Nathalie Ang 2009-78224 Marquez v.

COMELEC (1995) Facts: Petitioner Bienvenido Marquez alleged that at the time private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy as Governor of Quezon, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country. Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation (SPA 92-065) of respondent's certificate of candidacy, on the ground of the candidate's disqualification under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, was filed by petitioner with the COMELEC. This was dismissed. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before the COMELEC. In its 02 February 1993 resolution, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the petition. MR was also denied. Petitioner disqualifies "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. Issue/Held: Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office? Inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. RATIO: SC reference to the Oversight Committee of RA 7160. The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal charges. The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided: Art. 73. Disqualifications. - The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the

fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter. Caasi v. CA (1990) Facts Before the SC are two consolidated cases for the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao. In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987. COMELEC held that he is not disqualified to run for office, viz: The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. Issue/Held: (1) Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States? YES. (2) Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988? NO. Ratio: Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law. This is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.

In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides: SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." His card stated that he was a RESIDENT ALIEN, Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States." Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently. Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it. As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to him during the period of his residence therein. His act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office". We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988. The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

Pamil v. Teleron (1978) Facts: Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on this Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." The suit did not prosper, respondent Judge sustaining the right of Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. Hence, this petition is filed. It is his contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full force and effect. Issue/Held: Whether the Admin Code disqualification on ecclesiastics was repealed by the Election Code of 1971? NO. Ratio: SC: 7:5. The vote is thus indecisive. While five members of the Court constitute a minority, the vote of the remaining seven does not suffice to render the challenged provision ineffective. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. Seven members of the Court are of the view that the judgment should be affirmed as the challenged provision is no longer operative either because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution or repealed. The Revised Administrative Code was enacted in 1917. In the 1935 Constitution, as it is now under the present Charter, it is explicitly declared: "No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights." 5 The principle of the paramount character of the fundamental law 6 thus comes into play. There are previous rulings to that effect. 6 The ban imposed by the Administrative Code cannot survive. This is to conform to this provision of the 1935 Charter: "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all references in such laws to the government or officials of the Philippines shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution." It would be an unjustified departure from a settled principle of the applicable construction of the provision on what laws remain operative after 1935 if the plea of petitioner in this case were to be heeded. The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face,

inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test. Nonetheless, tie above view failed to obtain the necessary eight votes needed to give it binding force. The attack on the continuing effectivity of Section 2175 having failed, it must be, as noted at the outset, given full force and application. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment a quo is reversed and set aside. Respondent Gonzaga is hereby ordered immediately to vacate the mayoralty of the municipality of Albuquerque, Bohol, there being a failure to elect. Fermin v. COMELEC (2008) Facts: After the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan,6 the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), on November 22, 2006, passed Autonomy Act No. 2057 creating the Municipality of Northern Kabuntalan in Shariff Kabunsuan. This new municipality was constituted by separating Barangays Balong, Damatog, Gayonga, Guiawa, Indatuan, Kapinpilan, P. Labio, Libungan, Montay, Sabaken and Tumaguinting from the Municipality of Kabuntalan. Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in both cases, was a registered voter of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan. On December 13, 2006, claiming that he had been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for 1 year and 6 months, petitioner applied with the COMELEC for the transfer of his registration record to the said barangay. COMELEC approved petitioner's application for the transfer of his voting record and registration as a voter to Precinct 21A of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan.11 On March 29, 2007, Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. On April 20, 2007, private respondent Umbra Ramil Bayam Dilangalen, another mayoralty candidate, filed a Petition13 for Disqualification [the Dilangalen petition] against Fermin, docketed as SPA (PES) No. A07-003 [re-docketed as SPA No. 07-372 before the COMELEC] with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Shariff Kabunsuan. The petition alleged that the petitioner did not possess the period of residency required for candidacy and that he perjured himself in his CoC and in his application for transfer of voting record. COMELEC 2nd Division, in SPA No. 07-372, disqualified Fermin for not being a resident of Northern Kabuntalan.17 It ruled that, based on his declaration that he is a resident of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006 in his oath of office before Datu Andal Ampatuan, Fermin could not have been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for at least one year. The COMELEC En Banc, on September 20, 2007, affirmed the Division's ruling.19 Petitioner contends that the Dilangalen petition is a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).21 Following Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646, the same must be filed within 5 days from the last day for the filing of CoC, which, in this case, is March 30, 2007, and considering that the said petition was filed by Dilangalen only on April 20, 2007, the same was filed out of time.

