1G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975 SEC. QUIRICO P.

EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner, vs. HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents. Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Ist. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners. Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents.

MARTIN, J.: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as follows: IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied). Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities: 3 b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines. c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... . h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency. For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. 4 Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein." Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality. On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order: IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied). Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration first filed on the fundamental submission that the Order is a patent nullity. 6 As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations. It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. 10 We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory

function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none. Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of Court 13 to abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses and the authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly seized upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized, however, that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear. 15 Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown 16 and even before the issuance of a complaint. 17 It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. 21 In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant. 22 There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions 23 fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is reasonably relevant to the investigations. We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings. 25 In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled that since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 27 the same approach was followed in the administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing any administrative charge. 28 He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise. 30 Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against selfincrimination. A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the President of the Philippines to issue subpoena. 31 More tersely stated, respondents would now challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic authority, Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes 32 cannot be collaterally impeached. 33 Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now. 34 The settled rule is that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 35 Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue. WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside and declared of no force and effect. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Castro, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur. Makalintal, C.J., concurs in the result. Barredo, Makasiar, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ, took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring: The opinion of the Court, ably penned by Justice Martin, is both learned and comprehensive. It reflects the current state of doctrinal pronouncements in American Administrative Law, which up to now possesses worth in this jurisdiction. It is in accordance with the views expressed in two authoritative American treatises that of Davis 1 and that of Jaffe. 2 The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the same conclusion. 3 A similar approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz, 4 and McFarland and Vanderbelt. 5 A concurrence is thus called for. That for me does not conclude matters though. The constitutional rights of a person who may be involved in such administrative investigation, call for respect. A recognition of the expanded reach of the administrative process in order to assure that the objectives of a regulatory statute be attained cannot obscure the protection that the Constitution affords a person who may find himself in the position of a respondent. It is worthwhile to my mind that there be a reference, even if far from detailed, to such an aspect. Hence this separate opinion. 1. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside. 6 The broad sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot, consistently with the Constitution, go so far as to render it meaningless. It is with such a reading in mind that I view the pronouncement in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 7 on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin. The doctrine formulated in such American case by Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., ... . But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. "The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable."" 8 It has been given approval in an impressive number of subsequent adjudications. 9 It suffices, however, to call attention to the words of Justice Jackson in the two paragraphs preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt as to its lending itself to the construction that an inroad into the right of search and seizure is now permissible: "The Commission's order is criticized upon grounds that the order transgresses the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment's due process of law clause. It is unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. ... Although the "right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," ... is not confined literally to searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of process, ... neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. ... While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the name of public investigation, ... corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy . ... They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation. ... Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." 10 Thus is rendered clear that the landmark Boyd decision which warned against the use of the subpoena power to trench upon this guarantee still speaks authoritatively. This Court has spoken to the same effect, Boyd having been cited in a number of cases. 11 I would, therefore, read the opinion of my brethren as not departing from but precisely adhering to its command. Whatever relaxation of its compelling force may be allowable in case of corporations should not apply where an individual is concerned. That should reassure respondent Manalastas that if he could demonstrate a failure to abide by the constitutional mandate on search and seizure, he is not without a remedy. 2. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the opinion of the Court: "Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise." 12 The right not to incriminate oneself 13 is equally deserving of the utmost deference and respect. What is more, the present Constitution by the adoption of the Miranda doctrine has vitalized it even further. 14 There is, happily, the last sentence of such paragraph: "Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against selfincrimination." 15 When read in connection with the earlier reference to the fact that the respondent is called as a witness not as the party proceeded against, it cannot be said, in the light of the ruling in Planas v. Gil, 16 that it offends against this constitutional guarantee. As of now then, with the question of any modification of the Planas doctrine not being properly before us, I can yield my concurrence. Candor compels the statement, however, that for me a reexamination of such a pronouncement is desirable. A distinction between a witness and a respondent may be too tenuous if the realities of the situation be fully considered. I am bothered by the thought that the force of the Cabal 17 and the Pascual, Jr. decisions 18 may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a witness and is thus compelled to testify. For the present, it may suffice if I express my misgivings. At any rate, concurrence is not ruled out in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able opinion of Justice Martin. TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. Justice Martin which grants the petition and sets aside respondent court's order and writ of preliminary injunction of July 1, 1968 and would therefore require respondent Fernando Manalastas as assistant city public service officer of Manila (and all other city officials similarly situated) to comply with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to matters relevant to the investigation of anomalies and sworn statements involving or implicating certain City officials or other public officers." 1 While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before the PARGO, 2 on the basis whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is not facing any administrative charge" and that "he is merely cited as witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges", 3 it is a fact shown by the very petition at bar itself and its Annexes B and B-1 that respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a respondent or one directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements that concededly as per the petition itself initiated the PARGO's alleged "fact-finding investigation." 4 Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles, investigated by the PARGO on the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through him as commission agent to the City of Manila, sets forth the detailed allegations of said declarant that respondent Manalastas and a number of other city officials named and unnamed got the lion's share of the overpricing. Annex B-1 of the petition is the sworn statement of one Carlos Montaez with reference to some overpriced equipment sold by him to the City of Manila wherein he likewise narrated in detail the modus operandi and specifically named respondent Manalastas and five other officials to whom he allegedly gave: "due monetary consideration."

All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding, the very petition and said annexed sworn statements (which were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his expressly asking for them during the course of the hearing 5) show that respondent Manalastas (and others similarly situated) are indeed not merely witnesses but in reality respondents (subject to administrative and criminal charges.) Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 wherein the Court through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness stand as against the order of the Presidential Committee investigating the complaint against him for alleged unexplained wealth (since such proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one and his position was virtually that of an accused on trial and he therefore had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions) and ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against him. Pascual Jr. vs. Bd. of Examiners 7 is equally in point, wherein the Court sustained the lower court's writ of injunction against the respondent board's order compelling therein petitioner to take the witness stand in a malpractice case (wherein he was respondent) in view of the penal nature of the proceedings and the right of the accused to refuse "not only to answer incriminatory questions, but also to take the witness stand." 8 The Court therein stressed that "the constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."" and that "while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment." That petitioner's investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in substance and effect criminal in nature against him as a respondent (and not merely as witness) as indicated above, is borne out by the fact of record in Sugay vs. Pamaran 9 (of which the Court can well take judicial notice) that on July 22, 1971 respondent Manalastas as well as Carlos Montaez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1, petition, supra, 10) and a number of other city officials were charged by the city fiscal in the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila for violations of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) in connection with the alleged gross overpricing of the same equipment (steam cleaners and air compressor) purchased for the City. The main opinion's justification for upholding the subpoena, viz, that "since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege (against self-incrimination)would thus be unnecessary" 11 thus appears to be flawed in fact and in law: respondent was in fact being investigated as respondent-suspect and without submitting to the investigation was actually criminally charged in court; as a pure matter of legal principle, the 1973 Constitution has recognized the necessity of strengthening (and extending) the privilege against self-incrimination by expressly providing as a constitutional mandate in the Bill of Rights that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the use of any confession obtained in violation of said section by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence. Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination and in securing the respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena. Respondent was unquestionably a party respondent who under the doctrine of Cabal and Pascual, supra, had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand. This legal and constitutional right may not be defeated by the transparent expedient of citing respondent as a supposed witness in what was avowed to be a general fact-finding investigation but obviously was a fishing expedition to ensnare respondent as a prime suspect, as borne out by the sworn statements withheld from respondent court and now annexed to the very petition at bar and petitioner's contention that "In effect, the injunction issued by the lower court is one to restrain criminal prosecutions." This contention has of course been proven baseless by the events already cited above that such criminal prosecutions were in fact filed in court against respondent and others without the need of petitioner's "fact-finding investigation" and subpoenas. The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and resources can and must ferret out and investigate wrongdoing, graft and corruption and at the same time respect the constitutional guarantees of the individual's right to privacy, silence and due process and against self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure. This means that leads and charges must be investigated and followed up through the assistance of the corresponding police and law enforcement agencies as provided in the petitioner's executive charter 12 and the evidence secured by proper applications for search warrants, and as conceded in the petition itself, after the corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding charges against the persons who may appear responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices such as the Fiscal's office, like what was done in other cases." 13 There appears to be validity in respondent's contention that the subpoena power granted petitioner in its executive charter does not apply to general fact-finding investigations conducted by it. 14 I find no need, however, of going further into this issue, since this dissent is based directly on the fundamental tenet that respondent Manalastas was unquestionably being investigated by petitioner as respondent and a prime suspect (and not as a mere witness) and accordingly, under settled doctrine, he had every right to remain silent and to invoke his right against self-incrimination and to refuse to take the witness stand. I therefore vote for upholding respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena. G.R. No. L-12596 July 31, 1958

