European Review of HistoryRevue europeenne dhistoire Vol. 15, No.

6, December 2008, 691706

Architecture as a mode of self-representation at the Olympic Games in Rome (1960) and Munich (1972)*
Eva Maria Modrey*
Justus-Leibig-University, Giessen, Germany ( Received 30 April 2008; nal version received 20 September 2008 ) The Olympic Games are a major media event that draws attention all over the world. This tremendous media coverage gives the host country in particular the opportunity to introduce itself to a global audience and at the same time to transport a national identity as well as a political statement. This article shows, by analysing the architecture of the Olympic Games in Rome (1960) and Munich (1972), how a political statement can be transported by sports facilities. This kind of view assumes an understanding of politics, which not only includes political action in general. Item cultural events can be used as an object of investigation for analysing a political self-conception. In this way the article points out the function of sports facilities besides the capacity as a place for competition. The new political history, which develops in combination with the cultural history, argues that symbolism is a mode of communication that gives access to the sociopolitics of the past. The article elaborates the different factors which impact on the meaning of a symbol and points out the different opportunities for interpretation. According to Umberto Eco, the article understands the stadium as a sign that is turned, primarily by media and social interpreting, into an architectural symbol. In a last step it takes this interpretation in a broader context to dene a political statement of Italy and Germany at the respective time. Keywords: Olympic Games; architecture; Germany

I.

Introduction

The ongoing debate about the XXIX Olympic Games, which has taken place in the summer of 2008 in Bejing, China, renews the crucial question of the relationship between sports and politics. The controversial decision of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to give the Olympic Games to China, a country with a history of human rights violations, has turned the sporting event into a general quarrel between different political positions. Certainly, the Chinese Olympic Games are not the rst example of the political dimension of the Olympic Games. Olympic history offers numerous examples for their political instrumentalization, starting in ancient times and continuing with their new invention in 1894.1 Yet it is not just the obvious political abuse that has to be mentioned here. Previous studies have shown that the Olympic Games in general give the host country the opportunity to present itself to a global audience and make a political statement that will be heard around the world.2 Even though the statutes of the IOC3 are very strict, the host nations have the opportunity to shape the individual character of their Olympic Games and, to do so, host countries utilise symbols and rituals. Typical examples include the design of the Games, for example by

*This article based on a lecture was given at the conference New Political History in transnational perspective, 15 16 February 2008 at the EUI in Florence. *Email: eva.modrey@rub.de
ISSN 1350-7486 print/ISSN 1469-8293 online q 2008 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/13507480802500632 http://www.informaworld.com

692

E.M. Modrey

emphasising certain rituals and symbols within the xed course of the ceremony, and by highlighting the architecture of the stadium. Especially, the special construction methods of sports facilities help to manifest a national identity and to transport an image of the host country to its own people and to the international audience. As Pierre Nora has shown in his groundbreaking study on lieux de memoire, buildings and spaces are uniquely suited to communicate national identity.4 Even in ancient times, the Greek stadium for the Olympic Games not only fullled the sporting needs of the athletes but also presented the political and economic consensus of its time. It has to be concluded that a sports arena of the respective Olympic Games is not just a place where different nations stage a competition. It can also be understood as a space for national representation and as a symbol for national self-conceptualisation in general.5 This article focuses on the architecture of the Munich Games of 1972 and of the Olympic Games in Rome in 1960. Because of the Second World War, fascism and dictatorship, the national identities of these two states were fractured and both states had to cope with their fascist past during the postwar period. In this context, why and to what extent the design of the respective stadium s resembled the specic self-conceptions of both democratic states after the Second World War is of special interest. Furthermore, both countries had tried to organise and in one case had successfully staged the Olympic Games during their respective authoritarian regimes.6 The rst aim of this article is to show the political function of the Olympic Games in general, and especially of the Olympic sports complexes, as an instrument of postwar politics. Although there was discussion about the architecture of the Olympic Games in both instances, the two debates developed along altogether different lines. The examples of Rome and Munich make it possible to show the deployment of an architectural symbol. While in the Munich case the aim is to explain how a new sports complex is charged with meaning, the Rome example demonstrates the use of an existing architectural symbol. Most sport complexes in Rome were already charged with meaning from former times. This can show on the one hand how those symbols still help to represent a national identity in postwar Italy and on the other how this apparently xed symbol can change, setting off a new discussion about the predetermined meaning. By analysing the architecture, the self-image of both states will be described and the meaning of political signs and symbols within the Olympic Games will be explained. By looking at the public discussion about the respective stadiums architecture, the article shows in both cases how important the political and social consensus is concerning the image aimed at and the function of the media in complicating and changing the message. II. Architectural symbolism

To explain the merging of the economy, media and politics in the cultural context of the Olympic Games, this article applies an extended denition of politics which does not merely include political action but, rather, presents a comprehensive understanding of politics. What we know about the political utilisation of the Olympic Games, ostensibly a cultural event, is largely based on empirical studies that investigate the long tradition of the inuence of politics on the Games.7 In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of literature that reveals the link between modern sports and politics on different levels: the individual, organisational, international and national intrusion of politics.8 But in these studies architecture as a political symbol within the Olympic Games was mostly factored out.9 The article denes symbolic politics10 according to the premises of New Political History.11 This eld of research regards symbolic power not as a mere counterpart to political decisions, but rather as an integral component of it. Politics are made with and by symbols12 and in many ways they are an important part of political action. A symbol such as Willy Brandt kneeling in Warsaw served on the one hand to sustain and to conrm his political power during the era of Ostpolitik and on the other hand affected the

