GROUP ONE JANUARY 2007 LABOR-RELATED CASES

Members: Astronomo, Rubierose Malbas, Jel Panzo, Jimmy Rose Pascua, Dominique Quejano, Paolo Dominique Ramil, Maricel Ulibas, Maria Karen Rizza

Amkor Technology Philippines, Inc. vs. Juangco G.R. No. 166507; January 23, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner-company saw the need to reduce its existing manpower complement. Several meetings were held among its officers and department heads to discuss actions to be taken to implement the same. Sometime in October, 2001, petitionercompany convened its key officers and department heads, including respondent, to finally decide whether to implement a voluntary retirement/voluntary separation program or a retrenchment program. During the meeting, respondent expressed her interest and volunteered to personally participate in the downsizing program of the companys personnel. To formalize her decision to retire from the company, respondent submitted an undated letter signifying her intention to avail of the Voluntary Retirement Program of the company, effective 15 November 2001. On November 22, 2001, pursuant to her proposition, respondent received her voluntary retirement package in the amount of Three Million Seven Hundred Four Thousand Five Hundred Seventeen Pesos and 98/100 (P3,704,517.98) inclusive of an additional two (2) months pay. Respondent signed a Receipt and Release Waiver and Quitclaim on the same date. Respondent denied the due execution of her Release Quitclaim and Waiver, alleging that she signed the same under duress and intimidation. She claimed that she was threatened that she will receive nothing if she will not sign it. With the prospect of receiving nothing, she consented to sign the waiver. Petitioners maintain that respondents resignation was voluntary, perforce, there could be no illegal dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent voluntarily retired from her position as Executive Director in petitioner-company.

HELD: There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled to give his consent by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants. A re-examination of the records of the case convinced us that respondent was not coerced or intimidated into signing her retirement letter. The voluntariness of her

retirement is attested and confirmed by top ranking officials of petitioner-company then present during the meeting in October 2001. She failed to present evidence to contradict their statements. Respondent is a well-educated woman holding a managerial position. It is highly improbable that with her employment stature and educational attainment, she could have been duped into signing a retirement letter against her will. In signifying her intention to retire, she even made a proposition as to the amount she believed she was entitled to. Being a woman of high educational attainment and qualifications, she is expected to know the import of everything she executes. Having been granted a retirement package which is very much higher than the amount being received by an employee terminated for an authorized cause under Article 283 or one who retires under Article 287 of the Labor Code, we are not swayed by her argument that she was intimidated or coerced in signing her retirement letter. Indeed, it is safe to conclude that such retirement package was the reason why she opted to retire. Respondent received her retrenchment backwage a week after she submitted her resignation paper. She had ample time to mull over what courses of action to take if indeed she was illegally dismissed. Instead, she returned to the company to sign the Receipt and Release Waiver and Quit Claim and to receive her retirement package. Thereafter, she looked for employment in other companies. She filed her complaint for illegal dismissal only on April 25, 2002, or after almost six (6) months from her separation from petitionercompany. It is thus clear that the filing of the complaint was merely an afterthought when she failed to find another employment. If indeed she was made to resign against her will, she should not have allowed a considerable length of time to elapse before enforcing her rights allegedly violated. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be expected that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED and Decision dated September 27, 2006 is RECONSIDERED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals finding that petitioner coerced respondent to retire is REVERSED.

People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Jamilosa

G.R. No. 169076 ; January 23, 2007

FACTS: Witness Imelda D. Bamba testified that she met the appellant in Cubao, Quezon City on board an aircon bus. The appellant introduced himself as a recruiter of workers for employment abroad and could help her get employed as a nurse. Thereafter the appellant fetched her at her office. They then went to her house where she gave him the photocopies or her transcript or records, diploma, PRC license and other credentials. She also handed the appellant the amount of 300 US Dollars and the latter showed her a photocopy of her supposed US visa The appellant likewise got several pieces of jewelry which she was then selling and assured her that he would sell the same at the US embassy. However, the appellant did not issue a receipt for the said money and jewelry. Thereafter, the appellant told her to resign from her work at SM because she was booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for Los Angeles, California, USA. The appellant promised to see her and some of his other recruits before their scheduled departure to hand to them their visas and passports however the appellant failed to show up. They went to the supposed residence of the appellant but nobody knew him or his whereabouts. They also inquired from the US embassy and found out that there was no such person connected with the said office. Thus, she decided to file a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Prosecution witness Geraldine Lagman for her part testified that she is a registered nurse by profession. That she went to SM North EDSA to visit her cousin Imelda Bamba. At that time, Bamba informed her that she was going to meet appellant who was willing to help nurses find a job abroad. The appellant convinced them of his ability to send them abroad. The appellant asked for US$300.00 as payment to secure an American visa and an additional amount of Three Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P3,400.00) as processing fee for other documents. Four days after their last meeting, Extelcom, a telephone company, called her because her number was appearing in the appellants cellphone documents. The caller asked if she knew him because they were trying to locate him, as he was a swindler who failed to pay his telephone bills in the amount of P100,000.00. The appellant never showed up, prompting her to file a complaint with the NBI for illegal recruitment. Lastly, witness Alma Singh who is also a registered nurse, declared that she met appellant when Imelda Bamba introduced the latter to her. The appellant told her that he is an undercover agent of the FBI and he could fix her US visa as he has a contact in the US embassy. She gave the appellant the amount of 300 US Dollars and a bottle of cognac as grease money to facilitate the processing of her visa. Thereafter the appellant avoided her which prompted her to file a complaint. The appellant on his part claims that he did not recruit the complainants for work abroad but it was they who sought his advice and that there was no money involved.

The Trial Court found the accused guilty of Illegal Recruitment large scale. However, the appellant alleged that the Trial Court erred in convicting him, according to him the information charging him with illegal recruitment specifically mentioned the phrase for a fee and as such, receipt to show proof of payment is indispensable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the appellant of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale.