JOSE L. GUEVARA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner. Dominador D. Dayot for respondent. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Petitioner was ordered by the Commissioner on Elections to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 an article entitled "Ballot Boxes Contract Hit", which tended to interfere with and influence the Commission on Elections and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending

investigation and determination before said body "arising from the third petition for reconsideration of May 20, 1957 and the supplementary petition thereof of June 1, 1957 filed by Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc., praying for reconsideration of the resolutions of the Commission of May 4 and 13, 1957, awarding the contracts for the manufacture and supply of 34,000 ballot boxes to the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. and the respective answers of the latter two corporations to said petitions; and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the exclusive constitutional function of this Commission and its Chairman Domingo Imperial and Member Sixto Brillantes in the administration of all the laws relative to the conduct of elections." Petitioner, answering summons issued to him by the Commission, appeared and filed a motion to quash on the following grounds: a) The Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as neither in the Constitution nor in statutes is the Commission granted a power to so punish the same, for should Section 5 of Republic Act No. 180, vesting the Commission with "power to punish contempts provided for in Rule of the Court under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein," be applied to the case at hand, said provision would be unconstitutional. b) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists, the same cannot be applied to the instant case, where the Commission is exercising a purely administrative function for purchasing ballot boxes. c) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists, said power cannot apply to the present case because the matter of purchasing the ballot boxes was already a closed case when the article in question was published. d) Assuming that controversy contemplated by the law was still pending, the article in question was a fair report because it could be assumed that the news report of the respondent was based on the motion for reconsideration filed by the Acme Steel where there was an allegation of fraud, etc. The Commission, after hearing, denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of fifteen (15) days within which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court in view of the issue raised which assails the jurisdiction of the Commission to investigate and punish petitioner for contempt in connection with the alleged publication. Hence the present petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction. The facts which gave rise to the present contemptuous incident are: The Commission on Elections, on May 4, 1957, after proper negotiations, awarded to the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ACME), and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC), the contracts to manufacture and supply the Commission 12,000, 11,000 and 11,000 ballot boxes at P17.64, P14.00, and P17.00 each, respectively. On May 8, 1957, both the NASSCO and the ASIATIC signed with the Commission on Elections the corresponding contracts thereon. On May 13, 1957, the Commission cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of the latter to sign the contract within the designated time and awarded to the NASSCO and the ASIATIC, one-half each, the 11,000 ballot boxes originally alloted to the ACME. The corresponding contracts thereon were signed on May 16, 1957. Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the reconsideration of the resolution of the Commission of May 13, 1957. The first of these petitions was filed on May 14, 1957 which, after hearing, was denied by the Commission in its resolution of May 16, 1957. The second petition was filed on May 16, 1957 and was denied on May 17, 1957. The third petition was filed on May 20, 1957, and because of the seriousness of the grounds alleged therein for the annulment of its previous resolutions, the Commission resolved to conduct a formal investigation on the matter ordering the NASSCO and the ASIATIC to file their respective answers. Thereafter, after these corporations had filed their answers, the Commission held a formal hearing thereon on May 24, 1957. On May 28, 1957, the ACME filed a memorandum on the points adduced during the hearing, and on June 4, 1957, the Commission issued its resolution denying the third motion for reconsideration. The article signed by petitioner was published in the June 2, 1957 issue of the Sunday Times, a newspaper of nation-wide circulation. The question to be determined is whether the Commission on Elections has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings against petitioner with a view to imposing upon him the necessary disciplinary penalty in connection with the publication of an article in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 which, according to the charge, tended to interfere with and influence said Commission in the adjudication of a controversy then pending determination and to degrade and undermine the function of the Commission and its members in the administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The Commission on Elections is an independent administrative body which was established by our Constitution to take charge of the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and devise means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of free, orderly, and honest elections (Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil., 288; Nacionalista Party vs. The Solicitor General, 85 Phil., 101; 47 Off. Gaz. 2356). Its powers are defined in the Constitution. It provides that it "shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials" (Section 2, Article X). The Revised Election Code supplements what other powers may be exercised by said Commission. Among these powers are those embodied in Section 5 thereof which, for ready reference, we quote: SEC. 5. Powers of Commission. The Commission on Elections or any of the members thereof shall have the power to summon the parties to a controversy pending before it, issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and otherwise take testimony in any investigation or hearing pending before it, and delegate such power to any officer. Any controversy submitted to the Commission on Elections shall be tried, heard and decided by it within fifteen days counted from the time the corresponding petition giving rise to said controversy is filed. The Commission or any of the members thereof shall have the power to punish contempts provided for in rule sixty-four of the Rules of Court, under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt of the Commission. Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari accordance with the Rules of Court or with such rules as may be promulgated by the Supreme Court. It would therefore appear that the Commission on Elections not only has the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections but the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. And as an incident of this power, it may also punish for contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. In this sense, the Commission,

