Third World Quarterly

From the Ashes of Virtue, a Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey Author(s): R. Quinn Mecham Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2004), pp. 339-358 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993685 . Accessed: 08/10/2011 18:51
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Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 339-358, 2004

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R QUINN MECHAM ABSTRACT November 2002 general elections in TurkeytransformedTurkThe ish politics by bringing a new political party to power with almost two-thirdsof the seats in parliament. The now dominantJustice and DevelopmentParty (AKP) emerged from a tradition of Islamically orientated political parties that have challenged the religious policies of the Turkish state. Previous Islamically orientated parties in Turkey were successively banned from politics, but reemerged after a period in which they reframedtheir message in response to their perceived opportunitiesand constraints.The new Justice and DevelopmentParty has gone a step further than its predecessors, dramatically highlighting a process of institutionalchange and ideological moderationthat has occurred in Turkishpolitical Islam. The increasing moderation of the Islamist movementis the result of several institutional factors. First, the movementhas been given the freedom to make strategic choices in a political system that rewards political entrepreneurshipwith credible opportunitiesfor power. Second, the state and elements of civil society have imposed public institutional constraints on the movement'sbehaviour.Third,iterated interactionbetweenIslamist leaders, their constituency and the state have provided the movement with increased information about its potential appeal and strategic options over time. after Fromnow on, nothingwill be the samein Turkey.(RecepTayyipErdogan, the Justiceand Development victory,November 2002) (AK) Party'selectoral On 3 November 2002 over 10 million Turkish voters went to the polls to cast their ballots for the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP, but often styled AKParty (see below)). The party was new and untested, having never before competed in Turkishnational elections. But many of its leading faces were not new. Rather,the face of Recep Tayyip Erdogan,the AKP'Is leader, was almost universally known in Turkey as that of the Islamist former mayor of Istanbul.Erdoganwas most famous in recent years for having attracted the attention of legal and political authorities over accusations of inciting religious hatred and attemptingto change the secular characterof the Turkishstate. He had even served a prison term for provocative behaviourafter reading a famous poem with religious imagery at a political campaign rally. At
R Quinn Mecham is at the Centerfor International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Encina Hall, Stanford, CA 94305-6165, USA. Email: qmecham@stanford.edu. ISSN 0143-6597 prinvISSN 1360-2241 online/04/020339-20 ? 2004 Third World Quarterly DOL: 10.1080/0143659042000174842

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the November 2002 election, Erdogancould not compete as a legal candidatefor his party, but served as the party figurehead,leading a vigorous campaign for political change. The campaign proved remarkably successful, dramatically reshaping the dynamics of Turkish parliamentary politics. For the first time in 15 years one partywon the majorityof seats in the TurkishGrandNationalAssembly, leaving only one other party, Ataturk's own Republican People's Party (cHP),holding seats in parliament.'The remainingseats were won by a sprinklingof independent candidates. None of the three incumbentgoverning coalition parties (DSP, in reversal.2 ANAP, MHP) won any seats in parliament a remarkable Although prior polls showed the AKP with a considerablelead in the run up to the elections, few predicted that it would capture over 34% of the vote in Turkey's remarkably fragmented party system.3 Previous 'Islamist' parties had fallen considerably short of that numberin all previous elections, receiving 15.4% of the vote in the most recent legislative elections of 1999.4 What happenedbetween 1999 and 2002 that magnified the electoral success of Turkey's 'Islamists' enough to double their national electoral returns?Many factors relevant to the success of the AKP reflect sources of dissatisfactionwith Turkishpolitics and the Turkisheconomy that became channelled into the AKP as protest against an ineffective govemmental system. Rapid inflation in 2001, coupled with a profound economic recession in 2001-02 created widespread unemployment and consumer desperationamong many of those living on and beyond the marginsof the Turkisheconomy. Public perceptionsof parliamentary deadlock, embeddedinequitablepatronagenetworks,and desperatepersonalised political battles among incumbents provided strong incentives to vote for change. These perceptions,coupled with the AKP'S formidablegrassrootsorganisational strength and the continued public legal persecution of the party's populist leader made it appear the most promising of the potential agents of change.5 While each of these factorsplays a significantrole in accountingfor the AKP'S success, this paper focuses on anotherside of the story that has implicationsfor how Islamist movements are politically incorporatedthroughout the Muslim world. It likewise speaks to a currentdebate in Turkey, made more urgent after the November elections, regardingthe extent to which the AKP may be viewed as an Islamic party with a religious agenda. The central argument of the paper, and one of the reasons for the AKP'S success, is that strategicdecisions made by partyleadershipafteriteratedperiods of political learning have transformed the dominant Islamist movement in Turkey into a politically sophisticated,progressive and moderateparticipantin normal politics. In the process, religious preferenceshave not been abandoned, but have been reframed to engage the political regime on its own terms. This transformationhas occurred over time thanks to the convergence of multiple factors. They include strategic interaction in a political system that rewardspolitical entrepreneurship, presence of robustinstitutionalconstraints the on the Islamist movement's behaviour (judicial, military, civil society), and incentives for the movement to provide costly signals about its intentions, making its moderationself-enforcing. This moderatingtransformation occurred 340

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only through repeated interaction between Islamist leaders, their constituency and the state, allowing Islamists to gather new informationabout voter preferences and state constraints. The argumentis here developed in several stages. First, the modem historical context for Islamist political participationin Turkey is outlined with a brief discussion of two predecessors of the AKP, the Welfare (Refah) and Virtue (Fazilet) Parties. Second, sources of discontent within the Virtue party and the structural forces that led to a division of the Islamist movement into two political after Virtue's closure are discussed. Third, reasons for the ideological parties transformation the movement are outlined through a comparison of the AKP of with its contemporaryrival in representing Islamic interests in the political system, the Felicity (Saadet) Party. From Welfare to Virtue Turkey is often considered a distinctive case by scholars of political Islam because of its long history of secular nationalist ideology and the Turkish campaign against Islamic institutions early in the 20th century. The religious challenge to secular state ideology that re-emergedin the formal political sphere in the 1950s provides useful comparisons with many other states that have witnessed a similar secular-religious cleavage, however. Political cleavages between a secular-mindedstate elite and various forms of Islamic civil society emerged in the latter half of the 20th century in such states as Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Indonesia, Yemen, Uzbekistan and others. Perhaps more than the secular orientation of the state, what makes Turkey distinct from these cases is the experience of a democratic tradition in which this cleavage has played out. Although Turkey has, at best, modelled a system of interrupteddemocracy thanks to several military coups d'etat, credible elections have taken place in every decade from the 1950s to the present. These elections have provideda context in which Islamic identity has emerged as a politically energising factor. The centrist political parties of the late 1940s and 1950s sought to attract religiously conservative voters by incorporating Islamic language into their appeals. This strategy was initially utilised in the Democrat Party's (Demokrat Partisi- DP) challenge to the secular nationalist tradition of Ataturk's Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk PartisiCHP) in Turkey's first multipartyelections. Later on in the 1970s two distinctively Islamic political partieswere formedby a prominentindustrialist,Necmettin Erbakan,and his associates. The National OrderParty (Milli Nizam PartisiMNP), founded in 1970, distinguisheditself by its religious orientation,and was disbanded as a result of military interventionin 1971. After a brief period of self-exile, Erbakan returned to Turkey to arrange the establishment of the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi- MSP), which continued to highlight a focus on public morals and virtue (ahlak ve fazilet). Erbakan's National Salvation Party enjoyed considerable success as a minor party in the seats in the 1973 and 1977 elections to 1970s, capturingenough parliamentary wield considerable power in several coalition governments.6 Civil unrest in the late 1970s promptedthe military to intervene dramatically 341

