The Right Track & The Track That's Left (Exploring Predispositionalism)

THE RIGHT TRACK
&
THE TRACK THATS LEFT
(EXPLORING PREDISPOSITIONALISM)
Andrew David Viceroy
1
FORWARD 6
PART I INTRODUCTION: WHY PREDISPOSITIONALISM? 8
PART II 32 SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCES OF PREDISPOSITION

(IN CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS MECHANISMS) 45
Evidence #1: THE YOUS IN YOU 45
Evidence #2: THE MASK OF SUBJECTIVE FREEDOM 55
Evidence #3: MEMORY 60
Evidence #4: INTENTION 67
Evidence #5: GENETIC BEHAVIOR 72
Evidence #6: MANIPULATION 77
Evidence #7: CONFABULATION 83
Evidence #8: SPLIT BRAINS 89
Evidence #9: METAPHORICAL PRIMES 94
Evidence #10: THE SENSES 98
2
Evidence #11: UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE 105
Evidence #12: OVERLOAD 111
Evidence #13: PERSONAL CHEMISTRY 116
Evidence #14: MENTAL DISORDER 122
Evidence #15: THE MORALLY CHALLENGED 125
Evidence #16: THE BODY OTHER 131
Evidence #17: DEVELOPMENT 135
Evidence #18: RIGHT-SIDE BIAS 138
Evidence #19: POLITICAL AFFILIATION 142
Evidence #20: RISK 147
Evidence #21: ENVIRONMENT 150
Evidence #22: BEAUTY 155
Evidence #23: RELIGION 158
Evidence #24: IN-GROUP/OUT-GROUP 169
3
Evidence #25: MORE COGNITIVE BIASES 177
Evidence #26: GOALS AND LONG-TERM PRIMES 181
Evidence #27: EMPATHY 185
Evidence #28: OBLIGATION 189
Evidence #29: GENDER 195
Evidence #30: INTELLIGENCE 201
Evidence #31: ANCHORING & MISCELLANEOUS 205
Evidence #32: REACTANCE 207
PART III SOME CHALLENGES TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF

PREDISPOSITION IN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 209
CONFUSING VARIETIES OF DETERMINISM 214
DETERMINISM AND THEISM 220
AGENT CAUSALITY 236
QUANTUM RANDOMNESS 243
4
THE COGITO MODEL 247
LUCK 255
EMERGENT PHENOMENA 261
THE HUMAN ANIMAL 265
THE CAUSAL VACUUM 273
FUNCTIONALIST ILLUSIONS 282
ENDURANCE AND IDENTITY 297
RESPONSIBILITY 317
RETRIBUTIVISM 331
IN CONCLUSION 338
HELPFUL VOCABULARY 345
LOGICAL FALLACIES 350
5
FORWARD
Do you have an internal locus of control?1 That is to ask, do you lean toward the belief
that the conscious you and/or the spiritual you ultimately controls your motivations, goals,
feelings, and behavior? Are you ultimately responsible for your actions because you always have
the freedom to do otherwise? If you answered yes to these questions, then this book will give
you something to chew on. In the least, there is so much valuable information here that will give
you the crucial tools you will appreciate to help you achieve your goals and better navigate
through this complex world.
For those who wish to be technically precise and/or feel intimidated by psychological and
philosophical terminology, please go straight to the back of the book and spend some time
reviewing the Helpful Vocabulary section, as well as a section on the most commonly used
informal logical fallacies (I would!).
People have asked why I would make the text more difficult by using a less familiar word
like epistemic instead of related to the acquisition of knowledge and it is because there are
often subtle reasons that may not be immediately apparent (in this case, for example, because it
may be important to focus on the actual domain of access to knowledge in contrast to the domain
of, say, ontology [what exists], rather than just simplified versions of these concepts). There are
billions of people on the planet who disagree with the fundamental premises of this book, so I
must be thorough. I do get a little technical at times, especially in Part III (though this book
avoids all formal logic).
Ill say right now that however polemical I may get, the subject is complex and
multifaceted and, at the beginning of the day, reasonable people can plausibly disagree,
especially on the more speculative elements. The studies themselves are actually really fun and
will blow your mind. In addition to the core peer reviewed journal articles (with PDF file links,
when available), books, magazine articles, and essays supporting the primary evidences, I have
included many supplemental online links to multimedia material, movies/documentaries,
1
Harvey, J. H., Barnes, R. D., Sperry, D. L., & Harris, B. (1974). Perceived choice as a function of internal-
external locus of control. Journal of Personality, 42, 437-452.
6
programs, videos, lectures, interviews, and some of my favorite blogs and podcasts, whenever
relevant, for increased accessibility (interviews are great in that the authors themselves often
present their work as succinctly as possible, though its important to remember that they often
need further elucidation of the fine points). It is highly recommended that you constantly view
the footnotes and follow the included links online for further clarification whenever you dont
understand something, because within the constraints of user-friendly brevity, I can only scratch
the surface of so many complex topics. Go deep or tread lightly, the choice is yours!
The picture on the cover was taken from a rickety old footbridge in Portland, OR, looking
over multiple train tracks that head into the main yard where my grandfather was an engineer for
many years. On her birthday this year, my mother overcame her fear of heights to help me up
there (with a broken leg) to take the picture. This book is dedicated to her.
ADV - 10/12/2012
7
PART I
INTRODUCTION: WHY PREDISPOSITIONALISM?
When Pee Wee Herman slammed his bike into a curb, endured several painful flips, and
then landed directly on his feet before his friends nearby, he said, I meant to do that!2 We think
this way all the time the difference is that we actually believe it. When we discover that the
reason why we do that involves subjectively undetectable cognitive processing that belies the
real context of our motivations before we even consciously realize what our intention is, it might
often be more appropriate for us to ask, I meant to do that?
Confused? Theres a good reason why: we are predisposed not to reveal the deepest
influence upon our thought and behavior to our conscious selves. Selves? The non-conscious
you underpinning motivation, intention, and action is evidencing to be more pervasive than
weve ever imagined. Non-conscious biased processing can rig a decision context to seem fair,
balanced, unbiased, and consciously authored even when it really isnt.
We now know that even reasoned conscious plans do not go untouched. And the mind
perpetuates these manipulations long after we have made a decision, via confabulation.
Confabulation makes us all honest liars. Its the minds tendency to create and staunchly defend
a plausible narrative that best fits the only evidence it has, even if its partially or completely
wrong: it seems that I must have meant to do that for this reason! But the I is as
questionable as the reason, as we shall see.
Unfortunately, we have systemically built many of our most popular
philosophical/metaphysical world views and social systems upon just such erroneous
confabulation as well, because champions of metaphysical autonomy are determined to
downplay any notion that the human will can be significantly influenced beyond our control. But
worldviews based upon more superficial observations are being shown to increasingly clash with
2
McEuen, W. (Executive Producer), Burton, T. (Director). (1985). Pee Wee's Big Adventure. [Motion picture].
USA: Warner Bros. funkymonk80. [Video file]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJXU7EVXs2A
8
the way the world really is and even a world with so-called compatibilist freedom, depending
upon your interpretation of the word (and there are many. I will discuss some of them in depth
later), may be threatened beyond what some of us would comfortably concede.
Admittedly, sometimes hiding things from ourselves seems to work out in our favor, such
as when confronting distasteful true feelings of those we love or when considering our fragile
mortality. One might say that both the greatest triumph and the greatest tragedy in the history of
humanity is the ability to ignore key facts over an entire lifetime. Thats not going to happen
here. Ill try my best to find what is most difficult to find: truth integral.
I originally created this book for one reason: I wanted to have one source with all of the
best evidence, both empirical and philosophical, for the extent of predisposition in human beings.
Issues of control and origination naturally lead to issues of identity and responsibility. Telescope
in hand, my purpose in this book is to point it toward one constellation in our credulous sky and
challenge the still ubiquitous folk notions of free will, intention, and identity that seem to defy
the inference to the best explanation offered by the recent decades of scientific evidence. I will
offer a mountain of evidence for predictability in living things (the evidences) and I hope to
provoke you to ask yourself why this predictability exists if we are truly causally free from its
influence. I will also trace some of the implications, which are often surprisingly more optimistic
than we are inclined to fear.
We are constantly confabulating stories that conceal inclinations from some deeper part
of ourselves that our conscious selves are not aware ofor as Susan Blackmore might
suggest,3 of which, the conscious models of our many conscious selves show no awareness. That
is to say that each conscious self is a uniquely constructed narrative relative to the degree(s) of its
contingent awareness of something, and in this sense, we have many occurring simultaneously.
There may be a model of self that is aware to the degree that it communicates with others, a
model of self that is aware to the degree that it is in present danger, a model of self that is aware
to the degree of physical sensation it experiences, on and on simultaneously. Each self is
recalled upon demand, as it is advantageous, post hoc. These are the selves that are assembled
into a personal identity after the fact. Its bad enough that the glue that holds them together is
3
Viscontas, I. (Interviewer), Blackmore, S. (Interviewee). (2/27/2012). Point of Inquiry podcast: Gerald
Woerlee and Susan Blackmore - Near-Death Experiences and Consciousness. [Audio podcast]. (20:30-24:10).
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.pointofinquiry.org/gerald_woerlee_and_susan_blackmore_near-
death_experiences_and_consciousness
9
our venal memory, but our limited epistemic filter is the same cartridge through which we view
our whole life.
We go through life with the complete conviction that our influenced intentions and
decisions are completely rational and reflective and unbiased by unrealized motivations, with the
result of a basic intuition asserting our conscious mini-me is in the drivers seat with a fully
functional free will based upon meaningful reasoning. The reality is that within this market of
selves (again, adaptively selected on the fly, depending upon need), a slew of undetected
predisposed fallacious heuristics manifesting as behavioral and cognitive biases,4 neglects,
illusions and perception effectseven the effects of effects themselves,5 constantly influence our
choices. I want to present enough of these that you begin to see them like cockroaches: when you
become aware of three or four, then youll realize that there are more likely to be three or four
hundred you are unaware of.
The science of recent decades has shown us that the generation of responses is largely
unconscious, and we infer the moment of decision from the perceived moment of action6,7
[emphasis mine]. As neuroscientist Mark Hallett put it, Movement is generated subconsciously,
and the conscious sense of willing the movement comes later8 [emphasis mine]. That is to
say that the conscious mind might be better described largely as a delayed executive report of a
small fraction of whats actually happening below; its a preview9 of what action is already
instantiated, and were already acting *just before* were aware that weve consciously
decided to do so. I will present evidence showing that this is not confined to reflex or simple
decisions, but actually runs through the core of our personality affecting long term goals.
4
McKay, R., Efferson, C. (2010). The subtleties of error management. Evolution and Human Behavior. 31
309319
5
Engber, D. (10/26/2011). The Effect Effect: Daniel Kahneman and the language of popular psychology. Slate
Magazine. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/science/2011/10/daniel_kahneman_s_thinking_fast_and_slow_reviewed_.ht
ml
6
Bank, W. P., Isham, E. A. (2007). We Infer Rather Than Perceive the Moment We Decided to Act. Psychol
Sci. 2009 Jan;20(1):17-21. Available on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/journals/ps/20_1_inpress/banks.pdf
7
Eagleman, D.M. (2004). The where and when of intention. Science, 303, 11441146. Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://www.eaglemanlab.net/papers/EaglemanSciencePerspective2004.pdf
8
Hallett, M. (2009). Physiology of Volition. Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will.
Understanding Complex Systems, 2009, 127-143, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03205-9_7 Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://www.springerlink.com/content/b3jkw40413125637
9
Wegner, D. (2003). The Minds Self-Portrait. New York Academy of Sciences. 1001: 114 (2003). doi:
10.1196/annals.1279.011 (p. 10). Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~wegner/pdfs/Mind's%20Self%20Portrait.pdf
10
When Leibniz said that reasons may incline without necessitating,10 I mean to counter
that inclination always has a degree of necessity in the network of so much other influence,
realized or not, or there would be no inclination at all. Though Leibniz observed us often denying
ourselves and so inferred that we have freedom from causality, it is only because he was simply
not aware of all the causal forces at play. The origin of inclination is much more pervasive than
Leibniz could have imagined, right down to our psycho-semantic relationship with the vehicle of
language itself (and I will go into this more in the The Causal Vacuum). And many are still
wedded to worldviews built upon the philosophical ideas of people like Leibniz, established long
before the scientific evidence for cognitive mechanisms has made them largely irrelevant.
Its becoming increasingly obvious that we need to pay more attention to the evidence
that we really are beings who utilize some kind of dual/multiple processing cognitive system (or
perhaps in some way, merely divided by awareness), but this is nothing like the dualistic notion
of a spirit wearing a body. We have very limited access to the unconscious mind.11,12,13,14
Cognitive scientists estimate conscious awareness participation to be at only about 2%,15 with the
other 98% down in the basement, consciously unrealized (some more conservative estimates are
5%16). Some theorists, like Blackmore,17 would even downplay that conscious 2% as post hoc
and suggest that we are essentially automata. In any case, both the conscious and non-conscious
aspects of mind (not to imply they have different origins) are subject to causal forces at every
10
Leibniz, G.W.F. (1951). Selections. New York: Scribners [p. 435].
11
Erdelyi, M. H. (1985). Psychoanalysis: Freud's cognitive psychology. New York: Freeman.
12
Erdelyi, M. H. (1988). Issues in the Study of Unconscious and Defense Processes. In M. J. Horowitz (ed.),
Psychodynamics and Cognition. University of Chicago Press. Psychoanalysis and Consciousness in Philosophy
of Cognitive Science.
13
Erdelyi, M. H. (2006). The Unified Theory of Repression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5): Oct 2006,
499-511.
14
Kihlstrom, J. F. (1990). The psychological unconscious. In L. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook of personality: Theory
and research (pp. 445-464). New York: Guilford Press.
15
Mooney, C. (Interviewer), Lakoff, G. (Interviewee). (4/25/2011). Point of Inquiry podcast: George Lakoff -
Enlightenments, Old and New. [Audio podcast]. (9:40-10:00). Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.pointofinquiry.org/george_lakoff_enlightenments_old_and_new
16
Baumeister, R.F., Sommer, K.L. (1997). Consciousness, free choice, and automaticity. In: Wyer
Jr., R.S. (ed.) Advances in social cognition, vol. 10. Erlbaum, Mahwah.
17
11
turn, internally and externally. Michael Gazzaniga famously likens consciousness to an
interpreter18 and psychologist Daniel Wegner likens it to an abbreviated self-portrait:
The minds self-portrait has as a central feature the idea that thoughts cause actions, and
that the self is thus an origin of the bodys actions. This self-portrait is reached through a
process of inference of apparent mental causation, and it gives rise to the experience that
we are consciously willing what we do. Evidence from several sources suggests that this
self-portrait may often be a humble and misleading caricature of the minds operation--
but one that underlies the feeling of authorship and the acceptance of responsibility for
action.[19]
Compatibilist Eddy Nahmais has a version that he calls modular

epiphenomenalism,20,21 where the non-conscious mechanisms (mis)inform both our conscious
mechanism and our action. Julian Jaynes appropriated the notion of governmental bicameralism
(two-chamberedness) and applied it psychologically,22 producing the subtly different idea that
the mind is compartmentalized in such a way that it has an internal dialogue. I will allude to
several versions of bicameralism in Evidences #8, #12, #5, #23. Considering bicameralism
and similar ideas, Im completely on board with Dan Dennett when he wrote:
If we are going to use this top-down approach, we are going to have to be bold. We are
going to have to be speculative, but there is good and bad speculation, and this is not an
unparalleled activity in science. [] Those scientists who have no taste for this sort of
18
Gazzaniga , M. (Uploaded by EdinburghUniversity on Oct 19, 2009). Michael Gazzaniga - The
Interpreter. Gifford Lectures. Playfair Library Hall, the University of Edinburgh. [Video file]. Available on
9/19/2012 at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mJKloz2vwlc
19
10.1196/annals.1279.011 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
20
Nahmias, E. (2002). When consciousness matters: A critical review of Daniel Wegners The Illusion of
Conscious Will. Philosophical Psychology, 15 , 527 541 .
21
Nahmias, E. (2010). Scientific Challenges to Free Will, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (eds T.
O'Connor and C. Sandis), Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, UK. doi: 10.1002/9781444323528.ch44
22
Jaynes, J. (1976). The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin.
12
speculative enterprise will just have to stay in the trenches and do without it, while the
rest of us risk embarrassing mistakes and have a lot of fun.[23]
While its extremely difficult to intuitively overcome our evolutionarily selected

propensity for conscious authorship that appears as a complete picture of its own operation,24
its still easy enough to test whether the non-conscious minds sub-control (as I call it for
convenience) or the conscious mind has more direct mental control of the body. It certainly
seems like you can express the conscious will by lifting your arm or clapping your hands, but
well see evidence showing that the unconscious mind actually instantiates action slightly ahead
of the conscious decision to do so (Evidence #1).
And for the rest, well... Try, for example, to stop your nerves from feeling by merely
thinking about it. Stop your hair from growing or stop your body from producing urine by
merely thinking about it. And considering mental processes themselves, if youve ever tried to
stop thinking about thinking in meditation, youll understand where Im going.
Ask yourself why, for example, we should have a song stuck in our heads at all, let
alone after it is paused for 8 hours of sleep (okay, I prefer 10), even dreaming through many
different adventures without that song continuing on as a dream soundtrack, only to then arise
with that song from the night before suddenly replaying over and over in our heads again just
like a tape loop spliced around our sleep (and I write this in the middle of the third day of Elton
Johns Rocket Man chorus looping in my head, primed by a TV commercial). Clearly there are
some functions of consciousness/non-consciousness that have almost arbitrary mechanizations.
Why?
Psychology professor Margaret Wilson reminds us that the work of Epelboim, 1997,25
produced evidence that automatizing a task reduces the need for offloading work onto the
23
Dennett, D. (1998). "Julian Jayness Software Archeology." Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds
Representation and Mind. MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-04166-9
24
10.1196/annals.1279.011 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
25
Epelboim, J. (1997). Deictic codes, embodiment of cognition, and the real world. Behavioral & Brain
Sciences, 20, 746.
13
environment.26 Consider again all the multiple internal functions that have evolved to need
regulating in the body and are controlled by the non-conscious mind Can you mentally decide
to stop your heartbeat internally? Sure, we could increase control of a few select functions to a
very limited extent using methods like meditation, as we have seen yogis do, or biofeedback,
or we could plunge a knife into our hearts and win control that way, but as it is when dealing
with other people, there is a difference between compliance and eradication of the challenging
situation itself. How is it that we have lost, or never really had, complete control of our internal
functioning? Its still us underneath, right? Is sub-control your control? Is everything that your
body does your will? No? Then we must be able to evidence our ability to consistently divorce
our body from our will, right?
This all leads to a main concern for this book: is a life largely or even partially controlled
by a non-conscious controller, including all unrealized non-conscious reaction to external
influenceeven tainting the motivations in long term planningis that still freely controlled?
To what extent do we call this operator us in the sense of identity? Many theorists claim our
conscious, reasoned intentions give us free will. If even those are influenced by the non-
conscious mind to influence and alter those choices in a fundamentally undetectable way, who
has really made the decision?
Was it even really a decision or just a winning consensus of overwhelming, dominating,
automated impulses representing different parts of brain and body,27 that is, by genotype and
phenotype (via environment), individually and together; and by subsequent neuronal wiring of
corporeal and/or cerebral political factions? Are what we experience as conscious decisions
really just masks of ad hoc confabulations that incorporate all-too-late reasons, some more
convincing than others? I shall present evidence showing that this is not only possible, but likely,
in many more instances than we suspect.
Theres no reason why even instinctual actions shouldnt often line up with our reasoning
anyway, if they both come from the same source with the same desires. Desired actions would
depend upon how strong the less controllable impulses are that are not in accord with our reason.
26
Wilson, M. (2002). Six Views of Embodied Cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 9 (4):625--636. [p. 9].
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.124.8295&rep=rep1&type=pdf
27
Wright, R. (Interviewer), Dennett, D. (Interviewee). [9/2004]. Interview with Daniel Dennett, by Robert
Wright. [32:00-34:00]. Available on 9/19/2012 at http://www.conscious-robots.com/en/researchers-and-
associations/interviews/interview-with-daniel-dennett-by-robert-w.html
14
These ultimately have influence tooin fact, they get worked into the reasoning itself or are
subconsciously frontloaded, as we shall see.
All of this has implications in the historical arguments concerning free will and
determinism. Determinists can be roughly defined as those against contra-causal free will, i.e.
determinists contend that events and/or thoughts and/or actions are the results of the causal play
of forces in the world. There are many versions of this basic definition of determinism that are
more or less strict. This basic definition is good enough to serve my purpose.
It must be remembered that if randomness/acausality in the universe is fundamentally
true on some level tooand currently, many physicists say it is, even irrespective of limitations
in our knowledge (this is controversial though!), free will is then assaulted by both determinism
and acausality, and its up to the clever philosopher to carve out a meaningful defense for
meaningful free will somewhere in-between or beyond. How and why would we act at all if the
act had no causal motivation or even random motivation?
Throughout history, there have been some clever models defending versions of free will
with differing strengths, and we shall look at some of them in the Challenges (where Ill talk
more about acausality as well). While Ill make the humble, conservative, agnostic caveat that
its impossible to give absolutely definitive proof on these matters either way, I think all the free
will models posited so far that I am aware of have failed to trounce the inexorable authority of
these two fundamental forces: determinism and acausality, with the evidence for local
determinism ruling the day in the most relevant context of everyday choice. Ultimately, I will
argue for what I call predispositionalism, which combines the best of determinism and
compatibilism, and unifies the most relevant parts of several schools in psychology. It stands in
opposition to free will libertarianism.
Free will libertarians (nothing to do with the political movement) are defined by the
metaphysical ability to do otherwise of their own free will.28 I mean to present enough evidence
to suggest that this is merely due to
a) epistemic limitations concerning the actual motivations underlying even

(supposedly) reasoned actions
28
Kane, R. (Fischer, J.M., Pereboom, D., Vargas, M.) (2007). Four Views on Free Will. MA: Blackwell. (p. 6)
Available on 9/19/2012 at http://www.thedivineconspiracy.org/Z5217X.pdf
15
b) the unfair assertion that influence originating in the body proper is
responsible because it originates in the body proper, in a more fundamental way
than a person who is a product of nature and nurture can be (e.g. more
fundamental to the point that it exacerbates and/or perpetuates polarizing black
and white notions of metaphysical good and evil that dont actually exist, but
seem to exist, because of our ignorance to nuance and causal complexity).
This is to say that because an agents identity and motives are so ill-defined and
unrecognized, when she chooses to go left or right on the forked path, there are always enough
unrealized motives from non-conscious elements of the self influencing that decision to provide
sufficient causes, whether they are reasons or actual causally determining neural coding. This is
in addition to the realized causes, which are often confabulations anyway.
We should also take a close look at how people characterize free decisions before the
forked path. Sam Harris, in a lecture29 on his recent book about the absence of free will, makes
the pure and simple point that our freedom of thought itself is fundamentally thwarted by our
lack of freedom to choose what ideas pop into our heads in the first place. Alfred Mele once
wrote ...notice that we are not always in (proximal) control of which of our beliefs come to
mind anyway.30 Ironically, suppressing thoughts can lead to a rebound effect where the
thoughts actually recur more frequently anyway.31
When it comes to reasoning, these quasi-random ideas are still enmeshed in causal
processes, even if we may be limited in producing exactly what we want mentally. I happen to
think that we have more control of some ideas than others, though, perhaps a little more than
Harris thinks, and there is evidence for this whenever people simply work for solutions to
problems and then generate them. Its important to recognize that sometimes we think that we
havent yet decided something, but we often know what factors would tip the scales and so we
have decided, based upon internal modeling, and merely await the final inputs of data to know
which model to choose.
29
Harris, S. (Uploaded on Mar 27, 2012 by MichaelShermer). [20:00-25:00]. Available on 9/20/2012 at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pCofmZlC72g&feature=related
30
Mele, A. (1995). Autonomous Agents. (p. 15). New York: Oxford University Press.
31
Abramowitz, J. S., Tolin, D. F., & Street, G. P. (2001). Paradoxical effects of thought suppression: A meta-
analysis of controlled studies. Clinical Psychology Review, 21, 683703. Available on 9/20/2012 at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S027273580000057X
16
Because of this problem, as philosopher Neil Levy notes, Libertarians therefore locate
the indeterminacy they claim to be required by free will upstream of decision, or in the decision-
making process itself.32 So, much indecision is really based upon our epistemic deficiency and
waiting until the last moment gives us more information to work with. Two options may really
just be in very close competition, enough to go either way depending on a small change of
evidence. In this way, many decisions often categorized as free seem to be rather a free will
heuristic itself, where the rule of thumb is to wait until we have the most evidence possible and
the freedom perceived is merely a conflation, commensurate with the remaining ignorance
concerning the final data.
So, this kind of freedom is largely decided in a heuristic that itself was evolutionarily
selected for and may or may not represent genuine stochastic factors. In fact, as the Evidences
will show, what many libertarian philosophers consider to be the most important free decisions,
such as moral and social relationship decisions, are immediately decided upon by unreasoned
fast thinking heuristics based upon in-group semantic cues and/or physiological hormonal
interaction. This is true from dopamine influenced desires to oxytocin levels. Philosopher
Timothy Schroeder reminds us that even just desire motivation gets a boost of dopamine, so that
the wanting itself creates and perpetuates a physiological teaser of what one would get by
obtaining the object/goal.33 I think that this later in the game appeal to establishing freedom
via how reasoned out it is comes as an extraneous attempt to salvage it anyway, for a few
different reasons
The will itself is blanketed with enough internal and external misdirecting heuristics that
go beyond the agents will. This is crucial. They should therefore be considered to be at least as
threatening to free will as what Robert Kane calls Austin-style examples34 (after J. L. Austin).
Austin-style examples are like when a golfers putt is thrown off by a random nervous twitch;
a brain cross thwarts an attempt to press the correct button on a coffee machine, etc. Many
libertarians do admit that Austin-style examples will thwart free will. The many heuristics I
32
Levy, N. (2005). Contrastive Explanations: A Dilemma for Libertarians. Dialectica, Vol. 59, No. 1. (2005),
pp. 51-61 Key: citeulike:577383 Available on 9/19/2012 at
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0174/contrastive_explanations.pdf [p. 3].
33
Muehlhauser, L. (Interviewer), Schroeder, T. (Interviewee). (7/25/2010). Conversation from the Pale Blue
Dot podcast: 057: Tim Schroeder Desire and Morality. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=9456
34
17
will discuss in the Evidences influence us to act or think in a way, like an Austin-style
example, that is not according to our will. As Kane puts it, to have free will, it is necessary
not only to be the ultimate source of ones actions, but also to be the ultimate source of ones will
to perform the actions.35
The influence of the unconscious minds misdirecting heuristics may not be truly
random, but it is unrelated enough to have sufficient arbitrariness. Consider Kahneman and
Tverskys experiments showing the anchoring effect, where people who were environmentally
primed with higher or lower numbers on a rigged roulette wheel shortly afterward
commensurately chose higher or lower numbers when guessing the percentage of African nations
in the U.N.36 (see Evidence #31). Even all this, though, is too little and too late when we get
down to the even earlier causal sources and consider that there is no passive or acausal way to
gather information. Even a mere impression sets off an instant, complex, internal causal network
that libertarians cant avoid (more about this in the section The Causal Vacuum in the
Challenges).
My principle tactic here is to over-argue for a still completely tenable, though slightly
more controversial position in order to more deeply establish my ultimately adequate goal of a
somewhat more moderate position. I will argue evidentially for (fairly strong) determinism via
the alienation/estrangement of the conscious mind from the dominant non-conscious mind, as
well as the minds potential for internal and external manipulation by agent, by event, or from
one side of the curtain between the conscious and non-conscious mind to the other. This is in
order to firmly satisfy that what I will call predispositionalism is a defeater to the proposition
that we already generally utilize the kind of free will concept that is compatible with and
appropriate for how the world both is and should be systematically and structurally when it
comes to metaphysics/theology, social relations, justice, politics, etc.
The addition of the pre in predispositionalism will serve to include both the inner
characteristics of general dispositionalism (i.e. internal attribution within a commonly
perceived personal identity that ignores environment, situation, and culture) plus situational
attribution (i.e. external context) and highlight the fact that external context and all the
reasons this book will discuss that affect the will actually do some work in predisposing us
35
Ibid. (p. 19).
36
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124-
1130. Available on 9/19/2012 at http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/Ec101/JudgementUncertainty.pdf
18
towards actions. These reasons and contexts cannot be tenably excused merely because of our
epistemic limitations in defining all the complex parameters of each instantial causal network.
Indeed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between internal and external attributions
in the pragmatic definition of identity (I will discuss this more thoroughly in the Challenges
section after the Evidences). Predispositionalism emphasizes the strength of physiologically
interactive internal attributes and not strictly mental internal attributes possible in regular old
dispositionalism.
Some of the most well-known libertarians, such as Robert Kane, already accommodate
dispositionalism anyway. As we shall see, for Kane, internal characteristics appear to at least
partially underlie responsibility in the form of Self-Forming Actions. The choices an individual
makes creates an overall character over time that is at once freely chosen (in Kanes view), and
yet also has an epiphenomenal secondary quality along the lines of Lao Tzus famous saying,
A cart is more than the sum of its parts. This is all fine and good, but now there is evidence of
external influence that is, as I said, seemingly impossible to delineate in terms of tradition
identity.
Predispositionalism accommodates, appreciates, and incorporates both reductive and
holistic approaches, based upon the actual causal relevance of environment and cognitive
mechanisms. While it is not wedded to any psychological model beyond where the evidence
goes, the marriage is analogous to some social-cognitive perspectives in psychology, like Alfred
Banduras reciprocal determinism.37 I imagine George Engels BPS model38 (biopsychosocial
diagnostics) should/could have it too if it didnt overcompensate so far as to completely reject
the biomedical model when its more relevant (and just like when Carl Rogers humanistic
therapy overcompensated optimistically for Freuds pessimism, the truth in the middle was lost).
But this is not an appeal for fallacy of the middle-ground compatibilism, just what is
actually relevant and that comes with the science... as it comes. Psychologically, I merely mean
to salvage and incorporate the external emphasis prominent in unsuccessful behaviorism with the
recent evidence supporting cognitivism and functionalism, by predispositionalisms automatic
internal incorporation of the external world via mirror neurons, cognitive offloading, etc.
37
Bandura, A. (1986). Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
38
Biopsychosocial Model. (9/19/2012). The Nursing Planet. Available on 8/7/2012 at
http://nursingplanet.com/theory/biopsychosocial_model.html
19
As the great cognitive scientist John Bargh said concerning our propensity to frontload
evaluations (which I will show in the Evidences), each of these evaluations do directly affect
behavioral predispositions to act towards the object; muscular, behavioral, arm and leg and so
forthbodily movements, and again, this all happens within say, 200 milliseconds of exposure to
the stimulus39 [emphasis mine]. As Bargh notes, this covers all evaluations, not just strong ones.
It occurs to me that this evidence alone puts a significant burden upon the compatibilist, let alone
the libertarian.
How does predispositionalism differ from one or another variety of strong or soft
determinism (i.e. that previous events determine future events), compatibilism (i.e. determinism
and free will are compatible, so is responsibility), or incompatibilism (i.e. determinism is not
compatible with either free will or with responsibility)? My view probably could be reasonably
parsed into those veins in various ways, perhaps as a kind of soft incompatibilism or something
like Paul Russells compatibilist-fatalism,40 but its unnecessary to have to officially take such a
strong label though, even if my intuitions point toward incompatibilism or semi-
compatibilism, given that traditional compatibilism is really just a pragmatic semantic issue
induced by epistemological limitations.
We still may ultimately have a very complex situation where the overwhelming majority
of our action is strongly determined, but a small minority is not (what John Martin Fischer called
almost causal determinism41), and so prudence compels me to officially take a more
moderate agnostic position and hope that it is still enough to persuade the reader that we have
much less control than we believed at the end of the daythat we really must honestly confront
predisposition and not over-inflate the paupers purse and what it may purchase. The stream of
commonality between all of the Evidences listed here is that they evidence a kind of
predictability about thinking and behavior that we would not normally expect; one that seems to
genuinely undermine reasoning and freedom. If all the ancillary premises here were to fail with
further evidence in the years to come, this alone is worth trying to document.
39
TheMizzouTube. (uploaded on 8/23/2011). Unconscious behavioral guidance systems. Lecture by John A.
Bargh. [Video file]. [8:00-13:00]. University of Missouri Video Services. Available on 9/19/2012 at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pWSC48EUg-8
40
Russell, P. (2000). Compatibilist-Fatalism. Moral Responsibility and Ontology. (Kluwer: Dordrecht), 199-
218. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/prussell/Journals/Fatalism%20Final.pdf
41
Fischer, J. M., Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. (p. 15).
Cambridge University Press.
20
So, is being (pre)disposed as strong as being (pre)determined? That is to ask: is it
governed by strict/strong determinism or adequate/soft determinism? The evidence presented
here seems to show a continuum of both and may sit comfortably enough epistemologically in
the realm of (higher) probability to still undermine folk notions of free will with what I believe
are sufficiently and ultimately contrastive explanations.42 This is because experience is never
truly passive and there are always neuronal differences, whether or not the intentions or the
choices themselves are explicitly reasoned or rational, delineated by effectively impersonal
actions from some internal other(s) that we would not ascribe meaningful responsibility to for
anything other than pragmatic reasons, such as to deter or contain collateral damage. I like
predispositionalism because it leans significantly toward determinism, but not absolutely. We
need new language that reflects where the science is, without the baggage.
That free will/determinism discussions consider higher and lower probabilities
epistemically for inclinations as relevant is another motivation for the predispositionalism
labeling. This is to say that the functional consistency in the world (e.g. technology), in
combination with evidence that certain inclinations and biases are empirically shown to navigate
around our will, are evidence that our epistemic dependence upon probability is due to epistemic
limitations and does not necessitate probability correlate veridically across the board into all
physical and abstract realms. That we can separate stochastic factors in technology enough, for
example, to make a complex machine run throughout our entire lives, shows a salient departure
from a world where all consistency has a term limit subject to narrative or randomnesseven if
causality is probabilistic at the quantum level and we are ignorant enough to have to apply
probability to much of the world. In the least, when we consider the macro world, the great
statistician Persi Diaconis said it best, Probability is not a fact about the world; it is a fact about
the observers knowledge.43 (Not surprising to hear from a guy who has literally mastered the
ability to flip heads on a coin at will!)
Predispositionalism is a funny thing in the context of causality and acausality. Because of
the increased predictability in behavior, it intuitively feels like it should belong in the
determinism camp, but in the context of control, it is probably actually closer to acausality! This
42
Clarke, R., Kearns, S. (1/18/2011). On the problem of free will. [Video file]. [25:00-34:00]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.philostv.com/randolph-clarke-and-stephen-kearns
43
Episode 15: What is Probability (1988). Against All Odds: Inside Statistics. [Video file]. Annenberg
Media. ISBN: 1-55946-091-1 Available on 9/19/2012 at
http://www.learner.org/vod/vod_window.html?pid=153
21
is because the predispositions, while causal, are both arbitrary and ensconced. We may have a
goal in mind, but it will be filtered through heuristics that are fundamentally shaped by forces
that favor, for example, the adaptability and/or survival of the organism. This often has little or
nothing to do with you trying to, say, pick out the best tie on the rack (youre more predisposed
[not fated!] to go for the one the right by the way Evidence #18).
This said, its also true that theorists who want to establish free will must either present
acausality in a non-random way to preserve the control required for free will that
causality/determinism offers or they must present determinism in a flexible enough way to
preserve the freedom required for free will that acausality may offer. This is a goal, though, that
must always be tempered by an honest awareness of our tendency to filter our thoughts through
the fallacy of desired consequence. We shouldnt argue for what we want, but what the evidence
suggests... Unfortunately, as we shall see (see Evidence #24), thats not how we argue, and
even these theorists (and this writer), who would openly agree about the value of establishing
untainted objective facts, are subject to parameters of intention and identity that we are just too
entrenched in to remove from our core intuitions.
In the past, libertarians have tried all manner of assertions. As the libertarian philosopher
Robert Kane put it, ...libertarians have posited transempirical power centers, immaterial egos,
noumenal selves outside of space and time, unmoved movers, uncaused causes and other unusual
forms of agency or causation thereby inviting charges of obscurity or mystery against their
view.44 Some of these persist or resurface in variant forms. The evidence presented here will
challenge extreme/strong libertarianism and folk notions of dualism (like the above listed) that
advocate contra-causal free will more than it will challenge some of the more modest soft(er)
libertarians, though it will still stand in opposition to many of their common premises as well.
There are so many exciting theorists who know the terrain well and yet they splinter off
here and there in every possible direction. I cannot address them all, but most of the ones I
mention here are worth investigating further. There are more moderate libertarians, such as Mark
Balaguer, who is an event-causal libertarian that allows for determinism in a way; he relabels it
as appropriate non-randomness, while seeming to still hold out for some other more robust
validation of acausality in the free will equation. There is Alfred Mele, with one or more horns of
44
22
his agnostic autonomism; his daring soft libertarianism suggests that a counterfactually free
agents evolving character-forming decisions serve as a causal substance that affects
probabilities governing future moral decisions enough to resolve the luck problem for
responsibility (i.e. where luck involved in a decision process presents a lack of control and
responsibility). There is Robert Kane, who holds that the only free decisions are ones restricted
to moral decisions, because the freedom is produced by the moral imperative (ala Kant) in times
of increased indeterminacy, evoked by genuinely controversial desires. Bob Doyle rightly points
out that this engages the ethical fallacy.45
Flickers of Freedom is philosopher John Martin Fischers term46 for a type of objection
to Frankfurt-style cases (i.e. famous thought experiments similar to Austen style cases that
challenge our intuitions about freedom in decision-making). That this is the name of the most
popular free will related blog by Thomas Nadelhoffer may show the collective impression of the
state of freedom in philosophy for many theorists. It does seem to come down to mere flickers,
but for some, that is just enough. I will discuss whether this is a difference in measure or in kind.
Last, as I alluded to earlier, the predispositionalism label also serves to focus more upon
what endures even beyond possible defeaters to varieties of determinism (e.g. emergent
phenomenathough that this should be a defeater to all forms of determinism is debatable
itself), even circumnavigating around possible acausality in the mix (e.g. quantum
noise/stochasticity, and whatever extent that should be proven to be a factor at the macro level or
in consciousness. I will discuss this in Quantum Stochasticity in the Challenges section after the
Evidences).
The mounting evidence for heretofore undetectable effects and biases, such as our
vulnerability to the power of priming, along with the overwhelming subconscious primacy over
the conscious mind, combined with the absence of any evidence for some kind of causally free
consciousness that makes all the decisions (i.e. substance dualism: the ghost in the machine, as
the philosopher Gilbert Ryle pejoratively called it47), leaves us with a sufficient starting point to
commence with an attack on folk interpretations of the intuitive experience of what has been
45
Ethical Fallacy. (N.D.). [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/ethical_fallacy.html
46
Fischer, J. M. (2006). My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press.
47
Singham, M. (11/10/2010). On free will-2: The Ghost in the Machine. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://machineslikeus.com/news/free-will-2-ghost-machine
23
called the freedom to do otherwise in the same exact situation, however natural and real it may
seem to be in everyday experience.
I will allude to the Manipulation Argument. To defined this roughly: given that subjects
possess some amount of something called freedom, if agential forces can manipulate some
level of that freedom, so can nature/non-agential forces and the two may add up to leave us with
negligible or no freedom to spare. This may also negate moral responsibility in some meaningful
way as well and my include arguments that subterranean identity (i.e. the non-conscious will)
and other identity issues (e.g. situational attribution/extended identity) are beyond the rational
control of our conscious awareness enough to reasonably undermine folk notions of free will and
responsibility in a meaningful way. I mean meaningful in that evidenced predispositions for
otherwise illogical inclinations have substantial weight. Let me give you an example. Try to
randomly choose one of these four numbers:
1 2 3 4
As statisticians De Veaux, Velleman, and Bock tell us, 75% of us will choose #3,
approximately 25% of us will choose 2 or 4, and only 5% of us (freaks like me) will choose #1.48
Why is this so? Why should it be so skewed, so consistently? And why just to the right of center?
As we will see in Evidence #18, perhaps a bias that aesthetically and even morally prefers
objects on the right side is to blame. These kinds of inclinations should not even exist at all if a
strong libertarian indeterminism was actually effective. Keep this one-two punch of ill-defined
identity and natural manipulation in mind as you read through this book.
Free will has at least three components that its proponents need to satisfy in order to
rescue it from the cold hard grip of determinism. Henrik Walters describes them in his
wonderful book, Neurophilosophy of Free Will: From Libertarian Illusions to a Concept of
48
De Veaux, R. D., Velleman, P. F., Bock, D. E. (2012). Stats: Data and Models (3rd Edition). Boston, MA:
Pearson Education, Inc.
24
Natural Autonomy.49 Its a good idea to examine them earlier than later to give yourself an idea
of what is being challenged and defended throughout this work:
The FIRST component is the ability to do otherwise, given the exact same situation.
(This is often framed as what Harry Frankfurt called the principle of alternative
possibilities, or PAP; it is reinforced by the principle of possible refrainment, or
PPR).
The SECOND component is the ability to act from an intelligible form of

volitionto possess meaningful reasons for action. [It should be noted that
volition in its purest sense is merely the awareness of abilities to do/act otherwise.
This is not free will in itself either, as it still has unknown limits and origins.]
The THIRD component is the ability for one to be the originator of his actions,50
which I will argue also entails delineating a non-arbitrary proper identity.
As Walter notes, these are intuitions that many philosophers share about free will, though
unpacking each one to the extent needed to satisfy everyone could take volumes. Whats
important is that free will arguments must address more than one parameter or another: they must
address all three, even if hybrids may be created by positing stronger and weaker versions of
each category. To be remiss in any one of these parameters of freedom altogether, and
sometimes even just partially, would invalidate it as being truly free from any causal influence. It
should also be noted that a presence of identity further qualifies all three, but especially for the
third.
The scientific studies collected here challenge the commonly perceived extent of agential
control and awareness, agential responsibility, and have implications for agential identity as well,
even suggesting that perhaps there is no meaningful core identity. They implicitly make an
argument for the undermining of conscious control as we experience it, while also often
simultaneously challenging intuitive notions of identity in the phenomenal first-person
49
Walter, H. (2001). Neurophilosophy of free will: from libertarian illusions to a concept of natural autonomy.
(Trans. Cynthia Klohr). Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, (p. 6). ISBN 0262232146
50
Ibid. (pp. 261-262).
25
perspective that is commonly experienced as you. This is what Thomas Metzinger reduces to
ownership/my-ness, pre-reflexive self-intimacy/a stream of consciousness, and
perspectivalness/centeredness in the Phenomenal Self Model (PSM). The PSM is a transparent
subconscious model of our selves, constructed of at least these three qualities.51
Predispositionalism serves to highlight that even if we were to have as much control as
we think we do, epistemic misperception could taint that freedom to some extent anywayto the
extent that it could alter a decision, even though it was considered freely decided via what was
considered adequate reflection. Perhaps regardless of whether or not the non-conscious mind
represents inclinations that affect the perception of the conscious mind, then it would also seem
that even internal identity attribution would be as important as any freedom issue. Some
theorists consider things like dispositional psychological states to count as personal identity
within intentional action.52
If limited awareness of all the brains activity creates a conscious identity with a specific
opinion/belief/will based upon those limitations (2%), is that persons conscious identity still
responsible for their unconscious identity that has a differing opinion/belief/will based upon a
more complete knowledge of the self, since the person represents both aspects of mind
functionally? Does suicide by a knife to the heart show that a conscious mind intending to stop
that heart is at odds with and therefore separate from a non-conscious mind that intends to keep it
beating? We can also ask to what extent a person should be responsible for her actions performed
while sleepwalking or under varying degrees of stress or as several Evidences will suggest,
based upon the predisposed physical capacity of her cognitive equipment. Also, does the non-
conscious mind alter the conscious mind in order to persuade it? That is to say, should we
consistently grant the non-conscious mind functional capacity for intention status if it proves to
be a sufficiently dissimilar identity from the conscious mind in a meaningful way?
While those kinds of distinctions are more difficult delineate, its clear is that these
studies do show a strong enough influence and/or alteration of our cognitive experience so as to
collectively undermine the notion that we, as individuals, possess contra-causal free will.
Again, this is also known as libertarian free will; i.e. I have the ability to think and choose,
51
Metzinger, Thomas. Being No One. The Immortality of the Soul presented by the UC Berkeley Graduate
Council. Series: UC Berkeley Graduate Council Lectures [Show ID: 9181]. Berkeley, CA. 2/2005. Retrieved
on 9/19/2012 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mthDxnFXs9k
52
26
completely undetermined by and independent of *any* forcesthat is also to say that I may
always freely change my mind and freely choose to do otherwise. This is the freest version of
free will. Contra-causal means against causality; it may even freely go against the cause and
effect relationship in physical necessity that we have observed throughout the physical universe.
It should also be noted that since this does not follow logically from the view of natural science
in Newtonian mechanics, contra-causal/libertarian free will is/has often been often claimed to be
a gift from god and/or be a (by)product of the spirit/soul (though as we shall see, not always).
Contra-causal/libertarian free will is to be distinguished from the less free versions of
free will, such as what some naturalist philosophers call local control.53 This is defined here in
the negative sense as the mere physical and/or mental ability simpliciter, to perform an objective
without restraint; that is, free volition only in the everyday functionalist sense of what you
perceive that you are able to perform without someone or something stopping you (though it is
still caused, and therefore, should probably be considered different from contra-causal free will
not only in measure, but in kind). In his book Elbow Room,54 Dan Dennett illustrates the
measure of this freedom by asking us to consider the freedom of an animal in a small cage in
contrast to the freedom of that animal in a zoo. Local control is that difference.
Think of local control in terms of perceived possibility within our epistemic limitations.
All the forces of the world inside and outside your mind/body will compel you one way or the
other eventually; you just dont know which way until you do. You might think that you know
that you are actually able to choose to move your hand to the left or to the right, but until you
actually do it, what you actually knew and what you will actually do was and is still only
probabilistic, with merely very good odds (based upon precedence) that you wont have a heart
attack and die before you are able to accomplish the choice. Even highly probabilistic
possibilities are still not absolute knowledge of facts inscribed into the fabric of space-time...
again, until they are. So our knowledge is based upon probability, even if events in the world are
actually, overwhelmingly, a determined result of causal forces that are too complex to track.
Consistency in science evidences this (though, as I shall discuss later, some will challenge any
determined result with substance dualism and stochasticity).
53
Clark, T. (3/2008). Dont Forget About Me: Avoiding Demoralization by Determinism. Local vs. ultimate
control. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.naturalism.org/demoralization.htm#local
54
Dennett, D. C. (1984). Elbow Room. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
27
Local control is also what it means for some determinists to call themselves
compatibilists. Compatibilists contend that a determined world does not affect my own personal
ability to participate in the causation, in fact, it is required to some extent, in order to have
personal control. Again, my will is caused, but my person experiences the real contribution
and participation via conscious awareness of some of my actions, while being ignorant of all the
determinates.
John Martin Fischer frames semi-compatibilists as those who believe that determinism is
compatible with moral responsibility, and would see local control as semantically
inconsequential. Randolph Clarke frames narrow incompatibilists as those who believe that
determinism is incompatible with freedom but is compatible with moral responsibility. There are
also hard and soft compatibilists and incompatibilists (who sometimes, in the latter camp, wish
to suspend the issue of causality and focus on a way toward evidencing free will via
responsibility55), etc.too many varieties to cover here.
Since we are unable to completely illustrate any network of causation with absolute
perfection, theres always wiggle room for creative moderate neo-libertarian theorists, like Mark
Balaguer, who might contend that there are no distinctly metaphysical facts, and yet will admit
that the metaphysically interesting issue in the problem of free will and determinism boils down
to a straightforward and wide open empirical question about the causal histories of certain neural
events.56 The former quote implies the question is still open, but the latter reminds us that all
possibilities are not equally probable. This is a reasonably moderate position, even if I think a
neutral position is seriously threatened by the sum of the empirical evidence presented here that
leans in favor of deterministic incompatibilism (or semi/narrow/compatibilism). Whether or not
the summation of evidence in this book at the end of the day is really better described as
compatibilist, incompatibilist, or semi/narrow/compatibilist, I shall leave that, as well as any
other hybrid or middle-ground labels up to the reader (though my intuition leans to the latter
two).
Because of the ignorance of both our causal contingencies and the limitations of success
within our local control, the limited awareness that perceives our seemingly willful contributions
55
Muehlhauser, L. (Interviewer), Timpe, K. (Interviewee). (2/17/2010). Conversation from the Pale Blue Dot
podcast: 019: Kevin Timpe God and Free Will. [Audio podcast]. [4:15-6:20]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
56
Balaguer, M. (2010). Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. Cambridge; MIT Press. [pp. 1, 169]
28
in the present seems to be enough to consider ourselves free in some sense. Perhaps it is just
enough in some sense says the compatibilist, but as it has been noted by philosophers, even the
most extreme libertarian depends upon some cosmic stability to manifest her will, and its hard to
imagine this without, in the least, some functioning chains of causal determinism. Thinking itself
depends upon the consistency in the universe, even if there is not one long or eternal perfectly
determined chain from A to Z.
Considering the inescapable physiological and psychological subconscious causal
influence upon our experience (which we will consider in this collection), both externally and
internally, we are compelled to ask if the remaining element of self-awareness that seems to
traverse our experiences is enough to assert untainted self-control in a meaningful way. Is our
role in the world other than what the world requires via necessity and what the mind processes
subconsciously? Are our choices independent of any influence or enough to say that we have a
truly free will? We shall see, but considering the evidences at hand, it seems that whatever
answer we propose is worthy of the plot for a sci-fi novel. Perhaps one in which extra-
dimensional creatures virtually ride in our bodies through our predetermined world like a
rollercoaster hmm actually, thats not too different than some of the religious perspectives
well consider too.
Cause and effect is undeniable in the physical world. Its why science and technology
work. Consider a simple billiard ball scenario where one ball hits another ball that hits another
ball (though the world is more like causal network) and imagine if the middle ball simply
suddenly had self-awareness. Next, even though we observe cause and effect and mechanistic
principles in the world, we would ask if things like ideas are subject to causality too. To what
extent are conscious beings really some kind of cosmological automatons? Are thoughts
somehow independent from physicality? Are we just robots or puppets? Is there a third or fourth
alternative or a continuum? As the great monist Baruch Spinoza might have put it, are we natura
naturens/nature naturing: interactive expressions of a universe doing the dance as it becomes
aware of itself; or are we natura naturata, nature natured: expressions of a universe where the
dance is done OR somehow both, as Spinoza contended. You may or may not know that
many physicists like Einstein believe space-time is already being mapped out as a block
29
universe. Einstein once said, ...for us physicists believe the separation between past, present,
and future is only an illusion, although a convincing one57?
Regardless of speculation whether or not there is any kind of essence to consciousness
(whatever THAT means) or some kind of Consciousness (big C) beyond what we observe on
earth, in the least, we can say that humans have self-awareness in the world, so we cannot be
robots in the vital sense that we commonly use that word (or can we?58,59,60). That said, the
evidences in this book will challenge us to reconsider how similar conscious life really is from
what we would consider to be AI: artificial intelligence. While some critics61,62 maintain that a
straight comparison of the human brain/mind to a computer or software (sometimes referred to as
strong AI) belies too many of the as of yet still unknown details to satisfy our needs for an
unquestionably complete theory of consciousness (e.g. self-organization, mechanism of
sentience, subjective phenomenal experience, etc.), there are still many thought experiments that
are useful in this vein63,64,65 (sometimes referred to as weak AI) and do increasingly correlate
with the evidence. I would be remiss to ignore this evidence, even if so many nuanced narratives
throughout the history of humanity are offended to the core.
Consider that even a robot freely expresses the causal play of forces shared by agents in
bigger or smaller cages with the same extensions and limitations upon its local freedom:
pushing, pulling, imposing, resisting, etc. Setting aside for now how limited self-awareness
57
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (7/24/2007). Radiolab podcast: No Special Now. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.radiolab.org/2007/jul/24/no-special-now
58
Pennisi, E. (5/3/2011). Even Robots Can Be Heroes. Science Now. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/05/even-robots-can-be-heroes.html
59
Ewing, D. (3/8/2007). Robots Evolve to Deceive. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/duncan/17547
60
Floreano, D., Mitri, S., Magnenat, S., Keller, L. (3/2007). Evolutionary Conditions for the Emergence of
Communication in Robots. Current Biology. Volume 17, Issue 6, 20 March 2007, Pages 514-519. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.neurosecurity.com/articles/genetic/CommEvolution.pdf
61
Weed, L. (Jan.-Feb./2012). Philosophy of Mind: An Overview. Philosophy Now. Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://www.philosophynow.org/issues/87/Philosophy_of_Mind_An_Overview
62
Parry, M. (10/9/2011). Raymond Tallis Takes Out the 'Neurotrash.' The Chronicle of Higher Education.
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://chronicle.com/article/Raymond-Tallis-Takes-Out-
the/129279/#disqus_thread
63
Wright, R. (Interviewer), Dennett, D. (Interviewee). [9/2004]. Interview with Daniel Dennett, by Robert
Wright. [34:00-end]. Available on 9/19/2012 at http://www.conscious-robots.com/en/researchers-and-
associations/interviews/interview-with-daniel-dennett-by-robert-w.html
64
Kagan, S. (Uploaded by YaleCourses on Oct. 6, 2008). 3. Arguments for the existence of the soul, Part I.
[Video file post]. [29:45-end]. Available on 9/19/2012 at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GR63MMAi-
fs&feature=relmfu
65
Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown.
30
originates66 (often called the user illusion in computer science), consider what you would have
if you were to add limited self-awareness to a robot that also already had predetermined
programming (e.g. a chess program or a digital clock). Lets say it was mostly limited to an
awareness of external orientation, with minimal internal modeling mostly in relation to said
external experience (For those familiar with it, I ask you to consider the limited awareness of the
last person in Searles Chinese Room67 thought experiment: the interpreter). It would also have
an awareness of more or less limitation upon its freedom of movement but, when it comes
time to performing operations, it might also be inclined to mistakenly perceive that its intention
originated from its awareness, when in reality, it would be the logical fallacy of post hoc ergo
propter hoc: after, therefore because of.
Consider if the robot also incorporated complex improvisational software in its
programming that sorts (pseudo or truly) random data into organized forms, following generally
beneficial heuristics that balance personal and social benefits. This is a large part of the
conscious mind that we experience as freely willed and directed when we are thinking. Thoughts
are popping up in our head constantly, but in the case of the robot with self-awareness and these
same directives, there is still no actual free will in the libertarian/contra-causal sense, only the
experience of the performance within varying degrees of ignorance as to the origin of these
directives, as well as the ability to perform the tasks/plans within the physical and temporal
parameters of its local control (i.e. the knowledge of the probability and possibility within the
freedom of thought and action in itself). I will discuss how this improvisational software might
be analogous, or even more than analogous, to the way versions of randomness, such as
stochasticity/quantum noise, are incorporated directly or indirectly into some compatibilistic
models.
In addition to the general philosophical causality challenges to folk notions of the extent
of our freedom, we also have the mysterious underworlds of the subconscious/unconscious as
uniquely relevant to this discussion. Analogously, in much the same way as all physical
possibility in the universe has been constrained to some extent by the way the Big Bang unfolded
from the Planck epoch, events that unfold developmentally to make each brain what it is have
66
McCarthy, J. (1995-2002). Making robots conscious of their mental states. Stanford University. Retrieved
9/19/2012 from http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/consciousness/consciousness.html
67
from http://www.philosophynow.org/issues/87/Philosophy_of_Mind_An_Overview
31
the same constraints upon mental liberty and the actions that result from it as well. Within those
causal limitations, all kinds of processes that limit us epistemically have been borne upon our
experience as well, presumably via evolution/natural selection. Its extremely important to
consider what we cant consider: we cant even fathom the amount of time that has shaped our
construction, let alone the complexity of events therein. As speculative as evolution and
evolutionary psychology sometimes seem (and are), we have to acknowledge their influence.
Neuroscientist David Eagleman recommends an easy exercise to show us one example of
how our experience is processed: look into a mirror and
move your eyes back and forth, so that youre looking at your left eye, then at your right
eye, then at your left eye again. When your eyes shift from one position to the other, they
take time to move and land on the other location. But heres the kicker: you never see
your eyes move.[68]
Try it. The gaps, called saccades, are literally edited out by our brains. That the editing of
these and other jitters in the eye crucially improves our maneuvering presumably exists because
it had some survival benefit. David Linden notes that similar processing happens with hearing
and touch when our brain edits out data that does not warrant our valuable attention, such as
irrelevant background noise, clothes rubbing against our skin, etc.69 Psychologist Scott Lilienfeld
writes about Donald Broadbents filter theory of attention, which is a bottleneck through which
information passes. This narrow entryway allows only the most important information through,
and only as much of it as we can process at one time, filtering out less important stimuli from our
focus of attention.70 What is most relevant to our purpose here when considering this kind of
evolutionary editing is the question: what else gets edited out by Mother Nature for purely
pragmatic reasons of survival?
68
Bilger, B. (4/25/2011). The Possibilian. The New Yorker. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/04/25/110425fa_fact_bilger?currentPage=2
69
Linden, D. (2007). The Accidental Mind: how brain evolution has given us love, memory, dreams, and god.
Cambridge: Belknap Press
70
Lilienfeld, S., Lynn, S.J., Namy, L. L., Woolf, N. (2010). Psychology: A Framework for Everyday Thinking.
Boston, MA: Pearson ISBN-10: 0205650481 [p. 118.]
32
Thomas Metzinger hypothesized metaphorically speaking, you are a system that
constantly confuses itself with the content of its own self-model,71 because this self-model is
transparent to our conscious experience. The reason why we do not recognize our Phenomenal
Self Model (see Evidence #16) as representation is probably because it was unnecessarily too
taxing on the brain/body to make that particular function apparent, with no evolutionary survival
benefit worth the metabolic cost upon the brain/body. Our brains are dangerously big as it is.
fMRI studies have also shown that, as one might expect, the brain does have the plasticity to
grow in certain areas to accommodate relative use, such as was evidenced in the rear
hippocampuses of London cabbies who needed to memorize thousands of locations.72
Metzinger and others posit that we are nave realists, who cannot experience the virtual
reality in the brain as virtual realitythat is, as a processed, reproduced facsimile of reality in
the mind. If there was a survival advantage to this ability to perceive the processing itself and we
evolved the brain power to do so, we might experience it in the brain like watching TV or
listening to musicthat is, as the distinctly separate indirect/representational realism to which
the scientific evidence points. Some have made the case73 that nave realism is an extreme
caricature of the more basic direct realism, which doesnt require perfect representation like
nave realism does but thats too deep of a rabbit hole to follow now. Whats important for my
purpose here is that even this version of direct realism allows for imperfect representation and
distorts our reality.
Cognitive scientists have noted we may have evolved to conserve a more robust
awareness for reasons of cost when it comes to time-pressured cognition:
When situations demand fast and continuously evolving responses, there may simply not
be time to build up a full-blown mental model of the environment, from which to derive a
71
Metzinger, Thomas. Being No One. The Immortality of the Soul presented by the UC Berkeley Graduate
Council. Series: UC Berkeley Graduate Council Lectures [Show ID: 9181]. Berkeley, CA. 2/2005. (46:30-
51:00) Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mthDxnFXs9k
72
Telis, G. (12/8/2011). ScienceShot: The Brain of a Cabbie. Science Now. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/12/scienceshot-the-brain-of-a-cabbi.html
73
Morvan, P. (2004). Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them. Vol: 41, Issue: 3,
Publisher: JSTOR, Pages: 1-29 ISSN: 00030481 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.tcnj.edu/~lemorvan/DR_web.pdf
33
plan of action. Instead, it is argued, being a situated cognizer requires the use of cheap
and efficient tricks for generating situation-appropriate action on the fly.[74]
Our natural integration of selective attention shows that we are cognitive misers in need
of limiting our resources, so selective attention is a natural adaptive result. At the other end of
the spectrum, Daniel Wegner considers some of the social advantages to evolving just the
amount of self-awareness that we do have; that is, having and sharing increasingly complex
conscious previews of our actions through evolution:
Previews are adaptive in a simple sense because they create a social signaling system-
akin to turn signals on motor vehicles. Telling others which way we are going is not only
useful in traffic, but can be life saving in a variety of circumstances. Reporting previews
to others allows us to keep others out of our way, it often helps us to excuse our behavior,
and it can invite others to join with us as well. These functions would be unavailable to a
person who could not discern what he or she might do next, or to someone who was
unable to report these self-predictions to others. In this simple sense, conscious previews
could have evolved merely to allow us the luxury of bending our social world to our
minds imagined futures.[75]
Wegner also discusses the importance of authorship emotion related to motivation and
our perception of responsibility, which is just enough to anchor our moral actions to a sense of
self. If we also consider the psychological benefits of an explanatory style that favors an internal
locus of control,76 which accompanies evidence showing that those who feel more in control
often feel more empowered psychologically than those with an external locus of control (i.e.
environment/others are more fundamentally in control), then we see yet another possible reason
why too much awareness was snubbed by natural selection (I will go more into detail on the pros
74
Wilson, M. (2002). Six Views of Embodied Cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 9 (4):625--636. [p. 4].
75
10.1196/annals.1279.011 (p. 11). Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
76
Harvey, J. H., Barnes, R. D., Sperry, D. L., & Harris, B. (1974). Perceived choice as a function of internal-
external locus of control. Journal of Personality, 42, 437-452. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1974.tb00685.x/abstract
34
and cons of internal and external control perception in the Challenges). Others have suggested77
that since adjustable, unpredictable, protean behavior is advantageous in precarious social
situations,78 a specific kind of naturally selected ignorance of certain intentions might preserve
these traits and our lives.
While the subject of how our software itself and its limits came to be is beyond the
scope of this book, it is important to recognize that our experience is processed to some extent,
including transparent mental editing of what it considers to be too taxing and/or insignificant
experience, and that there are strong, tenable hypotheses available via evolutionary models to
explain them. We may have evolved some self-awareness via social survival benefit (again,
about 2%), but it seems that we may actually have not evolved more self-awareness for survival
benefit too, as it is cognitively very expensive.
Importantly, when considering the question of how much our unconscious decisions are
our decisions, research has revealed that there is unconscious implicit learning.79,80 As David
Myers puts it, In experiments, people have learned to anticipate the computer screen quadrant in
which a character will appear next, even before being able to articulate the underlying rule
(Lewicki, 1992, 1997).81 The work of John Bargh and Ezequiel Morsella has also evidenced the
unconscious mind influencing creativity and spontaneous behavior, but most importantly,
theyve given us a tenable picture of the unconscious as perceptual, evaluative, and
motivational and not merely the shadow of a real conscious mind as so many of us have
been led to believe for so long.82 These are evaluations based upon an automatic effect of
superficial features of a person.83 Think long and hard about that. Freedom of objective
evaluation must be foundational for any significantly free model of free will. We do not need
cognition to have affect.
77
Clegg, L. F. (2012). Protean Free Will. California Institute of Technology. Pasadena. (Submitted). Available
on 9/19/2012 at http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20120328-152031480
78
Miller, G. F. (1997). Protean primates: The evolution of adaptive un-predictability in competition and
courtship," in Machiavellian Intelligence II, ed. by A. Whiten and R. W. Byrne, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
79
Fletcher, P. C., Zafiris, O., Frith, C. D., Honey, R. A. E., Corlett, P. R., Zilles, K., & Fink, G. R. (2005). On
the benefits of not trying: brain activity and connectivity reflecting the interactions of explicit and implicit
sequence learning. Cerebral Cortex, 15, 10021015.
80
Frensch, P. A., Rnger, D. (2003). Implicit learning. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 12, 13-18.
81
Myers, D. (2010). Psychology 9th edition. New York: Worth Publishers. [p. 562]. (ISBN 978-1-4292-1597-8)
82
Bargh, J. A., & Morsella, E. (2008). The unconscious mind. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 73-79.
83
TheMizzouTube. (uploaded on 8/23/2011). Unconscious behavioral guidance systems. Lecture by John A.
Bargh. [Video file]. [8:30-10:00]. University of Missouri Video Services. Available on 9/19/2012 at
35
Even if many of Freuds propositions for how the mind works have been demonstrated to
be inaccurate,84 the evidence for a profound and powerful unconscious mind persists (not that he
invented the unconscious mind, but his emphasis on its pervasiveness still rings true, especially
in terms of defense mechanisms, such as false consensus effect and Terror Management Theory
[more on those in the Evidences]). Meyers provides a short list of some functions that
researchers have attributed to the unconscious (at least, so far), some of which I have mentioned
already and more that I will discuss in detail in the Evidences:
The schemas that automatically control our perceptions and interpretations

The priming by stimuli to which we have not consciously attended
The right-hemisphere activity that enables the split brain patients left hand to carry out
an instruction the patient cannot verbalize
The parallel processing of different aspects of vision and thinking
The implicit memories that operate without conscious recall, and even among those with
amnesia
The emotions that activate instantly, before conscious analysis
The self-concept and stereotypes that automatically and unconsciously influence how we
process information about ourselves and others.[85]
So this subconscious/unconscious part of our mind does all these things; it regulates
organs, dreaming, motor skills, etc., automatically and unconsciously influence[s] how we
process information about ourselves and others and yet is susceptible to much influence that
flies under the conscious radar. We hardly give the constant functioning of so many amazing
processes in our bodies a second thought in our conscious minds and generally just accept them
as ordinary, but would we consider these processes to be freely willed just because they
happen within our body proper? Clearly, even our own bodies are often at odds with our
conscious desires, or we confuse wanting with liking, which are not the same thing and even
84
Greenwald, A. G. (1992). New look 3: Unconscious cognition reclaimed. American Psychologist, 47, 766-779.
85
36
use different circuits in the brain,86 though both are desires. Its been shown that even animals
seemingly without the ability to reason out desire consciously dont have to like in order to want.
This is to say that theyve been evidenced in clever experiments to want either via habit alone or
via a simple awareness of unpleasant means to other ends.87 This distinction becomes important
when discussing moral implications, such as concerning pleasure based vs. action based
systems,88 and is clearly relevant to appeals to folk notions for why we do what we do. This is to
say that our unconscious mind does not, by default, always seek to fulfill our greatest pleasure or
happiness.
Our tastes often differ greatly. We do often concede that many of our predilections are a
product of mysterious subterranean forces, and recent fMRI studies have shown that even our
unconscious aesthetic sense is more predictive than our conscious aesthetic sense89 (perhaps
because its less tainted with cultural bias/confabulation). But if one suggests that seemingly
more interactive functions, like moral or analytical reasoning, might also be overwhelmingly
processed in the subconscious realm, like our tastes, motor skills, and reflexes are then we
begin to protest until the cows come home. Its too hard to bear the thought of giving up certain
decisions to the subconscious.
Folk notions of where the lines of identity, agency, and control should be drawn are not
only clearly challenged by the question about free will within unconscious processing, but also
by additional internal competition in other ways as well. The left/right hemispheric battle for
dominance in the brain, the battle between the young/old parts of the brain (e.g. the frontal cortex
vs. amygdala), the conscious vs. reflexive processing battle, and the varying speeds with which
different types of processes operate, all challenge the veracity behind our subjective impression
of strictly monotonic conscious control. The evidence for dual process systems (not to be
confused with substance dualism, which is separation of body and mind/spirit) is ever growing
86
Why wanting and liking something simultaneously is overwhelming. (2/14/2007). Retrieved 8/3/2011 from
University of Michigan News Service Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://ns.umich.edu/htdocs/releases/story.php?id=3165
87
Robinson, S.; Sandstrom, S. M.; Denenberg, V. H.; Palmiter, R. D. Distinguishing Whether Dopamine
Regulates Liking, Wanting, and/or Learning About Rewards. Behavioral Neuroscience, Vol 119(1), Feb 2005,
5-15. doi: 10.1037/0735-7044.119.1.5
88
Fyfe, A., Muehlhauser, L. (5/10/2011). Morality in the Real World podcast 15: Pleasure and Desire Are
Separate. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=12276
89
Berns, G. & Moore, S.E. (12/17/2010). A neural predictor of cultural popularity. Available at SSRN.
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1742971
37
and some theories are better evidenced than others.90 Psychologist Jonathan Haidt likens the dual
processing of our conscious/non-conscious elements to a man (as the conscious mind) riding an
elephant (as the non-conscious mind):
I'm holding the reins in my hands, and by pulling one way or the other I can tell the
elephant to turn, to stop, or to go. I can direct things, but only when the elephant doesn't
have desires of his own. When the elephant really wants to do something, I'm no match
for him.
...The controlled system [can be] seen as an advisor. It's a rider placed on the elephant's
back to help the elephant make better choices. The rider can see farther into the future,
and the rider can learn valuable information by talking to other riders or by reading maps,
but the rider cannot order the elephant around against its will...
...The elephant, in contrast, is everything else. The elephant includes gut feelings, visceral
reactions, emotions, and intuitions that comprise much of the automatic system. The
elephant and the rider each have their own intelligence, and when they work together
well they enable the unique brilliance of human beings. But they don't always work
together well.[91]
These kinds of analogies are limited, of course, but they can give us a feel for where the
research is heading. The extent of the remaining freedom of the rider is mysterious and we may
never be able to know what it is completely, but we do know that considering our overall
decisions (elephant included), they are at least way more limited than we have ever known.
Further, we often mistake phenomena like our emotional experience as not only directly referring
to absolute and/or teleological truths (that is, veridical in an absolute or purposeful sense), but as
being absolute truth (that is, rather than the product of factually objective relational properties
between the subject and object in specific, changing contexts). This is not to necessarily
90
Muehlhauser, L. (4/15/2011). How You Make Judgments: The Elephant and its Rider. [Web log post].
http://lesswrong.com/lw/531/how_you_make_judgments_the_elephant_and_its_rider
91
Haidt, J. (2006). The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding modern truth in ancient wisdom. (p. 4, 17). New York:
Basic Books.
38
characterize all knowledge in some hyper-nominal, Post-Modernistic way, as there is still an
apparent objective quality in the relationship between subject/object/context (e.g. it is an
objective fact that the current relational distance between you and your television is x and this is
analogous to an objective brain state, but neither of these are always absolutely true about the
relationship between you and your television); it is to propose that the extremes of both
absolutism and strong subjectivism are seemingly inappropriate phenomenally.
Research has shown us that our emotional predisposition and temperamental capacity is
inherited to some extent,92 and shows us what is directly most important to our survival instincts,
as our sympathetic and the parasympathetic nervous systems work try to maintain homeostasis.
The problem is wading through these primary and secondary heuristics when survival is not our
immediate concern, in addition to some of those survival instincts being outmoded and/or
irrelevant anyway. The result is that emotions that cause us discomfort, damage, even death
(from prolonged stress) as well as emotions that mislead us in so many ways. But the emotional
attitudes we inherit are prime examples of predisposition, the inherent belief and emotion behind
them pave the way for how we will most likely act. It doesnt have to be guaranteed, just
increase predictability. This is the framework within to consider predispositionalism, whether
through central or peripheral routes of persuasion.
Henry Plotkin wrote that our emotions are postcards from our genes.93 Joseph LeDoux
identified neural pathways that create an emotional response to visual or audible stimuli before
the intellect is even aware of it.94,95,96 The stimuli go straight from the eye or the ear through the
thalamus (which he calls the low road) to the amygdala and bypass the cortex (which he calls
the high road). We know that at least some of our emotion is delivered this way, without
conscious thinking, though people like Richard Lazarus97,98 still see it going through the
92
Abela, J.R.Z., Mcintyre-Smith, A., Dechef, M.L.E. (2003). Personality predispositions to depression: A test
of the specific vulnerability and symptom specificity hypotheses. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 22,
493-514.
93
Plotkin, H. (1994). Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-
19280-X [p. 208].
94
LeDoux, J. (2003). Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are. Penguin Putnam: ISBN 0-14-
200178-3
95
LeDoux, J., & Armony, J. (1999). Can neurobiology tell us anything about human feelings? In D.
Kahneman, E. Diener & N. Schwarz (Eds.), Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology (pp. 489-499).
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
96
Dimberg, U., Thunberg, M., & Elmehed, K. (2000). Unconscious facial reactions to emotional facial
expressions. Psychological Science, 11 (1),86-89.
97
Lazarus, R.S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. New York:Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-19-509266-0
39
appraisal at some point (i.e. more treatment through memories, analysis, etc.). As Storbeck et al.,
(2006) concluded,99 we must appraise an event interactively, by reasoning, testing it, etc., to
know whether it is truly what we first intuit. Still, these are merely a series of reactions to stimuli
from another part of the brain (with ITS own agendas), rather than a single less processed
reaction. Their multiplicity does not grant us more freedom than a minimal number of reactions
would and it is still subject to causal forces. As we will see in Evidence #6, scientists are at
the point where they can stimulate our brains into immediately experiencing rage, sadness,
hilarity, etc with electronic devices. How far do you think it is from there to manipulation via
nanotechnology?
In terms of social psychology, our social experience is so powerful that even when we are
told that some stranger is intentionally going to purposefully behave one way or another, and
they do, we often still believe that that is how that person generally is all the time. This is called
an attribution error.100 When this was shown in experiments, the truth did not matter; it was the
emotional experience that guided their impressions anyway. It should be noted that in less
individualistic cultures not as obsessed over free will/autonomy, people were more likely to pay
regard to such situational info;101 and people we think we know well, like ourselves, are more
inclined to attribute, say, good ideas, to our well thought out reasoning102 instead of context.
Some free will advocates will argue that free will must exist, if some creatures have
more of it than others103 and, if the tradeoff between freedom and limitations is not all or
nothing [because of the limited freedom in local control], neither is the tradeoff between
freedom and deterministic predictability.104 But how do we know that this charge doesnt
98
Lazarus, R.S. (1998). Fifty years of the research and theory of R.S. Lazarus: An analysis of historical and
perennial issues, Mahwah, N.J.: Lawerence Erlbaum Associates. ISBN 978-0-8058-2657-9
99
Storbeck, J., Robinson, M. D., & McCourt, M. E. (2006). Semantic processing precedes affect retrieval: The
neurological case for cognitive primacy in visual processing. Review of General Psychology, 10, 41_55.
100
Napolitan, D. A., & Goethals, G. R. (1979). The Attribution of Friendliness. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 15, 105-113.
101
Masuda, T., & Kitayama, S. (2004). Perceived-induced constraint and attitude attribution in Japan and in
the US: A case for cultural dependence of the correspondence bias. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 40, 409-416
102
Malle, B. F. (2006). The actor-observer asymmetry in causal attribution: A (surprising) meta-analysis.
Psychological Bulletin, 132, 895-919.
103
Horgan, J. (12/8/2010). Dear Scientists: Please Stop Bashing Free Will! Religion Dispatches. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from
http://www.religiondispatches.org/archive/science/3729/dear_scientists%3A_please_stop_bashing_free_will!_
104
Mol, P. (2004). Zenos Paradox and the Problem of Free Will. Skeptic. 10(4). Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/11-04-27
40
merely highlight our inability to recognize all of our determined motivations that preclude
accessing local control in the first place? It doesnt necessarily mean that those motivations are
still not influenced in a causal way. And we actually are predictable in many waysnot
necessarily rational, but predictable, even with many variables involved. Thats what psychology
has been doing all these years.
Adequate determinism is enough to perpetuate a somewhat predictable loss of control
often better than chance, limited by our epistemology, not necessarily our ontology. So why,
observing the trend of consistent causal influence, should the as yet empirically unexplained
remainder of influence not still be considered a part of the causal network by default? Why
suddenly posit and then favor a change in the way the world works evidentially? The remainder
of our experience that hasnt been directly shown to be sufficiently influenced by subconscious
motivations and primacy, cognitive and behavioral heuristics and biases, physiologically
influenced desires (e.g. oxytocin, dopamine, serotonin, vasopressin, etc.), brain
damage/trauma/diseases, unreasoned and instinctual actions, etc., should default probability-wise
to the presumption of causal influence rather than to the presumption of free will based upon the
fundamental impossibility of passively acquiring
experience/knowledge/information/impressions shouldnt it? Im not talking tout court
(completely by default), just about it being more likely.
Some libertarian philosophers have broken down agency into desires, will, and action in
the context of our beliefs and experience, seemingly with the hope of dismantling the grip of
causation by way of error in our beliefs and experiences.105 It does seem to be evidenced that
some action is less voluntary than other action, but when evaluating each concept, there is a
crucial arrangement that must be recognized, and it should be especially appreciated by any
theorist who values emergence and metacognition (i.e. the ability to think about thinking). The
way our decisions are influenced and biased are not merely in a way that there remain purely
untainted portions of freedom, while others are corrupted. This is the nature of biased filters,
through which our entire perception is routed: entire frames are in slightly different shades of
more or less color/influence overall, rather than leaving any sections completely uncolored. In
105
Murphy, N., Ellis, G.F.R., OConnor, T. (2009). Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will.
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. ISBN 978-3-642-03204-2. [p.21]. Available on 9/19/2012 at
http://www.thedivineconspiracy.org/Z5235Y.pdf
41
this sense, no pure freedom remains; there are really only whole colored panes that our
perception peers through, which are simply more or less biased to some extent.
And if secondary emergence/epiphenomena is an element of ones free will, consider
now the obfuscatory exaptive edifice built of misattributed autonomy and biases layered upon
misattributed autonomy and biases. The predispositionalist need not dismiss emergence outright;
in fact, it can easily be seen as another potential obstacle for the free will theorist in certain
situations such as this. The novel and unexpected fruits of organization and process cannot be
presumed to always unfold in ones favor, unless they are expected via predictability shown by
empirical experiment, in which case, theres no reason not to then include such phenomena in the
causal conception of the arrangement from the outset.
As I see it, because of this strictured bottleneck of autonomic misattribution and bias in
the decision-making process, the libertarian agency model, which requires at least some element
of pure, untainted freedom, is ontologically inappropriate, even incoherent. Theres no way to
look through perfectly clear glass, because there isnt any perfectly clear glass: every action is
colored by sub-control (i.e. which I define as the whole range of what may fall under non-
conscious influence upon action) in its own unique way. Of course, certain religious and
philosophical schools would challenge this, but they would have to empirically show that they
can transcend the bias, and as you will see below, minds that favor the supernatural seem to be
even more susceptible to biases overall.
That our entire perception is squeezed through biased filters is especially evidenced in
theory of mind experiments in the context of morality. As science writer Dan Jones writes, the
facts of other peoples mental lives are frequently viewed through a lens coloured by the very
issue that the facts are supposed to help us settle106 [emphasis mine]. We must remember this
fact that there are no uncolored lenses, even if we opt to use the free will model prudentially (e.g.
in punitive systems), because our epistemic limitations leave us deficient in understanding the
actual parameters of identity, responsibility, and moral/philosophical paradoxes.107 In The Causal
106
Jones, D. (8/2009). The good, the bad and the intentional: Dan Jones on the often surprising part played by
moral judgments in our folk psychology. The Psychologist. 22(8). [pp. 666-669]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.thepsychologist.org.uk/archive/archive_home.cfm?volumeID=22&editionID=178&ArticleID=154
4
107
Wilkinson, W. (Interviewer), Smilanski, S. (Interviewee). (10/10/2008). Free Will: the Good Absurd.
[Videofile]. Blogging Heads. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/14400
42
Vacuum section in the Challenges, I will argue more in depth about this fundamental
epistemological issue. Which brings us to the ethical implications
I will discuss several evidences that seem to suggest we each have an innate
predisposition for, and/or may be physically manipulated to favor, one or more fundamentally
different cognitive styles (i.e. a dual process theory of cognition [though there may be more than
two]). What may be most important is that these ways of thinking often appear to cash out to at
least one of the three classic rivals in the history of ethics: consequentialism/utilitarianism (a
kind of cost/benefit analysis based upon end result), deontology (duty/rule based system with
obligations and permissions), or virtue ethics (a kind of exponentially self-reinforced morality by
habituation/practice). There is a long history of philosophers who have found freedom to reside
in actions that are in accord with our values, rather than in our predispositions, desires, and
impulses, so showing this kind of vulnerability may be one of the biggest threats in this whole
work.
In addition to challenging our notions of free will, control, and identity, the implications
of these studies challenge our perception of responsibility, via confronting the notion that our
moral judgments have no erroneous a priori elements; that the veracity of our ethical choices are
based upon correctly perceived ontological (pre)suppositions (e.g. I know that this is the best
moral action to take and am morally responsible for it because I perceive the world
correctly/adequately). The studies below show startling empirical evidence of unconscious
physiological and/or psychological biases in our perception, epistemology, and reasoning that
influence our thoughts and actions without any regard as to the specific facts of the matter
*before* we consciously think them.
Whatever your position on free will, autonomy, local control, determinism,
compatibilism, fatalism, necessitarianism, essentialism, illusionism, or any combination thereof,
these studies imply that everyday intuitive judgment is often ill-equipped to make fair and
accurate assessments of how the world actually is and how right and wrong should be correlated
to it, because there are causal factors constantly influencing outcomes at the precognitive core of
our everyday intuitive judgments.
Some of these tests have overarching implications, while others are more specific. Some
have meta-ethical implications, while others may be ethically neutral. I will ask questions that
are well, questions. They may be considered overly speculative at times, but they remain mere
43
questions and not assertions until they are answered (and some probably already are answerable
to some extent). Modesty is immanently respectable and speculation is a necessary ingredient in
any hypothesis.
That said, we must be careful to avoid the genetic fallacy in terms of both morality and
ontology: just because our beliefs and actions are sometimes arbitrarily biased and we can show
this, doesnt mean that they arent sometimes actually accurate. This may be because our original
pre-biased belief was wrong to begin with, and the bias event, even though arbitrary, just
happens to push us in the right direction, like the broken clock that gives the right time twice a
day.
The main point of this collection is to highlight the illusion/delusion inherent in agential
epistemology and control. Aside from the issue of free will, the ethical implications of these
evidences follow commensurately as well; for example, Kants claim that we are all equally
valuable because we are all equally rational (a necessary component of his duty based ethical
system) would only be true if we were all actually capable of being equally rational but as this
work will show, we are not. The equally specious just-world hypothesis is a common
fundamental worldview of many people that is relevant here. This is the notion that justice
always prevails.
Most of us are not aware of the implications of the studies that behavioral and cognitive
scientists have been doing in the last few decades relative to what I have been discussing here so
far, so I thought it would be useful to gather some of the most poignant stuff into one place.
Unless you are already some kind of determinist, these studies, thoroughly considered, should
give you great pause about the way you see the world, your identity and integral relationship to
it; notions of blame, responsibility, love, empathy, and how social systems might be more
appropriately managed.
44
PART II
32 SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCES OF PREDISPOSITION
(IN CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS MECHANISMS)
The unifying theme in these evidences is that they highlight predisposition in the
behavior of biological life. Not only that, but these behaviors often suggest influences that are
strangely arbitrary. Their higher predictability often makes little sense in any other light than in
the context of evolutionarily produced cognitive mechanisms.
THE YOUS IN YOU
EVIDENCE #1: Several studies have shown evidence of human actions instantiated
before the will is consciously realized. That is to say that the action is active and has begun
to be performed before weve perceived that weve consciously decided what were going
to do.
Yes, claim #1 above means what you think it means, at least to some extent for at least
some (re)actions, and not merely reflexes. We should start at the beginning In Consciousness
Explained, Daniel Dennett describes108 an experiment performed by British neurosurgeon
William Grey Walter in the 1960s:
Grey Walter performed his experiment with patients in whose motor cortex he had
implanted electrodes. He wanted to test the hypothesis that certain bursts of recorded
activity were the initiators of intentional actions. So he arranged for each patient to look
at slides from a carousel projector. The patient could advance the carousel at will, by
pressing the button on the controller. (Note the similarity to Libets experiment: This was
a free decision, timed only by an endogenous rise in boredom, or curiosity about the
108
Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. [p. 167]. Boston: Little, Brown.
45
next slide, or distraction, or whatever.) Unbeknownst to the patient, however, the
controller button was a dummy, not attached to the slide projector at all! What actually
advanced the slides was the amplified signal from the electrode implanted in the patients
motor cortex.[109,110]
The patients went on record as saying that the carousel seemed to change pictures just as
they were about to press the advance button, but close enough that they thought that they had
done it themselves. The carousel was actually advanced by a specific brain impulse that would
later (presumably) be identified as RP: readiness potential. Readiness potential is the impulse
marker signaling when the brain starts to get ready to perform an action. As noted by Dennett,
the Grey Walter experiment paved the way for groundbreaking experiments two decades later by
Benjamin Libet. In the early 1980s, he reported some amazing results: human actions are
instantiated before the will is realized consciously.111,112,113 In Consciousness: A Very Short
Introduction, Susan Blackmore writes:
[Libet] asked subjects to perform the wrist flexion [a wrist stretching exercise] at least 40
times, at times of their own choosing, and measured the following three things: the time
at which the action occurred, the beginning of brain activity in motor cortex [i.e.
readiness potential or RP], and the time at which they consciously decided to act [i.e.
will or W] [] Libet found that the decision to act, W, came about 200 milliseconds
(one-fifth of a second) before the action; but the RP began about 350 milliseconds before
that, or about 550 milliseconds before the action[114] [emphasis mine].
109
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (7/24/2007). Radiolab podcast: No Special Now. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.radiolab.org/2007/jul/24/no-special-now
110
Singham, M. (11/15/2010). On free will-6: The 1963 Grey Walter experiment. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://machineslikeus.com/news/free-will-6-1963-grey-walter-experiment
111
Libet, B., C. A. Gleason, E. W. Wright, and D. K. Pearl. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in
relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act.
Brain 106: 623-642. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/content/106/3/623.abstract
112
Libet, B. (1999) Do We Have Free Will? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, No. 89, 1999, pp. 4757
http://www.centenary.edu/attachments/philosophy/aizawa/courses/intros2009/libetjcs1999.pdf
113
Luoshuzhai (6/30/2009). Neuroscience and Free Will - Libet's Experiment. [Video file]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQ4nwTTmcgs&feature=related
114
Blackmore, S. (2005). Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction. (pp. 86-87). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
46
The observance of RP activity before the conscious experience of decision making
suggests that at least some decisions perceived as willful actions are actually instantiated
subconsciously. Libet performed further experiments which lead him to believe in the existence
of a conscious veto qualifier to the original experiments, implying the subject has the
time/ability to veto an action in progress.
In 2007, Pockett and Miller released a paper showing how they experimentally tested
and rejected seven possible factors that would significantly challenge the accuracy of the Libet
clock method115,116 [emphasis mine].
More recent studies also improved upon the original,117 some with more direct
connections (fMRI vs. Libets EEG) and an added element of predictable deliberation. Libets
original results were vindicated when Soon et. al. found that there was precursor activity in
regions of the brain other than the SMA regions probed by Libet, and that this activity occurred
much earlier than the SMA activity118:
[The researchers] put people into a brain scanner in which a display screen flashed a
succession of random letters1. He told them to press a button with either their right or left
index fingers whenever they felt the urge, and to remember the letter that was showing on
the screen when they made the decision. The experiment used functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) to reveal brain activity in real time [] the team discovered
that a pattern of brain activity seemed to predict that decision by as many as seven
seconds[119,120,121] [emphasis mine].
115
Pockett, S., & Miller, A. (2007). The rotating spot method of timing subjective events. Consciousness and
Cognition, 16, 241254. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.psych.auckland.ac.nz/webdav/site/psych/shared/about/our-people/documents/sue-pockett/pockett-
rotating-spot.pdf
116
Sci. 2009 Jan;20(1):17-21. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
117
Matsuhashi, M., & Hallett, M. (2008). The timing of the conscious intention to move. European Journal
of Neuroscience, 28, 23442351.
118
Singham, M. (11/23/2010). On free will-11: Recent fMRI studies of the brain. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://machineslikeus.com/news/free-will-11-recent-fmri-studies-brain
119
Smith, K. (8/31/2011). Neuroscience vs philosophy: Taking aim at free will. Nature. 477, 23-25 (2011).
doi:10.1038/477023a. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110831/full/477023a.html
120
Keim, B. (4/13/2008). Brain Scanners Can See Your Decisions Before You Make Them. Wired Science.
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2008/04/mind_decision
121
Keim, B. (4/14/2008). Is Free Will an Illusion? Wired Science. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
47
Ultimately, Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes 2008, found that the outcome of a decision
can be encoded in brain activity of prefrontal and parietal cortex up to ten seconds before it
enters awareness122 [emphasis mine]. More recent studies used even more accurate cutting edge
fMRI equipment123 and one study by neuroscientist and surgeon Itzhak Fried even implanted
electrodes in epileptic patients that tracked at the neuronal level, giving results for decision
prediction with more than 80% accuracy.124,125
THE IMPLICATIONS: How can the body act before the mind realizes it has decided? I
wanted to do this one first, because if its implications are sound, then it is probably the most
devastating evidence against conscious will in the list, even if inexorably contested by some
philosophers and scientists, as most things are. Simply put, our experience of making a conscious
decision to do something appears to be merely a self-report of something that the brain had
already decided and actually instantiated. It is further evidence that we will continue to see
throughout this work that appears to validate the oft heard claim by many scientists that the
mind is what the brain does126that is, that consciousness appears to be a property of the
physical mind/body. This is keeping in mind that, as Harvard trained neurologist/anthropologist
Terrence Deacon suggests,127 that view of consciousness is better qualified in terms of its
production via co-emergent physical constraints on matter, rather than by the matter itself. As
http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2008/04/is-free-will-an/
122
Chun Siong Soon, Marcel Brass, Hans-Jochen Heinze & John-Dylan Haynes. (4/13/2008). Unconscious
determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature Neuroscience. 11, 543 545: doi:10.1038/nn.2112
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v11/n5/abs/nn.2112.html
123
Bode, S., He, A.H., Soon, C.S., Trampel, R., Turner, R., Haynes, J.D. (2011). Tracking the Unconscious
Generation of Free Decisions Using UItra-High Field fMRI. PLoS ONE. 6(6): e21612.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021612 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0021612
124
Smith, K. (8/31/2011). Neuroscience vs philosophy: Taking aim at free will. Nature 477, 23-25 (2011)
doi:10.1038/477023a Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
125
Fried, I; Mukamel, R.; Kreiman, G. (2011). Internally generated preactivation of single neurons in human
medial frontal cortex predicts volition. Neuron. 2011;69(3):548-62.
126
Hallett, M. (2002, May). Physiology of Free Will. Paper presented at the Neuroethics: Mapping the Field
Conference, SF, CA. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://bioethics.stanford.edu/conference/hallett.pdf
127
Sherman, J. (11/21/2011). At Last, Scientists Explain Why Animals Want Things But Objects Don't. [Web
log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/ambigamy/201111/last-
scientists-explain-why-animals-want-things-objects-dont
48
well as that, as the father of cognitive neuroscience, Michael Gazzaniga wants to remind us,
persons are also still products of external factors.128
Aside from the information that our conscious will decides to feed it, we need to at least
ask why there is any reason to presume that our subconscious isnt in complete control, with the
conscious descriptive report of the processing129 bubbling up just after an action.130
Psychologist George Miller wrote, It is the result of thinking, not the process of thinking, that
appears spontaneously in consciousness131 and as Nisbett and Wilson put it, There is an
important difference between awareness of the existence of an evaluation or motive state and
awareness of a changed evaluation or motive state.132 As we will also see in Evidence #8,
cognitive studies seem to imply a potential for internal conflict between hemispheres/parts of the
brain, which complicates the issue further.
Free will advocates will often concede reflexive action to some extent, as well as to some
constraints upon the will in the Libet/Soon et al studies, but the question, as free will champion
Eddy Nahmias asks,133,134 is whether or not this is always the case, and if there is no free will at
all. Its easy to feel like it would be moving the goal post to argue that the implications of these
experiments do not really get to free will proper, but some philosophers argue that since they are
limited to simple thoughts and movements; theyre nothing like planning for retirement or major
life choices, etc., involved here I will rebut that notion further on, but even if we concede it for
now, doesnt this study, in the least, challenge our notion of free will in the context of at least
some forms of spontaneity?
Again, dont reflexes and so many automatic non-willed functions in our bodies, from the
heart to the lungs to digestion give us a pretty good indication that our survival probably
128
Tallis, R. (11/12/2011). Rethinking Thinking How a lumpy bunch of tissue lets us plan, perceive, calculate,
reflect, imagineand exercise free will. (Dual book review/comparison of Michael Gazzanigas book, Whos
in Charge? and Terrence Deacans book, Incomplete Nature). The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204618704576642991109496396.html
129
Blackmore, S. (2005). Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
130
James Van Der Pool (Series Producer). (2009). The Secret You. [Television series]. BBC Horizen. (50:00-
56:00). Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N6S9OidmNZM&feature=related
131
Miller, G. A. (1962). Psychology: The Science of Mental Life. New York: Harper & Row
132
Nisbett, R., Wilson, T. (1977). Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports On Mental Processes. (p.
235). Psychological Review. Vol 84(3), Mar 1977, 231-259. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.84.3.231 Available on
9/20/2012 at http://people.virginia.edu/~tdw/nisbett&wilson.pdf
133
Nahmias, E. (2002). When consciousness matters: A critical review of Daniel Wegners The Illusion of
Conscious Will. Philosophical Psychology, 15 , 527 541 .
134
Nahmias, E. (2010). Scientific Challenges to Free Will, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (eds T.
O'Connor and C. Sandis), Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, UK. doi: 10.1002/9781444323528.ch44 [p. 7].
49
depended upon reactions that were beyond the conscious will? Doesnt this also imply that these
features were probably constantly selected for by natural selection? Thank goodness for that!
Imagine having to consciously think about making all those organs work. Why should we
presume that the unconscious mind, that most everyone concedes constantly regulates all of our
complex internal hardware, could only make unintelligent choices, just because there is a
curtain of ignorance between those subconscious operations and our conscious mind? Isnt an
action that does what is best for it in the appropriate context generally considered an intelligent
choice? We can also see how easy it is to error when tracking the etiology. How easy it would be
to ascribe intention ad hoc.
Even if this were merely evidence for a subconscious decision making component
subservient to conscious planning, wouldnt it still challenge free will as it is portrayed in folk
psychology? This is being extremely charitable. Consider what your leg has been doing for the
last three hours. Did you plan that out beforehand and execute it accordingly? I could play
devils advocate from the dualists perspective (which I will discuss more in depth in the
Challenges section) and suggest that my spirit actually made the decision and my body is just
faster than my mind is. But how much can we really appeal to the spirit as subconscious
decision making in verifying free will, when sometimes life threatening actions occur from the
unconscious, such as in sleep-waking? Time and again, we will our body to behave in some way:
to wake up, to be strong, to calm down, not to be in love or lust and we fail.
Considering both the earlier and later Libet experiments where he suggests there is a
conscious veto, Susan Blackmore echoes Libet and says, Although we do not have free will, we
do have free wont.135 And what is it that influences the veto? Why should that be any
different causally? Libet himself proposed that it is different; that it is more like basic awareness
and may not require or be the direct result of preceding unconscious processes.136 So, at best,
if we were to grant a measure of hypothetical freedom left (which we shall see later is still biased
and predisposed in other ways), according to the consequences of this experiment, it exists only
in the veto power after the act is already instantiated. Think damage control. This suggests a
135
Blackmore, S. (2005). Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction. (p. 89). New York: Oxford University
Press.
136
Singham, M. (11/19/2010). On free will-9: Attempts to salvage free will. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://machineslikeus.com/news/free-will-9-attempts-salvage-free-will
50
strangely inelegant, mysteriously post hoc medium, were it designed for something like contra-
causal free will.
If we were to discover that Libets veto does have free will, while the instantiation of
action does not, he suggests that there are implications in law and ethics, such as ethics that
depend upon physiological reactions (e.g. lust) and laws with consequences that depend upon
intention (e.g. hate crimes).137 For my money, Libets proposition seems unlikely, especially
since as noted by incompatibilist evolutionary biologist Jerry Coyne, vetoing takes place in
precisely the same brain regions as choosing.138
POSSIBLE CONTRARY EVIDENCE (AND RELATED STUDIES): Even though several recent
studies (as I have footnoted above) have confirmed Libets original analysis of his results
(perhaps excluding any special freedom associated with the conscious veto), defeasibility in the
scientific method always leaves open the possibility that the Libet study is flawed and/or
misinterpreted. Some recent studies139,140 claim to show that the readiness potential that Libet
interpreted as a decision may really just be the brain signaling some form of special attention.
Alfred Mele criticized the RP as not being enough time to actually house a choice or even an
intention, but merely an urge.141
In one test, after hearing a tone, subjects were instructed to immediately press a button
with their choice of right or left hands at the last moment. Since sides of the hands correlate to
the opposite brain hemispheres, the immediate side choice by the subject should have showed the
researchers the unconscious process in the brain indicating which hemisphere it chose but
there was no choice made. Some free will advocating neuroscientists downplay the Soon, et al.
2008 results with the charges that such simple left-right choices make an over-simplified
137
Singham, M. (11/22/2010). On free will-10: Ethical and legal implications of free will as simply a veto
power. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://machineslikeus.com/news/free-will-10-ethical-and-
legal-implications-free-will-simply-veto-power
138
Coyne, J. (12/27/2011). The no-free-will experiment, avec video. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/12/27/the-no-free-will-experiment
139
Ananthaswamy, A. (10/2009). Free will is not an illusion after all. New Scientist. Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn17835-free-will-is-not-an-illusion-after-all.html
140
Trevena, J., Miller, J. (3/2010). Brain preparation before a voluntary action: Evidence against unconscious
movement initiation. Consciousness and Cognition. Volume 19, Issue 1, Pages 447-456
141
Mele, A. (2006). Free Will and Luck. (p. 40). NY: Oxford University Press
51
caricature of decision making, as well as that subjective interpretations of mental history are not
trustworthy.142
FINAL IMPLICATIONS: Some researchers like Marcel Brass of Ghent University say that
using a response to tones changes the paradigm of the experiment enough that it cant be
compared to Libets experiment, as well as, more importantly, that the evidence he has shown
confirms Libets results in a predictive matter better than chance.143,144 As I have noted, Soon
et. al. found [via fMRI] that there was precursor activity in regions of the brain other than the
SMA regions probed by Libet [via EEG], and that this activity occurred much earlier than the
SMA activity145 [emphasis mine].
10 seconds is a long time for the brain not to be influencing action/decision. Even if this
evidence is overturned, the philosophical challenges to contra-causal free will, i.e. that no
action/thought can be independent of some influence, as well as the existence of other behavioral
and cognitive biases, will still stand, especially in their relevance to social psychology,
responsibility, and identity. The implications of Libets and similar studies are really evidence
that might even accommodate a more fatalistic or strong deterministic position where even
conscious access and/or input to the will are questioned, though I wouldnt make that argument
and global determinism (perfectly ordered causality from the beginning of time to the end) seems
pretty unlikely considering the evidence physicists have presented for quantum randomness. But
occasional randomness at the quantum level doesnt necessarily thwart predispositions at the
level of human behavior or we wouldnt have any functional psychological evidence of arbitrary
tendency to speak of. We do.
Is the conscious mind actually limited to the quality of self-awareness? Is it just a
periscope for the active subconscious mind used to collect data and make decisions? Is it
fallacious to even functionally delineate between our conscious awareness and our subconscious
142
143
Machine detects our decisions before we know them. (4/19/2008). New Scientist Magazine. issue 2652:
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19826525.600-machine-detects-our-
decisions-before-we-know-them.html
144
Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H. J., Haynes, J. D. (2008). Unconscious determinants of free decisions in
the human brain. Nature Neuroscience Advance online publication: 13 April 2008. doi:10.1038/nn.2112.
145
Singham, M. (11/23/2010). On free will-11: Recent fMRI studies of the brain. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://machineslikeus.com/news/free-will-11-recent-fmri-studies-brain
52
mind? That decisions are generated non-consciously ultimately undermines the folk notion that
conscious awareness holds primacy couched in our awareness and compels us to redefine
personal identity.
Is the Soon, et al. 2008 study, and others like it, really an oversimplified caricature of
actually much more complicated planning? Science writer Kerri Smith notes that it has been
shown in yet to be published work (still unpublished at the time of this writing. Keep an eye out
here146) that even when the decision making process is further complicated to include multistep
intention via mathematical problems, the results so far have shown up to a four second RP.147
That doesnt look good for Meles qualification of RP as a mere urge. And if we are going to
start considering mathematical calculations in the same category as urges, then again, we need to
revisit the ascription of intelligence to unconscious agency. More studies of this nature are
exactly what are needed and well know a lot more very soon. In any case, I will later argue that
even simple A/B Boolean type decisions are influenced by a personality constructed via any
number of arbitrary biases, heuristics, effects, neglects, etc., anyway.
Analogous to the successful evolutionary model,148 sometimes we should view even the
most complex choices and plans as a large collection of small simple choices, rather than as an
overarching portrayal of large, complex clusters of co-emergent conscious decisions or even
non-causal conscious decisions at fewer intervals. While these are also times when more
complex, emergent ideas erupt, they are, analogously, much less prevalent than the small
changes in a changing context guiding the process. This is not to say that there might not still be
multiple processes (i.e. regions of the brain) working in tandem as a network, just that each
heuristic within each element is built procedurally upon available data. And emergent or not, this
is all still causal; clearly, effects do not need to be linear to be caused.
The Libet/Soon, et al type studies are really just a bonus for determinists/compatibilists
when considering all of the other charges against the possibility of contra-causal free will and
especially predisposition, which do not even depend upon instantiated actions preceding the
conscious will, because it is concerned with all causal/motivating factors. This evidence merely
146
Hayneslab website. Research Fields> Volition, intentions and free will. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
https://sites.google.com/site/hayneslab/projects/volition-intentions-and-free-will
147
148
Dawkins, R. (1996). Climbing Mount Improbable. Viking Penguin: London.
53
takes causal determinism to an even deeper level than it needs to be to rebut contra-causal free
will. We will always look to the future for more evidence and philosophical clarification as to
where we may draw those lines, if any.
54
THE MASK OF SUBJECTIVE FREEDOM
EVIDENCE #2: Experiments have shown that the subjective experience of willful choice
is not evidence for free will.
In the mid 1980s and early 1990s, researchers studied the effects of backward masking:
By itself, a small stimulus would be easily recognized. If the small stimulus is followed
quickly by a large stimulus, then only the large stimulus is appreciated; the small one has
been masked. This phenomenon is robust and has been demonstrated in the visual and
tactile modes.[149,150,151]
Researchers showed that they were able to stimulate directed movements with smaller
stimuli that were masked by bigger stimuli.152,153,154 As the studies were described by
neuroscientist Mark Hallett, subjects were reacting to stimuli not perceived. In this
circumstance, the order of events was stimulus-response-perception, and not stimulus-
perception-response that would seem necessary for the ordinary view of free will155 [emphasis
mine]. Other response priming studies have delved further into the manipulation effect, but
without perception of any stimulation at all.156 Related to and reminiscent of William Grey
149
Hallett, Mark. Physiology of Free Will. Neuroethics: Mapping the Field. San Francisco, CA. 13-14 May.
2002. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://bioethics.stanford.edu/conference/hallett.pdf
150
Breitmeyer, B.G. (1984). Visual masking: an integrative approach. New York: Oxford University Press.
151
Taylor, J. L., McCloskey, D. I. (1990). Triggering of preprogrammed movements as reactions to masked
stimuli. J Neurophysiol. 63: 439-46. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2329353
152
Ibid.
153
Taylor, J.L. and McCloskey, D.I. (1996). Selection of motor responses on the basis of unperceived stimuli.
Exp Brain Res. 110: 62-6. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8817257
154
MacIntyre, N. J., McComas, A. J. (1996). Non-conscious choice in cutaneous backward masking.
NeuroReport. 7: 1513-6. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8856710
155
Hallett, Mark. Physiology of Free Will. Neuroethics: Mapping the Field. San Francisco, CA. May 13-14,
2002. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://bioethics.stanford.edu/conference/hallett.pdf
156
Fellows, S., Tabaza, R., Heumann, M., Klotz, W., Neumann, O., Schwarz, M., Noth, J., & Topper, R.:
Modification of a functional motor task by non-consciously perceived sensory stimuli. In: Neuroreport, Nr. 13,
2002, p. 637640.
55
Walters work mentioned in Evidence #1; they also showed a propensity to confabulate a
conscious willing over what was not, in fact, consciously actualized. Note*157,158,159
Harvard psychologist Daniel Wegner claims that there are three prerequisites for the
experience of conscious willing to occur: the thought must occur before the action, be
consistent with the action, and not be accompanied by other causes.160,161 Wegner devised
several experiments inspired by dactylomancy, which includes witchy practices like table
turning, Ouija boards, automatic writing, pendulum divining, etc.162 The useful feature in all of
dactylomancy is the ideomotor effect163: unconscious self-movement perceived as performed
by other agents. So even with all the indications of something being willed, direct action can still
be perceived as unwilled by the participants.
In his classic I Spy study,164 Wegner and his colleagues made a homemade dactylomatic
Ouija board type contraption that they built over a computer mouse, connected to a computer
with a software program. Two subjects operated the Ouija mouse. They could see the cursor
move over some 50 small images of toys on the screen.
157
It should be noted that some priming effects have been shown to correlate to the expectations of the
researcher rather than the actual intended priming (it would be better to say that the subtle priming of the
researchers cue overrode the priming of the study). For the purposes of this book, that is irrelevant anyway,
as the main concern here is simply non-conscious motivation/influence.
158
Yong, E. (1/18/2012). Primed by expectations why a classic psychology experiment isnt what it seemed.
[Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2012/01/18/primed-by-expectations-%e2%80%93-why-
a-classic-psychology-experiment-isn%e2%80%99t-what-it-seemed
159
Doyen, S., Klein, O., Pichon, C.L., Cleeremans, A. (2011). Behavioral Priming: Its all in the Mind, but
Whose Mind? PLoS ONE http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0029081 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
160
Wegner, D.M., Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent mental causation. Sources of the experience of will. Am
Psychol. 1999 Jul;54(7):480-92. Retrieved on 8/7/2011 from
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~wegner/pdfs/Wegner&Wheatley1999.pdf
161
10.1196/annals.1279.011 [pp. 4-7]. Retrieved on 10/31/2011 from
162
Table Tipping. (N.D.). An Encyclopedia of Claims, Frauds, and Hoaxes of the Occult and Supernatural.
The James Randi Education Foundation. Retrieved on 8/7/2011 from
http://www.randi.org/encyclopedia/table%20tipping.html
163
Idiomotor Effect. (N.D.). An Encyclopedia of Claims, Frauds, and Hoaxes of the Occult and Supernatural.
The James Randi Education Foundation. Retrieved on 8/7/2011 from
http://www.randi.org/encyclopedia/ideomotor%20effect.html
164
Wegner, D.M., Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent mental causation. Sources of the experience of will. Am
Psychol. 1999 Jul;54(7):480-92. Retrieved on 8/7/2011 from
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~wegner/pdfs/Wegner&Wheatley1999.pdf
56
[165]
They were instructed to move the Ouija mouse around, with words being spoken in the
headphones that sometimes matched up to the pictures of toys on the monitor. They were also
told that they would always be hearing different words from each other simultaneously. About
every 30 seconds, music played in the headphones. They were supposed to stop moving the
Ouija mouse a few seconds after they heard the music begin. They were then supposed to write
down on a clipboard in their laps how much they had intended to stop, independent of the other
participants intention to stop. The scale on the clipboard ranged from I allowed the stop to
happen to I intended to make the stop.
The kicker was that one of the two participants, was always a confederate researcher,
who did not really hear words or music, but was being instructed in the headphones to
manipulate the board in very specific ways at certain times that corresponded to words that the
actual subject heard. The researchers were really testing whether the unknowing subject felt like
she had directed the cursor by thinking about where it would go just before moving it, even if she
hadnt actually moved it. The confederate, knowing that the subject had been primed by a word
(e.g. swan), sometimes manipulated the cursor to land and stop on the swan at specific times
crucial for priority. This enabled Wegner:
to show that under certain conditions subjects were absolutely sure they had stopped
the mouse themselves when in fact it had been done by someone else. This happened, as
165
Image retrieved on 8/7/2011 from http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~wegner/pdfs/Wegner&Wheatley1999.pdf
(9/13).
57
Wegner had predicted, when they had heard the name of the object just before the
stop.[166]
Wegner notes that these are the well worn methods of mentalists. Many more studies
have confirmed this type of phenomena,167 including some recent experiments where:
Experiment 1 demonstrates that free-will beliefs are strengthened when conscious

