(1)ACCFA vs CUGCO FACTS:On 4 Sept 1961 a CBA was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and AWA) and

ACCFA. The said CBA was supposed to be effective on 1 July 1962. Due to non-implementation of the CBA the unions held a strike on 25 Oct 1962. And 5 days later CUGCO, the mother union of ASA and AWA filed a complaint against ACCFA due to unfair labor practices among others which CUGCO was able to win in court. On 25 Apr 1963, ACCFA appealed the decision and while the appeal was pending, RA 3844 was passed which effectively turned ACCFA to ACA. On 17 Mar 1964, ASA and AWA then petitioned that they may have sole bargaining rights with ACA. While this petition was not yet decided upon, on 19 March 1964, EO 75 was also passed which placed ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration. Notwithstanding the latest legislation passed, the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA. ISSUE: Whether or not ASA and AWA can be given sole bargaining rights with ACA. HELD: The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA under the LRPA and by virtue of RA 3844 the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the government is a governmental function NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step down to deal privately with said unions as it may have been doing when it was still ACCFA. However, the growing complexities of modern society have rendered the classification of the governmental functions as unrealistic, if not obsolete. Ministerial and governmental functionscontinue to lose their well-defined boundaries and are absorbed within the activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it to meet the increasing social challenges of the times and move towards a greater socialization of economic forces. (2)Citation. 406 U.S. 205,92 S. Ct. 1526,32 L. Ed. 2d 15,1972 U.S. Wisconsin v Yoder Brief Fact Summary. Several Amish families appealed a decision convicting them of failing to send their children to school until the age of 16 based upon Freedom of Religion under the constitution. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The law compelling parents to send their children to public school until the age of 16 is unconstitutional as applied because it impermissibly interferes with the Amish religious beliefs. Facts. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy are members of the Amish religion. Wisconsins compulsory schoolattendance law required them to cause their children to attend public or private school until they reach 16. Respondents declined to send their children to public school after completion of the eighth grade. Respondents were convicted of violating the law and fined $5 each. Issue. Did the application of the compulsory attendance law violate respondents rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution? (3) Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority Facts: On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. Even the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed or allowed by the decree. After no motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed the judgment became final and executor.Withstanding the Gonong decision still violations of the said decision transpired, wherein there were several persons who sent complaint letters to the Court regarding the confiscation of drivers licenses and removal of license plate numbers.On May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself to detach license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a resolution regarding the matter which stated that the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court, and that the Court has received several complaints against the enforcement of such ordinance. Issue:W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 are valid in the exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only as agents of the national legislature? Held:No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMA and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating drivers licenses for traffic violations within the said area.To test the validity of said acts the principles governing municipal corporations was applied, according to Elliot for a municipal ordinance to be valid the following requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.In the Gonong decision it was shown that the measures under consideration did not pass the first criterion because it did not conform to existing law. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such sanctions. Thus Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but

must obey at all times the will of the principal. In the case at bar the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. (4) Aquino III v. Comelec [April 7, 2010] FACTS: This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.Theprovisionreads:(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. ISSUE w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province. RULING: DENY THE PETITION .There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district.The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand from the phrase or each province point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.26 . Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states: Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office. Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement. (5)Philippine Constitution Association vs Gimenez Political Law Salaries of the Members of Congress Other Emolument FACTS: Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes selfish class legislation because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution. The Sol-Gen counter argued alleging that The grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute forbidden compensation within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the

Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional. HELD: Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which reads: The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation ofsixteen thousand pesos. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase. In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation other emoluments. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term other emoluments. Emolument as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites. It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office. Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby declared unconstitutional by the SC. (6)Pimentel v. Enrile G.R. 187714 March 8, 2011 Article VI, Sections 21 Case Digest - Pimentel v. Enrile, G.R. 187714, March 8, 2011 FACTS Sen. Villar and Sen. Lacson, each, delivered a privilege speech (on separate dates). Both of them suggested that Ethics Committee cannot take the floor with regard to accusations against Sen. Villar. More so, Sen. Lacson suggested, that since the Ethics Committee cannot act with fairness on Sen. Villar's case, it should be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion was approved with 10 members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions. When the respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were adopted. Sen. Pimentel raised an issue that there is a need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. But responded proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry on PS Resolution 706. The preliminary conference was then scheduled. Petitioners contested the following: 1) transfer of complaint against Sen. Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Sen. Villar's constitutional right to equal protection; 2) the Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation and complaint filed by Sen. Madrigal against Sen. Villar is violative of Sen. Villar's right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement of Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution; and 3) The Committee violated the due process clause of the Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole in spite of its own provision which requires its effectivity upon publication. Respondents argue that the instant petition must be dismissed for being premature, pointing out that petitioners failed to observe