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in Turkish politics in 1980. By the time civilian government was restored in 1983, a new constitution was in place that was designed to eliminate the politicians and the partiesof the 1970s from Turkey'spolitical future.Erbakan's movement managed to re-emerge in the 1980s, however, redefining itself as a party for radical change as opposed to the 'conservative'religious movement of the National SalvationParty.7 The new party's name, Welfare (Refah), suggested a strong commitment to social justice and positioned the party as a political competitorwith partiesof the left. After legal changes of 1987 allowed pre-1980 politicians the right to returnto politics, Erbakantook the helm of the Welfare Party, leading it into a lukewarm showing at the 1987 elections.8 Welfare would not have to wait long for political success, however. It increased its vote share in each of the four subsequent elections.9 In the legislative elections of 1991, Welfareenteredinto a temporaryelectoralcoalition with a right-wing nationalistparty'0in an effort to secure a showing above the 10% electoral threshold.Under this arrangement, party won almost 17% of the the vote; a considerable increase in supporteven after the electoral alliance is taken into account. It was the 1994 municipal elections and 1995 legislative elections that brought Welfare onto the stage as one of the most important political movements in the country, however. The 1994 municipal elections shocked the political establishmentas the Islamists took control of the two most important cities in Turkey (Istanbul and Ankara), and averaged over 19% nationwide, securing many other important municipalities. The victory was extended the following year in parliamentas Welfare secured over 21% of the vote in what would be its last election. This parliamentary showing gave Welfare enough seats to make it the largest political partyin the TurkishGrandNational Assembly. Despite early attempts by other parties to arrange a coalition that would exclude Welfare from power, Erbakanwas eventually given an opening to lead a government.'1As a result, he became Turkey's first Islamist prime minister in 1996. Welfare certainly couldn't be described as a militant Islamist organisation. Although Turkey has had experience with militant Islamic groups such as Hizbullah, which was implicatedin sporadicassassinationsof prominentfigures of the secular establishment throughout the 1990s, Welfare was foremost a political party. As such, it commandedthe allegiance and sympathiesof a much larger number of Turks than the secretive and relatively obscure militant Islamists.'2 Welfare did clearly distinguish itself from mainstream political parties, however. Erbakandescribed Welfare's ideology as one with a national viewpoint (millf goriuy),describingall the other parties as simply mimics of the West.13 Major themes of Welfare's campaignsincluded the importanceof social justice, Turkey's exploitation by the West, religious freedom, ethnic tolerance, promotion of private enterprise,creation of an interest-free 'Islamic' economy, an end to state corruption,and denunciationsof an 'imperialistZionist system' that threatenedTurkey's national independence.'4In combination,these themes had the effect of markingWelfare as a relatively anti-system party. Additionally,Welfare was distinctive both in its party organisationand in the unconventional policies it pursued in government. As a party organisation, Welfare was uncommonly effective at creating a connection between the party 342

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and its potential constituency. Unlike mainstream Turkish parties, which are notably elite in their orientation and lack substantive organic ties with their voting base,15 Welfare was able to develop substantialsupportat the grassroots level through an extensive organisational structure. For example, provincial organisationalcommittees'6were furtherdivided into district committees, which reviewed neighbourhoodorganisationthrough periodic inspections. Neighbourhood organisers appointed street representativesthat served as Welfare's presence at ground level even in the poorest neighbourhoods.Party representatives were also careful to attend communal events, often distributing municipal welfare services in visible but very local forums.'7 After Erbakan became Prime Minister in 1996, Welfare initially pursued domestic and foreign policy goals seemingly at odds with its coalition partner and the greater Turkish political establishment. For example, Erbakan's early foreign policy activism, which included state visits to Iranand Libya, and efforts to establish an economic bloc of Muslim countries (D-8) were actively questioned by leaders of other political parties and the military establishment. Controversy also erupted when leaders of religious brotherhoods (tarikatlar) were invited to participate in a Ramadan dinner at the prime minister's residence, opening Erbakanto accusationsthat the seat of governmenthad been overrunwith clerics. At the municipallevel, Welfare mayors who took power in 1994 had demonstratedtheir ability to provide better municipal services than their predecessors, but also attractedcontroversy of their own.18 Popular increases in the provision of local services were accompaniedby new restrictions on the sale of alcohol, an upsurge in mosque construction,and changes in local symbols and landmarksto reflect a religious tone. A plan to build an imposing mosque in the heart of modern Istanbul (Taksim square) while Tayyip Erdogan was mayor led to considerable controversy among the secular establishment, delaying and underminingthe plan. Despite considerablepopular success at the municipal level, Welfare's short tenure at the head of the national governmentis rememberedlargely for being ineffectual and compromised by the constraints of governing with a coalition partnerand the political boundaries set by the military establishment. Most of Welfare's campaign promises remained unfulfilled because of the political compromisesErbakanfound necessary to remain in power. On one side, he had to allow his secular-mindedcoalition partner,the True Path Party led by Tansu On filler, sufficient prerogativesto maintainthe partnership. another,he had to demonstrate sufficient reverence for the principles of the Republican secular constitution,drawn up under the military in the early 1980s, to avoid triggering another military intervention.Within these constraints,Erbakanalso had to try to maintain the loyalty of those who voted him into office, many of whom expected Welfare to inauguratea new era in Turkish politics. In the end, these conflicting demandsproved too much for Welfare's tenuous hold on nationalpower. Coalition partnergiller, who took on the foreign affairs s ministry, appeared to pursue a foreign policy independent from Erbakan' initiatives. Likewise, Erbakan'spopulist economic policies, which included large wage increases and agriculturalsubsidies, appearedat odds with qiller's public promises of fiscal austerity.Erbakan'sinitiatives to resolve the ethnic Kurdish 343