intentions to produce action outcomes bind the perception of action and outcome together
in time [and] Experiment 2 shows that these beliefs are strengthened when unconscious
priming of action outcomes creates illusory experiences of self-agency when the primed
outcomes occur.[168]
THE IMPLICATIONS: As it was put in Bank and Isham (2007), generation of responses is
largely unconscious, and we infer the moment of decision from the perceived moment of
action.169,170 Evidence #2 could be considered Part #2 of Evidence #1, with more of a
focus on the conscious cover-up than the origin of the action.
There is the very real possibility that the intuitive subjective perception of conscious
control falls under the logical fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc: after, therefore, because of.
Susan Blackmore writes that, these demonstrations of the mistakes we make show one thing
for sure that the feeling of willing something is no evidence either for or against free will.171
What we must realize is that if a magician can deceive us with so much predictable precision
using these principles, theres no reason to think that we dont often do it to ourselves, obscuring
our subterranean interests.
166
Blackmore, S. (2005). Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction. (p. 96.) Oxford University Press.
167
Wegner, D.M., (N.D.). Conscious Will and Authorship Processing sources. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~wegner/conscwil.htm
168
Aarts, H., and van den Bos, K. (2/11/2011). On the Foundations of Beliefs in Free Will Intentional Binding
and Unconscious Priming in Self-Agency. Psychological Science. February 11, 2011, doi:
10.1177/0956797611399294. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/02/10/0956797611399294
169
Sci. 2009 Jan;20(1):17-21. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
170
Eagleman, D.M. (2004). The where and when of intention. Science, 303, 11441146. Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://www.eaglemanlab.net/papers/EaglemanSciencePerspective2004.pdf
171
Blackmore, S. (2005). Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction. (pp. 97). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
58
As we shall see later in some fMRI scans (Evidences #8, #16), our conscious
tendency to misappropriate control is also retrofitted toward a multiplicity of sometimes differing
subterranean agendas that make up a human body where the vote of an internal caucus beats
out another before we are even aware of them (if ever). I dont mean to specifically pit one brain
hemisphere against another alone (it appears that the corpus collosum does act like an
arbitrator/inhibitor in this way172), but any conflict of interest in the brain/bodyeven factions of
neurons.
As science writer John Horgan wrote in the New York Times about the kinds of studies
where subjects are fooled into thinking they have control, When neurologists make patients
limbs jerk by electrically zapping certain regions of their brains, the patients often insist they
meant to move that arm, and they even invent reasons why.173 Its clear why Wegner calls these
confabulations intention inventions and well see many more, later in this writing. The
implications of Wegners work are reminiscent of the Libet/Fried studies in their daunting
implications and stand as the formidable Titans before the free will philosophers. At this point,
its likely that the free will philosophers will need more than philosophical slingshots to take
them down; they will more likely need some comparable scientific artillery.
172
McGilchrist, I. (Oct 21, 2011). The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World. RSA Animate.
TED. [1:15-1:30]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
https://www.ted.com/talks/iain_mcgilchrist_the_divided_brain.html
173
Horgan, J. (12/31/2002). More Than Good Intentions: Holding Fast to Faith in Free Will. New York Times.
Science Times. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.johnhorgan.org/more_than_good_intentions__holding_fast_to_faith_in_free_will_19044.htm
59
MEMORY
EVIDENCE #3: There is evidence that we can modify our memories and unintentionally
do so every time we access them.
Studies show that planning for the future improves memory, that a healthy hippocampus
is required for both planning and memory, and that they are connected in a way different than
thinking in the present.174,175 Because we modify our memories so significantly almost every
time we access them, some researchers have noted that, ironically, our most accurate memories
are the ones that we have never accessed.176,177
Rather than being stored like a filing cabinet, the way memory works is that each time we
remember something, we basically re-record the memory again from scratch, with the new
alterations built in, including present emotions (during the memory, not the original
event).178Along with the brain, even non-cerebral parts of the body, like the spine, have been
shown to store memories of pain via a neuron sensitizing protein called PKMzeta.179,180 When
this protein that bridges the gap between our synapses is neutralized, the memory is lost.181
Dr. Todd C. Sacktor lead a team of scientists who, using new drugs, have just about
figured out how to delete certain chronic fears, traumatic memories, and even bad habits based
upon this understanding of how memory really works. As the subjects remember some
174
Zimmer, C. (4/2011). The Brain: Memories Are Crucial for Looking Into the Future. Discover Magazine.
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://discovermagazine.com/2011/apr/24-the-brain-memories-crucial-looking-
into-future/article_view?b_start:int=0&-C
175
Norton, E. (8/24/2011). 'Time Cells' Weave Events Into Memories. Science Now. Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/08/time-cells-weave-events-into-mem.html
176
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (6/7/2007). Radiolab podcast: Memory and Forgetting. [Audio podcast].
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.radiolab.org/2007/jun/07
177
Devins, D. (Interviewer), LeDoux, J. (Interviewee). Discover Interview of Joe LeDoux. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://discovermagazine.com/videos/interview-joe-ledoux
178
Fernyhough, C. (1/13/2012). The story of the self. The Guardian. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2012/jan/13/our-memories-tell-our-story
179
Yong, E. (5/11/2011). A memory for pain, stored in the spine. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2011/05/11/a-memory-for-pain-stored-in-the-spine
180
Li, X.Y., Ko, H.G., Chen, T., Descalzi, G., Koga, K., Wang, H., Kim, S.S., Shang, Y., Kwak, C., Park, S.W.,
Shim, J., Lee, K., Collingridge, G.L., Kaang, B.K., Zhuo, M. (12/3/2010). Alleviating neuropathic pain
hypersensitivity by inhibiting PKMzeta in the anterior cingulate cortex. Science. 2010 Dec 3;330(6009):1400-
4. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21127255
181
Yong, E. (3/3/2011). Exposing the memory engine: the story of PKMzeta. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2011/03/03/exposing-the-memory-engine-
the-story-of-pkmzeta
60
traumatic/bad memory, before they are able to re-record it, the drug blocks the activity of a
substance that the brain apparently needs to retain much of its learned information.182 The
negative emotional associations with that particular memory are then removed by not allowing
the brain to retain them. The next time the memory is accessed it will be diluted or erased of
those connected traumatic elements. Another study showed that false memories about food can
lead to the avoidance of that food, effectively changing behavior.183
Scientists like Harvard psychology professor Daniel Schacter are noticing in brain scans
that many structures involved in the coding and retrieving are the same.184 So what we think
something means gets intertwined with the memory in a fundamental way. Considering that the
function of memory is to aid in our survival, both as declarative memory (facts/semantic,
events) and procedural memory (physiological, muscle, habit), its no surprise that writing the
playbook for possible truths is so deeply intertwined with memory that we would sometimes
incorporate hypothetical inferences as memories themselves (i.e. confabulation). And its also
not hard to see how memories become teleologically injected (this was meant to be like this for
this reason).
Even the so-called flashbulb memories of extra emotive events, such as (for
Americans) the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster, the assassinations of John F. Kennedy, or the
events of 9/11/2001, are not untouchable. Such testimonies were documented and then the
witnesses were revisited years later and re-interviewed only to give very different accounts of the
facts.185,186 Aside from altering memories in the depletory mode, there is also evidence that false
memories can be implemented rather easily (see Evidence #7 for more).187,188,189 Memory
182
Carey, B. (4/6/2009). Brain Researchers Open Door to Editing Memory. The New York Times, Research, p.
A1. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/health/research/06brain.html?_r=2
183
Bernstein, D., Laney, C., Morris, E., Loftus, E. (2005). False Memories About Food Can Lead To Food
Avoidance. Social Cognition, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2005, pp. 11-34 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
https://webfiles.uci.edu/eloftus/bernsteinSocialCognition05.pdf?uniq=-g02nr5
184
Beil, L. (11/28/2011). The Certainty of Memory Has Its Day in Court. New York Times. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/health/the-certainty-of-memory-has-its-day-in-court.html
185
Bohannon, J. (1988). Flashbulb memories for the space shuttle disaster: a tale of two theories. Cognition,
29, pp. 7399
186
Neisser, U. (1982). Snapshots or benchmarks? In U. Neisser (Ed.), Memory observed: Remembering in
natural contexts (pp. 43-48). San Francisco: Freeman.
187
Lindsay, D. S., Hagen, L., Read, J. D., Wade, K. A., & Garry, M. (2004). True photographs and false
memories. Psychological Science, 15,149-154.
188
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (6/7/2007). Radiolab podcast: Adding Memory. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.radiolab.org/2007/jun/07/adding-memory
189
Novella, S. (5/31/2011). Implanting False Memory. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/implanting-false-memory
61
researcher Kimberley Wade doctored videos of children taking balloon rides (in collusion with
the subjects parents, who provided images to manipulate digitally) and not only convinced her
subjects that they rode in the those balloons, but half of the subjects later claimed to actually
remember it.190
Recent studies have also found that the synapses all record memories via unique
rhythmsthat is, based upon certain individually preferred frequencies (which have longer or
shorter waves that cash out to rhythms) that correspond to their distance on the dendrite from the
neuronal cell body.191,192 Certain areas of the brain central to information flow (i.e. the entorhinal
cortex) can be rhythmically zapped to increase memory.193
THE IMPLICATIONS: Perhaps more than any of the Evidence below, since so much novel
evidence has been uncovered, the studies on memory have the widest range of significance to the
discussion of free will and identity. Neurophysiologist William H. Calvin asked, Who am I, if
not my memories?194 And that memory is limited. George Miller famously gave us
evidence195 that short term memory can hold roughly 7, plus or minus 2 items in it (Ill discuss
that more in another Evidence). Weve known that memories are reconstructive to some extent
from as far back as Freud, who noted that people often describe dreams and memories from non-
subjective perspectives, or observer memories, which are described from the point of view of
someone watching the event, rather than from looking out of their own eyes.
There is plenty of controversy about memory, from the normal, non-savant subject
known only as AJ, who has an uncannily perfect memory (leaving memory expert James
190
Nash, R. A., Wade, K. A., & Lindsay, D. S. (2009). Digitally manipulating memory: Effects of doctored
videos and imagination in distorting beliefs and memories. Memory & Cognition, 37, 414-424.
191
Kumar, A., Mehta, M.R. (2011). Frequency-Dependent Changes in NMDAR-Dependent Synaptic
Plasticity. Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience; 5 DOI: 10.3389/fncom.2011.00038
192
How the Brain Makes Memories: Rhythmically. (10/3/2011). Science Daily. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/10/111003161935.htm
193
Miller, G. (2/8/2012). Tiny Zaps Boost Memory. ScienceNow. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/02/tiny-zaps-boost-memory.html?ref=em
194
Loftus, E., Calvin, H. (3-4/2001). Memory's Future. Psychology Today. 34(2):55ff. Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://faculty.washington.edu/eloftus/MemoryFuture.htm
195
Miller, G. (1956). The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for
Processing Information. The Psychological Review. Vol. 63, pp. 81-97 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.musanim.com/miller1956
62
McGaugh and all scientists stumped!196), to the debate over whether its decay197 or
interference198 (retroactive or proactive199) that ends short term/working memory (up to 20-30
seconds). Still, the implications of these profound scientific breakthroughs concerning memory
range from lifesaving to absolutely terrifying. Like the old metaphor of a blade being a life-
saving scalpel in the hands of a doctor or a weapon in the hands of an enemy, technology like
that developed by Dr. Sacktor will affect our future in powerful ways.
Our long term memory lasts longer than 20-30 seconds and can be retrieved for years and
years. Constantly reformed memories subtly redefine our identity, as we strengthen the newer
neuronal connections with salient repetition via Long Term Potentiation.200 What does the nature
of memory and the ability to theoretically reprogram our long term identities imply in the
context of free will? Psychotherapists from the neo-Freudians to Rogerian humanists should be
happy as clams to be able to mold their clients according to whatever scripting seems
appropriate. But just as Michael Jackson never had an objective standard for when to stop
getting new noses, we could potentially find our selves entrenched in a shape-shifting vortex of
alienation more effectively than ever, even under the positive guidance of humanistic
therapists.
With the ability to reprogram our memories subtly to surgically (cue the soundtrack to
Total Recall), should we say that the erased desires of former selves are still freely desired or
undesired, since they cant persist to the extent originally intended? Libertarians and many
compatibilists would say that all that is important is that we have the ability to choose from any
changing identity. But if we desire to preserve a certain desiresay we believe with certainty
that a certain desire is good for us to have in any circumstance (e.g. to exercise one hour a
day) and then the subject is somehow manipulated to desire otherwise, against the wishes or
knowledge of that former self, has freedom of the will been preserved, merely because desires
themselves still exist later? Does the subject escape influence and manipulation because shes a
196
Woman with Perfect Memory Baffles Scientists. (3/20/2006). ABC News. Available on 9/19/2012 at
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=1738881&page=1
197
Altmann, E. M., Schunn, C. D. (2002). Integrating Decay and Interference: A New Look at an Old
Interaction. Proceedings of the 24th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. (pp.65-70). Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.
198
Waugh, N.C., Norman, D.A. (1965). Primary Memory. Psychological Review, 72, 89-104.
199
Underwood, B. J. (1957). Interference and forgetting. Psychological Review, 64, 49-60.
200
Shors, T.J., Matzel, L.D. (1997). LTP: Memory, arousal, neither, both. Behavioral and Brain Sciences
(response), 20 (4), 634-655, 1997.
63
different person? Are we more or less free if the manipulation of the subject is via another
agent, sub-control, or nature? I will go further into specifically agential causation in the
Challenges.
If we become almost, actually, or completely different people with different desires over
time (not necessarily a bad thing in itself), which self, with many completely reversed views,
experiences, and personality traits, say, 30 years later, is you when assessing the free will of
certain identities? Wouldnt our lack of access to certain manipulated/reprogrammed thoughts
and desires inhibit the freedom of our former self(selves)? Age old sci-fi topics indeed and we
need answers, because the science is here.
This might be where we would employ Dan Dennetts characterizing of certain kinds of
freedom worth wanting or not. A consequentialist might require or at least prefer to have the
kind of freedom that transcends selves. We would need to consider case by case examples, but
I would still generally characterize this manipulated freedom as unfree in all of them, intuitively
evidenced, in the least, by the mere conceivability of a kind of freedom that transcends
manipulated selves (i.e. reliably, in examples of counterfactual selves). We do seem to have
this ability to slip back into an old habit or way of thinking now and then, but there is a
difference in what were talking about here with rewritten memories, in that we actually think the
old habit itself is different than what it actually was.
Importantly, brain scans have shown that we categorize future selves with other people
and not as self,201 which is really unfortunate, considering that this ability is one of the greatest
features in the human mind (time travel!... kinda). In one study, people in a virtual reality
chamber were shown images either of themselves or of software modeled images of their future
selves. In subsequent interviews, designed to disguise the researchers intentions of course, those
primed with computer modeled images of their future selves were more likely not only to invest
in their futures (up to 30% more than those who were shown only their current selves), but they
were also more likely to act more ethically than those not as in touch with their future-selves.
Philosophers have provided thought experiments that demonstrate why this is intuitive for most
people: we dont care about the body surviving as much as the personality; we care about selves
201
Tugend, A. (2/24/2-120. Bad Habits? My Future Self Will Deal With That. The New York Times. Retrieved
on 9/19/2012 from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/business/another-theory-on-why-bad-habits-are-hard-
to-break-shortcuts.html?pagewanted=all
64
that are most like us now.202 And confining identity to a snapshot of the now is over before you
finish reading this sentence.
Revisiting the AI robot comparisons in the intro, its also interesting to consider that there
may be some similarities between computer memory and human memory. The short term or
working memory in computers (i.e. RAM) needs a trickle of electricity, while the long term
memory does not203 (magnetic fields hold the positioning of the code of 1s and 0s in place).
Many experts think that long term and short term biological memories also have different
mechanisms for coding and/or decay/interference. Memories are not merely bits of stored data,
but are innately procedural, because, importantly, they include our present reactions to the
memory. So, even though we usually intuitively frame our identities and experience with a
certain continuity running through our memories, is this continuity alone really enough to be
considered an identity in itself? I should note that many types of amnesiacs and people with
brain damage, mental illnesses, memory repression, or spatial and motor memory loss, do not
have the luxury of this continuity.
In a stunning case featured in the Radiolab podcast, Loops,204 a woman afflicted with
transient global amnesia was recorded by her daughter in the hospital, repeating their same
conversation with slight variations over and over for hours. The daughter has posted a small
sample of the conversation on YouTube.205,206 One wonders if the daughter would have crafted
her words exactly the same way each time in that mostly causally contained hospital room that
her mother would have responded exactly the same too it is that close.
What does the ability to completely recreate our desires and identities via science say
about the identity of a soul/spirit? Would false memories that influence our desires add or detract
from a notion of independent free will? Doesnt the fact that false memories can be implanted
show us that interrogators of any stripe, from doctors to detectives to lawyers, need to be aware
202
Kagan, S. (Uploaded by YaleCourses on Sep. 30, 2008). 14. What matters (cont.); The nature of death,
Part I. [Video file post]. Available on 9/19/2012 at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0_vqoz05W-
0&feature=relmfu
203
Service, R.F. (8/24/2012). New Computer Memory Material Goes Easy on the Juice. AAAS, ScienceNow.
Available on 9/19/2012 at http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/08/new-computer-memory-material-
goe.html
204
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (6/7/2007). Radiolab podcast: Loops. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://www.radiolab.org/2011/oct/04
205
Chicostine. (8/26/2010). It's Tuesday! (Transient Global Amnesia). [Video file]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N3fA5uzWDU8&feature=related
206
Chicostine. (4/9/2011). Transient Global Amnesia 2. [Video file]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FjDThF2GwnQ&feature=related
65
of this when leading a patient or a witness? And as science writer Ed Yong notes, having an
unrealistic belief about what people can actually remember is not a fair expectation for jurors to
have of the defendants and witnesses too. Unfortunately, 60 percent of people agreed with five
statements about memory that the experts almost totally rejected.207,208
Dr. Mayank R. Mehta, who co-discovered the unique rhythmic nature of individual
synapses said, We already know there are drugs and electrical stimuli that can alter brain
rhythms. Our findings suggest that we can use these tools to deliver the optimal brain rhythm to
targeted connections to enhance learning. What consequences does the ability to enhance or
incapacitate learning have on the will? As we will see in the Challenges to the Implications of
Predisposition section after the Evidences, some contend that having more options available
increases free will (though they see that accomplished by quantum stochasticity or illusionism),
but does learning increase our freedom by increasing our awareness of the options or does
ignorance increase our free will by multiplying the options and reducing prerequisites or is it
neutral? Is it a category error to confuse epistemology with freedom?
207
Yong, E. (8/6/2011). Five myths about memory (and why they matter in court). [Web log post]. Retrieved
on 9/19/2012 from http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2011/08/05/five-myths-about-memory-
and-why-they-matter-in-court
208
Simons, D., & Chabris, C. (2011). What People Believe about How Memory Works: A Representative
Survey of the U.S. Population PLoS ONE, 6 (8) DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0022757
66
INTENTION
EVIDENCE #4: Before we even articulate it, our impression of what someone else thinks
is heavily and undetectably influenced by frontloaded moral biases. These biases are
evidentially based upon consequences and/or superficial context, rather than, as we would
hope, strictly by their actual connection to the causes of the results.
In the article, The Good, The Bad and The Intentional, science writer Dan Jones gives an
excellent overview of the most significant work regarding intention over the last few decades,
and writes about a 1992 experiment concerning intentions, causation and blame:
Back in 1992 Mark Alicke published his findings that people were more likely to blame a
speeding driver for causing an accident when he was rushing home to hide a cocaine vial
from his parents than when he wanted to hide an anniversary present from them.[209,210]
In the Alicke study, blame over a consequence is influenced by the intention. More
recently, experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe has conducted slightly different experiments
showing how blame is ascribed to the intention retroactively, based upon the resulting
consequence. They strongly confirm what is now called the Knobe Effect.211,212,213 In Knobes
dissertation to Princeton, he wrote:
209
moral judgments in our folk psychology. The Psychologist. 22(8). [pp. 666-669].
210
Alicke, M. D. (1992). Culpable causation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Vol 63(3), Sep 1992,
368-378. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.63.3.368
211
Edmonds, D. (Interviewer), Knobe, J. (Interviewee). (8/28/2010). Philosophy Bites podcast: Joshua Knobe
on Experimental Philosophy. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://philosophybites.com/2010/08/joshua-knobe-on-experimental-philosophy.html
212
Knobe, J. (2003a). Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language. Analysis, 63, [pp. 190-193].;
Knobe, J. (2003b). Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation. Philosophical
Psychology., 16, [pp. 309-324].
213
4
67
A series of experiments demonstrate that peoples attributions of intentional action in
particular cases can actually be influenced by their moral beliefs. This result suggests that
moral considerations may actually be playing a role in the concept of intentional action
itself.[214]
Jones describes Knobes most famous experiment:
In a study published in 2003, Knobe presented passers-by in a Manhattan park with the
following scenario. The CEO of a company is sitting in his office when his Vice
President of R&D comes in and says, We are thinking of starting a new programme. It
will help us increase profits, but it will also harm the environment. The CEO responds
that he doesnt care about harming the environment and just wants to make as much
profit as possible. The programme is carried out, profits are made and the environment is
harmed.
Did the CEO intentionally harm the environment? The vast majority of people Knobe
quizzed 82 per cent said he did. But what if the scenario is changed such that the
word harm is replaced with help? In this case the CEO doesnt care about helping the
environment, and still just wants to make a profit and his actions result in both
outcomes. Now faced with the question Did the CEO intentionally help the
environment?, just 23 per cent of Knobes participants said yes (Knobe, 2003a).[215]
Similar results were found when this kind of contrast was repeated in another experiment:
people were given a scenario with a man named Jake, who participates in a shooting
competition. The problem is that he is a terrible shot who almost never hits anything at all, and
he must hit a bulls eye to win. He raises his gun and his aim is actually totally off, but his jerky
hand slips at the last second and the shot goes wild. This results in a perfect line up of the shot
214
Knobe, J. (11/2006). Folk psychology, folk morality. [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Princeton
University, New Jersey. [pp. 1, 73]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
https://webspace.utexas.edu/deverj/personal/test/folkpsychology.pdf
215
4
68
and he hits the bulls eye! Should Jake be credited with hitting it intentionally? Now consider a
similar scenario with Jake the terrible marksman, who wants to kill his rich aunt so that he can
get his inheritance. When he tries to line up his shot, his aim is completely off, but his jerky hand
slips at the last second and the shot goes wild, resulting in a perfect line up the shot and she is hit
and killed. Just as in the CEO study, in the first scenario, the overwhelmingly majority of the
people did not credit Jake with the bulls eye, but in the second scenario, Jake was
overwhelmingly blamed as a murderer.216
Upon free will advocate and expert Alfred Meles excellent criticism, they added
additional choices, expressed as levels of intentionality/culpability to show whether the subject
didnt only choose complete intention/culpability because they really wanted a middle ground
qualification and had no way to express it. Overall, the results showed that giving subjects a
chance to express praise or blame in no way diminished the asymmetry found in experiment 1.
Once again, almost all subjects (96%) said that Jake was trying.217 Another criticism that Mele
had was that, as Knobe puts it, people may judge certain behaviors to be intentional because
they believe that only intentional behaviors can be morally blameworthy. Knobe conducted
another test, again, partially devised by Mele, that pretty much ruled this out as well.218
Importantly and mysteriously, further studies about intention and morality show that the
Knobe effect is robust enough to still show up in subjects with damage to the emotion processing
ventromedial prefrontal cortex,219 suggesting that emotional reactions to immorality seeping
through to pre-judgment is very unlikely. Also interesting is its survival in people with autism
who are challenged in conversational pragmatics,220 so its less likely that its there to secure an
impetus to punish via semantics, as some have contended.221
216
Knobe, J. (2003b). Intentional action in folk psychology. Philosophical Psychology, 16(2), 309324. (p. 7-
10). Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/IntentionSkill.pdf
217
Ibid. (p. 14).
218
Ibid. (p. 15-18).
219
Young, L., Cushman, F., Adolphs, R., Tranel D., Hauser, M. (2006). Does emotion mediate the relationship
between an action's moral status and its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence. Journal of
Cognition and Culture, 6(1-2), 265-278. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.mit.edu/~lyoung/Site/Publications_files/Cult_Cog_2006.pdf
220
Zalla, T., Sav, A.M., Stopin, A., Ahade, S., Leboyer, M. (2009). Faux pas detection and intentional action in
Asperger Syndrome. A replication on a French sample. Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS, Ecole Normale
Superieure, 75005, Paris, France. J Autism Dev Disord 39:373-82. 2009 DOI: 10.1007/s10803-008-0634-y
221
Adams, F., Steadman, A. (2004b). Intentional action and moral considerations: still pragmatic. Analysis,
64, 264 267 AND Adams, F., Steadman, A. (2004a). Intentional action in ordinary language: core concept or
pragmatic understanding? Analysis, 64, 173 181.
69
The Knobe effect has likewise been observed delineating between actively doing and
passively allowing in ethical scenarios,222 for example, subjects more harshly prejudged some
doctors in the context of removing life support as killing compared to just letting the patients die.
Kliemann et al., 2008 showed that the Knobe effect was also observed in subjects who more
harshly judged people with bad prior records than good ones.223
THE IMPLICATIONS: The roots of the Knobe effect are still mysterious. It seems that no
single intuitive normative theory can explain it (yet). We do know that from the very formation
of our judgment about the intentions of others, which experts call the theory of mind, we fail to
assess the context in a way that we, ourselves, would consider fair if the tables were turned. We
also know that infants as young as three months old begin to evaluate social behavior and prefer
and expect helpers over hinderers,224,225 so if moral evaluations are somehow frontloaded into
intention, it looks like the trail may even go back to the beginning.
As an adaptive heuristic, the Knobe effect makes sure the punishers are punished, even if
by an excessive distribution of punishment. Is it something we can change? Is it something we
want to change? Is the Knobe effect a quasi-unconscious attempt to heighten the significance of
personal will, including, as is relevant to this work, the related freedom, or is that aspect of it just
a useful byproduct of the moral assertion, because the more freedom there is, the easier it is to
blame? Maybe studies testing whether or not free will advocates are more or less susceptible to
the Knobe effect, as compared to determinists, would provide useful evidence.
It seems that with many biases, the best we could hope to argue in terms of free will is to
say that since everyone seems to have a predisposition for them, the playing field is generally
equal. But predisposition and fairness are categorically different (even if some of our
predispositions are considered fair, see Evidence #27), nor does the equal distribution of some
undesirable effect really improve its appeal.
222
Cushman, F., Knobe, J., Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008). Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments.
Cognition, 108, 281289. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18377886
223
Kliemann, D., Young, L., Scholz, J. & Saxe, R. (2008). The influence of prior record on moral judgment.
Neuropsychologica, 46, 29492957.
224
Hamlin, J. K., Wynn, K., Bloom, P. (11/22/2007). Social evaluation by preverbal infants. Nature. 450, 557-
559. doi:10.1038/nature06288 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v450/n7169/abs/nature06288.html
225
Yong, E. (8/6/2011). Infants prefer a nasty moose if it punishes an unhelpful elephant. [Web log post].
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2011/11/28/infants-prefer-
an-nasty-moose-if-it-punishes-an-unhelpful-elephant
70
Last, lets consider how something like the Knobe effect might have serious
consequences in society. Consider the chairman of the board experiment in the context of
criticism in the so-called, pro-life movement; specifically, abortion perspectives vs. in vitro
fertilization technology. Though obviously personhood is debatable here, one situation is
considered killing a baby; the other is bringing a life into the world, even though the former kills
one life vs. the several leftover embryos from IVF treatments. As noted by philosopher Ronald
Lindsay,226 why dont we see pro-life people shouting about saving so many embryos, rather
than demonizing women at abortion clinics? Could it be the Knobe effect evoking more leniency
on IVF parents who aim to bring a life into the world? If life does begin at conception, are so
many fertilized eggs considered an acceptable loss, the numbers be damned, because of the
intention of the parents?
226
Lindsay, R. (2008). Future Bioethics: Overcoming, Taboos, Myths, and Dogmas. Prometheus.
71
GENETIC BEHAVIOR
EVIDENCE #5: There is evidence for a relationship between behavioral disposition (e.g.
aggressive or docile) and specific physical traits, as docility has been artificially selected
(bred) rather quickly in some animals. There is even evidence that our moral judgments
may be influenced genetically.
In the 1950s, the Soviet scientist Dmitry Belyaev from the Institute of Cytology and
Genetics, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, began a long term experiment
breeding silver foxes for docility. The test continues to this day,227,228,229 50 years and 45,000
foxes later, via over 40 generations of foxes that are now docile, friendly and as skilled as dogs
in communicating with people. The selected foxes also show developmental, morphological and
neurochemical changes concordant with those observed in other domestic animals.
In the Radiolab episode New Nice,230 evolutionary biologist Tecumseh Fitch hypothesizes
that since the accompanying physical changes that the domesticated foxes increasingly display
(e.g. smaller teeth, curly tails, multicolored coats, floppy ears, and a more effeminate face) are all
physical features that represent subjects with a lack of neural crest cells, this lack of neural crest
cells may be because the continual selection of foxes with the smallest/weakest/most immature
adrenal glands would also select the foxes with increasingly slower neural crest cell migration
during development. Basically, the foxes are increasingly docile because they are frozen in an
increasingly juvenile state.
227
Lindberg, S., Bjrnerfeldt, S., Saetre, P., Svartberg, K., Seehuus, B., Bakken, M., Vil, C., and Jazin, E.
(10/2005). Selection for tameness has changed brain gene expression in silver foxes. Current Biology. Volume
15, Issue 22, R915-R916, 22 doi:10.1016/j.cub.2005.11.009: Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.cell.com/current-biology/retrieve/pii/S0960982205013278
228
International Collaborative Study between: The James A. Baker Institute for Animal Health, Cornell
University, USA; The Institute of Cytology and Genetics, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia; and
Department of Biology, University of Utah, USA. (N.D.). Study of the Molecular Basis of Tame and Aggressive
Behavior in the Silver Fox Model. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://cbsu.tc.cornell.edu/ccgr/behaviour/Index.htm
229
AV Kukekova, LN Trut, K Chase, DV Shepeleva, AV Vladimirova, AV Kharlamova, IN Oskina, A
Stepika, S Klebanov, HN Erb, and GM Acland. (11/2007). Measurement of segregating behaviors in
experimental silver fox pedigrees. Behav Genet. 2008 March; 38(2): 185194. doi: 10.1007/s10519-007-9180-1:
230
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (Interviewers), Fitch, T. (Interviewee). (10/19/2009). Radiolab podcast: New
Nice. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.radiolab.org/2009/oct/19/new-nice
72
Abigail Marsh and a team of researchers published a study231 showing that people with a
long allele of a particular gene (a serotonin transporter) rated unintentionally harming someone
as more acceptable than did people with short allele carriers of the same gene.232 When they
used the classic Trolley Car Problem233 to test the subjects moral judgments concerning
foreseen harm, the study showed that the longer the gene was, the more likely they were to adopt
a utilitarian/consequentialist response to the ethical dilemma. That is to say that rather than to let
a train continue on the track it was on to kill five people, they were more willing to actively
divert it to kill only one person who happened to be on a side track. People with the shorter
length of the gene (SS) were more likely not to divert the train, and people with a medium length
gene (SL) were neutral on the matter:
[234]
231
Marsh, A., Crowe, S., Yu, H., Gorodetsky, E., Goldman, D., & Blair, R. (2011). Serotonin Transporter
Genotype (5-HTTLPR) Predicts Utilitarian Moral Judgments. PLoS ONE, 6 (10) DOI:
10.1371/journal.pone.0025148. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
232
New Study Finds First Links Between Genes and Moral Judgments. (10/5/2011). Georgetown University.
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.georgetown.edu/story/abigail-marsh-moral-judgment-gene.html
233
Sokol, D. (5/2/2006). What if... BBC News. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/4954856.stm
234
Wilcox, C. (10/5/2011). A Moral Gene? [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/science-sushi/2011/10/05/a-moral-gene
73
THE IMPLICATIONS: Marshs work, if accurate, could alter the course of relevant
philosophy, law, medicine, religion just about every important field link to human thinking
forever. Its that important. I will discuss the effects of hormones and neurotransmitters upon
behavior later, but it should be noted in this context that in some research, serotonin itself has
been shown to influence our moral judgement. Experimental psychologist Molly Crocket has
done experiments showing that the neurotransmitter serotonin directly alters both moral
judgment and behavior through increasing subjects aversion to personally harming others.235
The evidence shows a correlation between low serotonin and tolerance for unfairness (to the
point of incurring personal loss just to punish others).236
There are several other Evidences in this book with some speculation about
consequentialist/utilitarian judgment influence in different areas of the brain and/or in language,
such as more recent work of Scott Atran on Philip Tetlocks concept of sacred values.237,238
Should those other evidences also correlate, it would only bolster our moral predisposition
further, as the areas of the brain that correlate to these fundamentally different types of moral
processing will commensurately affect the agent depending upon the actual physical health of
those particular parts of the organ.
For many worldviews that presume we are all predisposed to an equal moral playing
field, especially theological ones, it should be very troubling that some brains favor cost/benefit
analysis concerning human life and others dont by default (or by the health/capacity of the brain
areas determined by genes and luck). What does this mean for philosophers, from Plato to Kant
to Robert Kane, whose conception of freedom is reflected in their ethical choicesthose who are
considered to be as free as they are allowed to act according to their values? When the
235
Crockett, M. J., Clark, L., Hauser, M.D., Robbins, T.W. (2010). Serotonin selectively influences moral
judgment and behavior through effects on harm aversion. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 107(40):17433-8
236
Warburton, N. (Interviewer), Crockett, M. J. (Interviewee). (7/22/2012). Philosophy Bites podcast: Molly
Crockett on Brain Chemistry and Moral-Decision Making (originally on Bioethics Bites). [Audio podcast].
Retrieved on 6/30/2013 from http://philosophybites.com/2012/07/molly-crockett-on-brain-chemistry-and-
moral-decision-making-originally-on-bioethics-bites.html
237
Berns, G. S., Bell, E., Capra, C. M., Prietula, M. J., Moore, S., Anderson, B., Ginges, J., Atran, S. (3/2012).
The price of your soul: neural evidence for the non-utilitarian representation of sacred values. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2012; 367 (1589): 754 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2011.0262
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://artisresearch.com/articles/Ginges_Atran_Price_of_your_Soul.pdf
238
Keim, B. (1/24/2012). Profit vs. Principle: The Neurobiology of Integrity. Wired Science. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/01/neurobiology-of-sacred
74
fundamental system of evaluation changes depending upon genetic predisposition or brain
health, how can this reflect rational, consistent, ethical standards?
Do certain beneficial or harmful physical traits in humans naturally correlate to certain
beneficial or harmful psychological traits? If we could breed less violent animals or even a less
violent society, do we have a moral obligation to do so? Have we domesticated ourselves
throughout our evolution via social groups favoring the breeding of more docile humans and if
so, what are the implications in moral philosophy and many popular brands of religion?
Wouldnt some people have more or less of a propensity to sin from the get-go, because of
their propensity to be more aggressive?
Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols have done other thought experiments than the Trolley
Car Problem to show that we are clearly torn between affirming a logical consequential
exoneration of responsibility in a determined world and renouncing it when faced with salient
examples of injustice.239,240 They have also made the case that morality itself may depend upon
personality. Knobe writes that Feltz and Cokely have shown241 the higher a participant was in
openness to experience, the more likely that participant was to give a relativist answer242
[emphasis mine]. Later, in Evidence #19, well see that other studies have shown openness to
experience to correlate with a propensity for liberalism, amongst other things, and that these
kinds of dispositions appear to have some physiological bases, whether genetic or developmental
or both.
The Belyaev experiment demonstrates that animals can clearly be bred to be more open
to experience. If personality can be altered physiologically, cant we also infer that our
physiological disposition may have at least something to do with our moral disposition? If so,
even this conservative concession would be enough to crack the foundations underlying the
239
on Experimental Philosophy. [Audio podcast]. [6:30-10:30]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
240
Nichols, S., Knobe, J. (10/25/2007). Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk
Intuitions. Nos 41 (4):663685. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jk762/Nichols-Knobe.pdf
241
Feltz, A., & Cokely, E. T. (2008). The fragmented folk: More evidence of stable individual differences in
moral judgments and folk intuitions. In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (Eds.), Proceedings of the
30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1771-1776). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science
Society. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://faculty.schreiner.edu/adfeltz/Papers/pp329_feltz.pdf
242
Knobe, J. (2/16/2011). Is morality relative? Depends on your personality. The Philosophers Magazine.
Issue 52. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.philosophypress.co.uk/?p=1795#
75
context of moral freedom. This would be true even if it is in combination with other
undetermined, learned and/or cultural considerations.
The empirical evidence already shows that altruism consistently has 3 degrees of separation
with gradation243,244 and so implies that predictable standards of social behavior are not in accord
with a necessarily unpredictable free will independent of causal influence. Professor Marshs
work suggests another path: our moral judgments are at least partially predisposed genetically.
As soon as we can all get of our personal genomes on the cheap, this will be exactly the kind of
thing well be paying our genetic analysts to describe after some testing: whats our capacity
for compassion, empathy, sympathy, utilitarian judgment, etc.? This will be limited, because it
wont include environmental and developmental influences, but it may increase our
predictability, which is almost always something good.
243
Fowler, J., & Christakis, N. (2010). Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0913149107. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu/cooperative_behavior_cascades.pdf
244
Rees, T. (3/15/2010). Altruism has 3 degrees of separation. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://epiphenom.fieldofscience.com/2010/03/altruism-has-3-degrees-of-separation.html
76
MANIPULATION
EVIDENCE #6: Experiments on insects, animals, and humans show an ability to

manipulate highly complex behavior via genetic variation/selection, physiological
stimulation, and behavior manipulation.
In The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins describes245 an example of how the existence or
removal of certain genes specifically influences behavior in animals. He tells of how the
zoologist W.C. Rothenbuhler experimented246 with several variations of unique drone/queen
honey bee hybrids in order to increase hygiene and fight the bacterial disease that many bee
larvae are vulnerable to called foul brood. Each genetic version of Rothenbuhlers hybrids
displayed a specific action. As Dawkins wrote, one group showed perfect hygienic behavior
(uncapping the wax cells of the diseased grubs, then throwing them out of the hive), a second
showed no hygienic behavior at all, and a third went half way, uncapping the wax cells of the
diseased grubs, but not throwing them out of the hive, until further mixing and back-crossing
created one that manifested the perfect combination of a complex series of actions, including
seeking out the specific cells containing larvae infected by the disease, then cutting the wax cap
off of that cell, then dragging the infected larvae out of the hive and throwing it onto a rubbish
heapultimately saving any hive with larvae infected by the disease. More recently, similar
manipulations upon ants were able to switch their caste rolls as workers and soldiers along with
the physical manifestations that accompany them.247
245
Dawkins, R. (30th Anniv. Edition 2006). The Selfish Gene. (p. 60-62). New York: Oxford University Press.
246
Goncalves, L.S., Stort, A. C. (1/ 1978). Honey Bee Improvement Through Behavioral Genetics. Annual
Review of Entomology. Vol. 23: 197-213 (1/ 1978) DOI: 10.1146/annurev.en.23.010178.001213. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.en.23.010178.001213?journalCode=ento
247
Rajakumar, R., San Mauro, D., Dijkstra, M.B., Huang, M.H., Wheeler, D.E., Hiou-Tim, F., Khila, A.,
Cournoyea, M., Abouheif, E. (1/6/2012). Ancestral Developmental Potential Facilitates Parallel Evolution in
Ants. Science. 6 January 2012: Vol. 335 no. 6064 pp. 79-82 DOI: 10.1126/science.1211451. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.sciencemag.org/content/335/6064/79.abstract
77
Science writer Ed Yong discusses more examples of single genes directly influencing
complex behavior in a piece focusing on a recent study248 where researchers found a gene (egt)
that causes caterpillars to climb up into the highest leaves:
This is a great example of what Richard Dawkins calls the extended phenotype where
genes can influence events well beyond the bodies that they live in [] Most of the
examples that Dawkins cites cannot be traced back to specific genes. Hoover and Grove
have found an exception a single virus gene that can control the behaviour of another
animal.[249]
The virus that can manipulate this gene, which is normally activated when the caterpillars
are molting, causes the caterpillars to climb high up, then die and quickly liquefy so that millions
more viruses spread out all down the plant and into the wind more effectively. It should go
without saying that the virus doesnt plan all this. It just evolved to do something effective for its
survival. When the gene was removed by scientists, the caterpillar was still killed by the virus,
but it did not climb. He goes on to mention other examples of extended phenotypes with beavers
(and their dams), ants, and snails.
It appears that even something like bacteria may have significant influence on our
thoughts and behavior via genetic influence developmentally and perhaps in adulthood as
well.250 Hippocampal circuitry, serotonin receptors, and receptors critical for the development
and function of the amygdala appear to be indirectly susceptible to gut bacteria in ways that can
affect learning, memory, and emotions such as fear and anxiety.
Scientists inserted plant genes into mice that made specific neurons able to respondto
be turned on and off, by light (known as optogenetics). They were able to control the animals
in simple ways, like steering them left or right or controlling body temperature, breathing rate,
248
Hoover, K., Grove, M., Gardner, M., Hughes, D., McNeil, J., Slavicek. J. (9/2011). A Gene for an Extended
Phenotype. Science. Vol. 333 no. 6048 p. 1401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1209199. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.sciencemag.org/content/333/6048/1401
249
Yong, Ed. (9/8/2011). Liquefying virus uses one gene to make caterpillars climb to their doom. [Web log
post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2011/09/08/liquefying-virus-uses-one-gene-to-make-
caterpillars-climb-to-their-doom
250
Constandi, M. (3/25/2011). Gut bacteria may influence thoughts and behaviour. [Web log post]. Retrieved
on 9/19/2012 from
http://scienceblogs.com/neurophilosophy/2011/03/gut_bacteria_may_influence_thoughts_and_behaviour.php
78
etc., with light.251,252 Aside from genetic influence on mind control via light frequency, there has
also been successful limited mind control via sound frequency,253,254,255 which makes sense,
because sound is merely in a different frequency register than light.
Recently, Sony and the University of Tokyo have been working together on a hand
manipulator (via electronic stimulation) called PossessedHand to help people learn electronic
instruments.256In the 1970s, professor of physiology at Yale University, Jose Manuel Rodriguez
Delgado, implanted radio-equipped electrode arrays, which he called stimoceivers, in cats,
monkeys, chimpanzees, gibbons, bulls and even humans, and he showed that he could control
subjects minds and bodies with the push of a button.257,258,259
In 1963, capturing great media attention, Delgado himself famously stood in front of a
charging bull that had one of his brain implants. He activated the radio transmitter, stimulating
the charging bulls caudate nucleus, and made the bull run away from him. Videos of some of the
experiment can be found online.260 Even in humans, Delgado also later showed, that not only
was physical manipulation possible by stimulating certain areas of the brain, moving limbs like
251
R. S. Ray, A. E. Corcoran, R. D. Brust, J. C. Kim, G. B. Richerson, E. Nattie, S. M. Dymecki. Impaired
Respiratory and Body Temperature Control Upon Acute Serotonergic Neuron Inhibition. Science, 2011; 333
(6042): 637 DOI: 10.1126/science.1205295 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/333/6042/637
252
Chorost, M. (10/19/2009). Algae and Light Help Injured Mice Walk Again. Wired Magazine. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.wired.com/magazine/2009/10/mf_optigenetics/all/1
253
Portenoy, R.K., Jarden, J.O., Sidtis, J.J., Lipton, R.B., Foley, K.M., Rottenberg, D.A. (1986). Compulsive
thalamic self-stimulation: A case with metabolic, electrophysiologic, and behavioral correlates. Pain 27(3):
277-290, 1986. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.scribd.com/doc/6051693/Compulsive-thalamic-
selfstimulation-a-case-with-metabolic-electrophysiologic-and-behavioral-correlates
254
Singer, E. (1/20/2009). The Army's Remote-Controlled Beetle. Technology Review, MIT. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/22039
255
Clarke, T. (5/2/2002). Here come the Ratbots: Desire drives remote-controlled rodents. Nature.
doi:10.1038/news020429-9 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.nature.com/news/1998/020429/full/news020429-9.html
256
PossessedHand: Techniques for controlling human hands using electrical muscles stimuli. Rekimoto Lab.
Interfaculty Initiative in Information Studies. The University of Tokyo. Available on 9/19/2012 at
http://lab.rekimoto.org/projects/possessedhand
257
Horgan, J. (10/2005). The Forgotten Era of Brain Chips. Scientific American. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.wireheading.com/delgado/brainchips.pdf
258
Jose M. R., Delgado; Vaino, Lipponen; Gerhard, Weiss; Francisco Del, Pozo; Jose Luis, Monteagudo;
Robert, McMahon. (1975). Two-way transdermal communication with the brain. American Psychologist, Vol
30(3), Mar 1975, 265-273. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.30.3.265 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/amp/30/3/265
259
Delgado, J.M.R. (1968). Intracerebral Radio Stimulation and Recording in Completely Free Patients.
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/scalar_tech/esp_scalartech11a.htm
260
John Robert Posey (uploaded on Apr 12, 2011). The Cordoba Bull Ranch Experiment - French
Documentary. [Video file]. Available on 9/19/2012 at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QwPUVqewEos
79
puppets, but primal emotional responses, such as fear, rage, lust, hilarity, were also induced at
will by the researchers.261
THE IMPLICATIONS: These are stunning examples of specific behavior manipulation that
have real world implications from medical marvels (e.g. neural prosthesis262,263) to limited mind
control. In the Delgado experiments, its important to note that he also found the elements of
confabulation shown in several other studies in this writing. A behavioral connection to both
specific genetic and physiological factors, as well as manipulation, is evident. In this case,
manipulation was by the researchers, but theres no reason to make the distinction between the
researchers and the non-conscious mind. Science shows how the non-conscious mind
manipulates our conscious behavior.
Remarkably, scientists have identified something in the hippocampus similar to what
Jerry Lettvin first called the grandmother cell in the late 1960s.264 It has been called the
Halle Berry neuron,265 and it shows Invariant visual representation by single-neurons in the
human brain.266 The indication is that there is a single neuron that represents the specific
concept of Halle Barry or, presumably, any other person, place, or thing. The evidence is
strong, though the idea still has its critics.267
This is very interesting science to consider in the context of Delgados work. He insists
that behavioral changes are only general and cannot be programmed in one subject to target
other specific individuals, but one wonders what could happen if the more recent research
involving individual neurons that identify with specific persons were somehow linked with it.
261
262
Ibid.
263
Mouse With 'Off Switch' in Key Brain Cell Population Developed; Research May Increase Understanding
of SIDS, Depressive Disorders. (7/30/2011). Science Daily. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
264
Boston, MA: Pearson ISBN-10: 0205650481 [p. 125].
265
Zimmer, C. (6/2009). The Brain Can a Single Neuron Tell Halle Berry From Grandma Esther? Discover
Magazine. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://discovermagazine.com/2009/jun/15-can-single-neuron-tell-
halle-berry-from-grandma-esther
266
Quian Quiroga, R., Reddy, L., Kreiman, G., Koch, C., Fried, I. (2005). Invariant visual representation by
single-neurons in the human brain. Nature, 435: 1102-1107. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.vis.caltech.edu/~rodri/papers/nature03687.pdf
267
Horgan, J. (1999). The undiscovered mind: How the human brain defies replication, medication, and
explanation. New York: The Free Press.
80
Perhaps via nanotechnology, mind controlled assassins like in the Manchurian Candidate will
step out of science fiction if they havent already! While manipulators drive the subject via
turning up and down various emotions in order to control the person, it seems they would still
have to know what the person was thinking in order to apply the correct emotion to the correct
representative neuron(s). Rather than guessing which stimulus matches each representation, it
might be easier to involve a confederate. The manipulators could then apply strong positive
emotions about the confederate into the subject and create strong trust and then be lead in that
way by the confederates suggestions.
We should always be cautious when trying to correlate animal/insect behavior with
human behavior, but if there are genetic combinations that can lead to predispositions for
complex behavior involving creatures as intelligent as bees and mice, we should seriously
consider the possibility, even the probability, that our own behavior is also often directly
influenced by our genetic makeup (and we dont have to downplay any branch of social science
to do thisindeed, it fascilitates it). Like the honeybees in this study, that could be up to the
point of a complex series of actions that go beyond our immediate sphere of influence (the
extended phenotype). It should be said that just because there is secondary or tertiary
phenomena, doesnt break causality in any way that is beneficial to the libertarian any more than
randomness does; actually, it still functions as causality, but the predictability is just further
removed. And theres also no reason to think that the same causal evolutionary pressures that
affect animals cant act upon humans. Even considering the unnatural insertion of plant genes
into mice shows us that the foundation for genetically based causal behavior is still there. Most
importantly for this book, if we consider the powerful influence of internal forces combined with
external forces, where is there room for contra-causal free will?
Last, its also worth mentioning that Mark Hallett describes studies that his team268 and
others269 conducted, where transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was used to direct motor
function, with stimulation of this area, subjects more often chose the hand contralateral to the
268
Brasil-Neto, J.P., Pascual-Leone, A., Valls-Sol, J., Cohen, L.G. and Hallett, M. (1992). Focal transcranial
magnetic stimulation and response bias in a forced-choice task. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and
Psychiatry 55: 964-966. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1015201/pdf/jnnpsyc00495-0102.pdf
269
Ammon, K. and Gandevia, S.C. (1990). Transcranial magnetic stimulation can influence the selection of
motor programmes. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry 53: 705-707. Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC488179
81
site stimulated with response times that were mainly less than 200 ms.270 More work needs to
be done concerning this type of stimulation though, as it is in its infancy, and in better controlled
tests with the some of the same researchers, the TMS results were not reproducible.271
270
Hallett, M. (2002). Physiology of Free Will. Neuroethics: Mapping the Field. San Francisco, CA. 13-14
May. 2002. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://bioethics.stanford.edu/conference/hallett.pdf
271
Sohn, Y. H., A. Kaelin-Lang and M. Hallett. (2003). The effect of transcranial magnetic stimulation on
movement selection. J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry. 74: 985-987. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://jnnp.bmj.com/content/74/7/985.abstract
82
CONFABULATION
EVIDENCE #7: Experiments have shown that we confabulate explanations for

instances when our brains fail to account for missing information. That is to say that when
we cannot remember or we remember inaccurately, then we not only fill in the gap with
something like a best guess, but do so with pathologically deluded certainty.
Many conditions, such as Korsakoffs syndrome, anosognosia, split-brain syndrome,

aneurysm of the anterior communicating artery, schizophrenia (for which a likely genetic
precursor has recently been found272), Antons syndrome, and Alzheimers disease all seem to
have in common the tendency to confabulate. As Dr. Johannes Pantel put it:
This might involve the persons ability to remember things from the past (in the case of
Korsakoffs), or to move an arm (in the case of anosognosia), or, in the case of split-brain
patients, to provide a valid explanation why their left arm just did something. And yet,
confabulating subjects are not knowingly trying to deceive, or making things up. In fact,
they do not have the intent to lie or deceive. They just dont know better! Or put more
precisely: confabulators dont know that they dont know what they claim.[273]
They will also often unknowingly integrate accurate bits of information to better
harmonize the confabulation to the context. For example, when a patient in a hospital with one of
these conditions is asked why they are in the hospital, they will answer something to the effect of
because Im a doctor and if you were to press them as to why theyre wearing a patients
gown, they might reply, my scrubs are in the car.274 As Dr. William Hirstein put it, There
seems to be a continuum, with confabulators and sociopaths at one end and people with OCD at
272
Ravenscroft, G. (10/24/2011). Schizophrenia loci cornered by genome-wide association study. Science
Network of Western Australia. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.sciencewa.net.au/topics/health-a-
medicine/item/1006-schizophrenia-loci-cornered-by-genome-wide-association-study.html
273
Pantel, J. (3/2006). A Review of William Hirsteins Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of
Confabulation. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 2004 Am J Psychiatry 163:559, doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.163.3.559:
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/163/3/559
274
Phillips, H. (10/7/2006). Mind fiction: Why your brain tells tall tales, New Scientist. Iss. 2572. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19225720.100-mind-fiction-why-your-brain-tells-tall-
tales.html
83
the other.275 OCD people are obsessed about what is actually true, rather than just filling the
gap and moving on.
Daniel Wegner showed that one does not have to have a mental disorder to confabulate
authorship of thoughts. In addition to studies already outlined in Evidence #2, he did another
study276 where subjects were subtly, but repeatedly primed with a word (deer). The subjects
then began a supposedly non-related task that involved automatic typing for five minutes.
Researchers then told the subjects that they had pulled words from their typing at random and
asked them to rate how much they figured each word was authored by them. The kicker is that
none of them actually were. The researchers used words that were not even typed by the subjects.
After typing so many words automatically for so long, they couldnt remember. Not only was the
word that they were primed rated the highest as being authored by them, but words associated
with those words (e.g. doe) were more highly rated as authored as well. Other studies have
shown semantic priming increases false memories.277,278
Pezdek, Lam, and Sperry (2009) had subjects watch crime videos and repeatedly made
them answer questionnaires that had unanswerable questions (because the researchers asked for
information not actually in the videos, but implied it was there). The study showed that forced
confabulation more strongly influences event memory if suggestions are other generated than
self-generated when the subjects bolstered their original confabulations with each additional
questionnaire.279
Gabbert, Memon, and Wright (2006) showed that we are subject to memory conformity,
When two people see the same event and discuss it, one persons memory report can influence
275
Hirstein, W. (2004). Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation, Cambridge: the MIT
Press. ISBN 978-0-262-58271-1. p. 99.
276
Gibson, L., Wegner, D.M. (2003). Believing weve done what we were thinking: An illusion of authorship.
Paper presented at the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Los Angeles, CA.
277
Mazzoni, G., Memon, A. (2003). Imagination can create false autobiographical memories. Psychological
Science, 14(2), 186188 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.mendeley.com/research/imagination-create-
false-autobiographical-memories
278
Loftus, E. F., Palmer, J. C. (1974). Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the
Interaction between Language and Memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, Vol. 13, No. 5.
(1974), 589. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from https://webfiles.uci.edu/eloftus/LoftusPalmer74.pdf
279
Pezdek, K., Lam, S., Sperry, K. (2009). Forced confabulation more strongly influences event memory if
suggestions are other-generated than self-generated Legal and Criminological Psychology. The British
Psychological Society. 14, 241252. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.cgu.edu/PDFFiles/sbos/Pezdek_Confabulation.pdf
84
what the other person subsequently claims to remember.280 A similar study281 was described by
philosophy professor Matt McCormick:
Poll students about integrated busing. Put them in groups and have a confederate argue
persuasively for the opposite view. Poll them again and their views change sharply. Ask
them about the view they had originally and they revise it to match their new ones. They
radically change their minds, and then change their memories of their former view, and
hide the change from themselves. And none of the subjects believe that the discussion
had had any effect in changing or modifying his position.[282]
Zoe Chance performed some recent studies where subjects were not only shown to inflate
their abilities, but that they were genuinely self-deceived.283
THE IMPLICATIONS: This Evidence is obviously related to Evidence #3, though it

focuses on a different aspect of memory, i.e. epistemology rather than identity, though both are
related. The issue is definitely a practical one in the least. As noted by Laura Beil in a New York
Times piece about the certainty of memory, about 75 percent of DNA-based exonerations have
come in cases where witnesses got it wrong and that scientists are now saying that rather
than the centerpiece of prosecution, witness testimony should be viewed more like trace evidence
[] with the same fragility and vulnerability to contamination.284 The Guardian UK writes that
its come to the point where the British Psychological Society warned professionals working in
280
Gabbert, F., Memon, A., Wright, D. B. (2006). Memory conformity: Disentangling the steps toward
influence during a discussion. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 13 (3), 480-485 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www2.fiu.edu/~dwright/pdf/disentangling.pdf
281
Nisbett, R., Wilson, T. (1977). Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports On Mental Processes.
Psychological Review. (p. 236). Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from (p. 6).
http://people.virginia.edu/~tdw/nisbett&wilson.pdf
282
McCormick, M. (2/12/2011). Do you know what you believe about God and why? or Is the Genetic Fallacy
a Fallacy? [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://atheismblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/do-you-
know-what-you-believe-about-god.html
283
Yong, E. (3/5/2011). People dont know when theyre lying to themselves. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2011/03/07/people-don%e2%80%99t-
know-when-they%e2%80%99re-lying-to-themselves
284
Beil, L. (11/28/2011). The Certainty of Memory Has Its Day in Court. New York Times. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/health/the-certainty-of-memory-has-its-day-in-court.html
85
the legal system not to accept early memories (dating from before the age of three) without
corroborating evidence.285
We have seen recent evidence that our processing fluency is a factor that affects
assessment of future potential,286 but does one persons fundamentally better ability to get to the
truth make them more or less free than another persons fundamentally worse ability, based upon
physical considerations? That is to ask a question reworded from a statement by a famous
ancient philosopher: if you know the truth, does knowing the truth set (make) you (more) free?
We must first ask if we can compare truth to knowledge without equivocating. I think we can.
Many educators have argued that education is the key to personal freedom, by multiplying our
options. Others might argue that more knowledge constrains us to feel more fated when we know
better how things are likely to unfold. It may be that more knowledge is liberating up to a certain
point, and then constraining.
A simple thought experiment might help us here: You are about to bake a cake. Youve
done it many times and are very good at it. A mad neurologist (uh oh, here we go!) has the
ability to zap you with her gizmo and lower your intelligence to the point where you are unable
to complete the task. You are still able to move where you want to move and think what you are
able to think, but you are unable to figure out how to bake a cake. Did the mad neurologist limit
and/or constrain your freedom to some meaningful extent? Yes, you are unable to perform at
least one less task than you were able to perform before you were zapped.
Id also speculate, just for fun, that just as memory heuristics will intuitively make
someone pick out the most likely suspect from a lineup if the perpetrator isnt actually there,
these may very well relate to or even be the very same intuitive heuristics that drive
predispositionalism. That is to suggest that perhaps, in the quick and dirty intuitive type-one
cognitive sense (e.g. see Evidence #31), we may perpetuate consciously unrealized
predispositions using the same cognitive mechanisms/impetuses used in memory and scripting.
Science confirms our inability to recognize delusion, from subtle to extreme. Can we say
that a person with clinical delusion has free will? If not, and we should still be able to say that
normal people should be considered to have free will, then at what point on the continuum does
285
Fernyhough, C. (1/13/2012). The story of the self. The Guardian. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2012/jan/13/our-memories-tell-our-story
286
Huang, J. Y., Song, H., & Bargh, J. A. (2011). Smooth trajectories travel farther into the future:
Perceptual fluency effects on prediction of trend continuation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
47(2), 506-508. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.12.002
86
it become acceptable and why? If conditions that produce this phenomenon have a genetic
foundation (e.g. schizophrenia), dont we have to recognize that our physical nature predisposes
our freedom on every relative level?
The famous Genain quadruplets, who all have schizophrenia, show mental disorders like
schizophrenia do have a genetic base, even if environment and/or development seems to play a
role in their differences (i.e. two showed later symptoms than the other two287). That there is
gene-environment interaction does not mean 1 point for free will. Predispositionalism will
immediately be construed by many to exclude environment, but thats exactly how it is
distinguished from dispositionalism: it includes external interaction metaphysically.
Environment is not presumed to be an acausal other and therefore, predispositionalism isnt
compelled to favor genes over environment or nature versus nurture, because nurture is just a
smaller set of nature.
Agent causality libertarian Timothy OConnor divides agency up into seven distinct
concepts and, as his theologian/philosopher co-writer Nancey Murphy writes that OConnor
reinterprets instances of confabulation not as illusory experiences of will but as