the doctrine or primary jurisdiction or prior resort. It is within the power of the Congress to discipline its members for disorderly behavior. More to that, the internal rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. With regard to the publication of the Rules of Procedure, the Rules of the Ethics Committee have already been duly published and adopted, which allowed the adoption of the supplementary rules to govern adjudicatory hearings. ISSUE Should the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole be published to be effective? HELD Generally, no. The proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the Senate since the proceedings involve the Senate's exercise of it's disciplinary power over one of its members. Thus, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate. The Constitution does not mandate internal rules of the House or Senate to be published because it only affects their members, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. However, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole provides: "Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole must be published before the Rules could take effect. Thus, the petition was granted in part, with reference to the publication. (7)Coseteng vs Mitra (G.R. No. 86649)

Facts:Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives from diverse political parties Petitioner Anna Dominique Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA. A year later, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino or LDP was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized. Petitioner Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal. On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised the House majority membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House minority. On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs praying that the Supreme Court declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation Issue: 1. WON the question raised is political. 2. WON the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Holding/ Held: 1. No, it is not. The political question issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, where this Court ruled that the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution is justiciable, and, even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. 2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political

parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.) The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. There is no merit in the petitioners contention that the House members in the Commission on Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments-eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable. (8) DPWH V.QUIWA, GR No. 183444, October 12, 2011 FACTS: Contractors Quiwa ET AL were engaged by DPWH through its Project Manager Philip F. Menez, Usec Encarnacion note the urgency of the Mt. Pinatubo Rehabilitatiion Project. Respondents accomplished woked on the Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River control. After completion, Respondents filed money with DPWH which referred to COA. The COA in turned returned the money claims with DPWH with the information that the latter had already been given the funds and the authority to disburse them. Prompted by prolonged inaction Respondents filed an action for a sum of money with the RTC against DPWH. RTC decided in favor of the Respondents. Ordered to pay the actual work completion, plus 10% of the total amount due as atty. Fee and lastly the sum equivalent lawful fees paid by the Respondents in entering the docket and the cost of suit. DPWH through the Sol. Gen filed an appeal to question the decision with the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed Court a quos decision. DPWH filed a petition for review before the SC on error committed by CA. ISSUES: CA ERRED DUE TO FINDINGS OF (1) INVALIDITY OF CONTRACT (2) Quiwa et al have no cause of action (3) award of attorneys fees, cost of suits is unwarranted and has no basis in law (4) USEC should be jointly and solidarily liable to plaintiffs HELD: The SC affirmed the decision of the CA with modification. It departed from the payment of attorneys fee and the cost of the law suit. The constitution provides for No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. DPWH was in bad faith in not settling its liability to the Respondents for the works accomplished by the latter. (9) ALLADO V. DIOKNO, 232 SCRA 192 G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994 Facts: The crime alleged to petitioner Allado and Mendoza, by the PACC [Presidential Anti-Crime Commission], is heinous crime of kidnapping with murder of Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German national, who is reportedly an international fugitive from justice. Other incidental crimes charged were illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, carnapping, and usurpation of authority. The whole investigation was triggered by an extrajudicial confession by a Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a discharge of the Philippine Constabulary. Based on the confession of Umbal, Judge Barrios of RTC Br 11 issued a search warrant against petitioners. For the institution of criminal proceedings the DOJ took over the case, after a new panel of prosecutors were recommended [cz petitioners claim the first set of prosecutors were affiliated w/ Lacson head of PACC and could not be impartial] and after preliminary investigation found probable cause that accused commited the crime and submitted the case for trial which was assigned to Judge Diokno of Br 62. Judge Diokno after finding probable cause issued warrant of arrest. Issue: WON the judge erred in finding probable cause issuing the search warrant. Ruling: Yes, there is no probable cause in this case. The probable cause test is an objective one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed. There is serious doubt on Van Twests reported death since the corpus delicti has not been established, nor have his remains been recovered.

