CHAPTER VII

The Right to Religion

The right to religion is another important guarantee of the 1987 Constitution when it provides:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights. (Article III, Section 5)

Of all human rights, religious freedom is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection, for it involves the relationship of man with his Creator. Hence, the sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right and duty to prevent. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the 58 Member States of the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948 defines freedom of religion as follows:
"Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance."

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According to the Wikipedia Encyclopedia:1

Many states have freedom of religion established in their constitution, though the exact legal consequences of this right vary for historical and cultural reasons. Most states interpret freedom of religion as the freedom of long-established religious communities to remain intact and not be destroyed. By extension, Democracies interpret "freedom of religion" as the right of each individual to freely choose to change, mix or abandon religion(s) altogether. The modern legal concept of religions freedom as the union of freedom of belief and freedom of worship with the absence of any state-sponsored religion, originated in the United States of America. The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom was written in 1779 by Thomas Jefferson. It proclaimed: [N]o man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burdened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.

In 1944 a joint committee of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America and the Foreign Missions Conference of North America, formulated a Statement on Religious Liberty:
Religious Liberty shall be interpreted to include freedom to worship according to conscience and to bring up children in the faith of their parents; freedom for the individual to change his religion; freedom to preach, educate, publish and carry on missionary activities; and freedom to organize with others, and to acquire and hold property, for these purposes.

In a Lincoln University publication,2 it defines:

Freedom of religion is a political principle that strives to forbid government constraint on people's choices of beliefs. It requires also that people be free to act upon their beliefs. Religious freedom includes the freedom to worship, to print instructional material, to train teachers and to organize groups for their employment and schools in which to teach, including religion.

Lastly, it can be stated with precision that the principles of the freedom of religion in the Philippines was adopted and taken from

1 www.wikipedia.org. 2 www.lincoln.edu.

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numerous cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. Hence, before we discuss the concept of religious freedom in the Philippine setting, it is imperative that we tackle the US concepts.

Freedom of Religion in the United States

(Adopted from a Lincoln University Publication entitled "Freedom of Religion")3 Religion has been at the center of some of the best and some of the worst movements in American history. Many of the early colonists fled religious persecution in their former countries and cherished their right to worship, as they believed in their new country. The guiding principles that the framers intended to govern the relationship between religion and politics are set forth in Article VI of the US Constitution and in the opening 16 words of the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. This constitutional framework reflects the deep concern that the founders of the American nation had about the relationship between church and state, and about the right of individuals to practice their religion freely. Religious freedom is protected by two clauses in the First Amendment: the establishment clause and the free exercise clause.

Establishment Clause
The first of the First Amendment's two religion clauses reads: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion x x x. Note that the clause is absolute. It allows no law. It is also noteworthy that the clause forbids more than the establishment of religion by the government. It forbids even laws respecting an establishment of religion. The establishment clause sets up a line of demarcation between the functions and operations of the institutions of religion and government in our society. It is so because the framers of the First Amendment recognized that when the roles of the government and religion are intertwined, the result too often was bloodshed or oppression. For the first 150 years of that nations history, there were very few occasions for the courts to interpret the establishment clause

3 Ibid.

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because the First Amendment had not yet been applied to the states. As written, the First Amendment applied only to Congress and the federal government. In the wake of the Civil War, however, the 14th Amendment was adopted. It reads in part that no state shall x x x deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. x x x. In 1947 the Supreme Court held in Everson vs. Board of Education4 that the establishment clause is one of the liberties protected by the due-process clause. From that point on, all government action, whether at the federal, state, or local level, must abide by the restrictions of the establishment clause. There is much debate about the meaning of the term establishment of religion. Although judges rely on history, the framers other writings and prior judicial precedent, they sometimes disagree. Some, including Chief Justice William Rehnquist, argue that the term was intended to prohibit only the establishment of a single national church or the preference of one religious sect over another. Others, including a majority of the justices of the current Supreme Court, believe the term prohibits the government from promoting religion in general as well as the preference of one religion over another. In the words of the Court in Everson:
The establishment of religion clause means at least this: Neither a state nor the federal government may set up a church. Neither can pass laws that aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion... Neither a state nor the federal government may, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and state.'"

To help interpret the establishment clause, the Court uses several tests, including the Lemon, coercion, endorsement and neutrality tests.

a. Lemon Test
The first of these tests is a three-part assessment sometimes referred to as the Lemon test. The test derives its name from the

4 330 US 1.