 European Review of HistoryRevue europeenne dhistoire

693

self-perception of German society in the 1970s.13 Through symbols, a political act becomes meaningful and can be used as an instrument of communication.14 One question that needs to be asked, however, is who and what make an object or a deed into a political symbol? When and why does the kneeling down become a symbol for a new democratic state? Or to stay with the case at hand, how is a building turned into an architectural symbol? Gavriel D. Rosenfeld claimed in his well-known examination of Munichs architecture and the memory of the fascist past that the Olympic stadium in Munich became a symbol for the German democratic state after the Second World War at the time of the Games.15 He offered this retrospective interpretation without discussing how it turned into a symbol and which (political or media or societal) forces were interested and involved in installing it as a symbol. The rst aim of this paper is to ask why, 30 years later, historians interpret, for example, the Munich stadium as a symbol of a democratic state. The paper thus seeks to examine different perceptions of the architecture prevalent in the 1970s and in the contemporary mainstream, as well as dissenting interpretations. For this purpose, the article distinguishes between a sign and a symbol according to the denition of Umberto Eco.16 Eco distinguishes especially between a denotative sign and a connotative architectural symbol. According to this distinction, the architectural building is the expression and the content is the function. The expression of the building is unchangeable, but the content i.e. the intended function can be inuenced by different meanings. In that sense, a sign cannot exist without interpretations and it is primarily this analysis that turns a sign into a symbol. In this context the mass media, which were often factored out in the investigations, play a crucial role in constructing national self-representation.17 Journalists help to interpret the signs employed and offer their audience different possible political interpretations and make them negotiable. As a result, a sign becomes politically relevant, and as such a process that can itself be understood as a political action turns the sign into a political symbol. Of course, this interpretation is not denite and is highly dependent on (individual) knowledge, experience, principles and emotions.18 This fact is very important for the example of Rome, as the second aim of the article is to use the Rome Games to show that an established symbol is not xed, but rather depends on the context and the time, i.e. where and when it is interpreted. In terms of Ecos distinction, the Rome case shows nicely how the interpretations changed a symbol under specic conditions and created a new one.19 III. Different self-conceptions: the Olympic Games of Rome and Munich

Italian and German ways of self-representation during the Olympic Games differed signicantly. They illustrate not only the individual paths taken by Italy and Germany after 1945, but individual approaches to appropriating the Olympics. While the Games in Rome drew heavily on Benito Mussolinis concept from the 1930s,20 the conception of Munich was intentionally contrasted to the former fascist dictatorship in three ways. First, the organising committee, in which leading politicians played an important role,21 designed the Munich Games as a contrast to the Olympic Games of 1936. Second, they were supposed to oppose National Socialist dictatorship in general and, nally, they wanted to set a positive, West German counter-example to the communist regime in East Germany. For the German organising committee in particular this intention had to be reached via non-political Games.22 That this in itself was a political statement was never a point of discussion. The intention to present to the world a democratic, cosmopolitan and amicable Germany ran through the whole concept of the Olympic Games in Munich. The designer Otl Aicher supported this image on a visual level by creating a blaze of colours and pastels of the rainbow.23 The seats in the stadium, the clothes of the employees and the ag group in the upper meadow eld were

694

E.M. Modrey

fashioned in this new colour design. The blue, green and yellow ags were perceived to be refreshing instead of sentimental or nationalistic.24 In addition, the pacist character was stressed by the fact that the military was not in attendance at the opening ceremony. In addition, stewards and policemen were not dressed in uniforms but rather in colourful clothes. The press therefore gladly dubbed them safari stewards, playing with associations of vacation and wilderness instead of military allusions.25 By having the stewards not carry any obvious weapons, the organising committee also intended to avoid stereotypes of the old Germany and to produce the picture of a peaceful Federal Republic. Thus the intention of the organising committee in agreement with the politicians was consistent with the media coverage and the targeted sign began to turn into a declarative political statement. Yet after the terrorist attack on the Israeli team the mass media often mentioned the architectural layout as a reason for poor security. The German self-representation did impair the safety of the Israeli team. So the intended sign, and the meanings it took on through the arrangements of the Olympic Games, changed after the terrorist massacre of the Israeli athletes. The sign was now construed as a symbol for a disorganised and careless Germany.26 The result is signicant: as mentioned in the introduction, this case shows how weak and changeable symbols can apparently be. They are highly dependent on the context they are read in and on the knowledge with which they are interpreted.27 In the following, the article will focus on architecture as a special feature of the Olympic concept to continue this analysis of the deployment and the handling of symbols and signs in the architectural self-representation. (a) The German roof construction of the stadium modern technology and lightness? At the time of its application Munich had no representative sports complex for such a megaevent. Willi Daume, the president of the National Olympic Committee (NOK), and the thenmayor of Munich, Hans-Joachim Vogel, proposed in October 1965 that Munich vie to host the Games.28 A whole new sports complex was erected four kilometres outside the centre of Munich at the Oberwiesenfeld.29 The ideas of Games of the short paths and green Games, which were already leitmotifs of the application, could be accurately realised on this vast and undeveloped piece of land.30 The area enchanted visitors with a grandiose green corridor, designed by Gunther Grzimek. A lawn stretched around the sports buildings and a newly built lake was designed to contribute to the peaceful and friendly atmosphere intended by the organisers (Figure 1).31 The main goal of the Munich architect Gunter Behnisch in constructing the sports complex was to set a counterpart to 1936.32 The construction of the site was aimed at and succeeded in posing an antipode to the exercise elds, the axis architecture of the National Socialist regime, and especially of the Olympic Stadium in Berlin dating from that time. In contrast to the monumental structure of the Berlin Stadium built by Werner March,33 which could host more spectators than thought possible, the new stadium in Munich should symbolise a reserved attitude instead.34 The impression of a colossal and oversized complex, which a stadium for 80,000 viewers might well have evoked, was avoided by the ground construction and by uniting the three main arenas, the Olympia Stadium, the natatorium and the sports hall, under a transparent roof (see Figure 1). This unity also matched the original idea of understatement and was intended to inspire a cheerful atmosphere in its visitors. In this context, it is important to understand that the architecture of the stadium in Munich, as well as that of the stadium in Berlin in 1936, is representative of the architectural style of its time: the Berlin stadium architecture is akin to the Memorial Coliseum of Los Angeles, which hosted the Olympic Games in 1932. And the symphony of steel, concrete and chemistry of the Munich stadium can also be found in other architecture of the postwar era, for example at the

 European Review of HistoryRevue europeenne dhistoire

695

Figure 1.