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insurgencyin southeasternTurkeywere not supportedeither by filler, who had presided over some of the strongestincursions against Kurdishguerillas, or by the military, which was deeply suspicious of opening peace talks with 'terrorists'. At the end of 1996 a corruptionscandal involving prominentmembersof ?iller's party tested the limits of the Welfare-True Path alliance.20It forced Erbakan publicly to come to his coalition partner's defence in an effort to preservethe fragile union.21 This served to alienatehis constituency,who clearly rememberedWelfare's promises to root out corruption,and provoked an anticorruptionmovement in civil society. The initial expansion of Islamic educational and bureaucraticorganisations during Welfare's tenure, as well as a new openness to Islamic identity and symbolism in the public sphere, made the military establishmentincreasingly nervous. The military and parts of secular civil society feared that Islamists would quickly infiltrate state institutions and eventually introduce Islamic law (&eriat). Elements within civil society, including the prominentTurkishIndustrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD),soon united in opposing the combination of populist economic spending, perceived corruptionand Islamic cultural entrepreneurship the Welfare government. The National Security by Council, composed largely of senior military officers, increasingly tightened their demands on Erbakanin response to perceived threats against the secular character of the state. In order to maintain his position, the traditionally anti-ZionistErbakanyielded to militarypressureto sign a military co-operation agreement with Israel and was forced to dismiss a large number of Islamist sympathisersfrom the military. In response to these actions and to the increasingly compromised ideological position of the Welfare government, many of Erbakan'snaturalallies in religious civil society began to criticise the government's policies vehemently and to withdrawtheir support.Erbakanwas forced to walk a tightropebetween behaving like a traditional Turkishcentre-right party and demonstrating his constituencythat he could provide meaningfulchange. to On 28 February 1997 the military establishmentissued a set of demands to Erbakan'sgovernmentthat would lead to its collapse. Apparentlyfed up with the continued penetration of the state by Islamist sympathisers and with public displays of Islamic mobilisation, the military forced Welfare's hand without formally taking power.22The essence of the National Security Council's demands was the elimination of Islamic influence and sympathisers within the state, including restrictions on religious civil society. Demands included the closure of hundreds of religious schools, tight controls over religious brotherhoods, and restrictionson Islamic dress. For Erbakan,agreeingto these demands would mean a dramaticalienation from those who had voted him into office. After protesting at the military interference, Erbakan ultimately signed the recommendationswith little apparentinterest in enforcing them. For several months the military continued to issue threatsagainst the government,mobilising civil society and the media in an anti-Islamicdrive.23 June 1997 Erbakan By was forced to resign, and the president called on opposition parties to form a new government. The new government, led by the centre-rightbut secularist MotherlandParty (ANAP), quickly showed its determinationto implement the Security Council's recommendations. 344

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After Erbakan'sdeparturefrom the premiership,the military maintained its pressure on elements deemed anti-secular.This was done to a large extent by providing the judicial system with incentives and resources to define Islamically orientatedpolitical groups and their leaders as anti-system.In May 1997, during Erbakan'slast weeks in power, a judicial motion was introducedto ban Welfare for violating the secular principles of the constitution. The judicial process continued until January 1998, when Welfare was formally closed by the Constitutional Court 'because of evidence confirming its actions against the 24 principles of the secular republic'. Erbakanand five other Welfare deputies were simultaneouslybanned from political leadership for five years. Judicial actions were also taken against other prominentfigures in the Welfare Party. In December 1997 Erdogan,the Welfare mayor of Istanbul, came under investigation by a regional state security court for 'dividing people by inciting them along the lines of.. .religious... differences'.25 Erdoganreceived this charge for reading several lines from Turkishnationalistpoet Ziya Gokalp at a political rally in the southeasterntown of Siirt: 'Minaretsare our bayonets, domes are our helmets, mosques are our barracks,believers are our soldiers.' By April 1998 the state security court had-decided against Erdogan, leading to the end of his mayorship of Istanbul, a short prison sentence, and threateningto remove his eligibility from any future political office. A number of court cases were also prosecuted against 'Islamic' businesses and the religiously orientatedbusinessmen's association MUSIAD (IndependentIndustrialists'and Businessmen's Association). As it became apparentthat Welfare would be closed by the Constitutional Court,a new partywas establishedto provide an institutionalbase for parliamentary deputies from the Welfare Party. The Virtue (Fazilet) Party was founded in December 1997 by a number of Islamists close to Necmettin Erbakan.Speculation ensued as to who might lead such a party given the legal restrictionson Erbakan's political life. Tayyip Erdogan emerged as a promising candidate thanks to his popularity in Istanbul and his increasingly prominent national presence. Indeed, some saw his provocativestatementsin Siirt as evidence of his intent to challenge Erbakanfor leadership of the party.26 Within Welfare, two separate generations with divergent agendas began to emerge over the leadershipissue. The younger 'reformists' strategicallypushed for greater internal democracy within the new party, while Erbakan pressed for the party to be run by personal loyalists.27Tayyip Erdogan's subsequent prosecution,however, left the reformistswith less leverage in selecting a leader, and a settlement was reached on giving party leadership to a long-time ally of Necmettin Erbakan,Recai Kutan. Kutanrepresentedthe older group of Welfare deputies known to be Erbakanloyalists, althoughhe projected a more moderate and politically careful image than Erbakan. Upon the formal closure of the Welfare Party,all Welfare deputies in parliamentshifted to the new Virtue Party, making it the largest party in parliament. At the first convention of the Virtue Party (14 May 1998), Kutan was careful to emphasise that Virtue was not just the Welfare Party under a new name, but a new party with an essentially democraticagenda. Although this was done, in part, to shield the party from accusations that a 'new Welfare' party would 345

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likewise be illegal, it also reflected a strategic shift by party leadership to redefinetheir message. Virtue's pnrncipal messages, which continuedthroughout its relatively short life, included the necessity of real democracy in Turkey, the importanceof human rights, and a focus on expanding political liberties. This agenda was supportedboth by traditionalists reformistswithin the new party, and but for different reasons. For Kutan, both Welfare's failures and the party closure occurredbecause of Turkey's democraticdeficit. With greaterreligious and political freedom, the movement would enjoy more room to manoeuvreand Erbakancould re-enterthe political arena.Virtue's reformistsalso saw a lack of freedom as their primaryobstacle, but they extended this notion to insufficient democracy within the party. Under an increasingly democratic system, they believed, the future was theirs. Over time, therefore,a transformation occurredin the Welfare Partythat came to be embodied in Virtue. By the time Welfare took power in 1996, the anti-system rhetoric that had characterisedseveral of its campaigns had succumbed to strategies of self-representationthat sought to ensure the party's survival within the system. Compromiseswith the establishmentthat would have been deemed inconceivable in previous years were made in an effort to maintain its grip on power. By the 1996 Welfare Party congress, multiple commentators noted that they saw a differentpartythan they had on previous occasions. At the congress, Welfare 'took pains to give both the West and the Turkish nation moderatemessages',28 and showed that 'it is more inclined to compromise'. This occurred, according to one commentator,because 'Erbakanhas realized the realities of the Republic'.29 Upon the founding of the Virtue Party, the realities of the Republic deserved much credit in determiningthe party's strategies of self-representation.Indeed, a number of Welfare deputies felt that the new party's name was too Islamic.30 Although Welfare had been under a great deal of suspicion regarding its democratic credentials, the Virtue Party incessantly spoke of the need for more democracy.Regardless of whether Virtue was truly differentfrom Welfare, and organisationallythis was in doubt, it found renewed momentum with a new message. The demise of Virtue Virtue found its new voice as an oppositionpartyby shifting from the old claim that Turkey was not religious enough to the claim that Turkey was not democratic enough. Both charges attempted to frame the Turkish regime as illegitimate to some degree, but the charges of poor democracysought to engage the secular democratic system on its own terms. The military and judicial establishments,however, refused to play that game. Rather, they continued to treat Virtue as a religious, subversive party, treating it, as one observer has noted, as a 'colony of lepers'.3' Although Virtue discardedmuch of Welfare's 'just order' (adtl diizen) and 'national view' (milli gorui4)rhetoric, focusing instead on Republicanvalues, a marketeconomy and Turkey's relationshipwith Europe, this was considered by many to be nothing more than a show that masked the party's true motives. Indeed, prominentmembersof the Virtue Party were regularly accused of Islamic dissimulation (takiyye), or hiding their true 346