We are reminded of the leading case of U.S. v. Samarin, decided ninety-two years ago where this Court ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his body not found, and there is but one witness who testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved. In People v. Inting, we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutors certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutors certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is a function of the prosecutor The extrajudicial statement of Umbal suffers from material inconsistencies In Lim v. Felix, where we reiterated Soliven v. Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said The Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscals bare certification. All these should be before the Judge. The extent of the Judges personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judges examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the judge must go beyond the Prosecutors certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the courts probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require. (10) TANADA V. TUVERA [136 S 27] FACTS: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in the Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents contend, among others that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the OG is indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of NCC. HELD: The interpretation given by respondent is in accord w/ this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the OG is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-- for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, w/c is the 15th day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Respondent's argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws w/ the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Art. 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the OG, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. xxx The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. The clear object

of the law is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws w/c are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. W/o such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of w/c he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. It is needless to say that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. (11) INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM: ARTICLE 32 : The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefore signed by at least 10 per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which evry legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof. Enabling Law: RA 6735 INITIATIVE: The power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation called for the purpose.

3 types of initiative: 1. 2. 3. On the Constitution a petition proposing amendments to the constitution On the Statutes A petition proposing to enact national legislation On local legislation A petition proposing to enact a required provincial, city, municipal or barangay, resolution or ordinance.

REFERENDUM: Power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called for the purpose. Required Petition: 1. 2. 3. Petition should be registered with the COMELEC Signed by at least 10% of the total number of registered voters Every legislative districts must be represented by at least 3% of the Registered voters.

(12) LOPEZ VS. SENATE AND HOUSE GR NO. 163556 (2004) FACTS: The joint Public Session of Congress adopted the Rules on canvassing on the Pres. And VP on May 10, 2004 election. The Joint session constituted a Joint Committee of both houses to conduct a preliminary canvass on the votes for Pres. And VP, and submit the final report to the Joint Public Session for approval. ISSUE: WON CONGRESS MAY DELEGATE THE PRELIMINARY COUNT OF VOTES FOR PRES AND VP TO A JOINT COMMITTEE? HELD: SEC. 4 Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution expressly empowers congress to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of COC for Pres. And VP. The Congress may delegate the preliminary canvassing to a joint committee provided that the committee will submit Committee Report for the approval of Congress as a body. (13) BERMUDEZ VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GR NO. 131429-Aug. 4, 1999 FACTS: Atty. Oscar Bermudez then OIC of the Provincial Prosecutor Office and Conrado Quiaoit vying for the PPO. Quiaoit was appointed by Ramos on June 30 1997. Assumed office on July 23, 1997 informed Pres. Ramos, Sec. of Justice and CSC of his assumption. OIC Bermudez refuse to vacate contenting that Sec. of Justice did not yet release the original appointment of Quiaoit.

