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Ren Girard, Evolution and Conversion: Dialogues on the Origins of Culture (2007) Martin F. Reichert

ch. 1: The Life of the Mind 1. "One long argument from the beginning . . . " Girard and a friend helped organize an exhibition of paintings at Avignon: "My friend and I were in a state of continuous mimetic drunkenness at the thought of being involved in such important cultural event." (21) This is our first explicit encounter with a concept that is of central importance to Girard's thinking. What might he mean by "mimetic drunkenness"? Politically Girard defines himself "as a sort of outsider . . . I'm a centrist, meaning I'm anti-crowd" (23). "I never learned anything from schools and universities. I'm a self-taught man." (24) 2. "Ce moment capital dans ma vie" This moment was the reading of Dostoevsky's The Eternal Husband, which had the same plot as Cervantes's Curioso Impertinente and resembled the vanit and snobbery he had noticed in Stendhal, Flaubert, and Proust; it turned Girard into a "mimetic realist." Girard talks about not quite fitting in: "I think that, on the one hand, it is true that I tend not to belong to specific environments or fields, but on the other hand, I cannot be considered an outsider in the classical sense of the term. I never felt an outcast, as many intellectuals like to represent themselves. This is probably because I had, and still have, a very strong sense of belonging to my childhood. I had a very happy childhood and I have always tried to surround myself with the things of my childhood." (26) 3. Deceit, Desire and the Novel Girard explains his first book as a reaction against the aestheticism of the New Critics, who "had no broad European education, no philosophy at all" (30), though somewhat later he admits to his own "philosophical navet" as the reason for having avoided falling under the spell of deconstruction (33). "The capacity to be surprised is legitimately regarded as the main scientific emotion. . . . There is also a strong curiosity . . . There is a form of humility as well, in the sense that it is a methodological attitude, a postulate that you have to have in order to solve specific problems. I have the impression sometimes that the book I am reading could upset my entire existence." (33) 4. The hidden things Girard addresses two mistakes he sees in Things Hidden: "The first is the rejection of the word 'sacrifice' in relation to Christianity. The second is the hasty and wrongheaded dismissal of the Epistle to the Hebrews." (40) 5. ". . . To the end" "Conversion is a form of intelligence, of understanding." (45) What does Girard mean by that?

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ch. 2: "A Theory by Which to Work": The Mimetic Mechanism This chapter attempts to give a brief outline of Girard's main ideas, starting with mimetic desire. 1. The mimetic mechanism at work In what way does Girard's definition of desire "contradict[ ] the modern conception of desire" (58)? modern: my desire is unique, individual; imitation is inauthentic (59) Girard: desire is mimetic What is the difference between desire, appetite, and instinct? What does Girard mean when he says, "all appetites can be contaminated with mimetic desire" (56)? appetites are physiological needs (food, sex) What about addiction? What is the difference between external and internal mediation? What does Girard mean by mimetic doubles? Is desire something to be avoided for Girard? Why (not)? And why does he use the word 'mimetic' rather than 'imitative' to designate what he means? for Girard 'mimetic' has a conflictual dimension this is also an aspect that's missing in recent research in neuroscience (e.g. the discovery of mirror neurons): acquisitive or appropriative imitation, so dominant in the behavior of children, are never discussed in such theories 2. Mimetic rivalry Girard finds in the Tenth Commandment (at one point on p. 63 erroneously referred to as the fifth) an obvious reference to mimetic theory: the injunction thou shalt not covet thy neighbours [possessions and wife] is clearly meant to reduce rivalry between people who live nearby and are thus easily drawn into the internal mediation of desire. A similar purpose, Girard argues, is played by the caste system in India and by the slaveholding society of classical Greece. Explain how this works. while mimetic desire is a human constant, mediation has changed drastically in modern society: everybody desires everything 3. Scapegoating and social order Can you explain what Girard means by scapegoating? How does scapegoating arise, and how can it bring about the end of violence? shift from the desire of the object (divisive) to the hatred of the rival (unifying) (65f.) The victim is seen as both guilty (it caused the crisis) and divine (it caused the peace that ended the crisis). In what way is the choice of a victim arbitrary but not random? "Infirmities, or unpleasant traits, are mistaken for guilt." (68) ". . . even if there isn't a preferential sign of victimization, the scapegoat will be chosen anyway. At that crucial moment something will often be interpreted as a sign. Anything. And everybody thinks they have found the solution, the culprit. In a way, the scapegoat mechanism functions like a false science, like a great discovery that is made, or something that is suddenly revealed, and then one reads in the eyes of other people the same insight." (69)