HELD: No. Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines illegal recruitment as any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or document signed by appellant where he acknowledged to have received money and liquor does not free him from criminal liability. Even in the absence of money or other valuables given as a consideration for the services of appellant the latter is considered as being engaged in recruitment activities. It can be gleaned from the language of Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code that the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment. In light of all the foregoing, the appeal is dismissed. The conviction of Joseph Jamilosa for Illegal Recruitment large scale is affirmed.

AMA Computer College Inc. vs. Zenaida Garay GR. No. 162468; January 23, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner AMA Computer College (AMACC) hired respondent Garay as a computer instructor in 1994 and was subsequently promoted as the principal of the High School department in 1996. On the month of May of the same year an incident occurred that led to the termination of Garay on July 1. The incident involved the disappearance of a brown envelope containing P47299.34 which was left in the comfort room by Sarah Perchado (the AMACC cashier). According to Perchado she recalled that the only person entering the comfort room after her was Garay. The incident prompted an investigation of Garay which even led to a preventive suspension prior to her termination for the ground of loss of confidence. Before her termination, the petitioners served Garay with several notices enjoining her to appear before hearings but such hearings were always canceled despite the respondents compliance. Upon being dismissed Garay filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and prayed to be reinstated with payment of backwages. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Garay. On appeal the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Bring denied by the Court of Appeals when they sought redress, the petitioners now come before the Court.

ISSUE: Whether of not the petitioners had the right to terminate the respondent on the ground of loss of trust and was able to prove such during the proceedings in the lower courts.

HELD: The SC rules against the petitioners. The Labor Arbiter and NLRC clearly state the grounds for their rulings. The labor arbiter found that there was no material evidence to show that Garay took the collections. The NLRC too came to the same conclusion, further noting that when the investigation of Garay showed that she was not guilty she was then charged of having refused to extend her utmost cooperation in the investigation, resulting in the loss of trust and confidence vested on her by the petitioners.

Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that factual findings of quasijudicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court. It is further emphasized that to be a valid ground for dismissal, loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion; otherwise the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer.

John F. McLeod vs. National Labor Relations Commission

G.R. No. 146667; January 23, 2007 FACTS: Complainant alleged that he is an expert in textile manufacturing process; that as early as 1956 he was hired as the Assistant Spinning Manager of Universal Textiles, Inc. (UTEX); that he was promoted to Senior Manager and worked for UTEX till 1980 under its President, respondent Patricio Lim; that in 1978 Patricio Lim formed Peggy Mills, Inc. with respondent Filsyn having controlling interest; that complainant was absorbed by Peggy Mills as its Vice President and Plant Manager of the plant at Sta. Rosa, Laguna; that at the time of his retirement complainant was receiving P60,000.00 monthly with vacation and sick leave benefits. When PMIs rank-and-file employees staged a strike on 19 August 1989 to July 1992, PMI incurred serious business losses. This prompted PMI to stop permanently plant operations and to send a notice of closure to the Department of Labor and Employment on 21 July 1992. PMI informed its employees, including McLeod, of the closure. PMI paid its employees, including managerial employees, except McLeod, their unpaid wages, sick leave, vacation leave, prorated 13th month pay, and separation pay. Under the compromise agreement between PMI and its employees, the employer-employee relationship between them ended on 25 November 1992. Records also disclose that PMI extended McLeods service up to 31 December 1992 to wind up some affairs of the company. John F. McLeod then filed a complaint for retirement benefits, vacation and sick leave benefits, non-payment of unused airline tickets, holiday pay, underpayment of salary and 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees plus interest against Filipinas Synthetic Corporation (Filsyn), Far Eastern Textile Mills, Inc., Sta. Rosa Textiles, Inc., Patricio Lim and Eric Hu. McLeod contending that the three mentioned companies are one and the same, thus liable for his compensation.

ISSUE: Whether an employer-employee relationship exists between the respondent companies and McLeod for purposes of determining employer liability to McLeod.

HELD:

Records disclose that McLeod was an employee only of PMI. PMI hired McLeod as its acting Vice President and General Manager on 20 June 1980. PMI confirmed McLeods appointment as Vice President/Plant Manager in the Special Meeting of its Board of Directors on 10 February 1981. McLeod himself testified during the hearing before the Labor Arbiter that his regular employment was with PMI. McLeod failed to present any proof of the employer-employee relationship between Filsyn, SRTI, OR FETMI. McLeod could have presented evidence to support his allegation of employeremployee relationship between him and any of Filsyn, SRTI, and FETMI, but he did not. Appointment letters or employment contracts, payrolls, organization charts, SSS registration, personnel list, as well as testimony of co-employees, may serve as evidence of employee status. What took place between PMI and SRTI was dation in payment with lease. PMI is indebted to DBP and as a security for such debts has mortgaged its real properties, together with all machineries and improvements found thereat. By virtue of the inter-governmental agency arrangement, DBP transferred the Obligations, including the Assets, to the Asset Privatization Trust and the latter has received payment for its obligations from PMI. As a rule, a corporation that purchases the assets of another will not be liable for the debts of the selling corporation, provided the former acted in good faith and paid adequate consideration for such assets, except when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) Where the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the debts, (2) Where the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the Corporations, (3) Where the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling Corporation, and (4) Where the selling corporation fraudulently enters into the transaction to escape liability for those debts. There is also no Merger or Consolidation between PMI and SRTI. However, McLeod claims that for purposes of determining employer liability, all private respondents are one and the same employer because: (1) they have the same address; (2) they are all engaged in the same business; and (3) they have interlocking directors and officers. This assertion is untenable. A corporation is an artificial being invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of its stockholders and from that of other corporations to which it may be connected. While a corporation may exist for any lawful purpose, the law will regard it as an association of persons or, in case of two corporations, merge them into one, when its corporate legal entity is used as a cloak for fraud or illegality. This is the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction. The doctrine applies only when such corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, or when it is made as a shield to confuse the legitimate issues, or where a corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and

controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation. There being no employer-employee relationship between McLeod and respondent corporations, McLeods cause of action is only against his former employer, PMI.

Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc. G.R. Nos. 164302-03; January 24, 2007

FACTS: The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid noncommission-earning employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant. The Union and the Company had entered into a three-year Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its terms. The Union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings. The Company refused on the ground that the members of the Alyansa were not members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of the Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse ensued. The Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The petitioners relied on two grounds: (a) deadlock on CBA ground rules; and (b) unfair labor practice arising from the companys refusal to bargain. The Office of the Mayor issued a permit to the Union to conduct protest action within the parameters of the company. The Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal alleging, inter alia, the following: there was a deadlock in the CBA negotiations between the Union and Company, as a result of which a Notice of Strike was filed by the Union; pending resolution of the Notice of Strike, the Union members filed applications for leave which were disapproved because operations in the plant may be disrupted; one day prior to the mass leave, the Union staged a protest action by wearing red arm bands denouncing the alleged anti-labor practices of the company; without observing the requirements mandated by law, the Union picketed the premises of the Company in clear violation of Article 262 of the Labor Code; because of the slowdown in the work, the Company suffered losses amounting to P2,733,366.29; the mass/protest action conducted was clearly a strike; since the Union did not observe the requirements mandated by law, i.e., strike vote, cooling-off period and reporting requirements, the strike was therefore illegal; the Union also violated the provision of the CBA on the grievance machinery; there being a direct violation of the CBA, the Unions action constituted an unfair labor practice; and the officers who knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike should be declared to have lost their employment status. The Union filed an Answer alleging therein that the mass action conducted by its officers and members was not a strike but just a valid exercise of their right to picket, which is part of the right of free expression as guaranteed by the Constitution. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision granting the petition of the Company. He declared that the mass leave was actually an illegal strike and as a consequence thereof, the union officers who knowingly participated therein deemed to have lost their employment. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUES: 1.)Whether or not the mass action staged by the Union was a strike, and if it was, whether it was illegal. 2.)Whether the individual officers and shop stewards of petitioner Union should be dismissed from their employment. HELD: Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. The term strike encompasses not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities. Since strikes cause disparity effects not only on the relationship between labor and management but also on the general peace and progress of society, the law has provided limitations on the right to strike. For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art. 263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike, the law provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. As to the shop stewards, it is quite clear that the jurisdiction of shop stewards and the supervisors includes the determination of the issues arising from the interpretation or even implementation of a provision of the CBA, or from any order or memorandum, circular or assignments issued by the appropriate authority in the establishment. In fine, they are part and parcel of the continuous process of grievance resolution designed to preserve and maintain peace among the employees and their employer. They occupy positions of trust and laden with awesome responsibilities. In this case, instead of playing the role of peacemakers and grievance solvers, the petitioners-shop stewards participated in the strike. Thus, like the officers and directors of

petitioner Union who joined the strike, petitioners-shop stewards also deserve the penalty of dismissal from their employment.

Seven Star Textile Company vs. Dy G.R. No. 166846; January 24, 2007

FACTS: Respondents Marcos Dy and Guillermo Cahillo were former employees of petitioner Seven Star Textile Company (SSTC, for brevity). Dy started his employment with SSTC on January 21, 1993 as Personnel Head and was later designated as Finishing Supervisor. On the other hand, Cahillo was employed as driver on August 17, 1993. On June 9, 1998, Dy and Cahillo filed their complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay against SSTC and its President/General Manager, Lin Ang Pang. The complaint alleged that Dy and Cahillo were dismissed from employment on May 2, 1998 and May 19, 1998, respectively, because of their refusal to render overtime work. SSTC denied that Dy and Cahillo were dismissed from work, claiming that the two did not report for work after they were reprimanded for refusing to render overtime work; that Cahillo had committed several infractions of company rules and regulations; that Dy held a supervisory position involving trust and confidence, so that a high degree of loyalty and respect was expected of him; and that Dy committed numerous absences and tardiness, acts of insubordination and willful disobedience of orders of his superiors, which warrant the loss of trust and confidence reposed on him; and that being a managerial employee, Dy is not entitled to his claims for monetary benefits. On November 17, 1999, Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio rendered his Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter declared that contrary to respondents Marcos Dy and Guillermo Cahillos claim, they were not dismissed from employment; they abandoned their work. Since respondents had voluntarily terminated their employment, petitioner Seven Star Textile Co. was no longer mandated to comply with the requirement to send notices to respondents. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. It declared, among others, that no termination paper existed; thus, there was no dismissal to speak of. Respondents unjustified refusal to render overtime work amounted to voluntary resignation. The NLRC also pointed out that respondents infraction of company policies had eroded the trust and confidence which their employer had reposed upon them. This, coupled with their recent unjustified refusal to render overtime work, would justify their dismissal. The NLRC also ruled that respondent Dy was a Finishing Supervisor - a managerial employee who, under the Labor Code of the Philippines, is not entitled to labor standard benefits. Respondents motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Decision was denied for lack of merit. Thereafter, respondents assailed the NLRC ruling via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated May 7, 2004, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondents and granted the petition. The appellate court noted that respondents reported for work on May 2, 1998 and May 19, 1998; they were informed,

however, that their services were already terminated. Petitioner even offered to give them separation pay, but respondents refused and filed the complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement. The Court of Appeals reiterated the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proving that the dismissal of the employee is for a valid and authorized cause rests on the employer. It explained that petitioner did not send any notice of dismissal to respondents, let alone any notice requiring them to return to work. Thus, the two-notice rule was not properly observed. The Court of Appeals also found that petitioner failed to prove its allegation that respondent Dy held a supervisory position, since the policies that were supposed to be executed were not identified. While respondent Dy supervised the packing, inventory and receiving of garments, petitioner did not present any evidence to show that respondent Dy had the authority to hire or fire employees of lower rank or that he had the authority to make such recommendations. Not being a managerial employee, respondent Dy was entitled to labor standard benefits under the Labor Code. Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit.