ISSUE: WON THE ABSENCE OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SEC. OF JUSTICE TO THE PRES. IS FATAL TO THE APPOINTMENT OF RESPONDENT QUIAOIT? HELD: The recommendation of the Sec. and the appointment of the Pres. Are acts of the Executive Department in itself and there is no sharing of power to speak of, the latter being deemed for all intents and purposes as being merely an extension of the personality of the President. The petition is denied for review on certiorari. (14) DADOLE VS. COA GR NO. 125350 Dec. 3, 2002 FACTS: Starting 1986, by virtue of the Ordinance of the Sangguniang in Mandaue City MTC and RTC judges started receiving increased monthly allowances. On March 15, 1994 DBM issued LBC 55 fixing the allowance of the judges. Acting on the DBM Directive Municipal auditor issued ND to petitioners in excess of the amt. authorized by law. Auditor asked them to reimburse the excess amount from Php 1,000 from April to Sept. 1994. Petitioner MR with COA Regional Office. Denied their petition. ISSUE: WON THE CITY ORDINANCE OF MANDAUE ON HIGHER ALLOWANCES FOR JUDGES WILL PREVAIL OVER THAT OF DBM UNDER LBC 55? HELD: Yes, the Court recognizes . The Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units subject to the power of control by Congress and power of supervision of the President. LBC 55 is null and void for infringing over the autonomy of the Mandaue City. (15)PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA,et.al v HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HISCAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,et.al G.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011, FACTS:The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk thePhilippines because an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends tothe waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to comply with thet e r m s o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s C o n v e n t i o n o n t h e L a w o f t h e S e a ( U N C L O S I I I ) , which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984. Such compliance shortenedone baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippinea r c h i p e l a g o a n d c l a s s i f i e d a d j a c e n t t e r r i t o r i e s s u c h a s t h e K a l a y a a n I s l a n d Ground (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as regimes of islands whose islandsgenerate their own applicable maritime zones.Petitioners, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers or legislators assailthe constitutionality of R.A. 9522 with one of their arguments contending thatthe law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters,thus s ubjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passageunder UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners have contended that thesepassage rights will violate the Constitution as it shall expose Philippine internalwaters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard. ISSUE:Whether or not R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal watersinto archipelagic waters HELD: PetitionDISMISSED.T h e C o u r t f i n d s R . A . 9 5 2 2 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e Philippines national interest. Aside from being a vital step in safeguarding thecountrys maritime zones, the law also allows an internationally-recognizeddelimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continentalshelf. T h e C o u r t a l s o f i n d s t h a t t h e c o n v e r s i o n o f i n t e r n a l w a t e r s i n t o archipel agic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to thew a t e r s e n c l o s e d b y t h e a r c h i p e l a g i c b a s e l i n e s , r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e i r d e p t h o r distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sealanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exerciseof sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and th e resourcestherein. Furthermore, due to the absence of its own legislation regarding routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage, thePhilippines has no choice but to comply with the international law norms. ThePhilippines is subject to UNCLOS III, which grants innocent passage rights overthe territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations andc o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e i r e x e r c i s e , t h u s , t h e r i g h t o f i n n o c e n t p a s s a g e , b e i n g a c u s t o m a r y i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w , i s a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e c o r p u s o f Philippine law. If the Philippines or any country shall invoke its sovereignty to forbid innocent passage, it shall risk retaliatory measures from the internationalcommunity. With compliance to UNCLOS III and the enactment of R.A. 9522, theCongress has avoided such conflict.Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the compliance to UNCLOSIII through the R.A. 9522 will not expose Philippine internal waters to nucleara n d m a r i t i m e p o l l u t i o n h a z a r d . A s a m a t t e r o f f a c t , i f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s d i d notc o m p l y w i t h t h e b a s e l i n e s l a w , i t w i l l f i n d i t s e l f d e v o i d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y a c c e p t a b l e b