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e.g. Michael Jackson; the Wicked Witch

Girard mentions the origin of culture in the context of ritual. How are the two related? And what does this have to do with scapegoating? culture develops through ritual in an effort to prevent frequent and unpredictable episodes of violence In his discussion of the story of Cain, Girard argues that God's prohibition, "if anyone kills Cain, he will suffer vengeance seven times over" (Gen 5:15), is the first law and as such "represents the foundation of culture, because capital punishment is already ritual murder" (73). What does Girard mean by that? Lev 20 and 24: anyone who sacrifices his children to Molech, anyone who is a medium or spiritist, and any blasphemer is to be put to death by the community: Lev 24:14 Take the blasphemer outside the camp. All those who heard him are to lay their hands on his head, and the entire assembly is to stone him.

4. Cultural mimesis and the role of the object Girard is perfectly content to admit that not all violence is rooted in mimetic desire: "The more cruel and wild a society is, the more violence is rooted in pure need. One must never exclude the possibility of violence that has nothing to do with mimetic desire but simply with scarcity." (74) In our society, however, the situation has changed. How so? ". . . basic appetites can trigger conflicts, but it is also true that the conflicts once triggered easily become trapped in a mimetic mechanism. One might say that any violent process that has any duration, any temporality, is bound to become mimetic." (75) random violence like muggings in big cities gets a lot of attention these days, but the most frequent type of violence isn't anonymous and random, it is relational (cf. Gilligan!) Girard also admits that while his work has focused on bad (or acquisitive) mimesis, good (or positive) mimesis is "more important" for the transmission of culture. What is the difference between the two, and why has Girard emphasized the former? Richard Dawkins's theory of memes shows awareness of positive mimesis, but he is unaware of negative mimesis still, scientists are more aware of mimesis than literary scholars Girard has stressed the bad side of mimesis because it is never harmless "Literary criticism should help to uncover the mimetic nature of desire instead of concealing it through its engagement with concepts such as originality and novelty, constantly advocated in an incantatory and empty fashion." (77) The interviewers return to the question of how modern society has learned to control mimetic desire without maintaining the strict hierarchies of the caste system or of the slaveholding society: we have produced so many goods that they are available to practically anyone. Girard agrees, but our consumer society gives him no cause for optimism that we have definitively mastered mimetic rivalries. Why not? And why does he say that we live in a minimalist and anorexic world (80)? inflation of objects (80) The consumer society, at its extreme, turns us into mystics in the sense that it shows us that objects will never satisfy our desires. It can corrupt us in the sense that it can lead us to all sorts of useless activities, but it also brings us back to an awareness of our need for something entirely different. Something that the consumer society itself cannot provide. (80f.)

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5. Mconnaissance Girard harps on the unconscious character of the scapegoat mechanism (84). Why is it important to insist that the scapegoaters misunderstand their role?

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ch. 3: The Symbolic Species 1. The missing link What affinities/similarities are there between Darwin and Girard? "part of the modern discovery of sacrifice as the foundation not only of human culture but also of the natural order" (96) What contribution can mimetic theory make to Darwins theory of evolution? it explains the origin of culture: religion protects us from mimetic escalation and it differentiates us from animals (98) sacrifice as a form of natural selection (99): groups that survived were scapegoaters; those that werent perished Where do Darwinists fall short in Girard's view? Darwin and Wilson neglect religion (96, 97f.) as the foundation of culture Where does Dawkins fall short? Dawkins "never provides an explanation for the emergence of culture" (100): he offers learning and culture as explanations for mental and behavioral phenomena, but he doesn't address them as phenomena to be explained he doesn't account for the negative effects of imitation 2. Ethology and the victimary mechanism The ethologist Konrad Lorenz suggests that simple forms of scapegoating exist even among animals: among geese, aggression directed against inanimate objects serves to strengthen the bond between individuals. Is scapegoating simply a natural phenomenon then, something instinctual? In what ways is human scapegoating different? I think what's implied here is that if scapegoating is "natural," it's part of the God-given order and there's nothing we can do about it; Girard's moral qualms about the "innocent victim" would be ill-founded so yes, there is a continuity, Girard doesn't deny that but nevertheless there is a "total break" How does Girard explain the "leap" from animal into human culture, into "the symbolic sphere"? discovery of the scapegoat mechanism, i.e. not the originary murder, but the ritual repetition thereof in sacrifice this is a social dynamic (which Lorenz overlooks by focusing on pairs) 3. The evolution of the mind In what sense is the scapegoating victim "the first symbolic sign ever invented" (107)? the victim stands for something else the scapegoating event repeats the moment when a crisis was suddenly resolved, as though from the outside, and peace was restored When Girard calls religion "the mother of everything" (108), what does he mean? scapegoating produces religion, which is the foundation of institutions: either one has the Enlightenment view in which religion is nothing, or one understands that religion is everywhere, and therefore it must be the origin of everything. One has to choose between these two perspectives. If you simply reject religion, then how does one account for the fact that the only