ISSUES: 1.). Respondents Dy and Cahillo are not entitled to procedural due process because abandonment was used merely as a defense and not as a ground for termination of employment. 2.) The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it found that petitioner dismissed the respondents contrary to the findings of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that there was no dismissal.

HELD: The rule that factual findings of administrative tribunal are accorded respect and even finality admits an exception: that is, when it is clear that a palpable mistake was committed by the quasi-judicial tribunal which needs rectification. The Court of Appeals found that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC committed an obvious mistake in declaring that respondents failed to substantiate their claim of illegal dismissal. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals pronouncement that in cases of illegal dismissal, it is incumbent upon the employer to show by substantial evidence that the employees dismissal was validly made, and failure to discharge that duty would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal. As the appellate court correctly held: Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proving that the dismissal of the employees was for a valid and authorized cause rests on the employer. It is incumbent upon the employer to show by substantial evidence that the termination of the employment of the employees was validly made and failure to discharge that duty would

mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal. On the other hand, abandonment as a just and valid ground for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Mere absence or failure to report for work, after notice to return, is not enough to amount to such abandonment. It should be noted that in its position paper, SSTC argued that Dy and Cahillo were not dismissed from work and that the latters refusal to render overtime work is a willful act of disobedience and insubordination to the lawful orders of their employer, which constitutes a valid ground for termination of employment; and that since Dy and Cahillo were dismissed for a just and valid cause, they are not entitled to separation pay. Thus, SSTC admitted that Dy and Cahillo were, in fact, dismissed from employment, although it argued that their dismissal was for a just and valid cause. However, no evidence was presented by SSTC to prove compliance with the twin requirements of notice of hearing or that a notice to return to work was served by them on Dy and Cahillo. Thus, the burden of proof to show that respondents dismissal from employment was for a just cause falls on petitioner as employer. Petitioner cannot discharge this burden by merely alleging that it did not dismiss respondents; neither can it escape liability by claiming that respondents abandoned their work. When there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers it a case of illegal dismissal. Petitioner desperately tries a convoluted, if not absurd, argument - that it only raised abandonment as a defense and not as a ground for dismissing respondents, and as such, is not bound to observe due process. However, whether abandonment is alleged as a ground for dismissing an employee or a mere defense, the employer has the legal duty to observe due process. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be inferred or legally presumed from certain equivocal acts. For abandonment to exist, two requisites must concur: first, the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and second, there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt acts. The second element is the more determinative factor. Abandonment as a just ground for dismissal thus requires clear, willful, deliberate, and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume employment. Mere absence or failure to report for work, even after notice to return, is not tantamount to abandonment. The Court of Appeals did not commit any error or grave abuse of discretion when it reversed and set aside the resolutions of the NLRC. The instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated May 7,2004 is AFFIRMED.

Ireneo L. Camua, Jr. vs. National Labor Relations Commission G.R. No. 15873; January 25, 2007 FACTS: Ireneo Camua, Jr. was a caulker in RBL Fishing Corporation from Jan 31, 1975 to Dec 21, 1997. On Aug 16, 1997, while Camua was on his way to work, he learned that a policeman armed with a warrant of arrest was looking for him in connection with the fatal

shooting of a man held up in a jeepney. He was then acting as Barangay Tanod when the incident occurred. Fearing of his arrest, Camua went into hiding in Batangas. The records show that Camua stopped reporting for work on Aug 18, 1997. As a standard office procedure, RBL sent him a letter on August 30, 1997, requiring him to report to work. Camua however alleged having answered the letter. Later on RBL sent him a memorandum informing him of his termination.

ISSUE: Whether or Not Camua abandoned his employment to warrant the dismissal made by RBL.

HELD: Camuas failure to report for work was not justified. The Court have held that through flight, one derogates the course of justice by avoiding arrest, detention, or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. To countenance Camuas excuse would be to place an imprimatur on his attempt to derail the normal course of the administration of justice. For unexplained absence to constitute abandonment there must be a clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employee, without any intention of returning. For a valid finding of abandonment, these two requisites should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, which is the more determinate factor and is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee has no more intention to work. Such intent must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified. (2) Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, the court consider Camuas failure to answer properly as a sufficient indicia that he was no longer interested in returning to work.

Elcee Farms Inc. and Corazon Saguemuller vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., G.R. No. 126428; January 25,2007

FACTS:

Pampelo Semillano and 143 other complainants, represented by the labor union, Sugar Agricultural Industrial Labor Organization (SAILO), filed this complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and back wages against Elcee Farms, Corazon Saguemuller, Hilla Corporation (HILLA), Rey Hilado and Roberto Montao. Private respondents alleged that they were all regular farm workers in Hacienda Trinidad which was owned and operated by petitioner Elcee Farms. Complainants alleged that Corazon Saguemuller was the president of Elcee Farms but records disclosed that it was her son, who was president thereof. In 1987, Elcee Farms entered into a Lease Agreement with Garnele Aqua Culture Corporation (Garnele). However, most of the private respondents continued to work in Hacienda Trinidad. Garnele sub- leased Hacienda Trinidad to Daniel Hilado, who operated Hilla. The contract stipulated the continued employment of 120 of Garneles employees by Hilado. Soon after Hilla took over, Hilado entered into a collective bargaining agreement with United Sugar Farmers Organization (USFO). The CBA contains a closed shop provision: Sec.2. Employees who at the time of the execution of these agreement are not yet members of the UNION be required by the EMPLOYER to join the UNIONas a condition for continuous employment. Should the refuse and fail to join said employees shall be dismissed by the EMPLOYER Due to their refusal to join the labor union, the private respondents were terminated by HILLA. SAILO and 144 complainants including the 131 private respondents, filed against Elcee farms, Corazon Saguemuller, Hilla and its officers, a complaint for illegal dismissal with reinstatement back wages, separation pay with damages before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the claim for damages and denied all claims made against Elcee Farms, Corazon Saguemuller and HILLA officers. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter but hold Elcee Farms and Corazon Saguemuller liable of the separation pay and other benefits since the lease to HILLA was a termination of employer-employee relationship. The NLRC also explained that Elcee Farms should have informed its employees of the lease made in favor of HILLA.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the NLRC erred in adjudging Corazon Saguemuller equally liable with Elcee Farms. 2.) Whether or not the NLRC contravened its own rules that findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter should be respected and given weight. 3.) Whether or not private respondents are entitled to the award of separation pay and moral damages.