unremarkable instances of our occasional penchant for forming false memories in order
to produce coherence with others expectations. What is termed a false sense of agency
(e.g., causing a person to become ill by thinking negative thoughts) actually falls under
the category of holding a false belief about the causal effects of ones basic acts.[288]
The implication here seems to be that false beliefs have nothing to do with causality and
therefore they have no influence on our freedom. In the cake baking example above, weve
already seen how limited knowledge can reduce freedom. There is no reason why false beliefs do
not work the same way. A confabulating mechanism in the brain actively reduces, limits, and
constrains the quantity of tasks that may be completed by an agent and so the agent is less
free.
287
288
Murphy, N., (2009). Murphy, N., Ellis, G. F. R., OConnor, T. (Eds.). Downward Causation and the
Neurobiology of Free Will. [p. 21]. 2009, VIII, 292. ISBN 978-3-642-03204-2 Available on 9/19/2012 at
87
As the evidence above shows, this mechanism, while not completely understood, is
something that increases via certain diseases and physiological factors, so it is not arbitrary. One
can be manipulated to have more or less of a propensity for it. Does it matter that the deterrent
itself is in the body proper? Of course not. In the Introduction, I mentioned that many libertarians
accept Austin-style examples as events where things like nervous twitches or brain crosses do
work in thwarting a persons freedom, because the randomness introduces an involuntary
element. It appears that the reduction of action performing knowledge is merely a temporally
extended version of an Austin-style example for the same reason.
88
SPLIT BRAINS
EVIDENCE #8: Split brain experiments have shown that the different hemispheres of the
brain have different personalities, aspirations, likes, and dislikes and even fight with
each other.
Scientists have learned that splitting the hemispheres of the brain help can control the
interhemispheric spread of epilepsy. In the 1960s, the splitting of the brain hemispheres of a
subject called W.J. showed that certain events or objects could be perceived in one hemisphere
without any perceivable awareness of them in the other hemisphere. Michael Gazzaniga and
Joseph LeDoux describe the results:
Thus, for example, if a word (such as spoon) was flashed in the left visual field, which is
exclusively projected to the right hemisphere in man [] the subject, when asked, would
say, I did not see anything, but then subsequently would be able, with the left hand, to
retrieve the correct object from a series of objects placed out of view.[289]
Nor did the left hemisphere know what was in the left hand, because the hemispheres
correspond to the opposite/right hemisphere that sees or touches an object. In an article/interview
with original researcher Michael Gazzaniga, Bruce Bower from Science News describes one
experiment:
one man had a picture of a chicken claw flashed to his left hemisphere and a picture of
a snow scene presented to his right hemisphere. From the ensuing selection of pictures,
he correctly chose a shovel with his left hand (controlled by the right hemisphere) and a
chicken with his right hand (controlled by the left hemisphere). When asked to explain
his choices, he responded: Oh, thats simple. The chicken claw goes with the chicken,
and you need a shovel to clean out the chicken shed. Gazzaniga concluded that the left
brain observed the left hands choice of a shovel (which stemmed from the right brains
289
Gazzaniga, Michael S. and LeDoux, Joseph E. The Integrated Mind. (pp. 3-5). Plenum Press, NY (1978)
89
nonverbal, inaccessible knowledge) and proffered an explanation based its own fowl
information. Further work indicates that the left-brain interpreter can influence memory,
sometimes for the worse, Gazzaniga adds. In one study, investigators presented novel
pictures to the left hemisphere of split-brain patients. When these new pictures shared
elements or themes with a picture the patients had already studied, the patients often
mistakenly identified the new ones as having been seen previously.[290,291]
When some people lose damaged parts of one hemisphere or another, we sometimes see
patients who recover with new talents based upon the known characteristics of the remaining
hemisphere. One girl, who lost most of her more analytical left brain, emerged from a coma
quickly developing impressive artistic abilities presumably enhanced by the remaining right
brain.292 Since the 60s and 70s, weve learned that while several generalizations about
differences between the left and right brain are false (e.g. language is only in one side, reasoning
is only in one side, emotion is only in one side, visual imagery is only in one side, memory is
only in one side), other differences in the hemispheres have been learned and/or vindicated (e.g.
the left brain has more focused awareness, while the right has more holistic awareness; the left
brain dissects things in an impersonal way, while the right brain connects us in meaningful
relationships, and more).293
In another study with split-brain patient Paul S.,294,295 researchers were lucky enough to
have a patient who, uncommonly, had developed some verbal functioning in the right
hemisphere, enough to ask personal questions from both hemispheres and compare them. Pauls
right hemisphere wanted to be a race car driver, while his left hemisphere wanted to be a
290
Bower, B. (2/24/1996). Whole-Brain Interpreter: A cognitive neuroscientist seeks to make theoretical
headway among split brains. Science News. Vol. 149 No. 8 p. 124 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.sciencenews.org/pages/pdfs/data/1996/149-08/14908-14.pdf
291
Experiments With Subjects Who Have Had Their Corpus Callosum Severed. (N.D.). Macalester University.
http://www.macalester.edu/psychology/whathap/ubnrp/split_brain/Gazzaniga%20Experiments.html
292
Girl loses half her brain in car crash... and gains an amazing new artistic ability. (Posted 7/21/2011). Daily
Mail Online. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-2017309/Taisia-Sidorova-
21-loses-half-brain-car-crash-gains-new-artistic-ability.html
293
TED. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
294
Behavior of Split Brain Patients. (N.D.). Macalester University. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.macalester.edu/psychology/whathap/ubnrp/split_brain/Behavior.html
295
Devins, D. (Interviewer), LeDoux, J. (Interviewee). (N.D.). Discover Interview of Joe LeDoux. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://discovermagazine.com/videos/interview-joe-ledoux
90
draftsman. Both sides were also given of list of items to see what they liked or disliked. When
Paul S. was asked whether or not he liked Richard Nixon, his right hemisphere expressed
dislike (this was during the Watergate scandal), while his left expressed like. In a more
extreme example along these same lines, a different anonymous split-brain patient even
developed the problem of one hand fighting against the other: one hand tried to pull down his
pants, while the other tried to pull them up; in another event, one hand tried to attack his wife,
while another tried to defend her.296
THE IMPLICATIONS: Again, we have more evidence of confabulation, but perhaps even
more importantly, we may have evidence of a physical basis for cognitive (moral?!) plurality in
the brain, known as fission.297 Parts of the brain do seem to have their own autonomy to some
extent and they also seem to be communicating with each other in a way298,299 (what else
would they be doing?) as the brain makes simple choices by assigning values to the stimuli
under consideration and then compar[es] these values to make a decision.300,301 And while it
would be misleading to be overly reductive and belie the holistic property of this organ with so
much redundancy, recent evidence seems to show that these values may be encoded to single
neurons that represent single persons, objects, and/or ideas.302,303 Just as the President and a
governor share some, but not all, intentions in their agenda, both are still part of the government;
296
Behavior of Split Brain Patients. (N.D.). Macalester University. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.macalester.edu/psychology/whathap/ubnrp/split_brain/Behavior.html
297
Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) and David Bourget (Assistant Editor), (2007-2009). 4.8g. Fission
and Split Brains. MindPapers. Available on 9/19/2012 at http://consc.net/mindpapers/4.8g
298
299
Left-right brain talk despite broken link. (10/19/2011). Machines Like Us. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://machineslikeus.com/news/left-right-brain-talk-despite-broken-link
300
R. Jenison, A. Rangel, H. Oya, M. Howard. (2011). Value encoding in single neurons in the human
amygdala during decision-making. Journal of Neuroscience, 2011, 31:331-338. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.rnl.caltech.edu/publications/pdf/jenison2011.pdf
301
Sanders, L. (1/29/2011). How the brain shops: Research locates neurons associated with valuing objects.
Science News. Vol.179 #3 (p. 8) Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/68372/title/How_the_brain_shops
302
Zimmer, C. (6/2009). The Brain: Can a Single Neuron Tell Halle Berry From Grandma Esther? Discover
303
91
similarly, it would be fallacious to think we need to delineate brain parts as always having the
same agenda.
In the work of Dr. Ralf Erkwoh,304 he discusses support for Julian Jaynes idea of
bicameralism, which is again, roughly, that one part of the mind speaks to another, and is
evidenced by our propensity for inner dialogue with a personal god and/or for some aspects of
schizophrenia, such as via auditory command hallucinations.
David Eagleman notes that one of the main rivalries in the brain is short term impulse
gratification versus more long term, reasoned decision making, and these are always locked in
battle.305 Can we deconstruct personality physically by looking at which part, or rather which
combination of parts, represents which approach or quality? Amazingly, to at least some extent:
yes. Rather than by a top down approach, the brain has been clearly shown to be what David
Linden calls a klooj. It has evolved bottom up like an ice cream cone, cobbled together with
ample redundancy from the simplest stem all the way up to the top scoop that humans have:
the frontal lobe; its clear that there is no one part of the brain that makes up the soul, but the
many parts, rather, seem to add their voices to the cacophony we observe in fMRI brain
scans.306,307
The frontal lobe acts as an inhibitor for the primitive parts of the brain, giving it, as Iain
McGilchrist puts it, that Machiavellian edge in manipulation308 unless, presumably, your
frontal lobe is not as healthy and/or powerful, then this part of your brain that deals in detached
abstract reasoning from a distance will acquiesce to the more primitive drives (which may or
may not be a good thing). Importantly, McGilchrist also notes that the same detached distance
the frontal lobe uses to manipulate is the same distance necessary for us to model empathy309
304
Erkwoh, R., Willmes, K., Eming-Erdmann, A., Kunert, H.J. (2002). Command hallucinations: Who obeys
and who resists when? Psy-chopathology, 35, 272-279.
305
Warburton, N. (Interviewer), Eagleman, D. (Interviewee). (5/22/2011). Philosophy Bites podcast: David
Eagleman on Morality and the Brain. [Audio podcast]. (10:10-end). Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://philosophybites.com/2011/05/david-eagleman-on-morality-and-the-brain.html
306
Linden, D. (2007). The Accidental Mind: how brain evolution has given us love, memory, dreams, and god.
Cambridge: Belknap Press
307
Grothe, D.J. (Interviewer), Linden, D. (Interviewee). (2/6/2009). David J. Linden, The Accidental Mind.
[Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.pointofinquiry.org/david_j_linden_-
_the_accidental_mind
308
TED. [3:35-5:50]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
309
Ibid. [4:15-5:00].
92
(which I will talk about more later in Evidence #27). This is part of the play where Faust
smiles wickedly and the all the Buddhas slowly nod.
Considering that some parts of the brain are more or less literal, liberal, strict, nurturing,
impulsive, analytical, focused, holistic, etc which part of the brain is you? Are you the
homogenized result of the brains many voices? When it comes to the notion of a spirit or soul,
which many people contend is why humans have free will, which part of the brain does it occupy
when one part makes a moral choice and the other part an immoral one? While this may be seen
as reverting back to the ancient notion that a person is driven by internal homunculi, in a very
real sense, we already know this to be the case when it comes to the agendas of all the tiniest
mechanisms in our bodies, depending on whether we break down the categorical identities to
cells or enzymes or bacteria or genes or atoms or whatever.
And what can we say about free will, souls, and identity when the opposite is true; when
two people actually share some aspects of both brain and mind, such as is the ultra rare case310
with young twins Tatiana and Kristin Hogan conjoined at the head? Though they are too young
to have much formal testing done, so far, several examples seem to show that the developmental
neural relationship between brain and bodies has resulted in one being able to see, feel, and taste
what the other sees, feels, and tastes at least to some extent. That they do have different
personalities is no surprise in any case, considering that they dont share all their cerebral or
physical parts, as well as the evidence above of our capacity for multiple personalities within one
person. There is a more recent case in Sao Paolo where conjoined twins Jesus and Emanuel were
born with two heads and one body.311 Time will tell what we will learn from these kids as they
get older, but the challenges here to traditional notions of free will, identity, and dualism as
simply defined corporeally are as stark as they can possibly get.
310
Dominus, S. (5/25/2011). Could Conjoined Twins Share a Mind? The New York Times Magazine. Retrieved
on 9/19/2012 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/magazine/could-conjoined-twins-share-a-
mind.html?pagewanted=all
311
Two-Headed Baby Born In Brazil. (12/21/2011). Newsone.com. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://newsone.com/2000656/two-headed-baby-born-in-brazil/
93
METAPHORICAL PRIMES
EVIDENCE #9: Studies show evidence that physical temperature priming tends to invoke
behavioral and/or cognitive biases related to trust and moral behavior.
In a study conducted by Lawrence E. Williams and John A. Bargh,312,313,314 based upon

experiments done by Solomon Asch in the 1940s, test subjects were all coincidentally met by
the psychology researcher they had come to see in the lobby in the building where they were
supposed to be tested. They were surreptitiously obliged to hold a cup of hot or cold coffee on
the way to take the test (e.g. would you be so kind as to hold my drink on the way to the
testing room, so I can carry all these books?). When they arrived and the supposed actual test
started (unbeknownst to them, it already had), they were told to take a seat and to give their
impression of an anonymous man presented in a photograph. The subjects primed with a hot
drink on the way to take the test were significantly more likely to give a warm, positive,
trusting impression of the man in the photograph than the test subjects who were obliged to hold
a cold drink.
In a somewhat similar experiment with similar exposures, such as holding hot and cold
compresses, after the study (this time, unbeknownst to them, the study was still going), test
subjects primed with a warm object were more likely to choose a free parting gift that was
verbally framed as a gift for them to treat a friend, rather than the second choice, which was a
gift framed as their personal reward. Test subjects with the cold object were more likely to
choose the parting gift framed as their personal reward. Multiple similar studies continue to
verify these findings, showing hot and cold temperatures related to the way that we use hot and
312
University of Colorado at Boulder. (10/23/2008). CU-Boulder Researcher Finds Link Between Physical and
Interpersonal Warmth. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.colorado.edu/news/r/3ad6704ec1ce8994302ae06172e5dee7.html
313
Williams, L., Bargh, J. (10/2008). Experiencing Physical Warmth Promotes Interpersonal Warmth.
Science 24: Vol. 322 no. 5901 pp. 606-607. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/322/5901/606
314
TheMizzouTube. (uploaded on 8/23/2011). Unconscious behavioral guidance systems. Lecture by John
A. Bargh. [Video file]. [46:00-53:00]. University of Missouri Video Services. Available on 9/19/2012 at
94
cold metaphorically,315,316,317,318 even including studies showing that heat emotionally
substituted for lost social acceptance and that lonelier people prefer hotter showers!319,320
Yale social psychologist John Bargh speculates321 that the connection may be due to
evolved cerebral wiring/proximity of the temperature assessment and trust centers. As infants,
the mother brings us the most warmth and so is to be most trusted. This heuristic would likely
prove beneficial and be favored by natural selection. fMRI evidence322 does show the left
interior insula being activated in both cold temperature priming and also in situations of distrust
in socioeconomic games (such as I will discuss in the context of oxytocin levels in Evidence
#13).
THE IMPLICATIONS: While these kinds of primes may evidence some hard-wired internal
machinery, they may still be interpreted as conciliatory (i.e. imitative, assimilative) or
compensatory (i.e. contrastive) responses. That is to say that our reaction to hot or cold is
not necessarily positive and negative by default, but may be further filtered through another
evaluative system, adding layers of emotional complexity. The cold didnt necessarily make
people shun others; it often made them seek others to get that warmth.
Whether we assimilate with the prime or contrast it emotionally/actionally depends upon
the motivation. Bargh says priming usually induces the contrastive effects when theres a
motivationin fact, motivational systems seem to usually trump both perceptual and evaluative
315
Zhong, C. B., Leonardelli, G. J. (2008). Cold and lonely: Does social exclusion literally feel cold?
Psychological Science, 19(9), 838-842.
316
IJzerman, H., & Semin, G. R. (2009). The thermometer of social relations. Psychological Science, 20, 1214
1220.
317
Kang, Y., Williams, L. E., Clark, M. S., Gray, J. R., Bargh, J. A. (7/2010). Physical temperature effects on
trust behavior: the role of insula. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsq077. Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://scan.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2010/10/26/scan.nsq077.abstract
318
Lehrer, J. (11/30/10). Trust and Temperature. Wired Science. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2010/11/trust-and-temperature
319
Shalev, I., & Bargh, J. A. (2011). Use of priming-based interventions to facilitate psychological health:
Commentary on Kazdin & Blase (2011). Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 488-492.
320
321
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (Interviewers), Bargh, J. (Interviewee). (11/17/2008). Radiolab podcast: Is Free
Will Really Free? [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.radiolab.org/2008/nov/17/is-free-
will-really-free
322
Kang, Y., Williams, L. E., Clark, M. S., Gray, J. R., Bargh, J. A. (7/2010). Physical temperature effects on
trust behavior: the role of insula. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsq077. Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://scan.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2010/10/26/scan.nsq077.abstract
95
systems. See the work of Douglas Kenrick and his updated version of Maslows famous
hierarchy of needs based upon the new science.323,324 Bargh gives an example of this hierarchy: a
crying child on a curb,325 which, if our mirror neurons kick in, might make us want to sit down
and cry too... but we have compensatory norms as well that compel us to go and help, to be the
strong one. We are complicated creatures, with complex internal machinery. Thats why when
we can be shown to perform highly predictive behavior through experiments like these, we must
really pay attention, because it shows that these cognitive systems do exist beyond the kind of
mere external influence that behaviorists of yore proposed.
How many other physiological biases that affect our perception in trust, behavior, and
ethics issues are there under the surface of our conscious awareness that we have just not
discovered yet? Even if these cerebral connections were selected because they were generally
favorable survival heuristics, these biases have no actual regard for the objective facts at hand.
For example, the man in the photo may be intent on making you warm so that you trust him, so
he can kill you later. Dont we still have to recognize these physiological biases as evidence
against contra causal free will in two of the most important areas: epistemologically, by coloring
our ability to discern who or what to trust at the precognitive level, and ethically, by affecting
our egoistic/altruistic behavior at the precognitive level?
Practically, this is really useful information. Are you feeling lonely or alienated? Take a
hot shower and have a warm drink. Want to have a good feeling at your social gathering?
Provide warm beverages and/or a warm environment. Just keep people warm! And remember not
to take distrust too personally
As science writer Carl Zimmer puts it, brains are wired with such stunning precision that
every neuron knows its place. Miswiring leads to disorders of emotion and thought.326 Wired
neuronal links to certain behavior, as well as the inability to link to certain information (such as
323
Jacobs, T. (6/22/2010). Maslows Pyramid Gets a Makeover. Pacific Standard Magazine. Available on
9/19/2012 at http://www.psmag.com/culture/maslows-pyramid-gets-a-makeover-20682
324
Renovating the Pyramid of Needs: Contemporary Extensions Built Upon Ancient Foundations. Perspect
Psychol Sci. 2010 May; 5(3): 292314. doi: 10.1177/1745691610369469. Available on 9/19/2012 at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3161123
325
A. Bargh. [Video file]. [70:00-end]. University of Missouri Video Services. Available on 9/19/2012 at
326
Zimmer, C. (5/17/2011).The Brain Is Made of Its Own Architects. Discover Magazine. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://discovermagazine.com/2011/may/21-the-brain-is-made-of-its-own-architects
96
agenesis of the corpus callosum,327 where faulty wiring makes it difficult to exchange
information from one cerebral hemisphere to the other) can leave us in situations where even
both proper and improper developmental wiring can interfere with the kind of willful action
implied by the concept of a ghost in the machine. The brain does show a remarkable plasticity328
to often find its way back from some problems to adequate functioning via new routes, and the
dualist could posit that a separate mind/spirit/soul is what drives this highly adept rewiring, but
adequate rewiring is not always the case (consider the cases in Evidence #14). Why? We
could say thats just how it is, but in the context where free will is posited as fairly distributed,
such as it is in many theological contexts, this is clearly often not the case and should invoke
some serious reflection over that position.
327
NINDS Agenesis of the Corpus Callosum Information Page. (N.D.). National Institute of Neurological
Disorders and Stroke. Available on 10/26/2011 from
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/agenesis/agenesis.htm#What_is
328
Williams-Hedges, D. (10/19/2011). Bridging the Gap. Caltech Media Relations. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://media.caltech.edu/press_releases/13465
97
THE SENSES
EVIDENCE #10: Many experiments of other types of sensory priming have also shown
that there is a tendency for a subjects expectations to influence what they perceive, even in
the face of directly contradictory sense experience, and that they confabulate the
justification of their choices.
In 1955, F. H. Allport defined Perceptual set theory as: a perceptual bias or

predisposition or readiness to perceive particular features of a stimulus.329 In the example
above, we saw experiments where the body/mind was primed by temperature concerning the
sensation of temperature. There are also well known experiments showing that people see what
they expect to see, such as people who were visually primed/exposed to images of animals or
people were biased in their perception of later pictures of ambiguous figures, such as the famous
rat/man and old woman/young woman figures (Bugelski & Alampay, 1961; Leeper, 1935)330
or even that people see what they wish to see,331 such as in order to satisfy some immediate
desire for an object, it will be perceived as closer in distance.332 In Bruner and Minturns paper,
Perceptual Identification and Perceptual Organisation (1955),333 they showed that ambiguous
figures (such as the one in the middle on the left) were perceived depending upon personally
desired outcomes; in this case, as either the letter B or the number 13:
329
McCleod, P. (2007). Perceptual Set. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.simplypsychology.org/perceptual-set.html
330
Balcetis, E., Dunning, D. (2006). See What You Want to See: Motivational Influences on Visual Perception
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. American Psychological Association 2006, Vol. 91, No. 4, 612625
0022-3514/06/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.91.4.612. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://research.chicagobooth.edu/cdr/docs/dunning.pdf
331
Aarts, H., Kess van de Bos. (11/2010). On the Foundations of Beliefs in Free Will: Intentional Binding and
Unconscious Priming in Self-Agency. Psychological Science. doi: 10.1177/0956797611399294. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/02/10/0956797611399294.abstract
332
Balcetis, E., Dunning, D. (12/2009). Wishful Seeing: More Desired Objects Are Seen as Closer.
Psychological Science. January 2010 vol. 21 no. 1 147-152 doi: 10.1177/0956797609356283. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://pss.sagepub.com/content/21/1/147.abstract
333
Bruner, J.S., and Minturn, A.L., (1955). Perceptual Identification and Perceptual Organisation. Journal of
General Psychology. Vol 53, 1955, 21-28. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://psycnet.apa.org/?fa=main.doiLanding&uid=1957-07092-001
98
[334] [335]
or
Philosopher Nicholas Everitt explains the evidence from the Bruner and Minturns studies (and
similar studies) thusly:
If I expect to hear the word collision, then I am more likely to think that I have had a
veridical [coinciding with reality] auditory experience of the word, even if the acoustical
signal I received was much closer to collusion than to collision. If I expect to see Fred
rather than Jim, I am more likely to believe that I have had a veridical visual experience
of Fred and not Jim, even though my ocular irradiation would have led me to think the
opposite if my expectation had been reversed.[336]
This kind of audio priming is known as the McGurk effect and is easily tested in the BBC
Two Is Seeing Believing? episode, Try The McGurk Effect!337 In the video, we watch a close up
of a mouth saying, ba ba ba ba. The video then switches to a mouth saying, fa fa fa fa and
we are visually primed to hear that sound. We then hear the sounds as fa fa fa fa, except the
audio has not really changed, only the video has, and we are still actually hearing, ba ba ba ba!
In The Blank Slate, Stephen Pinker discusses our confusion about whether external reality
is real or constructed by our minds or culturally influenced. He asserts that they are mostly from
the real world, but are also distorted by our desires.338 We can see this easily when we are
334
Image retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.simplypsychology.org/perceptual-set.html
335
Image retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=buy.optionToBuy&id=2006-
12810-003
336
Everitt, N. (2004). The Non-existence of God. (p. 170.) New York: Routledge Press.
337
Austin, N. (Producer). (2011). Try the McGurk Effect! Horizon: Is Seeing Believing? - BBC Two. [Television
series]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-lN8vWm3m0
338
Pinker, S. (2002). The Blank Slate. (pp. 197-218.) New York: Viking Penguin.
99
subjected to optical illusions, such as Edward Adelsons checker shadow illusion,339 where
squares A and B are actually the same color, though we would swear that B is lighter than A:
[340]
Psychology books are filled with images like these that we swear are wrong. But not
only that, even after you have seen some of these illusions... you still dont see it, even after
you do! We still cant visually learn to adjust. According to Pinker, our strange responses to
these illusions are byproducts of evolutionary adaptationsin this case, visionary ones.341
As we might expect, it turns out that there is a similar illusory priming analogue to the
sense of smell as well: Yeshurun & Sobel342 did a study where the same odors were labeled with
either positive (parmesan cheese) or negative (vomit) descriptions and the way that the subjects
rated the odor was massively influenced by the suggestive labeling. In another experiment,
certain liquid odors were dyed with an odorless color; these dyed liquids were rated as having a
more intense odor than the same liquid odor without the dye; also, it was easier for subjects to
correctly identify odors that were identified with the right color (e.g. yellow correlated with a
banana odor).
339
Coyne, J. (1/8/2011). Do We Perceive Reality? The Checker Shadow Illusion. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/01/08/do-we-perceive-reality-the-checker-
shadow-illusion
340
Ibid. Design by Edward H. Adelson.
341
Carr-West, J. (Interviewer), Pinker, S. (Interviewee). (Posted 9/5/2008). Changing Minds. [Video file].
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://comment.rsablogs.org.uk/2008/09/05/changing-minds-steven-pinker
342
Yeshurun, Y., Sobel, N. (1/2010). An Odor is Not Worth a Thousand Words: From Multidimensional
Odors to Unidimensional Odor Objects. Annual Review of Psychology. Vol. 61: 219-241 DOI:
10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163639. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163639?journalCode=psych
100
Last, we can be primed by our movements as well. Forward movement itself primes a
significant increase in achievement.343 In a study where subjects were told to listen to editorial
content while wearing headphones, they were told to nod their heads repeatedly (a yes
movement) or shake them repeatedly (a no movement), under the guise of testing headphone
quality. Those who nodded were much more likely to report being in agreement with what they
heard in the editorial content than the shakers were.344,345
In another test, some subjects were told to hold a pen in-between their front teeth, flexing
the same facial muscles as during smiling; other subjects were told to hold the pen in their lips
only, flexing the same facial muscles as when frowning. They were told to read comic strips in
both situations and the ones read while flexing the smiling muscles were consistently perceived
as funnier than the comics read while flexing the frowning muscles. The original test was
duplicated with even more rigorous standards and achieved similar results.346,347
John Bargh has presented a great deal of evidence for the chameleon effect, where agents
unconsciously adopt/mimic primed physical behavior as they move from person to person. He
comments about the evidence for priming over the last 20-30 years, all of these different
priming effects activating the systems have been found to proceed on, without conscious
guidance or intention or the necessity of any kind of conscious intention or awareness to directly
affect behavior348 More than that, he also shows that certain primes evoke secondary
stereotype associations not even included in the prime itself. For example, primes of elderly
people evoke stereotypes of weakness or close-mindedness, etc.349
343
Natanzon, M., & Ferguson, M. J. (2011). Goal pursuit is grounded: The link between forward movement
and achievement. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 379-382.
344
Wells, G. L., & Petty, R. E. (1980). The effects of head movement on persuasion: Compatibility and
incompatibility of responses. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 1, 219-230. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://carmine.se.edu/cvonbergen/The%20Effects%20of%20Overt%20Head%20Movements%20on%20Pers
uasion_Compatibility%20and%20Incompatibility%20of%20Responses.pdf
345
McRaney, D. (7/7/2011). The Misattribution of Arousal. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://youarenotsosmart.com/2011/07/07/misattribution-of-arousal
346
Munger, D. (11/2007). Just smile, you'll feel better! Will you? Really? [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://scienceblogs.com/cognitivedaily/2009/04/just_smile_youll_feel_better_w_1.php
347
Soussignan, R. (2002). Duchenne smile, emotional experience, and autonomic reactivity: A test of the facial
feedback hypothesis. Emotion, 2 (1), 52-74 DOI: 10.1037/1528-3542.2.1.52. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=buy.optionToBuy&id=2002-18343-004
348
A. Bargh. [Video file]. University of Missouri Video Services. Available on 9/19/2012 at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pWSC48EUg-8 [3:00-15:00].
349
Ibid. [17:00-20:00].
101
Last, its been shown that, just like humans, dogs yawn when they are stressed.350 Is this
the body trying to make itself calmer by physical association, like we might try to do by putting a
pencil in our mouths to simulate smiling (which I confess that I have done!)? What is crucial
here for my purpose is to acknowledge that that yawn is not even a conscious decision!
THE IMPLICATIONS: As innocuous as some of the distortions may seem in the studies
above, the cumulative misperceptions of desired effects as reality when they are not reality
especially the confabulations subconsciously contrived to cover themhave serious implications
upon our lives in the context of people consciously exploiting our desires in these ways. Yes, we
may get a thrill and a chill when mentalists and magicians guess exactly right what we have been
subtly primed to draw out of their view (for which, mind reader Eric Dittleman recently got a
standing ovation and became a semifinalist on Americas Got Talent351), but we also dont
recognize these kinds of manipulations in politics, advertising, and business negotiations in
general.352
Philosopher of religion professor Nicholas Everitts use of the evidence shows how
someone might think that they are receiving messages from god in prayer; thus, one is influenced
to adopt or confirm the relative belief system, which may also influence beliefs about causality
itself. We might try to validate any number of supernatural suggestions in this way (e.g. ghosts,
demons, etc.), which has a number of implications concerning free will, responsibility, and/or
identity, but especially in the complicated consequences of multiplying unreal agents that each
have wills of their own. How much do these imaginary agents represent some part of our
psychological selves, or are not representative, but are used as a provocative tool functionally for
the agenda of non-conscious mind, as a beneficial illusion? This is to suggest that natural
selection would favor those with a proclivity to invent gods and/or spirits that give them strength
to endure suffering.
350
Ronson, J. (posted 8/2012). Jon Ronson: Strange answers to the psychopath test. TED Talks. Available on
9/19/2012 at http://www.ted.com/talks/jon_ronson_strange_answers_to_the_psychopath_test.html [3:20ish].
351
'America's Got Talent': Mind Reader Eric Dittelman Wows Judges Playing 'Deal Or No Deal' With Howie
(VIDEO). (7/25/12). [Blog file post]. [Video file]. Available on 9/19/2012 at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/25/americas-got-talent-mind-reader-standing-ovation-
video_n_1700555.html
352
A. Bargh. [Video file]. Available on 9/19/2012 at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pWSC48EUg-8 [20:00-
25:00].
102
Indeed, some philosophers of religion have invoked353 a gestalt shift354 in order to
rescue more modest claims/versions of theism. This is an interpretive paradigm shift, such as
seen in the visual example above, the ability to suddenly be able to see a B after having only
been able to see the 13 until then or vice versa. This more relativistic perception is then applied
more generally to ideas and concepts and is a general foundational principle (in its own sense,
ironically) in Post Modernism. To be fair, advocates of this view wont often say therefore,
anything goes, because neither the B nor the 13 look anything like, say a spiral or the
letter T. Gestalt shifts are important to consider355 as escape routes from, or rather, inoculation
to, certain thought experiments/Gettier cases.
Even if imagined wills of imagined entities manifested sublimated desires of our own
will, wouldnt they clash with each other at some point and create complicated scenarios that
affect our own will? In a non-supernatural context, we may also subtly misperceive/misread cues
that others agree with us/think like us even when they are flat out telling us that they dont (this
is especially true in courting). Anyone who has seen a Necker cube or a Rubin vase knows that
some things can be perceived in different ways. If the brain automatically codes for intentional
representations via Gestalt laws of grouping, where the mind fills in the blanks and presumes
intention, we may misunderstand another person or situation emotionally before we even know
what both they and we are thinking. That is what underlies predispositionalism.
As Bargh has shown, its clear that conscious awareness is not needed to manifest
environmental influence and this is a crucial consideration in terms of delineating identity,
because we really do have to question why the distance between one influence and another, say
between one person and another, should be different than the influence between one part of our
brain/body and another, when both are non-reasoned, arbitrary, and unnoticed influence. If it is
convenience, we need to admit that, or else we need to know if/why a person with (internally
motivated) actions produced by, say, mental illness, is more culpable than a person forced at
(externally motivated) gun point or even some kind of mind control, merely because the former
action is contained in the body proper. I dont think many would argue that mental illness
353
Muehlhauser, L. (Interviewer), Reitan, E. (Interviewee). (3/17/2010). Conversation from the Pale Blue Dot
podcast: 028: Eric Reitan Christianity Beyond Fundamentalism. [Audio podcast]. [32:00-35:40]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=7418
354
Demonstration of a Gestalt Shift Experience. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.education4skills.com/phc/gestalt.html
355
Gendler, T., Stich, S. (10/18/2010). [Video file]. [26:00-27:30]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.philostv.com/tamar-gendler-and-stephen-stich
103
doesnt take ones free will, but that mental illness is not sufficiently causal by degrees. We favor
the all or nothing scenario; this is what we need to tackle.
104
UNIVERSAL LANGUAGE
EVIDENCE #11: There is evidence that the brain has an innate propensity to generate
and/or recognize specific universal structures in language (i.e. language facultya
biological basis for universal grammar). There is evidence that this same faculty may
produce other abstractly patterned concepts in a similar way, such as universal
propensities for mathematics and/or even universal moral grammar, either adaptively or
exaptively (as a byproduct).
There is increasing evidence for a genetic foundation for the ability to speak a
language/verbally communicate in both humans and other animals via the FOXP2 gene.356,357,358
We have long known and are learning more about where the areas for language are located in the
human brain, such as Wernickes area (where words are chosen/conceived), Brocas area (where
speaking/motor skills are associated with language), and Geschwinds territory (where
classification and labeling of concepts occur). The latter inferior parietal lobule was the last to
evolve in humans and does not develop in children until they are 5-6 years old! This is about
when most children start to read and write. Its also close to when many religions set the age of
reason/discretion or culpability. Only rudimentary versions of the inferior parietal lobule are
seen in some primates.359,360
Noam Chomsky famously argued for an innate language faculty with universal
grammar.361,362 He believes that physically influenced universal tendencies in language are
356
Strain, D. (7/7/2011). Language Protein May Help Build Brain Circuits. Science Now. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/07/language-protein-may-help-build-.html
357
Zimmer, C. (10/17/2011). The Brain: The Language Fossils Buried in Every Cell of Your Body. Discover
Magazine. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://discovermagazine.com/2011/oct/08-the-brain-language-fossils-
buried-in-your-cells
358
Quill, E. (12/4/2007). Speech Gene Helps Birds Sing. Science Now. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2007/12/04-02.html?ref=hp
359
Dubuc, B. (N.D.). Brocas Area , Wernickes Area, and Other Language-Processing Areas in the Brain.
The Brain from Top to Bottom. (Beginner)
http://thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/d/d_10/d_10_cr/d_10_cr_lan/d_10_cr_lan.html (Intermediate)
http://thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/i/i_10/i_10_cr/i_10_cr_lan/i_10_cr_lan.html (Advanced)
http://thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/a/a_10/a_10_cr/a_10_cr_lan/a_10_cr_lan.html All avaliable on 9/19/2012
360
Novella, S. (8/29/2011). The Bilingual Brain. [Blog file post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/the-bilingual-brain
361
Chomsky, Noam. (2006). Language and Mind. Cambridge University Press, 2006. Cambridge Books
Online. Cambridge University Press. 26 October 2011 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511791222
105
evidenced by how we appeal to unconscious linguistic rules; that the reason specific language
syntax feels right is via an innate framework for generative grammar. Even primates have been
recently shown to recognize letters and language structure in a unique, consistent, ordered, visual
way. As noted by cognitive psychologist Jonathan Grainger, They're using information about
letters and the relations between letters. This suggests this has to be linked to some kind of
ancient ability that's not linguistic at all, but just related to a fundamental ability to recognize
objects.363
As Schwitzgebel and Cushman put it, Moral judgment is sometimes claimed to arise
mostly from automatic processes that depend little on conscious reasoning from general
principles.364,365,366
Along the same lines of reasoning, the work of researchers like John Mikhail367,368 may
support an innate foundational approach to moral grammar as well, via a variety of evidence
from many disciplines, including the natural and social sciences, philosophy, etc.369,370 Theyve
shown that in moral sense experiments,371,372,373 where Mikhail employs twelve useful versions
362
Dubuc, B. (N.D.). Tool Module: Chomskys Universal Grammar. The Brain from Top to Bottom. Retrieved
on 9/19/2012 from http://thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/capsules/outil_rouge06.html
363
Loury, E. (4/12/2012). Monkey See, Monkey Do. Monkey Read? Science Now. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/04/monkey-see-monkey-do-monkey.html?ref=em
364
Schwitzgebel, E., Cushman, F. (in press). Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral
Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers. Mind & Language (forthcoming). Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/EthOrder-110321.pdf
365
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Retrieved on 8/7/2011 from Psychological Review, 108, 814-834. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
366
Mikhail, J. (2009). Moral grammar and intuitive jurisprudence: A formal model of unconscious moral and
legal knowledge. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 50, 27-100. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/Mikhail_MoralGrammar.pdf
367
Edmonds, D. (Interviewer), Mikhail, J. (Interviewee). (6/4/2011). Philosophy Bites podcast: John Mikhail on
Universal Moral Grammar. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://philosophybites.com/2011/06/john-mikhail-on-universal-moral-grammar.html
368
Mikhail, J. (4/2007). Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the Future. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, April 2007; Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 954398. Available at SSRN [pp.31-35]
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://ssrn.com/abstract=954398
369
Saxe, R. (9-10/2005). Do the Right Thing: Cognitive sciences search for a common morality. Boston
Review. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://bostonreview.net/BR30.5/saxe.php
370
Pinker, S. (1/13/2008). The Moral Instinct. New York Times. [p. 3.] Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/magazine/13Psychology-t.html?pagewanted=3&p&_r=3
371
MassimoPigliucci. (Uploaded on 10/30/2009). Neuroethics & the Trolley Dilemma. The Five Minute
Philosopher. [Video file]. Video retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NOfKyjyWiU0
372
The Moral Sense Test. Accessed on 9/19/2012 from http://wjh1.wjh.harvard.edu/~moral/index.html
373
Vedantam, S. (9/20/2012). Why Mental Pictures Can Sway Your Moral Judgment. NPR. on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.npr.org/2012/09/20/161440292/why-pictures-can-sway-your-moral-judgment
106
of the Trolley Car problem,374 highly predictable shifts in distinct moral intuition resulted, from
an applied ethical standard, based upon deontic duty driven/obligatory/absolute laws, to an
ethical standard based solely upon consequences/utilitarianism. The subjects are often unable to
explain why theyve shifted intuitive judgment standards from deontic to consequentialist,
essentially following rules that they are not even aware of, even though they could have tried to
explain/confabulate their shift by philosophical reasoning.
As Mikhail argues,375 these kinds of specific, sophisticated intuitive ethical shifts
transcend both age barriers, from children as young as 4-5, and wildly different cultural barriers.
Analogous to language, these similarities may be like the ubiquitous structural use of nouns and
verbs, word order, etc., while the differences may be analogous to the varied content of the
languages themselves, entailing culturally crafted morality/words. Mikhail observes that there is
more agreement overall cross-culturally considering heuristics for basic human rights than there
is when comparing languages and cultures and actual behaviors. Again, culturally acquired
moral grammar/behavior is to be distinguished from innate moral intuitions, especially in terms
of post-political/pre-political (though well see an underlying basis for at least some of those
choices as well in Evidences #19, #23).
There is, of course, some considerable controversy in regards to the extent that language
faculty is genetically, developmentally, or environmentally influenced and then people break off
into further subdivisions from there. Philip Lieberman argues language is a more emergent
neuronal property of non-language specific machinery already there; George Lakoff argues for
more of a focus on semantic interaction as a metaphorical extrapolation from sensory-motor
experience;376 Ive already mentioned the Halle Barry neuron377 and Invariant visual
374
Mikhail, J. (July 20, 2008). Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal Model of Unconscious
Moral and Legal Knowledge. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION: MORAL
COGNITION AND DECISION MAKING, D. Medin, L. Skitka, C. W. Bauman, D. Bartels, eds., Vol. 50,
Academic Press, 2009; Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 1163422. Available at SSRN: Retrieved
on 8/29/2011 from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1163422
375
Edmonds, D. (Interviewer), Mikhail, J. (Interviewee). (6/4/2011). Philosophy Bites podcast: John Mikhail on
Universal Moral Grammar. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://philosophybites.com/2011/06/john-mikhail-on-universal-moral-grammar.html
376
Dubuc, B. (N.D.). Tool Module: Chomskys Universal Grammar. The Brain from Top to Bottom. Retrieved
on 9/19/2012 from http://thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/capsules/outil_rouge06.html
377
107
representation by single-neurons in the human brain.378 All of these seem to go hand-in-hand
with this idea. And while there is evidence that all cultures do seem to operate from innate
generative frameworks, there is at least one culture that appears to challenge the framework seen
in most of the rest of the world for language, mathematics, moralityeven time itself: the
Amazonian Piraha. This is because theyve been left to their own devices (there arent any!) and
are practically meme-free in many ways, or in a few fundamental ways.
For example, they have no religion and a very limited concept of temporality.
Mathematically, this remote tribe does not think or count linearly beyond the first few numbers;
they think logarithmically (i.e. in exponential ratios).379 If you were to ask them the number
directly in-between 1 and 9, they would say 3, not 5 (because 3x3= 9).380 French cognitive
scientist Stanislas Dehaene has produced very convincing neuroimaging evidence that all babies
think this way naturally too and that most cultures in the world impress linear mathematics upon
our children unnaturally.381
The work of a now ex-Chomskian linguist, Daniel Everett, shows that there is also a
unique divergence of language pattern formation with the Piraha not seen anywhere else in the
world: the absence of recursion (i.e. potentially independent, tangential ideas, hierarchically
imbedded within sentences [like Russian dolls (which I love)]in fact, this very sentence is an
intentional example of recursion right now, with the bracketed tangential idea within the
parenthesed tangential idea]). As Steven Pinker notes, the Pirahas language has phonology,
morphology, syntax, and sentences, but it doesnt have recursion.382 Everett hypothesizes that it
never arose, because the culture itself never required it. It must be noted that six thousand other
languages do have recursion, so suspension of judgment about the Piraha language is justifiable.
378
379
Gordon, P. (8/19/2004). Numerical Cognition without Words: Evidence from Amazonia. Science. Vol. 306
no. 5695 pp. 496-499 DOI: 10.1126/science.1094492. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/306/5695/496.abstract
380
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (11/30/2009). Radiolab podcast: Innate Numbers? [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.radiolab.org/2009/nov/30/innate-numbers
381
Dehaene, Stanislas. (3/7/2002). Cerebral Bases of the Number Sense in the Parietal Lobe. Pinkel Lecture.
Institute for Research in Cognitive Science. Philadelphia, PA. [Lecture]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.ircs.upenn.edu/pinkel/lectures/dehaene/9/19/2012 Dehaene_PinkelTranscription_2002.pdf
382
Colapinto, J. (4/16/2007). The Interpreter, Has a remote Amazonian tribe upended our understanding of
language? The New Yorker. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/04/16/070416fa_fact_colapinto#ixzz1KCORnCi4
108
THE IMPLICATIONS: Mikhail offers developmental, anthropological, linguistic, and
philosophical evidence for some kind of universal moral grammar, but the big question here is
how much of this, if any, is causation and how much is merely correlation. His case is strong, but
more work needs to be done and the jury is still out. That other evidence here in this book (see
Evidences #5, #8, #12) shows certain areas of the brain may favor certain ethical
systems/opinions over others during cerebral dialogue certainly puts this issue into a place of
critical importance.
We saw in the Implications of Evidence #5 that scientists and philosophers have
conducted experiments showing morality can be altered by context and possibly even by genes.
How can this be lined up with the notion that the mind has a moral predisposition via language?
Perhaps these tendencies are subtle and/or brief ingredients in a bigger recipe or one/some will
be shown to outweigh the other. Moral grammar may just be a fundamental foundation for
developmental linguistic, neural moral systematizing (see Evidence #24). But this does not
mean that morality isnt hardwired to some extent. Again, we do seem to have two minds about
it, as was shown.383
Mikhail also points out that the implications for universal moral grammar suggest
codified law may someday even be worked into a functional software system for the
courts/lawyers/legislators that avoids our appeals to logical fallacies.384 Its hard to imagine that
such a huge acquiescence to software of this nature in any meaningful way that would go without
some major controversy, but it should certainly be investigated further. It would be interesting to
see how a completely dispassionate arbiter such as this would perform (and along these lines, I
will also discuss the highly successful Statistical Prediction Rules in Evidences #21, #25).
In the context of free will, a propensity for certain modes of moral grammar that are
based upon physical ability is clearly problematic for obvious reasons, especially in terms of a
view that our freedom exists in our ability to act according to our values. If I am predisposed to a
383
Nichols, S., Knobe, J. (10/25/2007). Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk
Intuitions. Nos 41 (4):663685. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jk762/Nichols-Knobe.pdf
384
Mikhail, J. (July 20, 2008). Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal Model of Unconscious
Moral and Legal Knowledge. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION: MORAL
COGNITION AND DECISION MAKING, D. Medin, L. Skitka, C. W. Bauman, D. Bartels, eds., Vol. 50,
Academic Press, 2009; Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 1163422. Available at SSRN: Retrieved
on 9/19/2012 from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1163422
109
consequentialist framework based upon my brain wiring (or narrative cuessee Evidence
#24), am I making as sound of a moral choice as if I am choosing based upon some other kind
of moral intuition? Again, what is the value of freedom and how free is a freedom that has been
pre-directed to some extent?
The pros and cons of the discovery, invention, and/or habituation of something like the
linear number system over our natural propensity for a logarithmic framework are debatable; as
is the extent to their mutual effect upon other internal and external systemic meta-concepts. We
do see that they are evidenced to be related. We can always view these meta-memes as the
forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden that facilitate both wonderful and horrific god-like power.
It is argued by environmentalists that the greatest knowledge is one that engenders a small
footprint and planetary homeostasis. Another view is that any opportunity to reduce suffering or
save lives via technology is obligatory, and technology seems to have survived for at least that
reason. In the future, we may decide that technology has become too threatening or it might
save us by allowing us to live in outer space. One things for sure: the Piraha are a simple, happy
people, without religion and without technology (Ill leave further evaluation up to the reader).
110
OVERLOAD
EVIDENCE #12: People have a tendency to resort to the more primal, emotional, parts
of the brain when they are forced to simultaneously multi-task too many (abstract)
decisions. It has also been shown that higher parts of the brain where moral functioning
takes place can be manipulated, overridden, and/or shut down commensurately.
There was an experiment by Stanford professor Baba Shiv385,386 based upon the results of
much earlier experiments by George A. Miller.387 Subjects in a room were given a number from
2-7 digits to remember and were then told to walk down a hallway into another room and repeat
that number to another researcher. Along the way, they were waylaid by an intern who just
happened to be passing by with some complimentary food for the volunteers. She had a nice
healthy fruit salad and she had a delicious, decadent, sinful piece of cake. Overwhelmingly, the
people who had higher numbers to remember (6-7 digits) were more likely to go for the cake,
while the lower numbered people (2-3 digits) were more likely to go for the healthier option.
A 2009 study reported that tiredness was commensurately related to moral behavior:
Depleted participants misrepresented their performance for monetary gain to a greater

extent than did non-depleted participants (Experiment 1). Perhaps more troubling,
depleted participants were more likely than non-depleted participants to expose
themselves to the temptation to cheat, thereby aggravating the effects of depletion on
cheating (Experiment 2). Results indicate that dishonesty increases when peoples
capacity to exert self-control is impaired, and that people may be particularly vulnerable
to this effect because they do not predict it[388] [emphasis mine].
385
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (11/17/2008). Radiolab podcast: How Much Is Too Much? [Audio podcast].
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.radiolab.org/2008/nov/17/how-much-is-too-much
386
Guild, G. (10/2010). How Do You Think? Willpower: What is it really? [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://geraldguild.com/blog/tag/willpower
387
Miller, G. (1956). The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for
Processing Information. The Psychological Review. Vol. 63, pp. 81-97 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.musanim.com/miller1956
388
Mead, N. L., Baumeister, R. F., Gino, F., Schweitzer, M. E., & Ariely, D. (2009). Too tired to tell the truth:
Self-control resource depletion and dishonesty. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 594-597.
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20047023
111
In another study, MIT cognitive neuroscientist Rebecca Saxe has demonstrated that its
fairly easy to intentionally alter moral perception by stimulating neurons in an area of the brain
behind the right ear known as the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ).389 She discovered this
to be the most active part of the brain when people are wondering what other people are
thinking,390 and so it is integral to all agential relations and theory of mind concerns, even just
thinking abstractly about what some unseen person said or did.391
As the BBC News reported, there was an experiment where
participants were asked how acceptable it was for a man to let his girlfriend walk
across a bridge he knew to be unsafe. After receiving a 500 millisecond magnetic pulse to
the scalp, the volunteers delivered verdicts based on outcome rather than moral principle
(another example of consequence versus duty). If the girlfriend made it across the bridge
safely, her boyfriend was not seen as having done anything wrong. In effect, they were
unable to make moral judgments that require an understanding of other peoples
intentions[392] [emphasis mine].
THE IMPLICATIONS: The House of Lords Science and Technology Sub-Committees

report, Behaviour Change,393 argued that nudge priming (subtle psychological suggestions)
does not appear to have been an adequate standalone tool for social influence towards better food
choices, more exercise, less alcohol consumption, etc.or at least that some tools are better than
others. The Shiv experiments may show just one reason why: cognitive limitations, diversions,
and/or inner competition can still trump the nudge. We can only pay so much attention.
389
Saxe, Rebecca. (7/2009). Rebecca Saxe: How we read each other's minds. TEDGlobal. Oxford, England.
http://www.ted.com/talks/rebecca_saxe_how_brains_make_moral_judgments.html
390
Saxe, R. & Kanwisher, N. (2003). People thinking about people. NeuroImage, 19, 18351842. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://web.mit.edu/bcs/nklab/media/pdfs/SaxeKanwisherNeuroImage03.pdf
391
Saxe, R. (2-3/2004). Reading Your Mind. Boston Review. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR29.1/saxe.html
392
Morality is modified in the lab. (3/30/2010). BBC News. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8593748.stm
393
House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee 2nd Report of Session 201012 (7/19/2011).
Behaviour Change. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-
a-z/lords-select/science-and-technology-sub-committee-i/news/behaviour-change-published
112
Does this mean we should try to limit group think tank interactions to less than seven if
we want to get a more productive experience? Consider the dynamics of smaller groups, where
everyone can still catalog and refer to each persons position in conversation, contrasted with
larger parties, where conversationally overwhelmed people tend to atomize by default. Many
people feel comfortable in one situation and yet not in the other.
More importantly, since we already know that we have a regular tendency to offload
cognitive work onto the environment,394 if something like the prefrontal cortex is overused, does
the mind defer to the more primal amygdala, with its emphasis on pleasure and emotion, rather
than reason and practicality? The work of Sheena Iyengar has shown that when we have too
many options, we are less likely to participate; we actually prefer simplicity; we become less
satisfied with our choices when we do make them; and we can get choice burnout.395,396 Does
this limitation mean that reason burnout or control burnout (which I will show in Evidence
#19 mark the rising appeal of superstition in times of fear) or even moral burnout may happen
to some people considerably sooner than it does to others?
For example, could some religious conservatives already be maxed out in terms of a
sense of obligation to their in-group to the point that they dont even have the mental capacity to
consider institutionalizing more socialistic policies? Not that we dont all have a sense of
responsibility equally to begin with, but that it is already used up in another domainthat is to
say that the sense of obligation is already taxed out by individually voluntary and/or theological
responsibility, while secularly principled people are more likely to extend authority to secular
institutions, like government, academia, science, etc.
That there are religious liberal majorities in other nations shows that the difference may
be more about neuronally hardwiring the narrative (see Evidence #24), but it still wouldnt
make our capacity unlimited. If there is a limited neuronal/cognitive capacity in humans for
empathy or morality or respect or any other abstract concept associated with successful relations,
394
Clark, A. (1998). Embodied, situated, and distributed cognition. In W. Bechtel & G. Graham (Eds.), A
companion to cognitive science (pp. 506-517). Malden, MA: Blackwell. [pp. 8-11]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.scribd.com/doc/63649984/Clark-Embodied-Situated-and-Distributed-Cognition
395
Iyengar, S.S., Kamenica, E. (2010). Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset Allocation. Journal
of Public Economics, 94 (7-8), 530-539. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.columbia.edu/~ss957/articles/Simplicity%20Seeking%20Final.pdf
396
Iyengar, S.S., Lepper, M. (2000). When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good
Thing? J. Personality and Soc. Psychology 79: 9951006. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
113
could there be a kernel of truth to Nietzsches contention that, there is not sufficient love and
goodness in the world to permit us to give some of it away to imaginary beings?397 (And we
could [and Nietzsche certainly would] also probably extend the use of the term imaginary
beings into the secular equivalent, e.g. concerning natural rights, egalitarianism, etc. See
Evidences #24). Moral burnout may also contribute to apparent limitations upon our
empathy that well observe more thoroughly later in Evidence #28.
Shifting gears to look at the RTPJ, what are we to make of what, in one sense, we might
portray as a physical representation of moral understanding, subject to physical health
conditioning? It does a lot more than that, but it literally does at least that. What if its damaged,
atrophied, or its electronically or chemically manipulated and the victim shows no other sign or
symptom of irregularity? While some might consider the victim to just be merely bumped into a
fairly common consequentialist/utilitarian default framework for their ethical guidance, those
and other social implications are still profound. Utilitarian systems are considered profoundly
immoral and/or erroneous by many for philosophical, religious, and/or political reasons, not to
mention a freely and erroneously chosen method of evaluation.
Concerning theory of mind, the inability to even remotely consider what others are
thinking would make one a different person in thought, deed, and personality, even if, as Saxe
says, these affected moral judgments are both somewhat minor (so far that is) and they are
judgments of others and not of selves (so far that is). Considering a damaged RTPJ, or even
just the natural variation of physical brain functionality between different people, wouldnt the
difference in ability to determine what people believe, desire, or intend have at least some
bearing upon fairness in the epistemological playing field concerning morality? For example, if a
person is unable, or less able by degrees, to know whether another person is in danger from
another person who intends to harm them, and so refrains from helping the potential victim, are
they less responsible? What if the RTPJ were damaged or hyper-active to the other extreme, and
the subject inferred harmful intention that wasnt really there, causing an assailant harm when
trying to defend some potential victim? Are there enough cerebral differences in people for
these kinds of influences to exist, even subtly? Wouldnt the notion of freedom in this context
397
Nietzsche, F. (1878/1914). Translated by Helen Zimmern. Aphorism 129. Human, All-Too-Human.
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Human_All-Too-Human#THIRD_DIVISION_-
_The_Religious_Life
114
be inexorably tainted? Importantly, as discussed in the Introduction, these are tangible ethical
consequences of epistemological problems in the free will discussion.
The important work of Antonio Damasio has further shown that we do need well
functioning emotional equipment and connections to make rational decisions; without being able
to associate emotion with choice, we are bereft of an intelligible context of what to actually
like/want,398,399 even if our emotional primes often influence our reasoning in ways we regret,
but the big ethical question in the context of the studies above is this: If cognitive burdens affect
moral decisions all across a continuum, should a mind that just happens to be fated with
extreme cognitive burdens, as either multiple events or as the inability to process them as
efficiently as other people, be considered on an equal ethical playing field with a mind that is not
so burdened?
The courts do recognize mental and emotional distress, but since the evidence shows that
this capacity clearly must be on a continuum, why is this kind of defense commonly only
considered applicable in extreme cases of insanity, trauma, etc.? This is to ask, why do we
consider it discretely rather than continuously (i.e. analogous in the sense of the distinction
between discrete values and continuous values in mathematics)? Is it for prudential, pragmatic
reasons, such as reducing impractical bureaucracy? Probably, but its also clear that the
recognition of the continuum of rational capacity should be important in other areas, such as
punitive retribution, behavior reform, and crime prevention. Again, part of the reason for
reframing the free will vs. determinism issue with predispositionalism is to habituate a more
appropriate, more veridical, continuous frame of reference over concerns like this. Discrete
values are obviously useful, but envisioning the continuous foundation can lead to different
consequences.
398
Enlightenments, Old and New. [Audio podcast]. (2:30-5:50; a great summary of the implications of Damasios
work). Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
399
Brooks, D. (Interviewer), Damasio, A. (Interviewee). (2009). Part 4: How Emotion Affects Decision Making.
Antonio Damasio: This Time with Feeling. [Video file]. (The whole interview is worth watching). Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://fora.tv/2009/07/04/Antonio_Damasio_This_Time_With_Feeling#fullprogram
115
PERSONAL CHEMISTRY
EVIDENCE #13: We are compelled to be attracted to specific types of people based upon
many unperceived factors. The chemicals that contribute to a physiological environment
friendly to the common romantic cycle of lust (dopamine), passion (norepinephrine), and
commitment (oxytocin) have shown us how our relationships are at least somewhat subject
to specific elements of literal chemistry down to the genes, as well as other sensory and
psychological biases.
Its fairly well known now that sexual selection studies over recent decades have shown
that all animals instinctively seek out mates with good apparent health, good physical
symmetry,400 good access and/or potential ability to access survival/reproduction resources, good
genetic diversity,401 and other physiological indicators identifiable in a dozen different brain
regions402 not perceived before we actually consider personality though, as one might expect
at this point, we tend to confabulate the opposite when asked.403 As science writers Kate Douglas
and Dan Jones put it:
Janine Willis and Alexander Todorov from Princeton University found that we make
judgements about a persons trustworthiness, competence, aggressiveness, likeability and
attractiveness within the first 100 milliseconds of seeing a new face. Given longer to
lookup to 1 secondthe researchers found observers hardly revised their views, they only
400
Edler, R. J. (2001). Background Considerations to Facial Aesthetics. Journal of Orthodontics 28 (2): 159
168. doi:10.1093/ortho/28.2.159. PMID 11395532. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://jorthod.maneyjournals.org/content/28/2/159.full
401
Perrett, D.; Burt, D. M.; Penton-Voak, I. S.; Lee, K. J.; Rowland, D. A.; Edwards, R. (1999). Symmetry
and Human Facial Attractiveness. Evolution and Human Behavior 20 (5): 295. doi:10.1016/S1090-
5138(99)00014-8. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.ehbonline.org/article/S1090-5138(99)00014-
8/abstract
402
Fischetti, M. (2/14/2011). Your Brain in Love. Scientific American. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=your-brain-in-love-graphsci
403
Forbes, G. (1/12/2010). Reasonable Doubts podcast extra: Getting Into Someones Genes. [Audio podcast].
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://castroller.com/podcasts/ReasonableDoubtsPodcast/1467505-
RD%20Extra%20Getting%20Into%20Someones%20Genes
116
became more confident in their snap decisions (Psychological Science, vol 17, p
592)[404,405] [Emphasis mine].
Men are more strongly wooed by the same woman in a red dress406 (for animals, its the
red flushed skin of a female in heat. Evolutionary psychology is clearly relevant here). Perhaps
the most influential bonding indicators though, happen at the chemical level. David Myers
writes, In a study of 5300 strip-club lap dancers, their hourly tips almost doubled on the days
near ovulation, compared with days during menstruation (Miller et al., 2007).407
Peptides like oxytocin have been shown to be at the core of pair-bonding and monogamy
in mammals.408,409 In studies by Dr. Carsten de Dreu,410 inhaling oxytocin has been shown to
boost favoritism toward our own ethnic or cultural group. Subjects who sniffed oxytocin were
more likely to choose to save their own race when tested with classic ethical dilemmas, such as
the Trolley Car Problem.411 It has also been shown to make people more or less cooperative in
social games (depending upon if they met their gaming partner beforehand),412 make people have
404
Douglas, K., Jones, D. (5/5/2007). Top 10 ways to make better decisions. New Scientist. Available on
9/19/2012 at http://facultyfiles.deanza.edu/gems/abrahamsmatt/Top10waystomakebetterdecisio.pdf
405
Willis, J., Todorov, A. (2006). First Impressions Making Up Your Mind After a 100-Ms Exposure to a
Face. Psychological Science, vol 17, p 592 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.consequentialstrangers.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/WillisTodorow2006-
FirstImpressions.pdf
406
Pazda, A.D., Elliot, A.J., Greitemeyer, T. (2011). Sexy red: Perceived sexual receptivity mediates the red-
attraction relation in men viewing woman. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.12.009. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002210311100299X
407
408
Churchland, Patricia. Patricia Churchland - Morality and the Mammalian Brain. The University of
Edinburgh. Edinburgh, Scotland. 2010. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n_PtnBacAP0&feature=player_embedded
409
Churchland, Patricia. Patricia Churchland: What do neuroscientific discoveries imply for free will and
responsibility? Neuro Enigmas II: Large-Scale Problems in Neuroscience. The Science Network. UC San
Diego, CA. (1/12/2007). (Part 9/11). Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u792V9tJuMM&NR=1
410
Yong, E. (1/11/2011). No love for outsiders oxytocin boosts favouritism towards our own ethnic or
cultural group. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2011/01/11/no-love-for-outsiders-oxytocin-boosts-
favouritism-towards-our-own-ethnic-or-cultural-group
411
412
Declerck, C.H., Boone, C., Kiyonari, T. (2010). Oxytocin and cooperation under conditions of uncertainty:
the modulating role of incentives and social information. Horm Behav. 2010 Mar;57(3):368-74. Epub 2010
Jan 18. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez/20080100
117
more or less favorable memories of their mother (depending upon their social anxiety),413 make a
man temporarily more sensitive and in the mood for cuddling,414 and perhaps most shockingly:
to increase trust, affection, and bonding commensurately. That is to say that the more oxytocin
there is in a mother with a child, the more they can literally predict the length of displays of
affection and bonding415 though again, it should be said that in the light of the more recent
studies above, it seems to follow that oxytocin only increases positive effects in previously
known/met people, but has sometimes been shown to increase distrust in previously unknown
people. The effects of oxytocin are conditional. This was shown in a double-blind study
involving oxytocin and
a trust game with real monetary stakes, in which the subjects played the role of either an
investor or a trustee. Investors could choose whether and how much money to invest with
an anonymous trustee, and the trustees could choose whether to honor or violate the
investors trust. The investors who had inhaled the oxytocin invested 17% more money
than those who received the placebo.[416]
Not to give oxytocin, or similar substances all the glory (I wont go into the many studies
on dopamine or norepinephrine or the power of androstadienone417,418), sexual attraction can be
influenced by situational context as well. In a 1974 study by Donald Dutton and Arthur Aron,419
discussions with/about the opposite sex in actual situations of physical danger (they conducted
413
Yong, E. (11/29/2010). The dark side of oxytocin, much more than just a love hormone. [Web log post].
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2010/11/29/the-dark-side-
of-oxytocin-much-more-than-just-a-%e2%80%9clove-hormone%e2%80%9d/
414
Coghlan, A. (6/1/2005). Trust me, I'm spraying you with hormones, New Scientist-Life. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn7451-trust-me-im-spraying-you-with-hormones.html
415
West, C. (11/2007). Level of Oxytocin in Pregnant Women Predicts Mother-Child Bond. APS Observer.
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/getArticle.cfm?id=2245
416
McGee, G. (Posted 7/12/2005). Chemical Trust: An Oxytocin Oxymoron. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://blog.bioethics.net/2005/07/chemical-trust-an-oxytocin-oxymoron
417
Bering, J. (5/13/2009). Armpit Psychology: The Science of Body Odor Perception. Scientific American.
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=armpit-psychology-body-odor
418
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (8/28/2007). Radiolab podcast: This Is Your Brain On Love. [Audio podcast].
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.radiolab.org/blogs/radiolab-blog/2007/aug/28/this-is-your-brain-on-
love
419
Dutton, D., Aron, A. (1974). Some Evidence For Heightened Sexual Attraction Under Conditions of High
Anxiety. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1974, Vol. 30, No. 4, 510-517. Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://www.fpce.uc.pt/niips/novoplano/ps1/documentos/dutton&aron1974.pdf
118
surveys on a not so steady rope bridge) led subjects to greater sexual arousal/interest when
recalling the interviewer than discussions with/about the opposite sex in actual less dangerous
situations (on a solid bridge). The process, entitled the misattribution of arousal, suggests the
misattribution is between sex/romance and danger, and other similar studies in the same vein
have confirmed the original results.420 Danger is sexy. You may have sensed it, but now you
know it. Be careful though, because danger is still... well, dangerous.
In other more recent studies, subjects were affected sexually and emotionally in dramatic
ways by unperceived factors as subtle as a whiff from negative-emotion related odorless tears,421
increased eye dilation,422 or physically similar features of the face.423 Even the mere picture of a
loved one has been shown (via fMRI) to actually reduce physical pain in lovers by as much as
45%.424 Libido (and hence, specific desires) can be targeted and reduced iatrogenically, that is to
say with certain medications like antidepressants, beta blockers, and opiods, to name just a few.
THE IMPLICATIONS: Anyone whos been in love and/or lust knows the powers these
emotions have to control our will even against what we might later reason out to be a better
decision. And considering all that is affirmed in the 100milisecond experiments from Willis and
Todorov,425 how much does freely willed reasoning come into play when biochemical reactions
that produce specific desires are not only beyond our control, but often beyond our perception
and then later confabulated as intention, as is typically the case after we act.
Bioethicists are rightly worried about the availability and misuse of psychological and
biochemical agents that may be or may already have been used to control, or at least influence,
hordes of unwitting victims. Some see it as one of our most underestimated threats in the next
420
McRaney, D. (7/7/2011). The Misattribution of Arousal. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://youarenotsosmart.com/2011/07/07/misattribution-of-arousal
421
Gelstein, S., Yeshurun, Y., Rozenkrantz, L., Shushan, S., Frumin, I., Roth, Y., Sobel, N. (2011). Human
Tears Contain a Chemosignal. Science. DOI: 10.1126/science.1198331. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/early/2011/01/05/science.1198331
422
Pellham, L. (12/17/2010). Body Language Expert. What Do Dilated Pupils Mean? [Web log post]. Retrieved
on 9/19/2012 from http://www.bodylanguageexpert.co.uk/what-do-dilated-pupils-mean.html
423
DeBruine, L. (2002). Facial Resemblance Enhances Trust. Proceedings of the Royal
Society of London B 269, 13071312
424
Minogue, K. (10/13/2010). Love Conquers AllEven Pain. Science Now. Retrieved on on 9/19/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2010/10/scienceshot-love-conquers-all.html?etoc
425
Willis, J., Todorov, A. (2006). First Impressions Making Up Your Mind After a 100-Ms Exposure to a
Face. Psychological Science, vol 17, p 592 Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.consequentialstrangers.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/WillisTodorow2006-
FirstImpressions.pdf
119
few decades. Couldnt we conceive of a situation where victims are not only taken advantage of,
but they also become completely averse to blame or prosecution, because of the continued,
residual, or naturally habituated influence of the trusty chemical bonds initiated by their
abusers? What are we to think of our sentimentality in light of its vulnerability to chemical
adjustments?
Lofty descriptions of what love is can change from person to person, culture to culture,
poem to poem, but the capacity to feel love and be monogamous depends to a major extent, if not
completely, upon levels of the chemicals described above, to the point that the lack thereof has
been clearly shown to lead to promiscuity. Still, must this demote our appreciation of what is
special or beautiful in the world? Cant we still appreciate it all with the same intensity in our
knowing of some of the underlying elements, just as we might still appreciate a mountaintop
vista, even though we understand how the mountains formed via plate tectonics, waters carved
out the valleys, etc? Does knowing how and/or why a person enjoys sex diminish enjoyment in
sex? Doesnt increasing our knowledge of how we might enjoy certain experiences merely give
us a greater potential to find ways to increase that joy?
We have every right to point out that causation and correlation are not the same thing
here and that just because these chemicals can be correlated with this kind of affect, doesnt
mean theyre required does it? Actually, it does. The affect is not there when the chemicals are
not there. Which brings up another more general matter here in basic psychology: the difference
between causation and correlation is in no way the same as the difference between nature vs.
nurture (besides the fact that correlation is always quantitative and never qualitative). When
people discuss nature versus nurture, sometimes, you get the impression that nature represents
causality, while nurture represents something freer. But nurture is just a smaller set of nature,
and never actually departs from the causal foundation that underpins it. Its just a more complex
network of causal influence (including bidirectional influences, etc.), rather than simple and/or
obviously direct causality (e.g. billiard balls).
Raymond Tallis is a very vocal critic of suggestions such as the ones I have just made
concerning the power of chemicals, physiology, and neuroscience, to affect our behavior and free
will in meaningful ways. In a debate with neuroscientist David Eagleman, he said,
120
That which is acted out in the public space (maintained by conscious human beings) that
we call "culture" is at least as important [as neuroscience in predicting behavior]. Once
this is granted, then brain science will have a more modest role in explaining why we do
things, and an even smaller one in framing social policy.[426]
The neuroscience has as much influence and is as important *as the studies show that it
is* (POST-environment), no more, no less. Tallis has created a strawman, a red herring, and a
false dilemma. Of course Eagleman includes environment in his assessment of neurosciences
impact on behavior predictability. External predictors are still predictors. Mirror neurons are
internal, but reflect what is external. Cognitive offloading incorporates what is external. Cultural
information is wired in neuronally. Tallis carries the torch for the old school humanistic agenda
to champion the self under the fading light of the scientific individual. At the end of the day, the
most accurate prediction will end any argument.
Psychology textbooks will often rightly hammer home the fact that correlation is not
necessarily causation (i.e. the unidirectional arrow), but that correlation is not necessarily
causation of one thing/direction doesnt mean it is free from all causation either, even as
emergent phenomena, IMO, because its just a higher level of complexity with more/unique
utility. Semantically, for pragmatic reasons, we make a distinction between choice and fate, but
they are still under a causal framework tooeven quantum randomness, just like emergent
phenomena, can get rerouted right back into channels of natural propensities, such as cognitive
biases, in the mind or in nature, going as far back as Plank time. Moving on
426
Eagleman, D., Tallis, R. (4/28/2012). The brain it makes you think. Doesn't it? The Gaurdian: The
Observer. Available on 9/19/2012 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2012/apr/29/neuroscience-david-
eagleman-raymond-tallis
121
MENTAL DISORDER
EVIDENCE #14: There are neurological disorders that radically alter not only
fundamental perceptions of sensation, but identity in self, others, and objects. The reality of
these experiences has also been bolstered by all manner of mind and body altering drugs
that have also been shown to mimic and/or exacerbate these kinds of conditions in normal
people.
In Phantoms in the Brain,427 neurologist V.S. Ramachandran shows how cognition

affecting conditions alter awareness potential in ways that many of us are not aware of. For
example, synesthesia is an experience of the senses merging, such as when numbers or even
tones are actually experienced as colors. Recent evidence is showing that the experience seems
to be a result of unusually excitable neurons wiring a little too recklessly in the relevant areas.428
Consider one womans mind that rewired itself incorrectly, because of right hippocampal
atrophy, to give her orgasms when she brushes her teeth.429,430 Ramachandran has
demonstrated431 that because of the crossed neural wiring and/or biochemical physiological
environment, these people are also more predisposed to thinking metaphorically and creatively.
He also notes that this probably evolved for the evolutionary benefit. Social groups wouldnt
want everyone to be the creative types though, especially, as he says, during brain surgery, so
we dont all have the propensity in our genes. In fact, for other people, the results go in the
opposite direction, with a higher propensity for analytical thinking (plus evolution takes time!).
Other changes/losses of ability and/or perception that are the results of neural re-wiring
via changes in biochemical/physiological environment and/or brain damage may predispose
427
Ramachandran, V.S. Phantoms in the Brain. BBC-4. [Television series]. (N.D.). Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/phantoms-in-the-brain
428
Norton, E. (11/17/2011). Overactive Neurons May Tangle the Senses. Science Now. Retrieved on 9/19/2012
from http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/11/overactive-neurons-may-tangle-th.html
429
Chuang, Y.C., Lin, T.K., Lui, C.C., Chen, S.D., Chang, C.S. (4/13/2004). Tooth-brushing epilepsy with ictal
orgasms. Seizure, 2004, 13, 179-182. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
430
Sci-Curious. (2/20/2009). Friday Weird Science: When it feels really good to brush your teeth. [Web log
post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://scientopia.org/blogs/scicurious/2009/02/20/friday-weird-science-
when-it-feels-really-good-to-brush-your-teeth
431
Ramachandran, Vilayanur. Beyond Belief: Enlightenment 2.0. The Science Network. UC San Diego, CA.
(11/1/2007). Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://thesciencenetwork.org/programs/beyond-belief-
enlightenment-2-0/v-s-ramachandran
122
experience in other ways, such as with prosopagnosia, where the ability to recognize faces is
impaired. There are over 30 areas in the brain that involve seeing and indexing; some are on the
how does this image help to direct me? neural pathway and others are on the what is it?
neural pathway, so conditions similar to prosopagnosia may prevent people from identifying
certain types of objects vs. living things. There is also the Capgras delusion, where the emotional
response to those who the sufferer sees (and even sometimes to objects, such as a house) is
completely disconnected, to the point where they absolute dont recognize or trust their own
families or even images in the mirror and they are perceived as alien imposters (This is not my
house! That is not my wife!).
Another cognition affecting condition is temporal lobe epilepsy, where large groups of
neurons fire rhythmically and simultaneously, but out of sync with the rest of the brain. There are
at least 40 types of this experience known to date, some of which produce phenomenal,
emotional, spiritual experiences (e.g. Geschwind Syndrome), as well as seemingly arbitrary,
impulsive actions with every epileptic episode, like suddenly urgently requesting a glass of water
or abruptly dropping everything and taking off running or repetitively rubbing the hands
together.432 Ramachandran believes that certain neural categories of inputs are artificially and
perhaps arbitrarily elevated in salience and hence intense emotional significance.
It has also been shown that there are drugs, such as LSD, that can simulate these
conditions by altering the brain in similar ways.433 Some drugs created to treat certain diseases
have very specific strong behavioral side effects, such as Parkinsons drugs like Pramipexole or
Ropinirole. Because they mimic dopamine, and dopamine is the main player in the reward
system, they have been shown to induce radical indulgences in gambling, sex, overeating,
etc.434,435
432
Riggio, S. (2009). Behavioral Manifestations of Frontal Lobe Seizures. CNS Spectr. 2009;14(2):66-70
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.cnsspectrums.com/aspx/articledetail.aspx?articleid=1973
433
Ramachandran, Vilayanur. Beyond Belief: Enlightenment 2.0. The Science Network. UC San Diego, CA.
(11/1/2007). Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://thesciencenetwork.org/programs/beyond-belief-
enlightenment-2-0/v-s-ramachandran
434
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (6/15/2009). Radiolab podcast: Seeking Patterns. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.radiolab.org/2009/jun/15/seeking-patterns
435
Eagleman, D. (7-8/2011). The Brain on Trial. The Atlantic. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/print/2011/07/the-brain-on-trial/8520
123
THE IMPLICATIONS: When neurons are not behaving normally, how is a person supposed
to step outside of themselves and evaluate that objectively? Some of these experiences are so
profound that they override reason and intellect. To what measure do these fundamental
misperceptions occur subtly enough to go unnoticed in the average person? These types of
disabilities alter everything from peoples ability to trust, to feel specific emotions, to identify
self and others, to attribute the relative importance of something, all the way to the ability to
even just survive by identifying or recognizing the actual significance of certain animals or foods
or by not spending every penny that they have on gambling. The minds of some Ropinirole
patients were so tweaked that they blew literally everything they could get their hands oneven
hundreds of thousands of dollars.436
Even though these parameters probably exist in many people to some extent and may be
subtle enough to go unrecognized, is it really fair that they would still be expected to be judged
in all manner of social contexts, including moral ones, without special consideration, via the
mistaken assumption that free will comes after these conditional filters, just because we are
unaware of the milder effects? At what point do these problems get recognized as fundamental
parameters that not only affect personality and identity, but social relations, and hence ethics? If
these experiences are on a continuum and not all or nothing, as the courts seem to have to
frame them due to practical limitations, do we just have to bite the bullet and concede to these
shortcomings in the judicial system?
Last, considering these particular types of illnesses, its also worth noting that the
Geschwind Syndrome and temporal lobe epilepsy in general seem to be a promising direction for
exploring at least some supernatural/religious experience now and in history (e.g. mystics,
prophets, etc.). For some of those who experience it, certain aspects of temporal lobe epilepsy
may even become addicting, because the spiritual feelings produced are experienced as a
gateway to understanding the Truth of the world. How much of the resulting dogma produced
in these experiences is really a product of neural function and how much of it is a product of
reason?
436
Lehrer, J. (8/19/2007). Your brain on gambling: Science shows how slot machines take over your mind.
The Boston Globe. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2007/08/19/your_brain_on_gambling
124
THE MORALLY CHALLENGED
EVIDENCE #15: Specific types of brain damage have not only impaired some peoples
ability to perceive the world in a way unrealistic enough to give them a seriously unequal
playing field ethically, but it has actually changed their personality.
When neuroscience researchers Jorge Moll and Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza reviewed the
Nature paper, Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgments,437
Scientific Americans Mind Matters editor David Dobbs introduced the review with, Do you
think it's okay to kill one person to save two or three others? It seems your answer may rely on
the relative health or strength of particular brain areas438,439,440,441 [emphasis mine]. This is
especially true in the case of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which helps us to feel
compassion and guilt.442 In The Moral Landscape, neuroscientist Sam Harris writes:
Frontal lobe injury can result in a condition known as acquired sociopathy, which
shares some of the features of developmental psychopathy [] [Moll and Oliveira-
Souza] found that the correlation between gray matter reductions and psychopathy
extends beyond the frontal cortex, and this would explain why acquired sociopathy and
psychopathy are distinct disorders.[443]
437
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., Damasio, A. (2/17/2007).
Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements. Nature. 446, 908-911 (19 April 2007)
doi:10.1038/nature05631; Received 3 November 2006. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
438
Dobbs, D. (8/6/2007). When Morality Is Hard To Like. Scientific American. Available on 8/7/2011 from
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=when-morality-is-hard-to-like
439
Moll, J., De Oliveira-Souza, R., Eslinger, P., Bramati, I., Mouro-Miranda, J., Andreiuolo, P.A., Pessoa,
L. (2002). The Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
Investigation of Basic and Moral Emotions. The Journal of Neuroscience, 1 April 2002, 22(7): 2730-2736.
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.jneurosci.org/content/22/7/2730.abstract
440
Raine, A., Yang, Y. (2006). Neural foundations to moral reasoning and antisocial behavior. Soc Cogn
Affect Neurosci (2006) 1(3):203-213. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsl033. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://scan.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/3/203.abstract
441
Yang, Y., Raine, A., Lencz, T., Bihrle, S., LaCasse, L., Colletti, P. (2005). Volume reduction in prefrontal
gray matter in unsuccessful criminal psychopaths. Biol Psychiatry. 2005 May 15;57(10):1103-8. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15866549
442
Carey, B. (3/212007). Study finds brain injury changes moral judgment. The New York Times. Available on
9/19/2012 at http://weber.ucsd.edu/~ecomisso/Moral%20Jdgmnt.pdf
443
Harris, S. (2010). The Moral Landscape. (p. 213). New York: Free Press.
125
Even more sobering, he suggests, While it may be difficult to accept, the research
strongly suggests that some people cannot learn to care about others.444 David Meyers writes
that studies of violent criminals have revealed diminished activity in the frontal lobes, which
play an important role in controlling impulses (Amen et al., 1996; Davidson et al., 2000; Raine,
1999, 2005).445
Evidence for uncontrollable immoral behavior associated with brain damage has been
demonstrated by several characters throughout history, such as Charles Whitman,446 the Texas
killer who was found to have a tumor compressing his amygdala, which stimulated
uncontrollable rage. His personal journals chronicled his curious demise, which he himself
regretted to the end, seemingly aware that something was wrong with his brain. He even left
money and instructions to have his brain diagnosed post mortem. There is also Phineas Gage,447
the railroad foreman famous for a unique brain injury that completely changed his personality by
damaging a very specific part of his frontal lobe. Afterwards, friends and family said he was no
longer Gage. There is Alexander Laing,448 who had severe frontal lobe brain damage from a
skiing accident that made him physically aggressive and turned him into an uninhibited sex
addict; and last, the still anonymous forty year old man who had an increasing, uncharacteristic
pedophilia impulse until he was diagnosed with a right orbitofrontal tumor. When it was
removed, his behavior went back to normal.449,450
Fifty-seven percent of frontotemporal-dementia patients will violate social norms, such as
taking off their clothes in public or blatantly stealing in front of clerks or making loud
444
Ibid. (p. 99).
445
446
447
Damasio, H., Grabowski, T., Frank, R., Galaburda, A., Damasio, A. (5/20/1994). The return of Phineas
Gage: clues about the brain from the skull of a famous patient. Science. May 20, 1994 v264 n5162 p1102(4).
http://webpub.allegheny.edu/employee/l/lcoates/CoatesPage/INTDS_315/Phineas_Gage_Science_Article.pdf
448
Sheaves, B. (7/4/2006). The Freak Accident That Left My Son Obsessed With Sex. Daily Mail. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-393938/The-freak-accident-left-son-obsessed-
sex.html
449
Burns, J., Swerdlow, R. (2003). Right Orbitofrontal Tumor with Pedophilia Symptom and Constructional
Apraxia Sign. Arch Neural. 2003;60:437-440. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://synapse.princeton.edu/~brained/chapter26/burns_swerdlow_arch_neurol_orbitofrontal-pedophilia.pdf
450
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ax5_8Gu91Ew&feature=related
126
noises/singing at inappropriate times.451 There is growing evidence that chronic traumatic
encephalopathy (CTE), which can affect areas of the brain connected to mood, memory, and
impulse control, predisposes people to suicide, although how remains unclear452
THE IMPLICATIONS: Its important to observe here that these examples of predisposition
to a change in personality clearly include moral behavior. Neuroscientist David Eagleman
writes for the Boston Globe:
If you are a carrier of a particular set of genes, the probability that you will commit a
violent crime is four times as high as it would be if you lacked those genes. Youre three
times as likely to commit robbery, five times as likely to commit aggravated assault, eight
times as likely to be arrested for murder, and 13 times as likely to be arrested for a sexual
offense. The overwhelming majority of prisoners carry these genes; 98.1 percent of
death-row inmates do.[453]
The implications are fairly obvious: some people may naturally have a more or less moral
predisposition than others and then may even gain or lose a more or less moral predisposition.
I use the stronger word predisposition here over mere disposition both because of the
physical physiological/genetic factor (rather than it just being internal, but merely
epiphenomenal, for those who prefer that term), as well as considering the additional external
factor shown in the work of Caspi et al (2002),454 which I will discuss more thoroughly in
Evidence #17. In fact, we all may be constantly gaining and/or losing very subtle degrees of
451
452
Travis, J. (5/2/2011). Brain Damage Found in NFL Veteran Who Took Own Life. Science Insider.
Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2011/05/brain-damage-found-in-nfl-
veterans.html?etoc
453
454
Caspi, A., McClay, J, Moffitt, T., Mill, J., Martin, J., Craig, I, Taylor, A., & Poulton, R. (2002). Evidence
that the cycle of violence in maltreated children depends on genotype. Science, 297, 851-854. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from
http://www.windfalldigital.com/ethicalemporium/site/Case%20study/Analysing%20genes/Moffitt_briefing%
20notes.pdf
127
moral/immoral/amoral capacity as our brains and bodies subtly change over time. In his book
arguing for moral realism, The Moral Landscape, Sam Harris writes:
Despite our attachment to notions of free will, most of us know that disorders of the brain
can trump the best intentions of the mind. This shift in understanding represents progress
toward a deeper, more consistent, and more compassionate view of our common
humanity [] It is not that free will is simply an illusion: our experience is not merely
delivering a distorted view of reality; rather, we are mistaken about the nature of our
experience [] our sense of our own freedom results from our not paying attention to
what it is actually like to be what we are.[455]
These examples also show behavioral unity456 between the mind and brain, which is
evidence against the notion that our moral will comes from a separate spirit within our bodies.
The idea that we may someday be able to be repaired morally via moral surgery or cured
with, as Peter Singer put it, a morality pill,457 seems far-fetched at the moment but,
considering the unintentional moral surgery that Alexander Laing received, who can imagine
what the future will bring?
Weve already seen the kind of manipulation that animals have endured in the mind
control experiments by Dr. Jose Delgado in Evidence #6, but again, for our purposes here, we
dont even need to show perfect manipulation to show a predisposition for more or less control.
In any case, its crucial for us to consider why, for example, when one part of the amygdala is
stimulated (the medial part) with an electric current, animals fly into a rage and when another
part of the amygdala is stimulated (the lateral part), they cower in fear.458 There is no denying
that the physical predisposition of the brain crucially predisposes personality, even if just in the
context of the range of choices from more or less limited to more or less extreme. As I have
argued in the Introduction, these kinds of limitations on our freedom do not leave any freedom
455
Harris, S. (2010). The Moral Landscape. (p. 110-112). New York: Free Press.
456
Marczyk, A. (N.D.). A Ghost in the Machine: The existence of the soul. Part 2: The Argument from Mind-
Brain Unity. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.ebonmusings.org/atheism/ghost.html#part2
457
Singer, P., Sagan, A. (1/28/2012). Are We Ready for a Morality Pill? The New York Times. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/are-we-ready-for-a-morality-pill
458
Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions. Oxford
University Press, New York, 1998.
128
untainted. Freedom is not added on free and clear at the end of the decision process. It all must
pass through our dirty circuitry first.
After all the evidence I have shown concerning animals and humans so far in the context
of genetic and physiological behavioral and mind control, I shouldnt even have to mention the
well known classical and operant behavioral conditioning experiments that are the
predispositional webs of learned and unlearned attitudes and desires in which every organism on
earth is wrapped, such as those evidenced by Pavlov and his famous drooling German Shepherds
or Skinner and his birds but I guess I just did! Theres too much written on all that to include
here, but a few things can be noted in this context. They had the right underlying principle, in
one sense, that is the sense that there is a causal chain in the behavioral process... but it was too
hell bent on denying the unique qualities of internal systems of cognition! We know now that
why Skinner failed is because we have to also include the mediation of evaluative, motivational,
and perceptional systems.459
Prepared learning is an evolutionary predisposition to learn some pairings of feared
stimuli over others. However, equipotentiality, the notion that any conditioned stimulus can be
associated equally well with any unconditioned stimulus, is not well evidenced. When organisms
are being conditioned, either by classical/Pavlovian association or by reward/punishment
reinforcement, certain conditioned/unconditioned stimuli overlap well and some do not. Also, in
the context of prepared learning, there is instinctive drift, where animals have been shown to
revert during operant conditioning to instinctive behavior similar to some new/modern learned
behavior in a new/modern context, all based upon evolutionary genetic influence.460 There is no
question that evolution pulls the strings on every being on this planet. Its not all about the
external world, though that doesnt mean that it isnt causal either.
Sociopaths feel no or very little compassion. Such an emotional deficit is not a choice.
While it will be argued that we do inform ourselves and others cognitively what to be emotional
about, we can see that even the ability to feel certain emotions, in this case, compassion, is
physically limited. There is fascinating evidence, for example, that we have a limited capacity to
459
460
Timberlake, W. (2006). Evolution-based learning mechanisms can contribute to adaptive and problematic
learned behavior. In S. Lilienfield & W. O. Donohue (Eds.), Great Ideas in Clinical Science. New York:
Routledge.
129
even be afraid of certain things.461,462 Scott Lilienfeld tells us, Mineka and Cook (1993) showed
that monkeys can acquire fears of snakes by means of observational learning. Nevertheless, these
monkeys didnt acquire fears of non-dangerous stimuli, like flowers, suggesting a role for
evolutionary predispositions in the development of fears.463 Certain fears that are literally,
physically easier to fear are evolutionary memories.464 We do not have the abilitythe
freedomto cognitively inform our fears equally it seems. We have a biological predisposition
for certain types of fear and this is just more evidence that shows how our freedom of thought is
subject to natural deficit, arbitrary change, and physical manipulation.
461
Weike, A. I., Schupp, H. T., & Hamm, A. O. (2007). Fear acquisition requires awareness in trace but not
delay conditioning. Psychophysiology, 44, 170180.
462
Ohman, A., Mineka, S. (2001). Fears, phobias, and preparedness: Toward an evolved module of fear and
fear learning. Psychological Review, 108, 483522.
463
Boston, MA: Pearson ISBN-10: 0205650481 [p. 178].
464
Mineka, S., Cook, M. (1993). Mechanisms involved in the observational conditioning of fear. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 122, 2338.
130
THE BODY OTHER
EVIDENCE #16: There are neurological disorders that color fundamental perceptions of
identity and not only influence choices based upon trust and morality, but even actual
movements of body parts against their will.
As Benjamin Libet writes in Do We Have Free Will?, there are many conditions that
produce involuntary actions, such as:
cerebral palsy, Parkinsonism, Huntingtons chorea, Tourettes syndrome and even