a s e l i n e s f r o m w h e r e t h e b r e a d t h o f i t s m a r i t i m e z o n e s a n d continental shelf is measured and which will produce two -fronted disaster: (1)open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resourcesi n t h e w a t e r s a n d s u b m a r i n e a r e a s a r o u n d t h e a r c h i p e l a g o a n d ( 2 ) i t s h a l l weaken the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine maritimespace. Such disaster was avoided through (16) CASE DIGEST OF MAGALLONA VS ERMITA FACTS OF THE CASE: The antecedent facts of this case emerged upon the passing of Republic Act 3046 in 1961. The laws purpose is to demarcate the maritime baselines of the Philippines as it was deemed to be an archipelago. RA 3046 stoodunchallenged until 2009, when Congress amended it and passed RA 9522. This amending law shortened onebaseline and determined new base points of the archipelago. Moreso, it has identified the Kalayaan IslandGroup and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands", generating their own maritime zones.The petitioners filed a case assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522. To their opinion, the law has effectivelyreduced the maritime territory of the country. With this, Article I of the 1987 Constitution will be violated. Thepetitioners also worried that that because of the suggested changes in the maritime baselines will allow for foreign aircrafts and vessels to traverse the Philippine territory freely. In effect, it steps on the states sovereignty and national security.Meanwhile, the Congress insisted that in no way will the amendments affect any pertinent power of the state. Italso deferred to agree that the law impliedly relinquishes the Philippines claims over Sabah. Lastly, they havequestioned the normative force of the notion that all the waters within the rectangular boundaries in the Treatyof Paris. Now, because this treaty still has undetermined controversies, the Congress believes that in theperspective of international law, it did not see any binding obligation to honor it. Thus, this case of prayer forwrits of certiorari and prohibition is filed before the court, assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522. THE COURTS RULING: The Court dismissed the case. It upheld the constitutionality of the law and made it clear that it has merely demarcated the countrys maritime zones and continental shelves in accordance to UNCLOS III. Secondly, the Court found that the framework of the regime of islands suggested by the law is not incongruent with the Philippines enjoyment of territorial sovereignty over the areas of Kalayaan Group of Islands and theScarborough. Third, the court reiterated that the claims over Sabah remained even with the adoption of theamendments.Further, the Court importantly stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III toprecisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no wayaffecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.With regard to the petitioners assertion that RA 9522 has converted the internal waters into archipelagic waters, the Court did not appear to be persuaded. Instead, the Court suggested that the political branches of Government can pass domestic laws that will aid in the competent security measures and policies that willregulate innocent passage. Since the Court emphasized innocent passage as a right based on customary law, italso believes that no state can validly invoke sovereignty to deny a right acknowledged by modern states.In the case of archipelagic states such as ours, UNCLOS III required the imposition of innocent passage as aconcession in lieu of their right to claim the entire waters landward baseline. It also made it possible forarchipelagic states to be recognized as a cohesive entity under the UNCLOS III. (17) SANTIAGO V. BAUTISTA 32 SCRA 188 FACTS: Teodoro Santiago Jr. was a pupil in Grade IV at the Public School in Cotabato City. Committee for Honor Students was constituted by the teachers concerned for purpose of selecting the Honor Students. Santiango Jr. was named third honor. 3 days before graduation he was represented by his parents that sought the invalidation of honor ranking. ISSUE: WON Court can reversed the decision of the Board of teachers. HELD: The Court Ruled that an award of honors to a student by a Board of Teachers may not be reversed by a Court where the awards are not governed by any applicable law. dismissal." Thus, it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, itwas the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to bedistinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenureto a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense thatfrom the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure doesnot arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of theoffice. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.

(18) PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955 petitioner, vs.SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS,respondents. FACTS: The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that ActsNo. 2706 otherwise known as the Act making the Inspection and Recognition of privates c h o o l s a n d c o l l e g e s o b l i g a t o r y f o r t h e S e c r e t a r y o f P u b l i c I n s t r u c t i o n a n d w a s amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutionalon the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well asteachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will alsodeprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civicefficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimitedpowers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawfuldelegation of Legislative powers. Section 1 of Act No. 2706It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all privateschools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, inaccordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his dulyauthorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order todetermine the efficiency of instruction given in the same, The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Educationbefore opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And insupport to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the Constitutionguaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any law requiringprevious governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the saidright On the otherhand,the defendantLegal Representativesubmitteda memorandumc o n t e n d i n g t h a t 1 ) t h e m a t t e r s p r e s e n t e d n o j u s t i c i a b l e c o n t r o v e r s y e x h i b i t i n g unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional questio n; 2) Petitioners are inestoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid.Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court .ISSUE:Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no.180 may be declared void and unconstitutional? RATIO DECIDENTI: The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief inthe form they seek to obtain. Moreover,there is no justiciablecontroversypresentedb e f o r e t h e c o u r t . I t i s a n e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e t h a t t o e n t i t l e a p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and legislativeaction he must show that he has sustained common interest to all members of thepublic. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises onlywhen the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actualcases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidentalto the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in thelast resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy betweenlitigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actualpositive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question tosatisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to besufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulationnot to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse byofficialse n t r u s t e d w i t h t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e d o e s n o t p e r s e d e m o n s t r a t e t h e unconsti tutionalityof such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude thatt h e r e h a s b e e n n o u n d u e d e l e g a t i o n o f l e g i s l a t i v e p o w e r e v e n i f t h e p e t i t i o n e r s appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionablefor being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the (19) MARIANO JR. COMELEC GR 118577 MARCH 7, 1995 FACTS: Petition filed by Mariano and Sen. John Osmena. Suing as taxpayers assail the constitutionality of Sec. 2,5 and 52 of RA 7854an act converting Makati into highly urbanized city. The validity of the creation of the City of Makati is challenged that it will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term neyond the 3 terms allowed by law. ISSUE: WON THAT THE CHALLENGED OF PETITIONER IS RIGHT. HELD: The Challenge is premature considering that elections could not be until three years later. Petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to open to an actual case of controversy. Petitioners being residents of taguig are not proper parties to raise the abstract issue.