HELD: 1.)Yes. Corazon Saguemuller should not be subsidiarily liable with Elcee Farms for separation pay and damages. It is basic that a corporation is invested by law with personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it. Mere ownership by a single stockholder is not in itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate personality. 2.) No. the findings of the Labor Arbiter may be overturned by the NLRC if supported by records. In this case the findings of the NLRC are better supported by the records than those made by the Labor Arbiter. Records shows that Elcee Farms was the employer named in the payrolls at the time the Hacienda was supposed to have been leased to Garnele. The lease agreement did not provide for the employment status of employees of Elcee Farms. In addition, the employees were not informed of the lease agreement and were not paid by Elcee Farms separation pay at the time Garnele was supposed to have taken over and leased the hacienda. The employer-employee relationship was severed only when Garnele entered into a lease agreement with Hilado and HILLA took over the management of the Hacienda. 3.) Yes. Moral damages are recoverable when the dismissal of an employee is intended by bad faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done contrary to good morals, good customs or public policy. Bad faith on the part of Elcee Farms is shown by the act of simulating the lease agreement with Garnele in order to evade paying private respondents the proper amount of separation benefits. Liability for separation pay is provided under Article 283 of the Labor Code for closure of establishment and reduction of personnel particularly cessation of operations. For this provision, three requirements are enumerated (1) service of a written notice to the employee and to the MOLE (2) the cessation must be bona fide in character (3) payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to at least one half month pay for each year of service or one month pay whichever is higher. In the present case Elcee Farms ceased to operate and manage the Hacienda when through Garnele it leased the Hacienda to Hilado, which renders it liable for separation pay to its employees under Article 283 of the Labor Code. In view of the foregoing, the petition is partially granted. The court affirms the award of separation pay and moral damages with modification that Corazon Saguemuller shall not be held subsidiarily liable.

G & M (Phil.), Inc. vs. ZENAS RIVERA G.R. No. 141802; January 29, 2007 FACTS: G & M (Phil.), Inc., petitioner, is a corporation engaged in the placement and recruitment business of overseas contract workers. It deployed Lorenzo Rivera, respondents husband, to work as equipment driver for its foreign principal, Mohammad AlHammad Recruiting Office in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia for a period of two (2) years. After working for one 1 year, 7 months and 17 days, Lorenzo met an accident and died on December 23, 1993. Respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unpaid salary differentials for her late husband alleging that he was not paid his salary for 23 days before

he died. She submitted a "Final Settlement of Liability of Foreign Employer" bearing the seal of the Philippine Embassy at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. She also claimed that her husband actually received only a monthly salary of SR 700, way below than that he ought to receive under his contract of employment which is US$ 600. Petitioner for its part, assailed the genuineness of the Final Settlement for lack of proper authentication. It pointed out that the respondents allegation that her husband received only a monthly salary of SR 700 is inconsistent with the claim for unpaid salaries as it is not possible for a worker receiving SR 700 per month to have unpaid salaries in the amount of SR 843.33 for 23 days. It likewise questioned respondents basis for filing the complaint, she not being a privy to her husbands working conditions while abroad. However, the Labor Arbiter ordered the payment of unpaid salary for 23 days, salary differential, plus attorneys fees. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), as well as the Court of Appeals, rendered a decision denying petitioners appeal and affirming the Labor Arbiters judgment. Petitioner then filed a Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is tenable in assailing the genuineness of the Final Statement and in questioning the authority of the respondent to file the complaint.

HELD: The contention of the petitioner is untenable. Since petitioner keeps and maintains the employment records, it is therefore incumbent upon it to produce the payrolls and vouchers to prove that respondents deceased husband was duly paid of his basic monthly salary. Petitioner failed to present any document/evidence to show/prove its contention of payment so, in the absence of such evidence, it can be safely concluded that the deceased was not paid his monthly salary as per POEA approved contract and his unpaid salaries were not given to him. Accordingly, whether the "Final Settlement" adduced as supporting evidence by complainant is genuine or fake does not overcome the rule that the burden on labor standards claim rests upon the employer. Failure therefore on the part of the petitioner to offer such payrolls and vouchers to controvert respondents claim for salary differentials is fatal. The petitioners allegation of inconsistency between the monthly salary of respondents husband appearing in the OCW Information Sheet and the claim of

respondent that her husband is still entitled to a salary of SR 843.33 for 23 days, the appellate court found that "this discrepancy is explained by the fact that aside from his monthly salary of SR 700, the deceased is still entitled to a monthly food allowance of SR 200 and monthly overtime pay of SR 200." As to the authority of the respondent to file the complaint, the OCW INFO SHEET clearly states that the beneficiary of Lorenzo Rivera is his wife Zenas Rivera, hence, the complainant in this case is the real party in interest because "she stands to be benefited by the judgment in this suit or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit".