The Olympic-area was designed as an overall concept.

stadium Camp Nou in Barcelona, built in 1957;35 the intended message is also represented in the construction of the Philharmonic concert hall in Berlin.36 The Philharmonic concert hall and the Munich Stadium were meant to symbolise the self-concept of the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1970s. Tony Judt remarked that, as a result of the forced new orientation after the Second World War and after a phase of total self-discipline, German politicians were anxious to present a contained, cosmopolitan and amicable nation. These attributes of a democratic country were extolled as a behavioural norm and played an important role in judging foreign countries. But he has also discovered a change in attitude in the 1970s: the former abstinence was supplemented by new demands for equal status. In that decade, German politics uctuated between those concepts.37 The key phrases self-condent behaviour and an attitude of abstinence were carved into stone in the roof construction of the Olympic Stadium of Munich and have been reected excessively in the public discussions concerning the roof construction.38 This top structure, which was considered revolutionary at that time,39 became an iconic symbol of the Munich Olympics in general before the games started. (Figure 2).40 Steel cables, which were used for the rst time on such a large scale, stabilised the large, sweeping canopies of acrylic glass. The construction was supposed to create an open and transparent atmosphere, which contrasted with the nations striving for power in the 1936 Games.41 However, in spite of its airy and meaningful pacic construction, the Munich roof has to be understood as the selfcondent statement of a modern Germany. The 74,000 square metres of the roof construction were a sign for the mastery of modern technology and economic effectiveness.42 The foundation stone of the Olympic Stadium was laid on 14 July 1969 and set new worldwide benchmarks: 123 base plates had to be made; pylons, each 81 metres tall, carried the stadium roofs 3400 tons; the cables had to withstand a pressure of 4000 tons; and the length of the whole cable span was equal to that of several apartment buildings.43 Thus the materials of the roof construction were not in themselves airy and light; they were, however, assembled in an amazing static construction, which emphasised the contrast between the key attributes lightness and light-heartedness. Besides the interpretation of a new, democratic and optimistic Germany, the Munich architecture was supposed to symbolise a modern and powerful Federal Republic. A correct representation of a modern and cosmopolitan Germany was not only discussed in political circles. The national and international media debates also focused on terms such as reserve and self-condence, and added notions concerning the peaceful impression and the

696

E.M. Modrey

Figure 2.

The tent as symbol of the Olympic Games: Al Madinas 28.10.1971.

tremendous modernity that made the roof a symbol against gigantism.44 The Sydney Sun Herald drew this conclusion in 1971:
The Germans are mindful of the image of pomposity they gained from the Berlin Olympics 1936 and are trying hard not to create the same impression this time. . . . But they pushed ahead with their application and their thorough preparation and planning shows the IOC chose wisely. . . . They want to convey an impression of lightness and merriment and artistic buoyancy, to get away from anything smacking of heroic gladiatorial struggles.45

According to the Sun Herald, this would be expressed mainly by the architecture, and the article closes with the prediction that these Games will not be oversized. An article in July 1972 honoured the highly technical innovation of the roof as a representation of a new, modern Germany.46 The Irish Independent also recognised the different conceptions and mentioned: The selection of Germany, and Munich, as the site for peaceful Olympic Games over a quarter century after D-day is an interesting commentary on how quickly nations can forgive and forget.47 These are only two examples of the highly favourable press coverage of the Olympic Games.48 The international press obviously recognised and extolled the different approach the German organisation was striving to achieve and the intended sign began to turn into the designated symbol. Thomas Meyer, a journalist at the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), described his emotions and impressions in his extensive coverage of a competition in the Olympic Stadium. This description can be understood as representative of the German reception of Munichs Olympic stadium.49 He reected:
Those who have not seen the stadium-of-the-eighty-thousand cannot know Munich! Having made your way through the entrance, nothing stands in your way of experiencing the tent roof. . . . Fully content, I adjust my sitting position in the anatomically formed green seats (this is also an entirely new grandstand experience). . . . And then, having climbed down to the Olympic lakeshore, sitting in the grass, it was almost like going on a holiday.50

This impression is also part of the German cultural memory and can be found as a motif in contemporary literature, as Ulrike Draesner points out in her novel Spiele.51 But the author also accurately describes the reinterpretation of the architecture after the terrorist act. Furthermore,

 European Review of HistoryRevue europeenne dhistoire

697

the media criticised the open and transparent atmosphere of the area as well as the low fences. These were much discussed as they diminished the security of the Olympic Village. It is also interesting that after the terrorist act the image of the terrorist on the balcony of the athletes room with a stocking over his head supplemented the iconograph of the Munich Olympic tent but did not replace it. But there were also other interpretations behind the intended function during the arrangements for the games. The gradual rise in construction costs raised serious problems for the ambitious roof construction and its idea of understatement.52 The costs of the construction of the whole Olympic area were recalculated at a Figure 400 500% higher than the initial estimate. In the end, the Olympic construction costs totalled DM 1.35 billion. This was mainly caused by the difcult and expensive construction of the roof.53 The Times, for example, saw the intention of the simple games endangered by the costs54 and the Melbourne Herald Tribune wrote that all the same these Games will still be dazzlingly spectacular in their own way. And dazzlingly spectacular costs.55 The German media worried about falling back into old paradigms of gigantism and massiveness.56 The debates regarding the roof turned into a public quarrel, which the German chancellor Willy Brandt tried to moderate by noting that the discussion in the national media would certainly leave a negative image of Germany in foreign countries. By ascribing to the discussions concerning the roof having an opinion-forming effect regarding Germany as a whole, Willy Brandt made the roof itself a political element. The international press criticised the Germans for turning the Olympic Games into a show of superlatives and saw the reason for this in the Germans general affection for monumentality.57 Besides the interpretation of the roof as a symbol of lightness and modernity, which was also mentioned in the media, the roof therefore turned into a symbol of gigantism. This nding is exemplied by headlines in, for example, Australian newspapers such as: The Monster of Munich58 and Munich Thinks Big for the Games59 or by the headline of the New York Times, Big Talk at Munich is the Big Cost of Big Roof.60 These exemplify the coverage which turned more and more from the roof itself to the analysis of a perceived political statement in general. The Boston Christian Science Monitor explained in May 1972:
A bustling, stable economy, a Nobel Peace Prize chancellor and a powerful voice in the Common Market will the West German people gain the international recognition, inuence and respect they long for? As West Germans prepare to host this years Olympic Games and watch their country move nearer United Nations membership, the Monitors UN correspondent assesses their mood.61