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motives until they were in a position to act on them. Old statementsby Tayyip Erdogan, for example, were brought forward in which he is quoted as saying (1994): 'You will be either Muslim or a Secularist. These two cannot exist together'32 and (1996) 'Is democracy a means or an end?.. .We say that democracyis a means, not an end.'33Erdogansubsequentlydismissed the quotes as inaccurate, or argued that they had been taken out of context and needed clarification.34 In late 1998 a new case was prosecutedagainst the Welfare Party in an effort to retrieve money that may have been passed onto Virtue. Erdogan's conviction of subversion was also upheld by the High Court of Appeals, forcing him to In vacate his mayoralposition and sending him to prison the following spring.35 December 1998 a new minority government was formed after defections from the MotherlandParty's leadership. Although the Virtue Party was the largest partyin parliament,PresidentSiileyman Demirel overlooked Virtue as unacceptable, and eventually agreedto a minoritygovernmentled by the DemocraticLeft Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi-DSP), the fifth-largest party in the National Assembly, violating constitutional norms in an effort to prevent Virtue from participatingin government. New elections were ultimately scheduled for April 1999. In the lead-up to the elections the military issued multiple public warnings against the dangers of Islam-based politics in an apparent attempt to caution the electorate against voting for Virtue. The most pressing dangersto Virtue in the election, however, appeared to come from divisions within the party itself. Splits between Erbakan's close associates and a younger generationmodelled on Erdoganand Gul became ever more apparent.Erbakan'songoing reputationas the 'phantom of the Virtue Party' was criticised both by the secular establishment and by increasing numbers within the party who felt that Erbakan was stifling party
democracy.36

Virtue's internalrift led to a brief period of political chaos in the month before the election, as a numberof Erbakanloyalists sided with disgruntledparliamentary mavericks in an effort to postpone the election. They were motivated both by fears of Virtue's standingin political polls,37 and by a belief that an alliance mavericks could buy time to remove Erbakan'spolitical with the parliamentary ban and allow him to lead the party into the next election. Although Kutan was initially against allowing Virtue deputies to supportsuch a move, pressurefrom Erbakanpersuadedhim to allow many Virtue deputies to supportpostponement. Virtue's reformists, most notably Abdullah Gul, vehemently opposed such a move. Although in the end the elections proceeded on schedule, the apparent hypocrisy of the new 'democratic' Virtue's anti-democraticmove was widely apparent.It appearedto some that Virtue was more interestedin saving Erbakan than in maintainingpolitical peace in the country.38 The outcome of the nationalelections was disappointingfor most in the Virtue Party.The party's nationalvote sharefell from over 21% in the previous election to about 16%, making it the third largest party in parliament. In municipal elections, however, where Virtue maintaineda high 24% share of the vote, the party managed to maintain most of its key municipalities. Virtue probably lost part of the national vote for a numberof reasons. First, Erbakan'spremiership, 347

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fresh in voters' memories, was marredby deadlock and tainted with scandal, diminishing the number of 'protest' votes that the party had won in 1995. Second, the military's repeatedpronouncementshostile to political Islam made a number of potential Virtue voters feel that the party would not be acceptable to the establishment,providingincentives to engage in strategicvoting for other parties. Third, the last-minute moves to postpone the elections and the visible splits among party leaders created a credibilityproblem within the party.39 The effect of Virtue's decline in support led to a surprise increase in votes for right-wing nationalists (National Action Party-MHP), ultimately generating a governing coalition of three parties, but leaving Virtue in parliamentary opposition.40

Virtue did not settle back into its oppositionrole without controversy.Indeed, the legal demise of the Virtue party might be traced to the post-election ceremony for the swearingin of new deputies. One of the new deputies elected, a woman named Merve Kavakci,had made it clear duringthe campaignthat she would not remove her headscarfin the National Assembly in accordancewith law. Virtue Party leaders decided to allow her to follow her conscience during the induction ceremony, and did not mandatethat she remove it. Upon entering the Assembly with a headscarf,she was greetedby shouts of 'Get out!' and with extended banging on desks by deputies from other parties.After almost an hour of chaos, she left the Assembly unable to take her seat.41Virtue thus became a focal point for the ongoing headscarf controversy. The incident led the state prosecutor to inauguratea closure case against Virtue, accusing the party of serving as a focus of anti-secularactivity and for remainingan extension of the banned Welfare Party.42 While the extended proceedingsat the ConstitutionalCourttook place, Virtue worked hard to shore up its moderateimage. In November 1999 the party sent a public relations mission to the USA and tried to push forward dramatic proposals in parliamentintended to help Turkey fulfil the Copenhagencriteria for entranceinto the EuropeanUnion. Virtue's policy proposalsincluded ending military dominance of the National Security Council, increased provisions for freedom of expression, and changes to electoral and detention laws. Conveniently, all of these proposed changes were also self-serving, reflecting the conclusion that Virtue's survival was dependent on expanded democracy in Turkey. Virtue had recruited a number of centre-rightconservatives without backgroundsin Welfare in an effort to demonstratethat it was indeed a new party. Additionally, three female intellectuals were invited onto the party's governing board, a move that would have been foreign to the Welfare Party.43 Early in 2000, as new revelationsaboutmilitantHizbullahassassinationsflooded the media, Kutan worked to distance Virtue completely from the militant group by accusing the military of negligence in not taking forceful action against Hizbullah. Ironically, these accusations provoked the military to make its own statementsagainst Virtue, accusing it of being a mere continuationof Welfare and a threat to the secular republic. While it was facing pressure from both the military and the Constitutional Court,the split within the partywas ever widening. In protest against Erbakan's personal influence, five key reformistsresigned from leadershippositions. The 348