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things that are common to all cultures are language, ritual, and God? Therefore, religion is the mother of everything. . . . (108) What role did language play in the evolution of humanity? Girard agrees that "myths were developed before language" (109). Shouldn't it be the other way round? scapegoating (i.e. ritual, i.e. religion) comes first: it is the event that generates culture, language language and the symbolic sphere could only be generated by a systemic catastrophe. . . . One cannot explain taboos, prohibition and the complexity of symbolic exchange systems simply via biological explanations of the emergence of unselfish behaviour. There must be that upheaval there, which forced the change in behavior. . . . The same reasoning can be applied to language. The only thing that can produce such a relational structure is fear, fear of death. If people are threatened, they withdraw from specific acts. . . . Prohibition is the first condition for social ties and the first cultural sign as well. Fear is essentially fear of mimetic violence; prohibition is protection from mimetic escalation. All these incredibly complex phenomena were triggered by the founding murder, by the scapegoat mechanism. . . . This catastrophe is the mimetic crisis, the deadly struggle of all against all, in the Hobbesian sense, which isnt a fanciful hypothesis but a dreadful reality. (109f.) 4. Social intelligence It has been suggested that the brains of early hominids expanded not due to tool making, but due to living in groups. What does Girard think? he agrees; coping with the stress of numbers and with the mimetic pressures and aggression due to overpopulation overpopulation may well explain all kinds of deviant behavior typical of dionysiac frenzy: hypersexuality, homosexuality and cannibalism are all acts that were present in dionysiac rituals (114) 5. Animal domestication and the origins of agriculture How does Girard explain animal domestication? domestication is a spin-off of keeping animals around for sacrifices I believe that one starts treating animals like human beings in order to sacrifice them (116): o the advantages of domestication are not foreseeable at the outset o its anti-economical: domesticated animals are smaller; they suffer stress due to captivity; they introduce new bacteria and viruses in some cultures without domesticable animals, massive ritual killings of humans never stopped the best sacrificial victims are insider-outsiders: domesticated animals arent quite humans yet, but they are insiders enough to work as substitutes How does Girard explain the origins of agriculture? What could have given to the human being the idea of putting seeds into the ground? They buried them hoping they would resurrect like the community as a result of sacrifice and they werent wrong. There you can see the fecundity of religion. (120) it appears that agricultural societies had a lower quality of life than hunter-gatherers, working harder for the same amount of food, less healthy, prone to famine, etc., so why was this behaviour reinforced (and hence selected for) if it was not offering adaptive rewards surpassing those accruing to hunter-gathering or foraging communities? Girard says it had a sacrificial origin: The hunter-gatherers started to settle permanently because of the increasing importance of ritual sites and the complexity of the rituals of which they were part, and which in turn produced, as I said, the domestication of animals and the discovery of agriculture. While climate

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change and soil conditions, etc., were also important, discovery around the place of sacrifice was most important. o Is that entirely plausible? One could imagine other reasons for staying in one place (weather conditions, illness), and other origins for observing the planting of seeds (such as coincidence) though admittedly Kathryn McClymond emphasizes the importance of plants in sacrificial systems 6. The fearful symmetry [The origin of language] Eric Gans argues that the mimetic crisis isnt resolved through sacrifice and scapegoating but through language or the giving of a sign to another. When all hands reach for the same thing, the sight of the others reaching out deters each from grasping it. Thus, the desired object becomes a repellent, sacred force that converts the gesture of appropriation into a gesture of designation, that is, into an ostensive sign that comes to designate the object rather than attempting to capture it. Girard counters that Gans downplays violence. Everyone hangs back not because of some ostensive sign, but because there has been violence before. The previous violence has produced fruits of awareness of its consequences (124). Ganss stance is a rhetorical manoeuvre to negate the primacy of religion in human culture.