although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 13, Article VIII), for it is merely an independent administrative body (The Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil., 126; 47 Off. Gaz. 2375), may however exercise quasi-judicial functions in so far as controversies that by express provision of the law come under its jurisdiction. As to what question may come within this category, neither the Constitution nor the Revised Election Code specifies. The former merely provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction, saving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and other election officials, while the latter is silent as to what questions may be brought it for determination. But it is clear that, to come under its jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in nature and must refer to the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of election. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between a duty which inherently is administrative in character and a function which is justiciable and which would therefore call for judicial action by the Commission. But this much depends upon the factors that may intervene when a controversy should arise. Thus, it has been held that the Commission has no power to annul an election which might not have been free, orderly and honest for such matter devolves upon other agencies of the Government (Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections, 85 Phil., 148; 47 Off. Gaz. 2851); neither does it have the power to decide the validity or invalidity of votes cast in an election for such devolves upon the courts or the electoral tribunals (Ibid.); it does not also have the power to order a recounting of the votes before the proclamation of election even if there are discrepancies in the election returns for it is a function of our courts of justice (Ramos vs. Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722); nor does it have the power to order the correction of a certificate of canvass after a candidate had been proclaimed and assumed office (De Leon vs. Imperial, 94 Phil., 680); and only very recently this Court has held that the Commission has no power to reject a certificate of candidacy except only when its purpose is to create confusion in the minds of the electors (Abcede vs. Imperial, 103 Phil., 136). On the other hand, it has been held that the Commission has the power to annul an illegal registry list of voters (Feliciano, et al. vs. Lugay, et al., 93 Phil., 744; 49 Off. Gaz. 3863); to annul an election canvass made by a municipal board of canvassers (Mintu vs. Enage, et al., G. R. No. L-1834); and to investigate and act on the illegality of a canvass of election made by a municipal board of canvassers (Ramos vs. Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722). And as to what are the ministerial duties which the Commission on Elections must perform in connection with the conduct of elections, the following resume made by the Commission itself in a controversy which was submitted to it for determination is very enlightening: In the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the first duty of the Commission is to set in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of election supplies, printing of election forms and ballots, appointments of members of the boards of inspectors, establishment of precincts and designation of polling places to the preparation of the registry lists of voters, so as to put in readiness on election day the election machinery in order that the people who are legally qualified to exercise the right of suffrage may be able to cast their votes to express their sovereign will. It is incumbent upon the Commission to see that all these preparatory acts will insure free, orderly and honest elections. All provisions of the Revised Election Code contain regulations relative to these processes preparatory for election day. It is incumbent upon the Commission on Elections to see that all these preparatory acts are carried out freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is essential that the Commission or its authorized representatives, in establishing precincts or designating polling places, must act freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is also essential that the printing of election forms and the purchase of election supplies and their distribution are done freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is further essential that the political parties or their duly authorized representatives who are entitled to be represented in the boards of inspectors must have the freedom to choose the person who will represent them in each precinct throughout the country. It is further essential that once organized, the boards of inspectors shall be given all the opportunity to be able to perform their duties in accordance with law freely, honestly and in an orderly manner, individually and as a whole. In other words, it is the duty of the Commission to see that the boards of inspectors, in all their sessions, are placed in an atmosphere whereby they can fulfill their duties without any pressure, influence and interference from any private person or public official. All these preparatory steps are administrative in nature and all questions arising therefrom are within the exclusive powers of the Commission to resolve. All irregularities, anomalies and misconduct committed by any official in these preparatory steps are within the exclusive power of the Commission to correct. Any erring official must respond to the Commission for investigation. Of these preparatory acts, the preparation of the permanent list of voters is the matter involved in this case, which to our mind is completely an administrative matter. (Decision of the Commission on Elections, October 28, 1951, In Re Petition of Angel Genuino vs. Prudente, et al., Case No. 196)1 Considering that the paramount administrative duty of the Commission is to set in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of election supplies, printing of election forms and ballots, appoinments of members of the board of inspectors, appointment of precincts and designation of polling preparation of registry lists of voters, so as to as to put in readiness on election day the election machinery, it may also be reasonably said that the requisitioning and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections is by the same token an imperative ministerial duty which the Commission is bound to perform if the elections are to be held. Such is the incident which gave rise to the contempt case before us. It stems from the ministerial act of the Commission in requisitioning for the necessary ballot boxes in connection with the last elections and in so proceeding it provoked a dispute between several dealers who offered to do the job. Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice" (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U. S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 Off. Gaz. 2570; In Re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony (People vs. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg vs. Decker, 31 N.E. 190; In Re Sims 37 P., 135; Roberts vs. Hacney, 58 S.W., 810). We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the Commission on Elections has no power nor authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge under consideration. Wherefore, petition is granted. Respondent Commission is hereby enjoined from proceeding with the case set forth in its resolution of June 20, 1957, with pronouncement as to costs. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court is made permanent. Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-27392 January 30, 1971 PABLO CATURA and LUZ SALVADOR, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and CELESTINO TABANIAG, et al., respondents. Joselito J. de la Rosa for petitioners. Ernesto Estrella for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.: It is a novel question that presents itself before this Court in this petition for the review of a resolution of respondent Court of Industrial Relations. Specifically, it is whether respondent Court, in the exercise of its power of investigation to assure compliance with the internal labor organization procedures under Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act,1 can require a labor organization's "books of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to [its] finances" be delivered and deposited with it at the hearing to conduct such investigation in accordance with a complaint duly filed without the officials of such labor organization, therein named as respondents and petitioners before us, being heard prior to the issuance of such order. The respondent Court, first acting through Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador and thereafter en banc, upheld its power to do so. The challenge to such competence sought to be fortified by the allegation of the absence of procedural due process was rejected. After a careful study of the matter, we cannot say that thereby respondents Court was in error. We have no reason to reverse. As set forth in the brief for the petitioners, Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, the President and Treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees Association, a legitimate labor organization duly registered, there was, on December 27, 1966, a complaint against them under Section 17 filed by the prosecution division of the respondent Court, the principal complainants being now respondent Celestino Tabaniag as well as other employees constituting more than ten percent of the entire membership of such labor organization. In the complaint, it was charged that during the tenure of office of petitioners before us as such President and Treasurer, they were responsible for "unauthorized disbursement of union funds" with complainants on various occasions during the latter part of 1966 demanding from them "a full and detailed report of all financial transaction of the union and to make the book of accounts and other records of the financial activities of the union open to inspection by the members," only to be met with a refusal on their part to comply. It was further asserted that the executive board of such labor organization passed a resolution calling for a general membership meeting so that petitioners could be confronted about the status of union funds, but then, Pablo Catura, as President, cancelled such meeting.lwph1.t There was thereafter a general membership resolution reiterating previous demands "for a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union," but again there was no response, thus compelling the members to refer the matter to the Department of Labor which duly issued subpoenas for the presentation of such book of accounts to petitioners without any success. After setting forth that complainants had exhausted all remedies provided in the union's constitution and by-laws, which were all unavailing, the complaint sought, after due hearing and judgement, to declare present petitioners, as respondents, guilty of unfair labor practice under the above provision of the Industrial Peace Act, for them to cease and desist from further committing such unfair labor practice complained of, and to render a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union as well as to make the book of accounts and other records of these financial activities open to inspection by the members.2 Thereafter, on December 28, 1966, respondent Celestino Tabaniag and the other members, as petitioners in the above complaint before respondents Court, sought an injunction to prevent now petitioners Pablo Catura who, it turned out, was again elected as President in an election on November 15, 1966, from taking his oath of office in view of his alleged persistence in the abuse of his authority in the disbursement of union funds as well as his refusal to make a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union.3 Then came the order of December 29, 1966, by Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador which, instead of granting the injunction sought, limited itself to requiring and directing "personally the respondents Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, president and treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees' Association, to deliver and deposit to this Court all the said Association's book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to the finances of the said labor union at the hearing of this petition on January 3, 1967 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. Said respondents are hereby required to comply strictly with this Order."4 There was a motion for reconsideration on January 2, 1967 by now petitioners Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador on the ground that they were not heard before such order was issued, which moreover in their opinion was beyond the power of respondent Court. With Associate Judge Ansberto P. Paredes dissenting, the order was sustained in a resolution by the Court en banc on February 28, 1967. Hence the present petition filed on April 3, 1967. The petition was given due course by this Court in a resolution of April 13, 1967 with a preliminary injunction issued upon petitioners' posting a bond of P2,000.00. Respondents did not take the trouble of filing an answer within the period expired on June 17, 1967 and petitioners were required to submit their brief within thirty days under this Court's resolution of July 14, 1967. Such a brief was duly filed on September 19 of that year. There was no brief for respondents. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision on October 4, 1968. In the light of the interpretation to be accorded the applicable legal provisions and after a careful consideration of the contention that such a power to issue the challenged order cannot be deemed as possessed by respondent Court which moreover did not accord petitioners procedural due process, we have reached the conclusion, as set forth at the opening of this opinion, that petitioners cannot prevail. The order as issued first by Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador and thereafter by respondent Court en banc must be sustained. 1. The controlling provisions of law to the specific situation before this Court concerning the power of investigation of respondent Court to assure compliance with internal labor organization procedures with the corresponding authority to investigate to substantiate alleged violations may be found in paragraphs (b), (h), and (l) of the aforecited Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act. Thus: "The members shall be entitled to full and detailed reports from their officers and representatives of all financial transactions as provided in the constitution and by-laws of the organization."5 ... "The funds of the organization shall not be applied for any purpose or object other than those expressly stated in its constitution or by-laws or those expressly authorized by a resolution of the majority of the member." 6 ... "The books of accounts and other records of the financial activities of a legitimate labor organization shall be open to inspection by any officer or member thereof."7 To repeat, the complaint before respondent Court against petitioners as President and Treasurer of the union, specifically

recited an unauthorized disbursement of union funds as well as the failure to make a full and detailed report of financial transactions of the union and to make the book of accounts and other records of its financial activities open to inspection by the members. Clearly, the matter was deemed serious enough by the prosecutor of respondent Court to call for the exercise of the statutory power of investigation to substantiate the alleged violation so as to assure that the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization as specifically set forth in Section 17 be respected. All that the challenged order did was to require petitioners, as President and Treasurer of the labor organization, to "deliver and deposit" with respondent Court all of its book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to its finances at the hearing of the petition before it on January 3, 1967. On its face, it cannot be said that such a requirement is beyond the statutory power conferred. If it were otherwise, the specific provisions of law allegedly violated may not be effectively complied with. The authority to investigate might be rendered futile if respondent Court could be held as having acted contrary to law. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very least, requires an inquiry into existing facts and conditions. The documents required to be produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether or not there was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law. It is not for this Court to whittle down the authority conferred on administrative agencies to assure the effective administration of a statute, in this case intended to protect the rights of union members against its officers. The matter was properly within its cognizance and the means necessary to give it force and effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the power sought to be exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of petitioners entitled to priority. No such showing has been made; no such showing can be made. To repeat, there should be no question about the correctness of the order herein challenged. 2. Nor is the validity of the order in question to be impugned by the allegation that there was a denial of procedural due process. If the books and records sought to be delivered and deposited in court for examination were the private property of petitioners, perhaps the allegation of the absence of due process would not be entirely lacking in plausibility. Such is not the case however. The pertinent section of the Industrial Peace Act makes clear that such books of accounts and other records of the financial activities are open to inspection by any member of a labor organization. For the court to require their submission at the hearing of the petition is, as above noted, beyond question, and no useful purpose would be served by first hearing petitioners before an order to that effect can be issued. Moreover, since as was shown in the very brief of petitioners, there was a motion for reconsideration, the absence of any hearing, even if on the assumption purely for argument's sake that there was such a requirement, has no cured. So it was held by this Court in a recent decision. Thus: "As far back as 1935, it has already been a settled doctrine that a plea of denial of procedural due process does not lie where a defect consisting of an absence of notice of hearing was thereafter cured by the alleged aggrieved party having had the opportunity to be heard on a motion for reconsideration. 'What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.' There is then no occasion to impute deprivation of property without due process where the adverse party was heard on a motion for reconsideration constituting as it does 'sufficient opportunity' for him to inform the Tribunal concerned of his side of the controversy. As was stated in a recent decision, what 'due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness and what it requires is fairness or justice, the substance rather than the form being paramount,' the conclusion being that the hearing on a motion for reconsideration meets the strict requirement of due process."8 WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied. The writ of preliminary injunction issued under the resolution of April 13, 1967 is dissolved and declared to be without any further force or effect. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. G.R. No. L-36385 July 25, 1979 ARCADIO R. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. HON. AMADO INCIONG, as Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission and DOMINGO CINCO, respondents. Pedro N. Belmi for petitioner. Porfirio E. Villanueva & Julio F. Andres, Jr. for the Public respondent. Domingo Cinco for himself as private respondent.