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1971 decision Lemon vs. Kurtzman 5 in which the Court struck down a state program providing aid to religious elementary and secondary schools. Using the Lemon test, a court must first determine whether the law or government action in question has a bona fide secular purpose. This prong is based on the idea that government should only concern itself in civil matters, leaving religion to the conscience of the individual. Second, a court would ask whether the state action has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Finally, the court would consider whether the action excessively entangles religion and government. While religion and government must interact at some points while co-existing in society, the concern here is that they do not so overlap and intertwine that people have difficulty differentiating between the two. Although the test has come under fire from several Supreme Court justices, courts continue to use this test in most establishmentclause cases.

b. Lemon Test Redux

In its 1997 Agostini vs. Felton6 the Supreme Court modified the Lemon test. By combining the last two elements, the Court now used only the purpose prong and a modified version of the effects prong. The Court in Agostini identified three primary criteria for determining whether a government action has a primary effect of advancing religion: 1) government indoctrination, 2) defining the recipients of government benefits based on religion, and 3) excessive entanglement between government and religion.

c. Coercion Test
Some justices propose allowing more government support for religion than the Lemon test allows. These justices support the adoption of a test outlined by Justice Anthony Kennedy in his dissent in Allegheny County vs. ACLU7 and known as the coercion test. Under this test the government does not violate the establishment clause unless it (1) provides direct aid to religion in a way that would tend to establish a state church, or (2) coerces people to support or

5 403 US 602. 6 Case No. 96-552 and 96-553. 7 492 US 573.

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participate in religion against their will. Under such a test, the government would be permitted to erect such religious symbols as a Nativity scene standing alone in a public school or other public building at Christmas. But even the coercion test is subject to varying interpretations, as illustrated in Lee vs. Weisman8 the 1992 Rhode Island graduation-prayer decision in which Justices Kennedy and Antonin Scalia, applying the same test, reached different results.

d. Endorsement Test
The endorsement test, proposed by Justice Sandra Day OConnor, asks whether a particular government action amounts to an endorsement of religion. According to OConnor, a government action is invalid if it creates a perception in the mind of a reasonable observer that the government is either endorsing or disapproving of religion. She expressed her understanding of the establishment clause in the 1984 case of Lynch vs. Donelly9 in which she states, The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community. Her fundamental concern was whether the particular government action conveys a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. OConnors endorsement test has, on occasion, been subsumed into the Lemon test. The justices have simply incorporated it into the first two prongs of Lemon by asking if the challenged government act has the purpose or effect of advancing or endorsing religion. The endorsement test is often invoked in situations where the government is engaged in expressive activities. Therefore, situations involving such things as graduation prayers, religious signs on government property, religion in the curriculum, etc., will usually be examined in the light of this test.

e. Neutrality
While the Court looks into the endorsement test in matters of expression, questions involving use of government funds are

8 505 US 577. 9 465 US 668.

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increasingly determined under the rubric of neutrality. Under neutrality, the government would treat religious groups the same as other similarly situated groups. This treatment allows religious schools to participate in a generally available voucher program, allows states to provide computers to both religious and public schools, and allows states to provide reading teachers to lowperforming students, even if they attend a religious school. It also indicates that the faith-based initiatives proposed by President Bush might be found constitutional, if structured appropriately. The concept of neutrality in establishment-clause decisions evolved through the years. Cited first as a guiding principle in Everson, neutrality meant government was neither ally nor adversary of religion. Neutral aid referred to the qualitative property of the aid, such as the funding going to the parent for a secular service such as busing. The rationale in Everson looked into the benefit to the parent, not to the religious school relieved of the responsibility of providing busing for its students. Later cases recognized that all aid is in some way fungible, i.e. if a religious school receives free math texts from the state, then the money the school would have spent on secular texts can now be spent on religious material. This refocused the Courts attention not on the kind of aid that was provided, but who received and controlled the aid. Decisions involving vocational training scholarships and providing activity-fee monies to a college religious newspaper on the same basis as other student groups showed the Court focused on the individuals control over the funds and equal treatment between religious and non-religious groups. In the 2002 case of Zelman vs. Simmons-Harris,10 the plurality decision clearly defines neutrality as evenhandedness in terms of who may receive aid. A majority of the Court continues to find direct aid to religious institutions for use in religious activities unconstitutional, but indirect aid to a religious group appears constitutional, as long as it is part of a neutrally applied program that directs the money through a parent or other third party who ultimately controls the destination of the funds. While many find this approach intuitively fair, others are dissatisfied. Various conservative religious groups raise concerns

10 Case No. 00-1751.

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over diminishing the special place religion has historically played in constitutional law by treating religious freedom the same as every other kind of speech or discrimination claim. Strict separationist groups argue that providing government funds to religious groups violates the consciences of taxpayers whose faith may conflict with the religious missions of some groups who are eligible to receive funding using an even-handed approach. Although the Courts interpretation of the establishment clause is in flux, it is likely that for the foreseeable future a majority of the justices will continue to view government neutrality toward religion as the guiding principle. Neutrality means not favoring one religion over another, not favoring religion over non-religion and vice versa.