This statement is followed by an overview of German history before and after 1945 and the journalist draws this conclusion: The roof can be understood as a symbol for Germans position in the world: modern, economically stabilized, and cosmopolitan, but always aspiring to be the best.62 Thus the different media interpretations of the architecture evolved into a political statement and offered the public diverse possibilities of lling it with content. The architecture was regarded as a political expression of Germany, and therefore turned into a symbol for German behaviour in general. It is interesting to note that the media themselves used the term symbol for their description. Apparently after the architecture and the meaning of the sports facilities had been widely covered by the media the intended sign was turned into a symbol. It can be concluded that on the one hand the architecture, which was primarily intended as a sign for Germanys new path after 1945, became a symbol for megalomania. But on the other hand the projected aim was reached in symbolising that Germany had returned to the international democratic order after the Second World War. Many illustrated books of the Olympic Games of 1972 featured the Olympic tent and describe it with the same adjectives the organising committee and the politicians had intended. It apparently became the dominant interpretation, which was then also accepted by historians. That said, it can be concluded that an intended sign

698

E.M. Modrey

can, but does not necessarily have to, turn into an intended symbol. The transformation depends on different and mostly unforeseeable factors: a sign can be interpreted in several ways and therefore different political symbols can evolve. The architecture of representative buildings is able to transfer such political statements and is also perceived as such in political discussions. (b) Between ancient buildings and modern sports architecture: the Olympics in Rome The stadium in Rome united the contrast always perceived between the old and the new in a special way. Ancient buildings were being made part of the Olympics along with the modern constructions of Pier Luigi Nervi.63 Nervi had completed those buildings, which he constructed in the 1930s and 1940s. The Italian government spent about $50 million to prepare for the tremendous sports event. Most of the money went into renovating facilities, upgrading older sites built by Mussolini in preparation for the 1944 Olympic Games, and into planning venues that included ancient monuments as part of the structures.64 In order to not overburden the population with additional taxes, the majority of the money was raised from the Italian soccer lottery, Totocalcio.65 The Italian organising committee wanted to stress continuity between modern times and the ancient past.66 Thus, the ancient monuments of the Bath of Caracalla enhanced the spirit of gymnastic events and the wrestling matches were located in the Basilica of Maxentius, where two thousand years before similar contests had taken place.67 Apparently the Italian government and the Olympic committee wanted to use architectural symbols, which could symbolise an old, traditional Italy. Thus they used architectural symbols from the past for the current self-representation and tied in old, established symbols of the power and tradition of the Eternal City. In contrast to the German case, where a whole new sports complex was erected, these symbols were already charged with emotions and meanings. Instead of devising a new image, as Germany did, Italy reverted to an image that had already existed before the fascist era. This line of tradition dating from ancient Rome to modern Italy, which was utilised by the Italian organising committee, had in fact been used before by Benito Mussolini. It was used to conrm the Italian claim to power as the former centre of the Roman world empire, the home of the Catholic Church, and the place where humanism and the renaissance were born and blossomed. With this line of argument, Mussolini nationalised historical events and produced an Italian myth about state, nation and the new Italian. The claim to be a ruling nation was the supporting pillar of the Italian national consciousness for various decades.68 In his study on national self-perception, Jens Petersen has determined that the year 1943 was an important moment of historical disruption and was therefore also an important moment in the construction of a national self-image. By referring to the Resistenza movement as a second Risorgimento (the unifying national movement from 1815 to 1870) a new national self-conception arose. Therefore it was possible for Italians to perceive an apparent continuity between historical national traditions and anti-fascist Italy. The Resistenza became the founding myth of the new state and the new society.69 The national awareness erased 20 years of fascism, Italys participation in the Second World War on the German side and its plans for colonialist expansion especially in Ethiopia, and was reconstructed by the resistance movement and historical traditions. Drawing a direct line from the old Roman Empire to the Risorgimento directly into modern times helped to re-establish national self-condence after the rupture of 1945.70 Romes international image is dominated by its ancient buildings, which shape the appearance of the city. Therefore the idea of also utilising the impressive architecture for the Olympic Games was virtually unavoidable. The incorporation of the ancient buildings in the Rome Olympics offered visitors a remarkable location. The setting was dominated by ancient buildings, such as the Thermal Springs of Caracalla, the Arch of Constantine, the Colosseum or the Forum Romanum.71 The organising committee concentrated on aesthetics and wanted