FERNANDO, C.J.:1wph1.t The facts of this suit for prohibition with preliminary injunction speak for themselves. They demonstrate beyond doubt that the remedy prayed for must be granted. This litigation started with private respondent Domingo Cinco filing a verified complaint on December 12, 1972 with the then National Labor Relations Commission, charging petitioner Arcadio R. Tolentino with violating the constitution of the Batangas Labor Union by refusing, as its president, to call for the election of officers in the month of November, 1972, and praying that such election be conducted immediately. 1 Upon receipt of such verified complaint on January 9, 1973, petitioner on the same date sent an urgent telegram to the respondent National Labor Relations Commission for the cancellation of the hearing of such complaint set for January 12, 1973 as he had to appear on that very day before the then Court of Industrial Relations, a formal motion to such effect being filed on January 11, 1973. 2 Petitioner was not informed of the action taken on such motion; instead, he was notified that on January 30, 1973, respondent National Labor Relations Commission issued an order directing the Batangas Labor Union "to hold its election of officers within twenty (20) days from receipt" thereof "in accordance with its constitution and by-laws under the supervision of the Registrar of Labor Relations who shall thereafter report the result to the said respondent National Labor Relations Commission." 3 Petitioner received on February 5, 1973 a copy of such order and on February 8, 1973, filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that as the Batangas Labor Union, which has a separate and distinct personality from the herein' petitioner was not a party in the case before respondent Commission, the due process guarantee was not observed in the issuance thereof and that the subject matter of such complaint is not one of those enumerated under the Rules of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission. 4 As such motion for reconsideration was not acted upon despite repeated requests, petitioner filed a notice of appeal on February 20, 1973 with the Secretary of Labor, praying at the same time that the pre-election conference set on February 22, 1973 and the election scheduled for March 3, 1973 be suspended in the meanwhile. 5 Respondent National Labor Relations Commission, thru its then Chairman, Amado G. Inciong, informed the herein petitioner that the elections of officers of the Batangas Labor Union would proceed as scheduled on March 3, 1973, and, as a matter of fact, notices of the said elections for March 3, 1979 were posted in different places within the premises of the Central Azucarera Don Pedro Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas. the place of employment. 6 Subsequently, on February 26, 1973, the Batangas Labor Union filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Batangas,

Branch No. VII, Balayan, Batangas, docketed as Civil Case No. 942 for prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction, against the respondent Domingo Cinco and the National Labor Relations Commission and the Secretary of Labor, seeking to annul the order of January 30, 1973 and to prohibit the respondent National Labor Relations Commission and the Secretary of Labor from enforcing it. 7 The court of first instance then presided by Judge Jaime delos Angeles, now retired, did not grant the writ of preliminary injunction ex parte as prayed for in the petition but instead set the application thereof for hearing on March 1, 1973 with due notice to all the parties, with neither the Commission nor the then Secretary of Labor appearing through counsel, although petitioner did. 8 After such hearing, Judge Jaime delos Angeles reserved his resolution on the matter at issue in view of the intricate legal questions raised therein. 9 On the same date, shortly before noon and within the court premises, petitioner was served with a copy of a subpoena dated February 28, 1973 issued by respondent Amado Inciong, Chairman of the then National Labor Relations Commission, requiring him to appear at the National Labor Relations Commission, Department of Labor, 3rd Floor, Phoenix Building, Intramuros, Manila, on March 2, 1973, at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to explain why he should not be held in contempt for trying to use old society tactics to prevent a union election duly ordered by the Commission under Presidential Decree 21 and, with Judge Jaime delos Angeles, at the same time and date, more or less, being served with a copy of the subpoena also requiring him to appear likewise before the respondent National Labor Relations Commission, to explain why he should not be held in contempt for trying to use old society tactics to prevent a union election duly ordered by the Commission under the aforesaid Presidential Decree 21. 10 The case was filed on. March 2, 1973 and on March 6, 1973, this Court issued this resolution: "Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction, the Court Resolved: (a) to require the respondents to file an [answer] thereto within ten (10) days from notice hereof, and not to move to dismiss the petition; and (b) to have a [temporary restraining order issued], effective immediately until further orders from this Court." 11 There was a letter from respondent Inciong dated March 14, 1973, received in the Supreme Court on March 15 which, to say the least, is impressed with unorthodoxy. It reads in fun as follows: "This refers to your summons in connection with G. R. No. L-3638.5 requiring me to file an answer to the petition for prohibition of the preliminary injunction within ten (10) days from notice. First of all the issue is not [sic] academic since we do not intend to continue with the contempt proceedings against petitioner Arcadio Tolentino. The union election has been held in accordance with our order and the winner duly proclaimed. Second, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over us. Enclosed is a copy of Presidential Decree 21 for your information and guidance. Third, under the New Society, we are evolving a de-legalized labor management system in this country, and we expect the fullest cooperation of the Supreme Court in this endeavor." 12 Accordingly, the Supreme Court, in March 22, 1973, took him to task in this resolution: "Considering the letter of Chairman Amado G. Inciong of the National Labor Relations Commission, filed with reference to the resolution of March 6, 1973, requiring the respondents to answer the petition herein, stating in chief that the issue evolved in this case is now academic and that the Court has no jurisdiction over the Commission in view of the Presidential Decree No. 21, the Court Resolved: (a) to [expunge] said letter from the records of this case; and (b) to require said respondent to [comply] with this Court's resolution of March 6, 1973, within five (5) days from notice hereof. Let the Secretary of Labor be [furnished] with a copy of the letter of Chairman Amado Inciong and the resolution of March 6, 1973." 13 An answer was filed on April 2, 1973, counsel for respondent Inciong reiterating that the case had become moot and academic as he had no intention of enforcing the contempt citation and alleging that the power to punish for contempt was provided for under Sections 7 and 10 of Presidential Decree No. 21. 14 Both petitioner and respondents were required to submit their respective memoranda, but as neither did so, the case was deemed submitted for decision. As set forth at the outset, prohibition lies. 1. Ordinarily, the plea that a case had become moot and academic would be granted. Had respondent Inciong made clear that he would quash the contempt citation, then this litigation could have been terminated. Instead, what was set forth by him in the letter had to be expunged, not so much because of its offensive tone but much more so by its lack of appreciation for what the law ordains. There was no retreat from his indefensible position. All that was alleged was that he would not enforce the contempt citation. The answer filed by him was of the same tenor. It is understandable then why this Court in the resolution above-cited, as wen as in the resolution requiring that memoranda be submitted by the parties, was of the belief that the legal issues presented should be decided. 2. We start with a fundamental postulate. As set forth in Villegas v. Subido: 15 "Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the State is express and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. What they do suffers from a fatal infirmity. That principle cannot be sufficiently stressed. ... Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid." 16 The undeniable concern of respondent Inciong that the objectives of Presidential Decree No. 21 be attained thus afforded no warrant for exercising a power not conferred by such decree. He ought to have known that the competence, "to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply" 17 certainly cannot extend to a judge of the court of first instance. Correctly construed, it cannot cover the case likewise of a party to a controversy who took the necessary steps to avail himself of a judicial remedy. It must ever be borne in mind by an administrative official that courts exist precisely to assure that there be compliance with the law. That is the very essence of a judicial power. So the rule of law requires. It is true that courts, like any other governmental agencies, must observe the limits of its jurisdiction. In this particular case, it is admitted that the then Judge Jaime delos Angeles, after hearing the arguments on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, reserved his resolution in view of the intricacies of the legal questions raised. 18 The proper step for an administrative official then is to seek a dismissal of the case before the court precisely on the ground that the matter did not fall within the domain of the powers conferred on it. Instead, respondent Inciong took the precipitate step of citing him for contempt. That was an affront to reason as well as a disregard of well-settled rules. Neither was there any contumacious act committed by petitioner in seeking judicial remedy. It would be a reproach to any legal system if an individual is denied access to the courts under these circumstances. The resort of respondent Inciong to what has been derisively referred to as epithetical jurisprudence, seeking shelter in the opprobrious term "old society tactics," is an implied admission of his actuation being devoid of support in law. As was so well stated by Chief Justice Hughes: "It must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute." 19 3. WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is granted and the assailed order of February 28, 1973, citing the then Judge Jaime delos Angeles, as well as petitioner Arcadio R. Tolentino for contempt, declared void and of no force or effect, both orders having been issued beyond the power of respondent Amado Inciong to issue. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 6, 1973 is hereby made permanent. Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.1wph1.t Santos and Abad Santos, JJ., are on leave. G.R. No. L-10280 September 30, 1963