Free Exercise Clause

"Congress shall make no law x x x prohibiting the free exercise (of religion)" is called the free-exercise clause of the First Amendment. The free-exercise clause pertains to the right to freely exercise ones religion. It states that the government shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. Although the text is absolute, the clause should not be interpreted to mean absolute right to a course of conduct just because it is permitted by one's religion. The courts place some limits on the exercise of religion. The Supreme Court has held that religious freedom must give way to reasonable restrictions that have been adopted to protect the health, safety and convenience of the entire community. For example, courts would not hold that the First Amendment protects human sacrifice even if some religion requires it. The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause so that the freedom to believe is absolute, but the ability to act on those beliefs is not. Questions of free exercise usually arise when a citizens civic obligation to comply with a law conflicts with that citizens religious beliefs or practices. If a law specifically singled out a specific religion or particular religious practice, under the current Supreme Court rulings it would violate the First Amendment. Controversy arises when a law is generally applicable and religiously neutral but nevertheless has the accidental or unintentional effect of interfering with a particular religious practice or belief.

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The Supreme Court has been closely divided on this issue. In its 1990 decision Employment Division vs. Smith11 the Court greatly narrowed a 35-year-old constitutional doctrine that had required a government entity to prove that it had a compelling interest whenever a generally applicable law was found to infringe on a claimants religious beliefs or practices. Under current constitutional law as explained in Smith, a government burden on a religious belief or practice requires little justification as long as the law in question is determined to be generally applicable and does not target a specific religion or religious practice. The Court in 1993 clarified how these principles were to apply in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye vs. Hialeah. 12 There, the Court closely analyzed a facially neutral and generally applicable law and determined that it was neither neutral nor generally applicable. Since the law burdened a religious practice (here the animal sacrifice ritual of the Santeria religion), the government would have to demonstrate that it had a compelling interest in passing the law. The Court would then strictly scrutinize the governments claims. In Hialeah, the government could not meet this burden and the law was stuck down. The first Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of free exercise was Reynolds vs. United States, 13 in which the Court upheld a federal law banning polygamy over objections by Mormons who claimed that the practice was their religious duty. The Court in Reynolds distinguished between religious belief and religious conduct or action, stating that Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive to good order. Recognizing the religious defense, the Court said, would permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. While the government could not punish citizens because of their religious beliefs, it could regulate religiously motivated conduct, provided that it had a rational basis for doing so. This rational basis test became the standard for determining whether a law that impinged on a religious practice violated the free-exercise clause. As that standard was easy for the government to satisfy, for almost a century the courts generally rejected religious-freedom claims against generally applicable laws.

11 485 US 667. 12 508 US 520. 13 98 US 145 (1878).

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It is important to note also that until the decision of Cantwell v. Connecticut,14 opened the door to federal litigation against the states for religion-clause claims (by ruling that the 14th Amendments protections against state action incorporates or absorbs, the freeexercise clause of the First Amendment) there was no cause of action against the state for laws that may have impinged on religious practices. In effect, the Supreme Court did not have opportunity to review this issue until the mid-20th century, when various freeexercise clause cases made their way through the state courts to the Supreme Court. In its 1963 decision Sherbert vs. Verner15 the Supreme Court found that the Constitution afforded at least some degree of government accommodation of religious practices. Adele Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, her faiths Sabbath. When she could not find other employment that would not require her to work on Saturday, she filed a claim for unemployment benefits. South Carolina law provided that a person was ineligible for benefits if he or she failed, without good cause, to accept available suitable employment when offered. The State denied Sherbert benefits, saying she had not accepted suitable employment when offered, even though she was required to work on a Sabbath. The decision was upheld by the South Carolina Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the state court decision. Justice William Brennan wrote that although the Court had theretofore rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs and principles, the conduct or actions so regulated had invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order. Since Sherberts conscientious objection to Saturday work was not conduct within the reach of state legislation, any law that resulted in an incidental burden to the free exercise of her religion must be justified by a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the States power to regulate. Thus, in Sherbert, the Court adopted a compelling interest

14 310 US 296 (1940). 15 374 US 398.