 European Review of HistoryRevue europeenne dhistoire

699

to connect their Olympic Games in the minds of the international audience with adjectives such as artful and elegant,72 which the press did indeed do. The journalists even often emphasised that the grand scenery made organisational mistakes forgettable.73 However, at least one mistake was made and was always mentioned: the use of fascist symbols at the Foro Italico. Those could then and indeed still can be seen on many buildings in Rome. Apparently it was not the architectural symbols of old Rome which caused a disruption within the discussions about the interpretation. Other former symbols which were already charged with emotions and meanings from the fascist era even started a parliamentary conict. The Foro Italico comprised numerous sports venues, most importantly the Olympic stadium and the Stadio dei Marmi. Before the end of the Second World War it was called Forum Mussolini. The Foro Italico is a representative example of the monumental complexes constructed between 1928 and 1938 and of the architecture that was typical of fascism. This architectural style refers to key stylistic elements of former times and as a result appropriates these older architectural symbols in its execution of architectural self-representation. Largerthan-life, heroic and athletic statues were central elements of the sports buildings, as well as a great pillar and a mosaic, all typical elements of architecture in a fascist state.74 These elements caused a parliamentary conict75 because the main settings of the Olympic Games of 1960 were full of memories and relics of Mussolini and the fascist regime. Some of the inscriptions on the mosaic in front of the stadium read: Duce, Duce, Duce or Many enemies, much honour76 (Figure 3). Others included long sentences like: I swear to execute without questioning the orders of the Duce and to serve with all my strength and if necessary with my blood the cause of the fascist revolution.77 One pillar bears the name of Mussolini in large type and the inscription DUX, Latin for leader, a title by which Mussolini liked to be addressed (Figure 4).78 During the fascist era, these inscriptions symbolised strength and power. But in postwar Italy the old meanings were newly discussed and challenged. During the parliamentary conicts and the public discussions, leftists petitioned the Roman City Council in February 1959 to erase fascist inscriptions from buildings and the Stadio dei Marmi on the Foro Italico. When the petition was unsuccessful, a Communist delegation introduced the matter to the Italian parliament in November 1959, asking the government under Antonio Segni to state its position. This led to stormy scenes in Romes parliament. Some politicians were afraid that the inscriptions would offend foreign athletes and could evoke the impression in Romes visitors that the Italians still believed in Benito Mussolini.79 However, the government replied that

Figure 3.

This sentence is still part of the mosaic in front of the Stadio dei Marmi.

700

E.M. Modrey

Figure 4.

The pillar in front of the stadio dei marmi.

thousands of foreign tourists saw the inscriptions every year without objecting to them. Furthermore, it was claimed that the inscriptions were a part of Italian history, no matter how dark this fascist period might have been.80 Also the government under Fernando Tambroni, in the third Legislative period in March to July of 1960, did not venture anything in this case. But when the government under Premier Amintore Fanfani81 rose to power again on 26 July 1960 (one month before the games started), the motion to erase the inscriptions was renewed. Premier Fanfani was known to despise Italys fascist past and ordered the removal of some fascist symbols and inscriptions before the beginning of the Olympics on 25 August.82 In a reaction to the erasure of those inscriptions neo-fascists painted slogans praising Mussolini on the banks of the Tiber and other public places night after night.83 The right-wing extremists thus protested against the governments decision to have some of the inscriptions commemorating the dictatorship deleted from the Foro Italico.84 This public struggle demonstrated the weakness of the Italian government of the time. The Christian Democrat Fernando Tambroni depended heavily on coalition partners to form a government. As a result of struggles within its own party, the Democrazia Christiana (DC) had to set up an alliance with a neo-fascist party, the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI). But in the Italian parliament the leftists also had a powerful voice,85 so that Tambroni, like his predecessor Antonio Segni, was forced to nd a balance between the differing ideas within his own governments as well as with foreign representatives particularly during the Olympic Games.86 Maybe this need for balance was the deciding factor that made the Italian government pass the order to remove the inscriptions only a few weeks before the start of the Olympic Games. The need to present an anti-fascist image before the world proved more important than the potential risk of displeasing the coalition partner and consequently risking the continuance of the government. Maybe the balancing act was to remove only some of the inscriptions, not all of them, and to do so very late.

 European Review of HistoryRevue europeenne dhistoire

701

While in Germany most politicians agreed on the intended sign and it was up to the mass media to offer different interpretations, in Italy even the parliament did not agree on the meaning of fascist architectural symbols and their impact on foreign affairs. Here the media placed this issue in another context. International newspapers recognised that this was a dangerous tightrope walk as well and wrote: The city government took no action and opponents charged it tolerated the inscriptions because it needed Neo-Fascist support.87 But this was not the only interpretation of events. The Los Angeles Times had reported already in 1959 on these events under the headline Italians Expect Fuss from Russ.88 They claimed that the Communists and the Soviets were looking for trouble, as they did every four years, as the journalist Paul Zimmermann put it. He commented on the situation:
Premier Mussolini, looking to a day when Rome could stage the Olympic Games, started the building program in the Forum. Naturally his name is inscribed.

And a few sentences later, he continued:

No one in his right mind would think of doing anything to mar the beauty of this or other Fascist built edices nearby. . . . So the pattern of Soviet trouble is there standing like a dark shadow over the XVII Olympiad.89

The New York Times also seized on familiar patterns of interpretation and supposed the Communists were acting as cheerleaders for the Soviets.90 Hence, the discussion about fascist symbols in the architecture of the Olympic setting, which originally centred on the question of an appropriate representation of the Italian Republic, turned into a debate between opposite sides in the Cold War. That the Italian government did not erase the fascist symbols was no longer the point of the discussion; instead, the fact that the communists wanted the symbols to be erased was criticised. The journalists of the Los Angeles Times, but also of the New York Times and the Washington Post, transferred the issue into a worldwide context and regarded the behaviour of the Italian communists as a typical example of Soviet behaviour. Olympic issues were thus instrumentalised and turned into an international debate about Cold War politics. This behaviour paralleled foreign policy between the USA and Italy, which was marked by a concealment of Italys fascist past in order to put Italy on the right side of the Cold War.91 Consequently, the architecture of the Italian Olympic Games was politicised in a rather different way than in the case of the Munich Olympic Games in Germany analysed above, but was nonetheless also turned into political action. The media did not discuss the architectural sign and its interpretation, as they did in Munich when they debated the meaning of a new building. Here an old architectural symbol was used to debate a political matter. The media converted the struggle about the inscriptions in the mosaics at the Foro Italico into a direct symbol of the Italian government. This shows how a symbol can be changed and depends on different interpretations in different times. While the mosaic symbolised power and force in the time of fascism, it turned into a political statement for postwar Italy and its politics of history. Also, the various problems mentioned by the press the Cold War and the weak foundation of the Italian government show that neither a sign nor a symbol has single interpretations, but rather both are charged with different content as the media coverage evolves.