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ch. 4: Dialogues and Criticism: From Frazer to Lvi-Strauss Girard acknowledges the influence of Greek tragedy, the modern novel, and especially the Gospels on his theory, but the influence of scholars is more complicated: anthropologist and myth researcher James Frazer (no scapegoat mechanism, his prejudice against religion and his contempt for the cultures he studied), sociologist Gabriel Tarde (fascinating observations on imitation, but superficial in the absence of a theory), sociologist and philosopher mile Durkheim (far superior to Tarde), social anthropologist Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (really important to me), anthropologist Claude Lvi-Strauss (important but incapable of imagining that mythology can express undifferentiation), classics scholar Walter Burkert (only one flaw: he argues that the hunting of large mammals came before religion), anthropologist Bronisaw Malinowski, and Christian philosopher and activist Simone Weil (of great importance). I am not a field anthropologist. I see myself as an interpreter who is combining anthropological, archaeological and ethnological accounts to construct a general theory of culture and its origins. . . . Like all scientists, I am in search of the common factor, the pattern, rather than difference. (144) On political correctness and bias: The main difference between contemporary anthropology and my work is that I claim that all cultures scapegoat and victimize someone, while it is fashionable to say that only Western culture did that. If one talks about ritual killing in the Amazon, it is seen as a pure fancy of Western prejudice. (145) One has to regard mythology and archaic religion as a riddle, and the solution of that riddle is quite real. Myth is primarily the accusation of the victim presented as guilty. Moreover, the myth is written from the point of view of the accusers. Taking these aspects into account, the riddle of myth becomes solvable. (146) I do not see why God could not be compatible with science. If one believes in God, one also believes in objectivity. A traditional belief in God makes one a believer in the objectivity of the world. . . . I still operate within a traditional epistemology, which considers things as real and sees God as the guarantor of that reality. (147) Readers do not realize how unphilosophical I am, and [they don't realise] the fact that I have been guided by the idea of contributing to . . . a science of human relationships, always starting from actual and real human relationships, moving away from the myth of the all-powerful subject. (148) I think there is some kind of incompatibility between traditional philosophy and mimetic theory. . . . Philosophy is looking for logical foundations. . . . Therefore, it always excludes the real anthropological foundation. (149) Girard refuses to write as a Christian apologist: I do think that the approach to facts in the social sciences should be devoid of both religious and anti-religious assumptions. (150) [From Beyond Rivalry:] Michael Serres argues that critical thinking is shot through with violence: In his view we have to renounce the inner violence of cultural progress as conceived in modern Western philosophy. To criticize and to discriminate are acts of expulsion, of division, of scapegoating. Girard, while sympathetic to this rendering of mimetic theory, doesnt feel the same. He says that there should be some critique of the subject: it does not have to be total negation. . . . I have to say that, personally, polemic does not trouble me much. If I am treated polemically, I will respond accordingly. It is true that it is a phenomenon of doubles, but I think it preferable to total silence. If you do not discriminate, you cannot distinguish, and to start thinking, you have to learn to distinguish. . . . The more

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we speak about dialogue in our time, the less we seem to practise it. Being polemical means acknowledging the existence of the other as one who does not think like me. But going back to Serres position: it is clear that we are still in a critical world. There are aspects of our culture that we cannot transcend; we are circumscribed by our limitations. But, ultimately, I dont see this as an issue of great importance. My position is somewhat in between Serres. . . and Girards. . . . Polemic is derived from the Greek word polemos, or war, and it speaks of a hostile attack or refutation of another. By that definition, I think it may be better to keep silence than to speak in this way. To adopt a clich, Ideas dont attack, people do, which is to say that a nasty personal attack can be cloaked as simply a difference of opinion, accompanied by contempt and derision. Defending a belief position with persistence and tenacity may be warranted at times; defending it with hostility, or attacking another in order to defend it, seems to imply a kind of egotism, as well as an unawareness of the doubles phenomenon Girard speaks of. Another understanding of polemic, though, is the art or practice of disputation or controversy; speaking and acting in a controversial manner at times seems to me part and parcel of living, conversing, thinking, feeling passionately. I disagree with Serres that criticism and discrimination are in themselves acts of expulsion, division, or scapegoating, but I think they often can be used for this purpose. On the other hand, I like what Girard says about argument as an acknowledgement of the other who is not me and who doesnt agree with me, and I think that signal has tremendous potential for openness and learning. This all reminds me of the tension I feel in Buddhism concerning opinion and belief on the one hand, as Pema Chdrn has said, holding on to beliefs [or opinions] limits our experience of life. That doesnt mean that beliefs or ideas or thinking is a problem; the stubborn attitude of having to have things be a particular way, grasping on to our beliefs and thoughts, all these cause the problems and on the other hand, Buddhists from the Dalai Lama to Chdrn to the Buddhist-on-the-street continue to hold strong opinions, act on them, and express them with vigor and enthusiasm to others.