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standard that government must meet when a generally applicable law unintentionally burdened a claimants religious practices and beliefs. The state in Sherbert could not demonstrate such compelling interest: the mere possibility that allowing exemptions to the unemployment compensation laws for Saturday worshipers might result in fraudulent or spurious claims was not sufficiently compelling, the Court reasoned. Even if an increase in fraudulent claims could be proved, the state would nevertheless have to show that no alternative regulations could combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights, thus also introducing a doctrine requiring the government to demonstrate that it used the least restrictive means when enacting legislation that burdened a religious belief or practice. It is interesting and important to note the legal and social context in which Justice Brennan articulated this compelling state interest standard for free-exercise clause claims. The civil rights litigation of the 1950s and 1960s had greatly informed the Courts perspective. It had become clear to Brennan that the Court must give a heightened scrutiny to cases in which fundamental rights were at stake and require the state to demonstrate that the law in question served only interests that were of paramount importance. A law having a merely rational, important, valid or legitimate purpose could not withstand a claim that it infringed on a fundamental right. In 1972, the Court reaffirmed that a generally applicable law, neutral on its face may nonetheless violate the First Amendment if such law unduly burdens the practice of religion. In Wisconsin vs. Yoder16 the Court held that the states interest in requiring a childs compulsory attendance at school through age 16, though important, could not withstand a free-exercise claim by members of the Amish religious sect. An Amish family claimed that requiring their children to attend public schools after age 14 would expose them to wordly influences against their traditionalist beliefs and undermine the insular Amish community. The Court in Yoder noted that the purpose of mandatory education was to develop a productive, self-reliant citizenry, but that the states purpose must be examined in light of the particular circumstances of the case. Since the Amish had a 200-year tradition of training their adolescents to be productive members of their separated agrarian community, the governments interests could still be achieved by requiring education only through

16 406 US 205.

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age 14. This would obviate the burden to the Amish communitys right to freely exercise its religion, while the states overriding interest would still be served. In a clear statement of its doctrine, the Court in Yoder held that [o]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. After Sherbert and Yoder, the Court applied the religiousexemption doctrine by examining two questions: Has the government significantly burdened a sincerely motivated religious practice? If so, is the burden justified by a compelling state interest? Increasingly, however, the Court narrowed the concept of a significant burden to religion and in a series of decisions throughout the 1980s, the Court rejected many free-exercise claims on this basis. The Court also became more willing to label state interests as compelling in cases where religious practice was significantly burdened by a general law. It was clear that the Supreme Court was struggling with the issue of requiring accommodations based on the compelling-interest standard. In its 1990 decision Employment Division v. Smith, still a highly controversial opinion, the Court ruled that it would no longer give heightened scrutiny to the governments refusal to grant exemptions to generally applicable laws that unintentionally burden religious beliefs or practices. In Smith, two counselors were fired from their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote at a ceremony of the Native American Church. The two men, members of the Native American Church, were determined to be ineligible for unemployment benefits because they had been fired for work-related misconduct. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the prohibition against sacramental peyote use was invalid under the free-exercise clause and thus the men could not be denied unemployment benefits for such use. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the free-exercise clause permits the state to prohibit sacramental peyote use and the state can thus deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, declined to apply the balancing test of Sherbert v. Verner, greatly limiting the scope of that precedent. Instead Scalia reached back to the early opinion in

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Reynolds v. U.S. (the polygamy case), claiming that to require the government to show a compelling interest in enforcing a generally applicable law when such a law impedes on religiously motivated conduct permits the individual to become a law unto himself, invites anarchy and would produce a constitutional anomaly. It would, Scalia claimed, make a citizens obligation to obey the law contingent on his religious beliefs. Scalia found that the Court had never in fact invalidated any government action on the basis of the Sherbert compelling-interest test except the denial of unemployment compensation (that Smith was itself an unemployment compensation case is not addressed in the decision). Scalia further stated that the only decisions in which the Court had held that the First Amendment barred the application of a generally applicable law to religiously motivated conduct involved not just free-exercise clause claims, but those claims in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and the press or the right of parents to direct the education of their children (Yoder). The Smith case, the Court said, did not involve such a hybrid situation. In the three years following Smith, more than 50 reported freeexercise cases were decided against religious groups and individuals. As a result, more than 60 religious and civil liberties groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union, Concerned Women for America, People for the American Way and the National Association of Evangelicals, joined to draft and support the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or RFRA. The act, which was signed by President Clinton on Nov. 17, 1993, restored the compelling-interest test and ensured its application in all cases where religious exercise is substantially burdened. Also in 1993, the Supreme Court re-visited the religious exemption issue in City of Hialeah. After a Santeria church announced plans to establish a house of worship in Hialeah, the city enacted an ordinance prohibiting the ritual slaughter or sacrifice of animals, which is one of the religions principal forms of devotion. The Supreme Court found that the history of the ordinance showed that it specifically targeted the Santeria practice of animal sacrifice while providing numerous exemptions for other instances of animal slaughter, including Kosher slaughter. Since the ordinance both burdened religious practice and was neither neutral nor generally applicable, the Court would apply strict scrutiny and the compelling interest standard to the citys actions. The ordinances could not