(20) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, G.R. No. 101191 October 18, 199vs.MARIO A. BRAVO, accused-appellant. FACT: imitated fiction when Mario Bravo, the herein accused-appellant, killed his mother-in-law, Elena Sta. Maria. He denied the killing, claiming that the old womans death was due to an accident. The trial court disbelieved him and convicted him of [[ ]] murder. 1 He now asks this Court to reverse the decision on the ground that he is innocent.At his trial before the Regional Trial [[ ]] Court of Malolos, Bulacan, the prosecution presented six witnesses, namely his wife Teofila, 2 his 11-year old daughter Mary [[ ]] [[ ]] [[ ]] [[ ]] [[ ]] Joy, 3 Natividad Sta. Maria, 4 Luisito Sta. Maria, 5 Maxima Rodriguez, 6 and Dr. Benito Caballero. 7 Only the accusedappellant testified in his defense.Pieced together, the separate testimonies of the prosecution witnesses disclosed the following version of Elenas death.In the morning of June 28, 1989, Mary Joy was studying in the living room of their house at Caingin, San Rafael, Bulacan. Her grandmother was in the kitchen and her father was in the yard. Her father told her to go to the bedroom and, rather cryptically, also not to mind anything she might later hear. Minutes later, she heard the sound as of a scuffle (kalabog) and then her grandmothers scream. She rushed out to see what was happening and found her father in the kitchen with his hands on her grandmothers head. The old woman was lying prostrate on the floor. Mary Joy ran out to call her other grandmother, Natividad Sta. Maria, whose house was nearby. On the way, she met her Lola Natividad, who had heard Elena call her name twice. Mary Joy [[ ]] told her what had happened and then went out with Rommel Munsayoc to fetch her mother from her office. 8 Natividad proceeded to the house and saw Mario choking the helpless Elena, who looked very pale. The old womans head was bleeding. Natividad loosened Marios hold on Elena and asked him what he was doing. Mario slumped to the floor and said nothing. She told him to help her carry Elena to her bed and to get a piece of cloth to stop the bleeding. Mario complied. Elena moaned and said, [[ ]] Pinalo ako ni Mario. May tama rin ako sa dibdib. 9 Some neighbors, hearing the commotion, went to Elenas house and helped bring her to the hospital. Teofila Bravo, Marios wife, followed and was able to talk to her mother, who said to her, Pinalo ako ng [[ ]] asawa mo. Pinalo ako ni Mario. 10 Luisito Sta. Maria, who was only a foot away from her Tia Elena, also heard what she said. 11 Elena died that same day. Dr. Benito Caballero, who conducted the autopsy on the victim, reported the cause of her death as shock due to cerebral hemorrhage and brain concussion with internal hemorrhage, fractured ribs, ruptured lungs, pericardium due to multiple traumatic [[ ]] force in the head, neck, extremity, shoulder and chest. 12 Mario maintained that all the injuries were caused by the victims fall in [[ ]] the kitchen and not by any violence exerted by him on the old woman. 13 Elena was 80 years old at the time of her death. She [[ ]] usually wore a brace but she was not wearing it when she fell and sustained the fatal injuries. 14 When Elena fell, he immediately [[ ]] went to assist her and it was at this point that Natividad came upon them. 15 He said that Natividad had testified against him because he had quarreled with her over the bad odor coming from her poultry. He also questioned the motive of another [[ ]] prosecution witness, his neighbor Maxima Rodriguez, whom he had earlier denied the use of their artesian well. 16 Marios version of Elenas death was disputed by Dr. Caballero, who declared on cross-examination that the wounds sustained by Elena could not have been caused by the alleged fall on the kitchen floor. Neither could they have been the result of an earlier accident because all [[ ]] the fractures were new or fresh. 17 After assessing the evidence, Judge Agustin S. Dizon found for the prosecution and disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Mario Bravo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to indemnify the heirs of the victim Elena Sta. Maria the amount of P30,000.00 for her death. We sustain his factual findings, which are adequately supported by the record. Like him, we are particularly persuaded by the narration made by the 11-year old Mary Joy, who knew that she was testifying against her own father. We do not think she invented a tale out of pure cloth to condemn her father to possibly the rest of his life in prison. Moreover, she was corroborated by the other witnesses, especially Natividad Sta. Maria, who came to succor Elena when she heard her call for help. But the best witness was Elena herself, who complained to Natividad and later to her own daughter that it was Mario whoattacked her. To Natividad she said: Pinalo ako ni Mario. May tama rin ako sa dibdib. To Teofila she said: Pinalo ako ng asawa mo. Pinalo ako ni Mario. As she died soon afterwards, these statements may be considered dying declarations, made with the consciousness of impending death. 18 Elena, who was then 80 years old, must have realized when she made these statements that she would not recover from her injuries. The statements may also be regarded as part of the res gestae as they were made soon after the startling occurrence without the opportunity and fabrication or concoction. 19 The appellants version of that incident is nothing if not absurd in light of the massive injuries sustained by Elena. It is inconceivable how one simple fall could have caused all the many serious and fatal injuries specified in the autopsy report. The defense now argues that if Mario had inflicted all these injuries, Elena should have said Pinagpapalo ako ni Mario and not Pinalo ako ni Mario, suggesting only one single blow. This is semantic quibbling. A woman on the verge of violent death is not expected to be finicky about her grammar. The failure to present the blunt instrument that caused the injuries was not fatal to the prosecution. In fact, the instrument could have been Marios hands. At any rate, we have held that: Likewise, the presentation or non-presentation of the weapons in evidence (the knife in stabbing and the carbine used in shooting the victim) is not vital to the cause of the prosecution. Corpus delictimeans the fact of the crime or that a crime has actually been perpetrated. It does not refer to the corpse of the victim or the weapon used to kill him. It is not therefore imperative that the [[ ]] weapons used in the commission of the crime be presented in court. 20