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ch. 5: Method, Evidence and Truth 1. The question of evidence in myths and rituals Girard admits that he has yet to develop a perfect way of presenting evidence for the existence of the scapegoat mechanism, for the assumption that the foundational murder is real and universal (167). What does he mean by that? Where is the problem? I think the problem is that the victimary mechanism can never be explicit in the myths: it is the multiplicity of consistent elements that constitutes proof (160, cf. 163) not sure what he means by the coincidence of myth and ritual (159) On p. 162, Girard gives us what elsewhere (in his book The Scapegoat) he calls the stereotypes of persecution that can be found in any myth: (1) a crisis of undifferentiation . . . ; (2) a victimary sign that singles out a villain; (3) an expulsion/killing of this villain. . . . What does he mean by a crisis of undifferentiation? What are victimary signs? How does Girard counter the objection that his theory is not falsifiable and therefore unscientific? witchcraft isnt unfalsifiable either (?) direct evidence isnt as irrefutable as is commonly assumed in the theory of evolution, not only was the circumstantial evidence decisive but it also allowed the finding of the direct evidence, which now seems essential. The same thing happens with mimetic theory. There is no direct evidence for the apparently fantastic claim that the foundational murder is real and universal. (167) 2. Science, anthropology and understanding Girard holds that the real obstacle in the case of mimetic theory hasnt simply been the incompleteness of the record but the unwillingness and inability of our world to question its own fundamental assumptions (170). He blames the anti-religious stance of anthropologists for their lack of understanding: Their general ambition . . . was to show that Christianity was a myth like any other. . . . I realize that it is Christianity that reads mythology better than any anthropologist. (ibid.) How was it possible for Christianity to supersede science? Girard affirms that the understanding of mimetic theory presupposes that we acknowledge our own mimeticism (172). What does that mean? And what does this have to do with conversion (this is the first time Girard brings up the other half of the books title)? 3. Literature as evidence How can literature be transformed . . . into a scientific instrument of enquiry (173)? And what kinds of questions would Girard address to a literary text? Im always looking for circumstantial evidence and that is why some reviewers of my books find my single-mindedness obnoxious. Nonetheless, my obsession isnt useless repetition: in analyzing a text, on cannot just reuse the same analytical approach that worked with another text. Writers are always different in their coping with mimetic mechanism. Every writer is part of a history that is both collective and individual. The possible mimetic combinations are enormous in number, as are the ways to express them. One cannot map out the way mimesis works with writers in general. Each one demands an entirely different demonstration, although a critic who is interested in the mimetic mechanism knows that ultimately he or she will unveil the same mimetic principles. (174) In order to reach the literature that interest me, one must reach mimetic experience, as well as the writers dealings with mimetic components. (175)