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reformist challenge came to a head in the Virtue Party congress of May 2000. A group of reformers,led by AbdullahGill, openly challenged Kutanfor control of the party.While Erbakanhad arguedthat the party's electoral disappointment was a result of its increasedmoderationand compromisewith the establishment, Gul and Erdoganmade the opposite case. They asserted that Erbakan'sstyle of leadershipwas increasinglyout of touch with the Turkishelectorate, and argued political group with internal that Virtue should redefine itself as a contemporary party democracy and European-stylesensitivities. In the conference's balloting for party leadership,Kutan managed to retain control of the party, but with an unconvincing margin of 633 delegates to Gill's 521. The success of the reformists sent a clear message to Erbakan,who now saw them as a real threat to the party. As the ConstitutionalCourt's deliberationsover party closure reached their final stages, actors from all sides appeared to want the party closed. For the secularists, Virtue remaineda haven for religious zealots that must be closed to reduce the Islamists' influence. Otherpartieswanted Virtue's closure in the hope that they could recruit deputies from its ranks. The Virtue Party itself even appearedto be satisfied with closure, as it would allow the divergent tendencies within the party a chance to finally break from each other.44 With the chief prosecutor demanding that all Virtue's 102 deputies be expelled from parliament, the closure case created a climate of political uncertainty.In June 2001, the court finally ruled against Virtue, absolving it of the charge that it was a continuationof the Welfare Party, but closing it because it was deemed a focal point for Islamic militancy. The Courtrejectedthe prosecutor'sdemandto expel all Virtue deputies from parliament, leaving the vast majority to remain as independents,but banned five Virtue members from political life for five years. The official closure was all that was needed to formalise the party's split. The reformist grouping under Gill had actually been working for over a year on the outline for a new party. Erbakanloyalists, however, were the first to inaugurate a new party, under a new name chosen by Erbakanhimself, the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-sp). The new name was meant to signify the state of blissful happiness that comes from spiritualself-realisation (and alternativelytranslated as 'happiness' or 'contentment'). The party's application was submitted on a Friday (the Islamic holy day), echoing its religious roots. Although Erbakan remained banned from politics, the party was designed as a vehicle for his re-entryand sought something of a returnto the earlier successes of Welfare as a social and political movement. One month later, in August 2001, the reformist wing unveiled their new party, the Justice and Development (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP).45 The AK Party, as it came to be known, echoed the meanings of the Turkishword 'ak', which signifies both 'white' and 'clean'. The intendedimplicationof such a name was that the AK Partymust be untaintedby the corruptionof the past, a clean slate. Having served his prison term and with a recent court ruling allowing him to again participatein party politics, Tayyip Erdogan took the helm of the new party, hoping to benefit from his reputation as the honest mayor of Istanbul on the national stage.46 The development and fall of Virtue yields two significant lessons in why political Islam in Turkeyhas changed. First, the story of Virtue is a story of how 349

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institutionalconstraintsalter the strategiccalculus of Islamist leaders. The 1998 National Security Council demands on Erbakan,which led to the dissolution of Welfare and the formationof Virtue, provided an imposing referencefor Virtue leaders in their attemptsto reframethe movement as one within the acceptable boundariesof the political system. Three particularconstraintshelped to mould Virtue's political position: the possibility of militaryintervention,a fear of legal closure by the courts, and the need to maintain and expand their electoral constituency. Virtue's increasingly tight control over more radical elements within the party, including the expulsion of members deemed rhetoricalliabilities, was motivatedby a fear of militaryand judicial intervention.Likewise, the creation of a new democraticrhetoricand the formulationof policies to expand democratic rights were produced in an effort to maintain their position in the existing system. These changes only occurred,however, because Virtue leaders believed that there was a reward for this behaviour, ie a promise of obtaining power through participationin elections. Constraintsalone did not change the movement's behaviour, but constraintswithin a context of democraticrewards did. A second lesson may be derived by examining the sources of Virtue's split into two parties. The institutional sources of the split are likewise a set of constraints within a context of democratic rewards. Judicial and military constraintson Virtue led to two divergentstrategiesover time, embodiedin different segments of the party. For the Erbakanloyalists, Virtue's greatest assets were those that made it (at least in popular appeal) anti-systemic. These assets included, foremost, its image as the party of Islamic activists. The reformist wing, on the other hand, saw this image as a potential liability that would keep them out of power. While acknowledgingthe importanceof religion as personal belief, they moved increasingly to accommodatethemselves within the secular constitutionalframework.Although institutionalconstraintscreated the climate in which strategic splits developed, it was the democratic framework that providedthe incentives for the reformiststo make the split from the traditionalist leadership.Erbakancould be challenged from within the party with the knowledge that electoral rewards could be found outside Virtue, if necessary. The electoral disappointmentof 1999, and the divergentinterpretations this result of within the party, served as an important catalyst for reformists to seek a constituency beyond Erbakan'sinfluence. A promise of 'continual light' Upon the creation of the two new parties, it was not initially clear to observers which one would gain ascendance over time.47Many, in fact, thought that the deputies split would destroy the movementas a whole. The Virtueparliamentary divided their allegiance between the two parties. Over time, however, it became apparent that the AK Party was building considerable momentum. Although many distrusted the AK Party's claims to be a new movement, given that its leadership was composed largely of former Welfare and Virtue politicians, it immediately began to set a distinctive tone. The party emblem symbolised this by departing from variations on the crescent moon logo that was common to 350

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Welfare, Virtue and now the Felicity Party. The AK Party's logo was simply a shining light-bulb with the slogan 'continual light' (siirekli aydinlik).48 The AK Party emerged with a formidable organisation, developed through contact with former Virtue leaders as well as notable politicians from centreright parties.Early defections to the AK Partyfrom such right-wingparties as the National Action (MHP), True Path (DYP), and Motherland(ANAP) parties served as an indication that politicians in the know were taking it seriously. The organisationwas built with an extensive grassroots component, modelled after the organisationalsuccesses of Welfare, and with a focus on municipalities and neighbourhoods.A fundamentaltenet of the party was internalparty democracy, a legacy of the reformists' reactions to Erbakan'spersonalistic leadership style. This was to be guaranteedby primaryelections for the party list, transparency in decision making, and extensive debate on policy-formulationissues. As one of the most popular and charismatic politicians in Turkey, Erdogan took leadership of the party, with checks on his leadership to come from the governing board. The AK Party's agenda was populist in style, with relatively few concrete policy recommendationsinitially. Erdogan described himself as a 'man of the middle path' and indicatedthat the AKP would work to serve as a bridge between traditionaland modernisingTurkey.The party was to represent'citizen Osman', the average Turk who was strugglingto make it in the modern world. The party made it clear early on that it would support a market economy and push for Turkey's admission into the European Union. It pledged to respect religious belief and supportmoral values, but within the context of a secular state (and in between references to Atatuirk).For the AKP, true secularism meant no state interference in religious practice, and thus it pledged to resolve the issue of restrictionson headscarves.In the AK Party's vision, religion remainedthe most important human institution, creating a natural moral and social order, but religious institutions could best be maintained in a climate of 'religious freedom'. The party's role was to fight injustice and inequity exacerbated by the endemic corruptionwithin the Turkish system. In many respects, the Felicity Party articulatedthe same agenda. Over time, however, differences from the AKP in tone and substancebecame apparent.Recai Kutan retained leadership of the Felicity Party, leading it to maintain much of the rhetoricof the defunct Virtue Party. Felicity was foremost a party to protect religious and naturalhumanrights, to serve victims of the Turkisheconomy, and to support nationalistic, emotive and moral values in society. Although a few progressive members of Virtue stayed on with the Felicity Party because of personalloyalties, the partywas markedby its older generationof leadershipand retained the more religiously conservative of Virtue's deputies. Members of Felicity felt that they carried the true banner of religious and social change in Turkey, and gradually moved to distinguish themselves from the AK Party by using more anti-West and anti-governmentrhetoric and by opposing the largescale structuraladjustmentreforms supportedby the populareconomy minister, Kemal Dervi,.49 As it became apparentin opinion polls that Erdoganwas becoming the most significant threat to the existing political establishment, Felicity attractedless 351

