain; for these decrees do not change the possibility of
things, and, as I have already said, even though it is certain that God always
chooses the best, this does not prevent something less perfect from being
and remaining possible in itself, even though it will not happen, since it is not
its impossiblility but its imperfection which causes it to be rejected. And
nothing is necessary whose contrary is possible (p14).
Evil is permitted but not designed, God concurs with evil without actually
willing it yet she must have created the possibility for it to exist for it
hardly seems possible that the most perfect being could willfully overlook
that which creates evil. Leibniz says that our judgments can be in error and
allow for the best possible judgments. Yet it is inevitable that individuals
will indeed make judgements in error. Thus it appears that in error we are
. . . since God’s view is always true, our perceptions are always true; it is our
judgements, which come from ourselves, that deceive us (p15).
The fact that God can know in advance that we will err makes it no less true
that God himself did not cause us to make the error so much as perhaps
simply know in advance that we would make such and such an error at such a
time. The fact that we cannot ourselves know if a given error in advance is
perhaps one of these things which judgement cannot render for us thus we
must assume freedom. Otherwise this would interfere greatly with our duty.
This is incredibly reminiscent of Kant and his famous mulling over of the idea
of freedom, theoretically of course we are not free yet practically how could
we live our lives and act in the world if we accept this to be true. Living in
the world demands that we deny the validity of the antinomies and relegate
. . . perhaps it is certain from all eternity that I shall sin? Answer this
question for yourself: perhaps not; and without considering what you cannot
know and what can give you no light, act according to your duty, which you do
know (p32).
It seems clear that the parallel drawn above to Kant’s treatment of freedom
less complex account of freedom could truly exist even the materialists
environment and genetics. Perhaps we can say that Leibniz could have done a
more thorough job of clarifying and delimiting the topic and I am
constrained to say that yes I feel Kant’s own similar work has much better
foundations and its turns are more slight and less prone to startle the mind
that terms such as freedom are not appropriate to such a discourse, in the
. . . just as a geometer does not need to burden his mind with the famous
labyrinth of the composition of the continuum, there is no need for any
moral philosopher and even less need for a jurist or statesman to trouble
himself with the great difficulties involved in reconciling free will and God’s
providence, since the geometer can achieve all his demonstrations and the
statesman can complete all his deliberations without entering into these
discussions, discussions that remain necessary and important in philosophy
and theology.
Unfortunately Leibniz does not appear to have provided us with a single clue
as to how we can apply our philosophy to the world nor as I said how it is