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Most modern anthropologists and philosophers, however, are still in that framework [Auguste Comtes positivism], considering religion as a lesser form of knowledge. On the contrary, it is a very rational form of knowledge. In sociobiological terms, it has an extremely powerful adaptive value. This is the reason why I find the arguments and the language of scientists more interesting than those of literary critics. Scientists are asking the right questions even though, from my point of view, they provide the wrong answers. (177) Girard admits that even though he strives for simplicity and common sense, all the central mechanisms of [his] theory are paradoxical and therefore highly complex (178). He denies that the truth he finds in the texts he examines is simply his own linguistic construct: I do believe in the truth of the text. I do not think all texts are truthful, but I believe, exactly like Freud, that ritual necessarily imitates an event which actually occurred. In its narrative, myth necessarily distorts that same event, but in such a way that the principle of the distortion can be discovered. To say that I simply mistake ritual and myth for the truth is a gross simplification of my work. Im not talking about an absolute truth of the text, and Im only saying that there is something hidden in the text, which refers to an actual event: the scapegoat mechanism. (180) He agrees that Erich Auerbach figural interpretation is quite similar to his own mimetic analysis of myths. 4. Conjectural thinking and the clues of history Girards method can be compared to that of a detective, the workings of myth to the structure of a mystery novel. 5. Misrecognition and truth While one of reasons why it is so hard to present evidence in mimetic theory is that it is hidden through the unconscious, yet it is also true that the fact that evidence has been erased may work as a super-proof, a meta-evidence because it shows the crucial importance of the element that has been erased. If someone removes the traces of a murder, it means he is strongly implicated in it. (185) Im convinced that there is a real event, which is hidden, covered up, traces of which are erased. Nonetheless, in a Freudian sense, this erasing of the traces isnt itself without traces. (187) [Derridas pharmakos] Girard agrees that his theory is often ignored or attacked because it entails a radical form of selfcriticism (188) for both individual and society. What is so uncomfortable about mimetic theory? Do you think that misrecognition in modern times corresponds to a . . . form of denial to cover up what would be a radical form of self-criticism for the individual and society . . . [and a defence against] the threat of overt self-criticism that would bring about the collapse of the individual identity and its convictions[?] Girard answers, I think you are right, because so much effort goes into preserving concepts such as individualism and the autonomy of desire. (188)

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ch. 6: The Scandal of Christianity 1. The anthropology of the Bible What tremendous anthropological insight did Girard discover in the Bible? Girard says he follows Nietzsche in recognizing that myth is against the victim, whereas the Bible is for the victim (196). Where does he part company with Nietzsche? What light can mimetic theory shed on the doctrine of original sin? If the scapegoat mechanism stabilizes human communities, what happens when it is revealed? 2. Myth and monotheism Girard considers the Bible the product of a revelation that occurred in two stages (199). Can you explain what he means? And how is this revelation related to an increased realism? What significant difference does Girard find between the myth of Oedipus and the biblical story of Joseph? 3. Figurae On the one hand, Girard sounds reluctant to see a radical break not only between the Hebrew Bible and the Christian New Testament, but also between non-biblical and biblical traditions in terms of the progression away from sacrificial systems (207). On the other, he claims that the superiority of the Bible and the Gospels can be demonstrated scientifically (210). What gives? 4. Revelation and Eastern religions What is different about Christianity? Where do even the radically nonviolent Jains fall short? 5. The judgment of Solomon and the non-sacrificial space Girard mentions that in an earlier book, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, he found the word sacrifice problematic in designating the action of Christ or that of the prostitute in the famous story of King Solomons judgment. How so? And what changed his mind? 6. History and sacrificial awareness Girard denies that God is changing. Instead, humans are changing in response to a God with a pedagogical strategy (217). In what way are we changing? 7. Celui par qui le scandal arrive So where does this leave human beings? Arent we condemned to mimesis? Desire is always mimetic, but some human beings resist desire and being carried away by mimetic violence. When Jesus says scandals must happen (Matthew 18:7-8) he is talking about communities. . . . To talk about freedom means to talk about mans ability to resist the mimetic mechanism. (222) What does Girard mean by skandalon? Skandalon becomes the inability to walk away from mimetic rivalry, an inability that turns rivalry into an addiction, servitude, because we kneel in front of those who are important for us, without seeing what is at stake. The proliferation of scandals, meaning of mimetic rivalry, is what produces disorder and instability in society, but this instability is put to an end by the scapegoat resolution, which produces order. Satan casts out Satan, meaning that the scapegoat mechanism produces a false transcendence that stabilizes society, through a satanic principle, and the order

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cannot but be only temporary, and it is bound to revert, sooner or later, into the disorder of scandals. (224) What does Satan represent in mimetic theory? a powerful trope for describing the unanimity of the crowd when it accuses the victim of being guilty (225) a non-being we will always be mimetic, but we dont have to be so in a satanic fashion