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withstand such scrutiny, the Court stated, holding them invalid under the free-exercise clause. While widely supported, RFRA was short-lived. On June 25, 1997, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6-3, struck down the act as applied to state and local governments. The Court in City of Boerne vs. Flores17 held that Congress overstepped its bounds by forcing states to provide more protection for religious liberty than the First Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith, required. While RFRA no longer applies to the states, it is still applicable to the federal government, as seen recently in several district court decisions. In 2000, President Clinton signed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, or RLUIPA, which mandates the use of the compelling-interest and least- restrictive means standards for free-exercise cases that involve infringements on religion from landuse laws and to persons institutionalized in prisons, hospitals and retirement or nursing homes. Cases challenging the constitutionality of RLUIPA are also making their way through the federal appellate courts. Currently, 11 states have passed their own RFRAs, all of which reinstate the compelling-interest test to varying degrees. In other states such as Minnesota, Massachusetts and Wisconsin the courts have held that the compelling-interest test is applicable to religion claims by virtue of their own state constitutions. In many states, however, the level of protection that applies to free-exercise claims is uncertain.

Freedom of Religion in the Philippines

In the Philippine setting, the two concepts namely, the establishment clause and the free exercise clause, as comprehensively discussed in the preceding section, are clearly applicable. It can be gleaned from the wordings of the Constitution that no law shall be made establishing a state religion or any statute that prohibits the free exercise or profession of any religion. One of the earlier cases that tackled this freedom is Aglipay vs. Ruiz.18 In

17 Case No. 95-2074. 18 64 Phil 201.

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this case, our Supreme Court took a more liberal approach than the US Supreme Court case of Everson vs. Board of Education. The petitioner, Msgr. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirtythird International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33th International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of Section 13, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:
"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium."

The Supreme Court, while discussing the background of the right to religion in the Philippines, ruled:
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims. The Malolos Constitution recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions to the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the Constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom.

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All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the Constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (Sec. 14, Subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and Sec. 1, Sub-sec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, Sec. 344, par. [c], Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium (Sec. 13, Sub-sec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (Sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to Sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays (Sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code). xxx xxx xxx Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for

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the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mereincidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.) We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and persecution, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar. Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage

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stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.

In American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 19 plaintiff is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation. In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45. Plaintiff protested against this requirement, but the City Treasurer demanded that plaintiff deposit and pay under protest the sum of P5,891.45, if suit was to be taken in court regarding the same. To avoid the closing of its business as well as, further fines and penalties in the premises, on October 24, 1953, plaintiff paid to the defendant under protest the said permit and license fees in the aforementioned amount. On the main issue of whether the act of imposing license fees by the City of Manila is an act restrictive the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship, the High Court ruled:
Article III, section 1, clause (7) of the Constitution of the Philippines aforequoted, guarantees the freedom of religious profession and worship. "Religion has been spoken of as 'a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to its Creator' (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil., 201). It has reference to one's views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence-to His being and character, and obedience to His Will (Davis vs. Beason, 133 U.S., 342). The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can

19 101 Phil 386.

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only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent." (Taada and Fernando on the license tax--a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights * * * The power to impose license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. * * * It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.' Nor could dissemination of religious information be conditioned upon the approval of an official or manager even if the town were owned by a corporation as held in the case of Marsh vs. State of Alabama (326 U.S. 501), or. by the United States itself as held in the case of Tucker vs. Texas (326 U.S. 517). In the former case the Supreme Court expressed the opinion that the right to enjoy freedom of the press and religion occupies a preferred position as against the constitutional right of property owners. 'When we balance the constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position. * * * In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of property here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State statute.'" (Taada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 304-306). Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code, provides: Sec. 27. Exemptions From Tax On Corporations. The following organizations shall not be taxed under this Title in respect to income received by them as such; x x x (e) Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, x x x or educational purposes, x x x Provided, however, That the income of whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Code;" is a license taxa flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights x x x. The power to impose license tax on the exercise of these

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freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. x x x It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax. Manila, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for~ as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.

Lastly, in the case of Garces vs. Estenzo,20 the corollary issue was whether it was a violation of the Constitution guarantee of the separation of Church and State when barangay officials of Valencia, Ormoc purchased a religious image using money from personal contributions. The Court held in the negative when it made this pronouncement:
The other contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium" (Sec. 8, Article IV and Sec. 18[2], Article VIII, Constitution). That contention is glaringly devoid of merit. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. Manifestly puerile and flimsy is petitioners' argument that the barangay council favored the Catholic religion by using the funds raised by solicitations and donations for the purchase of the patron

20 104 SCRA 510.

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saint's wooden image and making the image available to the Catholic church. The preposterousness of that argument is rendered more evident by the fact that counsel advanced that argument in behalf of the petitioner, Father Osmea, the parish priest. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socioreligious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses. The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas. The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affidavits. Petitioner Garces swore that the said resolutions favored the Catholic church. On the other hand, petitioners Dagar and Edullantes swore that the resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because they could see the image in the church only once a year or during the fiesta.

