Proceedings of the 2012 9th International Pipeline Conference IPC2012 September 24-28, 2012, Calgary, Alberta, Canada

IPC2012-90010

DESCRIPTION OF THE INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEM SISE IMPLEMENTED AT OCP (HEAVY CRUDE OIL PIPELINE) IN ECUADOR
Andrs Mendizbal OCP Ecuador Executive President Quito, Ecuador Francisco Montalvo OCP Ecuador Security Manager Quito, Ecuador

ABSTRACT The OCP (Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados - Heavy Crude Oil Pipeline) pipeline in Ecuador crosses through several regions determined by unique characteristics and threats. The pipeline runs almost parallel and at some points close (30km) to the border with Colombia, country with a very active group of illegal armed forces. It is also known that the logistics of these illegal groups operate within Ecuador. Within this context, and also considering minor delinquency within Ecuador, OCP Ecuador S.A. emphasized on the need to have a Security Management Model that addresses the security threats to which the pipeline is vulnerable. Under this model the company has invested in the implementation of an Integrated Electronic Security System (SISE) in order to monitor and control security of terminals, pumping and pressure reduction stations, block valve sites and other specific sites along the pipeline. This paper describes the SISE, its equipment and how it is managed in order to present a security model to other pipeline operators with similar threats. INTRODUCTION The need to implement the Integrated Electronic Security System SISE in OCP Ecuador S.A. arises immediately upon the start of operations (2003) given that during the first years physical presence of security personnel was kept at valve stations and vulnerable areas such as overpasses.

All this physical security device had a high cost; therefore, since OCP had fiber optic located along the whole pipeline the opportunity of taking advantage of the installed technology and thus implementing a security system which was seen. Although it represented a major investment, in the long term allowed cost reductions, optimization of existing resources, reduction of trespassing attempts and reduction of response times of our reaction force. In late 2005, several companies were invited to start a bidding process to implement the Integrated Electronic Security System (SISE). During 2006 the bidding contract for the implementation of the Integrated Electronic Security System was awarded to SIEMENS. Implementation of the project started at the Marine Terminal in Esmeraldas at the end of March, 2007 with a total effective implementation period of 15 months. The system started full operation at the end of July, 2008. Since then, and as of today, the Integrated Electronic Security System has been working optimally allowing an efficient compliance with the initial goals. Among the system goals were the following: Increase security and surveillance levels.

Copyright 2012 by ASME

 SCOPE

Protect OCP personnel and allow the companys operation under the best possible conditions. Access to timely information to support decisionmaking. Detect, deter and alert incidents in a timely manner. Minimize response time upon the confirmation of a security event. Achieve an acceptable level of resources savings.

The SISE is operated in the following ways: It can be operated in its entirety from either of the two Main Control Centers, from the Quito Main Offices QMO as well as from the Operations Alternative Security Center ECC Warehouse. From each Control sub center on each assigned security area (according to Annex 1).

GENERAL INFORMATION The Integrated Electronic Security System SISE covers the total 485-km length of the Pipeline. For that purpose, it has 109 video cameras, 6 monitoring sub centers, one Main Monitoring Center in Quito, and 13.9 kilometers of microphonic cable (against trespassing) distributed in 61 security areas, covering the boundaries of pumping and pressure reduction stations. The system is flexible and has the ability of coupling additional elements according to the needs of the companys operation. SYSTEM COMPONENTS The SISE is comprised by: Closed-Circuit Television Monitoring subsystem Access and Trespassing Control subsystem with all their (CCTV)

The Integrated Electronic Security System SISE is implemented in the OCP along 485 kilometers starting at the Amazonas Terminal in Lago Agrio (Ecuadorian Oriente near the northern border with Colombia) and ending at the Marine Terminal at Esmeraldas in the Pacific Coast. The Integrated Electronic Security System SISE has equipment installed at the following specific sites comprising the Pipeline: 1. 2. 4 Pumping Stations: PS-1 Amazonas, PS-2 Cayagama, PS-3 Sardinas and PS-4 Paramo 2 Pressure Reduction Stations and 1 automatic blocking station: PRS-1 Chiquilpe, PRS-2 Puerto Quito and ABS Quinind 25 main valves along the pipeline 8 overpasses: Cascales, KP37, Curva de la Boa, KP 128, Piedra Fina, Quinind, Tatica and KP 481 Marine Terminal Head offices in Quito and Emergency Control Center

3. 4. 5. 6.

Both subsystems, integrated.

components,

are

It is worth mentioning that OCP defined the assigned risk rate to each facility comprising the SISE according to the following security assigned risk rate: 1. Critical Sites: Overpasses, PS-1 Amazonas Station, Marine Terminal (MT), Quito Main Offices (QMO). Essential Sites: Valves, PS-2 Cayagama Station, PS-3 Sardinas Station, PS-4 Paramo Station, PRS-1 Chiquilpe Station, PRS-2 Puerto Quito Station and ABS. Complementary Sites: ECC Warehouse

Closed Circuit Television Sub-system CCTV

This subsystem is comprised basically by the following elements: a) Video Management System (VMX300) b) DVR (Digital Video Recording ) for image recording and camera control elements (DX8000) c) Field elements: mobile cameras, mobile domes, audio-video or data-Ethernet converters, speakers, loudspeakers, data and video protection, and other devices. Annex 2 shows a diagram of the described components. Video Management System

2.