IV.

Conclusion

To host the Olympic Games, a country needs many sports complexes, which can either already exist or have to be specially constructed only for the few weeks of the sporting event. While the organising committee in Rome could mostly fall back on existing sports venues, mainly dating from the fascist era, but some also from ancient times, Munich had to build a whole new sports complex within ve years. Both countries also tried to underscore modern aspects in their

702

E.M. Modrey

architecture. But while Germany wanted to set a distinctive counterpart to its former fascist regime, and expressly symbolised that in the architecture of the roof construction, Italy did not perceive a problem for its national representation in the fact that Mussolini had also emphasised ancient Rome in his national narrative. Furthermore, the parliament and the organising committee accepted the fascist inscriptions in the Olympic setting. The interpretation of the symbols employed, which also received a political interpretation through the media, also showed different possibilities for action. While the German debates focused on national aspects, the Italian discussions were, on the one hand, transformed into an international and wider context by relating them to the Cold War discourse, and on the other hand they were representative of the actual government situation. Both cases also show the deployment of an architectural symbol. While in the Munich case the installing of an architectural symbol was at the centre of the explanations, the Rome example could explain how much an installed architectural symbol depends on the time in which it is read. However, both examples show how an event which is non-political at rst glance, along with its architectural realisation, can be turned into a political symbol.

Notes
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. Guttmann, The Olympics, 16f. Houlihan, Sport and International Politics. The Olympic charter is published on the website of the IOC: http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/ en_report_122.pdf (accessed July 16, 2008). Nora, Lieux de memoire. Bale, Sport, Space and the City, 1f. Bale, Landscape of Modern Sport, 123. Germany hosted the Olympic Games in 1936 and used the event as a forum for national propaganda. Rome applied unsuccessfully for the Games four times (1924, 1936, 1940, 1944) under Mussolini; Ferrara, Litaliani in palestra, 21365. Guttmann, The Olympics, 16f. The Games in Berlin or the boycotted Games of 1980 in Moscow and 1984 in Los Angeles have been widely investigated; Rippon, Hitlers Olympics. A new view offers the study of Christopher Young. Christopher Young, and Alan Tomlinson. National Identity and Global Sport Events. Culture, Politics, and Spectacle in the Olympics and the Football World Cup. New York: State University of New York, 2005. This area of research is mainly inuenced by Murray Edelmann, Politics as Symbolic Action. For a detailed description of the German case see: Frevert and Haupt, Neue Politikgeschichte. The concept symbol is not clearly dened. Ernst Cassirer has noted that no other concept of aesthetics is so difcult to dene: Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Schneider, Der Warschauer Kniefall. Gohler, Symbolische Politik, 68f. Rosenfeld, Munich and Memory. Eco, A Componentional Analysis of the Architectural sign/Column. Dayan; Katz. Media Events, 19f. In the case of the Munich and Rome Olympics one also has to bear in mind that the memory of the former fascist states was very much alive. The public still shared the knowledge about the cruelties and atrocities under the rule of the Fuhrer and the Duce, and the negative experience of the Second World War. Patrizia Dogliani also explicates in her article about the war monumental how the meaning of the memorials and their intended function changed during Italian history. But she concentrates mainly on the time between 1871 and 1943, and gives only a short overview of the Italian Republic: Dogliani, Constructing Memory. Pilley, Ofcial Report of the Olympic Games. The Olympic committee was dominated by politicians and people from high society. The Olympic Games were under the patronage of the German president Gustav Heinemann. The president of the NOK was Willi Daume, president of the German Sportbund, and vice-presidents included Hans Jochen Vogel, mayor of Munich, and Hans Dietrich Genscher, German minister of the interior. Balbier, Kalter Krieg, 222f.

19.

20. 21.

22.

 European Review of HistoryRevue europeenne dhistoire

23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

703

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50.

51. 52. 53.