obsessive compulsions to act. A striking example is the alien hand syndrome (or
autonomous hand). Patients with a lesion in a fronto-medial portion of premotor area
may find that the hand and arm on the affected side performs curious purposeful actions,
such as undoing a buttoned shirt when the subject is trying to button it up; all this occurs
without or even against the subjects intention and will. (Cf. Spence, S.A. and Frith, C.D.
(1999). [Towards a functional anatomy of volition, Journal of Consciousness Studies]
p. 23.)[465]
The alien hand syndrome is not to be confused with the electronically stimulated
PossessedHand mentioned in Evidence #14, though some part of the mind does appropriate
the same controls. Nor is it to be confused with studies where subjects have the illusion of
owning a third arm, which one science writer called The Beeblebrox Illusion466 after a
character in Douglas Adams Hitchhikers Guide to the Universe stories. The alien hand
syndrome is a product of sometimes literal split personality and is perceived as being owned
by someone else.
465
Libet, B. (1999). Do We Have Free Will? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, No. 89, 1999, pp. 4757.
http://www.centenary.edu/attachments/philosophy/aizawa/courses/intros2009/libetjcs1999.pdf
466
Yong, E. (2/23/2011). The Beeblebrox Illusion: scientists convince people they have three arms. [Web log
post]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2011/02/23/the-
beeblebrox-illusion-scientists-convince-people-they-have-three-arms/
131
The Beeblebrox Illusion is important though, in that it has shown that we have all have a
propensity to readily incorporate physical identity parameters psychologicallyeven
physiologically to some extentinto neurological wiring. With the so-called Beeblebrox
Illusion, subjects placed their right arm on a table in front of them with a realistic rubber hand
next to it and a sheet to disguise the path from the rubber arm to the body. The left arm/hand,
totally hidden out of view on the other side of a curtain, was stroked with a brush on specific
parts just as the same was done to the same specific parts of the rubber hand in the visual
periphery. The mind was fooled enough to provoke increased fear/heart rate, etc., when the
rubber hand was threatened with a knife wound after just a few minutes of performing the
experiment. Other studies have shown that the mind is highly adaptable to retrofitting its
physical extension merely by even just a few moments of new sense data.467,468
Thomas Metzinger considers the brains association of the rubber hand with a/the real
hand to represent evidence for a Phenomenal Self Model (PSM). A functional PSM explains why
the association happens so easily, why this association can be used to treat people with phantom
limb pain, and why, when it is not functioning properly, we get problems of broken mineness
concerning both mental ownership (e.g. with dissociated personality[ies], such as in
schizophrenia) and physical ownership (e.g. with dissociated limb[s], such as in unilateral hemi-
neglect [that is not my leg!]).469
The Beeblebrox Illusion shows the ability for the brain to rewire itself with certain parts
of the brain overtaking areas lacking in stimulation from lost limbs, organs, etc. That is to say
that nerve sensitivity in phantom limbs and organs is re-associated/rewired/appropriated by
neighboring areas in the brain; for example, a rub on the cheek feels like it was rubbed on the
phantom hand because the neighboring neural circuitry moved/re-wired into the spot where the
hand used to occupy.470 This has implications in itself for the subject of this book. Conditions
such as alien hand syndrome and Tourettes actually cause one to uncontrollably manifest effects
467
Guterstam, A., Petkova, V.I., Ehrsson, H.H. (2011). The Illusion of Owning a Third Arm. PLoS ONE 6(2):
e17208. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017208. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
468
469
Metzinger, Thomas. Being No One. The Immortality of the Soul presented by the UC Berkeley
Graduate Council. Series: UC Berkeley Graduate Council Lectures [Show ID: 9181]. Berkeley, CA. 2/2005.
(17:00-35:00). Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mthDxnFXs9k
470
Phantoms in the Brain. (N.D.). BBC-4. [Television series]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/phantoms-in-the-brain
132
that seem to even have personality behind them, and must have surely even been mistaken for
spiritual possession in days of yore. Huntingtons Disease has been responsible for manifesting
not only jerky physical movements, but also egocentrism, aggression, and compulsive behavior,
the latter of which can cause or worsen addictions, including alcoholism, gambling, and
hypersexuality.471
THE IMPLICATIONS: A famous philosopher once wrote,
When I reflect on the mind (or on myself insofar as I am simply a thinking thing), I
certainly cannot distinguish any parts in myself; instead I understand myself to be a
completely unified and integral thing. And even though the whole mind seems to be
united with the whole body, if however a foot, an arm, or any other part of the body is
cut off, I know that nothing is thereby taken away from the mind. Nor can the
faculties of willing, sensing, understanding, etc., be said to be parts of the mind,
because it is one and the same mind that wills, senses and understands. In contrast, I
cannot think of any physical or extended body that I cannot divide easily in my
thought; for that reason alone, I understand that it is divisible. That would be enough
to teach me that the mind is completely different from the body if I did not already
know it adequately from other considerations.[472]
It seems that the dualist Rene Descartes was never privy to the phenomena of, say,
unilateral hemi-neglect, where the patients mind believes that one of their limbs is not really
theirs. So, contrary to Descartes portrayal of a supposedly undividable mind, these peoples
minds do reject ownership and connection to their own limbs even before they are cut off. Nor
was he privy to the mental conditions producing cognitive division in willing, sensing,
understanding that we saw in Evidences #14, #8. These are all mind/brain relationships
471
Van Duijn, E., Kingma, E.M., Van der Mast, R.C. (2007). Psychopathology in verified Huntington's
disease gene carriers. J Neuropsychiatry Clin Neurosci 19 (4): 4418. doi:10.1176/appi.neuropsych.19.4.441.
PMID 18070848. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://neuro.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/abstract/19/4/441
472
Descartes, Ren. (1998). Meditations and other metaphysical writings. Trans. Desmond M. Clarke. London:
Penguin, [Sixth Meditation, p. 67.]
133
that make no sense in Descartes dualistic Cartesian Theater. Arguing for an independent
mind/spirit was much easier before we had the fantastic scientific knowledge we now have.
While personality and ethical conduct are clearly affected in a fundamental way by many
conditions Ive presented and that should be enough to undermine contra-causal free will (in the
least; compatibilists beware!), some of these particular patients have even lost personal local
control over their own specific thoughts and body parts! And in the case of the Beeblebrox
Illusion, the notions of identity, immediately reprogrammable ownership, and therefore, control,
are also challenged.473 Is subjectivity merely the experience of the awareness of whatever it is
attached to, even when it is not attached? Consider that without personal identity, not to mention
the blurring effect of the wills of multiple agents in group identity, there is no you to have free
will in the first place.
Tourettes and alien hand syndrome are the absence of local control (of the negative
variety) and about as far from contra-causal free will as one can get. If autonomy does exist at
all, it does not exist for everyone. If identity exists at all, it does not exist for everyone. These are
evidences of a continuum of degrees to which we seem to be more or less biased by our physical
condition, let alone of even our basic local control, and this is separate from and in addition to
the slew of philosophical arguments against contra-causal free that will be discussed later. Again,
part of the reason for reframing the free will vs. determinism issue with predispositionalism is
to habituate a more appropriate, more veridical, continuous frame of reference over concerns like
this. Discrete values are obviously useful, but envisioning the continuous foundation can lead to
different consequences in how we choose to treat all manner of issues.
473
Metzinger, Thomas. Being No One. The Immortality of the Soul presented by the UC Berkeley
Graduate Council. Series: UC Berkeley Graduate Council Lectures [Show ID: 9181]. Berkeley, CA. 2/2005.
(12:40-14:50) Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mthDxnFXs9k
134
DEVELOPMENT
EVIDENCE #17: Certain genetic and/or physiological factors in early childhood seem to
be indicators for progress later in life, especially when coupled with certain developmental
conditions.
The love of a mother in early childhood has been shown to strongly predict a larger
hippocampal volume by school age and is the key to memory function and stress control.474 A 26
year study475 of 442 males who were mistreated as children showed that the subjects who were
both the most severely mistreated and who also had a specific enzyme mutation that confers low
levels of MAOA expression (on the y chromosome, perhaps also rarely on both xs in some
women as well476) were much more likely to develop strong antisocial behavior than the severely
mistreated subjects who conferred higher/normal levels of MAOA expression. Were talking as
high as 85% more likely, often including criminal activity. The study also showed that the lower
the severity of abuse in early childhood between both the MAOA mutants and the non-mutants
showed little to no difference later in life in anti-social behavior, suggesting the enzyme may
help to moderate the childs sensitivity to environmental insults; thus requiring both factors of
severe mistreatment and genetic predisposition to lead to the worst behavior.
Psychologist Walter Mischel once devised an experiment at Stanford where he tested the
willpower of four-year-old children by offering one treat (e.g. a marshmallow)or if they could
wait 15 minutes two treats.477 As time passed, years after the study, Mischel became aware of
474
Lubya, J.L, Barcha, D.M., Beldena, A., Gaffreya, M.S., Tillmana, R., Babba, C., Nishinoa, T., Suzukia, H.,
Botterona, K.N. (1/4/2012). Maternal support in early childhood predicts larger hippocampal volumes at
school age. PNAS February 21, 2012 vol. 109 no. 8 2854-2859 doi: 10.1073/pnas.1118003109 Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.pnas.org/content/109/8/2854.abstract
475
Caspi, A., McClay, J, Moffitt, T., Mill, J., Martin, J., Craig, I, Taylor, A., & Poulton, R. (2002). Evidence
that the cycle of violence in maltreated children depends on genotype. Science, 297, 851-854. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from
http://www.windfalldigital.com/ethicalemporium/site/Case%20study/Analysing%20genes/Moffitt_briefing%
20notes.pdf
476
477
Shoda, Y., Mischel, W., Peake, P. (1990). "Predicting Adolescent Cognitive and Self-Regulatory
Competencies from Preschool Delay of Gratification: Identifying Diagnostic Conditions". Developmental
135
anecdotally relayed unexpected differences between the kids who could better defer gratification
and the kids who couldnt, which he later formalized into further studies by keeping in contact
with some 250 of the original 500 kids over the decades. Observations in several tests showed
that significant differences well beyond chance were observed in overall competence, behavior,
SAT scores, and later, job quality, health, income, and a variety of other factors in the kids who
could defer gratification compared to those who couldnt. And the differences were
commensurate.478,479
THE IMPLICATIONS: While experiments such as Mischels have a definite element of

correlation between deferred gratification and success, he admits that there was no conclusively
established total causation directly from genetics in that particular study. In fact, there is
speculation that some kids merely learned, previously or simultaneously, to employ effective
methods of distraction. University of Michigan neurologist/psychologist John Jonides says will
power, cashes out in the real world as an ability to direct the spotlight of attention so that our
decisions arent determined by the wrong thoughts [] We call that will power, but its got
nothing to do with the will.480
Some people have strongly cautioned using these kinds of tests as heuristics for academic
funding, as there are other factors that contribute to ones success or devotion to a
discipline.481,482 While these points are taken, considering the possibilities for physiological
advantages inherent in nature that correspond to competence in the Moffitt and Caspi study, its
clear that natural gifts and curses do play some major roll in behavior, which does affect success
overall. That a nurturing parent can be intentionally and directly responsible for the size of their
Psychology 26 (6): 978986. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from

http://duende.uoregon.edu./~hsu/blogfiles/Shoda,Mischel,&Peake(1990).pdf
478
Lehrer, J. (5/18/2009). Dont! The secret of self-control. The New Yorker. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/05/18/090518fa_fact_lehrer
479
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (10/15/2010). Radiolab podcast: Your Future in a Marshmallow. [Audio
podcast]. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from http://www.radiolab.org/2010/oct/15/your-future-marshmallow
480
Lehrer, J. (5/18/2009). Dont! The secret of self-control. The New Yorker. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/05/18/090518fa_fact_lehrer
481
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (10/15/2010). Radiolab podcast: Singled Out. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.radiolab.org/2010/oct/15/singled-out
482
Midmorning News. (Broadcast 4/12/2010). Miller, C. (Interviewer), Shenk, D. (Interviewee). The true
nature of genius. Minnesota Public Radio. Minnesota. Retrieved on 9/19/2012 from
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/04/12/midmorning2
136
childs brain and capacity to remember and to deal with stress shows that we are not all equal in
our oft presumed capacities.
Recent evidence shows this is not a one way street either. Mothers who give birth to
male children have been evidenced to retain male DNA in their brains for the rest of their
lives.483 The extent to which this alters the thinking of the mother is unknown, though it has been
implied that it, in the least, might help protect her from Alzheimer's disease. In a later Evidence,
I will present some differences between the sexes. Testing in time will tell whether or not this
kind of event would influence a woman to cross over in these ways.
483
Phillips, M. L. (9/26/2012). Bearing Sons Can Alter Your Mind. ScienceNow. Retrieved on 9/28/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/09/bearing-sons-can-alter-your-mind.html?ref=em
137
RIGHT-SIDE BIAS
EVIDENCE #18: We have a right-side bias that we do not perceive that can even extend
into moral value assessments.
There is evidence484 that not only has right-side bias been around for at least 500,000
years, but that it is also a byproduct of language, because the correlating left side of the brain is
where language is processed. About ten percent of us are lefties who are most likely a product
of both genetics and environment.485 Environmental factors do play a role, evidenced by twins
with the same DNA, but different handedness.
Environment is also possibly evidenced by lefties who had early developmental problems
in the womb, in the default486,487 left hemisphere that shifted the language center to the right side,
along with their handedness, during development. There is growing evidence for various
physical and/or mental consequences of having language/handedness based in the right brain
rather than the left. Its a somewhat controversial idea known as brain lateralization.488
Marketing studies489 in Paco Underhills book Why We Buy: The Science of Shopping
have unveiled this bias in our orientation. Studies show that we have a tendency to pay more
attention to things on our right side more than on our left side; we also have a tendency to
walk/turn to the right, as well as to reach to the right; we also tend to buy products on the right
side of displays more than on the left side But as is often the case, subjects will deny any right
handed bias and confabulate unrelated reasons for purchasing the products.
484
Welsh, J. (4/29/2011). Ancient Humans Were Mostly Right-Handed, Too. LiveScience. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.livescience.com/13951-neanderthals-hand-dominance-language.html
485
Binns, C. (3/21/2006). What Makes a Lefty: Myths and Mysteries Persist. LiveScience. Retrieved on
9/19/2012 from http://www.livescience.com/655-lefty-myths-mysteries-persist.html
486
Rasmussen, T., B. Milner. (1977). Clinical and surgical studies of the cerebral speech apreas in man. In:
Zulch, K.J., O. Creutzfeltd and G.C. Galbraith (eds.), Cerebral localization. NY: Sringer Verlag, pp. 238-255.
487
Molfese, D.L., Freeman, R.B., and Palermo, D.S. (1975). The ontogeny of brain lateralization for speech
and nonspeech stimuli. Brain Lang. 2:356368.
488
Wang, S. (12/6/2011). The Health Risks of Being Left-Handed: Lefties Face Chance Of ADHD, Other
Disorders; Brain Wiring Holds Clues. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204083204577080562692452538.html
489
Underhill, P. (2009). Why We Buy: The Science of Shopping. (p. 79-81). Simon & Schuster 1230 Avenue of
the Americas, New York, NY 10020 (by Obat, Inc.).
138
A classic 1977 paper490 by Nisbett and Wilson describes this experiment. A rack of nylon
stockings was presented to subjects in a shopping mall, who were asked to choose their favorite
stocking as a free sample, then explain why it was their favorite but the four supposedly
different stockings were actually identical. The display was arranged with a marked positional
effect designed to maneuver the shoppers attention to the right, which is where most of the
subjects chose their product. None of the explanations for preference mentioned placement, but
rather focused completely on the superior color, softness, and durability of the stockings
themselves.
In another study, right-handed people wore a bulky glove on their right hand and
performed tasks. Their good/bad value judgments were altered commensurately with the
increased fluency of left hand use to ultimately resemble the good/bad value judgments of left-
handed people. As the study shows:
Right- and left-handers implicitly associate positive ideas like goodness and honesty
more strongly with their dominant side of space, the side on which they can act more
fluently, and negative ideas more strongly with their nondominant side. Here we show
that right-handers tendency to associate good with right and bad with left can be
reversed as a result of both long- and short-term changes in motor fluency.[491]
This has also been shown not to be mere cultural bias, such as certain countries having
customs for which side of the road to drive on.492
Last, even cockroaches have been shown to favor right-hand turns about 57% of the
time!493
490
Nisbett, R., Wilson, T. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.
University of Michigan. Psychological Review. Volume: 84, Issue: 3, Publisher: Psychology Pr, Pages: 231-259
DOI: 10.1037/0033-295X.84.3.231. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://people.virginia.edu/~tdw/nisbett&wilson.pdf
491
Casasanto, D., & Chrysikou, E. (2011). When Left is Right: Motor fluency shapes abstract concepts.
Psychological Science. doi:10.1177/0956797611401755 Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://www.casasanto.com/Site/papers/Casasanto&Chrysikou_2011.pdf
492
Novella, S. (3/14/2011). Cognitive Biases and Handedness. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://skepticblog.org/2011/03/14/cognitive-biases-and-handedness
493
Meyers, C. (12/10/2010). ScienceShot: Cockroaches Prefer Right Turns. Scienceshot. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2010/12/scienceshot-cockroaches-prefer.html
139
THE IMPLICATIONS: In the Introduction, I showed you a little sample from a Statistics text
book showing our propensity to favor choosing the number 3 75% of the time when it is
presented as 1 2 3 4. The far left choice is only at 5%. Is this a product of our right-side bias? It
certainly is consistent with it.
This bias is way more disturbing than one might think at first glance, for at least three
reasons: first, here we have examples of people who literally associate what is good with space
on the right side and what is bad or less good with space on the left side, to the point where
even a few minutes of using the left hand more fluently than the right can reverse right-handers
judgments of good and bad.494 This kind of arbitrary influence is alarming, especially in moral
situations. If youre ever in a line up to be chosen for something bad, such as execution, make
sure you stand on the choosers right side... Oh, and when posing for a picture with others, now
you know which side to stand on.
Second, whats most important about many of these seemingly innocuous biases is the
fact that subjects deny that their results were influenced by bias, and regularly insist that they
made decisions based upon other factors. Its clear that confabulation is not exclusive to the
mentally ill or brain damaged.495 Philosophy professor Peter Carruthers writes of this study, the
subject has no access to the process of interpretive thinking that generated their higher-order
belief.496
This is also a bias that I would think of right away when one makes the argument that our
free will is manifest when we sometimes make snap decisions between two seemingly arbitrary
options; for example, the ball is thrown on the roulette table and you impulsively bet on black
over red. While most libertarians argue that free will is more often a product of
reasoning/deliberating reflectively (as we will see later in the Challenges), the particular internal
sway of the right-sided bias toward one of two spatial choices shows that this kind of mapping
can correlate via predisposed association in any aesthetic domain. Some examples might be: the
right hand of God is where the righteous are; God is associated with light/white vs. dark; light is
494
A Glove On Your Hand Can Change Your Mind. (3/10/2011). Physorg. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-03-glove-mind.html
495
Bortolott, L., Cox, R.E. (2009). 'Faultless' ignorance: strengths and limitations of epistemic definitions of
confabulation. Conscious Cogn. 2009 Dec;18(4):952-65. Epub 2009 Sep 20. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
496
Carruthers, P. (2006). Conscious experience versus conscious thought. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth
Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/4353/1/Conscious-experience.pdf
140
associated with on vs. off; certain numbers are associated with God [e.g. 3,7,12], on and on.
We simply cant know all the conceptual neuronal connections and the extensions to those
connections, that the brain makes with the data it encounters, why it would favor one way over
another, especially since it appears to be influenced to some extent by subjective experience.
Third, this is an example of how manipulation tools in marketing behavior can be used to
steer someone toward a product or place that they never intended to buy or visit, they do try to
manipulate us and it works.497 Consider a more extreme version of this situation for illustration:
if a person is dying of thirst or has an addiction to an extremely addictive substance and/or is
biochemically predisposed to be addicted (e.g. as already noted, certain prescription medication
can radically increase addictive tendencies, such as gambling498) and someone tempts that
person with a glass of water or the drug or the opportunity to gamble is their free will on par
with someone who is not physically predisposed to acquiesce? Dont the numbers of those who
cave in bear this out?
Many people would intuitively agree that these are victims who have lost their capacity
for free will in at least some crucial respect; they are examples that could serve as a foundation
for the Manipulation Argument499 that incompatibilists argue undermines any meaningful
responsibility of an agent. What if we imagine just turning that predisposition down to a more
subtle level? Isnt that where most of us commonly reside? At what point on the continuum does
free will come and go?
497
Clay, R. A. (2002). Advertising as science [Electronic version]. Monitor on Psychology, 33, 38-43. Retrieved
on 9/20/2012 from http://www.apa.org/monitor/oct02/advertising.html
498
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (6/15/2009). Radiolab podcast: Seeking Patterns. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on
9/20/2012 from http://www.radiolab.org/2009/jun/15/seeking-patterns
499
141
POLITICAL AFFILIATION
EVIDENCE #19: Certain physiological factors account for some psychological

propensities that can lead to the adoption of certain political philosophies and/or group
identity (youre your body has something to say about which political/social/religious sect
you choose to identify with).
George Lakoff says that all language is essentially framing. It is metaphorical

extrapolation from sensory-motor experience, literally neurologically imbedded and connected to
circuits in the brain500 and relevant narratives are constructed and characterized in hierarchies
based upon intuitive similarities. This combines the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and Eleanor Roschs
prototype theory, the latter deviating from the standard Aristotelian method of mental
classification based upon semantic definitions. Ive already mentioned the Halle Barry neuron501
and Invariant visual representation by single-neurons in the human brain.502
Though major synaptic changes in the mind usually only happen with particularly
traumatic/salient events, certain political terms, metaphors (which have recently been shown to
be grounded in sensory perception503) and phrases heard can serve as codes that provoke mental
routing to more or less liberal or conservative moral systems. These include concepts (e.g. direct
causation [conservative] vs. system causation [progressive]) and specific emotions (e.g. favoring
in-group nurturance [conservative], militancy [progressive], etc.) and thus sometimes
perpetuating polemically entrenched positions in the brain even before reasoning can get a
neutral start.504 One study supporting this showed that voters can be completely swayed
500
Mooney, C. (Interviewer), Lakoff, G. (Interviewee). (4/25/2011). Point of Inquiry podcast. George Lakoff -
Enlightenments, Old and New. [Audio podcast]. (14:10-15:30, 21:25-end). Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
501
502
503
Telis, G. (2/7/2012). Metaphors Make Brains Touchy Feely. ScienceNow. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/02/metaphors-make-brains-touchy-fee.html?ref=em
504
Mooney, C. (Interviewer), Lakoff, G. (Interviewee). (4/25/2011). Point of Inquiry podcast. George Lakoff -
Enlightenments, Old and New. [Audio podcast]. (14:10-15:30, 21:25-end). Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
142
politically by a mere change in grammar,505 while another study showed that subjects respond to
fighting crime more or less strongly depending upon the metaphor used. For example, comparing
crime to a beast invoked much more passion than comparing it to a virus and both were way
more effective than associating the effort with any political party.506
The work of psychologist Jonathan Haidt attempts to show links between specific
ideological principles and psychological profiles.507 Haidt points out that some studies508,509 have
shown conservatives to be less open to new experience. Though we must never forget to
correct for confirmation bias,510even actual lower cognitive ability has been shown511 to correlate
with conservativism. Liberals better tolerate ambiguity and conflict. A similar study512 showed
more intelligent people have unnatural preferences and values that are novel in
human evolution, specifically, liberalism, atheism, and for men (but not women), preference for
sexual exclusivity and being more nocturnal.
Under Haidts Moral Foundations Theory,513 there are five fundamental moral values
shared to some degree by everyone: caring (protecting), fairness (justice), loyalty (in-group),
respect (for tradition and legitimate authority), and purity. In studies based upon these criteria,514
505
Collins, N. (10/15/2010). Politicians, Watch Your Grammar. Science Now. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2010/10/politicians-watch-your-grammar.html
506
Collins, N. (2/23/2011). ScienceShot: Tough on Crime? Depends on the Metaphor. Science Now. Retrieved
on 9/20/2012 from http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/02/scienceshot-tough-on-crime.html?etoc
507
Haidt, Jonathan. The physical difference between liberals and conservatives? TEDTalk. Monterey, CA.
(2/2008). Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from http://blog.ted.com/2008/09/23/the_physical_di
508
Hiel, A.V., Mervielde, I. (6/18/2004). Openness to Experience and Boundaries in the Mind: Relationships
with Cultural and Economic Conservative Beliefs. Journal of Personality. Volume 72, Issue 4, pages 659686,
August 2004DOI: 10.1111/j.0022-3506.2004.00276.x. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0022-3506.2004.00276.x/abstract
509
Gellene, D. (9/10/2007). Study finds left-wing brain, right-wing brain. The Los Angeles Times Obituaries.
Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from http://www.latimes.com/news/obituaries/la-sci-politics10sep10,0,2687256.story
510
Klein, D.B., (12/2011). I Was Wrong, And So Are You! The Atlantic. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/i-was-wrong-and-so-are-you/8713
511
Hodson, G., Busseri, M.A. (1/5/2012). Bright Minds and Dark Attitudes Lower Cognitive Ability Predicts
Greater Prejudice Through Right-Wing Ideology and Low Intergroup Contact. Psychological Science.
February 2012 vol. 23 no. 2 187-195 doi: 10.1177/0956797611421206 Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://pss.sagepub.com/content/23/2/187
512
Intelligent people have 'unnatural' preferences and values that are novel in human evolution. (2/24/2010).
e! Science News. Psychology and Sociology. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://esciencenews.com/articles/2010/02/24/intelligent.people.have.unnatural.preferences.and.values.are.nove
l.human.evolution
513
MoralFoundations.org/Home. (Updated 3/9/2011). [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://faculty.virginia.edu/haidtlab/mft/index.php
514
Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (in press, date posted: April 14, 2007). When morality opposes justice:
Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize. Social Justice Research. Social Science
Research Network. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=872251
143
liberals were shown to value caring and fairness considerably more than the other three, while
conservatives valued all five equally, though each was valued far less than liberals valued caring
and fairness. A further study concerning libertarians in the same vein showed:
1) stronger endorsement of individual liberty as their foremost guiding principle and

correspondingly weaker endorsement of other moral principles,
2) a relatively cerebral as opposed to emotional intellectual style, and
3) lower interdependence and social relatedness.[515]
In another study, conservatives were shown to scare/startle more easily than liberals516
and conservatives react more strongly to negative images, while liberals react more strongly to
positive images.517 University of Nebraska political scientist John Hibbing said of this, People
are experiencing the world, experiencing threat, differently. We have very different physiological
orientations.518 This seems to be confirmed by a more recent study showing actual differences
between conservatives and liberals in the size of certain parts of the brain:
political conservatives tend to have a larger right amygdala, a region involved in

detecting threats and responding to fearful stimuli, whereas liberals tend to have a larger
anterior cingulate cortex, an area that becomes active in situations involving conflict or
uncertainty.[519,520]
515
Iyer, R., Koleva, S., Graham, J., Ditto, P., Haidt, J. (8/20/2010, Last revised: November 05, 2010).
Understanding Libertarian Morality: The Psychological Roots of an Individualist Ideology. Social Science
Research Network. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1665934
516
Vedantum, S., (9/19/2008). Startle Response Linked to Politics. The Washington Post. Retrieved 9/20/2012
from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/18/AR2008091802265.html?hpid=topnews
517
Dodd, M.D, Balzer, A., Jacobs, C.M., Gruszczynski, M.W., Smith, K.B., and Hibbing, J.R. (2012).The
political left rolls with the good and the political right confronts the bad: connecting physiology and cognition
to preferences. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 2012; 367(1589): 640-
649. doi:10.1098/rstb.2011.0268 Retrieved 9/20/2012 from
http://ts-si.org/politics/31331-physiological-and-cognitive-differences-of-political-partisans
518
Keim, B. (9/18/2008). Conservatives Scare More Easily Than Liberals, Say Scientists. Wired Science.
Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2008/09/fearmongering-h
519
Miller, G. (4/7/2011). Does Your Brain Bleed Red, White, and Blue? Science Now. Retrieved on 9/20/2012
from http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/04/does-your-brain-bleed-red-white-.html?etoc
520
Kanai, R., Feilden, T., Firth, C., Rees, G. (4/7/2011). Political Orientations Are Correlated with Brain
Structure in Young Adults. Current Biology, 07 April 2011 DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2011.03.017
144
Some other interesting studies in this context are one showing that when people are
imitated, they are more likely to vote pro-social/left-wing521,522 and another study523 showing that
the fMRI brain scans of swing voters can offer temporarily usable information. For example,
they amplified like/dont like polling reactions to politicians and parties, though this study
may have had some control issues.524
THE IMPLICATIONS: Researchers often do warn us to proceed cautiously when interpreting

these studies525 and I think most people will have an immediate, strong knee jerk reaction against
this kind of work. There is nonetheless a growing body of evidence for physiological
predisposition, mostly via semantic frame/code neural routing, but also behaviorally in terms
of reactions to novelty, etc. and it can influence a person to join one or another political party,
with all of its ancillary beliefs (e.g. religious, cultural) that further influence our opinions and
become part of the blur of group identities. Its easy to see a picture of the world where we have
much less objectivity than we thought. Of course, political defectors make us wonder how such
results can be true, until we realize that such defectors might be physiologically on the fence
between two ideologies as well.
Last, environment, plain old circumstance, misunderstandings of the ideologies
themselves, as well as the plasticity of our neural networks dont guarantee anyone a place in
any ideology based upon our physiology. We must take this information, but take it cautiously.
We should, however, always be aware of psychological and philosophical tendencies toward
bias, because they are real, as well as how both these biases and the facts of these studies may be
exploited by others to influence our decisions. When it comes to making choices that conform to
our in-group, even when it seems the group opinion is absurd to us, well see that there is a
521
Collins, N. (1/28/2011). ScienceShot: Copycats Make Democrats. Science Now. Retrieved on 9/20/2012
from http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/01/scienceshot-copycats-make.html?etoc
522
Stel, M., Harinck, F. Being mimicked makes you a prosocial voter. Experimental Psychology, Vol 58(1),
2011, 79-84. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169/a000070. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/zea/58/1/79/
523
Iacoboni, M., Freedman, J., Kaplan, J., Jamieson, K.H., Freedman, T., Knapp, B., Fitzgerald, K.
(11/11/2007). This Is Your Brain on Politics. The New York Times Opinion. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/opinion/11freedman.html?_r=2&ref=opinion&oref=slogin
524
Keim, B. (11/12/2007). This Is Your Brain on Hillary: Political Neuroscience Hits New Low in New York
Times. Wired Science. Available on 9/20/2012 from http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2007/11/this-is-your-
br
525
Miller, G. (2008). Growing Pains for fMRI. Science. 2008 Jun 13;320(5882):1412-4. Retrieved on 9/20/2012
from http://www.scribd.com/doc/3634406/Growing-pains-for-fMRI
145
mountain of evidence showing we often cave in to the majority opinion anyway. Ill get to that in
the Evidences below, but for now, check out how Solomon Aschs classic experiments on
conformity526 showed just how far we are willing to go in order to stay with the in-group; the
videos527,528 of these experiments are really worth investigating further.
526
Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and social pressure. Scientific American, 193, 31-35.
527
Episode #20: Constructing Social Reality. (2001). Discovering Psychology with Philip Zimbardo. WGBH
Educational Foundation. [TV series]. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://www.learner.org/series/discoveringpsychology/20/e20expand.html?pop=yes&pid=1517 [7:00-8:00]
528
NLP (uploaded 5/1/2011). Aschs Conformity Experiment. [Video file]. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://www.betterdaystv.net/play.php?vid=19441
146
RISK
EVIDENCE #20: We have a bias toward endeavors that is commensurate with our
investment in money, time, and/or effort in that endeavor. This bias exacerbates another
propensity for risky decision making in order to avoid loss. When it comes to gambling, we
are more optimistic about a desired result in chance determined number games if we have
more control choosing the numbers.
The sunk cost effect/fallacy is used to describe a bias toward endeavors that is
commensurate with our investment in money, time, and/or effort in humans. The Concorde
fallacy describes the same condition as it applies to some animals. It has been shown that the so-
called lower animals have never demonstrated this bias though. Perhaps they realize when its
better to give up, no matter how much time/effort they put into something. Even young
children, when placed in an economic situation akin to a sunk cost one, exhibit more normatively
correct behavior than do adults.529 There is a common confabulation attempt with people
suffering from this bias to associate the stance with a desire not to waste as well.
The sunk cost bias is related to a propensity for risk taking over losses, which economists
refer to as loss aversion bias, and we do not see it in the context of risk taking over gains. This is
to say that we consistently react differently regard losses and gains, even when they are the same
amount. For example, when we are offered a guaranteed $1,000, plus the option of an additional
guaranteed $500 ($1,500 total guaranteed) or a gamble with that guaranteed $500 between a
result of either $0 or $1,000 (the potential is now $1,000 or $2,000 after the coin is flipped), we
will more often choose the safe bet of $1,500 rather than risk going for the $2,000. Our primate
cousins have shown that this particular bias seems to be deeply imbedded in our ancestors as
well, with 35 million years worth of precedent.530
In the reverse scenario though, with the same odds of risk and value, we start with $2,000
and are put into the situation where we will lose a guaranteed $500 (for a guaranteed $1,500 end
529
Arkes, H.R. Ayton, P. (1999). The Sunk Cost and Concorde effects: are humans less rational than lower
animals? Psychological Bulletin 125: 591600. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.5.591. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://americandreamcoalition.org/transit/sunkcosteffect.pdf
530
Santos, Laurie. Laurie Santos: A monkey economy as irrational as ours. TEDTalks. Oxford, England.
7/2010. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from http://www.ted.com/talks/laurie_santos.html
147
result) or we can gamble with that second $500 again to try to double it (for an end result of
either $1,000 or $2,000). Heres the interesting part: when the context is reversed to loss, with
the exact same odds of risk and value, we will more often tend to take the risk. Why?
Hormonal changes and dispositions can affect risk taking propensity, via testosterone,
cortisone, and even viewing erotic pictures.531,532 Also, when it comes to gambling, control bias
makes us think that we are instilling some kind of intelligence into the equation that increases the
odds in our favor, when actually, our lack of special intuition keeps the odds at no better than
chance.533 Last, importantly, we are more prone to seeing illusory patterns when we lose
control.534
THE IMPLICATIONS: This is the kind of evidence that makes one want to say, Stay away
from Vegas, baby! Its no surprise that for some survival advantage we would evolve to be a
generally optimistic species, and evidence of confabulation does tend to be wishful thinking,535
but the combination of these related propensities creates a dangerous vortex of bias that can
ultimately devastate some and thrill others (the lucky ones), especially in a world where we are
constantly told to trust our instincts.
Considering the way investments work in the modern world, an irrational commitment to
losing investments with an increased riskiness and propensity for delusion at the panic of loss
can obviously make a bad situation worse, based upon irrational justifications. This often results
in the commonly heard phrase, at least I tried. Perhaps this is just ad hoc.
It must also be said though, that for many people, risk is the spice of life and is even a
key ingredient for meaning. Again, at least I tried. The implications on the social level are
531
Coates, J.M., Herbert, J. (2008). Endogenous steroids and financial risk taking on a London trading
floor. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 105(16):6167-72 Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://www.pnas.org/content/105/16/6167.full.pdf
532
Knutson, B., Wimmer, G.E., Kuhnen, C., Winkielman, P. (2008). Nucleus accumbens mediates the
influence of reward cues on financial risk-taking. NeuroReport, 19(5): 509-513. Available on 9/20/2012 at
http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~span/Publications/bk08nr.pdf
533
Burger, J. M. (1991). The effects of desire for control in situations with chance-determined outcomes:
Gambling behavior in lotto and bingo players. Journal of Research in Personality, Volume 25, Issue 2, June
1991, Pages 196-204. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from http://www.scu.edu/cas/psychology/faculty/upload/Burger-
Schnerring-ME-1982.pdf
534
Whitson, J., Galinsky, A. (2008). Lacking Control Increases Illusory Pattern Perception. Science, 322
(5898), 115-117 DOI: 10.1126/science.1159845. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
535
Fotopoulou, A., Solms, M., Turnbull, O. (2004). Wishful reality distortions in confabulation: A case report.
Neuropsychologia. Vol 42(6) 2004, 727-744.
148
obvious in terms of the way our financial markets are set up. Rather than concentrating on
tweaking the system, shouldnt we concentrate more on increasing its immunity to our biases, if
possible? Again, any bias that can be exploited and get us to part with our money is something
we want to try to counter fundamentally.
Concerning our intuition that we are injection more of our clever intelligence into random
scenarios, our propensity for optimism bias is well documented. They are most often and most
accurately based upon our own direct and indirect comparisons536 of ourselves in the light of
others. Fortunately, our poor ability to self-report doesnt matter so much here. This particular
bias is best demonstrated in evaluations of group risk as opposed to individuals, but does
consistently show a tendency to favor the in-group.537
536
Weinstein, N. D., William M. K. (1996). Unrealistic Optimism: Present and Future. Journal of Social and
Clinical Psychology 15 (1): 18. doi:10.1521/jscp.1996.15.1.1.
537
Helweg-Larsen, M., Shepperd, J. A. (2001). Do Moderators of the Optimistic Bias Affect Personal or
Target Risk Estimates? A Review of the Literature. Personality and Social Psychology Review 5 (1): 7495.
doi:10.1207/S15327957PSPR0501_5. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://users.dickinson.edu/~helwegm/pdfversion/do_moderators_of_the_optimistic_bias.pdf
149
ENVIRONMENT
EVIDENCE #21: There is evidence that seemingly innocuous environmental or personal

conditions like cleanliness, ambiance, and mood, substantially affect moral and/or value
judgments, and are confabulated afterwards as purely determined by reason.
Its probably not surprising to most people that general mood could affect our value
judgments. One study even showed that something like hunger significantly effects judges
enough to give significantly harsher decisions just before lunch and more lenient decisions just
after lunch.538,539
The Spreading of Disorder/broken windows theory540 shows us that environmental
factors, such as whether or not there is graffiti on a wall, will cue subjects to litter more in the
area. When there was no graffiti, very few people littered, and the prime set the norm. Even more
basic environmental factors, such as weather and lighting,541 also prime people into misattributed
value judgments, and for what its worth, one study even documents a correlation between large
scale human crises in history (e.g. wars) with unusually bad weather.542,543
Environmental primes are especially evidenced in terms of cleanliness and purity overall,
in all the senses: ocular, olfactory, tactile, even mental imagery. There is a body of evidence that
shows that all manner of disgust in different domains, from icky, yucky, poopy diaper, rotten
538
Yong, E. (4/11/2011). Justice is served, but more so after lunch: how food-breaks sway the decisions of
judges. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2011/04/11/justice-is-served-but-more-so-after-lunch-
how-food-breaks-sway-the-decisions-of-judges
539
Danziger, S., Levav J., and Avnaim-Pesso, L. (2011). Extraneous factors in judicial decisions. PNAS.
Retrieved on 9/20/2012 from http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1018033108
540
Keizer, K., Lindenberg, S., Steg, L. (12/2008). The spreading of disorder. Science 322 (5908): 16815.
doi:10.1126/science.1161405. PMID 19023045. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.ppsw.rug.nl/~lindenb/documents/articles/2008_Keizer_Lindenberg_Steg_The%20spreading_of_d
isorder_Science_Express.pdf
541
Schwarz, N. & Clore, G. L., Mood, Misattribution, and Judgements of Well-Being: Informative and
Directive Functions of Affective States. JPSP, 1983,45,513-523. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://faculty.babson.edu/krollag/org_site/soc_psych/schwarz_mood.html
542
Zhang, D., Lee, H., Wang, C., Li, B., Pei, Q., Zhang, J., An, Y. (10/3/2011). The causality analysis of
climate change and large-scale human crisis, PNAS. doi:10.1073/pnas.1104268108 Retrieved on 9/21/2012
from http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/09/29/1104268108
543
Reardon, S. (10/3/2011). Got War? Blame the Weather. Science Now. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/10/got-war-blame-the-weather.html
150
food disgust to messy, cluttered, pig sty disgust to perceived unconventional sex type disgust,
has a correlative effect upon value judgments.
In one study, either on dirty desks in dirty rooms or on clean desks in clean rooms,
participants filled out questionnaires pertaining to moral scenarios, public policy, etc, as well as
a series of rating scales to what extent they were feeling various emotions, namely, relaxed,
angry, happy, sad, afraid, depressed, disgusted, upset, and confused The researchers correctly
predicted that experimentally induced disgust would make moral judgments more severe but
that this effect would be limited to participants who were more sensitive to their own physical
sensations.544
A similar study,545 under the guise of marketing tests for a new beverage, had subjects
taste a drink made with one gallon of water and one cup of lemon juice. The subjects, who were
all Christians, tasted and rated the drink, then did intermediary tasks where some copied passages
from the bible, others, the Quran, and others, Richard Dawkins infamous atheistic manifesto,
The God Delusion. As religious sociologist science blogger Tom Rees writes of the study:
On the second taste test, the students that had to copy a passage from the Koran or The
God Delusion rated the beverage as significantly more disgusting (even though it was
identical). Their moral disgust at having to write out this stuff translated into physical
disgust.[546]
This fit nicely with an earlier 2006 study by Chen-Bo Zhong and Katie Liljenquist, where
participants who hand-copied both ethical and unethical stories were offered parting gifts
afterwards, such as Nantucket Nectar juices, Energizer batteries, Sony CD cases, Snickers bars,
various cleaning products, etc. The participants who copied stories about unethical behavior were
far more likely to take the cleaning products than those who copied ethical stories.
544
Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G. L., & Jordan, A. (2008). Disgust as embodied moral judgment. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 10961109. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www-
psych.stanford.edu/~ajordan/papers/Schnall,%20Haidt,%20Clore,%20&%20Jordan%20(2008)%20-
%20Disgust%20as%20Embodied%20Moral%20Judgment.pdf
545
Ritter, R., & Preston, J. (2011). Gross gods and icky atheism: Disgust responses to rejected religious
beliefs. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47 (6), 1225-1230. DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2011.05.006
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103111001454
546
Rees, T. (9/6/2011). Is The God Delusion more disgusting than the Koran? [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://epiphenom.fieldofscience.com/2011/09/is-god-delusion-more-disgusting-than.html
151
Clean scents promote reciprocity and charity.547 Other similar studies consistently
confirmed the ability to cross-cleanse disgust in different domains. This has been called the
Macbeth Effect.548As it was written in the 2008 abstract of related work by Schnall, Benton,
and Harvey:
After having the cognitive concept of cleanliness activated (Experiment 1) or after

physically cleansing themselves after experiencing disgust (Experiment 2), participants
found certain moral actions to be less wrong than did participants who had not been
exposed to a cleanliness manipulation. [549]
Other studies confirm that different domains of disgust overlap and that there is a definite
relationship between biological and moral disgust.550,551 It should be noted that while much has
been evidenced in the many studies on disgust, one recent study has shown that disgust in the
right brain was either not eroded by damage like it has been shown to in the left brain552 (more
likely) or that all the earlier studies were faulty (less likely).
THE IMPLICATIONS: We seem to have some very deep connections to our evolutionary past
and these studies on disgust clearly appear to chalk up one for evolutionary psychology. The
more primal parts of the brain that relied upon olfactory abilities long before the other senses and
547
Liljenquist K, Zhong CB, Galinsky AD. (2010). The smell of virtue: clean scents promote reciprocity and
charity. Psychol Sci. 2010 Mar 1;21(3):381-3. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/facbios/file/Smell%20of%20Virtue%20Psych%20Sci.pdf
548
Zhong, C., Liljenquist, K. (2006). Washing away your sins: threatened morality and physical cleansing.
Science. (New York, N.Y.), 313 (5792), 1451-2 PMID: 16960010. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/313/5792/1451.short
549
Schnall, S., Benton, J., & Harvey, S. (2008). With a Clean Conscience: Cleanliness Reduces the Severity of
Moral Judgments. Psychological Science, 19 (12), 1219-1222 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02227.x.
550
Schaich Borg, J., Lieberman, D., & Kiehl, K. (2008). Infection, Incest, and Iniquity: Investigating the
Neural Correlates of Disgust and Morality. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20 (9), 1529-1546 DOI:
10.1162/jocn.2008.20109. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.debralieberman.com/downloads/pubs/2008_JOCN.pdf
551
Tybur, J., Lieberman, D., & Griskevicius, V. (2009). Microbes, mating, and morality: Individual
differences in three functional domains of disgust. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97 (1), 103-
122 DOI: 10.1037/a0015474. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.csom.umn.edu/assets/137596.pdf
552
Straube, T., Weisbrod, A., Schmidt, S., Raschdorf, C., Preul, C., Mentzel, H., & Miltner,
W. H. (2010). No impairment of recognition and experience of disgust in a patient with a right-hemispheric
lesion of the insula and basal ganglia. Neuropsychologia, 48(6), 1735-1741. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0028393210000801
152
abstract reasoning were more developed still contribute to our conflation of purity and
goodness. Speculatively, as much evolutionary psychology must be, until it endures robust
predictions, this may have evolved as a tendency toward better hygiene. Further, even after the
mental conversion of physical purity into a propensity for sexual or moral purity, this could have
bolstered evolutionary advantage in other ways too, such as by incurring favor in religious
groups or by avoiding dangerous comestibles or deadly STDs. In any case, the connections exist,
and along with all the other kinds of priming, serve to make us vulnerable to error via venal
epistemology that clearly has an important and direct relationship with our moral sense, even if
completely unnoticed. This simply cannot be dismissed from any discussion about moral
judgments.
Is there anything can we do about neutralizing priming biases to get the most objective
judgments and predictions possible from experts in public and private institutions of law,
medicine, welfare, etc.? Some people suggest utilizing SPRs: Statistical Prediction Rules,553
which use formal, algorithmic, and objective procedure in an equation. They have been shown
over many decades to actually significantly outperform the clinical diagnostics of many experts
based upon human judgment.554 As Grove and Meehl put it in the abstract of their
groundbreaking 1996 paper, Empirical comparisons of the accuracy of the two methods (136
studies over a wide range of predictands) show that the mechanical method is almost invariably
equal to or superior to the clinical method555 And as it was put by Michael Bishop and J.D.
Trout, When based on the same evidence, the predictions of SPRs are at least as reliable as, and
are typically more reliable than, the predictions of human experts for problems of social
prediction.556
553
Swets, J., Dawes R., Monahan, J. (10/2000). Better Decisions through Science. Scientific American. (p. 82)
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://venus.unive.it/romanaz/datamin/articoli/roc.pdf
554
Galef, J. (4/14/2011). Food, Bias, and Justice: a Case for Statistical Prediction Rules. [Web log post].
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://measureofdoubt.com/2011/04/14/food-justice-bias-a-case-for-statistical-
decision-making
555
Grove, W., Meehl, P. (1996). Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal
(Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The ClinicalStatistical Controversy. Psychology, Public
Policy, and Law, Vol 2(2), Jun 1996, 293-323. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
556
Bishop, M., Trout, J. D. (2005). Epistemology and the psychology of human judgment. Oxford University
Press. (Chapter 2).
153
Given that repeated studies of stock market analysts show results no better than
chance,557 perhaps SPRs would be welcome there as well. Other effective actuarial tools are the
VRAG (Violence Risk Appraisal Guide) and the SORAG (Sex Offender Risk Appraisal
Guide),558 as well as the Apgar score helpful in assessing the health of newborn babies. None of
these researchers advocate for solely statistical prediction, just, in the very least, a winning
combination consistent with the evidence. Hear hear! Dont be afraid of the numbers!
557
Kahneman, D. (10/29/2011). Daniel Kahneman: How cognitive illusions blind us to reason. The Observer.
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2011/oct/30/daniel-kahneman-cognitive-
illusion-extract?INTCMP=SRCH
558
Research Department Violence Risk Appraisal Guide: A Brief Summary. (N.D.). Waypoint Centre for
Mental Health Care. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.mhcp.on.ca/Site_Published/internet/SiteContent.aspx?LeftNavigation.QueryId.Categories=62&B
ody.QueryId.Id=1680
154
BEAUTY
EVIDENCE #22: There is evidence that aesthetic evaluations substantially affect value
judgmentseven moral ones, and are then confabulated afterwards as determined by
reason.
Studies show that plain people earn 1 to 15 percent less than people with average
looks, who in turn earn 1 to 13 percent less than those deemed good-looking.559,560,561
Researchers at the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay found that likable, good-looking, well-
dressed, and approachable teachers had students who said they learned more, had higher grades,
and liked the class better.562 For lawyers, attractiveness alone can account for up to a 12%
difference in earnings. 563 And on the other side of the spectrum, a new Cornell study that has
found that unattractive defendants tend to get hit with longer, harsher sentenceson average 22
months longer in prison.564
Considering our perception of what is beautiful, a recent study may have substantially
narrowed down the area of the brain that correlates with the subjective experience of beauty (i.e.
field A1 of the medial orbitofrontal cortex [mOFC]).565,566
Beauty is contextual though. Studies were done showing subjects images of two different
types of people for evaluation. When one of the faces was digitally altered to make it ugly and
559
Landman, B. (2/16/2010). Why Looks Matter. Womens Health. Retrieved on 8/7/2011 from
http://www.womenshealthmag.com/beauty-and-style/building-self-confidence
560
Hamermesh, D., and Biddle, J. (1994). Beauty and the Labor Market. American Economic Review 84:
1174-1194. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.ux1.eiu.edu/~lsghent/hamerbiddle.pdf
561
Stalcup, A. (N.D.). The Plainness Penalty: Lookism in Western Culture. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://angelastalcup.com/sample_article.pdf
562
Gurung, R., and Vespia, K. (2007). Looking Good, Teaching Well? Linking Liking, Looks, and Learning.
Teaching of Psychology, v34 n1 p5-10 2007. Retrieved on 8/7/2011 from
http://faculty.txwes.edu/mskerr/files/sample%20review%202.pdf
563
Hill, K. (3/26/2010). Attractive People May or May Not Be Better Lawyers, But They Do Get Paid More.
Above The Law. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://abovethelaw.com/2010/03/attractive-people-may-or-may-
not-be-better-lawyers-but-they-do-get-paid-more
564
Lowery, G. (5/11/2010). Study uncovers why jurors reward the good-looking, penalize the unbeautiful.
Cornell Chronicle Online. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/May10/AttractivenessStudy.html
565
Yong, E. (7/6/2011). Beauty is in the brain of the beholder. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2011/07/06/beauty-is-in-the-brain-of-the-beholder
566
Ishizu, T., & Zeki, S. (2011). Toward A Brain-Based Theory of Beauty. PLoS ONE. Retrieved on 9/21/2012
from http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0021852
155
then presented as a third option, the better looking version was considered the best overall... no
matter which face was the third competitor! This was shown to be a general tendency in many
contexts, including marketing/financial ones: when a third option is presented that looks like a
less attractive version of one of the other options, people will choose the better of those two,
ignoring the remaining more different, yet still attractive option.
THE IMPLICATIONS: Dan Ariely said about his third option studies above, If you ever
go bar hopping, who do you want to take with you? You want a slightly uglier version of
yourself. Similar but slightly uglier.567 Ha! It might give you a better chance, but youd get
in trouble if you kept inviting that person to join you on dates!
Joking aside, the implications are fairly obvious here: the neurophysiological influence of
beauty tangibly or intangibly compels us to favor it over the not so beautiful in matters of value
that may be completely unrelated to beauty. This is not a shocker to most people, at least when it
concerns favoring beautiful people. The issue is not whether we are absolutely able or unable to
decide whether we favor the beautiful, but that we already have the propensity to do so to some
extent. Biases are the amount that we favor something after we think we have already
compensated.
Whats worse is that these kinds of aesthetic biases can get further distorted by other
kinds of biases, such as the recent study that bad gossip affects our vision as well as our
judgment.568,569 They showed that we are more likely to notice faces associated with negative
comments. Combine this with a bias for favoring good looks and its a recipe for disaster if you
meet a femme fatale or a Don Juan. Nor is it difficult to see how the quiet, nice guy or gal gets
pushed out of the picture. Also, that beauty is largely determined by the capacity and/or healthy
functioning of one or more particular parts of the brain is clearly unsettling for that very reason. I
guess for those of us who may be a little more challenged in this way (ahem), well just have to
try to compensate... by writing books n stuff (wink wink).
567
Ariely, D. (Filmed 12/2008). Dan Ariely asks, Are we in control of our own decisions? TEDTalks. Available
on 9/19/2012 at http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_ariely_asks_are_we_in_control_of_our_own_decisions.html
568
Siegel, E., Anderson, E., Bliss-Moreau, E., & Feldman Barrett, L. (5/19/2011). The Visual Impact of
Gossip. Science http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1201574 Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.northeastern.edu/psychology/wp-content/uploads/Eriak.pdf
569
Yong, E. (5/21/2011). Bad gossip affects our vision as well as our judgment. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2011/05/20/bad-gossip-affects-our-vision-
as-well-as-our-judgment
156
So biases of different sorts fold into each other and build up in layers of delusion and
collusion. Is there a you that consciously acknowledges and tears through all these layers of
bias to make unaffected decisions every day? How would it be able to do so? How would you
know?
157
RELIGION
EVIDENCE #23: There is evidence that the propensity for the acquisition of and
perpetuation of religious belief often has natural neurological, psychological, and
sociological origins. Once acquired, these beliefs provoke some substantially predictable
behavior, both positive and negative, and can be instantiated with subtle priming
containing religious language, concepts, or imagery.
In a 1944 experimental study, Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel showed in a stop
motion animated movie570 that some simple cutout triangles and a circle had an extremely high
probability of being overwhelmingly perceived as representing actions and intentions of agents
as they moved around, entering and leaving a rectangle house with a swinging door,
fighting with each other, etc. Reasoning about the psychological intentional states in who (in
this case what) we perceive to be others is known as a theory of mind, and as Heider, Simmel
and others have shown, even infants experience this tendency when viewing inorganic two
dimensional objects on a screen.571,572 This is consistent with research that autistic individuals
are more likely to be atheist because they lack a fully fleshed theory of mind573,574
Dr. Andy Thomson shows how recent fMRI scans ground religious belief in evolved
adaptive mechanisms related to our phenomenal theory of mind commonly used in social
interaction (what is he/she thinking?). Via fMRI, we are able to discern the actual locations in
the brain of the fundamental dimensions of religious belief, such as, Gods perceived level of
570
Heider, F., and Simmel, M. (4/1944). An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior. The American Journal
of Psychology. Vol. 57, No. 2 (Apr., 1944), pp. 243-259. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.all-about-
psychology.com/fritz-heider.html
571
Gergely G., and Csibra G. (5/1997). Teleological reasoning in infancy: the infant's naive theory of rational
action. A reply to Premack and Premack. Cognition. 1997 May;63(2):227-33.
572
Bering, J. (Posted on 2/1/2011). Are You There God? It's Me, Brain. How our innate theory of mind gives
rise to the divine creator. Slate. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2011/02/are_you_there_god_its_me_brain.html
573
Caldwell-Harris, C.L., Murphy, C.F., Velazquez, T., McNamara, P. (2011). Religious Belief Systems of
Persons with High Functioning Autism. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society,
Boston, MA. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://csjarchive.cogsci.rpi.edu/proceedings/2011/papers/0782/paper0782.pdf
574
Khan, R. (9/18/2011). Atheism as mental deviance. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/gnxp/2011/09/atheism-as-mental-deviance
158
involvement, Gods perceived emotions, and doctrinal/experiential knowledge.575 For example,
there is a part of the left brain called the fusiform gyrus that is accessed when we try to identify
facial patterns,576 which has presumably been selected by evolution because it helped us to find
people in the dark, in the jungle, in a rushing river, etc but, as a byproduct, has also
contributed to our propensity to anthropomorphize the world (i.e. to give the world human-like
qualities, such as the early animists and pagans who saw a god or goddess in everything in
nature).
Philosopher and cognitive scientist Robert McCauly points out how our everyday access
to these mechanisms makes it feel natural to yell at our cars and our computers, as if they have
agency; we mistake the wind for people, prefer anthropomorphic poetry, etc.577 Whether or not a
person with a more developed or a more anemic fusiform gyrus has more or less of a propensity
to infer agency in nature remains to be seen.
Aside from an innate propensity for a teleological theory of mind, studies have shown
that the extent to which one believes in God may be influenced by ones more general tendency
to rely on intuition versus reflection.578 This is even to the point that analytical think has been
shown to undermine belief.579
In terms of sociological evidence for the inclination to form religion, its also been shown
that we have a propensity to perceive safety in numbers580 (affected by the D4 dopamine
receptor?581) which may help explain why a general-purpose need to belong drives belief in
575
Thompson, Andy. Why We Believe in Gods - Andy Thomson - American Atheists 09. American Atheist
2009 convention in Atlanta, Georgia. (4/23/2009). Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1iMmvu9eMrg&feature=player_embedded#at=2148
576
Trafton, A. (1/9/2012). How does our brain know what is a face and whats not? MIT News Office.
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2011/face-perception-0109.html
577
Mooney, C. (Interviewer), McCauly, R. (Interviewee). (5/5/2011). Point of Inquiry podcast: Robert
McCauley - Why Religion is Natural (And Science is Not). [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.pointofinquiry.org/robert_mccauley_why_religion_is_natural_and_science_is_not
578
Shenhav, A., Rand, D. G., & Greene, J. D. (2011, September 19). Divine Intuition: Cognitive
Style Influences Belief in God. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. Advance online
publication. doi: 10.1037/a0025391 Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Shenhav-Rand-Greene-JEPG11.pdf
579
Krakovsky, M. (4/26/2012). Losing Your Religion: Analytic Thinking Can Undermine Belief. Scientific
American. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=losing-your-
religion-analytic-thinking-can-undermine-belief
580
Rees, T. (6/16/2011). Safety in numbers. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://epiphenom.fieldofscience.com/2011/06/safety-in-numbers.html
581
Rees, T. (1/9/2012). How your genes can affect your response to religion. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://epiphenom.fieldofscience.com/2012/01/how-your-genes-can-affect-your-response.html
159
God582 in an overwhelmingly religious world which may help explain why religion only
makes for happy people if theres a lot of it about.583 That is to say, the popularity of religion is
conditional on societal circumstances,584 such as majority rules, which even primates have
shown to favor.585 Also, Solt and Habel showed that unequal incomes lead to societies
becoming more religious and increasing the average economic well being of people
makes them less religious.586 This is compatible with evidence that atheism increases with the
quality of life.587,588,589
It has been shown through Terror Management Theory research that control related death
anxiety prompts people to make choices that deny death and emphasize enduring actions, such as
those that bolster our religious views, or in a secular context, our contributions to science or art
or our children/family, as well as to believe in intelligent design (ID).590,591 In groundbreaking
Terror Management studies on the mortality salience hypothesis by Greenberg, Pyszczynski, &
Solomon (et al, 1990),592 half of a group of Christian subjects were reminded of their own death
582
Rees, T. (4/12/2011). A general-purpose need to belong drives belief in God. [Web log post]. Retrieved
on 9/21/2012 from http://epiphenom.fieldofscience.com/2011/04/general-purpose-need-to-belong-drives.html
583
Rees, T. (5/8/2011). Religion only makes for happy people if there's a lot of it about. [Web log post].
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://epiphenom.fieldofscience.com/2011/05/religion-only-makes-for-happy-
people-if.html
584
Diener, E., Tay, L., & Myers, D. (2011). The religion paradox: If religion makes people happy, why are so
many dropping out? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology DOI: 10.1037/a0024402. Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://psycnet.apa.org/?&fa=main.doiLanding&doi=10.1037/a0024402
585
Strain, D. (4/12/2012). For Chimps, the Majority Rules. AAAS:ScienceNow. Available on 9/21/2012 at
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/04/scienceshot-for-chimps-the-major.html?ref=em
586
Solt, F., Habel, P. and Grant, J. T. (2011), Economic inequality, relative power, and religiosity. Social
Science Quarterly, 92: 447465. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6237.2011.00777.x. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/07/21/why-is-economic-inquality-associated-with-religiosity
587
Barber, N. (5/11/2011). A Cross-National Test of the Uncertainty Hypothesis of Religious Belief. Cross-
Cultural Research. 1069397111402465 doi: 10.1177/1069397111402465. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://ccr.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/05/08/1069397111402465.abstract
588
Barber, N. (7/14/2011). The Human Beast. Psychology Today. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-human-beast/201107/why-atheism-will-replace-religion-new-
evidence
589
Rees, T. (8/3/2011). Well that settles it: income inequality really does go hand in hand with religion. [Web
log post]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://epiphenom.fieldofscience.com/2011/08/well-that-settles-it-
income-inequality.html
590
Galen, Luke. Terror Management: How Our Worldviews Help Us Deny Death. Center for Inquiry.
Michigan. (2010). Reasonable Doubts podcast: RD extra: Denying Death. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/reasonable-doubts-podcast/id266671828#
591
Tracey, J., Hart, J., Martens, J. (3/30/2011). Death anxiety prompts people to believe in intelligent design,
reject evolution: research. PLoS ONE. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-03-
death-anxiety-prompts-people-in9/21/2012 telligent.html
592
Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Rosenblatt, A., Veeder, M., Kirkland, S., Lyon, D. (1990).
Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who
160
through primes in a questionnaire and half were not. At the end of the questionnaire, they were
introduced to two fictitious characters, one Christian, one Jew. The group reminded of their own
death earlier thought more negatively of the Jew than the Christian. The subjects who were not
reminded of their own death did not think more negatively of the Jew than the Christian.[593]
TMT researchers often contend that even just the mere awareness of the existence of a
competing world view is enough to evoke in-group prejudice effects and increased self-
righteousness. While admitting much of this dark evidence about TMT (death anxiety
increases prejudicecontempt for others and esteem for oneself [Koole et al. 2006]), Christian
psychologist David Myers goes on to frame the research in a different way that emphasizes this
esteem as, deep religious convictions [that] enable people to be less defensiveless likely
to rise in defense of their worldviewwhen reminded of death (Jonas & Fischer, 2006;
Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006).594 There is a mountain of work being done on TMT; Ill leave it
to the reader to investigate the controversy further.
As we have already seen in Evidence #20, Whitson and Galinsky showed that lacking
control increases illusory pattern perception.595 As the award winning science writer Ed Yong
says about that study, even just thinking about absent control makes people more likely to
embrace superstitions596 [emphasis mine]. There is
evidence that (a) belief in religious deities and secular institutions can serve as external
forms of control that can compensate for manipulations that lower personal control and
threaten or bolster the cultural worldview. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 58 (2), pp308-
318.
593
TheraminTrees (also known as QualiaSoup). (Uploaded on 4/18/2012). death part one. [Video file].
[13:00-end]. Available on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=syNVg8V4EQU&list=PL51CD8266CEC42363&index=1&feature=plpp_vi
de
594
595
Whitson, J., Galinsky, A. (2008). Lacking Control Increases Illusory Pattern Perception Science, 322
(5898), 115-117 DOI: 10.1126/science.1159845. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
596
Yong, Ed. (Posted 12/27/2008). Lacking control drives false conclusions, conspiracy theories and
superstitions. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://scienceblogs.com/notrocketscience/2008/12/lacking_control_drives_false_conclusions_conspiracy_theor
ies.php
161
(b) religious conviction can also serve as compensatory personal control after
experimental manipulations that lower other forms of personal or external control.[597]
Perhaps also related to control absence, recent evidence shows that people who have had
a life changing religious experience are more likely to have hippocampal atrophy (a shrunken
part of the brain),598 which is hypothesized by those researchers to stem from religiously related
stress.
Religious beliefs provoke substantially predictable behavior, both positive and negative.
Punitive gods have been shown to stop cheaters, though they worry more. Compassionate gods
encourage them, though they are more carefree about lifes troubles.599,600 There are also studies
that show the vaguest perception of another agents presence in a secular context has the same
effect of thwarting cheating/immorality. For example, a camera, a mirror, or even just a poster of
eyes hung over a you keep track hotel mini bar. Much secular priming, for example, flashing
government or father or again, eyes, on a screen, is actually interchangeable with religious
priming; for example, flashing God or Jesus or eyes on a screen. This is especially true when
it comes to authority figures.601,602
This leads to a wealth of both positive and disturbing studies that evidenced a correlation
between religion and authoritarianism (see this important footnote concerning
authoritarianism603,604):
597
Kay, A., Gaucher, D., McGregor, I., & Nash, K. (2010). Religious Belief as Compensatory Control.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14, 38-48. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.yorku.ca/ianmc/readings/KayetalPSPRCompensatoryControl.pdf
598
Newberg, A. (5/31/2011). Religious Experiences Shrink Part of the Brain. Scientific American. Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=religious-experiences-shrink-part-of-
brain&WT.mc_id=SA_CAT_MB_20110601
599
Rees, T. (Posted on 4/23/2011). Punitive gods stop cheaters, compassionate gods encourage them. [Web log
post]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://epiphenom.fieldofscience.com/2011/04/punitive-gods-stop-
cheaters.html
600
Religious Beliefs Impact Levels of Worry. (8/5/2011). Science Daily. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
601
Galen, Luke. The Roots of Morality: Does Religion Play a Role or is the Tail Wagging the Dog? Grand
Rapids Community College Psychology Lecture Series. Grand Rapids, Michigan. (2011). (1:18:30-1:25:00).
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U7EUIGpKhmY
602
Kay, A., Shepherd, S., Blatz, C., Chua, S>N., and Galinsky, A. (2010). For God (or) country: The
hydraulic relation between government instability and belief in religious sources of control. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 99(5): 725-739. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
603
As social scientist Jonathan Weiler notes, in the negative sense, authoritarianism has more to do with a
willingness to punish, an inability to accept change, and a disregard for nuance (a willingness to mentally blot
162
religious priming can increase racial prejudice (Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2010
[and 605,606]), aggression (Bushman, Ridge, Das, Key, & Busath, 2007[607]), and support of
ethnoreligious terrorism (Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009, Study 3)
But religious priming also:

increased accessibility of prosociality-related words and the willingness to volunteer
(Pichon, Boccato, & Saroglou, 2007), generosity in a dictators game (Shariff &
Norenzayan, 2007), cooperation and charity donation (Preston & Ritter, 2010), and
decreased retaliation (Saroglou, Corneille, & Van Cappellen, 2009) [as well as]
activate[d] more abstract morality of moral integrity: it decreased hypocrisy (Carpenter &
Marshall, 2009) and increased honesty (Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007).[608]
THE IMPLICATIONS: The importance of religion as the great repository of our rich ethical,
metaphysical, and psychological history should earn it a solid place in the studies of every
human being on eartheven, in my opinion, in secular schools. Also, many people are first
exposed to morality in the context of religion, bolstered by the highs of family and community
acceptance, emotional support, and a very useful framework for metaphysical realtyeven
including extremely convincing phenomenal experiences. These are what motivate many
believers. Any scientific information about religion, no matter how positive or negative, will
have to acknowledge the implications of these powerful experiences forming the epistemic
out key points of an opposing argument) than it does merely propping up authoritative systems. He also notes
that identifying authoritarianism has a much more sound/consistent methodology now than it had 40-60 years
ago, when it was based more upon faulty Freudian psychology.
604
Mooney, C. (Interviewer), Weiler, J. (Interviewee). (11/21/2011). Point of Inquiry podcast: Jonathan Weiler
- Authoritarians Versus Reality. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
605
Crandall, C. S. & Eshleman, A. (2003). A justification-suppression model of the expression and experience
of prejudice. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 414446. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
606
Galen, Luke. The Roots of Morality: Does Religion Play a Role or is the Tail Wagging the Dog? Grand
Rapids Community College Psychology Lecture Series. Grand Rapids, Michigan. (2011). (48:00-end ).
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U7EUIGpKhmY
607
Bushman, B. J., Ridge, R.D., Das, E., Key, C.W., & Busath, G.M. (2007). When God sanctions killing:
Effect of scriptural violence on aggression. Psychological Science. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/brad.bushman/files/BRDKB07.pdf
608
Van Pachterbeke, M., Freyer, C., & Saroglou, V. (2011). When authoritarianism meets religion:
Sacrificing others in the name of abstract deontology. European Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 898-903.
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ejsp.834/abstract
163
framework in a fundamental way. Should a non-believer be compelled to do so, it would be
difficult to impossible to reason a believer out of some fundamental or ancillary religious belief
that they experienced their way into.
Science has had something to say about religion though, and much of it can be perceived
as positive, negative, or neutral. It seems that science has shown us some pretty compelling non-
supernatural reasons for why people are drawn to religion (or in the case of the autistic, why they
are not) and how it could have evolved, piggybacked upon our already adaptable socially
influenced neural network. We saw examples like mistaking natural patterns for designed
patterns, mistaking intention-like movements for the movements/intentions of agents,
experiencing death anxiety, the need to belong/safety in numbers/family replacement,609
illusion/delusion via loss of control, etc. The evolutionary arguments in the philosophy of
religion concerning the origins of these effects could be, in the least, adaptations, selected for
because of directly beneficial fitness effects, or they could be exaptations/byproducts, selected
for because of both direct and indirect fitness effects. The evolution of morality has been
considered by many scholars to have evolved for one or both reasons as well.610
We can see how religion reinforces its grip exponentially via biases like the
observational selection bias during prayer, as our propensity to count only the hits and ignore the
misses makes us more indebted to the god prayed to as the hits pile up, especially if one
promises to be more loyal/pray more in order to get those hits (please just do this for me god
and I will devote myself more). This is a systemic vortex for the believer, as she reinforces the
belief exponentially and her philosophical worldview is affected by a psychological issue, even if
some of the inherent propositions are desirable and/or do correlate with the world objectively.
We can see that the incorporation of intuitive heuristics that evolved to aid us in the
world practically, especially socially, is one area where psychology, especially social science,
and applied philosophy intersect. Evolved intuitive heuristics are always a systemic compromise
to some extent, at least to the extent that our epistemic limitations actually relate veridically.
They take cognitive shortcuts and will favor/reinforce fictions if they aid in our survival or
609
Pennisi, E. (8/23/2011). Does Religion Influence Epidemics? Science Now. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/08/does-religion-influence-epidemic.html?ref=hp
610
Fraser, B.J. (Posted Online 3/15/2011). Adaptation, Exaptation, By-Products, and Spandrels in
Evolutionary Explanations of Morality. MIT press Journals. Summer 2010, Vol. 5, No. 3, Pages 223-227
(doi:10.1162/BIOT_a_00052). Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/BIOT_a_00052
164
pleasure. The same intuition often used as a foundation for a metaphysical worldview, and the
ensuing philosophy based upon those presuppositions, is merely the first step in the scientific
method. Intuition in the initial abduction/hypothesis is then followed by other crucial steps that
aim toward getting us closer to objective data, for example, empirical testing, peer
review/independent verification, etc. Intuition alone is not enough.
Philosophical principals are still intertwined in the scientific process, such as when
identifying consistency, parsimony, etc., but science and philosophyespecially religious
philosophy, need to be employed together to identify intuitive biases and go beyond them,
because failure to do so can range from a colossal waste of time to flat out disaster. The thing to
take home here is that when all the best investigatory elements are applied (e.g. empirical testing,
peer review/independent verification, identifying consistency, parsimony, etc.), the resulting
consistency, that is: why technology/science works, serves to identify why we should think that
all of these elements constitute the best method for investigating objective reality. This is true
even when starting in the middle with naturalistic suppositions, and the results will often
indicate where its in our best interest to continue to work as if a proposition is true or not true.
Again, intuition alone is not enough.
It shouldnt have to be said that all manner of natural propensities toward reinforcing and
entrenching illusory pattern perception are a threat to personal freedom in a world actually free
from these illusions, even if, in limited ways, they can sometimes bring out the better in us. Nor
can we ignore the implications of holy books or any historical evidence for that matter,
constructed by those who are ignorant of the manifestation of all the biases discussed in this
book. Some will admit scribal errors and other kinds of basic mistakes, but will not concede that
the mountains of scientific and historical evidence for mistake, delusion, illusion, and agenda
should tip the scales away from them when discussing historical method and/or metaphysical
objectivity in terms of probabilities by default. I tend to think that the nature of a super-salient
miracle experience probably gives the subject a feeling that mass skepticism somehow only
validates them/it as more special anyway. Time and again throughout this writing: even
delusional experience trumps the data for us in the end, because we know that experience can be
evidence too. Can be. Secular people are just as vulnerable. Doesnt have to be a god
experience that trumps the data for us either; it could be love, trust, or just plain hope.
165
Of course, it must also be noted that biases or even pure delusion do not rule out the
possibility for the existence of the supernatural or something like it. They just give us more
possible explanations for what may really be happening in the mind and in the world, and we
must always keep in mind that in some instances, as the old saying goes, even a stopped clock is
right twice a day.611 The universe is wacky cracky. For example, dark energy (which pushes)
and dark matter (which pulls) We know that they make up 96% of the universe,612 but what
exactly are they? A quasi-dimensional, partially ontologically curtained other reality that houses
spirit beings? Ummm, probably not, but who can say without a doubt that dark matter or dark
energy dont bridge the natural and supernatural worlds? Perhaps consciousness produces that
bridge in some way. We just cant say for sure, even if its highly unlikely.
In a Christianity Today review of Richard Dawkins book, The God Delusion, the famous
Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga wrote, From a theistic point of view, we'd expect that our
cognitive faculties would be (for the most part, and given certain qualifications and caveats)
reliable.613 There does seem to be, for many religious people, a notion that the human condition
is one of irrational, animal impulses, until one rises above it by engaging with the part of
ourselves capable of rational abstract reasoning. For many theists, God and his perfect morality
are the impetus for this. The counter-challenge made by the evidence here is that even
rationalism is often too little, too late to get around innate cognitive and behavioral biases
epistemically. While this is still harmonizable theologically for those who would concede it, for
example, cognitive biases could just be original sin and evidence of The Fall of Adam and
Eve. It is still a significant problem in the context of perceived theological certitude or any
certitude, socially, especially for those who already have a propensity for authoritarianism, what
George Lakoff calls strict father theists.614
Just as we saw in Evidence #17, where the most severely mistreated children who also
had a specific enzyme mutation were 85% more likely to develop strong antisocial behavior,
611
An unsourced attribution is given to Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Marie_von_Ebner-Eschenbach
612
UCtelevision (Uploaded on Mar 13, 2008). Dark Energy and the Runaway Universe. Lecture by Alex
Filippenko at the Santa Barbara Museum of Natural History. [Video file]. [1:01:45-1:07:05]. Available on
5/19/2013 at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vPkGEVgOJK0
613
Clark, T. (3/2007). Is Naturalism Self-Defeating? [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.naturalism.org/plantinga.htm
614
Enlightenments, Old and New. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
166
religious people with a propensity for authoritarianism also seem to be more likely to acquire a
potentially volatile combination, especially because its been shown that these are the people
with more of an inclination to voluntarily incur costs to punish violations of social norms.615
Liberal theists are in a better place to reap the rewards in many ways.
Still, even if liberal theists are sometimes more likely to fare better socially because
theistic belief has pragmatic benefits, this has no bearing upon the ontological issue of
supernatural veridicality and the implications of perpetuating an erroneous and presumptuous
epistemological system. It would still be a non-sequitur. To play off of Sam Harris analogy on
this point,616 if you believe that your hairdryer is telling you to do good deeds, just because they
turn out to actually be good deeds doesnt mean that there isnt still a serious epistemic problem:
you think its coming from your hairdryer and who knows what kinds of recommendations for
future deeds will arise from that.
As Ive noted several times already, the psychologist Julian Jaynes has argued for a
bicameral mind that has internal dialogue by using religion (e.g. praying), possession,
anthropomorphism, hypnosis, and schizophrenia as examples617,618 Several Evidences here also
allude to the propensity for it as well, from split-brains to alien hands. The epistemic problem is
especially significant considering what is, arguably, the most important recent scientific evidence
concerning religion that I will present (yes, I saved it for last): its been shown that we are more
likely to project our beliefs and desires onto God as commands.619 Presumably, we do this in
order to more readily actualize them.
As this amazing fMRI evidence has shown, reasoning about Gods beliefs activated
many of the same regions that become active when people reasoned about their own beliefs620
615
De Quervain, D., Fischbacher, U., Treyer, V., Schellhammer, M., Schnyder, U., Buck, A., Fehr, E. The
Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment. Science. 27 August 2004: Vol. 305 no. 5688 pp. 1254-1258
DOI:10.1126/science.1100735. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
616
Christina, G. (10/13/2011). Listening to the Hair Dryer: Why Nice Religion is Still Problematic, Analogy
#37,476. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://freethoughtblogs.com/greta/2011/10/13/listening-
to-the-hair-dryer
617
Jaynes, J. (1976). The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
618
Erkwoh, R., Willmes, K., Eming-Erdmann, A., Kunert, H.J. (2002). Command hallucinations: Who obeys
and who resists when? Psy-chopathology, 35, 272-279
619
Believers' Inferences About God's Beliefs Are Uniquely Egocentric. (11/30/2009). Science Daily. Retrieved
on 9/21/2012 from http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/11/091130151321.htm
620
Epley, N., Converse, B.A., Delbosc, A., Monteleone, G., & Cacioppo, J. (2009). Believers estimates of
Gods beliefs are more egocentric than estimates of other peoples beliefs. Proceedings of the National
167
[emphasis mine]; reasoning about conversations with real people, other than ourselves, showed
all other real people to be represented by different areas of the brain. That is to say, when we
think about god, our brains do not recognize god as an other being. God does very well seem
to be a representation of our personal ideals.621 This doesnt have to be a bad thing, and Ill talk
more about why in the Conclusion of the book. Moving on
Academy of Sciences, 106, 21533-21538. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from

http://www.pnas.org/content/106/51/21533
621
Ross, L., Lelkes, Y., & Russell, A. (2012). How Christians reconcile their personal political views and the
teachings of their faith: Projection as a means of dissonance reduction. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 109 (10), 3616-3622 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1117557109
168
IN-GROUP/OUT-GROUP
EVIDENCE #24: We think that our beliefs result largely from consciously reasoned
conclusions, but we default primarily to our cultural in-group agendas, especially whenever
we encounter data challenging those in-group agendas. These kinds of challenges, even
when implicitly primed, actually strengthen our cultural biases, including a tendency to
deny irrational bias in ourselves, yet readily infer it in others. Some core identity values are
strong enough to outweigh and/or negate any amount of subsequent reasoning to the
contrary by out-group members.
I have already mentioned the well known behavior experiments on conformity by

Solomon Asch that show the extent to which people in our proximity can affect our choices,
even when we have serious doubts about agreeing with them.622,623,624 Its also been shown that
research demonstrates that people spontaneously, i.e., without conscious intent, infer and pursue
the goals perceived in others behavior, a phenomenon termed goal contagion.625,626, 627 When
we have more freedom to seek out answers, its also been shown that we are biased to look for
and/or promote that which confirms what we already believe. This is known as confirmation
bias, which focuses on the hits, while ignoring or downplaying the misses. A common way to
play out confirmation bias is via the most salient information available, which is known as
availability bias628 (which I will discuss in more detail in the next Evidence).
622
Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and social pressure. Scientific American, 193, 31-35.
623
Episode #20: Constructing Social Reality. (2001). Discovering Psychology with Philip Zimbardo. WGBH
http://www.learner.org/series/discoveringpsychology/20/e20expand.html?pop=yes&pid=1517 [7:00-8:00]
624
NLP (uploaded 5/1/2011). Aschs Conformity Experiment. [Video file]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.betterdaystv.net/play.php?vid=19441
625
Dik, G., & Aarts, H. (2007). Behavioral cues to others' motivation and goal pursuits: The perception of
effort facilitates goal inferences and contagion. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 727737.
626
Aarts, H., Gollwitzer, P., & Hassin, R. R. (2004). Goal contagion: perceiving is for pursuing. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 2327.
627
Loersch, C., Aarts, H., Payne, B. K., & Jefferis, V. E. (2008). The influence of social groups on goal
contagion. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 1555-1558.
628
Trout, J.D. (2009). The Empathy Gap: Building Bridges to the Good Life and the Good Society. (p. 104).
Viking/Penguin, New York.
169
Mercier and Sperber hypothesized, the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to
devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade629 as well as that reason is for overcoming
trust bottlenecks.630,631 Social psychologist Ziva Kunda found, there is considerable evidence
that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to
do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these
conclusions.632 This is what some have called motivated reasoning, and is often saturated
with emotional salience,633 though Mercier argues that reasoning does not need to be emotional
to be biased, since its even shown in abstract and mathematical tests, and really has more to do
with group identity and fear of reprisals from other in-group members.634
When our worldview is threatened with a belief challenging hypothesis or conclusion by
an anonymous or out-group membereven implicitlywe overwhelmingly tend to strengthen
our biases, more than in the control group, and we shift our standards or claim that science lacks
the ability to prove or disprove it either way (i.e. scientific impotence635). This was confirmed
by several experiments using fake newspaper articles and/or fake scientific studies about
controversial topics that challenged the known political, religious, and/or cultural views of the
subjects.636,637,638,639 We are even biased to perceive cognitive biases themselves as stronger and
more prevalent in others than in ourselves.640
629
Mercier, H., Sperber, D. (2010). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 34, 57111 doi:10.1017/S0140525X10000968. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/MercierSperberWhydohumansreason.pdf
630
Warburton, N. (Interviewer), Sperber, D. (Interviewee). (9/25/2011). Philosophy Bites podcast: Dan
Sperber on the Enigma of Reason. [Audio podcast]. (2:40-2:45, ). Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://philosophybites.com/2011/09/dan-sperber-on-the-enigma-of-reason.html
631
Todd, A.R., Hanko, K., Galinsky, A. D., Mussweiler. T. (12/14/2010). When Focusing on Differences Leads
to Similar Perspectives. Psychological Science 2011 22: 134. DOI: 10.1177/0956797610392929 Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://social-cognition.uni-koeln.de/scc4/documents/PsychScience22_2011.pdf
632
Kunda, Z. (11/1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychol Bull. 1990 Nov;108(3):480-98. Retrieved
on 9/21/2012 from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2270237
633
Mooney, C. (5-6/2011 issue). The Science of Why We Don't Believe Science. Mother Jones. Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/03/denial-science-chris-mooney
634
Mooney, C. (Interviewer), Mercier, H. (Interviewee). (8/15/2011). Point of Inquiry podcast: Did Reason
Evolve for Arguing? - Hugo Mercier. [Audio podcast]. (16:00-16:40, 25:00-27:15) Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.pointofinquiry.org/did_reason_evolve_for_arguing_hugo_mercier
635
Munro, G. (2010). The Scientific Impotence Excuse: Discounting Belief-Threatening Scientific Abstracts
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 40 (3), 579-600 DOI: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2010.00588.x
636
McRaney, D. (6/10/2011). The Backfire Effect. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://youarenotsosmart.com/2011/06/10/the-backfire-effect
637
Mooney, C. (Interviewer), Kahan, D. (Interviewee). (2/14/2011). Point of Inquiry podcast: Dan Kahan - The
American Culture War of Fact. [Audio podcast]. (8:00-10:40). Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.pointofinquiry.org/dan_kahan_the_american_culture_war_of_fact
170
On the other hand, if the challenge comes from someone perceived to be an in-group
member and/or authority figure that we trust, then we are inclined to allow a change of position
or at least consider it more readily. As Dan Kahan says, what I believe is a function of who I
believe. I have to trust somebody. Kahan, like Mercier, places a lotmaybe even the majority
of weightin reasoning upon the influence of in-group identity.641
In the consideration of specifically violent conflict, anthropologist Scott Atran has shown
that sacred values, described as deontological [duty based] reasoning and parochial
commitment,642 trump the hereto favored rational behavior models that are more likely to
employ consequential reasoning/cost benefit analysis. Atran hypothesizes that these unassailable
sacred values are immune to tradeoffs (i.e. immune to bargaining) and probably run deeper
than the evidence showing their relationship with specifically violent conflict.643 It has already
been mentioned (Evidence #5) that some important studies have shown these sacred values to
occur in different parts of the brain than where cost-benefit/utilitarian type values occur.644,645
Another study shows that many people voluntarily incur costs to punish violations of
social norms.646 Positive and negative emotions seem to have a role in the distribution of reward
638
Nyhan, B., Reier, J. (2010). When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions. Political
Behavior. 32(2):303-330, DOI: 10.1007/s11109-010-9112-2 Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.springerlink.com/content/064786861r21m257/fulltext.pdf
639
Munro, G. (2010). The Scientific Impotence Excuse: Discounting Belief-Threatening Scientific Abstracts
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 40 (3), 579-600 DOI: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2010.00588.x. Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2010.00588.x/abstract
640
Pronin, E., Gilovich, T., Ross, L. (2004). Objectivity in the eye of the beholder: Divergent perceptions of
bias in self versus others. Psychological Review, 3, 781-799. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.psych.cornell.edu/sec/pubPeople/tdg1/Pronin_Gilo_&_Ross_05.pdf
641
American Culture War of Fact. [Audio podcast]. (29:30-32:40). Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
642
Ginges J, Atran, S. (1/25/2011). War as a moral imperative (not just practical politics by other means).
Proc Biol Sci. 2011 Oct 7;278(1720):2930-8. Epub 2011 Feb 16. PMID: 21325334 [PubMed - in process].
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/278/1720/2930
643
Bohannon, J. (2/15/2011). Survey Says: War Is the Irrational Choice. [Web log post]. Science Now.
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/02/survey-says-war-is-the-
irrationa.html?etoc
644
Berns, G. S., Bell, E., Capra, C. M., Prietula, M. J., Moore, S., Anderson, B., Ginges, J., Atran, S. (3/2012).
The price of your soul: neural evidence for the non-utilitarian representation of sacred values. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2012; 367 (1589): 754 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2011.0262
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://artisresearch.com/articles/Ginges_Atran_Price_of_your_Soul.pdf
645
Keim, B. (1/24/2012). Profit vs. Principle: The Neurobiology of Integrity. Wired Science. Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/01/neurobiology-of-sacred
646
171
and punishment based upon cultural values too if, as another study found, positive affect
[emotion] allowed individuals to explore novel thoughts and behaviors that departed from
cultural constraints, whereas negative affect bound people to cultural norms.647 So, the happier
people are, the less that they feel constrained by their cultural norms in terms of value
expressions.
Last in the context of conflict, a propensity for moral disengagement648 (i.e. the ability to
excuse oneself from moral standards) has been shown under certain conditions, especially in
experiments regarding authority and obedience. In the famous Milgram experiments, subjects
were shown to be more likely to harm others against their intuitions, merely in obedience to
authority figures. Though no one was really getting shocked, subjects at a control center sent
what they thought were increasingly painful shocks to another participant in the other room
when they did not answer certain questions correctly all because they were sternly pressed to
continue by the researchers. As Stanley Milgram later described his famous experiment,
I set up a simple experiment at Yale University to test how much pain an ordinary citizen
would inflict on another person simply because he was ordered to by an experimental
scientist. Stark authority was pitted against the subjects' strongest moral imperatives
against hurting others, and, with the subjects' ears ringing with the screams of the victims,
authority won more often than not. The extreme willingness of adults to go to almost any
lengths on the command of an authority constitutes the chief finding of the study and the
fact most urgently demanding explanation.[649]
In the Hofling hospital experiment, 21 out of 22 nurses were convinced to knowingly

give overdoses to patients on the authority of phone calls from doctors they had never even