3.

The Pipeline has been divided into six areas, each one with a Control sub center in charge of the security of that area. Annex 1 describes each area.

Copyright 2012 by ASME

As its name suggests, the fundamental function of this system is to manage all CCTV system elements, from its configuration parameters to performing controlling functions.

This control and monitoring element receives video information from all the cameras of its area of influence through OCPs corporate network and in analog video directly from the cameras located at the stations. It will send a control signal to these same cameras in order to move them and thus change their surveillance area.

It is worth mentioning that for any contingency at the Main Control Center QMO located at the Quito offices, the alternate control center located at the ECC Warehouse will turn into the main control unit with all functionalities defined for this purpose. Main functions of the video management system are: To receive digital video over IP in LANs or WANs. To identify, receive, decode and monitor digital video from video converters to IP as well as from DVRs digital recorders. Domes and cameras control through DVRs or IP video converters. To show maps of the facilities allowing a rapid detection of areas of interest in order to see what is happening. A special situation occurs at the Marine Terminal (MT) which has a very special field element: a thermal imaging camera to monitor off-shore loading buoys.

The incoming video will be recorded in the hard disc of this DVR using for that purpose parameters defined by the user such as amount of images per second, video quality and detection of different events.

The operator, using the DVR system, may see live or remote video from the cameras corresponding to its area of influence.

The recorded images are easily located in the hard disk through techniques made available by the DVR such as search by date, fast search, search by event, etc. Access and Trespassing Control subsystem

This subsystem is comprised basically by the following elements: a) SIPASS Management, Monitoring and Access Control System b) Local storage elements from the ACC5100 database. c) Office elements: fingerprint readers, pulsating devices, electromagnetic locks and door controllers. d) Microphonic cable perimeter sensors (Field) Database Backup The information residing in the Sipass database may be partially or totally safeguarded as preventive measure against corruption of information. Likewise, SQL Server automatically performs maintenance of the Sipass database: Automatic registration of the database in Enterprise Manager Automatic management of the Database size Management of user connection

This camera is comprised by 3 elements: 1) A color PTZ camera for surveillance during the day. 2) A thermal imaging camera for day, night or foggy weather. 3) Pan Tilt to support the above-mentioned elements.

DVR - Image recording and camera control elements

These elements are located at the control sub-centers (see Annex 1). Basically they are comprised by a digital video recorder with connection to Ethernet. They interact through this connection with the video manager system providing it with video information in real time and video recording from its area of influence. Likewise, it gives the video manager system the possibility of controlling PTZ cameras and domes in its area.

Remote Access through WAN or LAN Remote communication is an essential component of the SISE security system and allows availability of event

Copyright 2012 by ASME

information of facilities at OCPs main offices. For this purpose, the access server communicates trough OCPs WAN or LAN with local access controllers called Advanced Central Controller (ACC) located at stations and valves. They store locally all events produced at their control area and transmit them to the server. Additionally, they store in their memory the database with information of user profiles so that, in case that the WAN or LAN network stops working, they keep access control of the facilities. On the other hand, it is encrypted in order to safeguard the information travelling by WAN or LAN.

Integration of trespassing alarms with cameras motion to monitor the area where the alarm occurs is performed in the same manner as explained above. However, it should be added that as a response to an alarm and under a digital logic programmed in the Access system, the same Sipass digital cards will produce relay outputs taking their contacts to the alarm inputs of the DVR digital recorder. With this information, the recorder will send an order to the cameras to move up to a defined point in its scanning so as to allow watching the area where the alarm occurred.

System Operation Microphonic cable perimeter sensors VALVES For detection of perimeter trespassing, a microphonic system mounted on fences is used only at stations to detect invasion of external security perimeter. Through signals generated by the minimum flexion of a coaxial transducer triboelectric sensor cable, a digital signal processor analyzes characteristic trespassing signals. The system will detect an intruder cutting, climbing or removing material from the fence. The installation is fast and easy. The economic fixing belts, resistant to ultraviolet rays, keep the sensor cable attached to the fence. The serial processor may control two independent zones, each with a sensor cable 305 m long max. (1000 ft). The field processor or PLC is permanently monitoring the sensor cable with the purpose of detecting not only trespassing but also the system status, generating an alarm signal in case of failure. These two signals, failure and trespassing alarm, will be used to inform the security system of all events occurring in the field. Integration of different Subsystems Integration of the different subsystems is performed basically at the control centers level in stations of control sub centers.

There is a mobile camera with infrared illuminator at the valves to monitor the entrance and its perimeter. The Infrared Illuminator operates automatically and only during the night.