Der Spiegel quoted Aicher, caricaturing him as a dreaming artist: Mit Farben kann man Politik machen, no. 31 (1972): 28 38. Rosenfeld, Munich and Memory, 156. Der Spiegel called the stewards Safariordner: Dos pack ma, no. 12 (1972): 68 73. See for example the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ): Zorn uber zugellosen Mord, no. 206, September 6, 1972, 3. See also: Reeve, One Day in September; Dahlke, Anschlag, 66f. The terrorist act and its function within the staging of politics within the Olympic Games cannot be discussed here, but will be investigated in my dissertation, written in the context of the DFG-funded (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) Research Training Group Transnational Media Events from Early Modern Times to the Present. Willi Daume describes this situation very colourfully in his memoirs: Daume, Deutscher Sport. See also his interview with the political magazine Der Spiegel: Dienen wir uberhaupt einer guten Sache?, no. 35 (1972): 28 38. In 1938 British Prime Minister Chamberlain landed at the Oberwiesenfeld, to negotiate the Munich agreement with Hitler. After the Second World War, 10.85 million cubic metres of debris were accumulated. Grube, Bauten, 31. The Times, Olympic city where pleasure has become a way of life, July, 30 1971, 4. Behnisch, Gesamtwerk Olympia, 9 11. His father Otto March built the Deutsche Stadion, which both sons, Werner and Walter, rebuilt for the Olympic Games 1936: Marg, Stadia and Arenas, 14. Mandell, The Nazi Olympics. Rosenfeld, Munich and Memory, 150. Marg, Stadia and Arenas, 97. Judt, Postwar, 563. Paulmann, Auswartige Reprasentationen, 30f. Deutsche Bauzeitung, Olympische Sportbauten, no. 4, April 1, 1970. This supposition can be documented with extensive international newspaper imagery, which always shows the Munich roof as pars pro toto for the Olympic Games. For example: Kobe Shinbun, January 1, 1972; Al Madinas, Djidda, October 28, 1971; Sydney Morning Herald, July 15, 1972; Suddeutsche Zeitung, June 22 23, 1968; Munchner Merkur, October 1, 1968. Bode, Das menschliche an der Olympischen Architektur, 140. Los Angeles Times, German Knowhow Ready for Olympic Games, June 18, 1972; New York Times, Architect is First 72 Olympic Winner, March 17, 1968. The exact construction is described in Grube, Die Bauten, 59f. Washington Post, Designing In, Under and With the Earth, April 8, 1972; Chicago Tribune, Munich Pushes Ahead for Olympics, April 9, 1972; New York Times, Next Stop Munich, October 30, 1968. Sydney Sun Herald, Munich72 wants to forget the past, August 22, 1972. Ibid. Irish Independent, Why Germany spends 185m on Olympic City, July 22, 1971. The article only shows an extract of the media analysis, which is undertaken in my dissertation Project Cultural Re-integration? The Olympic Games of Rome (1960) and Munich (1972) as Transnational Media Event. Beyond doubt the audience is not a homogeneous group. A distinction can be drawn between the audience in the stadium, in front of the TV, between newspapers and radio stations, between national and international viewers. And even these groups cannot be described as homogeneous: Rothenbuhler, The living room celebration of the Olympics. Wer das Stadion der Achtzigtausend nicht von innen gesehen hat, kennt Munchen nicht! . . . Ist man durch die breiten Publikumsschleusen gelangt, steht dem Zeltdach-Erlebnis nichts mehr im Wege . . . . Ich richte mich auf der anatomisch geformten grunen Sitzschale (auch das ein ganz neues Tribunengefuhl) ein wunschlos zufrieden . . . . Und als ich dann hinuntergeklettert war an das olympische Seeufer und im Gras sa, war es fast wie Ferien (translation by the author), quoted in FAZ, Olympisches Herzklopfen, no. 197, August 26, 1972. Draesner, Spiele. Washington Post, Munich Embroiled over Olympic Tent, March 13, 1968; New York Times, Mounting Costs of Olympics are Decried in West Germany, November 16, 1969. Scharenberg, Nachdenken uber die Wechselwirkungen, 159f.

704
54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

E.M. Modrey
The Times, Finance Problems for Munich, July 18, 1969; The Times, Munichs 10m Olympic Tent, July 23, 1969. Melbourne Herald Tribune, Germans Sheds, July 8, 1972. FAZ, Sind es Ersatzkriege?, August 5, 1972; Der Spiegel, Wir sind da so hineingeschlittert, no. 31 (1972): 28 38. New York Times, People Who Play in Glass Houses, August 21, 1972; Olympisches Feuer, Nachrichten aus der Olympiastadt, no. 11/12 (1969): 17 21. The Province, The Monster of Munich, July 8, 1972. Australian Womens Weekly, Munich Thinks big for the Games, June 28, 1972. New York Times, Big Talk at Munich is the Big Cost of Big Roof, September 3, 1972. Christian Science Monitor, An Afuent West Germany Seeks Acceptance, May 24, 1972. Ibid. For example, the Palazzo dello Sport: Thiel-Siling. Architektur. 88f. Telesca, Tra Beruti e LImmobiliare, 52. Davis, Rome 1960, 128. Vidotto, Roma contemporanea, 290f. Merwe, Rome 1960, 158. This claim can also be found in the writings of G. Papini: Papini, Italia mia. Petersen, Wandlungen des italienischen Nationalbewusstseins, 699 748. Grobolting, Le memoria delle republika, 331. Telesca, Sport, politica, affari, 160. The Games of the XVII Olympiad, Ofcial Report, 35. For example: Der Spiegel, Ein Magherebinier in Rom, no. 36 (1960): 42f; Die Zeit, Olympisches Fazit, no. 38 (September 16, 1960): 4. Also in the writings of Rudolf Hagelstange, Romisches Olympia, 9f. Caporilli, Il Foro Italico e lo stadio Olympico. Camera dei Deputati, Seduta del 6. Ottobre 1959, 10612 18. Molti nemici, molto onore (tTranslation by the author), quoted in: New York Times, Mussolini Pillar, February 21, 1959: 3. ` giuro di eseguire senza discutere gli ordini del Duce e di servire con tutte le mie Forze e se e necessario con mio sangue la causa nella rivoluzione fascista (translation by the author), quoted in: ` LUnita, Il Foro Italico ancora deturpato dallapologia del Duce, May 14, 1959, 4. New York Times, Mussolini Pillar, February 21, 1959, 3. Paul Zimmermann, Italians Expected Fuss from the Russ, Los Angeles Times, October 28, 1959, CI. Also mentioned in the parliamentary debate: Camera dei Deputati, Seduta del 6. Ottobre 1959, 10613. Ibid. In the third Legislative period (1958 1963) the government changed ve times. Fanfani succeeded Tambroni on 26 June 1960 and was in this position until 1 May 1963. New York Times, Fascist Symbols go for Rome Olympics, August 9, 1960, 2. New York Times, Italy is Enjoying an Olympic Calm, August 16, 1960, 23. Corriere della Sera, Incedenti al Foro Italico per la cancellazione delle scritte, August 11, 1960, 1; Il Messaggero, Manifestazione di protesta al Foro Italico, August 11, 1960, 4; LEuropeo, Un fatasma al Stadio dei marmi, August 21, 1960, 14 18. Grobolting, Le memorie della repubblica, 344f. Judt, Postwar, 294. New York Times, Fascist Symbols go for Rome Olympics, August 9, 1960, 2. Los Angeles Times, Italians Expect Fuss from the Russ, October 28, 1959. Ibid. New York Times, Italy is Enjoying an Olympic Calm, August 16, 1960, 33. Judt, Postwar, 290.

Notes on contributor
Eva Maria Modrey is a fellow of the research training group Transnational Media-Events from the Early Modern Times to the Present, Justus-Liebig University Gieen. The topic of her PhD thesis is Cultural Re-Integration? The Olympic Games of Rome (1960) and Munich (1972) as transnational Media-Event. Before coming to Justus Liebig University in 2007, she obtained a MA in history, and literature from University of Bochum (2007).