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attentionfrom the media, while the AK Partywas actively followed. Accusations continued to mount that the party was in the pocket of the various Islamic brotherhoods,that it was a gang of fundamentalistsaiming to create an Islamic state, or that it was fundamentallycorrupt.Althoughconstitutionalchanges were passed that made it more difficultfor the judiciaryto close political parties,50 the state prosecutor applied to the ConstitutionalCourt to force the AK Party to remove Erdoganfrom its list of founding membersand to bar him from running for parliament.The case against Erdoganeventually proved successful; and the ConstitutionalCourt issued a warning to the AKP, requiring Erdogan to step down from the Party's list of founding membersby October 2002. The issue of whether he could lead a political party without being a founding member was left open.5' A furthercourt case was filed against Erdogan,assertingthat he had misused public funds as mayor of Istanbulby grantingcontracts to companies with Islamic ties. He subsequentlyresigned as a founding member of the AK Party, but determined to lead the party despite the ban on his election to parliament. The AK Party strategicallydecided to distance itself from the Felicity Party, with the aim of picking up whatever votes it might lose to Felicity from centre-rightvoters who did not vote for Virtue in the previous election. The two parties recognised their ideological affinity, but Felicity also recognised the AK Party as a real threat to its survival. Within the Felicity Party, many members viewed the break by Erdoganand Gill as a selfish act, borderingon treason to the movement. In autumn2001, when constitutionalreforms were introducedin parliamentthat would have lifted Erdogan'sban from politics, Felicity deputies voted down the amendmentin secret balloting. Additionally,before elections in November 2002, Felicity worked to discourage voters from the AK Party by arguing that Erdogan was not competent to lead Turkey. In the process, they conveniently omitted to mention that Felicity's leaders had chosen Erdoganfor the Istanbul mayor's position in 1994 and had boasted of his success in that position repeatedly. Felicity circles felt that the reformists' integrity had been compromised by weakening their ideological convictions for the promise of
power.52

The elections of 3 November 2002 dramaticallyconfirmed the AK Party's hegemony, proving a bitter defeat for Felicity. Kutan, who had led Virtue to a moderate 15.4% showing in 1999, saw his partycrushed,with 2.5% of the vote. The AK Party,on the other hand, dominatedthe elections by capturingover 34% of the vote and almost two-thirds of the seats in parliament. The AK Party received substantivereturnsthroughoutTurkey,bringing in votes from secularminded areas in the Western half of the country that had shunnedWelfare and Virtue.Felicity, on the otherhand,received paltryreturnsthroughout most of the country, demonstratingthat the vast majority of Welfare and Virtue supporters nationwide had opted for the AK Party. Traditionalcentre-rightparties such as True Path and Motherlandalso had poor showings, failing to breachthe electoral thresholdfor seats in parliament.S3 These results demonstrated that AKP had very notable success in its stated ambitionto become the addressfor the centre-right in Turkey despite its reformist platform. What explains this dramatic shift in balance between the two wings of the 352

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Islamist movement in little more than one year? Three general reasons are here posited. First, Felicity's association with Erbakan,and the continuationof Kutan as party leader, sent a signal that Felicity was a direct successor to Erbakan's conservative religious movement. This carried the important connotation that Felicity was the successor to previously bannedparties,and thus a partythat was unacceptable to secular forces in the political establishment. As the AK Party appearedto have a greaterchance of maintainingits legality, voters searchingfor an Islamically-mindedalternativeto the government strategically opted for the AKP, believing it had a greater chance of becoming an important player. Likewise, strategic voters recognised that the movement's split put more pressure on individual parties within the movement to pass the 10% threshold, so choosing one party as a focal point appeareda sensible strategic response. Second, large sections of the electoratewho had previously voted for Welfare and Virtue did not do so out of a particularconviction that Islam should be politicised. Many, if not most, of the voters for these parties were sympathetic to Islamic issues but voted for Erbakan'smovement as an act of protest against These components of the 'Islamist electorthe existing political establishment.54 ate', therefore,were not bound by a particularideological loyalty and were able to shift their voting behaviour to what they perceived was the most effective 'protest party'. Erdogan's populist flair and 'language of the people' set him apartas one who could shake up the way that business was done in Ankarawhile still playing by the constitutional rules of the game.55The need for political protest was particularlyacute in 2002, as the country continued to endure its most significantrecession since World War II. The public blamed a considerable portion of Turkey's economic woes during this period on governmentmismanagement, political deadlock and corruption. The third, and most important,reason for the AKParty's dramaticsuccess and Felicity's concomitantfailure, was a series of strategicdecisions by partyleaders to moderate their message and image in an attempt to appeal to the more secular-minded centre-right. The AK Party demonstrated its commitment to religious moderationin a variety of ways. Its political rhetoric, while directly challenging the status quo on a wide range of issues, carefully avoided references that could brand it as a religious party in court. In policy it spoke about Turkey's hope of enteringthe EuropeanUnion to a degree none of its predecessors had done, while maintaining an active publicity campaign in support of Palestine. It also recruiteda significantnumberof women as potential deputies, none of whom wore headscarves, avoiding the potential trouble that led Virtue into legal controversy. Perhaps most convincingly, it actively recruited leadership from outside the Welfare-Virtue movement with the promise that they would unify the centre-rightand avoid controversialreligious policies. The party at thus moderateditself throughrecruitment the highest levels, raising the spectre of party dissolution if it reneged on these centrist commitments. I argue that the party strategicallymoved toward the centre for two reasons. First, institutionalconstraintswere ever present, much as they had been for the party's predecessors. The threat of several court cases against Erdogan, in motivatedthe partyconstantlyto signal its constitutionalacceptability particular, at the same time that it was calling for dramaticchange. The party also refrained 353

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from challenging the militaryas Kutanhad done, hoping to avoid providing any pretext for a confrontation. Second, the party was motivated by democratic incentives, recognising that the majority of Turks had consistently voted for centristparties. AKP leaders recognised that, if they could strike the fine balance between behaving like a religious protest party and brandishingsecular credentials, their potential constituency greatly expanded. In the end, this strategy proved successful on both counts. The AK Party's moderation was a direct response both to horizontal constraintsand democratic incentives in a moderately religious society. The AK Party's victory has dramaticallyalteredpolitical Islam in Turkey. As the party's programmehas unfolded duringits first year in office, it has become apparenteven to the party's fiercest critics that its agenda is much broaderthan one of renewing Turkey's moral character.The AK Party has clearly recognised that its policy positions are under close scrutiny for any threat to Turkish secularism and has been cautious in this regard.During the 2002 campaign, the party effectively built constraints into its own potential to use religion as a political tool by dramatisingpromises to uphold the secular system in public forums throughoutTurkey. This has raised its costs of politicising Islam while in power, as it could potentially lose much of its constituency in the next elections. More importantly,by recruitingleadershipfrom secular-mindedcentrist elites, its commitment not to politicise Islam becomes self-enforcing. Attemptsto do so could lead to partydissolutionand the loss of its parliamentary majority. The dramatic Turkish parliamentarydebate in February and March 2003 over allowing US militarypersonnelto use the countryfor a possible attack on Iraq demonstratedboth how pragmaticallyAK Party leaders approachedthe volatile issue, choosing to supportUS plans after intense negotiations, but also exposed lingering divisions between pragmatistsat the helm and partymoralists. After enteringparliament,the AK Partynominatedone of its West-leaningand liberal-minded leaders, Abdullah Gill, to the post of prime minister (given Erdogan's ongoing political ban). Erdogan subsequently assumed the post of prime minister after parliamentratified legal changes allowing him to compete in parliamentaryby-elections in March 2003. Giil's initial nomination sent a signal that the AKP was serious about its departurefrom Erbakan's political tradition.The party's early government agenda included economic reforms (a combinationof subsidies for the poor and increased privatisation),counter-corruptionmeasures,educationalreformsand promotionof Turkey's bid to join the EuropeanUnion.56Almost immediately,Erdoganset off on a tour of European capitals to make Turkey's case and further consolidate his moderate image. Dramatic and controversialreforms passed by the AK Party governmentin July 2003 furthermoved Turkey into accordancewith EU statutes by placing legal restrictions on military intervention in politics and offering a conditional amnesty to a portion of those affiliated with the long-standing conflict over Kurdish autonomy. It is significantthat moderatingchanges in Turkey'spolitical Islam movement took place over a series of parties and over an extensive period of political learning. What eventually emerged as the moderate-lookingAK Party was the result of many years of strategic responses to horizontal (ie judicial, military) 354