Lingkod Manggagawa sa Rubberworld vs. Rubberworld(Phils) Inc. G.R. No. 153882 ;January 29, 2007 FACTS: On August 26, 1994, Rubberworld filed with DOLE a Notice of Temporary Partial Shutdown due to severe financial crisis, therein announcing the formal actual company shutdown to take effect on September 26, 1994. A copy of said notice was served on the recognized labor union of Rubberworld, the Bisig Pagkakaisa-NAFLU, the union with which the corporation had a collective bargaining agreement.On September 1, 1994, Bisig Pagkakaisa-NAFLU staged a strike. It set up a picket line in front of the premises of Rubberworld and even welded its gate. As a result, Rubberworld's premises closed prematurely even before the date set for the start of its temporary partial shutdown. On

September 9, 1994, herein petitioner union, the Lingkod Manggagawa Sa Rubberworld, Adidas-Anglo (Lingkod, for brevity), represented by its President, Sonia Esperanza, filed a complaint against Rubberworld and its Vice Chairperson, Mr. Antonio Yang, for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal shutdown, and non-payment of salaries and separation pay. On November 22, 1994, while the aforementioned complaint was pending with Labor Arbiter Dinopol, Rubberworld filed with the SEC a Petition for Declaration of a State of Suspension of Payments with Proposed Rehabilitation Plan. The petition, docketed as SEC Case No. 11-94-4920, was granted by the SEC in its Order. Declaring that the case in the labor arbiter be suspended. But the Labor Arbiter did not heed the SEC decision and ruled in favor of Lingkod. Rubberworld appealed the case and posted a bond of Php 500,000. But Commisioner Atienza place the amount to P27,506,255.70. The NLRC declared that Rubberworld should upgrade the bond to perfect their appeal. But Lingkod contented that the appeal should not prosper because the NLRC decision have become final and executory. But rubberwold went straight to CA and it ruled in favor of them, hence this petition for certiorari against the CA. Since the petitioners' contention is that the CA should not have heard the case since the decision of the NLRC have become final and executory.

ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not the SEC has the power to suspend labor cases pending in the NLRC 2.) Whether or not the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion.

HELD: The SC ruled in the affirmative. It is plain from the foregoing provisions of the law that upon the appointment [by the SEC] of a management committee or a rehabilitation receiver, all actions for claims against the corporation pending before any court, tribunal or board shall ipso jure be suspended. The justification for the automatic stay of all pending actions for claims is to enable the management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extrajudicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the rescue of the debtor company. To allow such other actions to continue would only add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation. The law is clear: upon the creation of a management committee or the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver, all claims for actions shall be suspended accordingly. No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. Since the law makes no distinction or exemptions, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec

nos distinguere debemos. Allowing labor cases to proceed clearly defeats the purpose of the automatic stay and severely encumbers the management committee's time and resources. The said committee would need to defend against these suits, to the detriment of its primary and urgent duty to work towards rehabilitating the corporation and making it viable again. To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to other similarly situated claimants and forestall if not defeat the rescue efforts. Besides, even if the NLRC awards the claims of private respondents, its ruling could not be enforced as long as the petitioner is under the management committee The Sc ruled in the negative. Given the factual milieu obtaining in this case, it cannot be said that the decision of the Labor Arbiter, or the decision/dismissal order and writ of execution issued by the NLRC, could ever attain final and executory status. The Labor Arbiter completely disregarded and violated Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree 902-A, as amended, which categorically mandates the suspension of all actions for claims against a corporation placed under a management committee by the SEC. Thus, the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the order and writ subsequently issued by the NLRC are all null and void for having been undertaken or issued in violation of the SEC suspension Order dated December 28, 1994. As such, the Labor Arbiters decision, including the dismissal by the NLRC of Rubberworls appeal, could not have achieved a final and executory status. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. The Labor Arbiter's decision in this case is void ab initio, and therefore, non-existent. A void judgment is in effect no judgment at all. No rights are divested by it nor obtained from it. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings upon which the judgment is founded are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It accordingly leaves the party-litigants in the same position they were in before the trial. In fact, it is immaterial whether an appeal from the Labor Arbiter's decision was perfected or not, since a judgment void ab initio is non-existent and cannot acquire finality. Hence, such judgment does not become final in the sense of depriving a party of his right to question its validity. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion attended the CA's taking cognizance of the petition. Besides, the Labor Arbiter, by simultaneously ruling in his decision of August 16, 1995 on both the merits of the ULP case and the motion of Rubberworld to suspend the proceedings thereon, effectively required the respondent corporation to post a surety bond before the same respondent could have questioned the arbiters action in not suspending the proceedings before him.

Zenaida Angeles vs. Lordy Fernandez G.R.No.160213; January 30, 2007

FACTS: Respondent Lordy Fernandez worked as a secretary and all-around worker from July 1992 to May 1998 in Bon Chic, a tailoring and dress shop which was owned by petitioner Zenaida Angeles. Fernandez was dismissed by Angeles claiming that she abandoned he job and alleging that Bon Chics money and records were missing after Fernandez left he job. On the other hand, Fernandez claimed that she was dismissed without cause and in violation of due process.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that Fernandez did not abandon her job but was illegally dismissed as she neither informed that Angeles had considered that she had abandoned her job nor that she was being accused of taking the records and money of Bon Chic. However, NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter, finding credible the petitioners claim that respondent abandoned her job to elope with a much younger man. The NLRC noted that while the filing of the complaint was within the prescriptive period, respondent only filed it twenty months after the alleged dismissal, consistent with the claim of abandonment. Upon elevation of the case, Court of Appeals reinstated Labor Arbiters decision, ruling that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in considering on appeal, the belated affidavits stating new allegations of petitioner without giving respondent the right to rebut the same. Neither did petitioner inform the respondent of the charge of abandonment, nor did she give respondent the opportunity to explain her side.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not NLRC erred in accepting new evidences or affidavits in the appeal before it. 2.) Whether or not respondent abandoned her job.

HELD: 1.) It is well settled that NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence even for the first time of appeal, because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases. However, delay in the submission of evidence should be clearly explained and should adequately prove the allegation of the cause of termination. In the case at bar, however, petitioner did not explain her belated submission of affidavits, making her plea that the affidavits be admitted in the interest of truth, justice and fair play lacks merit.

2.) To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (a) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable; and (b) a clear intention to severe to employee-employer relationship. While respondent filed the complaint twenty months after her dismissal such filing was well within the four year prescriptive period allowed to institute an action for illegal dismissal. Aside from failing to prove abandonment, the petitioner failed to serve respondent the required written notices containing the charge of abandonment to afford respondent the opportunity to be heard and defend her self, and stating petitioners decision to terminate respondent with clear reasons therefore. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work is entitled to reinstatement but since Bon Chic ceased operation, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is awarded.