Petitioner further argues that he has been a resident of Barangay Indatuan long before the creation of Northern Kabuntalan. This change of residence prompted him to apply for the transfer of his voters registration record from Barangay Payan to Barangay Indatuan. Moreover, the one year residency requirement under the law is not applicable to candidates for elective office in a newly created municipality, because the length of residency of all its inhabitants is reckoned from the effective date of its creation. In his comment, private respondent counters that the petition it filed is one for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC which may be filed at any time after the last day for filing of the CoC but not later than the candidates proclamation should he win in the elections. As he filed the petition on April 20, 2007, long before the proclamation of the eventual winning candidate, the same was filed on time. In support of his claim that he actually filed a "petition for disqualification" and not a "petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC," Dilangalen takes refuge in Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,43 specifically Section 144 thereof, to the extent that it states, "[a]ny candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law x x x may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate," and COMELEC Resolution No. 780045 (Rules Delegating to COMELEC Field Officials the Authority to Hear and Receive Evidence in Disqualification Cases Filed in Connection with the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections), which states in Section 5(C)(1) and (3)(a)(4) that LACK OF RESIDENCE is disqualification under existing election laws. During the pendency of G.R. No. 179695 with the Court, Dilangalen filed, on September 27, 2007, with the RTC of Cotabato a motion to dismiss Election Case No. 07-022 on the ground that Fermin had no legal standing to file the said protest, the COMELEC En Banc having already affirmed his disqualification as a candidate; and this Court, in the abovementioned case, did not issue an order restraining the implementation of the assailed COMELEC resolutions. The RTC, however, denied this motion on September 28, 2007. On motion for reconsideration, the trial court remained steadfast in its stand that the election protest was separate and distinct from the COMELEC proceedings, and that, unless restrained by the proper authority, it would continue hearing the protest. Petition for certiorari before COMELEC: RTC acted with GAD. En banc affirmed. Issues/Held: (1) Whether or not the Dilangalen petition is one under Section 68 or Section 78 of the OEC? 78. (2) Whether it was filed on time? YES (3) Whether COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it declared petitioner as not a resident of the locality for at least one year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections? YES. (4) Whether COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it ordered the dismissal of Election Case No. 07-022 on the ground that Fermin had no legal standing to file the protest. YES. Ratio:

It is in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC. The petition contains the essential allegations of a "Section 78" petition, namely: (1) the candidate made a representation in his certificate; (2) the representation pertains to a material matter which would affect the substantive rights of the candidate (the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (3) the candidate made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible.34 It likewise appropriately raises a question on a candidates eligibility for public office, in this case, his possession of the one-year residency requirement under the law. Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional35 and statutory36 provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate.37 Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 25338 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate,39 with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the wining candidate. The ground raised in the Dilangalen petition is that Fermin allegedly lacked one of the qualifications to be elected as mayor of Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., he had not established residence in the said locality for at least one year immediately preceding the election. Failure to meet the one-year residency requirement for the public office is not a ground for the "disqualification" of a candidate under Section 68. The provision only refers to the commission of prohibited acts and the possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country as grounds for disqualification, thus: SEC. 68. Disqualifications.Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. Likewise, the other provisions of law referring to "disqualification" do not include the lack of the one-year residency qualification as a ground therefor, thus: Sections 12 of the OEC

SEC. 12. Disqualifications.Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service or sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC)40 SECTION 40. DisqualificationsThe following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentence by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; (c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; (d) Those with dual citizenship; (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad; (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and (g) The insane or feeble-minded. To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya,41 this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate. A COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary the legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds. In other words, Rule 25 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 cannot supersede the dissimilar requirements of the law for the filing of a petition for disqualification under Section 68, and a petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC under Section 78 of the OEC. Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections: The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the

Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, 2(3)]. The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office. Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice-versa. As the law stands, the petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC "may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy." The record in these cases reveals that Fermin filed his CoC for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections on March 29, 2007.58 It is clear therefore that the petition to deny due course to or cancel Fermins CoC was filed by Dilangalen well within the 25-day reglementary period. The COMELEC therefore did not abuse its discretion, much more gravely, when it did not dismiss the petition outright. Obviously, the COMELEC relied on a single piece of evidence to support its finding that petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., the oath of office subscribed and sworn to before Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, in which petitioner indicated that he was a resident of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan as of April 27, 2006. However, this single piece of evidence does not necessarily support a finding that petitioner was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan as of May 14, 2006, or one year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections.61 Petitioner merely admitted that he was a resident of another locality as of April 27, 2006, which was more than a year before the elections. It is not inconsistent with his subsequent claim that he complied with the residency requirement for the elective office, as petitioner could have transferred to Barangay Indatuan after April 27, 2006, on or before May 14, 2006. Neither does this evidence support the allegation that petitioner failed to comply with the residency requirement for the transfer of his voting record from Barangay Payan to Barangay Indatuan. Given that a voter is required to reside in the place wherein he proposes to vote only for six months immediately preceding the election,62 petitioners application for transfer on December 13, 2006 does not contradict his earlier admission that he was a resident of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006. Be that as it may, the issue involved in the Dilangalen petition is whether or not petitioner made a material representation that is false in his CoC, and not in his application for the transfer of his registration and voting record.

The foregoing considered, the Court finds that the Dilangalen petition does not make out a prima facie case. Its dismissal is therefore warranted. We emphasize that the mere filing of a petition and the convenient allegation therein that a candidate does not reside in the locality where he seeks to be elected is insufficient to effect the cancellation of his CoC. Convincing evidence must substantiate every allegation.63 A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favor is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced on the other side. Jurilla v. COMELEC (1994) Facts: EUGENIO JURILLA, MARCIANO MEDALLA, BERNARDO NAZAL, REY MEDINA, MELENCIO CASTELO, GODOFREDO LIBAN and ANTONIO V. HERNANDEZ were among the candidates in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections for the six (6) positions of councilor for the Second District of Quezon City. Respondent Antonio V. Hernandez filed with the Commission on Elections his certificate of candidacy for one of the contested seats. In Item No. 6 of his certificate he gave as his address "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates, Quezon City." However, he did not indicate on the space provided in Item No. 12 therein his Precinct Number and the particular Barangay where he was a registered voter. His biodata submitted together with his certificate of candidacy gave his address as "Acacia Street, Mariana, Quezon City," which is part of the Fourth District of Quezon City. His certificate of candidacy and his biodata filed with COMELEC did not expressly state that he was a registered voter of Quezon City or that he was a resident of the Second District thereof within the purview of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides: Sec. 39. Qualifications (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglunsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. Petitioners herein challenged his qualification before public respondent COMELEC explaining however that since they became aware of the grounds for private respondents qualification only after the elections, they chose to file their petition under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizing the filing of such petition at any day after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation. COMELEC promulgated its questioned resolution denying the petition for disqualification for being filed outside the reglementary period under Sec. 5 of RA 6646, which pertains to nuisance candidates.

Hence the instant petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of COMELEC in issuing the assailed resolution. Issue/Held: WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the petition for disqualificationNO Ratio: Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of 1991, the law does not specifically require that the candidate must state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number and the Barangay where he is registered. Apparently, it is enough that he is actually registered as a voter in the precinct where he intends to vote, which should be within the district where he is running for office. Failure to so state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number is satisfactorily explained by him in that at the time he filed his certificate he was not yet assigned a particular Precinct Number in the Second District of Quezon City. He was formerly a registered voter of Manila, although for the past two (2) years prior to the elections he was already a resident of "B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates," admittedly within the Second District of Quezon City. He filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Registry of Registered Voters of Second District, Quezon City. After due notice and hearing, and without any written opposition, the petition was granted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Consequently, as a registered voter of Precinct Number 233-B, New Capitol Estates, Quezon City, as judicially confirmed, the COMELEC had no other recourse but to declare that he was eligible, hence qualified, to run for the position in question. COMELEC referred to the action taken by petitioners herein as one to declare private respondent a "nuisance candidate" and intimating that they should have instead petitioned COMELEC to refuse to give due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of private respondent, citing Sec. 69 of BP Blg. 881, which provides: Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. The Commission may, motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. The holding of COMELEC that private respondent Hernandez was a "nuisance candidate" is erroneous because, tested against the provisions of Sec. 69, there is no way by which we can categorize him as a "nuisance candidate," hence, the procedure therein provided could not have been properly invoked by petitioners herein. Neither could they apply Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which would require such petition to be filed at any day after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.