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constraints on the movement's political behaviour and democratic experimentation by the party's leaders in attempts to gain power. Both constraints and democraticincentives provided opportunitiesfor elements in the Virtue Party to be entrepreneurial their leadership choices. This political learning could not in have occurred without political space in which Turkey's Islamic movement could experiment with political strategies, believing that these strategies might eventually pay off in the political arena. In this process robust horizontal constraintsplayed a significant role in dictating the range of possible strategic choices available, motivating many of the changes that took place. The Turkish case provides rich empirical material for theorising about the sources of Islamist moderationmore broadly.Although the extent of democracy found in Turkeyis rarein the broaderMuslim world, many Muslim countriesare experiencing new levels of political opportunity.These opportunitiesgenerate some degree of strategicpolitical space within frameworksthat place significant may generate political constraintson the extent to which political entrepreneurs of change. The transformation Turkishpolitical Islam is reflected in the strategic moderationtaking place among some Islamists in other countries of the Muslim world, including Egypt, Jordan and Morocco.s7 Compared with the recent Turkishexperience, however, Islamists throughoutthe Arab world face stronger institutionalconstraintson their ability to obtain significantpolitical power. The of transformation Turkishpolitical Islam suggests that moderationin other states may be more likely to continue in contexts of bounded, but significant, possibilities of political reward.

Notes
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Note that the Turkishelectoral system has a 10%electoral threshold,requiringthat political partiesreceive 10% of the national vote in order to win any seats in the parliament. The governing coalition before the elections consisted of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol and the National Action Party (Milli Partisi-DsP), the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) Hareket,i Partisi-MHP). None of these parties received over 10% in the November election, which would qualify them for parliamentaryseats. Because only one other party (CHP) broke the 10% electoral threshold (baraj), the AK Party's 34% of the vote translates into roughly 65% of the parliamentaryseats. State Instituteof Statistics,Milletvekili Genel Secimi Sonu,larn18.04.1999 (Results of the GeneralElection of Representatives 18/4/1999), Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 2001. These issues are discussed at length in R Quinn Mecham, 'Fromthe sacredto the state: institutionalorigins of Islamist electoral mobilization in Turkey', unpublished manuscript. The National Salvation Party won 11.8% of the vote at its debut in the national elections of 1973, an amount high enough to surprise many observers. The party's national support dropped slightly to 8.7% in in the nationalelections of 1977. It participated a series of three coalition governments,courted because its seats held the key to a majority coalition. The party's supportersincluded a considerable segment of small businessmen from Central Anatolia and recent urban immigrants from the countryside. MY Geyikdagi, Political Parties in Turkey: The Role of Islam, New York: Praeger, 1984. See also Binnaz Toprak, 'Politicisation of Islam in a secular state: the National Salvation Party in Turkey', in Said Amir Arjomand (ed), From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, London: Macmillan, 1984; Ali Y Saribay, Turkiye'de Modernele,smeDin ve Parti Politikasi: Milli Selamet Partisi Ornekolayz, Istanbul: Alan Yayinlarz,1985; and Sencer Ayata, 'The rise of Islamic fundamentalismand its institutionalframework', in Atila Eralp, MuharramTunay & Birol Ye,ilada, The Political and Socioeconomic Transformationof Turkey,Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993.

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7

9
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26 27 28 29 30 31 32

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Gulalp argues that the National Salvation Party and Welfare Party shared the distinctive characteristic of articulatingthe need for a spiritual order (manevi duizen)in society that defined both parties as the Islamic choice. However, differences between the parties include a shift in economic policy from state to private initiative, separate constituencies (from conservative religious orders to middle class professionals and marginal urban workers), and a move to incorporatesome of the equality ideology of the left. Haldun Guilalp,'Political Islam in Turkey: the rise and fall of the Refah Party', Muslim World, 99 (1), pp 24-36. Welfare took 7.2% of the vote, which disqualifiedit for seats under the 10% electoral threshold rule of the new constitution. The subsequentfour elections were: 26 March 1989 (Local), 20 October 1991 (National), 27 March 1994 (Local), 24 December 1995 (National). National Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi-MHP) In coalition with a centre-rightsecularist party, the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi- DYP), led by a former pnme minister, Tansu filler. An extensive discussion of the TurkishorganisationHizbullahis found in Ru,en (akir, Derin Hizbullah: Islamc &iddetinGelecegi, Istanbul: Metis Yayinlan, 2001. The second most prominent of the radical violent Islamist organisationsin Turkey is a group known as the Islamic Front of Fighters of the Great East (IBDA-C). See also Marvine Howe, TurkeyToday:A Nation Divided over Islam's Revival, Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000. The 'nationalviewpoint' vision was also a componentof National Salvation Partyideology and articulated in Necmettin Erbakan,Milli Gort4, Istanbul:Dergah Yaymlarn,1975. In the early years of Welfare, the party distinguisheditself rhetoricallyby arguing that there were only two parties in Turkey:Welfare, and all those who unite in 'aping' the West. A comparative discussion of many of these themes is found in Gulalp, 'Political Islam in Turkey'. See Ergun Ozbudun, ContemporaryTurkishPolitics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000. These committees were modelled on the Muslim rosary (tesbih), with 33 membersparallelingthe 33 beads of the rosary. Each district likewise had a party committee of 33 members. M Hakan Yavuz, 'Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey', ComparativePolitics, 30 (1), 1997, pp 76-77. See ibid. In 1994 Welfare captured over 200 municipalities across Turkey. This victory was extended to 325 municipalities by 1998. For an assessment of Welfare's municipal performance see Ugur Akinci, 'Municipal radicalism of political Islam in Turkey', Middle East Journal, 53 (1), 1999, pp 76-91. A discussion of these issues is found in Howe, Turkey Today. In November 1996 a car crash in the village of Susurluk revealed high-level connections between the True Path Party, organised crime and senior police officers. InteriorMinister Mehmet Agar's apparent knowledge and approval of the connections with organised crime led to his resignation. In the process of investigating what became known as the 'Susuluk affair', Welfare introducedlegislation which would limit the media's scrutinyof goverumentaffairs, helped maintainMehmet Agar's parliamentary immunity, and arguedthat ?iller did not need to defend her affairs in front of the Supreme Council. Howe, Turkey Today. A political rally, led by the Welfare mayor of Sincan (outside Ankara),particularly disturbedthe military. The Iranianambassador,who served as a prominentspeakerat the rally, condemnedTurkey's new military alliance with Israel, and encourageda crowd of radical participantsin its denunciationof Israeli policies. The mayor of Sincan also suggested the possible restorationof Islamic law in Turkey as the crowd waved Islamic symbols and chanted religious slogans. Furtherdiscussion of what came to be known as the 28 Februaryprocess can be found in Huli Cevizoglu, 28 3ubat: Bir Huikuimet Nasil Devrildi, Istanbul:Beyaz Yayinlarn,1998; Howe, TurkeyToday; and Ali Bayramoglu, 28 Subat:Bir Mudahalenin Giincesi, Istanbul: Birey Yayinlan, 2001. CourtChief Justice (and later President)Ahmet Necdet Sezer, quoted in TurkishProbe, 25 January1998. See also Y Akdogan, Siyasal Islam: Regah Partisi'nin Anatomisi, Istanbul: Uehir Yayinlarn,p 322ff. 9 Cumhuriyet, December 1997. This would constitute a violation of the TurkishPenal Code, Article 312. Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 9 December 1997. Including the formal founder of the Virtue Party, and long-time Erbakan associate, Ismail Alptekin. Sabah, 23 September 1996. Zulfikar Dogan, Milliyet, 23 September 1996. See Emel Aktug, 'Welfare Party's latest situation', TurkishDaily News, 23 May 1997. Ilnur ;evik, 'What label should we put on our system?', TurkishDaily News, 23 December 1998. As quoted in Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 8 July 1998. Milliyet, 14 July 1996. See Serdar Ergin, Hurriyet, 12 July 1998.