Culver Suico vs. NLRC; Banigno Mariano Jr. vs NLRC; Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) vs Ernesto Borje GR. No. 146762, GR. No. 153584, GR. No. 163793; January 30, 2007 This is a consolidation of 3 cases.

FACTS in Gr. No. 146762:

Culver Suico, Teresa Ceniza and Ronald Dacut were regular employees of PLDT Cebu Jones Exchange and members of the Mangagawad ng Komunikasyon ng Pilipinas (MKP). In 1997 the MKP launched a strike against PLDT where complainants took part by picketing. Acting DOLE secretary, Crescencio Tarajano, assumed jurisdiction over the matter and issued a return to work order, but was not heeded by the MKP which instead filed an opposition which was later on denied by DOLE secretary Leonardo Quisimbing. During the strike Ann Detelou Fernando sustained injuries when she was blocked by the strikers from entering the PLDT premises. Included in the incident were the three complainants. Because of said act the VP for personnel management and development center of PLDT (Emiliano Tanchico) sent the complainants separate letters demanding an explanation for their behavior. Complainants did not and were sent two other notices. Despite this the complainants still failed to reply and instead sent Tanchico three separate but uniformly worded letters asking for a hearing based on PLDT System Practice #94-016. This time it was PLDT Division Head that replied to complainants stating that they should first submit the explanation for their actions before a hearing could be conducted and indicated that their failure to do such will indicate a waiver on their part to be heard. Complainants still insisted on asking for a hearing and were subsequently sent termination notices. The complainants filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal which was ruled in their favor but was reversed by the NLRC upon appeal of PLDT and affirmed by the CA when the complainants sought redress.

FACTS in Gr. No. 153584: Benigno Mariano, Jr. was an employee of PLDT Laoag City and an officer of the MKP. During the 1997 strike that MKP launched against PLDT Mariano led a picket in the premises of PLDT. Melvyn Gillermo, a PLDT subscriber, suffered injuries and humiliation at the hands of the striker which he later identified in a letter to PLDT as Mariano. Gillermo demanded that the latter be dismissed. Like the above case of Suico, Tanchico sent Mariano a notice asking for an explanation for the way he behaved. Mariano replied only after being served a second notice, indicating in his reply no explanation but instead statement that the memorandum served upon him was a gross violation of his right to self organization and demanded a hearing be conducted based on the same PLDT system practice mentioned above. Subsequently Reynaldo Puzon, PLDT Assistant VP for North Luzon, sent Mariano a notice informing him of termination, citing therein that a hearing could not have been conducted for his failure to provide a written explanation. The Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA all ruled against petitioner when he sought redress.

FACTS in Gr. No.163793: Ernesto Borje was an employee of PLDT SFU Mother Exchange and a member of MKP. He was implicated of engaging in violent activities during the 1997 MKP strike on PLDT. Like the other two cases Tanchico sent Borje a notice asking for an explanation for his actions and Borje in return demanded a hearing be conducted based on the previously mentioned PLDT system practice. For failing to give a written explanation Borje was sent a letter notifying him of his termination. The Labor Arbiter and NLRC both ruled against Borje but the CA reversed the order and ordered Borjes reinstatement. PLDT now comes before the Court to question the CAs ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissals were done in accordance with due process and are thus valid.

HELD: It is important to note that the substantive bases of the dismissal of Suico et al are not an issue. It is the procedural aspect of their termination that is questioned. Did PLDT violate the requirements of due process under the Labor Code when it dismissed the employees without heeding their request for a hearing? Article 277(b) of the labor code indicates the minimum standard of due process in all cases of termination: Art. 277. Miscellaneous Provisions. xxxx a. Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the cause for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires, in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.

This article must be co related to Rule XXIII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code, which provides: Section 2. Standards of due process; requirements of notice.I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code: (a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; (b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and (c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination xxx. Apparently, PLDT complied with the two-notice requirement of due process. These two notices would have sufficed had it not been for the existence of Systems Practice No. 94-016. Under Systems Practice No. 94-016, PLDT granted its employee the alternative of either filing a written answer to the charges or requesting for opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his counsel or union representative, if he so desires which they did. This option is part of their right to due process. PLDT is bound to comply with the Systems Practice. PLDT further justifies that in the dismissal of employees for strike-related violence, it is sufficient to merely declare the latter to have lost their employment without having to comply with any procedure for their termination. This view is untenable. . Article 277 (b) in relation to Art. 264 (a) and (e) recognizes the right to due process of all workers, without distinction as to the cause of their termination. It should, however, be emphasized that consistent with the ruling in the Agabon Case, the procedural deficiency in the dismissal of the employees does not affect the validity or effectivity of the dismissal. The terminated employees, however, are entitled to nominal damages.

Chuayuco Steel Manucaturing Corporation vs. Buklod ng Manggagawa sa Chuayuco Steel Manucaturing Corporation GR. No. 167347; January 31, 2007

FACTS: Buklod ng Manggagawa sa Chuayuco Steel Manucaturing Corporation (respondent) is a legitimate labor organization and the recognized bargaining agent of the Chuayuco Steel Manucaturing Corporation (petitioner). In a special election of officers

conducted by the respondent, Camilo Lenizo won as president. The petitioner, however, did not recognize the copy of the election result issued to it because of an intra-union conflict between the Lenizo and Ibanez (former president) faction. The DOLE with the support of the BLR ordered the petitioner to recognize the newly elected officers. Ibanezs faction sought reconsideration but was denied. Later on in the same year of 2000, Lenizos group submitted collective bargaining proposals to the petitioner, seeing as how the CBA of the respondent expired in November 30, but the petitioner did not heed such proposals. The respondent filed a notice of strike with the NCMB grounded on unfair labor practice, union interference, refusal to bargain, and non-remittance of funds held in trust. Petitioner and Ibanezs faction filed motions to dismiss but were denied. Thus on April 25, 2001 a strike was staged. A month later the petitioner filed a motion before the NLRC to declare the strike illegal as the strikers employed unlawful means such as padlocking and obstructing the gate with other structures preventing free ingress and egress thereto. Upon ocular inspection the NLRC issued a restraining order in favor of petitioner and the strike was later on declared illegal by the Labor Arbiter and declared that the individual respondents who led and actively took part in said strike were to have consequently lost their employment status. Upon appeal by the respondent the Labor Arbiter was affirmed by the NLRC but was modified by the CA stating in its decision the reinstatement of 31 employees who took part in the strike.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 31 members of the respondent who took part in the strike are entitled to reinstatement.