The appellant says he had no motive for killing his mother-in-law but there are testimonies to the effect that he often quarreled with her. 21 He has not denied this. In any event, the familiar doctrine is that proof of motive is not essential where, is in this case, the culprit has been positively identified, significantly by no less than Marios own daughter, Mary Joy. He had earlier told her to go to the bedroom, presumably so she would not see his attack upon her grandmother. There is a queer assignment of error in the appellants brief, viz., that the challenged decision does not contain the facts of the case for or against and only of selected facts in favor of a party. It is argued that this is unconstitutional. The relevant constitutional provision is found in Article VIII, Section 14, which says that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. We do not find it has been violated in the challenged decision. It is for the judge to determine from the narration of facts, relevant or irrelevant, and the assertions by the parties, truthful or not, what actually happened in the case before him. Judge Dizon did this when he made what the appellant calls a selective finding of facts. Of course, it had to be selective. That is how a trial judge separates the chaff from the grain, extracts the truth from the mass of conflicting claims, and determines the basis of the decision he will have to make. The other issues raised in the appellants brief are not substantial enough to deserve anything less than short shrift. One does not argue only for the sake of argument. Arguments are not counted or measured but weighed. We agree that Mario Bravo killed Elena Sta. Maria but find that treachery and evident premeditation, as alleged in the information, were not proved at the trial. The crime is nonetheless still qualified as murder because it was, as also alleged in the information, [[ ]] committed with abuse of superior strength. 22 Mario Bravo was in the prime of life at 43 years of age. Elena Sta. Maria was near [[ ]] death because alone of her years when he dealt her the heavy blows that killed her. 23 This is a fact stranger than fiction that only the killer can explain. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED except as here modified, particularly with regard to the civil indemnity, which is increased to P50,000,00 in accordance with the existing policy of the Court. It is so ordered.