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35 36 37

38 3

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47 48 49

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Erdogan served a reduced sentence from the original 10-month term demanded in the conviction by the Diyarbakir State Security Court. Kemal Bal,i, 'FP unable to rid itself of Erbakan's specter', TurkishDaily News, 11 March 1999. Although Virtue's supporthad apparentlydeclined somewhat, an alternativetheory suggested that Erbakan was actually worried that Virtue could exceed the 21% garneredby Welfare in 1995, in the absence of his leadership.Subsequentreports after the election alleged that Erbakanwas pleased that Virtue did not perform as well as Welfare had done under his charismaticleadership. Ilnur Cevik, 'The new struggle within the Virtue Party', TurkishDaily News, 27 April 1999. Ilnur Cevik, 'Virtue Party may face credibility problem', TurkishDaily News, 23 March 1999. Abdullah Gill of Virtue's reformist wing argues that the drop in votes was primary the result of the self-interestedstrategyof Erbakanloyalists in pushing to postpone the elections. Author's interview, April 2002. The new governmentwas led by BuilentEcevit of the DemocraticLeft Party(DemokratikSol Partisi-DSP), in coalition with the centre-rightMotherlandParty (AnavatanPartisi-ANAP) and the right-wing nationalist National Action Party (Milli Hareket Partisi). Kavakciwas later accused of no longer being a Turkishcitizen because of a priormarriageto an American, and thus ineligible for her seat. She was also accused of inciting religious hatred; in an earlier speech in Chicago she had spoken of a personal 'jihad'. Kavak,i later remarrieda Turkish citizen, receiving her Turkish citizenship again, but was banned from politics for five years in the decision on Virtue's closure. In the indictment by state prosecutorVural Sava,, members of Virtue were described as 'provocateurs' and 'blood-sucking vampires'. The presence of women in leadership positions helped to moderate the party's image. Oya Akgonenc, for example, asserted that she never felt pressure from other party leaders to wear a headscarf, and actively sought to portraythe party as simply a centre-right,conservative party. Author's interview, May 2002. See Mehmet Ali Birand, 'Everyonewants the Virtue Party closed down!', TurkishDaily News, 27 October 2000. A third centristreligious party was also in the works, to be led by former Virtue mayor of Ankara,Melih Gok,ek. In July 2000 the ConstitutionalCourt ruled that Erdogan could legally head a political party, although the legality of him holding any subsequent political office because of his prior conviction remained in doubt. For initial reaction see Mete Belovacikli, 'New shape of opposition', TurkishDaily News, 25 June 2001. Some have claimed that the internalwires in the design resemble a Qur'anstand, thus reflecting the party's religious roots. Milliyet, 15 August 2001. During the early stages of the American-led attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, Kutan markedhimself as more anti-Americanthan Erdogan.Although the AK Party publicly expressed concerns over Afghan civilian casualties and foreign intervention in the conflict, Felicity openly questioned the legitimacy of the intervention.The party also supportedaggressive anti-Israelirallies in Istanbulin spring 2002. The court was now required to examine how central any anti-constitutionalbehaviour was to the party organisation, rather than closing it because of the actions of a few not directly implicated in party leadership.Provisions were also createdthat made it possible to give a partya judicial warning and remove government financial assistance without full party closure, if the court deemed it necessary. Author's interview with Chief Justice of the Turkish ConstitutionalCourt, Ha?im Kiliq, June 2002. Author's interviews with Felicity deputies Oya Akgonenq, Ali Oguz, Temel Karamollaoglu, and party employee Ismail Akkiraz, June 2002. Akkiraz highlighted Felicity's spiritual (manevi) base in contrast to the AK Party's increasingly 'materialist' (maddeci) perspective. DYP won 9.5% and ANAP won 5% of the vote. Data to support this argumentis presented in Ali larkoglu & Binnaz Toprak, Turkiye'deDin, Toplum ve Siyaset, Istanbul: TuirkiyeEkonomik ve Sosyal Etudler Yaymlari, 2000. Assessments of Erdogan'sbackgroundand populist appeal are provided in Ru?en 4akir & Fehmi lalmuk, Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Bir Donusum Oykiisii, Istanbul: Metis Yayinlan, 2001; Turan Yllmaz, Tayyip: Kaslmpafa'dan Siyasetin On Saflarina, Ankara:Umit Yayincilik, 2001; and MuhammedPamuk, Yasakll Umut: Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Birey Yayincilik, 2001. The AK Party's first decision was to prevent new deputies from moving into state residences provided for that purpose. These residences are to be sold, leaving the deputies to find their own housing. Official car privileges were also sharplycurtailed,the numberof official guardswas cut, and the numberof cabinet seats was cut from 38 to 23, all in an announced effort to reduce government expenditures. Strategic moderationin these countries is occurring within the context of splits between accommodative and militant Islamist groups. Islamist divisions between al-Wasat and the Muslim Brotherhoodin Egypt

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R QUINN MECHAM are discussed in Anthony Shadid, Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats and the New Politics of Islam, Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001. The division between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi movement in Jordanis assessed in QuintanWiktorowicz, The Manaagementof Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood,and State Power in Jordan, New York: University of New York Press, 2001. For a comparisonof the dual Islamist movement in Morocco see Quinn Mecham, 'Political liberalization and the future of Islamic movements in Morocco', CSIS Briefing Notes on Islam, Society, and Politics, 3 (2), Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies, 2000.

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