Nevertheless its conclusion to dismiss the petition and give due course to the candidacy of private respondent he being a qualified voter of Precinct No. 233-B, New Capitol Estates, Barangay Batasan Hills, must be sustained. Domino v. COMELEC (1999) Facts: DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election. Private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Domino because he is neither a resident nor a registered voter of the province of Sarangani. The petition was assigned to the Comelec Second Division, which rendered a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position and ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. On the day of the election, the Comelec ordered that the votes cast for Domino be counted but suspended the proclamation if he wins. The result of the election showed that Domino garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents. He filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Comelec, which was denied by the Comelec en banc. Hence, the present petition forcertiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction alleging that Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement. The Court allowed the candidate who received the second highest number of votes in the election to intervene. Issue/Held: WON COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the disqualification of petitionerYES WON the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission on ElectionsNO WON Domino met the one-year residency requirementNO WON the votes cast for Domino should be considered as stray votesNO WON the candidate with the 2nd highest number of votes may be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified--NO Ratio: The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine

whether false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate. Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes and provided further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of office. The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdictional, does NOT preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINOs qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement. The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voters disqualification. The trial court has no power to order the change or transfer of registration from one place of residence to another for it is the function of the Election Registration Board as provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189. The only effect of the decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the Election Registration Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voters registration record from the corresponding book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place the record in the inactive file. It is doctrinally settled that the term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. Domicile is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. A persons domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is

absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence. The fact that a party continuously voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his domicile. In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. Dominos failure to do so rendered him ineligible and his election to office null and void. The intervenors plea that the votes cast in favor of Domino be considered stray votes cannot be sustained. Thus, the votes cast for Domino were presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief that he was a qualified candidate, without any intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, said votes cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the peoples right to elect officials of their choice. Bautista v. COMELEC (2003) Facts: Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July 2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Josefina P. Jareo refused to accept Bautistas certificate of candidacy because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. Bautista filed an action for mandamus against Election Officer Jareo with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas.

Trial court ordered Election Officer Jareo to accept Bautistas certificate of candidacy and to include his name in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. The trial court ruled that Section 7 (g) of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 mandates Election Officer Jareo to include the name of Bautista in the certified list of candidates until the COMELEC directs otherwise. Election Officer Jareo included Bautista in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. At the same time, Election Officer Jareo referred the matter of Bautistas inclusion in the certified list of candidates with the COMELEC Law Department. COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of Bautistas certificate of candidacy since he was not registered as a voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on the COMELEC Law Departments recommendation before the barangay elections on 15 July 2002. Bautista and private respondent Divina Alcoreza were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. Bautista obtained the highest number of votes (719) while Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes Lumbangan Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bautista as the elected PunongBarangay. Bautista took his oath of office as Punong Barangay before Congresswoman Eileen ErmitaBuhain of the First District of Batangas. Bautista again took his oath of office during a mass oath-taking ceremony administered by Nasugbu Municipal Mayor Raymund Apacible. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5404 on 23 July 2002 and Resolution No. 5584 on 10 August 2002 to cancel Bautistas certificate of candidacy and directed the Election Officer to delete Bautistas name from the official list of candidates. COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco directed Election Officer Jareo to (1) delete the name of Bautista from the official list of candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan; (2) order the Board of Canvassers of Lumbangan to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming the elected Punong Barangay with due notice to all candidates concerned; and (3) direct the proclaimed disqualified candidate Bautista to cease and desist from taking his oath of office or from assuming the position which he won in the elections, citing COMELEC Resolution The Board of Canvassers reconvened and after making the necessary corrections in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes, proclaimed Alcoreza as the winning Punong Barangay. Alcoreza thus assumed the post of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan. Issue/Held: WON the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584YES, division first WON the COMELEC deprived Bautista of due processYES WON Bautista was a registered voter of the barangay when he filed his cocNO WON it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong Barangay in view of the alleged disqualification of the winning candidate BautistaNO