647
Ashton-James, C., Maddux, W., Galinsky, A., Chartrand, T. (2009). Who I Am Depends on How I Feel:
The Role of Affect in the Expression of Culture. Psychological Science, 2009; 20 (3): 340 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2009.02299.x Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19254240
648
Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personality and Social
Psychology Review. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/Bandura1999PSPR.pdf
649
Milgram, S. (12/1973). The Perils of Obedience. Harper's Magazine. Abridged and adapted from his
book, Obedience to Authority. New York: Harper & Row. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://harpers.org/archive/1973/12/0021874
172
met.650 Thankfully, they were fake doses. The famous Stanford prison experiment651 also
demonstrated moral disengagement when the subjects were shown to internalize their authority
or obedience roles well beyond the scope of the intended 14 day study, to a dangerous point
where it had to be abandoned after just 6 days in. The prison guards and the inmateseven
the superintendent Philip Zimbardo, who was the lead researcherall claimed to suffer
negative effects from their roles.
THE IMPLICATIONS: Perhaps I should have listed this one first to give the reader a better
context for my own reasoning here. Our culture is saturated with confirmation bias; nearly every
time someone survives a plane crash or their heartbeat is revived, a genuine miracle is
proclaimed, even though the probabilities for these happening have been shown to be far from
uncommon.652 We have a robust bias to emotionally favor the underdog/minority; its
consistently 80-90%, whether its sports teams, businesses, animated shapes[!]653,654 or,
presumably, intellectual positions. Perhaps that will always perpetuate our drive to challenge the
status quo in the form of disconfirmation bias. The implications of an underdog bias seem scary
in the context of a democracy is that why we seem to go back and forth between parties every
4-8 years? The studies seem to downgrade the power of this bias though, when it comes to core
sacred values. That is to suggest that it seems as if we default to favoring the underdog, unless
core identity values are challenged.
Sperber says that reasoning defaults to trying to justify prima facie intuition; that we
default to disregarding nuance in favor of the superficially obvious (i.e. availability bias).655
Also, Mercier admits that reasoning defaults to producing a biased argument for personal and
650
Hofling, C. K. (1966). An experimental study of nurse-physician relationships. Journal of Nervous and
Mental Disease, 141, 171-180.
651
Episode #19: The Power of the Situation. (2001). Discovering Psychology with Philip Zimbardo. WGBH
http://www.learner.org/series/discoveringpsychology/19/e19expand.html
652
Radford, B. (8/12/2011). Drowned Boy Reveals the Psychology of Miracles. Discovery News Analysis.
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://news.discovery.com/human/drowned-boy-miracles-110812.html
653
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R., Wheeler, S. (Interviewers), Engber, D., Goldschmied, N. (Interviewees).
(8/23/2011). Radiolab podcast: Games; On the Winning Side. [Audio podcast]. [45:30-57:30]. Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://www.radiolab.org/2011/aug/23
654
Engber, D. (4/30/2010). The Underdog Effect: Why do we love a loser? Slate. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.slate.com/id/2252372
655
Warburton, N. (Interviewer), Sperber, D. (Interviewee). (9/25/2011). Philosophy Bites podcast: Dan
Sperber on the Enigma of Reason. [Audio podcast]. (2:40-2:45, ). Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://philosophybites.com/2011/09/dan-sperber-on-the-enigma-of-reason.html
173
especially in-group agendas, but they both emphasize that reasoning can still be productive with
out-group challengers in a unique way that is most productive overall. This is when confirmation
bias also entails a disconfirmation bias towards the opponentnot merely a bias towards our
own desires, but a bias towards disproving what our cultural competitor says. This kind of
discourse though, even if distasteful and/or instantiated for egoistic reasons, ultimately creates a
division of labor that is productive, with more data getting critically treated.656
Non-controversial discussion in echo chambers between like-minded people will rarely
lead to emergent thought.657,658 Not that novelty cant be a distraction in the wrong direction. It
would be a fallacy of the middle ground to think that the truth is always in the synthesis of the
compromised thesis and antithesis. The point is that more diverse information leads to more
creativity and possibility.659 Ironically, people often spend so much effort trying to find the right
in-group position to defend with strong conviction and loyalty, but the biggest in-group seems
most loyal to the position of not defending any position with the appearance of strong
conviction. Its often considered distasteful in many other cultures.660
The last major implication in Mercier and Sperbers study661 is that because our beliefs
have such a strong in-group influence, if we honestly actually want to influence others in
different cultural circles to see our views and not just beat our chest to impress any in-groupers,
we must make every effort to highlight some significant agreement and reduce polarization,
though as both Dan Kahan and Mercier point out, agreement is not the ultimate goal, respectful
engagement is. I think this is one of the, if not the most important findings in my whole work
here, as it applies to every two people/groups that will ever be engaged in discussion, forever: in
any dialogue of potential conflict, we can increase mutual influence and tolerance, while
656
Mooney, C. (Interviewer), Mercier, H. (Interviewee). (8/15/2011). Point of Inquiry podcast: Did Reason
Evolve for Arguing? - Hugo Mercier. [Audio podcast]. (6:00-7:30, 19:00-22:00). Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.pointofinquiry.org/did_reason_evolve_for_arguing_hugo_mercier
657
Myers, D. G., Bishop, G.D. (1970). Discussion effects on racial attitude. Science 169 (3947): 778779.
Bibcode 1970Sci...169..778M. DOI:10.1126/science.169.3947.778.
658
McKenna, K. Y. A., Bargh, J. A. (1998). Coming out in the age of the Internet: Identity de-
marginalization' from virtual group participation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 74
(September).
659
Nemeth, C.J. and Ormiston, M. (2007) Creative Idea Generation: Harmony versus Stimulation. European
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 524-535.
660
Price, W. F., Crapo, R. H. (2002). Cross-cultural perspectives in Introductory Psychology, 4th edition.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Chapter 28. (Gimme a Break! Patterns of Cooperation Among Mexican-
Americans, African-Americns, and Anglo-Americans).
661
174
simultaneously decreasing the extreme polarities, by simply instantiating an awareness and a
habit to always intentionally seek out and explicitly present common ground before we continue.
Teach every teacher to teach this one thing to every child, in every discussion and every debate
throughout their education (Ill discuss this in more detail in Evidence #32).
It would be great if thats all we had to do to produce world peace, but unfortunately, by
and large, as the studies suggest, we disengage from our reasonability when our core values are
challenged. Incurring personal costs in order to punish violations of social norms and the
propensity for tribal nepotism seem like highly favorable traits to evolve for valuable coalition
bonding, but what can we learn from our biases that we can apply to the modern world? Can the
effects of these biases be curbed somewhat by intentional countermeasures, and if so, to what
extent? Presenting common ground is still important by default, since we cant know anothers
core values, until we do.
It seems that how we frame our intention and the intention of others does not only have a
specific affect upon how we are perceived, but how we perceive that our reasoning itself actually
cashes out. While several studies and issues in this book do seem to require directly addressing
the age old philosophical, religious, political, or scientific delineations and relationships (and
such framing cannot be further reduced or avoided), I do appreciate that there are some
conscientious examples of framing by researchers also cited in this work that not only seem to
seek to disarm bias in the perception of their work, but have also actually found ways to be more
objectively accurate when ascribing values.
For example, Jeremy Ginges and Scott Atran frame the sacred values662 bias in their
work663 as deontological reasoning and parochial commitment. Sacred values are a reified
abstract in-group commitment that also allows for secular interpretations in the formation of
cultural/political/philosophical isms. Sacred values range from unassailable supernatural duty
concepts to analogously unassailable secular concepts like inalienable rights, reason, honor,
recognition, etc. Considering the already loaded term sacred values this redefinition to
662
Mooney, C. (Interviewer), Atran, S. (Interviewee). (8/29/2011). Point of Inquiry podcast: Scott Atran -
Violent Extremism and Sacred Values. [Audio podcast]. [15:00-22:00, 31:15-]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.pointofinquiry.org/scott_atran_violent_extremism_and_sacred_values
663
Ginges J, Atran, S. (in process 10/2011). War as a moral imperative (not just practical politics by other
means). Proc Biol Sci. 2011 Oct 7;278(1720):2930-8. Epub 2011 Feb 16. PMID: 21325334 [PubMed - in
process]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/278/1720/2930
175
include the secular justifiably diffuses a potential theism vs. atheism conflict in at least some
instances.
Dan Kahan uses anthropologist Mary Douglas Cultural Theory (of risk) in his in-group
distinctions, where core values are split in two major ways: via what she terms high group and
low group (i.e. collective control vs. individuality) and via what she terms high grid and
low grid (i.e. hierarchal class stratification vs. a more egalitarian framework). He finds too
much overlap when dividing by the typical ideological divisions, such as theists vs. atheists or
liberal vs. conservatives or Republican vs. Democrat and finds that the value stratification that he
used for his studies is not only less overtly polemic, but also more accurate and robust, because
its easier to cover more subjects who may not be as philosophically/politically sophisticated.664
George Lakoff talks of framing value conception for in-groups dually in terms of a strict
father family (following rules) vs. the nurturing parent family (morality is nurturance), both of
which we all have to some extent for different issues.665 Anti-pragmatists might charge these
researchers with being overly accommodating and ask, Is ignoring the most salient group
delineations really the most practical direction for science education or are researchers, like
politicians, really just using manipulative psychological tools to bolster their own agendas?
From the three examples above, it seems to me that these researchers have merely found better
ways to ask the right questions when possible.
664
American Culture War of Fact. [Audio podcast]. [4:00-8:00, 18:00-20:10]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
665
Enlightenments, Old and New. [Audio podcast]. [20:45-37:00]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
176
MORE COGNITIVE BIASES
EVIDENCE #25: We have several cognitive biases that sometimes work well as quick and
dirty intuitive heuristics, so we favor them as useful, but they get us into trouble in other
contexts where we need a larger and more accurate pool of data.
Some cognitive biases noted by J.D. Trout that are increasingly evidenced in the
scientific literature are the previously mentioned availability heuristic666 (i.e. confusing the high
probability that a reason will come to mind with a high probability that it will explain the
problem in question), as well as the overconfidence bias667 (where our overconfidence doesnt
correspond to reality), the omission bias668 (where we fail to recognize certain bad consequences
of inaction and/or blame ourselves for action that was actually right according to the odds, but
unlucky), and the hindsight bias669 (because an effect is in the past, it seems more easily
predictable than it actually is and/or would be again). He also notes the popular base rate
neglect670,671 (where we fail to realize that we are unable to estimate the relative
frequency/probability of events), which is often the result of the availability heuristic and
exacerbates the problem further.
That we ignore so much that is right in front of us bolsters the evidence for the
availability heuristic. Daniel Simons performed several attention tests to show this. He created
one classic video672 where the viewer is instructed to count how many times the players wearing
white pass the basketball in a scene with three players in white and three players in black all
moving around randomly and passing the balls around rapidly. In the middle of the video,
666
667
Grothe, D.J. (Interviewer), Trout, J.D. (Interviewee). (9/3/2009). Point of Inquiry podcast: Part one: The
Empathy Gap. [Audio podcast]. (11:30-17:45). Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.pointofinquiry.org/jd_trout_the_empathy_gap
668
Ibid. (19:40-21:35).
669
Ibid. (22:30-22:45).
670
Ibid. (10:00-12:45).
671
Zuckerman, D. (12/19/2011). Base Rate Neglect: Help Yourself by Knowing the Odds. Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from
http://www.fpanet.org/ToolsResources/ArticlesBooksChecklists/Articles/FinancialPlanning/BaseRateNeglect
HelpYourselfbyKnowingtheOdds
672
Simons, D. Chabris, C. (1999). The Original Selective Attention Test. The Invisible Gorilla.
[Videorecording]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.theinvisiblegorilla.com/videos.html
177
someone in a gorilla suit walks slowly through the scene, stops and beats its chest, then walks
out of view. Half of the people who watched were so focused on the task that they did not even
notice the gorilla at all. Several other tests have shown this to be a common phenomenon.673
THE IMPLICATIONS: I originally intended to discuss the availability heuristic in tandem

with the confirmation bias, as they are related, but there is too much to say about each one
independently, and as we go through the cognitive biases, neglects, and misleading heuristics, we
notice that they are all related and exacerbate each other in different ways anyway.
J.D. Trout shows how the same biases that have probably evolved as good intuitive
heuristics, such as when we need[ed] a good guess in a hurry and science is/was not available,
can steer us in the wrong direction in other contexts, such as in political legislation and social
engineering. For example, heuristics like the availability heuristic (again, how easily something
comes to mind) and the representativeness heuristic (subtly different, in that it is specifically
how salient/memorable and/or emotive something is) can produce base rate neglect/the fallacy of
misleading vividness674 and provoke politicians to choose to focus on legislation based less upon
what the science shows are actually bigger and/or more frequent problems than what is just
dominant in the media, etc. Trout asks us to consider the uproar over the Columbine school
shootings and resulting attention to gun control in Congress, while teen suicide, though more
quiet in the news, is really a much more detrimental issue for school kids according to social data
inadequately filtered by our biased heuristics.675
To be fair, politicians would say that suicide prevention vs. gun control in schools is a
false dichotomy, because we can address both, but the point is that we need an honest
recalibration of what the science actually says in public policy to trump biased argumentum ad
673
Spiegel, A. (Posted 6/20/2011). Why Seeing (the Unexpected) is Often Not Believing. NPR. Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://www.npr.org/2011/06/20/137086464/why-seeing-the-unexpected-is-often-not-believing
674
Labossiere, M. C. (1995). Fallacy: Misleading Vividness. Fallacy Tutorial Pro 3.0. Retrieved on 9/21/2012
from http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/misleading-vividness.html
675
Grothe, D.J. (Interviewer), Trout, J.D. (Interviewee). (9/3/2009). Point of Inquiry podcast: Part one: The
Empathy Gap. [Audio podcast]. (Especially 17:45-19:35). Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.pointofinquiry.org/jd_trout_the_empathy_gap (9/10/2009). Point of Inquiry podcast: Part two: The
Science of the Good Society. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.pointofinquiry.org/jd_trout_the_science_of_the_good_society
178
populum and reasoning heuristics only meant for immediate response. This can be accomplished
using what Trout calls outside strategies.676
Weve already seen one such outside strategy suggestion in Evidence #21 by Trout
and others in the form of improvement by applying actuarial methods like Statistical Prediction
Rules. This, along with some modest, creative social engineering, could create policies and
environments that innately thwart biases on the social level before they can even get a foothold
or be recognized as such. They will also help steer us around our weaker willed desires toward
our higher aims when they conflict. People get very suspicious when they hear phrases like
social engineering, but we are already products of constant negative social engineering: the
media and advertising. What Im talking about is systematizing awareness and strategies to
counteract them, as well as the effects of unintentional internal intra-social engineering: our
cognitive biases. Its been shown that statistical measures help defeat the failure of poor self-
reporting and we are poorly aware of how much we are actually influenced. We are already
looking to fMRI to document influence, especially in advertising,677,678 but depending upon
technology, polling could go that way too.
So there is good reason to welcome organizing society in a way that thwarts our
unhealthy and inaccurate cognitive shortcomings without an unrealistic fear of losing crucial
freedom. As Trout notes, we just about always complain about paternalistic laws that impose a
restriction upon some freedom, including all manner of health and safety laws. But we base these
laws (hopefully) upon risk probabilities that cash out to goods intended for our future selves and
which most laypeople are largely unable to calculate or even address at all.679 Of course,
skeptical complaining is a good thing to keep ourselves in check. The question is, how much do
we want to limit our now selves for the benefit of our future selves? As Trout illustrates, we
do allow seat belt and helmet laws, but still allow people to drive themselves. There is a middle
ground that is reasonable.
676
677
Falk, E. B., Berkman, E. T., Lieberman, M. D. (2012). From Neural Responses to Population Behavior:
Neural Focus Group Predicts Population-Level Media Effects. Psychological Science, 2012; DOI:
10.1177/0956797611434964
678
Lee, J.J. (4/27/2012). Effective Ad? Ask Your Brain. ScienceNow. Available on 9/21/2012 at
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/04/effective-ad-ask-your-brain.html?ref=em
679
Trout, J.D. (1/5/2009). Peanut Butter and Paternalism. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-greater-good/200901/peanut-butter-and-paternalism
179
Much is being written by philosophers and social scientists about our responsibility
toward future selves and more will be in decades to come. It will be interesting to see how much
this affects the conversation about free will. I will discuss now selves and future selves more in
the Challenges section regarding identity.
180
GOALS AND LONG-TERM PRIMES
EVIDENCE #26: Some primes have more enduring effects upon goals and character
unconsciously. Primes of money and/or power have been shown to make us more self-
centered, and can deeply affect our behavior long term at the expense of others.
Goals can be activated and perpetuated nonconsciously.680 Weve seen that in addition to
all the sensory priming, semantic priming is equally pervasive and well-evidenced. There is
evidence of neuronal categorizing right down to single neurons representing objects in the
worldat least as persons anyway.681,682 As we have seen in Evidences #19 (politics) and
#23 (religion), neuronal representations seem to be wired in such a way that even our world
views and long term goals are affected when we are primed by them. These representations seem
to have impact in other social domains as well. In a study contrasting how Americans and
Indians choose, Krishna Savani, et al (2010) discusses:
recent findings about the effects of primes that promote attention to the self at the
expense of other people. Vohs, Meade, and Goode (2006), for example, found that
priming money, which is associated with individual influence and control, makes people
engage in more self-interested behaviors. Likewise, Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, and
Gruenfeld (2006) found that priming power (i.e., the capacity to influence other people)
reduces willingness to adopt other peoples perspectives. We suggest that these primes
lead to individual-focused behavior because they activate similar underlying concepts
(e.g., independence, influence, control)[683,684,685] [emphasis mine].
680
Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K., Trtschel, R. (2001). The automated will:
Nonconscious activation and pursuit of behavioral goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.
81:1014-1027.
681
682
683
Savani, K., Markus, H. R., Naidu, N. V. R., Kumar, S., & Berlia, V. (2010). What counts as a choice? U.S.
Americans are more likely than Indians to construe actions as choices. Psychological Science, 21, 391-398. [p.
6]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2010/01/13/0956797609359908
181
In addition to the Galinski et al (2006) showing that people primed with power are less
willing to assume anothers perspective, those primed with power were also shown to be less
accurate in adducing the emotional expressions of others; they were ultimately less empathetic,
and were more likely to have a tendency to presume that others did not have the same quality of
privileged information. In short, Across these studies, power was associated with a reduced
tendency to comprehend how other people see, think, and feel686 [emphasis mine].
In another study by Vohs, Meade, and Goode (2008), they showed that people who were
primed with money were less helpful than were participants not reminded of money, and they
also preferred solitary activities and less physical intimacy.687 They also showed some positive
effects, such as that they sought more work and worked harder.
There is evidence that conscious task rewards can actually thwart motivation when they
over-focus on the tasks688,689 and that a recently evidenced unconscious reward component, as
Bijleveld, Custers, Aarts 2011, put it, has a favorable effect by itself, free of any conscious
intervention.690 While conscious control offers the ability to conserve energy and change
strategies in order to acquire rewards, evidence of unconscious reward motivation suggests that
rudimentary mechanisms operating without conscious intervention play an important role691 in
goal formation, people can often weigh the relative importance of attributes quite well
unconsciously and that subliminal motivation can have long-lasting effects on executive
684
Vohs, K. D., Meade, N. L., & Goode, M. R. (2006). The psychological consequences of money. Science, 314,
11541156. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.sciencemag.org/content/314/5802/1154.short
685
Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Inesi, M. E., & Gruenfeld, D. H. (2006). Power and perspectives not taken.
Psychological Science, 17, 10681074. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/galinsky/power%20and%20perspective-
taking%20psych%20science%202006.pdf
686
Ibid.
687
Vohs, Kathleen D., Nicole L. Mead, and Miranda R. Goode (2008), Merely Activating the Concept of
Money Changes Personal and Interpersonal Behaviour, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17(3),
208-212. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.csom.umn.edu/assets/101518.pdf
688
Baumeister, R. F., Masicampo, E. J., & Vohs, K. D. (2011). Do conscious thoughts cause behavior? Annual
Review of Psychology, 62, 331361. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.131126.
689
Dijksterhuis, A., Aarts, H.(2010). Goals, attention, and (un) consciousness. Annual Review of Psychology,
61: 467e490, 2010.
690
Bijleveld, E., Custers, R., & Aarts, H. (2011a). Once the money is in sight: Distinctive effects of conscious
and unconscious rewards on task performance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 865869.
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.03.002
691
Bijleveld, E., Custers, R., Aarts, H. (2012). Adaptive Reward Pursuit: How Effort Requirements Affect
Unconscious Reward Responses and Conscious Reward Decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/a0027615
182
control processes.692 Also, personality can be a factor in whether a person benefits more from
conscious or unconscious rewards.693
THE IMPLICATIONS: Considering the power of priming, one thing should be clear at this
point: environment has a powerful impact on our lives. It plays an actual roll in our non-
conscious decisions that affect goal driven behavior. This is the kind of evidence that really
comes into play when discussing what I will call the endurance argument: the notion that time
allows for the establishment of special identity and/or a long term decision-making process that
creates a space for free will. I will address this argument at length in the Challenges.
The ability of primes and biases to affect us unconsciously and over the long term
undermine the notion that when it comes down to making a decision, its our conscious mind that
really gets the credit. Also threatened to an unknown extent is the notion that our ability to
reason over time purifies our control. This doesnt have to be negative though. As John Bargh
has shown, studies showing priming of achievement have worked wonders as well.694 And
conscious task driven achievement rewards are often a well established failure in comparison.
Well see later that this counts for creativity in general.
What do these studies imply about how people in well-to-do cosmopolitan cities perceive
the world by default, as opposed to country folk? Are people in places where money and power
are displayed generally less empathetic, self-centered, and ambitious? The stereotypes may be
there for a good reason. One might think that perhaps studies like these should be used to rebuke
public displays of wealth, but then what of those who are inspired to work hardermaybe just
hard enough to get bywhen they wouldnt have been able to do it otherwise, without the
inspiration? What if these primes compel people to be stronger and better informed in order to
compete? Whatever the consequences, for the purpose of this book, we can see that, as it was put
692
Capa, R., Bouquet, C. A., Dreher, J. C., Dufour, A. (2012). Long-lasting effects of performance contingent
unconscious and conscious reward incentives during cued task-switching. Cortex.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2012.05.018
693
Bustin, G. M., Quoidbach, J., Hansenne, M., and Capa, R. L. (2012). Personality modulation of
(un)conscious processing: Novelty seeking and performance following supraliminal and subliminal reward
cues. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(2): 947e952, 2012.
694
A. Bargh. [Video file]. [26:00-30:00]. Available on 9/21/2012 at
183
in Vohs, Meade, and Goode (2008), even subtle reminders of money elicit big changes in
human behavior.695
695
Ibid.
184
EMPATHY
EVIDENCE #27: We have the neural underpinnings for a predisposition for empathy
like it or not! This is to say that, unless inhibited, autonomic and somatic responses are
generated to some degree in a subject, merely by the awareness of the experience of another
agent.
There is growing evidence for Wolfgang Prinzs common coding theory,696,697,698 which is a
theory that links motor (movement) and perceptual (audio/visual) representations via mirror
neurons (i.e. perception and action share the same code in the brain. Common coding may be in
addition to separate coding). Mirror neurons are experience related neurons that automatically
fire in us after merely perceiving the experience of others, especially salient experience.699,700
This has been shown to occur in the context of pain,701,702,703,704 touch,705,706 and disgust707 -it has
even been shown to happen in animals, especially primates.708,709
696
Prinz, W. (1997). Perception and action planning. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 9: 129-154.
697
Ezel, J.A., Gazzola, V., Keysers, C. (2008). Testing Sumulation Theory with Cross-Modal Multivariate
Classification of fMRI DATA. Plos One 3(11) e3690. Available on 9/21/2012 at
698
Eran Dayan, E., Casile, A., Levit-Binnun, N., Giese, M.A., Hendler, T., & Flash, T. (2007). Neural
representations of kinematic laws of motion: Evidence for action-perception coupling. PNAS, 104, 20582-
20587
699
Decety, J., & Moriguchi, Y. (2007). The empathic brain and its dysfunction in psychiatric populations:
implications for intervention across different clinical conditions. BioPsychoSocial Medicine, 1, 22-65.
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://emr.sagepub.com/content/3/1/92.abstract
700
Hein, G., Singer, T. (2008). I feel how you feel but not always: the empathic brain and its modulation.
Curr. Opin. Neurobio. 2008; 18(2), 153-158. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://neulaw.org/papers/HeinSinger_EmpathyReview_CoiN_2008.pdf
701
Morrison, I., Lloyd, D., di Pellegrino, G., & Roberts, N. (2004). Vicarious responses to pain in anterior
cingulate cortex: is empathy a multisensory issue? Cognitive & Affective Behavioral Neuroscience, 4, 270-278.
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.springerlink.com/content/5x2140l146417806
702
Jackson, P.L., Meltzoff, A.N., & Decety, J. (2005). How do we perceive the pain of others: A window into
the neural processes involved in empathy. NeuroImage, 24, 771-779. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053811904005208
703
Lamm, C., Batson, C.D., & Decety, J. (2007). The neural substrate of human empathy: effects of
perspective-taking and cognitive appraisal. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19, 42-58. Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://home.uchicago.edu/decety/publications/Lamm_JCN2007.pdf
704
Singer, T., Seymour, B., ODoherty, J., Kaube, H., Dolan, R., Frith, C. (2004). Empathy for pain involves
the affective but not the sensory components of pain. Science, 303, 1157-1161. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
705
Keysers, C., Wicker, B., Gazzola, V., Anton, J.L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V. (2004). A touching sight: SII/PV
activation during the observation and experience of touch. Neuron, 42, 33546. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.socialbehavior.uzh.ch/teaching/semsocialneurosciencews07/touchingsight.pdf
185
Again, Dik and Aarts note and bolster research demonstrat[ing] that people
spontaneously, i.e., without conscious intent, infer and pursue the goals perceived in others
behavior, a phenomenon termed goal contagion.710,711
Because of the link between motor action and perceptual consequences, there is the
opportunity for what is called ideomotor learning, going back to Roger Sperry712 and William
James. Ideomotor learning predicts/anticipates/directs future movement based upon what it has
learned from desirable responses.
THE IMPLICATIONS: When we do not understand that we are actually predisposed to

empathy, we might think that only something like the concept of free will can accommodate it,
but not all of the evidences for predisposition are threatening to our humanity, indeed, some may
underpin that too. It must be understood though, that some studies have shown that
predispositions to empathy may still have complex parameters.713 Even feeling other peoples
pain doesnt necessarily lead to pro-social behavior, as was shown in kids with conduct disorder,
who seemed to sadistically enjoy the experience of others suffering more,714,715 though as one
may expect, this is atypical.
706
Blakemore, S. J., Bristow, D., Bird, G., Frith, C., Ward, J. (2005). Somatosensory activations during the
observation of touch and a case of vision-touch synaesthesia. Brain, 128, 1571-1583. Retrieved on 9/21/2012
from
http://fasphilosophy.rutgers.edu/goldman/Spring%202008%20Seminar/Blakemore%20et%20al.%20(Vision-
touch%20synaesthesia).pdf
707
Wicker, B., Keysers, C., Plailly, J., Pierre Royet, J., Gallese, V., Rizzolatti, G. (2003). Both of us disgusted
in my insula: the common neural basis of seeing and feeling disgust. Neuron, 40, 655-664. Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://www.cs.phs.uoa.gr/el/courses/emotions/papers/DISGUST%20INSULA.pdf
708
Keysers, C., Gazzola, V. (2009). Expanding the mirror: vicarious activity for actions, emotions and
sensations. Curr Opinion Neurobiol. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.bcnnic.nl/txt/people/publications/2009_Keysers_sdarticle38.pdf
709
Marcos Z. (5/7/2012). Dogs Feel Your Pain. ScienceNow. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/05/dogs-feel-your-pain.html?ref=em
710
711
712
Sperry, R.W. (1952). Neurology and the mind-body problem. American Scientist, 40, 291-312.
713
Dewar, G. (2008). Empathy and the brain. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.parentingscience.com/empathy-and-the-brain.html
714
Decety, J., Michalska, K., and Akitsuki, Y. (2008). Who caused the pain? An fMRI investigation of
empathy and intentionality in children. Neuropsychologia;46:260714.46
715
Decety, J., Michalska, K., and Akitsuki, Y., Lahey, B.B. (2009). Atypical Empathetic Responses in
Adolescents with Aggressive Conduct Disorder: A functional MRI Investigation. Biol Psychol. 80(2): 203.
186
The existence of functional mirror neurons in the context of certain popular religious
theologies is also interesting to consider. One could say that rather than being inherently evil, we
actually understand the pain of others to some extent and, at least in the short term, would be
inherently sympathetic enough to want to eradicate it. It is true that biases may come after the
initial empathy that may negate it (and we shall see more of this in the next few Evidences) or
that a fast heuristic is an even more likely source of a bias, as it doesnt get enough time for a
reasoned veto.
Perhaps, as the Christian theologian might reply, this is where our corruption lies (i.e.
there is none that doeth good Ps. 14:1 and the wickedness of man was great in the earth,
and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually Gen. 6:5/8:21),
though the experience of empathy before bias corruption seems to sit less comfortably with the
doctrine of original sin. The theist might also retort that the corruption lies in frontloading of
moral biases seen in Evidence #4.
Though there will never be an end to theistic rejoinders from infinite points of view on
just about any topic as long as humans exist, I will discuss some of the more popular theological
implications for these Evidences further in the Challenges section. Theists are certainly not the
only ones with a pessimistic opinion about the nature of human moral predisposition.
Perhaps the greatest bias we possess is for our self-preservation; perhaps it should even
be listed as an Evidence, as my goal here is to illustrate all the ways in which we are pulled in
different directions in the world, often beyond our conscious desires. I want to highlight them so
we can work with them or against them, whichever is appropriate. What I dont want to do is
ignore them or downplay them. We do have an egoistic drive in competition with our empathetic
drive, because both ultimately serve our survival/social needs and quality of life needs. It should
go without saying that the balance is important.
That said, what may be most important here is to recognize that even if we accept the
most reductive, nihilistic (i.e. amoral) scientistic conception of the world, as the philosopher
Alex Rosenberg has noted, human life is still:
largely the result of selection for cooperation, for altruism, for coordination, as a result of
the fact the we found ourselves on the Savanna two million years ago or so at the bottom of
the food chain and were selected for those cooperative dispositions that moved us to the top
187
of the food chain. And those dispositions continue to be in force in the early twenty-first
century and will continue to be in force so long as the environment remains reasonably stable
to make most of us quite non-nihilistic in our fundamental dispositions [] even when we
recognize the illusory character of the drivers of human social life, we are going to be unable
to do enough about them to endanger ourselves or anybody else.[716] [emphasis mine].
716
Flanagan, O., Rosenberg, A. (10/6/2011). Owen Flanagan and Alex Rosenberg on the significance of
naturalism. [Video log post]. [100:00-103:00]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.philostv.com/owen-
flanagan-and-alex-rosenberg
188
OBLIGATION
EVIDENCE #28: In a situation where one or more people are in distress and need of aid,
both the number of bystanders that are present and the number of people in distress
correlate to the likelihood that a bystander will give that person aid.
Bibb Latan and John Darley conducted several experiments that showed the bystander
effect.717 It is described on changingminds.org thusly:
Latan and Darley sat a series of college students in a cubicle amongst a number of other
cubicles in which there were tapes of other students playing (the student thought they
were real people). One of the voices cries for help and makes sounds of severe choking.
When the student thought they were the only person there, 85% rushed to help. When
they thought there was one other person, this dropped to 65%. And when they thought
there were four other people, this dropped again to 31%.[718]
The subjects claimed to not only be unaware of the influence of the number of
bystanders, but they also denied that the numbers had any influence in their decisions and
reaction time.
This correlates with the work of Paul Slovic that showed evidence for something a little
different: he showed a propensity for individuals to commensurately avoid helping other
individuals as they are perceived to be a part of larger and larger groups experiencing the same
problem (i.e. the identifiable victim effect). That is to say: the larger the distressed group, the
less chance for the individual to give aid. As he writes:
Most people are caring and will exert great effort to rescue individual victims whose
needy plight comes to their attention. These same good people, however, often become
717
Darley, J. M., & Latan, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8, 377383. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://faculty.babson.edu/krollag/org_site/soc_psych/latane_bystand.html and retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.wadsworth.com/psychology_d/templates/student_resources/0155060678_rathus/ps/ps19.html
718
Straker, D. (N.D.). Bystander Effect. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://changingminds.org/explanations/theories/bystander_effect.htm
189
numbly indifferent to the plight of individuals who are one of many in a much greater
problem. [] One fundamental mechanism that may play a role in many, if not all,
episodes of mass-murder neglect involves the capacity to experience affect, the positive
and negative feelings that combine with reasoned analysis to guide our judgments,
decisions, and actions.[719]
THE IMPLICATIONS: Weve seen some of the neural underpinnings for the capacity for
empathy, but there is also evidence that it is limited. We might think that in a scenario where
there are more people around, one would feel more encouraged to help a person in distress,
because there is more support around, but this is not the case.
Consider the recent case of Good Samaritan Hugo Alfredo Tale-Yax,720 who was stabbed
while thwarting a mugging on the streets of New York, left bleeding to death with at least 20
people noticing over an hour, yet none helping. It was all caught on surveillance camera. One
person even stopped to take a picture and continued on. Would you consider this bias as a factor
that would influence your (moral) decision to help or not if you had not been made aware of it?
If this example is really just correlation without causation, with actual good reasons why people
do not help each other when there are more people around, what would they be? Is altruism
really just something like egoism in disguise?
We know that our individual choices are strongly influenced by social norms. We are
likely to conform to a group opinion when one is made to feel incompetent or insecure; the group
has at least three people; the group is unanimous; one admires the groups status and
attractiveness; one has made no prior commitment to any response; others in the group observe
ones behavior; or ones culture strongly encourages respect for social standards.721
When considering our propensity for altruistic behavior, or any behavior in our decision-
making process, perhaps even more deeply imbedded than social norms, are the sociobiological
effects of internal physiological responses to certain stimuli. There are many to consider. Ive
719
Slovic, P. (4/2007). If I look at the mass I will never act: Psychic numbing and genocide. Judgment and
Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 2007, pp. 7995. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://journal.sjdm.org/jdm7303a.pdf
720
Davis, L., Milberger, M., and Santichen, K. (4/25/2010). Good Samaritan Left for Dead on City Sidewalk.
ABC News Good Morning America. Available on 8/7/2011 from
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Weekend/dying-homeless-man-stopped-mugging-sidewalk/story?id=10471047
and video file retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHaSrqwWMYs
721
190
already mentioned the effects of the neurotransmitter oxytocin in the context of pair-bonding, its
also crucial in social behavior. In some experimental games of neuroeconomics, 45% of
oxytocin-treated subjects demonstrated the maximal trust level, versus 21% in the placebo
group.722 Zak et al (2007), showed that oxytocin subjects were 80% more generous than
placebo subjects in a money-gifting generosity game; these effects were twice as potent as the
endogenous effect of altruism (one-sided giving)723,724 [emphasis mine], and oxytocin subjects
were more mindful of generous human intentions.725
Another important parameter of neuroeconomic studies was the resulting indication that
even though oxytocin does stimulate common reward circuitry (e.g. food and drink),726
oxytocins influence was not merely a generalized effect on risk taking or optimism (i.e. a
hedonistic decision heuristic), but was a specific effect on social decision making, in that
oxytocin was shown to produce the first mover effect: to inspire approach, as in initiative,
which is crucial when getting the pay it forward ball rolling. What the bystander effect needs is
initiative and it seems that oxytocin provides it.
In other sociobiological studies, reflexive bodily responses during computer viewings of
black and white faces evidenced prejudice in the brain (the amygdala) and in certain facial
muscle reactions.727,728,729 In similar studies, viewers were asked to press a button and shoot
men who popped up on a screen holding a gun, while not shooting the men holding a bottle or a
flashlight. Both teams found that the black men that popped up on the screen holding harmless
objects were more often mistakenly shot by both white and black subjects than were the white
722
Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M., Zak, P.J., Fischbacher, U., Fehr, E. (2005). Oxytocin increases trust in humans.
Nature. 2005;435:6736. Available on 9/21/2012 at
723
Zak, P. J (2007), The Neuroeconomics of Trust, in: R. Frantz (ed.), Renaissance in Behavioral Economics,
Routledge.
724
MacDonald, K., & MacDonald, T. (2010). The peptide that binds: A systematic review of oxycotin and its
prosocial effects in humans. Harvard Review of Psychiatry, 18(1), 1-21. doi:10.3109/10673220903523615 [p.5].
725
Ibid. [p.9]
726
Ibid. [p.4]
727
Cunningham, W.A., Nezlek, J.B., & Banaji, M.R. (2004). Implicit and explicit ethnocentrism: Revisiting
the ideologies of prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 13321346. Available on 9/21/2012
at http://faculty.psy.ohio-state.edu/cunningham/pdf/cunningham.pspb.2004.pdf
728
Eberhardt, J. L. (2005). Imaging Race. American Psychologist, Vol 60(2), Feb-Mar 2005, 181-190. doi:
10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.181 Available on 9/21/2012 at http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/amp/60/2/181
729
Vanman, E. J., Saltz, J., Nathan, L., Warren, J. (2004). Racial Discrimination by Low-Prejudiced Whites:
Facial movements as Implicit Measures of Attitudes Related to Behavior. Psychological Science 15: 711-714.
Available on 9/21/2012 at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15482441
191
men.730,731,732 Its clear that our immediate instincts can be trained and they may spill over into
our reasoned judgment as biases.
Darley and Latans work identified a decision-making process for intervention in the
bystander effect. Three things must happen in order for people to help: they must notice the
incident, then they must recognize the situation as an emergency, and then they must take
responsibility and help.733 The more people that are observed not helping evokes a diffusion of
responsibility (and diffusion of responsibility is probably why that movie with all your favorite
actors doing cameos in it also has most of them giving the most mediocre performances of their
careers). It becomes easier to either ignore the incident or to fail to recognize the situation as an
emergency. After observing thousands of people in these situations, researchers have discovered
several other factors that will increase our odds in helping others, in addition to the ones already
mentioned:
We are in a more alert frame of mind

We have the time to help
Were in a good mood
Were feeling guilty
The person is somehow similar to us
We are in a small town[734]
So far, with all of these propensities in mind, can we really view our tendency toward or
away from altruism as something ideologically pure? Even animals have shown behavior that
730
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., & Wittenbrink, B. (2002). The police officers dilemma: Using ethnicity
to disambiguate potentially threatening individuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83,
13141329. Available on 9/21/2012 at http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=buy.optionToBuy&id=2002-08203-
006
731
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., & Wittenbrink, B. (2007). The influence of stereotypes on decisions to
shoot. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37,11021117. Available on 9/21/2012 at
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/bernd.wittenbrink/research/pdf/cpjw07.pdf
732
Greenwald, A. G., Oakes, M. A., Hoffman, H. (2003). Targets of Discrimination: Effects of Race on
Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 399 (2003).
733
734
Ibid.
192
would put many humans to shame.735,736,737,738,739 Does the egoism in disguise theory seem a
little more likely now, considering all of these fast-track heuristics and subterranean influences?
What about moments where people give their lives for others? That happens a lot more than we
know. Does it matter that they were motivated by or can be explained by social exchange theory
or social norms or sociobiology or theology or utilitarianism or tit-for-tat reciprocal altruism?
Yes, it matters because we want to maximize that behavior.
These results may relate to other evidence here concerning some possible physical
limitations upon empathetic response, such as the moral burnout hypothesized in Evidence
#9. Peter Singer has noted in The Life You Can Save,740 that people are willing to make huge
sacrifices to save a life in our immediate sphere of attention, such as to jump into a lake with a
$500 suit on to save a drowning baby, but are not willing to make the same sacrifice or even a
much smaller sacrifice to save the lives of people out of our immediate attention, such as to send
far less than $500 to aid destitute children who will surely die without it. Nationally, more than
26,000 children under five die each day of preventable causes.741
It seems pretty clear that the former scenario is more instinctually housed via immediate
and salient emotional provocation, while the latter can be contemplated from an armchair and
shuffled to the analytical part of the brain. This is exactly why we need to systematize social
programs. Theres no getting around the increased efficacy favoring our least salient selves that
we would admittedly ascribe equal importance and responsibility to in any given moment. That
is to say that as we consider this right now, we cant think of a moment when Singers two
735
Muehlhauser, L. (Interviewer), Pierce, J. (Interviewee). (11/16/2009). Conversations from the Pale Blue Dot
podcast: 010: Jessica Pierce Animal Morality. [Audio podcast]. [4:30-end]. Available on 9/21/2012 at
736
Yong, E. (8/6/2011). Charity of the apes chimps spontaneously help each other. [Web log post]. Available
on 9/21/2012 at http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2011/08/08/charity-of-the-apes-
%e2%80%93-chimps-spontaneously-help-each-other
737
Morell, V. (7/26/2011). Asian Elephants Are Social Networkers. [Web log post]. Science Now. Available on
9/21/2012 at http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/07/asian-elephants-are-social-netwo.html?ref=em
738
Binns, C. (2/28/2006). Case Closed: Apes Got Culture. Live Science. Available on 9/21/2012 at
http://www.livescience.com/7064-case-closed-apes-culture.html
739
Schmidt, R. E. (12/8/2008). Not just your kids: Dogs can think no fair too. Associated Press. Available on
9/21/2012 at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28112599
740
Grothe, D.J. (Interviewer), Singer, P. (Interviewee). (6/19/2009). Point of Inquiry podcast: Peter Singer -
The Life You Can Save. [Audio podcast]. (7:30-9:30). Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.pointofinquiry.org/peter_singer_the_life_you_can_save
741
UNICEF. (2008). State of the World's Children Report. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.unicefusa.org/news/releases/more-than-26000-children.html
193
examples are justifiably different, even if we have a propensity to miss or make those distinctions
all the time in our daily lives.
Slovics work is just more evidence in the case against intuition as our primary guide to
morality. More than just intuition is needed in moral evaluation. Its important to recognize
limiting factors when they exist and to consider that they may or may not be directly related to
whatever it is that facilitates empathy directly (e.g. mirror neurons). Theres a long way to go in
the research to map out all our limitations, but we see things that demand our attention.
Considering that behavioral/cognitive research like this is in its infancy, how many other factors
like the bystander effect do you suspect may affect your decisions without you knowing it?
The last thing to discuss about the bystander effect is how this predisposition might cash
out intellectually. Social media often does not require that we justify ourselves every time we
press like or post a superficial strawman caricature of our cultural competitor, such as a bad
photo of them with an ad populum or ad hominem sound byte. We often dont feel that we have
to explain why we approve or disapprove, just show that we do approve or disapprove,
superficially. As much of the evidence in this work shows, if the main reason that beliefs are
adopted in the first place is merely that the in-group majority believes them and we fear reprisals,
whether we realize that or not, then through social media, an intellectual diffusion of
responsibility will seem to justify and habituate the promotion of empty propaganda, i.e. I dont
need to defend it intellectually; surely someone else somewhere else has already done that, since
so many people believe it. Ill just keep pushing it until I get an explanation.
I admit that as the data continues to role in, it may be perceived as more accurate for me
to have combined some of these Evidences, such as the priming biases, empathy related issues,
moral predispositions, etc. and perhaps separated out other Evidences more than I have, such as
intention biases, other moral predispositions, etc., but the correlations are always in flux to some
extent and some effects are more evidenced than others. It is my hope that the reader will get
enough of a taste of these problems in the challenge to generally accepted folk intuitions of free
will to investigate the science further on her own.
194
GENDER
EVIDENCE #29: Certain experiments have shown biases that may be based upon gender
alone.
Men and women have been shown to have significantly different intuitive response to
classic thought experiments, such as the Chairman of the Board thought experiment described
in Evidence #4 where women were actually shown to be more likely to ascribe knowledgeable
intention in the case of blame.742,743 This is especially true in cases of judicial judgment over
assault.744
These results seem to be due more to an enduring propensity for empathy in women745
(for the victim), than they do to authoritarian assertions about fairness,746,747 which would also
explain why women are more liberal in cases related to civil liberties.748 As Singer et al (2006)
put it, Both sexes exhibited empathy-related activation in pain-related brain areas (fronto-
insular and anterior cingulate cortices) towards fair players. However, these empathy-related
responses were significantly reduced in males when observing an unfair person receiving
pain.749 And as CUNY philosophy professor Jesse Prinz adds, When men watch wrongdoers
742
on Experimental Philosophy. [Audio podcast]. [11:20-12:30]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
743
Buckwalter, W., Stich, S. (10/26/2010). Gender and Philosophical Intuition. [pp. 17-18]. Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/_files/ncartwright/phil152/gender-and-philosophical-intuition.pdf
744
Coontz, P. (2000). Gender and judicial decisions: Do female judges decide cases differently than male
judges? Gender Issues. Volume 18, Number 4, 59-73, DOI: 10.1007/s12147-001-0024-7 Retrieved on 9/21/2012
from http://www.springerlink.com/content/qepfgr289rt68ee6
745
Mestre, M.V. (2009). Are women more empathetic than men? A longitudinal study in adolescence.
The Spanish Journal of Psychology. 12:76-83. 2009. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.ucm.es/info/psi/docs/journal/v12_n1_2009/art76.pdf
746
Singer, T., & Steinbeis, N. (2009). Differential roles of fairness - and compassion-based motivations for
cooperation, defection, and punishment. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1167 (1), 4150.
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04733.x/abstract
747
Harenski, C.L., Antonenko, O., Shane, M.S., Kiehl, K.A. (2008). Gender differences in neural mechanisms
underlying moral sensitivity. Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience, 3, 313-324. Retrieved on 9/21/2012
from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19015084
748
Tajuana, M., Johnson, S.W., M. Gubala., S.M. (2002). The Impact of Gender and Race
in the Decisions of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals. Prepared for delivery at the
annual meeting of the 2002 Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill. Available on 9/21/2012 at
http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/psrw/MassieJohnsonGubala.pdf
749
Singer, T., Seymour, B., O'Doherty, J.P., Stephan, K.E., Dolan, R.J., Frith, C.D. (1/26/2006). Empathic
neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others. Nature; 439:466-9.
195
getting punished, there is activation in reward centers of their brains, whereas womens brains
show activation in pain centers, suggesting that they feel empathy for suffering even when it is
deserved.750
As it was shown in Evidence #20, our propensity for taking risks increase when we
experience loss, with hormonal changes and/or (pre)dispositions via testosterone, cortisone
even when viewing erotic pictures. While women are more sensitive to testosterone than men,
studies have shown that testosterone is naturally found about ten times more abundant in men,
thus suggesting an increased male vulnerability to risk and impatience by default.751 Men have
been shown to decrease testosterone production via fatherhood, which improves sympathy,
marriage longevity, and child rearing.752,753
Prinz has also noted754 several other studies that show differences in gender outcomes,
such as that women were twice as generous in a game that involved dividing $10 with a
stranger,755 that women are more likely than men to reciprocate acts of kindness,756 and that
women tend to be more egalitarian then men, and men are more likely to be either completely
selfless [or] selfish.757 Tend and befriend758 is an alternative stress response to fight or flight that
brings the inner nurse out in people and is typically seen more in women. Some researchers
750
Prinz, J. (5/18/2010). Sex on the Bench: Do Women and Men Have Different Moral Values? Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/experiments-in-philosophy/201005/sex-the-bench-do-
women-and-men-have-different-moral-values
751
Barber, B., Odean, T. (2/2001). Boys will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock
Investment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, No. 1, 261-292. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/odean/papers/gender/gender.html
752
Lee T. Gettler, Thomas W. Mcdade, Alan B. Feranil, Christopher W. Kuzawa. Longitudinal evidence that
fatherhood decreases testosterone in human males. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2011;
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1105403108 Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.pnas.org/content/108/39/16194
753
Norton, E. (10/12/2011). Fatherhood Decreases Testosterone. Science Now. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/09/fatherhood-decreases-testosteron.html
754
755
Eckel, C.C., & Grossman, P.J. (1996). Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games, Games and Economic
Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 181-191, October. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.altruists.org/f117
756
Croson, R., Gneezy, U. (2008). Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic Literature, 47(2):
44874. DOI:10.1257/jel.47.2.448 Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://cbees.utdallas.edu/~crosonr/research/%5B59%5D.pdf
757
Andreoni, J. & Vesterlund L. (2001). Which is the Fair Sex? Gender differences in altruism. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 116(1), 293-312. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.pitt.edu/~vester/QJE2001.pdf
758
Taylor, S.E., Klein, L.C., Lewis, B.P., Gruenewald, T.L., Gurung, R.A.R., & Updegraff, J.A. (2000).
Biobehavioral responses to stress in females: Tend-and-befriend, not fight-or-flight. Psychological Review,
107, 411429.
196
consider tend and befriend to be a result of higher levels of oxytocin,759 so this latter evidence
may be a result of that also.
THE IMPLICATIONS: Jesse Prinz and the researchers in these studies are often very clear
about their apprehension in concluding that they are necessarily documenting evidence for a kind
of gender essentialism based upon hard wiring genetics, etc. (though they wont deny it either).
The problem, as Stephen Stich notes,760 is that these studies are often limited by small sample
sizes, locations, time frames, socializations, cultures, education, politics, religion, class, role
demands, outliers, on and on. As Prinz notes though, from what it looks like at this point, party
commitments do seem to have a stronger influence than gender, with more variation depending
upon who they are interacting with and hired/appointed by.761
As noted in related Evidences above, this research is in its infancy, considering the
amount of variables. As with most biases in a biological context of race, gender, sexuality, etc.,
gender bias sits in a larger context with many competitors, so we must take them individually
with a pinch of saltits the collective context that is really most significant. For the individual,
the average differences are just that, and any individual can be anywhere on a continuum in
comparison.
Even so, the focus in these Evidences for my purpose here is not constrained to genetic
biases; cultural biases are still relevant. The focus should not be upon the novelty of
predisposition in gender either. It may be fairly obvious that men are this way and women are
that way, but what should be observed is that we take for granted that there can be physiological,
cultural, and sexual reasons for paradigmatic shifts that put us on fundamentally unequal playing
fields at times. This is not to say that we cant ultimately overcome them, but we should try to
recognize them if they are there.
All that said, and considering the emotionally charged implications inherent in even
discussing the possibilities that there may be some gender essential differences, it nonetheless
759
Taylor, S.E. (2006). Tend and befriend: Biobehavioral bases of affiliation under stress. Current Directions
in Psychological Science, 15, 273-277.
760
Gendler, T., Stich, S. (10/18/2010). [Video file]. [31:00-36:00]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.philostv.com/tamar-gendler-and-stephen-stich/
761
197
seems intuitive to many that women and men have different ways of seeing the world that are
often complementary. Are men and women fundamentally different? Yes and no. Consider that
there are perceptual clues that are contingent upon physical/physiological abilities. A womans
ability to better detect olfactory chemical cues (e.g. armpit odor telling whether or not someone
just watched a happy or sad movie, teardrop smells, sexual receptivity, etc. See Evidence #13)
will make them seem more intuitive in some instances, while a man, who is evidenced to have
a better capacity for spatial tasks might better understand, intuitively, situations where that is
more relative (e.g. linguistic, artistic, mechanical, etc.). So, intuition itself is limited and not
magical.
Weve also seen that in at least some respects, even differing motivations can produce
resulting judgments that are actually similar, such as when enduring empathy in women for the
victim can lead to harsher judgments than the fairness punishment judgments more pronounced
in male wiring. People have argued that in certain situations like these, gender does matter,762
whether these differences are the result of the push of nature or the pull of nurture (as
psychologist David Myers might put it).
I want you to think about these differences in a completely different context now.
Consider the mutual codependence that both a man and a woman have with each other in that
both are required to procreate. This creates a window for a unique kind of social balance that
may have always been in play since the beginning. I want to propose that women and men really
do anchor each other to produce a perceived acceptable middle ground in some unique ways.
That is to say, a motivational middle ground between more (generally) emotional/empathetic
women and (generally) principled men in a way that is socially advantageous. It would be easy
to see why this would have evolved as such, as we are crucially social animals. What would this
mean in the context of the moral role of the individual vs. the moral role of the citizen as part of
a balanced collective? Collective morality is something to consider in this collection of
Evidences in the context of responsibility. If our conscious minds really are a consensus of
subterranean forces (i.e. a mixture of sub-control and conscious control), then collective morality
would seem to be an intuitive expansion of that internal heuristic socially and sexually.
762
Peresie, J.L. (5/3/2005). Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal
Appellate Courts. Yale Law Journal 114(7): 175990. Available on 9/21/2012 at
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/114-7/peresie.pdf
198
If what is perceived as good and right is truly based upon a folk heuristic that every fair
result should be a (simplified Hegelian) synthesis of every thesis and antithesis we can posit (in
this case, a compromise between the empathy of women and the principles of men), then the
moral position of the individual will be, by functional necessity, required to be off the mark for
the individual in order to balance out their counterpart for the greater good in the middle. If you
dont get that, read it again until you do. It may be the most crucial, fundamental heuristic for
successful collective morality. Most crudely put: if your goal is for society to be at the number 3
and your partner is a number 4, then it may be best for you to be at number 2. This is reasoning
that favors the mean (average) over the mode (majority). The long run regularity runs inbetween.
Of course, not everything can work this way; there are possible conflations and category errors,
but there are instances where it works, such as in the kinds of push-pull type psychological
predispositions mentioned.
Consider that it has been noted that behavior in animals is often mistaken for intention
(see Evidence #6). For example, one ant might have a genetic propensity to build up a lip
around any hole that it might find. The propensity for this individual task benefits the colony
when the rains come and the lip around the hole keeps the water out. But when the ant is
separated from the colony, its repeated behavior to continue to build a lip in other contexts
might be nonsensicaleven detrimental. This is the kind of predisposition that we observe in all
life and philosophers and scientists do their best to delineate modes of intention with what Daniel
Dennett calls the intentional stance.763
If we have evolved social behavior in much the same role driven way, our behavior may
also very well be contextually sensible or nonsensical. So, when it comes time to be judged for
our actions, will all the parties (all the other ants) be judged in context of when our behavior
made sense each time? Not likely. Intention is often more difficult to ascribe than we think.
When an infant automatically employs motor behaviors like the sucking reflex, does it do so
because it chooses to survive or is it just a reflex?764 Context means everything to the success of
predisposition, but even that doesnt tell the whole story.
763
Dennett, Daniel. Applying the Intentional Stance to Non-Humans: Can it take the strain? Presentation
at UCLA symposium: How like us are they? Human and Non-human Primate Cognition. [Conference].
(2/4/2011). Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://vimeo.com/19605230
764
Swaiman, K. F., Ashwal, S. (1999). Pediatric Neurology: Principles and Practice, Third Edition, Chapter
45, C.V. Mosby Co., Philadelphia, PA, 1999: 719-728.
199
The moral and/or strategic implications of individuals contingent upon parter/group
contexts are hinted at in some of the other Evidences here (e.g. neuroeconomic games in
Evidence #28) and may be explored more deeply in the complex world of John von
Neumanns game theory, for example, with Nash equilibrium, where the success of all the
players in a game cannot be strategically improved unilaterally. It doesnt have to be gender
differences that put this into play, though natural physical delineations can exacerbate cultural,
religious, and/or political delineations in terms of reinforcing in-group/out-group distinctions. All
of these parameters can have some influence in something as comprehensive as game theory.
200
INTELLIGENCE
EVIDENCE #30: The range of our capacity for intelligence can be limited or enhanced to
some extent by our genetic predisposition.
We know that there is a correlation with higher intelligence and more gray matter in areas
linked to language, attention, and memory.765,766 Neural processing speed also correlates with
intelligence.767 Speaking of sex differences, women are better spellers, have better verbal fluency
(men at verbal analogy) and word memory, theyre more sensitive to touch, taste, and odor, and
they have better emotion detectors. Men score better in math problem solving,
physics/geometry/spatial ability, and computer science.768
There is evidence from the largest intelligence study in the history of the world, involving
over 21,000 subjects, 200 scientists, and 100 organizations that they have finally tracked genes
that contribute to brain health (correlating to disease), size, and intelligence.769,770 Senior author
Paul Thompson said, We found fairly unequivocal proof supporting a genetic link to brain
function and intelligence. 771 Science writer Elaine Schmidt writes
Project ENIGMA investigators also discovered genes that explain individual differences
in intelligence. They found that a variant in a gene called HMGA2 affected brain size as
well as a persons intelligence. DNA is comprised of four bases: A, C, T and G. People
whose HMGA2 gene held a letter C instead of T on that location of the gene
765
Haier, R. J., Jung, R., Yeo, R., Head, K., Alkire, M.T. (2004). Structural brain variation and general
intelligence. NeuroImage, 23(1): 425-433.
766
Colom, R, Jung, R. E., & Haier, R. J. (2006). Distributed Brain Sites for the g-factor of intelligence.
NeuroImage, 31,1359-1365.
767
McGarry-Roberts, P. A., Stelmack, R. M., Campbell, K. B. (1992). Intelligence, reaction time, and event-
related potentials. Intelligence. 16:289313.
768
Myers, D. (2010). Psychology 9th edition. New York: Worth Publishers. [pp.432-433]. (ISBN 978-1-4292-
1597-8)
769
First intelligence gene discovered. (4/16/2012). Cosmos. Available on 9/21/2012 at
http://www.cosmosmagazine.com/news/5515/intelligence-gene-found
770
Jason L. Stein et al. (2012). Identification of common variants associated with human hippocampal and
intracranial volumes. Nature Genetics, 2012; DOI: 10.1038/ng.2250 Available on 9/21/2012 at
http://www.nature.com/ng/journal/v44/n5/full/ng.2250.html
771
Schmidt, E. (4/15/2012). New Genes Linked to Brain Size, Intelligence. Science Daily. Available on
9/21/2012 at http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/04/120415150123.htm
201
possessed larger brains and scored more highly on standardized IQ tests[772] [emphasis
mine].
There is also an evidenced lower correlation of intelligence similarity between fraternal

twins reared together than there is between identical twins reared apart, which is (crucially)
lower than there is between identical twins reared together. This shows that there are both
genetic and environmental effects at play in acquiring intelligence.773 Methods of learning are
not equal however: direct instruction has been shown to be more effective than discovery
learning (77% vs. 23% solved similar problems774). We also know that there are many problems
in I.Q. testing because of confounds like testing bias,775 when tests inadvertently require the
subject to know cultural parameters in order to answer correctly, and stereotype threat.776
Stereotype threat is the dark side of the Pygmalion effect: students do better/worse than others
based upon expectations (of that student) alone. When it is negative and based upon race, class,
gender, etc., it is the stereotype effect, and it creates a negative emotional affect that can thwart
learning.777 You dont even have to believe in it. Just worrying if someone else believes it is
enough.
The future is now, though, and researchers from Washington University in St. Louis have
announced that theyve found a way to incorporate fMRI techniques to assess crucial aspects of
general fluid intelligence (also showing how crucial global connectivity in this LPFC region [a
hub] is to intelligence, documenting up to 10% difference between subjects).778,779
772
Ibid.
773
McGue, M., Vaupel, J.W., Holm, N., Harvald, B. (1993). Longevity is moderately heritable in a sample of
Danish twins born 1870-1880. J. Gerontol 48:B237-B244
774
Klahr, D., & Nigam, M. (2004). The equivalence of learning paths in early science instruction: Effects of
direct instruction and discovery learning. Psychological Science, 15, 661 667.
775
Myers, D. (2010). Psychology 9th edition. New York: Worth Publishers. (ISBN 978-1-4292-1597-8). [p.
437].
776
Steele, C. M.; Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African
Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69 (5): 797811. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.69.5.797.
ISSN 0022-3514. PMID 7473032.
777
Azrin, N. H., Holz, W. C. (1966). Punishment. In W. K. Honig (Ed.), Operant behavior: areas of research
and application. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. Pp. 380-447.
778
Brice, M. (8/1/2012). Goodbye, IQ Tests: Brain Imaging Can Reveal Intelligence Levels. Medical Daily.
Available on 9/21/2012 at http://www.medicaldaily.com/articles/11216/20120801/intelligence-mri-iq-test-
brain.htm
779
Cole, M. W. , Yarkoni,T., Repov, G., Anticevic, A., Braver, T.S. (2012). Global Connectivity of Prefrontal
Cortex Predicts Cognitive Control and Intelligence. The Journal of Neuroscience 27 June 2012, 32 (26), pp.
8988-8999
202
THE IMPLICATIONS: In the Republic, Plato once wrote, No two persons are born exactly
alike; but each differs from the other in natural endowments, one being suited for one occupation
and the other for another. For thousands of years now, we have had intuitions that certain
people are better suited for certain tasks. When we set out to distinguish between what
intelligence really is, we see that it is not so easy to define as nicely as we might like. Harvard
professor Howard Gardner is well known for his 8 (or 9) intelligences;780 these might include
working with our hands, navigating natural spaces, negotiating emotional situations, improvising
on an instrument, playing sports, or living without leaving a footprint. Culturally, what is
considered intelligent can change too.
That said (and lets never forget that was said), some people have been able to narrow
down definitions of general intelligence that are useful. The gold standard of Charles Spearmans
still widely accepted g781 (yes, for general factor intelligence) was later split into fluid
intelligence (what Horn and Cattell described as the ability to perceive relationships
independent of previous specific practice or instruction concerning those relationships,782 such
as in IQ tests) and crystal intelligence (which relies upon experience, memory, semantic
knowledge, cultural knowledge, etc.). Its the fluid intelligence testing correlations with fMRI
mapping of regions in the Lateral Prefrontal Cortex (LPFC) that allowed the Cole et al. (2012)
researchers to make the kinds of predictions about intelligence that were actually statistically
significant.
So now we are able to see via technology how inherited biological components may
contribute to our intelligence. And intelligence is important for reasons that we often fail to
consider. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it would be cruel and unusual punishment
to execute the mentally retarded. Now, it seems, an IQ score (below 70) can determine life or
death in America for criminals.783 Of course, we must always be vigilant and never forget our
worse than embarrassing history regarding the treatment of people against their will in the
780
Gardner, H. (1999). Intelligence Reframed: Multiple Intelligences for the 21st Century. New York: Basic
Books.
781
Spearman, C. (1904). General Intelligence, Objectively Determined and Measured. The American
Journal of Psychology 15 (2): 201292. doi:10.2307/1412107.
782
Horn J. L. & Cattell R. B. (1967). Age differences in fluid and crystallized intelligence. Acta Psychologica,
26, pp. 107-129.
783
Myers, D. (2010). Psychology 9th edition. New York: Worth Publishers. [p.426]. (ISBN 978-1-4292-1597-8)
203
context of intelligence. Like Plato, we all want to have people in the societal positions best suited
for them; unlike Plato, we have enough of a good reason now to know that that should never be
forced or systematized in a coercive way. We can vote democratically to put a smart politician in
office or recommend a smart person for a particular job, but thats the extent it should go for
reasons of which I shouldnt have to argue.
In Evidence #7, I discussed how freedom is directly affected by epistemology, because
the more you know how to do, the more you are able to do. This, of course, is only part of the
picture, as you may know how to do a lot, but be physically unable to do anything at all (and a
very inept person may be very capable, physically). It would be the person with the right
combination of knowledge and physical or manipulative ability who has the most freedom, but it
would still be local freedom.
204
ANCHORING & MISCELLANEOUS
EVIDENCE #31: We have heuristics that allow priming to bias our abstract estimation
of range, in the numerical sense and in the sense of value. Numbers in our sense sphere
affect numbers we are estimating.
A robust heuristic known as the anchoring effect shows that our general epistemic
predictions are influenced commensurately by priming in the environment. Science writers Kate
Douglas and Dan Jones describe a classic experiment784 by Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman, for which Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in 2002, where participants were asked to:
[] spin a wheel of fortune with numbers ranging from 0 to 100, and afterwards to
estimate what percentage of United Nations countries were African. Unknown to the
subjects, the wheel was rigged to stop at either 10 or 65. Although this had nothing to do
with the subsequent question, the effect on people's answers was dramatic. On average,
participants presented with a 10 on the wheel gave an estimate of 25 percent, while the
figure for those who got 65 was 45 per cent.[785]
Kahnemans book Thinking, Fast and Slow lists a slew of erroneous cognitive
processing examples that he and many other scientists have documented over the last half of a
century (many that are in this work). As Slate Magazine writer Daniel Engber puts it,
Kahneman designates no fewer than three biases (confirmation, hindsight, outcome), 12

effects (halo, framing, Florida, Lady Macbeth, etc.), four fallacies (sunk-cost, narrative,
planning, conjunction), six illusions (focusing, control, Moses, validity, skill, truth), two
neglects (denominator, duration) and three heuristics (mood, affect, availability).[786]
784
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124-
1130. Available on 9/21/2012 at http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/Ec101/JudgementUncertainty.pdf
785
Douglas, K., Jones, D. (5/5/2007). Top 10 ways to make better decisions. New Scientist. [p.4] Retrieved on
9/21/2012 from http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19426021.100-top-10-ways-to-make-better-
decisions.html
786
Engber, D. (10/26/2011).The Effect Effect: Daniel Kahneman and the language of popular psychology.
Slate Magazine. Available on 9/21/2012 at
205
THE IMPLICATIONS: Since were nearing the end of the Evidences, I wanted to show
Kahnemans list so that anyone interested in the biases, effects, heuristics, etc. that Ive discussed
can see that there is so much more for the reader to explore out there and the list just keeps
growing (I like to say this word with an Al Pacino/Tony Montana accent, cockaroashes!).
Kahneman won the Nobel Prize for this work and that should give you an idea of how serious
and relevant it is. Thinking, Fast and Slow is an update of that 1974 work. The concepts of fast
and slow thinking refer to the contrast between how quick and dirty heuristics affect
fast/reactive thinking (represented by the experiencing self) and how those and other biases
affect slow, normative reasoning (represented by the remembering self).
As I pointed out in Evidence #19, a propensity for openness to experience gives one
a propensity for adopting liberal ideology. McElroy and Dowds (2007) work demonstrates that
the Big-Five personality trait of openness to experience is more susceptible to the anchoring
effect.787 This makes sense. Previously, I mentioned the false consensus effect: a defense
mechanism that is the tendency to overestimate the tendency to which others share our beliefs
and behaviors, e.g. everybody cheats on their taxes, rolls through stop signs, and flirts, even
when they are married. Add this anchoring effect propensity to the false consensus effect and
we have a serious epistemic problem in the liberal community. I would hypothesize that this
creates a propensity for credulous thinkingeven conspiracy type thinking. It must be
remembered that there are real conspiracies, but Im talking about watching out for the ones that
we still cling to even when we have less and less good evidence. Again, we must be aware of the
sunk cost fallacy (Evidence #20)!
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/science/2011/10/daniel_kahneman_s_thinking_fast_and_slow_reviewed_.ht
ml
787
McElroy, T., Dowd, K. (2007). Susceptibility to anchoring effects: How openness-to-experience influences
responses to anchoring cues. Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 2007, pp. 4853.
Available on 9/21/2012 at http://journal.sjdm.org/jdm06143.pdf
206
REACTANCE
EVIDENCE #32: When we feel that our freedom is threatened, we assert it by acting
contrarily to the desires of authority figures, rules, and laws.
Studies have shown that people do the opposite of whats expected of them in order to
assert their freedom when their freedom feels threatened. Its called reactance. Its important to
note that children are more vulnerable than adults and men seem to be more vulnerable than
women.788,789
Because of reactance, we see a boomerang effect where forbidden alternatives become
more enticing. Its not surprising that there is evidence of reactance as a principle factor in
adolescent smoking and alcohol initiation, peer intimacyjust about any adult hedonic
activity.790
As we might expect (and as was discussed in Evidence #24), reactance can be reduced
by avoiding core values. It can also be reduced by highlighting the similarities between agents,
the credibility of the source/data, and low controlling/autonomy positive language.791,792,793
THE IMPLICATIONS: I think its clear why this should be last: this is the kind of scenario
where we intuitively feel like weve achieved some sort of freedom to do otherwise. In reality,
reactance is so predictable that clever parents (and manipulators in general) have been exploiting
it since the dawn of time, by using reverse psychology on their children, until the kid gets wise
788
Hammock, T., Brehm, J. W. (1966). The attractiveness of choice alternatives when freedom to choose is
eliminated by a social agent. Journal of Personality, 34, 546-554.
789
Brehm, S. S. (1981). Psychological reactance and the attractiveness of unobtainable objects: Sex
differences in children's responses to an elimination of freedom. Sex Roles, Volume 7, Number 9,937-949
790
Miller, C. H., Burgoon, M., Grandpre, J., Alvaro, E. (2006). Identifying principal risk factors for the
initiation of adolescent smoking behaviors: The significance of psychological reactance. Health
Communication 19, 241-252.
791
Silvia, P. J. (2005). Deflecting reactance: The role of similarity in increasing compliance and reducing
resistance. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 27, 277284.
792
793
Miller, C. H., Lane, L. T., Deatrick, L. M., Young, A. M., Potts, K. A. (2007). Psychological reactance and
promotional health messages: The effects of controlling language, lexical concreteness, and the restoration of
freedom. Human Communication Research, 33, 219-240.
207
and you need to bust out the double reverse psychologyhaha! This is not recommended
though, because it ultimately undermines the authority of the parent and habituates
manipulation.794 The best kind of manipulation is defensive and corrective, which is one of the
main themes of this book. Its something to think about and a good way to end the Evidences of
predisposition for erroneous thinking about objective reality and control.
794
Gottman, J.M. (1997). Raising an Emotionally Intelligent Child: The Heart of Parenting. New York:
Fireside, Simon and Schuster. [p. 212].
208
PART III
SOME CHALLENGES TO
THE IMPLICATIONS OF PREDISPOSITIONALISM
First things first: its important to point out right away that our everyday language has a
long history of being structured paradigmatically around the concept of dualistic free will (i.e. a
body driven by a spirit). When determinists use expressions like I chose or we can change or
they decided out of convenience, it does not mean that contra-causal free will is veridical or
that our intuitive use of such language gives evidence to its ontological weight. We use these
words, at least in part, because the semantic habit is still appropriate in a very functional sense:
we, pragmatically defined, are still a functional part of the causal chain. One merely needs to re-
designate some properties in order to make semantic room for our causal interaction, for
example, as metaphor. This may prove difficult to habituate conceptually or it may even prove to
be unnecessary, if our language evolves with our shifting consciousness over time.
There is an analogous problem with moral language couched in the context of religious
framing to the point where they are commonly conflated. For example, a spiritual person is
considered to be one who is ethically attentive; a soulful person is one who is considered to be
empathetic, etc. Ill hit on the language problem a bit more throughout the challenges below, but
whats important to remember is that even if our subconscious mind chooses, changes, or
deliberates before we are consciously aware of it, it is still a pragmatically defined us making
decisions within the causal process. Linguistic concerns about orgination in the context of both
identity and responsibility will be addressed. Moving on
209
You never really change like they say; you only become more like yourself
- Janes Addiction795
I want to make an important distinction between two different views of predisposition,