OVERPASSES

They have a mobile camera with infrared illuminator to monitor the Overpass and its perimeter. The Infrared Illuminator operates automatically and only during the night. Electric power for the cameras is taken from solar panels conveniently and independently located. Since energy coming from this source is limited and the initial investment is high, this system has been dimensioned to move the camera maximum 6 hours per day.

STATIONS

Trespassing Access Control Integration of trespassing alarms at the stations control centers is made through digital input/output modules of the Sipass Access Control System. Any signal, alarm or failure from the zones monitored by the PLCs is received by these access control system cards and will be seen as alarms at the stations local access client.

These facilities are protected by a perimeter trespassing or microphonic cable system installed on the stations external fence, divided by zones for a better monitoring with the CCTV system through mobile cameras, that will have prepositioning functions in order to combine them with the perimeter system alarms and automatic patrol functions to supervise the linked perimeter.

Trespassing Alarm signals will be processed through the Sipass Access Control system, which will also register alarms from the Valves and their corresponding area.

Trespassing CCTV

Copyright 2012 by ASME

The mesh perimeter of each Pumping Station is zone-divided and controlled by dual modules or two-zone control PLCs with a maximum length of 300 meters.

Video cameras are installed on existing lighting poles along the mesh.

All signals from cameras are recorded in the recording or DVR system located at each station control center. Surveillance and monitoring of all security systems at the assigned area and at the station itself will be controlled from there.

The DVR system is connected to OCPs existing corporate network, allowing alarm and video images transmission to either the Main or Alternate center in Quito.

There is access from the control sub centers to all CCTV recording and Access Control systems such as digital recording, alarm records, input/output records, non-allowed access attempts and patrol controls.

Reduction of operating costs (see Figure 1) Replacement of other security measures Complementing of initial security measures Integrating current security systems, thus optimizing resources Effectively supporting all OCPs departments It contributed to the operation of the OCP and to the early detection of risk situations such as fires, floods, etc. Reduction of vandalism and trespassing attempts (See Figure 2) Improvement of permanent surveillance Incident documentation Optimizing companys database and records Reduced recruitment of specialized private security personnel for facilities surveillance (see Figure 3) Reduced patrol frequency and reconnaissance of distant facilities by public forces (see Figure 4)

QUITO OFFICES Main Control Center at Main Offices Main Control Center at Quito offices works as a mega Control Center since it has all the functions of a Control Sub Center on all areas along the pipeline, having access to all CCTV recording and Access Control systems such as digital recording, alarm recording, input/output records, nonallowed access attempts and patrol controls. Figure 1 It has 5 LCD monitors 52 to display video images of the CCTV system for the whole Pipeline.
# 4

INCIDENTS

Alternate Control Center This Control Center operates as a backup to the Main Control Center and may operate simultaneously with the Main Control Center.
-

4 3 3 2 2 1 1

CONCLUSIONS We can conclude that we have a system that works efficiently and that has been able to satisfy the implementation requirements. In summary, it can be said that the following has been achieved with the SISE:

(2004)

(2005)

(2006)

(2007)

(2008) YEAR

(2009)

(2010)

(2011)

(2012)

Figure 2

Copyright 2012 by ASME

Figure 3

Figure 4

Copyright 2012 by ASME

ANNEX 1 SISE BY LOCATION Location Area PS-1 AMAZONAS Station / Lago Agrio I 20001 Valve / Sevilla Cascales Overpass KP-37 Overpass Curva de la Boa Overpass II 20002 Valve 20003 Valve PS-2 / CAYAGAMA Station Piedra Fina Overpass 20004 Valve / Rio Loco 20005 Valve / El Salado 20006 Valve / Las Palmas III KP-128 Overpass 20007 Valve / Chontaloma PS-3 / SARDINAS Station 20008 Valve PS4 / PRAMO Station (Papallacta) 20009 Valve / Cuchauco 20024 Valve / Yaruqui IV 20010 Valve / Yaruqui Norte 20011 Valve / Rio Guayllabamba 20025 Valve / Pomasqui PRS1 CHIQUILPE 20012 Valve / Nono 20013 Valve / Pueblo Nuevo PRS2 PUERTO QUITO 20014 Valve / Pedro Vicente Maldonado 20015 Valve 20016 Valve / Arenanguita 20017 Valve / Rio Blanco QUININDE Overpass V 20018 Valve / Rio Quininde 20019 Valve / Rio Quininde ABS QUININDE 20020 Valve / Rio Viche 20021 Valve / Rio Viche TATICA Overpass 20022 Valve / Esmeraldas 20023 Valve / Esmeraldas KP-481 Overpass ADM Zone and Base Camp / Esmeraldas Operating and Industrial Zone / Esmeraldas VI Communication Station / Esmeraldas On-Shore Facility / Esmeraldas Buoys / Esmeraldas Head Office Quito QUITO ECC Warehouse

Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

Region ORIENTE REGION SIERRA REGION

COASTA L REGION

Copyright 2012 by ASME

ANNEX 2 OCP Offices and Warehouse

PUMPING STATIONS

VALVE

Copyright 2012 by ASME