QUA CHEE GAN, JAMES UY, DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU, CUA CHU TIAN, CHUA LIM PAO alias JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING, petitioners-appellants, vs. THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellee. Sabido and Sabido Law Offices and Ramon T. Oben for petitioners-appellants. Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.

BARRERA, J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Sp. Proc. No. 20037) denying the petition for writs of habeas corpus and/or prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus filed by Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are as follows:. On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged the above-named petitioners before the Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of having clandestinely remitted the same to Hongkong and petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King, with having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and United States Governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, and Capt. A. P. Charak of the OSI, U.S. Air Force) in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of U.S. dollars.1 Following the filing of said deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by the presiding member of the Deportation Board. Upon their filing surety bond for P10,000.00 and cash bond for P10,000.00, herein petitioners-appellants were provisionally set at liberty. On September 22, 1952, petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges presented against them in the Deportation Board for the reason, among others, that the same do not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens from this country, and that said Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. This motion to dismiss having been denied by order of the Board of February 9, 1953, petitioners-appellants filed in this Court a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition, which petition was given due course in our resolution of July 7, 1953, but made returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila (G.R. No. L-6783). The case was docketed in the lower court as Special Proceeding No. 20037. At the instance of petitioners and upon their filing a bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the respondent Deportation Board from hearing Deportation charges No. R-425 against petitioners, pending final termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings. On July 29, 1953, the respondent Board filed its answer to the original petition, maintaining among others, that the Deportation Board, as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners and the authority to order their arrest; and that, while petitioner Qua Chee Gan was acquitted of the offense of attempted bribery of a public official, he was found in the same decision of the trial court that he did actually offer money to an officer of the United States Air Force in order that the latter may abstain from assisting the Central Bank official in the investigation of the purchase of $130,000.00 from the Clark Air Force Base, wherein said petitioner was involved. After due trial, the court rendered a decision on January 18, 1956, upholding the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State. The court, likewise, sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation of charges against him, on the theory that the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Consequently, the petitioners instituted the present appeal. . It may be pointed out at the outset that after they were provisionally released on bail, but before the charges filed against them were actually investigated, petitioners-appellant raised the question of jurisdiction of the Deportation Board, first before said body, then in the Court of First Instance, and now before us. Petitioners-appellants contest the power of the President to deport aliens and, consequently, the delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary power to investigate, on the ground that such power is vested in the Legislature. In other words, it is claimed, for the power to deport to be exercised, there must be a legislation authorizing the same. Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940), the Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefor (Sec- 37). With the enactment of this law, however, the legislature did not intend to delimit or concentrate the exercise of the power to deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone, because in its Section 52, it provides:. SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation therefrom, with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twentyseven hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613). Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code) referred to above reads:. SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses." While it may really be contended that the aforequoted provision did not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of Immigration under Commonwealth Act No. 613, but merely lays down the procedure to be observed should there be deportation proceedings, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport an alien-which provision was expressly declared exempted from the repealing effect of the Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. And the, exercise of this power by the chief Executive has been sanctioned by

this Court in several decisions.2 Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. Petitioners contend, however, that even granting that the President is invested with power to deport, still he may do so only upon the grounds enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, and on no other, as it would be unreasonable and undemocratic to hold that an alien may be deported upon an unstated or undefined ground depending merely on the unlimited discretion of the Chief Executive. This contention is not without merit, considering that whenever the legislature believes a certain act or conduct to be a just cause for deportation, it invariably enacts a law to that effect. Thus, in a number of amendatory acts, grounds have been added to those originally contained in Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as justifying deportation of an alien, as well as other laws which provide deportation as part of the penalty imposed on aliens committing violation thereof. Be this as it may, the charges against the herein petitioners constitute in effect an act of profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations an economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The President may therefore order the deportation of these petitioners if after investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged. There seems to be no doubt that the President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is clear from a reading of Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a "prior investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent." The first executive order on the subject was that of Governor General Frank Murphy (No. 494, July 26, 1934), constituting a board to take action on complaints against foreigners, to conduct investigations and thereafter make recommendations. By virtue of Executive Order No. 33 dated May 29, 1936, President Quezon created the Deportation Board primarily to receive complaints against aliens charged to be undesirable, to conduct investigation pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and the rules and regulations therein provided, and make the corresponding recommendation. 3 Since then, the Deportation Board has been conducting the investigation as the authorized agent of the President. This gives rise to the question regarding the extent of the power of the President to conduct investigation, i.e., whether such authority carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of, since the Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it does, whether the same may be delegated to the respondent Deportation Board.1awphl.nt Let it be noted that Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, unlike Commonwealth Act No. 613 wherein the Commissioner of Immigration was specifically granted authority, among others, to make arrests, fails to provide the President with like specific power to be exercised in connection with such investigation. It must be for this reason that President Roxas for the first time, saw it necessary to issue his Executive Order No. 69, dated July 29, 1947, providing For the purpose of insuring the appearance of aliens charged before the Deportation Board created under Executive Order No. 37, dated January 4, 1947, and facilitating the execution of the order of deportation whenever the President decides the case against the respondent. I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order that all respondents in deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the Commissioner of Immigration in such amount and containing such conditions as he may prescribe. . xxx xxx xxx

Note that the executive order only required the filing of a bond to secure appearance of the alien under investigation. It did not authorize the arrest of the respondent. It was only on January 5, 1951, when President Quirino reorganized the Deportation Board by virtue of his Executive Order No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the filing of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release in such amount and under such conditions as may be prescribed by the Chairman of the Board. As has been pointed out elsewhere, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority the President's power to deport is predicated, does not provide for the exercise of the power to arrest. But the Solicitor General argues that the law could not have denied to the Chief Executive acts which are absolutely necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation granted him, such as the authority to order the arrest of the foreigner charged as undesirable. In this connection, it must be remembered that the right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by the Constitution in the following language:. 3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution). As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion in the case of Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al. (65 Phil. 230, 239), this provision is not the same as that contained in the Jones Law wherein this guarantee is placed among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. Furthermore, a notable innovation in this guarantee is found in our Constitution in that it specifically provides that the probable cause upon which a warrant of arrest may be issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under oath, etc., of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. This requirement "to be determined by the judge" is not found in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, in the Philippine Bill or in the Jones Act, all of which do not specify who will determine the existence of a probable cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation,

either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt. The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas. Be that as it may, it is not imperative for us to rule, in this proceeding - and nothing herein said is intended to so decide on whether or not the President himself can order the arrest of a foreigner for purposes of investigation only, and before a definitive order of deportation has been issued. We are merely called upon to resolve herein whether, conceding without deciding that the President can personally order the arrest of the alien complained of, such power can be delegated by him to the Deportation Board. Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the Constitution itself, as well as the statute relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of the existence of which requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the same. In other words, the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would serve the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so, then guarantee a delegation of that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberty of the people. The guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation. We are not unaware of the statements made by this Court in the case of Tan Sin v. Deportation Board (G.R. No. L-11511, Nov. 28,1958). It may be stated, however, that the power of arrest was not squarely raised in that proceeding, but only as a consequence of therein petitioner's proposition that the President had no inherent power to deport and that the charges filed against him did not constitute ground for deportation. . IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered. Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur. Bengzon, C.J., reserved his vote. Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part. G.R. No. L-24576 July 29, 1968