and it is the central point of this book. I can make an analogy for each view. The difference is
between tunnels and tracks. If we imagine that we are ever tunneling through our lives in the
world like rodents or ants in the earth, we can imagine that we would prefer to travel in any
already existing tunnels that we would happen to come upon. More often than not, these would
facilitate our tasks and wed use them. So, even though these tunnels would represent tendencies,
they would still be tendencies that are a product of our choices. This tunnels scenario
represents our phenomenal predisposition.
Now consider a scenario where our bodies are trains, on a planet that has a limited
network of tracks that overlap. As it is in life, there are reasons why tracks tend to be directed in
certain directions, from and toward places for one reason or another. Sometimes, these tracks go
to places that we dont prefer to visit like we did when they were first built; consider, for
example, our predispositions for fats, sugars, and salt that kept us alive on the Savannas when
food was scarce (I dont want to ignore the hunger problems that still exist though). And unlike
the tunnels, these tracks are not as forgiving in how much you may divert from where you may
go, and you are limited to crossing points of tracks. This analogy represents our causal
predisposition. Later on, I will revisit this tracks analogy with some modifications to address
some other free will models that have been proposed by philosophers.
The libertarian free will theorist wants to assert that digging or tunneling is an exercise of
our freedom, especially when (or with some philosophers like Robert Kane, only when) there is a
forked path and the choice has a moral imperative. What I am arguing is that the overwhelming
majority of our thought and action is actually much more analogous to the tracks scenario than
it is to the tunnels scenario, because even our phenomenal tunnel preferences seem to be
guided by our causal track limitations; that is, because of the magnetic pull to stay on the tracks.
Its what the Evidences above were all about. For reasons given in the Introduction, the
conscious, phenomenal tunnel preferences experience (which is admittedly sufficiently
redundant to say!) was probably selected for some psychological evolutionary benefits and may
795
Janes Addiction. (2011). End to the lies. Album: The Great Escape Artist. [CD]. LA: EMI
210
continue to have them. Still, our inability to see the tracks underneath our wheels doesnt make
them disappear and we will suffer worse consequences by ignoring them. Ignoring those biased
underpinnings condemns us to the same fate as those who ignore history.
Consider the evidence for right-side bias that we saw in Evidence #18. Again, you
have a clear biaspresumably all creatures, even cockroaches, have this biasfor arbitrarily
favoring one side over another in a typical, everyday binary decision (again, 57% measured for
roaches796). Presuming humans are about 43% to 57% as well, when you consider all the typical
everyday A or B type decisions where your conscious reasoning may have been trumped by just
enough ride-side bias to be considered attributed to that bias, could you honestly say that it
hasnt affected your life in some very important ways? I wont do the calculations, but for
cockroaches, that 7% difference between a 50-50 choice is a matter of life and death, because
apparently pest control experts plan on using this information to more effectively find them and
kill them.797
Admittedly, there are some considerations here, such as about the type of decisions made,
and the statistics work is not as cut and dry as it may seem, but we still cant evade the evidenced
percentage of right side bias that remains after all this. And just because a more reasoned
decision may be better able to evade something like a quickly chosen handedness bias (it actually
doesnt, but for the sake of argument), there are other biases evidenced to affect long term goals
and more reasoned decisions even more strongly, as we saw in the Evidences and will discuss
more in the section Endurance and Identity.
So here we are on the Midnight Special. And now when someone says, Youre on the
right track, you can think of it as loaded wordplay that evokes something important about the
way the world actually is: theres the right track and theres the track thats left. That is to say,
we might know which track goes right and which track goes left, but we still dont know which
track is the correct track, even if, and partially because we more often prefer to think that the
right track is the right track.
We might be tempted here to consider the work of George Lakoff and John Bargh
presented in the Introduction and in several Evidences above showing strong metaphorical
semantic priming influence in neural encoding. For example, warm hands predicting warm
796
Meyers, C. (12/10/2010). ScienceShot: Cockroaches Prefer Right Turns. Scienceshot. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2010/12/scienceshot-cockroaches-prefer.html
797
Ibid.
211
thoughts, heavy/serious, rough/difficult, etc.hard and soft furniture even highly
predicted hard and soft opinions of those people sitting on it.798 We might presume that
perhaps we prefer the direction right because we prefer to be right (as in correct), but that
even insects have this right-side propensity gives us reason to think otherwise, or if it is like it is
with so many other encoded metaphors, it may make humans even more likely to go right than
insects. Last, it might be that our propensity for the direction right is what originally inspired the
usage of the word right to mean correct etymologically. Unfortunately, Im unable to
confirm the history of that word and as Bargh tells us, some of these metaphors are hard-wired,
but others are learned early in life or merely unconsciously suggested. Its the big picture of so
many tracks of predisposition that we ride upon in nocturnal oblivion that should concern us
most.
Fine, you say, continuing in the bigger metaphor, then Ill always pull the switch that
puts me on the left track! Which is like saying, Whatever my nonconscious self desires, since
it is fundamentally arbitrarily biased and therefore unreasonable, Ill do the opposite; that way,
Ill always be right er, correct! But its still problematic, because sometimes even a biased
heuristic can be accidentally right, and the idea that we will just go against the grain in order to
get freedom is something that philosophers have criticized as... well, reactionary. Youre no freer
than before and now youre consigning yourself to a disposition of reactance (Evidence #32).
Its also the kind of thinking that underpins much religious thinking, from body and
world denying monotheistic religions to body and world denying eastern religions. In this
context, establishing it as a principle, its called asceticism. Cosmic reactance has been addressed
by philosophers not only in the context of religion, but in secular thinking. I dont mean secular
in the sense that if we reversed asceticism to deny our denial (double-reverse psychology!), wed
end up with hedonism but I guess we would and that could be considered a principle too!
Body trumps/denies spirit.
Another version of cosmic reactance in the secular sense was under Nietzsches radar. He
considered working or playing in that deeply hypnotic creative space, when you lose all track of
time, to be the most divine state that humans can participate in (psychologists often call it
flow). So much so that he framed it in metaphysical opposition to the reactionary disposition,
798
212
with the implication that this creation energy is imbued with well, he isnt clear, but he frames
it divinely (i.e. as Dionysian), implying a godish creation power to some extent (obviously he
was an atheist, so to a very limited extent) and many artists of all types have this intuition that the
psychological space of flow does offer or alter possibility in a unique way. There certainly is a
salient contrast with the everyday pedestrian, Yes sir. No sir. EAT WORK SLEEP OBEY.
Creation energy; I love it. I can get lost with my guitar for hours and hours. It may be
the truly greatest space a head can be in, right up there with love, success, and other
physiological drugs, but here Id depart from the idea that flow is somehow in metaphysical
contrast to a kind of reactionary disposition sympathetic to fatalistic puppetry. Id suggest,
rather, that perhaps flow isnt a special phenomenal freedom, but a heightened exploratory
awareness with a complete surrender to the cosmic play of both randomness and non-
randomness.
As I have already argued in the Introduction, awareness is not freedom, and as we shall
see, neither randomness nor non-randomness offer anything like libertarian freedom either. Yet
the combination of the three is sufficient for a kind of phenomenally ecstatic experience without
having to posit supernatural metaphysical freedom. I will talk about both flow and reactance
more in depth in the sections Emergent Phenomena, The Cogito Model, Functionalist Illusions,
and Responsibility (where perhaps most importantly, well see that reactance seems to be an
exaptive feature of the same mechanism that provides Responsibility).
I am having a little fun with metaphysical speculation here, but to get back on track(!),
this book is intended to be of a more practical nature, concerned with the consequences of
empirically observed issues of control and epistemology that arent as easy to dismiss on those
grounds. Of all the deciding factors in your typical conscious decisions, there are often arbitrary
predispositions that youre not considering. This might seem like a trivial proclamation from
Captain Obvious, but identifying biased underpinnings and keeping them in our awareness is not
trivial in the least, especially when considering how their mere existence should inform and
qualify your worldview. I will continue to allude to these implications repeatedly throughout the
Challenges, as I did throughout the Evidences.
213
CONFUSING VARIETIES OF DETERMINISM
It has been noted by many determinists799,800 that free will proponents often make the
mistake of confusing determinism with what philosopher Daniel Dennett would call local
fatalism and have only a vague understanding of what determinism and contra-causal free will
really mean consequentially (and/or they refuse to acknowledge different types). Dennett
describes these people as perceiving as if they have no contribution to the outcome of choice,
such as when a person jumps off a bridge, and while in the air wonders whether he should jump
or not. Of course, it is too late in this case, but, as he defends, most deterministic choices do not
fall into this camp.801
The distinction we need to make, filing away randomness for a moment to make a point,
is that a determinists actions and decisions, even though determined by antecedent causes, can
affect an outcome, while for the fatalist, ones actions cannot affect a predetermined outcome.
And THAT is the kicker: a predetermined outcome, as in, pre-known or predestined or
fated. The fatalist needs a positive prediction in their epistemic domain with which to work.
Determinists are in the realm of unknown outcomes that are causally affected, while fatalists,
also in the realm of causally affected outcomes have a particular, known, declared outcome to
meet, or to hopelessly try to avoid.
P. F. Strawson wrote that the identification of the will with the act [] is compatible
with the truth of the determinist thesis.802 Determinism does not necessarily mean that you dont
have any local control. Arguably, determinism is only fated in the weaker sense that when all
the contingent forces are at play subconsciously, we are only made aware of the limited
remainder of options (if more than one) made for the final executive decision, summed up and
experienced consciously. The philosopher Paul Russell writes:
799
Warburton, N. (Interviewer), Russell, P. (Interviewee). (12/30/2010). Philosophy Bites podcast: Paul Russell
on Fate. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://philosophybites.com/2010/12/paul-russell-on-
fate.html
800
Johnson, D., Ridley, B. (Interviewers), Beahan, J., (Interviewee), Galen, L., Fletcher, D. (Commentators).
(6/7/2010). Reasonable Doubts podcast: RD Extra: Jeremy's appearance on the Don Johnson Radio Show.
[Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://itunes.apple.com/podcast/reasonable-doubts-
podcast/id266671828
801
Dennett, D. (1984). Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Oxford: Clarendon Press
802
Strawson, P.F. (1962). Freedom and Resentment. Reprinted in Strawson, P.F. (ed.) 1968. Studies in the
Philosophy of Thought and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [p. 2]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/06-07/Phil285/readings/Freedom&Resentment.pdf
214
Compatibilists and incompatibilists, evidently, conceive of fate in quite different terms.
For the compatibilist, a person is subject to fate only if their circumstances are such that
they are unable to causally contribute to the course of events in some relevant
respect.[803] [Emphasis mine].
Russell goes a bit farther than Dennett in one sense, making the case that there are some
significant elements of fatalism that can (must) be conceded by compatibilists, and yet still he
argues that agents may be legitimately held responsible in circumstances where they are subject to
fate.804 The eminent naturalist philosopher and determinist Tom Clark writes, compatibilists
endorse a notion of non-consequentialist desert that as far as I can see can only be justified on a
libertarian, essentially supernaturalist construal of moral agenthood.805 Whether this is true of
Russells notion of responsibility, called the responsibility-compatibilist claim, is in question,
though just about every professional determinist and compatibilist thinks theyve found a way
out of the responsibility problem... and maybe they have. In the section on Responsibility, Ill
discuss why some philosophers think determinism doesnt negate responsibility.
Its as if a devil says, Non-conscious elements create a fundamental character that makes
even our conscious planning determined. Then an angel says, but we are also still
*interacting* with the external world in a way that we, ourselves, are a *part* of that causal
expression, captured in conscious results from the contingent process of our mental life that
*experiences the confrontation of forces*. We can and do causally influence choice from
within Then the devil says, but if strong predispositions create a fundamental basis for our
decisions, then even those crumbs of conscious decision are predisposed to a predictable extent
that is often much better than chance. Then the angel says, So there are some unpredictable
elements of human behavior. You wont ever know what all the causal factors are in the human
decision-making process. Then the devil says, Is there any good reason to think that those are
803
Russell, P. (1998). Compatibilist-Fatalism. University of British Columbia. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/prussell/Journals/Fatalism%20Final.pdf
804
Warburton, N. (Interviewer), Russell, P. (Interviewee). (12/30/2010). Philosophy Bites podcast: Paul Russell
on Fate. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://philosophybites.com/2010/12/paul-russell-on-
fate.html
805
Clark, T. (3/23/2008, at 01:37 PM). Why reading defenses of hard determinism makes people morally
worse. [Web log comment]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://gfp.typepad.com/the_garden_of_forking_pat/2008/02/why-reading-def.html
215
something other than a problem of our epistemic limitations, when we keep improving
predictability and narrowing the gap over time?
This dialogue shows how a fatalistic devil is contrasted with an angel that can be
viewed as predispositionalistic, deterministic, compatibilistic, and/or even libertarian at this
point. In every comparison between fatalism vs. predispositionalism, determinism,
compatibilism, and libertarianism, you can see how fatalism differs, because fatalism doesnt
allow for causal interaction of the agent (says the human). Now, if the angel were to continue on
as a compatibilist or libertarian, it might reply to the devils closing point with, Maybe. That
depends upon what is actually happening in the decision making process. Maybe metacognition,
emergence, and/or randomness at some stage within the decision making-process make enough
of a difference. The predispositionalist and determinist will say, Those are rational rejoinders,
to which we should keep an open mind, but in light of the science, those reasons still do not have
enough merit to stand as a default position. I admit this thought-exercise uses a broad brush that
fails to capture the nuance of many position.
So fatalism denies even local control. Local control is the extent of our freedom, and
that is only perceived freedom, both because we dont realize what is actually possible and
because we dont know the ratio of sub-control in every actioneven the extent to which we can
characterize it as the agenda of our subconscious software. Perhaps one could say that we are
only up to our neck in the Styx. As Tom Clark puts it, by being embedded in the causal matrix
[rationality and desire] inevitably have their effects, and a strong, skillfully pursued desire can
have far-reaching effects indeed.806 This is different than having a literal or proverbial gun to
your head for each decision, as fatalism is often characterized, because we are both part of the
process of change and unaware of the outcome. As it has been noted by determinists,807 our will
itself is determined both consciously and subconsciously; that is, partially in the context of a
conscious ignorance of most of those contingent forces. So for us, there is a balance of causality
and our interaction within that causality; interaction does not negate the causality, it participates.
Again, Clark writes:
806
Clarke, T. (7/1998). The Flaw of Fatalism. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from
http://www.naturalism.org/fatalism.htm
807
Beahan, J., Galen, L., Fletcher, D. RD69 Determinator 4 - Rise of the Machines. [Audio podcast]. (24:45-
104:45). Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://itunes.apple.com/podcast/reasonable-doubts-
podcast/id266671828
216
People and their wills arent disempowered when we explain them in terms of antecedent
causes. Just as my antecedents, genetic and environmental, had the causal power to create
me in all my glory, I too have causal power to influence the world. So dont forget about
me. You cant logically attribute power to the world and not to the agent...[808]
When all the plastic balls in a lotto machine are facing in just so directions and then the
air machine is turned on and the air pressure moves at just such a speed in just so directions for a
specific amount of time and then the numbers come out in some particular order if you were to
repeat all of those contingencies in just the same way, the same result would recur. Science aims
to map out what is consistent in this scenario and it is able to do so with precision when all or the
overwhelmingly majority of the variables are known. This is why the technology all around you
works. But the more we are able to map out the variables of the human mind, the more
predictable that is too this is what makes fatalism appealing.
Is the lotto machine example analogous to human causality internally? If all the
contingent internal variables were just so again in the mind, would we do the same again? Not
quite. Why? Because the human mind is not an obligate (closed) system like the lotto machine is.
It is facultative. As it has been shown in the Evidences (see Evidence #27), our minds have
mirror neurons that necessarily incorporate the external world, so context is fundamentally
relevant to the mind at any given moment.
If the context were exactly the same as the lotto ball machine internally and externally
would we do/think the same as before? I think there is evidence that it would (consider
Evidence #3), but that seems like a very difficult, if not impossible proposition to ever
deliberately test for conclusively, and we may never rule out the angels final objections, even if
we decide to default away from them, using a methodological causality.
First and perhaps most obviously, wouldnt an aging body be different from second to
second, with millions of cells constantly dying and constantly replaced, and with old memories
falling away and new thoughts shaping a new mind in an exponentially new context? Its true
that we usually dont change that much from second to second, but it would seem to be enough
to thwart exact predictability. The amnesiac in Evidence #3 is probably about as close as we
Clark, T. (3/2008). Dont Forget About Me: Avoiding Demoralization by Determinism [Web log post].
808
Retrieved on 9/21/2012 from http://www.naturalism.org/demoralization.htm
217
will getclose enough to be eerieand most importantly for this work, still close enough to
show enduring predispositions.
Should we consider that what endures beyond both determinacy and acausality is
therefore actually a free will or an acausal spirit? The evidence that cognitive biases are often
consistent across race, gender, and age (e.g. see Evidence #4), and yet are often irrespective
of immediate context (e.g. see Evidence #18) or even consciousness (e.g. see Evidence #1)
evidences body based predisposition and Internalism. So, given the evidence for particular biases
and heuristics in this book, the lotto ball machine as an analogy for causality in thought would be
more accurate if the machine had some reason to favor certain numbered balls over others, such
as that all the balls were not equal and their size or weight made them more likely to drop, just as
certain thoughts are more appealing consciously or unconsciously, based upon physical
connections to certain conscious or unconscious desires. Even if there is some kind of random
influence in the mixing of the balls, some kind of non-randomized filter at the end of the process
would be more accurate (and the analogy holds for biological evolution in general as well). As
statisticians De Veaux, Velleman, and Bock tell us, Its not easy being random.809
Weve seen in the Evidences that not only are we compelled toward one thought/action or
another by so many forces that we are not aware of, but that these are non-conscious tendencies
that seem to be running on software that is only more or less assailable, if and when it is
assailable at all, by a responsive veto driven feedback loop in our awareness towards a kind of
re-habituation over time. Is this free will? No, its rewriting the software from within the
software. Or if you prefer to frame it as Nietzsche expressed it: becoming is stamped with the
character of being.810 We are process. Separating the two is a metaphysical false dichotomy.
In ontology (the study of being), there are ordered hierarchical categories of being that
supervene upon one another. This is to say that social groups supervene upon living beings
which supervene upon cells which supervene upon molecules, etc. Here is the visual link to that
809
De Veaux, R. D., Velleman, P. F., Bock, D. E. (2012). Stats: Data and Models (3rd Edition). Boston, MA:
Pearson Education, Inc.
810
Heidegger, M. (1991). Nietzsche. (D.F. Krell, Trans. Vol. 2, Ch. 26, p. 202). San Francisco: Harper and
Row. (Original work published 1954). Retrieved 9/21/2012 from
http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Courses/Spinoza/Texts/Martin%20Heidegger%20-
%20Nietzsche's%20Fundamental%20Metaphysical%20Position.htm
218
illustration:811 At first, it may be easier think of it as social groups are made from living beings
which are made from cells which are made from molecules, etc. Each category must
fundamentally have everything necessary to produce the next category. If all the elements are
represented in a statement of supervenience, then we can say that, for example, cells obtain
supervenience upon (are a product of) molecules (and only molecules). Again, for something to
obtain, the category it supervenes upon must provide all it needs to exist. This will become
important to remember later.
When it comes to the philosophy of mind, we want to know if the mind supervenes upon
neuronal activity in the brain. Philosophy of mind internalists say it does, but philosophy of
mind externalists, such as those who believe that the spirit is separate from the body (i.e.
substance dualists), say it doesnt. They say that the body supervenes upon the spirit/mind. I have
shown evidence here that, to my mind, vindicates the philosophy of mind internalists in this
respect: the mind is what the brain does. Its a bit more complicated than that though, as
predispopsitionalism does incorporate the external internally (e.g. via mirror neurons), so the
classic internal/external categorical definitions are not as clean as I would like.
Later, Ill talk a little more about emergent phenomena and the possible implications for
free will and predisposition via quantum randomness, but first, lets consider contra-causal
libertarian free will in the context of theism.
811
Levels of existence. (N.D.). Available on 9/21/2012 at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Levels_of_existence.svg
219
DETERMINISM AND THEISM
What I mean to impress upon you is that what is so important about the evidence in this
book has implications about our worldviews that cannot be ignored, because it shows that we are
fundamentally disproportionally challenged in our abilities to understand, calculate,
communicate, love, resist, desire, and perhaps most importantly for this section, to obey. This
means that some umbrella type rules and laws can often be inappropriate. Unfortunately, many
theistic worldviews operate under the premise that everyone gets the same fair shot at proving
they are good persons and a one size fits all list of rules is just fine. Its a consequence of the
notion that the body is a puppet for the spirit; that the kinds of biases in this book are either
mistakes of science or they are freely chosen tunnels. That is to say that they are considered
connections to predispositions, but they are merely descriptions of what people choose, because
there are consistently good reasons to choose them that push the ratios beyond chance.
The differences between determinist/compatibilist philosophers are often problems in
standardizing terminology; they still agree that empirical evidence roots their views and that
there are constraints upon our freedom. Free will proponents are often not able to explain how
free will works empirically or produces agential control needed for morality, known as the
responsibility objection, nor satisfy all three necessary parameters listed in the Introduction (i.e.
ability to do otherwise, meaningful reasons for action, and proper origin). Many theistic free
will advocates have a difficult time grasping why superficial locally fatalistic presumptions are
really a mischaracterization of determinism. Sometimes it seems, by accompanying appeals to
supernaturalism and appeals to ignorance/possibility, that there may really be a more
fundamental itinerary in their position required by consistently harmonizing an ancillary
worldview (i.e. theological commitments).812
In some forms of theism, such as Christianity, we often hear about biblical support for
predestinationwhich is really a form of fatalism, except that it allows for causal participation
and responsibility somehow. Some say the agent is not responsible for their fate, since they
had no choice, and the origin of every action can always be traced beyond the self. The
812
podcast/id266671828
220
predestined agent is usually portrayed as necessarily contributing to their fate and so is still
responsible.
While there is a genuine difference concerning epistemology in predestination and
determinism, that is, predestination is known to some extent, determinism is not, the two are also
often delineated by many theists in terms of function, because predestination still allows for
causal participation and responsibility. Though there are epistemological differences and
predestination still allows for causal interaction, theological predeterminism still has the causal
problems of determinism in the context of predispositions for behavior built in too. The chain of
causality must be acknowledged pertaining to action. The situation is analogous to when
creationists erroneously delineate between microevolution and macroevolution in function rather
than measure, but they are the same thing in reality. The same process that makes bacteria evolve
in the short term makes larger creatures evolve over the long term.
This is where substance dualism theology saves the day and allows for a kind of
predeterminism that sometimes retains libertarian free will and is seen as a-okay, as long as some
god is in control or is the only one who gets to see the future and hence, be in control of it. Now
we have a spirit that can be causally independent of the material body, which allows for non-
causal choices and preserves free will and still allows for the prophetic action of a god, who can
willfully and temporarily steps in and out of the causal chain when it wants to take a peek (or
whatever it wantswith gods, for many people, anything goes). But without dualism,
predestination could not be salvaged from fatalism. I will briefly address the implausibility of
dualism here and more thoroughly later in the section The Causal Vacuum. Religious
philosophers have put way too many versions of free will accommodating gods on the market to
discuss here, from barely deistic to hyper-personal, and since most of the claims are unassailable
by their supernatural nature, I only address it here briefly in the most general ways that theism is
understood.
Many theists of most varieties do advocate free will today.813 For example, go-to
Christian apologist J.P. Moreland analogizes the miraculous freedom of the spirit with Aristotles
prime mover cosmological argument for the existence of god, a first mover is not subject to
laws in its initiation of action. Since such an initiation is a first, spontaneous, action not caused
813
Carey, J. & Paulhus, D. L. (2009, July). Are Free Will and Determinism Incompatible? Poster presented at
the 1st Annual meeting of the Association for Research in Personality, Evanston, IL. Retrieved on 9/22/2012
from http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~jcarey/ARP_Poster_FAD.pdf
221
by a prior event, it amounts to the absolute origination of initiatory movement814 Other
Christians go a less supernatural route; the well-known theistic physician-geneticist Francis
Collins argued against determinism thusly:
You're talking about genetic determinism, which implies that we are helpless marionettes
being controlled by strings made of double helices. That is so far away from what we
know scientifically! Heredity does have an influence not only over medical risks but also
over certain behaviors and personality traits. But look at identical twins, who have
exactly the same DNA but often don't behave alike or think alike. They show the
importance of learning and experienceand free will. I think we all, whether we are
religious or not, recognize that free will is a reality.[815]
Ill address the kind of causal claims made by J.P. Moreland later in the section, The
Causal Vacuum, but Ill point out now that Dr. Collins is crucially remiss in his statement above.
As Collins correctly implied, the genome does a whole lot more than just code for protein.816 Its
true that I am arguing that our mental properties supervene on our physical properties, and as I
mentioned above, I guess you could say that I am a philosophy of mind internalist and Collins is
a philosophy of mind externalist/dualist (though, again, predispositionalism internally
incorporates the external world in ways we dont often realize as well, so the language is not
appropriate really), but the crucial point here is that developmental factors in the unique
experience of each individual twin interacting with the world in different contexts actually
physically change (i.e. rewire) their neurological connections and set up unique
neuronal/physiological predispositions for each twin so that they are no longer physically
identical internally. Thus, the notion that their supposedly identical physicality attached to
different personalities disproves determinism is false.
As I noted above, in order to obtain ontological supervenience, the category that an order
supervenes upon must provide all that it needs to exist. The flavor of vanilla does not obtain
814
Moreland, J.P. (2009). The Recalcitrant Imago Dei Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism. (p. 47).
UK: SCM Press.
815
Horgan, J. 2007. Francis Collins: The Scientist As Believer. National Geographic. 211: 36. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0702/voices.html
816
Pennisi, E. (9/5/2012). Human Genome Is Much More Than Just Genes. ScienceNow. Available on
9/22/2012 at http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/09/human-genome-is-much-more-than-
j.html?ref=em
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supervenience upon seashells and rock salt, but by vanilla beans and all of the components that
underlie the biological ability to taste. In this case, for there to be identical personalities, the
neurons of the twins themselves would have to be identical in order for the exact same
personality to supervene upon both sets of neural patterns. That means exactly identical
experiences too throughout their whole lives! It would be a category error to say that each
twin could obtain on each others DNA when the neural patterns were not the same. I presume
that Collins would probably not disagree with this, so far, if pressed, but as smart as he is, Im
going to give him the benefit of the doubt and say that the point was belied, rather than missed,
or more charitably, perhaps he doesnt believe in the ever-increasing evidence for the plasticity
of the brain and coding.817
Another point of contention might be whether supervenience itself negates causality. It
doesnt, and I will dismantle that thoroughly in the section Emergent Phenomena. Also, there are
possible stochastic neuronal factors818 to consider as well, which I will discuss further in The
Cogito Model, but all we need to know is that they cant help Collins here. Last, and most
importantly in the context of predispositionalism, even developmental neuronal wiring changes
and/or stochastic neuronal influence, if indeed the latter does occur, are still not guaranteed to
curb more fundamental forms of predisposition. Its a mistake to think that because twins could
have different personalities, that they are also immune to shared cognitive and behavioral biases
any more than they are immune to genetically inherited illnesses (as the famous schizophrenic
Genain quadruplets have shown819). Also, theory of mind philosophers widely accept multiple
realizability, which recognizes that different physical properties can manifest similar mental
states (e.g. a man and a woman can both show happiness).
Collins argument is a low redefinition strawman to imply that all determinists only have
regard for genetic considerations in causal interaction between beings and the world and belies
the significant physical changes internally garnered by their developmental relationship to varied
external causal influence (i.e. external interaction, such as via mirror neurons, as I showed with
817
Michelon, P. (2/26/2008). Brain Plasticity: How learning changes your brain. Sharp Brains. Available on
9/22/2012 at
http://www.sharpbrains.com/blog/2008/02/26/brain-plasticity-how-learning-changes-your-brain
818
Singham, M. (11/12/2010). On free will-4: The implications of modern physics for determinism. [Web
log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://machineslikeus.com/news/free-will-4-implications-modern-
physics-determinism
819
223
the unsuitability for the obligate lotto ball machine as an analogy for facultative causality in the
mind above). Moving on
Another claim that Christian theologians have commonly defended is that only libertarian
free will can satisfy God in our relationship to him. The freer we are, the more God enjoys our
triumph over evil (when we do triumph). Sounds reasonable, right? In fact, it is so important that
its what prevents him from interfering with all the profound suffering in the world.
Philosopher Stephen Maitzen820 has pointed out that if there is some kind of intrinsic
value that makes free will trump suffering in value, then the consequence of this position is that
God will not prevent the suffering of, say, infants who die of bone cancer. Indeed, religious
apologists also commonly tout the soulbuilding value of suffering itself in order to bolster
Gods clemency, but forget or belie that it often happens to children not even at the age of
reason. Maitzen, and others, have also pointed out that there are plenty of examples in the bible
of God interfering with peoples free will, sending lying spirits/prophets (1 Kings 22:23, 2
Chron. 18:22, Ezek. 14:9); intentionally creating confusion and delusion (2 Thes. 2:11, Jer. 4:10,
20:7); as well as the example of God interfering with the free will of Pharaoh in Exodus 14 when
he hardens his heart, so that he is unable to be merciful. The Apostle Paul even speaks of Gods
propensity to harden hearts in Rom. 9:18, Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have
mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth [emphasis mine].
Last, Maitzen notes that even we are often obliged to interfere with peoples free will all
the time. It makes very little sense, in light of the bible verses above, that God would not
interfere with, say, a child molesters free will, by creating some influence in the womb to make
him/her not sexually predisposed to that kind of crime, while still expecting usin fact,
obligating us, to interfere with a child molesters free will. J.L. Mackie even wrote about
interfering with free will as an argument against the coherency of Gods divine attributes in the
Problem of Evil:
if mens wills are really free this must mean that even God cannot control them, that is,
that God is no longer omnipotent. It may be objected that Gods gift of freedom to men
does not mean that he cannot control their wills, but that he always refrains from
820
Muehlhauser, L. (Interviewer)., Maitzen, S. (Interviewee). (3/7/2010). Conversations from the Pale Blue Dot
podcast: CPBD 025: Stephen Maitzen Can Theism Ground Morality? [Audio podcast]. [21:55-25:00, 28:30-
29:30]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=7086
224
controlling their wills. But why, we may ask, should God refrain from controlling evil
wills? Why should he not leave men free to will rightly, but intervene when he sees them
beginning to will wrongly? If God could do this, but does not, and if he is wholly good,
the only explanation could be that even a wrong free act of will is not really evil, that its
freedom is a value which outweighs its wrongness, so that there would be a loss of value
if God took away the wrongness and the freedom together. But this is utterly opposed to
what theists say about sin in other contexts. The present solution of the problem of evil,
then, can be maintained only in the form that God has made men so free that he cannot
control their wills [] it remains impossible to hold that an omnipotent God binds
himself by causal or logical laws[821] [emphasis mine].
So, while the subject of freedom and necessity inherent in the nature and actions of God
has taken up volumes of theology, it appears that a good case can be made that his absolute
freedom is not the magic bullet that theists would hope for. Thats no surprise, considering that it
doesnt effectively serve as a magic bullet functionally in human action either, for theists or non-
theists. This is largely because our epistemic limitations force us to shift the primary functional
value, in terms of ascribing responsibility, over to intention. Consider all of the choices we make
where the consequences are exactly the opposite of what was intended, because we were unable
to predict them. So we ask, well, what did we intend to do? and the free will issue is no longer
front and centerin fact, when it comes to Christianity, Jesus showed that sin is purely
intentional anyway. Consider Mat. 5:21-28, where we have already murdered or committed
adultery in our hearts, regardless of being free to act upon such thoughts. I will discuss more
about responsibility specifically near the end of the challenges.
I have already shown that without omniscience, and with cognitive biases, it may
honestly be better to seek to standardize methods of external/offline cognitive processing when
appropriate (e.g. SPRs see Evidences #21, #25). The monotheist may counter that God is the
Ultimate Offline Processor and we must trust the holy books: perhaps our intuition can somehow
skirt our biases if divinely influenced (i.e. divine revelation). Unfortunately, the various sects
often disagree about fundamental issues, so those are no help pragmatically, leaving one to
821
Mackie, J. L. (4/1955). Evil and Omnipotence. Mind, New Series, Vol. 64, No. 254. pp. 200-212. Retrieved
on 9/22/2012 from http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-
4423%28195504%292%3A64%3A254%3C200%3AEAO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2
225
wonder why a salvation plan would be so epistemologically remiss, even for its own adherents.
In any case, believer and non-believer alike, since none of us are omniscient and holy books
leave much to be desired in terms of accessibility to clarification, we can only appeal to what has
worked best up until now, using a meritocratic combination of history, science, and philosophy
as our guide to refine rehabilitation, social engineering, law, etc.
Over the centuries, several models for consciousness have been proposed. The one that
resonates with most theists has been the Cartesian model of dualism proposed by Rene
Descartes:
The dualist paints the picture as follows:
SPIRIT/WILL>CONSCIOUS MIND>UNCONSCIOUS MIND>ACTION
The monist paints the picture as follows:
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL FORCES>UNCONSCIOUS MIND> CONSCIOUS MIND>ACTION[822]
Its unknown whether Descartes was trying to support theological convictions or, as
Noam Chomsky argued,823 he wanted to do something at the level of what Newton did: uncover
an invisible, yet objective reality, detectable by the hard sciences. It is completely understandable
why a theist would want to plug a soul into the free will equation; in the chain of cause and effect
from the dawn of time, doesnt it seem that naturalism has failed to account for the most
important effect of all: the subject? Theists want to not only ask how it is that
physicalism/materialism has produced an organization of material in just such a way that it has
complex qualitative self-awareness, desires, and a life span,824 but why?
These are genuinely motivating questions, but our answers can only go as far as the
evidence implies, based upon how the mind works, always keeping in mind the potential for the
822
Singham, M. (11/12/2010). On free will-5: Models of how the brain works. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://blog.case.edu/singham/2010/11/12/on_free_will5_models_of_how_the_brain_works
823
Chomsky, N., Foucault, M., Elders, F. (1971). Human Nature: Justice versus Power. Noam Chomsky debates
with Michel Foucault. Available at http://www.chomsky.info/debates/1971xxxx.htm on 9/22/2012
824
Kagan, S. (Uploaded by YaleCourses on Oct. 6, 2008). 4. Introduction to Plato's Phaedo; Arguments for
the existence of the soul, Part II. [Video file post]. [27:45-29:40]. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AGXYeV2v5fU&feature=related
226
logical fallacy argumentum ad ignorantiam.825 For this reason, we cannot dismiss dualism out of
hand and must argue based upon reasoning within the scope of relevant evidence that we are
familiar with functionally.
The world of science is fantastic. I mean that it really engenders some great fantasy. For
example, when I observe microscopic images of, say, a large macrophage digesting bacterium in
the body, I imagine that kind of life as also made up of an amalgam of relatively smaller
particles, which may even be considered to be alive or have quasi-life with their own
behaviors (like a virus is considered quasi-alive826), and so on until Im compelled to look in
the other direction and imagine our massive universe to be an unimaginably small particle within
some other massive universe of giant living beings. I fantasize that perhaps these worlds within
worlds can only connect via our thoughts. If our thoughts have such a strong impact upon how
these microscopic entities in our bodies behave (psychoneuroimmunological evidence shows that
it does827), then its not too fantastical to consider that thinking might somehow hold the secret
for how consciousness itself links all the life from all these levels of existence together in some
amazing way. Sci-fi, yes, but not impossible. In an analogous way, I think substance dualism is
like that.
When I was a teenager, I was hit on my scooter by a drunk driver and I spent two years in
casts (and over two decades later I am, as I write this, recovering in bed for seven months from
an osteotomy related to that accident). Upon many occasions, I have thought about physicists
notion of the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,828 or something like it, where,
crudely put, every little possibility splits off and creates a separate alternate reality. I fantasize
that in many worlds, I bounced to the left and died under that car, rather than bouncing to the
right to live. Of course, Im only aware of life in the worlds where I am alive, until the day where
it is not possible to be alive in any of them and I cease to exist. I think substance dualism is
like that.
825
The Argument from Ignorance is erroneously thinking that truth depends upon whether we know if the
premise has been proven false, and if it hasnt, that every competing idea is equally tenable. Its to
erroneously say, You cant prove unicorns dont exist? Then they are as likely to exist as anything else.
826
Villarreal, L. (12/2004). Are Viruses Alive? Scientific American. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=are-viruses-alive-2004
827
Myers, D. (2010). Psychology 9th edition. New York: Worth Publishers. [p. 534-538]. (ISBN 978-1-4292-
1597-8)
828
Vaidman, L. (2008). "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/qm-manyworlds
227
These ideas that I entertain have some evidence-based elements preceding them, which
are bound and bolstered further emotionally, but then they end with some highly speculative
metaphysical leaps. I couldnt say that either case is actually true, and I wouldnt ever try to
convince anyone that they areand I dont really believe either one isbut its pleasurable to
think that they could be true, because they have some basis in fact and a nice internal consistency
on the surface thats fairly unassailable. Thats about as far as I feel I should go with them.
Sometimes in philosophy we can get carried away with fantastical ideas too. They may
seem to be based upon the way the world really is at times and may also seem to have an internal
consistency. Thats a far cry from accepting them as the most plausible default worldview
though, qualifying as an actual belief with the most merit. Actually, the two examples I presented
do appear to have more science behind them than the notion of contra-causal free will, even if
they are inevitably equally implausible because of the concluding speculations. At the end of the
day, these are metaphysical considerations.
Yale philosophy professor Shelly Kagan notes that for the physicalist, the mind is not a
thing that is independent from the brain/body any more than a smile is a thing, independent
from the mouth, teeth, and body. The confusion arises, as a category error, when we are not
careful and we ontologically reify the often used semantic framing of the mind as a noun for
convenience.829 When we look at the example I showed earlier of the ordered hierarchical
categories of being that supervene upon one another (e.g. social groups supervene upon living
beings which supervene upon cells which supervene upon molecules, etc.), there is a point when
we go into mental representations that are only conceptually real. The people in a group are
real, but there is no group floating around in space; its the result of a process and may actually
represent the process. Just like a smile, the mind is really the result of a special process based
upon the ability of the particular combination of physical substance that can support it. In this
case, its a functioning body that the mind supervenes upon. The mind is still a rare and amazing
phenomenon, but not an independent phenomenon.
829
Kagan , S. (Uploaded by YaleCourses on Oct. 6, 2008). 3. Arguments for the existence of the soul, Part I.
[Video file post]. [0:00-8:10]. Available on 9/22/2012 at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GR63MMAi-
fs&feature=relmfu
228
Kagan,830,831 and others,832 have also shown that philosophers as far back as Socrates
have been making the case for dualism using metaphors that can actually be shown to support
physicalism and reject dualism in light of the kind of evidence weve seen in this very book. For
example, in the Phaedo, Socrates character Simmias argues that the physical capacity/condition
of a harp to be harmonious relates to the abstract idea of perfect harmony in a similar, but not
exact, way that a physical body and a mind might also relate commensurately: by degrees of
harmoniousness. If the lyre is soundly constructed and in tune, its capacity for harmony is
great and if it is damaged and out of tune, the opposite is the case. The allusion is that a healthy
body and mind have a similar relationship.
Weve seen that a variation of degrees does exist in the relationship between mind and
body throughout this book in terms of physical health, especially of the brain in particular. This
commensurate relationship has not been observed to exist between a mind and a soul and seems
to be illogical in principle anyway, as the soul is necessarily supposed to represent perfect
harmony, simplicity, singularity, reason, indestructibility, immutability, etc. (its the body that is
imperfect), and not varying degrees of harmoniousness, complexity, destructibility,
reasonability, creativity, morality, etc. Simmias argues that harmony can be destroyed by altering
the physical. Kagan notes that Socrates never really addresses this argument directly (perhaps
because he thinks he has already argued successfully for the soul earlier in the dialogue).833
Here, Socrates, and the dualist, would reply that harmony is not really broken; what is
really broken down in degrees by the destruction of the physical is just our epistemic access to
these perfect entities. In the scientific literature, they could point to a woman identified as AJ,
who has hyperthymestic syndrome.834 This means that she can remember almost everything,
830
Kagan, S. (Uploaded by YaleCourses on Sep. 30, 2008). 8. Plato, Part III: Arguments for the immortality
of the soul (cont.) [Video file post]. [24:00-end]. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&v=oJzGgp-hoKc&NR=1
831
Kagan, S. (Uploaded by YaleCourses on Oct. 6, 2008). 9. Plato, Part IV: Arguments for the immortality of
the soul (cont.) [Video file post]. [6:00-20:00]. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=borZuyV0uk8&feature=relmfu
832
Strain, D.T. (2006). Simmias' Harmony Socrates Arguments For A Distinct Soul Dissected. [Web log
post]. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://humanistcontemplative.blogspot.com/2008/05/simmias-harmony.html
833
Kagan, S. (Uploaded by YaleCourses on Sep. 30, 2008). 8. Plato, Part III: Arguments for the immortality
of the soul (cont.) [Video file post]. [24:00-end]. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&v=oJzGgp-hoKc&NR=1
834
Marshall, J. (2/16/2008). Forgetfulness is Key to a Healthy Mind. New Scientist. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19726431.600-forgetfulness-is-key-to-a-healthy-mind.html
229
including uncanny details. How is this so? Doctors cant explain it, but the dualist can: her
physical nature allows her perfect epistemic access to it.
But is this really so? How can it be so in any meaningful way when it comes to the
retrieval of personality supposedly located offsite in a soul? As we have seen throughout this
book, the way we interact with the world is influenced by the physical in real time and the way
we act is what defines who we are. In the case of AJ, she doesnt know what she hasnt learned
either. THAT would be evidence for substance dualism. Humanist blogger DT Strain has
noted835 that evidence like the Libet study and genetic propensities (and I would add the other
evidence Ive presented) shows that the body leads the mind and not vice versa, and the principle
of parsimony should guide us not to invent superfluous parameters when we dont need them.
Whether a brain, a body, or a harp (as noted in the Introduction, today, computers, AI,
and robots would be better analogies), the difference between measure and kindbetween
quality rather than quantity has also been overlooked. The Platonist might contend that every
difference in quality is merely a difference in quantity; for example, in music, a unique
dissonance quality is empirically verifiable between any two notes in terms of quantity by the
number of waves in the frequency. But the quality of the harmony that predisposes/influences
our choices and perspectives is itself in the quality of the physical substrate/wood, the tension in
the strings, and integrity of the intonation. In the context of predispositionalism, as I have
defined it, it may necessarily reflect external context in its identity to some degree as well (and I
will further argue that in depth in Endurance and Identity). Ultimately, the quality of the brain
and body does affect the quality of the mind.
For example, the timbre of any instrument will be affected interactively by the
environment in which it is played. When a sound is made in a padded room, or with reflective
tile, or underwatereven in the presence of gassesthe timbre and sometimes the pitch itself
will be altered. More generally, we can also point to how the influence of the gradual internal
evolution of aesthetics standards for what one considers harmonious relates to the external
rejection or reinforcement of those standards socially. We up the ante when we become jaded
sensually and become connoisseurs as our baselines of experience shift. This is what
835
Strain, D.T. (2006). Simmias' Harmony Socrates Arguments For A Distinct Soul Dissected. [Web log
post]. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://humanistcontemplative.blogspot.com/2008/05/simmias-harmony.html
230
psychologists call adaptation-level phenomena.836 As it was shown in the Evidences (e.g.
#23, #24), we often thoughtlessly collude non-consciously to like what the in-group likes. I
think that we suppress our fundamentally interactive identity in order to get the psychological
benefits of an illusion of autonomy.
Considering physicalist models, mere humans dont have the luxury of having it all in
hand like the gods donot that theistic or dualistic theories actually explain consciousness
anyway. Even so, naturalists like Dan Dennett, Terrence W. Deacon (who unites evolutionary
theory and information theory in a unique way: as the narrowing of possibility),837, 838 Thomas
Metzinger,839 Francis Crick, and Owen Flanagan,840 to name just a few, have posited interesting
versions of how consciousness may have arisen outside of the dualistic model, but the hard
problem of consciousness is well, hard and everyone has some holes to fill. As Susan
Blackmore notes,841 its very difficult to avoid getting locked into the Cartesian Theatre. And
that we still have not been able to create life from inorganic matter shows how far we have to go
validating any of their premises empirically, though progress is being made.842,843,844,845 As for
cognitive science, neuroscientist Mark Hallett has this to say about consciousness as we know it
now:
836
Adaptation-level phenomenon. (N.D.). Psychology Glossary online. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://www.psychology-lexicon.com/cms/glossary/glossary-a/60-adaptation-level-phenomenon.html
837
Deacon, T. W. (2011). Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. New York: W. W. Norton
and Company. Available on 9/22/2012 at http://anthropology.berkeley.edu/content/incomplete-nature-how-
mind-emerged-matter
838
839
Clark, T. (5/2009). Consciousness Revolutions: Review of The Ego Tunnel by Thomas Metzinger. [Blog file
post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.naturalism.org/metzinger.htm
840
Clark, T. (8/2002). Review: The Problem of the Soul Two Visions of the Mind and How to Reconcile Them
by Owen Flanagan. [Blog file post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.naturalism.org/reviews.htm#Flanagan
841
842
Marshall, M. (8/15/2011). First life: The search for the first replicator. Issue 2825. Retrieved on 9/22/2012
from http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21128251.300-first-life-the-search-for-the-first-
replicator.html?full=true
843
Scientists take first step towards creating 'inorganic life.' (9/12/2011). Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-09-scientists-inorganic-life.html
844
Wogan, T. (1/7/2011). Can a Simple Model Explain the Advent of Cells? Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/01/can-a-simple-model-explain-the-a.html?etoc
845
Overbye, D. (7/28/2011). Its Alive! Its Alive! Maybe Right Here on Earth. New York Times. A1.
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/28/science/28life.html?pagewanted=all
231
Parietal and frontal areas maintain a relatively constant bidirectional communication. It is
likely that this network of structures includes the insula. Within this network, with
activation as well of the global neuronal workspace, the perception of volition is
generated. The sense of agency comes from the appropriate match of volition and
movement feedback, likely centered on the parietal area.[846]
We are beginning to better map out networks and where more and more specific
conscious phenomena originate but clearly there is more work to do to flesh out a working
model, let alone a testable one. Still, since we can tenably start with the evidenced causality
pertaining to physical material, the challenge for the theist is to show how, even if they could
produce unassailable reasons why, the physical transcends the causal, because all the evidence
collected here shows us that the mind really is what the brain does (as it has been said ad
nauseam by naturalists); that our mental properties supervene on our physical properties. And if
the mind and the spirit are not the same thing then Houston, we have a problem, because
theres just no way to evidence any distinction between the two. Okay, never say never, maybe
someday a soundly designed out of body experience experiment will vindicate the dualist.
While the subjective experience of free will is surely the most salient reason for its
survival,847 the tradition of contra-causal free will is often strongly perpetuated by some religious
prejudice that requires it, and may even be a necessary byproduct of ethical and/or metaphysical
harmonizing of texts and tenets in the evolution of the doctrine in question. This, along with a
western tradition that focuses on individuals, rather than in the East, where societies tend to be
more collectivist/holistic and determinism is more prominent, is why it is so difficult for
determinism to be the dominant paradigm.
846
Hallett, M. (4/26/2007). Volitional control of movement: the physiology of free will. Clin Neurophysiol. 2007
June; 118(6): 11791192. doi: 10.1016/j.clinph.2007.03.019. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://ukpmc.ac.uk/articles/PMC1950571/reload=0;jsessionid=11527EC4E7318AA3C369E43489462EE4
847
Aarts, H., and van den Bos, K. (2/11/2011). On the Foundations of Beliefs in Free Will Intentional Binding
and Unconscious Priming in Self-Agency. Psychological Science. February 11, 2011, doi:
http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/02/10/0956797611399294
232
As noted by the deterministic podcasting professors at Reasonable Doubts,848 by
dropping the illusion of dualism, we also find it makes more sense pragmatically to encourage
healthy practices like decentering,849 which is the common result of meditation, and is one way
to practice observing our internal dialogue. When we realize that we are not independent
unimpressionable souls, but actually interactive agents intertwined with an environment that is
constantly impressing unconscious behavioral and cognitive biases upon us, we also realize that
we dont need to believe everything we hear in our internal dialogue. We can more readily
employ a healthy skepticism internally and externally that uses empirical evidence and the
scientific method to guide us more reliably.
This is an actual foundation to work from, using, as Daniel Dennett famously put it, the
naturalistic crane of empirical consistency, rather than the sky hook of an arbitrarily
ungrounded ghost in the machine. Determinism is the foundation of the naturalistic world view
in the same way that empirical evidence is the foundation of science, and they are all related to
each other via causality. Even psychology, social science, and history, what some have called the
soft sciences, operate upon the notion that we can learn about ourselves by observing causal
consistency.
The John Templeton Foundation is a well funded organization that seeks to bridge the
gap between science and religion. In 2010, they awarded Florida State University philosopher
and free will expert, Alfred Mele, a $4.4 million grant850 over 4 years to explore the scientific
evidence for and against free will. That the Templeton Foundation was motivated to spend so
much money on this type of research is evidence for how significant the kinds of results in this
book are to many theistic worldviews, though, again, as stated above, not crucial. There are
several religions, including versions of Christianity, which are compatible with the strongest
forms of determinism, even fatalism.
848
Beahan, J., Galen, L., Fletcher, D. (1/15/2009). Reasonable Doubts podcast: RD29 Free Willy vs The
Determinator. [Audio podcast]. [21:30-51:30]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://itunes.apple.com/podcast/reasonable-doubts-podcast/id266671828
849
Winner, J. (10/29/2008). Decenter to Be Centered. [Blog file post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/stress-remedy/200810/decenter-be-centered
850
Big Questions in Free Will: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Investigations. Available on
9/22/2012 at http://www.freewillandscience.com/wp
233
Mele is officially agnostic about the truth of compatibilism and has publically stated,
if [complete predictability] turned out to be true, that would be a threat to free will,851 though
he has debated psychologist Daniel Wegner (see Evidence #2) on the subject of conscious will
in 2009,852 has toyed with several two stage compatibilist and soft libertarian models, and is
more sympathetic to that direction.853 As the Florida State University press release for the grant
puts it, his last book854 was an effort to debunk those claims [that conscious will is an illusion]
and that he falls clearly in the pro-free will camp.
Tom Clark has argued that both the JTF and perhaps Mele are looking to validate
specifically libertarian free will with that money, but no matter how much money one throws at
it, the ultimate results will always be somewhat elusive and susceptible to moving the goalpost:
what sorts of findings about the brain would suggest that it has a capacity to make
contra-causal choices? Libertarian freedom asks a lot: it requires that given the complete
and total macro- and microscopic situation, including the agent herself, she could have
done otherwise but for some reason did not. If the total situation contains that reason, to
specify it would necessarily limit the contra-causal freedom of the agent by showing why
a particular choice was made. If the situation doesn't contain that reason, then the choice
is in some sense arbitrary and inexplicable. It seems likely that further research into the
brain will show why particular choices are made, not that the same exact brain state in the
same exact conditions could produce two or more different choices, something difficult,
perhaps impossible to test for. [855]
851
852
Nurse, P., Wegner, D., Mele, A., Haggard, P. (6/13/2009). Yours to Decide Fate, Free Will, Neither or
Both? N. Y., N. Y. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://worldsciencefestival.com/events/yours_to_decide_fate_free_will_neither_or_both
853
Alfred Mele. (N.D.). Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/mele
854
Mele, A. (2009). Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. Oxford University Press, USA.
855
Clark, T. (4/2010). Knights Templeton on Quest for Causa Sui. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012
from http://www.naturalism.org/roundup.htm#templeton
234
So what has the research uncovered so far? A list of winning studies is available here856
and yes, these do include theological treatments on free will as well. Its difficult, if not
impossible, to be objective about naturalistic foundations when one starts with theological
presumptions, so lets hope they consider this. It must be said that there are plenty of brilliant
philosophers and psychologists represented there who dont have anything to do with religious
advocacy too.
Last, all of the following defenses are often appropriate to varying theistic arguments, but
it must be said here that there are still several prominent western theists in history for whom
versions of strong and soft determinism and/or predeterminism (i.e. fatalism) were doctrinal,
such as John Calvin, Jonathan Edwards,857 Martin Luther,858; in the east, one could see it in
versions of the doctrine of karma in Buddhism, Hinduism, Sikhism, Jainism, etc. There are also
countless pantheists, panentheists, and open theists who are comfortable with determinism.
Were talking millions of theists over time. Like naturalists, they see themselves as an integration
of self and nature that they experience as unique, direct manifestations of the cosmos its just
that they also add a unified Divine teleology into the equation.
As we move through the Challenges, since many of the opponents of determinism are
against it for theological reasons, we will encounter the subject of religion throughout the rest of
this book.
856
Big Questions in Free Will: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Investigations. Available on
9/22/2012 at http://www.freewillandscience.com/wp
857
Wainwright, W. (First published 1/15/2002; substantive revision 8/6/2009). Jonathan Edwards, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/edwards/#2.1
858
The Epitome of the Formula of Concord. (1580). The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Lutheran
Church. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://bookofconcord.org/fc-ep.php
235
AGENT CAUSALITY
It makes sense to me, following Determinism and Theism, to briefly mention agent
causality, which, in its basic form, is at least as old as Aristotle and still enjoys favoritism by
some libertarian philosophers today, especially theistic ones. Its main characteristic is that it is to
be distinguished from event causality, in that its source, the agent, is immanent (as Roderick
Chisholm put it, in the context of an unmoved mover859) and enduring. I mention this after the
last section because many philosopherseven some libertarians 860will argue its really just
one step removed from dualism in what it needs, and as libertarian Robert Kane suggests,
perhaps agent causality needs dualism.861 Also, it really merely stipulates and defines, rather than
does the necessary work at the end of the day. In the section below, The Causal Vacuum, I will
further illustrate some of the problems agent-causality shares with dualism. It should be said now
that predispositionalism sees agent and event causality as a false dilemma, since they are
causally intertwined by internal/external interaction evidenced throughout this book (see
Introduction: Bargh, Evidences #27, #24, #6, The Causal Vacuum, and Endurance and
Identity).
One of the better theistic philosophers is agent-causalist Timothy OConnor. He believes
that agent causality is our best bet because it at least identifies an explainable, unique element in
the causal chains where, perhaps the buck stops.862 He argues that agent causality does more
work than, say, mere simple indeterminism. Simple indeterminism, like classic agent causality,
doesnt accept brain states, for example, as causal explanations (its important to note that
indeterminacy means uncertainty, not acausal or non-causal and that is how I will use it
throughout the book). This is to say that indeterministic reasons, reasons we are unaware
of/uncertain about, are not considered reasons by OConnor because they are not realized.
They are only considered sufficiently causal reasons if they are reasoned out. Sound reasonable?
859
Chisholm, R. M. (1983). Human Freedom and the Self, reprinted in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson. [p. 34].
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
860
Kane, R. (2005). A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. [pp. 57-63]. New York: Oxford University
Press.
861
Ibid. [p. 63].
862
OConnor, T. (2000). Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. [pp. 85-95]. New York: Oxford
University Press.
236
Well, you know where I stand on this. To disregard the kinds of influence on our decisions that
this book describes is to belie too much about their causal influence.
OConnor fears that if he allows things like brain states to count as sufficiently causal,
then because one event can be traced back to another, beyond the agent, we wont be able to
effectively delineate the kind of orgination we need to establish responsibility. And this notion
seems to be central to OConnors overall metaphysical worldview in the context of ultimate
explanation: unless we avoid indeterminstic elements like the influence of brain states and put all
of our eggs into the origination issue basket and plug the hole so responsibility can be ascribed,
then we have an unending supply of mere unsatisfying brute descriptions.863 This is not a
surprising position for any theist. The origination issue by itself is a reasonable objection, and I
will answer that in detail in the section Responsibility, but for now, its enough to see that we
cant discount the effects of arbitrary biases that we saw in the Evidences. OConnors most
recent work864 focuses on the reasonability of a premise that tries to accommodate the varying
degrees of freedom elicited by our intuitions in thought experiments and in empirical research,
but not present in so many current models on all sides.
Most agent-causalists dont accept that certain elements in causal chains/co-emergent
networks like reasons, motives, brain states, and moods are justified as sufficiently causal in
explaining free actions. When most agent-causalists consider actions preceded by intentions,
perhaps preceded by or co-emergent with choices, beliefs, moods, and/or some strange unknown
non-conscious reasons, then moods, reasons, and motives would not be included. Unlike other
agent-causalists, the philosopher Randolph Clarke does accept reasons such as these to be causal
explanations probabilistically (as do I/predispositionalism), and yet he thinks he can somehow
simultaneously salvage agent-causality (I do not). OConnor and Carl Ginet reply that if Clarke
accepts these kinds of factors as causal, then he makes agent-causality superfluous865 (and I
agree).
863
Muehlhauser, L. (Interviewer), OConnor, T. (Interviewee). (4/14/2010). Conversations from the Pale Blue
Dot podcast: 035: Timothy OConnor Theism and Ultimate Explanation. [Audio podcast]. [29:15-46:15].
Available on 9/22/2012 at http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=8047
864
OConnor, T. (2009). Degrees of freedom. Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the
Philosophy of Mind and Action. Volume 12, Issue 2, 2009 DOI:10.1080/13869790902838472 Available on
9/22/2012 at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13869790902838472?journalCode=rpex20
865
Press.
237
Henrik Walter writes, The main argument for the assumption of agent causation, namely
the adequacy of everyday explanations, turns against itself.866 That is to say that the use of
something like foundationalism (i.e. there are self-justifying basic beliefs) falls short when,
according to agent causality, as Walter writes, the definition of the agent may not include any
properties that could be captured by the categories of event causation, like its body, its history,
its natural properties, and so on867 Robert Kane also argues that because modern agent-
causality proponents want to avoid the pitfalls of substance dualism, such as violating natural
laws, requiring a soul, etc., this leaves very little left (what exactly?) to explain how agents are
both motivated to tip the balance between potential choices868 and to explain how the brute fact
that the buck stops with agents isnt as equally unsatisfying as reasons leading to events.
Ironically, the evidences in this book show reasons like brain states carry equal or sometimes
better currency in predicting action. This is what should define a reason; our reason shows it
has causal power. Again, for my purposes, predisposition is all I need.
Gary Watson writes that the agent-causalist merely labels what libertarians need.869 To
say that agency is more satisfying because it is more explanatory becomes less satisfying when
we realize there are still unaddressed reasons (motives, brain states, and moods) hanging in the
remainder of the equation, especially when these reasons are shown to actually do predictive
work in human behavior and elsewhere. The evidence is that they do work and cannot be
ignored. As uncharitable as it may be, we have to consider that someone who would ignore this
kind of evidence has other philosophical commitments.
As somewhat of a side point that should probably be in the religion section, it may also
be noted that in the context of ethics and many versions of Christianity, people themselves hang
in this remainder of the equation that certain theodicies claim god uses to justify free will in
his salvation plan. Jesus unambiguously said that most of us are bound for hell in Matt. 7:13-14.
In terms of presenting an omni-benevolent, let alone merciful Creator, the brute fact of this
exploited remainderthis means to the end hanging in the balance of that handful of believers
that do pass the testseems strikingly unsatisfying to me.
866
(Trans. Cynthia Klohr). Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, [pp. 261-262]. ISBN 0262232146
867
(Trans. Cynthia Klohr). Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, [pp. 262]. ISBN 0262232146
868
Press.
869
Watson, G. (1982). Free Will. [p. 10]. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
238
The issue has nothing to do with free will. It is about the responsibility of god before the
universe was even created whether or not to create the kind of world where most of its
inhabitants would need to be eternally punished, in order to get a few to worship him forever.
Would YOU create such a world knowing these consequences? Wasnt this perfect Trinity
already perfectly satisfied enough to reject using people as means to ends, regardless of whether
they have free will or not? Is a mother who leaves a knife by her infant considered negligent or
do we appeal to the childs free will? Arent humans similarly relatively ignorant enough not to
be responsible in a way that requires eternal punishment? Wouldnt we all choose god if we
knew what he knew? Of course we would.
Again, this complaint is really in the realm of ethics, but I think it is interesting that this
brute fact of leftovers for the theist would not be unsatisfying here in its lack of elegance that
would be expected in a divine plan. Two questions for the theistic agent-causalist are: why
should a specific remainder of souls be more satisfying than an infinite remainder (i.e. in an
infinite multi-verse) and why would there be *this particular number* of remaining agents in the
Divine Agents plan? That is to ask, why would the universe be set up for there to be the *brute
fact* of, say, 7,347,831,603 people going to hell, with, say, 144,000 going to heaven? Even if it
were a nice round number why that number? I bring this up, because it shows that even agency
is only reducible to its own dissatisfying brute facts, so we must look towards what influences
our intuition that favors agency when we appeal to it, taking into account the fallacy of desired
consequence,870 while also considering concepts at the edge of or, in principle, beyond our
epistemic limitations. Moving on
Aristotle said, It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought
without accepting it. To what extent is this actually possible, if the entertained thoughts are
also evolutionarily/physiologically/psychologically preferred? Considering the strong evidence
for our propensity to infer agency in the world (Evidence #23), we would be remiss if we did
not consider that this evidence of anthropomorphism may, in itself, be an example of a brain state
contributing to the emotions, beliefs, and choices of some philosophers in such a way as to tip
the scales in favor of preferring causal-agency as a more satisfying metaphysical brute fact
than something like a TOE (theory of everything), an infinitely regressive multi-verse, a
870
Fallacy: Appeal to Consequences of a Belief. (N.D.). Nizkor Project. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-consequences.html
239
subjective network of physical/physiological grounded internal/external influence (e.g.
predispositionalism), agnosticism, or, as we shall see, other potential ways of starting fresh
causal chains in thinking, such as via quantum stochasticity.
OConnor and some other theistic philosophers (such as Nancey Murphy) rely on the
ability of metacognition (i.e. thinking about thinking) to do some heavy lifting in supplying
freedom metaphysically.871 Later, in the section Responsibility, well see that theyre right that
metacognition is powerful in what it provides us in models of hierarchical selves in terms of
responsibility, but it still falls short in enough crucial ways not to grant the kind of freedom that
libertarians want. This is because metacognition itself cannot not provide free will without
deeply grounded origination or deeply grounded alternative possibility.
Coincidentally, Id like to use metacognition for a thought experiment in the context of
theistic philosophy. Its been shown that philosophers can have their special kinds of biases, such
as how their views change when the mere order of evidence is presented differently.872,873
Considering the Evidences here for the way we deal with intention (see Evidence #4), sacred
values (see Evidence #24), and our predisposition for (divine) agency detection (see
Evidence #23), the way a theistic philosopher turns over ideas in her mind may correlate to an
analogy like the following: imagine a recording studio, where the theistic philosopher sound
engineer sits in a conjoined control booth that looks onto a bigger band room through a window.
I cant help but think of Dennetts criticism of the Cartesian theater here, with a little
homunculus viewing the world, but in this scenario, the analogy is limited to thinking about
thinking (i.e. metacognition). Its not about perception of actual physical representation.
Now imagine the theistic philosopher is in the control room, assembling hypothetical
metaphysical scenarios in the band room (i.e. ideas); she may assemble a scenario that entails a
world with a god in it, represented by a statue of Jesus in the center of the band room, along with
other representations in the room. In order to objectively imagine a scenario/world/concept
871
872
on Experimental Philosophy. [Audio podcast]. (14:00-15:30). Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
873
Schwitzgebel, E., Cushman, F. (2012). Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in
Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers. Mind & Language (2012), 27, 135-153. Retrieved on
240
without a god in it while deliberating, she may temporarily remove the Jesus statue and put it
into the hallway.
Now, the point of some of the evidence in this book is to suggest that it might be a more
accurate analogy to say that even when the theistic engineer puts the Jesus statue in the hallway
to temporarily entertain non-theistic worldview scenarios in the band room there would be
another unrecognized god/agency statue in the control room itself, behind the engineer, that has
influence on her. That is to say that even when we think we are considering hypothetical non-
divine agency scenarios objectively, we still have pervasive agency detection software, intention
biases, and sacred values biases running unnoticed in the background, affecting our intuitions
and (hence) decisions, and that theists in particular are more likely to be neuronally wired to
those representations in a more pervasive way (see Evidence #24), with stronger emotional
agency connections to value judgments, theistic in-group, authority, family, etc.
But what if we recognize that we are sometimes biased to infer agency where it doesnt
exist and there also just happens to really be divine agency in or behind the cosmos anyway? We
would be excluding a fact of the world based upon supposing it to be a bias, when it was really
appropriate on some level. Even if we recognize reasons for a tendency to intuitively favor deism
when the big questions reach a stale mate, it doesnt mean there is no divine agency or some kind
of vague teleological force. This possibility must be conceded with some humility, though it
would be a confusing design to make an agency detector as unreliable as it is, and one that
extends to animals as well. Darwin illustrated this by writing about a guard dog barking at a
curtain moved by the wind.874 This leads to another important question that I will only briefly
consider, if a divine plan is ultimately about behavior, why should there be a mystery element
concerning the existence of the Agent or the Plan at all?
At the end of the day, the more reasonable theistic philosophers like OConnor are
humble enough, as we all should be, to attempt to entertain thoughts objectively in philosopher
mode, even if his particular agency detection wiring may be just enough to tip the scales in
favor of agent causality and motivate him to find philosophical justifications afterwards. Many
laypeople that rely on folk intuitions about agency often are not so inclined to even do that. This
kind of humility may even come down to what it means to have a good education, either in a
874
Mooney, C. (Interviewer), McCauly, R. (Interviewee). (5/5/2011). Point of Inquiry podcast: Robert
McCauley - Why Religion is Natural (And Science is Not). [Audio podcast]. [15:00-16:15]. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://www.pointofinquiry.org/robert_mccauley_why_religion_is_natural_and_science_is_not
241
school or at home, where the academic value standard of honestly trying to reason objectively is
inculcated enough to perhaps have some affect upon the cognitive dissonance in the theist and
non-theist alike. The scientific method that evidences biases like those seen in this book goes a
step further and institutionalizes independent confirmation, motivation to challenge said claims,
as well as still humbly requiring that we never completely close the door on new evidence that
may modify our current models.
242
QUANTUM RANDOMNESS
In his book Quantum Gods,875 physicist Victor Stenger set out to refute the New
Age/liberal theistic exploitation of modern physics. He notes that it has been untenably
appropriated in order to allow for gods and supernatural events/miracles by appeals to, for
example, misunderstood concepts like quantum randomness, as well as the implications of the
indeterminacy in Heisenbergs uncertainty principle. Though I am not a physicist and am merely
going to attempt to treat the concepts of randomness and uncertainty philosophically, should the
utility in the definition of randomness in quantum randomness amount to something other than
the utility in the common definition of randomness that I will be using (thankfully, alleviating the
need for me to understand quantum mechanics), then that needs to be explained how it is
different. As far as I know, that is not and has never been an issue.
It should also be said earlier than later that quantum randomness that breaks up the chain
of global determinism/fatalism is irrelevant to predispositionalism, because predispositionalism
is more concerned about human behavior and (higher) probabilities in human behavior. That
said, there are proponents of free will, both theistic and non-theistic, who do understand the
arguments and genuinely still disagree with actual rebuttals that go beyond merely proposing
misrepresentations of modern physics or determinism, including the argument from ignorance or
miraculous/supernatural explanations.
For example, some highly regarded scientists like Roger Penrose and Martin Heisenberg
(the son of Werner Heisenberg, known for the aforementioned uncertainty principle) have
argued876,877 that there are quantum fluctuations not only in the world, but in the brain, such as in
the release of synaptic vesicles and the opening and closing of ion channels. This is still
controversial, and while they are still the scientific minority, there seems to be increasing
evidence to support it, making it suitable for a more robust kind of free will than classic
determinism or even typical compatibilism allows, though for Penrose and Heisenberg,
apparently not as far as strong libertarian free will.
875
Stenger, V. (2009). Quantum Gods. NY: Prometheus
876
Roger Penrose. (N.D.). [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/penrose
877
Heisenberg, M. (5/14/2009). Is free will an illusion? Nature. 459, 164-165 doi:10.1038/459164a.
243
Heisenberg writes about some observations of a species of small flies called Drosophila
that persuaded him to incorporate quantum stochasticity into his free will model:
The activation of behavioural modules is based on the interplay between chance and
lawfulness in the brain. Insufficiently equipped, insufficiently informed and short of time,
animals have to find a module that is adaptive. Their brains, in a kind of random walk,
continuously preactivate, discard and reconfigure their options, and evaluate their
possible short-term and long-term consequences.
The physiology of how this happens has been little investigated. But there is plenty of
evidence that an animals behaviour cannot be reduced to responses. For example, my
lab has demonstrated that fruit flies, in situations they have never encountered, can
modify their expectations about the consequences of their actions. They can solve
problems that no individual fly in the evolutionary history of the species has solved
before. Our experiments show that they actively initiate behaviour [878] [emphasis mine].
In the introduction, I supplied research that has revealed unconscious implicit

learning.879,880,881 The work of John Bargh and Ezequiel Morsella has also evidenced the
unconscious mind influencing creativity and spontaneous behavior, but most importantly,
theyve given us a tenable picture of the unconscious as perceptual, evaluative, and
motivational and not merely the shadow of a real conscious mind as so many of us have
been led to believe for so long.882 These are evaluations based upon an automatic effect of
superficial features of a person.883 This is information that might have changed Heisenbergs
mind, were he aware of it. Unconscious implicit learning need not be limited to humans.
878
Two-stage models for free will. (N.D.). [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/two-stage_models
879
Fletcher, P. C., Zafiris, O., Frith, C. D., Honey, R. A. E., Corlett, P. R., Zilles, K., & Fink, G. R. (2005). On
the benefits of not trying: brain activity and connectivity reflecting the interactions of explicit and implicit
sequence learning. Cerebral Cortex, 15, 10021015.
880
Frensch, P. A., Rnger, D. (2003). Implicit learning. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 12, 13-18.
881
882
Bargh, J. A., & Morsella, E. (2008). The unconscious mind. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 73-79.
883
A. Bargh. [Video file]. [8:30-10:00]. Available on 9/22/2012 at
244
While Heisenbergs quantum free will model is more refined, as we shall see,
unfamiliarity with difficult quantum randomness has produced folk versions of an unrefined
quantum free will model which implies that the mental processagainthe firing of synaptic
vesicles and the opening and closing of ion channels, has some element possibly analogous to the
Casimir effect. I can only speculate here that information travels inter-dimensionally like/as
quantum particles, either truly random or perhaps mistakenly perceived as undetermined until
they are observed/decided upon. Its hard to know for sure how this model could be coherently
fleshed out, given that truly random thoughts would seem to go on for quite some time before
relevant or useful ideas would come to mind in a timely succession.
Fortunately, we dont really need to know the details, because the standard reply to
acausality/randomness equals freedom is that it is a category error/conflation anyway. The
consequence would mean that every decision is not chosen, but random, and so would also
negate the agents free will, just in a different way. The jump itself is a non sequitur, because
even if we cant presume random and free are the same thing in cognition in any meaningful way
or the thoughts would translate to gobbledygook; remember that free will needs both meaningful
reasons for action and the ability to do otherwise. Also our cognitive biases distort our
perception of the decisions context unconsciously to some extent before even the most
random/free computation would have a chance to be decided upon (still unconsciously), so
decisions still cannot evade many of the kinds of precognitive biases that are evidenced in this
book.
For example, there is also evidence that birds may use quantum effects to see Earths
magnetic field884 and so, in one sense, quantum effects may be salient enough to grant these
animals more of a certain type of freedom: local freedom. In the case of the birds, I would not
deny that quantum effects extend this kind of freedom, but it is not a metaphysical kind of
freedom from influence any different than possibility increased by letting another person out of a
cage or by gaining an epistemically derived potential for freedom via the acquisition of
knowledge. That the increase in possibility for the bird is acausal isnt a problem for
predispositionalism, because it doesnt negate the predisposed behaviors, it only gives them more
of an opportunity to become entrenched in them. Predispositionalism is less concerned with
Grossman, L. (1/27/2011). In the Blink of Birds Eye, a Model for Quantum Navigation. Wired Magazine.
884
Available on 9/22/2012 at http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2011/01/quantum-birds
245
causality than it is with control. This is yet another reason why this book is not framed from the
perspective of good old fashioned determinism and it brings us to a discussion of two-stage
systems
246
THE COGITO MODEL
Harvard astrophysicist and philosopher Bob Doyle has put together an amazing online
collection of information about all things free will.885 Its a real public service and if I ever met
him, Id probably give him a hug. Like Penrose and Heisenberg, he holds the Cogito Model,886
which treats quantum stochasticity much more reasonably: as a refined version of the two-stage
process, perceived to be somewhere between compatibilism and libertarianism, first there is a
random generation of alternative possibilities [] Then an adequately determined will selects
[] First free, then will.887 I will say right away that this model has at least one notable strength
that I appreciate as a predispositionalist: an emphasis on probabilities, rather than certainties. But
nuance gets the best of us eventually and we find a way to delineate our views.
Like Penrose and Heisenberg, Doyle admits that quantum indeterminism is normally
only important on a microscopic scale of atoms and molecules, yet asserts, again like Penrose
and Heisenberg, that irreducible randomness invalidates any demonstration of strict causality.
Determinism is an illusion, because even these physical objects, which appear to be continuous
and highly deterministicthings like planets with orbits that are predictable to a very high
degree of accuracy still emerged from quantum chaos that strong determinists untenably ignore
in order to biasly idealize the world.888
Its important to note that quantum mechanics is still considered mechanical in one sense,
even within probabilities, and reliable enough to run the most accurate clocks and machinery in
the world (i.e. atomic clocks, nuclear weapons), which puts the overall effect of quantum
randomness into question at the macro level. Why is there so much demonstrable, predictable
consistency at the macro level, and what role does quantum randomness really play when
considering so much reliability in science, technology, and even human behavior? Is Doyle
conflating quantum randomness with our epistemic limitations because we often appeal to
probabilities, even though the more truly random data is, the more prediction power statisticians
885
The Information Philosopher Website. Available on 9/22/2012 at http://www.informationphilosopher.com
886
The Cogito Model. (N.D.). [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/cogito/
887
Doyle, B. (5/17/2009). Martin Heisenberg on Free Will. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://gfp.typepad.com/the_garden_of_forking_pat/2009/05/martin-heisenberg-on-free-will.html
888
Doyle, B. (N.D.). A Free Will Tutorial: How Adequate Determinism and Modest Libertarianism Give Us a
Corrected and Completed, Consistent and Coherent, Comprehensive Compatibilism. Part 4/8. [Multimedia].
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.informationphilosopher.com/tutorials/free_will
247
actually have? Is he is considering it in the sense that birds (might) use it for navigation? That
cant be it, because they use it not in order to cash in on random products, but like atomic clocks
and nuclear weapons, for its reliable consistency.
As Phil Mol writes in Zenos Paradox and the Problem of Free Will, some physicists
maintain that quantum mechanics equations contain hidden variables that cause determinism to
prevail, despite the seeming randomness in experimental results889 [emphasis mine]. It should
also probably be noted here in the context of modern physics that chaos theory is a somewhat
misleading label in one sense and I mention this to counter the presumption that modern physics
implies that anything goes. As deterministic physics professor Mano Singham writes at
machineslikeus.com:
[]chaos theory is strictly deterministic. What it says is that certain systems are so
sensitive to the specification of their initial state, that the initial state can never be
specified with sufficient accuracy to enable the prediction of final outcomes. So
chaotic system are deterministic (hence do not allow for free will) but unpredictable.
Furthermore, not all complicated systems are chaotic. Systems that are chaotic have to
obey certain types of laws and it is not clear that the brain is a chaotic system [890]
[emphasis mine].
Of course, we should also question whether quantum randomness has biological salience
consciously, in a more aware way than how birds might use it instinctively. This is to ask: is the
mechanical randomness interactive with consciousness? Does it translate [a]causally and at what
stage in the process? Michael Shermer writes,
[Physicist Victor] Stenger computes that the mass of neural transmitter molecules, and
their speed across the distance of the synapse are about three orders of magnitude too
large for quantum effects to be influential. There is no micro-macro connection.[891]
889
890
Singham, M. (11/12/2010). On free will-4: The implications of modern physics for determinism. [Web
log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://machineslikeus.com/news/free-will-4-implications-modern-
physics-determinism
891
Stenger, V. (2009). Quantum Gods. (p. 9). NY: Prometheus
248
And as Alfred Mele writes in his book, Free Will and Luck, that quantum indeterminacy
might even exist in the brain is only the half of it:
One possibility, as David Hodgson reports, is that in systems as hot, wet, and massive as
neurons of the brain, quantum mechanical indeterminacies quickly cancel out, so that for
all practical purposes determinism rules in the brain (2002, p. 86). Another is that any
indeterminism in the human brain is simply irrelevant to free action and moral
responsibility[892] [emphasis mine].
So even if there was quantum indeterminacy in the brain, its translation to free will and/or
moral responsibility is a separate question. Doyle admits molecular biologists have assured
neuroscientists for years that the molecular structures involved in neurons are too large to be
affected significantly by quantum noise893 [emphasis mine], but he brings up other types of
noise and/or errors that function in the same way, such as thermal, neuraleven quantum noise
is still not completely ruled out yet. So Doyle does address this question and also seems to avoid
the problem of the first standard reply above (i.e. the randomness objection: randomness does
not equal agential freedom, because the agent still has no control). He does this by admitting,
Quantum randomness does not directly cause our actions. It gives us access to alternative
possibilities for action that are generated freely.
So for these two stage compatibilists, the quantum and thermal noise/errors generated in
the brain are what give us previously unavailable unique, emergent, creative options; thus
avoiding both a fatalistic chain of events and the loss of free will by over-imposing randomness.
Its important to note here that this is where Doyle opts for a more moderate position than the
strong libertarian/contra-causal free will notion where quantum randomness simpliciter allows
for all uncaused thought.894
Doyle, and presumably Heisenberg and Penrose, is arguing for a more compatibilist
position that the grand eternal causal chain going all the way back to the Big Bang is broken by
quantum fluctuations, and so makes a distinction between acceptable adequate or local
892
Mele, A. (2006). Free Will and Luck. (p. 10). NY: Oxford University Press
893
Noise. (N.D.). [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/noise.html
894
Clark, T. (12/7/2005). Mind, Unspecified - comment on Henry Stapp's Quantum Interactive Dualism.
[Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.naturalism.org/mind.htm
249
determinism and unacceptable strict or global determinism. Again, given that we really do not
know the exact nature of the perceived randomness of quantum behavior due to our epistemic
limitations, because we can only get so small and even the top cosmologists dont agree on quite
a lot, prudence suggests retaining a more agnostic position there for now.
Concerning general relativity, physicist Sean Carroll writes,
these kinds of GR phenomena are very far away from our everyday lives; theres
really no relevance to discussions of free will. GR violates global determinism in
the strict sense, but certainly obeys local determinism; thats all that should be
required for this kind of discussion.[895]
Concerning quantum mechanics, he sees a restoration of [] determinism at the level of

the fundamental equations896 ultimately via the possibly deterministic many-worlds hypothesis,
where each quantum fluctuation can play itself out constrained only by cosmic possibility. We
are merely one of those instantiated possible wave branches, but he realizes that this sacrifices it
for the observational predictions made by real observers897 and so still leans toward putting a
point in the indeterminism camp. In the end, it does appear to be true that the way we humans
operate by default is best summed up by Doyle when he writes, Epistemology, the study of
what we know, is fundamentally probabilistic. Ontology, the study of what exists, is
fundamentally statistical,898 so lets move ahead, taking this as a given, remembering also that
predispositionalism is about high probability in the predictability of behavior and the lack of
awareness concerning influence and control over thoughts, behaviors, and actions, not
strict/global determinacy.
The picture that remains gives us two possible objection routes to take against Doyles
use of the first free, then will model. The first is well-suited for use with a philosophical free
will hero that I will call the Dionysian improviser: imagine a person who sets out mentally to let
the universe speak through her via the kind of chaotic creation energy experienced during
895
Carroll, S. (12/5/2011). On Determinism. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2011/12/05/on-determinism/#more-7735
896
Ibid.
897
Ibid.
898
The Illusion of Determinism. (N.D.). [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/illusion_of_determinism.html
250
artistic/musical improvisation (i.e. a kind of Nietzschean free spirit) or even via special
meditation/prayer, etc. She may choose to dance wildly and she may choose to move her fingers
so as to be able to play her violin but there are still both a heightened allowance and a
heightened acceptance of error, as well as the excitement over happy accidents, plus the overall
sensation that randomness, as nature personified, plays a major role. In this case, there is an
almost tangible sensation that freedom reigns, because one observes that theyve allowed for a
higher percentage of chaos on the continuum of intentional control. But does freedom really
reign? What exactly is happening when our Dionysian improviser is going back and forth
between her impulses to flail her arms wildly or to strike the bow aggressively or softly, or to
stay within a certain tempo or follow a motif, then abandon them?
Lets revisit our AI model in the Introduction. Imagine that this self-aware robot
temporarily runs some randomized idea software for part of its functioning, in addition to or
alternating back and forth with the non-randomized choice software. This can be considered in
accord with Doyles Cogito Model adopted from William James,899 first free, then will, back
and forth, either slowly or at imperceptible quantum speed. Would this really give the robot free
will or would it just be alternating between randomness and causality at whatever speed?
Unless they are simultaneous, the former lacks the free will requirement of meaningful reasons
for action, and the latter, still lacks at least some of the ability to do otherwise (than what the
biases predispose), even when choosing from new emergent options. This is especially true when
saturated with all the biases in this book, let alone all the biases we dont know about.
The second possible objection is to say that Doyle seems to be equivocating in his use of
the term free when he says first free, then will, as it still remains unclear as to how the now
randomized thoughts could be truly free if they are consistently relevant and useful to the
thought at hand. Doyle says:
In the first "free" stage, the development of creative alternative possibilities for thought
and action, our control is probably minimal. Random thoughts appear to "come to us,"
more than "from us." These thoughts may be our own, remembrances of past experiences
or ideas that are relevant to the current situation. But they also may be random
variations of past experiences and contain many immediate sensory inputs we can not
899
William James. (N.D.). [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/james
251
control that suggest new possibilities to us. Random alternatives may be generated
internal to our minds or come into us from external events that are random and outside
our control. Nevertheless, we may have some control over the time we allow our minds
to consider new possibilities[900] [emphasis mine].
If Doyle wants to make the random thoughts relevant so that we are not thinking a
hundred thoughts of gobbledygook between each thought we can actually utilize, then he must
concede that they are ultimately considerably filtered through non-random processes before the
will gets its chance. At some point our decisions must stick and have some consistency or we
would be schizophrenic and incoherent. Even if quantum randomness is salient to consciousness,
it will not necessarily filter randomness in a non-random way through the biased filter of how
our physical world actually is ontologically. Randomness between events, in this case, between
thoughts/choices, doesnt necessarily cash out with equal probability; the measurement
problem.901
Again, as statisticians tell us, Its not easy being random, whether that randomness is a
product of machines or of living things. Remember, as we saw in the Introduction and in
Evidence #18, even when we try to behave randomly by choosing a number between 1 and 4
or we choose a direction at random, we still prefer to overwhelmingly choose the number 3 and
the direction right. Studies have shown that we can train ourselves to behave randomly using
feedback,902 but that is not a default ability (Rhodes College in Memphis, TN, has put together a
fun website all about randomness that actually does that kind of training with games and tests903).
With this in mind, if we try to integrate the Cogito Model, it seems like the world is really
more like first random then predisposed processing/filtering through the objective macro-
world fashioned by what spilled out at Plank time then conscious report, with action coming
both before and after the conscious reportmaybe even before the processing/filtering. The two
900
Control. (N.D.). [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/control.html
901
Vongehr, S. (12/11/2011). Regress Type Arguments Are The Single Biggest Problem In All Of
Fundamental Science And Philosophy. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.science20.com/alpha_meme/regress_type_arguments_are_single_biggest_problem_all_fundament
al_science_and_philosophy-85402
902
Neuringer, A. (1986). Can people behave randomly?: The role of feedback. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 115, 62 -75.
903
Rhodes College website. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://faculty.rhodes.edu/wetzel/random/mainbody.html#references
252
stage model belies the most interesting part: the middle. More choices do not necessarily equal
more control, especially considering a dominant non-conscious mind responding to the most
salient options in the basement before the conscious mind event gets the awareness report of
what options made the cut. The first free, however truly random it is (as opposed to the kind
of so-called psuedorandomness that most computers generate), does us no good if there is still
predisposition in the filtering afterwards.
In either of these objections, there is little reason to think that the addition of noise errors
will negate the non-random causally determined thoughts in the sense that the non-randomized
choice software is still going to lean its decisions toward its biases from whatever options it has,
random noise additions included. The additions do not make it any less biased, just slightly less
predictable. Again, the focus of this book is upon the science of predisposition, not strict
determinism, and predisposition endures beyond the Cogito Model, even if deterministic fatalism
does not. If the causally determined non-randomized choice software is always running, it seems
reasonable that the random options adopted would still have to appeal to the biases and would
usually be chosen because they have the ability to further entrench the agent in that bias by
appealing to them. So even Doyles more modest compatibilism, that breaks the cosmic A to Z
strict determinism chain, presents no real challenge to my use of predisposition here
functionally; the quantum options would simply compel us to shift to the most similar option that
still appeals to our same contextual and body-based biases.
Here I will remind the reader of my tunnels and tracks analogies at the beginning of the
Challenges. The tunnels represent observed tendencies, but they would still be a product of our
choices, our phenomenal predisposition. The tracks represent our causal predisposition, which
are less malleable tendencies (less malleable because we are unaware of the manipulation, the
origination, or how to stop it). Admittedly, these analogies arent perfect, but they do some work
at showing these particular differences.
While two stage theorists might still prefer the tunnels scenario, given the options to dig
or tunnel or to do something novel, I could stray a bit from the original tracks analogy to
accommodate the Cogito Model as I see it. I might say that while the trains would always still be
pulled to stay on the tracks, say magnetically, perhaps they would have some very rough ability
253
to temporarily go off road/off track (e.g. via quantum noise, Austin-style examples,904
novelty in exaptive thought) to another track and do so without totally derailing. There would
also be more tracks overlapping than we see in this world and, of course, the tracks would be
unseen.
I bring this up now in the context this section, because randomness, such as in Austin-
style examples or quantum noise, would really only make the trains jump the tracks of
predisposition or go off road temporarily in this modified version, but they would still be pulled
back onto other very real tracks of predisposition that are not the same as an open road or a
tunnel. They may even be a more direct route to where the other track was headed. Thats how a
heuristic or bias would operate if imbedded biologically, socially, environmentally, etc., and
thats what the evidence is showing. What if, because the Cogito Model is true, quantum effects
actually facilitate predisposition in this way? Something to consider.
So even though Doyle says that quantum noise can have a major effectif it is part of a
thought,905 the biases are still there to change the odds, so the significance is still in question in
that way too. Using the lotto ball machine analogy again, this is to say that with some of the balls
more likely biased to drop because of size or weight differences compared to the other balls,
some minor random variables, in say, the air blowing in the machine, will not upset the
machines favoring of those particular balls that are heavier or fit in the hole better. Here, the
philosopher cannot say ceteris paribus: all things being equal with such a comparison. If they
do make a difference in the way Doyle proposes, how much of a difference they actually make
will have to be something for the statistical scientists of the future to determine. At the end of the
day, random noise could be considered our greatest opportunity for change or it could be
considered an error of thinking that wastes our time by possibly even entrenching us further in
our biases or both (analogous to mutations in evolution)!
904
Kane, R. (Fischer, J.M., Pereboom, D., Vargas, M.) (2007). Four Views on Free Will. MA: Blackwell. (p.
17) Available on 9/19/2012 at http://www.thedivineconspiracy.org/Z5217X.pdf
905
Causa Sui. (N.D.). [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/causa_sui.html
254
LUCK
Before I wrap up on theories pertaining to or relying upon randomness in some way,

perhaps I should briefly mention what has come to be a thorny crown for some libertarians: luck.
As Tamler Sommers sees it,
The point is that there are at least two varieties of luck that determine our futures. There
is external luckwinning the lottery, for example, or having parents with friends in high
places.[3] And then there is internal luck: the talents we possess, the intelligence,
discipline, desires, passions, disabilities and so on. These internal factors have enormous
causal influence over our futures.[906]
Why should luck be a problem for libertarians? Because there is no way to distinguish it
from how actions are brought about without causal influence. Its important to note the
difference between contrastive explanations and causal explanations, as libertarians need
contrastive explanations to defeat luck, but dont see them as deterministic explanations (which I
will call causal explanations). Libertarians deny that the kinds of influence that weve seen all
throughout this book that increases predictability in behavior are causal explanations. It must
also be remembered that any exhaustive explanation relies upon epistemic perfection, in terms of
creating a proof, which immediately puts all of us at a disadvantage. I will generally default to
the simple observation that the scientific method does some work in showing that predictability
in human behavior can be increased in situations where decisions are influenced before
reasoning can be applied (as is shown throughout this book). Is our freedom the extent to which
we can alter that predictability by reason/contrastive explanations? Those are influenced as well,
and not (never IMO) causally independent, though interactive.
That our neuronal re-wiring in response to our interaction with the external world creates
causal explanations is what I believe will be further shown in science as technology progresses.
Certain predispositions are more plastic than others; it must be viewed as a matter of tendencies,
some with expiration dates and susceptibility to change, others without expiration dates and
906
Sommers, T. (2005). Free Will Skepticism in Action. Chapter 5 of his Doctoral Dissertation at Duke
University. [p. 6]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.naturalism.org/SommersCh5.pdf
255
susceptibility to change. If everything could be changed on the spot, there would be no
predisposition and libertarian free will would seem way more plausible. Again, that there are
tendencies that rely upon probability is due to our epistemic limitations, not that they are
necessarily undetermined. A very complex causal pathway, even one infused with some random
possibility, may have an actual probability worth saying thats going to happen if we had the
capacity to know it. Indeterminacy is only uncertainty.
As I have noted, predispositionalism sees agent and event causality as a false dilemma,
since they/the mind are causally intertwined by internal/external interaction of subject and
environment evidenced throughout this book. The accounting claim is that there could be two
scenarios that are exactly the same that lead up to opposing decisions. If the physical neuronal
representation907,908 for every brain state changes subtly for every decision that we presume to be
able to choose between alternate possibilities, THAT means that sufficient causal explanations
can always be provided in principle. If they are provided, then I agree with Randolph Clarke909
(perhaps for a slightly different reason) that the accounting claim is a red herring thats a day
late and a dollar short. I adduce that those accounting claim scenarios where the world is exactly
the same, but with two possible different outcomes actually contain two minds that are, in the
least, not the same neuronally, well before a decision (Clarkes opinion may differ). Let me be
clear about this: if the slightest neuronal change is what makes a person favor one equally
desirable decision over another, then that neuronal change serves, in principle, as both a physical
representation and a causal explanation, let alone a contrasting one, because it can no longer be
analogized as one mind before a fork in the road; it becomes two minds, one predisposed
toward one path, the other to the other.
There are libertarians who argue that our responsibility does not require contrasting
explanations, such as Robert Kane, because they believe that the many of the kinds of
predisposition I have outlined in this book actually create a precedent for free action, based
upon the notion that personality itself can be a result of an accumulation of self-forming actions
907
908
909
Clarke, R. (2004). Reflections on an Argument from Luck. Philosophical Topics 32, Nos. 1 & 2, 47-64.
256
(SFAs910) that have built up over time. As the idea goes, since our character was created by free
actions, its predispositions are free as well. This goes as long as those original actions that made
up the character were actually free, such, as Kane believes, as with virtuous action (hailing back
to the virtue ethics of Aristotle911), formed during genuine bouts of moral conflict that generate
higher levels of quantum indeterminacy (uncertainty) in the brain.912
Philosophy professor, Eddie Nahmias, has also suggested that indeterminacy does some
work at providing freedom, and that recent scientific discoveries do not threaten free will. Most
of [neuroscientists and psychologists] discoveries involve statistical correlations that are
compatible with indeterminism. Moreover, it is implausible to think that indeterministic
interactions at the microphysical level never have an effect on the way things happen at, say, the
neurobiological level... Sometimes its difficult to know when philosophers mean true
randomness or uncertainty when they say indeterminacy, especially quantum
indeterminacy. Fortunately, the reply is the same to both when it comes to predispositionalism.
I certainly agree that we habituate action, as the virtue ethicists contend, but not that
actions are free from causal influence in any meaningful way because of it. And I have already
described what happens when we encounter indeterminacy. Its just like it is for actual true
quantum randomness in the brain: we still reroute to more fundamental predispositions. That
includes evidence of moral biases, where many philosophers prefer to think the freedom resides
(we saw otherwise in several Evidences #4, #18, etc.) and its especially not in a way that
would automatically exonerate second generation actions based upon such ignorance. It just
seems utterly unconvincing to me that uncertainty would breed freedom, when we have all the
physical propensities and familiarities that we surely default to when uncomfortably uncertain. It
seems to me fairly obvious that we would more often fall back on what is familiar internally and
confabulate it externally afterwards, rather than bravely explore new territory at these moments.
Thankfully, scientists have evidenced that for me.
While we are straying ever further from the luck issue now and into responsibility and
identity, its important to show here the problems with the foundation for what is supposed to be
910
Kane, R. (1996). The Significance of Free Will. New York: Oxford.
911
Hursthouse, Rosalind, "Virtue Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (7/18/2003). Available on 9/22/2012 at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/
912
Kane, R. (1996). The Significance of Free Will. New York: Oxford. [p. 130].
257
able to circumnavigate the luck problem. Susan Wolf illustrates the problem of identifying a self-
made, responsible character:
An agent, for example, performs some action because she wants to perform it, and she
wants to perform it because she wants something else to which the action in question is
perceived as a means. But why does she want that something else? Perhaps because the
pursuit of that goal offers the best chance of satisfactorily realizing her complex system
of values. But then we may ask why she has that particular system of values If, on the one
hand, we can answer this question by describing the agent's heredity, her upbringing, her
most significant recent experiences, and so on, then the agent seems to fit the problematic
model of the nonautonomous agent. The agent acts in accordance with her values, but her
values are a result of forces external to herself...[913]
When we see the kind of evidence that Ive shown for, say, unconscious learning
processes, why should we presume that self-forming actions ever form our character, rather than
that our non-conscious self and/or events form our character (or the interaction of the three)?
The onus is upon the philosopher to describe a completely free action where there was no causal
influence and the ability to do otherwise, in order to get to this kind of character that gets to
perform free actions but as I argue in the Introduction and throughout this book, nothing
remains untainted, because even so-called SFAs born free in genuine moral conflict are then
squeezed through the filters of biased processing. And even virtuous actions are often done
instinctively or, as many have argued, because there simply is no other desirable alternative.
Levy, Wolf, and J. M. Fischer all appeal to scenarios where there is no desirable alternative
action to the morally good action available in order to show that it is not the alternative
possibility that grounds responsibility. Fischer describes a popular scenario to illustrate the
problem:
a baby has fallen into a swimming pool in front of you and is in immediate danger of
drowning. All you have to do is bend over and pick the baby up; this would be extremely
913
Wolf, S. (1990). Freedom Within Reason. (pp. 13-14). New York: Oxford University Press
258
easy for you, and we may suppose that there are no other morally relevant reasons. []
does the existence of this alternative possibility ground your moral responsibility for your
decision? I do not deny that the alternative possibility exists, but I do very much doubt
that it is what grounds your moral responsibility. For what would such an alternative
possibility be like? It would be the possibility to judge best something for which there are
no good reasonsfailing to bend over and save the baby. And it does not seem to me
plausible to say that this kind of possibility is what grounds your moral responsibility for
your decision.[914]
Levy has his own version:
Imagine you are faced with a choice, between hitting a child who has darted out in front
of your car, or slamming on the brakes. It is just obvious what you should do. Everything
rationality, morality, prudence speaks in favour of hitting the brakes, and nothing
speaks in favour of hitting the child. Since it is so obvious what you should do, you
would not feel that your freedom was enhanced if there was some indeterminacy in your
decision-making process. [915]
There are some interesting issues of identity with Kanes proposition of a free SFA
infused character that I will deal with later. In addition to the above objections to the appeal to no
need for explanations, for now its enough to suggest, as Levy has shown, that Kanes excuse
proves too much: it implies that agents are responsible not only for the actions they choose, but
also for the counterfactual actions which were equally available to them.916 Levy shows via a
clever thought experiment that the externalized mechanism of Kanes SFAs, the part that chooses
option A or B, is indeterministic to the point where the resulting action deserves no praise or
blame, even though all of Kanes conditions were met. Levy finishes with a thought experiment
914
Fischer, J. M. (1995). Libertarianism and Avoidability: A Reply to Widerker. Faith and Philosophy 12:
122-25.
915
Levy, N. (2005). Contrastive Explanations: A Dilemma for Libertarians. Dialectica, Vol. 59, No. 1. (2005),
pp. 51-61 Key: citeulike:577383 Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0174/contrastive_explanations.pdf
916
Ibid.
259
by Michael Zimmerman,917 similar to the ones I shared in Evidence #4. He posits a scenario
where two assassins shoot at their target. One hits and kills and the other hits a bird flying by.
The responsibility of the two assassins is not equal, because the consequences matter. He shows
that intuitively, luck can make the agent more or less responsible, not merely cleverly positioned
indeterminacy or character.
917
Zimmerman, M.J. (2002). Taking Luck Seriously. Journal of Philosophy 99, pp. 553576.
260
EMERGENT PHENOMENA
As in all psychology, where correlation is not necessarily causation, but especially in this
kind of endeavor, where psychology and philosophy meet, we must be especially vigilant against
what American philosopher John Dewey called the historical fallacy,918 so that we do not
frontload causal elements that are actually a product of the process. Let us observe, for example
the process of making wine. As yeast is added to the mashed grapes, it eats the sugar and
produces alcohol, which in turn, kills the yeast when there is too much of it and fermentation
stops. When attempting to create wine, we do not therefore list alcohol in the ingredients; its
merely a product of the process.
Emergence is a secondary product of a process too, with the primary products being
forms, concepts, and/or ideas/thoughts that lead to the emergence of novel secondary products
with causal and influential qualities that are essential unpredictable beforehand. But just as the
wine making process does not make the process, nor the produced alcohol, acausal or
unpredictable afterwards, neither is the process of thinking, nor the produced thoughts, acausal
or unpredictable for that reason! This is true even if the results that supervene upon a process are
not reducible to that process. Emergent phenomena is an expression used to signify an
emergence of significantly novel possibility that sprouts from a combination of known
phenomena. Some writers have made the case that emergent phenomena undermine
determinism:
One reason that determinism does not imply an absence of alternatives is the role of
emergent phenomena in complex systems [] Emergent phenomena are novel, and
unpredicted by our knowledge of the system [] This is a feature of complex systems
often overlooked by strict determinist deniers of free will. Emergent phenomenon
themselves are not merely affected by their surroundings, but interact dynamically with
other parts of the system.[919]
918
Dewey, J. (1896). The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Dewey/reflex.htm
919
261
This charge has nothing to do with the actual chain of causality. Emergent phenomena
merely make the etiology more complex and less predictable and the property of novelty
shouldnt divert our attention from the fact that this is fundamentally an epistemic issue, just like
with chaos theory. Determinism is not about predictability per se, thats predestination,
indeterminacy, and/or fatalism. Only a god would have perfect access anyway and such a god
would already know about the emergent phenomena. Mol highlights our epistemic limitations
over the causality we cant predict in both charges, but that is not the same thing as freedom. Its
merely ignorance. Once we know what a process produces, then our predictability improves a
little.
As it has been said by determinists like Stephen Pinker,920 the human brain has anywhere
from eighty six to a hundred billion neurons921 and even a three year old child has an estimated
quadrillion synapses connecting them,922 so expecting beings to be perfectly predictable because
they follow causality is not a reasonable expectation. Even though a nematode worm like
Caenorhabditis elegans with 302 neurons may be a much better candidate for predictability,
there are still external causal factors to predict. Neither is the assumption that because we may be
aware of the dominant influences that are propelling us toward a decision and yet choose to
override it, we have made a contra-causal decision. That override is not an example of contra-
causal free will; the will to override is itself determined, even if we are only aware of the
superficial inner dialogue that drowns out the din of subconscious forces underneath.
We can look at this lack of awareness from another view. Martin Heidegger writes
eloquently about Nietzsches expression amor fati:
Amor fati is the transfiguring will to belong to what is most in being among beings. A
fatum is unpropitious, disruptive, and devastating to the one who merely stands there and
920
Unseenstrings. (8/11/2008). Steven Pinker & Richard Dawkins on Free Will. [Video file]. (0:30-0:45)
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8LE4uu49SU8&feature=related
921
Azevedo, F.A., Carvalho, L.R., Grinberg, L.T., Farfel, J.M., Ferretti, R.E.L., Leite, R.E.P., Filho, J.W.,
Lent, R., Herculano-Houzel, S. (4/2009). Equal numbers of neuronal and nonneuronal cells make the human
brain an isometrically scaled-up primate brain. The Journal of Comparative Neurology. 513 (5): 53241.
doi:10.1002/cne.21974. PMID 19226510 Retrieved 9/22/2012 from http://www.mendeley.com/research/equal-
numbers-of-neuronal-and-nonneuronal-cells-make-the-human-brain-an-isometrically-scaledup-primate-
brain/#
922
Drachman, D. (2005). Do we have brain to spare? Neurology. 64 (12): 20045. doi:10.1212/01.
WNL.0000166914.38327.BB. PMID 15985565. Retrieved 9/22/2012 from
http://www.neurology.org/content/64/12/2004.extract
262
lets it whelm him. That fatum is sublime and is supreme desire, however, to one who
appreciates and grasps the fact that he belongs to his fate insofar as he is a creator, that is,
one who is ever resolute [to participate]. His knowing this is nothing else than the
knowledge which of necessity resonates in his love.[923]
For Nietzsche (and possibly Heidegger), knowledge is possible As error concerning