Religion in the Educational Institutions

The more controversial issue is the freedom of religion in Philippine schools. The issue takes a more significant discussion due to the proliferation of schools and educational institutions run by religious orders. At the onset, it must be noted that schools cannot promulgate rules prohibiting students from exercising their freedom of religion or force them to follow school rules against their religious beliefs. This rule is not only applicable to both sectarian and nonsectarian schools.

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Thus, the DepEd 21 requires, that pursuant to the Constitutional guarantee on the rights of citizens to freedom of religion and nondiscrimination on the basis of sex, religion, creed or color, all schools should strive to ensure that these rights of students are protected and strengthened. In view thereof, all schools, both public and private, are directed to review their policies to ensure that these are sensitive to the religious rights of students. In the specific case of Muslim students, the following policies shall be adopted: a. Female Muslim school children should be allowed to use their veil or headdress (hijab) inside the school campus; b. In Physical Education (PE) classes, Muslim girls shall not be required to wear shorts; they shall be allowed to wear appropriate clothing in accordance with their religious beliefs; c. Muslim students shall not be required to participate in nonMuslim religious rites.22 Although the above directive mentions in particular the Muslim students, the rules are understood to be applicable to all religions. However, it is wrong for students to assert freedom of religion to exempt him or her from the religious policy of a sectarian school. The reason is simple. While students are not deprived of their freedom of religion, upon enrollment in a religious school, they have voluntarily entered to abide by the school's religion and the policy thereon. The discussion on freedom of religion in schools will not be complete without discussing the flag saluting controversy decided by the Supreme Court.

The Ebralinag Doctrine

21 DepEd Order No. 53, series of 2001. 22 Ibid.

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In the case of Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, et al.,23 the sole issue was whether or not school children who were members of the Jehovahs Witnesses could be expelled for refusing to take part in the flag ceremony due to religious beliefs. The same question was raised in 1959, in Gerona, et al. vs. The Secretary of Education, et al.24 and Balbuna, et al. vs. The Secretary of Education, et al.25 The Supreme Court upheld the expulsion in the Gerona case, declaring
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Under a system of complete separation of church and state in the government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious ceremony. The flag salute is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar. In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education is not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all. x x The children of Jehovahs Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.

Balbuna reiterated Gerona, to wit:

The Secretary of Education was duly authorized by the Legislature thru Republic Act 1265 to promulgate said Department Order, and its provisions requiring the observance of the flag salute, not being a religious ceremony but an act and profession of

23 219 SCRA 256. 24 106 Phil 1. 25 110 Phil 150.

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love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of religion.26

However, in the Ebralinag case, the Supreme Court abandoned both precedents, stating
The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from ones job or being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech and free exercise of religious profession and worship. xxx xxx xxx The situation that the Court directly predicted in Gerona that: The flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few participants, and the time will come when we would have citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism - a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the school population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an exemption. (Gerona, p. 24) We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovahs Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a small portion of the school population will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes. (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 1, 24). After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public school where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of patriotism, respect for human rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Section 3(2), Article XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. xxx xxx xxx

26 Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.

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Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovahs Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education x x x and to make such education accessible to all. (Section 1, Article XIV). In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72-75, we upheld the exemption of members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, from the coverage of a closed shop agreement between their employer and a union because it would violate the teaching of their church not to join any labor group. x x x It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some compelling state interests intervene. (Sherbert vs. Berner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 970, 83 S. Ct. 1790.) We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovahs Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however bizarre those beliefs may seem to others.

Expressing reservations and concern over the serious adverse effects the Ebralinag doctrine may have on the authority of schools, colleges and universities to promulgate rules of conduct for their students, Justice George R. Coquia27 wrote
The Philippine Supreme Court in reversing the Gerona case had cited the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the West Virginia vs. Barnette case, but applied the principle of freedom of religion. Actually, the Barnette case did not exactly rule on religious objections. Justice Jackson, the ponente, held that the school regulation in question violated the first/amendment to compel anyone to express views or opinions which he did not hold. The issue which the Philippine Court should have addressed itself in Ebralinag and Amolo cases is whether Department Order No. 8 which implemented Republic Act No. 1265 was a valid secular policy. Is the Filipino flag really an image as idol? Indeed the Filipino flag is a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines utterly devoid of any religious significance. It does not represent idolatry or god. In fact it represents the Filipino people. It is entirely secular. The religious liberty as enshrined in the Constitution has never excluded legislation of general scope not directed against doctrinal loyalties of particular sects. Conscientious scruples have not in the course of long struggle for

27 The Flag Salute Ruling: A Case of Valid Secular Policy on Religious Freedom to Evade Civil Responsibility? published in the San Beda Law Journal, 1994.