MARTINIANO P. VIVO, as Acting Commissioner of Immigration, BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Bureau of Immigration and DEPORTATION OFFICER, Bureau of Immigration, petitioners, vs. HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIX, JOSE CALACDAY, ET AL., respondents. Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners. Edgardo R. Hojilla for respondents. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the order of 27 May 1965 of the respondent Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 60906, which enjoined the above-named immigration officers from arresting and detaining, with a view to deporting the herein private respondents. The private respondents Juan, Pedro, Julio, Marcelo, Jose, Manuel and Benito, all surnamed "Calacday" arrived in the Philippines from Hongkong, the first four on 18 November 1959, and the last three on 6 December 1959. Upon their arrival they sought admission as Filipino citizens. After investigation, a board of special inquiry, in its decisions of 7 and 11 December 1959, found them to be the legitimate sons of a Filipino citizen, one Isaac Calacday, and thus admitted them into this country. The Bureau of Immigration then issued to each of them an identification certificate as a Filipino citizen, with the notation that their admission as such was by a decision of the board of special inquiry, duly affirmed by the Board of Commissioners. Sometime in February, 1963, however, Isaac Calacday confessed before an immigration official that the seven respondents were not his sons (Petition, page 4, paragraph 4; Annex "C" to Petition, page 2; Annex "I" to Answer; Respondent's Manifestation, 29 November 1965, page 4). He retracted his confession in March, 1963, in an investigation in the Department of Justice, with the explanation that, in a fit of anger, he disclaimed, under oath, paternity of the respondents because they refused to give him money (Annex "I" to Answer). On 9 May 1963, Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano Vivo issued warrants of arrest against the herein private respondents, stating in said warrants their deportability under Section 37 (a) (1) and Section 37 (a) (2) in relation to Section 29(a) (17) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, for having entered the Philippines "by means of false and misleading statements and that they were not lawfully admissible at the time of entry, not being properly documented for admission." The warrants directed any immigration office or officer of the law to bring the respondents before the Commissioner, for them to show cause, if any there be, why they should not be deported (Annexes "B-1" and "B-2" to Petition). Manuel Calacday was subsequently arrested. The others remained at large. On 26 April 1965, the respondents filed before the respondent court a petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 60906, praying for three principal reliefs, namely: to restrain the arrest of those petitioners who have not been arrested; to release Manuel Calacday who had been arrested; and to prohibit the deportation of all the petitioners, all upon the claim that they are Filipino

citizens. Respondent Commissioner of Immigration questioned the propriety of the remedy of prohibition, and insisted that habeas corpus is the proper one, but the respondent court invoked its general jurisdiction, which includes certiorari and prohibition, on the ground that habeas corpus would be proper only to the one already arrested but not to those not yet arrested. On 27 May 1965, the respondent court, resolving the issue only of "whether the respondent Acting Commissioner of Immigration (therein petitioner) can summarily order the arrest and deportation of the petitioners (therein respondents) ..., without giving them a chance to be heard as Filipino citizens", and relying on the case of Commissioner of Immigration vs. Fernandez, et al., L-22696, 29 May 1964, issued the order, now being questioned before this Court, the dispositive part of which states: . IN VIEW THEREOF, the Court finds, the motion to be well-founded, and so hereby orders that the writ of preliminary injunction issued (sic) during the pendency of this action, enjoining the respondents from arresting and detaining the petitioners herein, with a view to their deportation, upon the filing by the petitioners of a bond in the amount of P10,000 each, to answer for whatever damages may be sustained by the respondents as a result of the issuance of the said writ. In the meantime, the respondents are hereby ordered to release Manuel Calacday and any other of them who may now be detained by virtue of the order of arrest issued by the respondents, within 48 hours after the filing of the said bond to guarantee their appearance here and at the investigation of their case by the Board of Immigration. We agree with petitioning Commissioner that the court below is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of respondents Calacdays.These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the Immigration authorities under Sections 28 and 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act (C.A. No. 613). That jurisdiction is not tolled by a claim of Filipino citizenship, where the Commissioner or Commissioners have reliable evidence to the contrary; and said officers should be given opportunity to determine the issue of citizenship before the courts interfere in the exercise of the power of judicial review of administrative decisions. We have so ruled in Porta Perez, et al. vs. Board of Special Inquiry, L-9236, 29 May 1956, wherein we said: . The respondents impugn petitioners' claim to Philippine citizenship on the strength of a sworn Statement of Tecla Socella, supposed mother of the petitioner Melanio Porta Perez as given in the birth certificate presented by him to the immigration authorities to the effect that the said birth certificate refers not to the said petitioner but to one Melanio Perez now living in Pagbilao, Quezon Province. And there being thus substantial evidence that petitioners are not Filipino citizens but are Chinese nationals who have gained entry into this country through false representations, the respondents by way of special defense, contend that the present action is premature, and urge that they be allowed to proceed with their investigation until they shall have finally determined whether petitioners are or are not Filipino citizens, or are or are not subject to deportation. We find merit in this contention. The present case is not one where the Philippine citizenship of the persons threatened with deportation is admitted or conclusively appears, there being reliable evidence that herein petitioners are aliens who have succeeded in gaining entry into this country through false representations. In line with the views expressed by this Court in the case of Federico M. Chua Hiong v. The Deportation Board, G.R. No. L- 6038, March 19, 1955, we think it would be in the sound judicial discretion to allow the respondents to continue the proceedings already begun by them until they have determined whether or not the petitioners are aliens. Their decision on the question is, of course, not final but subject to review by the courts.". And in Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531, 533, this Court said: .1wph1.t While the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board as an instrument of the Chief Executive to deport undesirable aliens exists only when the person arrested is an alien, however, the mere plea of citizenship does not divest the Board of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners should make "a showing that his claim is frivolous" (Ng Fung Ho vs. White, 259 U.S., 275), and must prove by sufficient evidence that they are Filipino citizens. [Kessler vs. Strecker (1939) 307 U.S., 21, 35-36.] If such is the primary duty of petitioners, it follows that the Deportation Board has the necessary power to pass upon the evidence that may be presented and determine in the first instance if petitioners are Filipino citizens or not. This is inherent-in, or essential to the efficient exercise of, the power of the Deportation Board (Laurencio vs.Collector of Customs, 35 Phil., 37). It is not therefore correct to state that the question of citizenship should be determined exclusively by the court, As this Court ruled in a recent case: . Resuelto por la Junta que tiene jurisdiccion, es obvio que debe proseguir con el caso hasta su terminacion. Si la Junta halla infundados los cargos de indeseabilidad del recurrente, el caso habra terminado totalmente, pero si la halla indeseable, puede apelar contra el fallo, y si la apelacion fracasa, entonces sera el tiempo de considerar si demonstrando causa razonable debe haber un juicio ulterior sobre la ciudadania Filipina que alega mediante habeas corpus." (Llanco vs. The Deportation Board, G.R. No. L-6272, prom. February 22, 1954.) It is well to note here that when the petition for certiorari and prohibition (the respondent judge considered it as such) was filed, deportation proceedings had been started against the respondents (petitioners below) but had not been completed. In view of the non-completion of the proceedings, the Board of Commissioners has not rendered as yet any decision. The respondents Calacdays, therefore, are not being deported. Before the Board reaches a decision, it has to conduct a hearing where the main issue will be the citizenship or alienage of the respondents. Therefore, there is nothing so far for the courts to review. It is clear from the order complained of that the court below misapprehended the import of the warrants issued by the Commissioner herein. Said warrants required the respondents to be brought to the immigration authorities, not to be deported, but "to show cause, if any there be, why he should not be deported from the Philippines", as expressly recited therein. There was no case of "summarily arresting and deporting" the respondents Calacdays, as unwarrantedly assumed by the court below. The Calacdays have alluded in this Court to certain documents in support of their claim to Philippine citizenship. The proper procedure is for said respondents to appear before the Immigration officials and there submit these documents as evidence on their part to show cause why they should not be deported. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that, the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioners of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1, of Article III (Bill of Rights) of our Constitution, providing: . 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable, searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. It will be noted that the power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited by the Philippine Constitution to judge exclusively, unlike in previous organic laws and the Federal Constitution of the United States that left undetermined

which public officials could determine the existence of probable cause. And in Qua Chee Gan, et al. vs. Deportation Board, L20280, promulgated on September 30 1963, this Court pointed out that Executive Order No. 69, of July 29, 1947, issued by President Roxas, in prescribing the procedure for deportation of aliens, only required the filing of a bond by an alien under investigation, but did not authorize his arrest. Discussing the implications of the provision of our Bill of Rights on the issuance of administrative warrants of arrest, this Court said in the same case: . xxx xxx x x x1wph1.t