itself, as will to power, as will to deception. Becoming as invention volition self-denial, the
overcoming of oneself not a subject but a doing, establishing creative, not causes and
effects924 [emphasis mine]. For Nietzsche, mistake and error sprouting from ecstatic creativity
are the impetus that (best) guides our knowledge and experience, what he calls the Dionysian.
This kind of creative nature is an intrinsically active component of being that is also intrinsically
interactive. For Nietzsche, this was a paradigm that was lost when Platos reified entities paved
the way for scientific advancement, but also the ascription of good and evil in philosophy and
religion, places where he felt narrative was more appropriate.
The Dionysian expression is a highly nuanced view and its debatable whether this view
contradicts determinism per se, as it is not necessarily an assertion of contra-causal free will. In
fact, he derides free will as a scandalous artifice of theologians enforcing responsibility, and his
doctrine of the Eternal Return of the Same can ultimately be seen as a fatalistic metaphysical
model entailing the affirmation of an eternally unchanging repetition of the same events.925 It
should be said though, that he also had some words for those scientific absolutists who would
reify and impose cause and effect upon the will.926
Many scholars believe this attitude was perhaps more against the institution of science,
which in his day was making extraordinary assertions based upon logical fallacies and poor
evidence, such as that the size of the brain implied superior race, etc. (i.e. Social Darwinism.
Some have also made the case that he did flirt with that). Perhaps this stance merely reflected a
more complex or even incomplete position about the will. What is apparent is that Nietzsche
923
Heidegger, M. (1991). Nietzsche. (D.F. Krell, Trans. Vol. 2, Ch. 26, p. 198-208). San Francisco: Harper and
Row. (Original work published 1954). Retrieved 9/22/2012 from
http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Courses/Spinoza/Texts/Martin%20Heidegger%20-
%20Nietzsche's%20Fundamental%20Metaphysical%20Position.htm
924
Ibid.
925
Friedrich Nietzsche. (N.D.). [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/nietzsche
926
Ibid.
263
most valued the phenomenal expression of freedom and that is still consistent with determinism
via the constraints of our epistemic limitations and some variant of illusionism. Studies show
what many artists already know: creativity has value in itself and/or is the most important part of
the equationeven beyond survivalin fact, competition kills creativity.927,928 In any case, it
would be interesting to hear what he would think about predispositionalism in the phenomenal
realm, as opposed to strict determinism.
As we saw above concerning quantum noise, we could also draw an analogy from
emergence via creative errors by the way that evolution works via natural selection, taking
advantage of mutation adaptively, destroying old patterns and creating new ones. Also like
quantum noise, emergence may or may not break the chain of strict determinism back into the
dawn of time, but it generally still fails to thwart predisposition. Its still there, and random or
not, the self-correcting mechanisms in our software merely utilize a built-in propensity that
compels us to play and create novelty. As Shelly Kagan notes, even chess playing computers
and music making machines following non-random general heuristics can still create novel
phenomena that can be plausibly framed as creative in a natural way.929 Like quantum noise,
creativity will serve to update our software, but the crucial point is that the emergence of
novelty via occasional errors, randomness, or whatever, by willful assertions of the creative sort
or not, does not negate biased tendencies evidenced in the science of behavior; it may merely
gives us more novel pathways to further entrench those biases. Theres no reason to think that
internal and external mechanisms of bias wont exploit the function of emergent novelty.
The laws of physics underlying every production of novel emergent phenomena by
certain forces/objects should simply then be considered to have the possibility to produce said
phenomena once it has been produced. Theyre called secondary effects and tertiary effects and
so-on. Nothing evades the laws of physics to allow for contra-causal free will, including
randomness, as we have seen, even if the original functional utility of combined forces/objects
becomes unrecognizable via emergent phenomena in the categorical hierarchy of ontology.
927
Green, B. (20/1/2004). The 6 Myths Of Creativity. Fast Company Magazine. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://www.fastcompany.com/51559/6-myths-creativity
928
Amabile, T. M. (1982). Children's Artistic Creativity: Detrimental Effects of Competition in a Field
Setting. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 8 573-578
929
Kagan, S. (Uploaded by YaleCourses on Oct. 6, 2008). 4. Introduction to Plato's Phaedo; Arguments for
the existence of the soul, Part II. [Video file post]. [38:50-41:15]. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AGXYeV2v5fU&feature=related
264
THE HUMAN ANIMAL
If quantum randomness is what offers us free will and the way it does that is not unique
to humans, then this may be a problem for many people who do not believe that animals have
free will (or a soul that communicates with the body via quantum randomness). This is especially
true in the context of some popular theology and I think its important to consider this in depth,
because the kind of connection thats implied in this book incorporates all life on this planet in a
special way. And as noted by determinists,930 many theistic free will proponents who argue from
quantum randomness in the brain have a big problem to deal with: the fact that every neural
network operating with the same quantum release of synaptic vesicles and the opening and
closing of ion channelsincluding the likes of, say, chickens and bats, would also have free will
in a meaningful way. That is to say that if quantum randomness is what gives humans free will, it
would give animals the same novel, creative options that it does for humans; first free, then will.
We could ask: does the theistic dualism model, or like-wise, the two stage model, suggest
that we consider quantum randomness to be a pre-agential parameter that only we can and do
appropriate for special agential freedom in the special way our special human brains operate?
That is to ask, are only humans free in a meaningful way because our brains or souls have special
access in a way that other animals cannot or is that special pleading? If animals have quantum
based free will like humans do, what happened to Delgados charging bull931 in Evidence #6?
It seems an animals free will is at least as subject to manipulation as a humans is. Even many
non-theistic compatibilists, such as Daniel Dennett, would deny animals have any kind of free
will even close to what humans have because animals cannot recognize reasons for action,
neither before nor after the action.932
Perhaps animals dont consider as many options when acting and so seem/are less free for
that reason. Perhaps they dont consider anything at all, as Dennett suggests, and they are purely
instinctual beings, the result of an undeveloped or absent prefrontal cortex. Of course, it depends
on which animal were talking about. Evidence that our closest primate relatives wire up
930
931
932
Shook, J. (Interviewer), Dennett, D. (Interviewee). (12/12/2011). Point of Inquiry podcast: Daniel Dennett -
The Scientific Study of Religion. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.pointofinquiry.org/daniel_dennett_the_scientific_study_of_religion
265
neuronally much more quickly than humans do, shows that our more plastic human brains
really do also allow for wiring based more upon experience.933 This said, it may be behavior
based, developmental predisposition, favorable for adaptability. Experience is no more
intrinsically veridical than genetic predisposition and we must keep that in mind.
Historically, many, if not most dualistic free will theists in the West have affirmed that
non-human animals are automata without free will for another reason: the dualistic soul/spirit in
humans is what gives us our miraculous capacity for free will, so non-humans are completely
excluded in principle. For most theists, and non-theists for that matter, but for different
justifications, there is no moral dimension for non-humans. There are some exceptions, such as
the Seventh Day Adventists, and religions that believe animals embody reincarnated souls, etc.
Sometimes the animals souls are requalified as different, as in neither freely moral nor eternal
like a human soul,934 but in much popular western theology, these kinds of alterations open up a
huge can of worms, especially in regards to salvation and theodicies concerning evil and
suffering,935 so perhaps that there is such a firm line drawn is an affirmation of pragmatic
intuitions for convenience and/or parsimony.
But there is also increasing scientific evidence that challenges so much popular theology
and it shows something more like a continuum in the capacity for moral reflection. It may
sometimes feel intuitively true and many theists/dualists have argued that, contrary to what
Darwin posited, because we perceive such a great divide between human and non-human
conscious ability in the most crucial ways, this amounts to a difference between each in kind
rather than in measure and is evidence for the human soul. There are two rejoinders to this that
remind us that, first, this apparent divide in cognitive abilities between humans and animals is
really only perceptually exacerbated by the fact that all the cognitively intermediary hominids
(e.g. Neanderthals) are now extinct,936 as well as the fact that there is still an obviously wide
continuum of cognitive ability within the non-human world itself, for no apparent reason
theologically. I will briefly diverge to address the crux of the dualists argument here.
933
Cohen, J. (2/1/2012). Human Brains Wire Up Slowly but Surely. ScienceNow. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/02/human-brains-wire-up-slowly-but-.html
934
Thompson, B. (1999). Do Animals Have Souls? [Web blog post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.apologeticspress.org/apcontent.aspx?category=11&article=582
935
Trakakis, N. (3/31/2005). The Evidential Problem of Evil. 2. William Rowes Evidential Argument from
Evil. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-evi/#H2
936
Dutilh Novaes, C. (8/26/2011). The missing hominids. [Web blog post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.newappsblog.com/2011/08/the-missing-hominids.html
266
An argument that some version of humaniqueness, as the banished937 evolutionary
scientist Marc Hauser called it in a naturalist context,938,939 is evidence for a soul with free will
because of its uniqueness parameter would be a non-sequitur that can be applied to the
uniqueness of any animal, so it must be shown that the ways in which humans are themselves
unique apply uniquely as evidence for a soul and free will. I think its valuable to take what
Daniel Dennett calls the intentional stance: to apply intentions and beliefs, etc. to other living
creatures and see what happens, while recognizing when we are unduly anthropomorphizing and
need to stop. Its worth checking out the links here though that several non-human animals have
some of the same abilities/components that we recognize as crucial to personhood940 and even
free will. These are:
Complex language941 (even non-linguistic mathematical ability, with a minimal

understanding of actual representations of more or less quantities and the
difference between cardinal and ordinal numbers)942,943,944,945,946
937
It should be noted that the ethical violations committed by Marc Hauser (apparently including fudging
some data Carpenter, S. [9/6/2012]. Harvard Psychology Researcher Committed Fraud, U.S. Investigation
Concludes. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2012/09/harvard-
psychology-researcher-co.html?ref=em ) have no bearing on any of the evidence provided here and most of
his general theories have been independently evidenced by other research anyway [noted here] or even
corrected before the work was actually published [much of it was not even published]; these are still ethics
violations nonetheless and show the value of stringent peer review. That said, some have used his scandal to
try to discredit the whole of evolutionary science, but as Frans De Waal wrote, In the field of cognition, the
march towards continuity between human and animal has been inexorableone misconduct case wont make
a difference and it is a rare uniqueness claim that holds up for over a decade [see De Waal, F.
(10/17/2010). Morals Without God? N.Y. Times Online. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/morals-without-god/?src=me&ref=general ]. In any case, the
basic idea of humaniqueness that there are fundamental ways in which humans are exceptional precedes
Hauser, exists independently of his violations, and will endure after himin fact, even many of his cultural
competitors couldnt agree more that humans are exceptional.
938
Lavoie, A. (2/17/2008). Scientist postulates 4 aspects of 'humaniqueness' differentiating human and animal
cognition. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2008-02/hu-spf021408.php
939
Pettus, A. (11-12/2008). What Makes the Human Mind? Harvard Magazine.
940
podcast: 010: Jessica Pierce Animal Morality. [Audio podcast]. [4:30-end]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
941
The Animal Language Institute. Available on 9/22/2012 at http://www.animallanguageinstitute.net
942
Morell, V. (12/22/2011). No Joke: Pigeons Ace a Simple Math Test. Science Now. Retrieved on 9/22/2012
from http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/12/no-joke-pigeons-ace-a-simple-math.html
943
Tennesen, M. (9/15/2009). More Animals Seem to Have Some Ability to Count: Counting may be innate in
many species. Scientific American. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-animals-have-the-ability-to-count&page=2
944
Emmerton J. (2001). Birds judgments of number and quantity. In: Cook R.G, editor. Avian visual
cognition. 2001. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.pigeon.psy.tufts.edu/avc/emmerton/default.htm
267
Planning (such as hiding food in many places and later retrieving the treasures
that were closest to spoilage first)947
Problem solving948
Causal reasoning(!)949
Reciprocally altruistic communities with complex social behavior (including
fairness and/or hierarchal status awareness)950,951,952,953
Representational self-awareness954
Theory of mind955
Hyper-intelligence956 and episodic memory957
Socially coordinated creativity on demand958
945
Dingfelder, S. (3/2007). Monkey Math. APA. Monitor Staff. Vol. 38, No. 3. [Print version: page 14].
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.apa.org/monitor/mar07/monkey.aspx
946
Morell, V. (11/1/2012). Video: Not Just Parroting Back: Alex the Parrot Knew His Numbers. ScienceNow.
Available on 11/2/2012 at http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/11/video-not-just-parroting-back-
al.html?ref=em
947
Fields, H. (8/5/2011). Do Tayras Plan for the Future? Science Now. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/08/do-tayras-plan-for-the-future.html
948
Morell, V. (8/18/2011). Aha! Elephants Can Use Insight to Solve Problems. [Web log post]. Science Now.
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/08/aha-elephants-can-use-insight-
to.html?ref=em&elq=a9db609434ad482da7ef9460c14e5ee2
949
Morell, V. (9/17/2012). Whodunit? Crows Ask That Question, Too. Science Now. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/09/whodunit-crows-ask-that-question.html?ref=em
950
951
Yong, E. (8/6/2011). Charity of the apes chimps spontaneously help each other. [Web log post]. Retrieved
on 9/22/2012 from http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2011/08/08/charity-of-the-apes-
%e2%80%93-chimps-spontaneously-help-each-other
952
Morell, V. (7/26/2011). Asian Elephants Are Social Networkers. [Web log post]. Science Now. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/07/asian-elephants-are-social-
netwo.html?ref=em
953
Binns, C. (2/28/2006). Case Closed: Apes Got Culture. Live Science. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.livescience.com/7064-case-closed-apes-culture.html
954
DeGrasse Tyson, N. [Executive Editor]. (2/9/2011). How Smart Are Animals? [Television series episode].
Fine, S. [Executive producer]. NOVA. WGBH/Boston. (27:00-28:00). Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://video.pbs.org/video/1777525840
955
Choi, C. (2/6/2012). Chimps Can Get Inside Others' Heads Just Like Humans. Live Science. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://www.livescience.com/18325-chimpanzees-theory-mind.html
956
957
Goldman, J. (8/9/2011). Guest Post! Its About Time: Delving Into Animals Memories. Scientific
American. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/thoughtful-
animal/2011/08/09/about-time-animals-memories
268
Abstract reasoning and tool use959
The ability to feel a significant level of emotion/empathy (e.g. grieving elephants
and magpies,960 mice and chimps who refuse to take food if it hurts another,961
rats with trapped cagemates [that] were motivated to learn how to free them962)
Sensitivity to fairness (e.g. jealousy: N.Y. Times writer Frans De Waal writes, A
dog will repeatedly perform a trick without rewards, but refuse as soon as another
dog gets pieces of sausage for the same trick)963,964
on and on They have some of these same abilities/components we recognize as crucial to

personhood and free will even if they have these abilities separately or in diminished capacities
(not to mention the cognitive abilities some animals have that humans would die for965,966,967,968).
Just like humans, other animals have evolved these kinds of cognitive traits because of
evolutionary pressures; its just that no other animal has evolved what seems to be the overall
958
959
VanCott, R. (8/5/2010). Tool-Using Animals. NOVA Science Now. [Interactive Media]. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/nature/tool-using-animals.html
960
Derbyshire, D. (10/24/2009). Magpies grieve for their dead (and even turn up for funerals). DailyMail.
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1221754/Magpies-grieve-dead-
turn-funerals.html
961
962
Ferber, D. (12/8/2011). Rats Feel Each Other's Pain. Science Now. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/12/rats-feel-each-others-pain.html
963
De Waal, F. (10/17/2010). Morals Without God? N.Y. Times Online. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/morals-without-god/?src=me&ref=general
964
Schmidt, R. E. (12/8/2008). Not just your kids: Dogs can think no fair too. Associated Press. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28112599
965
Willis, C. M., Church, S. M., Guest, C. M., Cook, W. A., McCarthy, N., Bransbury, A. J., Church, M. R.
T., Church, J. C. T. (2004). Olfactory Detection of Human Bladder Cancer by Dogs: Proof of Principle Study.
BMJ, 329, 712. Retrieved on 11/13/2012 from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15388612
966
Morell, V. (7/26/2011). Guiana Dolphins Can Use Electric Signals to Locate Prey. Science Now. Retrieved
on 9/22/2012 from http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/07/guiana-dolphins-can-use-
electric.html?ref=em
967
Yong, E. (2/24/2011). Turtles use the Earths magnetic field as a global GPS. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2011/02/24/turtles-use-the-
earth%e2%80%99s-magnetic-field-as-a-global-gps
968
Hecker, B. (2/2/1998). How do whales and dolphins sleep without drowning? Scientific American.
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-do-whales-and-dolphin
269
best, dominating combination of mental abilities, nor do they have the ability to cook their food
and generate such a high stock of neurons.969
That a greater concentration/combination of abilities in human brains allows for
increased emergent novelty via exaptation is the typical effect novelty in almost any context of
emergence, excluding occasional evolutionary convergence,970 and its a much more plausible,
parsimonious vehicle for explaining an exceptional form of freedom for the human animal than
frontloading humans with souls for free will (presumably to fulfill theological commitments).
Its true that humans have a more holistic flood light type of intelligence, rather than the
typical animals laser like intelligence. Another difference is that while animals have been
shown to use a tool for a single purpose, only humans are able to repurpose the same tool. But it
would be strange to suggest that because of examples like these we should suddenly throw out
the exaptive novel emergence we see evident in evolution all over the place. That these human
qualities are a step or two away in their evolution from the abilities that animals already have
and/or are plausible emergent outcomes of combinations of already possessed abilities is strong
evidence for the plausibility of their emergence via exaptation. The frontloading of a soul is just
unnecessary and extreme when we see the spread of emergent phenomenal qualities that seem to
be arbitrarily dispersed here and there based upon the animals unique cerebral setup.
On the other end of the spectrum concerning animals, religion, and uniquely human
freedom, there have been ethical challenges to naturalists by some religious apologists that it
would be speciesism for naturalists to exclude animals from moral considerations. For
example, the most celebrated living Christian apologist (arguably), William Lane Craig, writes:
Naturalists are typically materialists or physicalists who regard man as merely an animal
organism. But if man has no immaterial aspect to his being, whether you call it a soul or
mind or whatever, then were not qualitatively different from other animal species. On a
969
Gibbons, A. (10/22/2012). Raw Food Not Enough to Feed Big Brains. ScienceNow. Available on 10/27/2012
at http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/10/raw-food-not-enough-to-feed-big-.html?ref=em
970
Map of Life: Convergent Evolution Online (N.D.). What is evolutionary convergence. Available on
9/22/2012 at http://www.mapoflife.org/about/convergent_evolution/?section=0
270
materialistic anthropology theres no reason to think that human beings are objectively
more valuable than rats.[971]
Aside from the most apparent reply that morality should be fundamentally connected to
what we actually value, Christian philosopher Wes Morriston replies to Craigs argument with
an at the end of the day rebuttal (that I have never denied as a possibility when outlining the
moral continuum above):
When molecules are arranged in such a way as to constitute a living human organism
having a first-person point of view, the person thus constituted has special moral
significance. And note well she has it in virtue of the very same special-making
properties [] That she has a material mind is of no consequence. If it makes her self-
aware, capable of rational reflection, and so on, there is no reason to deny that she has
moral worth.[972]
Another rebuttal to Craigs speciesist charge against naturalists has been to point out
that if no moral dimension exists for non-human animals, the real speciesist would be Craigs
god973 and that such a god intentionally sets a standard that trivializes non-human violence. It
should also be said that just because some animals dont have certain or similar capacities for
moral awareness or intelligible language does not, in itself, give license to those who do to treat
them immorally, as it is enough, as Jeremy Bentham famously argued,974 that they feel pain, let
alone that there exists increasing evidence that we share various combinations of faculties critical
to moral decision-making, evidenced above. So the sense in which humans should be considered
special is limited morally, just as we would hope to convince some hyper-advanced aliens that
971
Craig, William Lane; Antony, Louise. (2008). Is God necessary for morality? Video of a debate at the
University of Massachusetts on 10 April, 2008. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.veritas.org/Campus/Recordings.aspx?cid=14
972
Morriston, W. (2011). God and the ontological foundation of morality. Religious Studies, Page 1 of 20 f
Cambridge University Press 2011. doi:10.1017/S0034412510000740 [p. 10]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://spot.colorado.edu/~morristo/DoesGodGround.pdf
973
QualiaSoup. (Uploaded on 11/6/2011). Morality 3: Of objectivity and oughtness. [Video file]. [1:20-1:35].
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sN-yLH4bXAI&feature=digest_mon
974
Bentham, Jeremy. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, first published 1789, chapter 17;
this edition Burns, J.H. and Hart, H.L.A. (eds.) The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. Oxford University
Press, 1996, p. 283.
271
came down to snack on us. Craig, seeming to anticipate this kind of rebuttal to his worldview has
adopted the extreme theological position that animals actually arent aware enough to feel the
pain that their bodies appear to be reacting to, which is such a disturbing and specious claim for
such a high profile apologist that I will not even respond to it, though others have.975
Other (presumably non-theistic) libertarians like Mark Balaguer are less threatened by
free will in animals:
it might very well turn out that parakeets have free will. If we are free, then the seat of
this freedom is not anything particularly noble, or dignified, or human it is the
braininess of our brains. Now, I have no idea how far down the evolutionary scale
freedom extends; earthworm actions might be just as undetermined as human actions are,
but it is doubtful, at this level, that they are appropriately nonrandom.[976]
Some philosophers like Peter Singer contend that humans generally avoid the continuum
of moral significance grounded upon certain combinations of capacities that contribute to each
animals unique awareness which is and should be, in principle, no different than the scale that
we use for humans. Here is another situation where we might want to keep in mind the
distinction between what is discretely delineated, rather than continuously delineated. While this
is a huge diversion that could be a book of its own, I generally agree with Singer in this respect,
though there are other considerations that require more extensive treatment than Im willing to
go into here (e.g. the perceived value of human identity, the perceived value of potential for or
lost capacity for moral awareness, pragmatic concerns, etc.). Lets return to an animals laser-
like focus on free will itself.
975
Coyne, J. (10/04/2012). William Lane Craig argues that animals cant feel pain. Why Evolution is True.
[Web log post]. Retrieved on 12/28/2012 from https://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2012/10/04/william-
lane-craig-argues-that-animals-cant-feel-pain/
976
Balaguer, M. (1999). Libertarianism as a Scientifically Reputable View. Philosophical Studies: An
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition Vol. 93, No. 2 (Feb., 1999), [p. 195].
272
THE CAUSAL VACUUM
Weve seen that the two stage model is reasonably evidenced and modest in the context
of choice, though it still doesnt provide evidence that the remaining will is still impervious to
other predisposing influence, were a causal option to be removed by stochastic factors. In terms
of explaining stochasticity and its incorporation into a coherent free will model, the challenge is
much more difficult for the contra-causal libertarian dualist, whether she employs quantum
randomness directly 977 or indirectly, as a (mere) causal chain-breaking event in agent
causality.978 The problem actually highlights the difficulties in coherently explaining how a free
will model could ever avoid pervasive adequate causal effects that circumnavigate even
acausality via predisposition. Lets go back to the basic theory of dualism and see what we know
so far in light of the Evidences in this book
Rene Descartes argued that the mind and body are separate and independent of each
other. There are several flavors of dualism, but as illustrated by theoretical physicist Mano
Singham, the classic Cartesian dualistic model looks something like this:
Genes/Environment/Stochasticity

Will Conscious Thoughts Unconscious Neural Activity Action[979]
I would suggest a model that looks more like the following:
Genes/Environment/Stochasticity

Conscious Thoughts/Will Unconscious Neural Activity Action[980]
977
Clark, T. (12/7/2005). Mind, Unspecified - comment on Henry Stapp's Quantum Interactive Dualism.
[Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.naturalism.org/mind.htm
978
Agent-Causality. (N.D.). [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/agent-causality.html
979
Singham, M. (11/12/2010). On free will-5: Models of how the brain works. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://blog.case.edu/singham/2010/11/12/on_free_will5_models_of_how_the_brain_works
980
Ibid.
273
Notice the crucial two way arrow allowing both Genes/Environment/Stochasticity and
Unconscious Neural Activity to affect/signal both Conscious Thoughts/Will to the left and action
to the right. When talking about causality in the context of determined thought, we always try to
be wary of committing a category error. My shopping list shows just one way that categories can
be treated erroneously.
When we looked at the list of hierarchical ontological categories in the Introduction, you
may have noticed that there was a point when physical things became mental representations (i.e.
when actual living beings became a mental representation of social groups). In the context
of causal free thought, we cant portray thoughts as bouncing off of each other in the way that
two billiard balls bounce off of each other or can we? Wouldnt that be a kind of category
error? Yes and no. While they arent exactly the same, and its true that even strictly within
mental representations there can be category errors (e.g. Simpsons paradox), Im going to argue
that mental representations in human perception, whether we are consciously aware of them or
not, are still not free of causality, even in at least some deterministic ways enough to create
predispositions, all automatically and non-consciously.
First, Ill argue that there is no passive mental experience physically. Second, Ill argue
that there is automatic semantic categorizing, based upon internal definitions, regardless of
perfect consistency with external definition (causality is not dependent upon being right. What is
274
crucial is that there is enough linguistic categorical consistency based upon the physical coding
of those definitions alone). That is to say that even for the wildest emergent phenomena, such as
a green sun with a thousand eyes that I imagined in the shower, and which I later believe
motivates me to join the House of the Twilight Eye culteven for that image, the automatic
linguistic categorizing of my experience by my brain fundamentally uses physical processes
along the way, including neural coding,981,982,983,984 until it eventually cashes out as action.
Lets consider choice in the relationship between two epistemological factors:
predisposition via sense perception (i.e. phenomenal experience by acquaintance) and even just a
weak causal contingency when accessing information, such as recent evidence for some of the
parameters of the old SapirWhorf hypothesis,985 which is a kind of linguistic relativity that
posited that the structure of language affects behavior. It was rejected in the 1960s by Berlin and
Kays important experiments on color association ambiguity between cultures.986 The work of
George Lakoff987 in Evidence #24, neural coding in Evidence #6, and all the evidence for
semantic primes has changed the game since the 1960s. The structure is probably not as
important as the semantic content itself and its relationship to how important social ties are
coded (e.g. to personality traits, to in-groups cues, etc.).
Its important to make a distinction between what Im saying here and something like a
kind of linguistic determinism that says that our experience is completely limited by our
language. This is not well evidenced.988 We know from the evidence that we automatically do
quick non-conscious association with words, even with words that are primed so quickly, that we
981
R. Jenison, A. Rangel, H. Oya, M. Howard. (2011). Value encoding in single neurons in the human
amygdala during decision-making. Journal of Neuroscience, 2011, 31:331-338. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.rnl.caltech.edu/publications/pdf/jenison2011.pdf
982
Sanders, L. (1/29/2011). How the brain shops: Research locates neurons associated with valuing objects.
Science News. Vol.179 #3 (p. 8) Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/68372/title/How_the_brain_shops
983
984
985
Koerner, E.F.K. (2000). Towards a full pedigree of the SapirWhorf Hypothesis:from Locke to Lucy"
Chapter in Ptz & Verspoor (2000:17).
986
Berlin, B., Kay, P. (1969). Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution. Berkeley: University of
California Press
987
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire, and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind. University
Of Chicago Press
988
275
might not see them. They still affect us. They still predispose us. Predispositionalism in external
and internal interaction with general semantic description doesnt require perfect global
determinacy in communication anyway, though, as I have said, it does posit constant causal
changes neuronally, and we must account for this influence in our interaction with each other and
the world.
As I noted in The Human Animal, animals have many crude versions of mental qualities
that humans have, but they dont have a language that is as complex as ours and abstract
linguistic categorization does seem to limit them in what they are able to believe. As philosopher
Tim Crane noted in the context of animal consciousness,989 some concepts are contingent upon
categorization of other concepts. For example, the classic false belief test990 shows when children
have enough of a grasp upon the categorizational element of language that they can have a theory
of mind. In this sense, this is probably as close as we can get to linguistic determinism.
An objection might be made right away that, as it was put by evolutionary epistemologist
Dr. Jeremy Sherman (discussing the work of physicalist Terrence Deacon), information is not a
thing. Its a narrowing of possibility.991 This may or may not be true depending upon the
semantic context, but in one sensethe sense Im using it here to counter contra-causal free
willit fails to account for the fact that the impetus for this narrowing is still contingent upon
physical vehicles (e.g. waves, photons, neurons, etc.) to be, ultimately, physically received and
then representationally coded for in sensory experience, even if and when we dont understand it.
This is not the same claim as something like linguistic determinism. In any case, when I speak
of information here, I am concerned with the epistemological moment of impactthe reception
of that narrowing; as both an ontological thing and as pure process transported by effectual
things. There still must be a point of connection/impression.
Even if the knowledge/narrowing of information were post-reception (I dont think it
is, but if it were), there would still be a perceived point of transference of informational change
989
Warburton, N. (Interviewer), Crane, T. (Interviewee). (11/2/2011). Philosophy Bites podcast: Tim Crane on
Animal Minds. [Audio podcast]. (16:00-end). Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://philosophybites.com/2011/11/tim-crane-on-animal-minds.html
990
Wimmer, H., Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong
beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition 13 (1): 103128. doi:10.1016/0010-
0277(83)90004-5. PMID 6681741.
991
276
in the experience of a normally functioning brain, like a point when film has the image
impressed upon it or recording tape has sound impressed upon it. This is how I will use the term
information, by including the relevant physical things upon which, true or pure
information is contingent to transfer to human experience (i.e. in the coding). Plainly, without
them, we would not have the experience at all and the experience itself is required for the will to
have any awareness at all, let alone to act freely within it. Otherwise, we just go, duh.
Im going to ask a long and complicated question now. You may need to read it twice:
Even if we say that thoughts dont have to be determined to be causal, via acquaintance, how can
an impression/idea travel to a non-causal dimension (i.e. a causal vacuum) where a sense
impression is unpressed, perhaps analogously, like a digital file that is unzipped, and yet
somehow still carry the information enough to invoke a decision to then be re-pressed
somehow, with causally effective content upon dimensional reentry, post-decision all without
claiming to have any meaningful causal influence? Just by the very definition of contra-causal
free will, for it to be truly free, it cannot.
The phenomenal world does not escape predisposition, influence, and causality just
because its not a wine glass smashed in a fireplace. While that might be the same type of causal
action in every culture, and yet have a different significance, even if definitions are universally
contingent, they still have a significance that has causal influence. That is to say that the
definition itself can make some sort of a causal contribution in the way it is causally pre-defined
and causally organized when accessed mentally, even if not veridical or determined or it is
categorized as gibberish. Even the more reasonable Cogito Model does not plausibly address the
non-random causality in automatic semantic categorizing, because the language itself steers
thoughts/decisions via subjective, developmentally wired neural pathways (see Evidence #24).
We might even get routing influence from the etiology of words like be-cause in everyday
language. Brains are habituated to employ both semantic categorizing and reasonability in very
specific ways that may be arbitrary, especially if associated with salient experience, but they
dont seem to employ randomness in any of it. Arbitrary is not necessarily random, just
contextually inappropriate. Even if it did employ randomness, random noise would be more
likely to merely make the train jump to another track going in the same direction.
277
Again, for every experience, the change in data moves from source to agent, as light hits
the eye, or sound hits the ear, neurons are firing992even just purely mental experience and/or
awareness of context begins to evoke the biases in this book. Again, these are clearly not always
randomized thoughts/firings, even if sometimes arbitrary. For example, as light hits the eye,
there is retinotopic mapping993 and our bias to pay more attention to images that look like
faces994,995 comes into play. From here we can consider what I presented in Evidence #28,
where viewings of black or white faces evidenced automatic prejudice in the brain (the
amygdala) and in certain facial muscle reactions.996,997,998 This is all built in to the phenomenal
experience whether we like it or not, even though, as it was shown, these kinds of biases were set
up semantically by cultural/external parameters. They still become wired in as a predisposition.
Whats key here is that there is no such thing as passive experience. All phenomenal
beholding is interactiveeven empirically observableto the point where we can accurately
predict which of a thousand pictures a person is looking at by analyzing brain activity using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).999 As vague as this present kind of mind
reading is, we can still distinguish between mental thoughts about faces or tools or sports, on
and on, with high degrees of accuracy, even if the readings are limited to some subjective,
developmentally produced categorical scaffolding for each person.
The point is that all communication, when detectable, invokes what we can call linguistic
predispositionalism: language, when detectable, even non-consciously, always influences the
992
993
The Salk Institute. (10/6/2010). From Eye to Brain: Researchers Map Functional Connections Between
Retinal Neurons at Single-Cell Resolution. Science Daily. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
994
Episode #25: Cognitive Psychology. (2001). Discovering Psychology with Philip Zimbardo. WGBH
http://www.learner.org/series/discoveringpsychology/20/e20expand.html?pop=yes&pid=1517
995
Norton, E. (10/23/2012). Identifying the Brain's Own Facial Recognition System. ScienceNow. Available on
10/23/ 2012 at http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/10/identifying-the-brains-own-facia.html?ref=em
996
Cunningham, W.A., Nezlek, J.B., & Banaji, M.R. (2004). Implicit and explicit ethnocentrism: Revisiting
the ideologies of prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 13321346.
997
Eberhardt, J. L. (2005). Imaging Race. American Psychologist, Vol 60(2), Feb-Mar 2005, 181-190. doi:
10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.181 Available on 9/22/2012 at http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/amp/60/2/181
998
Vanman, E. J., Saltz, J., Nathan, L., Warren, J. (2004). Racial Discrimination by Low-Prejudiced Whites:
Facial movements as Implicit Measures of Attitudes Related to Behavior. Psychological Science 15: 711-714.
Available on 9/22/2012 at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15482441
999
Singer, E. (3/5/2008). Mind Reading with Functional MRI. Technology Review. MIT. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://www.technologyreview.com/biomedicine/20380
278
subjects thought causally to some extent, and oftenmuch more often than we admit
predisposes their behavior to some extent. Im being conservative with this really, because if the
subject receives thoughts, there is always a causal reaction to it (e.g. accept, deny, ignore, etc.)
and their personality is altered to some extent. Even a conscious veto is a causal reaction. It may
not appear behavioral, but in the least, the context of their behavior is altered to some extent.
New data, new mind, to some extent.
So if thoughts themselves are fundamentally causal, in the context of contra-causal
dualism, we should ask the question: what is it that goes inter-dimensionally to influence, and yet
supposedly not influence, a decision, which by the definition of contra-causal is necessarily
not a reaction from the other side? Isnt it information? Considering the causal chain of
influences that come together to make definitions, how could a reasoning agent escape the
regression of influences that come together to make definitions, even in just accessing those
determined definitions semantically as concepts (i.e. the parameters of the definition itself is
made up of inescapable causal facts) in order to make that contra-causal free choice? It can't be
done.
If you acknowledge even just the impression of any idea or thing in order to consider it,
you not only allow yourself to be impressed by (i.e. caused by) the thing or idea itself, but also
the semantic category that *causally defines* that thing or idea, in real time constantly,
however right or wrong the description actually is. Again, there is no such thing as passive
experienceeven in the simplest event in purely mental experience, because describing, the
descriptions, and accessing descriptions are themselves all predisposed in another sense via
semantic compliance. Your brain will immediately categorize the linguistic/semantic experience
instinctively in ways that change who you are by what you know.
Can our decisions really remain free from causal influence by instantaneously stepping
into a hypothetically non-causal, purely observational dimension that can negate the impressions
of things, ideas, and even the definitions causal parameters necessary to think about them and
then somehow, this causally neutralized identity with causally neutralized information jumps
back from this anti-causal chamber into the causal dimension, repeating this process for
gazillions of thoughts and actions, analogously mirroring the countless inter-dimensional,
randomly jumping particles like the Casimir effect? No. There are clearly parts of the Casimir
effect analogy that break down. There is no way for causality to be coherently neutralized for a
279
strong libertarian response, even if it disappears into another dimension and comes back.
Information is either causally perceived or it is not perceived; it is also either random
information or it is caused, but neither allow for uncaused interaction with a non-predisposed
entity.
So what is it that goes inter-dimensional to (not) influence a decision from the other side
if there is neither causally tainted sense impression nor causally tainted information? Theres
nothing left. No etiology to speak of. Where does the wellspring originate for the contra-causal
will? As Tom Clark puts it, Suppose we had such freedom: on what basis would we
choose?1000 All this and we have completely assumed that the subject is going to receive
information that is accurate enoughor at least, self-consistent enough to work withwithout
losing control of their perception in the world, that is to say, the freedom to perceive correctly.
The free will proponent may reply that just because one has a distorted view of what the
factors are in the decision making process, which is to say that the conscious part incorporates
some of the already distorted results of the subconscious process, it doesnt mean that one still
cant freely choose between the distorted decisions but when you consider that if another agent
or Mother Nature herself could exploit this and alter your perceptions in just such a way so as to
steer you exactly where they want you to go in your decision have you really made a free
choice? That is to also ask, would you consider a hypnotized or brain-washed person to be
free, even if they do claim to experience some subjective choice making process that is
unaware of all the manipulation underneath? Is there a different you that is separate from what
the brain is doing?
Each choice we make is a mental experience of neural activity, but it doesnt mean that
we can reify that mental experience ontologically into a thing; it means that the multitudes of
impressions we have about something are collectively summed up for us by the time we
experience that thing. These are determinants related to the most similar past experiences, even
including the suggestive impressions for ideas/objects that are as of yet still not experienced. We
can be emotionally moved and motivated into action by the line the cow jumped over the
moon, but the event will never really happen. This kind of phenomenal motivation, I hope I
have shown, still doesnt escape causality, even if its causal influence is as indirect as it gets.
1000
Clark, T. (Spring, 2002). Applied Ethics: Science and Freedom. Free Inquiry Magazine. Vol. 22, Num. 2.
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=library&page=clark_22_2
280
Like all emergent phenomena, it is still at the mercy of its internal and external context,
evidencing and becoming further entrenched in the predispositions from the personality and
character that enjoy or despise it.
281
FUNCTIONALIST ILLUSIONS
There are many determinists who have asserted that the freedom of the conscious will is
an illusion and, indeed, this book shows evidence that might seem to support that. Aside from a
compatibilism that is defined by a break in the eternal chain of perfectly determined events since
the dawn of time by elements of randomness (i.e. two stage systems) or a compatibilism where
systems of responsibility are justified (i.e. semi-compatibilists), other compatibilists, and some
who still call themselves determinists, may focus agnostically upon our epistemic limitations. No
one is omniscient and we are unable to completely identify the causal chains and simply hold
that we are therefore (and/or for other reasons) justified in defaulting to free will friendly
standards of responsibility functionally in law (e.g. Benjamin Libet1001). Physicist Sean Carroll
argues pragmatically that free will is so ingrained in what it means to be human, that it is at least
as real as any metaphysical process we name and call real:
The problem with this is that it mixes levels of description. If we know the exact quantum
state of all of our atoms and forces, in principle Laplaces Demon can predict our future.
But we dont know that, and we never will, and therefore who cares? What we are trying
to do is to construct an effective understanding of human beings, not of electrons and
nuclei. Given our lack of complete microscopic information, the question we should be
asking is, does the best theory of human beings include an element of free choice?[1002]
To Carroll, asserting the meaninglessness of free will is like asserting the

meaninglessness of time, evolution, or baseball. It is considered by him and many other free will
agnostics to be such an integral part of our experience, so ingrained in our epistemology and the
nature of time and experience that its possible that we really cant do without it without perhaps,
suffering some serious consequences. On top of that and related to that, it seems to strike an
1001
Singham, M. (11/22/2010). On free will-10: Ethical and legal implications of free will as simply a veto
power. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://machineslikeus.com/news/free-will-10-ethical-and-
legal-implications-free-will-simply-veto-power
1002
Carroll, S. (7/13/2011). Free Will Is as Real as Baseball. Discover Blogs: Cosmic Variance. [Web log post].
Available on 9/22/2012 at http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2011/07/13/free-will-is-as-real-
as-baseball/
282
overly reductionist nerve in a lot of people. How far are we willing to reduce? Why stop at
neurons? These are genuine concerns.
But when humans metaphysically reify and name processes, some processes may have
elements necessary to our getting along in the world (e.g. free will, time) while others do not
(e.g. the process of mowing the lawn). The determinist asks, Can I get along without
perpetuating the idea that nothing is influencing my choice [or rather, already influenced my
choice before I even realized it]? Yeah, we could say who cares? and continue to find
pragmatic value in the presumption of volitional possibility, but the question in the mind of
determinists is what might a world utilizing a more veridically correct metaphysical perspective
discover as a consequence of such a paradigm shift?
Even some determinists, like Tamler Sommers, have made arguments against accepting
determinism in paradigmatic thought:
Vain it may be, but it is also a simple fact of human psychology. We need to see
ourselves as RMR [robustly morally responsible] in order to perform acts that conflict
with our self interests. We need to view ourselves as praiseworthy in order to sacrifice
our self interests to help others. Shedding the illusion of RMR would therefore cause us
to drastically reduce our charitable donations.[1003]
It should always be remembered that prudential/pragmatic/functionalist arguments

against determinism are arguments from utility. This may even be extended by some1004 to
suggest that we implicitly or explicitly consider illusionism: the theory that it could be in our best
interest to willfully pretend that something is or isnt true, even though it may not be true. A
variation of this is to accept the concept as valuable enough in itself to justify itself in other
domains, even if it isnt true. This is closer to what Sean Carroll describes above (i.e. it has
intrinsic value as mere process). Illusionism is a smaller subset of functionalism, which is similar
to illusionism in holding that sometimes its in our best interest to use whatever works, though in
1003
1004
Wilkinson, W. (Interviewer), Smilanski, S. (Interviewee). (10/10/2008). Free Will: the Good Absurd.
[Videofile]. Blogging Heads. (66:30-end). Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/14400
283
the broader sense of functionalism, the thing or method referred to may actually exist
ontologically.
Saul Smilanski is a philosophical illusionist regarding free will who has identified an
intriguing paradox concerning determinism. He writes:
The Ethical Advantages of Hard Determinism is a paradox: a non-hard-determinist

cannot gain the height of moral worth that a HD can, because only if you believe that
whatever you do you will not become worthy or unworthy on that account, can your
decision to do the right thing be fully disinterested and morally pure. But then hard
determinists dont believe in (free will dependent) moral worth. So the height of moral
worth is attained when it is impossible[1005] [emphasis mine].
Philosopher Nadeem J. Z. Hussain argues that the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche

proposed or at least tolerated honest illusions that have enough value in themselves, in the
least, affective value, not to require any other kind of justification (Art understands that its
illusions are illusions without the illusions themselves being undermined1006). While the
complexity of Nietzsches worldview and how it incorporates, tolerates, or merely recognizes
illusionism (i.e. as a product of active or passive nihilism1007) is beyond the scope of this book.
There dont seem to be many free will advocates operating under the pretext of illusionism
explicitly, though as we shall see, there are several who do so implicitly. In addition to any
evidence that a loss in free will belief may be functionally detrimental, we should be aware that a
functionalist rationale would still boil down to merely that; functionalist/prudential rationale
cannot reify libertarian free will.
While some philosophical applications of illusionism seem to be more palliative, others
appear to be more agenda drivenor further, an inadvertent appeal to the fallacy of desired
consequence. Apparently, because determinism is currently popular among some of the high
1005
Smilanski, S. (4/13/2008, at 11:40 AM). Why reading defenses of hard determinism makes people morally
http://gfp.typepad.com/the_garden_of_forking_pat/2008/02/why-reading-def/comments/page/2/#comments
1006
Hussain, N. (2007). Honest Illusion: Valuing for Nietzsches Free Spirits. The Philosopher's Annual 27,
Patrick Grim, Ian Flora and Alex Plakias, eds, 2007. Philosophers Digest. [This article first appeared in B.
Leiter & N. Sinhababu, eds, Nietzsche and Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 157-191].
1007
Haar, M. (1985). Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language. In The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of
Interpretation, edited by David B. Allison. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1985, 5-36.
284
profile naturalists and atheists,1008 via their propensity to recognize the implications of the kind
of science in this book regarding religion, religious apologists are citing pragmatic social
psychological evidence against determinism in order to disparage atheism (though there are
dogmatically anti-deterministic atheists like Raymond Tallis, Massimo Pigliucci, and, arguably,
Sean Carroll AND as it has already been said, there are and have been millions of theistic
[pre]determinists). One Christian apologist from simpleapologetics.org, Carson Weitnauer, has
noted that there have been some studies that purport to show that determinism priming
encourages anti-social behavior:
When researchers compare people with a belief in determinism with those who believe in
free will, the determinists:
Are more aggressive and less helpful towards others.[1009]

Recommend more punitive measures for behavioral deviations.[1010]
Have a less positive view about expected career success [and] are given more negative
work performance evaluations.[1011]
Have a far lower readiness potential, within the brain structure, to take
action.[1012,1013,1014,1015]
1008
Weitnauer, C. (5/23/2011). Atheism and the Denial of Reason. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012
from http://www.reasonsforgod.org/2011/05/atheism-and-the-denial-of-reason
1009
Baumeister, R. F., Masicampo, E. J., DeWall, C. N. (2009). Prosocial Benefits of Feeling Free: Disbelief in
Free Will Increases Aggression and Reduces Helpfulness. Pers Soc Psychol Bull. February 2009 vol. 35 no. 2
260-268. doi: 10.1177/0146167208327217. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://psp.sagepub.com/content/35/2/260.short
1010
Viney, W., Waldman, D., and Barchilon, J. (1982). Attitudes toward Punishment in Relation to Beliefs in
Free Will and Determinism Human Relations. November 1982 vol. 35 no. 11 939-949 doi:
http://hum.sagepub.com/content/35/11/939.abstract
1011
Stillman, T. F., Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., Lambert, N. M., Fincham, F. D., & Brewer, L. E. (2010).
Personal philosophy and personnel achievement: Belief in free will predicts better job performance. Social
Psychological and Personality Science, 1, 43-50. doi: 10.1177/1948550609351600. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.csom.umn.edu/assets/164290.pdf
1012
Harrington, T. (3/23/2011). Does Belief in Free Will Lead to Action? [Press release]. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/news/releases/does-belief-in-free-will-lead-to-
action.html
1013
Rigoni, D., Khn, S., Sartori, G., Brass, M. (4/22/2011). Inducing Disbelief in Free Will Alters Brain
Correlates of Preconscious Motor Preparation: The Brain Minds Whether We Believe in Free Will or Not.
Psychological Science. May 2011 vol. 22 no. 5 613-618. doi: 10.1177/0956797611405680. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://pss.sagepub.com/content/22/5/613.short
285
An excellent rejoinder1016 to these charges by the professorial podcasters at Reasonable
Doubts does the public a great service and I will draw heavily from their critical analysis and
identification of several problems in both Weitnauers overall argument above and in the studies
themselves. In addition to the studies above, the Doubtcasters also consider the pragmatic trend
setting 2008 study by Vohs and Schooler1017 showing that determinism priming increased the
subjects tendency to cheat.
The first criticism that can be leveled upon the researchers in the above studies is that key
terminology of the primes was philosophically all over the place, with the exception of the 2009
Baumeister, Masicampo, and DeWall study. Many, if not most or all of the key determinism
primes were from quotes by Francis Crick from his book, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The
Scientific Search for the Soul. The subjects were measured afterwards by the 1994 Paulhus and
Margesson Free Will and Determinism (FAD) scale.1018 In the FAD scale, they do attempt to
delineate between fatalistic determinism and scientific determinism, as well as randomness and
free will, but several of their examples are vague and can fairly easily cross-over. Consider some
of the standards for scientific determinism that could easily be considered fatalistic
determinism, such as:
10. Your genes determine your future.

21. Parents character will determine the character of their children.
24. Childhood environment will determine your success as an adult.[1019]
Whats worse is that, at the end of the day, at least some of the researchers that use the
FAD standards are using specifically fatalistic determinism as the benchmark in the studies, but
1014
Weitnauer, C. (8/7/2011). Atheism, Determinism and Social Problems. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://www.reasonsforgod.org/2011/08/atheism-determinism-and-social-problems
1015
Keim, B. (5/27/2011). Disbelieving Free Will Makes Brain Less Free. Wired Science. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2011/05/free-will
1016
Beahan, J., Galen, L., Fletcher, D., Schieber, J. (7/5/2011). Reasonable Doubts podcast: RD87 The
Unintelligent Design of Sex. [Audio podcast]. [16:30-39:30]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://doubtreligion.blogspot.com/2011/07/episode-87-unintelligent-design-of-sex.html
1017
Vohs, K. D., & Schooler, J. W. (2008). The value of believing in free will: Encouraging a belief in
determinism increases cheating. Psychological Science, 2008 Jan;19(1):49-54. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.carlsonschool.umn.edu/assets/91974.pdf
1018
Paulhus, D.L., Margesson, A. (1994). Free Will and Determinism (FAD) scale. Unpublished manuscript
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
1019
APPENDIX A: FAD-Plus: Free Will and Scientific Determinism. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~jcarey/fad_current_items.pdf
286
then still lumping fatalistic determinism and scientific determinism together as generic
determinism anyway (what logical fallacy expert Julian Baggini calls low redefinition1020) when
summing up their studies for the public or in their abstracts. Even one researcher from the creator
of the FAD scale did this.1021 Why? This has important philosophical consequences that offend
and misrepresent the majority of reasoned determinists who are not fatalists and soft/adequate
determinism, or, arguably, stronger forms of compatibilism/semi-compatibilism, probably stand
as the closest philosophical positions to predispositionalism.
As for the primes, consider this quote from Francis Crick used to prime for determinism
(out of an entire anti-free will essay [chapter?] that was used):
Although we appear to have free will, in fact, our choices have already been
predetermined for us. We cannot change that.[1022,1023]
Concerning the study showing that determinism priming decreased Readiness

Potential1024 (Readiness Potential is discussed in Evidence #1), the lead author, David Rigoni,
commented, If we are not free, it makes no sense to put effort into actions and to be
motivated.1025 This shows either the researchers misunderstanding of the kind of determinism
that most people who call themselves determinists believe in or, more charitably, it merely
appeals to more popular folk notions of it. As I have discussed here, this view is actually
fatalism. Just because Francis Crick (or David Rigoni) is a high profile scientist, doesnt mean
1020
Baggini, J. (2/9/2004). Low Redefinition. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.butterfliesandwheels.org/2004/low-redefinition
1021
Carey, J. & Paulhus, D. L. (1/2011). The Independence of Free Will and Determinism in Judgments of
Moral Responsibility. Poster presented at the 12th Annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social
Psychology, San Antonio, TX. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~jcarey/SPSP_poster_2.pdf
1022
Crick, F. (7/1/1995). The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons.
1023
Vohs, K. D., Schooler, J. W. (2008). The value of believing in free will: Encouraging a belief in
1024
Rigoni, D., Khn, S., Sartori, G., Brass, M. (4/22/2011). Inducing Disbelief in Free Will Alters Brain
Correlates of Preconscious Motor Preparation: The Brain Minds Whether We Believe in Free Will or Not.
Psychological Science. May 2011 vol. 22 no. 5 613-618. doi: 10.1177/0956797611405680. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://pss.sagepub.com/content/22/5/613.short
1025
action.html
287
that hes not susceptible to lazy reasoning/fatalism (i.e. why should we worry about the
future, if it is something we cannot change?). Contrary to what Crick said, we can change that
and do change that whenever we interact with other agents and causally influence each others
behavior via behavioral feedback loops in our intertwined causal chains and still be determinists
(and predispositionalists). Its not surprising that priming subjects with fatalistic lazy reason will
produce fatalistic lazy reasoning in the subjects.
Consider another quote from Cricks book, crowned in a paper by Vohs and Schooler
explaining their cheating study:
You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of
personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of
nerve cells and their associated molecules. Who you are is nothing but a pack of
neurons.[1026,1027]
Quotes like this one incorporate value cues/narratives and so are fairly overt allusions to
nihilism. We are not privy to the entire essay that was used from Cricks book beyond a few
quotes, but if this quote from the top of the paper explaining the study was used or is an essential
distillation of their perspective of determinism, we can see what happened. Its also important to
note that Vohs and Schooler do make a few important concessions, such as:
Agency and responsibility are tied to meaning, and being robbed of agency likewise robs
one of meaning (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). [] Beyond the psychological
palatability afforded to each position, there is also the moral component. The question of
free will has always been tied to the moral implications of the argument (Pereboom,
1997). Generally, the predictions made about the consequences of an eroding sense of
free will differ systematically with the position they are trying to advance.[1028]
1026
Crick, F. (7/1/1995). The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons.
1027
Shariff, A.F., Schooler, J., & Vohs, K.D. (in press). The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard
problem of free will. In J. Baer, J.C. Kaufman, & R.F. Baumeister (Eds.), Psychology and freewill. New York:
Oxford University Press. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/meta/publications/Brett/Schooler's%20Publications%20copy/8.pdf
1028
Ibid.
288
Wouldnt a quote like Cricks quote containing the reference to a sense of identity, in
addition to other parts of that quote, be necessarily tied to a loss of value/moral concepts?
Baumeister, et all, (2009) does explicitly concede that the subjects were laypeople, so folk
notions of free will were expected. Whether or not the subjects of these studies were demotivated
by inaccurate fatalistic priming or whether they were demotivated by confusion about the
moral/value significance of determinism/fatalism (which I will discuss more in depth below in
the sections on Responsibility and Retributivism) or whether or not they were demotivated by a
perceived/misperceived destruction of their sacred values (see Evidence #24), its probably a
safe bet to say that the subjects were not properly informed about the actual implications of
being causally interactive agents with the capacity for local control and the ability to participate
as a unique expression of the cosmos. Imagine the difference if they were primed with THAT
instead. This seems to be at least partially because some of the researchers themselves had a bias
of determinism as fatalism de facto.1029
Its easy to see how not delineating between perceived proper causal and moral
implications would be a major flaw in a study, but what about the cultural implications? Some
studies by researchers suggest that many crucial aspects of free will belief do transcend culture,
especially at a young age, including that the majority of participants said that (a) our universe is
indeterministic and (b) moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism.1030 Shaun
Nichols writes:
In the case of free will, research suggests that people in a diverse range of cultures reject
determinism, but people give conflicting responses on whether determinism would
undermine moral responsibility. When presented with abstract questions, people tend to
maintain that determinism would undermine responsibility, but when presented with
concrete cases of wrongdoing, people tend to say that determinism is consistent with
moral responsibility.[1031]
1029
Clark, T. (3/2008). Dont Forget About Me: Avoiding Demoralization by Determinism. [Web log post].
1030
Sarkissian, H., Chatterjee, A., De Brigard, F., Knobe, J., Nichols, S. and Sirker, S. (2010). Is Belief in Free
Will a Cultural Universal? Mind & Language, 25: 346358. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x Retrieved
on 9/22/2012 from http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/cultural-universal.pdf
1031
Nichols, S. (3/2011). Experimental Philosophy and the Problem of Free Will. Science 18 March 2011:
Vol. 331 no. 6023 pp. 1401-1403. DOI: 10.1126/science.1192931. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
289
While it may be true that free will belief is generally culturally ubiquitous, in addition to
conflicting cultural opinions concerning determinisms undermining of responsibility, one study
has shown that with increased age, American children showed an increased tendency to endorse
the free will to act against social constraints, while Nepalese children showed a decreased
tendency. They also showed that there can be an increasing cultural divergence over time in
free will endorsements.1032 The Doubtcasters cite the work of Krishna Savani,1033 whos shown
that Americans are more likely than Indians to construe actions as choices1034 and also that:
the expression of preferences in choice is not as central to agency in urban middle-

class Indian contexts as it is in North American contexts and that the link between
personal preference and choice is shaped by what it means to be a good agent in a given
context.[1035]
It makes sense that determinism primes given to people in/from a country where a value
dependence upon free choice is not as personal and pronounced as it is in America would not
have such a demoralizing effect, such as in India, where the notion of causal-friendly karma
and/or a caste system, etc., is already commonplace. Another study comparing American and
Japanese subjects showed that choice does not become meaningful for people in East Asian
contexts unless other people are invoked.1036,1037 This shows yet another value parameter
concerning choice different than in both American and Indian studies (the origin of the latter still
1032
Chernyak, N., Kushnir, T., Wang, Q. & Sullivan, K. (in press). A Comparison of Nepalese and American
Childrens Concepts of Free Will. Proceedings of the 33rd annual meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. [p.
4]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://csjarchive.cogsci.rpi.edu/proceedings/2011/papers/0030/paper0030.pdf
1033
Krishna Savani. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Krishna_Savani/
1034
Savani, K., Markus, H. R., Naidu, N. V. R., Kumar, S., & Berlia, V. (2010). What counts as a choice? U.S.
Americans are more likely than Indians to construe actions as choices. Psychological Science, 21, 391-398.
1035
Savani, K., Markus, H. R., & Conner, A. L. (2008). Let your preference be your guide?
Preferences and choices are more tightly linked for North Americans than for Indians.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 861-876. [p. 12].
1036
Hoshino-Browne, E., Zanna, A. S., Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., Kitayama, S., & Lackenbauer, S. (2005).
On the cultural guises of cognitive dissonance: The case of Easterners and Westerners. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 89, 294-310. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/~sspencer/spencerlab/articles/2005-HoshinoBrowne-AZanna-Spencer-MZanna-
Kitayama.pdf
1037
Kitayama, S., Snibbe, A., Markus, H. R., & Suzuki, T. (2004). Is there any free choice? Self and
dissonance in two cultures. Psychological Science,15, 527533. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
290
being vague, though Savani, et al (2008) cites good reasons to believe that it is different than in
Japan).
The Savani study below showed that even though choice makes North Americans feel
more in control, free, and independent, and thus has many positive consequences for individuals
motivation and well-being, it also found that it affected Americans in some negative ways
even in some ways that did not affect Indians:
We found that merely activating the concept of choice led to reduced support for
affirmative action (Study 1), reduced support for public policies aimed at benefiting
society (Study 2), increased support for policies aimed at expanding individual rights
(Study 3), higher levels of victim blaming (Study 4), and reduced empathy for a
disadvantaged individual (Study 5). Although we found these effects among American
participants, Study 5 provided initial evidence that these effects of choice are likely
culture-specific: Whereas choice reduced Americans empathy for a disadvantaged child,
it had no influence on Indians empathy.[1038]
So, several parameters of free will value are culturally dependent. The author
hypothesizes that the distress may be a result of the free will priming inducing too much
perceived responsibility. Culture is also definitely a parameter of concern when priming
something that has such profound implications for it, and just as importantly, when it doesnt
have profound implications it isnt a concern! There are other studies that show a little
realism can be good.1039 This includes realistic anxiety over possible future failure.1040,1041,1042
Consider the work of Barry Schwartz, which argues that
1038
Savani, K., Markus, H. R., Naidu, N. V. R., Kumar, S., & Berlia, V. (2010). What counts as a
choice? U.S. Americans are more likely than Indians to construe actions as choices. Psychological Science, 21,
391-398. [p. 6].
1039
Schneider, S. (2001). In search of realistic optimism: Meaning, knowledge, and warm fuzziness. American
Psychologist. 56, 3, 250-263.
1040
Goodhart, D. E. (1986). The effects of positive and negative thinking on performance in an achievement
situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 117-124.
1041
Norem, J. K. (2001). The positive power of negative thinking. New York: Basic Books.
1042
Showers, C. J. (1992). Compartmentalization of positive and negative self-knowledge: Keeping bad apples
out of the bunch. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 1036-1049
291
freedom, autonomy, and self-determination can become excessive, and that when that
happens, freedom can be experienced as a kind of tyranny. [] unduly influenced by the
ideology of economics and rational-choice theory, modern American society has created
an excess of freedom, with resulting increases in peoples dissatisfaction with their lives
and in clinical depression. One significant task for a future psychology of optimal
functioning is to deemphasize individual freedom and to determine which cultural
constraints are necessary for people to live meaningful and satisfying lives.[1043]
This is crucial information about deterministic and predispositionalistic worldviews that

is absolutely noteworthy here. All of his conclusions run throughout this book. Its an internal
locus of control, where you feel responsible, that science shows exacerbates depression,1044 as
opposed to an external locus of control, where you blame the external world. Free will is about
control.
The last relevant concession that Vohs and Schooler also make in their determinists are
cheaters study is:
note that simply doing nothing is coded as cheating. Hence, the anti-free-will essay
may have induced passivity generally, rather than immoral behavior specifically.
Although participants were instructed to press the space bar to avoid receiving the
answers, their failure to do socounted as cheatingmay not have been deliberately
unethical.[1045]
So, there might have been an indifference factor: perhaps the subjects, who were doing
mental calculations of math problems, did do the problems honestly, but let the answers come up
on the screen below because they wanted to check their answers and were either able to do the
calculations before the answers appeared or were able to avert their eyes.
1043
Schwartz, B. (2000). Self-determination. The tyranny of freedom. Am Psychol. 2000 Jan;55(1):79-88.
1044
Myers, D. (2010). Psychology 9th edition. New York: Worth Publishers. [p. 578]. (ISBN 978-1-4292-1597-
8)
1045
Vohs, K. D., & Schooler, J. W. (2008). The value of believing in free will: Encouraging a belief in
292
It has also been argued by optimistic X-Phi professor Tamler Sommers that the negative
pro-social effects of determinism primes are merely immediate effects, literally in the realm of
15 minutes or so; long term effects will most likely be different after the shock wears off and
people reflect on how their situation is really not much different than it was before.1046 It should
also be said that Sommers gives Smilanskis illusionism a kernel of credit when he says, I
conclude that the most one can say about the implications of free will skepticism on childrearing
is this: It maymay-not be a good idea to express ones [free will] skepticism to an adolescent
child.1047
It should already be obvious that, as it is most relevant to this book, these kinds of studies
only imply pragmatic problems concerning the application of determinism and do not really
challenge the actual ontology of determinism or predispositionalism and even these researchers
admit this about determinism when pressed.1048 A bait and switch implication that the ontology
of free will would somehow be bolstered by pragmatic concerns would be on par with suggesting
that the most socially successful theological groups must also therefore correlate ontologically
(an example of post hoc ergo propter hoc).
As shown in Evidence #24, it seems that we have a propensity for reifying
unassailable metaphysical propositions for pragmatic/psychological/emotional/social reasons,
whether they are veridical or not. Theoretical physicist and religious skeptic Taner Edis
considers religion in the context of economical Rational Choice Theory,1049,1050 where theistic
concepts are purchased for their structural function as a thought product and are categorized
and bought rationally and economically from the marketplace of ideas in order to make
subjective sense of the world according to an awareness of their personal needs. In this consumer
sense, any metaphysical propositional fix that cannot, in principle, be challenged is perceived
1046
Sommers, T. (4/2/2008). No Soul? I Can Live with That. No Free Will? AHHHHH!!! Is Giving up on Free
Will Really So Bad? [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/experiments-in-philosophy/200804/no-soul-i-can-live-no-free-will-
ahhhhh
1047
1048
action.html
1049
Edis, T. (2007). Science and Nonbelief. Amherst; Prometheus. [pp. 162-165]
1050
Grothe, D.J. (Interviewer), Edis, T. (Interviewee). (6/6/2008). Point of Inquiry Podcast: Taner Edis -
Science and Nonbelief. [Audio podcast]. [24:00-29:00]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.pointofinquiry.org/taner_edis_science_and_nonbelief
293
as justifiably rational in a strong enough sense to self-validate the use of subsequent, ancillary ad
hoc reasoning to bolster its defense or the defense of a more general worldview that rests upon it.
As already noted by philosophers (e.g. at least as far back as Nietzsche) and scientists
(see Evidence #24), sacred values are not limited to religious concepts; secular versions do
exist (e.g. human rights, animal rights, rational integrity, honor, duty, etc.), so theres no
reason to exclude free will from being both purchased and metaphysically unassailable in the
same light. And as it was discussed in the context of theism, some sacred values do require the
purchase of (i.e. the metaphysical reification of) other sacred values and libertarian free will can
be quite serviceable as an ancillary purchase. While functionalist/prudential rationale cannot
actually reify libertarian free will, determining whether or not free will provides fundamental
emotional/psychological support, such as in the loss of free will studies above, may show how
these kinds of underlying motivations can perpetuate the free will concept and, at the end of the
day, show how it may merely originate from consumer motivation as an underlying structure for
other beliefs.
The real issue for studies that show a loss in free will belief may be harmful (and that can
repeat their results in other cultures and/or after their flaws are accounted for and cleaned up) is
whether or not we should take seriously the option of the illusionist and incorporate free will into
our worldviews for pragmatic reasons. Assuming this is desirable or even intellectually possible
in the light of the growing evidence, we would still have to weigh the pros and cons, even if they
were all tenable pragmatic concerns. For example, considering the notion of a one true love or
a soul mateperhaps our most ubiquitously cherished notion on the planetwe often feel that
there are difficult consequences worth enduring to perpetuate it, vertical or not.
We may experience ourselves and/or our mates falling in love several times with other
people or even to more than one person at the same time and yet we perpetuate the soul mate
ideal because, perhaps, we need to believe that someone finds us to be more special than anyone
else in the world. Maybe we feel obligated (by our worldview) to perceive some cosmological
coherence to our emotional lives. Perhaps the difference in this case and that of the reification of
libertarian free will is that we can actually make it true to some extent by continuing to believe it,
and therefore build up enough of the right synaptic connections (as memories) and trust
hormones (see Evidence #13), which actually do make certain people more meaningful to us
than anyone else in the world. Unfortunately, that it can be merely circumstantially true for some
294
still doesnt make it necessarily, ontologically true for everybody nor should any physiological
basis for the experience of love be demoralizing.
Tom Clark has argued against the notion that determinism should be considered
demoralizing for some time. He contends that people could become demoralized if they confuse
ultimate control with local control1051 but, we dont have to suppose people (kids for instance)
*ultimately* deserve praise or blame to make rewards and sanctions justly contingent on their
behavior, which is what holding them responsible entails.1052 This seems to also imply that our
moral heuristics are based upon vestigial remnants of specifically absolute ultimate morality
and dualism, as opposed to merely objective and/or relative morality. Clark asks the difficult
question to the advocate of libertarian freedom: what does ultimate control require from us in the
context of responsibility that local control does not? Its hard to articulate what that might be and
as far as I know, no one has done it satisfactorily.
Are illusionism and functionalist arguments the last resort of what P.F. Strawson
famously called panicky metaphysics?1053 Humanity has certainly shown a proclivity for the
suspension of disbelief when it comes to our love of temporarily reifying fiction in art and
entertainment. While the suspension of disbelief has surely been a valuable cognitive resource for
psychological, political, epistemological reasons (allowing us an escape route from polarized
positions in internal deliberation) and may even have evolved as such, at the end of the day,
illusionism must fall short of actually instantiating policy, because it is ultimately non-veridical;
it merely passes the buck, obscuring our only source for a fair deterrence foundation. Again,
Clark notes:
In my view, the proper expression of reactive attitudes is that they should be constrained
by the humane and practical requirement that deliberately inflicted harms should
accomplish some good that cant be accomplished in any other way. Compatibilists dont
1051
Clark, T. (3/2008). Dont Forget About Me: Avoiding Demoralization by Determinism. [Web log post].
1052
1053
Philosophy of Thought and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
295
hold that view, and by keeping the myth of LFW alive, illusionists help to block the
possibility of ever achieving it[1054] [emphasis mine].
1054
296
ENDURANCE AND IDENTITY
What better to follow a discussion of illusionism than with the concept of identity? While
it is true that each one of us putatively represents both local material (i.e. the body) and a
conscious awareness with a local compilation of memetic entities and other phenomena (i.e.
memories of experiences and information; the mind), it is not as easy as it seems to parse out the
ramifications of identity when we look more closely at how arbitrary and predetermined so many
of the essential components came to exist. Identities like chairs or tables are often framed by
philosophers merely as the result of local equilibria or real patterns in the physical
cosmos.1055 Human identity is typically viewed by many philosophers as something of an
enigma: we know it when we see it, and yet on closer inspection, we lose some of that
confidence.
Consider the identity of Henry Moliason, who, after botched brain surgery removing
too much of the hippocampus, spent the last 55 years of his life with extreme anterograde
amnesia. He was completely unable to retain any new memories and could only remember the
first 15 years of his life, distributed and solidified throughout the brain, but he couldnt
remember what he ate or did or who he met five minutes previous.1056,1057 His very identity was
frozen in time for 55 years. Interestingly, his implicit, procedural memory (i.e. the kind of
memory we employ learning sports or a musical instrument, etc.) did show improved
learning.1058 How can we qualify Mr. Moliasons personhood/soul/spirit?
We saw examples of the undermining of folk identity in the Introduction and throughout
the Evidences by the reordering of conscious/subconscious hierarchy in decision-making
(Evidences #1, #2); it was undermined by the continuous tampering/rewriting of our
memories in real time (Evidence #3); by the ability to reorder physiological/neural
representations in the brain (Evidence #6)even to have corporeal factions and cerebral
1055
Flanagan, O., Rosenberg, A. (10/6/2011). Owen Flanagan and Alex Rosenberg on the significance of
naturalism. [Video file]. [42:15-44:00]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.philostv.com/owen-flanagan-
and-alex-rosenberg
1056
Shimamura, A. P. (1992). Organic amnesia. In L. Squire (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Learning and Memory (pp.
30-35). Macmillan: New York.
1057
Corkin, S. (1984). Lasting Consequences of Bilateral Medial Temporal Lobectomy - Clinical Course and
Experimental Findings in HM. Seminars in Neurology. 4(2):249-259.
1058
Milner, A.O. (1964 1965). The sanctions of customary criminal law: A study of social control. Nigerian
Law Journal. 1:180-81.
297
hemispheres with different personalities and possibly to share mind (Evidences #6, #8, #16);
by evidence that the mind operates upon, and identity is contingent upon, a continuum of
delusion and confabulation (Evidences #9, #10, #26, #7, #14, #18, #20, #19, #24, #25,
#23, #31, #30), by evidence that ethical, ontological, and social identity all supervene on
physical identity (Evidences #15, #5, #11, #6, #13, #14, #15, #16, #19, #24), and by the
multi-interpretive ramifications of our primary dependence (and moral interdependence) upon
group/social identity (Evidences #4, #24, #29). In the Human Animal, I showed how our
identity seems to barely splinter off from other animals in a lucky way. In the Causal Vacuum, I
showed how an identity with a contra-causal body/spirit duality at its core is incoherent. Theres
still a lot more to say about identity though.
Collectively, these arguments and Evidences dont imply anything like what the
substance dualist proposes and one would think that theyd have a lot to answer for in terms of
advocating libertarian contra-causal free will via the old folk notions of identity, that is to say,
via a free spirit with primary conscious directives, essentially uncoupled from physical
constraints. Still, some libertarian free will advocates will try to redirect our focus on causation
by diluting identity temporally, both qualitatively, by positing a special difference between
having long term goals and short term desires, and quantitatively, by attenuating causal necessity
with a network of multiple ordered goals and desires rather than single cause and effect
instances. The works of modern libertarians, from theological dualists to agent causality
philosophers show that along with the kind of emergent thought already discussed, long-term
planning1059/purposiveness is one of the last great refuges: the Mount Olympus of libertarian free
will advocates. For example, libertarian philosopher Thomas Pink writes:
What does action involve? I have claimed that the one thing that it does involve, that does
make it a genuine action, is purposiveness []
When I cross the road deliberately and intentionally, it is clear that I must be crossing on
the basis of a prior desire or decision to cross. And it is equally clear that my goal or
1059
Murphy, N., Ellis, G.F.R., OConnor, T. (2009). Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will.
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. ISBN 978-3-642-03204-2. [p.4]. Available on 9/22/2012 at
298
purpose in crossing must come from this same cause. It must come from the object of this
same prior motivation, from what I wanted or intended to do in crossing the road []
This goal that my decision has does not appear to come from any prior cause at all. For
example, it does not appear to come from any prior desire. Instead the goal comes from
the decisions own nature.[1060]
He also contrasts this notion of purposiveness (i.e. having goal oriented desires), with a
more brute assertion about another type of freedom: the idea that sometimes we can just decide
to do things, without any desire or other passive motivation having pushed us so to decide.1061
A mere lack of conscious awareness of our motivations resolves the naked assertion that
sometimes we can just decide to do things, without any desire or other passive motivation
having pushed us so to decide, though the former ideas about purposiveness are a little more
complex and should be addressed. First, when it comes to action, the idea that all action has
purposiveness must explain how teleology exists metaphysically in all actionary inorganic
matter, and if it does (in some latent form), then the most obvious rejoinder is: why is this form
of purposiveness so incredibly predictable? If a chemical reaction contains purposiveness, then it
seems not to offer us an example of freedom or contingency, but necessity.
An example that might seem to bolster Pinks position is the efficacy of cutting edge pain
management techniques,1062,1063 where the subjects train their minds to habitually deemphasize
pain by watching visual representations of it in an fMRI live imaging feedback loop, with the
pain shown on a screen as flames over certain parts of the brain. The mind sees the pain as it
increases and decreases in real time and discovers, in real time, which thoughts can deemphasize
that pain, giving itself the tools to reverse the bad habit and enforce pain-free thinking habits
then and in the future.
1060
Pink, T. (2004). Free Will: A Very Short Introduction. (p. 93-94). New York: Oxford University Press.
1061
Ibid. (p. 92).
1062
Community Academic Profile: Dr. Shawn Mackey Current Research Interests. Virtual Reality and real-
time fMRI Applications of real-time fMRI Phase II. Available on 9/22/2012 from
http://med.stanford.edu/profiles/Sean_Mackey
1063
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (Interviewers), Mackey, S., Thernstrom, M. (Interviewees). (6/7/2007).
Radiolab podcast: Loops. [Audio podcast]. [51:30-end]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.radiolab.org/2011/oct/04
299
The impression is not only that temporality seems to negate the causal process by
seeming to keep all of the changes internal, but also because the process shows evidence of
(freer) long term goals behind (less free) short term desires and with each having a qualifiable
identity. Its also interesting that even though the will of the original person actually becomes
ever estranged from the desires of the most recent incarnation, you are still perceived by self
and others as both the original person and the new person, for reasons of context, convenience,
ownership/property, etc., and the change is perceived as evidence of some kind of freedom
ultimately, of the same person.
There are hierarchies of desires both qualitatively (i.e. desires about desires,
first/second/third order desires, etc.) and quantitatively (i.e. short term and long term desires). A
qualitative example is when an addict desires [2nd order] to overcome their addiction desire [1st
order]. The feedback loop example above highlights the contrast between short term and long
term desires and/or a hierarchical ordering of desires that seemingly evidence a possible place for
indeterminacymore broadly, what Ill call the endurance argument, and/or a special identity
within the salience of any long term continuity. Still, changes in identity do not bestow free will,
they merely eliminate the wills of former selves, rewriting and reascribing them to new selves
that are less than the yesterday you. That some desires endure long enough for us to feel
compelled to ascribe the holder with a special identity in ontological terms is unwarranted.
If we say, this person has an identity because they have a desire that has lasted X
amount of time, can we therefore say, this person is free because they have a desire that has
lasted X amount of time? Why would it be so that a person is free just because they have a
desire, or several overlapping desires, lasting X amount of time? Just because we choose to focus
our microscopes to a point where we can arbitrarily ascribe an identity to these types of objects
(in this case, humans) with overlapping qualities? At what point would a desire or its holder
become causally free and why then? I will argue that the setting for which we focus our
microscopes in freedom and identity alike is perspectival, arbitrary, and probably selected for
evolutionary advantage, in order to support our more functional/practical desires. The identity
bias is perhaps even more deeply imbedded than our control addiction and very difficult to
dislodge. Of course Im me and youre you! That seems absurd! But how about the
microorganisms crawling on your arm are they you too? Can we take those away? And the red
blood cells? And the bacteria? Most importantly, there is our automatic-self to address.
300
The evidences in this writing should be enough to allow us to be reasonably skeptical of
Pinks assertions. As John Bargh says, if motivations or goals can be unconsciously primed and
correspond to representations, then they can be affected over the long term. He and other
researchers, such as Custer and Aarts, show that they can be.1064 As Custers and Aarts put it,
recent discoveries ...challenge this causal status of conscious will. They demonstrate that under
some conditions, actions are initiated even though we are unconscious of the goals to be attained
or their motivating effect on our behavior.1065 For as much stock libertarians put into goal
directing identity, there is already a lot of evidence for unconscious goal motivation, including,
1. Information process goals