 European Review of HistoryRevue europeenne dhistoire Bibliography

705

Balbier, Uta Andrea. Kalter Krieg auf der Aschenbahn, Der deutsch deutsche Sport 1950 1972. Eine politische Geschichte. Paderborn: Schonigh, 2007. Bale, John. Landscape of Modern Sport. London, New York: Routledge, 2003. . Sport, Space and the City. London, New York: Routledge, 1993. Behnisch, Gunter. Gesamtwerk Olympia. In Olympische Bauten, edited by Olympiabaugesellschaft. Munich: Kramer, 1972. Bode, Peter. Das menschliche an der Olympischen Architektur. In Die Spiele der XX. Olympiade, Munchen/Kiel 1972 und die XI. Olympischen Winterspiele Sapporo 1972. Das ofzielle Standardwerk des Nationalen Olympischen Komitees fur Deutschland, edited by Deutsche Olympische Gesellschaft, 138 41. Munchen: Sankt Michaelsbund, 1972. Camera dei Deputati. Seduta del 6. Ottobre 1959. In Atti Parlamentari dell Assemblea, Anno 1959, III Legislatura, Discussioni, edited by Camera dei Deputati, 10612 8. Roma: Stabilimenti Tipograci C. Colombo, 1961. Cassirer, Ernst. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1955. Caporilli, Memmo. Il Foro Italico e lo stadio Olympico. Immagini delle storia. Roma: Tomo edizioni, 1990. Dahlke, Mathias. Der Anschlag auf Olympia 72. Munich: Meidenbauer, 2006. Daume, Willi. Deutscher Sport 1952 1972. Munich: Pro Sport, 1973. Davis, Eric Leslie. Rome 1960: The Games of the XVIIth Olympiad. In Historical Dictionary of the Modern Olympic Movement, edited by John E. Findling and Kimberly D. Pelle, 128 34. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996. Dayan, Daniel, and Elihu Katz. Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1992. Dogliani, P. Constructing Memory and Anti Memory: the Monumental Representation of Fascism and its Denial in Republican Italy. In Italian Fascism, edited by R.J.B. Bosworth and Patrizia Dogliani. New York: Macmillan, 1999. Draesner, Ulrike. Spiele. Munich: btb, 2007. Eco, Umberto. A Componentional Analysis of the Architectural Sign/Column. Semiotica 5 (1972): 97 117. Edelman, Murray. Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence. Chicago: Markham, 1971. Ferrara, Patrizia. Litaliani in palestra, Storia documenti e immagini della ginnastica dal 1833 al 1973. Roma: La Meridiana editori, 1992. Frevert, Ute H.-G. Haupt. Neue Politikgeschichte. Perspektiven einer historischen Politikforschung. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005. Gohler, Gerhard. Symbolische Politik, Symbolische Praxis. In Was heit Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?, edited by Babara Stollberg-Rillinge, 57 70. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005. Grube, Peter. Die Bauten der Olympischen Spiele 1936 und Munchen 1972. Ein Vergleich, Univ. Masters thesis, Munster-(Westfalen), 1986. Grobolting, Thomas. Le memorie della repubblica. Geschichtspolitik in Italien nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. In Was heit Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?, edited by Babara Stollberg-Rillinge, 329 54. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005. Guttmann, Allen. The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002. Hagelstange, Rudolf. Romisches Olympia. Kaleidoskop eines Weltfestes. Munich: Piper, 1961. Houlihan, Barrie. Sport and International Politics. London: Routledge, 1997. Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945. London: Penguin Books, 2005. Mandell, Richard. The Nazi Olympics. New York: Macmillan, 1971. Marg, Volkwin. Stadia and Arena. Ostldern-Ruit: Hatje-Cantz, 2006. Merwe van der, Floris J.G. Rome 1960. In Encyclopedia of the Modern Olympic Movement, edited by John E. Findling and Kimberly D. Pelle, 157 64. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004. Nora, Pierre. Lieux de memoire. Paris: Gallimard, 1984 1992. Papini, Giovanni. Italia mia. Heidelberg: Groos, 1943 (First edition: Firenze 1939). Paulmann, Johannes. Auswartige Reprasentation. Introduction to: Auswartige Reprasentationen. Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945. Cologne: Bohlau, 2005. Petersen, Jens. Wandlungen des italienischen Nationalbewusstseins nach 1945. QFIAB 71 (1991): 699 748. Pilley, Phil. Ofcial Report of the Olympic Games: XVIIth Olympiade, Rome. London: Worlds Sports, 1960.

706

E.M. Modrey

Reeve, Simon. One Day in September. New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000. Roche, Maurice. Mega-events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture. London and New York: Routledge, 2000. Rosenfeld, Gavriel R. Munich and Memory: Architecture, Monuments and the Legacy of the Third Reich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Rothenbuhler, Eric. The Living Room Celebration of the Olympic Games. Journal of Communication 38, no. 4 (1998): 61 81. Scharenberg, Swantje. Nachdenken uber die Wechselwirkungen von Architektur und Wohlbenden. Das Olympiastadion in Munchen, ein politischer Versammlungsort. In Das Stadion. Geschichte, Architektur, Poltik, Okonomie, edited by Mathias Marschik, R. Mullner, G. Spitaler, and M. Zinganel, 153 74. Wien: Turia und Kant, 2005. Schneider, Christopher. Der Warschauer Kniefall. Ritual, Ereignis und Erzahlung. Konstanz: UVK, 2006. Telesca, Guiseppe. Sport, politica, affair. Le Olimpiadi di Roma del 1960. Memoria e Ricerca, no. 25 (2007): 153 69. . Tra Beruti e LImmobiliare. Le Olimpiadi del 1960 e la trasformazione urbanistica di Roma. Passato e Presente, no. 67 (2006): 43 68. Toohey, Kristine. The Olympic Games: A Social Science Perspective. Wallingford: CAB, 2007.