Under the express terms of our Constitution it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt. The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It s enough, as was true before the executive order of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas. Following the same trend of thought, this Court, in Morano vs. Vivo (L-22196, 30 June 1967, 20 SCRA, 562; Phil. 1967-B, page 741), distinguished between administrative arrest, in the execution of a final deportation order and arrest as preliminary to further administrative proceedings. The Court remarked in said case: Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power 1 as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation. We see no reason why the cautionary bond requirement of the 1947 Executive Order No. 69 of President Roxas should not apply to deportation proceedings initiated by the Immigration Commissioners, considering the identity of ends sought to be served. Such notice and bonds should suffice to ensure the subject's appearance at the hearings without prejudice to more drastic measures in case of recalcitrant respondents. But as long as the illegal entry or offense of the respondents Calacdays has not yet been established and their expulsion finally decided upon, their arrest upon administrative warrant violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights. The constitutional guarantees of individual liberty must be liberally construed and applied if we are to enjoy the blessings of a regime of justice, liberty and democracy that the Philippine Constitution sought to secure and consolidate. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writ prayed for is hereby granted, the order issued in Civil Case No. 60906 of the Court of First Instance of Manila is set aside, and the proceedings ordered discontinued. But the warrants of arrest heretofore issued by the petitioner, Immigration Commissioner, against herein respondents Calacdays are declared null and void, without prejudice to said respondents being required to furnish bonds in such reasonable sums as the Immigration Commissioners may fix, in order to guarantee their appearance at the hearings and other proceedings in their case, until final determination of their right to stay in the Philippines. No costs. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur. G.R. No. L-25694 November 29, 1976 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, LUCIO SANTOS, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellant. Solicitor General Antonio Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for appellant. Sta. Ana and Mariano for appellee.

FERNANDO, J: The ruling in Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board 1 is decisive of this appeal filed by the respondent Commissioner of Immigration from an order of the lower court in a habeas corpus proceeding to release petitioner Lucio Santos. Respondent official could order the arrest of an alien only after "there is already an order of deportation." 2 Such was not the case here as admitted in the brief of respondent. The application for habeas corpus was filed by petitioner, who was detained under a warrant of arrest issued by respondent on the ground of his being a Chinese citizen who entered the country illegally. The assertion that he was an alien was denied by him in his petition. Then as set forth in the brief of respondent: "On January 18, 1966, the lower Court issued a writ of habeas corpus commanding the Commissioner of Immigration to produce before it on January 19, 1966 at 8:30 A.M. the person of Lucio Santos; to explain under what circumstances he was arrested and is being detained; and to show cause why he should not be set at liberty, * * * On the scheduled day, respondent Commissioner asked the lower Court for three days within which to submit his written return. The lower Court granted his request and the hearing was set anew for January 25, 1966 at 8:30 A.M. * * * On January 21, 1966, respondent official filed his return to the write of habeas corpus. He stated that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen but a Chinese subject whose real name is Ong Hiong King; that petitioner illegally entered this country from Hongkong and was detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration; that deportation proceedings against petitioner were pending hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry; that petitioner had confessed that he was an illegal entrant to this country; that based on his own application for registration with the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkong for documentation as a Filipino, it is evident that petitioner is a Chinese because, even if he was born of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, his election of Filipino citizenship was made much too late and thus he was in estoppel to claim or elect Filipino citizenship; that the lower Court is without jurisdiction

because the subject matter of the action the deportation of petitioner is vested by law upon the Board of Commissioners after due hearing and determination of the existence of grounds for deportation; and that petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies * * *." 3 The lower court, however, without passing on the question of citizenship, ordered the release of petitioner upon posting a bond of P5,000 to insure his appearance at the deportation hearing when ordered to do so. This order was appealed to this Court. It appears clear, therefore, that at the time of the challenged order, the deportation proceeding was still pending. Moreover, the release was provisional. The crucial facts as thus noted would render clear that the appeal cannot prosper. The Que Chee Gan ruling speaks too clearly to be misunderstood. 1. The question that had to be decided in Qua Chee Gan, according to the ponente, Justice Barrera, was whether the power of the President to conduct an investigation leading to deportation carries with it the authority to order an arrest. It was answered in the negative. Thus: "Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt. The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested." 4 2. It should not escape attention that under the present Constitution, a warrant of arrest may issue on a showing of "probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, * * *." 5 This case, however, is governed by the former Constitution. The conclusion reached by the lower court, therefore, finds support in Qua Chee Gan We cannot set it aside. WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated February 5, 1966 is affirmed. No costs. Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur. Barredo, J, took no part. G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: A petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively, are both American nationals residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna, while Adriaan Van Elshout, 58 years old, is a Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna. The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners on 27 February 1988 from their respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID. Petitioners are presently detained at the CID Detention Center. Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Two (2) days after apprehension, or on 29 February 1988, seventeen (17) of the twenty-two (22) arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the country. One was released for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid working visa. Thus, of the original twenty two (22), only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation. Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes. The "Operation Report," on Andrew Harvey and Richard Sherman dated 29 February 1988 stated: xxx xxx xxx ANDREW MARK HARVEY was found together with two young boys. RICHARD SHERMAN was found with two naked boys inside his room. In respect of Van Den Elshout the "After Mission Report," dated 27 February 1988 read in part: Noted: There were two (2) children ages 14 & 16 which subject readily accepted having been in his care and live-in for quite sometime. On 4 March 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code (Deportation Case No. 88-13). The "Charge Sheet" read inter alia: Wherefore, this Office charges the respondents for deportation, as undesirable aliens, in that: they, being pedophiles, are

inimical to public morals, public health and public safety as provided in Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. On 7 March 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code On the same date, the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners. On 14 March 1988, petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond alleging that their health was being seriously affected by their continuous detention. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their provisional release, respondent ordered the CID doctor to examine petitioners, who certified that petitioners were healthy. On 22 March 1988, petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which, however, respondent denied considering the certification by the CID physician that petitioners were healthy. To avoid congestion, respondent ordered petitioners' transfer to the CID detention cell at Fort Bonifacio, but the transfer was deferred pending trial due to the difficulty of transporting them to and from the CID where trial was on-going. On 4 April 1988 petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country." On 7 April 1988, the Board of Special Inquiry III allowed provisional release of five (5) days only under certain conditions. However, it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present petition. On 4 April 1988, as heretofore stated, petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Return of the Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. A Traverse to the Writ was presented by petitioners to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor General. Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following grounds: 1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation. 2) Respondent violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision. 3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. They further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile. We reject petitioners' contentions and uphold respondent's official acts ably defended by the Solicitor General. There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not (Moncado vs. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1 [1948]. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof." (People vs. Syjuco 64 Phil. 667 [1937]; Alverez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 [1937]). The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section 5). In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant (See Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, February 28, 1968,22 SCRA 857; People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, L-41686, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 86, cited in CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1987 ed., p. 143). Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence (Section 12, Rule 126,1985 Rules on criminal Procedure). But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7 March 1988 "for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Administrative Code." A hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has served its purpose. The process of the law is being followed (Cruz vs. Montoya, L39823, February 25, 1975, 62 SCRA 543). "were a person's detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee, his petition for hebeas corpus becomes moot and academic" (Beltran vs. Garcia, L-49014, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 717). "It is a fumdamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning" (Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 1050 [1947]). That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion involving children" (Kraft-Ebbing Psychopatia Sexualis p. 555; Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children are the preferred sexual object" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665) [Solicitor General's Return of the Writ, on p. 101. While not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution). At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity (Callanta v. Villanueva, L-24646 & L-24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, L-61770, January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA 525). The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part: (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other

officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien; xxx xxx xxx The foregoing provision should be construed in its entirety in view of the summary and indivisible nature of a deportation proceeding, otherwise, the very purpose of deportation proceeding would be defeated. Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562). The specific constraints in both the 1935 1 and 1987 2 Constitutions, which are substantially Identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action. The order of deportation is not a punishment, (Maliler vs. Eby, 264 U.S., 32), it being merely the return to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders (U.S. vs. De los Santos, 33 Phil., 397). The deportation proceedings are administrative in character, (Kessler vs. Stracker 307 U.S., 22) summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings (Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155). It is essential, however, that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the charges against him, relating the facts relied upon. (U.S. vs. Uhl 211 F., 628.) It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unprejudiced investigators (Strench vs. Pedaris, 55 F. [2d], 597; Ex parte Jew You On, 16 F. [2d], 153). However, all the strict rules of evidence governing judicial controversies do not need to be observed; only such as are fumdamental and essential like the right of cross-examination. (U.S. vs. Hughes, 104 F. [2d], 14; Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155.) Hearsay evidence may even be admitted, provided the alien is given the opportunity to explain or rebut it (Morrell vs. Baker, 270 F., 577; Sercerchi vs. Ward, 27 F. Supp., 437). (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]). The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G. R. No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that "the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section I of Article III of the Constitution" (referring to the 1935 Constitution) 3 is not invocable herein. Respondent Commissioner's Warrant of Arrest issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be deported. They were issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code." Before that, deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation. Section 37 of the Immigration Law, which empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of overstaying aliens is constitutional. The arrest is a stop preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated the condition of their stay in this country. (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562). To rule otherwise would be to render the authority given the Commissioner nugatory to the detriment of the State. The pertinent provision of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, which gives authority to the Commissioner of Immigration to order the arrest of an alien temporary visitor preparatory to his deportation for failure to put up new bonds required for the stay, is not unconstitutional. xxx xxx xxx ... Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for his deportation under Section 37[al of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State. (Ng Hua To vs. Galang, G. R. No. 10145, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 411). "The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings." (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceedings. The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (G. R. No. 10280, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]) reiterated in Vivo vs. Montesa, supra, that "under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution), it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated, probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. Thus, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly provides: Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such a case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than 3 days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses. The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration." The use of the word "may" in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. The exercise of the power is wholly discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-9700, February 28,1962, 4 SCRA 442). "Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code guarantees the right of aliens facing deportation to provisional liberty on bail." (Tiu Chun Hai et al vs. Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 [1958]). As deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of Immigration, supra). Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for

its self-preservation or public interest (Lao Tan Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]). The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 [1918]). It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco et al., 16 Phil. 534 [1910]). Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of the State. WHEREFORE, the Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied. SO ORDERED. Yap, C.J., Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 78596 July 13, 1989 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON J. LIWAG, Acting Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) and JOHN DOES, agents of the CID, respondents. Emmanuel O. Sales for petitioner.

FERNAN, C.J.: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus filed by Lucien Tran Van Nghia alleging that he was arrested without warrant and deprived of his liberty by respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation and his agents. Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national with temporary address in Sta. Ana, Manila. Originally admitted to the Philippines on November 1, 1981 as a temporary visitor, his status was changed to that of an immigrant on November 16, 1984 based on his representation that he is financially capable and will invest in the Philippines. To date, however, petitioner has not made any investment and has engaged only in French tutoring and practice of acupressure. On May 28, 1987, respondent CID Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag received a sworn complaint from a certain Dionisio G. Cabrera, Jr., allegedly petitioner's landlord, accusing petitioner of being an undesirable alien for "committing acts inimical to public safety and progress." 1 Acting thereon, respondent Commissioner Liwag issued on June 1, 1987 a mission order to a team of seven (7) CID agents for them "to locate and bring subject to Intelligence Division for proper disposition" and "submit report." 2 On June 2, 1987, the aforementioned CID agents went to petitioner's residence in Sta. Ana to invite the latter to the CID headquarters for verification of his status but petitioner and his then lady companion reportedly locked themselves inside their bedroom and refused to talk to the agents. The immigration agents then sought the assistance of members of the Western Police District. Once again petitioner adamantly refused to be taken in and in the ensuing struggle, both petitioner and the lawmen were injured. Finally, petitioner was subdued and immediately taken to the CID Intelligence Office. A warrant of arrest was issued by respondent Commissioner on June 2, 1987 but there is nothing in the records to convince this Court that said warrant was served on petitioner prior to his apprehension. Said warrant was based on the following acts and circumstances: That he applied for and was granted permanent status on his representation that he is financially capable of investing in the Philippines but he made no investments but engaged in tutoring in French and practice of acupressure; that he wilfully refused to recognize the authority of immigration agents who were sent to invite him to CID for verification of his status and physically resisted being taken in by the agents resulting in physical injuries to himself and the agents; that he has thereby made himself an undesirable alien subject to deportation. 3 By reason of the injuries he allegedly sustained when he was "brutally seized" by the CID agents, petitioner, upon request of the French consul, was transferred from his detention cell at the immigration office to the Philippine General Hospital for urgent medical treatment. On June 10, 1987, petitioner's counsel filed the instant petition for habeas corpus to avert the "threatened removal" of petitioner from PGH and to question the validity of his detention by respondent Commissioner. A return of the writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on June 17,1987. Thereafter, the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda. The core issue is the legality of the arrest and detention of petitioner by the Immigration Commissioner preparatory to deportation proceedings. Petitioner insists that respondent official has no power, authority or jurisdiction to cause his arrest because under the 1987 Constitution, it is provided that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce ... ." 4 The aforesaid argument raised by petitioner has been resolved in the case of Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago, G.R. No. 82544, June 28, 1988, where the Court, through Madame Justice Melencio-Herrera, said: The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.' (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no 'truncated' recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (G.R. No. 10280, September 30,1963, 9 SCRA 27 [1963] reiterated in Vivo vs. Montesa, supra, that 'under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution)), it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by authority other than a judge

if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37 [c] with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. ... . The particular circumstances obtaining in the case at bar have seriously placed on doubt the legality and propriety of petitioner's apprehension by respondent Commissioner. For unlike in the Harvey case where the warrantless capture of two suspected alien pedophiles was based on probable cause ascertained only after close surveillance for a three-month period during which their activities were monitored, herein petitioner was "invited" by a combined team of CID agents and police officers at his apartment unit on the strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a sworn complaint of a single individual. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent. But even assuming that the arrest of petitioner was not legal at the beginning, certain events have supervened to render his petition moot and academic or to otherwise cure whatever defect there was at the inception of his arrest. Firstly, petitioner is no longer under confinement. On June 20, 1987, petitioner was released upon the posting and approval of a personal bailbond on June 19,1987 in the amount of P20,000.00 during the pendency of the administrative proceedings by the CID or until further orders of the Court. 5 The general rule in a number of cases is that the release, whether permanent or temporary, of a detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic, unless there are restraints attached to his release which precludes freedom of action, in which case the Court can still inquire into the nature of his involuntary restraint under the Villavicencio vs. Lukban rule. 6 In Moncupa vs. Enrile, supra, the Court granted the writ of habeas corpus inspite of the fact that petitioner Moncupa had been temporarily released from detention on orders of the defense minister. In the Moncupa case, it was shown that attached to his discharge was the prohibition to travel, to change his abode and to grant interviews to members of the mass media without official permission. He was also ordered to report regularly to the military authorities. The Court subsequently nullified said conditions and ruled: Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. .. . 7 Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ. 8 Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is not similarly restrained. The only condition in his bailbond is that ordinarily found in any other analogous undertaking, which is "to appear and answer the complaint x x x; will at all times hold himself ... amenable to the orders and processes of the Court; and after conviction, he will surrender himself ... in execution of such judgment ... ." 9 Secondly, records show that formal deportation proceedings have been initiated against petitioner before the Board of Special Inquiry of the CID. 10 The restraint (if any) against petitioner's person has therefore become legal. The writ of habeas corpus has served its purpose. 11 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. So ordered. Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., is on leave. G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990 HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents. Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment. The facts are as follows: xxx xxx xxx 1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz: 04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at nagbibigay ng salaysay. S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. Horty Salazar 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla. 05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?

S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar. 06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari? S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card ko. 2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram: YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW. 4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads: HORTY SALAZAR No. 615 R.O. Santos St. Mandaluyong, Metro Manila Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987. 5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar. 6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter: Gentlemen: On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following: 1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution. 2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." 3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code. Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to protect our client's interests. We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters. 7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1 On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved. The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution.

Under the new Constitution, which states: . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2 it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared that mayors may not exercise this power: xxx xxx xxx But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4 Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body: We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5 Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers: (c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment. 6 On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers: (b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or nonholder of authority if after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 7 On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well: (c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 8 The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code. The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments. We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11 xxx xxx xxx The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41). The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute

and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12 The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts. Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant: Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. 13 We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void, thus: xxx xxx xxx Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise: 1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/ recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper. 2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and 3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly, 1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892; 2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969; 3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542; 4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and 5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang." In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently. In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security. 14 For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles: 1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search: 2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205. No costs. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.