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Presentation to the Conference on Global Financial Crisis and Capacities of the Islamic Financial System, Islamic Republic of Iran
(17 January 2009)
2007
2008
2009
2010
Origin of Crisis
8
Core Faultlines Comments by Sage Transmission Channels MENA/GCC Outlook SSA Outlook Asia Outlook Global Recovery by 2010
(Percent)
7 6
5
4 2005 2006 2007 2008 LDMCs-28 2009 non-LDMCs-28 2010 IDB-56 MCs
Major Wall Street investment banks, hedge & derivative funds, unregulated credit default swaps market In April 2004, net capital rule waived for US investment banks; unleashed reserves held to cushion losses
$10 trillion in securitized toxic assets $55 trillion in credit derivatives and credit default swaps (mechanism to insure banks against losses) CDS market size was more than twice the size of the combined GDP of U.S.A. + Japan + the E.U.
AIG, operating in more than 100 countries, became insolvent (holding $441 billion of CDS) End of investment banks in US investment Contagion effect on banks in Europe (UK, Switzerland, France, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands) Seizing-up of interbank lending market Partial nationalization of banks and deposit guarantees Cost of lending to businesses and households became prohibitive
Growth in credit volume and paper profits generated by investing borrowed funds
Poor market discipline Slicing of risks and selling of debts to multiple investors; instead of risks being diversified, it obscured risks creating systemic vulnerabilities
System incentivizes creation of speculative bubbles Unsustainable rise in asset prices became possible because of co-mingling of aggressive lending and truncating risk-taking
Lack of due diligence Astronomical expansion in the size of the derivatives market created a false sense of security Moral hazard Global financial institutions had grown to too big to fail size, leading to imprudent lending practices
I made a mistake in presuming that self-interest of organizations, specifically banks and others, were such that they were best capable of protecting their shareholders and their equity in the firms.
Will the U.S. financial system collapse today, or maybe over the next few days? I dont think so but Im nowhere near certain old world of banking,, has largely vanished, replaced by what is widely called the shadow banking system. And as the unknown unknowns have turned into known unknowns, the system has been experiencing postmodern bank runs.
In a country where money is respected, Wall Streets leaders used to have our respect. They had our trustTimes have changed. Gone is the respect and trust. For 30 years, greedy, callow, ignorant financiers, supported by no less callow politicians from all the political parties, have proclaimed the wonders of financial innovation and how proud we all should be of the City of London. The pric etag for their behavious is an economic calanity. We should never have bought such sname oil. The consolation in these dark times is that we never will again. The coming months will be very bad. Halting this loss of confidence, providing stimulus and, if necessary, replacing private demand are essential if we want to prevent the recession from becoming a Great Depression.
Weaker ODA and remittance flows to low-income countries Sharp slowdown in global import-demand
Global export volume to fall by -2.1% in 2009; (1982) OECD countries import-demand: -3.4% in 2009
5
(percent)
From $147 per barrel in May 2008 to less than $50 in December 2008 Fiscal balance of oil-exporting countries under threat
Exposure of some SWFs and banks to US toxic debts Over fivefold jump in riskiness of some GCC banks Deposit guarantees and massive liquidity injections by GCC central banks
Troubled Corporates
Fourfold rise in borrowing costs during 2008 Cancellation of major infrastructure and commercial projects Property bubble - significant drop in real estate prices
Wealth Destruction
October 2008: 25% drop in stock prices or $250 billion losses Massive drop in GCC stock market indices by over 50% leading to potential delinquencies by investors which adds to banks vulnerabilities
7
(percent)
4 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 World Bank-SSA excl. South Africa IDB-SSA-22
Chart 5: Growth Outlook for the Asian Countries 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2006 2007 2008 2009
World Bank-South Asia IDB-Asia-8
2010
Growth Prospects Origin of Crisis Core Faultlines Comments by Sage Transmission Channels MENA/GCC Outlook SSA Outlook Asia Outlook Global Recovery by 2010
Thank You