2. Achievement and performance goals
3. Interpersonal goals[1066]
This is the evidence that crushes the endurance argument (or what Richard Double calls
delay libertarianism). Priming affects how we treat goals, and the persons, places, and things
associated with those goals, over long periods of time not merely in the moment itself.1067 This is
because our representations of people and things associated with our goals that persist every time
we access those goals are, just like our memories, vulnerable to primes from both the past and
present, reinvented ad hoc, and confabulated to have always been that way.
Bargh notes how these unconscious primes can contain some of the same core elements
of conscious primes, Kurt Lewins signatures of a motivational state, including persistence,
resumption, and consequences for mood and motivational strength,1068 which give the
unconscious some of the core qualities often associated with independent agency. These
unconscious goals are necessarily behavioral and enduring externally or they wouldnt have been
1064
Ibid. (p. 92).
1065
Custers, R., Aarts, H. (2010). The unconscious will: How the pursuit of goals operates outside of conscious
awareness. Science. 329, 47-50.
1066
1067
Fitzsimons, G. M. & Bargh, J. A (2004). Automatic self-regulation. In Baumeister, R. F., &
Vohs, K. D. (Eds.), Handbook of self-regulation: research, theory and applications (pp. 151
170). New York: Guilford.
1068
301
selected for. With so much evidence for unconscious predispositional influence over both the
short and long term, with no evidence for unique conscious control that non-conscious
mechanisms arent also doing, besides venal subjective phenomenal experience, why should we
presume to default to the dominance of conscious influence on decision, let alone presume it is
happening at all?
Double thinks that the delay theory [] fails to produce a sort of indeterminacy
libertarians want.1069 He also complains that the ability to act rationally, but differently (or not
act) given the exact same reasons, what Robert Kane calls dual rational control, seems
impossible, as each reaction is still based upon a consciously and/or unconsciously motivating
set of data, even if manipulatable both in the short term and less so over the long term. As he
writes, delay libertarianism does not show how we could rationally select either choice given
the actual occurrence or non-occurrence of the delays.1070 I basically argued this from a slightly
different angle in the Causal vacuum, bolstering the motivating set of data with our knowledge
of neural coding, but it this case, Im not even sure that it needs that extra ontological boost.
Related to that context, reifying free will based upon the endurance of certain desires is a
category error and the length of the desire or of the network of desires that constitute the
emergent property does not correlate to its freedom from causality itself, its just that it has a
more extensive network of causal relations. Aside from the fact that its difficult enough to
reasonably describe how most long term plans and goals cant be evidenced by source
motivations, even the rare seemingly arbitrary sudden desire to be a race car driver or jump
out of a plane before I die may still has an average of 98% non-conscious influence upon your
decision that you are just unaware of. At the end of the day, the contrast between short term and
long term identity is really just a distraction from the fact that you were participating in causal
parameters all along the way, knowingly or unknowingly. This is another reason why I chose to
frame this book as predispositionalism, rather than the determinism: I wanted to highlight the
point that factors like non-conscious influence and cognitive biases may exist and endure in
much the same way that long term plans and goals endure.
What about intention? Does it represent our identity enough to allow for libertarian
freedom? We saw how our intention was frontloaded with moral biases in Evidence #4. In a
1069
Double, R. (1993). The Non-reality of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. [p. 213]
1070
Ibid.
302
discussion about free will on Philosophy TV,1071 both Randolph Clarke and Stephen Kearns
seem to agree that actions, in general, are intentional at the end of the day, because the actional
choice is sort of an answer to the intention itself. This is even if, as they agree, intending to try
to score a goal doesnt count as intending to score a goal though one may ask: is trying not
actually intending or is it merely an indirect admission that the perceived probability of failure is
higher? Accepting a low probability for success doesnt necessarily negate intention if intention
is on a continuum.
They dont necessarily agree, however, that the step from reasoned explanations to
actional choices is equal. As I already explained in Luck, many philosophers require this of
libertarians in order to distinguish their actions from luck. Kearns worries that reasoned
explanations to actional choices are different in a crucial way, because if actions are truly free,
then some of those options wont be in accord with prior goals and need their own explanation to
be justified as actional intentions, which seems to allude to Doubles objection to Kanes dual
rational control as well.1072
Kearns worry may be tenable, even if he trusts his intuition that ultimately, actions in
general are intentional. What explains the jump from an intention to an action? Does it depend
on the unique quality of the intention? In some instantiations that follow intentions, quick and
dirty actional decisions that are automatized in some way (just as the heart does not wait for a
decision to beat) seem to be evidence for some kind of connection between intention and
biology/physiology. But what about long term decisions not to decide or to delay the decision?
Do they have any part of that automatization? Do they have just enough to plug Kearns hole?
Again, I ask, why should the delayed veto be exempted from predispositional influence?
In the section Luck, I discussed Robert Kanes SFAs. Kane posits an ultimate
responsibility using Aristotles argument for virtue ethics: if a man is responsible for the
wicked acts that flow from his character, he must at some time in the past have been responsible
for forming the wicked character from which these acts flow.1073 Kane admits that unless
1071
Clarke, R., Kearns, S. (1/18/2011). On the problem of free will. [Video file]. [54:00-end]. Available on
9/22/2012 at http://www.philostv.com/randolph-clarke-and-stephen-kearns
1072
Ibid.
1073
303
sufficient reasons are shown to exist in our past, the infinite regression of insufficient reasons
goes back to birth and there is still no ultimate responsibility. Susan Wolf describes the problem
In order for an agent to be autonomous, it seems, not only must the agent's behavior be
governable by her self, her self must in turn be governable by her self her deeper self,
if you like and this must in turn be governable by her (still deeper?) self, ad infinitum.
If there are forces behind the agent, so to speak, making the agent what she is, then her
control of her behavior is only intermediate, and therefore superficial. But if there are no
forces behind the agent making the agent what she is, then her identity seems to be
arbitrary [] The condition of autonomy seems at once impossible and necessary for
responsibility.[1074]
Robert Kane addresses the problem thusly,
The only way to stop this regress is to suppose that some acts in our life histories must
lack sufficient causes altogether, and hence must be undetermined, if we are to be the
ultimate sources or grounds of, and hence ultimately responsible for, our own wills []
Free will (in contrast to mere free action) is about self-formation.[1075]
As I have also noted, Kane believes that the indeterminacy that facilitates this end to
infinite regress happens when we are engaged in a real moral conundrum and the brain creates a
state of indeterminacy. This, for Kane, is the moment when we create our characters that can
then perpetuate that freedom in secondary and tertiary choices, etc. It shows how and why
responsibility is so intuitively related to identity. The origination issue will be resolved to my
satisfaction in the section on Responsibility, as it is not the only conceivable underlying principle
for [ultimate] responsibility, but its important to keep in mind as we watch all the parts that
comprise identity dissolve as they are delineated.
To continue now though and say that we have free actions because we need them for
Ultimate Responsibility would be a fallacy of desired consequence. Inspired by Robert Kane,
1074
Wolf, S. (1990). Freedom Within Reason. (pp. 13-14). New York: Oxford University Press
1075
304
Alfred Meles daring soft libertarianism rests upon the same cryptic notion of responsibility
through character building over time; it is also, somehow, considered foundational enough to
justify events caused by the agent down the road. Should we presume that because they are both
in the body proper and that the character governing those decisions is comprised of decisions
made by the body proper, that that makes them free? As Derk Pereboom writes, Mele argues
it may be that by earlier character-forming decisions, for which the agent is morally
responsible, she has significantly affected the probabilities that govern her decision.
Through their past behavior such agents shape present practical probabilities, and in their
present behavior agents shape future practical probabilities. Mele calls this view daring
soft libertarianism.[1076]
As Mele himself writes that this gradual process might make an agent less egoistic in
time, with actions that might progressively have reinforcing consequences that help to produce
in him increased concern for the welfare of those around him. This increased concern would
presumably have an effect on his evolving deliberative habits.[1077] So for Mele, based upon
Kanes work and Aristotles virtue ethics, the character formed by those rare free moral actions,
actually increases in virtue and does some work to make deliberative habits. Its important to
note here that these deliberative habits in this case are able to justify responsibility, because if
and when they are really arbitrarily produced predispositions, then we should be able to say the
same thing about those as well.
I think that Meles/Kanes/Aristotles approach is clever, but ignores how humans
actually behave ethically. Virtue ethics is not evidenced to be true, in that we do NOT
consistently increase and decrease in virtue. We are a complex ethical mish mash. The approach
also belies the fuzzy identity issues involving the way we change over time, based upon who we
are, were, and the environment, including cognitive offloading and mirror neurons, etc. It cant
be repeated enough that in Evidences #24 and #27 we saw evidence for spontaneous,
1076
Pereboom, D. (2007). On Alfred Meles Free Will and Luck. Cornell University Philosophical Explorations
10, 2007, pp. 163-72. [p. 2]. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://www.arts.cornell.edu/phil/homepages/pereboom/MelecommentPHILEXPLORATIONS.pdf
1077
Ibid. (p. 15).
305
unconscious goal contagion.1078,1079, 1080 It seems funny that the goals that supposedly make one
free are unconsciously contagious. Its hard for me to imagine that anything I could catch
would make me more free.
In Evidence #3, Ive already said a lot about the impact of memory loss and
reformulation in identity. Weve also seen it in all sorts of other ways, via mental diseases and
even simple gains and losses of knowledge over time, because when you change, you subtly
readjust everything to some extent, not just that memory or bit of knowledge or desire. In
psychology, adaptation-level phenomenon is an important concept in this context. Psychology
Glossary online defines it as:
the tendency to adapt to a given level of stimulation and thus to notice and react to
changes from that level. [] we use our past to calibrate our present experience and to
form expectations for the future. Success and failure, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, are
relative to our prior experience. If our achievements rise above those expectations, we
experience success and satisfaction. If our achievements fall below the neutral point
defined by prior experience, we feel dissatisfied and frustrated[1081] [emphasis mine].
Its easy to see how our predisposition to (re)calibrate our present experience and to
form expectations for the future in itself creates identity issues. Of course, our physical
predisposition creates limitations on the ways that we can change, but personally, I dont see any
reason why a libertarians use of emergent phenomena as a metaphysical platform for breaking
causal orbit couldnt be equally applied here in the sense that adaptation-level phenomena might
create layers of emergent identity that thwart as much control as it supposedly would gain
freedom commensurately. Why should we presume emergence is freeing? Metaphysics is tricky
business, but there you are and, okay, theyre a little fun too!
1078
1079
Aarts, H., Gollwitzer, P., & Hassin, R. R. (2004). Goal contagion: perceiving is for pursuing. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 2327.
1080
1081
Adaptation-level phenomenon. (N.D.). Psychology Glossary online. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://www.psychology-lexicon.com/cms/glossary/glossary-a/60-adaptation-level-phenomenon.html
306
So with that, lets get down to some specifics about the odd nature of identity. It helps to
see what we can find that is essential to it, if anything. This is a huge topic that goes beyond the
scope of this book, but there are some things we can ask and some things we can say. Identity
has a funny way of changing as you focus in and out. Ive said that I believe we have evolved to
prefer an identity bias that separates us from the world in a fairly superficial manner
(unrealistically favorable in every way of course), based upon what we see: our bodies. Ive
already given a great deal of evidence for empathy via mirror neurons in Evidence #27. Do
you think that when you suffer physical pain or enjoy physical pleasure that it does not literally
affect others to some extent? It does, especially when we trust and care a great deal for them.
Even the splitting of our own brain hemispheres to leave to non-identical personalities puts us in
a pickle when trying to identify which side is us... as we watch our hands fight with each other,
zipping up and down our jacket.
We extend this physical border to our cognitive identity as well. Ive given a whole
bunch of evidence for sub-control/non-conscious identity. Who is that that performing so many
tasks that I didnt reason out? But lets go down a different path now. Lets go outward.
Cognitive distribution is when we use the environment to think for us. One thing that we can ask
is: does the mind employ cognitive distribution in the environment in such a fundamentally
interactive way that environment itself should be included in our cognitive identity? More
holistically inclined eastern metaphysical thought has helped us to be aware that key elements in
the concept of the self can be viewed as facultative constructs that extend outside of the body in
reified categorical, contextual relationships, such as in hierarchies, classifications, groups,
contrasts, etc.
Many western cognitive scientists will concede cognitive distribution to the environment
in a weaker sense, but are compelled to concede much more when it comes to mentally
simulating external events interactively.1082 I have already argued throughout the Evidences for
cognitive offloading in social systems via mirror neurons and other social mechanisms. These
have even been evidenced in animals. John Bargh has shown that
1082
Wilson, M. (2002). Six Views of Embodied Cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 9 (4):625--636. [p.
7-11]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
307
flocks of birds and herds of antelope and schools of fish have incredible synchrony and
movement; they can all move as one unit [] theyre not thinking about this. Theyre not
deciding to move one way or the other, but by merely perceiving what others in their
group are doing they do the same thing, so theres a direct link between perception and
action.[1083]
This takes in-group preferences to a whole other level! The subject of cognitive
offloading has controversial parameters, but even some of the top post philosophy of mind
western philosophers of cognitive science and neuroscience would say that the winner would
probably be on the reductionist end of the spectrum and still also believe that holistic science
has had enough success to make it worth pursuing in the future.1084 Chemero and Silberstein
talk about David Rumelharts early example of working out a math problem on a chalkboard,
where the cognitive system included the brain, the chalkboard and the act of writing on the
board.1085,1086
In Philosophy Now magazine, Laura Weed gives an excellent overview of the extended
mind in the philosophy of mind. She discusses the contributions of J. J. Gibson, who expanded
the notion that thought is ecologically embedded in a body and an environment. She also
mentions Andy Clark and his argument for the environment as a mental facilitator functionally
and socially, including his classic thought experiment with David Chalmers introducing Otto and
his notebook.
Clark shifts the philosophical emphasis from analysis of the brain to analysis of a
humans kinesthetic interaction with an ecological and social space. He points out that
large-scale social projects, such as a building project or a disaster relief effort, occur
1083
A. Bargh. [Video file]. [13:00-end]. University of Missouri Video Services. Available on 9/22/2012 at
1084
Chemero, T., Silberstein, M. (2008). After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science.
Philosophy of Science. 75 (1):1-27. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
https://edisk.fandm.edu/tony.chemero/papers/chemsilberphilsci08.pdf
1085
Ibid.
1086
Rumelhart, D., et al. (1986), Schemata and Sequential Thought Processes in PDP Models, in D.
Rumelhart, J. McClelland, and the PDP Research Group (eds.), Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations
in the Microstructure of Cognition, vol. 2, Psychological and Biological Models. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
757.
308
across a considerably extended space and through the intersection of many peoples
minds, and are not limited to neuronal firings in any individual brain. Clark, in a joint
paper with David Chalmers, discusses the fictional example of Otto, a man with memory
problems who remembers the location of a library (and other useful pieces of
information) by writing it down in a notebook. They argue that Ottos memory is literally
in the notebook, not in his brain.[1087]
It seems hard to deny that a more extreme example of cognitive offloading, such as that
of a cyborg, with an additional computer brain and wireless internet built in, would not include
the qualitative capability of her technical hardware in an intuitive description of her overall
identity. How much does our proximity to this technology make an ontological difference in
defining our identity when it comes to cognitive offloading (e.g. via a computer or a calculator)
or in accomplishing physical tasks (e.g. with a motorcycle or a wrench or a knee brace),
considering that the mind has evolved to perceive the body itself as an extended instrument for
the survival of the mind, however misinformed it is? Remember how quickly the mind rewires
itself in the Beeblebrox Illusion. In just a few minutes, the threat of a knife wound to the rubber
hand is enough to trigger the autonomic nervous system Evidence #16.
Consider also our increasing externalization of memory to technology and social media.
We dont need to remember contact information anymore; its in our phones, along with beeping
reminders for appointments (it seems like my mothers goes off ten times a day). We dont need
to remember events anymore, as long as weve captured them on video and plugged them into
the eternal internet. Is there a better way to become immortal without actually being immortal?
And since we usually choose what we post, its often what we would consider to be the best of us
that lives on long after death (and negative press may help to thwart anti-social tendencies in a
more profound way than the more slowly spreading bad reputations of yore). This really will be
the only posthumous identity that most of will ever have. Im not arguing that this is or isnt a
bad thing, only that the negative consequences and implications should always be considered and
prepared for.
1087
from http://philosophynow.org/issues/87/Philosophy_of_Mind_An_Overview
309
In this case, documenting history in such a salient way gets my vote, because most
anything that reduces the ignorance of history is probably a good thing. We just need to
understand that in this externalizing of our identity to interact with others via social technology,
it still benefits us to exercise our minds, keeping them active and autonomous, at least to some
extent, for their overall health (and some even define health itself as increased autonomy).
Not only is the barrier between self and others fuzzy in this way, but the desired uniqueness in
our identities are at constant risk of being smudged out by the identity of other persons or groups
in that sphere, slowly and subtly.
Even the body itself, especially when viewed from a molecular perspective, is constantly
exchanging particles/energy, let alone the obvious exchange of food/air/waste with our
environment interactively, so its commonly perceived boundaries are literally nebulous.
Metaphysicians sometimes refer to identities as space-time worms1088 in order to rectify the
real world identity problem of constant small changes that happen over the existence of the
identity. It is often more appropriate to view identities as consistent information patterns,1089
rather than as stuff. How consistent these patterns are depends upon the identity.
In a class on Death at Yale (PHIL 176), philosopher Shelly Kagan taught that even
though body parts may change and the generally perceived identity still exists as a space-time
worm, it depends upon which parts change, because they are not all equal. While some theorists
may lean toward the torso, Kagan leans toward the brain as being the crucial house of
identity.1090 I tend to agree, though holistic physiology of the body does affect the brain
interactively and they simply cannot be completely disentangled, nor, as we shall see, can the
environment. If neuronal patterns1091,1092 in the brain hold the memories that make up our
1088
Kagan, S. (Uploaded by YaleCourses on Sep. 30, 2008). 10. Personal identity, Personal identity, Part I:
Identity across space and time and the soul theory [Video file post]. [22:00-end]. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&feature=endscreen&v=00KDsArsQ3A
1089
Kurzweil, R. (2011). Episode 4: What is the Nature of Personal Identity? Closer to Truth. PBS [Video
File]. Available on 9/22/2012 at http://www.closertotruth.com/video-profile/What-is-the-Nature-of-Personal-
Identity-Raymond-Kurzweil-/632
1090
Kagan, S. (Uploaded by YaleCourses on Sep. 30, 2008). 11. Personal identity, Part II: The body theory and
the personality theory [Video file post]. [16:45-33:05]. Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ifIbyexApas&feature=related
1091
1092
310
identities, it seems that what we normally consider to be our identities are defined by both matter
and process. This is the body view of identity, which stands in opposition to the dualistic soul
view, discussed earlier, as well as the personality view of identity (which I wont get into).
Kagan notes that the problem of fission, which is the term for the branching off of
identity commensurate with the branching off of the neurons, physical (brain and body) parts,
etc., is equally troubling for all three views in trying to nail down where the person is by
following the parts.1093 He gives a thought experiment involving three men who surgically
exchange brain hemispheres and torsos in such a way that each torso has the two brain halves of
the other two men. Where would the persons be? Following the brain as the house for identity
is still ambiguous. He notes that even if we ascribe the soul to one half of the brain, we are
always left with a living thinking half brain without a soul (and many have asked us to consider
what happens to a soul in the case of the formation of monozygotic twins, who are the product of
a split zygote, long after fertilization). Its difficult for the folk notion of the soul to survive these
kinds of challenges without the same no branching caveats.
Professor of eastern religion, Dr. Charles Goodman, asks us to consider a hypothetical
scenario where future nano-bots were able to rearrange 1% of those neurons in our brain that
correlate to our identity to match up to Napoleons brain. Remember that our experience of
identity as memory is facilitated by our synaptic connections in the brain, which literally
physically correlate to what we think mentally to some extent (see Evidences #3, #6, #24).
So after a 1% change in our neural wiring, say, as Goodman puts it, to correspond to 1% of
Napoleons mind, would it still be you? How about 2%? ...and so on. This hazy boundary allows
what has been called the sorites paradox: the fallacy of the heap:
Would you describe a single grain of wheat as a heap? No. Would you describe two
grains of wheat as a heap? No. You must admit the presence of a heap sooner or later,
so where do you draw the line?[1094]
1093
Kagan, S. (Uploaded by YaleCourses on Sep. 30, 2008). 13. Personal identity, Part IV; What matters?
[Video file post]. [00:00-36:00]. Available on 9/22/2012 at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OGA0Yo-
SoPM&feature=endscreen&NR=1
1094
Hyde, Dominic, "Sorites Paradox", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward
N. Zalta (ed.). Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/sorites-paradox
311
In the PBS series Closer to Truth, famed metaphysician and identity specialist Peter van
Inwagen (a non-dualistic theist!) poses a thought experiment where God collects all the original
atoms to recreate Socrates at sixty years old and, then again, collects all the other original atoms
to recreate Socrates at seventy years old1095 (because we know that the molecules change
constantly and by ten years none of them would be the same). Which one would be Socrates?
This shows the kind of philosophical conundrums that can be a result of thinking that identity is
merely the same stuff.
In the same show, Ray Kurzweil talks1096 about how some Alzheimers patients now have
actual machinery in their brains; an integral assemblage of molecules that actually replace the
lost, dead neurons and allows them to think, even though machinery is commonly perceived to
be a non-biological pattern. It is literally part of their thinking process and these patients are
very protective of it as part of their selves. Long live the cyborg!
We dont have to exclude western religious paradigms altogether to rethink our
traditional notions of identity either. As it was noted by biblical scholar Robert Price, the
existentialist Christian philosopher Paul Tillich wrote that the more Nonbeing that Being can
take into itself, the stronger it will be1097,1098,1099 in the sense of provoking ourselves to face our
fears, build character, etc. What is integral? Everything. Even if we have limited direct
participation in the world around us because of distinctions we perceive that can limit those
specific kinds of causation. We can still see that a perception can help us to expand the circle in
terms of not only fuzzy metaphysical identity, but also ethically, socially, psychologically, etc.
There are other signs that Christianity may be heading towards a more obscure theology
of identity, personal responsibility, and group morality. In the June 2011 issue of Christianity
Today, we witnessed perhaps the first large scale Christian media source concession that science
1095
Von Inwagen, P. (2011). Episode 4: What is the Nature of Personal Identity? Closer to Truth. PBS [Video
Identity-Peter-van-Inwagen-/176
1096
Kurzweil, R. (2011). Episode 4: What is the Nature of Personal Identity? Closer to Truth. PBS [Video
Identity-Raymond-Kurzweil-/632
1097
Price, R. (11/6/2011). Costumed in Confusion. Zarathustra Speaks! [Web log post].
1098
Christopherson, J.R. (1995). The Concept of Nonbeing and Its Role in Paul Tillichs Thought. Volume:
Ph.D., Publisher: University of Chicago, Page: 198
1099
Tillich, P. (1968). A History of Christian Thought: From Its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism.
[pp. 33, 73]. (New York: Simon and Schuster). Available on 9/22/2012 at
http://download.tales.com.br/marxismo/Hist%C3%B3ria%20da%20filosofia/Tillich,%20Paul%20-
%20The%20History%20of%20Christian%20Thought%20(Christian%20Library)%20(philosophy).pdf
312
shows no genetic evidence for a literal first couple (i.e. Adam and Eve); that the contrary is the
case. After reminding us of the mistakes of condemning people like Copernicus and Galileo,
Christianity Today tries to adapt theologically by suggesting that perhaps we should consider
spreading the blame of original sin upon populations, since biblical groups/tribes were held
responsible collectively for the actions of individuals in those groups:
Hebrew thought offers one clue to resolving this tension: The corporate nature of
humanity. Scripture often calls groups of people by the name of their historical head.
Israel is an obvious example. So are Canaan and Cush.
At times, Scripture also holds groups of people morally responsible for the actions of
some of their members.
Thus some have suggestedas does John Collins in Did Adam and Eve Really Exist?
(Crossway, 2011)that if both biblical and scientific clues suggest a larger population
contemporary with Adam and Eve (Whom did Cain marry? Whom did God protect him
from?), we can still conceive of Adam and Eve as leaders of that original population.
That suggestion has the virtue of embracing both a prehistoric couple and a prehistoric
population.[1100,1101]
Lets bring identity home now to policy/law based upon the notion that we have
libertarian contra-causal free will. If part of my brain that made me crazy enough to be a
dangerous murderer were to be completely fixed, as in corrected, by scientists, consider how
unfair it would be to continue to cast me as an evil murderer afterwards (see Evidence #15). If
were going to isolate the relevant identity of a particular agent to specific temporal states, it
would be fairer to view our existence as a plurality of many, many selves, but because of the
vagueness (i.e. sorites paradox) involved in trying to delineate between each of these many
oblique selves as combinations of changing qualities, we realize that it is an impossible task
1100
No Adam, No Eve, No Gospel. (6/2011). Christianity Today. Vol. 55, No. 6, Page 61. Retrieved on 9/22/2012
from http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2011/june/noadamevenogospel.html?start=1
1101
Falk, D. (6/6/2011). BioLogos and the June 2011 Christianity Today Editorial. [Web log post].
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://biologos.org/blog/biologos-and-the-june-2011-christianity-today-editorial
313
without arbitrary conventional classifications. Just like with the concept of free will, theres no
enduring self beyond the illusionist functionality that weve arbitrarily incorporated into
functional semantic concepts. Even though we consider those evolved, arbitrarily classified
human identities to still be functionally useful for praise and blame, it doesnt mean that we need
to, or even should, build or deconstruct all ontological reality around them as well.
Neither mind nor body is isolated from an interactive flux, though our perception is
otherwise. Even as we lose and gain key qualities of our identities, we feel a stable identity, but
these conscious and physical snapshots of our continually developing present identities in our
limited awareness merely serve the functional needs of perpetuating the kind of consciousness
that endures robustly. Slowly replacing the parts of anything will eventually create a new object,
even if we consider it the same overall object after each small replacement until it isnt. I
contend it is different with each change, even each contextual change.
Returning to our robot with the ability to access only 2% of its software, including some
randomized software to bolster emergent data, we find that its identity is couched in all the same
things mentioned above, including a propensity to focus only on that 2%. Again, if our freedom
somehow lies in the emergent data from the randomized programs, what happens when we lose
or erase memories (see Evidence #3) as our identities change and new identities delete the old
ones bit by bit, erasing unrealized emergent identity contingent upon seemingly less significant
conscious data?
When we consider up-to-us-ness, what exactly is the us in that consideration? Should
we presume that that 2% necessarily represents all of or only what is most essential about our
(proposed) identity? It may represent all of us in some ways, over certain issues, considering
that we seem to use our conscious minds as a feedback loop for our benefit. But it clearly doesnt
in other ways either, as our conscious experience is not to be trusted in, for example, regulating
our heart beat or breathing regularly. What else do we not entrust to our conscious awareness?
Again, to what extent is a life largely or even partially controlled by an overwhelmingly non-
conscious controller, including all unrealized non-conscious reaction to external influence, still
freely controlled?
Thoughts and actions only serve potential future selves anyway, whether its 15 seconds
afterwards or 15 years, and as we saw in the Evidences, especially when procrastinating
314
responsibility.1102 Often, our thoughts and actions are biased toward a temporal proximity to our
most current snapshot: the present, but of course, some thoughts and actions are learned to
prevent circumstances later in life or after life, commonly perceived as dangerous enough to
trump any bias for the present (e.g. preparing for the limitations of old age or avoiding eternal
punishment in an afterlife). This gamble is considered a safe bet if enough people are perceived
to take it seriously (another evolutionarily adaptive heuristic), but it doesnt, in itself, confirm the
perpetual existence of a spirit or a reified enduring identity. It seems identity is conceptual at best
and perhaps even nominal. Its no different than when we say that these five people are a
group and then five minutes later, we say that they arent. Nothing has really changed
ontologically.
Raymond Tallis believes that the loss of control perceived by determinists and
neuroscientists is an epistemic sham that leaves us in a relatively identical position to the one we
perceive. He charges that the proposition that we are cognitively affected by are biases and
heuristics in a meaningful way is
either a truism (we are sometimes deceived about the nature of reality and why we do
things) or self-contradictory (we are usually or always deceived about the nature of
reality and why we do things). Yes, there are illusions, dreams, delusions and
hallucinations; but we could not recognise them for what they are unless the vast majority
of our experiences were not illusions, delusions, dreams or hallucinations.[1103]
The heart of Tallis critique and not a very good one, because it presumes a self in
order to keep itself from being self-contradictory, but that is exactly what is at stake here: folk
notions of identity are challenged to the core, so when Tallis says WE are sometimes
deceived and WE are usually or always deceived, he hasnt specified who we is: our
conscious identity, our non-conscious identity or any combination of those with our
incorporation of social identity (crucially, still internal causally!). As Susan Blackmore might
1102
Tugend, A. (2/24/2-120. Bad Habits? My Future Self Will Deal With That. The New York Times. Retrieved
on 9/22/2012 from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/business/another-theory-on-why-bad-habits-are-hard-
to-break-shortcuts.html?pagewanted=all
1103
Eagleman, D., Tallis, R. (4/28/2012). The brain it makes you think. Doesn't it? The Gaurdian: The
Observer. Available on 9/22/2012 at http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2012/apr/29/neuroscience-david-
eagleman-raymond-tallis
315
ask: which of all the conscious identities are you referring to? Our awareness of our long term
plans, immediate plans, or knee-jerk reactions? Our more or less conscious (than those)
awareness of who is near us? Our more or less conscious (than that) awareness of how dry our
mouth is? Or how about our least conscious awareness of our internal organ regulation?
Consciousness is a post hoc recollectionan assemblage of any one or more of these
phenomenal states, put together to suit the need at hand. Tallis framing of the questions
themselves are non-sensical, because the model is outdated. We may have language habits, but
that doesnt make them veridical.
While libertarians who confuse determinism with fatalism (and actual compatibilist-
fatalists like Paul Russell) may find identity issues to be unsettling because of concern over
neglecting origination issues, once we establish a plausible naturalistic model for responsibility,
a pragmatic model for identity is not too difficult to extrapolate for that context either.
Pessimism over identity loss is merely a matter of recalibrating our compass to recognize the
benefits of a more causally integrated metaphysical outlook. This will take time to cover all the
bases and allay the fears that contribute to default worldviews that have a propensity for
asserting supernatural parameters, even if the propensity for anthropomorphism is biologically
imbedded (see Evidence #23).
316
RESPONSIBILITY
Historically, the forward-looking way that libertarians have tried to ground responsibility
has been positive contribution in the freedom to choose between two or more possibilities. That
is to say that you must be able to freely choose between two possibilities, which Ive already
argued against throughout the book by the evidence for the impossibility of passive experience,
including automatic mental semantic categorizing of deterministic neural coding (to some
extent, enough for predispositionalism), non-conscious motivation and cognitive biases, identity
issues, etc. The backward-looking way to ground responsibility has to do with the origin of the
action: you must be able to show that the origin of the action is within the agents control.
Paul Russell notes1104 that the chief concern libertarians have about determinism is the
latter; they are also concerned why so many determinists are remiss about acknowledging
origination as the most important factor in the determination of responsibility. Deep
responsibility should be able to be ascribed directly, rather than having to settle for
responsibility that they perceive to be superficially corrected/adjusted, and based upon
another forward-looking pragmatic assessment of contribution. Its a fear that, as Robert Nozick
puts it, we will lack originatory value.1105 Philosopher Robert Audi writes that there is, one
powerful reason to adopt a volitional theory: it supplies a causal factor which genetically unifies
actions in terms of a common kind of origin, even if not necessarily its ultimate origin, in the
psychology of the agent.1106
Unfortunately, to adopt a theory of origination proper (i.e. etiology limited to the body
proper) just because it makes life easy would be a fallacy of desired consequence. Its also often
demonstrably not true, as so many Evidences here attest, in similar ways that they attest to the
implausibility of a forward-looking grounding of responsibility in human consciousness, from
genetically inherited predisposition that absolutely affects our decisions, to the practical
impossibility of delineating which, if any, motivations come from reasoning and not our non-
conscious processes. Im talking about the ones that make us get up and have cookies with our
parents when we are sleepwalking (I did this), to our oblique sense of external identity as well,
1104
Russell, P. (1998). Compatibilist-Fatalism. University of British Columbia. [pp. 3-4]. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/prussell/Journals/Fatalism%20Final.pdf
1105
Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). [p. 313].
1106
Audi, R. (1993). Action, Intention, and Reason. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. [p. 79].
317
such as the neuronally codified external influences via mirror neurons, constant memory
redaction, etc.
Also in the spotlight here is volitionalism, which says that an agent is not responsible for
an action unless the agent has chosen it. Non-volitionalists either find responsibility in other
areas than choice or they dismisses it altogether (i.e. nihilism). Focusing in on what constitutes a
choice is important here, for example, how much actual freedom do motivational brain states
leave us in choice, if any? and so are identity issues in the context of intention. Do I breathe,
pump my blood, and sleepwalk? Can the me that produces non-conscious action be dismissed
as non-influential in the production process of conscious choice? How? That humans are the
ultimate source of our action based upon location in the body proper is not enough, unless you
want to put sleepwalkers on the stand.
Two-stage compatibilists could say that they restart causal chains in thought constantly,
so they may contend that their thoughts have this originatory value. My argument is that there
is still an enduring influence that circumnavigates (supposed) causa sui mental events and
appears to serve the functional negation of acausality as freedom anyway. That is to say that
there is still a tendency for right side bias, etc., even after these random events in the decision-
making process Then its back to considering the direct identity issue for determinists. Is
there a path to deep responsibility that doesnt involve freedom per se?
The answer, as one would expect, is controversial. In one attempt, P. F. Strawson
famously showed that clinical, theoretical concerns could not supersede our robust, naturally
produced moral sentiment anyway, so deeply held reactions (i.e. resentment) are deep enough
for the compatibilist to be on par with a libertarians deep responsibility:
It is one thing to ask about the general causes of these reactive attitudes I have alluded to;
it is another to ask about the variations to which they are subject, the particular conditions
in which they do or do not seem natural or reasonable or appropriate; and it is a third
thing to ask what it would be like, what it is like, not to suffer them. I am not much
318
concerned with the first question; but I am with the second; and perhaps even more with
the third[1107] [emphasis mine].
Strawsons approach brings up an interesting side point thats worth exploring briefly:
our propensity to dispense our sense of justice, even when we incur costs,1108 under a
psychological framework of reactance (Evidence #32). And this to the extent that the
reactance frames an entire worldview in the same way that the presumption of libertarian free
will can frame a worldview. Philosophers like Nietzsche have spoken of the kind of resentment
(ressentiment) that precludes morality in the sense that it motivates us to reify morality
polemically. This was to the extent that the resentment of the slave class compelled them to
appropriate Platonic entities in religious terms (as Christianity) and to metaphysically describe
themselves ontologically as absolutely good and the out-group (non-Christians) as absolutely
bad. However much of this is actually true, if moral realism is the right model (I dont know if
it is or isnt), does not rule out the fact that resentment does motivate us in deep ways
psychologically (and Nietzsche has often been touted as the first real psychological philosopher).
We could even consider it as metaphysically imbedded in a more general way, manifesting as
ressentiment against a physically contingent mortal existence, out of our control and subject to
time, death, ignorance, suffering, etc.
Do similar moral sentiments like ressentiment influence free will incompatibilists
requirement for origination justification because they have a deeper commitment, a metaphysical
commitment, to dualism, rooted in an identity that transcends the physical (i.e. the spirit), with
the potential for transcending ressentiment, theologically/supernaturally? Russell writes, What
is at stake here is our conception of ourselves as (actively) ordering nature, rather than being
(passively) ordered by nature.1109 While there is some evidence to support this, it is still merely
an ad hominem attack unless it is grounded. If it is grounded, then the incompatibilists
1107
Philosophy of Thought and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
1108
1109
Russell, P. (1998). Compatibilist-Fatalism. University of British Columbia. (p. 7). Retrieved on 9/22/2012
from http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/prussell/Journals/Fatalism%20Final.pdf
319
requirement may be merely a fallacy of desired consequence with any answer to their
requirements being incoherent and inappropriate, because the requirement itself is incoherent and
inappropriate. Since we cant know for sure if it is grounded, Russell finds it prudent to consider
how we can justify responsibility and identity and Strawsons approach comes into play.
Whether or not the idea of libertarian free will precedes reactance or vice versa is an interesting
question as well, but whats more interesting and relevant here is the fundamental mechanism
that produces reactance in the first place, and how philosophers have found a ground for
responsibility itself in that fundamental mechanism
Russell correctly notes that what we might call Strawsons deep experience approach
still leaves the determinist/compatibilist without some account of the relevant capacities
required of moral agents.1110 He sees that weakness as being satisfactorily filled though, by the
addition of various models of hierarchical or real self theories laid out in the work of people
such as Daniel Dennett,1111 Harry Frankfurt,1112 and Gary Watson.1113 These hierarchical
selves, which show our ability to criticize/veto ourselves by the natural ability to recognize
multiple inner identities, are, as Russell puts it, something that is essential to being capable of
moral conduct and an appropriate object of moral sentiment and provide a substantial account
of self-determination and self-control without any appeal to indeterministic metaphysics. While
offering a naturalistic model for the capacity to consider alternatives, and for his purpose, he
argues:
It is a general capacity of this nature that distinguishes fully responsible human adults
from animals and children who (in some degree) do not enjoy such a capacity and thus
are not (fully) responsible. The crucial point remains, however, that this sort of higher-
capacity involves no contra-causal or libertarian metaphysical commitments. [] It is
simply incorrect, on this account, to suppose that any agent in a deterministic framework
1110
Ibid. (p. 5).
1111
Dennett, D. C. (1984). Elbow Room. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. [see CH. 2].
1112
Frankfurt, H. (1/14/1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person Author(s): The Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 1, pp. 5-20 Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu/~schopra/Persons/Frankfurt.pdf
1113
Watson, G. (1975). Free Agency. Journal of Philosophy. 72 (April):205-20. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://philpapers.org/rec/WATFA
320
is incapable of altering or amending his character and the structure of his own will[1114]
[emphasis mine].
This is because responsibility is not grounded upon actual external possibilities, but upon
the (multiple) internal factions that need representation. The difference is subtle, but crucial, and
it represents a present-looking grounding for responsibility (how bout that?!). Also, as I and
others have argued, that we act within causality representing these factions (selves), even if it is
still indeterminate, grounds those very desires in the action. One thing thats important in the
context of my goal in this book is to show that these hierarchical selves also highlight
unsuccessful factions in the divided will itself. That is to say that the will often thwarts itself even
before action. It seems pretty apparent that the factions in hierarchical selves are merely battling
each other based upon causal influences that appeal to conflicting desires inherent in any non-
omniscient being with only partial awareness. This doesnt negate the grounding though, it just
complicates it.
What do these factions represent? Corporal/cerebral regions (Evidence #8)?
Sentient/non-sentient regions (Evidence #1)? The pull of the direction of the reasoning itself?
Arguments for the whole or for the part? Is it always based upon abstract ideas relating
externally or do the desires and biases of actual corporeal regions play some role in deliberation?
Some day we may be able to put actual percentage guestimations on these and tighten them up,
but aside from the capacity for hierarchal selves, by some of the evidence in this book (see
Evidences #8, #15, #16), we need to consider the real possibility that physically delineated
factions are directly or indirectly represented in deliberation as a first step. As non-intuitive as it
is, the evidence is just too strong.
Does ignorance of complex causal influence upon motivation make choices free? Ive
given evidence and argued that it does not. Ignorance in the context of responsibility, on the
other hand, is perceived to sometimes commensurately absolve the actor in the ethical sense
(consider children, the mentally handicapped, or animals), while the remaining practical
reasoners are expected to be capable of knowing and obeying socially constructed laws de
facto. Because of our epistemic limitations regarding the ability to track causality, we are
1114
Russell, P. (1998). Compatibilist-Fatalism. University of British Columbia. [p. 5]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012
from http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/prussell/Journals/Fatalism%20Final.pdf
321
tempted to conflate the first scenario regarding causality with the second one regarding
responsibility, but the difference between ignorance of physical laws in the universe and
ignorance of socially constructed laws is categorical and should not be conflated ontologically.
That is to say that to conflate physical laws and socially constructed laws is often considered a
category error, as the latter deals with value and the former does not.
This may be contested by moral realists, for whom good and bad actions are objective
and/or absolute, just like the laws of nature. They might ask, How can absolute moral law be
excused by ignorance if absolute physical law is not excused by it? And again its true that,
socially, we do default to: ignorance of the law is no excuse. But is this the default for
ontological or pragmatic reasons? Inevitably, we are compelled to consider the nature of
individual and social responsibility in its ontological context, as well as its epistemic context.
That is beyond the purview of this book, but we can ask: how can moral realists with an
absolutist view of morality consistently justify the exoneration of children, the mentally
handicapped, or animals via ignorance in society?
For many moral realists, who are also often dualistic theists and libertarian
incompatibilists, this dissonance is rationally and/or psychologically satisfied by theological
parameters of spiritual reward or punishment in the afterlife (where all are considered culpable
when pressed). These are particularly unassailable parameters empirically, and so is a
conversation ender, really but what of the non-theistic moral realist semi-compatibilist? I dont
want to get sidetracked by that rabbit trail here either, but suffice it to say that non-theistic moral
realists have long struggled to assert that the crucial differences lie in the distinction between
objective and absolute morality, the former not being as restrictive as the latter in essential ways.
A brief example would be something like desirism, as I noted in the Introduction, where these
kinds of objective facts about desire are considered on par with objective facts about distance; a
distance question is both relative and objectively factual in a general sense (e.g. how far are you
from Disneyland?).
Lets return to the more common arguments though. Prudential/pragmatic/functionalist
arguments against determinism by libertarians commonly make the charge that theres no way to
assign responsibility to a determined agent if no one can help what they do. It seems that
retributive punishment is a vestigial organ of the same, often theistic free will dualism mindset
that has perpetuated the ancient notion of a little god-like homunculus that drives our bodies
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toward our various destinies (Spinozas metaphor was that we create a kingdom within a
kingdom1115). The seat for this ghost in the machine1116 somehow mediates between two
worlds in such a way that the driver is always at least partially shielded in some incoherent sense
from not only the material world, but from ideas and emotions. In some crucial sense, this is
what is seen to preserve their identity.
Determined agents still have their causal powers, their cumulative values, thoughts,
beliefs, and behaviors that interact within the world; this includes predispositions for empathy
that we saw in many of the evidences, but especially in Evidences #27, #13. This is crucial to
understand about agents in society. We must never forget that the experience of empathy has the
power to compel us all to perform and encourage pro-social behavior. Again, when we do not
understand that we are actually predisposed to empathy, we might think that only something like
the concept of free will can accommodate it, and so it makes sense that the perceived loss of free
will (e.g. in the Vohs et al cheating study1117 discussed above) would naturally cause
demoralization via the loss of any emotivation.
Agents contribute their personal internal narrative to the mix (which itself is a
construction of the mind created for and perpetuated by adaptive selection in evolution) and
therefore have well enough identity and may play well enough of a unique part in the world to
coherently receive blame and credit in the prudential/pragmatic/functionalist sense via the
identifying bodies that define them. We marvel and/or are disgusted by their unique part in the
worlds moral expression, and if necessary, would still protect ourselves from any danger they
might present as effectively, yet as compassionately, as possible. As determinist and naturalist
Bruce Waller put it, we have role responsibility as proximately autonomous beings.1118
Even if randomness is incompatible with responsibility,1119 incompatibilist libertarians
believe contra-causal free will is necessary for responsibility, because responsibility is
1115
Spinoza, B. (1992). Ethics. Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett,102 (Part III, Preface); translation by
Samuel Shirley.
1116
Marczyk, A. (N.D.). A Ghost in the Machine: The existence of the soul. [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://www.ebonmusings.org/atheism/ghost.html#rama1998
1117
Vohs, K. D., Schooler, J. W. (2008). The value of believing in free will: Encouraging a belief in
1118
Clark, T. (11/2005). Review: Freedom Without Responsibility, by Bruce Waller. [Web log post]. Retrieved
on 9/22/2012 from http://www.naturalism.org/reviews.htm#Waller2
1119
Abumrad, J., Krulwich, R. (6/15/2009). Radiolab podcast: Stochasticity. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://www.radiolab.org/2009/jun/15
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incompatible with determinism. Some incompatibilist determinists agree that responsibility is
incompatible with determinism, because the infinite causal regression negates any possibility for
responsibility, and there are a million and one hybrids of all the fun stuff in-between them. Semi-
compatibilist J. M. Fischer allows for ethical responsibility even in a deterministic worldview.
Semi-compatibilism says that even a completely causally determined world is still compatible
with agential local control (Fischers version is called guidance control), and hence, it is also
compatible with ethical responsibilityat least naturalistic responsibility. It is this responsibility
that is most important, since the free will issue is ambiguous. Role responsibility appears to be of
the same sort in the crucial ways, while more strongly enforcing the causality.
Incompatibilists like Clark and Waller recognize that compatibilists and semi-
compatibilists want to salvage too much by still calling it compatibilism; they want the praise
and blame, cake and eat. Kant called compatibilism a wretched subterfuge and a petty
wordjugglery1120 If compatibilists and semi-compatibilists or semi-compatibilists and
determinists have merely semantic differences in terminology, people like Clark and Waller
would say that those semantic differences count, both when recognizing a wider perspective
concerning how an agent is to be accountable, as well as when one is perpetuating
misperceptions about metaphysical untruths (i.e. as inappropriate deontological residue). Perhaps
we could draw a similar analogy between fundamentalist religious folk and more liberal
believers who still perpetuate the same literature because they dont take literally, confusing
future generations who might have yet another way to interpret it.
Other incompatibilists and naturalists (and this predispositionalist!) are happy just to be
able to entertain reasonable theories of responsibility that dont require contra-causality,
alternative possibility, or origination resolution. Whether it is grounded by deep phenomenal
experience (e.g. Strawson) and/or an awareness/recognition of hierarchical selves (e.g. Dennett,
Frankfurt, Watson, Russell[?]. Predispositionalists would add external selves here, if they chose
to try to ground responsibility; that isnt required of predispositionalism though. It may not be
grounded. More work needs to be done), or merely some form of local/guidance control (e.g.
Fischer); even when that local control does not argue for a deep or ultimate responsibility
with justified praise or blame at all (e.g. Waller, Pereboom, Clark, again, possibly
1120
Kant, I. (1927). The critique of practical reason. Trans. T. K. Abbott. New York: Longman, Green, and
Company. [originally published in 1788].
324
predispositionalism), none of these models require deeply grounded origination or deeply
grounded alternative possibility.
Remember that some philosophers rely on the ability of metacognition to do some heavy
lifting in supplying freedom metaphysically.1121 Theyre right that metacognition is powerful in
models of hierarchical selves for providing responsibility, but neither responsibility nor any of
these hierarchical selves models require deeply grounded origination nor deeply grounded
alternative possibility. Importantly, this is why metacognition itself does not provide free will.
Its beyond the scope of this book to treat Strawsons, Russells, Fischers, or Wallers
models here, as I have nothing to complain about them in the context of predispositionalism (the
challenges against them are theirs to defend) and they have been written about ad nauseum
already. Its enough to know that there are tenable naturalistic models that serve our ethical
needs without hocus pocus. Moving on
Back to prudential/pragmatic/functionalist arguments made by free will proponents in the
context of responsibility, we often hear that if we are ever able to discover that someone has a
determined propensity for immorality, then others might be morally obligated to constrain or
even incarcerate them in advance but this is a false dichotomy, as there are more options than
that. It would surely never extend to preventative incarceration, as we are not omniscient beings
and will never know 100% whether or not a person will commit a crime based upon
physiological standards alone. Its especially true in this country (the USA), where the principle
is that we are innocent until proven guilty anyway.
As determinists have argued,1122 we already do take preventative measures to some
extent with people who are having psychological issues, from circumstantial to innate, drug
problems, criminal records, etc., as well as expecting certain behaviors from people going
through temporary hormonal/physiological issues, e.g. pregnant or menstruating women,
teenagers in puberty, people on certain medications with side effects, PTSD, etc., so just as we
prepare for the kind of determined behavior we see constantly evidenced from these various
temperaments, there should be no shock at the notion that we might exercise (institutionally)
1121
1122
Beahan, J., Galen, L., Fletcher, D. (2/19/2009). Reasonable Doubts podcast: RD34 Determinism One Last
Time. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://itunes.apple.com/podcast/reasonable-doubts-
podcast/id266671828
325
some kind of cautionary observation or intervention of people who, for example, may have brain
damage/gray matter reduction in areas of the brain that we know (or will know) are subject to
uncontrollable rage or process critical moral decision making.
Theres no reason not to consider all the examples in the long winded sentence above
when trying to ground origination as well. Its perfectly reasonable to distinguish between a kind
of reactionary experience, such as when our knee jerks at the hit of a hammer, and a kind of
procedural experience, like when our temporal lobe engages its consequential options in
computation but that doesnt mean that the latter is the result of some kind of supernatural
autonomy (i.e. a spirit), indeed, we observe a whole continuum in deliberation from basic reflex
all the way to Obsessive Compulsive Disorder in the natural world that is highly predictable and
consistent when correlating to empirically verifiable conditions.
As it has been observed,1123 this is analogous commensurately to what extent even free
will proponents will make responsibility concessions for the volitionally, and therefore morally,
helpless (e.g. children, mentally challenged, etc). All it takes is an honest acknowledgement of
this continuum of harmful intention that most libertarians already concede to some extent.
Considering the myriad of ways that even people who are considered perfectly normal and
healthy are still compromised volitionally, responsibility is clearly not an on/off position, but lies
on a continuum. The implications of this fact alone are perhaps the most important, because
again, a continuous framework seems to be more appropriate for so many of these issues than a
discrete one that frames the facts as more black and white.
It seems that most neurophilosophers lean toward a position of incompatibilism.
Considering the evidence, such as in Evidence #5, where both genetic and cerebral factors
appear to predispose one toward either cost-benefit (utilitarian) or sacred value type moral
judgments, our fundamental ethical playing field is, for the first time in history, shown to be
potentially exceedingly disparate in a meaningful way. If one part of the brain or the other is
healthier, or there is more of a propensity for a certain gene, thats how youll be predisposed to
evaluate moral decisions. There is no argument from any philosopher that can negate the
powerful significance of this kind of predisposition, as much as they are compelled to try, even if
1123
podcast/id266671828
326
it is a ratio of influence on a continuum. As David Eagleman notes, we must rethink a legal
system that assumes that we are all fundamentally practical reasoners, because we are never
going to be able to untangle our genes and our environment:
As we become more skilled at specifying how behavior results from the microscopic
details of the brain, more defense lawyers will point to biological mitigators of guilt, and
more juries will place defendants on the not-blameworthy side of the line. This puts us in
a strange situation. After all, a just legal system cannot define culpability simply by the
limitations of current technology [] The crux of the problem is that it no longer makes
sense to ask, To what extent was it his biology, and to what extent was it him?[1124,1125]
Concerning expected responsibility in rational choice theory, which affects disciplines

from law and economics to medicine and political science, Gilovich and Griffin write that:
The theory of rational choice assumes that people make them and make them well.
Proponents of the theory do not insist that people never make mistakes in these
calculations; but they do insist that the mistakes are unsystematic. The model assumes,
for example, that the rational actor will follow the elementary rules of probability when
calculating, say, the likelihood of a given candidate winning an election or the odds of
surviving a surgical intervention.[1126]
Neuroscientist and determinist author Sam Harris puts the issue thusly:
The men and women on death row have some combination of bad genes, bad parents, bad
ideas, and bad luck which of these quantities, exactly, were they responsible for? No
1124
1125
Warburton, N. (Interviewer), Eagleman, D. (Interviewee). (5/22/2011). Philosophy Bites podcast: David
Eagleman on Morality and the Brain. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://philosophybites.com/2011/05/david-
eagleman-on-morality-and-the-brain.html
1126
Gilovich, T., Griffin, D. (2002). "Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now". In Thomas Gilovich, Dale
Griffin, Daniel Kahneman. Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-2. ISBN 9780521796798. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://assets.cambridge.org/97805217/92608/sample/9780521792608ws.pdf
327
human being stands as author to his own genes or his upbringing, and yet we have every
reason to believe that these factors determine his character throughout life. Our system of
justice should reflect our understanding that each of us could have been dealt a very
different hand in life. In fact, its immoral not to recognize just how much luck is
involved in morality itself.[1127]
Still, the courts are not yet ready to accept scientific evidence of this sort,1128 not least
while there are still strong advocates to the contrary. The pugnacious retired neuroscientist,
physician, secular humanist, philosopher Raymond Tallis (who one of his intellectual
competitors Patricia Churchland calls the Archduke of Misinformation) would undoubtedly
describe the quotes above as neurotrasheven, ironically, intellectual illness. Even the
fellow secular humanist compatibilist Daniel Dennett thinks his attacks seem more like
caricatures than arguments, hes not really doing philosophy. Hes doing propaganda, so a
clear image of what Tallis actually proposes is difficult to see. (And this from Dennett, who
himself has scolded the recent rash of neuroscientists books as irresponsible, because they
explicitly or implicitly imply strict determinism rather than adequate determinism/soft
determinism/compatibilism.1129)
In one piece for the Wall Street Journal though, it appears that Tallis supports some kind
of free will via emergent phenomena (sometimes quoting Michael Gazzaniga):
the true locus of [mental] activity is not in the isolated brain but in the group
interactions of many brains, which is why analyzing single brains in isolation cannot
illuminate the capacity of responsibility. This, the community of minds, is where our
human consciousness is to be found, woven out of the innumerable interactions that our
brains make possible. Responsibility (or lack of it), Mr. Gazzaniga says, is not located
1127
1128
Reardon, S. (12/12/2011). Courtroom Neuroscience Not Ready for Prime Time. ScienceInsider. Retrieved
on 9/22/2012 from http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2011/12/courtroom-neuroscience-not-ready.html
1129
Shook, J. (Interviewer), Dennett, D. (Interviewee). (12/12/2011). Point of Inquiry podcast: Daniel Dennett -
The Scientific Study of Religion. [Audio podcast]. (23:50-26:50). Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.pointofinquiry.org/daniel_dennett_the_scientific_study_of_religion
328
in the brain. It is an interaction between people, a social contractan emergent
phenomenon, irreducible to brain activity.[1130]
Marc Parry writes that for Tallis, The human sphere encompasses a community of
minds [] woven out of a trillion cognitive handshakes of shared attention, within which our
freedom operates and our narrated lives are led.1131 A response to both Tallis and Gazzaniga is
that the so called terms of the agreement in a social contract are affected by the parameters at
play, those being the arrangements of neuronal wiring of the participants (however they came to
be, whether genetically, developmentally, semantically, via prototype theory, linguistic
determinism, etc. [see Evidence #24]), and this includes, perhaps most importantly in terms of
social responsibility, reflexive unconscious determined social interaction via mirror neurons.
Tallis and Gazzaniga are obviously aware of these influences, but at least in Tallis case, dont
consider them adequately causal. In terms of predispositionalism, they are sufficient.
Tallis quote above seems to be making a strawman argument (and several philosophers
and scientists have charged him with such a tendency [including the example in Evidence
#13]), unless he is claiming that either what is in the brain has absolutely nothing to do with
responsibility, which would be a very difficult position to hold, or hes claiming that this kind of
emergent phenomena between more than one mind creates a kind of freedom that negates any
kind of relevance of predisposition as I have argued for it. As I have already discussed, for the
purposes of this book, evidence for predispositionalism circumnavigates emergent phenomena
and stochastic factors that social situations produce. That the concepts of responsibility or
social contract or personhood, etc., are merely abstract entities is true in one sense, but one
cant negate the parameters that predispose those individual persons and they include causal
influence from real interpersonal feelings and physical reactions, with unrecognized in-group
biases and frontloaded intentions, etc.
1130
Tallis, R. (11/12/2011). Rethinking Thinking How a lumpy bunch of tissue lets us plan, perceive, calculate,
reflect, imagineand exercise free will. (Dual book review/comparison of Michael Gazzanigas book, Whos
in Charge? and Terrence Deacans book, Incomplete Nature). The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204618704576642991109496396.html
1131
Parry, M. (10/9/2011). Raymond Tallis Takes Out the 'Neurotrash.' The Chronicle of Higher Education.
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://chronicle.com/article/Raymond-Tallis-Takes-Out-
the/129279/#disqus_thread
329
This is where predispositionalism is subtly less constrained in the same way that stronger
varieties of determinism are, as it focuses on the fact that there exists influence leading to higher
probabilities of actions, and that such influence does some consistent work in undermining free
will. Even with highly probable consequences, we can say that we have enough reliable
evidence/information to mark a significant loss of control in a meaningful way in social
situations.
330
RETRIBUTIVISM
savage or civilized, we have some belief in the utility of practices of condemnation and
punishment -P. F. Strawson[1132]
Even if some determinists like Tamler Sommers have conceded that, Perhaps a
retributive streak is necessary to motivate the type of behavior that wins battles,1133 some
determinists argue that the chief aim of retribution is suffering for its own sake, not protection,
deterrence, rehabilitation, or interventionthese are merely fringe benefits. As Tom Clark said,
Retribution is the idea that you should be punished whether or not it serves any public good or
personal benefit for you or anyone else; you simply deserve to suffer.1134 It is the theory of
punishment that holds the simple brute fact that wrong doers deserve to suffer based upon
intrinsic values even before desert1135 and is sometimes argued for intuitively via reflective
equilibrium, such as by using thought experiments.1136 Since retributivists have intrinsic value to
work with, they dont consider the emotional element of revenge satisfaction to be the primary
motivation in principle, even if it often is in practice.
I bring up the issue here, because a worldview that takes causality, determinism, free will,
etc., seriously, should line up reasonably with their position on retributivism, which affects
public policy. Notice that I didnt say a worldview that takes causality, determinism, free
will, etc., seriously, should affect how they think about retributivism. Thats because ones
view on retributivism, or their predisposition for that view via an already held predisposition for
authoritarianism, might influence their position on free will, determinism, etc. more
1132
Philosophy of Thought and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 13. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
1133
1134
Beahan, J. (Interviewer), Clark, T. (Interviewee). (1/22/2009). Reasonable Doubts podcast: RD30 FW v D2:
Judgment Day. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://itunes.apple.com/podcast/reasonable-
doubts-podcast/id266671828
1135
Danaher, J. (9/7/2011). Moore on Justifying Retributivism (Part One). [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com/2011/09/moore-on-justifying-retributivism-
part.html
1136
Danaher, J. (9/8/2011). Moore on Justifying Retributivism (Part Two). [Web log post]. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com/2011/09/part-one-this-is-second-post-in-
brief.html
331
fundamentally (in fact, my intuition says that this is more likely). In any case, we can reason
about it.
It has been shown that we do appeal to both reasoning and emotional satisfaction in
revenge. It has been shown that even though it seems intuitive for many that getting revenge
would purge emotion, revenge for catharsis doesnt work. People who took revenge felt worse
later, especially via behavioral biofeedback,1137 while people who did not get revenge were still
happier overall, even if they still had more of a sense of regret over not getting revenge.1138,1139
Catharsis has also been shown to prime prejudice.1140,1141
Also, considering the study showing that authoritarian types have more of an inclination
to voluntarily incur costs to punish violations of social norms,1142 we see that there is another
emotional element in revenge to contend with: connection to social identity. This can incorporate
defending the punishment via emotion tied to unassailable sacred values and religious
parameters (see Evidence #23).
Just as it was discussed in the Introduction, certain heuristics have evolved to serve us in
immediate situations that are inappropriate in others, in measure and/or in kind. Emotion is one
of those heuristics. The real danger of any system based upon that kind of standard is that it is
merely phenomenally real and doesnt necessarily correlate to reality or our values
proportionately. Emotion is an indispensible indicator in human experience, as well as being a
crucial element in decision-making,1143,1144 but most of us do already recognize its limitations
1137
Bushman, B. J., Baumeister, R. F., & Stack, A. D. (1999). Catharsis, aggression, and persuasive influence:
Self-fulfilling or self-defeating prophecies? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 367-376.
1138
Price, M. (6/2009). Revenge and the people who seek it. Monitor Staff. June 2009, Vol 40, No. 6. Print
version: page 34. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/06/revenge.aspx
1139
Carlsmith, K. M., & Darley, J. M. (2008). Psychological aspects of retributive justice. In M. P. Zanna
(Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, (Vol. 40, pp. 193-236). San Diego, CA: Elsevier. Retrieved
on 9/22/2012 from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1031193
1140
DeSteno, D., Petty, R. E., Rucker, D. D., Wegener, D. T., & Braverman, J. (2004). Discrete emotions and
persuasion: The role of emotion-induced expectancies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 43
56.
1141
Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W., & Mullen, E. (2004). Political tolerance and coming to psychological closure
following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks: An integrative approach. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 30, 743758.
1142
1143
Enlightenments, Old and New. [Audio podcast]. (2:30-5:50; a great summary of the implications of Damasios
332
and just about no one today would try to reify a system of punishment based upon that alone. Its
really more of a behind the scenes indicator of subjective, functional issues.
Some retributivists have employed the age old eye for an eye punishment exchange
rationale known in Latin as lex talionis, but as it has been shown, this line of thinking leads to
certain absurdities in practice, as it is written by the Murder Victims Families for Human Rights
activists, Do we rape rapists? Do we burn down arsonists homes? Do we beat batterers? Why
does homicide fall into a different category of crime and punishment?1145 Others may reject lex
talionis, but still prefer to keep the argument squarely in terms of intrinsic value. Besides
defending retributivism on unassailable sacred values parameters, one positive defense of classic
retributive justice that seems to need further evaluation is the unknown extent to which humans
need retributive justice for social order/cohesion.1146
While some studies seem to have shown that more severe punishment effectively deters
crime,1147,1148,1149,1150,1151 other studies have still left the majority (88%) of criminologists
unconvinced,1152,1153,1154,1155,1156 and for some like Columbia law professor Jeffery Fagan,1157 the
work). Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from

1144
Brooks, D. (Interviewer), Damasio, A. (Interviewee). (2009). Part 4: How Emotion Affects Decision
Making. Antonio Damasio: This Time with Feeling. [Video file]. (The whole interview is worth watching).
http://fora.tv/2009/07/04/Antonio_Damasio_This_Time_With_Feeling#fullprogram
1145
A Brief Background on Capital Punishment. (N.D.). Murder Victims' Families for Human Rights.
[Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.willsworld.com/~mvfhr/capital.htm
1146
1147
Dezhbakhsh, H., Rubin, P., and Shepherd, J. (2003). The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:
Evidence from a 'Judicial Experiment. Economic Inquiry. Vol. 44, No. 3 (2006), [pp. 512535]. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from
http://deathpenalty.procon.org/sourcefiles/The%20Deterrent%20Effect%20of%20Capital%20Punishment.p
df
1148
Palmer, L. I. (1975). Andenaes and the Theory of Deterence. Faculty Publications. Paper 520. Retrieved
on 9/22/2012 from http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/520
1149
Andenaes, J. (1974). Punishment and Deterrence. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=15518
1150
Gibbs, J. (1975). Crime, Punishment and Deterrence. New York: Elsevier. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.jstor.org/pss/1828702
1151
Ehrlich, I. (1975). The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death. 65 Am.
Econ. Rev., 397 (1975); Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and
Additional Evidence, 85 J. Pol. Econ. 741 (1977).
1152
Radelet, M., Lacock, T. (2009). Do Executions Lower Homicide Rates? The Views of Leading
Criminologists. 99 Journal of Criminal Law & Crimonology 489. Northwestern University. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/DeterrenceStudy2009.pdf Graphs for studies retrieved
333
skepticism has a lot to do with the implications of the evidence for sociopathic predisposition
discussed here (see Evidences #15, #17), so the debate over some kind of qualification of
effective deterrence rages on. In one sense, it doesnt matter either way; it would be a false
dichotomy to think that we must choose between prevention and strong punishment. The strength
of a sentence may still be based upon deterrence and not necessarily revenge satisfaction.
Punishment can be reasonably compatible with consequentialism, though is certainly not
required by consequentialism, but sometimes seems to have ethical, logical, or epistemic
problems leading to paradoxical standards when in the context of determinism1158 or
predispositionalism. Consequentialists can oppose punishment/retributivism and reply that it is
the retributivist system that allows for superfluous desert, not consequentialism itself.
Consider this thought experiment:
A man robs a bank. As he is trying to escape, he gets in a car accident [killing a

pedestrian] and suffers severe brain damage to the point where he remembers
absolutely nothing about his past life. All he wants to do after he gets better is help
others, but the courts want to lock him up for life.
Strong determinist Derk Pereboom said of this, The desert issue here is basic in the
sense that the agent, to be morally responsible, would deserve the blame or credit just because
on 9/22/2012 from http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/study-88-criminologists-do-not-believe-death-penalty-

effective-deterrent
1153
Radelet, M., Akers, R. (1996). Deterrence and the death penalty: the views of the experts. Journal of
Criminal Law & Criminology. 87, no.1 (1996), pp. 1-16.
1154
Austin, J., Clark, J., Hardyman, P., and Henry, D.A. (1999). The Impact of Three Strikes and Youre
Out. Punishment & Society. October 1999 vol. 1 no. 2. 131-162. doi: 10.1177/14624749922227757. Retrieved
on 9/22/2012 from http://pun.sagepub.com/content/1/2/131.abstract
1155
Donohue, J., Wolfers, J. (4/2006). The Death Penalty: No Evidence for Deterrence. Economists Voice.
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DonohueDeter.pdf
1156
Klein, L., Frost, B., Filatov, V. (1978). The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:
An Assessment of the Estimates, pp. 336-60 in Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen and Daniel Nagin
(eds), Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates.
Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences.
1157
Williams, E. (4/11/2006). Capital Punishment Does Not Deter Murder, Fagan Says. University of Virginia
Law. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2006_spr/fagan.htm
1158
Warburton, N. (Interviewer), Tadros, V. (Interviewee). (7/3/2011). Philosophy Bites podcast: Victor Tadros
on Punishment. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://philosophybites.libsyn.com/victor-
tadros-on-punishment
334
she has performed the action and not by virtue of consequentialist considerations.1159 It could
be said that in one sense, this is true for the individual, though consequentialist considerations
are in effect as a deterrent to others who might attempt to fake memory loss in order to take
advantage of such a standard.
Determinists are often consequentialists in the realm of punishment, but the narrative
doesnt have to be so; some determinists are moral realists, which might actually allow for more
flexibility in this context. UK philosopher Victor Tadros, has composed a tenable quasi-
deontological theory of punishment (the duty view) that is neither based upon knee jerk
retributive emotional responses nor religious texts, nor strictly retributivist thinking. He places
the emphasis on duty based deterrence (the permission to punish offenders is grounded in the
duties that they incur in virtue of their wrongdoing.1160 These duties serve to deter others). It
incorporates both the backwards looking element of a retributive system and the forwards
looking element of consequentialist deterrence. The challenge is discovering and fleshing out
the ethical bones that accommodates both a legal view like this and all the scientific evidence
before us.
It should be noted that libertarian free will in the context of law is largely ignored, which
is a good indicator of its ad hoc nature. As philosopher Stephen Maitzen put it:
Juries never ask if the defendant had libertarian freedom when he committed the crime
before deciding to convict the defendant. Judges dont instruct juries to pay any attention
to that. So unless the criminal law is way out of whack with ordinary moral assumptions,
libertarian free will just isnt part of our ordinary moral background.[1161]
Any recognition by the courts of limitations upon the will that is in effectthat is, in the
context of criminal behavior by reason of insanity (e.g. the MNaghten Rules or the Model Penal
Code), is compatible with the framework of determinism and even more so with
predispositionalism. A consistent libertarian free will advocate would have to contend that
1159
Pereboom, D. [and Fischer, J.M., Kane, R., Vargas, M.] (2007). Four Views on Free Will. (p. 86). MA,
Oxford, Victoria AU: Wiley-Blackwell.
1160
Tadros, V. (10/15/2011). The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law. Oxford University
Press.
1161
Muehlhauser, L. (Interviewer)., Maitzen, S. (Interviewee). (3/7/2010). Conversations from the Pale Blue
Dot podcast: CPBD 025: Stephen Maitzen Can Theism Ground Morality? [Audio podcast]. [24:45-27:00].
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=7086
335
actions in crime do not, could not, even follow from any possible motivation. In this way, the
perpetuation of the notion of contra-causal free will is a threat to the efficacy of determinism in
law.
Any caricature of determinists as soft on crime is fallacious, indeed, recent citings of
Viney, et al, (1982),1162 by religious apologists shows that the framing finally seems to be going
the other way. Just because one prefers a more empathetic and accurate framework for justice,
rather than emphasizing revenge toward dangerous people, doesnt mean that determinists or
predispositionalists dont value protection, deterrence, or intervention, nor do they over-value
rehabilitation, even if they find value it in when it is appropriate.
Its true that we must produce credible and effective deterrents to criminal behavior in a
balanced way. Recognizing predisposition neither gives us a free pass on crime nor does it set us
up to be judged like unfeeling robots. It recognizes a healthy balance. As Stephen Pinker argues,
we still must give our full attention to:
the other parts of the brain (primarily in the prefrontal cortex) that could have
inhibited the behavior by anticipating how the community would respond to it. We
are that community, and our major lever of influence consists in appealing to that
inhibitory brain system. [1163]
No one would disagree that punishment is one of the most difficult burdens in life. And
for all we know now we may find out someday that the same generally desirable capacity for
empathy we possess might sometimes also entail a propensity to underwrite an unconscious
acceptance, perpetuation, or even creation of pain in others, just in order for us to feel more
deeply understood empathetically. Both the heroes and the villains of countless tales have been
motivated by the phrase, Feel my pain. In fact, as I showed in Evidence #27, there is
1162
Viney, W., Waldman, D., and Barchilon, J. (1982). Attitudes toward Punishment in Relation to Beliefs in
Free Will and Determinism Human Relations. November 1982 vol. 35 no. 11 939-949 doi:
http://hum.sagepub.com/content/35/11/939.abstract
1163
Pinker, S. (2002). The Blank Slate. (p. 183). New York: Viking Penguin.
336
evidence that children with conduct disorder got a sadistic rush from their stronger empathetic
ability.1164,1165
Whatever extent that retributive justice for social order/cohesion is necessary must be
considered in the light of actual empirical evidence and adaptability/habituation, not merely the
convenience of wishful thinking that free will pre-validates it ontologically. While it would be
nave to think that the desire for retribution can just be hand-waved away, an overall long term
goal that reduces these desires at the source via education should not be abandoned on those
grounds. That would be an appeal to the naturalistic fallacy (i.e. because it is natural, it cannot
be or should not be curbed).
When we truly recognize that even the most dangerous person can only do what they are
predisposed to do within the context of the influential forces that they have experienced
throughout their lives, internally and externally, we are moved into a position of humility,
empathy, and compassioneven if we would still restrain and/or incarcerate them as needed.
The information collected here emphasizes a policy of prevention, deterrence, and containment,
rather than a spirit of vengeance. It would be to encourage the principle in John Bradfords,
there but for the grace of God, go I rather than the modern notion that unless even a
sequestered criminal continually suffers, justice is not being served and therefore there is no
closure. Pragmatically, the environment and everyone in it, have a larger share in the blame.
Responsibility is still present, but it is re-qualified. These progressive ideas are not new, just now
further evidenced by science.
1164
Decety, J., Michalska, K., and Akitsuki, Y. (2008). Who caused the pain? An fMRI investigation of
empathy and intentionality in children. Neuropsychologia;46:260714.46
1165
Decety, J., Michalska, K., and Akitsuki, Y., Lahey, B.B. (2009). Atypical Empathetic Responses in
Adolescents with Aggressive Conduct Disorder: A functional MRI Investigation. Biol Psychol. 80(2): 203.
337
IN CONCLUSION
Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills - Arthur Schopenhauer
After reviewing the evidence in this book, certain folk notions of reality seem to fall
away. Its difficult to see what is left to allow a contra-causal decision that isnt a product of
the world, or in the very least, co-emergent with it developmentally. Neither will help the contra-
causal free will proponent.
I gave the phenomenal and causal analogies for tunnels and tracks. Its becoming
increasingly clear that not only do the brain and body drive the mind, and not the other way
around, but that the external world has one hand on the wheel. Even if and when there are truly
random noise options and emergent phenomena available, these are not evidenced to curb our
biases. Jumping the tracks may give them more opportunities to entrench themselves in even
deeper ways, on a more direct track of our predisposition. Perhaps we should envision a network
of rollercoasters in the dark. Ever ridden on Space Mountain at Disneyland? This analogy has its
limitations too, but that the tracks are obscured by darkness is an important inclusion of our
conscious ignorance of the bulk of the etiological network.
As far as we know, no one is immune to biases, even including professional philosophers,
who have been shown to have different views about whether a philosophical principal is true,
depending on the order in which the examples were given. This is opposed to lay people, who
dont.1166,1167 Professional economists/analysts will also sometimes still bring in ideology or the
sunk cost fallacy1168 or repeatedly fail to acknowledge when their predictions are literally equal
to chance.1169
1166
on Experimental Philosophy. [Audio podcast]. (14:00-15:30). Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
1167
Schwitzgebel, E., Cushman, F. (2012). Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment
in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers. Mind & Language (2012), 27, 135-153 Retrieved on
1168
Trout, J. D. (3/2/2009). Do Economists Wear Seatbelts? Stubborn beliefs in the economist's research
market. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-greater-
good/200903/do-economists-wear-seatbelts
1169
Kahneman, D. (10/29/2011). Daniel Kahneman: How cognitive illusions blind us to reason. The Observer.
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2011/oct/30/daniel-kahneman-cognitive-
illusion-extract?INTCMP=SRCH
338
Weve also seen that the substance dualist, who denies the ever-increasing evidence for
embodied cognition1170,1171 is robustly challenged with the above presented evidence of how we
perceive knowledge. This includes everything from automatically, causally, neuronally and
linguistically categorized unconscious perception to conscious planning and reasoning reliably
correlating with alterations in the material body/brain in a highly predictive manner, from its
primary development of cognitive pattern platforms in infancy, to the many here evidenced
facets of its typically active cognitive biasing, willful memory reconstruction, a literal split
personality in the two brain hemispheres (is there a mind/soul for each?) all the way to its
commensurately degraded epistemic abilities affected by age, disease, and/or damage, until
death, where we, predictably, lose any ability to detect any evidence of a separate mind/spirit
from the brain. And as some have noted,1172 if dualism is metaphysically true, near death out of
body experiences should always occur and functioning brains with no evidence of mind should
be commonplace too, but claims to the former are very rare (though scientists can now mentally
reproduce the experience1173,1174) and the latter is unheard of.
Not only all that, but we also now know that other animals possess many of the same
kinds of abilities that give humans our more complex mental awareness, just merely in the wrong
concentration and combination. All of this evidence occurs before we even start to argue about
dualism on purely philosophical grounds, if there is such a thing.
As we have also seen, accepting contra-causal free will has important practical
consequences in the context of responsibility. While quantum randomness may break down the
chain of global determinism/fatalism enough to make indeterminacy and humble defeasibility
our default bottom line, we also know that we dont need perfect knowledge to have practical
knowledge. This is what predispositionalism is all about, knocking down the cosmic strawman,
the false dichotomy of contra-causal free will vs. absolute determinism. Predispositionalism
1170
Novella, S. (7/8/2011). More on God of the Gaps. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/more-on-god-of-the-gaps
1171
Novella, S. (8/9/2011). Still More Misdirection and Illogic from Egnor. [Blog file post]. Retrieved on
9/22/2012 from http://theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/still-more-misdirection-and-illogic-from-egnor
1172
Ray, C. (9/18/2011). Sunday Argument #8: Against dualism. [Web log post]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://teapotatheism.blogspot.com/2011/09/sunday-argument-8-against-dualism.html
1173
Ehrsson, H. (2007). The Experimental Induction of Out-of-Body Experiences. Science 317, p. 1048 DOI:
10.1126/science.1142175
1174
Jha, A. (8/23/2007). Scientists develop technique to induce out-of-body experiences. The Guardian.
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2007/aug/24/2
339
focuses on identifying the more predictable thoughts and behaviors that escape our conscious
awareness and origination.
It seems that a long term loss of control can negatively influence health, by way of more
stress hormones,1175 but I believe this can beshould beperceived as a training of the mind to
come to grips with reality in a deeper way; a way that allows the agent to acquiesce and then let
go rather than fighting against the world. Control requires knowledge, and the recognition of
our onion-layers of predisposition is knowledge. Again, we are in the causal chain as well, so we
are not helpless, we just need to find a way to live in flow and declaw the negative stress.
Recognize your most compassionate self as vindicated and fully accept your own part in a causal
cosmos that will often not appeal to your desires. Its something that must go beyond the fear of
a loss of control. And it is a natural, noble aim, not supernatural woo, because it resides in your
perception, which can, to some extent, be affected by your efforts.
Train yourself to alter your fundamental perception of your locus of control, which will
alter your overall explanatory style. Optimism can be learned to some extent.1176 Try exercising
to boost your dopamine and serotonin. Take a hot shower when you are lonely or depressed.
Keep your world clean and organized and you and others will have more of a propensity to
respect that. Get lots of sleep and you will have less of a chance of behaving unethically. Enjoy
the benefits of human consciousness that afford you the great ability to be able to explain
yourself to others. And when you have conflict with someone, always make an effort highlight
the points of agreement, and know the best time to negotiate (after lunch!). Consider also the
prevalence of priming and confabulation and in-group biases in social situations and allow
compassion to temper your judgement by habituating it. The more beautiful person standing on
your right might not be the better person for the job or more trustworthy. Be ever aware of the
physical to mental connection evidenced in this book and work with them pro-actively, knowing
that there are probably many more reasons to scrutinize our gut feelings.
Considering predisposition and theology, they are not necessarily incompatible, but
doing away with dualistic illusions will encourage us to focus more on how to prevent and repair
rather than merely upon satisfying the revenge instincts of victims in a world where contra-
1175
Weiss, J. M. (1977). Psychological and behavioral influences on gastrointestinal lesions in animal models.
In J. D. Maser & M. E. P. Seligman (Eds.), Psychopathology: Experimental models. San Francisco: Freeman.
1176
Reivich, K., & Gillham, J. (2003). Learned optimism: The measurement of explanatory style. In S. J.
Lopez & C.R. Snyder (Eds.), Positive psychological assessment: A handbook of models and measures. (pp. 57-
74). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
340
causal free will makes prevention and rehabilitation hopeless. Simply put: determinism allows
for a platform of societal compassion that is literally not even conceptually possible with
libertarian free will (without great special pleading), as it is contra-causally immune to
habituated rehabilitation. Think about that: if the spirit is truly free from all influence, you just
better hope that people do the right thing. Saul Smilanski also argued1177 that if deterministic
incompatibilism were true, acting morally when there is no actual responsibility creates a more
altruistic action (even if he ultimately thinks there are enough other reasons to still hide the truth
of it from ourselves). Also, libertarian free will is seriously remiss when it comes to being
accountable to what we observe empirically in psychology, neuroscience, and physics. That too
is a matter of responsibility intellectually.
Our natural predisposition for empathy (that is when a normal healthy brain is
functioning properly, see Evidences #27, #15 and when post hoc fairness judgment and other
biases are accounted for see Evidences #29, #4) will cash out to a compassionate, forgiving
disposition to a degree that even many theologies cannot defend, because they and/or their gods
often hold people eternally, originally culpable/sinful. This is ontologically built in to the way
things are, regardless of our desires. Its very simple: the more helpless you know people are, the
less you are going to blame them. Using Jonathan Haidts example from the beginning, we may
hold the rider responsible, but can we blame the elephant? Clearly, we guard ourselves from any
danger, but we should be very wary of assuming that we can justifiably blame anyone in a way
that affords them a kind of deep responsibility. Compassion is a mindset worth habituating and
there is a least as much justification for it.
Determinists are in no danger of being excluded from participating in ethical systems, nor
are they fated to abject pessimism. As noted by Tom Clark,1178 we dont have to be self-caused
in order to hold each other responsible or to be moral. Even after knowing that we could not act
in any other way than how we are compelled to act by all the forces at play, known and
unknown, we still have concern for each other and experience feelings and desires. Not only that,
but we react to our own caused experiences, actions, and desires. None of this requires a ghost in
1177
Smilansky, S. (1994). The Ethical Advantages of Hard Determinism. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research. 54 (2):355-363.
1178
Beahan, J. (Interviewer), Clark, T. (Interviewee). (1/22/2009). Reasonable Doubts podcast: RD30 FW v D2:
Judgment Day. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://itunes.apple.com/podcast/reasonable-
doubts-podcast/id266671828
341
the machine or any supernatural basis for causality or free will when desiring a world where
people treat each other how we would want them to treat us. Desire is caused too, each one with
a burst of dopamine,1179 and while we must always hold up our desires to the light of reason, they
can never be ignored as an element in the equation for individual and social fulfillment (i.e.
ethical systems, even desirism itself).
Just because causal powers contributed to the creation of what we recognize as our
selves, doesnt mean that we arent also a part of that network or that our motivation for
happiness isnt justified by the same desires that actually do define our relationships, in contrast
to ad hoc absolute theistic systems. This is as close as we can get to being causa sui1180 without
actually doing/being it, as no one actually brings herself into existence at least that we know
of! Even without the myopic self-importance ascribed by so many supernatural philosophies, we
can still recognize an integration of self and nature when we experience our roles as always
unique, direct manifestations of the cosmos. When fully contemplated and realized, this is an
experience as profound as any religious experience; rather than an experience of transcendence
and caprice, it is an experience of grounding, empathy, and integrity. Integrity? What about all
the biases and delusion and confabulation? The integrity comes from admitting these illusions as
a necessary part of our being and becoming (as philosophers like Nietzsche witnessedif there
is a philosopher like Nietzsche!).
All that said, even as an admitted atheist, I want to suggest something that you might not
expect to hear, but thats in accord with the evidence to some extent1181,1182: as long as we
actively eliminate our internal authoritarian representation, we can take a look deep inside and
meet our god (or goddess or higher power or Tao or Zen or ubermenschwhatever). With
reverence and humility, we can exercise a very satisfying feature of the mind and ask, for
example, You, who represent all that I would seek in this world, if you werent perfect; if you
1179
Muehlhauser, L. (Interviewer), Schroeder, T. (Interviewee). (7/25/2010). Conversation from the Pale Blue
Dot podcast: 057: Tim Schroeder Desire and Morality. [Audio podcast]. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
1180
Sommers, T. (Interviewer), Strawson, G. (Interviewee). (3/2003). The Buck StopsWhere? Living
Without Ultimate Moral Responsibility. Galen Strawson, interviewed by Tamler Sommers, on getting free of
free will. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://www.naturalism.org/strawson_interview.htm#causasui
1181
Epley, N., Converse, B.A., Delbosc, A., Monteleone, G., & Cacioppo, J. (2009). Believers estimates of
Gods beliefs are more egocentric than estimates of other peoples beliefs. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 106, 21533-21538. Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from
http://www.pnas.org/content/106/51/21533
1182
Believers' Inferences About God's Beliefs Are Uniquely Egocentric. (11/30/2009). Science Daily. Retrieved
on 9/22/2012 from http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/11/091130151321.htm
342
werent all powerful or all knowing or eternal; if you didnt even exist beyond the very
experience of this inner dialogue, help me understand what could I do to help you? How
could we help each other? And without pretending that youve done anything more than
reflectively engage your ideal-self; without reifying or perpetuating any supernatural being or
domain or theology; without any dangerous dogma or delusion, you will gain all the benefits that
any theist actually gets from prayer and meditation.
And you dont have to feel like youre lying or being disingenuous or even habituating
delusion, because there is someone there: you. And you are connected to the cosmos,
consciously, unconsciously, and causally. Predispositions are trails of light that swirl all around
you and run through you. Thats not New Age woo; no special powers; no Deepak Chopra, just
the facts of life. Its the best we can do: be honest about the propriety of our ideals in the context
of the evidence. Dont use the word god if that bothers you (hello bristled eliminativists!). I do
again stress, though, that the authoritarian representation be delineated, as this is an externalizing
element of imposition worth negating.
Physics professor Mano Singham has produced an appropriate metaphor that captures
how we should interpret the world through a deterministic lens, and now that I am near the end,
its probably a good time to remind the reader of my early intention, stated in the Introduction, to
over-argue for predispositionalism by arguing for determinism:
We should view ourselves as a stage play that is unfolding. The stage setting and the
actors are like the conscious brain, the things that we see and are aware of, but the
performance also requires the participation behind the scenes of many unseen groups like
the lighting crew, the sound crew, and the stage hands, all obeying the instructions of the
director and the playwright, the last two items in this metaphor representing the laws of
science [] During a good performance we forget that the actors are playing
predetermined roles and view them as responding spontaneously to their surroundings,
even though we know deep down that this is not the case.
We should enjoy our lives and ourselves in the same way.[1183]
1183
Singham, M. (12/2/2010). On free will-16: A sense of self in the absence of free will. [Web log post].
Retrieved on 9/22/2012 from http://machineslikeus.com/news/free-will-16-sense-self-absence-free-will
343
When we take part in dreams fabricated internally by our non-conscious mind, not failing
to take into account that we do often incorporate live stimuli from our external surroundings
when sleeping, dont they serve as our self-scripted plays every night? Its been reported that
researchers have found that when we move in our dreams, our brains fire in the same pattern as
when we move in the real world.1184 It certainly feels like reality when in the dream moment,
even when we have dreams that take for granted the experience of flapping our arms and landing
on the sun for a picnic as a real possibility. Do we take free will for granted in this world in an
analogous way?
Experiencing the causal world as an integral participant is no different than it has always
been. That our eyes are determined to see and our cells are determined to replicate beyond our
mental control does not make us afraid. Likewise, deferring more respect to the primacy of our
subconscious mind and all its decisions, including the role it allows us to experience consciously,
should not rob us of pleasure any more than knowing how the taste buds on the tongue work with
the pleasure centers in the brain would make ice cream any less delicious. That causal chains
may have an element of acausality in them that goes beyond our mere ignorance of the causal
network is more frightening, as they can make the world less predictable. Determined or acausal,
ultimately, finding the consistency in the worldin our predisposition, wherever possible, will
bring us closer to how the world actually works and that, in my opinion, will prove to be a very
good thing.
1184
Reardon, S. (10/27/2011). Dream Movements Translate to Real Life. Science Now. Retrieved on 9/22/2012
from http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/10/dream-movements-translate-to-rea.html
344
HELPFUL VOCABULARY
Abstract: theoretical; mental; in idea only (not concrete).
Acausal: not causal, random.
Affective: of or pertaining to emotional experience.
Agency/agent: the conscious experience of being able to think, reason, and/or make a decision.
Apologist/apologetics: a person/discipline that defends criticisms of theology.
Bias: a systematic misrepresentation of the (larger) population.
Commensurate: related by degrees; if one part changes, the other part changes to the same
degree.
Compatibilism: the view that free will and determinism are compatible.
Confabulation: To guess without realizing youre guessing, then to believe and assert it, with
almost pathological certainty.
Consequentialism: a philosophical system of ethics based upon an obligation to consequences.

Related to Utilitarianism.
Contingent: not necessary; dependent upon factors.
Contra-causal: not causal, but not necessarily random either. The ability to defy causality and
perform a wholly or partially uncaused action.
Counterfactuals: Hypothetical alternate realities.
Defeasible: capable of being disproven; falsifiable.
Deontology: a philosophical system of ethics based upon an obligation to duty, rules, and/or and
absolute standard (one of the Big 3 ethical systems, along with Utilitarianism/Consequentialism
and virtue ethics).
345
Desert: a condition of deserving praise or blame, reward or punishment.
Determinism: a philosophical view that everything happens for causal reasons. ALSO:
*VAR: Strict or global determinism: a philosophical view that causality has never been
interrupted since the beginning of time.
*VAR: Adequate or local determinism/ causality: a philosophical view that causality exists
and is largely influential at the macro level, but it is and has been constantly interrupted by
quantum randomness, enough to significantly change even macro events.
Dualism/ (Substance) Dualism: the philosophical view that the mind and body are
metaphysically independent.
Emergent phenomena: significantly novel possibility that sprouts from a combination of known
phenomena. Some argue that emergent phenomena undermine determinism.
Empirical: evidential; testable.
Epistemology (epistemic; epistemological): the study of how we know; how we acquire

knowledge.
Etiology: the study of origination, causation, causal history.
Facultative: optional.
Fatalism: the strongest version of determinism that doesnt allow for any agency that can
fundamentally change some pre-known outcome in the world. Some say the agent is not
responsible for their fate, since they had no choice. The origin of every action can always be
traced beyond the self.
Functionalism/functional value: value that serves a practical purpose but might not be
objectively real (e.g. mistakenly thinking that you are loved might make you happier and
healthier, whether or not you actually are). Why answers for how things are the way they are,
rather than what is objectively real. William James said, It doesnt work because its true, its
true because it works.
346
Heuristic: intuitive rule of thumb in our thinking.
Illusionism: the idea that we should accept certain metaphysical illusions as truths because it is
to our benefit (i.e. free will, religion, denial of death, etc.)
Incompatibilism: the view that free will and determinism cannot be compatible.
Indefeasible: not capable of being disproven; unfalsifiable.
Indeterminacy: uncertainty.
Intrinsic value: has value in any context. The opposite of relative value.
Libertarian/contra-causal free will: the philosophical view that one has free will that is free
from causality. The word libertarian in this context has nothing to do with the political
movement.
Local control: freedom only to the extent that we are actually able to move or are constrained.
Meritocracy: based upon evidential merit.
Metacognition: The ability to think about thinking itself. Considered by some to allow special
freedom on a metaphysical level.
Metaphysical: pertaining to abstract forms, thoughts, agency, existence, causality, truth; as well
as first principles, ultimate grounds, being, time, substance.
Monism: philosophical view that the world (universe) is all made of one substance (i.e. some
incredibly small particle).
Multi-verse: the requalification of the universe as containing many universes like the kind that
we observe and infinite others that we havent observed, but are evidenced by physics.
Nihilism: the absence of a philosophical system of ethics or one where there is no real basis for
morality; Nietzsche however, had a much more nuanced definition that incorporated different
stages, passive, active, etc., and it did not necessarily cash out to harmful behavior, just behavior
without an ontological foundation. In fact, he charged that the most moralistic impositions were
just nihilistic masks in one sense, because they obscured the epistemic path to creative integrity.
347
Objective: real, regardless of opinion.
Omniscient: all knowing.
Ontology: the study of being; how things come to be and what is objectively real (ontic;
ontological).
Originatory value: intrinsic value that allows for responsibility based upon a sufficient
indication of origin.
Parsimony: economy and elegance of explanation; succinct. Explains most by saying least
(though it has to actually explain without substituting in another mystery [e.g. magic, god,
supernatural, etc.]).
Phenomenal: sense experience, rather than reasoned experience.
Pragmatism/pragmatic value/prudential: similar to functionalism; thinks that what is

functional is what is most important. Emphasis on the practicaleven that what is practical is
real in an important sense.
Predeterminism/predestination: events that must happen are known and cannot be avoided.
Debatably similar/identical to fatalism, accept, the predestined agent is usually portrayed as
necessarily contributing to their fate and so is still responsible. Some say the agent is not
responsible for their fate, since they had no choice.
Predispositionalism: The addition of the pre in predispositionalism will serve to include

both the inner characteristics of general dispositionalism (i.e. internal attribution within a
commonly perceived personal identity) plus situational attribution (i.e. external context) and
highlight the fact that external context and all the reasons that affect the will actually do some
work in predisposing us towards actions.
Reify: to make real conceptually or ontologically.
Retributivism: punishment for the sake of punishment, not for moral instruction or to keep
people safe.
348
Semi-compatibilism: the view that even if free will and determinism are not compatible, people
still have genuine responsibility.
Simpliciter: purely; in its most simple definition.
Stochasticity: lacking predictable order.
Subconscious: part of the mind that isnt in our awareness.
Sub-control: thoughts, action, and behavior wholly or partially influenced by non-conscious

elements in the brain/body.
Subjective: a personal experience which may or may not correspond to objective reality.
Teleology: of or pertaining to purpose, intention, goal orientation.
Theodicy: generally, an attempt to explain away a challenge to the (evidential) problem of

Evil (why there is suffering and/or evil). Free will is often used as a theodicy.
The Trolley Car Problem: A classic thought experiment ubiquitous in ethics involving a
runaway trolley that will either kill four people or can be diverted to kill one person. Is it ethical
to do so? There have been many versions (most popular, has a fat man on footbridge, who can be
pushed off to stop the train) and much has been written about it in many disciplines.1185
Utilitarianism: a philosophical system of ethics based upon an obligation to the greater good.
Veridical: corresponds to objective reality.
Virtue ethics: a philosophical system of ethics based upon habituating virtuous action so as to
make it fundamental to ones character. A good person concentrates on maximizing action that is
in accord with their virtues, for the intrinsic value of engaging virtuous action produces
flourishing.
Volitionalism: an agent is not responsible for an action unless the agent has chosen it.
1185
349
LOGICAL FALLACIES
ad hoc: made up to explain something after the fact (consciously or unconsciously).
argumentum ad ignorantiam: argument from ignorance; erroneously thinking that truth depends
upon whether we know if the premise has been proven false, and if it hasnt, that every
competing idea is equally tenable, e.g. you cant prove unicorns dont exist? Then they are as
likely to exist as anything else. But ignorance to the facts does not make every remaining
possibility equally probable.
Category error: conflating different ontological or epistemic domains.
Fallacy of desired consequence: a proposition must be true, only because it seems like the most
desirable option.
False dilemma/dichotomy: an unnecessarily forced choice, because both options can be chosen.
Genetic fallacy: the merit of an argument is demoted based upon irrelevant issues of origin.
Naturalistic fallacy: because it is natural, it cannot be or should not be curbed.
non sequitur: does not follow logically.
post hoc ergo propter hoc: just because something comes after something, we think, therefore,
the first thing caused it. Correlation doesnt require causation.
Red herring: a distraction from the real issue.
Special pleading: granting special privileges without explaining why.
Strawman: a weaker version of the real argument, set up to more easily knock down.
350
Hey Andrew whats your book about?
I originally created this book for one reason: I wanted to have one source with all of the
best evidence, both empirical and philosophical, for the extent of predisposition in human beings.
Issues of control and origination naturally lead to issues of identity and responsibility. In
considering the state of the current scientific evidence and coexisting treatment in philosophy, I
also became convinced of a more appropriate term with which to reframe the age old free will vs.
determinism debate: predispositionalism. This is because even the label compatibilism belies the
pervasive extent of causal influence on behavior, while the label determinism simply isnt
accurate as an umbrella term, because it doesnt account for quantum randomness.
Too much emphasis is placed upon whether or not causal chains are broken and not
whether behavioral predisposition endures and circumvents any proposed break in the chain. I
argue that such a hypothetical causal break, whether by salient quantum randomness/ noise/
indeterminacy or emergent phenomena, is even more likely to get rerouted right back into
channels of natural physical and mental propensities and biases in the mind or in nature anyway.
Rather than causal breaks offering freedom, as is proposed in some versions of two-stage
compatibilism, these breaks would simply compel us to shift ('jump tracks') to the most similar
option that still appeals to our same contextual and body-based biases; a set of new tracks
potentially even more entrenched behaviorally than before the proposed quantum/emergent
effects. Science never ceases to reveal more and more internal and external mechanisms of
predisposition, so we know that they must stick at some point, and this is what matters in
predispositionalism, not whether we can trace all causal networks back to Planck time. This book
is a philosophy/ psychology hybrid that attempts to integrate the external emphasis prominent in
failed behaviorism with the modern evidence for cognitive systems that still automatically
incorporate the external world via mirror neurons, cognitive offloading, etc.
A list of topics and sub-topics in this book involve subjects like: cognitive biases, defying
causality, priming, remote control mice, political predisposition, Pee Wee Herman, body parts
that fight with each other, jealous dogs, alien hands, artificial intelligence, honest liars, revenge,
the concept of Halle Barry, Illusionism, music stuck in your head, quantum freedom, rewriting
351
memory, interviewing God, baking a cake, marshmallows, manipulation, mirror neurons, the
Dionysian Improviser, tunnels vs. tracks, risk, disgust, the number 3, moral breeding, moral
grammar, moral burnout, moral surgery, cockroaches that prefer to turn right, love drugs,
hierarchical selves, cyborgs, autonomy, luck, evil neuroscientists (of course), runaway trolleys
(of course), ghosts in the machine (of course), sexy danger (of course), collective morality, two
headed babies, a causal vacuum, Lotto balls, creation energy, unfree gods, having an orgasm
when you brush your teeth, and non-conscious identity that performs simple mathematical
calculations up to four seconds before we even experience a conscious decision to do so.
NOTE: the beauty of an ebook is that I can revise it at will, as long as I don't stray too far
from the copyright. I will occasionally update parts that would benefit from revision, as new
evidence or ideas emerge. If needed, a history of previous versions can be found in the tabs.
352

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THE RIGHT TRACK

Andrew David Viceroy

PART I INTRODUCTION: WHY PREDISPOSITIONALISM? 8

PART II 32 SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCES OF PREDISPOSITION

Evidence #1: THE YOUS IN YOU 45

Evidence #2: THE MASK OF SUBJECTIVE FREEDOM 55

Evidence #3: MEMORY 60

Evidence #4: INTENTION 67

Evidence #5: GENETIC BEHAVIOR 72

Evidence #6: MANIPULATION 77

Evidence #7: CONFABULATION 83

Evidence #8: SPLIT BRAINS 89

Evidence #9: METAPHORICAL PRIMES 94

Evidence #10: THE SENSES 98

Evidence #12: OVERLOAD 111

Evidence #13: PERSONAL CHEMISTRY 116

Evidence #14: MENTAL DISORDER 122

Evidence #15: THE MORALLY CHALLENGED 125

Evidence #16: THE BODY OTHER 131

Evidence #17: DEVELOPMENT 135

Evidence #18: RIGHT-SIDE BIAS 138

Evidence #19: POLITICAL AFFILIATION 142

Evidence #20: RISK 147

Evidence #21: ENVIRONMENT 150

Evidence #22: BEAUTY 155

Evidence #23: RELIGION 158

Evidence #24: IN-GROUP/OUT-GROUP 169

Evidence #26: GOALS AND LONG-TERM PRIMES 181

Evidence #27: EMPATHY 185

Evidence #28: OBLIGATION 189

Evidence #29: GENDER 195

Evidence #30: INTELLIGENCE 201

Evidence #31: ANCHORING & MISCELLANEOUS 205

Evidence #32: REACTANCE 207

PART III SOME CHALLENGES TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF

CONFUSING VARIETIES OF DETERMINISM 214

DETERMINISM AND THEISM 220

AGENT CAUSALITY 236

QUANTUM RANDOMNESS 243

EMERGENT PHENOMENA 261

THE HUMAN ANIMAL 265

THE CAUSAL VACUUM 273

FUNCTIONALIST ILLUSIONS 282

ENDURANCE AND IDENTITY 297

HELPFUL VOCABULARY 345

LOGICAL FALLACIES 350

Compatibilist Eddy Nahmais has a version that he calls modular

While its extremely difficult to intuitively overcome our evolutionarily selected

a) epistemic limitations concerning the actual motivations underlying even

The SECOND component is the ability to act from an intelligible form of

The schemas that automatically control our perceptions and interpretations

THE YOUS IN YOU

Experiment 1 demonstrates that free-will beliefs are strengthened when conscious

Jones describes Knobes most famous experiment:

EVIDENCE #6: Experiments on insects, animals, and humans show an ability to

EVIDENCE #7: Experiments have shown that we confabulate explanations for

Many conditions, such as Korsakoffs syndrome, anosognosia, split-brain syndrome,

THE IMPLICATIONS: This Evidence is obviously related to Evidence #3, though it

reinterprets instances of confabulation not as illusory experiences of will but as

In a study conducted by Lawrence E. Williams and John A. Bargh,312,313,314 based upon

In 1955, F. H. Allport defined Perceptual set theory as: a perceptual bias or

Depleted participants misrepresented their performance for monetary gain to a greater

THE IMPLICATIONS: The House of Lords Science and Technology Sub-Committees

In Phantoms in the Brain,427 neurologist V.S. Ramachandran shows how cognition

The Right Track & The Track That's Left (Exploring Predispositionalism)

The Right Track & The Track That's Left (Exploring Predispositionalism)