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ch. 7: Modernity, Postmodernity and Beyond 1. The apocalyptic feeling Apocalyptic elements in the Gospels are relevant today, Girard claims (234). How so? And what do you make of his description of the Anti-Christ as "a super-victimary machine that will keep on sacrificing in the name of the victim" (236)? the sacrificial order has run its course (235) our self-destruction has become very possible cf. Holocaust: "an attempt to divorce the West from its dedication to saving victims" (236) the Anti-Christ: people might be well-meaning and see to it that victims are saved even if they have to "Ideologies are not violent per se, rather it is man who is violent. Ideologies provide the grand narrative which covers up our victimary tendency." (237) Explain. cf. terrorism (238): it's not about difference, but about competition (with the West) he talks about this some more later on when he explains why the world is becoming more and more Christian: 257f. 2. Modernity and its discontents The modern world gives "real possibilities of true autonomy, of individual judgements" (240), but also more possibilities for "false individuality" and "negative mimesis." It has universalized "internal mediation." Can you think of examples? modernity (individualization) emerged with the Renaissance (239) dismantling of "external mediation": the feudal system; cf. dharma and the caste system in India fashion Modern society has also created new mechanisms to help keep violence at bay. He mentions the division of labor and social mobility (241), the legal system, technology (244) and the mass media (249f.), the free market economy (242f., 244ff.), and globalization (245). All of these are still mired in violence. Choose one of these or an example of your own and discuss what Girard calls katechon, the attempt to hold back violence with violence. 3. The market as the sacred What are Girard's views on globalization? globalization (245): helps the spread of Christian ethics and an anti-sacrificial epistemology This is not a question of optimism/pessimism: globalization contains factors of both stability and instability it's a fragile world: to study it we need an interdisciplinary team of researchers (246) it encompasses the whole planet: unique unlike in the sacrificial order, there is no deliberate slaughtering of humans in the global market it gives us some protection from greater violence (247), but only as a form of kathecon (holding back violence with violence) therefore we "must have a compassionate adjustment of the free market society" (cf. 243: capitalism restrained by moral rules) the cleaning of the Temple is an anti-sacrificial gesture rather than an economic one Economy today has replaced religion, from which it springs (248): but there is no conflict between them What does "the market" have to do with "the sacred"?

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Today consumerism and markets have been so successful at controlling violence without religious institutions, that we think we have outgrown religion. We can have our esthetic/spiritual cake in art, and with the market we can eat it, too. Unfortunately, the markets are fast approaching a crisis. Even if we can somehow overcome the challenges of currency devaluation, credit freezes, stock market crashes, and the fact that we've mortgaged the future to the tune of a hundred trillion dollars, the biosphere cannot sustain the perpetual growth curve demanded by our market system. With global warming, fisheries collapses and famines, the market system will lose its capacity for continued growth. At that time, there will be enormous violence completely devoid of reference to religion, and the Christian church will be recognized as the only means of recovering social solidarity. At that time, it will become abundantly clear that art in no way can serve as a "nonviolent" alternative to religion. 4. The weak subject How did Seinfeld get in there? What is Girard's point? some media, e.g. Seinfeld, can increase our awareness of our mimetic situations Seinfeld speaks some important social truth without inciting painful self-criticism in the viewer; cf. Shakespeare (250) democracy has some dangers too, but as long as there's criticism, division of powers, etc. it's less prone to mimetic imbalance than the Soviet one-party-system Girard is open to consider the notion that "contemporary democracy is dominated by conformism" and that consumption has created "weak, socially indifferent and pathologically narcissistic" individuals who "aren't passionate about anything" (251). What do you think? Has our consumer society made us apathetic and exhausted, or are we still "strong enough to have mimetic desire"? turning the other cheek: no quietism/masochism, but going against bad reciprocity, against any escalation of bad mimesis 5. The kenosis of God What does Girard mean when he says that "the modern world is becoming more and more Christian, but also less and less so" (258)? The modern world has become both better and worse (254). Christianity has contributed to the secularization of the world: it destroys all religions (257) "atheism is a Christian invention" insofar as religion is aligned with a sacrificial order our blindness is that we accept persecution of those who are seen as the persecutors (258) cf. nihilists today take a profoundly Christian stance: everything can be attacked and destroyed "except the defense of victims which they espouse" "the world is becoming more and more Christian, but also less and less so, and one should emphasize both aspects" but Christianity had to learn the deeper, mimetic meaning of the Gospel "We will always be mimetic, but we do not have to engage automatically in mimetic rivalries. We do not have to accuse our neighbor; we can learn to forgive him instead." (262)