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religious toleration relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. Religious convictions which contravene the relevant concerns of a political society do not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities. The inculcation of patriotism through flag salute ceremonies and reciting the pledge of loyalty is a valid concern of the State. It did not become invalid because it violated religious principles of a certain religious sect. Although the freedom of religion has been granted a preferred position in the group of legal values, it is not altogether absolute as all other rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. It may be limited on consideration of public policy, safety and health. Religious doctrines may not be used as an excuse for the commission of crimes, infringe upon the rights of others or evade civic responsibilities that would be tantamount to making religious beliefs superior to the law of the land and in effect permitting every citizen to be the law unto himself (Watson vs. Jones, 13 Wall, 679 (1871)). This is shown in court rulings concerning conscientious objectors. The decision allowing the witnesses of Jehovah from participation in singing the national anthem and the flag salute, the reciting of the patriotic pledge on grounds of religious conviction may open the way to grave consequences in the future in the Philippines. It is very evident that the Supreme Court followed the trend of decisions in the U.S. courts which reversed its own decisions on similar issues. In seventeen major cases in the United States the U.S. Supreme Court reversed itself twice, in three cases, the Court was divided into a 5 to 4 voting and others 6 to 3 eliciting about 29 separate opinions. The trend of decisions of United States Supreme Court has interpreted too liberally the concept of freedom of religion and the no establishment of religion clause of the constitution to such an extent of even justifying the freedom not to believe over those who believe. This is shown in the recent school prayer and Bible reading cases in public schools. In George Wallace, Governor of Alabama vs. Ismael Joffre, three Alabama statutes authorizing a period of silence in all public schools for meditation and voluntary prayer were held to be unconstitutional as violative of the no establishment of religion clause. The Court ruled that the prayer even voluntary in character was repugnant to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court even legalized abortion at a certain stage of pregnancy on the ground of the womans right to personal privacy (Roe vs. Waade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). In Doe vs. Bolton, 410 U.S. 1979 (1973) the Court held unconstitutional a Georgia abortion law which prohibited abortion before ending the first trimester of pregnancy. What should be an ominous warning was the Jehovahs Witnesses in the United States did after winning the Barnette case Witnesses. In several states they made utterances both oral and written also on grounds of religious freedom depreciating the war

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effort. They publicly presented their views on the obnoxious nature of the flag salute and pledge of allegiance to it. The U.S. Supreme Court in Taylor vs. Mississippi (319 U.S. 538 [1943]) even reversed the conviction of the Witnesses on the ground that if the Court has just decided in (Barnette) case that Witnesses had the right to refuse to salute the flag because it violated their religious conviction, they could not be convicted for stating their reasons and beliefs upon which they rested their non-compliance. The U.S. Supreme Court evaded the issue of the seditious words. The crying need at this time in the Philippines is more discipline and not freedom especially if such freedom amounts to license. Article XIV, Section 3 of the Philippine Constitution which provides that all educational institutions shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism will be rendered ineffective. It is the sad experience in the Philippines that even graduates of the Philippine Military Academy which is supposed to be a premier and model school for training of the youth for discipline, patriotism, loyalty and love of country are the ones initiating rebellion to overthrow the duly constituted authorities. They have openly uttered seditious words and defiance of their superiors and not one of them have been prosecuted in their acts. Students in the state university in open defiances of school authorities refuse to attend their classes contesting the authority of a duly elected President of the university. Almost every week students hold rallies and demonstration in the university belt, a thickly populated area, obstructing traffic and disrupting classes in the schools on trivial causes all in the name of freedom. The United States is already a well-established and politically stable country, with strong economy. It can afford to tolerate seditious acts. The authorities even allow groups to burn and trample on the U.S. flag. It is not in the Philippines. The Philippines which is still on its way of building a nation is not in position to absurd the excesses of freedom now practiced in the United States. The Philippines has in fact been cited as basket case of U.S. style democracy run amuck. A London analyst described the Philippines as an Asian country but its culture is Spanish, with an overlay of Latin American and North American influence. People know that the Philippines has a carbon copy of the American constitution, but what happened? (Time, June 14, 1993).28

In the light of the Ebralinag doctrine, sectarian schools must now ask whether they can subject students to disciplinary action for refusing on religious grounds to participate in the religious activities and rites of the school. Can a catholic school compel a non-believer to attend first Friday mass in school on pain of disciplinary sanction?

28 Ibid., pp. 58-64.

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It must be noted, however, that the Ebralinag ruling involved a school regulation requiring students to attend an activity that was not generally considered religious. It follows therefore that if for any reason a non-religious school rule contradicts the religious beliefs of the student, he (the student) may refuse to abide thereby with impunity. On the other hand, if the schools rules support the religious beliefs it espouses, any violation thereof must be censured as provided for in the school manual or disciplinary code, particularly if the schools subscription to such religious doctrines was known to the student before his enrollment. In the latter case, the students non-compliance with the schools religious policy is inexcusable. He can no longer assert his own freedom of religion. The rationale behind this is not that students are deprived of their freedom of religion upon their enrollment but that they are deemed to have asserted that right by choosing to abide by the schools religion when they voluntarily enrolled therein. It stands to reason that if the schools religious persuasion was so objectionable to the student then he should not have opted to join its rolls.