HELD: It is settled that the CA, NLRC and the Labor Arbiter were unanimous in finding that the strike staged by the respondent was indeed illegal pursuant to Article 264(e) of the Labor Code. Thus even if a strike is valid because its objective or purpose is lawful it may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal. The respondents act of blocking the free ingress and egress of the corporations premises and the illegal acts committed by members of the respondent union is one of the many grounds invalidating the said strike. Nevertheless the responsibility for such acts is individual and not collective as indicated in Art 264 (a). Therefore any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.

Given the evidence presented in the proceedings of the lower court and the fact that 24 of the 31 individuals indicated in the order for reinstatement have actually been in active participation of the illegal acts and tendered their resignation, and 3 of those in the order of reinstatement have actually not participated in the strike, then it is the remaining 4 that should be reinstated namely respondent members Ronilo A. Adia, Arnel Q. Fabillar, Eugenio M. Marinas, Jr., and Vicente A. Penillos.

Capitol Wireless, Inc. vs. Carlos Antonio Balagot G.R. No. 169016 January 31, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner Capitol Wireless (Capwire) hired respondent Balagot as a collector. As Balagots duties required him to work outside of the office, Capwire assigned to him a motorcycle as a service vehicle, for which it shouldered expenses for gasoline maintenance.

At around 3:35 pm of May 9, 2000, the director of Capwires HRD saw, to his surprise, Balagot at the Head Office of China Bank with which Capwire had no business relations. It was thereupon discovered that Balagot had been rendering services to China Bank and that since 1992, Balagot had been concurrently employed with Contractual Concepts, Inc. (CCI), a local manpower company which assigned him to render messengerial services to China Bank. The Capwire HRD director recommended the immediate termination of the services of Balagot on the ground of gave misconduct and willful breach of trust and confidence. Balagot was given a memorandum to explain his side. An administrative hearing was conducted, Balagot admitted that simultaneously with his employment as a collector for Capwire, he had been performing messengerial duties to China Bank on a part time basis. Balagot reiterates his argument that his job at CCI did not interfere with his job at Capwire, maintaining that he performed his tasks for CCI only after office hours. Capwire informed Balagot that he was found guilty of grave misconduct resulting in the lost of trust and confidence in him and that he was dismissed. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not having a double job constitutes a valid ground for dismissal.

HELD: There is no denying that taking on double job per se is not illegal as extra income would go a long way for an ordinary worker. The only limitation is where one job overlaps with the other in terms of time and/or poses a clear case of conflict of interest as to the nature of business between the two employees. In the case at bar, the problem is as to time and performance of duty. With Capwire, Balagot woks as a collector from 8:00am to 5:00pm. On the other hand, his job at CCI is as a messenger assigned at China Bank. Under the Rules on Evidence, specifically Section 3 Rule 131, the presumptions: that the ordinary course of business has been followed and that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life, are disputable presumptions that can only be overcome by clear and preponderant evidence. The banking industry follows the ordinary working hours of 8:00am to 5:00pm. A bank has no use for an employee who can only be of service to it after 5:00 in the afternoon. It logically follows that Balagot performs his duties at China Bank during office hours that is from 8:00am to 5:00pm.

Verily, jurisprudence recognizes as a valid ground for dismissal of an employee, the unauthorized use of company time.

Norsk Hydro (Phils.), Inc. and Hans Neverdal vs. Benjamin Rosales, Jr. G.R. No. 162871; January 31, 2007 FACTS: Benjamin Rosales worked for Norsk as an Operations Supervisor, as part of his job he looks for a place or lot to establish business in. He found a seven hectare land in Misamis Oriental. Disclosing that other part are sold for 400 while a portion are sold 1,200 per square meters. But Pepito Abecia, a real Estate broker, told Neverdal that Rosales defrauded them (company) by overpricing the land. Rosales was dismissed. Rosales on the other hand, filed an action against Norsk for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for there was a just cause for the dismissal, being loss of confidence and trust.

NLRC affirmed the decision, and CA reversed and ruled in favor of Rosales for they held that Norsk failed to prove that Rosales erred with substantial evidence. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Rosales was illegally dismissed. HELD: The SC answered in the negative. Law and jurisprudence have long recognized the right of employers to dismiss employees by reason of loss of trust and confidence, especially in cases of employees occupying positions of responsibility, on the premise that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence.It should also be stressed that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not needed to justify the loss of trust and confidence on the responsible officer. It is sufficient that there be some basis for the same, or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct, and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded of his position. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code states, however, that the loss of trust and confidence must be based on willful breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his employer. Ordinary breach will not suffice; it must be willful. Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. More specifically the loss of trust must be founded on clearly established facts. In the present case, Neverdal, as president of the company, issued a show-cause memorandum and a notice of preventive suspension to Rosales. Despite its directive to Rosales to explain, within 72 hours, the charges against him, he did not do so. On the scheduled hearing, he did not present any evidence, constraining the company to evaluate the case based on the documents available, the affidavit of Abecia who appears to have no reason to implicate Rosales except for the fact that Rosales and the other brokers reneged on their agreement on his share of the overprice. Likewise, it appears that Abecias affidavit was a declaration against himself, lending it substantial credibility. Further, it appears that Rosaless right to notice and hearing was not violated. The records clearly show that the company set an administrative hearing to give Rosales an opportunity to explain his side and to call for witnesses and present his evidence.