Ratio: In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., the Court held that it is the COMELEC sitting in division and not the COMELEC en banc which has jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy. Election Officer Jareo reported to the COMELEC Law Department Bautistas ineligibility for being a non-registered voter. The COMELEC Law Department recommended to the COMELEC en banc to deny due course or to cancel Bautistas certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation in Resolution No. 5404 dated 23 July 2002. A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The COMELEC en banc can only act on the case if there is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC division. Hence, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of Bautistas certificate of candidacy without first referring the case to a division for summary hearing. The proceeding on the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy does not merely pertain to the administrative functions of the COMELEC. Cancellation proceedings involve the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasijudicial powers, the Constitution mandates the COMELEC to hear and decide cases first by division and upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. Bautista alleges that the COMELEC denied him due process because there was no notice and hearing prior to the issuance of Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584. The opportunity to be heard does not only refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court during a formal hearing. There is due process when a party is able to present evidence in the form of pleadings. However, the COMELEC did not give Bautista such opportunity to explain his side. The COMELEC en banc issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584 without prior notice and hearing. We cannot ignore the importance of prior notice and hearing. Severe consequences attach to the COMELEC Resolutions which not only ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Bautista but also the annulment of his proclamation as Punong Barangay. What is involved here is not just the right to be voted for public office but the right to hold public office. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal show substantial evidence to support its ruling. In other words, due process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be considered in the adjudication of the case. Due process in proceedings before the COMELEC, exercising its quasijudicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides for the twin requirements of prior notice and hearing A summary proceeding does not mean that the COMELEC could do away with the requirements of notice and hearing. The COMELEC should have at least given notice to

Bautista to give him the chance to adduce evidence to explain his side in the cancellation proceeding. The COMELEC en banc deprived Bautista of procedural due process of law when it approved the report and recommendation of the Law Department without notice and hearing. Under the Revised Administrative Code, one of the qualifications of an elective municipal officer is that he must be a qualified voter in his municipality. Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code reads: Section 2174. Qualifications of elective municipal officer. An elective municipal officer must, at the time of the election, be a qualified voter in his municipality and must have been resident therein for at least one year, and must not be less than twentythree years of age. He must also be able to read and write intelligently either English, Spanish, or the local dialect. On the other hand, under the Republic Act No. 2370, otherwise known as the Barrio Charter, a candidate for the barrio council must be a qualified elector. Section 8 of the Barrio Charter reads: Section 8. Qualifications for election to the barrio council. Candidates for election to the barrio council: Must be a qualified elector and must have been a resident of the barrio for at least six months prior to the election; and Must not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or of a crime which carries a penalty of at least one year imprisonment. The words qualified elector meant a person who had all the qualifications provided by law to be a voter and not a person registered in the electoral list. In the same vein, the term qualified when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. However, under the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992, an elective local official, including a Punong Barangay, must not only be a qualified elector or a qualified voter, he must also be a registered voter. Section 39 of the Local Government Code provides: SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filpino or any other local language or dialect. xxx Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day. xxx These qualifications were reiterated in Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 dated 23 May 2002 which prescribed the guidelines on the filing of certificates of candidacy in connection with the 15 July 2002 elections. Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 likewise requires the Election Officer to verify whether the candidates are registered voters and possess all the qualifications of a candidate.