Does Freedom of Religion Include the Right to Attack and Offend Other Religions?
Another important issue oftentimes raised by students and administrators as well, is whether or not the students (or any person for that matter) freedom of religion includes the right to attack and offend the other religions of other students (or other persons), moreso, of the school. The legal issue was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court in the case of Iglesia Ni Cristo vs. CA, et al.,29 but regrettably, the High Tribunal did not adequately address the issue in its decision. The opinion therefore of Justice Coquia again may be adhered to by schools as basis of any regulation limiting students right to religion inside the campus. Answering the query in the negative, Justice Coquia30 reasoned

29 GRN 119673, July 23, 1996. 30 See Annotation by Justice George R. Coquia entitled "Does Freedom of
Religion Include the Right to Attack and Offend Other Religions?" in the case of Iglesia ni Kristo vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 119673, July 26 1996; 259 SCRA 529.

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Limitations of Freedom of Religion Article III, Section 5 of the Philippine Constitution fully guarantees religious belief, worship and the exercise of religious profession of every inhabitant. Every citizen has the unquestioned and untrammeled right to worship God according to the dictates of his conscience as long as it is not in violation of law, subversive of good order or injurious to the equal rights of others. There is free, equal and undisturbed enjoyment and exercise of religious worship, in whatever form it may be, and the free and peaceful discussion of any religious subject are granted and secured by the Constitution of the Philippines. To revile with malicious and even blasphemous contempt the religion professed by others would be considered as an abuse of the right of religious freedom and punishable under several statutes. Offenses Against Religious Freedom Any public officer or employer, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs the right of the freedom of religion of another may be liable for damages. Title III of the Revised Penal Code treats of Offenses against Religious Feelings. Article 132 of this Code penalizes an act of any officer or employee who shall prevent or disturb ceremonies or manifestations of any religion. Thus a capitan del barrio was found guilty of the crime against religious feelings

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when he halted a religious procession, attacking the participants therein with the help of three (3) men. An officer disturbs the ceremonies when his behavior paralyzes or interrupts a religious manifestation or prevents it from being carried out with the usual formality or devotion. The privilege of religious worship cannot be suspended by any person even on the pretense of authority. Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, likewise punishes any individual who in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony shall perform an act notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the faithful. (see US vs. Balcuesta, 25 Phil. 223 [1917]; People vs. Reyes, CA G.R. No. 13633-R, July 27, 1955). An act is considered notoriously offensive to the religious feelings when it ridicules or makes light of anything devoted to religious ceremonies; and when it plays with, damages or destroys any object of veneration of the faithful. x x x. Proper Norms of Proselytism It may be concluded that although the exercise of religion is complemented and oftentimes reinforced by the guarantee of freedom of speech, of the press and of the right to assembly and petition under the Constitution, the latter freedom may not be used as a cloak, under cover of which one may run counter to the interests of the State. The right to natural liberty, as in the case of every natural right, is measured and limited by natural moral law. The citizen has the right to think, to speak, to write, to print, and to publish freely, but with decency and with truth proximately or remotely rests on moral law. The rights of free speech and free press may not be stretched so as to interfere with the rights of others, or to violate public regulations or the penal laws of the land, enacted for the good order and general welfare of the people. In fine, religion calls for affirmations and actions manifesting those beliefs. It is protected by the Constitution when clearly represented as religious, but only in the realm of belief or some manifestations affecting such belief. The exercise of the freedom of religious worship or profession and including the right to proselytize especially in pluralistic societies is now subject to certain regulatory norms. For in the use of all freedoms, the moral principle of personal and social responsibility is to be observed. In the exercise of their rights, individual men and social groups are bound by the moral law to have respect both for the rights of others and for their own duties toward others and for the common welfare for all. Men are to deal with their fellows in justice and civility. Furthermore, society has pretext of freedom of religion. It is the special duty of government to provide this protection. Its action of course is to be controlled by juridical norms which are in conformity with the objective moral order. While religious bodies or individuals have the right not to be hindered in their public teaching and witness to their faith, in

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spreading religious faith, everyone ought at all times to refrain from any manner of action which might constitute coercion, or kind of persuasion that would be dishonorable or unworthy, especially when dealing with the poor or uneducated people. Such a manner of action would have to be considered an abuse of ones own right and a violation of the right of others. As it is, the proper spread of the gospel should be distinguished from proselytism. The latter has been termed as a corruption of missionary work by appeal to hidden forms of coercion or by propaganda unworthy of the gospel. It is more of an abuse of religious freedom.

***