It is thus clear that the law as it now stands requires a candidate for Punong Barangay to be a registered voter of the barangay where he intends to run for office. Bautista admitted in his affidavit dated 24 August 2002 that he was not a registered voter of Barangay Lumbangan. According to Bautistas affidavit, he was practically out of the country from 1995 until 2001. When the certified list of voters ceased to be effective and operative after the barangay elections in 1997, qualified voters had to register again to vote in any election. Apparently, Bautista failed to register during the general registration of voters conducted by the COMELEC in 1997 since he was still out of the country during that time. Republic Act No. 8189 (The Voters Registration Act of 1996) provides for a system of continuing registration of voters. Thus, Bautista should have registered anew in the office of the Election Officer when he came back to the Philippines in 2001 and learned that his name was no longer included in the roster of registered voters. As early as 2001, he was already aware that his name was no longer included in the roster of registered voters. Yet, Bautista chose not to register anew that year despite his knowledge that he needed to register as a voter in the barangay to run for the office of Punong Barangay. Bautista was aware when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Punong Barangay that he lacked one of the qualifications that of being a registered voter in the barangay where he ran for office. He therefore made a misrepresentation of a material fact when he made a false statement in his certificate of candidacy that he was a registered voter in Barangay Lumbangan. An elective office is a public trust. He who aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing himself. The importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the electoral process. Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, false representation of a material fact in the certificate of candidacy is a ground for the denial or cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. The material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office. A candidate guilty of misrepresentation may be (1) prevented from running, or (2) if elected, from serving, or (3) prosecuted for violation of the election laws. The electorate cannot amend or waive the qualifications prescribed by law for elective office. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. The fact that Bautista, a non-registered voter, was elected to the office of Punong Barangay does not erase the fact that he lacks one of the qualifications for Punong Barangay. COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified. The exception to this well-settled rule was mentioned in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and reiterated in Grego v. COMELEC. However, the facts warranting the exception to the rule do not obtain in the present case. the exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.

When the electorate voted for Bautista as Punong Barangay on 15 July 2002, it was under the belief that he was qualified. There is no presumption that the electorate agreed to the invalidation of their votes as stray votes in case of Bautistas disqualification. The Local Government Code provides for the rule regarding permanent vacancy in the Office of the Punong Barangay, SEC. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. Xxx xxx If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay member, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, or in the case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay. For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. Since Bautista failed to qualify for the position of Punong Barangay, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, or in the case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking sangguniang member, shall become the Punong Barangay. Salcedo v. COMELEC (1999) Facts: Petitioner VICTORINO SALCEDO II and private respondent ERMELITA CACAO SALCEDO both ran for the position of mayor of the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a petition seeking the cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy on the ground that she had made a false representation therein by stating that her surname was Salcedo. Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use said surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. Private respondent was eventually proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo. The Comelecs Second Division ruled by a vote of 2 to 1, that since there is an existing valid marriage between Neptali Salcedo and a certain Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage of the former with private respondent is null and void. According to the Comelec, the use by private respondent of the surname Salcedo constitutes material representation and is a ground for the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. However, in its en banc Resolution, the Comelec overturned its previous resolution, ruling that private respondents jurisdiction by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, claiming that public respondents ruling was issued in grave abuse of discretion. Issue/Held: WON private respondents use of such surname constitutes a material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election CodeNO

Ratio: The use of private respondent of the surname Salcedo does not constitute material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The material misrepresentation contemplated by the Code refers to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave - to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake. Petitioner has made no allegations concerning private respondents qualifications to run for the office of mayor. A false representation under Section 78 must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to ones qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to ones identity, is not within the scope of the provision. There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent. Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not know who they were voting for when they cast their ballots in favor of Ermelita Cacao Salcedo or that they were fooled into voting for someone else by the use of such name. It may safely be assumed that the electorate knew who private respondent was, not only by name, but also by face and may have even been personally acquainted with her since she has been residing in the municipality of Sara, Iloilo since at least 1986. Bolstering this assumption is the fact that she has been living with Neptali Salcedo, the mayor of Sara for three consecutive terms, since 1970 and the latter has held her out to the public as his wife. Also arguing against petitioners claim that private respondent intended to deceive the electorate is the fact that private respondent started using the surname Salcedo since 1986, several years before the elections.